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SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE:
1965–1969

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Thomas W. Wolfe
PREFACE

This inquiry is a contribution to The RAND Corporation's continuing program of research, undertaken for the United States Air Force, on Soviet military and political policy vis-à-vis the West. The present Memorandum is the final portion of a three-part study of the Soviet Union's political-military posture toward Western Europe since the end of World War II, and of the way in which the Kremlin has exploited its growing power in dealing with both Western and Eastern Europe as well as in its political rivalry with the United States on the European continent. Parts One and Two, which appeared under the title *Soviet Power and Europe: The Evolution of a Political-Military Posture, 1945-1964*, RM-5838-PR, took the subject to the point of Khrushchev's ouster in 1964; Part Three examines it under the changed conditions of the successor regime and in the light of such major events as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.

Together with the earlier Memorandum, the present study aims at providing a synthesis between two planes of analysis -- the political and the military -- for the period that it covers. In so examining the nature of Soviet European policy since World War II, it illuminates the kinds of problems that the United States faces as leader of the Western alliance.

The study draws on a wide range of original Soviet materials, as well as on secondary Western sources and analyses of Soviet policy, including earlier work on Soviet affairs by the author and other RAND analysts.
The period covered by Part Three of this study of the postwar evolution of Soviet policy toward Europe runs from Khrushchev's ouster in the fall of 1964 to mid-1969, when the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime found itself still faced with the laborious task of repairing the damage to Soviet interests wrought by the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Prior to the Czechoslovak affair, however, the regime had for the most part been able to profit handsomely from the gradual erosion of NATO, one of the major, though perhaps partly unearned, successes of Soviet foreign policy since World War II.

With an eye to the decisive weight of industrial Europe in the world power balance while the United States, in the mid-sixties, was increasingly distracted by the Vietnam war, Khrushchev's successors had sought through active diplomacy and political maneuver to establish closer economic, technical, and political ties with West European countries; they had tried to foster the idea that new, pan-European security arrangements would help to settle the "German problem" as well as provide a timely alternative to NATO in 1969, when its members became eligible to exercise their option to leave the alliance. By playing upon West European desires for a role more independent of the United States, and especially upon de Gaulle's anti-Americanism, the Soviet Union seemed to have found a convenient formula for weakening NATO unity and undermining U.S. influence in Europe without having to exert direct pressures on the Western alliance.
The tendency of America's European allies to move away from their close dependence on American leadership was not the only factor favoring the new European diplomacy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. There was also a feeling in the West that dissension within the Communist world had offset the erosion of NATO unity and that, as the bipolar division of Europe broke down, the continent might, after two decades of Cold War, be moving toward some form of reconciliation. Above all, there was a widespread belief that the naked use of Soviet military power in Europe was virtually ruled out, both because of the strategic nuclear standoff and because of presumed evolutionary changes in the Soviet system itself. The bridge-building mood of the mid-sixties, together with the belief that the new Kremlin collective leadership was inclined toward moderation and traditional norms of international behavior, led many in the West to question the continued need for NATO as a defense against a Soviet military threat presumed to be dying, if not already dead.

In this climate, the European diplomacy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime prior to the Czechoslovak crisis seemed to offer the Soviet Union prospects for progress toward some of its principal objectives in Europe. Soviet policy, though perhaps no longer geared to the expectation of revolutionary social and political transformations in Western Europe, appeared still to be aimed at the break-up of NATO, the weakening of West European ties with the United States, and the isolation and demoralization of West Germany -- objectives whose attainment would leave the Soviet Union dominant on the European continent and would enhance its global power position relative to the
United States. Thus, Soviet aims could be described as to upset the postwar status in the Western half of a divided Europe while preserving it in the East.

The essential flaw in this picture, however, was the Kremlin leadership's inability to arrest, without recourse to naked force, the gradual erosion of Soviet authority and control in East Europe, where the process of change and internal reform that had begun with Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" campaign was so dramatically displayed in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Even before that crisis came to a head, in July and August, the Soviet leaders had become so preoccupied with defending their position in East Europe against the undermining effects of freer East-West intercourse in general and Bonn's Ostpolitik in particular that they virtually surrendered the chances for initiatives in European affairs with which circumstances such as America's absorption by the war in Vietnam had presented them. It might be said that the Kremlin's regression to dogmatic defense of orthodoxy, both in East Europe and against the restiveness of Soviet intellectuals at home, had begun to foreclose what opportunities it had for a flexible diplomacy in the Western half of Europe even before the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

In the short run, the invasion itself brought both benefits and liabilities from Moscow's viewpoint. Some of its advantageous effects were: to reestablish the credibility of Soviet military power as the prime instrument of Soviet control in East Europe, a credibility that had steadily declined since Khrushchev crushed the Hungarian rebellion twelve years earlier; to snuff out the Czechoslovak reform experiment and allay Soviet fears
that it might spread to other parts of East Europe; to increase the Soviet military presence deployed in the key Northern Tier area of the Warsaw Pact, on NATO's doorstep; and to remind Bonn that Moscow held the keys to any bargains to be struck in the East, thus making it clear that serious concessions to the Soviet Union and East Germany would be the price of a continuing Ostpolitik.

On the debit side, the Czechoslovak invasion, among other things, shattered the image of a mellowing, peace-loving Soviet Union. It created, instead, an impression of unpredictability, which, together with the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" of intervention devised by Moscow to justify the invasion, became an incentive to NATO to halt the disintegration of its military posture and gave the alliance a fresh sense of its relevance to European security. Further, the invasion threatened to split the Communist movement in Western Europe and squandered much of the neutralist sentiment and other political capital that the Soviet Union had accumulated there; it also prompted the United States to mend its relations with its European allies and to delay the opening of strategic arms talks with Moscow. In Czechoslovakia, the Soviet occupiers found it difficult to persuade the people to cooperate in their resubjugation, and Moscow's uncertainty as to the reliability of the country's armed forces meant that it had to assume a bigger share of the Warsaw Pact defense.

But, beyond all this, the Soviet Union's attempt to reimpose by force of arms the authority it had acquired in East Europe through military victory in World War II dealt a severe setback to the prospects of East-West reconciliation in Europe. Whatever their motives -- fear
that orthodox Communist rule could not survive in an atmosphere of relative freedom. Concern that their military security might be breached by a westward-looking Czechoslovakia -- the Soviet leaders had shown that they could not tolerate such "subversive" concepts as bridge-building and freer East-West traffic in ideas. At best, it seemed likely that Europeans could look forward to another indefinite period of uneasy East-West confrontation, backed up by bipolar alliance arrangements, rather than to a reconciled Europe.

As for the Soviet Union's policy toward East Europe in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak experience, it appeared to have at least three choices. The most radical of these, and hence perhaps the least likely, was outright acceptance of fundamental reforms of the Communist order in East Europe. Given the regression of the incumbent Soviet leadership to ultraconservatism and defense of orthodoxy, its tolerance of systemic reform and liberalization either in the Soviet Union or in East Europe promised to remain low.

A second alternative was that the Soviet leadership might increasingly dedicate itself to a kind of neo-Stalinism, demanding more rigid conformity at home and seeking elsewhere in the Soviet camp to stamp out revisionist trends by the reimposition of physical control through Soviet military and police power. Although the Brezhnev doctrine of intervention within a hazily-defined "socialist commonwealth" was not necessarily a blueprint for such a policy, it was available to serve as the rationale for any Soviet attempt to keep East Europe under control and to insulate it from Western influence. From a West European viewpoint, such a neo-Stalinist course might not be altogether deplorable, for a Soviet Union preoccupied with
staving off "subversion" of its own system from the West might be unable to give much attention to tampering with the status quo in Western Europe. Depending on the resilience and political imagination of its rulers, a third policy alternative open to the Soviet Union was to adjust itself opportunistically to the postinvasion situation, and to seek to preserve its hegemony in East Europe by exploiting and dividing the forces of political change and modernization rather than stifling them by neo-Stalinist despotism. This probably would presuppose the Soviet leaders' willingness to rise above their anxious authoritarianism toward East Europe and to reopen a more flexible diplomacy in Western Europe, aimed especially at exploiting Bonn's insecurities and hopes of reunification. By mid-summer of 1969, there were increasing signs that, despite its insistence on neo-Stalinist orthodoxy within the Soviet bloc itself, the Kremlin leadership was seeking ways once more to exploit fissures in Western unity, in keeping with the principle -- long the basis of its European diplomacy -- that it is essential to prevent a united Western policy front toward the East.

From the time the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime assumed power, in October 1964, until mid-1969, its European policy unfolded against the background of a changing Soviet-American power balance, the change being partly the result of the military programs pursued by Khrushchev's successors. Though marked by a continuing emphasis on maintaining a strong Soviet military position in Europe, these programs also included a substantial buildup in offensive and defensive strategic forces and the further development of blue-water naval
forces and other elements of conventional power that added to the mobility and versatility of the Soviet Union's global capabilities. The rapid closing of the gap in strategic nuclear forces that separated it from the United States, and a growing capacity to project other forces into areas traditionally beyond the Soviet Union's reach, meant that for the first time in its history the USSR was becoming a truly global militar power.

How this circumstance might affect the stability of deterrence and the future political conduct of the Soviet Union in the international arena were matters of no small import. In the past, deterrence had been marked by a military and political asymmetry: America's superior nuclear power coincided with a political posture oriented mainly toward containment of the Soviet Union and defense of the international status quo, while the Soviet Union, inferior in strategic power, was wedded to political-ideological aspirations to reshape the world order along Communist lines. Thus, the weight of American strategic power and superiority in globally mobile forces set definite limits upon the risks the Soviet Union was willing to run. In the changing situation of the late sixties, a critical question was whether the Soviet leaders, no longer laboring under a markedly unfavorable power balance, might be tempted to pursue somewhat bolder policies than before.

Some students of Soviet affairs, though doubting that the Soviet Union would go so far as to court a deliberate confrontation with the United States, believed that its stronger military posture and more vigorous assertion of global interests would probably increase the incidence of dangerous situations and enhance the possibility that in some
major crisis the Soviet leaders, overestimating their position and diplomatic leverage, might blunder into an action with perhaps disastrous consequences. Other observers maintained, however, that engrained Soviet caution toward the danger of war would be likely to dominate the Kremlin's outlook, and discourage it from any propensities to take undue risks, despite a power balance more favorable to the Soviet Union than before. In this view, while more militant, hardline tendencies had appeared within the Soviet leadership as the country's relative power position became stronger, these elements had their way only with regard to intrabloc matters like Czechoslovakia, and it was still to be seen whether militancy would be extended to issues outside the bloc. The Soviet need to mend fences in the West while girding for a possible enlargement of border conflicts with China was another factor deemed likely to temper militant anti-Western tendencies in Moscow.

Which of these contrasting appraisals would prove closer to the mark was still a moot question in mid-1969, at a time when the Soviet Union and the United States finally cleared the way for their long-delayed strategic arms limitation talks. The talks themselves would doubtless throw some light on whether the Kremlin leaders were mainly interested in bringing the strategic competition with the United States to a halt, or in manipulating it to Soviet advantage. Beyond this, however, what remained as one of the central questions for the future was whether the Soviet leaders would cling to old orthodoxies likely to feed global ferment and discord, or whether they would seek closer cooperation with the world's other nuclear
superpower in an effort to reduce the sources of international tension and instability.
CONTENTS

PREFACE .......................................................... iii

SUMMARY .......................................................... v

Part Three

THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN PERIOD:
ITS FIRST HALF DECADE ........................................... 1

Section

XI. OVER-ALL TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER

KHRUSHCHEV'S SUCCESSORS ................................. 3

A. Status of the Collective Leadership ........ 4

B. Domestic Policy: Economic Developments ... 10

1. The Economic Reform Program ........ 11

2. Upturn in Economic Performance .... 13

C. Domestic Policy: Control of Social and

Cultural Change ........................................... 16

1. Social Problems and Control Measures 17

2. The New Regime and Soviet Intellec-
tual Dissent ........................................... 20

D. Trends in Foreign Policy ......................... 27

1. The Soviet Position in the Sino-

Soviet Dispute ........................................... 28

2. The New Regime's Reassertion of an

Interest in the Vietnam War ........ 32

3. The Impact of Vietnam on Soviet

Foreign Policy ........................................... 36

E. Soviet-American Relations ..................... 41

1. Negotiations on Nuclear Nonprolifer-

ation and Other Matters ..................... 43

2. Soviet Reluctance To Hold ABM Talks 46

3. Soviet-American "Crisis Collaboration" To Avoid War ........ 48

4. The Tentative Emergence of a New

Soviet Stance Toward the United

States .................................................. 51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Main Phases in the Post-Khrushchev Pattern of Policy Toward Western Europe</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Initial Soviet Policy Toward West Germany</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Temporary Berlin Harassment</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Reaction to Bonn's &quot;Peace Note&quot;</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>The Growth of Soviet-French Cordiality</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. De Gaulle's Soviet Visit</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Other Elements of the Emerging Soviet Policy Line in Europe</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Soviet Talks with Western Leaders</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Soviet Reluctance To Enter a Dialogue with the United States on European Security</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Soviet Relations with East Europe Prior to the Bucharest Conference</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Poland</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Bulgaria</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Hungary</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Rumania</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>The Bucharest Conference Line on European Issues</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## XIII. SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICY AFTER THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>General Features of the Soviet Diplomatic Offensive in Western Europe</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Soviet Policy Toward West Germany</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The Soviet Approach to Countering Bonn's Eastern Policy</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Efforts To Loosen Bonn's Ties with Berlin</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Possible Implications of Bilateralism for Soviet Policy Toward Bonn</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Soviet Diplomacy's Intensified Drive Against NATO</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Soviet Relations with France and Britain</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Soviet Policy Toward the Countries on NATO's Northern and Southern Flanks</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
-xvii-

F. Soviet Policy in the Middle East and Its Impact on Europe .......... 137
1. The June War and Its Aftermath .... 139
2. Questions Concerning the Soviet Military and Political Commitment in the Middle East .......... 143

XIV. SOVIET POLICY IN EAST EUROPE: MID-1966 TO MID-1968 ................. 151
A. Efforts To Counter Bonn's Bridge-Building Diplomacy in East Europe ...... 152
B. Continuing Tensions in Soviet-Rumanian Relations ......................... 155
1. The Budapest "Consultative" Meeting and the Rumanian Walkout .......... 158
2. Unresolved Soviet Dilemma: How To Handle the Recalcitrant Rumanians .. 161
C. New Ferment in the Warsaw Bloc and the Czechoslovak Challenge ............ 163
1. The Ouster of Novotny and the Launching of the Czech Reform Movement .......... 164
2. Student Unrest and the Party Power Struggle in Poland ..................... 171
3. New Pressures on Prague and the July Crisis ............................. 175
4. A Short-Lived Truce .......... 183
5. The Invasion of Czechoslovakia .......... 186

XV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IN LIGHT OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ................. 193
A. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Position in East Europe .................. 194
1. Factors Behind the Intervention .... 195
2. Effects of the Intervention on Soviet Interests in East Europe .... 202
3. The Soviet Search for a Settlement in Czechoslovakia ................. 209
4. The Future Pattern of Soviet Relations with East Europe .......... 215
B. The State of Soviet Policy in Western Europe

1. Preinvasion Prospects for Progress Toward the Soviet Union's European Objectives .............................................. 220
2. Effects of the Czechoslovak Invasion upon NATO .............. 225
3. The Shattered Image of a Prudent and Moderate Soviet Leadership ... 231
4. Impact of the Invasion on Soviet-German Relations ............ 234
5. Spur to the Mending of American Relations with West European Countries ......................................................... 239
6. Embarrassment of Communist Parties in Western Europe ........ 241
7. Setback to the Prospects for East-West Reconciliation .......... 243
8. Soviet Policy and the Future ...... 245

XVI. SOVIET MILITARY POLICY UNDER THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN REGIME ........................................... 249
A. Change and Continuity in Soviet Military Policy .................. 250
B. Programs Affecting the Soviet Strategic Posture .................... 257
1. Buildup of Strategic Offensive Forces .................................. 257
2. Strategic Defense and the Deployment of ABM ..................... 264
C. Efforts To Improve the Mobility and "Reach" of Soviet Conventional Forces 268
1. Developments in Naval Policy ...... 268
2. Other Trends Bearing on the Global Mobility of Soviet Forces .... 274
D. Doctrinal Developments .............. 279

XVII. THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE TOWARD EUROPE ... 289
A. Considerations Bearing on the Size of the Soviet Military Presence in Europe 290
B. Trends Affecting the Soviet Theater Forces and Their European Role .... 296
Part Three

THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN PERIOD: ITS FIRST HALF DECADE
XI. OVER-ALL TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER KHRUSHCHEV'S SUCCESSORS

Although the main focus of our inquiry is upon the political and military aspects of Soviet policy toward Europe, the development of Soviet European policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime can perhaps best be understood if viewed against the background of the regime's efforts to deal with the interrelated problems and priorities of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine some of the general trends in Soviet policy after Khrushchev's ouster before taking up specifically the present regime's approach to various European policy issues during its first four-and-a-half years in power.

When Khrushchev's successors took over the responsibility for the conduct of Soviet affairs, in the fall of 1964, they found important problems calling for their attention in three separate but interlocking areas of policy concern. The first of these centered on the delicate process of working out arrangements for collective rule in what was potentially, from past experience at least, an unstable period of succession. The second had to do with various tasks on the domestic front: finding realistic remedies for the perennially unsatisfactory agricultural situation; boosting declining rates of economic growth; and dealing with other cumulatively vexatious questions such as the Party's proper role in the management of a modern society, the restiveness of the intelligentsia, and pressure from the population for better living standards. The third major area of policy
concern for the new collective leadership was that of foreign affairs and defense, where there was a manifest need to repair the Soviet Union's international position, not only in the power contest with the West, but also in the increasingly bitter struggle with Peking for leadership within the Communist world itself.

Let us turn then to the manner in which the new Soviet regime under Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin sought to cope with the problems confronting it in each of these broad policy areas, beginning with that of keeping its collective leadership intact.

A. STATUS OF THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

As the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime approached the end of its fifth year, in the autumn of 1969, it was only fair to say that collective rule in the Soviet Union had weathered the period since Khrushchev's ouster in better shape than many observers had thought likely in view of previous Soviet succession struggles. Whatever internal maneuvering for power may have taken place within the top leadership, no single leader had yet managed to thrust himself conspicuously forward in a bid for personal ascendency over his fellow oligarchs. Nor did it appear that any of the leaders, with the possible exception of Brezhnev, were in a position from which such a bid for dictatorial power might be made.

Perhaps this meant that the recurrent pattern of one-man rule characteristic of most of the first half-century of the Soviet Union's existence had finally ended, marking another step in what some students of Soviet affairs regard
as the post-totalitarian evolution of the Soviet system toward some sort of constitutional political order. On the other hand, perhaps only a temporary equilibrium had been struck among the handful of collective oligarchs making up the interlocking directorate of Party and government leaders. A major crisis, or the Soviet system's cumulative failure to cope with basic issues and dilemmas, could conceivably destroy this equilibrium, thereby reviving the prospect that a strong and resourceful leader with dictatorial ambitions might come to power. As only time can test the ultimate stability of the collective leadership arrangements of the post-Khrushchev period, suffice it to note here some of the principal features of collective rule thus far.

One of these has been a studied effort to work out a division of labor within the collective leadership, designed to achieve both efficiency and harmony while keeping any individual from gathering too many strands of power into his own hands. With Brezhnev heading the Party chain of command and Kosygin the machinery of government and industry, other leading posts in the top Party and government organs have been parceled out among a small inner circle of perhaps some twenty oligarchs, including such figures as N. V. Podgornyi, M. A. Suslov, A. P. Kirilenko, D. S. Polianskii, K. T. Mazurov, P. N. Demichev, and A. N. Shelepin. Whereas, in the Soviet Union's past experience, collective leadership arrangements -- notably the sharing of dual command over the Party and government by Khrushchev and Malenkov, respectively, in 1953-1954 -- did not endure for long, it would appear that the distribution of responsibilities in the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has held up
somewhat better. Certainly, there has been little indication of any open Party-government rivalry that would pit Brezhnev and Kosygin directly against each other.

A second noteworthy feature of the present collective rule has been the rather marked continuity of leadership at both the top echelon of the system and at broader, intermediate levels. As Seweryn Bialer has pointed out, Khrushchev's successors not only managed to prevent open conflict among themselves, but they also avoided a large-scale turnover of personnel in the ranks of Party and state officialdom that might have created confusion and uncertainty during the succession period. Reflecting a "don't rock the boat" attitude, this stabilization of leadership cadres was enhanced at the 23rd Party Congress, in April 1966, by the repeal of provisions in the Party statutes requiring periodic turnover of officials and by the tightening of Party membership requirements. Although in the aggregate no wholesale changes have occurred in the composition of the leadership -- a factor which has had the important incidental effect of closing the top political echelon to younger men and thus creating a generation gap of sorts -- there has been considerable movement up and down the official ladder. An attempt to trace the shifting fortunes of various individual leaders would take us beyond the scope of the present narrative; however, at least two cases merit mention in terms of a potential threat to the stability of collective rule.

The first case in point is that of Brezhnev, who, while apparently possessing few of the attributes of a contender for one-man charismatic rule, has had the
advantage of operating as head of the Party apparatus, the
traditional springboard to power used by both Stalin
and Khrushchev. Brezhnev's stature has grown gradually,
beginning with his assumption of the initiative for major
new agricultural programs in March 1965 and his emergence
as the regime's chief spokesman on such matters as defense.
After the 23rd Party Congress, where Brezhnev became the
second man in Soviet history to be accorded the title of
"General Secretary" of the Party, his star rose still
further.

Toward the end of 1966 there were even a few small
signs that a Brezhnev "cult" might be forming, as his
sixtieth birthday, in December, was celebrated with
accolades beyond those tendered to any other member of
the collective oligarchy, and his wartime record was the
object of fulsome praise by a Politburo colleague.
Brezhnev's standing as *primus inter pares* within the col-
lective leadership seemed once again to be publicly
affirmed by the deference with which he was treated at
the celebration of the Soviet Union's fiftieth anniversary,
in November 1967.

Despite the fact, however, that Brezhnev has gradually
come to overshadow Kosygin, the next most prominent oli-
garch, he has evidently not sought to encroach upon
Kosygin's area of responsibility or to step far ahead of
the rest of the collective leadership. Rather, he has
seemed to prefer the relatively self-effacing role of a
consensus leader. Whether he may yet one day seek to
aggrandize his own power at the expense of his colleagues
thus remains a question for the future.
The second individual whose case might point to a possible threat to stability is Aleksandr Shelepin, a former head of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and one of the youngest members of the collective oligarchy. Because of his association with the secret police, his later experience in other control activities, and his alleged "hardline" leanings, Shelepin was looked upon by some Western analysts as the potential focal point of a "conservative" or "neo-Stalinist" faction within the regime. Rumors emanating from Soviet sources in the fall of 1965 that Shelepin was maneuvering to replace Brezhnev as head of the Party apparatus gained some substance in December 1965, when the Party-State Control Committee of which he was chairman was abolished and Shelepin was also deprived of his post as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Subsequent demotions of several men considered to be Shelepin's protégés, including V. S. Tikunov, V. E. Semichastnyk, and N. G. Egorychev, further pointed to the possibility that action was being taken to suppress an internal resistance originating in a coterie sympathetic to Shelepin's hard line.

By the fall of 1968, although Shelepin's own political destiny remained quite uncertain, there was cumulative evidence, as we shall see, that a factional rivalry had been developing within the leadership over opposing policy approaches. While by no means such as to suggest that a breakdown of collective rule was imminent, the situation did serve as a reminder that Soviet elite politics were perhaps less tranquil than the outward stability of the collective leadership would indicate.
Finally, perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of collective rule as exercised by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime during its first five years in office was a gradual drift toward deepening conservatism and orthodoxy. At the beginning, the post-Khrushchev oligarchy appeared merely to be given to the cautious and colorless pursuit of what might be called consensus politics, both as a device for reducing friction within the leadership and as a pragmatic way of dealing with policy problems. In contrast to Khrushchev and his bold style of "assaultism" and innovation from above, his successors deliberately stressed delovitost' -- business-like behavior -- as the hallmark of their approach. Initially, this expressed itself in realistic stocktaking and the setting of feasible short-term goals, especially in the economic realm.

As time went on, however, the collective leadership revealed itself increasingly as an oligarchy of conservative bureaucrats, who were not only distrustful of arbitrary innovation from above, as under Khrushchev, but fearful also of pressure for liberal reform from Soviet intellectuals below. Although the shift toward a rigidly defensive orthodoxy did not necessarily lead to immobilism and policy paralysis, it did produce an ample quota of unimaginative measures and ambivalent policy positions which might not answer to the dynamic requirements of long-term development. Indeed, as events at home and abroad tested the quality of Soviet collective rule, perhaps the salient question which emerged was whether the bureaucratic oligarchs in the Kremlin would prove capable of finding fresh and constructive solutions to the problems
facing the Soviet Union in an age of pervasive change, or whether they would simply seek to maintain themselves in power by reverting to the orthodox habits and sterile methods of the past.

B. DOMESTIC POLICY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

On the home front, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime found it necessary initially to devote a large share of its energies to improving the performance of the economy and redefining the Party's role in the supervision of economic activity. Among the regime's first significant measures affecting the Soviet economy was the elimination, in November 1964, of Khrushchev's bifurcated Party organization which had put Party apparatchiki directly into industrial and agricultural operations. Besides removing a source of internal friction between the industrial and the agricultural wing of the Party apparatus, this decision seemed to be aimed at restoring Party officials to their former role of overseeing and checking the production-technical-economic experts instead of engaging directly in economic tasks.

Other early moves in the economic field, such as the cutback of the more grandiose parts of Khrushchev's chemical industry expansion plan, suggested an awareness by the new regime that resources had been spread too thin in Khrushchev's time and that a more realistic approach was called for that would match available resources with the most pressing requirements. The chief development reflecting this need for a shift of resources was the new agricultural program announced by Brezhnev in March 1965. It involved, among other things, a planned investment of
71 billion rubles in agriculture over the next five years, plus greater incentives to peasants and the reduction of state quotas upon collective farms. At about the same time, the regime initiated administrative steps toward better centralized control over resources by doing away with the State Committees, set up under Khrushchev's 1957 economic decentralization scheme, and returning to the system of centralized ministries for industrial management, especially within the cluster of defense industries.18

1. The Economic Reform Program

The task of revitalizing the Soviet economy demanded a good deal more, however, than merely improving control over the use of resources. From about 1958 on, there had been both a marked slowdown in the rate of economic growth and a sharp rise in the capital-output ratio.19 Together, these were disturbing signs of an unhealthy trend, which minor administrative tinkering with the economy was unlikely to correct. Rather, the situation called for major reforms that would boost productivity and efficiency, stimulate the introduction of new technology, and provide for the orderly growth of all sectors of the economy.

Against this background the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, in September and October 1965, came up with a series of corrective measures and reforms that represented, potentially at least, a significant departure from past "command economy" practice.20 These reforms, which completed the dismantling of Khrushchev's industrial-administrative structure, were designed to place more authority in the hands of centralized ministries in Moscow and at the same time to provide for
greater exercise of initiative and independence at local management levels -- aims seemingly difficult to reconcile with each other. The new program proposed in the fall of 1965 also envisaged the use of profitability, market demand, interest, and other devices adapted from capitalist economics to improve Soviet economic performance. Initially these "rationalizing" innovations, many growing out of suggestions first broached in the latter part of the Khrushchev period by such economic reformers as Evsei Liberman and A. M. Birman, were to be tried out in the consumer industry sector before being extended to other areas of the Soviet economy. Toward the end of 1968, the shift of enterprises to the new system of planning, management, and incentives had affected about 25,000 enterprises accounting for about 70 per cent of the country's output, according to the Soviet Union's chief economic planner.

How successful the Soviet economic reforms may ultimately prove to be in speeding up economic growth and promoting greater resilience in the traditionally heavy-industry-oriented Soviet economy remains to be seen. Numerous difficulties, including those of working out the kind of realistic pricing system on which meaningful profit criteria must rest, have attended the reform program, which on the whole has been less impressive in practice than on paper.

Most Western observers tend to agree that the present reforms must be carried a good deal further if they are to produce a real economic revolution in the Soviet Union, but opinions differ on how likely this is to happen. Some observers, for example, have emphasized the dilemma
created for Soviet economic planning by the attempt to combine market mechanisms with arbitrary centralized control; others have pointed out that Soviet economics has shown a considerable ability to make pragmatic adjustments to the needs of the times, and that the Soviet Union is also in a position to learn from reform schemes pioneered in East Europe. At any rate, although one cannot predict where the economic reforms of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime may ultimately lead -- as concerns either their contribution to the solution of fundamental economic problems or their political and social impact on Soviet life -- it is apparent that a short-term improvement of the economic situation did occur after the new regime came to power.

2. Upturn in Economic Performance

Thanks in part to good harvests in all but one year of the 1964-1968 period, including an all-time record grain harvest of around 170 million metric tons in 1966, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was able to take credit for an upturn in the over-all performance of the Soviet economy. According to figures released at a Supreme Soviet session in Moscow just prior to the Soviet Union's fiftieth anniversary celebration, in the fall of 1967, the annual rates of growth for such key categories as national income and industrial and agricultural output had risen somewhat above the levels recorded during the latter years of Khrushchev's rule, with the average annual growth rate of "national income," for example, reaching 7.2 per cent in 1966-1967, as against 5.7 per cent for the period 1961-1965.
Western analyses of Soviet economic performance, incidentally, show that the growth record under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in the three-year period 1965-1967 did not surpass the growth rate of Khrushchev's latter years to the extent suggested by the Soviet-released figures. In terms of gross national product (a method of measurement different from the Soviet concept of "national income"), the Western estimates show an average growth rate of about 5.8 per cent for 1965-1967, and about 4.9 per cent for 1962-1964, the last three years of the Khrushchev period. Nevertheless, even though the average growth rate may have flattened out more than Soviet authorities would like to admit, the upturn was sufficient to enable the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to view with some optimism the prospect of meeting planned performance goals for 1970, the terminal year of the eighth Five-Year-Plan. Although the goals outlined in this plan were considerably scaled down by the new rulers from those projected earlier by Khrushchev, their attainment obviously would reflect favorably upon the economic stewardship of the present regime, and probably would help to strengthen its political position at home and abroad.

Despite some improvement on the economic front during its first years in office, however, the Soviet leadership was still beset with many problems that grew out of both the uneven past development of the Soviet economy and the increasing demands placed upon it by a modernized society. The pressure in favor of the long-deferred investment needed to reduce the lag in such neglected sectors of the economy as agriculture, housing, and consumer goods aggravated the perennial competition for resources as it
threatened the interests of the traditionally favored claimants, heavy industry and defense. One indication of this sharpening competition for resources came from Dmitrii Polianskii, the Party leader charged with overseeing the agricultural program, who twice in 1967 stated that the good harvest of 1966 had "gone to the heads of some comrades" who were "beginning to argue" that agricultural investment could be cut back to permit diverting resources to other claimants. Polianskii's admonition that such arguments should "be nipped in the bud" apparently did not carry the day, however, for lobbying on behalf of heavy industry continued in the Soviet press. Moreover, at the Supreme Soviet session of October 1967, the advocates of uninterrupted agricultural growth suffered a slight setback; although some increase in agricultural investment was announced, it was below the level required to meet the five-year goals originally staked out by Brezhnev in 1965.

At the same session of the Supreme Soviet it also was made known that the percentage increase in the production of consumer goods would be slightly greater in 1968 than that of producer goods, a notable reversal of traditional priority, which some Western observers attributed to inflationary pressure created by the fact that incomes were rising at a faster rate than was the supply of consumer goods. Meanwhile, however, this concession to consumer expectations was accompanied by the announcement of a 15 per cent increase in defense allocations for 1968, and the possibility of an even larger boost in military spending was suggested by expansion of the "unattributed" expenditure residual in the state budget, much of which is
generally believed to cover unannounced defense outlays. Besides attesting to the continued strong claim of the military establishment upon Soviet resources, a question we shall take up more fully in a later chapter, the increase in defense allocations also pointed up what is probably one of the more perplexing problems on the Soviet leadership’s economic agenda.

In attempting to allocate resources so as to meet three pressing sets of requirements -- the satisfaction of consumer needs, military and defense industry claims, and over-all economic growth -- the regime must decide what tradeoffs among the three will best serve its policy. The more it directs investment toward the first two categories, the less remains for the third, and the regime's failure to promote a high rate of economic growth, in turn, could jeopardize the attainment of its economic goals for 1970. The difficulty of adjusting these conflicting priorities was doubtless among the factors that delayed formal ratification of a "final version" of the eighth Five-Year-Plan.

C. DOMESTIC POLICY: CONTROL OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Coming to power at a time of quickening social and cultural change in Soviet society, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime inherited the problem -- already grown serious in Khrushchev's time -- of keeping such change under control. Essentially, this was for the ruling Communist elite the dual problem of how to insure discipline and conformity on the one hand while at the same time encouraging the kind of initiative and creativity needed to make a modern society tick. In the economic realm, as we have seen, the regime sought to deal with this dilemma by adopting
reforms intended to combine centralized ministerial authority with greater independence and initiative at local management levels. With respect to the social and intellectual sectors of Soviet society, a somewhat analogous attempt to find a workable blend of imposed conformity and constructive participation also characterized the initial approach of the post-Khrushchev regime. Unfortunately, as time went on, the emphasis tended to shift to the first element of this combination.

1. Social Problems and Control Measures

Soviet life has produced a variety of social problems that, theoretically, should never have arisen in a Communist society or should at least be on the decline at this stage of its development. However, as Soviet authorities themselves complain, many of these troublesome problems seem to be on the rise. One category includes the dodging of "socially useful labor," widespread alcoholism, and the growth of crime and "hooliganism," the last ranging from theft of state property to crimes of sex and violence, often involving gangs of wayward youths.

Particular concern also has been expressed by representatives of the Soviet "establishment" over a second category of problems, perhaps best described as tendencies among the younger generation that reflect the young people's alienation, in one form or another, from present-day Soviet society. These tendencies, some of which seem akin to the questioning of established ways and values by youth elsewhere, include indifference to Marxism-Leninism as a repository of answers to the main problems of life,
aversion to military service, growing resistance to the appeal of Komsomol membership, and the incursion of "bourgeois values and ideology" into the thinking of Soviet youth.

The official response to these problems has taken various forms, which can perhaps be roughly divided into coercive and constructive efforts to improve social control. In the first category, one of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's early measures was the revision, in September 1965, of the "antiparasite law" of 1961. The revised law provided that persons who "avoid socially useful labor and have an antisocial, parasitic way of life" could be assigned to mandatory labor in their home locality, but it eliminated the feature of the previous law that rendered such people subject to deportation. This was followed in July 1966 by stiffer decrees, which strengthened the power and authority of the police (militia) and included the replacement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) by a new central body called the Ministry for Protection of Public Order, or MOOP.

These moves toward more rigorous law enforcement seemed to downgrade the role of voluntary social organs, like the "comrades' courts," which had been encouraged in Khrushchev's time. The new laws did not, however, impinge on the functions of the secret police. The powers of the latter, as during Khrushchev's administration, continued to be under rather close Party control, although a campaign to restore the public image of the KGB as the defender of Soviet security against foreign intelligence operations was launched soon after the new regime took over. Later, with the growing official concern over intellectual protest
at home and potential infection from the reform ferment in East Europe, the KGB gradually was given greater freedom of action against domestic dissent.

Parallel with more stringent laws and disciplinary measures, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime launched an extensive effort toward better social control, especially over youth, through educational reforms and indoctrination. These measures included an overhaul of the educational system and creation of a new, centralized USSR Ministry of Education, the revision of propaganda and recreation programs aimed at Soviet youth, and appeals to military veterans to take a more active part "in the indoctrination of young people in the revolutionary, militant and working traditions of the Soviet people." A new military service law, introduced in 1967, also apparently sought to expose a larger slice of the country's youth to the virtues of "patriotic education" within the armed forces.

Another development in the social sector that received at least some encouragement under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was recognition of the need for greater use of sociological research in dealing with social problems that had not yielded to standard Marxist-Leninist remedies. The founding in February 1965 of the Institute of Concrete Social Research in Leningrad was an example of new interest in developing empirical sociological research techniques. However, the reluctance of Party officialdom to allow the social sciences to compete with Marxism-Leninism, "the only scientific teaching" about society, was also evident from the outset. Later, as the Party's concern over ideological erosion in the Soviet Union increased, the question of making better use of Soviet social science
became one of the issues in the struggle of the liberal intelligentsia for greater freedom of expression and reform from within the Soviet system — the subject to which we shall turn next.

2. The New Regime and Soviet Intellectual Dissent

In the intellectual sector of Soviet society, the new regime's need to make more effective use of the creative intelligentsia has come into recurrent conflict with its demands for conformity from Soviet intellectuals. The situation here has been complicated by the regime's differing attitudes toward the scientific-technical and the cultural-artistic intelligentsia. In general, the regime has seemed to feel that the first group should be encouraged to play a more vigorous role in Soviet affairs and to explore new paths, especially in the fields of science and technology, for the sake of promoting efficiency and innovation. Yet, at the same time, the leadership apparently has not allowed similar latitude to the second group, preferring that it be constrained to avoid the kind of intellectual inquiry and artistic expression that might challenge the Party's authority and monopoly of power or run counter to Marxist-Leninist concepts of society.

The regime has found it difficult, however, to maintain such a neatly compartmentalized approach to the Soviet intellectual community. "Conservative" as well as "liberal" elements are represented in both subdivisions of the intelligentsia, the scientific-technical and the cultural-artistic. While the more numerous and bureaucratically better-entrenched conservatives can be regarded
as the natural allies of the regime, a scattering of "liberal-minded" intellectuals from both groups appear to have taken up the case for greater freedom of expression and reform from within, thus posing for the governing establishment the delicate problem of how to deal with dissenters whose professed aim is to make the Soviet system work better.

After the new regime took office in 1964, there were several periods when the liberal intelligentsia enjoyed relative freedom to air its viewpoint, but each permissive phase was followed by a fresh effort of the authorities to enforce conformity. By mid-1967, the drive for conformity had clearly become dominant. One of the periods of tolerance lasted from the spring to the fall of 1965, when Soviet intellectuals drew encouragement from such developments as the repudiation of Lysenkoism; the demotion of L. E. Il'ichev, a strongly orthodox supervisor of ideological affairs; and the publication of two notable articles by Pravda's newly-appointed editor, A. M. Rumiantsev, which stressed the formula of "freedom for creativity." During this half-year, the liberal intelligentsia pressed its case for a more realistic portrayal of Soviet society and its shortcomings, and there was an outburst of experimental literary and dramatic production, with avant-garde journals such as Novyi mir taking the lead in publishing the works of young or previously banned writers. In the fall of 1965, however, the pendulum began to swing the other way. The liberal-minded Rumiantsev was removed from the editorship of Pravda in early October, about the same time that conservative proponents of a hard cultural policy, including S. P. Trapeznikov, launched a strong
attack on liberal tendencies. Another ominous note for the liberal intelligentsia was the arrest, in late September, of authors A. D. Siniavskii and Yuli Daniel, whose conviction, in February 1966, for having published abroad a fictional satire on Stalinism was to stand as a warning against attempts to evade literary censorship.

Throughout 1966 and early 1967, as the harsh disciplinary action against Siniavskii and Daniel cast a pall over the cultural scene and the liberals became the targets of dogmatist broadsides in the magazine Oktiabr', most of the liberal intellectuals, or at least the more prominent among them, remained silent. The chief exception perhaps was an unprecedented letter of protest reportedly sent to the Kremlin by twenty-five leading scientists and writers on the eve of the 23rd Party Congress, warning that any attempt to rehabilitate Stalin's reputation at the Congress might provoke "serious dissension within Soviet society."

By the spring of 1967, however, spokesmen for the liberal viewpoint again began to make their voices heard, apparently encouraged by the demotion of several orthodox hardliners in the Party hierarchy, including V. E. Semichastny, the head of the KGB.

One well-known voice of protest was that of novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who at the Fourth USSR Writers' Congress, in May 1967, circulated a petition against censorship in general, and criticizing the KGB, in particular, for confiscating some of his unpublished manuscripts in 1965. Another voice was that of poet Andrei Voznesenskii, who in early July drew applause from a Moscow theater audience for a poem on the adverse
effect of censorship on creative contributions to society, and who later that month sent a letter to Pravda denouncing literary officials who prevented his appearance at a poetry reading in New York. Although prominent figures from the Soviet artistic world had thus again joined the cultural debate, the liberal argument in the summer of 1967 was also sounded by social scientists and journalists, and in at least one case by a distinguished natural scientist.

In June and July, a number of articles called for better use of Soviet social science, attributing its backwardness to intellectual stagnation of the "not too distant past," and urging that Soviet sociologists be allowed to address themselves to "real social problems" and to play a greater role "in changing the very structure of society" instead of merely helping the regime to impose social controls. A recurrent theme was that the interests of communism would best be served by frank analysis of difficulties encountered by the Soviet system, and that attempts to curb the creative work of artists and other intellectuals by narrow fiat raised the danger of "subjective" decisions. But perhaps the most eloquent plea for intellectual freedom came from a leading Soviet physicist, Professor Andrei D. Sakharov, whose privately circulated essay calling for enlightened reform of the Soviet system appeared in print only in the West.

Official reaction to the round of liberal argument in the summer of 1967 was not long in coming. On July 8, an unsigned editorial in Komsomol'skaya Pravda repudiated the more liberal articles published in that newspaper during June and called for stricter Party control over
intellectual expression. Rumors circulated in Moscow to the effect that new pressures had been brought against writers who supported Solzhenitsyn's protest, and that various editors sympathetic to the liberal viewpoint had lost their posts; they included the editor of Komsomol'skaiapra\vda and an official who had authorized the publication of historian A. M. Nekrich's contentious 1941. 22 iiunia, a book highly critical of Stalin's mistakes. In August, the Party Central Committee issued a decree condemning departures from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, especially in the social sciences.

For a brief interval during the fall of 1967, while attempts were being made to convey an image of domestic harmony in connection with the Soviet Union's fiftieth anniversary celebration, the regime managed to keep the lid on further intellectual controversy. However, this momentary truce was broken in December 1967, with the renewal of an open campaign of criticism and ridicule aimed at various liberal literary figures. Soon thereafter, it became apparent that a new and harsher crackdown on liberal dissent was under way, as events stemming from the earlier Daniel-Siniavskii affair came to a head in Moscow. There, in January 1968, a 30-year-old poet, Aleksandr Ginsburg, and three young codefendants were tried and convicted after almost a year of imprisonment on charges of "agitation aimed at subverting or weakening the Soviet regime," charges based on their having compiled a "white book" on the Daniel-Siniavskii case and having helped to edit an underground literary journal, Phoenix 1966.

The trial, conducted under circumstances which showed the crude hand of the KGB, aroused a measure of protest
in the Soviet Union that the regime doubtless found disquieting. The first critical voice to be heard was that of Pavel M. Litvinov, a 30-year-old physicist and grandson of the late Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov. He not only spoke out on behalf of fair play for the Ginsburg defendants, but also braved the KGB by making an unauthorized disclosure of closed-door proceedings that had taken place in September 1967 against three youths sentenced for leading a street demonstration against the detention of Siniavskii and Daniel. On the heels of Litvinov's action, which cost him his job and may have placed his future in jeopardy, several hundred persons representing a rather broad segment of the Soviet intelligentsia signed petitions of protest against the Ginsburg trial, including a public appeal addressed to the Budapest conference of Communist parties in late February 1968. Although indicating a widespread disposition among Soviet intellectuals to reject the official version of the Ginsburg affair, even at considerable risk to themselves, these protests did not bring a relaxation of pressure against the liberal intelligentsia.

