A Guide To Military Civic Action

300th Civil Affairs Group
Foreword

The idea for this Guide emerged from training plans developed by the 300th Civil Affairs Group after the unit had spent nearly a year on active duty during the 1961 Berlin crisis. Upon deactivation, in an effort to conduct meaningful reserve training which would also be useful to regular components, it was recognized that the preparation of a comprehensive single volume on military civic action would meet both these criterion since very little written material was available on this important new subject. Accordingly the challenge of preparing such a publication was accepted as a part of the 300th's training mission by the commanding officer at that time, Colonel Lawrence B. Rohde.

The preparation of this volume has been the joint effort of many individuals. The 300th CA Group recognizes the extensive time and energy given by all participants in compiling this study. We are proud to present the results of this effort in this publication.

This Guide was prepared for use in both military civic action training and operations. However, users should be aware that this publication has not been formally cleared by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School or the Department of the Army, and therefore the views and conclusions presented should not be interpreted as representing official policies or doctrine. Comments and questions concerning the Guide should be addressed to the 300th CA Group, USAR Center, 6601 Baltimore Avenue, Riverdale, Maryland, 20840.

EINAR WINDINGLAND
Colonel, CA, USAR
Commanding
Preface

In the past few years considerable interest has been expressed in defining and exploring the use of military civic action as a counterinsurgency measure as well as an avenue for achieving broader social and economic improvements in underdeveloped nations. If military civic action is to fulfill such purposes, those concerned must be fully aware of the various aspects inherent in such tasks and must be trained in the principles, methods, and technical skills necessary to achieve civic action goals.

To assist in this training, the 300th Civil Affairs Group has prepared this Guide, using a wide variety of sources. It is directed particularly to meet the on-the-scene orientation and reference needs of U.S. military personnel actively engaged in civic action. It is hoped that this Guide will provide the reader with sufficient information to answer most questions which may arise in the conduct of civic action operations. In addition, it discusses civic action theory and principles, and provides or refers to related background material.

The first parts of this book are largely descriptive. They seek to provide background or setting for the "how to do it" content which follows. Part I of the Guide introduces the concept and purposes of military civic action, its history, current organization, and United States supporting policy. Part II discusses the environment of civic action -- the characteristics and problems of developing areas, the role of national development planning, and the implications of frequently encountered insurgency. Part III explains the methods and procedures by which civic action may be effectively performed in the field. Because of its importance in establishing effective working relationships with the host country people, special attention is given to this topic in a separate chapter.
Preparation of this volume was essentially the outgrowth and a continuation of previous training exercises conducted prior to 1965. Recognizing that there was no Department of the Army field manual on civic action, training was directed toward detailing the content that might appropriately be included in such a manual. During ANACDUTRA 1966, a civic action workshop was conducted to perform initial research. Later in the year discussions were held with representatives of CONARC, the Civil Affairs School, and the Combat Development Command to receive their suggestions and comments. The drafting of this final version was performed by a selected group of writers.

Responsibility for the wording of the final draft of this volume must be borne by the editor. It is my hope that I have reflected faithfully the composite view of my many associates in this project.

Washington, D. C.
July, 1969
Major, CA, USAR
Editor
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Part One

Introduction To Military Civic Action
Chapter 1

The Role Of Military Civic Action In Country Development

As individuals have the capacity to adapt to a changing environment, so also institutions can be modified to meet changing circumstances. The world's military forces are no exception to this process of adaptation. Traditionally the role of the military has been to defend or to conquer. Today the boundaries of most countries are likely to be fixed. As a result the task of the military is primarily to defend against external threats and internal subversion. The unlikely prospect that armies would engage in actual combat in order to perform this function has brought about a further shift in direction - the use of large standing armies to work constructively for the benefit of the community.

The use of the military for nation-building is not without historical precedent. One of the earliest examples was the rebuilding and modernizing of Persian cities in 300 B.C. by Alexander's conquering armies. Between the first and fourth centuries A.D., the Romans broke with the common practice of exploiting and suppressing conquered peoples by conducting a massive building program in England. Largely through the efforts of Roman Legionnaires, the Britons were introduced to Roman agricultural techniques, the Roman legal system, and more effective engineering and mining techniques. More recently, the British in India amassed an impressive list of engineering accomplishments which enabled India to move out of a medieval posture into the nineteenth century.

Both Russia and the United States have used their armies in the development of their respective countries. One noteworthy achievement was the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway which was directed by Czarist military engineers. Since its formation in 1919, the Red Army has often been used to harvest crops and to build roads. In the United States, settlement of the Western frontier was significantly aided by the work of Army engineers. Many early American explorers, such as Lewis and Clark, Pike, and Benjamin
INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

Bonneville were Army officers. These men explored and mapped the Western frontier, laying the groundwork for later settlement. In the Nation's capital, the Washington Monument, the Library of Congress, and portions of the Capitol were built by Army Engineers. Probably the Army's greatest engineering feat was construction of the Panama Canal, completed in 1914 after eight years of work.

These historical excerpts illustrate the great potential energy possessed by military forces and ways this energy can be used to help develop a country. Modern military forces possess skills which are in short supply in many areas of the world. In developing areas, the military is often the only well-organized, equipped, and mobile force that possesses the variety of skills required for country building. Thus in practical terms it is highly advantageous for developing nations to direct the capabilities of their standing armies to this end. In addition, the peaceful use of military forces on constructive projects strengthens the position of the government itself by combating or alleviating conditions which foster and perpetuate discontent.

The United States has been aware for some time of the advantages of employing military forces in projects useful to the civilian population. One of the earliest recognitions of these advantages was made by the Draper Committee, appointed in 1958 to examine various aspects of foreign assistance. The committee's suggestion that consideration be given to the use of indigenous forces in the socio-economic development of underdeveloped countries was incorporated in the Act for International Development of 1961 which provides:

"To the extent feasible...the use of military forces in less developed, friendly countries in the construction of public works, and other activities helpful to economic development shall be encouraged."

Acting on this legislative authorization, the United States armed forces have established programs to assist the military forces of emerging and developing states in this function.

Fundamentals Of Military Civic Action

The peaceful use of military forces for constructive purposes in the community at large is now commonly referred to as "military civic action" or simply "civic action."

It is defined officially as:
"The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development"
which would serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population."\(^1\)

Lieutenant General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, the former War Minister of Columbia, describes the purpose of civic action in this way:
"Military civic action has as its purpose to extend to vast sectors of the populace the government's help, especially in the field of social assistance, through the military organization of the nation. It is based on the premise that the use of military means to accomplish programs of economic and social welfare will awaken in the benefited population trust and sympathy towards the government and the military forces. These programs are developed without affecting the military efficiency of the armed institutions or compromising their principal functions."\(^2\)

It is quite possible that credit for originating the term "civic action" belongs to Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippine Islands, who in 1950 led the Filipino Army against the Communist Hukbalahap. Another widely held belief is that Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, an American Advisor to Magsaysay authorized the new label. (It is generally agreed that Lansdale was the prototype for the socially conscious Colonel Hillondale in the book by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American.*) Lansdale defined civic action as "...almost any action which makes the soldier a brother of the people, as well as their protector."

The official definition of military civic action includes the term "preponderantly indigenous military forces" which can be interpreted in various ways and therefore requires some clarification. The basic instrument of civic action in a developing country is its own military force. The civic action role of outsiders such as United States military personnel, is essentially to serve in an advisory capacity and to provide equipment and funding assistance. The definition of civic action, however, does not preclude projects substantially manned and administered by U.S. military personnel.


INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

Objectives Of Civic Action

Civic action contributes to the social, cultural and economic progress of a country. For very remote and inaccessible areas, the military forces of a country are often the only governmental agency equipped and prepared to initiate needed programs and to perform services in the socio-economic field. Civic action often brings government and civilization to remote areas where there are no other actual or symbolic representations of national authority and national development.

Civic action promotes the desire of communities to contribute to their own progress. The people learn that they can help bring about their own social and economic improvement by working side by side with the military. The United States renders advice and assistance wherever needed, but the major effort must come from the people themselves.

Civic action strengthens the ties of mutual respect and friendship between the civilian population and the national armed forces. The armed forces of some developing countries have been a major political force separate and apart from the people. Participation in civic action brings the soldier closer to the people and makes both aware of their combined potential for nation building. Civic action engages the military in peaceful and productive pursuits and refutes the arguments of those who condemn military expenditures as a useless drain of public funds.

Lastly, civic action assists in reducing discontent among the people, thereby discouraging insurgency and infiltration of extremist ideologies. It eliminates some of the grievances and helps to dissuade civilians from cooperating with guerrilla forces.

Military civic action is only one contributor out of many public and private efforts to achieve these objectives. By itself, civic action cannot produce a satisfied populace in areas where basic discontent centers around long standing political, economic, or social grievances. But, in concert with the total government effort, the individual projects of civic action symbolize for the citizen the government's desire and determination to better his lot.

Scope Of Civic Action

There is almost a limitless variety of projects in which military forces may be of assistance. In most instances selected projects must be tailored to the distinctive needs of the local people and the community. Any project list, therefore, can only be suggestive of a much wider range of existing projects. Sufficient to identify the scope of military civic action operations is a list of the major socio-economic fields in which there exists the greatest
potential for self-help projects. (For a detailed list of projects see Appendix B.)

1. Agriculture and natural resources development (improving farming techniques, insect and rodent control, construction of simple irrigation systems, water conservation).

2. Industry and communication (establishment of small local industry, improving rural communications).

3. Transportation (road construction and repair).

4. Health and sanitation (improvement of sanitary measures, operation of community dispensary units).

5. Education (literacy programs, instruction in technical skills).

6. Public administration (assistance to local police).

7. Social welfare and housing (encouragement of community and civic projects).

It should be pointed out that however impressive this list may appear, most civic action projects are conducted on a relatively small scale at the local level and often cost as little as the equivalent of a few hundred American dollars a year.

**Concepts Of Civic Action**

To properly introduce military civic action requires more than the recitation of an abbreviated definition. It is impossible to convey in a few words the concepts on which civic action is founded. A knowledge of these concepts, however, is fundamental to a complete and accurate understanding of the nature of civic action. The following four concepts constitute the basic principles on which all military civic action is founded:

(1) Civilian self-help is the single most important factor in the development process. The military organization may provide a share of trained manpower, equipment and funds, but to achieve lasting progress it is the civilian community that must be stimulated to make the major effort for nation building.

(2) Project selection must reflect as closely as possible the choice of the local people.

(3) The manner of accomplishment is often as important as the completed work. To foster continued confidence in the host government and its military forces requires that civic action be so styled as to elicit the sustained confidence of the people and encourage their cooperation and participation.
INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

(4) Civic action operations should not work against the basic mission of the military forces.

United States Policy

A basic premise of U.S. foreign policy is that the security of the United States as well as its fundamental values and institutions will be best preserved and enhanced by our country's participation in a community of free and independent nations. In order to promote this policy, the United States assists developing nations to maintain their freedom and independence, and to deal effectively with their political, social, and economic problems. Accordingly, it is in the interest of the United States' objectives to promote and support in the developing nations certain self-preserving attitudes. Military civic action, like our other foreign operations, seeks to encourage developing nations:

(1) to maintain their independence, especially from powers hostile or potentially hostile to the United States;

(2) to refrain from violence in their relations with other powers and states;

(3) to maintain an effective and orderly government without recourse to totalitarian controls, thus, in turn, enabling each nation to make steady progress toward meeting the aspirations of its people; and

(4) to accept the principles of an open society whose members are encouraged to exchange ideas, goods, values and experience with the rest of the world. This implies that each government must be willing to cooperate in the measures of international economic, political, and social controls which are vital to an interdependent world community.

Specific Policy Regarding Insurgency And External Aggression

One objective of military civic action has been described by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as being to strengthen allied and friendly countries so that they can withstand external and internal threats. The use of civic action to accomplish this objective was clearly acknowledged by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Lieutenant General Barksdale Hamlett. General Hamlett emphasized that the use of force is not the only way to stem the tide of resistance to a lawful government. The more lasting method is to attack the conditions which generate resistance. Thus military civic action, in contributing to social and economic advancement, constitutes an all important preventive measure against the inequities and discontent which encourage insurrection.
Civic action policy in an insurgency situation is based on two possible situations:

(1) countries threatened with internal subversion, especially in remote and underdeveloped areas, and

(2) countries threatened by external aggression.

In countries conducting active campaigns against internal subversion, or threatened with potential internal subversion, military civic action is intended to establish friendly and cooperative relationships between the military and the people, and, at the same time, to contribute to the economic development of the country. Consider, for example, guerrilla operations, a phase of insurgency which cannot be effectively fought without the support of the populace. The military, through civic action programs, can establish a rapport with the people, thereby substantially eliminating the popular support required for successful subversive activities. In countries where the threat is primarily external aggression, military civic action is designed to strengthen the will of the people to resist aggression by improving living conditions and building the country's economy.

An Example Of Military Civic Action - Guatemala

To further explain civic action and give it realistic perspective, a country illustration is helpful. The program in Guatemala is a fine example of how a military civic action program should be initiated and carried out.

The Guatemala story begins in 1960. At that time the American Embassy in Guatemala informed the Department of State that the President and Minister of Defense of Guatemala desired that a Civic Action Mobile Training Team be sent to assist in setting up a military civic action program. The first recommendation of the team's two American officers was that two senior grade Guatemalan officers be assigned to work with and learn from the team so that the Guatemalans would be capable of carrying out a civic action program when the team departed.

The team and the two Guatemalan officers first visited all military zones and discussed civic action projects with military units and officers of all services. At the conclusion of the survey the combined team drew up a program of action to suit the requirements of the area and the capabilities of the Guatemalan military. Details of the program were worked up in close coordination with representatives and agencies of the United States Country Team and their Guatemalan civilian and military counterparts.
The civic action plan presented to the President of Guatemala called for some 14 actions of a low cost nature, such as school building and classroom furniture repair and construction, distribution of donated powdered milk, military band concerts, medical assistance to sick and injured civilians, provisions for water supply, construction of civilian recreational facilities, and most important, support of a literacy program.

"Accion Civica" is now an integral part of the Guatemalan Armed Forces. In Guatemala City, military personnel keep a printing press going which turns out a penny-a-copy primer for teaching adult literacy. These books have found their way to almost 100,000 illiterates now learning their ABC's from voluntary instructors. Into the rain forests of the northeast, the potentially rich area of Guatemala known as the Peten, Accion Civica flies teams of doctors and dentists who donate weekends to give medical attention to men, women, and children, who, as often as not, have never seen a doctor before. In Guatemala, Accion Civica has built football fields and has made Christmas toys, turned ammunition cases into school desks, painted assembly halls, planted fruit trees, and constructed public bath houses for a village fiesta. One of the most ambitious projects to date is the school hot lunch program being promoted throughout the country.

The military civic action program in Guatemala has shown the army's concern with the people at the lowest level and its accountability in economic terms, an idea unheard of in Latin American armies of the past. The point was well made by the Chief of Government when he said, "Through civic action we are paying off the investment the people have made in us."
Chapter 2

Organization For Civic Action

Civic action often involves large numbers of people, diverse activities, and a variety of supporting agencies. Under these conditions, where operational complexities are likely, it is essential that coordination of effort and unity of purpose be encouraged by careful attention to organizational details. All participants in civic action share in this responsibility. For this reason, each individual should be aware of the scope and variety of agencies engaged in civic action programs and should understand their respective roles and capabilities.

Agreements Between Nations

When developing nations wish to establish civic action programs with United States participation, the proposal is often formalized as part of a written agreement. These agreements are negotiated by the diplomatic staffs of the United States and the host country and may be in the form of an assistance treaty, a mutual defense treaty or other international agreement or pact.

The broad purpose of the agreement is to provide a legal basis for United States peace time operations in the host country and to protect the rights and property of the host people. The agreement usually establishes the relationship which U.S. agencies will have with the military and civilian and governmental organizations in the country. Individual civic action projects, unless unusually large, are not normally of sufficient importance to require separate negotiation and inclusion in the agreement. The agreement does, however, provide the broad guidelines within which the numerous details of a project can be worked out.

Since 1945, the United States has entered into more than forty bilateral defense agreements. These agreements usually provide for the conduct of military operations, supply, public utilities, transportation, and the use of airspace and communications facilities.
The Country Team

The overseas commitments and foreign policies of the United States are executed under the general direction and supervision of United States Government representatives in each country. These representatives, together with the Ambassador as leader, form the "Country Team." The team concept assures maximum coordination, unity, and singleness of purpose in promoting U.S. interests abroad.

The Country Team concept was developed as a management technique to coordinate and interrelate the diverse activities of the many U.S. agencies operating abroad. It is evident that the agencies which our government employs to carry out our political, diplomatic, military, economic, technical, cultural, informational, and other responsibilities cannot effectively accomplish their missions through independent action. The planning and implementation of civic action, in particular, require coordination because of the number of agencies involved.

In enacting the Mutual Security Act of 1954, Congress formally recognized the need for coordination of our governmental activities abroad. Under this Act the President is authorized to take whatever steps are necessary to secure regular and systematic supervision and guidance of U.S. programs at the country level. The Country Team approach is the direct result of this legislative action.

The Country Team is a group or committee of the heads or representatives of U.S. government agencies operating in the host country. The structure and size of a Country Team depend upon the complexity of the host country and the scope and nature of the U.S. involvement in the area. A typical Country Team consists of the Ambassador and key members of his staff, and representatives of the United States Information Service, the Agency for International Development, and the Military Assistance Program. This organization is illustrated in Figure 1.

The Ambassador, as direct representative of the President and head of the Department of State mission, is the team chief. The relationship between the Ambassador and the other team members should not be that of an army command relationship. The Ambassador's role is nearer to that of a board chairman than a commander. Agency representatives on the Country Team usually receive direction and detailed guidance from their parent organizations in the United States. These directives are binding and cannot be overruled by the Ambassador. The Ambassador is usually able to accommodate individual agency interests by integrated planning, personal persuasion, and consultation with agency heads.
Figure 1. Organization of the Country Team and Relationship to Other Agencies.
The burden for developing a civic action program within a given country rests with the Ambassador and his Country Team. Country team members consult with their counterparts in the host country to generate an interest in civic action. If the host government indicates a desire to undertake a program of civic action, it may ask the Country Team to assist in conducting surveys and developing plans. Any effort by the Country Team to guide the local government in the development of a realistic and workable plan should leave the impression that the plan is still conceived and directed by the host government.

**U.S. Military Organization For Civic Action**

U.S. civic action programs are a part of our larger overall Military Assistance Program. The military assistance portion of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to furnish military assistance to any friendly country, when such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace. The purpose of this section is to examine the machinery through which the U.S. military mission as defined in this Act is translated into effective civic action operations.

Under the direction of the President, the Department of State assumes responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States, including the establishment of military assistance programs. The Department of Defense is the principal implementing agency for such assistance programs, and, consequently, for civic action operations. In most countries to whom the U.S. provides military assistance, a Military Assistance Advisory Group has been established as the representative of the Secretary of Defense.

The **Military Assistance Advisory Group**

A primary responsibility of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) is to develop military assistance plans and programs, in cooperation with the Ambassador, and to provide advisory services and technical assistance to recipient countries. Generally, the MAAG is tri-service with a command element, joint staff, and separate service sections. The size and importance of the service sections normally corresponds to the composition of the host nation's armed forces.

The civil affairs officer on the Military Assistance Advisory Group is primarily responsible for working with the host country forces and other U.S. agencies in the planning, execution, and supervision of that portion of any civic action program which is funded through the Military Assistance Program. More specifically, the civic action functions of the MAAG civil affairs officer include a determination of country needs and the action required to meet
these needs; the coordination of MAAG operations with the host coun-
try (in particular, the coordination of the Country Team civic
action operations); and, finally, the securing of that portion of
funding which falls under the military assistance program.

The MAAG civil affairs officer can request help in advising and
supporting the host country forces in planning, executing, and super-
vising their own civic action program. Help is available in the form
of staff augmentation, civic action mobile training teams, and organ-
ized detachments of units, namely civil affairs units and special
forces. Staff augmentation represents the necessary number of civic
action trained U.S. military officers added to MAAG to cope with
the problem at hand.

Civic Action Mobile Training Teams

The most commonly employed organization for implementing civic
action programs is the Civic Action Mobile Training Team (MT).
This team normally consists of one to four U.S. officers and en-
listed men drawn from all branches of the military service. The
specialists on the team are sent to the country on a temporary duty
basis to make initial surveys and necessary local contacts and to
develop and implement programs through supervision and advice.
They operate under the supervision of the civil affairs-civic action
officer on the Military Assistance Advisory Group staff. The pri-
mary purpose of the Civic Action MTT is to train the local military
forces and civilians and to encourage them to develop and execute
civic action plans and programs.

Civil Affairs Units for Civic Action

Within the continental United States, there is currently one
active army civil affairs group with two civil affairs companies.
Many more CA units are available in reserve. CA units are organ-
ized under the cellular concept which permits the MAAG (or tacti-
cal commander) to tailor a unit to the requirements of a particular
situation by adding or deleting specialized functional teams
such as those listed below:

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<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
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<td>Public Welfare</td>
<td>Civil Information</td>
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<td>Public Works &amp; Utilities</td>
<td>Public Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
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<td>Public Education</td>
<td>Food &amp; Agriculture</td>
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<td>Public Communications</td>
<td>Labor Management &amp; Utilization</td>
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Civil Affairs units of appropriate size may be advantageously employed in situations when the host government requests large-scale assistance in planning and implementing a nation-wide action program.

Special Forces For Civic Action

The mission of the U.S. Army Special Forces is to advise, train, and to support indigenous military forces in counterinsurgency operations. When directed, Special Forces may establish operational bases and engage in guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare operations. To supplement these missions, Special Forces personnel can engage in military civic action utilizing their specific skills to assist host country armed forces in planning and executing civic action projects.

There are seven United States Army Special Forces Groups distributed throughout the world. A group with detachments possesses civil affairs, medical, engineering, military police, psywar, military intelligence, and signal capabilities. In many instances, the technically skilled personnel of the Special Forces are used to form Mobile Training Teams.

General Capacity Of U.S. Military Forces For Civic Action

Department of the Army Circular No. 525-1, 20 April, 1967, states that all military units will have a capability to perform some civil affairs functions. This guidance shows recognition of the fact that civil affairs, and, in particular, civic action, involves the relationship between all U.S. military personnel stationed in a host country and the civil authority and populace of that country. To implement this directive overseas, commanders of United States tactical or service units may designate an officer to plan and coordinate local civic action projects.