On the contrary, the regime's concern about nonconformity at home apparently began to merge with fear that the reform ferment from developments then unfolding in Czechoslovakia might spill over into the Soviet Union. The result was a series of sterner steps to enforce discipline upon the Soviet intellectual community. Some of the Soviet scientists who had signed protests against the Ginsburg trial were expelled from the Party, and others were told to toe the line or lose their privileged status. "Last warnings" were issued to a number of
persons to cease talking with foreign correspondents, part of a general curtailment of contacts between Soviet citizens and the foreign colony in Moscow. The press also took a hard line toward the dissent evoked by the January trial; its position was typified by a Pravda article in March which compared the defendants with "Trotskyite" and other "renegade" elements purged in the 1930s, and charged that "bourgeois propaganda" was trying to use the trial to discredit the Soviet system.

In late March, the regime's new efforts to combat dissidence among Soviet intellectuals received an authoritative stamp when Brezhnev made a speech calling for "iron discipline" in Party ranks and indicating that writers and scientists who failed to shun "the praise of our ideological opponents" and were not "ready to work for the well-being of their homeland" could not "expect immunity." This speech, and a resolution adopted at a Central Committee plenum in early April, set the stage for a new tightening of ideological controls in the Soviet Union and a massive propaganda campaign against what Soviet authorities chose to describe as "subversive" efforts by the West aimed at "undermining socialist society from within."

In October 1968, the arrest and conviction of Pavel Litvinov and four other intellectuals for having staged a public protest against the Czechoslovak invasion added another dreary chapter to the mounting campaign for orthodox conformity, amidst which an occasional brave voice of protest could be heard. Although the issues that lay beneath the restiveness of an articulate segment of the Soviet intellectual community were not likely to be
resolved by either fiat or propaganda, the outlook for reform through critical protest was not bright at the beginning of 1969, for the repressive campaign against intellectuals had become part of a more pervasive trend toward what might be described as neo-Stalinism. At best, this seemed to suggest that the liberal wing of the intelligentsia faced further intimidation before its protests against narrow conformity could again be countenanced. At the worst, it meant that official sanctions and lack of general public support were gradually forcing the protesting intellectuals to resign themselves to the futility of trying to improve the system from within.

D. TRENDS IN FOREIGN POLICY

In keeping with its general style of eschewing flamboyant personal initiatives, the collective leadership team under Brezhnev and Kosygin apparently set out to conduct Soviet foreign policy in somewhat more sober and restrained a fashion than had been the case under Khrushchev. If the new leaders were dissatisfied with the Soviet Union's position in foreign affairs as they found it in the fall of 1964, they did not immediately advertise the fact by criticizing either Khrushchev's general line of "peaceful coexistence" or specific policies initiated by him. Rather, their approach seemed to be based on a resolve to work patiently for improvement of the Soviet Union's economic potential and its military position vis-à-vis the United States, while avoiding unsettling initiatives like those that Khrushchev had undertaken in Berlin and Cuba.

Paradoxically, however, though the new leaders may have taken office hoping to concentrate their energies on
economic and other tasks at home rather than raise fresh issues abroad, they soon found that foreign policy problems had sought them out. Of the more immediate issues thrust upon the new leadership, the first was an impending showdown in the Sino-Soviet conflict, posed by Khrushchev's timetable for a conference of Communist parties in Moscow at the end of 1964, which presumably he had called in preparation for reading Peking out of the world Communist movement. The second issue, or, more accurately, a whole series of issues, grew out of the increased American commitment to the war in Vietnam, beginning in mid-February 1965 on the heels of Kosygin's visit to Hanoi. Among other things, the extension of American air attacks to North Vietnam ended the sanctuary customarily enjoyed by established Communist regimes, thus bringing the Soviet leaders face to face with the uncomfortable question of having to honor obligations for the defense of a client Communist state far from the continental base of Soviet military power.

The Soviet response in each of these instances suggested that, while the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was eager to steer clear of any sharp new crisis in its relations with China and the United States, it was not prepared to make fundamental concessions involving the Soviet Union's political interest and prestige for the sake of reaching a compromise with either its Communist or its capitalist adversary.

1. The Soviet Position in the Sino-Soviet Dispute

In the Sino-Soviet case, the new regime initially sought to get off a collision course with Peking by
deferring the December 1964 preparatory meeting of Communist parties to March 1965 and changing it to a "consultative" session. This and other gestures aimed at moderating the Sino-Soviet polemics failed, however, to mollify Peking, which made clear that its price for harmony was a basic reversal of Soviet policies, a price the Soviet leaders were not willing to pay. As early as November 1964, for example, in a twelve-point editorial on Khrushchev's fall, the Chinese emphasized that they wanted nothing less of his successors than repudiation of the whole of Khrushchev's "revisionist" foreign and domestic policies. In March 1965, Soviet overtures for an end to open polemics were flatly rejected in an editorial in which the Chinese again demanded Soviet capitulation on all major issues and charged that the new Kremlin leaders had taken over Khrushchev's "revisionist" line lock, stock, and barrel.

Although the Soviet leadership may have been tempted to repay Chinese intransigence in kind, and in fact did occasionally relax its self-imposed ban on polemics, it was careful on the whole not to allow itself to be drawn into untimely or ill-considered moves against Peking. The latter's stock in the world Communist movement was not helped by setbacks suffered by some of its clients, such as Ben Bella's fall from power in Algeria and the abortive coup in Indonesia in the autumn of 1965. By sticking to tactics of minimum retaliatory invective and appealing for "unity" within the Communist camp in support of North Vietnam, the Soviet regime gained ground steadily at Peking's expense throughout 1965 and 1966, as underscored by the virtual isolation of the Chinese at the 23rd Party Congress in Moscow, in April 1966.
The Soviet position was strengthened further with the onset of Mao's "cultural revolution" in China, the excesses of which added lustre to the "moderate" Soviet posture in the eyes of most Communist bystanders to the dispute. By the autumn of 1966, the Soviet leaders had contained Peking's influence to the point that they felt it profitable to revive the idea of a conference of Communist parties. 

Thereafter, Moscow's lobbying for such a conference was coupled, in 1967 and early 1968, with increasingly open attacks on "Mao Tse-tung and his clique," which suggested that the Kremlin leaders had finally given up all hope of reconciliation with Mao's regime and were now willing to encourage any dissident Party factions in China that might seek his overthrow. Indeed, one of the "theses" issued by the CPSU in 1967 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union included what amounted to an open invitation to the Chinese Communist Party to break with Mao's "ruinous policy."

As these political attacks on Maoist rule sharpened, Sino-Soviet relations in general grew more strained. In the summer of 1967, a series of "provocations" against the Soviet Embassy in Peking drew strong protest from Moscow about "hostile acts against Soviet diplomats," and throughout the year there were recurrent allegations of border incidents from both sides. The detention by the Chinese of a Soviet ship at Dairen in August 1967, and of another bound for Vietnam in April 1968, added further irritants. Meanwhile, trade between the two Communist rivals declined steadily, and had reached an all-time low by early 1968.

In February 1968 the Soviet Union's two-year-long effort to arrange a world conference of Communist parties...
moved closer to success, when an advance "consultative"
session of some sixty parties was convened in Budapest.
At this conference, despite Rumania's walkout, the Soviet
leadership again managed to demonstrate Mao's isolation
from the rest of the world Communist movement. It accom-
plished this, not by threatening to excommunicate China,
as Khrushchev had done, but by emphasizing the need for
"unity" against alleged "imperialist aggression," and by
letting Peking's refusal to have any part of an ecumenical
Communist gathering speak for itself.

To sum up, it can be said that the Brezhnev-Kosygin
leadership's handling of the Sino-Soviet dispute up to
early 1969 succeeded in loosening Peking's ties to a num-
ber of Communist regimes, including those of North Korea
and North Vietnam, and in putting China on the defensive
within most of the world Communist movement. Measured
against the situation at the time of Khrushchev's ouster,
these were achievements from which the Brezhnev-Kosygin
regime could derive considerable satisfaction. At the
same time, the picture was by no means unclouded. If
Maoist rule in China were to become firmly consolidated
and to remain so even after Mao's death, Moscow could
look forward to a long period of deep Chinese hostility.
Conversely, there was the danger that a breakdown of
Party rule under Mao might imperil the very existence of
the Communist system in China, a danger which Moscow pro-
fessed to see in the situation. Finally, as suggested
by the exchange of unprecedentedly bitter propaganda broad-
sides that followed new clashes between Soviet and Chinese
border guards on an island in the Ussuri River in March
1969, it even seemed possible that future Sino-Soviet
relations would bring an outright military collision between the two countries. This, of course, would shatter one of the fundamental dogmas of Marxist-Leninist theory, namely, that war is a product of the capitalist order, unthinkable between fraternal Communist states.

2. The New Regime's Reassertion of an Interest in the Vietnam War

During most of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's first four years in office, issues growing out of the war in Vietnam made themselves felt increasingly in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Besides calling for enlarged commitment of Soviet resources to the support of Hanoi and sharpening debate within the Soviet leadership over hardline versus moderate policies abroad, the Vietnam conflict also created propaganda and political opportunities of which the Soviet Union sought to take advantage in its relations with Europe, largely to the detriment of the détente with the United States that had been achieved under Khrushchev. Until the attention of the Soviet leadership was preempted, in 1968, by the emergence of a reformist movement in Czechoslovakia, with its acute challenge to the Soviet-dominated order in East Europe, it is probably fair to say that no set of foreign policy problems received closer scrutiny in Moscow than those connected with the conflict in Vietnam.

The new Soviet regime's first manifest step toward reasserting an interest in the Vietnam situation was Kosygin's trip to Hanoi with a military aid delegation, which was announced in Pravda on January 31, 1965. The reasons for this trip, which seemed to betoken a definite
departure from Khrushchev's policy of *de facto* disengagement from the Vietnam problem, are still open to speculation. At least two explanations are consistent with the assumption that the new Soviet leadership believed at the time that it was embarking on an approach that carried a relatively low risk, even though it reversed Khrushchev's hands-off attitude toward the Southeast Asia area. One theory is that the Soviet leaders were persuaded that the United States was about to write off its commitments in South Vietnam, where the political and military situation had greatly deteriorated in late 1964 and early 1965, and that therefore Soviet entry upon the scene could be accomplished without much risk of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and without serious detriment to their relations elsewhere. A second explanation, perhaps overlapping the first, is that the Kosygin mission was meant to reestablish Soviet influence in Hanoi both to counter Chinese influence and to exert moderating leverage upon the North Vietnamese, lest the Hanoi regime be inclined to provoke the United States into an unnecessarily vigorous reaction.

If the new regime thought that the United States was on the verge of abandoning South Vietnam and that a display of Soviet support for Hanoi would entail little risk of a strong U.S. response, events proved otherwise. The Viet Cong attacks on Pleiku while Kosygin was in Hanoi provoked precisely such a response; with the extension of U.S. bombing to North Vietnam and the increasing commitment of American forces to South Vietnam, the Soviet leadership discovered that the United States was in fact prepared to employ its military power to thwart a Communist takeover in South Vietnam. Likewise, if the Soviet
leadership initially entertained any hopes of prolonging the détente of 1963-64 so as to be free to deal more effectively with urgent domestic problems, these hopes also were jolted by the deepening conflict in Southeast Asia, which caused a growing chill in Soviet-American relations from early 1965 on.

The steps by which the Soviet Union moved toward a deeper involvement in Vietnam after February 1965 need not be traced here. Suffice it to say that having made some unsuccessful private efforts to induce Hanoi and Peking to consider negotiation of the crisis, Moscow took up an uncompromising diplomatic stance in the spring of 1965 and thereafter moved toward progressively larger commitment of its political and military resources in support of the Communist side in Vietnam. At the same time, despite the increased scale of military aid and a coy reluctance to help bring about a negotiated solution, the Soviet leadership abstained from a formal commitment of its own military forces, remaining consistently unwilling to intervene in the Vietnam hostilities in a fashion that could involve the Soviet Union in a major confrontation with the United States.

Soviet hesitancy to play a conspicuous role as a peacemaker in the Vietnam conflict has sometimes been attributed to the fear of driving Hanoi into the arms of Peking. (Kosygin, in his celebrated talks with Prime Minister Wilson in London in February 1967, may have stepped briefly into the peacemaker's role, but he quickly backed out of it.) Other factors doubtless entered the picture also, such as the temptation to exploit the political and propaganda value of a war whose prolongation was so
obviously discomfiting to the American government at home and abroad. In any event, whatever the reasons that persuaded the Soviet leadership to eschew a peacemaker's role, when the diplomatic breakthrough that led to preliminary talks between the United States and North Vietnam in Paris did come, in the spring of 1968, it was apparently a U.S. Presidential initiative, not a helping hand from Moscow, that got the process of negotiation started.96

Although it endorsed the agreement to begin talks, the USSR showed little disposition to mediate seriously for their success. Asserting that the United States had never expected Hanoi to agree to President Johnson's suggestion of March 31 that talks be held,98 Soviet spokesmen maintained a generally skeptical attitude toward the outcome of the Paris negotiations, taking the position that "pre-election propaganda considerations" had motivated the American offer and that the United States was still hopeful of attaining a "military solution" in Vietnam rather than prepared to "embark upon the road of political settlement."99 Besides passing up the opportunity to interpose a moderating voice during the early months of the Paris talks, the Soviet Union continued to promise the "utmost assistance" to Hanoi's war effort, and underlined this pledge by signing a new military aid agreement with North Vietnam in July.100

Subsequently, the Soviet stance shifted slightly; in the bargaining which led to President Johnson's October 31 announcement of a bombing halt and the widening of the Paris talks, Soviet diplomacy played a discreet though apparently still minor role.101 After the change of administration in Washington in early 1969, Moscow's
wait-and-see attitude toward the policies of the new Nixon Administration extended also to the Paris talks. What contribution the Soviet Union might be prepared to make to help break the continuing deadlock at Paris remained, for the time being, an open question.

Let us return now to some of the effects that the Vietnam war had upon the general development of Soviet foreign policy after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's decision, in early 1965, to commit itself to increasing support of Hanoi.

3. The Impact of Vietnam on Soviet Foreign Policy

The deterioration of the détente, which became a by-product of the conflict in Vietnam, was accompanied by a gradual hardening of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements, manifested in a tendency to softpedal the theme of peaceful coexistence and to dwell more than before on the danger of war posed by the "aggressive forces of imperialism." The downgrading of "peaceful coexistence," which began in Pravda editorials in the fall of 1965, was given formal cognizance at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 by Brezhnev, who placed it fourth on a list of six foreign policy priorities, below such goals as strengthening the unity of the Communist camp and supporting "national liberation" movements in the developing countries. Increasing attention to the danger of war ran parallel to this lessening of emphasis on peaceful coexistence with the "imperialists." Beginning in the summer of 1965, both military and political commentary in the Soviet press took up the theme that "the aggressive character of imperialism" was
growing, making it "the most important duty" of the Soviet party and other Marxist-Leninist parties "not to permit an underevaluation of the danger of war."104 Thereafter, most of the top Soviet leaders periodically found it expedient to express some degree of concern about the possibility of a major new war, linking this possibility sometimes to the general worsening of the international situation and sometimes specifically to the danger of escalation by "American imperialism" in Vietnam.105

As suggested in an earlier chapter, it has often been important to distinguish between Soviet declaratory utterances on the likelihood of war -- which serve various purposes of internal argument and external propaganda -- and the private convictions of the leadership.106 What the latter may be in the present regime is, of course, a speculative matter. This writer is inclined to suppose that Khrushchev's successors still consider a major war between the rival systems unlikely -- if not thanks to benign U.S. intentions then because of a combination of Soviet nuclear deterrent power and the political forces generally described as the "world peace movement."107 At the same time, however, it is best not to dismiss out of hand the possibility that the present leaders differ from their predecessors in their private views on the danger-of-war issue. They may indeed have come to believe, as their propaganda has so tirelessly asserted, that American military intervention in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, together with such other matters as the alleged American backing of the "Israeli aggressors" and the military junta in Greece, betokened a shift of U.S. policy in a direction that could involve the major powers in a larger war.108
Certainly, Soviet military preparations under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime seem to reflect a gradually rising estimate of the possibility that tensions in the international arena might cause the Soviet Union to become involved in armed conflict of one sort or another. Although these preparations have not been in the form of "crash" programs that would suggest concern over an imminent outbreak of a major war, they have nevertheless required increased military budget outlays with each successive year—indicating, among other things, that the leadership has deemed it prudent to seek a higher level of military preparedness despite domestic economic demands on Soviet resources.

How much of the upward trend in Soviet defense expenditure can be linked to heightened tensions growing out of the situation in Southeast Asia since early 1965 is difficult to say. As we shall see in a chapter dealing specifically with the new regime's military policies, some share of the rising defense outlays can be attributed to programs to bolster the Soviet strategic posture, doubtless the result of a post-Cuba reappraisal of the USSR's strategic position vis-à-vis the United States. These programs, given the lead times involved, presumably were initiated before the Vietnam crisis grew severe, and they probably would have been pursued no matter what the turn of events in Southeast Asia. It would thus seem fair to say that the arms buildup carried out by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime derived its initial momentum less from the war in Vietnam than from the regime's resolve to alter the image of a Soviet Union strategically inferior to its principal Western adversary. At the same time, of course,
Vietnam underscored what to Moscow probably looked like hostile and dangerous American policies, thereby convincing the leadership of the wisdom of taking measures to strengthen the Soviet military posture.

The potential effect of these measures on the military power balance, together with the implications that might flow from any substantial shift in the balance favorable to the Soviet Union, will be discussed later. As to the Vietnam war and its influence on Soviet foreign policy, perhaps one of its principal effects was to sharpen the regime's problem of deciding between the virtue of a hard and militant line abroad and that of a policy of restraint and moderation.

From the beginning of its tenure, the new collective leadership was marked by a controversy between advocates of what could loosely be described as the "hardline" and the "moderate" policy course. The hardline approach implied not only a larger and possibly more dangerous level of support for Hanoi's war effort but also the adoption of a tougher attitude on Germany and other European questions, a more vigorous attempt to extend Soviet influence in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World, and a further buildup of military forces that probably would quicken the tempo of the arms race. The moderate line, on the other hand, implied a willingness to work seriously for a negotiated solution in Vietnam, and a readiness to seek an easing of international tensions by helping to promote greater stability in Europe and the Middle East, by mending Soviet relations with the United States, and by exploring new approaches to bringing the arms race under control.
The Vietnam war, of course, was only one of many factors bearing on the Soviet Union's choice between these two broad lines of policy. However, to the extent that Soviet policy decisions under the collective rule of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have been the product of "committee compromise" between hardline and moderate factions within the leadership, the war in Vietnam probably has tended to weaken the case of those leadership elements favoring priority for economic improvement at home and a tension-easing policy of moderation abroad. Even so, the impact of the war seems not to have tipped the scales decisively in favor of advocates of the hard line. Indeed, it can be argued that the greater part of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's foreign policy record testifies to an inability to pursue a clear-cut policy line in either direction, at least in dealing with countries outside the Soviet bloc. In this view, rule by "committee compromise" has tended to produce a policy deadlock of sorts, with hard and soft factions often canceling each other out, leaving the regime to steer a middle, and frequently ambivalent, policy course between the two.

Whatever effect the internal interplay of collective leadership politics may have had upon the foreign policy decisions of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, however, it would appear that the Kremlin has found it particularly difficult to settle upon an unequivocal policy line toward the United States, a problem that perhaps reflects the tangle of conflicting and interdependent interests characteristic of the relationship between these two global rivals.
E. SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

In the period from October 1964 to early 1969, Soviet policy toward the United States went, first, through a brief spell of détente inherited from the Khrushchev era; next, through a three-year period of mounting hostility, punctuated by occasional moments of cooperation; and then into a phase which saw the tentative renewal of the search for accommodation between the two superpowers that had been abruptly set back by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 1968. During most of this time, the Soviet leadership exhibited a highly ambivalent attitude toward the United States.

On the one hand, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime adopted an increasingly critical anti-American line quite soon after coming to power; it turned a cold shoulder to the periodic U.S. overtures for better relations; it frequently pictured Vietnam as a total barrier to cooperation; and it was prone to playing upon divisions in the West between the United States and its allies that were due, in part, to the Vietnam conflict. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership apparently remained persuaded that a complete freeze in Soviet-U.S. relations would neither force the abandonment of American policy in Vietnam nor serve other Soviet interests -- least of all that of maintaining the Soviet Union's tacit "survival pact" with the United States. Accordingly, the Kremlin kept open lines of negotiation with Washington on a number of specific issues, particularly in the arms control field, and it continued to recognize a mutual Soviet-American interest in keeping crisis situations in various parts of the world from developing into
an armed confrontation between the nuclear superpowers themselves.

As noted previously, a perceptible cooling in Soviet-U.S. relations first became evident in early 1965, after a brief interlude during which the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had adhered officially to Khrushchev's priority on "peaceful coexistence" and the United States, in turn, had expressed the hope of fostering mutual understanding and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe. Such hopes were expressed, for example, in President Johnson's State of the Union message of January 4, 1965, the first of a number of overtures he was to make to the new Soviet regime on the theme of East-West "bridge-building." One may observe, incidentally, that the beginning of an overtly hostile Soviet stance toward the United States by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime came in the Soviet reaction to this speech -- and not after the initiation of U.S. bombing attacks against North Vietnam more than a month later, as often assumed.

By mid-1965, there was no mistaking that little was left of the détente in Soviet-U.S. relations which had carried over from the Khrushchev period. In addition to reviving old charges that the United States was encouraging the "revanchist" aspirations of West Germany by sponsoring the multilateral force (MLF) project which allegedly would enable Bonn to acquire nuclear weapons, the Soviet leadership began to lay new stress on other aspects of American policy that it considered inimical to Soviet interests, especially the growing American military commitment in Vietnam. From then on, Soviet attacks on American policy became increasingly sharp, as one spokesman after another
sought to pin upon "American imperialism" the full responsibility for "threats to peace" throughout the world and asserted that only American withdrawal from Vietnam could halt the deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations.117

In the face of this campaign of anti-American invective, there was little response to Washington's periodic overtures for better East-West understanding, as illustrated by the treatment accorded President Johnson's major speech of October 7, 1966, in favor of a "bridge-building" policy. This speech, in which the President called for a return to the spirit of détente and suggested various steps toward reconciliation with the Soviet Union and the East European countries,118 met with a chilly reception in Moscow, where a week later Brezhnev delivered a public rebuff, stating that American officials labored under a "strange and persistent delusion" if they thought it possible to improve relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe despite the conflict in Vietnam.119

1. Negotiations on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Other Matters

Although such dramatic American diplomatic initiatives as the bridge-building speech of October 1966 and President Johnson's tête-à-tête with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro in June 1967, during the Arab-Israeli crisis, failed to produce any notable shift in the Soviet Union's public criticism of American policy, the Kremlin leadership tacitly demonstrated in a number of other instances that it was prepared to deal with the United States on certain specific questions without making resolution of the Vietnam crisis a precondition for negotiations.
Thus, for example, the Soviet Union responded to an American initiative of May 1966 for negotiation of an outer-space treaty designed to amplify and formalize earlier understandings on the regulation of space activities, including the 1963 UN resolution against placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit. The treaty, negotiations on which proceeded simultaneously with angry Soviet denunciations of U.S. policy in Europe and Asia, was signed in almost record time on January 27, 1967, the first multilateral agreement with arms control provisions since the partial test ban of 1963. The renewal of a cultural exchange agreement between the two countries in March 1966, a Soviet decision in September 1966 to exchange weather satellite photos with the United States, and resumption of talks which in November 1966 led to the signing of an agreement to set up direct commercial flights between the United States and the USSR, were other examples of matters on which Moscow chose to deal with Washington in this period.

But perhaps the most notable manifestation of this willingness to overlook Vietnam as a barrier to participation in negotiations with the United States came in connection with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, a matter which had been under intermittent discussion in arms control conferences since 1960. After having insisted, at the recess of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in the fall of 1965, that the Vietnam situation barred the way to fruitful negotiation on nonproliferation and other arms control matters, Soviet spokesmen adopted a different attitude when the Geneva talks reconvened, in January 1966, placing new emphasis on the need for a nonproliferation
agreement. The prospect of using a nonproliferation treaty as a means of blocking German access to nuclear weapons doubtless counted heavily with the Soviet leaders, outweighing any risk that their readiness to explore the subject anew would be construed as unseemly "collusion" with the United States while the Vietnam war was in progress. At any rate, the ensuing negotiations yielded their first fruit in August 1967 with the joint U.S.-Soviet acceptance of a draft nonproliferation treaty, complete except for Article III on inspection, which was left blank.

Although the nonproliferation talks bogged down for several months because of unresolved differences over inspection and the dissatisfaction of various nonnuclear countries with some aspects of the proposed treaty, a joint U.S.-Soviet draft of a completed treaty was presented at Geneva on January 18, 1968, marking yet another significant step in collaboration despite the constraints of the war in Vietnam. Amendment of this draft followed, and a later version was submitted to the UN General Assembly in March 1968. On July 1, 1968, the effort culminated in the signing of the treaty by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and fifty-eight other countries.

Thus, although some important nations held out against signing, the nonproliferation negotiations established a new landmark in the effort to control nuclear weapons. As regarded the relationship between the two nuclear superpowers, they demonstrated that neither U.S.-Soviet rivalry nor the tensions of the Vietnam conflict precluded agreement in a case where both sides presumably perceived a
treaty as serving important interests, albeit for somewhat different reasons. The Soviet Union's view of the treaty as a way to forestall any NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements with Germany, and its desire to profit from the political embarrassment that this might introduce into relations between the United States and its allies,\(^{130}\) were obviously not shared by the United States. However, the latter's primary interest in the treaty as a device for inhibiting the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons so as to reduce their destabilizing influence upon the international environment may have been shared to some extent by the Soviet Union. Perhaps an additional reason why the Soviet Union and the United States could join in supporting the treaty was that, for the time being at least, it left each of them free to pursue unilaterally the military programs by which it could hope to weight the strategic balance in its favor.

2. Soviet Reluctance To Hold ABM Talks

By contrast with their readiness to pursue uninterrupted negotiations of the nonproliferation treaty even when Soviet-American relations were at their most frigid over the Vietnam war, the Soviet authorities displayed a marked reluctance to enter talks on another major arms control issue raised by the United States, namely, a moratorium on deployment of missile defenses, linked later with limitations on strategic offensive systems. This issue came to the fore in early 1967, after U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara had disclosed officially in November 1966 that the Soviet Union had embarked on the deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses.\(^{131}\) American hopes
of persuading the Soviet Union to reconsider this step and agree to a mutual freeze on ABM deployment in order to head off a new and expensive round in the strategic arms race were voiced by President Johnson in his State of the Union message of January 1967, along with an invitation to enter negotiations on the subject. 132

Reaction from the Soviet side was both cool and equivocal, as typified by Kosygin's comments in February, and again in June 1967, in which he showed no enthusiasm for an ABM moratorium, but did not slam the door shut on possible negotiations. 133 There were a few signs at the time to suggest that the U.S. initiative may have touched off an ABM policy debate within the Soviet leadership, 134 which might explain why the Soviet government was slow to respond formally to the American offer. When, in September 1967, Secretary McNamara announced with obvious regret that the United States had decided to go ahead with deployment of a "relatively light" and "Chinese-oriented" ABM system, later named the "Sentinel" system, 135 it was felt in some quarters that this initiative might end the Soviet Union's footdragging. 136

For the next ten months, however, neither this move nor other promptings from the American side had any perceptible effect in eliciting a formal reply from Moscow. Not until mid-July 1968, almost a year-and-a-half after President Johnson's initial bid, did the Soviet leadership finally indicate that it was prepared to discuss ABM deployment and the related question of strategic offensive forces. By then, looming troubles within the Communist world and other factors evidently had persuaded the Soviet leaders that it was time to seek a new breathing
spell in relations with the United States. Their assent to missile talks was a signal to this effect. We shall take up in a moment this and other signals that seemed to herald the opening of a new diplomatic dialogue between Moscow and Washington. But first let us turn briefly to another aspect of limited 'cooperation' in Soviet relations with the United States that remained relatively unchanged under Khrushchev's successors even during the most virulent season of anti-American utterance from Moscow.

3. Soviet-American "Crisis Collaboration" To Avoid War

If at least one constant feature could be found in the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's approach to Soviet-American relations, it was the recognition that the two powers had a common interest in avoiding a direct military collision that could lead to nuclear war -- a danger manifestly enhanced wherever their respective great-power commitments might be invoked in a local conflict. Thus, in the various "hot" crises that developed after they came to power, Khrushchev's successors, like Khrushchev before them, in a sense collaborated with the United States to steer clear of this hazard.

Perhaps the principal example was the case of Vietnam itself, where both powers sought to sidestep an open confrontation despite their deepening stakes in the struggle. The India-Pakistan war in the autumn of 1965, brought to a halt after Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent in early 1966, provided another occasion for a momentary conjunction of Soviet and U.S. crisis diplomacy, although the two countries' parallel interest in dampening this crisis probably
stemmed less from fear of being drawn into military conflict with each other than from a common desire to contain China. The Middle East crisis of May 1967, climaxing by the six-day Arab-Israeli war in June, once more demonstrated that Moscow and Washington saw eye to eye on the necessity of not allowing local hostilities to develop into a military showdown between themselves. Doubtless, the very brevity of the war helped to prevent a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation, but it is nevertheless significant that at the height of the fighting both Soviet and American diplomacy sought to contain the conflict, making the first use of the "hot line," among other things, as a means of crisis communication.

Once the immediate danger of a Soviet-U.S. military entanglement subsided, however, the limits of this mutual interest in crisis control soon became apparent. Indeed, Soviet propaganda found it expedient to charge that the United States had been itching all along to intervene on the side of the Israeli "militarists" with the "big stick" of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Bent upon recouping its prestige in the Arab world and improving its position in the Middle East, the Soviet Union showed little interest in responding to American appeals for restoration of stability in the area and the curbing of another arms buildup. Although it joined in the November 1967 resolution of the Security Council to restrict a "ruinous arms race" in the Middle East, the Soviet Union went ahead with large-scale arms shipments to put the defeated Arab armies back on their feet, along with other forms of political and material support of the Arab states that were hardly likely to promote a stable settlement in the region.
Also, despite a display of diplomatic restraint during the efforts of the United States and the United Nations near the close of 1967 to mediate a Greek-Turkish quarrel over Cyprus that threatened to reignite hostilities in the eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union continued to call for the removal of American military power from the Mediterranean as one prerequisite for "solution" of the problems of peace and security in the Middle East and Europe.

The Soviet leadership doubtless found it difficult to pass up the opportunity to strengthen the USSR's political-strategic foothold in the Middle East, because it came at a time when British withdrawal from the region and American preoccupation with Vietnam combined to reduce the chances that such a Soviet effort would encounter concerted Western opposition, except in an acute crisis like that of the six-day war. Somewhat similarly, with respect to the larger question of Europe itself, the Soviet leadership apparently also was tempted to take advantage of a situation which saw the day-to-day attention of U.S. policymakers increasingly distracted from the European scene by the war in Vietnam. In any event, as will be brought out in more detail later in these pages, the Soviet Union in 1966-1967 gradually shifted to a more active European diplomacy, perhaps hopefully calculated to channel the anti-American line of Charles de Gaulle and other European discontents into a political force effective enough to bring about a significant decline in the presence and influence of the United States in Europe.
The prospects of making progress in this direction may have looked rather good to the Kremlin leaders until the ground began to heave under their own feet in East Europe. After the early months of 1968, as the reformist heresy in Czechoslovakia generated a crisis that threatened to split the Warsaw bloc itself, much of the momentum went out of the Soviet campaign to detach the United States from its NATO allies. Now the need to patch up relations with the United States and to free Moscow for whatever measures might be required in East Europe apparently assumed new importance for the Soviet leaders. It was at this point that they began to explore anew the possibilities of rapprochement with the United States, although the strongly hostile notes that could still be heard suggested that internal differences were making it difficult for the Kremlin leaders to orchestrate a less palpably anti-American policy line.

4. The Tentative Emergence of a New Soviet Stance Toward the United States

Signs of a Soviet disposition to encourage a thaw in Soviet-American relations appeared in the spring of 1968, at a time when the imminent conclusion of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the opening of the Paris talks on Vietnam, and Washington's scrupulous observance of a hands-off attitude toward developments in East Europe had combined to produce a momentary slackening of Soviet-American political tensions. Among the first conciliatory gestures from Moscow were the announcement, on May 4, that the Supreme Soviet had finally got around to ratifying the consular treaty, and the Soviet Union's agreement later
that month, after numerous postponements, to resume negotiations on a new cultural exchange pact. But the principal move suggestive of a shift in Moscow's approach was the decision to enter talks on limiting missiles and ABM, which had been delayed for almost eighteen months. It was made known not in a direct reply to the American invitation but in this passage of a speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Supreme Soviet on June 27:

One of the unprobed areas of disarmament is the search for an understanding on mutual restriction and subsequent reduction of strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons -- offensive and defensive -- including anti-missile. The Soviet Government is ready for an exchange of opinion on this subject.

Although readiness for an exchange of opinion gave no grounds for supposing that agreement was just around the corner on what promised to be the subject of the most complex technical and political negotiations yet undertaken between Moscow and Washington in the nuclear age, Gromyko's statement nevertheless prompted far-reaching speculation that an historic turning point in Soviet-American relations was at hand if the two superpowers could indeed find a formula to impose limits on the dynamics of the strategic arms race. Why the Soviet Union had finally chosen to embark on the talks was likewise a question of widespread interest, the more so because the decision apparently had been contested right up to the end by groups within the Soviet leadership who were skeptical of its wisdom.

Coming only a few days after proponents of the Sentinel ABM system had defeated an appropriations cut in the U.S.
Senate that would have postponed construction of this American anti-missile system, the Soviet move could be interpreted as a belated effort to head off the U.S. program. While this may have been a factor, many other considerations doubtless entered into the decision. Some of these were probably related to the Soviet strategic arms buildup, which by mid-1968 had put the USSR in a position approaching numerical parity with the United States in land-based missile launchers, so that strategic limitation talks may have struck the Soviet leaders as a timely means by which to avoid a massive new drain on resources for another round of strategic arms just after the USSR had managed to "catch up" in this field. Similarly, the Kremlin leaders may have welcomed the opportunity presented by the talks to establish publicly that the Soviet Union was now able to deal as a strategic equal with its major adversary, from which the United States and the rest of the world could be expected to draw the appropriate political conclusions. In a later chapter we shall deal in somewhat greater detail with these particular considerations as well as with other long-term factors relating to the strategic balance.

In the immediate context of troubles stemming from the turmoil within the Warsaw bloc in mid-1968, another likely motive for the Soviet decision to engage in missile talks was, as already suggested, the desire to clear the decks for dealing with these problems. If the United States was encouraged to believe that the talks held promise of improving relations with the USSR, Washington would be hesitant to jeopardize their progress by making difficulties over any steps the Soviet Union found
necessary to keep the Czech reformist movement in line. Internal Kremlin politics also may have entered the picture, with the missile-talk offer and other Soviet gestures of accommodation toward the United States representing, as some observers saw it, the product of bargaining between hard and moderate factions within the Politburo. In this view, the "hardline ideologues" may have given in to the "moderate pragmatists" by agreeing to ease relations with the United States in return for a tougher campaign for conformity at home and in East Europe. How Soviet policy would straddle the contradiction between a more amicable approach to the U.S. Government and an ideological conformity drive based on the theme that the Soviet Union had to combat a massive "subversive campaign" directed against it by that very same government was not entirely clear.

Indeed, such contradictions remained characteristic of Moscow's stance toward the United States, as gestures of accommodation were interspersed with abusive attacks on American policy. In May 1968, for example, only a few days before Moscow's propitiatory announcement that the consular treaty had been ratified, speakers at May Day ceremonies on Red Square accused the United States of "embarking ever more openly upon the path of aggression" and of "stepping up ideological subversion against the socialist states." In early June, after President Johnson had made at least one private plea for better Soviet-American cooperation and issued three more public appeals to the Soviet Union to put aside "old antagonisms," Soviet spokesmen responded coldly, declaring once again that relations between the two countries would
not improve so long as the United States continued to wage its "barbarous war" in Vietnam, to plot against the "progressive" Arab states, and to support "revanchist forces" in West Germany. In early July, at a moment when Soviet-American relations seemed to be newly infused with a spirit of cooperation as demonstrated by Gromyko's acceptance of missile talks, the signing of the nonproliferation treaty, and the Soviet Union's release of a Vietnam-bound American airliner that had been forced down by MIGs near the Kurile Islands, Brezhnev chose to deliver a vitriolic indictment of the United States as a land "of political gangsterism that causes contempt and disgust throughout the world."

The tendency for Moscow to speak with two voices on Soviet-American cooperation, which could be interpreted as a reflection of internal differences between moderate and hardline leadership elements, was perhaps least evident in the Soviet Union's treatment of the U.S. position on the situation in East Europe, in the mid-months of 1968. On this question, the hard voice held sway. Despite the fact that the American government leaned over backwards to avoid involving itself in the events of Czechoslovakia, Moscow repeatedly accused the United States of being behind the Czech liberalization movement and of trying to restore "the capitalist order" there. Moreover, in a transparently crude effort to buttress its case, Moscow sought to plant "evidence" that American arms were being smuggled to subversive forces in Czechoslovakia, thus concocting a plot that it might then use either as an instrument in the war of nerves against the Dubcek reform government or as an excuse for military intervention in Czechoslovakia.
There was more than a touch of irony in the fact that the harsher the Soviet accusations against the United States and the West for alleged meddling in the Czech situation, the more Western officials sought to stand aside from the crisis. Following the American lead, NATO adopted a "correct" hands-off attitude, and in July, to avoid any suggestion of provocation, a field exercise of West German, American, and French troops previously scheduled to take place near the Czech border was moved to another location in West Germany. It was almost as if the West, by adopting a posture of restraint and trying to remove any excuse for Soviet intervention, had been cast in the role of looking out for the enlightened self-interest of the Soviet Union as well as its own -- a role that unfortunately awakened in the West a sense of frustration and even shame not unlike that produced by the abandonment of Czechoslovakia at Munich, thirty years before.

It would perhaps be unwarranted to assume that a peaceful and enlightened solution of the Soviet Union's dilemma in East Europe was beyond the capacity of any Soviet leadership group. But the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, for one, demonstrated that it could do no better than revert to the pattern of military suppression employed against Hungary in 1956. Despite a widespread belief that the Soviet Union was merely bluffing and would not risk the political cost of invading another Communist country, its leaders did precisely that when, in August 1968, they called upon Soviet arms to snuff out the reform experiment in Czechoslovakia. In regard to Soviet-American relations, the invasion of Czechoslovakia brought
to a momentary halt the tentative exploration of specific steps toward accommodation such as the strategic arms limitation talks; in a broader sense, it seemed to suggest that East-West bridge-building looked more dangerous to the orthodox oligarchs in the Kremlin than did a return to the frowning hostility of a Cold War environment. However, if the past imprint of Hungary and Vietnam on the attitudes of the Soviet Union and the United States toward each other was a reliable guide, one could expect that, even though the Czechoslovak intervention threw up a formidable obstacle to genuine improvement of relations, the two nuclear superpowers would sooner or later resume their groping search for some basis of accommodation.\textsuperscript{161} Upon this note, let us now turn to the evolution of Soviet policy toward Europe in the five years following the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's assumption of power.
XII. THE FORGING OF SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICY UNDER THE 
BREZHEV-KOSYGIN REGIME: 1964-1966

It may be useful to begin this discussion of Soviet policy toward Europe under Khrushchev's successors by recalling briefly the general state of affairs which obtained in Europe at the time the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime came to power. Although a divided Europe in which both the Soviet Union and the United States maintained a strong presence was still doubtless the dominant feature of the political landscape, by the autumn of 1964 this once rigid division of postwar Europe was clearly giving way to a more fluid situation. The loosening of internal ties within both alliance systems and some broadening of relations between the two halves of Europe seemed to have set the stage for unpredictable changes, which might eventually lead Europe far from the division of the Cold War and at the same time alter the roles of the two external superpowers in European affairs.

In Western Europe, the process of economic and political recovery, along with a belief that the threat of military attack from the East had virtually vanished, contributed to a frame of mind more relaxed than at any time in the past two decades. Deterrence, based essentially on the high risks of a nuclear war growing out of military action in Europe, had come to be taken for granted as the source of European security. In most Western opinion, there was little likelihood, after the lesson of Cuba, that the Soviet Union would soon again try to upset the power balance under which a continuing political standoff and a reassuring measure of East-West détente in Europe had come into being.
In this atmosphere, the erosion of NATO under the acid of de Gaulle's attitudes caused no great concern in Europe; indeed, most members of the Western alliance, displaying pale reflections of the Gaullist outlook, seemed to be moving in one degree or another away from their close dependence upon American leadership. Incidental to the feeling that the countries of Western Europe could and should begin to play more active and autonomous roles on the European stage was the onset of disillusionment with some of the grander designs for the integration of Europe that had originally been conceived at American urging.

A somewhat analogous situation existed in the autumn of 1964 in Eastern Europe, where members of the Warsaw bloc were showing varying shades of a nationalist self-assertiveness that sometimes ran counter to Soviet interests and perspectives. Although the challenge to Soviet hegemony here remained more or less muted, except in the case of Rumania, the Soviet Union could no longer count on unquestioning obedience from its East European partners; rather, the problems of maintaining discipline and unity within the bloc now called for the exercise of something more closely akin to traditional coalition politics. At the same time, however, nationalist trends in East Europe were not wholly adverse to Soviet interests, for they tended to fragment any concerted regional opposition to the Russians. Moreover, if some decline of the Soviet Union's authority within its alliance system had set in, the East European Communist regimes were still keenly aware that their ultimate security rested on Soviet arms, especially in the sense that Soviet military power served
as the final guarantee against the rise of revisionist aspirations in Germany.

The problem of Germany and her future doubtless remained the focal issue of East-West relationships in Europe in the fall of 1964. A divided Germany, denied the infinitely difficult goal of reunification, or even the less elusive prospect of "reassociation," would continue to be the source of tension and discord in the heart of Europe. A Germany rejoined, and thereby transformed once more into the most potent European state, not only would become a prize that neither East nor West could afford to lose, but might, if she should seek to go her own way, prove equally disturbing to both. The only satisfactory way to resolve the German problem, it seemed, would be to integrate a reunified Germany into an economically and politically unified European system. But, at best, such a system lay itself clearly at the end of a long process of evolution, and not within the realm of near-term possibilities. Thus, despite a generally welcome improvement in the Cold War climate, and notwithstanding even some signs, such as Khrushchev's overtures to Bonn in 1964, that Moscow might be considering new initiatives with respect to Germany, there still appeared to be little immediate prospect for the solution of the profound dilemma posed by the German problem throughout the post-war period.

This, then, in barest outline, was the background against which the new Kremlin leadership took up the task of forging its own policies toward West and East Europe. In this and subsequent chapters, we shall consider the nature of the policies which have emerged since
the autumn of 1964, beginning with an examination of the trends in Soviet policy toward Western Europe.

A. MAIN PHASES IN THE POST-KHRUSHCHEV PATTERN OF POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE

Soviet policy toward Western Europe under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime went through three distinct phases in the period between October 1964 and early 1969. In the first, which lasted about a year-and-a-half, Soviet European policy remained relatively subdued, in keeping with the general tendency of the new regime to eschew foreign policy initiatives while it was still consolidating its domestic position.

The second phase began in the summer of 1966, roughly between the 23rd Party Congress, which was held in Moscow in April, and the Bucharest conference of Warsaw Pact states in July. The outlines of a new European policy bearing the impress of the successor regime had gradually taken shape. Characterized by a firm effort to improve Soviet relations with Western Europe, with the notable exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, the new policy line also was marked by more active exploitation of the vulnerability of the United States on the issue of the Vietnam war in an attempt to weaken European-American ties, and by renewed advocacy of an all-European security conference for a European settlement that would aim to exclude the United States from any substantial influence in European affairs.

A third main phase of Soviet European policy under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime can be most conveniently dated from the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which had the effect,
among other things, of placing the Soviet Union at least temporarily on the political defensive in Europe while it sought to repair its badly tarnished image. A good argument can be made, however, that well before the events of August 1968 the Soviet leaders had become so preoccupied with arresting the erosion of their authority in East Europe that they were no longer in a position to make the most of the opportunities afforded by a flexible Soviet diplomacy in the western half of Europe. If this was the case, Soviet policy toward Western Europe could be said to have been losing momentum even before the Soviet blow fell upon Czechoslovakia. In any event, after the Czechoslovak "interruption" the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime could be expected to try to regain some of the initiative in European affairs which it had let slip from its grasp.

The concern of the present chapter is with the first of the several policy phases denoted above, that is, the period from Khrushchev's ouster in the autumn of 1964 to the Bucharest conference in mid-1966. At the outset, despite trends in Western Europe toward a further loosening of the ties between the United States and its NATO allies, the new Soviet leaders showed little disposition to plunge headlong into a diplomacy designed to take advantage of the situation. Indeed, they made an almost studied effort not to disturb the delicate balance in Europe, as though they wished to preserve a détente atmosphere in this part of the world while the tension was rising in Southeast Asia and Soviet relations with China were passing through a new phase of uncertainty.

To be sure, an insistent propaganda campaign was carried on in the early months of the new regime against
the MLF and other proposed forms of NATO nuclear organization, capped by a demonstrative Warsaw Pact meeting in Poland in January 1965 to consider countermeasures to the MLF if it should come into being. This campaign, however, was essentially a continuation of the one previously pursued under Khrushchev, and while it showed that Soviet opposition to any form of German participation in nuclear affairs remained adamant, it represented no new initiative that threatened to upset the quiescent state of the East-West confrontation in Europe, such as might have been any serious effort to reopen the question of a German settlement and the status of Berlin.

B. INITIAL SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WEST GERMANY

With respect to Germany, the new Soviet regime promptly dropped Khrushchev's project for warming up relations with the Federal Republic, and turned a deaf ear to suggestions from Bonn that the invitation for a high-level Soviet visit was still open. On the basic questions of a German peace treaty and of Berlin, however, the new Soviet leaders gave no hint of wishing to press for alteration of the situation registered by the Soviet-GDR friendship treaty of June 1964, which had served to mollify the Ulbricht regime to some extent while avoiding any real hardening of fundamental East-West positions. In fact, early pronouncements of the new regime even suggested some slight softening of the Soviet stand on Germany. Brezhnev's anniversary speech of November 6, 1964, and a major foreign policy editorial in Pravda shortly thereafter, exhibited a modification of the standing demand for a peace treaty.
covering the two Germanys and dropped the rider calling for a change in the status of Berlin that had been a customary part of the peace treaty formula.\footnote{5} Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, speaking at the United Nations on December 7, 1964, also gave an indication that the new Soviet regime was disposed to shelve the matter of a German peace treaty for the time being. Although Gromyko mentioned the need for a German peace settlement in general terms, he did not call for conclusion of a peace treaty, nor did he revive the demand regarding the status of West Berlin.\footnote{6}

These signs of willingness to keep the Berlin and German issues on the shelf were the more notable in light of the pall which Khrushchev's rumored toying with a "sell-out" of East Germany had cast over relations between Moscow and the Ulbricht regime. Brezhnev and Suslov, it may be recalled, had taken special pains to allay East German fears of a sellout just prior to Khrushchev's overthrow.\footnote{7} Once having disposed of Khrushchev, however, the new collective leaders not only made no further reference to his alleged flirtation with Bonn at East Germany's expense, but by softening their attitude on Berlin and a peace treaty they seemed to be showing little deference to East German sensibilities.

All of this might be taken to mean that, while the new Soviet regime had seen fit to cut off the overtures to Bonn launched in the latter days of Khrushchev's tenure, it did not care to be hurried into a position that might foreclose the eventual possibility of working out some improvement in the Moscow-Bonn relationship. Little tangible effort was forthcoming on Moscow's part, however,
to encourage Bonn's hopes for better relations. Although Kosygin tossed out a kind word or two for the new generation of West Germans during a VE-Day celebration speech in East Germany on May 7, 1965, this was but a faint note in the barrage of anti-Bonn propaganda called forth by the occasion; moreover, it came in the midst of what many thought was the development of a new Berlin crisis.

1. Temporary Berlin Harassment

Beginning in April 1965, coincident with a Bundestag session in West Berlin, and continuing through about June, Soviet and GDR agencies carried out a series of harassments of Western land and air communications with Berlin, which included the buzzing of West Berlin's Congress Hall by Soviet jets, the occasional closing of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn for joint Soviet-GDR troop maneuvers, and other interference with air and barge traffic. Whether the initiative for this "retaliatory" campaign against the Bundestag meeting came primarily from the Ulbricht regime or from Moscow was open to question, but there was no doubt that Moscow had given its approval, for Soviet forces took an active part in some of the harassment measures.

From the Soviet viewpoint, a demonstration of "toughness" at this time may have been calculated to offset the image of Soviet hesitancy toward the Vietnam situation, and also to remind the United States that the Soviet Union held cards in Europe that could be played to the discomfiture of the West if U.S. policy in Southeast Asia were not altered. In any case, the campaign against Berlin's
communications with the West was allowed to cool off before it took on the dimensions of another major crisis, but not without having achieved the objective of discouraging further meetings of West German parliamentary bodies in Berlin for the time being. As we shall see later, the revival of Soviet opposition to the maintenance of this particular kind of symbolic bond between the Federal Republic and West Berlin was to become a factor of some consequence in the development of Soviet policy toward Bonn.

Once the harassment of Berlin had subsided, the summer of 1965 brought no evidence of new Soviet initiatives against West Germany. However, the Soviet Union displayed some interest in resuming a quiet diplomatic dialogue with Bonn when Dr. Karl Carstens, the West German deputy foreign minister, was received in Moscow in September 1965. The Carstens visit, reflecting another step in Bonn's attempt to improve the climate of its relations with Moscow and selected East European countries, may have been regarded by the Soviet leaders as a gesture by which West Germany sought to isolate the East German regime from its Warsaw Pact neighbors; if so, they were careful to sidestep any such maneuver, as suggested by the coincidence that an East German delegation headed by Ulbricht was ostentatiously welcomed in the Soviet Union while Carstens was present. Nevertheless, although the Carstens visit may have accomplished little more than to help smooth Soviet-West German trade, which in 1965 was running at about a half-billion dollars annually, the fact that the visit took place at all testified to a slight warming of relations between the two capitals.
Any hopes, however, that a new corner had been turned in Soviet-West German relations receded toward the end of 1965 as various Soviet leaders again began to belabor the foreign policies of the Erhard government. Besides questioning the Federal Republic's right to be treated as an equal and accusing Bonn of cynically abusing its membership in NATO for its own "revanchist" purposes, Soviet spokesmen also took up the charge, which was to be heard more and more frequently, that U.S. support of the FRG was leading to the emergence of a special Washington-Bonn military axis within NATO. In the early months of 1966, the Soviet line toward Bonn grew progressively harder, especially after the Erhard government sought to press its policy of "reconciliation" toward Germany's eastern neighbors one step further with its "Peace Note" of March 25, 1966.

2. Reaction to Bonn's "Peace Note"

This note, in which Bonn offered to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and "any other East European state" to renounce the use of force for the settling of international disputes, contained nothing that implied abandonment of West Germany's position on such central issues as Germany's future frontiers and reunification; but it did recognize that reunification could come only at the end of a long process of détente and reconciliation that would dispel "distrust with regard to alleged German aggressive intentions." As the note did not concede the existence of separate German states, it obviously was unpalatable to the GDR, and the Soviet Union was thus, in effect, presented with
a choice between treating the note as a friendly gesture from Bonn and spurning it in order to back up the Ulbricht regime's resistance to West German conciliatory moves. It chose the latter alternative.

Formal Soviet rejection of Bonn's "Peace Note" was delayed about two months, but the treatment accorded it in Brezhnev's opening speech at the 23rd Party Congress on March 29 foreshadowed what was to come. Brezhnev brushed aside Bonn's proposals with the cryptic comment that they only showed that "the FRG intends to continue its aggressive and revenge-seeking policy." Like other speakers at the Congress, he included in his denunciation of West German revanchism the warning that a bilateral military partnership was "taking shape between the ruling circles of the USA and the FRG," with each partner "seeking to aggravate tension in Europe -- each for his own purpose." According to Brezhnev, the U.S. purpose in aggravating European tensions was to create a pretext for "keeping its troops and war bases in Europe, and thereby to have a means for directly influencing the economy and policy of the West European countries." Bonn's purpose, he charged, was "to involve the USA and its other NATO partners more deeply in its revanchist plans in order to secure a revision of the results of World War II in its favor."

Having pictured a growing Washington-Bonn axis as the main threat to European security, Brezhnev later in his speech returned to the European security theme by proposing "an appropriate international conference" on that subject. Although his suggestion was vague as to participants and agenda for such a conference, it provided a preview of what would shortly become one of the main features of
the new regime's European policy approach. In a sense, the notion of an all-European security conference, which had lain more or less dormant for a decade, was also the Soviet answer to Bonn's "Peace Note" of March 1966. Incidentally, whereas Brezhnev tended to attribute the "Peace Note" initiative to encouragement from the United States, some Soviet interpretations of Bonn's "Eastern Policy" took a different tack, asserting that the note was Bonn's own reply to the failure of the United States and other NATO members to respond to West Germany's desire for a new "Western initiative on the German question." When the formal Soviet answer to the "Peace Note" came, on May 18, amidst signs that Bonn's initiative had scored at least a minor success in Eastern Europe, the counter-conditions laid down for improvement of Soviet relations with the Federal Republic conspicuously included the holding of a European conference to take up "the proposals of the Socialist and other states of Europe on questions of European security," linked with other measures to bring about a German peace settlement, "reflecting the real situation in Europe." The range of measures stipulated by the Soviet Union called for settlement of virtually all outstanding European problems as the prerequisite for improved Moscow-Bonn relations, making it evident that the Soviet Union was primarily interested in preparing the way for a new diplomatic offensive in Europe -- one of the objects of which was to blunt the edge of the West German government's policy of reconciliation.
Indeed, from mid-1966 on, when the Bucharest conference served as the platform from which to launch this offensive in earnest, the Soviet leadership displayed little interest in feeling out the prospects for better relations with either the Erhard government or the coalition under Kiesinger that succeeded it later in 1966. Rather, the Soviet Union chose to step up its attacks on West German "militarism and revanchism," accusing Bonn in more and more strident terms of pursuing an aggressive foreign policy with the support and blessing of the United States. It seemed as though the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had come to consider the Federal Republic beyond redemption and, instead of entertaining the possibility of dealing bilaterally with Bonn, had in effect resigned itself to backing up Ulbricht's resistance to a conciliatory Eastern policy on the part of West Germany.

Yet, despite the strident attacks on rampant revanchism in Bonn, there was an occasional suggestion that the Soviet Union might be allowing itself elbow room for an alternative policy approach. One Soviet writer, for example, in a particularly damning attack on FRG policy in June 1966, still took pains to point out that "exposing Bonn's aggressive foreign policy" did not mean looking upon the Federal Republic "as an outcast among states." West Germany, he said, was not "inhabited solely by militarists and revenge-seekers. There are also healthy forces in the country who realize the need for a radical revision of the foreign and home policy." This, together with the notation that differences as well as coinciding interests existed between Bonn and Washington, was typical of the hints slipped now and then into Moscow's anti-German
propaganda, suggesting that under appropriate conditions the Soviet Union might be prepared to play a different policy card of some sort.

C. THE GROWTH OF SOVIET-FRENCH CORDIALITY

By contrast with its increasingly hard line toward West Germany between October 1964 and mid-1966, the Soviet Union displayed a growing interest in closer bilateral relations with France. At the outset, be it said, the new regime's inclination to pick up the cultivation of de Gaulle where Khrushchev had left off apparently was tempered by some of the same considerations that had kept Khrushchev wary of staking Soviet policy in Europe exclusively upon a Moscow-Paris axis: the limitations of de Gaulle's power; the long-standing Soviet disposition to deal directly with the real source of power in the West; and perhaps an ambivalent attitude toward the prospect of having U.S. influence -- with its potential restraint upon German ambitions -- removed from the scene. Whatever may have been the weight of such considerations in the councils of the new Soviet regime, however, factors suggesting that it would be useful to continue moving toward the Soviet-French rapprochement initiated under Khrushchev soon proved persuasive. As it happened, a reciprocal interest in rapprochement existed in Paris.

For the Soviet Union, the possibilities of turning de Gaulle's anti-Americanism to good account were to be seen largely in terms of further weakening NATO unity and undermining American influence in Europe without the liability of having to exert direct Soviet pressure upon the Western alliance -- a course which had often proved
unproductive in the past. Improved relations with France also provided an instrument for exerting subtle leverage on Germany; at the same time, they offered Moscow a way to defuse France's potential for attracting the countries of East Europe away from the Soviet orbit, for Paris could not encourage greater East European independence without risk of rupturing the rapprochement with the Soviet Union itself.

To de Gaulle, convinced that there was no longer any military danger in a Europe secure under the umbrella of a nuclear stalemate, the situation promised the great prestige of playing the prophet of détente with the Soviet Union and the satisfaction of leading the European disengagement from the United States. De Gaulle's growing belief that the Federal Republic of Germany could no longer be counted on to support his idea of an independent Europe based on a Franco-German axis centered in Paris also apparently sharpened his interest in forging closer links with the Soviet Union. 28

In any event, out of these partially convergent, if not always basically compatible, interests grew an increasing number of Soviet-French contacts. Beginning early in 1965, the Soviet Union made a series of gestures suggesting that development of closer Soviet-French relations would "open interesting prospects" for both. 29 These steps included the renewal in January 1965 of the standing Soviet invitation to de Gaulle to visit Moscow, the appointment in March of a new and more prestigious Soviet ambassador to Paris, 30 and the conclusion later the same month of a television agreement committing the Soviet Union to adopting the French system of color television -- a flattering bow to the value of French technology. 31 In late April, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko paid a five-day visit to de Gaulle, and by the
summer of 1965 it had become apparent that, while Soviet-French differences remained on a number of questions, the two countries were moving toward a collaborative relationship from which both might hope to profit.

Soviet approval of the course of French policy in Europe became perceptibly warmer in early 1966, as de Gaulle's dissatisfaction with NATO grew sharper. Thus, when the French leader, in an exchange of letters with President Johnson in March 1966, made it known that he had decided to withdraw French forces from NATO integrated military commands and that U.S. military facilities in France would have to be renegotiated, the Soviet Union promptly commended de Gaulle on the "realism" of this initiative to restore "French sovereignty." At the same time Soviet commentary charged that the United States, together with Britain and West Germany (its only "loyal partners" in NATO), was trying "to frighten the French government by threatening it with isolation if it should not rescind its intention to remove its troops from NATO control." 

1. **De Gaulle's Soviet Visit**

The development of closer ties between the Soviet Union and France in the first year-and-a-half after the fall of Khrushchev came to its most conspicuous juncture with de Gaulle's much-heralded journey to the USSR in June 1966. The French President's two-week state visit, during which he was accorded unprecedented honors and held long talks with the Soviet leaders, produced neither a dramatic "reversal of alliances" nor specific political commitments with respect to such hard-core issues as a German settlement or the Soviet proposal for a conference on European security. It did,
however, in addition to a variety of agreements on mutual consultation and scientific-economic cooperation, produce a significant affirmation on both sides "that the problems of Europe should be considered first of all in a European framework." Although de Gaulle qualified this formula as not "denying in any way the vital role which the United States must play in the pacification and transformation of the world," he left little doubt as to his preference for a greatly circumscribed American role in Europe.

One is tempted to assume that for de Gaulle and his Soviet hosts the chief effect of their talks was to confirm a mutual readiness to minimize American influence in Europe, yet it may be that neither party came away from the visit without certain reservations on this account. De Gaulle, though his emotional preference was doubtless to see the United States excluded from Europe, may also have realized that a Europe without some form of American support probably would not be strong enough politically and strategically to balance Soviet influence. Moreover, any purely European combination, in order to be strong enough to do so, would almost surely have to provide a greatly expanded role for Germany, which de Gaulle's policy was hardly meant to encourage. As for the Soviet leaders, despite their presumable interest in cooperating with Paris as a means of promoting the political isolation of the United States (and of Bonn) in Europe, they had reasons for not embracing de Gaulle too warmly. The Kremlin, at the time, was trying hard to hammer out a coordinated European policy within the Warsaw Pact, and concentration on a détente with de Gaulle before Pact unity was achieved might only undermine the quest for the latter. There was also the possibility that the Soviet leaders
regarded their flirtation with de Gaulle essentially as a useful way of marking time until termination of the war in Vietnam and other developments made it propitious once more to take up seriously with the United States the matter of reaching a settlement in Europe.

D. OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EMERGING SOVIET POLICY LINE IN EUROPE

If the Soviet regime in its private councils did in fact believe that the time might come when it would be more profitable to turn from de Gaulle to a diplomatic dialogue with the United States about terms for a European settlement, this was not evident in 1966, as the outlines of a new Soviet policy toward Europe gradually took shape. In addition to dwelling upon the familiar theme of the dangers posed by West German revanchism and siding with de Gaulle as exponents of a Europe that should assert its own identity, the Soviet leaders sought in a variety of ways to persuade Western Europe that improved relations with the Soviet Union would serve its political, economic, and security interests better than continued "subservience" to an American government which, according to Soviet propaganda, added to the international tension both by its own "aggressive" behavior in Vietnam and by its support of West German "revenge-seekers" in Europe.

One expression of these Soviet efforts to encourage organized opposition to U.S. policies was the revival of the "Popular Front" idea of the mid-thirties. In October 1965, at the time of the thirtieth anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, at which the original Popular Front had been launched, Soviet spokesmen such as B. N. Ponomarev began to urge that Western Communist parties seek a "broad
coalition" of "anti-imperialist, democratic forces," including even "right-wing Social Democrats," in order to oppose "American imperialism." As various Soviet accounts put it, a basis for the collaborative struggle of Communist and non-Communist groups against "American imperialism allied with West German revanchism" was to be found in a "new element" in world capitalism, namely -- "the striving of West European states to defend their national interests." Although the renewed emphasis on Popular Front tactics in late 1965 and 1966 brought no results in terms of formal alliance between Communist and non-Communist parties in Europe, with the possible exception of Finland, it did serve to give West European Communists somewhat greater flexibility in trying to influence popular and official sentiment in their countries.

1. Soviet Talks with Western Leaders

Another aspect of the Soviet effort to persuade West Europeans that their interest lay in siding with the Soviet Union against the alleged threat of a Washington-Bonn axis was to be seen in the growing number of visits which Soviet leaders exchanged with their European counterparts in 1966. Besides de Gaulle's journey to Moscow in mid-summer, which Kosygin repaid later in the year with a nine-day state visit to France, the flow of visits in both directions included two trips to Moscow by British Prime Minister Wilson, a call upon the Pope and the Italian government by Gromyko, and visits to Finland and Austria by Kosygin and Podgorny, respectively.

Wilson's talks with the Soviet leaders brought out the interesting but hardly surprising point that Britain could expect little improvement in relations with the Soviet Union so long as she continued her traditionally close relationship
with the United States. Whatever the private tenor of the conversations, the Soviet government let it be known public-
ly that such things as Britain's backing of U.S.-sponsored nuclear consultative arrangements in NATO and her failure to
denounce U.S. policy in Vietnam stood in the way of better Soviet-British relations. During Wilson's first Moscow trip, in February 1966, Kosygin took pains to point out that the visit had been at British initiative, and both then and on the second visit, in July 1966, it was apparent that Wilson could not expect to enlist Soviet cooperation in ef-
forts toward a negotiated settlement in Vietnam unless he was prepared to put pressure on the United States to reverse its stand. Although the talks in Moscow produced no visi-
ble progress on outstanding issues, both sides chose to re-
gard them as useful in keeping open the dialogue between East and West, and Kosygin agreed to pay a return visit to London, which took place early the following year.

Perhaps the most unexpected object of Soviet diplomatic attention, as various Soviet leaders shuttled about Europe, was Pope Paul VI, upon whom Gromyko paid a call in the course of a visit to Italy in April 1966. Marking an historic first meeting between a high Soviet official and a Roman pontiff, Gromyko's visit underscored Moscow's interest, not only in paving the way for more amicable relations between the Cath-
olic Church and the Soviet Union, but also in courting broad-
er support for the notion of a pan-European conference on European security problems. The recurrent theme of "Europe for the Europeans," to which Gromyko reportedly alluded in his talks both with the Pope and with Italian government of-
icials, was coupled with the suggestion at his press confer-
ence that all people should join with the Soviet Union in
"the search for relaxation of international tensions and peace regardless of differences in ideology and religion."

Meanwhile, on May 4, 1966, on the heels of Gromyko's visit to Italy, the Soviet Union took a much-publicized practical step in another direction with the signing of an agreement under which Italy's Fiat Company was to build a major automobile plant in the USSR. This move in the economic sphere served notice that the Soviet Union was interested in developing not only better political relations with cooperative countries in Western Europe but closer industrial-technical ties as well. If this were to encourage Europeans to believe that cooperation with the Soviet Union would pay economic dividends and offset the so-called "technological gap" and "brain drain" that were disturbing European-American relations, so much the better, although it was not clear that the export of Western auto-manufacturing techniques and other advanced technology to the Soviet Union would necessarily prompt a reverse flow of Soviet technology from which Western Europe might expect to profit.

2. Soviet Reluctance To Enter a Dialogue with the United States on European Security

Just as it was increasingly evident in the summer of 1966 that such overtures from Moscow as the bid for closer political-economic cooperation with Western Europe and for a pan-European security conference heralded a new and more active phase in the Soviet Union's European policy, so it had become equally obvious that Moscow at this juncture did not wish to enter into a direct dialogue with the United States on European problems in general or European security
issues in particular. Virtually all Soviet pronouncements on the need for a European security conference implied the exclusion of the United States from at least the preparatory stages of such a gathering and stressed that there should be a "European settlement" of issues involving the security of the Continent. Moreover, it almost seemed as though the Soviet leaders were afraid that their own access to West European audiences would suffer if they lent an attentive ear to American suggestions bearing on the subject of East-West Relations.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1966, there had been growing public discussion in the United States, fed by a series of hearings on Capitol Hill, on the future role of NATO and on the need for initiatives to reopen an East-West dialogue on European questions, despite the strain on U.S.-Soviet relations caused by the Vietnam war. In the course of one of these hearings, in June 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara made the significant point that the time might be ripe to consider a reciprocal reduction of forces in the rival organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a suggestion repeated in a slightly different context several months later in President Johnson's "bridge-building" speech of October 7, 1966.

However, just as Moscow was showing no interest in the general U.S. initiative for bridge-building discussions, so it declined to pick up the specific suggestion that mutual troop reductions might become part of an East-West accommodation in Europe. Rumors of possible Soviet troop withdrawals from East Germany circulated freely on the eve of de Gaulle's visit to Moscow, but no actual moves of this sort took place. Moreover, even
though the question of troop reductions remained before the public in the summer of 1966 as a result of senatorial urging in Washington that U.S. forces in Europe be cut back, the Soviet Union refrained from exploring the subject with the United States.

This reluctance to be drawn into discussions with the United States on troop withdrawals from Europe doubtless stemmed to some extent from the situation in Vietnam. Throughout 1966, Moscow increasingly found itself the target of allegations from Peking that it was "colluding" with the United States to ease the European situation and thereby permit the transfer of American troops to Southeast Asia. Direct response to suggestions emanating from Washington on the touchy question of troop reductions would not only have seemed to lend substance to the Chinese criticism, but it would have tended to embarrass the Soviet Union's own diplomacy, aimed at taking advantage of the growing isolation of the United States on the Vietnam war issue. Hoping to keep the United States on the defensive in Europe, the Soviet leaders were of no mind to let the initiative slip from their own hands on the matter of European security arrangements, including the question of troop reductions. Indeed, when the Bucharest conference of July 1966 provided the occasion for publicizing a new Soviet initiative on European security, the package of proposals put forward on this subject included reference to mutual troop withdrawals but, at the same time, was notably ambiguous as to what voice the United States should have in the proposed process of settling European security problems.
The Bucharest conference not only served as a platform for inviting the countries of West Europe to give thought, as it were, to bypassing the United States in a move toward a general European settlement and new, all-European collective security arrangements; it also was significant in providing the occasion for Soviet efforts to promote united action by the Warsaw states on Vietnam and to counter tendencies of some individual bloc members, particularly Rumania, to stray from a common policy on Warsaw Pact matters. Before examining the transactions of the Bucharest conference itself, therefore, it might be well to go back briefly over the development of Soviet relations with East Europe in the period from Khrushchev's ouster to mid-1966.

E. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE PRIOR TO THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE

A few words on some of the underlying trends that shaped the system of Soviet-East European relationships to which Khrushchev's successors fell heir may usefully precede our discussion of specific policy issues in the period leading up to the Bucharest conference of July 1966. As frequently noted, it is difficult to find a label that properly describes the evolving alliance system in East Europe, which, at the time the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime came to power, was held together by a web of ideological, economic, political, and military ties. The
East European states clearly were no longer completely subordinated to Soviet power, yet limits were set upon independent national action both by the control and influence the Soviet Union was capable of exercising and by the interaction of the East European regimes upon one another. Each of these states was obliged in a sense to work out an adjustment between its own national aspirations and the requirements of bloc solidarity, just as domestically each tended to develop its own brand of "nationalized" communism.

From the Soviet viewpoint, ever since the green light had been given under Khrushchev for greater autonomy in East Europe, Moscow had found itself alternating between bilateral dealings with the individual East European regimes and attempts to exercise its leadership through some multilateral form of "institutionalized unity." Even though the multilateral approach to economic integration through CEMA had fallen rather flat in 1962-1963, the Warsaw Pact continued to be upgraded as a multilateral instrument through which both military and political integration could be promoted. The Pact had proved to be a means through which intrabloc conflict and friction could be resolved or at least contained, but at the same time it remained, like CEMA, something less than an ideal instrument for carrying out common policies emanating from Moscow. In fact, though both CEMA and the Warsaw Pact were joint multilateral bodies, the system still lacked a set of organs for policymaking and centralized enforcement of decisions. Authoritative policy formulation rested mainly with Communist Party leaders from the member states, meeting together as circumstances demanded in what has sometimes
been described as a system of "mutual concessions, confer-
ence and discussion." Even then, the policy decisions
they reached were not binding, and were implemented largely
by the national states and parties rather than through the
international machinery of the bloc.

If past experience indicated that neither bilateral
nor multilateral principles for the management of Soviet
relations with the other Warsaw Pact members were al-
together satisfactory, a third alternative presented it-
self to the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. This was to cultivate
further the trend toward regional differentiation which
had developed in Khrushchev's day between the "Northern
Tier" of states -- Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia --
and the southern, or Balkan, grouping. The "Northern
Tier" countries, which together with the Soviet Union it-
self formed a quartet sometimes referred to as the "first
strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact, were obviously
of prime strategic and political importance to Soviet
European policy, for not only did their territory lie
astride what in wartime would be the main axis of a
Central European campaign, but they were the countries
sharing the most immediate geopolitical interests against
West Germany.

According to one East European witness, the idea for
a northern regional grouping with a preferential relation-
ship with Moscow originated with Gomulka between 1959 and
1963 and was inspired by his concern that a bilateral
Soviet-East German axis might be formed at Poland's ex-
pense. Whether or not this fear was justified, the
Soviet Union evidently found it advantageous to confer a
privileged status upon "Northern Tier" countries, which
received a more important regional role in Soviet military and economic planning than did countries of the "Southern Tier." Discrimination in favor of the "Northern Tier" was heightened in Khrushchev's time by the erosion of Soviet influence in the "Southern Tier," where in 1961 Albania had broken away from the Pact, and where by early 1964 Rumania was beginning to balk against Warsaw Pact military arrangements in much the same fashion in which she had taken the lead in resisting Soviet proposals for economic integration and division of labor through CEMA.

These, then, were some of the trends at work in Soviet relations with East Europe when the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime took office. Basically, the decline in the Soviet Union's once unquestioned dominance in East Europe during the past decade had left Khrushchev's successors with the broad choice of either making the best of an unsatisfactory situation or trying to reimpose the Soviet writ throughout the region. On the whole, they apparently accepted the former alternative in the first years of the new regime, when the Soviet Union followed a largely conciliatory and fence-mending line in East Europe, partly perhaps to ease fears and uncertainties that had arisen there after the change of leadership in Moscow. Eventually, of course, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime reversed itself, when it called upon troops to restore Soviet authority in Czechoslovakia.

1. The German Democratic Republic

The new Soviet leaders hastened to reassure Ulbricht that no Soviet deal with Bonn at Pankow's expense was in
the works. although, as noted earlier, they left themselves some room for maneuver toward a possible rapprochement with West Germany. On several occasions prior to the Bucharest conference, the Soviet leadership showed that it was responsive to East German concerns about the possibility that a solid Warsaw Pact front might not be maintained against Bonn.

One such occasion was the convening of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw in January 1965. This meeting, the first since July 1963, was called at Ulbricht's insistence, according to Kosygin, suggesting that Ulbricht had put in a special claim for placing GDR interests high on the policy agenda of the Warsaw Pact. The principal professed object of the meeting was to put the Warsaw Pact states jointly on record as opposed to any NATO nuclear sharing arrangement that might give West Germany access to atomic weapons. As subsequent commentary indicated, the meeting also was intended to demonstrate "the complete emptiness of the imperialists' hopes of disuniting the socialist countries." Another display of Soviet willingness to stand behind Ulbricht against the potentially disruptive effects of economic and other overtures from Bonn came with the cold reception tendered the Federal Republic's "Peace Note" of March 1966. Three months later, the Soviet Union likewise quickly deflated the conciliatory trial balloon launched by West Germany's Rainer Barzel.

Meanwhile, however, the Soviet leaders made plain that their political support of Ulbricht carried a price tag in the form of economic concessions, such as those embodied in a Soviet-GDR economic agreement signed on
December 3, 1965, after an apparently arm-twisting trip to Berlin by Brezhnev a few days before. The suicide on December 3 of Dr. Erich Apel, Chairman of East Germany's State Planning Commission, was reportedly in protest over the disadvantageous terms of this agreement. Among these terms, according to some critics, was Moscow's insistence on charging artificially high prices for Soviet products exported to East Germany, as well as its demand that payment be partly in hard currency. The five-year agreement covering an exchange of some $15 billion worth of goods also was said to peg GDR exports to the USSR below world market prices. The Soviets later reportedly justified these price differentials as necessary to offset the large armament burden borne by the USSR on behalf of the Warsaw bloc.

2. Poland

With respect to Poland, the Soviet leaders lost no time in letting Gomulka know that, like Khrushchev, they regarded Poland as a key member of the Northern Tier of Warsaw bloc states, so situated that if she should begin to assert independent tendencies in the fashion of Rumania, this could have adverse effects on the Soviet position in Central Europe and even on the existence of the German Democratic Republic. Gomulka, in turn, was not unmindful of his own dependence on the Soviet Union, economically and as the guarantor of Poland's western frontier.

Several times during the first year of their tenure, both Brezhnev and Kosygin visited Poland to confer with Gomulka. These meetings were cited as illustrations of the Soviet Union's "proper and friendly relations" with its
bloc neighbors, demonstrating, as Brezhnev put it during his visit to Poland in April 1965, the "correct combination of individual and common interests" which countries of the Communist world should seek in their relations with one another. But coming, as they did, shortly after the March 1965 "preparatory" meeting of Communist parties in Moscow had conspicuously failed to conciliate Peking or produce a formula for worldwide Communist unity, Brezhnev's remarks only accentuated the limitations of the Soviet-Polish example as a model for intra-Communist relations. Indeed, on one issue on which the Soviet Union made a strong plea for joint "practical action" -- that of bloc support for Vietnam -- Poland itself was slow to heed the summons, as were most of the other East European countries. Down to the time of the Bucharest conference, for example, only Bulgaria and Hungary had followed the Soviet lead in offering volunteers.

3. **Bulgaria**

With Bulgaria, long considered the most conformist of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact partners, the new Soviet leadership presumably expected to carry on business as usual. Any complacency, however, that Moscow may have felt at the outset with respect to Soviet-Bulgarian relations was punctured in April 1965, when an abortive plot against the regime of Todor Zhivkov was disclosed in Sofia. Although details of this internal conspiracy involving General Tsvetko Anev and several other Bulgarian army and Party officials are obscure, it had a decidedly anti-Soviet tinge, having apparently been inspired by a nationalist-minded faction that hoped to reorient Bulgarian policy in
a more independent direction, perhaps on the Rumanian model. 85

To prevent further erosion of Soviet authority in the already shaky Southern Tier, Moscow quickly dispatched a high-level troubleshooter in the person of Mikhail Suslov to make an on-the-spot investigation in Bulgaria. 86 Suslov's conclusion seems to have been that the Zhivkov regime had the situation under control; but the Soviet Union thereafter could not take the steadfast loyalty of its Bulgarian partner wholly for granted.

4. Hungary

In the case of Hungary, a country that both geographically and politically hovered between the Northern and the Southern Tier of the Warsaw bloc, the new Soviet leaders evidently recognized from the outset that they had a fence-mending job on their hands, for Janos Kadar had proved to be the most outspoken of all East European leaders in defending Khrushchev's record and voicing concern that his ouster might presage regression to heavy-handed Soviet tactics in East Europe. 87 A soft approach to Kadar, which Mikoyan was shrewdly chosen to spell out in person, helped to improve Soviet-Hungarian relations considerably, 88 but Hungary's posture within the Pact suggested nevertheless that she might not be altogether immune to the Rumanian brand of independent behavior.

Perhaps the strongest hint that interest in expanded trade and credits from West Germany might lead Hungary to break ranks on a common political line despite the displeasure of Moscow and Pankow came on June 3, 1966, after
Kadar had conferred with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, when Hungary published a generally favorable appreciation of Bonn's March 1966 "Peace Note." From time to time, there were other signs of Hungary's toying with potentially heretical foreign policy ideas, such as a Danubian confederation of some sort. But Kadar remained careful not to step out of the role of a loyal, though by no means obsequious, ally of the Soviet Union, and Moscow responded by giving Hungary something like the preferential treatment accorded the Northern Tier members of the Pact.

5. Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union suffered an initial downturn in the fall of 1964, for the Czech leader Antonin Novotny, like Kadar in Hungary, showed some resentment of Khrushchev's dismissal. The old-guard Party leadership under Novotny was not in a good position, however, to contemplate any basic reorientation of Czechoslovak policy, and its attitude toward Moscow returned to one of official warmth, interspersed with discreet chafing at what it considered inequities in the relations between the two countries, especially in the economic field.

The economic difficulties that came to light after negotiation of a five-year trade agreement in October 1965 were apparently related to the Soviet Union's reluctance to commit itself to adequate supply of agricultural and industrial raw materials upon which the Czech economy, like the economies of most of the East European countries, had grown heavily dependent. The Soviet Union, for its part, was not happy either about the raw materials situation, for the traditional pattern had become reversed,
so that the USSR now found itself exporting more raw materials to East Europe than it imported and, moreover, upon an unfavorable basis in terms of investment costs. Politically, from the Soviet viewpoint, these economic difficulties could have undesirable side effects if, as had happened in some other East European capitals, they were to increase Prague's receptivity to Western initiatives, particularly from Bonn.

Despite such strains in Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, Moscow could take satisfaction in the general support which the Novotny leadership gave to a common front of bloc countries against West Germany as well as to the Soviet "unity" line against Peking. In the latter connection, beginning with Novotny's speech at a Kremlin reception in September 1965, the Czechoslovaks became the most vocal backers in East Europe of Soviet lobbying for a new world conference of Communist parties "at an appropriate time." Given the generally cooperative attitude of the Novotny regime, together with Czechoslovakia's key position as a member of the Northern Tier within the Warsaw Pact, the new direction taken by the Dubcek reform government in 1968 was all the more discomfiting to the Kremlin leadership, as its efforts to stamp out the Czech experiment were so graphically to illustrate.

6. **Rumania**

Toward Rumania, the maverick of the Warsaw bloc, the new Soviet leaders initially adopted a conciliatory attitude tantamount to "turning the other cheek," but they were to find that this approach did little to narrow the
breach which had begun to open between Moscow and Bucharest in Khrushchev's day. Rumania's gradual emancipation from Soviet dominance, which originally had been facilitated by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958 and later was symbolized by a memorable Rumanian "declaration of Marxist independence" of April 27, 1964, continued to manifest itself along three principal lines: Rumania's resistance to the process of military integration and centralization within the Warsaw Pact, her opposition to supranational economic planning under CEMA, and her insistence on "equality" and "independence" in interparty and interstate relations. The last, translated into foreign policy terms, meant among other things that Rumania reserved the right to deal as she saw fit with the West, particularly West Germany, and to play a neutral role as the "honest broker" in the dispute between Moscow and Peking.

Rumanian dissatisfaction with Warsaw Pact military arrangements was expressed in several ways soon after Khrushchev's ouster. In November 1964 Rumania reduced compulsory military service from 24 to 16 months; at about the same time, in interviews with Western correspondents, Rumanian officials spoke of "the need for new ways" of reaching decisions within the Pact and recalled earlier Rumanian statements favoring the "abolition of all military blocs." In June 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu, who had but recently taken over the post of Party secretary left vacant by the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March, made a speech before a group of Rumanian officers in which he stressed "national" requirements for defense of the "fatherland" and pointedly omitted all reference to the
Warsaw Pact.  

That same month, a new Rumanian constitution was published; it contained a proviso on declaration of war which was aimed both at preventing Rumania from being drawn into extraneous conflicts by her Warsaw Pact commitments and at keeping any war decision in Rumanian hands.  

Meanwhile, the reported reduction of the Rumanian army from 240,000 to 200,000 men, together with indications that Rumania was balking at sending her troops out of the country for participation in joint Warsaw Pact exercises in the summer of 1965, suggested that recalcitrance in the military sphere had come to parallel Bucharest's determination not to follow the Soviet Union blindly in foreign policy and economic matters.

Faced with an obstructionist Rumanian attitude whose possible spread to other members of the bloc was doubtless disquieting, the Soviet leaders evidently decided in the fall of 1965 that the time had come to counter Rumanian efforts to water down the Warsaw Pact. The grounds on which the Soviets chose to grapple with the Rumanian deviation concerned the question of Pact reorganization, a matter which the Rumanians themselves had already brought up. The first open Soviet initiative took the form of a proposal by Brezhnev for tightening the organization, ostensibly in order to strengthen bloc "unity" in the field of defense. Speaking at a Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship rally in Moscow in September 1965, Brezhnev said: "The current situation places on the agenda the further perfection of the Warsaw Pact organization.... We are all prepared to work diligently to find the best solution." Two weeks later, in a speech to the Party plenum, Brezhnev again took up the question of Pact
reorganization, as he described a series of talks recently held in Moscow with various East European leaders:

Great attention [was] paid to the coordination of the foreign policy of the socialist countries, particularly to coordinating our actions in the United Nations. We discussed the question of improving the activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the need to set up within the framework of the Treaty a permanent and prompt mechanism for considering pressing problems.

From the evidence available, it is difficult to determine just how the Soviet Union's allies lined up on the need for organizational reform of the Pact, or the extent to which they themselves may quietly have lobbied for change. However, it may be surmised that competing suggestions for reform were offered by at least the Soviet and Rumanian sides, each for its own reasons. Two kinds of organizational change seem to have been at issue: first, changes in the Pact's political mechanism for coordination and enforcement of a common foreign policy line; second, reform of the military command arrangements within the Pact.

For their part, the Soviets apparently were interested primarily in organizational reform in the first category, designed to put teeth into such organs as the Political Consultative Committee, or perhaps to create new ones, as a way of bringing pressure on independent-minded Pact members like Rumania to conform to joint foreign policy positions. With regard to the Pact's military command structure, which was already thoroughly Soviet-dominated, Moscow at the time presumably was satisfied with the existing situation, although, as we shall see, there was
later to be a shift of Soviet thinking in this area of Pact reform as well. 110

Rumania seems to have approached the issue of organizational reform the other way around. On the one hand, the Rumanians were interested essentially in preserving the Pact's existing political machinery, which gave the individual bloc members considerable latitude for an independent stand on foreign policy matters, or even in loosening this machinery still more. With regard to the military command structure, on the other hand, it was apparently the Rumanians who were then pressing for Pact reforms intended to lessen the Soviet Union's military control. From the Rumanian viewpoint, no doubt, there was tactical logic in this order of approach, for, if Rumania could weaken the Soviet grip on the Pact's military structure, it might thereby hope to reduce the chances of Moscow's acquiring a tighter hold over foreign policy decisions.

Following Brezhnev's talks with various East European leaders in the fall of 1965, the Soviet Union evidently continued to work behind the scenes to promote its version of organizational reform within the Warsaw Pact. The public record again is skimpy as to alignments within the Pact on the reorganization issue, although, as later reported by a Western journalist who cites "informed sources," a private and unproductive session of Pact leaders was believed to have been held in East Berlin in February 1966 to thrash out Rumanian demands for Pact reform. 111 At the end of March 1966, Brezhnev once more returned publicly to the theme of "improving the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact"; he was speaking to the 23rd Party Congress -- a speech,
incidentally, in which his reference to the dangers of excessive "nationalism" might have been taken to apply to Rumania as well as to China.\footnote{112}

About a month later, Ceausescu in turn took a position which seemed to indicate that Rumania remained as unsympathetic as ever to any proposals drawn up by Moscow for organizational reform of the Warsaw Pact. In a strongly nationalist speech on May 7, 1966, the 45th anniversary of the Rumanian Communist Party, he not only denounced "military blocs . . . and the sending of troops to other countries" as an "anachronism incompatible with independence and national sovereignty," but he also lashed out at a variety of historical and contemporary examples of Soviet meddling in Rumanian affairs.\footnote{113} Although Brezhnev made a hurried trip to Bucharest a few days later, presumably to persuade Ceausescu to desist from tactics destructive of bloc unity, the Rumanians apparently retracted nothing.\footnote{114} On the contrary, a series of press leaks suggested not only that Rumania had not budged from its position on matters of issue\footnote{115} but that she was now prepared to reveal her own proposals for Warsaw Pact reform designed to reduce Soviet control and influence within the Pact.