Other services besides the United States Army share civic action responsibility. In Vietnam, Marine Forces employ Combined Action Companies to assist in local defense and to conduct civic action projects consistent with their constabulary function. Any planning for civic action operations should also recognize the medical assistance, air evacuation, and supply transport capabilities of the U.S. Air Force and the diverse transportation capabilities of the Navy.
International And United States Government And Private Organizations

U.S. Military personnel engaged in civic action can rely on the support and guidance of their own military organization and upon the additional advice and assistance of many U.S. government and civilian agencies and international organizations. These agencies have objectives similar to those of civic action and in many instances will be working alongside U.S. military units where their expertise and experience can be called upon. The civic action officer should recognize the capabilities and programs of the agencies working in his local area so that he may enlist their support and benefit from their special capabilities.

The Agency For International Development

In administering the United States foreign assistance program, the Agency for International Development (AID) provides development loans, development grants, supporting assistance, and technical cooperation. The type and amount of foreign assistance provided by AID is geared to the self-help capabilities and economic self-discipline shown by each country. AID represents the largest single external source of civic action funds and resources available to the host country. The programs it recommends and carries out are supported by many different kinds of outside economic aid—imports of material and services, surplus foods, U.S. technicians, and lines of credit for country purchases in the United States.

Within the host country the AID mission is headed by a chief who is a member of the Country Team. The mission has both a development planning and a technical staff. The planning staff develops aid plans designed to support the host country's own plans and priorities. The technical staff is a group of experts who advise country officials and offers technical guidance in the planning or execution of specific projects. U.S. technicians work directly with local government employees to help organize, plan, and conduct projects.

AID and civic action operations share the tasks of assembling U.S. resources and expertise, securing local response and effort, and executing self-help projects. These common characteristics encourage close cooperation and mutual support between U.S. military civic action personnel and various members of the local AID mission.

United States Information Agency

The mission of the United States Information Agency is to tell the people of the world that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with the aspirations of all men for freedom, progress, and peace. The overseas operating arm of the USIA is the United States Information Service (USIS) which has posts abroad staffed and equipped to tell America's story. These posts
explain and interpret American objectives and policies and promote understanding and acceptance of the United States by describing American life and culture.

The USIS posts participate in civic action programs by explaining project purposes and by securing local cooperation. This is most effectively accomplished by direct contact between USIS local employees and local leaders.

United States Private Organizations

There are more than 240 private foundations, churches, labor agencies, and business supported organizations in the United States operating programs in foreign countries. At times these programs may parallel civic action operations. Many of these organizations operate on an international basis. Among the more important are the following: CARE (health and medical assistance), Near East Foundation (rural housing and development), Rockefeller Foundation (commodity research projects), National Lutheran Council (urban social workers training programs), Technico Foundation (vocational training), Institute of International Education (education programs), Asia Foundation (small business assistance), and the American Red Cross and various Christian denominations and other religious organizations (general relief and welfare services).

The United Nations

In seeking to improve the economic and social conditions of the people of the world, the United Nations sponsors specialized agencies which operate in economic, special, educational, health, and related fields. Among the specialized agencies with which the civic action officer is most likely to come in contact are the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO).
Part Two

The Environment Of Civic Action
Chapter 3

The Underdeveloped Countries

Today there can be little optimism in the progress being made by emerging nations. Both in absolute and relative terms the gap between the rich and the poor is widening; one is an affluent culture of tremendous potential for improving man's existence, and the other is a culture of poverty and strife.

Less than a billion people live in the world's rich countries while well over two billion inhabit the poorer ones. The per capita income of the poor countries is less than one-fifteenth of the culture of affluence; less than one-thirtieth in comparison with the United States. While the economic growth rate of the poor and the rich nations is increasing at about the same rate, the population increase in the emerging nations is much more rapid than in the industrial ones; 2.5 percent annually compared to 1.5 percent. Hence the relative gap in per capita income widens.

In the emerging nations food production often fails to equal the population increase. Many countries which were previously grain exporters have become importers. Per capita food production in some parts of the world have dropped in recent years. The situation in 1965 and 1966 was particularly bad; the estimated total food production dropped 2 percent in all developing regions except the Near East.

These discouraging statistics bear witness to the difficulty of the task which emerging countries face - to compress into a brief time span the numerous social and economic changes which have occurred over many centuries in Western Europe and the United States.

The problem involves more than just raising productivity and stabilizing population growth. Attitudes and values of literally billions of people must be changed. Social institutions and political ideologies must be altered; ignorance must be overcome.
One way to begin to understand the incredible complexity of these tasks and to be better able to contribute to their solution is to know and understand the characteristics of emerging nations. Although the culture and economy of each country in underdeveloped areas are unique, there are some characteristics which most share. The conditions and the problems which emerging nations face will be discussed in succeeding portions of this chapter.

Civic Action As An Aid To Development

The many problems of underdeveloped nations are often compounded by overly optimistic attempts to establish high growth rates through a major overhaul of basic production industries, transportation, communications, and power facilities. Underdeveloped nations often ignore necessary counterpart development in the rural areas. The great value of civic action in this situation is that working at grass roots levels provides a foundation for overall economic growth by directing assistance to the immediate needs of the people through local projects.

It is an economic fact that growth in one sector of the economy can stimulate growth in another sector. For instance, a country with vast mineral resources has great growth potential because development of a mining industry can create jobs in numerous supporting services, such as heavy equipment and rail service. A civic action rail construction project, in modernizing a primitive transportation system, can contribute to the expansion of mining operations. The associated growth of activities related to mining adds to the total economic expansion, thereby greatly multiplying the effect of the single project. Carefully selected civic action projects can thus have bonus side effects in terms of overall national development. This suggests their vital importance as a catalyst in stimulating the total economy.

Civic action also serves to convert latent, but potentially productive, assets into working assets. Military activities, for example, generally do not directly contribute to a country's growth and actually act as a severe drain on the limited resources of poorer nations. Through civic action, however, the skills and resources of the military forces are directed toward constructive purposes in the civilian economy.
Problems Of Emerging Nations

The emerging nations in aggregate are faced with a number of common problems whose solutions are not readily visible. Six problems or crises can be briefly cited.¹

The first problem is a virtually uncontrollable population increase which threatens to offset all economic gain. Some progress is being made with the adoption of official population planning policies. Birth rates, however, will probably continue to rise before they begin to decline.

Rising expectations of the people coupled with a low income and an unemployment economy constitute a second problem for emerging nations. Most people throughout the world are well aware of their poverty, and are no longer satisfied with a relatively self-contained, subsistence economy. They want something more, yet they also want to avoid retracing the painful and laborious path to economic stability marked out by the West. In short, the joys of affluence have been made tantalizingly real, but have remained frustratingly out of reach.

A third problem is the lack of unity among the people in emerging nations caused by their great cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity. In Nigeria, for example, there are more than 150 distinct language communities, and no single community contains more than 20 percent of the population of the country. Such diversity is often coupled with political instability. A heterogeneous population with no dominant ethnic group combined with a politically unstable and weak government often makes nation-building extremely difficult.

A fourth problem develops from a cultural rigidity and results in a lack of social innovation and a tendency to reject new ideas. This rigidity may be the product of past experience or cultural and religious beliefs and values that do not lend themselves to development planning. People whose total range of experiences have been traditionally identified with a single rural area find that modernization calls for radically different outlooks which can cause tremendous stresses and strains within the family and within the population as a whole.

A fifth problem is the destruction of the physical environment arising from forest clearance, over-cultivation, grazing, erosion, and pollution. This degradation tends to make the land infertile.

and unavailable for farming, livestock, and human habitation. Where the population-carrying capacity of the land is exceeded, yields per acre will drop as demand for production increases.

A sixth problem is the brain-drain of knowledgeable scientists, engineers, technicians, and managers from the emerging nations to the culturally affluent countries. All of these people are needed to maintain and improve upon established levels of economic development.

These major problems will have to be overcome if the gap between the two cultures is to be reduced. The rapid evolution of developing nations will depend not only on our intent to help them and our ability to mobilize their available resources, but also on our understanding of the basic conditions which create and sustain these problems. The remaining portion of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of these conditions.

Shared Characteristics Of Underdeveloped Areas

While there are no two countries in the underdeveloped areas of the world which have identical cultures, many of them share common characteristics, due in part to their similar relationship with the industrializing West during the past four hundred years. Many of the problems of these countries today that cause us to classify them as "underdeveloped" are primarily a result of the influence of the West.

The history of contact between the West and the underdeveloped areas has been long and not always pleasant. The innovations and technical advances that the West introduced sometimes had the unfortunate appearance of being self-seeking measures designed to benefit the Western nation at the expense of the underdeveloped area. The record of colonialism is, however, marked with some successes. Some of the great cities of Asia and Africa were originally built as trading centers by European powers. A few ultimately became the industrial and administrative centers of their countries. Other facilities such as transportation centers, seaports, industries, and plantations, were begun by Europeans. Yet developments of this kind cannot offset the fact that European colonial expansion was principally exploitative and that many of the problems of underdeveloped nations today are the result directly or indirectly of this self-interested development.

Much of today's inequality between nations is due to fairly recent events. Africa has not always been "dark and savage" but was stable and had complex indigenous societies until the destruction of native kingdoms under the combined onslaught of Arab expansion, European contact, and the slave trade. The terrible overcrowding of some Asiatic, Caribbean, and Middle Eastern countries is the product of fairly recent improvements in epidemic control and agricultural techniques introduced by Europeans without corresponding reductions in the birth rate. The common experience of these countries in their contact with the West has been one of enticement and coercion toward change and conformity with the West, often at great sacrifice.

Nationalism

The people of the developing countries have a strong, emotional will to achieve a respectable place among nations. It is a place which has been denied them for four hundred years and which, with independence, seems at last possible. However, most of this nationalistic drive resides in the educated class. The majority of these countries are not sufficiently integrated for the general populace to share such aspirations. As literacy increases and communications improve, these nationalistic feelings will spread.

In the underdeveloped areas of the world, many countries are today about to achieve national consolidation. This consolidation can be slow and difficult when remote villagers and tribesmen, living in isolation, do not yet know that they are citizens. Many of the societies of the East are "pluralistic societies", in that they contain more than one people, language, religion, or cultural heritage. Sometimes they contain several groups, often extremely different. Such groups may not presently place their common nationality above their particular group allegiance. In some pluralistic societies the different peoples may have no relations except economic ones. Remote tribal groups may have no desire to become a part of a nation, and may not even know that such a thing exists. Government for them is some kind of outside authority about which they know little except that it is something which they want to avoid.

The new nationalizing central governments are attempting to create unity by binding all of the elements of their society together. National school systems are primarily concerned with the dissemination of information about national goals. In most of these countries, tribal and unassimilated groups are currently being tied to the central government through new markets and new products. New roads, bus lines, and railroads make it easier to get goods to the cities and to travel to and fro.
The Urban Elite

In underdeveloped countries a gulf exists between the classes exposed to Western education and the rural peasantry, educated in the native traditions. The civil servants, merchants, politicians, army officers, and even technical specialists are often part of this group of people who originally served as intermediaries between the colonizers and their fellow countrymen. The characteristics of this elite group, which includes the usually small middle class, sets them apart from the rural populace. Almost all live in the cities and towns and are comparatively well-educated. Literacy is normal among members of the elite group and they usually speak the language of the former colonizers. This elite class is often oriented toward the West because it was educated in traditional Western manner and has been under the influence of Western ideas in the cities. It may reflect Western food habits and patterns of consumption. Although the elite class is a minority group in the total population, it usually supplies the political, military, and commercial leadership of the country. Unfortunately, the educated class is often far too small in number to meet the training manpower needs of developing nations and, having had little contact with the rural peasant, often does not fully understand and appreciate their position.

The Rural Peasant

In a country where 50 percent or more of the working males engage in farming and related pursuits, the economy is considered to be based on agriculture. About three-fourths of the world's peoples, most of them in the tropical or subtropical zones, still have an economy based on an unmechanized form of agriculture. In this primitive agricultural society the peasant village is tied to the urban centers on which they are dependent for the specialized goods produced there. In contrast to the urban elite, the rural peasant is oriented toward traditional values and customs. Because the average villager is illiterate and his level of education quite low, he knows comparatively little about Western ways. He cannot even take advantage of most of the new devices he learns about because his economic circumstances are so poor. The average villager speaks only his own language, follows traditional dietary patterns, and has his own medical practices and practitioners. His knowledge of the world is usually confined to the immediate region around his village.

The social group the peasant depends on more than any other is that of his family and kin. He is tied to this group economically, socially, and spiritually; and it acts as his insurance company. When he cannot depend on kinsmen in his relationships, the peasant tends to depend on people he knows well in a personal way or on the basis of face-to-face contact. He does not understand impersonal relationships and he distrusts the stranger. He believes the economic pie is too small to be divided, consequently one man's gain is another man's loss. Therefore the peasant regards another man's
success as made at his expense. This is the prevalent situation in areas where the population is high and the land scarce.

The Economy

The nations toward which foreign aid is directed are underdeveloped in two principal ways — in the inefficiency of their agricultural production and in their lack of industry. Practically all these nations aspire to industrialization, but the difficulties in making this transition are many. Among the major drawbacks are a dearth of working capital and a lack of incentive, both for the inhabitants and outsiders, to make local investments. In any case industrialization alone will not solve the problem of greater food production. Today, the largest countries push a two-pronged effort of development, directed toward improved agricultural production and increased industrialization.

The non-Western lands usually have the problem of continuing coexistence of the old and new economies which have great difficulty existing side by side. The old, relatively self-sufficient village economies must compete with the development of new national industries, increased international trade, and various kinds of skilled and unskilled manpower needed by the industrial cities. There was undoubtedly much that was good in peasant village life before the impact of the Western-derived institutions and the international economy. The surviving subsistence economies, tribal and village ties, and ethnic and religious groups have deep roots and command strong allegiance; but the old way of life of which they are a part is disappearing. Today, even the villagers have had enough contact with outsiders so that they too want the advantages which the world economy can bring them.

The Circle Of Mass Poverty

The fundamental observation that one can make about the economic status of less-developed countries is that the continuing circle of mass poverty, from which escape has proved almost impossible during past centuries, continues unabated. This poverty is perpetuated by the failure of productivity to increase substantially relative to the population. Major economic factors contributing to this failure usually include an overdependence on the primitive and obsolete agricultural sector of the economy, a lack of sufficient capital accumulation, deficient or underdeveloped natural resources, little technological progress, and balance of payment difficulties.
Even though economic characteristics among the less-developed countries vary, the majority of the inhabitants live very close to the subsistence level, with total income averaging under one hundred dollars per capita. For the entire group of developing nations, about 70 percent of all the income goes for food. The pattern of productivity activity parallels this consumption pattern with 70 to 80 percent of the total population engaged in agriculture. The non-agricultural population is often clustered in a few cities with small-scale industry and government employment accounting for much of the remaining output. In a few cases, one major industry dominates the non-agricultural picture: oil in the Middle East or rubber in Malaya, for example.

In one sense, overpopulation is the crux of the underdeveloped countries' problem. In most less-developed areas, the population is so large that, given the natural resources and capital available, there is barely enough output per person to maintain life. When output increases because of improved technology, population seems to increase just as fast, so that there is no improvement in the average standard of living. This vicious circle starts with personal incomes and living standards so low that productivity is depressed and saving is impossible for the mass of the population. When people are poor they cannot save since this would mean cutting back on an already pitifully low living standard. For a poor nation to divert resources from producing food and other consumer goods to investment in capital goods such as highways, factories, and machinery, is to risk further human want and privation. Yet without capital goods a country cannot hope to raise the standard of living of the masses.

One special aspect of this circle of poverty in many nations is the surplus farm population. It has been estimated that throughout the underdeveloped economies as much as 20 to 40 percent of all farm population is surplus, in the sense that its marginal product is substantially zero. In other words, up to two-fifths of the farm workers could be removed without any reduction in the total farm output. But to convert a surplus population of this size to productive employment is an almost impossible task. The problems seem insurmountable. Millions of people would have to be uprooted from their farms and villages, kept from starving until they became re-established in industrial jobs, and reeducated to assume their new position. Who could supply so many jobs, provide the necessary tools and equipment, and conduct the training programs required? Moreover, could such a wholesale shift be made without destroying the traditional values of peoples whose life patterns have been fixed for centuries? Few developing countries visualize any major uprooting of people in this fashion.
Another social characteristic of economic importance in many less-developed countries is the primitive state of the labor force. To say that the labor force is unskilled is technically incorrect. The fact is that many workers may be highly skilled, but the skills practiced are the same as those in evidence hundreds of years ago. People who know only how to till the soil with crude plows require extensive retraining in modern farming methods to become productive contributors. People who cannot read and write are obviously unqualified for jobs in science, engineering, and business, all occupations essential to development, yet in most poor nations half the population is illiterate. The result is that in most poor nations a middle class-laboring force is small or non-existent. Draftsmen, carpenters, bookkeepers, salesmen, electricians, and other skilled laborers are almost always in short supply. To transform a predominately illiterate population into the skilled labor force required for industrial development requires massive programs in education and job training.

Rapid growth in output per capita has come mainly in countries that emphasize individual initiative and provide social and political institutions conducive to individual work and advancement. By and large, these conditions are lacking in the developing nations. Apathy and ignorance characterize the great mass of their populations. There is little individual initiative or effective impetus toward economic development. The peasant who owns no land of his own and who must give up much of what he produces to a landlord sees little gain in working hard to increase output. If he gets enough to eat and has a place to live, he feels little need to strive to get ahead economically. If his lot has historically been one of poverty and misery and he had not been educated to enjoy better things, there is little to give him hope of a better lot through his own efforts.

There are still other aspects of the vicious circle of poverty common to the less-developed nations. The very limited industrialization is an integral contributor. Government investment in industry is usually required but often minimal. Private investment is frequently discouraged by taxation policies and the inherent risks of conducting business under conditions of economic and political instability. The small industries that do exist are usually handicapped by a lack of operating capital, insufficient technological innovation, and a shortage of technically trained entrepreneurs and managers. The deficiencies of capital and modern technology also explain the limited development of natural resources in many of the poorer nations.
The economic instability of many less-developed countries is largely the result of their dependence on foreign trade. Imports, primarily nonagricultural products, usually exceed exports, mainly agricultural commodities, thus resulting in an unfavorable balance of trade. In bad crop years, reduced agricultural production severely restricts or even prohibits exports, creating a need for increased imports and further enlarging the balance of payments deficit.

The current situation in the less-developed countries is such that very significant changes are needed to enable them to escape their economic dilemma. Briefly, the four primary necessities for increasing productivity are capital accumulation, technological progress, resources discovery and development, and population control. These four factors are all of importance and must be combined in such a manner as to achieve an economic balance beneficial to the economy. Sizable foreign aid is essential for economic growth; however, the fundamental desire for economic betterment and the initiative for carrying out projects must arise from within the country and not simply be implanted from outside.

The Politics Of Underdeveloped Nations

A basic characteristic of modern highly-developed societies, which is typically absent in underdeveloped nations, is the capacity for political and governmental growth and change in an orderly and constructive manner. In its absence, the political systems of developing nations tend to be either static and inflexible, unresponsive to the social and economic needs of the people, or, at the other extreme, volatile and unpredictable, frequently characterized by abrupt and violent changes. In this unstable political climate government officials are usually unable to efficiently meet the demands for leadership placed on their shoulders by the tremendous burdens of country development.

Underlying the inadequacies of many developing-country governments is the great heterogeneity of the population which prevents unification and the securing of common support. Developing areas often exhibit great differences in religion, languages and dialects, and tribal and village allegiances of its people. In the poorer nations there is almost always great disparity between the rich and the destitute. These great inconsistencies tend to promote local loyalties and discourage the establishment of a common bond or identification of popular and community interests with the national government.

Some of the problems of modern government in developing countries stems from the long periods of colonialism during which more highly
developed powers dominated these areas economically and militarily as well as politically. The colonial governments established at that time were typically based on the foreigner's concept of government which was seldom adjusted to meet local requirements. These artificial colonial governments served principally to further exploit the area and were not intended to encourage development of a viable local government suitable to home rule by the native population. Without having a history of self-rule the newly emerging countries, upon gaining their independence, were often severely handicapped by their own inexperience in governmental operations. In some instances they attempted to carry on the existing or traditional colonial form of government while modifying it as local circumstances required, as, for example, by the abolishment of plantation and absentee ownership of farms in favor of land reform programs. More often, newly independent countries have discarded the yoke of colonial government and established a new and more suitable form of government. Sometimes these new governments have unrealistically adopted Western forms of democracy which have proven unworkable in less than modern societies. For example, great demands are placed on the individual citizen in a democracy. Emerging nations with a high illiteracy rate and limited communications cannot depend on an informed population to intelligently elect and support representatives.

Both the remnants of colonialism and the great diversity among the people of developing areas prevent the central government of many emerging nations from exerting an influence in the lives of the people, particularly those in rural areas. Frequently the governmental body with the most direct daily impact on the people is the local government which either exercises the functions of a delinquent national government, or at least implements national policy. With inadequate transportation and communication, the local government units often become isolated from each other and from the central government. Because of usual shortages of trained personnel and capable leaders, local government officials often are required to serve in a variety of capacities. Their distinctive functions become blurred in the eyes of the local citizens whose loyalties tend to focus on the individual government official as the leader, quite independent of the national government.

A large majority of the educated people in underdeveloped countries are frequently government-employed. In many cases these government workers are the children of civil servants or other professional people and are products of a self-perpetuating ruling class which is often isolated from the needs and wishes of the uneducated masses. Governments heavily staffed by these aristocrats are usually characterized by favoritism, nepotism, and corruption. Political intrigues and accompanying jealousies on the part of leaders tend through the years to exclude from government service people of capability and dissenting opinions. In some instances the prominence of the military forces in an emerging nation has resulted in ill-
equipped army officers performing basic governmental functions normally reserved for civil servants.

The electoral process in many underdeveloped countries is often woefully ineffective. High illiteracy among the population, general educational deficiencies, and inadequate mass communication media prevent the people from being exposed to the problems, issues, and candidates. Political parties, if they exist at all, are usually unable to provide the balance between the party in office and the opposition necessary for progressive growth and change.

In the more politically-sophisticated nations a variety of non-governmental organizations serve the vital function of expressing the needs of the people and providing political balance. Religious groups, professional and civic associations, lobbying groups, unions, and many other organizations serve the political interests of a broad range of people and groups. In the underdeveloped nations these organizations are few and they frequently experience frustration in expressing the wishes of their constituents to an often domineering and unheeding government.

The Role Of The Military

One of the significant trends in the political life of developing nations has been the growing role of the military establishment as an independent political force. The involvement of the military in politics was once limited mainly to Latin America, but now the pattern has spread to Afro-Asia where, during the past decade, many governments have been overthrown by military coups and replaced by regimes directly administered by the military or dominated by them. This development has important implications for civic action operations.