One of the leaks from Rumanian sources in May 1966 concerned a proposal on Warsaw Pact reform said to have been circulated to other Pact members. An official denial was issued in Bucharest on May 18, but excerpts from the alleged document were published by the French Communist newspaper \textit{L'Humanité}, suggesting that the Rumanians had used this channel to make their views known. Among the points included, most of which were consistent with Rumanian positions expressed on other occasions, were: (1) There
should be prior consultation before any use of nuclear weapons; (2) the practice of having a Soviet officer in the post of supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact forces should be changed to allow rotation of the post; (3) Rumania objected to _pro rata_ sharing of overhead costs of the Pact; (4) the presence of Soviet troops in East Europe, with the exception of East Germany, was no longer necessary, and any country that wanted such troops should bear the cost itself. Another Rumanian leak at this time revealed that a meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee would be held in July in Bucharest, where it could be expected that the contending Soviet and Rumanian ideas on the organization and functions of the Pact would be thrashed out.

Meanwhile, in late May and early June 1966, while visiting Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev anticipated further attacks on the Rumanian position in two speeches in which he argued for strengthening the Warsaw Pact and indirectly chided those who might be "naive" enough to call for a loosening of the Warsaw military alliance while the military bloc of the North Atlantic alliance still existed to serve "the policy of the revanchists and militarists."

While advance preparations for the Bucharest conference were under way, including a twelve-day meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Moscow in the middle of June and a gathering of Pact defense authorities in Berlin the same month, the Rumanians maintained an officially correct, if somewhat cool, attitude toward Moscow. During a visit of Chou En-lai to Bucharest in June, for example, they took pains to stress their neutral stance as "honest brokers" in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, and refrained from
publishing some of the more outspoken anti-Soviet thrusts in speeches by the Chinese delegation. So far as the impending Bucharest conference was concerned, it appeared that Rumania was not thinking seriously of trying to dissociate herself from the Warsaw military alliance whose protection she enjoyed, but, rather, that she was bent upon finding out what price the Soviet Union would be willing to pay for the appearance of bloc unity.

The Soviet leaders, for their part, seemed eager to avoid a public display of annoyance toward Rumania, but occasionally their vexation showed through, as when Brezhnev, during his visit to Prague in May, indirectly scolded the Rumanians for their divisive attitudes, or when Kosygin, in a speech in Cairo that same month, pointedly mentioned Rumania while listing "friends and allies" of the Soviet Union who had extended help to the UAR. On the whole, however, the Soviet leaders managed to "keep their cool," as it were, in the face of what must have appeared to them as a provocative challenge from their Balkan ally. As the Bucharest conference approached, the Kremlin leadership, if not quite sure how best to handle the recalcitrant Rumanians, was probably counting on fraternal pressure from other bloc members to help bring Bucharest into line.

F. THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE LINE ON EUROPEAN ISSUES

Perhaps the first thing to be said about the Bucharest conference itself is that proposals for internal reform of the Warsaw alliance apparently got nowhere. Notwithstanding the standard assurances that the conference had produced
a "full identity of views" and further improvement in "the working of the Warsaw Treaty Organization," the conferees, so far as specific disclosure of the meeting's transactions permits one to judge, endorsed neither Soviet advocacy of institutional improvements to provide a "permanent and prompt mechanism" for coordination of Pact policy nor Rumanian suggestions for the further loosening of Soviet control over the alliance machinery. From the Soviet standpoint, therefore, the net effect was failure to tie the hands of Rumania or any other Pact members who might wish to follow Rumania's example in pursuing independent policies toward West Europe, and especially on the German question. Similarly, the CEMA session tacked on at the end of the Bucharest conference failed to come to grips with such divisive economic issues as price differences, intrabloc sharing of investment in raw materials development, and currency convertibility; indeed, its joint resolution merely stated that the organization would carry on its work in accordance with previous principles.

Although the Bucharest conference may have contributed little to Soviet hopes of ironing out the many internal differences over political, military, and economic relationships within the Warsaw bloc, it did achieve at least surface unanimity among the member states on a common approach to the war in Vietnam and to the issues of European security. The conference "Statement in Connection with U.S. Aggression in Vietnam," which contained a blanket condemnation of alleged American misdeeds in Southeast Asia and endorsement of Hanoi's terms for settlement of the Vietnam conflict, marked no basic change in the Soviet position on
Vietnam, but it was noteworthy to the extent that it included some points to which not all of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies had previously subscribed. Our interest here, however, lies primarily in the joint "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe," a document described by Izvestia as the most comprehensive and realistic plan for European security ever offered the people of Europe, and one to which Kosygin later referred as having enabled the Soviet Union and its allies to "hold the initiative in raising the urgent problems of European security."

The declaration, which offered a further modification of the series of Soviet-sponsored programs for European security that had begun with Brezhnev's brief proposal in April 1965, most nearly resembled the eight-point program set forth in the Soviet reply of May 1966 to Bonn's "Peace Note." Like the May 1966 document, the Bucharest declaration called for settlement of a broad range of European issues, noting that "two decades after the end of World War II, its consequences in Europe have not yet been eliminated; there is no German peace treaty, and centers of tension, abnormal situations in the relations between states, continue to exist." Much of the declaration was given over to denunciation of U.S. policy in Europe, which was pictured as "all the more dangerous for the European peoples because of being increasingly based on collusion with the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany." The specific proposals were listed under a seven-point program at the end of the declaration.

The first point on this program was a generalized plea for good-neighbor relations among European countries...
and the development of closer economic, technical, and cultural contacts. Next came a proposal to liquidate military alliances in Europe, with the added proviso that, if the West was not prepared for this step, the military organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be abolished, with the alliances themselves temporarily remaining. The third point catalogued a list of partial disarmament measures "toward a military détente in Europe," to include dismantling of foreign bases, withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers, phased reduction of the armed forces of the two German states, creation of nuclear-free zones, and cessation of flights over European territory by nuclear-armed foreign aircraft. The fourth point dealt with the need to rule out West German access to nuclear weapons "in any form whatsoever"; the fifth called for recognition of the immutability of Europe's postwar boundaries as the basis of a durable peace. A solution to the problem of a German peace settlement stood sixth on the list, with the stipulation that the starting point must be acceptance of the "reality" of the existence of two German states. The final point of the Bucharest program was a proposal for "an all-European conference to discuss security and promote European cooperation."

What the agenda for such a conference should be was again left open, the only new element being the suggestion that the conference might formulate a "general European declaration on cooperating in maintaining and consolidating European security," which presumably would serve as a substitute for a collective security treaty to replace the existing NATO and Warsaw treaties. The question
whether the United States would be invited to participate in the proposed "all-European conference" also was left vague. An assertion in the Bucharest declaration that American policy aims in Europe "have nothing in common with the vital interests of the European peoples and the tasks of European security," together with a pointed observation that "the European states are capable of solving problems of relations among themselves without outside interference," tended to stamp the United States as an outsider without a valid claim to admission. On the other hand, the declaration also said that, in addition to the Warsaw Pact countries, the proposed conference was expected to bring together "other interested states, both members of NATO and neutrals," thereby leaving the door open to the United States as a NATO member. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the declaration on this question -- an ambiguity with perhaps the subtle intent of accenting a West European sense of separateness from the United States -- the Soviet leadership probably entertained no serious expectations that any meaningful conference could be arranged without American participation.

To sum up, the central significance of the Bucharest proposals for Soviet policy in Europe seemed to hinge on two points: first, that the existing military alliances were to be dissolved in favor of new, all-European security arrangements; and, second, that under these arrangements the participating states were to guarantee a new European order recognizing the permanent division of Germany. In turn, the sleeper in this design for a European settlement appeared to be its studied silence on the Soviet Union's bilateral treaties with the Communist states of
East Europe. Renewal of these treaties, which we shall take up in a subsequent chapter, provided a backstop for dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; under the bilateral treaty network, Soviet military access to East Europe would remain unimpeded after an American withdrawal from Europe, and the Soviet Union would thus remain alone as the dominant military power on the European continent.
XIII. SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICY AFTER THE 
BUCHAREST CONFERENCE

With the promulgation of the Bucharest declaration in mid-1966, the forging of a new Soviet European policy line under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was for all practical purposes complete. In regard to Western Europe, this policy seemed pointed primarily toward the familiar aim of breaking up NATO and loosening Europe's links with the United States, although a secondary element, reflected in negotiations with the United States on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, also kept alive the notion of Soviet-American collaboration on matters affecting Europe's future. In both instances, an important Soviet objective appeared to be the isolation of Bonn and the underwriting of the permanent partition of Germany.

What gave the policy toward Western Europe a fresh cast was mainly its emphasis upon proposals intended to elicit closer political-economic-technical ties between the West and the Soviet Union and to encourage the idea of new collective security arrangements as a timely alternative to a NATO that had allegedly outlived its usefulness. Looking two or three years ahead, a Soviet line attuned to the Gaullist theme of "Europe for Europeans" might lend itself nicely to the suggestion that West European members of NATO would be well advised to exercise their option to leave the alliance after its twentieth anniversary in 1969. In the context of such a strategy for separating Western Europe from American influence, however, the problem of Germany remained troublesome. Continuation of a tough line toward Bonn would tend to drive West
Germany closer to the United States. While receptivity to a West German policy of reconciliation would threaten the stability of the East German regime and perhaps reduce the common fear of German "revanchism" which had helped to cement the Soviet hold on East Europe. There was a further impediment to a Soviet line aimed at encouraging West European relaxation and the fragmenting of Western alliance arrangements; this grew out of the sharp contrast between gestures of rapprochement from Moscow and the steady strengthening of the Soviet military machine under Khrushchev's successors -- a process that was becoming increasingly visible by mid-1966. and one we shall take up in detail later.

With regard to East Europe, the Soviet Union emerged from the Bucharest conference with a lapful of unresolved problems. which, if essentially familiar, nevertheless called for fresh thinking -- especially in light of the new policy line staked out toward West Europe. In a broad sense, perhaps the basic Soviet problem was how to maintain the cohesion of the Warsaw bloc while at the same time encouraging closer cooperation and more relaxed relations with West Europe. In particular, there was the knotty matter of keeping various East European regimes from breaking ranks on a common line toward West Germany, so as not to compromise the position of the German Democratic Republic. This problem was further complicated by the Soviet Union's own interest: the potential advantages of better bilateral relations with Bonn.

For the Soviet leadership, there was also the need to marshal support among the East European countries for the Soviet position against China, and for a world conference of Communist parties, at the probable price of further
concessions to restive Warsaw Pact members like Rumania. Beyond these questions stood that of the Soviet attitude toward the Warsaw Pact itself. Besides its purely military potential and its function as an instrument through which Soviet political control and influence could be exercised in East Europe, the Pact had also become a useful vehicle of sorts for "conflict resolution" among its member states. Therefore, how far and how fast to move in the direction of scrapping the Warsaw Pact for some broader European security scheme was a problem of by no means negligible proportions for the Soviet leadership.

Finally, of course, unforeseen developments could intrude upon the Soviet Union's relations with both halves of Europe, calling perhaps for a substantial readjustment of the European policy that had gradually taken shape during the first two years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. The present chapter, dealing mainly with Western Europe and the Middle East, will take us through the next two years in the evolution of this policy, up to the fateful juncture, in August 1968, when the Soviet Union's effort to halt the process of change in East Europe by force of arms threw its European policy into disarray.

A. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN WESTERN EUROPE

Following the Bucharest conference, it became more apparent than ever that Soviet diplomacy had taken the initiative in Europe, in part perhaps because the Vietnam war had increasingly drawn American attention from the European scene and provided tempting opportunities for
Moscow to play upon strains between the United States and its West European allies. During the latter months of 1966 and in 1967, top Soviet leaders continued an unprecedented round of visits to various European capitals, tirelessly preaching the advantages of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the dangers of subjection to American political and economic hegemony, particularly as U.S. policies were allegedly calculated to encourage the revanchist aims of Bonn. As previously discussed, the suggestions for "bridge-building" in President Johnson's speech of October 7, 1966, received a chilly reception in Moscow, where Brezhnev declared that the United States was laboring under a "persistent delusion" if it thought relations with the Soviet bloc could be improved despite the war in Vietnam.

Interestingly enough, although the Soviet message to Western Europe depended in part on persuading Europeans that their interests were being damaged by the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, there was no suggestion from Moscow that Europe had ceased to be the decisive arena of world politics. On the contrary, as Gromyko put it in a speech at the United Nations in September 1966, Europe was still to be considered "the barometer of the world's political weather." Or, as another Soviet spokesman argued, the main focus of U.S. strategic attention had not shifted from Europe to Asia despite the war in Vietnam and therefore it would be a mistake to accept the notion that "the situation in Europe has stabilized and there is no threat to world peace." Likewise, in the mounting volume of Soviet propaganda centering on the dangers of a new Bonn-Washington axis and on the need for a European security
program like that advanced in the Bucharest declaration, this point was consistently made in late 1966 and early 1967:

In spite of the menacing events unfolding on other continents, Europe is the world focus of political contradictions. It is in Europe that the two systems directly confront each other and that enormous political and military forces are concentrated. And it is also in Europe that unsolved problems are pregnant with the threat of dangerous conflicts. This picture of a Europe pregnant with the danger of new conflicts doubtless was meant to reinforce the Soviet contention that European tranquility was still threatened by West Germany, against which a new system of European security must therefore be built. But the picture was so overdrawn that it served, in a sense, to bring out certain elements of contradiction in the Soviet position. To begin with, the image of a conflict-prone Europe was curiously out of keeping with the prevailing impression in the West that Europe in the mid-sixties was a fairly secure place, thanks to a stabilized military environment "governed by tacit common interest in preventing war"; but, if one did concede that European stability was illusory, then Soviet arguments that NATO had become a useless anachronism would tend to fall flat. For it would then appear unwise to many West Europeans to start scrapping a security system of their own for an unknown alternative, especially as NATO's functions already included the implicit one of "containing" West Germany within the NATO framework.

Moreover, even though the reemergence of an aggressively nationalistic Germany was an objectionable thought to most
West Europeans, their latent fears on this score were unlikely to be seriously aroused by a Soviet propaganda that chose to intensify its familiar attacks on German re-anch- ism and militarism. along with new warnings about the "rise of neo-Nazism" in West Germany. 7 at the very time that a new coalition government in Bonn was displaying an obvious readiness to move toward reconciliation. Suffice it for the moment to note that these inconsistencies served somewhat to weaken the Soviet diplomatic offensive in Europe, as we now look briefly at the development of Soviet policy toward West Germany following the Bucharest conference.

B. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD WEST GERMANY

Internal political developments in West Germany in the fall of 1966. which led to the formation. early in December, of a "Grand Coalition" government of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), presented Moscow with a choice between continuing an uncompromising line toward Bonn or responding more affirmatively to the new Eastern policy advanced by the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition. This policy, the essence of which was to seek reconciliation with the Soviet Union and East Europe and "regulated coexistence" (geregeltes Nebeneinander) with East Germany. 8 reflected the leaning of the Social Democrats toward a more liberal and active Eastern policy. It involved, among other things, a partial abandonment of the so-called Hallstein Doctrine. 9 as indicated by Kiesinger in a Bundestag speech on December 13, 1966. in which he made known that Bonn was prepared to establish diplomatic ties with the countries of East Europe. 10
Soviet treatment of this newest conciliatory overture from Bonn was at first restrained, but did not suggest any readiness to enter into more amicable relations with West Germany. Although a few Soviet commentators initially viewed Kiesinger's statement as a "step in the right direction," most Soviet appraisals, like one offered by Brezhnev in mid-January of 1967, professed to find in it "ample evidence that the goals of West German imperialism unfortunately remain unchanged." On January 28, just as Bonn's new policy was about to bear its first fruit with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and Rumania, the Soviet Union delivered a particularly harsh attack against Bonn in the form of a note to the American, British, and French governments, pointedly observing that these powers, along with the Soviet Union, were "responsible under the Potsdam Agreement for preventing the resurgence of German militarism and Nazism." In this note, which stressed that neo-Nazi trends in West Germany could produce "a new Hitler... armed with nuclear weapons," Bonn's desire to improve relations with the USSR and East Europe was acknowledged. However, the note concluded Bonn had not given up the "revanchist aims" of former German governments, such as "territorial claims to other states, a striving for nuclear weapons, provocative designs against Berlin and the like."

It is unlikely that the Soviet government expected this denunciation to prevent Bonn and Bucharest from establishing diplomatic relations, but, once they had done so, Moscow again faced the question whether to go along gracefully with Bonn's efforts to normalize relations.
with the Soviet bloc, or to lend its support to Ulbricht, who had immediately dug in his heels to resist any further East European movement toward the Federal Republic. After what may have been momentary reservations about letting Ulbricht's fears dictate Soviet policy, the Soviet leaders evidently, for reasons of their own, chose to back him up. Two reasons may be supposed to have been particularly persuasive: First, the Federal Republic's pursuit of détente with the East not only might stimulate divisive forces within the Soviet bloc but also promised to alleviate a source of discord between Bonn and the Western allies, and thus threatened to work against the Soviet goal of keeping West Germany isolated; second, there was the plain fact that, with her advanced industrial-technical resources, West Germany, if given access to East Europe, could be expected to make important economic inroads in the region, thus paving the way for greater political influence.

1. The Soviet Approach to Countering Bonn's Eastern Policy

In opposing Bonn's new Eastern policy, the Soviet Union pursued a dual approach. On the one hand, it took various steps in concert with East Germany and Poland to erect a common bloc front against Bonn's efforts to establish further diplomatic ties in East Europe. These steps will be discussed in the next chapter. Concurrently, the Soviet Union also moved quietly toward a series of bilateral conversations with Bonn, designed, apparently, to turn West German hopes for détente to Soviet advantage. Characteristic of this element of Soviet policy was the
proposal that West Germany -- as the precondition for improved relations -- abandon various positions: on borders, Berlin, nuclear equality, the role of the Federal Republic as spokesman for all Germans, and so on. If these conditions were met, the net effect would be to change the status quo on the West European side while confirming it in East Europe.

This second line of Soviet policy took shape between July and October 1967. In July, as subsequently disclosed, private talks were held in Bonn between Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Soviet Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin, at which, along with several German suggestions for improving relations, the possibility of working out a renunciation-of-force agreement was broached.\(^1\) This idea, recalling Bonn's March 1966 "Peace Note,"\(^2\) was taken under consideration by the Soviet Union. After about three months, during which other efforts by Bonn to improve the climate of relations with both Moscow and East Germany had made little progress,\(^3\) Tsarapkin again met with Brandt on October 12, this time to convey Soviet readiness to discuss an agreement renouncing the use of force. However, Tsarapkin reportedly said, such a step toward improving relations would only be possible if East Germany were also included in an exchange of declarations on the same basis as other East European states.\(^4\) Thus, the price for Bonn was willingness to move toward recognition of the GDR, a price it declined to pay.

Two months later, after further conversations between Brandt and Tsarapkin, in November 1967, had produced no easing of Soviet terms for a renunciation-of-force agreement, the price was steeply raised on December 8 in a
Soviet government statement to the three Western powers and Bonn. Besides denouncing "neo-Nazism and militarism" in West Germany in terms similar to those of the Soviet note of the previous January 28, the new statement stipulated that a renunciation-of-force agreement could now be had only if Bonn met East Germany's maximum conditions for "normalizing" relations; these included the familiar demands for the recognition of existing frontiers, abandonment of Bonn's claim to represent all Germans, and renunciation of nuclear arms, as well as a disavowal of the claim that West Berlin is a part of the Federal Republic.

The addition of the last item to the price tag for improvement of Bonn's relations with the Eastern bloc immediately suggested that Soviet diplomacy had now set its sights on loosening the Federal Republic's ties with Berlin -- an objective which had been more or less quietly shelved since the brief harassment of Berlin's communications not long after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime came to power. This supposition was strengthened a few days after the December 8 statement, when a joint Soviet-East German declaration, again assailing West German "aggressiveness," included the pointed warning that "illegal encroachment on West Berlin by the FRG will meet a firm rebuff." Coupled with ominous statements issued later in December by various East German spokesmen to the effect that institutions and activities of the Federal Republic should be driven out of West Berlin, this warning seemed to imply that a new Berlin crisis might be brewing as the year 1968 began.
2. Efforts To Loosen Bonn's Ties with Berlin

At this point, the Soviet leadership had to make up its collective mind whether to permit the Ulbricht regime to launch a campaign of harassment that might indeed bring on a full-blown crisis or whether to try more subtle tactics by which to turn Bonn's reconciliation policy to Soviet advantage. Although there was speculation that the Soviet leaders may have differed among themselves over this choice, the second alternative apparently won out, at least for the time being. In an aide-memoire presented to Bonn on January 6, the Soviet Union set out a long list of complaints on activities of the Federal Republic in West Berlin that allegedly contravened the city's four-power status, but at the same time suggested that Bonn's policy of seeking better relations with East Europe might receive more generous consideration if the Federal Republic were to reduce its political presence in West Berlin. This would include giving up the practice of holding Bundestag committee meetings in West Berlin and forgoing other public shows of unity with the city.

In February 1968, a fresh Soviet protest against Bonn's "unlawful activities" in West Berlin alleged that these were being carried on with the "connivance" of the Western occupation authorities. This was soon followed by another formal denunciation of "neo-Nazism" in West Germany. The latter statement declared that Bonn had "pronounced a death sentence on its so-called 'new Eastern policy'" by refusing to clamp down on neo-Nazi trends; but it also held out a sprig of reassurance by noting that the Soviet Union was willing "to grant full support to the Federal Republic" provided the latter would pursue "a peaceful foreign policy."
Bonn's replies to the barrage of Soviet notes and other protests disputed Soviet charges of fostering neo-Nazism, and also declared that West Germany was only following long-existing practices in West Berlin, which in no way could be construed as tampering with the city's four-power status. The Federal Republic also sought to regain some initiative for its normalization policy by once more proposing to negotiate renunciation-of-force agreements with the Warsaw Pact countries, sweetening the proposal on this occasion with an offer to consider some understanding on nonaggression with East Germany after bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the Soviet protest tactics of early 1968 had placed Bonn in an awkward predicament, for they amounted to saying that the Federal Republic could now expect to advance its normalization policy only at the cost of severing its ties with West Berlin. In the eyes of the Soviet leadership, the situation in West Berlin -- given a growing malaise among the city's population and its increasingly precarious economic position -- may have appeared shaky enough to justify the hope that a combination of pressure and persuasion would prompt Bonn voluntarily to relinquish its influence in the city.

Further developments in the spring and summer of 1968 bore out the point that the Soviet Union -- in what appeared to be close collaboration with the Ulbricht regime -- was prepared to continue a probing campaign designed to weaken the Federal Republic's ties with West Berlin. In this phase of the campaign against Berlin, however, the Soviet Union remained in the background, allowing East Germany to apply a graduated series of restrictions upon West German
access to Berlin but avoiding a direct challenge to the access rights of the Western powers — a tactical ploy presumably meant to keep a major crisis from erupting and one with the added potential of creating friction between the Federal Republic and its Western allies.

The initial GDR move came on March 11, 1968, with an order prohibiting travel to Berlin and to points in the German Democratic Republic by West German citizens who were members of the right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) or who "engaged in activities of a neo-Nazi nature." The next restriction, applied on April 13, was a "temporary" ban on travel by West German officials to West Berlin through GDR territory. This was followed on June 11 by an East German announcement that transit visas would be required of all citizens of the Federal Republic and that special transport taxes would be applied after July 1, 1968, to passengers and freight moving to Berlin. Hints from Pankow suggested that additional restrictions possibly extending to air travel, might be in store.

Despite protests from the Western allies, the East German curbs on travel invalid and "inconsistent with the goal of a relaxation of tension in Europe," neither the tripartite powers nor the West German government seemed disposed to take any counteraction that might precipitate a new Berlin crisis of major dimensions. thus conveying to Moscow and Pankow the message that "salami tactics" judiciously applied might succeed in slicing away still further the rights of free access to Berlin. How far this process might be carried would depend largely on the restraint which the Soviets chose to exercise over Ulbricht's appetite for more slices. This, in turn,
depended at least in part on what use the Soviet Union saw in maintaining a sense of tension over the Berlin question.

From one viewpoint, the tensions caused by the squeeze on traffic between West Germany and Berlin could be regarded as useful in justifying increased Warsaw Pact vigilance and a tightening of cooperative military activity among Pact members in the Northern Tier, where Czechoslovakia's reform course had introduced an unexpected challenge to Soviet power in the early months of 1968. To the extent that the Soviet leaders shared with Ulbricht an interest in checking unwelcome changes in Czechoslovakia's orientation, a heating up of the Berlin situation probably was a convenient device for attempting to restore discipline and unity in the Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, however, there was a case to be made against allowing the Ulbricht regime too much leash. Not only might the East Germans manage to whip up a full-blown Berlin crisis to which the Western powers would find it imperative to react, but the prospects for development of a more flexible Soviet policy toward West Germany -- an alternative not without some potential appeal to Moscow, as we shall see in a moment -- might also be set back. In this connection, the Soviet Union's interest in obtaining Bonn's signature on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty provided a further incentive for not letting Ulbricht go too far and too fast in applying a squeeze on Berlin; as Bonn let it be known, its price for signing the treaty might include such quid pro quos as a relaxation of "massive Soviet political pressure" against the Federal Republic and a letup on GDR harassment of traffic to Berlin.
That the Soviet Union was indeed wary of permitting Ulbricht to overreach himself was suggested by the invitation extended to Foreign Minister Willy Brandt to confer in East Berlin with Pyotr A. Abrasimov, the Soviet ambassador to East Germany. The eight-hour session on June 18, between the chairman of West Germany's Social Democratic Party and the Soviet plenipotentiary in East Germany seemed to serve several purposes: It was a reminder to Ulbricht that management of the Berlin situation remained in Soviet hands; it gave the Soviets the opportunity to play upon internal differences between the West German coalition partners -- CDU and SPD -- over the handling of the Berlin question; and it allowed the Soviet Union to convey the impression that no major crisis was brewing, a point which Brandt was also happy to make.

A further interesting point of the Brandt-Abrasimov meeting was that it marked one more move toward direct bilateral dealings between Moscow and Bonn. A short time earlier, it may be recalled, a step in the same direction had been Bonn's suggestion, in April, that progress might be made toward renunciation-of-force agreements with the Warsaw Pact countries if the subject were first tackled bilaterally between Moscow and Bonn. In mid-1968, after Moscow's disclosure, in the July 11 issue of Izvestia, of theretofore unpublished aspects of its confidential talks with Bonn on a force-renunciation agreement had drawn a riposte from Brandt, the rather one-sided nature of Moscow's terms for an agreement became more clear. In particular, as Brandt revealed, a Soviet memorandum of July 5, 1968, had specified that the Soviet Union would reserve the unilateral right to use force against West
Germany under some circumstances even if it signed a mutual declaration renouncing force. Despite this evidence of the abrasive character of bilateral dealings between Moscow and Bonn, however, the possibility that bilateralism might enter into future Soviet policy toward West Germany was not necessarily to be ruled out.

3. Possible Implications of Bilateralism for Soviet Policy Toward Bonn

Venturing here onto rather speculative terrain, one might suppose that even though Soviet attitudes toward West Germany hardened perceptibly in 1967 and the early months of 1968, the Soviet leadership had not closed its mind completely to the potential advantages of a more flexible policy aimed at bilateral settlement of the Berlin question and other issues with Bonn. Such an alternative policy, though departing from the customary, intransigent Soviet line toward West Germany, would not necessarily be incompatible with the Soviet goal of keeping Germany divided, nor with that of weakening the Federal Republic's attachment to NATO; indeed, it might hold more promise of prying Bonn away from its Western partners, especially the United States, than an unmitigated hard line.

Several circumstances might have persuaded Moscow that it would pay to pursue a serious bilateral game with Bonn. Despite Soviet insistence that revanchism remained rampant in West Germany and that nothing had really changed behind the facade of a conciliatory Ostpolitik, there were some grounds for supposing that the Soviets perceived a qualitative change in Germany and her leadership. a change that created a more fluid situation with possibilities
for policy reorientation. One of its aspects was the emergence under the Grand Coalition of a more independent German diplomacy, which, though still in a formative stage, seemed inclined to abandon its old fixations in favor of "recognizing realities." Bonn's uncertainty as to how much Western backing it could count upon was another factor that, in Soviet eyes, might make the West Germans more amenable to abandoning some of their old positions in the light of new "realities." In part, this uncertainty grew out of circumstances such as the distraction of the United States by the war in Vietnam. American concern over the balance of payments, pressures for troop reduction, and other problems that tended to create doubt about the durability of American commitments in Europe. But perhaps the most specific, and in some sense unwitting, source of West German disquiet was the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

As noted by a number of European observers, nothing except Vietnam and de Gaulle had done more to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe in the mid-sixties than the negotiations on a nonproliferation treaty. Politically, the treaty in essence would have seemed to convey to the Soviets that the United States was willing to negotiate against German interests for an agreement which, though less offensive to the Federal Republic than in its original form, nevertheless promised to place a nonnuclear Germany at a permanent disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and France. Given this apparent demonstration of U.S. reluctance to advance German interests against the Soviet Union, Moscow may well have counted on new opportunities to arise that would enable it to
press for the settlement of other issues with Bonn without encountering significant opposition from the United States. Furthermore, if the Federal Republic were ultimately to sign the nonproliferation treaty and thereby formalize the attainment of Moscow's long-sought goal of barring the nuclear door to Bonn, the Soviet leaders also might come to feel more confident than before that they could handle West Germany alone without the restraining benefit of an American presence in Europe, thus resolving their old ambivalence on this score.

Bonn, in turn, if persuaded that American support of German interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union could no longer be taken for granted, would have a further incentive to seek a rapprochement with Moscow. This need not necessarily take the form of a new Rapallo, but it might result in Germany's accepting some new European security arrangement that would be tantamount to her giving up the NATO path to German security, and that would perhaps be accompanied by Soviet-dictated changes in the GDR regime calculated to make East Germany a more palatable neighbor, or even a confederate partner, for the Federal Republic.

Although the prospect of a bilateral Moscow-Bonn rapprochement in the direction speculatively outlined here was obviously set back in 1968 by the Czech invasion, it was still not to be dismissed out of hand as a possible alternative pattern for the future development of Soviet-West German relations.46

C. SOVIET DIPLOMACY'S INTENSIFIED DRIVE AGAINST NATO

At the same time that Soviet diplomacy was seeking ways of dealing with Bonn's new Grand Coalition government
in late 1966 and 1967, it also busied itself with other matters on Moscow's European policy agenda. These included drumming up support for the European security proposals advanced at the Bucharest conference, appealing for increased technical cooperation between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc, agitating against the American military and economic presence in Europe, and campaigning for the dissolution of NATO. All of these themes, which various Soviet leaders had dwelt upon in their recent travels to European capitals and which Soviet propaganda organs had taken up with new vigor were brought together by Brezhnev at a meeting of European Communist parties held at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967.

Here Brezhnev, playing upon European resentment toward the United States over such problems as the technological gap, declared that a new and "promising trend" toward pan-European cooperation in the economic and technical fields had set in and would help ensure Europe's "liberation from the dollar." Belaboring the American military presence in Europe as a factor which "encourages West German militarism and increases the threat to peace in Europe." Brezhnev prescribed adoption of the Bucharest collective security proposals as a general answer to this threat. In a more specific tack directed against American naval deployment in the Mediterranean area, he asserted that "the time has come to demand the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean." Rather curiously, Brezhnev also found it expedient to claim that it was important "to tie down the forces of imperialism in Europe" as a "real help to the liberation struggle . . . on other continents." which would suggest that he saw some virtue in a contained military stalemate in Europe.
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Brezhnev's Karlovy Vary speech, however, was its call for a broad program of political action aimed at bringing about the demise of NATO. After paying note to Western discussions on the future of NATO, and dismissing as "absurd" the idea that "NATO is capable of playing a positive role in developing contacts between West and East," Brezhnev gave the signal for concerted agitation against NATO with the following words:

In weighing the possibilities opened up by evolving events in Europe, we cannot ignore the fact that in two years the governments of the NATO countries will have to decide whether or not NATO is to be extended. In our opinion, it is quite correct that Communists and all progressive forces should try to use this circumstance to develop still more widely the struggle against the preservation of this aggressive bloc.

In subsequent months, this call for an intensified campaign against NATO was followed by a series of opportunistic propaganda attacks against various NATO activities, real or alleged. Among the targets were a proposal to create a NATO standing destroyer force; a tentative idea for establishing a nuclear mine belt along the Turkish frontier; NATO's alleged "provocations" against "independent Arab countries" in the Middle East conflict; and its similarly alleged backing of "Greek reactionary circles" in the Greek coup of April 1967 and again in the November 1967 Cyprus crisis. Following the first meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council outside France, in mid-June 1967, Soviet propaganda focused on alleged attempts...
of the United States to make its NATO partners give "direct support to the aggressive expansionist designs of Israel."
and harped on the growing "fear" among NATO countries of "being involved in policies alien to their national interests."56

The anti-NATO campaign touched off by Brezhneiv at Karlovy Vary reached a crescendo after the next meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in Brussels in mid-December 1967. At this meeting, the NATO members, including France, agreed to a political report on the future tasks of the alliance which stressed, among other things, that "the way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the alliance constructively in the interest of détente."57 On military questions, and without French participation, the members adopted a new strategic concept, formally replacing the outmoded one of "massive retaliation" with a strategy of "flexible response." approved the creation of a standing naval force in the Atlantic, and set up a five-year military planning cycle. They also agreed on reduced force levels for ground troops, and called on the Warsaw Pact countries to join in a phased reduction of opposing armies in Europe.58

For those hoping that Soviet hostility toward NATO might be softened by the accent on détente sounded at the Brussels session, the Soviet response was hardly encouraging. With one voice, Soviet propaganda organs asserted that NATO's "aggressive" nature remained unchanged, despite attempts to put on a "new face" at Brussels with the adoption of the "so-called Harmel Plan." Thus, deriding "talk about plans to modernize the Atlantic alliance" so as to make it "a practical instrument for cooperation with the East." a
Moscow commentator declared that "the Brussels session shows plainly enough that NATO will continue as an instrument of war." The main line taken in Soviet commentary on the Brussels meeting depicted NATO as "torn by serious contradictions," with its members increasingly unhappy over being tied to U.S. policy, especially over "the growing risk of being drawn into dangerous military ventures, alien to their interests." Under the "cover of talks about 'reform'," the United States was said to be trying to get a firmer grip on the other NATO members, to make them shoulder a greater share of military expenditure, and to bind them to long-term commitments.

The creation of a standing Atlantic destroyer force was viewed in this light by some Soviet observers as a commitment intended to forestall "the disintegration of the bloc in 1969 in connection with expiration of the North Atlantic Treaty." Other commentary described the destroyer force as a "substitute for the abortive MLF project." NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" doctrine drew criticism on the grounds that it was even "more dangerous" than the concept of "massive retaliation," because it "may raise false hopes that a military conflict in Europe can be kept within local bounds and not allowed to develop into a big war with use of all means of extermination." One military matter raised at the Brussels meeting, however, was virtually ignored; namely, the call for mutual troop reductions, which was dismissed by a Soviet radio panelist as "only a gesture."
D. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND BRITAIN

In Soviet attacks on NATO, both before and after the Brussels meeting, France fared better than the other alliance members, generally being commended for not truckling to the United States. The cooperative tenor of Soviet-French relations which had been set by de Gaulle's trip to Moscow in mid-1966 and Kosygin's return visit at the end of the year continued throughout the early months of 1967. There was, for example, an increased exchange of various economic and technical delegations, as working ties between the two countries were expanded in aviation, electronics, food processing, and other industries.

Toward the end of April, about a month after the departure of U.S. and other NATO forces from France, a symbolic gesture of closer Soviet-French rapport in the military field took place when France's top military man was invited to Moscow for the annual May Day parade in Red Square. He was General Charles Ailleret, French chief-of-staff and expositor of France's "all-azimuths" nuclear strategy, who was later to perish in an airplane crash. Several months after his trip to Moscow, his visit was returned by Marshal M. V. Zakharov, chief of the Soviet General Staff. In June, in another demonstration of Soviet-French collaboration, Kosygin twice stopped off in Paris on short notice to confer with de Gaulle during a trip to the United Nations in connection with the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Yet, along with these manifestations of continuing cordiality, signs of a subtle change in Soviet-French relations appeared in 1967. Suggestions of a slight
cooling-off in the political sphere first arose when pro-
jected spring visits to Paris by Brezhnev and Podgorny failed to materialize. As some Western observers saw
it, the French national elections in March, which showed
de Gaulle slipping and brought gains to the French Commu-
nist Party, may have reduced Moscow's previous ardent
interest in courting the French leader. De Gaulle's trip
to Poland in September 1967, during which he suggested to
Gomulka that Poland might profit from France's example by
steering a more independent course between the world's
two "colossi," probably irritated the Russians no less
than some of his other utterances irked the West Germans.
Even at the Brussels meeting in December 1967, where French
abstention from the military discussions was applauded by
the Soviet Union, France's adherence to a declaration that
"the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the
alliance" served notice that de Gaulle was not neces-
sarily Moscow's man. So, too, did the French leader's
public approval of President Johnson's Vietnam peace
initiative of March 1968.

What probably gave Moscow the clearest notice that the
time had come to hedge its bets on de Gaulle, however, was
the latter's handling of the domestic crisis which arose
in May 1968 out of the protest movement of students and
workers. De Gaulle's resort to the theme that "totali-
tarian communism" was attempting "to take over the country,"
and his harsh strictures against the French Communist
Party must have placed a serious strain on the for-
bearance of the Soviet leadership. the more so as Moscow
had sought to throw the influence of the French Communist
organization behind de Gaulle against what it described
as "politically adventurist" student radicals. De Gaulle's resounding electoral success in June, which he owed in part to evoking the threat of a Communist takeover, added a further element of doubt as to the future of Soviet-French collaboration. Although the public Soviet response to the French crisis avoided a direct censure of de Gaulle, it came close to the target by charging that the Gaullist party had chosen to present itself to the electorate as "the savior of the country against 'The Red Menace'."

Perhaps none of this added up to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership was prepared to write off de Gaulle's further potential as an alliance splitter and a rallying point for anti-American sentiment in Europe. It did suggest, however, that the Soviet-French rapprochement had passed its peak by mid-1968 and entered a stage in which its usefulness to Soviet policy would tend to decline -- an impression strengthened, as we shall see, by de Gaulle's own evident disenchantment with the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 1968.

Soviet relations with Britain warmed up several degrees after Kosygin's London visit, in February 1967, as a result of pledges by both sides to develop trade and technical cooperation, but Soviet policy achieved no visible success in inducing the Wilson government to veer away from its close association with the United States or to lessen its support of NATO. Moscow's hopes of exploiting Anglo-German differences over troop costs and other issues to drive a wedge between London and Bonn likewise were blunted, partly perhaps because of Britain's need to win West German backing for British membership in the European Economic Community.
From the point of view of the Soviet Union, the Wilson government's reluctance to repudiate U.S. policy in Southeast Asia despite its strong desire to help bring the Vietnam war to the conference table remained a distinct impediment to the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations. Thus, even though the Soviet leadership continued the dialogue with Britain on various major issues, the Soviet press in 1967 and early 1968 remained sharply critical of what it chose to describe as British subservience to American policy; later in the year, Gromyko noted publicly that Soviet-British relations would be improving somewhat more rapidly "if British foreign policy overcame its one-sided orientation on a number of major international issues."

The rather slow pace of efforts to establish closer Soviet-British ties, despite some increase in economic contacts, was illustrated by the cautious sparring over terms for a treaty of friendship and peaceful cooperation, which Kosygin had proposed during his London visit. Discussions on the subject in 1967, during which British Foreign Secretary George Brown visited Moscow, and again in January 1968, when Wilson paid a brief visit to the Kremlin, yielded no apparent progress on the treaty. Another project for which Kosygin had sought British backing in February 1967, the proposal for a European security conference, was discussed again during Wilson's Moscow visit of January 1968. Soviet unwillingness to make clear whether such a conference would include the United States apparently left the British wary of giving it unqualified endorsement. Although the joint communiqué covering Wilson's visit noted that a security
conference "could be valuable, subject to the necessary preparation." 84

In talks with other European leaders, as with the British, Soviet efforts to promote a European security conference along the lines of the Bucharest proposal continued to meet with a mixed response, owing in part to the question of American participation. In March 1968, for example, Austria agreed "in principle" to the idea of an all-European security conference, but reportedly balked in private at the exclusion of the United States. 85 Similar reservations were shared by a number of other European governments whose endorsement had been sought, including that of Italy. Another obstacle that made it difficult for Soviet diplomacy to sell its version of a European security conference was the question of GDR participation. Insistence that East Germany be included was logical enough from the Soviet viewpoint as a way of enhancing the Ulbricht regime's international stature, but at the same time it raised for several West European countries the complicated issue of diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

Nonetheless, whether or not Soviet diplomacy could take the credit, the idea of a European security conference gained some headway. In February 1968, for example, at a Dutch parliamentary discussion, it was urged that more active steps be taken in this direction. 86 giving impetus to the notion that some of the smaller countries in both West and East Europe might explore ways of removing the various hindrances to a security conference. Meanwhile, rather paradoxically, the Soviet Union itself -- perhaps because of increasing distraction by troublesome developments in East Europe -- seemed to be soft-pedaling the
idea of an all-European security conference. However, there were occasional signs that the project had by no means been dropped from the Soviet agenda. In his tour d'horizon of June 27, 1968, for example, Gromyko once more devoted major attention to the need for a European security conference, stating that the Soviet Union was ready to enter preparatory discussions "with those governments of European states which understand the need and urgency of coordinating and pooling efforts for this purpose." Interestingly enough, however, he no longer linked the conference proposal with the subject of mutual dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 87

E. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE COUNTRIES ON NATO'S NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FLANKS

Along with the developments discussed above, Soviet European policy in the period following the Bucharest conference was notable for the increased attention given to improving relations with countries on the northern and southern flanks of NATO. With regard to the Scandinavian countries, which Soviet commentary occasionally singled out as recognizing "more clearly than any other region of West Europe" the need to normalize relations with the Soviet bloc, 88 Moscow's principal aim seemed to be to encourage the Nordic members of NATO -- Norway and Denmark -- to quit the Western alliance in favor of a neutral grouping of northern states, along with Sweden and Finland.

Although the Soviet Union sought to promote the idea of Scandinavian neutrality, its attitudes toward this question varied from time to time, largely perhaps because of uncertainty as to whether a Scandinavian defense alliance unassociated with NATO would represent a form of neutrality
acceptable to Moscow. In the fall of 1966, for example, following NATO maneuvers in the north of Norway designed to meet a simulated threat to NATO's northern flank via the Arctic, the Soviet Union launched a press campaign to warn Norway that her security would be better assured through a policy of Nordic neutrality than through association with NATO. The idea that a defense alliance of Scandinavian states might serve as a substitute for NATO membership was specifically attacked by Izvestiia in September 1966, at which time it was also suggested that Great Power guarantees of Scandinavian neutrality might be a useful alternative to NATO. A month later, however, the Soviet Union tentatively recognized that a Scandinavian defense alliance was a "possible alternative." provided it stayed outside existing military blocs. Subsequently, this idea disappeared from Soviet commentary, which focused once more on the straightforward theme that, since there was no Soviet threat to Scandinavian security, there was no longer any need for Norway to look to NATO for protection.