The emerging nations (in the more extreme instances) suffer from two divergent tendencies which tend to prevent national unity: the weakness of national sentiment in the average citizen, and the often intense nationalism of some sectors of the elite. A central cause of these two contrary movements is the scarcity of nationwide institutions, apart from the civil service, with its unifying effect. In many of the new states the political parties are regional or communal. The universities are still largely sectional. There is no national organization which commands widespread participation and assent. The single exception to the void of central authority in many emerging nations is often the military, which recruits from all parts of the country and, most important of all, is national in its symbolism. It is comprised of men of every socio-economic level, who, by serving the military, acquire a sense of national loyalty which tends to transcend sociological identities and regional interests. As the
only genuinely national institution in the governing structure, the military exerts a cohesive influence upon the population as a whole and inspires the national pride so essential to nation-building.

In addition to being a truly national institution, able to exert a unifying influence and to promote broad populace support of national objectives, the military is often the most modern institution in emerging countries. While other organizations can function on a primitive level, the army, by its very nature, is tied to the progress of the outside world. To fulfill its mission the army must be the equivalent in training and armament of foreign powers. It is necessary to acquaint officers with the achievements of world military science which inevitably leads to comparisons. Officers thus become intimately familiar with the relative position of their country and the advances possible through adoption of modern concepts and technology.

As a national and modern institution, the military is able to exert a profound influence on national affairs. The implication of this ability is clear for civic action. Since the military is usually involved in national politics, often either in actual control of the government or as a contender for political power, it takes a special interest in civic action as a technique of political influence and economic development. Being acutely aware of its country's needs for modernization, the military is likely to be favorably disposed to civic action projects. Furthermore, having had foreign military contact, officers have a rapport with advisors that facilitates the implementation of projects.

In addition to the favorable disposition of the military toward civic action, the armed forces of developing countries usually possess a number of special attributes which specially qualify them for a role in national developments. While the civilian base in any country naturally is numerically superior and possesses greater overall resources, the military is likely to have a proportionately higher share of trained manpower, equipment, and funds. Its leaders are frequently among the most educated. The Army also possesses capabilities for security and mobility often denied civilian aid groups. Most importantly, it has the ability to sustain itself and function in any environment, however primitive or dangerous. This is particularly necessary in civic action operations conducted in rural areas of unrest where there is currently an associated military problem. The militia thus is often likely to be a developing country's best single instrument for nation-building in rural areas under adverse circumstances.
Chapter 4

Insurgency And Countermeasures

The history of the last two decades shows that dissident political groups frequently attempt to subvert the governments of newly emerging nations before they can become fully established and gain the confidence of their people. When this internal political division amounts to an organized rebellion or revolt against a duly constituted government, a condition of "insurgency" exists.

Roughly forty percent of the world's population lives in the poorer nations striving to modernize—to pass from traditional agrarian and hierarchical structures into the modern world. In this development, vacuums may be created in the political, economic, and social life of the nation which invite unrest and dissent. Into these gaps the insurgent insinuates himself to win the support of the people.

Insurgency often strikes at emerging democracies. In Greece and in the Philippines, insurgency occurred after the ravages of World War II left both countries in political turmoil. In Malaysia the British helped counter insurgency in a similar situation. In these cases the governments were able to preserve the integrity of their countries by skillful use of their resources to meet the problems confronting their nations.

Insurgent movements often develop in response to the legitimate grievances of the people. In some cases legitimate movements have been exploited by external powers bent on gaining political control. In either event the insurgent always poses as the champion of reform. The insurgent "rises" against a "corrupt and totalitarian" regime which he deems is against the "true" needs of "the people."

Insurgent movements are often purely internal and nationalistic in nature. However, they may be Communist-inspired movements sustained from within the country or supported from outside areas which are dominated by the Sino-Soviet bloc. The United States is determined to prevent further Communist expansion in this manner by maintaining a stable, popular, non-Communist government in the allied or friendly countries and in the neutral or uncommitted nations.
Military civic action is an effective measure used to combat insurgency by helping to relieve the conditions which contribute to unrest and revolt. Civic action programs demonstrate to the people that the government is concerned about their welfare and is capable of making improvements. Although civic action operations are often conducted in stable countries, it is most likely that civic action will be used in areas of the world where insurgency is either a direct or latent threat to the constituted government. It is, therefore, necessary for personnel engaged in civic action to recognize the threat of insurgency and be able to effectively advise and assist the indigenous military forces in combating subversion through civic action.

Analysis Of Insurgency

Throughout history, people have rebelled for numerous reasons. The American Revolution developed from a desire of the colonists for economic equality and grew into a movement for independence. In France, grave social injustices resulted in a massive uprising of the peasants against the aristocracy. The desire for political and religious freedom sent Ireland into a long rebellion against England in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The fundamental cause of insurgency stems from the real, imagined, or incited dissatisfaction of a significant portion of the population with prevailing political, social, or economic conditions. Such dissatisfaction is usually centered around a desire to achieve one or more of the following objectives:

1) National independence. For many years Algerians sought political, economic, and social equality with France, which had ruled the country for 130 years. This desire developed into a movement for national sovereignty. Revolution occurred between 1957 and 1961 resulting in independence for Algeria.

2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression. The initial success of the Huk Communist campaign in the Philippine Islands can be attributed in large measure to the oppressive measures taken by landowners against the tenant farmers. The Huk movement secured widespread support by fanning the flames of tenant farmers' discontent with the inequitable division of land and disproportionate sharing of profits.

3) Elimination of foreign exploitation. The resistance movement in French Indo-China was an example of the unified desire of major segments of the population to resist violently foreign exploitation.
Desire for economic and social improvements. Years of social inequality in which the wealth was controlled by a few landowners, has resulted in numerous revolutions and continuing unrest among the underprivileged masses in a number of Latin American countries. The tremendous dissatisfaction and the desire to raise their standard of living to that of the affluent world adds fuel to the fires of discontent.

Elimination of corruption. In Southeast Asia large segments of the population have supported insurrections in an attempt to eliminate graft, corruption, and nepotism in the government.

Religious freedom. Tensions between Greeks of the Greek Orthodox religion and Turkish Moslems has caused a decade of unrest and periodic violence on Cyprus.

Insurgent movements usually stem from more than one cause. Vietnam, for instance, has elements of all six primary causes. A desire to eliminate foreign rule and exploitation led to a move for national independence. This desire was identified with Communist efforts which in turn led to opposition by the Catholic minority. Tensions subsequently developed between Catholics and Buddhists. Peasants, who constitute a majority of the population, have been incited to revolt against the corrupt and oppressive South Vietnamese Government, which, until violence broke out, had shown little concern for social justice and economic betterment.

As previously stated, insurgency is caused by the dissatisfaction of some portion of the population and their desire to improve existing conditions. Such dissatisfaction develops as the population becomes aware of other more satisfactory conditions which they contrast with their own poorer circumstances. Through recent contacts with modern nations, the impoverished people of the world have compared their lot with that of the West, found it sadly deficient, and aspired to the fruits of a modern society. Their aspirations have engendered a "Revolution of Rising Expectations." Perhaps this constitutes the single most important underlying source of current turmoil within the less developed countries throughout the world.

Currently the developing nations are areas most susceptible to insurgency, partially because their low standard of living, high illiteracy rate, and low health standards prompt dissatisfaction among the people. The newly formed independent governments often found in these countries are incapable of effectively combating unrest and instability, particularly when the discontent is fostered and supported by external forces. Shortages of food, clothing, and
shelter caused by the "population explosion" in many developing countries also contributes to making these areas prime targets for insurgency.

In summation, a cause or potential for insurgency arises when two fundamental conditions exist. First, the population is dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions and supports insurgency by providing recruits, information, and food. Secondly, there is an integrated political and military leadership which organizes and directs the participants. This second factor is critical because only with aggressive, commanding leadership can the fragmented populace be coordinated and directed. One need only recall the contrast between the poorly led and ill-equipped irregulars of the Hungarian revolt and the overpowering Communist troop counteroffensive to recognize that without some form of integrated political-military leadership, revolt by the people can be futile.

**Communism And Insurgency**

The goal of Communism is world domination. The successful overthrow of established governments and the eventual formation of Communist puppet regimes is an important step in reaching this goal. An intermediate objective is the diplomatic and economic alignment of target countries with Communism. At the very least, orientation of a country toward an anti-Western position or even a neutral status is recognized as a minimum accomplishment.

Communist led or inspired insurgencies often take the form of a "People's War." The strategy and tactics for these wars have been evolved through trial and error in five years of civil war in Russia (1919-1923), twenty-five years of conflict in China (1924-1949), and the continuing struggle in Southeast Asia since 1945.

The experience of Nazi Germany in World War II is recent evidence of the difficulties involved in outright conquest as a means of world domination. Communist countries prefer insurgency to overt aggression as a means of gaining power for several reasons. Most importantly, the Communists recognize that their attachments to genuine social reform movements assures them local support. Secondly, the Communists' primary aim of expansion and domination is insulated from adverse world opinion by its integration with legitimate domestic reform movements. Thus, through infiltration and gradual assimilation, the Communists are able to use insurgencies to disguise and further their own objectives.
The Communists inevitably add their own trained cadre to the insurgent forces. Through direct involvement they increase the effectiveness of the insurgent elements and aid in shifting the balance of power away from the government militia. In the 1950's, Burmese insurgents, under the direction of Communist cadre, concentrated their efforts on cutting transportation on the Irrawaddy River. This river was the lifeline of the economy. From the interior, teak wood, the major export, was floated downstream to the coastal ports. From the south a great portion of the rice necessary for survival of the peasants was shipped north. An inordinate number of government troops were required to keep the river open in the face of a relatively small number of guerrillas. Their services elsewhere were necessarily restricted and the Communists were allowed to exploit unsecured areas. Town-by-town, insurgents led by trained Communists cadre took control; eventually they established a puppet state.

To prevent further Communist expansion, the United States is determined to help maintain stable, popular, and non-Communist governments in the countries of allies, friends, neutrals, and the uncommitted nations of the world. For this reason, the United States observes all insurgencies in order to detect any intrusions by unfriendly influences.

**Phases Of Insurgency**

Insurgencies often begin with the extreme dissatisfaction of a single individual or a small group of strongly motivated activists whose continued frustration at not being able to further their position by peaceful and legal means finally erupts in speeches, demonstrations, and threats of civil disobedience. These acts spread the attitudes and beliefs of the dissident group, first to friends and neighbors, and then to entire areas which become aroused and prepare to actively pursue their cause.

As the discontent grows without effective appeasement from the government, major outbreaks of violence occur and organized forces of subversives begin to engage in guerrilla warfare, acts of sabotage, and other forms of violence. Finally the situation develops into full-scale organized fighting involving substantial troops and large portions of the country. Insurgency generally develops in three progressive stages which have been officially defined as follows:

**Phase I: Latent and Incipient Insurgency.** This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a threat, to latent or incipient situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur frequently in organized patterns. However, no major outbreaks of violence or periods of uncontrollable insurgent activity are present. (An example of Phase I occurred in the Cuban Revolution.
The early stages were characterized by frequent minor incidents and widespread resentment among the people against the corrupt and oppressive government.

Phase II: Organized Guerrilla Warfare. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority. (The Cuban Revolution entered Phase II when guerrillas began operating regularly from mountain sanctuaries and their exploits attracted interest and aid from countries outside Cuba.)

Phase III: War Movement. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established government. (A war of movement refers to the condition in which guerrilla forces operate over relatively large areas, attacking government troops as they are exposed and withdrawing swiftly. To counter these tactics, the government forces must move with the guerrillas, thus producing a highly mobile battleline.)

Counterinsurgency Measures

The basic cause which breeds insurgency is instability in the social, economic, and political conditions of a country. For this reason it is essential that emphasis be given to economic, social, and political improvements when planning counterinsurgency measures. The assumption that the solution to insurgency must be in terms of combat operations alone has been proved erroneous. The use of force is a temporary measure to stem the tide of resistance to the lawful government. A more lasting way is to attack the basic causes of instability with a coordinated effort involving all appropriate government and civilian capabilities.

There are three principal means of combating insurgency: environmental improvement, population and resources control, and counterguerrilla operations. All three programs must be completely integrated from the planning and development stage through the final stage of execution. They must be initiated as early as possible since an escalating insurgency becomes increasingly difficult to put down.

Military Civic Action Versus Insurgency

While the insurgent forces are being defeated, a battle for the loyalty of the people must be fought. Even though overwhelming military strength is employed against them, guerrillas cannot be defeated as long as they hold the good will of the people. It is, therefore, necessary for the government to implement an effective program of psychological warfare and civic action. If the people become convinced that the government is sincerely working for them, the insurgent movement must ultimately collapse from lack of support.
The host country military forces have certain capabilities which make them particularly well suited to perform civic action operations under conditions of insurgency. Military troops will enter and operate effectively against guerrillas in areas where other government agencies may not be willing or capable of functioning. Military troops also are often in contact with people whose relationships with the central government may have been tenuous and who are ripe for subversion. Through continued and close contact with this segment of the population, the military is in a position to discover the underlying factors of discontent. Finally, since in some countries the military was the principal tool of government oppression, their reversion to a role of civic action should substantially strengthen the government's position.

For each of the three stages of insurgency (latent and incipient insurgency, organized guerrilla warfare, and a war of movement), a different degree of civic action is required. During the latent period, when the army is not burdened by a physical struggle against the insurgents, it can undertake civic action programs directed at long term social and economic development. Literacy programs and major road-building for example, can be initiated during this relatively inactive stage. As the insurgency begins to quicken in tempo, the military must expend increasing amounts of energy to prevent escalation. What time remains for civic action must necessarily shift to shorter-term projects designed to show the populace in a matter of months or weeks that the government is trying to help them. Simple irrigation systems, disease immunization, and school repair are appropriate projects during this phase. Finally, when open hostilities have broken out and the military is actively engaged in fighting, only immediate civic action measures such as emergency medical care for civilian wounded may be feasible. It is important to recognize that "...the earlier the army begins civic action, the more time and energy it will have to devote to it and the higher the probability that it will be able to prevent, defeat, or at least de-escalate subversive insurgency. It is precisely because civic action becomes so difficult to execute during insurgency that preventive counterinsurgency is to be preferred."

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Population And Resource Control

Insurgent movements are dependent upon the civilian population for support and for supply of food, arms, and ammunition. This support can be effectively blocked by solidifying control of the populace and securing the areas in which guerrillas operate, thus denying them easy access to the people.

The first phase of such a program is the establishment of a workable administration to handle the affairs of the area and its inhabitants. Through this administration, control measures are introduced which usually include cordon and search of the area, defense and internal security, organization of intelligence and communication capabilities, and screening and documentation of the populace. These measures should be presented, in so far as possible, as means for improving the security and well-being of the population. They should be initiated by civilian police who are in close contact with the citizens and who can tailor the requirements to fit local situations. All control measures adopted should be capable of enforcement and sanctioned by national laws and regulations.

Other measures may be employed to deny the insurgents access to needed supplies and equipment. Resource control measures include: the requirement that all civilians surrender their weapons and radio sets; control and restriction of raw material and livestock usage; establishment of price, monetary, and rationing controls; regulation of the disposition and use of medical facilities and drugs; and the evacuation of designated areas to forestall acts of collaboration.

Counter-Guerrilla Operations

The initial and prime objective of indigenous military units is the elimination of the insurgency forces. This is generally accomplished in three stages.

In the first stage an attempt is made to physically separate and isolate the guerrilla elements from each other, their support base in the local population, underground elements, and any other sponsoring power. This eliminates the guerrilla's source of supplies, recruitment, and intelligence. The first stage of counter-insurgency should start as soon as the constituted government realizes there is an insurgency movement against it.

In the second stage, the guerrilla forces are sought out and destroyed in direct combat. In this phase of active fighting, the guerrillas must be constantly harassed, permitted no refuge or fixed bases of supply and reorganization, and decimated by surrender, capture or death.

The third stage is one of reconciliation and reconstruction, during which an effort is made to convert captured guerrillas into loyal, useful citizens. This re-education is initiated in an effort to prevent resurgence of the guerrilla force at a later time.
National Planning And Country Development

A local civic action project will often be a part of a national plan for development of the entire country. Whether the project is independent or part of a larger and more comprehensive program of development, it is desirable that personnel engaged in civic action, working at the local level, understand national planning efforts in order to gain general perspective and to affect needed coordination.

Most of the countries of the world are far behind the economically mature nations of Europe and North America. A basic reason for this lack of development is their frequent failure to effectively plan and coordinate the use of existing natural and human resources. Proper planning for national development attempts to achieve a balance between economic, sociological, psychological, and political improvement; the aim is the improvement and strengthening of all these aspects of the nation. To achieve this balance as well as subsequent goals, decisions must be made between an almost unlimited number of competing claims for the country's limited resources. Assignment of priorities results in an orderly investment of resources for steady growth of the nation as a whole, while still devoting attention to an improved status and role for the individual citizen.

The host country government constructs its own plan of national development. For some nations the plan may be little more than a financial budget. In other nations it may be a detailed and long-range operation, with specific responsibilities prescribed for the various ministries. In nations where there is a severe shortage of qualified professional personnel, host country officials may request U.S. civilian and military personnel to provide assistance in preparing the development plan. Regardless of how extensive the plan is or who prepares it, a cohesive strategy for achieving certain objectives must be presented and a carefully considered set of priorities established to accomplish these goals within a given time period.

Host Government Planning Agencies

Planning systems vary from country to country, but some common features can be recognized. Generally all systems are responsible for formulating and revising regional and national development plans and for recommending the policies, laws, coordination measures, and
machinery required to implement such plans. Normally each country has a single central planning agency, often with local as well as central government departments. The efforts of the various departments are coordinated and integrated into the national plan at the central agency. The agency generally has these functional divisions:

1. A planning unit to prepare plans, establish programs, and design specific projects.
2. A coordination unit to provide liaison between plan formulation and program and project execution.
3. An evaluation unit to receive, review, and act upon progress reports.
4. A statistical and research unit to conduct surveys and to carry out special analyses and investigative studies.
5. A coordinating unit to monitor technical assistance.
6. A public information unit for publicity efforts and publications.
7. An administration unit.

The Role Of The United States In National Planning

The primary responsibility for national planning and country development rests with the local government. Economic, political, and social growth, by their very natures, are internal affairs which must be cultivated and nurtured from within if they are ultimately to succeed. The assistance provided by an external power, unless carefully applied through the medium of local government, can have a debilitating effect on the government's ability to control and improve its own affairs.

When the United States accepts the invitation of developing nations, its avowed purpose is to encourage and assist these countries to more effectively help themselves to mobilize their own national resources and achieve their own national goals. Our role is to provide resources and advice to augment the host country's efforts. Credit for successful accomplishments should always be focused, to the fullest possible extent, on the host government.

To be most effective, our advisory assistance should be administered through established organizations such as embassies, MAAG Missions, MTT's, AID, USIS, Military Assistance Commands, or United Nations organizations. The extent to which U.S. military personnel...
participate in country planning and development will vary from country to country, depending primarily on U.S. interest and objectives and the existing military demands. In most instances national planning is beyond the scope of military capabilities, being a principal responsibility of the host government and skilled civilian advisors and agencies. In some situations military personnel, as members of the coordinated Country Team effort, may find that they are expected to fully participate in proposing, planning, reviewing, and evaluating country-wide development programs, particularly when the nation's security is threatened.

National Planning Operations

The substance of a country's plans is largely determined by its social, economic, and political structures as well as by its stage of development. Because of differences in the structure of the economy and its stage of development, the scope of national planning at any time can and does range from the limited and piecemeal project-by-project approach found in free or mixed economies (public and private) to the comprehensive centralized planning found in socialized economies. In any country, whatever its political or economic system, the questions asked by development planners are the same. They are:

(1) What should be the size and scope of the plan?

(2) How can and should the plan be financed?

(3) What priorities should be established?

(4) What economic growth rate is feasible and socially desirable?

(5) What agencies, private and public, should be involved, and to what extent?

(6) What policies and controls are necessary to ensure implementation?

To answer these questions, the activities of national planning generally revolve around four major functions: inventory, assessment, projection, and strategy. An inventory must first be conducted to collect, record, and analyze the data on the social and institutional forces at work in the country and the human and material resources strength, actual and potential. (For a detailed outline of inventory topics see Appendix E). Second, an assessment must be made of the political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological forces which are stimulating or obstructing development. This appraisal includes a tentative listing of target areas where some sort of developmental action is anticipated. Third, targets, trends, and relationships,
present and future, must be projected among the various problems, obstacles, and other factors and sectors of development. This projection involves interrelating the information and intelligence gathered from the inventory and assessment operations with estimates of which areas of the economy are likely to be the best targets for development efforts. Fourth and finally, objectives must be set and the strategy for their accomplishment determined. The choice of objectives and the design of related strategy are made by evaluating alternative proposals and gauging the impact of each alternative on the many interrelated political, economic, and social factors requiring consideration. This evaluation necessarily includes an analysis to define realistic objectives in the light of available resources and a formulation of special programs to accomplish these goals.

The national plan of country development resulting from these four operations is a composite of programs, each of which consists of smaller projects. For example, projects such as the repair of a road or bridge combine to form a program for improved transportation, which in turn is part of the economic development of the country. Finally, it is necessary that overall economic development be structured to harmonize with similar development in the political, sociological, and psychological spheres of the country. In this way component activities are related to each other and to the larger whole. Contributions at the project level, such as civic action, are thus inherent and recognizable components of the total plan for national development. Naturally, many civic action projects will be initiated and implemented outside the framework of the national plan, but this does not lessen their significance or recognized contribution.

Developmental Areas—Problems And Programs

National development includes broad development of a nation's capabilities in five major areas: financing and capital formation, agricultural and industrial development, development and mobilization of human resources, public administration, and community development. These developmental areas are interrelated, for actions taken in one area affect the other areas. For this reason, it is important that a balance be obtained between political, economic, and social development if overall country objectives are to be realized.

The following outline from Internal/Defense Development Planning Guide (ST 31-176), prepared by the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, is reproduced here in its entirety to provide some details of the general characteristics, problems, and program remedies in each of the five national development areas. A brief review of the content is sufficient for orientation purposes.
FINANCING AND CAPITAL FORMATION

a. A basic economic weakness in most developing nations is that of basic capital. Considerable expansion must take place in physical capital before sustained growth is possible at rates which will substantially offset population increases.

b. Potential sources of capital in the developing nations are: surpluses in the hands of small social groups not committed to constructive investment; increased production resulting from the adaptation and employment of technology and techniques already available in the more developed nations; and employment of idle manpower in properly organized rural industries and in voluntary work on community projects.

c. Methods of assembling capital in the developing nations include:
   (1) Private savings and investments.
   (2) Government taxation, borrowing, and earnings.
   (3) Inflation resulting from government creation of money and credit.
   (4) Amassing of available resources to build roads, schools, and dispensaries, and to make farm improvements.
   (5) Special agencies of the United Nations.
   (6) Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
   (7) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
   (8) Development Assistance Group (DAC).
   (9) Developed nations and industries.
   (10) Partnership of nations.
   (11) Private foundations.
   (12) Private investors.
   (13) Asian Development Bank

d. External capital can serve as a catalyst to stimulate the process of domestic capital formation.

e. National development cannot be achieved without a sound and equitable tax structure. The national tax structure should be so constituted as to generate revenues for the government which would result in a sound fiscal structure and would encourage an orderly, balanced national development. An equitable system of direct taxes should be used in conjunction with an equitable system of indirect taxes to include sales, transfer, and import duties. As a long term policy, increased reliance on income taxes, as administration and compliance improve, should be a goal of most developing nations. Meanwhile, however, astute uses of indirect taxes are recommended. It is essential that an equitable distribution of the tax burden be achieved.
f. National development banks play an extremely important role in stimulating national progress. Some of their functions are to:
   (1) Borrow funds for public institutions or functions.
   (2) Provide medium and long range credit for private borrowers.
   (3) Advise the government on financial matters.
   (4) Assist in the promotion of sound development projects.

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

a. General. Agricultural and industrial development are complementary. Each economic sector depends in some measure on the other. Concurrent, balanced development in both sectors (agriculture and industry) is necessary to achieve the objectives of an internal development program.

b. Agriculture. Agrarian reform embraces all matters affecting agriculture, and is often recognized as a primary consideration in developing countries. Land distribution, in which a redistribution of agricultural assets is planned, is only one aspect of agrarian reform but perhaps the most vital and difficult to achieve. Agriculture in most developing countries is plagued by problems in the following areas:
   (1) Antiquated and unfair land tenure systems.
   (2) Large estates.
   (3) Quasi-feudalism.
   (4) Idle land.
   (5) Fragmented holdings.
   (6) High rents and interest rates.
   (7) Low productivity.
   (8) Low or no property taxes.
   (9) Peasant discontent.

c. Agrarian Reforms. As a general concept, agrarian reform measures include:
   (1) Improvement of landlord-tenant relations.
   (2) Resettlement of population.
   (3) Breaking up of large estates.
   (4) Creation of optimum-sized farms.
   (5) Establishment of agricultural credit programs.
   (6) Establishment of equitable property taxation.
   (7) Supplying of technical advice to farmers.
   (8) Improvement of transportation.
   (9) Establishment of market facilities.

d. Agricultural development.
   (1) A strong agricultural sector is crucial for sustained and balanced development in the developing nations for the following reasons: increased employment results in increased demands for and consumption of food; rapid population growth requires an increasingly adequate food supply; the large majority of the population often depends upon agriculture
for its livelihood; and agricultural development often re-
sults in markets for industrial production and capital
formation, with ultimate improvements in health, sanita-
tion, education, and other areas of social and political de-
development.

(2) A primary requirement for overcoming resistance to changes
in the agricultural situation is the development of a con-
viction that benefits will accrue from the use of new
technology, skills, and management techniques. Benefits
will be derived from the shift from subsistence farming to
production of a surplus for sale. Such incentives will
include storage areas, market facilities and stable prices.
Finally, the availability of items such as fertilizers,
Improved seeds, tools, credit, market facilities, storage
areas, and technical advice will assist in overcoming re-
sistance to agricultural change.

e. Industrial Development.

(1) Three factors are applicable to developing nations con-
cerning industrial development: industrial acceleration
is possible; imported technology is required; and its
value to a developing nation varies.

(2) The functions of industrial development are to:
(a) Improve the investment climate.
(b) Identify industrial opportunities.
(c) Evaluate feasibility of projects.
(d) Attract investment.
(e) Assist investors.
(f) Finance projects.
(g) Improve industrial productivity.
(h) Perform applied industrial research.
(i) Raise the per capita income.

DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

a. Social Development. The major areas of social development re-
quiring attention are health, education, training, urbanization,
population, leadership, status, citizen groups, land reforms,
public administration, community development, and housing.

b. Mobilization of Human Resources. The chief agents of develop-
ment are healthy, educated, well-trained people; thus, the main
aims of development are to improve the people's health, to in-
crease the range and quality of human skills, and to instill a
sense of involvement in a larger local and national purpose. The
highest priority in human resources development must be attached
to measures that increase health, sanitation and nutrition, make
better use of the labor force by creating higher levels of pro-
ductive employment, improve the quality of the labor force
through vocational education and training, enlist popular support
for development tasks, and attract participation of the various
social groups. Finally, it should be noted that goals must be set within the framework of an internal development plan for the improved use of human resources.

c. Education.

(1) Major problem areas in education are:
   (a) Shortage of teachers and classrooms.
   (b) Poorly educated and trained teachers and administrative personnel.
   (c) Low teacher status and pay.
   (d) High percentage of school-age population.
   (e) Curricula not designed to prepare people to deal with practical problems of development.
   (f) Distance between schools in rural areas.
   (g) Shortage of secondary schools in rural areas.
   (h) High rate of illiteracy among people over school age.
   (i) Heavy demand for education in all areas.
   (j) Lack of accurate data on current and projected educational needs.
   (k) No laws, or unenforced laws, for compulsory attendance; consequently, a large dropout rate.
   (l) Large number of repeaters in classes.
   (m) Fewer girls than boys in school.

(2) A national education program must provide for a system of elementary and secondary schools, universities, vocational, technical, and professional schools, and an adult education program. There must be schools for special purposes such as teacher training, agricultural improvement, industrial training, and public administration. The emphasis in education should be on training people and leaders alike to deal with practical problems of development. A survey should be made to determine the educational requirements for supporting present and projected internal development.

d. Health.

(1) Major problem areas in health improvement are:
   (a) Shortages of medical personnel - doctors, nurses, technicians, and administrators.
   (b) Lack of adequate facilities - dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, medical schools, and research institutes.
   (c) Lack of understanding of health habits and practices, sanitation and nutrition.
   (d) Inadequate data on communicable diseases and other ills; data needed to develop adequate health programs.
   (e) Acute health problems in rural areas.
   (f) Illiteracy.

(2) A national health improvement program must provide plans for the development of public health programs in coordination with other related plans. Such a plan should emphasize the education and training of a professional and auxiliary staff to strengthen health services. Specific, measurable
goals should be set for expanding each category of the staff. An index must be established reflecting the current situation in order to provide a starting point from which progress can be measured. A national health program should provide increased resources for the control of disease, the improvement of general health, and the operation of an effective public health service.

e. Other Social Factors. Development of human resources to their fullest potential requires adequate housing, ample employment opportunities, and a complete range of social services (water, electricity, public transportation, sewage, police, and fire protection, etc.).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

a. Public administration is the conduct of governmental functions. It provides the machinery to develop and execute a national development program. Deficiencies in public administration in the developing countries entail more than simple nepotism, corruption, or inefficiency. Major problem areas in public administration in developing countries are:
   (1) Administrative time lag.
   (2) Violent change.
   (3) Political instability.
   (4) Communications.
   (5) Shortage of trained personnel and training facilities.
   (6) Unattractiveness of public service careers.
   (7) Tradition.
   (8) Excessive centralization.
   (9) Improper staffing of offices.
   (10) People's demands.
   (11) Public inertia.
   (12) Public relations (attitudes of superiority).

b. To help solve many of these problems, action is necessary in such areas as: leadership at national and local levels of government; personnel administration, to include sound and businesslike procedures; and a civil service system complete with a procedure for awarding merit ratings and creating incentives. Training is perhaps the most significant aspect of remedial programs; therefore schools should be established to provide a continual flow of knowledgeable people into various aspects of the public administration system. Finally, the corrective program must consider public relations, reorganization, and a system of constant reappraisal to ensure that adjustments are made as they become necessary.

c. Success of a national development program depends on the effectiveness of the public administration system in developing plans...
and programs at all levels, to include health, education, agriculture, industry, housing, budget, social welfare, monetary and fiscal policy, and credit. The public administration must also ensure that objectives and priorities are established, a method of financing decided upon for all programs, tax and land reforms administered, and a means established for operation of the public administration organization itself.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

a. A major part of internal development is community development. In community development, the efforts of the people at the community level are united with those of the government to improve the political, economic, social, psychological, and cultural conditions at local and community levels, and to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, thereby enabling them to contribute more fully to national progress.

b. Implications of this program are:
   (1) The program is two-sided. Governmental authorities and the local population both contribute.
   (2) The character of the program is comprehensive. Its aims and methods are broad.
   (3) The initiative must in part be local. People are encouraged to develop their own projects as well as to participate in government projects.
   (4) The methods are voluntary. The process relies on freedom, and tends to avoid compulsive tactics such as obligatory labor.

c. The following basic elements in community development must be considered:
   (1) Projects must fill the basic needs of the community. The first projects initiated should be in response to the expressed needs of the people. Local improvements may next be achieved through unrelated efforts in each substantive field; however, full and balanced community development requires concerted action and the establishment of multi-purpose programs. Community development aimed at the improvement of forms of local government, and the transition toward effective local administration where it is not yet functioning, is an important objective. The identification, encouragement, and training of local leaders must be considered. It should be noted that participation of women and youth in community projects invigorates development programs, establishes them on a wide basis, and secures long-range expansion. Implementation of a community
development program on a national scale requires adoption of consistent policies, specific administrative arrangements, and recruitment of personnel. Self-help projects often require governmental assistance to be fully effective; however, the resources of voluntary non-governmental organizations should be fully used in community development programs at the local, national, and international level. Economic and social progress at the local level will necessitate parallel development on a wider, national scale.

(2) Projects must contribute to internal development. Community development contributes to balanced political, economic, psychological, and social development by increasing food and raw materials, stimulating growth and decentralization of industry, fostering an exchange economy, promoting capital formation (both rural and urban), creating facilities such as wells, roads, houses, schools, and clinics, and finally, by developing human outlooks and institutions.
Part Three

Civic Action Planning And Operations
Chapter 6

Working With The Host Country People

The involvement of U. S. Military forces in civic action operations overseas is a complex process which brings together people of vastly different backgrounds and cultures. Many of the sights, sounds, and smells overseas will be different from those at home. The climate may reach extremes not normally found in the United States. The people and their ways will differ from the American soldier and his ways. Under conditions vastly dissimilar from our own, the task of working together for a common goal becomes exceedingly difficult. The basic cause of this difficulty stems from the dissimilarity in attitudes, reactions to various situations, behavioral patterns, and habits between Americans and other people. These differences tend to disrupt or prevent effective interaction and community effort. To minimize this divisive effect, it is essential that American military personnel engaged in civic action overseas know the culture in which they work; be familiar with their own distinct American background and its effect on behavior; and, in view of these differences, recognize the need for appropriate personal adjustment of attitude and behavior in order to achieve harmonious and effective working relations with the host country people.

The Challenge Of Influencing People

The American soldier performing a civic action mission in a foreign country is confronted with the challenge of convincing unfamiliar people to accept his assistance and advice in undertaking projects which he hopes will be beneficial to them. From a number of points of view this is an unusual and demanding task.

First, civic action projects are voluntary efforts on both sides. They are cooperative ventures. We cannot and should not try to force changes in the host country, even though we might believe such changes to be absolutely essential. Only through the difficult art of persuasion and encouragement can such cooperation be secured.
Second, civic action projects are expected to be accomplished fairly rapidly. Unlike the gradual evolution of people's needs in earlier times, the people of developing areas now expect dramatic changes to take place in a few years, or at most, in a few decades. It is difficult to retain local enthusiasm or elicit continued active effort on projects which do not provide some immediate tangible returns as well as long-term benefits.

If changes are to take place voluntarily and in a relatively short time, the challenge involves considerably more than the mere demonstration of new ideas to recipient peoples. Superior techniques themselves will not do the job of civic action; success can come about only when the technician can secure the endorsement and cooperation of the people he is assisting. This cannot be accomplished without understanding the local customs and beliefs which influence the people's thoughts, values, and actions. Furthermore, Americans have their own specific body of customs and beliefs which differ in many respects from those of the underdeveloped nations. These attitudes must be adjusted to accommodate and blend with the behavior of the local people.

A third factor which is part of this challenge of influencing people overseas is the variability of local situations which necessitates great flexibility in adapting both human behavior and technical design to accommodate the local culture. If the civic action team wishes to introduce a change that will fit permanently into the local scene, the technology involved is likely to require reworking and modification to meet long-range local requirements. Although some similarities exist, situations confronting Americans overseas are almost always "strange" and varied. Nations and regions within countries are sometimes extremely heterogeneous with regard to religion, skill levels, behavior patterns, and social relations. Every difference imposes a renewed demand for a related response.

The effect of culture and social mores is a fourth factor which makes influencing foreign people a challenging task. Every component of a culture — knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs, skills, mores, attitudes, and institutions — tends to have either a favorable or an unfavorable influence on the way in which people respond to changes introduced by foreigners. Consequently, each particular course of civic action must be weighed in terms of how it will be received in the context of the local culture. This is an extremely complicated task and requires an extensive knowledge of the area's culture and a systematic, responsive approach to influencing foreign people and their culture.

In the following sections the effects of culture and mores on civic action operations will be discussed in detail.
Effects Of Culture And Mores On Planned Change

The American soldier arrives in a foreign country with the heritage of nearly two centuries of rapid social and economic progress. This is in stark contrast to the tradition of failures and limited achievements in most of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Just as the newly arriving soldier must not expect all the comforts of home in his new environment, neither should he expect to find familiar cultural patterns. Hopefully his response will not be an attempt to impose his own American values on his hosts. They probably will not be especially eager to adopt the ways of their new "advisors." In fact, they may stubbornly insist on doing things their own way, a way which actually may work against progress and development.

The civic action worker will face two additional hindrances which discourage progress: first, the relative lack of education and sophistication of the host people; and second, their satisfaction with the existing way of life. In backward areas, lack of education hampers the people from readily understanding and appreciating new methods. Their adherence to relatively inadequate but traditional methods may discourage their enthusiasm and lessen their incentive to accept new technology.

In effect, the civic action worker must take a step back in time to deal effectively with many people living in depressed areas of the world. This means that the modern American must gear his way of thinking and attitudes to blend with a culture and state of society which may be ancient and simple by comparison. Money and equipment alone will not produce desired changes. The implementer or field worker himself becomes the key ingredient in the civic action process.

Native custom and psychology may hamper even the most rudimentary attempts to improve local conditions. In Uganda, for example, the people resisted using latrines through fear of sorcerers who might use the excrement to cast evil spells. Resistance to change may also stem from a failure to understand the potential benefits. Although the local people may desire a better way of life, they usually are understandably hesitant to alter arrangements they already know and trust. In these situations, it is most advantageous to apply new approaches to old standards and let any progress speak for itself rather than to attempt to persuade the populace to adopt a total revision.
An example serves the purpose of illustrating the manner in which new ideas can be incorporated into existing practice and thereby becomes more palatable to the local people. While a given community may be unwilling to coldly "fire" the local witch doctor in favor of modern medical assistance, the same witch doctor may be persuaded to adopt certain modern practices or at least discontinue some harmful rituals if he can be convinced this will add to his influence and power. By incorporating a few modern medical practices into the witch doctor's healing powers, it is possible to introduce new ideas without having them viewed with the same superstition and rejection as might be the case if they were advanced by an American physician.

Another aspect of local custom which may hinder the acceptance of change is the attitude toward wealth and accumulation of goods. Buddhists, for example, are concerned primarily with simple day-to-day living and the accumulation of good deeds for the life hereafter. The farmer who is a religious Buddhist is therefore unlikely to be easily persuaded to produce more crops than he needs for his own consumption. Crop surpluses and profits from these sources are of little importance to the Buddhist, although food reserves and export sales may be essential factors in developing the national economy.

Local superstitions may be detrimental. Laotians, for example, worship spirits of natural phenomena such as the sun and the moon. With centuries of this type of belief, it is easy to imagine the Laotian farmer being very reluctant to accept methods which appear to contrast or sharply contradict nature, e.g., failing to acknowledge the stars or the moon as factors in gauging planting time.

Even when proposed changes do not run counter to deep-seated beliefs, they may nevertheless interrupt local practices and therefore be unacceptable. An American aid team in a Middle Eastern village found that a new water pipe system was poorly received by the very women who were expected to appreciate the improvement. The new water lines replaced the local well where the women had gathered daily to exchange gossip. Another example is the case of new strains of wheat which are often poorly received despite their high yields because they are difficult to grind or strange tasting.

American soldiers engaged in civic action overseas must keep these lessons in mind and should work to develop a sensitive, responsible attitude toward local customs. Yet respect for the foreign culture is only part of the job. The next section will discuss how the worker overseas must recognize how his own behavior pattern has been influenced by our American culture and what adjustments are necessary.
Contrast in American And Foreign Cultures

In confronting people with different cultural and social values, Americans bring with them values acquired over a lifetime. Americans can easily fall into the trap of attempting to impose American ideas and beliefs on the host country people.

The tendency to act only according to one's own cultural background is natural, and a justifiably difficult mistake to avoid. Transferred from the relatively comfortable surroundings of an affluent society, the American soldier may find himself in circumstances in the host country that are not duplicated even in the worst American ghetto. Under these conditions he is likely to react as he has been taught according to his past experiences. Unfortunately, habitual reactions on the part of the American may be a source of irritation or insult to his hosts.

Although we may say that men everywhere are basically alike, the existing dissimilarities are still significant enough to block communication and discourage interaction. Personnel living in the field will be living in cultures that are worlds apart from our own. If the field worker expects the local people to have precisely the same motivation as the typical American, or to make the same distinctions of behavior, thought, and value, he is risking failure of his plans.

It is necessary for the American not only to understand the culture of the host country, but also to review and evaluate his own background which may prove an actual hindrance in dealing with foreign people. To examine the cultural premises of one's own actions and thoughts is a difficult process. Yet, in dealing with people from other parts of the world, examination of our American culture and its effect on our behavioral patterns is important preparation for overseas work.

Americans need to become aware of the unconscious presuppositions underlying our own culture that tend to influence our decisions and actions. It is important for us to discover just what our reactions will be to the difficulties we may encounter among foreign people.

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This section has been adapted from Technical Cooperation and Cultural Reality. (ST 41-10-96). U. S. Army Civic Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia. p. 115-136. Prepared by Conrad M. Arenberg and Arthur H. Nichoft for the Agency for International Development.
In short, the American soldier needs to know how being an American will help or hinder our civic action mission. To assist in acquiring this knowledge the following discussion on selected features of American culture is presented. Contrasts with the cultures of underdeveloped countries are emphasized to help explain why American attitudes often differ with those of other people.

**Judgement Based On Principles**

Automatic categorization of various actions as either right or wrong, based on principle, is a keystone of American cultural behavior. Americans are likely to run into serious difficulty in foreign countries if they judge events harshly and absolutely without intermediate evaluation.

Opposing judgments are the rule in American and Western life: moral-immoral, legal-illegal, right-wrong, success-failure, clean-dirty, modern-outmoded, civilized-primitive, practical-impractical, introvert-extrovert, secular-religious, Christian-pagan. The repeated reliance on absolute judgments hampers consideration of the intermediate ground or reappraisal of position. By its very nature, the dependence on black and white judgments is arbitrary, usually extreme, and therefore laden with the risk of error.

Judgment in terms of principle is a very old and pervasive means of organizing thought in American and Western Culture and is deeply rooted in our philosophy and religion. Non-Western people do not usually rank one action or object as superior, and therefore to be embraced on principle, while ranking the others as inferior to be rejected. Rather, they tend to rank the two categories as equal and to say that each must have its due; or they may not connect them at all with principles guiding conduct. A non-Westerner is more apt to be guided by horror of impropriety or possible shame rather than by cut-and-dried principles of right and wrong.

**Work And Play**

In much the same way as opposing judgments, the distinct division of work and play is an American concept not generally practiced in the underdeveloped areas of the world. To persons brought up in present day American farming, business, or industry, work is what they do regularly, grimly, purposefully, whether they enjoy it or not. It is a necessity, perhaps even more importantly, a duty, a "good thing in itself since one ought to keep occupied." A man is judged by his work. Work is serious adult business; for a man is supposed "to get ahead" or "to make a contribution" to the community or mankind.
PLAY IS DIFFERENT. IT IS FUN, AN OUTLET FROM WORK, WITHOUT SERIOUS PURPOSE EXCEPT TO MAKE WORK MORE EFFICIENT. IT IS THE LESSER CATEGORY AND, THOUGH SOME OF US MAY "ENJOY OUR WORK," IT IS A MATTER OF LUCK AND BY NO MEANS SOMETHING THAT EVERYONE CAN COUNT ON SINCE ALL JOBS CONTAIN SOME "DIRTY WORK," TEDIOUS, AND TASKS THAT ONE COMPLETES JUST BY PUSHING ON. WORK AND PLAY ARE DIFFERENT WORLDS, THERE IS A TIME AND PLACE FOR EACH; BUT WHEN IT IS TIME FOR WORK, THEN PLAY AND THE LIGHTER PURSUIT MUST BE PUT ASIDE.

IN MANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, THESE TWO ACTIVITIES MAY BE THOROUGHLY INTERWOVEN. A THRESHING FLOOR, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY WELL BE A DANCING ARENA AND THE NETTING OF A HUGE CATCH OF FISH MAY BE THE OCCASION FOR A FULL-SCALE COMMUNITY CELEBRATION. THE AMERICAN HABIT OF ASSOCIATING WORK WITH RIGHT PURPOSE AND GRIM EFFORT, AND PLAY WITH FRIVOLITY AND IDLENESS IS ADMIRABLE AT HOME, BUT IT MAY BE COMPLETELY OUT OF PLACE IN ANOTHER CULTURE.

TIME IS MONEY

EMANATING FROM THE WORK-PLAY SPLIT IS THE AMERICAN NOTION OF "TIME IS MONEY." THE MORE THEY ASSOCIATE, THE SOONER BOTH FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS BECOME AWARE THAT THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD TIME VARY. IN GENERAL, AMERICAN TIME IS EXACT, PEOPLE ARE PUNCTUAL, ACTIVITIES ARE SCHEDULED, AND TIME IS APPOINTED FOR SEPARATE PURSUITS.

FOR AMERICANS TIME IS VALUABLE. TIME CAN BE TURNED INTO PROFIT, FOR WORK TURNED OUT FASTER THAN PLANNED CAN RELEASE EXTRA TIME TO DO MORE WORK FOR ADDITIONAL GAIN. THE EQUATING OF WORK WITH TIME, THE USE OF THE LEAST AMOUNT OF TIME TO PRODUCE THE LARGEST POSSIBLE QUANTITIES, THE EXPECTATION THAT THE TIME PEOPLE ARE PAID FOR WILL BE MARKED BY SUSTAINED EFFORT, AND THE BUDGETING AND PLANNING OF MAN-HOURS IN RELATION TO COST OF THE END PRODUCT ARE ALL CENTRAL FEATURES OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY, AND NO SMALL PART OF WHY IT IS SO PRODUCTIVE.