In its approach to Norway and Denmark, the Soviet Union applauded groups in the two countries that were demanding the "liquidation of NATO" and advancing "positive programs" for a "neutral, atom-free North." as well as pushing for a popular referendum on withdrawal from NATO. There were both soft and hard elements in the Soviet attitude toward Norway. On the one hand, Soviet propaganda expressed sympathy for Norway, pictured as having been "drawn into NATO against her will" and having found NATO membership "a heavy yoke on her foreign policy." A brief interlude of hostility toward the Norwegian coalition
government that had taken office in 1966 was followed by efforts to establish cordial relations with the new government.\textsuperscript{93} which led to the signing of a trade agreement in September 1967 and a visit to Moscow by the Norwegian Defense Minister, Otto G. Tidemand, a month later.\textsuperscript{94} On the other hand, however, the Soviet Union complained that Norway was lending herself to the purposes of NATO's "northern strategy." aimed at making Scandinavia "an anti-Soviet jumping-off point." and warned that leaders "who countenance such strivings subject their countries to great risk."\textsuperscript{95} Soviet spokesmen also asserted that the USSR had been falsely accused of having a "particular interest in ice-free harbors in Norwegian territory."\textsuperscript{96} Similarly, while treating anti-NATO trends in Denmark as an encouraging sign of "political maturity." the Soviet Union found fault with Denmark's failure to recognize certain political realities, as in her refusal to establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic.\textsuperscript{97}

Toward Sweden, the Soviet Union pursued a cordial line, marked in 1967 by an increasing exchange of military visits,\textsuperscript{98} a trip to Stockholm by a Supreme Soviet delegation, and a visit to Moscow by Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson. Soviet commentary took particular satisfaction in the growth of anti-American sentiment in Sweden, noting that the United States was "becoming alarmed" at Sweden's friendly relations with the USSR,\textsuperscript{99} and applauding the Swedes for dismissing charges by a visiting U.S. Congressional delegation that anti-American demonstrations were compromising Swedish neutrality.\textsuperscript{100} In July 1968, during a visit to Stockholm that was cut short by the need for his presence at a Warsaw Pact meeting
on the Czech situation, Kosygin sounded the standard Soviet line that Norway and Denmark should emulate Sweden's neutral stance by abandoning NATO. He also, on this occasion, expressed opposition to the idea of a Nordic defense alliance.

With respect to Finland, Soviet policy continued to promote the warmer relations which had developed since the Finnish Communist Party had been taken into Finland's coalition government in the summer of 1966, providing an example of the kind of Popular Front government that the Soviet Union was interested in seeing set up in the West. In May 1967, Moscow greeted with approval measures adopted by a new permanent commission for "expanding the economic foundation of neighborly relations between the two countries"; in December, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Finnish independence, Podgorny visited Helsinki, where new pledges were made to strengthen trade, cultural, and other ties between Finland and the Soviet Union. Soviet commentary on this anniversary paid particular tribute to Finland's support of the idea of convening a European security conference and to the Finnish "suggestion for creating an atom-free zone in Scandinavia."

The Soviet desire to see Finland remain as a show window for Popular Front governments was underscored in the spring of 1968, after the Finnish Communist Party lost ground in the March elections and changes in the Cabinet had the effect of reducing Communist influence in the government. Despite these changes, Moscow accepted the situation without notable protest, presumably in order not to jeopardize Communist participation in a continuing, though somewhat diluted, Popular Front arrangement in Finland.
On NATO's southeastern flank, meanwhile, the Soviet Union devoted further attention to the improvement of relations with Turkey, which had shown signs of warming ever since early 1965, when Turkey evidently began to feel that her interests in the Cyprus question had been slighted by her NATO partners. \^1^0^5^ Agreements reached in 1966 and 1967 for Soviet economic and technical aid helped to melt at least some of Turkey's traditional coolness toward her powerful neighbor to the north, \^1^0^6^ and although Turkish officials presumably continued to regard Moscow's overtures with a wary eye, the two countries moved gradually toward a détente of sorts. From Moscow's viewpoint, the problem of balancing carefully between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus issue was eased considerably by the military junta's coup in Greece, in April 1967, after which Soviet diplomacy aligned itself squarely with Turkey, although not without some impediment to Soviet relations with the Cypriot regime of Archbishop Makarios. \^1^0^7^ In September 1967, when Turkish Premier Suleiman Demirel visited Moscow in return for Kosygin's visit to Turkey the previous December, the Soviet press noted that both sides had reached "close or identical" views on various international questions, and that there were no longer any territorial disputes to obstruct Soviet-Turkish relations. \^1^0^8^ Along with such assurances of amity toward Turkey, a querulous note occasionally crept into Soviet commentary over such matters as the proposal for a nuclear mine belt at the Soviet-Turkish frontier, an idea which the Turks themselves had suggested to their NATO partners. For the record, the Soviet press sought to gloss over this last point in its attacks upon the mine belt proposal.
picturing it as "a barefaced U.S. propaganda provocation aimed at poisoning the favorable development of Soviet-Turkish relations";\(^{109}\) on a clandestine level, however, Soviet-inspired propaganda took on a harsher tone to the effect that Turkey risked being turned into a graveyard if the mine belt were installed.\(^{110}\)

Despite the probability that doubts about the other party were not resolved in either Moscow or Ankara, the Soviet Union could at least feel that its policy of "practical collaboration" with Turkey was paying off in undermining the position of the United States in Turkey and loosening to some degree the latter's affiliation with NATO.\(^{111}\) These doubtless appeared as no small gains, given the strategic importance of Turkey as the Soviet Union's door to the Eastern Mediterranean and the growing significance which this region assumed in Soviet plans in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.

F. SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS IMPACT ON EUROPE

At the Brussels meeting of the NATO Council in December 1967, note was taken of "a marked expansion in Soviet forces in the Mediterranean" and of the need to give particular attention to the "defense problems of the exposed areas" such as NATO's "South-Eastern flank"; at the next meeting of the Council, in Iceland, six months later, the same question again received close attention.\(^ {112}\) This sensitivity in NATO to problems of safeguarding the southern flank of Europe grew not only out of immediate concern over possible repetition of such regional conflicts as the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the Cyprus crisis, but
also out of a more deep-seated apprehension that the Soviet Union might see in the turbulent Middle East a beckoning opportunity to expedite the removal of Western influence from the area and to establish itself as the dominant power at the strategic crossroads of the European, Asian, and African continents. NATO's disquiet over the creeping growth of Soviet military and political influence in the Mediterranean increased still more after the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Behind such Western concern lay the long-time ambition of Russian leaders from the Czars to Stalin to obtain a strategic-political foothold in the Middle East. Should the incumbent Soviet leadership be bent upon an energetic pursuit of this traditional aspiration, the potential consequences could indeed be felt in Europe. Among other things, the Soviet Union might manage to acquire a position from which it would be possible to outflank Turkey and Greece, to raise the political and economic costs of European access to Mid-East oil, and to interpose Soviet military power across lines of communication through the area. Moreover, the very threat to European interests implicit in any Soviet attempt to establish a dominant sphere of influence in the Middle East could spill over into Europe in the form of revived Cold War animosities and perhaps even lead to a Great Power confrontation in the Mediterranean. For all these reasons, even though Soviet involvement in the Middle East is a subject which lies largely outside our study, it seems appropriate here to examine briefly the links between the evolving situation in the Middle East and Soviet European policy.
1. The June War and Its Aftermath

The pivotal event that brought fundamental changes in established political and power relationships in the Middle East during the tenure of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was, of course, the six-day Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. The extent to which prior Soviet policies contributed to the outbreak of the June war need not be debated here. Suffice it to say that, despite Russia's role as arms supplier to the Arab states and her somewhat dubious part in exacerbating the crisis in May 1967 which immediately preceded the Israeli attack, the war itself probably came as an unwelcome surprise to the Soviet leadership. Attempts in concert with the United States to contain the conflict, which we have already discussed, suggest that avoidance of a Great Power confrontation was uppermost in the Soviet leaders' minds during the period of active hostilities, although at the very close of the war they issued an ambiguous threat to take unspecified measures against Israel.

The aftermath of the war, however, presented a new and fluid situation, full of both pitfalls and opportunities for Soviet policy. While it is still far from clear what course this policy eventually may take, some of the choices made by the Soviet leaders -- who apparently differed on occasion among themselves -- can be identified. One choice, obviously made promptly after the fighting ceased, was a decision to put the shattered Arab armies back on their feet, toward which end large arms shipments were dispatched, along with additional military advisers. Initially, this move may have been dictated by a desire to recoup Soviet prestige in the Arab world and, as Soviet
sources put it, to "restore the military balance" between the Arab states and Israel. However, it had several other effects: It reduced the prospects for avoiding another expensive round of the Middle East arms race; it increased Arab dependence on the Soviet Union; and it raised the possibility that the rearmed Arab countries might precipitate another war in the Middle East by attempting to avenge their latest military setback at the hands of Israel.

In connection with repairing the military posture of the Arab states, particularly Egypt, the Soviet Union faced the decision whether or not to make its help contingent upon internal political reforms that would give "progressive" Soviet-oriented elements more influence and would help prepare the way for revolutionary changes in the sociopolitical order. Two schools of Soviet opinion seem to have been involved. One, taking an essentially ideological position, favored a line aimed at "breaking up the old government machine" and weeding out bourgeois elements, especially in the armed forces. The other, more pragmatic, apparently felt it prudent to go slow in pressing for a revolutionary transformation which Nasser might regard as unwarranted interference in Egyptian affairs. The counsel of the second school of thought evidently prevailed, although some pressure undoubtedly was put on Nasser to let local Communists out of jail and to purge the "military bourgeoisie" in his officer corps.

Another Soviet decision of considerable consequence was to keep on station in the Mediterranean the bulk of the augmented naval force, which had made its presence highly visible during and immediately after the six-day
war. This force, details of which we shall take up in a later chapter, was credited by Soviet spokesmen with having played a "decisive role in frustrating the adventurous plans of the Israeli aggressors." Some of its units put in at Egyptian and Syrian ports during the tense period following the sinking, in October 1967, of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by an Egyptian missile patrol boat, ostensibly to warn Israel of the risks of retaliatory action. Publicized flights of Soviet strategic bombers on "friendly visits" to "fraternal Arab countries," in December 1967 and subsequently, seem to have had a similar function.

Besides these displays of its military presence in the immediate theater of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union also chose to show the flag in a widening area beyond the Eastern Mediterranean. To the westward, its naval units called at ports in Algeria, where the possibility arose that the Soviet Union might seek to arrange with the Boumedienne government for the use of the former French naval facility at Mers el Kébir. At the same time, the Soviet Union turned its attention toward the southern part of the Arabian peninsula, where British power was in the process of vacating the strategic rimlands governing access to the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. In November 1967, Moscow decided to intervene in the Yemeni civil war, sending air support, including both transport and combat aircraft flown by Soviet pilots, to aid the republican regime in Yemen against the royalists. This step was taken just as the last of Nasser's troops were being withdrawn from Yemen and the British had pulled out of Aden in neighboring South Arabia. It was followed about a year later
by the signing of a Soviet military and technical aid agree-
ment with the new South Yemen government in Aden.

Although only time will tell whether Soviet military
aid activity in the two Yemeni states was a passing episode
or the prelude to a larger plan for extension of Soviet
political and military influence into adjacent Arabian
areas, the fact remains that tentative first steps
were taken toward establishing a Soviet presence at the
gateway to the Indian Ocean. Incidentally, it was a
matter of some interest that in the spring of 1968, follow-
ing a trip to India earlier in the year by Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov, head of the Soviet navy, a group of Soviet naval
vessels for the first time made an extended "goodwill"
cruise through the northern Indian Ocean and the Persian
Gulf. Soviet military aid programs in the Sudan and
Somalia were also pertinent to the extension of Soviet
military influence along the western rim of the Indian
Ocean in 1968.

Throughout the period after the June war while the
Soviet Union was helping to rebuild the armed forces of
the Arab states and making its own military presence felt
in the Middle East, Soviet spokesmen stoutly denied that
the USSR had any intention of setting up military bases
on NATO's southern flank. As one commentator put it, "the
Soviet Union never has had, nor is it working toward the
acquisition of bases, spheres of influence, or oil con-
cessions" in the Mediterranean basin. In a formal
sense, it was true that the Soviet Union did not move to
acquire its own bases; however, by making use of local
facilities in the Arab countries and seeking access to
Yugoslav naval installations, the USSR was hardly
displaying indifference toward the utility of supporting bases in the area. At the same time that it was denying interest in acquiring bases of its own, Moscow continued to press for the elimination of Western bases in the Mediterranean area, making those in Libya and Cyprus the particular targets of its propaganda. The presence of foreign bases was singled out as a major cause of the November 1967 Cyprus crisis. After the June war, the Soviet Union also stepped up its propaganda against NATO naval activities in the Mediterranean, labeling naval maneuvers in August 1967 as an attempt by NATO to offset its "seriously weakened political position in this area."  

2. Questions Concerning the Soviet Military and Political Commitment in the Middle East

One result of the June war, as suggested by these various steps of the Soviet Union, was a gradual increase in its military commitment in the Middle East. How much more deeply the USSR might choose to commit itself militarily remained to be seen, but the Soviet leaders clearly had made up their minds to demonstrate that the Mediterranean could no longer be regarded as an exclusively Western preserve. At a minimum, the maintenance of a military presence in the area seemed designed to restore damaged Soviet prestige in the Arab world by a visible show of support that would deter Israel from any serious military moves against the Arab states. Another function of the Soviet military presence may have been to retain some local control over possible provocative actions by client Arab states. Also, the maintenance of a Soviet military foothold in the Middle East, together with military aid
programs to selected states in the region, may have been counted upon to reduce hostile access to the southern border areas of the Soviet Union itself in the event of a major crisis in either Europe or the Far East.\textsuperscript{135}

Beyond this, however, one could not say with assurance that the Soviet Union had more ambitious military undertakings in mind, such as a major buildup of forces and supporting bases in the Mediterranean capable of outflanking Europe strategically from the south. The character of the Soviet forces rotated into the Mediterranean and the problems of reinforcing and logistically supporting them under hostile conditions were such as to suggest that the Soviet Union was far from being in a position to confront NATO power in the area directly.\textsuperscript{136} Rather, while asserting that as a Black Sea and Mediterranean power it had an "irrefutable right" to send its warships into Mediterranean waters,\textsuperscript{137} the Soviet Union seemed prepared for the time being to go no further than to employ its forces for surveillance and occasional harassment of NATO naval operations in those waters. With regard to committing naval forces to the Indian Ocean as a routine matter, the Soviet Union's capacity to sustain a permanent offshore presence of significant size likewise seemed somewhat limited, unless arrangements were made with suitably located countries for support facilities ashore. In this connection, Soviet aid programs for the construction of port facilities in such countries as India and Somalia opened the possibility of bargaining for use privileges.

In the political sphere, Moscow's efforts in the aftermath of the June war to rally international support for the Arab cause, including attempts to bring the various Warsaw
Pact countries together on a common line toward the Arab states and Israel, testified to the Soviet Union's continuing intention to play a major political role in the affairs of the Middle East. Perhaps the most pressing immediate issue before the Soviet leadership was whether to pursue a policy of uncompromising support of the Arab position, which was likely to keep Middle East tensions dangerously high, or to advise the Arab states to offer mutual concessions that might lead to a settlement and reduce the danger of a new war.

According to some observers, Soviet spokesmen, in private discussions with Arab leaders in 1968, tended to counsel the latter course. But their public utterances often conveyed the impression that the Soviet Union was interested in keeping the Middle East situation just below the boiling point, perhaps on the calculation that an incomplete settlement and continuing tension would keep the Arab world conscious of its dependence on the Soviet Union and firmly aligned against the West.

Only toward the close of 1968, after a spiraling cycle of incidents had posed the danger of open renewal of warfare, did the Soviet Union begin to take what looked like serious diplomatic initiatives to break the Arab-Israeli impasse. The first of these was Moscow's expression, in early December, of active support of the Jarring UN mediation mission in order to facilitate a political settlement that would head off "a new dangerous flareup" in the Middle East. This was followed on December 30 by a Soviet note to France, Britain, and the United States proposing terms for a settlement which reflected a somewhat more flexible attitude than Moscow had.
previously displayed on such questions as border adjustments, and which raised the possibility of including some "variant of guarantees by the four permanent Security Council members." Although the Soviet proposal connoted having the Great Powers bring pressure to bear, especially upon the Israeli side, and reportedly was unacceptable to the United States on a number of points, it did lead to informal four-power talks in New York in April 1969, to explore the prospects for a political settlement.

Whatever second thoughts in Moscow may have prompted the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to seek a diplomatic cooling-off of the Arab-Israeli crisis, the Soviet leaders certainly were not unaware that the situation since the June war of 1967 had placed greater political leverage in their hands than they had theretofore possessed in the Middle East, a region which Brezhnev, in July 1967, had described as "one of the major areas of the national-liberation movement" where the "Soviet Union sees its task as one of frustrating imperialism's designs . . . and helping the Arab states to defend their freedom and independence." It was also, incidentally, an area that afforded access to the India-Pakistan subcontinent, where Soviet political and strategic interests were growing. Increased cultivation of Iraq and Iran in 1967-1968 suggested, moreover, a widening pattern of the Soviet Union's regional involvement in this part of the world.

There was thus little room to doubt that, by early 1969, the Soviet Union was politically more deeply engaged in the Middle East than ever before. Yet various unresolved questions remained as to its objectives in the area, and whether and to what extent its leadership was prepared to follow high-risk policies in their pursuit.
On the one hand, it might be argued that the Soviet leaders -- sensing a slowdown of the political offensive against Western Europe and having suffered political losses in East Europe -- would find themselves the more tempted to seek compensating gains by pursuing a radical policy course in the Middle East. In this view, they might hope to pull off a political end run through the Middle East, putting themselves in a position to threaten Europe by cutting off her oil supply, by bringing pressure on less stable states on the southeast rim of Europe, and so on. Within the Middle East itself, a companion feature of this essentially radical and high-risk policy might be for the Soviet Union to use its increased political leverage to install "progressive" revolutionary regimes in the Arab countries, hoping thereby both to consolidate its influence and to demonstrate that Soviet political strategy is capable of achieving dynamic ideological successes, which would help offset the rival claims of Peking's Third World strategy.\textsuperscript{149}

On the other hand, however, there were grounds for supposing that the Soviet leaders might be inclined toward a more moderate and patient policy course in the Middle East. Among considerations that might sway them in favor of a conservative approach would be: the desire to avoid being drawn into active intervention on behalf of the Arab states in the event of a new round of Arab-Israeli warfare, which might also embroil the Soviet Union with the United States; awareness that denial of oil and other Middle East resources to traditional Western consumers could cut both ways, increasing the economic demands of Middle East countries upon the Soviet Union
to make up for lost revenue; recognition that continued closure of the Suez Canal, while damaging to Western interests, would also be hard on Egypt and the Soviet Union itself, the more so as transit of the Suez has been of declining value to the West with the development of supertankers while becoming more important to the Soviet Union for routing supplies from its Black Sea ports to North Vietnam and for establishing a strategic link with the Indian subcontinent; and finally, the possibility that, even though "progressive" Arab regimes could perhaps be launched on the "socialist path" with generous Soviet assistance, such regimes might prove jealous of their independence and defy Soviet control in the manner of Castro's Cuba.

In light of such considerations, it might well be argued that Moscow would eschew a radical policy in the Middle East, and that the Soviet leaders more likely would prefer to work toward such objectives as reducing Western influence and improving the Soviet Union's own position in the Middle East by using such relatively conventional foreign policy methods as economic projects, military aid, and diplomatic support to strengthen the pro-Soviet orientation of existing Middle East governments. A parallel feature of this approach, which might also recommend itself to the Soviet leadership, would be an attempt to seek larger economic gains from the Soviet Union's improved position in the Middle East. Soviet activity has already been pointed toward such aims as acquiring a major role in the development and marketing of Persian Gulf oil resources and Iranian natural gas -- partly to regain a payoff on the considerable
credits the USSR had extended in the area. and partly perhaps to use Middle East oil (which costs less to produce than Soviet oil) -- in an effort to channel more of the Soviet Union's own investment resources into other sectors of the Soviet economy.

Whether Soviet policy in the Middle East will tend to move along the extreme or the moderate lines sketched out above remains to be seen. To a considerable extent, the answer may turn on the opportunities which present themselves, together with the risks and costs of pursuing them. The Soviet leaders may find that Arab nationalism, a force that worked for them as long as the common object was to expel dominant Western influence from the area, will begin to work against them if it becomes plain that Western influence is simply to be replaced by Soviet domination. At the same time, the attitudes of the Western powers are likely to represent a factor of no little consequence in shaping the opportunities perceived by the Soviet leadership in the Middle East. Should the policies of the Western powers, for any of a variety of reasons, seem to signal a declining interest in the area, Moscow may come to the conclusion that the way is open for further Soviet penetration, with reduced risk of encountering serious outside resistance.
XIV. SOVIET POLICY IN EAST EUROPE: MID-1966 TO MID-1968

In the two years after the Bucharest conference of July 1966, the Soviet Union was obliged to cope with progressively troublesome threats to its control over East Europe and to the unity of the Warsaw bloc. These challenges began early in this period with Rumania's breaking of ranks on a common line toward West Germany, which made more difficult the problem of maintaining bloc cohesiveness in the face of Bonn's diplomatic drive in East Europe. However, it was the subsequent, and perhaps largely unforeseen, train of events in Czechoslovakia which posed the most severe problems for the Soviet leadership.

Regarded in Moscow as the gravest challenge to Soviet interests in East Europe since the Hungarian rebellion of 1956, Czechoslovakia's new course under the Dubcek regime not only raised disturbing questions as to the steadfastness of the military and foreign policy position of a key member in the Warsaw Pact's Northern Tier, but in the eyes of the Soviet leaders it also threatened to weaken the internal structure of Communist power in that pivotal country -- perhaps an even more disturbing prospect.

In this chapter we shall deal with the efforts of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to stem the gradual erosion of Soviet authority in East Europe, including the developments that culminated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The management of military affairs within the Warsaw bloc, as well as the impact of the Czechoslovak intervention upon Soviet European policy, will be taken up in later chapters.
A. EFFORTS TO COUNTER BONN'S BRIDGE-BUILDING DIPLOMACY IN EAST EUROPE

The most notable sign that neither the Bucharest conference nor another gathering of Warsaw Pact leaders later in 1966 had produced a workable formula for a united policy front came on January 31, 1967, when Rumania took the independent step of establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, thus openly breaking the common line on West Germany. This move, which at the same time signaled Bonn's abandonment, at long last, of the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, was made in the face of strenuous opposition from Ulbricht's regime, backed by Poland and the Soviet Union. In fact, only three days previously, the Soviet Union had delivered a particularly harsh attack on the reconciliation policy enunciated in December 1966 by the new Kiesinger-Brandt coalition government in Bonn.

Once Rumania had broken the ice, the possibility arose that other East European countries might be tempted to follow suit, with Hungary and Czechoslovakia among the more likely candidates. Although the Soviet leaders may have had some reservations about letting Ulbricht define the terms for a bloc response to the Federal Republic's overtures, on balance they apparently decided to stand behind his efforts to slow down any precipitous East European movement toward Bonn. These efforts began in early February with sharp East German criticism of Rumania, which the latter promptly rejected as unwarranted "interference" in her affairs; this was followed by a hastily arranged meeting of Warsaw bloc foreign ministers, reportedly called at Ulbricht's insistence to set conditions for further contacts with West Germany. Several
weeks later, the Soviet Union came out openly in support of Ulbricht's line when Brezhnev, speaking in Moscow on March 10, asserted that West Germany remained the prime obstacle to peace and security in Europe, and that it would be "extremely naive to accept the current manifestations of Bonn's policy as signs of a change in its foreign policy course."9

Other steps taken in the spring of 1967 to blunt Bonn's bridge-building diplomacy toward East Europe included a drive to enact, or in some cases to renew ahead of schedule, a series of bilateral defense treaties between countries of the Warsaw Pact, with initial emphasis on the Northern Tier states. The first of these steps was the renewal on March 1, 1967, of the Polish-Czecho-   

slovak Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, followed later in March by new treaties between East Germany and Poland, and East Germany and Czecho-   

slovakia.10 By the fall of the year, all the Warsaw Pact allies, with the conspicuous exception of Rumania, had signed bilateral mutual assistance treaties with Pankow, at the same time that the Soviet Union had updated its bilateral treaties with each Pact member, again with the exception of Rumania. As noted earlier, one significant effect of this widening network of bilateral treaties was to provide backup arrangements in the event that Soviet proposals for the dissolution of the opposing military alliances were accepted.11 Another effect was to demonstrate solidarity with the Ulbricht regime, and thus to take the edge off Bonn's bid for further diplomatic ties in East Europe.
Thanks to the countermaneuvering of the German Democratic Republic, with assistance from Poland and the Soviet Union, much of the initial momentum of Bonn's diplomatic offensive had been checked by April 1967. Outwardly at least, the Warsaw bloc leaders, including upon occasion even Rumania's Ceausescu, adopted a uniform line toward West Germany's striving for "normalization" of relations with East Europe, specifying that Bonn must meet such prerequisites as recognition of existing European frontiers, acceptance of the existence of two German states, and renunciation of nuclear weapons. However, this posture was not wholly resistant to continued feelers from Bonn, as illustrated by the response to a new West German appeal on April 12 for improving relations between the two parts of Germany. This initiative not only gave encouragement to Southern Tier countries wishing to broaden their contacts with West Germany, but it even set off a series of alternately hard and soft replies from Pankow, suggesting that Ulbricht himself saw some advantage in the opening of a new dialogue with Bonn. Moreover, despite the outward adherence of the East European states, save Rumania, to a policy of keeping Bonn politically at arm's length, this did not prevent most of these countries from continuing to expand their economic relations with the West generally and the Federal Republic in particular.

That the East European regimes were in one degree or another determined to retain their freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, no matter what they thought individually about relations with Germany, was demonstrated during the Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties, in April 1967. As noted in the preceding chapter.
Brezhnev used this occasion to decry the presence of U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, and to call for a program of political action built around the idea of European security and aimed specifically at casting doubt on the utility of NATO as a medium for promoting East-West understanding. However, Soviet hopes of turning this "historic" meeting of twenty-four Communist parties from both East and West Europe into a unified front against Peking did not materialize. 16 nor, for that matter, was Moscow able to muster unanimous endorsement for its European policy line, inasmuch as two European Communist parties -- the Yugoslav and the Rumanian -- refused to attend the conference at all.

In declining to appear at Karlovy Vary, the Yugoslavs and the Rumanians not only showed themselves wary of being drawn into an anti-Chinese front but maintained also that the pursuit of European security arrangements was properly a matter for governments rather than for a party conclave. In the months prior to the Karlovy Vary meeting, Yugoslav differences with Moscow had sharpened over these and other issues, including Soviet criticism of the more liberal political trends in Yugoslavia that followed Tito's moves in 1966 against the conservative Rankovic wing of the Yugoslav party. 19 If the Karlovy Vary meeting left Soviet-Yugoslav relations unimproved, this was even more true in the case of Rumania.

B. CONTINUING TENSIONS IN SOVIET-RUMANIAN RELATIONS

Soviet displeasure at Rumania's boycotting of the Karlovy Vary meeting, expressed in references to the "unfortunate" absence of certain parties from the
conference. evidently irritated the independent-minded Rumanians. On May 7, 1967, eleven days after the close of the Karlovy Vary gathering and exactly one year after his strongly nationalistic 45th-anniversary speech. Ceausescu published an article. similar in tone to that speech. which again denounced meddling in Rumanian party affairs and defended the "legitimate right" of a given Communist party not to participate in international conferences if it so saw fit. This indication that Soviet-Rumanian relations were again wearing thin came on the heels of rumors that Rumania was still taking an obstreperous stand on military arrangements within the Warsaw Pact.

In early May, Western news agencies reported that Rumania was resisting the appointment of a Soviet officer to the post of Warsaw Pact commander, left vacant when Marshal Andrei Grechko was reassigned to the position of Soviet Defense Minister after the death of Marshal Malinovsky in late March. One version of these reports had it that Bucharest was asking that the Warsaw Pact post be rotated and given to a non-Soviet officer, in line with its rumored demands a year earlier; another version reported a proposal to create new subordinate commands for the Northern and Southern Tiers, under an over-all Soviet commander. Subsequently, Marshal Ivan Iakubovskii, a Russian, took over the top job of Warsaw Pact commander without there being a reorganization into subordinate commands. but the delay of almost three months in making known his assignment lent some substance to speculation that Rumania had made a contentious issue of the matter.
New difficulties in keeping Rumania aligned with the rest of the Warsaw bloc arose for the Soviet Union in 1967, in connection with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even before the actual outbreak of hostilities on June 5, Bucharest had declined to fall in with Soviet efforts for a coordinated bloc stand in support of the Arab states, indicating instead that both sides ought to contribute to a settlement of the crisis. After the war broke out, a hastily summoned conference of Warsaw Pact representatives in Moscow issued a statement condemning alleged Israeli-American aggression and pledging support to the Arab countries. Rumania, although represented at the conference, refused to sign the statement and subsequently urged the Arab states and Israel to negotiate a settlement. Moreover, she was alone among the Warsaw Pact countries represented in Moscow in declining to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. A month later, Rumania stayed away from a similar gathering in Budapest. Although she subsequently attended two further meetings on the Middle East situation (at Belgrade in September and Warsaw in December 1967), she apparently succeeded on both occasions in causing the communique to be watered down and found other ways of demonstrating her independent policy line.

If Soviet tactics in this series of meetings were aimed at achieving a unified position on the Middle East with which even Rumania could agree, they can be judged reasonably successful. However, Moscow's problem of forging coordinated bloc policies did not end with the question of the Middle East. Another issue, which gradually came to a head in 1967 and early 1968, was that of winning solid support for a new world conference of
Communist parties. Here again, the Soviet Union was to find Rumania a stubborn holdout and a potentially dangerous example for other parties seeking to retain their freedom of maneuver in the contest for Communist leadership between Moscow and Peking.

1. The Budapest "Consultative" Meeting and the Rumanian Walkout

From the autumn of 1966, as previously noted, there had been a perceptible increase in Soviet-encouraged lobbying for a new international Communist conference of the kind that had last met in Moscow in December 1960. In October 1967, a rising volume of statements from various Soviet supporters was capped by a declaration from the head of the French Communist Party that conditions were finally "ripe" for a "consultative meeting" to make "practical preparations" for such a world conclave. One month later, after further behind-the-scenes maneuvering, invitations were issued for a "consultative" meeting to take place in Budapest in February 1968. Thus the stage was set for what a Pravda editorial hopefully foresaw as a major step toward restoration of "Communist unity." with no intent to "excommunicate" any party from the world Communist movement.

The Budapest meeting, which opened on February 26 with some sixty parties represented but a number of important dissenters missing, proved to be less than a resounding display of unity. On February 29 the Rumanians, whose misgivings had been voiced in advance, pulled out of the consultative talks, charging that the Soviet Union
had violated its assurances that there would be no criticism of China, and asserting that to hold a world conference under existing conditions of discord would "only flagrantly illustrate on a world scale the lack of unity between Communist parties." Prior to the Rumanian walkout, the chief Soviet delegate, Mikhail Suslov, seconded by hardline speeches from the Polish and East German delegates, had warned against "dangerous nationalistic tendencies" and declared that Peking's attempts to discredit "the very idea" of a new world conference could "in no way serve as an argument for the further postponement of the conference." When the Budapest session came to a close, on March 5, it issued a communiqué ignoring Rumania's walkout and stating that the conferees had agreed to set up a preparatory committee that would go ahead the following month with arrangements for a formal world party conference, tentatively scheduled to be held in Moscow in November-December 1968.

Thus, by virtue of what were described as "steamroller tactics," the Soviet delegation under Suslov -- himself generally identified as one of the hardline figures in the Soviet leadership -- managed at Budapest to win formal backing for the long-deferred world conference. Although the endorsement given by some of those present, especially the Czechs, may have been only lukewarm, the Soviet Union had succeeded in isolating Rumania without precipitating a revolt against its authority among other Warsaw bloc parties, or for that matter, among the West European Communist parties. The prospect of facing another showdown with the Rumanians, however, was just around the corner, for on the day after the Budapest meeting, a session
of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee -- reportedly called at Rumania's request to discuss her objections to the draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation as well as certain Warsaw Pact military matters -- opened in Sofia.

Contrary to expectations that the meeting in Sofia might boil up into an open row, possibly including a Rumanian threat to bolt the Warsaw Pact, the two-day session ended with both Soviet and Rumanian leaders apparently having decided merely to let their differences simmer. With respect to Rumania's complaints about the joint Soviet-U.S. draft of a nonproliferation treaty, a final amended version of which was to be presented at Geneva just a few days later, on March 11, the Sofia meeting registered no concession to the Rumanian viewpoint. Rather, it issued a separate statement on this subject on behalf of all the delegations except Rumania's, endorsing the draft treaty and leaving Bucharest again standing alone. The Rumanians did, however, join in a declaration condemning U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam. On the matter of Warsaw Pact military arrangements, nothing was disclosed at the time about any discussion that may have taken place, although one hint that Czechoslovakia, too, might be sliding toward the Rumanian position was given by a Czech commentator who said on March 6 that perhaps the time had come when "the Warsaw Pact member countries might ask some questions similar to those which some time ago caused de Gaulle to quit NATO."
2. Unresolved Soviet Dilemma: How To Handle the Recalcitrant Rumanians

Following the Budapest and Sofia gatherings in the early months of 1968, Soviet-Rumanian relations appeared likely to deteriorate still further, especially as Rumania showed no disposition to aid the Soviet Union in efforts to bring Warsaw Pact pressure to bear on the new reform government in Czechoslovakia. At the meeting in Dresden on March 23, which witnessed the first joint attempt of Warsaw bloc leaders to call the Dubcek regime to account, Rumania's chair remained vacant, and, as we shall see later, the Rumanians continued to display support for Prague's refusal to bow to Moscow's dictate.

When the preparatory meeting of Communist parties convened in Budapest in April to discuss arrangements for the formal world conference in Moscow seven months later, Rumania was again missing, along with a number of other ruling parties, their absence foreshadowing the subsequent collapse of the scheduled conference the following November, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, Moscow and Bucharest continued to give signs of discord over other matters, with occasionally a few polite words for each other. For example, at the same session of the Rumanian Central Committee in April at which Ceausescu criticized Soviet disregard at Sofia and Dresden for Rumania's interests as a co-equal in the Warsaw Pact, his regime also undertook some internal housecleaning with strong anti-Soviet overtones, while the Soviet Union responded with propaganda attacks questioning the ideological rectitude of the Rumanians.

On the other hand, when de Gaulle arrived in Bucharest
in May for his long-announced visit to Rumania. His invitation for "combined political action" by France and Rumania met with a cautious response from Ceausescu, who made clear that bilateral cooperation between their two countries would not be at the expense of Rumania's Warsaw Pact ties and who used the occasion to offer some unaccustomed words of praise for the Soviet Union's wartime "heroism and sacrifice." 56

For the Soviet leaders, however, such rhetorical gestures from Ceausescu were scarcely enough to gloss over the stubborn fact that Rumania remained bent on an independent and even defiant course in her policies toward the Soviet Union. Taking stock of their relations with Rumania as the situation in East Europe grew more vexed, they doubtless asked themselves once more how best to deal with the defiance of this troublesome ally. Should they take the path of persuasion through appeals to Communist unity, or should they turn more vigorously to such political, economic, and military pressures as could be brought to bear on Bucharest?

Politically--to judge by Moscow's tendency to strengthen its ties with the bloc members most disposed to follow its cue, such as East Germany and Poland--the Soviet leadership no doubt saw some virtue in a tougher course designed to isolate Rumania still further. However, the damage that such an approach might do to the image of bloc unity was likely to counsel against carrying it too far, which would seem to leave the situation just about where it had been.

The prospects of forcing Rumania back into line through economic tactics were not much better. During
1967, according to Rumanian charges, some economic pressure had been applied, and a still more massive squeeze was still possible, but only at the risk of driving Rumania closer to the West and Yugoslavia.

Direct military pressure was hardly feasible for the Soviet Union, except in the case of extreme provocation, which the wily Rumanians were likely to avoid. Yielding some ground to Bucharest's demands for greater equality and reform within the Pact promised perhaps to ease differences in the military domain, but any such relaxation of Soviet control would run counter to moves already under way toward an organizational tightening of the Pact machinery -- the need for which is likely to have taken on added urgency for the Soviet leaders in mid-1963.

Although it thus appeared, prior to August 1968, that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime still had not found an answer to the problem of how best to handle the recalcitrant Rumanians, the situation changed rather abruptly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. As we shall see in a later chapter, the Czech object lesson served to dampen the defiance of the Rumanians, who for some time thereafter took pains to display a more cautious attitude toward the Soviet Union.

C. NEW FERMENT IN THE WARSAW BLOC AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK CHALLENGE

If Rumania posed a perplexing problem for the Soviet Union, developments elsewhere in East Europe in the early months of 1968 doubtless gave the Soviet leadership still greater cause for concern over how to restore respect for its authority and to maintain the cohesion of the Warsaw
bloc. Beginning in January 1968, a new ferment of reform, with disturbing implications for the Soviet hold upon East Europe, arose in Czechoslovakia after the ouster of the Novotny regime. At the same time that Poland also was briefly and to a lesser degree subjected to an upsurge of internal protest. This new restiveness in East Europe, which must have evoked memories of the difficulties of 1956, was no doubt especially perturbing to the Soviet leaders, coming as it did at a time when they were having to cope at home with a mood of disquiet among Soviet intellectuals over cultural controls and the trials of dissident writers.

1. The Ouster of Novotny and the Launching of the Czech Reform Movement

The Novotny regime in Czechoslovakia, though not always an unquestioning servant of Soviet policies in East Europe, had nevertheless been among the Kremlin's more docile and orthodox Warsaw Pact partners. It was probably with some anxiety, therefore, that the Soviet leadership looked on during the fall and winter of 1967 as an increasingly severe internal political struggle in Prague threatened the position of the fifteen-year-old Novotny regime. The discontents in Czechoslovak life that lay behind this power struggle in Prague are matters with which we cannot here deal at length, but they apparently included dissatisfaction with the halting progress of new economic programs, unresolved political and economic grievances of the Slovak half of the country, and Novotny's failure to heal a growing friction between the regime and the country's students and intellectuals. 60
In mid-December 1967, a few days after Brezhnev had made a surprise visit to Prague in a presumable effort to save Novotny's position, the revolt against Novotny's Old Guard leadership came into the open at a Czech Central Committee plenum. Shortly thereafter, at the plenum of January 3-5, 1968, Novotny was replaced as Party Secretary by Alexander Dubcek, a relatively obscure 46-year-old Slovak Party functionary, who was soon to find himself a national hero. At the end of March, Novotny's fall was made complete when he also lost the purely titular post of president.

Concurrently with the unseating of Novotny, a broad process of internal reform, described by some Czech intellectuals as a "bloodless revolution," was tentatively set in motion by the new Dubcek regime. Besides ousting numerous officials of the Old Guard, a task made easier by the embarrassing defection of one general and the suicide of another who allegedly had conspired to use the armed forces to put Novotny back in power, the Dubcek regime promised liberalizing reforms in many aspects of the country's economic, political, and cultural life. Among symbolic signs of change, perhaps none was more dramatic than the public homage paid to the memory of Jan Masaryk on the twentieth anniversary of his death, the first such observance since the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

For the new leadership in Prague the reform movement presented multiple problems, among the most critical of which was how to keep the pressures for change from upsetting the internal structure of Communist authority and from creating a demand for a reorientation of Czech
foreign policy that could call down the wrath of the Soviet Union. During what can be regarded as the unfolding of the Czech experiment -- the period from January 1968 until the issuance of the regime's new "action program" in early April -- the new leadership in Prague showed itself aware of the need to control the rampant spirit of reform so as to keep it from provoking either an internal attempt at a comeback by conservative Party elements or outside intervention.

Illustrative of the new regime's careful tightrope walking were major speeches by Dubcek in February and March, in which he sought to strike a balance between the demands of intellectuals, students, and other reform-minded groups on the one hand and the misgivings of conservative elements in the Party and state bureaucracy, the army, and the police on the other. With regard to the internal scene, Dubcek promised that there would be no return to "administrative methods" of governing -- a Communist euphemism for arbitrary rule. At the same time he reassured those who had expressed "fears that a more or less widely tolerated democratism ... might weaken the foundations of power and ... the principles of socialism" by telling them that the new regime itself was aware of the danger of "going too far in the process of democratization." As for external relations, Dubcek hinted on the one hand at greater independence in foreign policy by saying that Czechoslovakia would formulate "standpoints of her own on basic international questions" and that she would also make better use of her position as an industrialized nation "in the center of Europe" to seek the "extension of cooperation between states -- irrespective of their social
system." In effect, this meant that Prague would seek better relations with West Germany, a move sure to raise Soviet hackles. On the other hand, Dubcek also reaffirmed Czechoslovakia's fidelity to the Soviet Union, declaring that the Czech Communist Party "stands firmly and unshakably" linked to the USSR by its "fraternal bonds with the CPSU" and that "our future plans and prospects cannot be imagined without Czechoslovakia's membership in the community of socialist countries."69

At a meeting of the Czechoslovak Party Presidium on March 21, where Novotny's full retirement from the political scene was announced, the new Czech leadership reiterated that it would "not allow itself to be taken in" by attempts to legalize "nonsocialist moods" under "the guise of democracy or rehabilitation."70 Two days later at Dresden, where an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact members, without Rumania, had been convened to elicit an accounting from Dubcek and his associates, the Czech leaders once more sought to quiet the fears of their allies that Czechoslovakia's liberalization program might endanger Communist rule in the country and her adherence to the common policies of the Warsaw bloc.

What went on at the Dresden meeting was only partly disclosed in its communiqué, which stressed the danger of "militaristic and neo-Nazi activity" in West Germany and the need "to carry out practical measures in the immediate future to consolidate the Warsaw Treaty and its armed forces."71 An apparent warning to Czechoslovakia not to stray from the fold was contained in a passage stating that the conference members expected the new Czech leadership to "insure the further progress of socialist construction"
in that country; it also was reported that they had pressed
Dubcek to look to the Warsaw Pact countries for temporary
financial aid, so as to discourage Czechoslovakia from
seeking credits and other economic assistance from Bonn. 

So far as outside onlookers could determine, however,
this first employment of collective pressure against the
Dubcek regime apparently involved only a mild form of
political and economic arm-twisting. Perhaps the one
foretaste of things to come was furnished by rumored
Soviet-East German troop maneuvers hastily mounted in
the German Democratic Republic near the Czechoslovak
border while the Dresden meeting was being held. But
on the whole, apart from the Dresden court of inquiry, the
initial Soviet response to events in Czechoslovakia was
studiously circumspect, whatever may have been the private
misgivings in the Kremlin about the course upon which the
Dubcek regime had embarked.

Thus, during most of the first three months of 1968,
the Soviet press remained discreetly silent on what was
going on in East Europe. Only after the launching of a
domestic propaganda campaign, on March 14, to stress the
need for vigilance against "bourgeois" and other unhealthy
outside influences was the press permitted a fragmentary
coverage of the new political crisis that was taking shape
in East Europe. A cryptic report of Novotny's resignation
from the presidency on March 22, the communiqué of the
Dresden meeting, and an interview with the new political
chief of the Czechoslovak armed forces in which he pledged
his country's continued cooperation with the Soviet Union
were among the few items to emerge toward the end of March
from the virtual blackout in the Soviet press on Czechoso-
lavak developments.
By contrast with the Soviet Union, most of the other Warsaw Pact members in East Europe were somewhat more outspoken. Predictably, the Ulbricht regime in East Germany took the most vocal and hostile stand on the Czechoslovak situation, asserting that "counterrevolutionary" and "imperialist" forces were at work in Prague, and moving to restrict travel between the two countries. Rumania, as previously noted, took no part in the Dresden inquiry, and on March 23 Ceausescu suggested that he was not averse to emulating the Czech example in a modest way, when he said that every Rumanian should be permitted "to express his views freely on the policies of the Communist Party." Poland, busy with its own crisis, initially frowned on expressions of solidarity between Polish and Czech students, while the regimes of Hungary and Bulgaria refrained from open disapproval of developments in Czechoslovakia. Of the two, the Hungarians took a somewhat more pliable tack; a leading Party official wrote in mid-March that a democratization process was planned in Hungary also, though he cautioned that it could not be carried out in a hurry. Bulgarian officials were less sympathetic to the idea of internal reform, hinting publicly that the Sofia regime was prepared to deal with any "troublemakers."

Why the Soviet Union maintained a cautious, even temporizing, attitude toward the Czechoslovak situation during the first months of 1968 is not altogether clear. Differences within the Soviet leadership over whether to take a hard or a soft approach may have led to hesitation, but this explanation alone does not fully account for the early months of the year, when Moscow seemed prepared to go along with Dubcek. The careful silence of the Soviet
press during this period may have reflected both an effort to isolate the Soviet people from the unrest in East Europe and a prudent decision not to exacerbate that unrest by critical public comment from Moscow. The Soviet leaders may even have hoped to be able to stem the reform movement in Czechoslovakia by bringing about a relatively quiet accommodation between the opposing factions within the Prague leadership, perhaps counting on Dubcek to restrain "extremist" liberal elements and perhaps overestimating the influence retained by the conservative wing of the Czech Communist Party. But if the Soviet leaders did begin by hoping that delaying tactics would resolve the Czech problem, they evidently were disabused of this idea in early April, when the Dubcek regime's new "action program" was adopted.

This program, which was approved in Prague on April 5 at a week-long Central Committee meeting that also ordered sweeping changes in the leadership of both Party and government, provided new guarantees of freedom of speech, broader electoral laws, more powers for parliament and the government vis-à-vis the Party apparatus, somewhat greater scope for non-Communist groups in Czech political life, and other political and economic reforms. If given more than lip service, these changes would add up to an experiment in the "democratization" of a Communist country more far-reaching than anything on record. While the reforms embodied in the action program clearly made it in Communist terms a "revisionist" program, from the viewpoint of the Czech moderates associated with Dubcek its aim could be considered conservative, for it was intended to preserve the rule of the Party by tackling
creatively the various problems in Czechoslovak life which under Novotny had threatened to undermine the Party's leading role. The Soviet leaders, or most of them, evidently did not see it this way, but tended to regard the Czechoslovak experiment as a dangerous departure from orthodoxy that ultimately might threaten the basis of Party legitimacy everywhere, the Soviet Union included. 86

Little wonder, given the orthodox outlook of most of the ruling group in Moscow, that alarm over the liberal reform movement in Czechoslovakia should gradually have persuaded the Soviet leaders of the need for more serious measures to bring it under control -- a task most of them evidently felt could no longer be entrusted wholly to the moderate Dubcek leadership itself. Before turning to the active and often contradictory efforts of the Soviet Union to stamp out the liberal contagion in Czechoslovakia, let us go back for a moment to the internal crisis which flared up in Poland in the spring of 1968 and which, for a time at least, seemed as though it might serve to channel Polish nationalism in an anti-Soviet direction and perhaps bring about an upheaval parallel to that in Czechoslovakia.

2. Student Unrest and the Party Power Struggle in Poland

To Poland, a country which twelve years earlier, upon Gomulka's accession to power, had undergone its own briefly euphoric reform experience but then had lapsed back into another restrictive phase under the same leader, the early months of 1968 also brought a new wave of internal ferment, stimulated in part perhaps by events in neighboring Czechoslovakia. Among its first signs was a protest resolution
on March 1 by the Polish Writers Union against the government's cultural and censorship policies. This was followed a few days later by an outbreak of student riots at Warsaw University which soon spread to other university cities. Although the immediate incident out of which these protests grew was the closing of a classical Polish play containing certain anti-Russian lines that audiences applauded vigorously, behind them lay the long-smoldering resentment of Polish intellectuals toward the increasingly repressive practices encouraged by a dogmatic faction within the Polish Communist leadership.

The government's response to the student rioting and strikes included vigorous repressive measures by the police and a propaganda campaign blaming the disorders on Zionists, intellectuals, and former Stalinists; a number of officials of Jewish background who were the parents of alleged student ringleaders were dismissed from their jobs. Comulka, in a speech to the nation about two weeks after the student demonstrations had begun, sought to moderate the anti-Zionist tone of the propaganda campaign to which some of his own subordinates had presumably given official blessing, but he held out no specific promise of reform measures to alleviate the unrest that was abroad in the country.

By the end of March, the protesting student groups and liberal intellectuals opposing the policies of the Gomulka regime appeared to have been fairly well isolated, with a good deal less support from working-class elements of the population and less access to the corridors of power than in the parallel case of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leadership, which had kept studiously silent toward the Polish unrest, perhaps on the theory that a
"low profile" was the best insurance against the release of any latent anti-Soviet element in the situation as well as to protect its own people from the infection of rebellion. Apparently began to breathe a little easier. On March 22, the Soviet public finally learned of Poland's student disorders, along with the explanation provided by Gomulka's speech several days earlier that they had been stirred up by "anti-Soviet agitators." 93

From the Soviet viewpoint, the fact that the student revolt had collapsed without arousing wide popular support for reform reduced any immediate concern that a second Czechoslovakia was in the making. Although there was always the possibility -- given a Polish populace in which strong anti-Russian sentiments slumbered -- that a crisis stemming from the suppression of nationalist feelings offensive to the Soviet Union might take a turn unwelcome to Moscow, this danger, too, seemed to have been alleviated by the Gomulka regime's handling of the situation. In addition to Gomulka's own strong reassertion of Poland's close ties with the Soviet Union, attention had been diverted from potential Soviet-Polish discord during the March unrest by a Polish propaganda line which stressed that demands for reform could weaken Poland's stand against the revanchist aims of a West Germany still bent upon robbing Poland of the Oder-Neisse territories. 94

From Gomulka's own standpoint, however, the March disorders represented something more than an abortive protest against his regime from frustrated intellectuals and students. They also served as the cover, and in part the pretext, for a challenge to his leadership from within Party ranks. 95 Whether this was merely a power struggle
among potential contenders for his post, if and when he should choose to step down, or an active effort to unseat him was not at first altogether clear, although charges were aired during the factional in-fighting in March that a coup d'etat against his leadership had been in preparation.  

At least three factions within the Party leadership seem to have been involved in the triangular struggle for power which came to the surface during the spring ferment in Poland. The first was the older group of men around Gomulka himself. The second, led by General Mieczyslaw Moczor, Minister of the Interior and head of the secret police, was the so-called "Partisan" faction, a hardline group with an ultranationalist, anti-Zionist tinge. The third group consisted of younger, potentially reformist elements advocating technological progress, whose most influential spokesman was Edward Gierek, provincial Party boss in industrial Silesia. We cannot here go into the details of the internal struggle among these groups. Suffice it to say that, in the purge of middle-echelon officials and in other personnel shifts that went on in the summer of 1968, Gomulka managed to retain his authority, although Moczor gained some ground in a Party reshuffle in July. The possibility remained that a showdown among the contending factions at the Fifth Party Congress, in November 1968, would settle the issue of Gomulka's continued leadership.

As seen from Moscow, the Party struggle in Poland was probably somewhat disturbing, for neither of the factions maneuvering against Gomulka seemed likely to prove as reliable in support of Soviet interests as that
veteran 64-year-old leader had been. Moreover, Moscow
could hardly have welcomed any instability in Poland's
leadership that stemmed from an inner Party fight at a
time when East Europe was in the throes of uncertainty
created by the upheaval in Czechoslovakia. So long as
Gomulka kept his hold on power, however, these concerns
were not overriding. In the mid-months of 1968, as the
problem of dealing with the Czechoslovak heresy rose to
the top of Moscow's agenda, Gomulka's Poland proved a
cooperative partner by lining up with the Soviet Union's
effort to use the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of col-
lective pressure upon the Dubcek regime.

3. New Pressures on Prague and the July Crisis

In early April, after a brief relaxation of tensions
following the Dresden meeting, the Soviet Union displayed
its first open disapproval of Prague's new course. On
April 12, a few days after a CPSU plenum in Moscow had
sounded the alarm about new threats of "subversion" from
the West. Pravda for the first time condemned "rightist
excesses" that allegedly were showing up in Prague. A
hasty trip to Moscow in early May by Dubcek (who among
other things sought, unsuccessfully, to obtain a hard-
currency loan from the Soviet Union) apparently failed
to reassure the Soviet leadership that the process of
democratization in Czechoslovakia was fully under con-
trol. For on May 6, upon his return to Prague, Dubcek
disclosed that the Soviet leaders had "expressed anxiety"
on this score. At this point, as if to underline the
Soviet Union's growing impatience with liberalizing trends
in Czechoslovakia, a meeting of hard-core Warsaw Pact allies
was convened in Moscow to discuss the Czech situation. At the same time, Soviet propaganda stepped up its attacks around the general theme that activities by "antisocialist" elements in Czechoslovakia were being exploited by the West to sow discord within the Warsaw bloc.

Despite the increasing severity of Soviet propaganda assaults upon Prague in mid-May, there was some indication that the Soviet leadership was not of a single mind on shifting to an undiluted hardline approach to the Czech problem. This was perhaps best brought out by Kosygin's surprise arrival in Czechoslovakia on May 17 for a ten-day "work-and-cure" sojourn at Karlovy Vary, concurrent with the appearance in Prague of a Soviet military delegation under Marshal Grechko for a six-day round of conversations with Czech defense officials. The seemingly conciliatory nature of Kosygin's visit, which the Czechs said has been arranged at short notice on his initiative, suggested that at least some elements of the Soviet leadership were still hopeful that Dubcek could be prevailed upon to assert stricter Party control over the reform movement, and thus spare the Soviet Union the onus of having to crack the whip itself.

While Kosygin was still taking the waters at Karlovy Vary, and presumably trying through personal diplomacy to persuade Dubcek to muzzle the increasingly outspoken Czech press and otherwise to set his house in order, it was announced simultaneously in Moscow and Prague in late May that Warsaw Pact maneuvers would take place on Czechoslovak territory in June under the command of Marshal Iakubovskii. Czech agreement to these maneuvers, apparently extracted during the Grechko delegation's Prague visit, proved
later to have been a tactical error, for the maneuvers permitted the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and gave the Soviet Union a major instrument of pressure for the climactic phase of the war of nerves against the Dubcek regime which was to unfold in July.

Before we come to the July crisis, however, a few intervening developments in the contest of wills between the Dubcek regime and the Soviet leadership deserve mention. At the end of May, immediately after Kosygin's return to Moscow, a three-day Central Committee plenum was held in Prague, evidently to weigh whatever propositions the Soviet leader had advanced for settling the conflict. The results were a setback for Moscow and a victory for the Czech progressives, who won endorsement for convoking an extraordinary Party Congress in September 1968, two years ahead of schedule -- a move which Moscow had opposed for fear that it would result in the removal of the remaining "orthodox" members from the top echelons of the Party in Prague. The plenum also made known that implementation of the action program would proceed without delay, although it again gave notice that no opposition parties would be tolerated.

In Moscow a two-week period of hesitation ensued, during which the Soviet leadership apparently reached a consensus to tighten the screws on Prague a few more turns. For on June 14 a new barrage of anti-reform propaganda opened with a Pravda article in which Academician F. Konstantinov attacked Cestmir Cisar, a secretary of the Czech Central Committee, as a revisionist. Although the German Democratic Republic, in its own heated polemics with Prague, had already launched personal diatribes against
a number of prominent Czechoslovak figures. The Konstantinov article was the first from Moscow to single out a high Czech official for criticism. It was followed, in the latter part of June, by even more vituperative attacks on Czech reformers. While mass meetings of factory workers were organized throughout the Soviet Union to pledge support to the People's Militia and other "healthy forces" in Czechoslovakia.

At this juncture, two developments bearing upon the Czech democratization process occurred in Prague. On June 27, the National Assembly voted to abolish censorship, formalizing one of the key promises of the Party's action program. That same day, a manifesto entitled "2000 Words," written by Ludvik Vaculik and signed by seventy prominent scientists, artists, athletes, and other public figures, was published in several Prague papers. This document, which called for a radical speedup of the reform program by grass-roots action, was deplored by some Prague Party leaders, including Dubček, but it seemed to confirm Soviet forebodings about what could be expected once the Czech censorship apparatus had been dismantled.

If any single turning point in the Soviet response to the Czechoslovak challenge during the first six months of 1968 can be identified, it probably came at this time, for from the early days of July throughout the remainder of the month Moscow mounted a steadily intensified war of nerves against the Dubček regime, against the backdrop of military moves which implied that the Soviet Union was preparing for armed intervention should the Czechs persist on their democratization course. As the first step in this heavy-handed phase of pressure against Prague, Moscow
delayed the departure of its troops from Czechoslovakia upon completion of the joint Warsaw Pact exercises on June 30. Using a variety of flimsy pretexts, including a reported finding by Marshal Iakubovskii that the exercises showed Czech troops to be incapable of manning their defenses against West Germany without the presence of outside help, the Soviet Union kept a sizable force in the Czech countryside, much to the embarrassment of Czechoslovak authorities, who repeatedly announced that the Soviet troops were to be withdrawn "without delay."

On July 11, following Dubcek's rejection of a pre-emptory summons to attend a Warsaw bloc summit meeting in Poland on the Czechoslovak situation, Moscow sounded another stern warning to Prague with the publication of a Pravda article by I. Aleksandrov which not only attacked the "2000 Words" manifesto as evidence of "the activation of rightwing and counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia" but, more ominous still, laid down essentially the same rationale for intervention as that used in Hungary in 1956. Then, on July 15, the Soviet Union and its four most orthodox Warsaw bloc partners, in a joint letter couched in almost brutal language, delivered what amounted to an ultimatum to the Dubcek leadership to mend its ways or face the consequences. Spelling out the dangers to Communist rule posed by the Czech reform movement, the letter enjoined the Party leadership in Prague to reimpose control over mass media, to suppress all "antisocialist" forces and organizations, and to observe the principles of Marxism-Leninism and "democratic centralism." It also invoked an appeal to "healthy forces" in the country, such as the People's Militia, to "mobilize" for "battle against
the counterrevolutionary forces in order to preserve and consolidate socialism in Czechoslovakia." But the letter's central message seemed to be that the Soviet Union, with the assent of at least its core Warsaw allies,\(^{125}\) would no longer hesitate to intervene as it saw fit in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. For by fiat these affairs had now become the business of Prague's Communist neighbors. Said the letter:

This is no longer your affair alone... We shall never agree to having imperialism, by peaceful and non-peaceful methods, making a breach in the socialist system, from inside or outside, and transforming power relations in Europe to its own advantage.

Upon the heels of this letter, which was followed by a demand from Moscow for an immediate meeting of the full Soviet Politburo and the Czechoslovak Presidium on Soviet soil,\(^{126}\) several menacing new moves set the stage for intervention. One of these, discussed in a previous chapter, was the "revelation" on July 19 of the alleged discovery of arms caches and secret documents "proving" that American and West German agencies were conspiring to aid subversive and counterrevolutionary elements in organizing uprisings in Czechoslovakia.\(^{127}\) Another was the announcement on July 23 that Soviet forces were engaged in extensive maneuvers all along the western frontiers of the USSR, including the border with Czechoslovakia.\(^{128}\) Shortly thereafter, it was made known that East German and Polish troops also were cooperating in the exercises;\(^{129}\) at the same time, there were reports that Soviet forces stationed in these countries and in Hungary were moving closer to Czechoslovakia, within whose borders other
Soviet troops were still encamped. Finally, to ensure that Prague would get the message, Pravda published letters from two groups of Czech factory workers asserting that the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia would make "every honest man feel more secure in his work." While an article in the Soviet press recalled the welcome extended to the Soviet forces that liberated Czechoslovakia from German occupation in 1945.

Presumably, as the last days of July approached and the world became uncomfortably aware that a momentous new crisis had arrived, Moscow counted upon the Czech leadership's nerves to crack under the strain. They did not. Apart from what appeared to be a minor concession or two, such as the "demotion" of a defense official who had openly criticized Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact military setup, the Dubcek regime held firm, winning the first round of the July crisis by successfully insisting that a showdown meeting with the Soviet Politburo be held at Cíerna, on Czechoslovak soil.

What is more, as the crisis entered its second round at Cíerna on July 29, it became apparent that Moscow's heavy-handed methods had backfired, causing the Party in Czechoslovakia to close ranks behind Dubcek, and unifying the country as a whole in solid support of his regime. This national rallying around the beleagured Party leadership, which the Soviet leaders must have regarded with a mixture of chagrin, envy, and respect, was probably a key factor in the showdown at Cíerna, together with warnings to Moscow by Ceausescu, Tito, and a number of West European Communist leaders against trying to bludgeon the Czechs into submission.
The display of internal Czechoslovak solidarity upset any Soviet hopes of splitting the Prague leadership and finding within its ranks a group of men more amenable to Moscow's bidding than Dubcek and his close associates. The warnings from other Communist parties, on the other hand, served notice on the Soviet Union that an attempt to force the Czechs to submit to its dictate might tear the Communist movement wide open and torpedo the world conference of parties scheduled for the following November. Temporarily, at least, the Soviet effort to bring the Czechs to heel faltered before these obstacles. After a tense four-day confrontation at Cierna, the Soviet leaders backed down, ordering withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia and dropping for the time being the more blatant demands of the July 15 letter.

Thus, the July crisis ended, as was confirmed on August 3 at Bratislava, where the leaders of the Soviet Union and of its four orthodox Warsaw Pact partners met with the Czechs to endorse the truce agreed on at Cierna. The Bratislava communique, while somewhat more wordy than the cryptic Cierna announcement, was couched in broad platitudes which told little about any specific understandings reached. It was a document which the Czechs could interpret as a license to continue their reform program on a circumspect basis, while the other parties could regard it as a Czech commitment to restrain the reform movement and as a reaffirmation of Warsaw bloc solidarity. On the face of things, however, the outcome of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings seemed to signify that Prague had successfully defied the power and authority of the Soviet Union.
4. A Short-Lived Truce

Soviet spokesmen sought to salvage something from the collapse of the effort to intimidate Prague by asserting that the Cierna-Bratislava compromise was proof that the members of the Warsaw alliance were able to settle their differences in a "fraternal" manner. But throughout the world it was generally felt that the July confrontation had produced a serious setback for the Soviet Union. True, some observers cautioned that the Soviet leaders had driven a hard bargain with Dubcek without giving up the continuing threat of intervention if he should let things get out of hand; however, the prevailing impression was that the world had witnessed another David-over-Goliath victory. If few thought this was the last chapter in the contest of wills between Prague and Moscow, many, including this writer, deemed it likely that the Dubcek regime had at least won a breathing spell, for the Soviet leaders -- having brandished the threat of military intervention and then backed away -- presumably were not prepared to repeat this crisis scenario immediately.

From the Soviet viewpoint, there were certainly good arguments for honoring the Cierna-Bratislava truce until at least after the scheduled world party conference in Moscow, the success of which would depend in large measure on the Soviet Union's display of readiness to accept "mutual accommodation" of conflicting positions within the Communist camp. Given this circumstance and the characteristic vacillation of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime toward the Czechoslovak problem during the preceding seven months, one might have expected Moscow to adopt an interim policy of watchful waiting to see what changes would be
registered at the Fourteenth Czechoslovak Party Congress in September as well as to ascertain just how much the Czechs would actually adhere to their side of the Bratislava agreement with regard to Warsaw Pact cooperation, a common line on Germany, the exercise of discipline in the press, and other restraints upon the reform movement.

Even a modest period of grace, however, apparently was more than Moscow could abide, for within less than two weeks after the Bratislava armistice it became evident that a new round of political-military pressures had been launched against the Dubcek regime. Soviet polemics against Prague reopened on August 14 with an article attacking reform-minded elements of the Czech press, followed the next day by a lurid account of the details of an alleged West German plot for a two-pronged military offensive against East Germany and Czechoslovakia, intended "to confront the Warsaw Pact countries with a fait accompli." The "slanderous" anti-Soviet activities of the Czech press again became the target of a Pravda diatribe on August 16, the same day that Dubcek -- on the occasion of a visit by Ceausescu to Prague -- appealed to the Czech people not to move too fast toward reform, so that the country might still enjoy freedom of action to go ahead with the "democratization process." During the next four days, the Soviet press charged in mounting crescendo that the Dubcek leadership was not acting vigorously enough to suppress "subversive activities by antisocialist forces" within the country.

The military aspect of this renewed Soviet pressure upon Prague first became manifest on August 11, when it was announced that still another Warsaw Pact exercise
along Czechoslovakia's borders had begun immediately after the conclusion, on August 10, of the large-scale "Nemen" logistics exercises carried out during the July crisis. Visits by several of the Soviet Union's highest-ranking military leaders to Poland and East Germany within the next few days in connection with the new maneuvers gave further evidence that Moscow was again flexing its military muscle. As it later became known, the maneuvers inspected by Marshals Grechko, Iakubovskii, and others had in effect served as a dress rehearsal for the impending invasion, but at the time there was no public hint that the Soviet leadership had made up its mind to take the fateful step from which it had drawn back in July.

There remains considerable uncertainty as to the sequence of the Soviet leaders' decisions on military intervention both before and after the Cierna-Bratislava meetings. According to anonymous East German sources cited in the Western press, plans had been made to intervene before the Cierna meeting; the July pressures and troop maneuvers were said to be the prelude to this intervention, which was to take place after a "cry for help" from the Novotny wing of the Czech leadership. Soviet failure to find anyone to call for help allegedly caused this move to be canceled "at the 11th hour," just before the Cierna gathering. In the opinion of Ota Sik, the Czech economic leader who took temporary refuge in Yugoslavia after the invasion, the intervention had been decided on before Cierna and Bratislava, and these meetings were merely a "smoke screen" while final preparations were being made. The Soviet version, of course,
is that the intervention decision came with great reluctance only after the Czechs had failed to live up to the Bratislava agreement of August 4, but the brief interval of truce, hardly enough to allow a fair test of Czech performance, tends to cast doubt on this contention. Whether the intervention decision was made well in advance or was reached only on the eve of the invasion, it does seem plain that preparatory steps for such a contingency had begun as early as the July border maneuvers and rear-area mobilization, and that by August 10 (the start of the "communications troop" exercises that proved to be the dress rehearsal), the military phase of preparation was well in hand.

2. The Invasion of Czechoslovakia

On the night of August 20-21, the blow fell. Striking with virtually complete surprise, Soviet-led invasion forces rolled across Czechoslovakia's borders from their several maneuver areas, while Soviet airborne troops began landing at Prague's main airport, whence they penetrated eight miles to the heart of the city to invest such key points as radio, parliament, and other government buildings. Dubcek and other leaders of the stunned nation, after appealing to the population to remain calm and offer no resistance, were taken into custody in their offices. Meanwhile, the Czech armed forces, which in the words of the Prague radio had "not received a command to defend the country," stood by as the occupation of Czechoslovakia was quickly consummated.

If the military phase of the intervention gave every sign of having been carefully planned and decisively
conducted. the same could not be said for the political aspects of the operation. Nothing pointed up more vividly the contrast between the chilling efficiency of the military seizure of Czechoslovakia and the poor political preparation for its occupation than the collapse of the Soviet Union's original alibi that it acted with other "fraternal socialist countries" to satisfy a "request by party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces." Despite denials from all responsible Czechoslovak authorities that any request for assistance had been made, the Soviet Union sought for several days to present the invasion as a legitimate response to a call for help from loyal Communists in Prague, stressing that Communist rule in Czechoslovakia had fallen under dire peril from "counterrevolutionary forces" within the country, which had "entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism."

It became apparent almost immediately, however, that Moscow had again failed to reckon with the uncompromising solidarity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Not only were the Russians unable to produce a single Czechoslovak leader to authenticate the alleged call for help, but more embarrassing still, no one could be found in Prague to form a puppet government -- even among the most orthodox Party conservatives who were considered to be in Moscow's pocket. In those first days of the occupation, Ludvik Svoboda, the old soldier and President of Czechoslovakia who flew to Moscow, was virtually the sole link between the occupied nation and its occupiers -- the Party channel of communication and the intergovernment relationship.
between Prague and Moscow having been severed. Faced with the incongruous situation of having a military pro-consul ensconced in Prague without a government to give orders to, the Soviet leaders tried to prevail upon Svoboda to put together a makeshift regime. Failing in this, they were obliged to turn again to Dubcek, whom only a few days before they had imprisoned and denounced as a traitor. 160

Surely, there is no more bizarre chapter in the whole sorry invasion episode than the abduction of Dubcek and his close associates, who, after being taken to Moscow in manacles, were freed so that they might "negotiate" with their captors, because no one could be induced to form a puppet government. Svoboda's insistence that the Soviets deal with Dubcek and Cernik was an act of high courage, but in the end it also spared the Russians the political embarrassment of having to set up their own, alien military regime to rule the Czechoslovak people directly. As one perceptive observer has put it, the Soviet leaders evidently came to the belated realization that their best bet was to return Dubcek and his colleagues to Prague to serve, temporarily at least, as a "protective political cushion" between Soviet power and the Czechoslovak people. 161

Once the Moscow agreement of August 26 was concluded and the Dubcek regime reinstalled in Prague, 162 the Soviet Union's diplomatic and propaganda effort to justify the invasion took a new turn. Around the end of August, the line shifted toward laying the blame at the door of NATO in general and West Germany in particular. 163 Preinvasion allegations that NATO and Bonn had drafted plans for subversive intrigues and military operations against
Czechoslovakia were revived, and emphasis was placed on the right and the duty of the Soviet Union and its hardcore Warsaw allies to intervene in Czechoslovakia to keep it from being "torn away" from the bloc and thereby upsetting the power balance between the West and the Communist camp. The theme that the danger of war had been averted by the preventive occupation of the country, which had been briefly sounded at the outset, also reappeared in the statements of Soviet spokesmen.

Perhaps the principal fruit of the Soviet effort to justify the invasion, however, was the emergence of what came to be labeled the "Brezhnev doctrine." In it, the Soviet Union claimed the right, in the name of the "class struggle" and "proletarian internationalism," to intervene forcibly in the affairs of any member of the "socialist commonwealth," despite such "abstract" notions as national sovereignty and self-determination. Although this doctrine struck many observers abroad as something new, its antecedents in Soviet history go back quite far; its reformulation in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak invasion, therefore, was more a reversion to orthodoxy than the enunciation of a novel concept. Either way, however, its implications were disturbing.

The outlines of the Brezhnev doctrine were laid down in September 1968 by several Soviet writers, one of whom, Sergei Kovalev, dismissed the "formal-legal arguments" of "those who speak about the 'illegality' of the actions of the socialist countries in Czechoslovakia" and declared that the socialist states could not "remain inactive in the name of some abstract idea of sovereignty when they saw how the country was exposed to the danger of antisocialist degeneration."
The keystone of the intervention doctrine as elaborated after the invasion was the assertion that "counter-revolution" within Czechoslovakia, abetted from without by "world imperialism," had threatened to open the gates of the "indivisible" socialist system. This, it was alleged, would have resulted in Czechoslovakia's becoming a corridor through which NATO troops could approach the Soviet frontier, as well as in carving up the commonwealth of European socialist countries and in violating the right of these countries to "socialist self-determination." Obviously, this theoretical edifice would collapse if it were to be established that no real counterrevolutionary danger ever existed in Czechoslovakia. Hence the Soviet Union's attempt to wring from the Czechoslovaks themselves a confession that counterrevolution was rampant in their country prior to the invasion.

Although the Brezhnev doctrine justified the invasion as fulfilling an international "class" duty to suppress antisocialist elements who had "step by step prepared a counterrevolutionary coup" in Czechoslovakia, it did not stop there. Its expositors also suggested that socialist countries which toyed with "new brands" of socialism that "play on the national sentiments of the people," and even socialist countries "seeking to adopt a 'non-aligned' position," should be aware that they, too, were subject to the doctrine of preventing "a weakening of any link of the world socialist system." The suggestion that there was to be no middle ground in the struggle between "two opposing social systems" was accompanied by a reminder that nonaligned socialist states owed their "national independence" to "the might of the socialist commonwealth and primarily of its main power -- the Soviet Union and its armed forces."
Needless to say, the implications of this argument were not lost on such countries as Yugoslavia, whose long adherence to the principle of multiple roads to communism was clearly put in jeopardy by the Soviet Union's assertion that it had the right to set itself up as the final arbiter of Communist development in another socialist state and to intervene whenever it deemed communism to be "threatened" there. This was tantamount to saying that the Soviet Union refused to recognize the sovereignty of any Communist state within the reach of Soviet military power. Edward Kardelj, Yugoslavia's leading theoretician, promptly sounded his country's concern that the Soviet Union was promulgating "a very dangerous doctrine." But misgivings about the pernicious character of the Brezhnev doctrine were voiced in the non-Communist West as well. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, warned the Soviet Union that it would damage any chance of a renewed détente if this doctrine meant that such principles of the United Nations Charter as the sovereign equality of nations and the prohibition against use of force did not apply to Soviet relations with the countries of East Europe.

The Soviet Union for its part did not concede one inch to its critics. Having covered up Soviet self-interest in maintaining control over East Europe with an ideological cloak that elevated the principle of class struggle above any forms of bourgeois "legality," the Soviet leaders took the position that no one had grounds to reproach them "in connection with the events surrounding Czechoslovakia." Nevertheless, it was clear that the invasion of Czechoslovakia, whatever the reasons that prompted Moscow to
launch it. had created as many new problems for the Soviet Union in Europe as it may have solved.
XV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IN LIGHT OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The conduct of Soviet policy toward Europe during most of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime's first four years in power provided little indication, except perhaps in retrospect, that by the autumn of 1968 the Soviet Union would find itself once more branded as an aggressor for having repeated in Czechoslovakia the sort of ruthless military intervention it had perpetrated twelve years earlier in Hungary. Yet, within eight or nine months after the beginning of the Czech reform experiment in early 1968, the Soviet leadership managed, through its mistreatment of Czechoslovakia, to tarnish its prestige and to undo many of the gains that Soviet policy had achieved in Europe since Khrushchev's ouster. In their attempt to turn back the clock of history in East Europe the Soviet leaders accomplished their immediate aim of crushing Czechoslovakia's democratization program, but in the process they squandered a good deal of their political capital in Europe and elsewhere, and the divisive effect of their clumsy intervention in Czechoslovakia threatened to have unsettling repercussions in other parts of the Communist world, including perhaps the Soviet Union itself.

The ultimate consequences of the Soviet Union's ill-conceived attempt to reimpose on East Europe by force of arms the authority it originally acquired there through military victory in World War II are, of course, unforeseeable now. In this chapter, we shall try mainly to take stock of the state in which Soviet European policy was left after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968,
and to note some of the problems which seemed to lie ahead for the Soviet Union in its relations with both halves of a still partitioned Europe.

A. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET POSITION IN EAST EUROPE

Among the problems growing out of relations between the Soviet Union and its East European allies, perhaps none was more fundamental and perplexing than that of deciding where to set the limits of Moscow's tolerance for diversity and change in East Europe. During its first four years in power, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had learned to live with a considerable range of restiveness in East Europe, including challenges to Soviet authority from a frequently uncooperative Rumanian ally. Presumably, it could have done the same with respect to Czechoslovakia. Why, then, did the Soviet leaders in August 1968 choose to put down the Czechoslovak reform experiment by force -- a step they had backed away from at the height of the July crisis a few weeks before?

A full accounting of the reasons for this fateful decision in Moscow may be long in coming, for it will probably require another candid "secret" speech by some new Soviet leader of the future to help explain what prompted the present generation of leaders to act as they did. Some of the considerations behind the move against Czechoslovakia, however, are evident even from today's perspective, though it is difficult to determine their relative weight in the pattern of Soviet motivation.
Factors Behind the Intervention

Apart from the immediate circumstances previously discussed that triggered the invasion, at least five broadly related motivating factors seem to have been important: the suspicion that "reform Communism" in Czechoslovakia was tending toward some form of social democracy that would undermine the orthodox basis of monopoly party rule; the belief that toleration of creeping reform would jeopardize the Soviet Union's control in East Europe; the fear of feedback from the liberal experiment in Prague upon the interlocking legitimacies of the other Communist regimes in East Europe and the Soviet Union itself; the worrisome prospect that a Czechoslovak reorientation toward West Germany would undermine the East German regime and set an example likely to open the rest of East Europe to economic-political penetration by Bonn; and concern that all of these developments would weaken the military and strategic position of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw coalition vis-à-vis the West.

With respect to the issue of orthodoxy versus reform and the various dangers which the Soviet leadership apparently perceived in the developments in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it should perhaps first be noted that there had been for some time a growing difference within the leadership elites of most of the East European countries -- and to some extent within the Soviet ruling elite as well -- between defenders of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and advocates of what might be called reform communism. No simple formula will describe reform communism, which took varying forms in East Europe, depending on the particular political culture in which it arose. Nationalism was one of its
chief ingredients, blended with recognition of the need for economic modernization and, in some cases, toleration of more liberal political values than were condoned under orthodox communism. Some of the East European proponents of reform may have been tending toward what William Griffith has labeled "covert social fascism" -- an authoritarian mobilization of society intended to achieve modernization on an essentially nationalist basis while still using the internationalist vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism. Others -- and this would seem to have been true of the Czechoslovak reform Communists -- appeared to hold the view that one could best serve the Party's leading role in society, not by clinging to old modes of rule based on orthodox conformity, but by liberal or "humanizing" reforms intended to promote modernization by establishing closer rapport with the people and the restless intellectuals.

To the Soviet leadership the issue of orthodox versus reform communism in East Europe posed a peculiarly difficult problem, for in these countries reform communism -- whether bearing an authoritarian or a liberal tinge -- was closely linked with the assertion of national consciousness and independence, which almost by definition tended to be directed against the Soviet Union as the obvious dominant outside power. Therefore, even the pragmatist, progressive elements among the Soviet leadership who may have been in some degree sympathetic to reform communism in the abstract could scarcely afford to sanction it in practice; indeed, they were probably obliged to dig in their heels for orthodoxy alongside the most diehard Soviet dogmatists. Here, then, was a problem that fed on itself: Whatever the potential merits of reform communism might be in making Communist
regimes in East Europe more effective and popular, the more they succeeded the greater the threat they were likely to present to Soviet control and influence in the area.

Partly as a consequence of this situation, the Soviet leaders found themselves, as the Czech experiment progressed, increasingly committed to the defense of orthodoxy in East Europe, even though this ran counter to their professed doctrine of "different roads" to communism and, instead, set up the Soviet Union as the only model for the Communist regimes of East Europe. On the homefront, meanwhile, this commitment to orthodoxy tended to rigidify the Kremlin leadership against pressures for reform within the Soviet Union itself, and to heighten its concern over the example that was being set by Czechoslovakia. Thus, among the first internal preventive reflexes after the July crisis was a series of warnings by the Soviet Central Committee against expecting a liberalization of centralized Party rule or the introduction of "so-called bourgeois freedoms" into Soviet society.

Not surprisingly, the more a fear of feedback from the ferment in Czechoslovakia prompted the Soviet leaders to insist upon strict conformity at home, the less leeway was left them to tolerate the experiment in Prague. How many more deviations could they afford to accept, if each new apostasy were to increase the difficulty of holding the line against reform at home? In a sense, they were confronted with a Communist version of the domino theory, and the problem was the more acute because the ultimate domino to topple might well be the legitimacy of their own claim to a monopoly of political power.
One way for the Soviet leaders to resolve this problem might have been to adjust themselves gracefully to diversity and experimentation in Czechoslovakia and wherever else in East Europe the reform trend might manage to take hold, allowing some features of reform communism to seep back into the Soviet Union itself. But precisely because the Soviet leadership saw Party rule imperiled by such liberalizing reforms and its grip upon East Europe threatened by them, this path was exceedingly difficult to contemplate. Indeed, it would perhaps become possible only after a long process of internal change in the outlook and composition of the Soviet Party leadership itself. Another way to tackle the problem was to be found in dogmatic reassertion of the old verities and willingness to reimpose them by force. Although this alternative was none too attractive either, since it could well boomerang by arousing more fervid national sentiment in East Europe and directing fresh resentment against the Soviet Union from there and from many other quarters, it was the course embraced by Moscow.

In choosing to resort to repression rather than bow to reform, the Soviet leadership probably found its dilemma somewhat eased by the cooperation it received from orthodox Party leaders in some of the East European countries. The Ulbricht regime in East Germany and the Gomulka regime in Poland, their own concerns aroused both by the infectious example of Prague's internal reforms and by the possibility that the Dubcek leadership might adopt a more lenient policy toward West Germany, apparently proved willing accomplices in the suppression of Czechoslovakia, although the extent to which they may have urged military intervention upon Moscow is still being debated. Bulgarian and
Hungarian party leaders also went along, the latter perhaps with some reluctance. But even though joined by subservient partners within the Warsaw bloc, the Soviet Union had not necessarily resolved its problems in East Europe, as we shall see presently. Not only had the traditional friendliness of the Czechoslovak people toward the Soviet Union been replaced by smoldering enmity, but strongly ambivalent and contradictory emotions were doubtless generated in the other Warsaw bloc countries which had lent themselves to the cold-blooded invasion of a sister East European state.

According to some interpretations, the Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia was dictated less by an urge to snuff out a threat to ideological and political orthodoxy than to forestall a more concrete threat to the strategic security of the Soviet Union. However, in Moscow's concept of security in Europe, the need to preserve the ideological and political basis of the Soviet Union's hold upon East Europe is so intimately linked with its interest in maintaining a forward military position in this half of a divided Europe that it would be difficult to say where the one leaves off and the other begins.

If a threat to Soviet security were to be defined in the narrow sense of military activities in the West against which the Soviet Union felt compelled to protect itself, there would seem to have been no grounds whatever for ascribing the invasion of Czechoslovakia to "genuine" security concerns. Despite Soviet claims that West Germany was engaged in menacing NATO-backed military machinations against Czechoslovakia, the Western powers had leaned over backwards to avoid any semblance of military provocation.
during the Czech crisis. As for the long-term trends in NATO prior to the invasion, their general direction had been toward a slackening of effort and withdrawal of forces rather than toward a buildup which might have looked threatening to the Soviet Union. It is difficult to believe that the Soviet charges, so patently linked with Moscow's desperate effort to concoct a rationale for the invasion, had been taken seriously by the Soviet leaders themselves.

On the other hand, so far as the trends in Czechoslovakia may have seemed to point toward a loosening of Prague's adherence to the Warsaw Pact, there was doubtless real concern in Moscow -- shared by at least East Germany and Poland -- that in the important Northern Tier the military structure of the Pact was endangered. But, despite Czechoslovakia's more outspoken attitude on the need for military reforms within the Pact, there was no indication that the Dubcek regime had proposed to renounce its military obligations to the Warsaw alliance. Had it done so, the Soviet Union would hardly have failed to produce concrete corroborating evidence on a point so central to its argument that Czechoslovakia intended to quit the Pact. Therefore, one might suppose that what carried weight in Soviet councils was not any demonstrable evidence of Czech military malfeasance but the possibility that Czechoslovakia's political evolution might be leading toward a military reorientation.

The Soviet military security system in East Europe was built both on a substantial forward deployment of its forces in the area which were reinforceable from the Soviet Union, and on the contributions of its East European allies.
Presumably, the Soviet Union was prepared to tolerate some reduction of East European contributions to the collective military posture of the Pact -- as it had done in the case of Rumania -- but not a threat to its own military access to East European territory, particularly territory as strategically important as that of Czechoslovakia. Since prior to the Czech crisis in the summer of 1968 no Soviet forces actually had been permanently deployed in Czechoslovakia, the possibility that was perhaps particularly disturbing to Soviet military authorities in the period between Bratislava and the invasion was that Prague -- having rid itself once of the Soviet troops which overstayed their leave during the July crisis -- might renege on granting them access to Czech territory in the future.

That this problematical contingency would have tipped the scales toward intervention seems unlikely, however, had the Soviet leadership not been seized, rightly or wrongly, with the larger concern that the Czechoslovak example was placing the basis of Soviet authority and control in East Europe in jeopardy. In the sense that Czechoslovakia's slipping out from under Soviet control -- either through more independent foreign policies within the Warsaw alliance or through a leaning toward neutrality -- would have seemed to Moscow to constitute an adverse shift in the power balance that would entail a loss in security both real and symbolic, one may perhaps say that the intervention rested to a significant degree on security considerations.

Apart from the various political, ideological, and security factors that had helped to create a crisis of Soviet authority in East Europe, persuading Moscow that it
must intervene in Czechoslovakia, another element in the intervention decision was the attitude of the Western powers, particularly the United States, toward the situation. According to a view widely voiced in the West by both critics and friends of American diplomacy, a hands-off American attitude encouraged interventionist elements within the Soviet leadership to believe that they could move into Czechoslovakia without risk. Some maintain, though apparently without foundation, that Moscow received the green light in the form of specific American assurances against interference in any action the Soviet Union might take; others believe that the impression grew simply out of America's failure to keep the Russians guessing. By either argument, the Soviet decision to invade might not have been taken had explicit warnings against such a move been delivered. It may well be, of course, that the Soviet Union would have gone ahead with the operation against Czechoslovakia, warning or no warning. A final judgment on the extent to which Soviet decisionmakers were swayed by their advance reading of the likely Western reaction to an invasion awaits better information as to what went on in the minds of the Soviet leaders; in the meantime, one can hardly overlook the harsh irony that U.S. hopes of eliminating an excuse for Soviet intervention by not "meddling" in the Czechoslovak situation may in fact have contributed to the Kremlin's decision to go ahead.

2. Effects of the Intervention on Soviet Interests in East Europe.

For whatever reasons, the intervention did take place. What can be said then as to its effects, favorable and
adverse, upon the Soviet position in East Europe? There seems to be little question that one significant result of the invasion was to reestablish the credibility of Soviet military power as the ultimate instrument of Soviet control in East Europe. This credibility had been steadily diminishing in the twelve years since Khrushchev had demonstrated his willingness to employ raw force against Hungary. Perhaps from the Soviet viewpoint, the final swift erosion of respect in East Europe for the authority of Soviet arms appeared to have set in after the backdown at Cieerna and Bratislava, which may have helped to persuade even noninterventionists within the Kremlin leadership that the time had come to act forcibly.