SUCH A CONCEPT OF TIME IS USUALLY QUITE FOREIGN TO PEOPLE OF NON-WESTERN OR NON-INDUSTRIAL CULTURES. IN MOST AGRARIAN, PEASANT SOCIETIES, WORK IS NOT EQUIVALENT WITH TIME AND SCHEDULED SOLELY IN TERMS OF PRODUCTION; IT IS, INSTEAD, GEARED TO SEASONAL EMERGENCIES, CLIMATE, OR EXHAUSTION OF SUPPLIES AND RESOURCES. OFTEN TROUBLE WILL START IF AMERICANS EXPECT EXACT, REGULAR ATTENDANCE OR STEADY, UNFLAGGING EFFORT THROUGH FIXED PERIODS OF TIME.

EFFORT AND OPTIMISM

ANOTHER PECCUALLY AMERICAN TRAIT IS THE LINKING OF EFFORT AND OPTIMISM, WHICH HOLDS THAT TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT A CONDITION OR PROBLEM WILL ALMOST INEVITABLY BRING SUCCESS. BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS OBSTACLES OVERCOME IN AMERICA'S PAST, THE CITIZEN REMAINS EVER CONFIDENT THAT THROUGH HIS EFFORTS SUCCESS WILL BE ACHIEVED.
As a result, the worthwhile American is judged to be the one who "gets results" and "gets ahead." His success is measured in terms of his positive solution to the problem. A man who fails is unsuccessful through his own fault.

But like other traits of culture, we cannot expect to find a corresponding one elsewhere, particularly in non-industrial countries; and like all supposed virtues, this one has its pitfalls and can induce cultural blindness. The first pitfall can occur when Americans show cynicism towards people who have gained high status without ascendency combat against difficult obstacles. Equally unfortunate would be an American's frowning on the frequent emphasis in underdeveloped countries on "busy work" or activity for its own sake even though unproductive.

To other people in other parts of the world, a history of failure in recent decades and centuries is as well known as the history of successes is to us. It is not because these people have no interest in getting things done, but, because they have had so many reversals during the period when America was achieving its greatness, that they lack the confidence of Americans.

Because of the emphasis on rapid, dynamic progress, Americans place a heavy accent on youthfulness. Despite their experience, old people are generally passed over. This attitude differs greatly from that of non-Westerners, most of whom equate age with experience. Americans should not attempt to impose modern youthful concepts haphazardly on foreign people. Americans should keep in mind that the glorious eras of many people are in the past, so the old ways are tried and true. Modernity and novelty have no value in themselves for these people.

Men And Nature

For many Americans the natural environment is something to overcome, to improve upon, or to tear down and rebuild in a better way. The greater effort that marks the American response to obstacles may seem shallow, irreverent, or undignified to peoples of other cultures.

This conquering attitude toward nature appears to rest on two assumptions: that the universe is mechanistic and man is its master; and that man is categorically different from all other forms of life. Specifically these other forms lack his unique attribute - a soul. In most of the non-Western world, nature is rarely conceived of as being mechanistic, and man is merely another form of life, different only in degree from the others. In most so-called animistic religions, all living creatures are believed to have something corresponding to a soul and there is no sharp dividing line between man and animals or plants. Excluding Westerners, most people consider man and nature as one, and man works with nature rather than attempting to conquer it.
All cultures, through trial and error, have adapted to their natural environments, albeit their adaptations may be considerably below American standards. Through experience, these people have evolved programs of conservation, methods of stretching and restoring their often slim resources, and elaborate adaptations to climate, vegetation and terrain. When boundless confidence leads Americans to tame nature with impressive, costly mechanical devices, and thus to brush aside the experience of centuries, it can be an exciting process for the people being aided. But, unfortunately, these underdeveloped people may feel uncomfortable in seeing the realistic nature of their time-tested environment being pushed aside. In many cases this concern is justified when their native solutions outlast certain modern innovations which fail to provide lasting solutions.

Material Well-Being

The difference in material wealth between people of the United States and those living elsewhere in the world is especially obvious. In the United States success and achievement are measured in terms of material goods, both because they are abundant and because they are indicative of how much money an individual earns. The emphasis is on visible prestige articles since the size of one's bank account is not a public evidence of an individual's position. A person's status is also measured to a degree, by his level of education, occupation, and social behavior.

People other than Americans also value comfort and the saving of labor but are often unable to acquire the material goods available here. They therefore concentrate their satisfaction in other directions, often by striving for spiritual and aesthetic excellence rather than tangible material goods. The American overseas will quickly notice the inferiority and lack of comfort-producing mechanisms in the underdeveloped countries. There is no surer way to cut oneself off from other people or gain their dislike than to ostentatiously insist in the expensive luxuries of one's habitual way of life. To concentrate on creating an atmosphere of American comfort is to establish a microcosm of American society and culture which will effectively insulate itself from the local culture. It may be more convenient to buy all one's groceries in an American commissary. However, this means losing the opportunity to learn the buying patterns and dietary habits of the local people, a knowledge that could be partially learned at the local market place.

Moralizing

A basic kind of black and white decision Americans make consists of classifying actions and objects as good or bad. While this moralizing is one of America's domestic strengths, it leads to one of her pitfalls abroad. Part of the inventory a person must make to understand other people is a determination of the sort of judgments he
habitually makes about events, conduct, and individuals. An American will want to note that in other cultures, rank or esteem, the dignity of a person, the honor of an individual, the compassion due the unfortunate, and the loyalty due a kinsman or co-religionist may be all important in moral judgments.

The inclination to moralize often makes an American cynical or critical when he finds that the code by which he was reared does not exist elsewhere in the world. This view magnifies evil and turns what may merely be a difference in moral standards, or an indifference to moralizing at all, into supposed corruption. It leads to an individual seeing evil everywhere. Rather than making a moral judgment, it is much better to learn what customs, privileges, laws, obligations, immunities, and standards of value really prevail.

Equality Of Men

The equality of men is another value which flows from the American tendency to moralize. Our legal and institutional heritage prescribes equal rights, condemns special privileges, and demands equal opportunity and representation for every citizen. But overseas, an American's patience is tried in dealing with people whose authority seems neither justified nor deserved; or in waiting for the ordinary man who will act only when he has received the go-ahead from his figures of prestige or respect.

To introduce this equality principle into conversational dealings with the citizens can cause unfortunate repercussions. In countries where people do differ in rank and prestige, Americans are likely to given offense if they are brusque, breezy, or treat everyone alike or impersonally. It is much better to try to acquire some of the local usages of titles, formal forms of address, language and manners of courtesy, and deference, than to try to accustom foreigners to American ways.

Rules For Effective Behavior

This list cannot give specific directions on how to effectively work with each people and place, or for each specific kind of technical advance. Its main function is to give a general idea of the types of precautions which should be observed and thereby alert the individual soldier to make similar rules based on personal observation of local circumstances.
WORKING WITH THE HOST COUNTRY PEOPLE

(1) Projects will be received more enthusiastically by the host country people if the basic ideas appear to be of local origin. Inhabitants can be led to "suggest" a specific program, if the advisor theorizes on an idea rather than openly suggesting it, or by asking local officials leading questions. Problems which appear to be "suggested" by the people themselves, will receive far wider support than if they are initiated by foreigners.

(2) Programs undertaken must be within the capabilities of the area and its inhabitants. To launch a large-scale project that would overtax the ability of the local labor force or that would place too heavy a drain on the available resources is to weaken the project from the beginning. Such a program will antagonize the people, rather than convince them that we are there to assist them.

(3) Civic action helps the local people to help themselves. It is our primary purpose to assist them in these projects, not to do them ourselves. Projects should quickly be turned over to the people and they should be encouraged to continue them on their own. This installs pride of authorship in their own work and renews self-confidence in themselves and their abilities.

(4) A continued effort should be made through appropriate channels to enlist the aid and support of the local people. We can little afford to jeopardize the host country's support merely for the sake of expediency in acquiring materials or in getting something done.

(5) Local customs and mores must be understood and respected. Although respect for local customs may require that problems be approached in less than the most efficient manner, final results are likely to be longer lasting if projects are adapted to local ways. Project technology and implementation must take local circumstances into account. Little can be accomplished by imposing our moral code on an unresponsive people.

(6) Civic action personnel should be prepared to recognize the relativity of behavior and opinion. They must understand that many of the things they do and believe to be good may be considered by persons with a different cultural heritage as good, bad, or merely irrelevant. Conversely, Americans must understand that we tend to judge the behavior of others from our own cultural point of view.
(7) Members of the civic action team should attempt to work closely with the people. They should share the effort with them, and should not isolate themselves in a strictly advisory or directory capacity.

(8) Advisors should lend themselves to suggestions by the nationals and should not assume the position of "expert" in the field.

(9) It is advisable for members of civic action teams to learn, or at least make an attempt to learn the language of the country in which they work. Knowledge of the native language reduces the chances of misunderstanding through faulty interpretation and also ingratiates the member to the local people. To them, this represents true concern on the part of the civic action team for their problems and welfare.

(10) Recreational and informal time should be spent in association with citizens of the host country. Americans often make the mistake of spending their off-hours within a limited social circle, consisting solely of their fellow countrymen. This is a serious error, as the individual deprives himself of the opportunity to become better acquainted with the country, and may create an air of resentment by the local people, who further regard him as a foreigner concerned only with his own interests.

(11) Indigenous social forms and conventions should be adopted when appropriate. Behavior which reduces the feeling of strangeness is likely to increase rapport. However, the principle of adopting indigenous customs should be followed with discrimination. Insincere conduct is quickly spotted and noted as an attempt to mock the native institutions.

(12) In certain areas overseas, one's senses may be assailed by foul odors, raucous noises, dirty and disorderly streets, and other outwardly disturbing sights, such as disfigured human beings and rotting animal corpses. This condition cannot be changed overnight. The American must learn to ignore unpleasant or repugnant sights, sounds, and smells over which he has no control and learn to live with them.
Chapter 7

Area Survey And Project Selection

The goals of military civic action are multiple and difficult to achieve — to contribute to social and economic progress, to encourage the people to help themselves, to promote friendship with the armed forces, and to alleviate discontent leading to insurgency. In addition, the circumstances under which civic action operations must be conducted are varied and complex: strange customs and behavior, limited skills and equipment, language problems, and often personal hazard. In this unusual environment, the responsibility of choosing the "right" project or projects to achieve the goals of civic action is an extremely difficult task. A systematic procedure for this purpose becomes a necessity as greater complexities are introduced. Obviously, solutions to simple problems with limited involvement can be selected and carried out with a minimum of formal planning. However, more sophisticated project-selection techniques must be used during extensive and lengthy civic action operations if such operations are to be completely successful.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a systematic procedure for conducting an area survey and for selecting projects. The procedure is set forth in a rather formal mechanical style to achieve simplicity and clarity of presentation. However, it should be kept in mind that in the field many of the distinctions made here will be blurred. Some activities will be merged, or carried out simultaneously or in some order other than that stated here. Therefore, modification and adaptation of the procedure to meet local needs is expected and necessary. Only the basic tasks to be performed and the principles involved are relatively constant.

Summary Of Procedure

The approach suggested consists of two phases, each requiring a fact-gathering field survey and an analysis of the information secured. The first phase is oriented toward problem identification and involves an area survey to gather information relevant to civic action operations and to observe local problems. After the area
survey is completed, the information is analyzed and tentative identification is made of feasible projects. The second phase consists of a project support survey to collect additional detailed information specifically related to project feasibility. Based on this detailed information, projects are evaluated and priorities set according to predetermined criteria.

The distinctive purposes of the two phases should be made clear. The first, consisting of an area survey and an identification of feasible projects, entails a broad investigation at many levels to secure general information of any type which may influence future operations. The survey and analysis are designed to establish a framework of area characteristics and potential projects for later, more detailed, analysis in the second phase. The second phase consists of a project-by-project field survey and evaluation designed to gather detailed information on how each project would be implemented, and to establish project priorities. The two phases, carried out in sequence provide for an orderly progression of information-gathering, analysis, and decision-making.

It is necessary that surveys and situation analyses be repeated as long as civic action operations are in progress. Information quickly becomes outdated and priorities soon rendered inappropriate by rapidly changing conditions. Furthermore, if time allows and operations are sufficiently complex, surveys and analyses should be prepared in written form for later reference and distribution.

Phase I—The Civic Action Survey

The civic action survey is essentially a reconnaissance of the local area for the purpose of gathering a wide range of information relevant to future civic action operations. This information includes three major topics: problems and needs of the local population, availability of human and material resources, and the operational situation. These topics may be organized for data gathering and analysis according to various functional areas such as medicine, agriculture and education, and also by geographical subdivisions such as region, village and hamlet. The topics are outlined on page 67 and discussed in detail beginning on page 68.

Different geographical areas within a country may well be faced with wholly different problems whose potential for solutions will vary greatly. Civic action programs workable in one area are not necessarily appropriate in another, although the areas may be only a few miles apart. Thus each area must be surveyed independently and its boundaries clearly defined to assure systematic coverage of sub-areas.
The area survey should be continued until the civic action team is thoroughly familiar with an area and is able to draw up a tentative list of feasible projects and make initial recommendations. The more thorough the survey, the greater the likelihood of realistic appraisal. The survey process itself is conducted through personal inspection, discussions with local leaders, briefings by host country and American civilians and military authorities, and through a review of written reports pertinent to the situation.

The information in the survey will often be gathered by different members of the civic action team. The various reports must be consolidated, interrelated and presented in order. In almost every instance, the survey will be sufficiently extensive to warrant a written report. While the format of the area survey is usually optional, and should be tailored to local requirements, standardization within a command is recommended to promote familiarity with its organization, to avoid omissions, and to eliminate repetitious content. A strictly military format for an area survey includes six paragraphs: statement of the problem, assumptions, facts bearing on the mission, discussion, conclusions, and recommended action. This format is illustrated in Appendix D and is self-explanatory.

Regardless of the exact format used, the essential component of the area survey is the factual information gathered in the field. These contents are outlined below and will be discussed in subsequent sections.

1. Problems and Needs of the Local Population
   a. Needs expressed by the local citizens.
   b. Needs expressed or written by experts (local or American civilian or military authorities).
   c. Needs personally observed by surveyors.

2. Availability of Material and Human Resources
   a. Local civilian capability.
   b. Host country military capability.
   c. U.S. military capability.
   d. Other (host government, U.S. agencies, international agencies).

3. Operational Situation
   a. Attitudes and customs of local civilians.
   b. Disposition of indigenous military forces.
   c. Overall military situation.
   d. Status of existing civic action and related programs.
Problems and Needs of the Local Population

The most important single element of the civic action area survey, identification of local problems and needs, can be accomplished in three ways: (1) by personal observation and deduction; (2) by soliciting an expression of needs from the local population or from civilian or military officials; and (3) by review of appropriate written documents which cite existing problems. The importance of this information requires that all three sources be utilized.

Of the three sources, the local population is most likely to indicate needs of immediate and real importance, and to suggest where assistance will be responsively received and supported. Local participation in a project is difficult to obtain unless residents have actually expressed a specific need and desire for assistance. On the other hand, expressed "immediate" desires are often quite inconsistent with actual basic needs. For example, the expressed desire for superficial household conveniences may ignore a basic sewage and sanitation problem. In many instances, the more important needs of an area will be learned through consultation with advisors and field experts, both those of the host country and our own government.

The civic/action team may also identify local needs based on personal observation of existing deficiencies. In many cases the people do not recognize long-standing detrimental conditions as problems. Unexposed to the benefits of advanced technology, they may not be able to visualize any possible improvements in their living conditions. For example, few inhabitants of underdeveloped areas realize the degree to which disease can be controlled by immunization and other means of preventative medicine.

Availability of Human and Material Resources

The area survey should identify both skilled and unskilled labor available to the area, as well as equipment and raw materials which may be used on local projects. One critically important resource is the assistance of local leaders without which any project is unlikely to succeed. At the earliest possible time during the survey, these leaders should be identified and contacted as a courtesy in order to establish a good working relationship from the start.

Possible sources of project funding should be investigated. During the area survey, when no specific projects are in mind, the listing and investigation of possible financial support need only be general. Later, during the project survey when specific requirements are known, a more thorough exploration of available support must be made.

Contacts most useful for securing information on the availability of resources are local civilians, our own and host country military forces, and the host government. Agencies such as AID
and UNESCO should also be contacted for possible assistance.

**Operational Situation**

There are four aspects of the operational situation which directly affect civic action activities: the attitudes and customs of the local people, the disposition of the indigenous military forces, the overall military situation, and the nature and extent of existing civic action and related programs.

The importance of taking into account the customs and attitudes of the local population has been fully explained in chapter six. Assessment of attitudes at an early stage will help assure that later efforts will in no way violate local customs and politics. In conducting the area survey the civic action team should note and report all local cultural and behavioral patterns which may significantly influence future operations and may require either special attention or modification of normal procedures. Many of these patterns will be difficult to detect by personal observation. It is important that knowledgeable field workers and advisors, intimately familiar with local custom, be consulted. Elected and appointed officials may be interviewed, although it must be remembered that some may have lost touch with local conditions. Religious leaders may also provide helpful guidance.

Similarly, direct contact with military personnel of the host country should enable the civic action team to assess the disposition of the military toward the conduct of civic action operations. It is necessary to know, for example, the attitude of local military forces toward civilians, and the attitudes of the citizens in turn toward the military. The reactions of local military leaders to proposals that they initiate civic action programs are of particular importance. In many instances higher levels will have to be contacted to ascertain the true stance of the military regarding involvement. At this time the organization of the military should also be noted and the chain of command identified.

Clearly, the tactical situation has great consequences for civic action operations. In the area survey, the exact nature of the military problem should be studied to the extent that information is available. As discussed in chapter 4, each of the stages or phases of insurgency lends itself to a particular kind or degree of civic action. Therefore, the existing phase of insurgency must be known in order to develop an appropriate program of civic action. In addition, the length of time during which local military units will remain in an area will largely determine the amount of time in which programs may be implemented.

The fourth and last aspect of the operational situation which the area survey should examine is the status of any existing civic
action and related programs. Current programs must be known and thoroughly understood if supplemental projects are to be chosen and undesirable duplication avoided.

Identification Of Feasible Projects

The area survey should reflect the political, sociological, economic, and military circumstance of the area in sufficient detail to provide a comprehensive knowledge of the area and to permit a factual appraisal of the situation. From area survey information it should also be possible to derive a tentative list of feasible civic action projects by reviewing recognized problems and needs, and noting appropriate civic action remedies.

A substantial portion of the information gathered will deal either directly or indirectly with existing problems. After a logical review of these problems and a careful examination of those courses of corrective action thought to be appropriate, it should be possible to formulate a tentative list of likely civic action projects. Appraisal of this list in the light of available human and material resources and the general operating situation will further identify those projects which appear feasible.

In many instances the nature of identified problems will clearly suggest certain obvious corrective actions. Specific projects may also be immediately suggested by the local authorities and by American advisors in the field. However, in other instances, even though a problem is recognized, specific civic action projects may not be immediately apparent. A number of technical references of assistance in identifying specific projects are available and should be consulted. These publications are listed in Appendix C. They generally describe low-cost development projects and simplified techniques suited for use by personnel engaged in military civic action. The projects are those which may satisfy pressing needs at the small community level; however, they usually require the guidance of trained technicians.

After a rough list of projects is compiled, they should be screened to eliminate any that are clearly beyond the capabilities of the resources identified in the area survey. For example, a basic irrigation problem suggests many solutions, one of which may be the construction of an earthen dam. This type of project may be clearly beyond the capabilities of local manpower and equipment. Projects most likely to be rejected as unfeasible or impractical are those requiring highly-skilled manpower (which usually is not available), scarce materials and equipment, or extensive and exhaustive expenditures of time, energy and money. Rejected proposals should be replaced by more practical alternative designs. In the above illustration of the rejected dam, it may be found that digging a simple well or diverting a stream is sufficient to supply a less ambitious irrigation system. A more practical alternative is thus presented.
Once the list of feasible projects is drawn up, the civic action survey is completed. Attention may then be directed to phase two of the recommended procedure, which consists of a fact-gathering project support survey to obtain detailed information regarding the specific projects proposed and an analysis of this information in light of various criteria to establish project priorities.

**Phase II—Project Support Survey And Priority Evaluation**

The second phase of the recommended procedure consists of a second field survey, called the project support survey, in which detailed information is gathered to be used in evaluating feasible projects to determine their relative priority. The type of information to be gathered parallels the criteria used for evaluation. For example, one important criterion used to determine which project is best among a number of possible choices is the degree of enthusiasm and interest in the idea which the local populace expresses. During the project support survey the local people are questioned in this regard concerning each of the feasible projects contemplated. Later, during the final evaluation, the people's reaction to each of the projects is considered in determining final priorities.

In contrast to the area survey, where information is gathered at every level, the project support survey is concentrated on the local level. The people, their leaders, the local military forces, American advisors in the vicinity—these contacts have the immediate knowledge and skill to provide the detailed information by which the appropriateness of each project can most accurately be assessed. In effect, the project area survey is directed to those people who are in the best position to answer the question: "What is the best civic action project for this area at this time?"

If the list of feasible projects is so long as to preclude a comprehensive examination of each project, the civic action team may reduce the list to a more manageable length by excluding those projects which in its judgment are least appropriate. Early in the project support survey it will probably become clear which project types can be rejected at once as too complex, too costly, or otherwise deficient. Detailed information should be gathered only on those remaining projects which appear to be both feasible and appropriate.
Criteria for Evaluating The Appropriateness Of Action Projects

As previously stated, the project survey gathers information useful in evaluating each contemplated project. This information must directly relate to the criteria being used to evaluate the appropriateness of each project and to determine priorities. In any given situation, special emphasis may have to be placed on particular appraisal factors. However, it is possible to identify certain basic criteria which should be applied in every situation if a thorough and rigorous evaluation of projects is to be made. The following twelve criteria are considered essential. They constitute areas of investigation from which relevant information should be obtained in the project support survey:

CRITERIA INVOLVING ATTITUDES OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE

(1) The project should generate a high level of interest and enthusiasm. Strong initial interest among the local people usually indicates that they will respond with cooperation, enthusiasm, and expectation once the project is begun. If the community does not express support for a project, it is extremely unlikely that any measure of success can be achieved.

(2) The local populace should be willing to participate directly in the project. Local people must not only be interested in the project but must be willing to commit themselves to it and contribute their time and effort toward its accomplishment. This direct involvement is necessary if they are to associate themselves with the project's successful completion and thereby increase their own capacity and aptitude for self-help. Civic action entails working with people, not for them.

(3) There should be a high probability that the local populace will continue to maintain and operate the project after its completion. Civic action is primarily an initiating and motivating effort to start people to help themselves. In most cases the support of military forces in civic action operations must be withdrawn soon after a project is completed. The real measure of success is not the immediate completion of a project but rather the long-term, permanent benefits derived from a civilian continuation of the initial effort. Projects should be rejected when evidence suggests that the local populace is unlikely to maintain and support the effort after the civic action team leaves.
(4) The local people should understand and appreciate the significance of the project and the benefits derived. One of the goals of civic action is to promote favorable relations between the host country military, as representatives of the civil government, and the people. The U.S. military posture is improved in the host country by civic action projects undertaken by American personnel. The image of the military engaged in civic action is greatly strengthened if the people fully understand the importance of the assistance they receive and the benefits which accrue from their participation in the project.

PROJECT-ORIENTED CRITERIA

(5) The project should make an important and significant contribution toward alleviating local problems or meeting local needs. Some problems or needs are more significant than others, and their remedy is of considerably greater importance to the well-being of the community. For example, widespread malnutrition is a more critical problem than the need for recreational equipment. Problems such as malnutrition and rampant disease which seriously affect the lives of many people should receive the highest priority in project selection.

(6) Projects which are directed toward immediate needs should receive priority. Sometimes the needs of an area are so critical from a time standpoint that immediate action is required if effective help is to be provided. Examples of this would be inoculation against an epidemic or construction of a levee in a flood crisis. In emergency situations calling for prompt action, special short-term priority must be given certain civic action projects.

(7) Projects should be accomplished in a short time with immediate tangible benefits. Projects which can be completed relatively quickly offer less opportunity for unforeseen circumstances, such as unfavorable weather or a changing political or military scene, to disrupt or jeopardize progress. Initial local enthusiasm tends to wane as projects become drawn out. Projects which provide rapid success and immediately tangible benefits are far easier to accomplish than projects requiring extended implementation, holding only the promise of long-term indirect returns.
Projects should have a high efficiency ratio of benefits to cost. Projects with substantial benefits at low unit costs should receive priority over less efficient alternatives. In most instances the cost of a project in terms of man-hours expended and materials used can be measured. On the other hand, the estimation of expected benefits also involves immeasurable intangibles which may be evaluated only on the basis of judgment. For example, the benefits of a sanitation project versus an irrigation project, both requiring 1,000 man-hours, can be determined only on the basis of subjective appraisal of the expected community benefit. Usually the civic action team's judgment about which project is most needed relative to cost, provides a satisfactory measurement. While the benefit-cost ratio is a difficult factor to determine for any one project, opinions as to the relative efficiency of one project with respect to another should be made.

The projects should interrelate with and support one another. The limited value of a given project taken by itself is multiplied to the extent that it supports and supplements other projects. Priority should be given to projects which effectively interrelate with other projects to form comprehensive programs. Isolated and limited efforts to combat large problems often fail because supporting projects are lacking. Thus, building school houses without providing for the training of additional teachers is unproductive, and should receive low priority. If teachers are available, then constructing schools should receive high priority since it supports and assists in completing a total education program.

Projects should have a high probability of success. Difficult, complicated, or untried projects which are dependent on many uncontrollable circumstances should be avoided. Civic action projects which fail often discourage the local people and even seed resentment. For this reason, relatively simple and straightforward projects with proven success should be given priority. Easy initial success creates a foundation of enthusiasm upon which later, more complicated projects can be built.

Projects should serve as a catalyst to generate future self-help efforts. Civic action should be employed as a "demonstration" of what the community can accomplish. Immediate benefits are important, but the real value of civic action is the degree to which the community is encouraged to duplicate and expand the single project into a major lasting change. Training programs, where the knowledge received initially by a few individuals is soon conveyed to others and finally to the entire community, are an excellent example of civic action serving as a growth stimulant or catalyst.
Projects should invite and require indigenous leadership and should reflect credit on the host country. The role of the United States in civic action is principally to advise and support. Our involvement should be substantially less than that of the host country. Their leaders should direct the project and obtain the credit. In this way local leadership, both military and civilian, is developed and enhanced in the eyes of the populace.

These twelve criteria comprise the most important yardsticks by which virtually every contemplated civic action project should be evaluated. In a given situation other factors may have to be taken into account. Naturally the basic mission of the United States military should not be compromised by civic action operations, nor should overall military efficiency be impaired. It should be equally apparent that civic action operations should not prejudice the initiative or undermine the authority of civilian or military administration in the host country.

Information pertinent to each of these criteria should be gathered for all potential projects during the project support survey. As in the case of the more general area survey, some form of written report should be employed. Because local conditions vary greatly, no set format is required; however, it is recommended that the report be organized to facilitate comparisons in projects and their rankings.

Priority Evaluation

The final and most crucial task is the setting of priorities. The projects must be weighed one against the other in the light of their relative importance with respect to each criterion. A few projects will immediately be identified as inferior and can be readily discarded. Selection of the "best" project from among the remaining "good" projects is more time-consuming and becomes increasingly difficult as the field is narrowed. The evaluation and final selection is necessarily a matter of judgment, since none of the criteria are measurable. Judgment must also be exercised in assigning additional weight to some criteria because of their local importance.

In the balance of relative advantages and disadvantages a single project should eventually emerge as a superior choice. The selection will not always be clearcut, but it should be defensible on the basis of a rational ranking process and a consideration of all
relevant factors. Clearly, considerable thought and study must be devoted to the evaluation process; but a correct decision, leading to a successfully completed project, is well worth the effort expended at this critical juncture.
Chapter 8

Working Effectively To Implement Civic Action

Preparatory surveys and analyses are of small consequence if the project itself is not successfully carried out. To complete a project successfully, the civic action worker must be perceptive, exercise good judgment, and exhibit some ingenuity. These abilities, along with the necessary flexibility, sense of service, patience, and inner resourcefulness required in field work, cannot be taught; but some basic observations can be conveyed on how field operations can best be conducted. These generalizations and observations are presented here in three sections. The first section deals with basic planning activities and requirements. The second presents certain principles for effective field work developed through experience. The third section deals with project evaluation. It should be kept in mind that the admonitions, techniques, and pieces of information discussed here are only useful if one first believes in their importance and then enthusiastically works accordingly.

Planning Requirements

Any responsible job requires some planning if it is to be successfully performed. Although the necessity for planning appears to be understood by most Americans, we often fail to plan in sufficient depth to meet the greater number of contingencies that arise overseas. Furthermore, because of the many special difficulties overseas, such as inadequately trained people, frequent breakdowns or delays in communications, and faulty or non-existent equipment and facilities, it is strongly advisable to make relatively elaborate physical and psychological preparations before taking action. In this section, the special nature of planning for civic action will be discussed, along with the other preparatory activities of work scheduling, security arrangements, supply and funding, and public information.
The Civic Action Plan

So many things can go wrong in civic action operations overseas that preparatory arrangements must be extremely thorough. Because of this inherent complexity, plans should be written. Any reasonable format which does not violate planning principles is acceptable. A sample plan developed by the U. S. Army Civil Affairs School is presented in Appendix D.

Every plan should present the overall concept and purpose of the civic action operation, and should include the role of the host country forces and other agencies so as to facilitate coordination at all echelons. The functional areas and types of undertakings chosen as courses of action should be stated. Procedures for evolving and submitting specific projects should be outlined and responsibilities for planning, coordination, and ultimate execution should be clearly delineated. The plan should state what support from the Military Assistance Program and other agencies is available, along with the justification required and the conditions under which such support will be provided.

Another way of describing the content of a civic action plan, in less military jargon, is the familiar WHO?, WHAT?, WHERE?, WHEN?, WHY?, and HOW? question format:

WHO? — The specific parties at every echelon, both civilian and military, who will be involved and their responsibilities.

WHAT? — A detailed statement clearly defining the project(s) and the operation. Also, lists of material, equipment, and manpower needs.

WHERE? — The area of operations clearly identified with locations firmly established.

WHEN? — A schedule of activities drawn up with predetermined deadlines established.

WHY? — A candid statement of objectives and purposes with emphasis on benefits to be secured.

HOW? — A clear step-by-step explanation of how the projects are to be accomplished with special attention to expected difficulties, essential equipment and funding requirements, interaction with host country civilians and military, and necessary coordination requirements.
The details of planning or how the plan itself should be organized should not overshadow certain essential requirements which must be met. Good planning foresees potential obstacles, failures, inadequacies, and misunderstandings, and encourages a resourcefulness to effectively meet contingencies that arise to block action. More things can go wrong in the overseas environment that one would anticipate in the United States. Therefore, the most critical ingredient in planning for civic action is the correct anticipation of the unexpected and the preparation to provide for appropriate adjustment.

Work Scheduling

For large, complex, and lengthy projects, such as the construction of a building or highway, it is advisable to prepare a detailed day-by-day work schedule to assist in completing the work on time with a minimum of unnecessary and costly delays. The project should first be broken down into major phases or distinct jobs. In house construction, for example, separate jobs would be evacuation, foundation, basement plumbing, wooden frame, rough wiring, etc. Daily work activities should then be planned and an estimate made of the total number of days or man-hours required to complete each phase. Starting dates should be set so that all phases are completed in the order desired. Often two or more phases must overlap if all requirements for a subsequent job are to be ready at a given time. After the sequence and timing of jobs is established the requirements for manpower, material, and equipment should be listed on a daily basis. Advanced delivery dates should be shown and critical items given special identification.

The difficulty and importance of programming a large project involving many complex sequential relationships is usually not fully appreciated by the novice civic action worker. Whenever possible, the services of an expert should be obtained. Some assistance can be obtained from publications such as Engineer Field Data (FM 5-34) which give procedures for estimating construction times and preparing technical schedules. In every instance the project officer should at least understand the sequence of jobs and the necessity of pushing those that are critical. In day-to-day operations the work schedule should be used to measure progress (or lack of it) and to take appropriate action quickly when needed.

Security

In areas endangered by insurgency, project security will be an especially essential aspect of planning and implementation. Generally, a careful examination of prior hostilities in the area will indicate the potential danger. Consultation with local military and civilian leaders and the people can provide further intelligence on the magnitude of the problem.
Where a real potential for destruction and theft exists, project security may have to be maintained around-the-clock for extended periods. In early stages, construction material is particularly subject to theft. Partially completed projects may be destroyed. Even after completion, safeguards may be necessary.

Minimum security measures include the arming of the civic action team and continuous open communications between project site and the nearest U. S. military force. Security measures, of course, can be greatly facilitated by the support of the local people who are proud of their project and do not wish to see it destroyed. These citizens will quickly report incidents which endanger the project.

Supply And Funding

Because civic action is based on the self-help concept, most projects fall within the scope of existing resources. When a major effort is undertaken requiring substantial funding, the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) can provide economic, technical, and military assistance. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) conducted by DOD is authorized to equip certain military units with additional military type equipment to enhance their ability to carry out civic action projects. AID is authorized to program and fund material costs, including soft goods; expendable items such as school, medical, agricultural, welfare, and surplus food supplies; and lumber, cement, steel, roofing and other construction materials.

It can be seen that civic action funding is a joint AID-DOD effort. The area or country administrator of AID, in his capacity as the coordinator for military and economic assistance programs, is responsible for insuring that civic action programs are properly funded through use of AID or MAP funds. The proportion of AID-MAP funds is determined at the Country Team level. The Military Assistance Advisory Group or Mission prepares the MAP budget including the funds for approved civic action projects. No expenditure of funds may be made until program approval has been secured. All U. S. military personnel engaged in civic action should be alert to this requirement and should not make firm commitments or promises of assistance until such approval has been obtained.

Public Information

An underlying objective of civic action, albeit a pragmatic one, is to enhance the image of military forces in the eyes of the people. A public information program is useful in accomplishing this objective by informing the people of the role which the military is performing in community development. At the very least,
publicity given civic action programs will tend to reduce the often antagonistic attitude of citizens toward the presence of U. S. troops. When successful, favorable publicity can engender a positive response from the citizen toward his government and his military force. Such a favorable attitude constitutes a sound basis of support for expanding civic action operations.

Specific publicity efforts may include ground breaking and dedication ceremonies and festivals, distribution of leaflets, newspaper and radio commentary, committee and council presentations, and awards to individuals and communities. In every instance emphasis should be given to the role of the local people and indigenous military — our role is always secondary.

Principles For Effective Field Work

No general principles can be stated which will enable the individual to deal with all contingencies which may arise in civic action operations. What is required is a working knowledge of how to get the job done based on extensive field experience. There is literally no substitute for overseas experience. However, the experiences of others have been reported and the lessons learned may be summarized and presented as a useful introduction to the fundamental techniques for effective field work. Application of these principles will necessarily require adaptation to local requirements. The principles presented here have been organized around four critical aspects of field work: administration, communication, motivation, and training.

Administration

The demands for effective management under foreign circumstances can be considerably greater than at home. The rules of good management are often difficult to apply overseas in situations which differ radically from those in the United States. It is important to observe certain fundamental rules of management which have been found to be particularly effective and appropriate in accomplishing major tasks in a foreign environment.

Whenever possible, the feasibility of a plan should be tested on a limited scale before attempting its widespread application. A short-term, small-scale pilot project will expose specific difficulties and reveal desirable modifications, as well as test the general workability of a plan. Even new ideas should be tried out before making the final decision.
New methods of implementation should constitute actual improvements over existing methods and should not seriously disrupt indigenous work habits. Slight increases in efficiency may not be worth the money, time, and retraining, or worth the possible serious social and political consequences. For example, in many cases manpower can do the work just as cheaply and as well as modern machine power and can at the same time provide jobs for the local population.

Gradual step-by-step expansion of a project is better than the sudden undertaking of an expansive program which is likely to prove unmanageable. The work may be slow, but gradual success is better than immediate failure.

Once a program is started, momentum should be built and maintained. Persistent efforts should be maintained to keep local interest once it has been aroused.

In a supervisory capacity, every attempt should be made to assess individual capabilities and differences. The treatment of all indigenous workers as if they had the same abilities (or lack of abilities) will often lead to the inappropriate assignment of jobs and responsibilities.

Whenever possible, indigenous workers should be encouraged to take on increasingly responsible tasks.

For any project, always try to find an intelligent and well-informed individual to whom you can turn for advice and assistance. There is great utility in friendship with indigenous persons. It means learning much that would otherwise be inaccessible.

Frequent on-site visits are essential to appraise progress and obstacles. Ignored projects are apt to disappear. Monthly meetings should be held to exchange ideas and to give encouragement and praise.

Advisory personnel should live on the site of the project, if possible, in order to be fully accepted; they should eat local food and enjoy personal luxuries privately.

Project work will be more appealing if it can be made to be fun or appears to be the "modern thing to do."
Projects should never be initiated without first calling on formal leaders (such as district chiefs) to show respect and to ask permission.

Indigenous laws and regulations should be scrupulously obeyed. The civic action worker should attempt to learn particular regulations governing customs, traffic, housing, financial transactions, and the various aspects of his work.

Civic action personnel should not become involved in internal political affairs. Less interference with duties is likely to result if one remains neutral. Similarly, Americans should not impose on indigenous persons unsolicited political beliefs and opinions.

A sense of proportion must be maintained about the job. A sense of fitness or rightness should accompany the undertaking. Try to carefully estimate the actual impact of your acts on others in their own context.

Communication

Inability to communicate is the handicap or inadequacy most frequently cited as a limiting factor in overseas operations. Located at the grass roots level, where few people are likely to understand English, civic action operations are particularly susceptible to failures due to faulty communication. Just as the native cannot be expected to know English, few American military personnel can be expected to have accomplished the difficult task of mastering the local dialect to serve as interpreters. Thus in a great majority of cases, face-to-face communication must be accomplished through a local interpreter. Effective implementation of a project depends upon the availability of such an individual and the observation of certain rules.

If the interpreter is truly bilingual there may be but few problems; unfortunately, this seldom is the case. Interpreters are naturally reluctant to show ignorance. Many of them are likely to try to muddle through interpretations at the expense of meaning. On occasion the interpreter might even deliberately distort a translation for extraneous reasons. Often extensive breakdowns in communication occur because the interpreter simply cannot understand or explain adequately.
A few basic and simple principles can do much to alleviate these difficulties. First, one should speak slowly to allow time for interpretation and understanding. Second, slang, cant, jargon, and colloquialisms should be avoided because most interpreters are not familiar with the special meanings of vernacular American English. Third, insofar as possible one should avoid technical English. The special terminology of our professions and vocations is rarely known to the ordinary interpreter. Fourth, one should be repetitive to clarify and strengthen points whose real significance may otherwise be lost. Fifth, one should check on the interpreter's understanding of what is said. Finally, one should make every effort to improve the interpreter's translating ability. For example, one can explain and establish common meanings for some frequently used terms.

From time to time, it may be useful to communicate through gestures, pictures, or written instructions. In particularly complex situations, many potential difficulties in communications can be reduced if detailed explanations are translated into the native language by an accurate interpreter and then distributed as printed documents.

Aside from the language barrier itself, communication overseas is often exceedingly difficult because of fundamental differences in philosophy, modes of thought, and basic conceptions of cause and effect. These differences in general background cause people to talk about different things when they think they are discussing the same topic. While these problems are often virtually insurmountable without extensive retraining, much confusion can be avoided if concrete terms are used that are likely to have common meaning rather than highly abstract words. Also if one is quite explicit and gives adequate details, the possibility for listener-drawn implications is reduced.

Naturally there is no substitute for knowing the language of the host country. For any extended period of service, civic action personnel should attempt to acquire at least a rudimentary language ability. A few simple expressions in the local dialect often go far toward establishing initial understanding and rapport. A good interpreter plus close "identification" with the host country is probably the best solution to the communication problem.

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Motivation

It often develops that despite host government sponsorship and our own willingness to offer assistance, the individual citizen of the country is unwilling to participate or furnish the cooperation which is essential in implementing civic action projects. While we may be able to easily recognize the benefits which a project will provide, to the local citizen these benefits may be difficult to imagine, or may be of too little personal importance to warrant his support. To the local people the value of material goods is readily understandable, but they do not always find it easy to adopt the methods that make a better way of life possible. For this reason, and many others which cause people to be disinclined to do things for themselves, the civic action worker will often be called upon to motivate his hosts - to induce them to participate fully and effectively.

The attitudes of people toward civic action may range from wholehearted enthusiasm to indifference to open antagonism. To develop cooperative attitudes we must first offer friendship, extend genuine respect for indigenous feelings and ideas, and have sincere regard for the welfare of individuals. Only through such acts on our part can specific motivational techniques have any hope of success.

If one is sensitive to behavioral cues and has a knowledge of indigenous customs, it may be possible to determine the factors which are causing insufficient local incentive. While this is a difficult task and requires exceptional perception of often hidden circumstances, it is obviously worthwhile to know the kinds of obstacles that arise and the various motivators that effect each type of situation.

Perhaps the most widespread obstacle that blocks motivation to change is simple indifference to the projects and purposes of outsiders. The local people are primarily concerned with their own way of life. Projects conducted by foreigners place demands on the local citizen's time and energy which they are usually unwilling to meet without adequate compensation. A variety of rewards may serve as appropriate compensation, either monetary or psychological (eg. a rise in status). Establishing competition for awards is sometimes successful, although in certain societies competition should be avoided where to excel at the expense of others is considered an impropriety.

Adapted from Working Effectively Overseas (f.n.l). p. 86-112.
In favorable circumstances a simple explanation of the potential practical benefit of a project can be effective in securing cooperation. An explanation usually needs to be supplemented by a tangible demonstration of the desirable returns expected if indifference is deeply rooted. If a proposal can be introduced and explained to the local population in such a way as to make them feel it is their idea rather than an outsider's, they are more likely to accept the proposal and want to carry it out. Sometimes a direct appeal for help will overcome local apathy. Whatever technique is used to overcome indifference, persistence is usually required to make people realize the importance of the project and to involve themselves personally.

Another factor blocking motivation is the belief on the part of indigenous individuals that the intentions of Americans may be detrimental rather than beneficial. If this fear is present the only method of solving the problem appears to be repetitive explanations of one's motives plus tangible demonstrations, sometimes over a long period, of actual benefits. The civic action worker should realize that certain projects may actually cause real harm or loss to particular individuals. Indigenous equipment may be lost, stolen, or broken. Normal working habits and behavior patterns may be broken with resulting psychological and social injuries. Few effective solutions are possible if the people are basically suspicious of civic action operations. It is easier to induce people to accept gains than to suffer suspected losses.

A third factor blocking motivation is deeply entrenched habits or methods which are exceedingly difficult to change. Even though existing methods are not always the most effective, they do bring some measure of satisfaction to the worker. The village worker may not be able to visualize any method which would be more efficient or successful than the time-honored practices of his ancestors. His way of doing things often consists of strongly ingrained habits which would require considerable effort or hardship to break. Often a new method will be adopted only tentatively after repeated explanation and demonstration of its practical advantages. Sometimes, if the advisor himself does the work more effectively with the new method, the argument for change is strengthened. The securing of endorsement by respected community figures may provide further encouragement.

Apart from individual habits and procedures, mores and general cultural beliefs may interpose obstacles to innovation and motivation. Any inappropriate behavior which disregards cultural definitions may cause the loss of cooperation and, if seriously disrespectful, may incur resentment and antagonism. Local custom should be thoroughly understood, and care should be taken to avoid procedures which may in any way offend the people. If work performed in a Western manner offends local customs, indigenous techniques should be adopted.
Certain customs and beliefs cannot be changed and the goals of a project and the manner in which it is implemented may have to be abandoned, and more realistic goals and procedures substituted.

In some instances personal motivation is lacking simply because the individual fears undertaking a venture which may be unsuccessful or may risk the possible loss of personal goods or personal prestige. Projects should be selected which minimize these possibilities, at least until the individual has gained sufficient confidence and competence to act more freely. In most other societies persons are reluctant to take on responsibilities or to engage in activities that are not appropriate to their station in life. It is extremely important to recognize that, although our presence is temporary, the local citizen must live in his society for the rest of his life and meet the social responsibilities which it dictates. He is unlikely to risk the long-term displeasure of his own people and the possible disruption of normal social interaction simply in order to comply with the suggestions of a short-term resident foreigner. We must therefore modify our objectives in order to avoid requiring indigenous people to come into conflict with basic social forms.

It is appropriate to conclude this discussion on motivation by emphasizing the importance of negotiation as a means of solving a very wide variety of conflict situations. In most parts of the world negotiation is not only an accepted practice, but a life-long habit which is used in any situation where a conflict in goals is involved. Negotiation is characterized by compromise in order to reach a conclusion which serves both parties. The effective negotiator is adept at finding bargaining issues of importance to one or both parties that were not apparent initially. Driving too hard a bargain may result in lasting resentment - too easy a conclusion will not meet intended goals. In every case, it is desirable to indicate that the negotiation has been accomplished with good will and a desire for further interaction.