Evidence that the action against Czechoslovakia had made East Europeans far more cautious and had restored their respect for Soviet military power and the Kremlin's will to use it was to be seen in the case of Rumania, in particular. Although continuing to express disapproval of Soviet interference in the affairs of a fraternal Communist country, the Rumanians became notably more guarded in their criticism of Soviet policy and let it be known in September that they were amenable to offering various concessions (such as renewal of the Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty, which had run out early in 1968) in return for a Soviet guarantee of nonintervention. Ceausescu later reportedly yielded also to the Soviet Union's insistence on holding joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Rumanian soil in early 1969. Such maneuvers, which the Rumanians had resisted on the theory that they might be used to exert pressure, as in Czechoslovakia, presumably were meant to symbolize Bucharest's reintegration into the Soviet scheme of things.
in East Europe. If Rumania, the notorious maverick of the Warsaw bloc, found it expedient to toe the line more carefully, other members of the bloc were even less likely to give Moscow offense by showing signs of policy independence.

Although some East European leaders may have been left uncomfortable by the thought that the crude treatment meted out to Czechoslovakia might be turned against their own countries should Moscow find itself crossed, they no longer had much room for maneuver. Unlike the leaders of the West European Communist parties, who were beyond the reach of Soviet military power (in a sense, one might even say that they enjoyed the "protection" of NATO) and therefore could exert at least some political leverage on the Kremlin by threatening to boycott the scheduled November world party conference in Moscow, the East European leaders found that they were more tightly than ever in Moscow's embrace. Indeed, the complicity of the ruling regimes of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria in the invasion of Czechoslovakia had worsened their position, not only compromising their freedom of political maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but also in effect symbolizing their reacceptance of a servile satellite status, from which they would find it difficult to escape without disowning their part in the melancholy undertaking against Czechoslovakia. If a further reminder of their lot were needed, the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of intervention provided it, for among other things this doctrine had the effect of limiting the sovereignty of states belonging to the "socialist commonwealth."  

While the assault against Czechoslovakia thus served to restrict the freedom of action of the participating East
European members of the Warsaw bloc, it also had the somewhat paradoxical effect of making the Soviet Union more dependent than ever upon the Pact as an instrument through which to assert its control and bring collective pressure to bear on heretics within the fold. The pains displayed by the Soviet Union to drape the mantle of collective Warsaw Pact sanction over the chastisement of Czechoslovakia attested to this dependence, which was heightened by the awkward miscarriage of Soviet expectations that a quisling government could be speedily found in Prague to welcome the occupying forces. Similarly, the Soviet Union's attempt to depict the invasion as a "family affair" of no concern to the rest of the world also depended on seconding motions from the Warsaw bloc satellites, just as the demand for continued stationing of Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory pending "normalization" of the country was advanced in the name of collective defense of the Warsaw camp.

Even the Brezhnev doctrine implied a somewhat symbiotic need for the Warsaw Pact, since the ambiguously-defined "socialist commonwealth" to which the doctrine applied had no institutional form of its own apart from the Warsaw Pact organization and CEMA. Pending some new institutional formula for the socialist commonwealth, any future intervention presumably would again involve use of the Warsaw Pact machinery.

If in a political sense the Soviet Union's need for the collective façade of the Warsaw Pact may have tended to offer the East European members of the Pact somewhat more leverage on Soviet policy than suggested above in connection with their "re-satellization," this was hardly true in a strictly military sense. Indeed, the invasion had
underscored the reality of the USSR's dominant military role in the Warsaw alliance, and may even have prompted some elements of the Soviet leadership to believe that the Soviet Union should place less military reliance generally upon its Warsaw Pact allies than had been the case before the crisis in Czechoslovakia threatened to open a gap in the important Northern Tier area of the bloc's defenses.  

So far as the over-all military posture of the Warsaw alliance was concerned, the Czechoslovak crisis would seem to have yielded both advantages and disadvantages from the Soviet viewpoint. On the one hand, it settled the question of Soviet access to Czech territory and left a somewhat larger net deployment of Soviet forces in the Northern Tier area than before. Moreover, thanks to the successive maneuvers and mobilization which preceded the invasion, as well as the coordinated conduct of the operation itself, the Soviet theater forces involved were brought to a high level of combat readiness, and their mobility and logistical support were tested with rather impressive results.  

On the other hand, however, the Czechoslovak armed forces, the second largest in East Europe, had for all practical purposes been deleted from the Pact's order of battle for the time being, and the necessity of keeping a watchful eye on them was tying up most of the Soviet occupation troops, not to mention the uncertainties that the situation was bound to pose for Soviet planners in the event of military hostilities across the East-West dividing line in Europe. Apart from raising questions as to Czechoslovakia's contribution to the Pact's posture in the critical Northern Tier triangle, the invasion also seemed to have shifted a still larger share of the joint security burden to
the Soviet Union itself. In the short term, this meant
extra expenditure to cover the immediate costs of the in-
vasion and occupation; in the long run, it could also
mean a greater demand on Soviet resources to maintain the
theater forces at a higher level than previously planned.
Finally, the Czechoslovak events had aroused new concern
in the West about Soviet intentions and about the USSR's
demonstrated ability to alter the conventional military
balance in Central Europe on short notice. As a result,
NATO was again prompted to take a close look at its own
defense; this interaction, to which we shall return later,
might well offset any momentary military margin that the
Soviet Union had gained from the operation in Czechoslovakia.

In another sense, the spiral of interacting suspicion
and mistrust touched off by the invasion spelled an end,
for the time being, to the idea that the opposing military
alliances in Europe had become little more than "relics
of a fading confrontation." For the Soviet Union, this
meant among other things that shoring up the Soviet politi-
cal and military position in Europe remained at the top of
the priority list, reducing the prospect of pursuing more
active policies against China in the Far East. Although
Peking professed to see in the action against Czechoslovakia
a portent of more aggressive Soviet behavior toward China,
the Soviet leaders now had their hands full in Europe,
making it unlikely that they would find much time or energy
for new initiatives against China.

Indeed, the central Soviet preoccupation with Europe
was made strikingly clear by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, speaking before the UN General Assembly on October
3, 1968. In the course of his speech -- the first by a
high-level Soviet official other than the USSR's representa-
tive to the United Nations to defend publicly the
Soviet Union's invasion role -- Gromyko said:

When the question of the arms race or of
hotbeds of international tension, and especially
of the entanglement of interests and counterin-
terests of states is raised, one's mind involun-
tarily turns to Europe. History takes revenge
for forgetfulness, if someone deliberately forgets
the significance of European affairs, or neglects
them.32

Even the November world party conclave in Moscow,
originally aimed primarily at unifying the Communist move-
ment against Maoist influence, fell victim temporarily to
the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia. Faced
with the prospect of a protest boycott by many Communist
parties previously aligned on the Soviet side, not to men-
tion such confirmed protégés of China as the Albanians,33
the Soviet Union found it expedient to postpone once more
the conference it had so long labored to bring about.
After "preparatory" discussions in Budapest in October and
November had failed to remove obstacles to the meeting, the
Soviet Union finally made known on November 25 -- the day
the conference had been scheduled to open -- that it had
been deferred until some time in May 1969.34 Not only did
this postponement reflect a loss of political ground in the
old struggle with Peking, but it also deprived the Soviet
Union for the time being of a compliant forum in which it
may have hoped to fortify its hand for dealing with a new
set of problems in East Europe.
By all odds, the Soviet Union's most troublesome problem in East Europe was how to bring about a stable settlement of the postinvasion situation in Czechoslovakia. On a short-term basis, the Soviet Union certainly had achieved many of its presumed objectives: the restoration of censorship; the banning of free assembly and of non-Communist organizations; the weeding out of officials particularly objectionable to the Kremlin; and the spiking of any possibility that Czechoslovakia might waver in her adherence to the Warsaw bloc or seek closer relations with West Germany. Under the guns of the occupation forces the Soviet writ ran large again, even to the point of preventing the Czechoslovak people from referring to their uninvited guardians as occupiers. What is more, the intervention had laid to rest, for the time being, Soviet fears that the élan of reform and independence manifested during the Prague Spring might spread to other parts of the Soviet Union's East European domain.

But, despite all this, the Soviet Union found itself in an uneasy position, caught in a political quagmire of its own making. In the world at large, the invasion had earned for it an obloquy which even Soviet self-righteousness and doctrines of Marxist-Leninist necessity could hardly cover. While in Czechoslovakia it was apparent from the early days of the occupation that the Soviet Union was hard put to it to persuade the people and their leaders to cooperate amiably in their own resubjugation. Thanks to the solidarity between the Dubcek regime and the people during the immediate postinvasion days, when Moscow
botched the political phase of its intervention operation, the installation of a subservient puppet regime had been thwarted, making it necessary to leave the Dubcek-Cernik-Svoboda leadership in office.  

36 Seemingly, the Soviet design was to divide and conquer: to let Dubcek and his associates discredit themselves by serving as the dismantlers of their own reforms in the name of "normalization," and to count upon time to disillusion the people and undermine their unity.

Yet the occupation nation showed a surprising talent for observing the letter of the normalization process while continuing to circumvent it in spirit, calling forth repeated complaints and warnings from Moscow. A particular source of Soviet frustration was the apparent disposition of the Czechoslovak people to go on giving the occupiers the cold shoulder when, instead, they should have been displaying gratitude for having been spared the horrors of "counterrevolution" by the Russian intervention.  

38 Other criticism from Moscow included recurrent charges that antisocialist forces were obstructing the normalization process by "trying to inspire in the population a false understanding of normalization" and by encouraging the people not to cooperate with the occupation forces. Failure to purge undesirable officials was a frequent complaint. It was reported, for example, that the Soviets had presented a list of 20,000 Party and government officials they wanted removed from their posts, a sacrificial offering far larger than Prague apparently was willing to make. Czech news media were repeatedly attacked for violating their "obligation" not to criticize the occupying powers. It was also charged that antisocialist forces were exploiting
calls for national unity in attempts "to poison the minds of the people" and to carry out "overt and covert sabotage of the Moscow agreement."

Gradually, however, it became apparent that Dubcek and his associates were being forced into one concession after another, powerless, it seemed, to fulfill the hopes of the Czechoslovak people that somehow the occupation might be softened or reversed. A second "negotiating" session between the Czech and Soviet leaders in Moscow in early October, six weeks after the invasion, produced what appeared to be an even more humiliating submission to the Soviet dictate than the Moscow agreement of August 26. Besides acceding to demands that the internal life of Czechoslovakia and its foreign policy be more speedily brought into line with the Soviet formula for normalization, the Czech leaders pledged themselves to sign a treaty providing for the stationing of occupation troops in their country. This pledge was coupled with a declaration that both sides viewed "as their prime task the implementation of measures to create a reliable barrier in the way of mounting revanchist strivings of West German militaristic forces." In other words, the occupation was to be legitimized in the name of defense against an alleged military threat from West Germany.

For two or three months after the signing of the harsh October treaty, the complex tug-of-war between the Czechs and Slovaks and their occupiers yielded conflicting evidence as to which side might be gaining the advantage. To the outsider taking a hardheaded, "realistic" look at the situation, it seemed only a matter of time until the Kremlin would succeed in bending the Czechs and Slovaks
to its will. Having accepted the political liability of stamping out the Prague Spring by force, the Soviet Union, in this view, would hardly prove squeamish about strangling any residual Czechoslovak efforts to salvage some measure of freedom. For that matter, was it not also clear in Prague that the Soviet Union possessed both the might and the determination to brook no further nonsense from its dependency?

As evidence that this lesson had sunk in, it could be observed that the Soviet tactics of fomenting division within the Prague leadership already had seriously eroded the position of Dubček and his more loyal associates. New men, sensing the futility of hatred against Soviet power, were coming forward to help by quietly reimposing Party and police controls over their countrymen and adopting a "sensible" stance of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The new "compromise-seekers,"43 not tainted as pro-Moscow agents and holdovers from the Novotny past, could be expected eventually to engineer a settlement under which Moscow's interpretation of "normalization" would prevail.

On the other hand, there were some grounds for questioning how successful the Soviet Union was being in rooting out subtle resistance to its occupation rule. Despite the Czechoslovak leadership's formal compliance with Soviet demands, the Soviet Union had not managed to break the country's morale. There was, for example, the phoenix-like quality of Czechoslovak nationalism, which arose to inspire quiet defiance among students and workers in the latter months of 1968, just about the time the exasperated Russians seemed to be making progress in splitting the Prague leadership,44 while shortly after the turn of the
year the immolation of Jan Palach testified to the depth of the feeling against the occupation among the country's youth. From the Soviet viewpoint, the surprising spirit of resistance manifested by the Czechoslovak working class was likely to be even more discomfiting than the anti-Soviet student sentiment, especially since both groups seemed to be pooling their support for continuation of the reform program.

If for a time it seemed possible that an emerging alliance of students and workers might rally behind Dubcek and help to prevent Moscow and its potential collaborators from unseating him, this prospect ebbed rapidly in the early months of 1969. Finding himself obliged to threaten resort to "undemocratic" methods to quell protest against the occupation, but temperamentally unequipped to play the role of stern disciplinarian, Dubcek was able to satisfy neither his supporters nor his critics; consequently, his leadership suffered a steady decline. The pressures on him came to a head in April 1969 -- following an outbreak in Prague of anti-Soviet demonstrations to celebrate a Czechoslovak ice-hockey victory over a Soviet team. The Soviet Union promptly condemned the Dubcek regime for failing to control "antisocialist" elements and dispatched its Defense Minister and a Deputy Foreign Minister to Czechoslovakia to bring word that its patience was at an end.

Precisely what these emissaries said is not a matter of record, but they are reported to have demanded an immediate housecleaning of the Prague leadership, and to have backed up their demand by threats of new military measures against the country. At any rate, they made
their point. On April 17, Dubcek was replaced as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party by Gustav Husak, while other changes in the Party's Presidium resulted in the return to power of several orthodox pro-Soviet leaders and the dropping of a number of "progressive" members, including Josef Smrkovsky. Significantly, there were no public protests over the demotion of Dubcek and his more liberal lieutenants from student-worker groups, whose heady but brief protest alliance appeared to be dissolving in the face of blunt warnings from Husak that anti-Soviet attitudes would not be tolerated.

Along what path Husak might lead the country, no one could say. He himself was a Slovak nationalist, and no novice in the in-fighting of Communist politics. Under his leadership might emerge, not a one-sided settlement on strictly Soviet terms, but rather a precarious modus vivendi with Moscow, subject to continuing negotiation and adjustment. For the Soviets, guarantees of undiluted Party rule in Czechoslovakia and a foreign policy dictated from Moscow would doubtless be among the minimum conditions of any such living arrangement, while for the Czechoslovaks it might include the assurance that there would be no return to open punitive terror and some measure of freedom of private conversation as a substitute for an uncensored press. Conceivably, the uneven struggle between the Czechoslovak people and their occupiers could be terminated on far bleaker terms for the occupied country. In either case, the Soviet rulers might find that in imposing their will upon Czechoslovakia they had lost an ally and gained a grudging subject whose allegiance henceforth would have to be exacted by repeated doses of threat and intimidation.
4. The Future Pattern of Soviet Relations with East Europe

Beyond the immediate outcome of the Kremlin's effort to bring Czechoslovakia to heel lay more lasting problems of Soviet policy in East Europe. Even though the Czechoslovak reform experiment had been smashed, the question still remained whether it had really been extinguished once and for all. Having tasted a measure of freedom under a reformist Communist regime, the Czechoslovak people might bide their time until conditions made possible a new start in the direction that was closed off in August 1968. A critical question, therefore, and one applicable not only to Czechoslovakia, was whether the Soviet Union could prevent such conditions from arising again within its East European domain. In 1956 it had crushed Hungary's defiance, only to find twelve years later that the process of change in East Europe had brought new challenges to its authority -- first from Rumania and then from Czechoslovakia. Might not a similar pattern be expected to recur?

In the cold afterlight of the Czechoslovak experience, "yes" might seem too facile an answer. By demonstrating anew in Czechoslovakia that the Soviet Union would not shrink from armed suppression of challenges to its control in East Europe, the Soviet leaders undoubtedly had dealt a severe blow to those elements within the East European Party elites whose sights had been set on modifying the Soviet-style Communist system to fit their particular national conditions. By the same token, the orthodox hard-line factions in these countries, unsympathetic to reform and dependent to a considerable extent on Soviet backing for their own political foothold, were probably strengthened by the Czechoslovak reminder of the grim
reality of Soviet power. The circumstances were not apt to encourage renewed agitation for change and reform in East Europe among Party elites at the top, where effective action in these societies necessarily rests, whatever the pressures from below.

On the other hand, there was no warrant that the clock could be made to stand still. The very fact that the Soviet Union again had been obliged to invoke naked military power to sustain its authority testified to the vitality of the forces of change at work in the political, social, and economic life of East European society. Though raw power might intimidate the countries of East Europe and compel their servile obedience to the Soviet dictate, it could not prevent new internal tensions from arising in these countries, widening the gap between the regimes and their people, especially youth and the intellectuals. For that matter, the Soviet leadership itself sat somewhat uneasily upon the lid which it had clamped over its restive intelligentsia at home; there was always the possibility that something like national remorse seeping up from below, and dissension developing within its own ranks at the top, might cause the Soviet leadership to question the wisdom of repressive measures in East Europe and, as had been the case under Khrushchev after Hungary, lead gradually to more flexible policies in that region. Thus it might be argued that, once the immediate impact of Czechoslovakia subsided, something like the pattern of the past could again emerge -- with the Soviet Union finding it expedient to give some ground to diversity and change in East Europe while seeking also to reopen the interrupted effort toward an East-West détente.
But, even if this were to happen, another critical question would still remain. The earlier cycle ended, not with Moscow's relaxation of strict control following forcible intervention, but rather with the fear that Soviet authority had been dangerously eroded and had to be reimposed by force. If history were to repeat itself, therefore, would it again go the full cycle, producing the armed suppression of another Hungary or Czechoslovakia, or would the Soviet Union manage to break this fateful sequence by peaceful accommodation to evolutionary change in East Europe?

Obviously, there was no ready answer to this question in the aftermath of the Czechoslovak crisis. But at least three policy choices, each with a salient bearing on the nature of the Soviet Union's future relations with East Europe, appeared to stand before the Soviet rulers. The most radical of these, and hence perhaps the least likely, was outright acceptance of fundamental reforms of the Communist order in East Europe. Before the Soviet Union could accept any sort of systemic reform in the East European political order involving a lessening of Soviet control and abandonment of the principle of strict political conformity, it seemed fairly certain that there would have to be basic changes in the outlook of the Soviet leadership and its guiding political ethic at home. Unfortunately, given the marked regression of the incumbent leadership to ultraconservatism and the defense of orthodoxy, its tolerance of systemic reform and liberalization either in the Soviet Union or in East Europe promised to remain rather low. Indeed, barring a collapse of the incumbent collective leadership under the weight of cumulative policy
failures and frustration and its replacement by men of greatly different vision, one could hardly suppose that the ruling elite would willingly set out on a path of liberalization that would jeopardize its own claim to a monopoly of political power.

If the reform road thus seemed one the Soviet leadership was unlikely to take, at least in the near future, there was a second and perhaps much less remote alternative bearing on the Soviet Union's relationship with the countries of East Europe. This was the doleful prospect that the Soviet leadership might increasingly dedicate itself to a kind of neo-Stalinist restoration, demanding more rigid conformity at home and stamping out revisionist and reformist trends elsewhere in the Soviet camp by reimposing physical control wherever Soviet military and police power could be brought to bear. Although the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of intervention within a hazily-defined socialist commonwealth was not necessarily an action blueprint for such a course, as we have noted, it was available as the ideological rationale for any attempt to keep East Europe under rigid Soviet control and to insulate it from the dangers of Western influence.

Depending on the resilience and political imagination of the Soviet rulers, there was a third and somewhat less heavy-handed approach to managing Soviet relations with East Europe. It amounted essentially to dealing with pressures against the Soviet position in East Europe opportunistically, seeking to manipulate and divide the forces of political change and modernization rather than attempting to stifle them by resort to a neo-Stalinist despotism. Though this course, too, would doubtless rest
in the last analysis on the reminder that Soviet military power stood ready to ensure Soviet hegemony in East Europe. It could allow more room for any internal differences that might arise within the collective Kremlin leadership over how best to cope with challenges to Soviet interests in that region.

Whether the governing opinion within the Soviet leadership were to favor strict defense of orthodoxy or more subtle techniques of control in East Europe, however, one thing which seemed likely was that Soviet policy in this half of Europe could not be divorced from Soviet policy toward the other half of the divided continent. A basic problem for the Soviet Union, as Fritz Ermarth has noted, remained that of how to preserve its hegemony in East Europe while keeping open the prospects for extending its influence in West Europe. On the one hand, disciplinary measures to keep dissent down in the East could prompt NATO to keep its guard up in the West. On the other hand, a relaxation of Soviet policy in East Europe for the sake of improving opportunities for political advance in Western Europe carried the risk of new erosion of Soviet authority and the repetition of experiences like that of Czechoslovakia.

Almost a year after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was still by no means clear whether the Soviet leaders, in order not to prejudice their chances for exploiting favorable political opportunities in the West, would manage to rise above the anxious authoritarianism they had come to display toward East Europe. But, as we shall see later, there were indications that the Kremlin leadership had at least begun to move again in the direction of a more active
diplomacy in the West, aimed especially perhaps at exploiting Bonn's insecurities and hopes of reunification. Before we come to these indications, however, let us look at some of the consequences of the invasion for the Soviet Union's policy toward Western Europe, where the Czecho-slovak affair also proved to be a major political watershed in relations between the Soviet world and the West.

B. THE STATE OF SOVIET POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE

There is no easy way to reckon the damage done to Soviet interests in Western Europe by the brutal resubjugation of Czechoslovakia. Prior to that crisis, things had seemed to be going rather well there for the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Keeping their eye on the decisive weight of industrial Europe in the world power balance while the United States was increasingly distracted from European affairs by the Vietnam war, the Soviet leaders had sought through active diplomacy and political maneuver to establish closer technical, economic, and political ties with West European countries and to foster the idea that new collective security arrangements would provide a timely alternative to NATO. By playing upon West European desires for a role more independent of the United States, and especially upon de Gaulle's anti-Americanism, the Soviet Union seemed to have found a convenient formula for weakening NATO unity and undermining U.S. influence in Europe without having to exert blatant pressures on the Western alliance, a course which had often proved unproductive in the past.
The tendency of America's European allies to move in one degree or another away from their former close dependence on American leadership was not the only factor favoring the new European diplomacy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. There was also the feeling in the West that disunity within the Communist world had weakened any threats from that quarter and thus partly offset the lack of unity in NATO, besides perhaps increasing the chances for East-West reconciliation. Above all, there was the widespread belief in the West that the naked use of Soviet military power anywhere in Europe could virtually be ruled out, both because of the strategic nuclear standoff and because of presumed evolutionary changes in the Soviet system itself, which were thought to point toward more temperate, non-ideological foreign policy decisions.52

1. Preinvasion Prospects for Progress Toward the Soviet Union's European Objectives

In this general atmosphere, the European diplomacy conducted by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime prior to the Czechoslovak crisis seemed to offer reasonable prospects for progress toward some of the principal objectives of Soviet policy in Western Europe. Although, as in the Khrushchev era, it could be doubted whether the Soviet Union counted any longer upon bringing about revolutionary social and political transformations in Western Europe, Soviet policy appeared still to be aimed at such long-standing objectives as the breakup of NATO, the weakening of West European ties with the United States, and the isolation and demoralization of West Germany -- objectives which, if attained, would leave the Soviet Union dominant
on the European continent and enhance its global power position relative to the United States.

In a sense, Soviet aims could be described as seeking to upset the status quo in the West of Europe while preserving it in the East. Just as there had been an inherent contradiction in Soviet policy in Khrushchev's time between the idea of bilateral Soviet-U.S. collaboration for particular ends and the exclusion of the United States from Europe, so there was some ambivalence on this point under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, though the latter seemed somewhat less equivocal than Khrushchev about making removal of American power from Europe an explicit aim of its diplomacy. In the Mediterranean basin on Europe's southern flank as well, the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime sought to improve its military-political position in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war at the expense of American and other Western influence in the area.

Although the situation in Europe as it evolved between 1966 and 1968 was scarcely one in which the fragmentation of the Western alliance had advanced far enough to satisfy maximum Soviet aims, the Soviet Union nevertheless had seemed to be gaining influence in Western Europe at the expense of its superpower rival. By the time of the Bucharest conference of July 1966, the initiative in Europe had increasingly shifted to the Soviet Union; if nothing else, following de Gaulle's military withdrawal from NATO and pressures within the United States itself for reduction of American forces in Europe, the Western alliance appeared to be coming apart at the seams more rapidly than the Soviet Union's own Warsaw bloc, which was not without troubles of its own. Provided
the Soviet Union managed to maintain reasonable discipline within the Warsaw bloc while continuing to hold the initiative for solution of outstanding European problems. The chances looked fairly good for important gains, perhaps including a few defections from NATO after its twentieth birthday, in 1969, and a continuing American disengagement from Europe without the need for substantial political concessions from the Soviet bloc in return. In effect, the very fluidity of European political life which many in the West hoped would help to soften the old Cold War divisions in Europe provided an environment in which the Soviet Union could hope to change the status quo in Western Europe to its advantage.

There were still many problems for Soviet policy in Western Europe, to be sure. Britain continued to resist Soviet efforts to pry her loose from her traditional association with the United States. In France, where de Gaulle had revived the image of a Communist menace in order to cope with domestic disorder in the spring of 1968, Soviet-French cordiality was beginning to cool. The situation in West Germany also remained in many ways not to the Soviet Union's liking, as German bonds with the United States continued to withstand the diverse strains placed upon them, and Bonn's Ostpolitik seemed likely to make further inroads in East Europe. But things were looking up a bit: The CDU-SPD coalition was showing serious signs of wear. West Berlin's morale was sinking, and there had been only halfhearted opposition to the slicing away of access rights to Berlin in the spring of 1968. Moreover, the nonproliferation negotiations had helped to advance the dual objective of barring the nuclear door to Bonn and introducing a
troublesome issue into German-American relations, while within West Germany herself the stirring of small but vocal nationalist elements, such as the National Democratic Party (NPD), had given the Soviet Union a fresh target for its tired warnings to both Warsaw allies and West Europeans that their security was threatened by German revanchism and neo-Nazism.

Perhaps the general picture sketched above suggests a somewhat more purposeful and successful exploitation of the policy openings available to the USSR in Western Europe prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia than the record of Soviet accomplishments actually warrants. Despite a situation "objectively" ripe for important Soviet gains, it might be argued, Soviet diplomacy had not in fact made substantial progress toward such major objectives as neutralizing Western Europe and weaning it away from the United States. Moreover, it might also be said that, well in advance of the Czechoslovak crisis, the Soviet leaders had become so preoccupied with defending their position in East Europe against the undermining effects of freer East-West intercourse in general and Bonn's Ostpolitik in particular that they had virtually surrendered the initiative in European affairs which circumstances seemed to have bestowed upon them in 1966 and early 1967.

In short, there is much to be said for the view that an inadequate Soviet response to the opportunities at hand in Western Europe preceded the turning point reached in Czechoslovakia, and that therefore the invasion itself was more an event that suddenly illuminated the ineptitudes of Soviet policy than one which marked a wholly unexpected reversal of form. Nevertheless, it is hardly to be
denied that the invasion created new difficulties for the Soviet Union in its relations with the Western half of Europe, and that a number of Soviet policy interests which might otherwise have remained undamaged were at least temporarily set back by the action against Czechoslovakia.

2. Effects of the Czechoslovak Invasion upon NATO

One of the immediate repercussions in Western Europe, where in the aftermath of the invasion Soviet popularity sank to probably an all-time low, was the reawakening of old anxieties about the Soviet military threat to Europe. This, in turn, promised to pump new life into NATO, whose members now found themselves disabused of the comfortable notion that the naked use of Soviet military power in the heart of Europe need no longer be taken seriously. To be sure, Soviet armies had not crossed the dividing line in Europe, but if the Soviet leaders were capable, in cold blood, of a massive military invasion of an ally professing basic loyalty to the Warsaw bloc and the Communist political order, what compunction would they feel about taking military action against the non-Communist Western half of Europe if it should ever let its defenses lapse? In such an event, how inviolable, after all, might the military dividing line through the middle of Europe prove to be?

From Moscow's viewpoint, the revival in Europe of fear and respect for Soviet arms may have appeared to be a not unwelcome by-product of the operation against Czechoslovakia. so long as it did not shock NATO into closing its ranks once more and embarking upon a new buildup of its defenses. Whether NATO's reaction would go this far was by no means
clear initially, however, either to its own members or the Soviet Union. In general, the invasion of Czechoslovakia could be said to have resolved NATO's doubts about the need for its existence and to have given it collectively a fresh sense of its relevance to European security; but beyond this, views as to what measures NATO should take and how urgently it should pursue them varied from country to country during the initial period of reaction to the invasion.

On the one hand, France -- the least enthusiastic supporter of the alliance -- remained as reluctant as ever to restore her formal military ties with NATO, and de Gaulle seemed little disposed to do anything in response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia except to call it "reprehensible." In several other countries, such as Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey, where sentiment in support of NATO had been flagging, there were varied expressions of revived interest in the value of the alliance, but no initiatives for strengthening it were forthcoming. In Germany, on the other hand, where anxiety over the new influx of Soviet troops into Central Europe was coupled with concern that the United States might not adopt a firm enough stance against Soviet pressure, the Bonn government stressed how seriously it viewed the postinvasion situation, and Kiesinger urged a prompt conference of heads of government of the NATO countries to consider measures for strengthening West European security.

Britain, though among the countries that reportedly were initially cool to the idea of convening either a special summit or a ministerial meeting to discuss the security implications of the Soviet intervention -- one of the objections being that no major decisions were likely
to be reached until a new administration took office in the United States -- subsequently indicated that she would go along with a ministerial meeting in advance of the regular December session of the NATO Council.\textsuperscript{58} In the United States, meanwhile, advocates of unilateral American troop reduction in Europe conceded that their case was dead for the time being,\textsuperscript{59} while the Johnson Administration, after drawing criticism from European capitals for having hesitated at first to take up a position that might close the door to strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{60} moved to declare itself on August 30 with a presidential warning to Moscow not to "unleash the dogs of war" by further military actions in East Europe.\textsuperscript{61} The following day, the United States announced that, in view of the "changed East-West military situation" brought about by the massive influx of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia, it had begun a review with its European allies of their common defense arrangements in NATO.\textsuperscript{62}

Out of this initial flurry of somewhat disjointed responses by NATO's members, during which the question of possible NATO intervention in Czechoslovakia was never raised,\textsuperscript{63} perhaps the main point which emerged was that NATO intended to take a fresh look at its own defenses in light of the circumstance that the Soviet Union had upset the long-standing military balance in Europe by introducing into Central Europe larger forces than had been present there "at any time since the early postwar period." From the Soviet side, there were immediate protestations that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had not disturbed the power balance in Europe but, rather, had saved it by preventing the "neutralization" and ultimate Western takeover of a
Communist bloc country. Coupled with this rebuttal from Moscow were Soviet warnings against what were labeled West German attempts to stampede NATO into building up its defenses.

As we shall see in a later chapter, the issue of a shift in the conventional arms balance in Central Europe subsided when the Soviet Union, at the approach of winter, withdrew the bulk of its forces from occupied Czechoslovakia. During the early postinvasion period, however, it was the presence of these additional forces at NATO's doorstep, along with fresh uncertainty about Soviet behavior, which helped the Western alliance partners to arrive at what has been described as a "stopgap policy" to suspend any further consideration of troop withdrawals from West Germany or other economy measures until the effects of the Czechoslovak invasion had been fully evaluated. This stopgap position, made known at a meeting of NATO's Defense Planning Committee on September 4, 1968, still left unclear what was to be done to strengthen NATO's security and who should take the initiative in doing it.

The process of working out a collective NATO response went forward during the next couple of months, yielding its first formal product in mid-November at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, where the Western allies outlined a new military program for NATO based on their studies of the postinvasion situation. The military measures announced at Brussels amounted largely to pledges that the NATO members would try to meet previously-agreed standards of manning, equipment, and training, and would take several other steps toward modest improvements in NATO's posture and its alert procedures. Although these measures were
directed more toward improving the quality of NATO's forces than their size, a notable feature of the November program was that, for the first time, the European members of NATO (France excepted) had pledged a larger contribution to the collective effort than the United States. Even France exhibited a readiness to move closer once more to practical military collaboration with her NATO allies. Thus, the French were willing to cooperate with a new NATO command, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, which was activated a few days after the Brussels ministerial meeting with the mission of keeping an eye on Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean.

If, on the whole, the November program offered as NATO's first concrete response to the Czech invasion seemed unlikely to pose any formidable new military problems for the Soviet Union in Europe, it served at least to confirm NATO's resolve to halt the gradual erosion of its military posture which had been taking place over the previous few years, and which the Soviet Union doubtless would have liked to see continue. Beyond the somewhat limited commitments undertaken at Brussels to repair NATO's defenses, the November ministerial meeting also produced several rather noteworthy policy statements bearing on NATO's future.

One of these was the declaration that recent events had demonstrated that NATO's "continued existence is more than ever necessary"; this was a formal way of saying that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had put an end to debate over the possibility of withdrawals from NATO after its twentieth birthday in 1969. A second significant declaratory element of the Brussels communiqué was a warning that any further Soviet intervention by force in Europe or
the Mediterranean would "provoke an international crisis of grave consequences." Although presumably voiced for its deterrent effect on Moscow, whose enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine had seemed to make such countries as Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania potential targets of Soviet intervention, this warning prompted some critics in the West to observe that NATO appeared to be extending its protection to countries beyond the alliance's traditional area of responsibility. A third important declaration at Brussels reaffirmed that the pursuit of European reconciliation remained a major policy goal of the Atlantic alliance. The NATO allies also noted, however, that the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had dealt a severe setback to hopes of progress in this direction.

Taken together, the military program and the policy statements that made up NATO's collective response at Brussels suggested that the invasion of Czechoslovakia would have not only the short-run effect of interrupting such détente-oriented measures as "balanced mutual force reductions," aimed at easing tensions between the opposing military alliances in Europe, but also, in the longer run, the effect of postponing indefinitely any prospects for dismantling of these alliances in favor of a new European security system. Few West European members of NATO seemed disposed to gamble upon replacing their common defense arrangements with some untested scheme of pan-European collective security, as the Soviets had proposed in years past; and the Soviet Union for its part now appeared to have a greater need than ever for the institutional framework of the Warsaw Pact as a device for keeping its military forces deployed in East Europe.
3. The Shattered Image of a Prudent and Moderate Soviet Leadership

The image of a Soviet Union progressing toward moderation, stability, and traditional norms of international behavior under an essentially prudent and pragmatic collective leadership had come to be widely accepted in the West during the tenure of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. This image, together with many of the assumptions about Soviet conduct upon which it rested, was a conspicuous casualty of the adventure in Czechoslovakia, from which the Soviet leaders emerged with a new reputation for unpredictable and irresponsible behavior.

Perhaps the chief factor in stamping the Soviet leaders as men capable of unpredictable, ruthless, and even desperate actions was their surprising resort to military intervention after the Czech crisis had passed its climax at Cierna and Bratislava in early August. As several observers have noted, massive invasion coming on the heels of a negotiated agreement was bound to give the Soviet action an aura of irrationality and to call into question the predictability of Soviet decisionmaking. Even if one conceded that the Soviet leaders had inched hesitantly and indecisively toward the use of force, and that in terms of their own premises and the values they felt to be at stake they had acted logically and "rationally" in finally deciding to invade Czechoslovakia, the fact remained that in most Western eyes men prone to make abrupt and unpredictable moves like that against Czechoslovakia were capable of unleashing equally unpleasant surprises in some future crisis. Moreover, the flagrant disregard for the "decent opinion of mankind" shown by the Soviet leadership in the assault upon Czechoslovakia,
together with signs that the Kremlin was still not rid of an almost neurotic fear of deviations from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, helped to dispel the widespread image of the Soviet collective leadership as an inherently cautious group of bureaucratic oligarchs with little propensity for rash action. Rather curiously, despite all this, no alarm was raised during the Czech invasion that the Soviet leaders were recklessly courting the danger of nuclear war. Perhaps it was thanks to Western restraint and the "lie low" policy of NATO during the crisis that the charge of risking nuclear disaster was not laid at the Soviet door.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the reputation for unpredictability and ruthless assertion of power acquired from the Czechoslovak invasion was not necessarily to be deplored, for it could serve to breed fear and paralysis among opponents. But even though helpful in this sense to Soviet diplomacy, such a reputation could become a questionable asset if it should end by persuading the West that the mellowing of Soviet power was but a pious hope and that no reasonable basis for getting along with the Soviet Union could be found. Indeed, one of the most regrettable effects of the Czechoslovak episode might prove to be its having undermined those assumptions of rationality and predictability of Soviet conduct upon which the stability of co-existence of the opposing systems in the nuclear age had been greatly dependent.

Besides casting doubt on the behavior of the Soviet leadership in general, the Czechoslovak affair strengthened the impression in the West that dogmatic hardline elements had gained the ascendancy in the Kremlin, a development which also seemed to portend that Europe would have to gird
itself for a renewed period of harsher East-West confronta-
tion. Whether, in fact, the Czech crisis left the Soviet
leadership internally torn between orthodox hardliners and
pragmatic moderates was, however, difficult for outsiders
to determine. Perhaps no aspect of the crisis prompted
more speculation based on flimsier evidence than the ques-
tion of differences between contending factions within the
Soviet leadership. That there was a split in the Politburo
between those who felt that the Czech reform experiment
must be stamped out by force and those who wanted to kill
it by slow attrition seemed highly plausible, but how
deply this cleavage ran and who lined up on each side
were matters on which little could be said with certainty.74

While it may be supposed that the issue of how to deal
with Czechoslovakia aggravated the political problems within
the Kremlin, and may even have placed some members of the
collective leadership in a vulnerable position, the Brezhnev-
Kosygin regime did manage to contain any sharp differences
within its ranks. Eventually, the sensitive issue of Soviet
policy toward Czechoslovakia might prove divisive enough
to bring about a shakeup in the ruling group, especially if
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the intervention should
mount, but for the time being, at least, the regime had
weathered what was probably the most severe test of its
stability since it took power in October 1964.

Whatever the balance between hardline and moderate
factions within the Kremlin, however, hope in the West of
being able to deal on reasonable terms with temperate ele-
ments among the Soviet leadership was badly shaken by the
Czechoslovak repression. Not only had supposed moderates
of the Kosygin and Podgornyi stripe apparently turned up
among the hawks on the intervention issue, but the moderate position seemed likely to suffer in any event. If the West were to swallow Czechoslovakia's subjugation with little more than a gulp of moral indignation and offer to go back to business as usual, the policy of the Soviet hardliners would be vindicated and the position of the moderates further undermined. If, on the other hand, the West refused to treat the situation as a mere "family affair" within the Warsaw camp and put some sting into its disapproval, the Soviet hardliners could be expected to claim that they were right all along about meddling interference from the West, while the moderates would find themselves either obliged to agree or placed in the compromising position of siding with the meddlesome adversary. In short, the currency of moderation in East-West diplomacy seemed to have been debased by the Soviet handling of the Czechoslovak situation.

4. Impact of the Invasion on Soviet-German Relations

Another consequence of the assault on Czechoslovakia was a further deterioration in Soviet relations with West Germany. While the invasion might have been expected to aggravate long-standing Soviet-German differences in any event, it was probably the Soviet Union's attempt to concoct a rationale for its armed intervention which first led it to turn up the heat against Bonn. After the collapse of its initial flimsy pretext that Soviet troops had been "requested" by unidentified members of the Prague leadership to put down internal "counterrevolutionary" elements, the Soviet Union fell back on allegations that it intervened just in the nick of time to forestall "a major
politico-military operation" against Czechoslovakia which the West had been preparing under cover of a policy of building "bridges" to the East. According to Soviet claims, the "timely" and "decisive" intervention in Czechoslovakia "shattered" Bonn's plans for "tearing the country away from the Warsaw Pact and turning it into a 'corridor' for the Bundeswehr on the road to the Soviet frontier." Despite its patent absurdity, this fictional justification was accompanied by the very real presence of numerous Soviet combat divisions and air units in Czechoslovakia, where at least some of them seemed likely to remain for some time. These forces, in addition to providing leverage against the stubborn Czechoslovak population and its leaders, were postured in depth against the West to sustain the fiction of a newly-arisen military threat from that quarter. Thus, impaled in effect on a fantasy of its own making, the Soviet Union itself had created a new military threat in the heart of Europe which NATO could scarcely afford to ignore.

However, the mischievous effects of Moscow's insistence that Germany and her NATO partners were to blame for the "preventive" invasion of Czechoslovakia went somewhat further than raising the level of military tension in Europe. Among other things, Soviet efforts to depict Bonn as the villain in the piece brought West Germany's policy of reconciliation toward the East to a virtual standstill. By interpreting Bonn's Ostpolitik as evidence of a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and demanding an end to Bonn's influence in the East, Moscow all but throttled any German hopes of cultivating normal relations with the Soviet bloc, thus leaving the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition with a seemingly
bankrupt policy on its hands while strengthening the position of those in Germany who maintained that the Federal Republic had little choice but to return to the cold-war policies of the Adenauer era. Although the Bonn coalition government declined to regard the Ostpolitik as a dead letter, and later offered to reopen a dialogue with Moscow on improvement of relations in the East, it was fairly clear that its bargaining position had been vitiated by the invasion. Moscow, having reaffirmed its military rule over East Europe, held the keys to any bargains that Bonn might hope to strike in the East, and was not likely to temper its hostility to Ostpolitik overtures unless they involved more extensive concessions than any Bonn had ever been willing to make.

For a brief interval between the end of the July crisis and the invasion, it had seemed that the Soviet Union might be toying with a shift of tactics toward West Germany, designed perhaps to play upon the promise of improved relations with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, in order to sidetrack the development of a special West German relationship with Czechoslovakia. One sign of a more conciliatory approach to Bonn was Ulbricht's rather surprising offer, on August 9, to open talks on a renunciation-of-force agreement without making full-scale recognition of his regime a precondition. While this gesture may have come at Ulbricht's own initiative, it seems unlikely that he would have turned abruptly from a hostile to a cooperative stance without agreement from Moscow. But, if Ulbricht's move was to have been the opening step in a concerted effort to isolate Bonn from Prague by conciliatory tactics, it was overtaken by events and never followed up.
On the contrary, an even tougher Soviet line toward West Germany emerged after the invasion. Not only did Moscow serve notice on Bonn that the policy of an opening to the East was no longer tenable, but -- more ominously still -- the Soviet Union reasserted the claim that, under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter as well as under the Potsdam agreements, it was entitled to intervene unilaterally in West Germany, by force if necessary, to prevent the "renewal of aggressive policy" by a former enemy state. Warnings from the Western powers that any Soviet attempt to test this thesis would lead to an "immediate allied response" under the North Atlantic Treaty helped perhaps to allay anxiety in West Germany, while in most other quarters in the West the tendency was to regard the Soviet claim as a propaganda ploy rather than a prelude to a power move against Germany. After what had happened to Czechoslovakia, however, there remained a lingering concern -- fed by Soviet assertions that the right under the UN Charter to take "necessary measures" against the Federal Republic applied also in case of "encroachments on West Berlin" -- that the Soviet Union might find a pretext for a power squeeze against Berlin designed to demonstrate that it was not in retreat because of its difficulties in East Europe.