The techniques for influencing human behavior are always a delicate issue. Despite any guidance that can be given, motivating other human beings is perilously open to misjudgment. One cannot avoid mistakes in attempting to motivate others. The best safeguards are respect for human dignity, sensitivity to local conditions, and a genuine concern for the well-being of others.
Training

A major part of civic action consists of teaching new methods and ideas. Civic action personnel must think of themselves as teachers, for it is by teaching and advising that a reservoir of new skills is introduced and established in the host country.

The nature of instruction overseas is basically not dissimilar from teaching in the United States. The same techniques of conveying information by lecture, demonstration, and discussion are applicable. Students must be motivated and their abilities and programs assessed. Discipline must be maintained. Yet the overseas environment does introduce certain factors which often complicate the teacher's task. Facilities and training materials are likely to be inadequate or non-existent. The disparity in background between the alien teacher and the native student, language difficulties, the heterogeneity of students' abilities and achievements, and the frequent lack of fundamental skills all serve as barriers to effective teaching. These conditions contribute to the difficulty of teaching overseas and place special demands on the individual teacher.

A first requirement is that the overseas teacher be particularly alert to recognizing his students as individuals, not a faceless mass of humanity to which information must be distributed. Students learn as individuals, and the teacher must adopt methods that are appropriately suitable to individual differences. In a homogeneous group a single method of instruction may be effective but the marked extremes in abilities and interests present overseas demand specialized treatment of individuals and groups.

If feasible, separate, more homogeneous classes should be formed from a single large heterogeneous group so that disparities in abilities and interests can be reduced. In some cases a common class may be more advantageous if the more capable students serve informally as teaching assistants. This is particularly helpful if the advanced students are able to convey certain points better because they are not hindered by a language difference and can draw on common cultural experiences with their fellow students.

Part of this individualized approach is the problem of determining exactly what it is the students expect to be taught. What we think should be taught may differ from what the students (people) believe they ought to know. If the teacher's goal is to be accomplished, the student must have a similar goal. An educational program can fail completely if no one bothers either to find out what the students really wish to learn and teach accordingly, or else to convince the students of the value of the subjects to be offered.
One of the most difficult aspects of teaching overseas is assessment of student progress. Frequently students are reluctant to display their knowledge by answering questions or volunteering information. In some societies, it is considered rude to excel in a competitive situation; in others, the people have never been exposed to any sort of group discussion and as a result are very shy about volunteering information. Ordinarily, under such circumstances, the teacher will have to rely on discussions with individuals, written testing, and practical demonstrations of skill to sense the student's competence and progress.

The student's lack of the most elementary skills ordinarily taken for granted often provides a rude shock to the new overseas teacher. This lack of basic fundamentals, plus a range of experience and background likely to differ vastly from the teacher's, poorly equips the student for learning anything other than simple essentials. The teacher must divest himself of all frills, complexities, and elaborations that may tend to confuse and detract from the essence of the knowledge to be conveyed. Instruction in fundamentals may frequently be required to establish necessary preparatory knowledge on which to base the lesson.

The teacher should adapt instructional materials to suit the needs of the students. The American textbook may have to be substantially revised or completely rewritten and translated to be suitable to those levels of experience found in the overseas setting. Great dependence on diagrams and models, movies, and practical demonstrations will be necessary when communication is a problem. Training aids should be kept simple. Unnecessary elaboration which tends to confuse should be avoided.

Language difficulties overseas pose a major problem in teaching since teaching is pre-eminently a communication process. If the student does not understand what the teacher is saying, learning simply does not take place. If the teacher has the inclination and time to learn the language, this, of course, is the best solution. Partial mastery of the local language, however, is generally not adequate for teaching. The use of an interpreter is generally a necessity. Sometimes a student will serve as interpreter. The teacher must take care to check on the effectiveness of the translation in presenting the subject matter and transmitting the original meaning. In many parts of the world students are extremely reluctant to show that they do not understand. They may, instead, assume a "look of comprehension," nod in assent, or pay seemingly close attention in order to be courteous or to save face, when in fact, they understand practically nothing being said. To avoid this problem, subject matter should start simply and progress slowly with the student's understanding being checked at regular intervals. Explanations should be detailed in terms that are as comprehensible as possible to the learner. The student's grasp of the subject should then be tested by questions and discussion whenever there is doubt.
about his actual progress. Every opportunity should be taken to make learning interesting and rewarding.

Because teaching is of such fundamental importance to any program of country development, special measures must be taken by civic action personnel engaged in teaching to increase their effectiveness by adapting to local conditions. The fundamental gaps in knowledge and skill, the language differences, the disparities of general background between teacher and students, and the general lack of training resources in certain countries increase the complexity of teaching overseas and heighten the need for extra preparation and the development of special skills. It can seldom be expected that civic action personnel can bring these special talents with them to the job. In beginning a teaching assignment it is strongly recommended that the prospective teacher or advisor contact his predecessor or other knowledgeable person before he begins his job in order to determine, at least in a general way, the characteristics of his prospective students, the training methods that have been effective, and the teaching materials that should be prepared. This will expedite the development of those special teaching skills, which are so important to teaching new methods and ideas effectively in a strange environment.

Project Evaluation

Most approaches to evaluation of civic action are concerned with the question: to what extend did the project achieve its goals in the most efficient manner? This question can often be answered with a great deal of accuracy when the goals of a project are specifically defined and sufficient data about results, timing, and the resources employed are obtained. When an examination of possible technical alternatives is also conducted, it can often lead to improved methods and better results with fewer resources. Evaluations of this kind are necessary to improve the technical capacity and economy of military forces engaged in civic action missions.

Equally important to the evaluation of completed projects, are progress evaluations of "on-going" projects. This second type requires careful study of the situation, either before a project is started or early in its course, so that at later stages it will be possible to measure the results against the original situation and to weigh actual achievements against desired results.

Both types of evaluation are important in civic action operations if improved methodology is to be developed and greater efficiency secured. Yet, few measures or yardsticks have been developed to measure success or progress in projects which deal with diverse human and
economic factors. The process of evaluation is therefore a difficult task. This difficulty makes it important that available knowledge and known procedures be used by civic action workers in undertaking evaluation activities.

**On-going Evaluation**

Both final and on-going evaluation requires the setting forth of objectives. If measurement of progress toward these objectives is desired, the objectives obviously must be stated in terms that permit some sort of measurement or appraisal. Most frequently progress will be measured relative to the rate of change expected, the alignment of actual costs with expected expenditures, and the general accomplishment of long-range desired benefits. Regular on-site inspections can be made to determine if the work is progressing as scheduled. Inventories of expended material and labor can be made to check on consumption rates relative to scheduled usage. Not so simple is the problem of measuring the degree to which progress is being made toward the basic objective of civic action which is to help people help themselves.

The measurement procedures which may be used to determine progress toward long range project goals should be aimed at measuring changes in people, changes in literacy, technical skills acquired, levels of information, attitudes, degree of dissatisfaction, and levels of desire for improvement. These human changes cannot be physically measured or counted but they can be appraised on the basis of personal observation and judgment. Under some circumstances, outsiders free from personal involvement should be brought in to deliver unbiased opinions. Still, even under the best circumstances, precise determination of progress, success, or failure, will be difficult.

In conducting on-site investigation of progress, special attention should be given to the following areas where failure is most likely:

1. The adequacy of planning and the establishment of, or the failure to establish, suitable priorities.
2. The adequacy of the administrative organization, including the degree of delegation of authority to field personnel and the avoidance of extensive vertical and horizontal clearances to facilitate operations.
3. The level of competence and of cultural understanding in the personnel selected to do the work.
4. The right or wrong choice of equipment and material for performing the work.
(5) The adequacy of financing.

(6) The degree of understanding by the people and officials of project goals and purposes.

Final Evaluation

Evaluation is essentially a process of learning from experience. Evaluating completed civic action projects means identifying the critical factors of success and failure from which improved future techniques may be devised. A continuing program of evaluating completed projects eventually eliminates unsuccessful projects and procedures, encourages the adoption of more effective working procedures, and focuses research efforts on problems still unsolved. In many ways, evaluation is the most constructive way in which the art of civic action may be improved.

Precise determination of success or failure is difficult. There is an element of failure in many successful projects and an element of success in many that are conceded to be failures. Projects that appear to be short-term failures may prove to be long-term successes. Conversely, projects that appear to be successful in their early stages may fail in the long-run. Thus, the scale between reasonably complete success and nearly total failure is a long one and precise rating of any project on this scale is difficult. What must be identified are those specific areas of project development where success or failure is clear and where lessons can be learned from fairly evident outcomes.

What aspects of completed civic action activities should be evaluated? Four areas appear most critical although undoubtedly lessons can be learned from every activity subject to evaluation.

(1) The degree to which immediate technical objectives were achieved in terms of overall quantity, quality, time, and cost measurements.

(2) The degree to which resources were appropriately and efficiently used as measured by unit costs, i.e., output-input ratios.

(3) The appropriateness of administration and management.

(4) The degree to which intangible benefits of the project were accomplished.
The last question is the most important and cannot be answered with quantitative precision. For certain types of projects there are direct relations between inputs and outputs, but most projects are not of this order. To add up, for example, the monetary value (in terms of salary and other costs) of a medical program of mass immunization would not give an indication of its true significance and would not take into account the long-term benefits of a healthy population. In making a final analysis of the intangible benefits of a project, common judgment is all-important. "Overall impact" must be based on observations and qualitative analysis.

One consequence to look for in evaluating project impact is the degree to which the consumption pattern of the community is permanently altered to provide an increased level of satisfaction. In other words, are the people eating better, enjoying better housing, served by improved medical care facilities? Do they have a higher general standard of living as a result of the project? The impact of a project can also be judged by the degree to which it increases the range of indigenous resources utilized, increases the range of commodities produced, or removes bottlenecks in the system of resource exploitation and production.

Similarly, a project has impact if it contributes to an increased division of labor which improves the efficiency of production or the direct satisfaction of wants. The contribution of the project to increase the effectiveness of communications is also important. Finally, projects make a great contribution by establishing an internal capacity in the host country, which is not dependent on artificial external stimuli.

By way of summary, it is appropriate to refer again to the goals of civic action presented in chapter 1. Broadly speaking, all evaluation seeks essentially to identify the extent to which the goals of civic action are efficiently accomplished. These goals serve not only as the basic standards by which all civic action is judged, but as continuous guides to appropriate field operations.

Civic action —

- Contributes toward social, cultural, and economic development.
- Assists in preventing the infiltration of extremist ideologies.
- Strengthens the ties of mutual respect and friendship between the civilian population and the armed forces.
- Promotes the desire of communities to contribute to their own progress.
Appendix A

Ten Recommended References

These ten books are presented as an introductory library for the civic action worker who seeks to have essential reference works at hand and to keep abreast of developments in the field. It should be regarded as a minimum list representing only the beginning of a more extensive library.


This volume is a compendium of vital concepts and information about human behavior which must be taken into account in the formulation and execution of overseas development programs. The work is an outstanding effort to translate the findings of the social sciences into a non-technical description of the ways in which our own culture and that of non-Western people influence efforts to produce economic and social change. The ultimate practical purpose of the volume "is to stimulate the technician going overseas to be sensitive and inventive in handling the cultural side of technical problems." Chapters dealing with the problems of planned change, characteristics of the undeveloped areas, and American cultural values are extremely informative and a "must" for every prospective overseas worker.


This book, written in non-technical language, presents the philosophy and techniques of community or grassroots development.
Many underlying principles are explained which are appropriate for use in civic action. Chapters 1 and 2 concern the definition and problems of community development. Chapter 3 deals with the cross-cultural barriers to the introduction of change. Chapter 4 concerns the techniques of introducing change. Chapter 5, "Directing Change," stresses the importance of the basic community development doctrine—a project should be oriented toward the needs of the people, rather than toward material development based on standardized programs. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are concerned with aspects of interesting communities in their own problems. Included are techniques of questioning, of gaining cooperation, of stimulating discussion, the special problems of disorganized communities and city areas, and the selection and training of workers.


A general introduction to how the discipline, training, and technical skills of armed forces can be employed not only in preventive counter-insurgency of a civic action nature, but also for national development. The current organization and operation of U.S. military civic action is described along with a review of how armies in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, Vietnam, and the Far East have been and are involved in social and economic development. Detailed illustrative reports on these activities are given. Of special interest are the discussions of the problems and dangers in expanded civic action.


An annotated bibliography of literature on civic action, with emphasis on military civic action in Latin America. Some references are made to Asian programs and to the general topic of community development. Works cited cover definitions, U.S. legislation, policy, programs, evaluation techniques, program evaluation, and opinion. The bibliography is divided into three sections: primary material, which deals with civic action in depth; general background material; and civic action information by country.
TEN RECOMMENDED REFERENCES


This study shows "...what a selected number of countries have done to harness their military potential for non-military purposes and to draw conclusions from this experience." The fifteen countries reviewed are: Belgium, Brazil, Columbia, France, India, Iran, Israel, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The specific programs prepared by nationals of the countries concerned are detailed. This work is a useful basic source for understanding the reasons behind military civic action and the exact nature of various programs.


A collection of papers on the contemporary role of the military in some of the newly emergent states of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and the countries of Latin America. The authors have addressed themselves in particular to a study of how the military compete with their civilian counterparts to promote or retard national development. The papers answer many of the questions (and expose most of the problems) concerning the military as an active political group in underdeveloped countries.


This book is designed to help the Peace Corps Volunteer learn what he should do to become an effective overseas worker. Every overseas worker, however, will find value in the principles of effective behavior presented and the illustrative accounts of specific methods. Major problems likely to be encountered by the overseas worker are discussed along with appropriate responses. Separate chapters are devoted to adjusting to the overseas environment, establishing effective human relations, respecting human dignity, teaching and advising, and motivating. An appendix presents fifty typical problem situations designed to provide the reader an opportunity to put the principles of behavior into practice in realistic settings.
APPENDIXES


This pocket-sized manual provides the U. S. Army advisor to host country forces a ready reference on doctrine and techniques which are most frequently employed in countering latent, incipient, and active insurgency. The doctrine, tactics, and techniques presented are broad in scope and involve principles applicable to many and varied locales. Covered are such topics as the relationships between the Army advisor and other members of the U. S. Country Team (USAID, USIS, etc.); tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency operations; support operations such as fire support, military civic action, intelligence, and psychological operations; and such special considerations as military training, special terrain, and individual and small unit action.


This manual on civil affairs is an excellent primary source on all aspects of the relationships between military operations and the civilian environment. A detailed section on internal development presents general information on the nature of the problem and the role of the military in the conduct of civic action operations. Chapters of special relevance to civil action are those dealing with internal defense and internal development. In short, this manual is a useful reference in all matters relating to civil-military relationships.


A comprehensive survey of the role of military civic action in economic development and social reform. Civic action is defined and the concept discussed including supporting rationale. Two chapters are devoted to a thorough review of the history of civic action from early efforts by colonial powers to the latest civic action operations of the United States in Korea. Case studies are given for six countries: Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Dahomey. The author draws upon his background as Director of the Civil Affairs Combat Development Agency (c. 1962) to thoughtfully and realistically discuss many of the problems to be faced in further developing the civic action capabilities of our armed forces.
Civic Action Projects

A complete list of projects is impossible to compile. Civic action responds to a wide range of basic community needs which vary in different parts of the world in accordance with the physical environment, culture, major means of livelihood, and desires of the people. The list of projects presented here serve as a general guide to the types of activities undertaken and some of the specific efforts involved. The full range of possibilities must inevitably depend upon the awareness, initiative, understanding and wisdom of those who are in a position to identify needed action.

Community Development and Social Welfare

1. Establish community relations councils at town and village level to promote better civilian-military relations, discuss mutual problems, and provide mutual assistance.

2. Provide qualified specialist personnel for advice and assistance to the civilian community.

3. Establish model administration setup in a village and provide instructions to the village officials.

4. Provide assistance in planning, surveying, and constructing houses and community buildings such as schools, civic centers, temples, orphanages, and medical centers.

5. Improve home living conditions by construction of wells or simple filtration systems and construction and repair of sumps and latrines.

6. Provide security of hamlets and villages to permit a normal way of life.
7. Provide assistance and guidance in the establishment and operation of fire fighting organizations in the communities.

8. Provide emergency food, clothing, shelter, and medical support in the event of guerrilla attacks, fire, flood, crop failures, or other caused or natural disasters, until such time as appropriate civilian agencies can assume responsibility.

9. Provide portable generators on a temporary basis for special and emergency occasions.

10. Permit utilization of military communication means by civilians in emergency situations.

11. Protect national treasures and religious monuments.

12. Restore damaged religious and historical monuments.

13. Sponsor youth groups.

**Education**

1. Provide basic education and literacy training.

2. Provide vocational and technical training, and instruction in home and small industry techniques.

3. Organize and conduct day schools for children and evening classes for adults.

4. Provide instructors.

5. Train teachers.

6. Construct educational facilities and supply necessary equipment.

**Health and Sanitation**

1. Assist medical personnel in district and village dispensaries on a scheduled part-time basis.

2. Provide emergency medical treatment and evacuation of civilians to local facilities.

3. Make available the special medical equipment of the military.
4. Assist in the construction and repair of dispensaries and maternity clinics.

5. Improve sanitary conditions and standards including proper disposition of waste.

6. Provide safe water supply systems.

7. Control and eradicate malaria and other contagious diseases where corrective action is effective such as by mass inoculations, draining swamps, instructing in personal precautions, rodent and insect control.

8. Teach sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid.

Agriculture

1. Introduce breeding techniques and new stock.

2. Provide training in fertilizer usage.

3. Give advice and assist in the construction and use of simple farming tools and equipment.

4. Assist in clearing and preparing land, including instruction on soil management and land acclamation.

5. Provide training in the use of vaccines, pesticides, and spraying operations.

6. Construct simple irrigation, drainage, and flood control systems.

7. Conduct such forestry activities as planting, thinning, and harvesting, and provide fire prevention training.

8. Design and construct fish ponds and provide assistance and advice on problems related to fish production and hatchery programs.

9. Construct crop storage and livestock housing facilities and related agricultural buildings.

10. Provide instruction and assist in insect and rodent control and extermination.
Mass Media Information Programs

1. Provide instruction in how to construct simple projects which can be made from available material.

2. Announce the time and place of health services, food and clothing distribution, education programs, and other sponsored programs.

3. Announce evacuation procedures and assistance available for displaced persons.

4. Provide instruction on simple health and sanitation measures.

5. Provide advice and assistance on the best methods for informing the people through such media as publications, films, broadcasting, or other forms of audio-visual aids.

6. Provide audio visual equipment and power source on a temporary basis to communities for educational and cultural projects.

7. Establish a system of signals for use when communities are under attack by guerrilla forces.

Transportation

1. Construct, repair, or improve roads and bridges, railroads, inland waterways, wharves, harbors and airfields.

2. Provide emergency transportation.

3. Provide transportation for people and essential equipment, materials, and food supplies under imposed security conditions.

4. Prepare evacuation plans.
Appendix C

Technical References And Example Projects

American military advisors will almost inevitably be asked to provide technical information on contemplated civic action projects. In those instances where a specialist is not available, the advisor will need to consult appropriate reference material for the detailed information required. A number of such manuals are available which illustrate simplified techniques and construction details for hundreds of low cost, village-level civic action projects. These handbooks usually contain detailed drawings and pictures to clarify the presentation and assist both in overcoming the practical problems of construction and in providing an understanding of the purposes and uses of the various implements depicted. Conversion tables and bibliographies add to the value of these manuals.

Three such handbooks from different organizations are listed below followed by examples of the type of detailed instructions they provide.

Hopfen, H. J. Farm Implements for Arid and Tropical Regions.


Bamboo Walls, Partitions, and Ceilings

Bamboo buildings can be built to meet different needs in strength, protection against rain and wind, light, and ventilation (figs. C2 and C3).

   (1) Local bamboo.
   (2) Bamboo working tools such as machete, hacksaw, chisel, drill.
   (3) Lashing materials—wire or cordage.
   (4) Nails, plaster or stucco, barbed wire.

b. Details.
   (1) Bamboo may be used in its natural form or split along its length. It can be used upright, lashed, or crosswise. It will dry quicker after rain and be more durable, when upright.
   (2) Its uses in walls differ in various areas. Sometimes bamboo strips or thin bamboo culms are nailed or lashed crosswise and close to each other, or both sides of hardwood or bamboo uprights. The spaces between the strips or culms are filled with mud and stones so that the strips are nearly covered. Or, flexible strips of bamboo can be woven together and a mud plaster or mud mixed with straw or dried grasses placed on one or both sides. An attractive, but less strong wall, may be built by stretching bamboo boards crosswise as a base for plaster or stucco, then painted white with lime or cement.
   (3) Partitions are much lighter and weaker, often no more than a matting woven from thin strips of bamboo split from the culm. These are held in place by a light framework of bamboo poles. Thin walled culms and tough wood bamboo are mostly used. The bamboo partitions or walls are often used on the outer side of houses and as a finish on ceilings or walls.
   (4) Ceilings can be built with small, unsplit culms placed close together or by forming a lattice of lathlike strips split from larger culms. A space should be provided for escape of smoke from kitchen fires.

From Simplified Designs and Techniques for Military Civic Action (TM 5-227).
Figure C2. Sprung strip construction.

Figure C3. Woven or wattle construction.
Selecting A Dam Site

To determine whether or not a selected site may be usable for building a dam requires preliminary evaluation. If such evaluation shows the site has good possibilities, an authority should be consulted before construction starts (fig. C4).

**a. Tools and Materials.**

(1) Maps.
(2) Rainfall data.

**b. Details.**

(1) A dam that holds more than a few acre feet of water (1 foot of water (30 cm) covering 1 acre of land (0.4 hectares) equals one acre foot of water) can be dangerous if the dam breaks. Also, to build a dam requires time, labor, materials, and money. Thus, care must be taken in selecting a dam site and to guard against dam collapse, excessive silting, lack of water because of small catchment area, porous soil, polluted water, etc.

(2) Site selection includes six points:

(a) Enough water to fill the reservoir.
(b) Maximum water storage with the smallest dam.
(c) A sound foundation and leak-proof reservoir.
(d) Reasonable freedom from pollution.
(e) A storage site close to users.
(f) Available materials for construction.

(3) The annual rainfall and type of catchment will determine the amount of water which the reservoir will receive. A catchment with steep slopes and rocky surfaces is very good. If the catchment is of porous soil over a leak-proof rock base, springs will develop and carry the water to the reservoir. Trees with small leaves, such as conifers, are desirable near the reservoir as they act as windbreaks and reduce loss of water from evaporation. Swamps, heavy vegetation, pervious ground, slight slopes are all detrimental to a good yield of water from the catchment.

(4) The average catchment area will drain five acre feet of water into the reservoir, during the year, for every inch of annual rainfall falling on a square mile of catchment, i.e., about 10 percent of the rain.

(5) The best location for building a dam is where a broad valley narrows, with steep sides, and a firm base on which to build the dam. Ground containing large boulders cannot be used. Weathered or fissured bedrock, alluvial sands, and porous rocks also are not good. The best base for building a dam are granite or basalt layers at or near the surface or a considerable depth of silty or sandy clay.

(6) Location of the dam upstream from its point of use can lower pollution and may allow for gravity feed of the water to its point of use.

(7) It is best, if stone is nearby, to build a masonry dam. When building an earthen dam, rock will be required for the spillway. The best soils to use for earth dams contain clay with some silt or sand. There should be enough of this soil close to the dam site to build the entire dam of reasonably uniform material.

(8) Careful selection of the dam site will save labor and material costs and help insure a strong dam. A careful preliminary investigation, using the above guides, will form a strong basis for discussion with an expert and encourage him to inspect the proposed site.

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1From *Simplified Designs and Techniques for Military Civic Action (TM 5-227).*
Figure C4. Good and bad sites.
Appendix D

Civic Action Example Report Formats

The U. S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, has developed general procedures and associated formats to provide basic guidance for planning civic action in the absence of more specific directions.

Five planning formats taken from Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action (ST 41-10-90) are reproduced here to familiarize the field worker with the recommended military form of structuring planning operations. Many circumstances such as insufficient planning time will necessarily require substantial modification of these general procedures.

CIVIC ACTION SURVEY - The compilation of information pertaining to a geographical area or region with respect to the political, economic, and social conditions, to determine the applicability, acceptability, and feasibility of conducting "civic action" in certain functional areas.

CIVIC ACTION ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION - An analysis and comparison of courses of action within selected civic action functional areas to determine the most suitable courses of action in arriving at recommendations or a decision.

CIVIC ACTION PLAN - A translation of the decision into: courses of action to be pursued, civic action tasks to be performed by agencies, support requirements, and coordination between agencies.

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM - A restatement of a specific portion of a plan reflecting detailed information pertaining to time frame justification, responsibilities, services, supplies, and costs involved in accomplishing civic action projects.

CIVIC ACTION PROJECT - Action taken by military and paramilitary units that contribute to the economic, political, and social development of an area and simultaneously builds cumulative civilian support for the military.
FORMAT - CIVIC ACTION SURVEY

(Classification)

Headquarters
Place
Date and Time

File Nr. 

SUBJECT: (Sufficient for file identification. Example: "Civic Action Survey Study for the Country of ")

NOTE: The heading is similar to that used for a military letter. The file number and subject are included as in a military letter. Classification appears at the top and bottom of each page.

1. MISSION. Concise statement of the problem in the form of a mission. If the problem is complex, indicate the scope. Subparagraphing may be used. Example follows:

"Determine feasibility and applicability of a Civic Action program for the Army and assess its capabilities to execute and support such a program. Recommend various functional areas of endeavor for intensive exploitation to develop:

"a. Respect and friendship of the country's citizenry for the military forces.

"b. Respect of the military for the citizen, his rights, and the national democratic institutions.

"c. An increased stability of government through military participation and contributions of its manpower, resources, and technical capabilities to the overall national program."

From Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action (ST 41-10-90), U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
2. ASSUMPTIONS. Any assumptions pertinent to the survey-mission necessary for a logical discussion. Assumptions are used in the absence of factual data to constitute a basis for the study and to broaden or limit the mission. The assumption, while not a fact, must at least have a basis or foundation of fact.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE MISSION. Paragraph 3 contains pertinent statements of undeniable fact relative to the country's current politico-socio-economic conditions having direct and immediate influence on the Civic Action mission. Some facts may be uncovered during research while others are inherent in briefings and/or directives assigning the mission. Statistics relative to deficiencies or needs discovered in each of the pertinent functional areas under consideration may well be presented in this paragraph. The following principal paragraph headings provide a suggested approach.

a. General conditions.
   (1) Political.
   (2) Sociological.
   (3) Economic.

b. Assessment of needs.
   (Under each functional area of need (see para 83c, FM 41-10) for possible exploitation in support of the mission, discuss major or critical deficiencies uncovered during research.)

4. DISCUSSION. Paragraph 4 includes the analysis of all the relevant factors inherent in each functional area under study... including the consideration of applicability, feasibility and host government's capabilities of exploiting each functional field of endeavor. This is the paragraph in which the author sets down in a clear and concise manner, his analysis of the data presented in paragraph 3 above. (NOTE: However, in a lengthy or complex survey, this paragraph may be only a summary with the details included in a discussion annex.) The author must exercise the same care in setting down his discussion as was used in analyzing his data to insure that each item is placed and treated in its proper functional area. Suggested paragraphing and content guidance follows:
CIVIC ACTION EXAMPLE REPORT FORMATS

a. Applicability. The sociological implications and psychological impact of your mission and/or objectives on the society in question. Consider (favorable or adverse) factors of customs, culture, mores, and religion of the area.

b. Feasibility. The feasibility of successfully accomplishing the mission. Consider (favorable or adverse) factors of politico-economic pertinency, such as: current political atmosphere; civil/military relationship; internal security (degree of insurgency, insecure and denied areas); current MAP status and country priority; and U.S. policy guidance bearing on the mission.

c. Capabilities. General assets in:

(1) Host government.
   (a) Functional ministeries
   (b) Armed Forces
   (c) Others

(2) U.S. Country Team.
   (a) USAID
   (b) USIS
   (c) U.S. MAAG or Mission (including special attachments...Special Forces, MTT's 3rd country support, and so forth.)
   (d) Other than above.

5. CONCLUSIONS. Paragraph 5 presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis of all the relevant factors. Each major conclusion, where appropriate, will reflect degree of consideration given to:

   a. Benefits to be derived by the host government (politico-socio-economic).
b. Benefits accruing to the U.S. national policy and enhancement of U.S. prestige.

c. And other pertinent considerations affecting the conclusions.

6. ACTIONS RECOMMENDED. Paragraph 6 must be in consonance with the conclusions. State your findings briefly, i.e., the general functional areas recommended for exploitation. Successive steps to be pursued by the staff may also be recommended in order to insure progressive and coordinated planning actions leading up to the actual implementation of the program. Example follows:

"That detailed estimates and plans be prepared by or for the host government's armed forces (or jointly) in order to establish a Civic Action program embracing the following functional areas deemed applicable, feasible, and within the joint capabilities of the present U.S. Country Team and the host government's armed forces:

"a. Public health and sanitation.

"b. Education (with emphasis or priority on increasing literacy).

"c. Public works and utilities.

"d. ... and ... so ... forth."

\(\textit{s}/\)

(Initiating staff officer and title)

(SEE FORM 27, STAFF STUDY, FM 101-5 for handling of concurrences and nonconcurrences.)

JTE 1: Applicability (capable of being applied, fit or suitable). As an example of non-applicability; rabies control normally requires collection and extermination of dogs and other animal life affected. In a given
Buddhist country, opposition by or even alienation of the religious elements may result. In some Buddhist nations (viz. Laos), the extermination of animal life is a criminal offense and this right is legally reserved in the constitution to the Chief of the National Police. (Moreover, voodoo, animism, and superstitions with accompanying witchcraft may offer almost insurmountable problems.)

NOTE 2: Feasibility (practicability, capable of being accomplished). In Latin America, the Armed Forces of many nations have been used during many decades by dictators as a brutal instrument of suppression. Can the military in such cases overcome public fear and distrust; become an instrument of benevolence; discontinue its lofty perch of special privileges and attain some degree of success in a national Civic Action program aimed at its skeptical citizenry?

NOTE 3: Capabilities (in the form of assets). Technological know-how, manpower, material, training potentials, and supervisory personnel.
FORMAT - CIVIC ACTION ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION¹

(Classification)

Headquarters

Place

Date and Time

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (Civic Action)

REFERENCE: Map, Chart, or Document. (As necessary for understanding of the Estimate.)

1. MISSION. A statement of the mission and its purpose. If the mission is general in nature, determine or state (if previously determined by a Civic Action Survey) what functional areas of endeavor must be exploited to insure that the mission is accomplished. State multiple functional areas in the sequence in which they are to be accomplished or to reflect priority of emphasis within the mission.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

a. General situation. For each functional area, determine all the facts or in the absence of facts logical assumptions which have a bearing on the situation in need of correction and which contribute to or influence the ultimate choice of supporting project activities or courses of action. Analyze where pertinent available facts and/or assumptions and arrive at deductions from these as to their favorable or adverse influence or effect on the accomplishment of the mission.

b. Considerations which may adversely affect the exploitation of the functional area. For each functional area within the mission, determine and list significant difficulties or difficult patterns which are anticipated and which could adversely affect the accomplishment of the mission.

¹From Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action (ST 41-10-90), U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
c. Feasible courses of action. Determine and list all feasible project activities or courses of action within each of the selected functional areas which will play a part in the over-all accomplishment of the mission.

3. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Determine through analysis the probable outcome of each project activity or course of action and weigh as to desirability and feasibility; and justify as a project activity for exploitation within the related functional area of endeavor.
   a. Desirability.
   b. Feasibility.
   c. Justification.

4. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION. List advantages and disadvantages apparent in each course of action. Compare each course of action in terms of these advantages and disadvantages. Decide which courses of action promise to be most successful in accomplishing the mission. Elimination of certain courses of action may be recorded with basis for rejection.

5. DECISION. Translate each project activity or course of action selected into a complete statement, showing who, what, when, where, and why as appropriate.

/s/
(Initiating staff officer and title)
FORMAT - CIVIC ACTION PLAN¹

(Classification)

Heading

CIVIC ACTION PLAN (Country Code Name)

TASK ORGANIZATION: List military organizations in the country that are to be included in the execution of the plan. If the plan envisages additional military units the number and type of unit may be listed. Task organization may be shown as an annex if sufficiently large.

1. SITUATION.

   a. General. A statement of the situation as it exists within the country concerned.

   b. Enemy elements. Summary of Communist or anti-U.S. Forces, including their influence, objectives, organization and leaders.

   c. Friendly elements. Summary of assets available to support Civic Action mission; including military units or organizations, include military elements operating within the country that are not subject to MAAG control; e.g., SAC, MATS, etc.

   d. Assumptions. Supposition on the current or future situation assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof. Assumptions must be logical and reasonable and should be used to state conditions that must exist for the plan to be used.

2. MISSION. To plan and conduct Civic Action activities in ________ in coordination with other agencies, to secure a flexible coordinated program in support of U.S. objectives.

(Classification)

¹From Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action (ST 41-10-90).
U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
3. OBJECTIVES. List all objectives in the country that the military is to be directed to support.

4. TASKS. (This section should serve the purpose of paragraph 3 of an operations order or plan.)

   a. Concept of operations. This is a statement of the visualization of the conduct of the entire operation. It should clarify the purpose of the operation and is stated in sufficient detail to enable subordinates to fully understand their role in the operation. The concept of operations may be included as an annex, if the length makes it unwieldy in the body of the plan.

   b. Subsequent subparagraphs (c, d, e, etc.) should list these courses of action proposed to achieve the objective. Depending on the military organization in the country, tasks may be assigned to units, listed by service, or given as tasks peculiar to a local area.

5. COORDINATION. State specifically the arrangements made to insure coordination between the military and other government agencies. Levels of coordination, extent of coordination, and responsibilities for coordination should be shown.

6. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. List provisions for support requirements that are beyond the current capability of the military. This should include additional funds, equipment and personnel.

7. COMMAND. Identify responsible command elements and show location. Clarify command channels for implementation of plan.
**EXAMPLE: CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM**

**FUNCTIONAL AREA - PUBLIC WORKS**  
**TASK: IMPROVE ROAD AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS**  
**REFERENCE: ANNEX G, CIVAC/MAPLAN FY**

**PROJECT NR. PW-5**  
**TITLE: ROAD AND AIR STRIP CONSTRUCTION VIC MERALDA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) PROJECT SITE</th>
<th>(2) DESCRIPTION (Objective)</th>
<th>(3) ITEMS REQUIRED (Nomenclature)</th>
<th>(4) QTY</th>
<th>(5) COST PER UNIT</th>
<th>(6) TOTAL COST</th>
<th>MAP</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>USIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outskirts of city of Meralda Tacama Air Strip</td>
<td>This project consists of the construction of 28 kilometers of connecting road and an air strip 1800 x 45 meters on the outskirts of the city of Meralda. See attached TAB A for Map of Area for Construction Sites (omitted).</td>
<td>Diesel Oil 1200 Gals</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>$240.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gasoline, 80 Octane 8000 Gals</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,920.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oil, wt 10 100 Gals</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>220.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oil, wt 20 400 Gals</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,120.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oil, wt 30 150 Gals</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>480.00</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POL at rate of 7,000 miles per year per motorized equipment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To be contracted for by local Esso distributor.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portland Cement 1000 Sacks</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Steel rods 1/2&quot; 50 Tons</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shovel, D-Handle 100 Ea</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td></td>
<td>$270.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shovel, Long-Handle 25 Ea</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mattock, Pick 5 lb 100 Ea</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td>350.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wheelbarrow 50 Ea</td>
<td>11.65</td>
<td></td>
<td>582.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bar, Digging 25 Ea</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>125.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ax, Single Bit, 4 lb 20 Ea</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 From *Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action* (ST 41-10-90).  
U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
## PROJECT NR. PW-5
### TITLE: ROAD AND AIR STRIP CONSTRUCTION VIC MERALDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(7) HOST COUNTRY MILITARY PARTICIPATION (Pers-Equip-Materials, etc.)</th>
<th>(8) CIVILIAN COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION (Labor-Equip-Materials)</th>
<th>(9) U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL REQUIRED</th>
<th>(10) ESTIMATED STARTING DATE</th>
<th>(11) ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE</th>
<th>(12) REMARKS (Tasks-Priorities-Benefits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major MAP items of equipment will be furnished by 113 Engineer Battalion and will be located on site, consisting of:</td>
<td>Meralda Community is supplying 400-man labor force (volunteers). To be compensated only by payment-in-kind by:</td>
<td>3 U.S. NCO's (Constr Eng), supervisors from 18-MTT-102, FY ____</td>
<td>1 Jan ____</td>
<td>30 Dec ____</td>
<td>Meralda, a fertile but isolated farming area of great potential will be able to market their produces in the heretofore unreachable capital of Ito. May encourage mechanization of farming and offer market for manufactures products from local industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tractor, TD-20</td>
<td>Cudan Govt. using U.S. PL 480 surplus foods.</td>
<td>2 U.S. NCO's (Hvy Eng Equip Maint) from 18-MTT-102, FY ____</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tractor, Whl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Scraper, MTD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Truck, DP, 2-1/2 T</td>
<td>Two local civilian doctors will support project with free medical care in the Meralda Dispensary.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Roller, Sheepsfoot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Roller, TWD, PNEU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Rootor, MTD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Grader, Road, MTD</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Compressor, Air 210</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Air Hammer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Distributor, Water, TRK-MTD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Pumps, Centrifugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Crane, Shovel 20T, TRK-MTD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Crushing and Screening Plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cudan Army to supply project officer (Eng), equipment operators, mechanics, labor team supervisors, supply personnel, and truck drivers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) PROJECT SITE</th>
<th>(2) DESCRIPTION (Objective)</th>
<th>(3) ITEMS REQUIRED (Nomenclature)</th>
<th>(4) QTY UNIT</th>
<th>(5) COST PER UNIT</th>
<th>(6) MAP USAID USIS TOTAL COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Technical Assistance Support.</td>
<td>3 NCO's 18-MTT-102 (See Item 9)</td>
<td>For 370 days at $15.00 per diem</td>
<td>375.00</td>
<td>$5,559.00</td>
<td>$5,925.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 NCO's 18-MTT-02 (See Item 9)</td>
<td>For 120 days at $15.00 per diem</td>
<td>1,800.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of Travel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$9,424.50 $9,080.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$18,504.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Establishment of a country development plan requires a deliberate and detailed inventory and assessment of the area concerned. The inventory is conducted to collect, record, and analyze information on the area, together with related background studies, and to present those aspects of greatest pertinence to the various development problems.

All aspects of a country are inventoried and considered in the assessment in terms applicable to country development. The following outline of inventory topics is taken from Internal/Defense Development Planning Guide (ST 31-176) prepared by the U. S. Army Special Warfare School and is reproduced here in its entirety for reference purposes.

a. Geography

   Location, size, external relationships, significant characteristics, military or political regions, coasts, soils, water sources, vegetation, and geographic effects on population.

b. Climate

   General weather conditions, meteorological services, weather with relation to military operations or government programs, and effects of weather on the population.

c. Economy

   (1) General: General characteristics of the economy, its energy, and its raw material base; its development and the framework of the government policy within which it operates; gross national product; skills and distribution of the labor forces; trends and historic external influences; goals, programs, and fulfillment prospects; consumer interests and foreign trade.
(2) Agriculture: Internal food supply; industrial crops; market system; influence of climate, terrain, and government policy; production methods; improvement programs, and strengths and weaknesses.

(3) Raw Materials: Reserves, productions, processing and distribution.

(4) Commerce and Industry: Nature and capacity of individual enterprises; power sources; government policy toward; degree of industry directed toward improving the internal economic situation; production incentives; trade balance and practices.

(5) Finance: Finance structure and operation; government policies; tax structure; debts; and banking system.

(6) Transportation and Telecommunications: Rail; highway; inland waterway; ports; merchant marine; civil air; telecommunications; characteristics development; administration and control; government policies; schools and training; and significance on the economy.

(7) Labor: Manpower resources; use of labor force; influence in government planning and control; working conditions; management and labor relations problems; and legislation.

(8) Recapitulation of factors in the economic situation significant to insurgent growth.

d. Sociology

(1) Population: Significant details; size; composition; distribution; structure; trends; and movement of ethnic groups; problems and government policies; outlook and attitude; social structure; social values and patterns; family and group relations; cultural homogeneity or complexity; areas of friction; and customs and traditions.

(2) Religion: Role in society and relation to government; principal i.i.ths; and value judgements present in the society as a result of religious teachings.

(3) Public Information: Media of mass communication and significant characteristics.

(4) Education: Main characteristics; state, church and private involvement.
(5) Health and Sanitation: Attitudes and environmental factors; diseases of man and animals; administration of public health; medical programs and organization; medical personnel, research, facilities and training supplies.

(6) Welfare: Levels of living and social welfare legislation; public and private aid and services; and social problems.

(7) Recapitulation of factors in the sociological situation significant to growth of insurgency.

e. Politics

(1) Present Political System: Constitutional background, where applicable regulation of the nation in theory and practice; pattern of government; civil and religious rights; constitutional provisions with relation to economic, social, and military matters; organizational systems regionally; judicial system; bureaucracy; administrative districts; dependencies and associated states; historical external political influences; public administration; nepotism; and corruption.

(2) Political Dynamics: Salient features of the system; stability and social tensions; leadership; political awareness among populace; political parties; electoral procedures; pressure groups; and external influences.

(3) Public Order and Safety: Police and penal systems; facilities; honesty and efficiency of police; criminal codes and procedures; civil defense; use of national police, constabulary, gendarmerie, and other police or paramilitary forces (with essentially a police mission); to include qualitative aspects; conscription or recruitment systems; international agreements; legal basis; economic basis (to include appropriation system); position of forces in national and local government structure; general organization, training, doctrine and efficiency; rapport with population; and state of internal security and public order.

(4) Military Forces: Qualitative aspects; conscription or recruitment systems; international agreements; legal basis; economic basis (to include appropriation system); position of forces in national and local government structure; general organization, training, doctrine and efficiency; rapport with population; and role in internal security.
(5) National Policies: Government approach to national and international problems, trends, major issues, foreign relations, foreign investment, defense policy and public support of national policies.

(6) Intelligence, Security, and Propaganda: Intelligence agencies; effectiveness and methods of operation; security practices; propaganda themes; targets and effectiveness; and propaganda for foreign countries.

(7) Recapitulation of factors in the political situation significant to growth of insurgency.

f. Present External Influences and Interests in Country

(1) United States: Organizations and resources of governmental agencies; programs; U. S. Military programs, resources, and capabilities; commercial enterprises and their resources; factors limiting effectiveness of U. S. effort.

(2) Free World (except U. S.): Significant governmental aid programs; commercial interests; and extent to which they can and will support reform programs.

(3) International: Capabilities and efforts of international organizations; religious missionary programs of private non-profit organizations.

(4) Communist Influences and Programs: Party structure and other instruments for implementing policy; the extent of, and reasons for, their success; infiltration of government (especially police and armed forces); influence in economic planning; influence in labor and agrarian movements; and infiltration and exploitation of other groups and movements.
Appendix F

Characteristics Of Underdeveloped Areas—World Distributions

These charts may be used to identify the extent and location throughout the world of certain characteristics which usually are associated with underdeveloped areas. The shaded areas on the maps experience the most extreme condition or the lowest level of development for each of the characteristics examined.

Chart

1. Natural Population Increase
2. Nutritional Value of Average Diet
3. Cause of Death
4. Average Life Expectancy
5. Literacy Rate
6. Level of Technological Development
7. Gross National Product
Chart 1 POPULATION INCREASE

Economic progress is hampered where the population increases at an excessive rate. Shaded on the map are inhabited areas where the total of births over deaths exceeds 20 per 1,000 per year.
Chart 2
NUTRITIONAL VALUE OF AVERAGE DIET

Progress in many nations is blocked by diets which provide insufficient energy to work hard or to recover from disease. Inhabited areas which experience inadequacies in calories, protein, and fat are shaded on the map.
Chart 3
CAUSES OF DEATH

When people learn to control parasites and guard against bacterial growth and spread, they are able to cut down on transmissible diseases such as malaria, smallpox, plague, tuberculosis, typhus, yellow fever, and cholera. Shaded areas are those inhabited regions where more than 10 percent of the deaths are caused by these transmissible diseases.
The anticipated life span for a nation's people is a fair measure of the degree of progress in medical and health technology. The shaded area represents inhabited regions with life expectancies below 45 years.
Chart 5
LITERACY RATE

Education is the key to national development beyond the primitive level. Inhabited areas where less than half the population can read and write, shaded on the map, correspond significantly to inhabited areas where little technological progress has been made.
More important than supplies of industrial raw materials are the skills and abilities of a nation's people. The shaded area indicates those inhabited regions where technology is not significantly developed.
Chart 7
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

The amount of an individual's share in the value of goods and services produced by his country is an acceptable standard of economic well being. The shaded area indicates those inhabited regions where the per capita gross national product is below $200.