Although the effect of the Czechoslovak invasion in spiking West Germany's conciliatory approach to the East doubtless was regarded in Moscow as an appreciable gain, both in terms of traditional Soviet interest in the maintenance of a divided Germany and as a reminder to Bonn that the keys to any future German settlement remained firmly in Soviet hands, it also involved certain political costs. An important part of the Soviet Union's political capital
in Europe had always been the contention that Germany was the inveterate troublemaker against whom stern Soviet policies were necessary and justifiable. Now the shoe was on the other foot, and it was a troublemaking Soviet Union which sought to depict West Germany's desire for normal relations as a warlike provocation and uttered veiled threats of military intervention. Henceforth, the Soviet Union could hardly expect to trade quite so freely as before on the image of an ever-delinquent Germany.

But the Soviet Union's position with respect to West Germany suffered still other damage from the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The use of East German forces in the invasion, for example, gave a cynical twist to Moscow's long-standing animadversions about the "menace" of German militarism, not only casting doubt on the sincerity of the Soviet Union's professed alarm about revive's German militarism, but pointing up the contrast between the international conduct of the two German governments in a manner distinctly unfavorable to the Communist regime. Bonn's delay in ratifying the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (its ratification having been an objective avidly pursued by the Soviet Union) was another by-product of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The violation of Czechoslovak sovereignty gave Bonn both a plausible excuse to postpone approval of the treaty and a fresh opportunity to press for stronger American nuclear guarantees in return for signing it.

Finally, one of the invasion's more significant effects on the Soviet Union's German policy was the crimp it put in Moscow's prospect of either isolating West Germany or weaning her away from the Western alliance. In either case,
the key to attainment of the objective lay in separating Germany from the United States: in the first instance, by prevailing upon Washington to place Soviet-American collaboration ahead of Germany's interests; in the second, by convincing Bonn that a bilateral understanding with Russia would bring greater rewards than a close tie to NATO. Although neither avenue toward undermining the U.S.-German relationship was necessarily closed to the Soviet Union by its action in Czechoslovakia, the temporary effects of the invasion were hardly favorable to Moscow, for both Washington and Bonn had been given fresh reason to look to the preservation of firm U.S.-German ties, the foundation upon which the Western alliance rested.

5. Spur to the Mending of American Relations with West European Countries

Apart from putting a new premium on the maintenance of firm bonds between the United States and its West German ally, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia also brought home to Washington the need for greater attention to its relations with other West European countries. In the larger sense this meant that the United States was again being drawn more actively into Europe, a development obviously detrimental to the Soviet aim of detaching the United States from its European partners. At the same time, however, it was apparent that the Czechoslovak crisis had injected a certain asperity into U.S.-West European relationships, from which Moscow might derive some satisfaction. Complaints were raised in several European capitals, for example, that the United States reacted "insensitively" to the invasion, showing unseemly haste to resume the pursuit
of détente with the Soviet leaders and thereby appearing to give symbolic approval to the Soviet Union's breach of morality and standards of decency in international conduct.\textsuperscript{91} Some European critics of American diplomacy, including de Gaulle, saw in the situation a cynical understanding between the two Great Powers on "spheres of influence,"\textsuperscript{92} while others went so far as to assert that it was "obvious that the Americans gave the Russians carte blanche to invade Czechoslovakia."\textsuperscript{93}

Although critics tended to ignore such things as the lead taken by the United States in seeking a UN Security Council resolution of condemnation,\textsuperscript{94} some of their reproaches, particularly those suggesting that there should be "a decent interval" before any meeting between top Soviet and American leaders, appeared well warranted. In any event, the agitation over Washington's initial reaction to the Czechoslovak crisis subsided after the United States began to manifest a sterner attitude toward the Soviet Union, beginning on August 30 with President Johnson's warning to Moscow not "to unleash the dogs of war." Shortly afterward, among other manifestations of disapproval, the United States also indicated that it was no longer in a hurry to get on with strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union, although still hopeful of salvaging them later at an "appropriate time."\textsuperscript{95}

Whether or not postponement of these talks left Moscow seriously disappointed was an open question. However, the very fact that the United States, despite its manifest interest in pursuing the talks, felt obliged to set them aside for the time being attested to Washington's new, postinvasion responsiveness to European concerns that the
United States might put collaboration with the Soviet Union ahead of its alliance obligations to Europe. To the extent that this development narrowed the Soviet Union's opportunity to play upon differences between the United States and its European partners, still another debit could be chalked up to the misadventure in Czechoslovakia.

6. Embarrassment of Communist Parties in Western Europe

A further effect of the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia was the somewhat unhappy plight in which it left the various West European Communist parties. Were they to condone the Soviet action, their chances of winning public support and of promoting Popular Front movements in the West were bound to face decline, while disapproval would not only offend the Soviet Union but would widen the fissures in the international Communist movement. Most of the West European parties, including the two major ones, in France and Italy, chose to dissociate themselves from Moscow's move; nevertheless, it appeared that they had been badly damaged both in their appeal to domestic constituencies and as instruments for the support of Soviet policy in Europe.

Tangible evidence of the adverse impact of the invasion upon the fortunes of a West European Communist party came first from Sweden, where in the parliamentary elections of mid-September the Communists lost substantial ground, despite having denounced the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. The Finnish Communists suffered a similar electoral setback in early October. Internal dissension within the various European parties, especially bitter in France and Italy, arose also over the issue of how far to go in criticizing the Soviet Union. Although Moscow's threatening to cut
off subsidies and other help to the West European Communist parties led some of them to soften their criticism, it appeared that such pressures might serve only to split these parties into pro- and anti-Soviet factions.

Besides creating difficulties between Moscow and the Western party leaderships, the invasion also brought a challenge to Moscow's influence over the two largest Communist-led trade unions in Western Europe, those in France and Italy, with the further possibility that revolt against Soviet control might spread to the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions.

Perhaps one of the principal setbacks to Communist interests in Western Europe could only be measured in terms of a "lost alternative." Had the development of a "democratized" national Communist system in Czechoslovakia been permitted to continue, its example might have gone far toward convincing social-democratic and neutralist elements in Western European countries that it was safe to get into bed with their domestic Communist parties without fearing the loss of national integrity. As it was, however, the Soviet Union not only chose to crush the Czechoslovak experiment but it also promulgated a doctrine to justify this intervention -- the so-called Brezhnev doctrine -- which could be interpreted to mean that any country in which Communists came to office would find its sovereignty in jeopardy. Thus, though the Western parties might profess their dedication to a nationally-oriented "reform Communism," this was not likely to repair their domestic standing unless they could bring themselves to cast off their ties with the Soviet Union and oust the old-line Moscow loyalists within their ranks.
Just as Moscow's disregard for Czechoslovak sovereignty had prejudiced the influence of the West European Communist organizations, so it tended also to reduce the attraction of neutralist positions in the European political spectrum. Austria, sharing a border with Czechoslovakia, was a case in point. A perceptible cooling of Soviet-Austrian relations set in after the invasion, and concern was evident in Vienna that Austrian neutrality might not be respected should the Soviet Union at some point decide that military measures were needed to suppress criticism of Soviet policy in Rumania and Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, as the initial shock of the invasion wore off, it was not unlikely that neutralist sentiment in some parts of Europe would revive. Finland provided a pertinent example. There, after a nervous interval during which a few anti-Soviet demonstrations were staged, the Finns returned to a carefully neutral stance, professing to see no alternative to this position for a small country living at the Soviet Union's doorstep.

7. Setback to the Prospects for East-West Reconciliation

Although much of the political capital accumulated in Western Europe by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had been dissipated in one stroke by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union could probably expect to regain some of it gradually as time softened outraged sentiment and the intolerable again became the normal state of affairs. There was, after all, the precedent of Hungary, also a traumatic case of armed intervention which the Soviet Union had rather quickly managed to live down. But in some ways Hungary was not an apt parallel, for there one could
recognize that the Soviet Union had acted to restore a Communist regime that had been thrown out of power and to bring back into the Soviet camp a country that had left the Warsaw Pact. Neither of these extenuating conditions applied in the case of Czechoslovakia, where the issue was the right of an incumbent Communist regime to experiment with a modified, "humanized" form of Communist rule.

The difference was crucial. Indeed, the implications which flowed from this distinction between Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 would have perhaps a more fundamental bearing on Western Europe's future relationship with the Soviet Union than any other effect of the Soviet intervention. For, in trampling Czechoslovakia underfoot, the Soviet Union laid bare the melancholy truth that Communist orthodoxy remained a formidable obstacle to the reconciliation of a divided European continent and to genuine East-West coexistence.

Despite having leaned over backwards not to "meddle" in the Czechoslovak reform experiment, the West learned that the Soviet leaders could not abide even the mild breath of freedom promised by "reform Communism," but on the contrary felt that communism could only survive by continuing to employ such weapons as strict press censorship, monopoly party rule, secret police controls, and, ultimately, armed repression. What this meant, in effect, was that so long as the defenders of orthodox communism remained fearful of liberalizing reforms from within, they also were likely to feel threatened by contaminating ideas from without, particularly those implicit in European social democracy. By mere force of example, the West was cast as a constant "subversive" threat against which tighter barriers must be erected.
After Czechoslovakia, the renewed jamming of Western broadcasts and attacks on bridge-building concepts as alleged weapons in the West's subversive arsenal reflected this fear of outside contamination, if indeed the resumption of these practices did not testify to a deeper need for an external enemy against which the Soviet leaders could mobilize their subjects in order to keep their totalitarian system running. Moreover, the Czechoslovak case also marked the rebirth in Moscow of the pernicious doctrine that the Soviet Union enjoys the right to impose orthodox rule within its sphere by using its military and police power, regardless of "abstract" notions of national sovereignty and self-determination. In this climate, the prospects for bridge-building and freer East-West traffic in ideas hardly looked promising, much less the attainment of genuine reconciliation between the rival systems in a divided Europe.

8. Soviet Policy and the Future

To be sure, there was no fatal inevitability that a new Iron Curtain would be rung down around the Warsaw bloc, nor, if so, that it would remain long intact. The subterranean evolution of the Communist order within the Soviet bloc might prove stronger than efforts to hold it back. The dogmatists and defenders of orthodoxy themselves might lose their hold upon the machinery of decision within the Soviet leadership, opening the way for more flexible accommodation to the process of change in East Europe and to the notion of bridge-building in both directions between East and West.
For that matter, even if the Soviet Union were to remain preoccupied with staving off "subversion" of its system from the West, the situation was not necessarily altogether bleak from the West European viewpoint. For, in a sense, this could mean a diversion of Soviet energies, with Moscow giving less attention to altering the status quo in Western Europe and more to defending it in East Europe.

But, at best, any such shift of attention promised to be only a relative matter, unlikely to keep the Soviet leaders so inward-oriented that they would cease to interest themselves in the affairs of the Western half of Europe, the more so as the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime showed no disposition to abandon the tendency -- common also to its predecessors -- to obstruct the emergence of a united Western policy front toward the Soviet Union. This tendency, perhaps consistent enough to be called a basic principle of Moscow's European diplomacy, reflected several apparently deep-seated convictions: (1) that a united Europe would represent a threat to Soviet security and, conversely, that a divided or fragmented Europe would enhance Soviet security and provide a better environment for the pursuit of Soviet interests; (2) that a prospering and reasonably cohesive Western Europe would prove a powerful attraction for the East European countries in Moscow's orbit, thus threatening the Soviet Union's harmony in a region it deemed vital to its security; and (3) that a unified Western Europe, or a reconciled East-and-West Europe, would come to be dominated by Germany, a prospect that made it necessary to keep Germany divided in a divided Europe.

Given this bias against European unity long characteristic of Soviet policy, it might be assumed that the
Soviet leadership would be loath to sit by and forgo recurrent opportunities to exploit fissures among the Western allies. Indeed, though we could not, in the present study, follow the course of Soviet policy toward Europe beyond mid-1969, there were already by this time some signs that, despite an obvious desire to tighten the Soviet bloc against ideological penetration from the West, the Kremlin leadership was beginning once more to reactivate a stalled diplomatic effort toward Western Europe, where the unifying effects of the Czechoslovak invasion appeared to be wearing thin. 106

The renewal of a more active Soviet diplomacy toward Western Europe was centered on the general theme that Soviet-West European relations should be put back on the track on which they had been prior to the Czechoslovak "interruption," although there were also enough variations on this theme to suggest that the Soviet leadership was having some difficulty making up its collective mind on a uniform approach. France, perhaps considered to be the country most prone to resume cooperative relations with the Soviet Union, became the initial target of overtures for a return to preinvasion "normality," 107 in contrast with Moscow's distinctly cool attitude toward Britain. 108 Toward West Germany, the customary harsh Soviet line was tempered by several amicable gestures, 109 while with respect to NATO itself the Soviet Union's position veered from a new and somewhat conciliatory appeal in mid-March for an all-European security conference to a vitriolic denunciation of NATO on its twentieth anniversary, on April 9, 1969. 110

On the whole, however, the Kremlin leadership seemed aware that a reactivated Soviet diplomacy should avoid
giving rise to fresh alarms in Europe, for by failing to do so it might invalidate the argument that Soviet-West European relations need no longer be encumbered by the unpleasant events in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, in the early months of 1969, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime evidently found it expedient to weigh its next moves in Europe with a particular eye to their impact upon its relations with the new Nixon Administration in the United States. As suggested by the disinclination to press the issue of West Germany's election of a new federal president in Berlin on March 5 beyond the dimensions of a temporary mini-crisis, the Soviet Union's interest in preserving an atmosphere suitable to conducting strategic arms talks and negotiations on other matters with Washington seemed to counsel a diplomacy in Europe that would keep tensions within bounds. The eruption, at the same time, of new difficulties with China over a bitter border clash in the Far East gave Moscow a further incentive to avoid exacerbating tensions on the European front. Thus, as matters stood by the summer of 1969, the Soviet Union's European diplomacy again appeared to be headed in the direction of encouraging the gradual erosion of NATO, which had been in process before the Czechoslovak "interruption" and had represented one of the major, though perhaps largely unearned, successes of Soviet policy in Europe.
XVI. SOVIET MILITARY POLICY UNDER THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN REGIME

Like Khrushchev, his successors apparently discovered after taking office, not only that the task of creating and maintaining a modern military establishment was costly and often in conflict with their domestic goals, but that the problems of deriving political advantage from Soviet arms also were intricate and difficult. Nevertheless, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime saw fit to go ahead with a large arms buildup, which by the middle of 1969 had put the Soviet Union in a much stronger military position than that in which Khrushchev had left it about five years earlier.

On the whole, this buildup was aimed largely at improving the Soviet Union's global power position, suggesting that, while the new Kremlin leadership may have had no great fault to find with the military power left at its disposal on the European continent, it was by no means pleased to have inherited a situation in which for two decades the United States not only enjoyed marked strategic superiority over the Soviet Union but also went virtually unchallenged in its capacity to intervene locally in contested trouble spots around the globe. In mid-1969, the full extent to which the military policies of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime might serve to alter this situation still remained to be seen, but important changes in the military power relationship between the two superpowers already had taken place.

In the present chapter, we shall examine the broad trends which marked the over-all evolution of Soviet military policy during the first half-decade of the Brezhnev-
Kosygin regime; in the next, we shall deal specifically with developments affecting the Soviet Union's military posture in Europe.

A. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

Before taking stock of the main trends in Soviet defense policy and posture between 1964 and 1969, it may be useful to make a few general observations on change and continuity in this field. Soviet military policy can be seen, at least in part, as reflecting the differing conceptions that have informed Soviet foreign policy under successive leaderships from Stalin to the present day. Under Stalin, for example, the Soviet Union pursued a foreign policy of essentially continental dimensions, and its military policy remained largely oriented in a continental direction. In the Khrushchev era, by contrast, the Soviet Union was transformed into a global power, breaking out of its continental shell to assert its influence and interests in every quarter of the world. However, Khrushchev never succeeded in fully reshaping Soviet military power to support a political strategy of global dimensions. His successors, in effect, picked up this task where Khrushchev left it. The common denominator in all three leadership periods was the maintenance of a strong military posture toward Europe -- a point brought home once more in August 1968 by the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia, which, among other things, increased the forward deployment of Soviet forces in East and Central Europe.

Under Khrushchev's successors there was no appreciable tendency toward the kind of radical departure from previous
Soviet military thought and practice which had marked the Khrushchev period off from the Stalinist one. The military policy of the new regime continued to rest essentially on the same set of strategic assumptions and foreign-policy priorities that underlay Khrushchev's military philosophy: (1) that nuclear war must be avoided; (2) that deterrence based on Soviet strategic-nuclear power offers the best guarantee against a nuclear war; and (3) that the Soviet Union must maintain the military capacity, not only to back up its interests in Europe, but also to sustain its role as a global competitor of the United States and to cope with the problems created by the rise of a rival seat of Communist power in Peking. Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime did not challenge these underlying policy assumptions when it took office in October 1964, it apparently was less than satisfied with some aspects of the military posture it had inherited.

In strategic forces, for example, despite notable advances in missile, space, and missile-defense technology under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union had failed to catch up with the United States. Indeed, the effect of these technological advances and of Khrushchev's efforts to exploit them politically during the "missile-gap" scare of the late fifties and early sixties had been to spur American strategic programs, leaving the Soviet Union with respect to "forces-in-being" in a strategic position still clearly second-best to that of the United States. Likewise, although a start was made under Khrushchev toward acquiring more mobile and flexible conventional military capabilities, and especially toward expanding the country's maritime capacity, the Soviet Union still lagged far behind the West in
most of the elements of globally-maneuverable military power that would be needed should the USSR wish to project its military presence into areas well beyond the periphery of the Soviet bloc. Even in the case of Europe, toward which a strong military posture had been maintained, the new regime apparently was not altogether satisfied with the situation as Khrushchev left it, for one effect of his military reforms had been to reduce the nonnuclear options open to the Soviet Union in this critical arena of East-West competition.

Perhaps it would be misleading to suggest that Khrushchev's successors set out in systematic fashion to correct the various shortcomings they found in the Soviet military posture in order to match it more precisely with an accepted pattern of strategic and political priorities. Military power and foreign policy can seldom be kept neatly "in phase," for many contingent factors tend to intrude upon the process of matching military preparations with policy priorities and objectives. In the Soviet case, they include the organizational habits of the Soviet bureaucracy; the bargaining interplay among various elite groups; the constraints of resources, technology, geography, and tradition; and the pressures on decisions exerted by allies and adversaries -- to mention but a few.

Nevertheless, to the extent that one can find some correspondence between Soviet military preparations and foreign policy priorities, it would seem warranted to say that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime set itself the task of bringing the Soviet Union's over-all military posture better into line with its growing global obligations and interests. In so doing, the regime continued to place
emphasis on the Soviet military position in Europe, at the same time that it gave increased attention to improving the Soviet Union's offensive-defensive capabilities and to developing more mobile and versatile conventional forces. Thus, what chiefly distinguished the military policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime from that of the Khrushchev period was not the direction of the effort but its scale.

Khrushchev's successors probably were prompted to increase the scale of Soviet military preparations by the belief that the USSR must provide itself with a wider range of military options and divest itself of the political liability of having a markedly second-best strategic posture in any future confrontation with the United States -- a liability that was dramatically driven home by the Cuban missile crisis toward the end of the Khrushchev decade. Or, to put it in slightly different terms, the new regime apparently felt that remedial measures were required to restore the credibility of Soviet military power as a backstop for Moscow's declaratory policy. Also, as noted earlier, the war in Vietnam and a general Soviet belief that U.S. military power was being increasingly committed to the suppression of "national liberation" movements in the Third World doubtless served to persuade the new regime that further measures were needed to improve the Soviet Union's ability to project military power into distant areas in support of its Third World policy.

In any event, despite the high priority they had set upon major investment programs and various reforms to stimulate economic growth and performance, the Soviet leaders found it expedient to make successive annual increases in the military budget. The Brezhnev-Kosygin
The regime's first military budget, for 1965, was 12.8 billion rubles. Thereafter, the figure mounted each year: 1966 -- 13.4; 1967 -- 14.5; 1968 -- 16.7; while for 1969 the announced budget climbed to 17.7 billion rubles, partly perhaps as a result of costs incurred in connection with the invasion and subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia.

This steady upward trend in Soviet military outlays represented a diversion of resources hardly calculated to help the new regime meet its domestic economic goals. As suggested by Kosygin's observation at the 23rd Party Congress, in April 1966, the need for strengthening Soviet defenses to meet the threat posed by a deteriorating international situation had prevented the Soviet Union from making "a substantial reduction in military expenditures and a correspondingly greater capital investment in peaceful sectors of the economy." The pressure of rising military costs was reflected also in a certain amount of policy controversy over economic and defense priorities, and in numerous articles on the enhanced importance under present-day conditions of tying together more effectively the economy and the planning and procurement of weapons for the armed forces.

The possibility that this issue had provoked internal argument for a major alteration of the traditional organization of the Defense Ministry along more civilian-oriented lines arose after the death of Marshal Malinovskii, the Defense Minister, in March 1967. At that time, there was a spate of rumors in Moscow that his successor might be Dmitri Ustinov, a Party civilian with a long career in the management of defense industry. Had Ustinov taken over the post customarily occupied by a military professional
with command prerogatives over the armed forces, it seems likely that rather sweeping organizational changes would have followed, perhaps with the effect of further reducing the influence of the professional military on resource decisions, a development as radical as some of the reforms with which Khrushchev was associated. As it turned out, the regime shied away from such an innovation, if it had in fact seriously contemplated it, and after a brief delay Marshal A. A. Grechko was appointed, leaving undisturbed the role of military professionals in the defense hierarchy.

In 1968, the tendency of the Soviet leadership to seek resolution of its political dilemma in Czechoslovakia through military pressure -- first in the form of threatened intervention and then by actual invasion -- raised anew the question of military influence upon the Soviet decisionmaking process. Military professionals played an important instrumental role in the invasion and in the confused early days of the occupation, which clearly enhanced their prestige, and, in 1969, the threat of new repressive measures against Prague in the wake of anti-Soviet demonstrations again underscored the active role which had devolved upon military men like Marshal Grechko as the executors of Moscow's East European policy. Meanwhile, as will be brought out later in this chapter, there was a renewal of internal debate over Soviet strategic doctrine and military preparations, some aspects of which suggested an assertive bid by the military hierarchy for a larger voice in the decisions affecting the country's security. Although it remained to be seen to what extent the Soviet military leadership might succeed in translating its instrumental and advisory role into a more potent and
direct influence within the top councils of the regime, so far as could be judged from the outward evidence available in mid-1969, the traditional grip of the Soviet political leadership on the machinery of decisionmaking was still intact.

Viewed as a whole, the stewardship of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime over Soviet military affairs in the five years following Khrushchev's ouster yielded some rather impressive accomplishments. True, a number of perennial problems remained unresolved, such as that of reconciling defense requirements with economic demands, while the new leaders also found that the task of translating military might into tangible political gains was hardly less intractable than it had been in Khrushchev's day. Nevertheless, the military policy and programs of the new regime produced notable changes in the Soviet armed forces, contributing to a gradual shift in the American-Soviet strategic balance and to the transformation of the USSR from an essentially continental military power into a more truly global one. Neither the precise nature nor the ultimate effect of this emerging pattern of power in the international system is as yet predictable, although any substantial shift in the previously recognized power balance could well have a far-reaching impact upon world politics and upon the international rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is a matter to which we shall return later in this study. Meanwhile, let us look at the main features of the military programs undertaken by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, considering first its efforts to strengthen the Soviet Union's strategic posture.
B. PROGRAMS AFFECTING THE SOVIET STRATEGIC POSTURE

Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, programs in the strategic field have fallen largely into two categories: those aimed at a buildup of the strategic delivery forces, and those directed toward strengthening the Soviet Union's strategic defenses, including the initiation of ABM deployment. These efforts have reflected the concept that a complementary "mix" of offensive and defensive forces should be sought, a concept more congenial to orthodox Soviet military thinking than giving preference to either offense or defense alone.\(^9\)

When Khrushchev's successors first came to office, however, it was by no means clear how vigorously they would seek to improve the Soviet Union's strategic posture vis-à-vis the United States. Their initial approach did indicate, if nothing else, a determination to strengthen the technological base upon which any effort to alter the strategic balance would ultimately depend. Appropriations for scientific research were stepped up, and, as made evident by the public display of new families of offensive and defensive weapons, the Soviet military research and development program was pushed even more energetically than before.\(^{10}\) Only after the new leaders had been in power a year or two did it gradually become apparent that they had committed themselves to a substantial buildup of Soviet strategic delivery forces.

1. Buildup of Strategic Offensive Forces

As indicated by informed accounts which began to appear in the U.S. press in the summer of 1966, an accelerated
program of Soviet ICBM deployment had been set in motion in the USSR. Given a lead time of around eighteen months for construction of a typical ICBM launcher site, it was apparent in retrospect that the decision to go ahead with accelerated deployment of new launchers, which began to show up in increasing numbers in the summer of 1966, must have been taken fairly early in 1965, not long after the new regime came to power. By October 1966, the number of ICBM launchers stood at about 340, and a year later the operational ICBM total reached 720, representing a deployment rate of more than one new launcher per day.

Although the pace of deployment began to slow down in 1968, the Soviet ICBM buildup did not taper off at this juncture to the extent expected in some Western quarters. In September 1968, the ICBM total was 900; by the early months of 1969, it had edged up to more than 1000, with enough additional launching silos in various stages of construction to give the Soviet Union within the near future a slightly larger ICBM force than the United States for the first time since the earliest days of the missile age. These figures on the Soviet ICBM buildup under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime may be compared with a total deployment of around 200 ICBM launchers in Khrushchev's time.

Along with this quantitative buildup of ICBMs went qualitative improvements, such as the introduction of new types of missiles in dispersed and hardened sites, in contrast with the ICBM force of the Khrushchev period, much of which consisted of early-generation missiles of "soft-site" configuration. The principal new missile types added during the rapid expansion of the ICBM force from 1966 to 1969 were the SS-9 and the SS-11, both liquid-fueled and emplaced...
in dispersed concrete silos. The SS-9, the larger of the two, with a warhead variously estimated at 10 to 25 megatons, became the object of widespread attention when it was singled out by U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin K. Laird in March 1969, during debate over the Safeguard missile defense system, as a weapon which posed a first-strike threat against the American land-based Minuteman deterrent force. Laird indicated that there were then about 200 SS-9s in the Soviet inventory and that their deployment was continuing. The smaller SS-11, with a warhead of about one megaton, had been estimated previously by other U.S. officials to account for more than half of the Soviet buildup.

In addition to the deployment programs for new liquid-fueled missiles of the SS-9 and SS-11 types, other steps were taken in the field of solid-fuel missiles to improve the quality of the Soviet ICBM force. As emphasized in the late Marshal Malinovskil's report at the 23rd Party Congress, in April 1966, and subsequently reiterated by other military spokesmen, the Soviet Union accorded "special importance" to the development of mobile land-based missiles for the strategic missile forces. Mobile missiles, it was stressed, would lend themselves to concealment and therefore reduce their vulnerability to attack. Although the Soviet Union's late entry into the field of solid-fuel technology delayed the operational availability of such missiles, Western authorities in 1968 confirmed Soviet claims that a mobile, solid-fuel ICBM was in the works, in addition to mobile strategic missiles of shorter range in the MRBM or IRBM class. Furthermore, it was reported in September 1968 that a nonmobile solid-fuel
ICBM, roughly comparable to the American Minuteman, might soon become operational in the Soviet Union. In early 1969, the outgoing U.S. Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford said: "We now believe the deployment of such a missile has started." While the expansion and operational improvement of the land-based missile forces stood first among the measures to strengthen the Soviet strategic delivery capacity, other delivery means also received their share of attention. A relatively high priority, for example, went to missile-launching submarines, as was made evident in 1968 by the introduction into operational use of a new class of nuclear-powered submarines with a ballistic missile-launching capacity -- 16 tubes -- comparable to the U.S. Polaris-type submarine. Appearance of the new submarine after pause in the nuclear-sub construction program suggested that the Soviet Union intended to expand its existing missile-launching submarine force, which in 1968 numbered about 75 submarines, or about one-fifth of the total undersea fleet.

As Soviet military leaders pointed out, the USSR also continued to count on contributing manned aircraft to its strategic striking power, a contribution provided chiefly by a holdover force of long-range bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles for "stand-off" attacks against enemy targets. Although no new development program for an advanced heavy bomber was reported, the long-range bomber training flights to northern coastal areas of the American continent in 1968-1969 gave further testimony to the Soviet Union's continuing interest in maintaining a manned-aircraft strategic delivery system.
Beyond these various operational delivery systems, the USSR had under way a number of additional strategic-delivery projects, the result of the vigorous research-and-development program fostered by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. One of these projects concerned the development of some sort of orbital bombardment system. It first came to public attention in 1965, when Soviet commentators described a large missile paraded through Red Square as an "orbital" vehicle that could "deliver a surprise blow on the first or any other orbit around the earth," a claim which immediately raised the question whether the USSR intended to comply with the October 1963 UN resolution against placing nuclear weapons in orbit.

Subsequently, in November 1967, Secretary McNamara and other U.S. defense officials identified the Soviet project as a "fractional orbital bombardment system, or FOBS," designed to deliver its weapon payload from a satellite before completing a single orbit. In its developmental phase, at least, when presumably carrying no nuclear payload, FOBS was not considered to be in violation of the space treaty. While noting that FOBS might be intended to reduce the warning time available through conventional radar, Mr. McNamara stated that the U.S. development of "over-the-horizon" radar would make it possible to recapture any lost warning time and that, in any event, FOBS did not appear to offer significant military advantages over nonorbiting ICBMs. From the Soviet viewpoint, however, the effort invested in developing FOBS, which reportedly was flight-tested twelve times in the period from September 1966 to October 1968, would tend to suggest that the project was in fact looked upon
as promising dividends of some sort, perhaps of a political-
psychological as well as a military nature. 35

Another project that might appreciably increase the
Soviet strategic delivery potential came to light in
September 1968, when it became known that the Soviet Union
was developing multiple warheads for its ICBMs -- a phase
of missile technology which until then had seemed to be
exclusively pioneered by the United States. Soviet interest
in multiple warheads of either the MRV or the MIRV variety 36
had been inferred for some time; the fact that, as early
as 1963, Soviet military leaders had made reference to the
"future possibility" of degrading Western defenses by means
of "maneuverable warheads," 37 together with occasional East
European comment on the advantages the Soviet Union would
derive from adapting its large missile payloads to MIRV, 38
suggested that sooner or later the Soviets would unveil
a multiple warhead program of their own.

This they did by testing their version of a multiple
warhead about one week after the successful first tests
of MIRV for Minuteman and Poseidon had taken place in the
United States, in late August 1968. 39 Whether the Soviet
multiple warhead (which, according to U.S. press accounts,
may be employed with the SS-9 booster) also possessed an
independently targetable feature was apparently not known.
However, it was at least clear that the Soviet Union had
not been idle in the multiple reentry-vehicle field.

These then were some of the steps taken under the
Brezhnev-Kosygin regime with respect to both deployed
strategic delivery systems and R&D projects. In summing
up, several points seem important.
First, the Soviet programs were evidently intended not only to increase the weight of strategic firepower but to diversify the Soviet strategic delivery potential and to reduce its vulnerability. Whether an intent to acquire a first-strike capability lay behind these programs was by no means self-evident, but at least some aspects of the strategic buildup were sufficiently ambiguous to lend themselves to such an interpretation, as was, indeed, Soviet targeting doctrine itself.\textsuperscript{40}

Second, as matters stood in early 1969, the Soviet Union had several new strategic delivery systems which were either in the very early stages of deployment or in a preoperational testing stage. These included a Minuteman-type silo-emplaced ICBM; a mobile, solid-fuel ICBM; a Polaris-type ballistic-missile submarine; FOBS, and MRV. The critical policy decision, therefore, that must have faced the Soviet leaders at this juncture was whether to go ahead with the procurement and deployment in meaningful numbers of some or all of these new delivery systems, or to hold back until they saw what came of the strategic arms limitation talks that had been temporarily derailed by the Czech invasion.

A third and closely related policy question was whether, having attained slightly better than numerical parity with the United States in ICBM launchers, the Soviet Union should next attempt to establish definite superiority in strategic delivery capacities or forgo for at least the time being another strategic arms buildup. In the final chapter of this study we shall return to considerations bearing on these policy choices. For the moment, let us take up the programs sponsored by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in the field of strategic defense.
Parallel to measures for improvement of Soviet strategic delivery capabilities, another significant move by the new regime to bolster the Soviet strategic posture was its decision to go ahead with the deployment of antiballistic missile defenses. As discussed in an earlier chapter, it is still not entirely clear whether the tentative deployment of a first-generation ABM complex employing the GRIFFON missile had begun in Leningrad in 1962 and then been halted for technical, economic, or other reasons. At any rate, only after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime assumed power did it become unmistakably evident that the Soviet Union had taken the historical first step of deploying ABM defenses. The first official U.S. cognizance of the Soviet deployment program was given in an interview by Secretary McNamara in November 1966. According to his and subsequent accounts, the Soviet Union had installed a second-generation ABM defense system around Moscow, employing the so-called GALOSH missile displayed on several occasions in Red Square parades. This system was credited with providing limited area defense to the Moscow region against Minuteman firings from North America or Polaris missiles launched from northern waters.

The extent to which additional ABM defenses of the GALOSH type or different design might be scheduled for deployment elsewhere throughout the Soviet Union remained, however, a matter of continuing conjecture. As widely noted in the U.S. press, the installation of ABM defenses around Moscow was accompanied by construction of another new defensive system -- the so-called "Tallin" system --
deployed over an extensive geographic area, including the northwestern approaches to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Tallin system was thought in many quarters to be a third-generation ABM deployment program, but in early 1968 Secretary McNamara stated that the majority of the U.S. intelligence community had come round to the view that the system "most likely" was designed "against an aerodynamic rather than a ballistic missile threat." Should the future bear out this judgment, then obviously the Soviet ABM program as it developed during the first few years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime represented a much more modest start toward coping with the formidable problems of missile defense than was originally thought to be the case. Incidentally, the addition of the new Tallin system to an already massive array of air defenses -- together with Soviet development of new long-range interceptor aircraft -- also would imply that even in the missile age Soviet planners have continued to place a high priority on improving their strategic defenses against bomber attacks.

Whatever the uncertainties attending Western estimates of the status of Soviet ABM defenses, it can be said that Soviet spokesmen themselves failed to express unmitigated confidence in their country's ABM program. Soviet claims of ABM progress during the first years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime varied from outright assertions that the Soviet Union had "solved" the missile defense problem to more guarded statements like those of Marshal Malinovskii at the 23rd Party Congress to the effect that Soviet defenses could cope with some but not all of enemy missiles. In early 1967, several prominent Soviet military leaders voiced notably conflicting views on the state of the
country's missile defenses,50 which again suggested that professional military opinion in the Soviet Union was by no means agreed on the effectiveness of an ABM program in which something on the order of $4 to $5 billion in resources had already been invested.51 Although Soviet military men differed occasionally as to the capabilities of the country's ABM system, none questioned publicly the desirability of building such defenses.52 Indeed, many military spokesmen continued to emphasize the important role that ABM was expected to play in the strategic defense system, an example being the strong case made for ABM in a March 1967 article by a Soviet general, who stressed the value of both active defense and of a powerful offensive posture.53 Likewise, the third edition of the widely-known Sokolovskii treatise Military Strategy, issued in early 1968, repeated without change an assessment offered five years earlier to the effect that modern defense resources would make it possible to insure "the complete destruction of all attacking enemy planes and missiles, preventing them from reaching the targets marked for destruction."54

While in Soviet military circles there was thus general advocacy of a vigorous ABM program, tempered perhaps by professional debate over the technical and operational potential of available defense systems, it remained unclear what the policy preferences of the Soviet political leadership itself might be with regard to the pace and extent of ABM deployment. As noted in a previous chapter, American suggestions in early 1967 for an ABM moratorium apparently touched off a policy debate within the Kremlin on this and the associated question of strategic arms
For a period of almost eighteen months, neither the American moratorium proposal nor the U.S. decision of September 1967 to go ahead with a "thin" ABM deployment in the United States elicited a response from Moscow, suggesting that the Soviet leaders either could not resolve their policy differences or preferred to leave their hands untied in the ABM field.

Then, in June 1968, the Soviet Union finally agreed to enter talks with the United States on ABM and other strategic arms levels. We have already noted some of the possible reasons for this decision, and the subject is one to which we shall return. So far as the future of the Soviet ABM program itself was concerned, the decision to explore the prospects of an ABM moratorium left a number of questions unanswered.

On the one hand, it was possible that, despite the Soviet Union's modest headstart in ABM deployment, the technical and operational uncertainties attending the duel between offensive and defensive systems may have served to raise doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders about the long-term feasibility of acquiring effective missile defenses. Or, technical and economic difficulties of a more immediate nature may have made a pause for negotiation preferable to pressing on with a more extensive deployment program. On the other hand, it was by no means clear that the leadership was ready to write off further ABM deployment. Not only did the Soviet Union continue to pursue a high level of research activity in the ABM field, as was to become known in the course of time, but in early 1969 Soviet commentary on the controversy in the United States over U.S. plans for deployment...
of the Safeguard missile defense included notably few arguments against the merits of missile defenses as such, suggesting that the Soviet Union may have wished to avoid compromising its own freedom of action with regard to ABM.

C. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE MOBILITY AND "REACH" OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES

If nothing else, the large investment of effort and resources devoted to building up the Soviet strategic posture seemed to testify to the determination of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to erase the image of a Soviet Union strategically inferior to its major adversary. At the same time, the regime's military policy involved what might be described as a parallel attempt to improve the reach and mobility of Soviet conventional, or general purpose, forces. Although this undertaking did not match in scope and priority the effort that went into strengthening the Soviet strategic posture, it represented a significant advance beyond the steps taken toward the end of Khrushchev's tenure to enlarge the capacity of the country's naval forces for both blue-water and amphibious landing operations, and to improve the mobility of its conventional military power in general.

1. Developments in Naval Policy

The policies of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime carried further the process of transforming the Soviet navy from its traditional role as a mere adjunct to land power into an instrument for the global support of Soviet interests, although the naval program failed to create "balanced"
naval forces in the Western sense. Primary emphasis continued to fall upon improving the fleet of more than 350 submarines, the world's largest undersea force, whose mission includes both strategic delivery of sub-launched missiles and interdiction of seaborne supply lines. According to a major article on Soviet sea power written in 1967 by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, head of the Soviet navy, the submarine fleet and the naval air arm (a land-based force of some 850 aircraft\(^2\)) had been given "the leading place" in the buildup of Soviet naval power.\(^3\)

While the surface forces in this scheme of things thus did not enjoy top priority, as had been the case also in Khrushchev's time, there was a significant renewal of surface-ship construction under the new regime. In addition, many existing surface units in cruiser and destroyer classes were modernized to fire surface-to-surface and anti-aircraft missiles,\(^4\) the latter suggesting an interest in preparing the surface forces to operate in waters beyond the protective range of land-based Soviet air cover. These forces in 1968 included some 20 cruisers, about 170 vessels classed as destroyers, frigates and destroyer escorts, upward of 100 amphibious ships, and a fleet of several hundred fast patrol boats, some of which were armed with missiles of the so-called STYX type, used by the Egyptians to sink an Israeli destroyer in October 1967.\(^5\)

In the maritime field, meanwhile, the steady growth of the Soviet merchant fleet continued, bringing its tonnage up from about 6 million deadweight tons at the close of the Khrushchev period to more than 10 million by the fall of 1967, according to the Soviet official in
Along with this expansion of cargo capacity went a proliferation of trawler and oceanographic activities, providing useful logistics and intelligence adjuncts to Soviet sea power. It is worth noting, incidentally, that a large Soviet merchant fleet without global naval forces to protect it would tend to offer hostages to Western naval power in the event of a crisis, an inhibiting factor for Soviet policy, which may have been among the incentives for extending the blue-water reach of the naval forces.

The selective character of the Soviet naval program, particularly the failure to build a force of attack aircraft carriers, has led some to doubt that Soviet naval advances should be interpreted as evidence of an effort to lay down a worldwide offensive challenge to Western sea power. Whatever may be the ultimate verdict on this score, a number of noteworthy innovations and departures from past Soviet naval practice did become evident under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. With increasing frequency after 1964, for example, Soviet submarines conducted regular patrols in distant ocean areas, including a much-publicized round-the-world cruise by nuclear-powered submarines in 1966 and the maintenance of full-time patrols within missile range of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States. These demonstrations of a Soviet capacity for blue-water operations were not confined to the submarine fleet. As pointed out in April 1966 by Paul H. Nitze, then U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Soviet surface ships were also "developing the capability for high seas operations away from their confined home waters, replenishing at sea, as our navies long ago found advantageous."
Perhaps a more striking example of the Soviet navy's departure from past practice -- if only because of its greater visibility -- was the establishment during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict of what appears to have become a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Actually, the Soviet Union had begun to establish such a presence on a modest scale at the time of the Cyprus crisis of 1964. However, it was only after Brezhnev demanded withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, in April 1967, on the eve of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, that the dispatch of additional Soviet naval units to the Mediterranean attracted widespread notice.

The augmented Soviet detachment of some forty combat and auxiliary vessels which stationed itself in the eastern Mediterranean at the time of the June war was, of course, clearly inadequate to taking on the Sixth Fleet, and doubtless was not intended to challenge the latter directly. What drew particular attention to the Soviet presence was the inclusion in the naval force of a tank-landing ship -- a type of amphibious vessel only recently introduced into the Soviet navy -- together with a couple of troop-landing ships carrying black-bereted troops of the reconstituted naval infantry forces. Although the peak of the crisis had passed before these landing ships arrived on the scene, the unprecedented display of an amphibious capability well away from the home waters no doubt was meant to convey the impression that the Soviet Union was prepared to intervene with local landing parties if necessary.

Soviet reluctance to become involved militarily in the Arab-Israeli fighting and thereby risk triggering a Great Power confrontation actually took much of the edge
off any implied threat of intervention by Russian naval forces in the area. Yet Soviet spokesmen contended that both during and after the June war the naval units served an important deterrent function in "frustrating the adventurous plans" of the Israelis and their alleged "imperialist" backers. Whatever degree of credence such claims might warrant, the establishment of a naval presence in the Mediterranean, together with the initiation in 1968 of goodwill naval visits to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, clearly meant that the Soviet Union had acquired a new diplomatic tool for support of its interests in this part of the world.

Another notable innovation in Soviet naval policy was the decision to build helicopter carriers, the first two of which were completed after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime took office. This development came as the climax to a long and evidently frustrating internal debate over the pros and cons of adopting aircraft carriers. As mentioned earlier, the World War II head of the Soviet navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, revealed in his memoirs, in 1966, that proposals for carrier construction in the late thirties had been vetoed by Stalin. After World War II, a carrier program was again proposed, but it too was turned down, in part because catching up with the West evidently posed too great a burden on Soviet resources, and in part, according to the incumbent head of the navy, because the advent of the nuclear age had underscored the vulnerability of carriers and marked the beginning of their "irreversible decline" as the "main striking element" of modern naval power.
In the end, the decision to invest in helicopter carriers was a compromise representing, not a belated bid to compete with the United States in carrier attack aviation (although such an effort in the future cannot be ruled out), but rather a step toward improving the Soviet potential for landing operations and antisubmarine warfare. Which of these two purposes might stand higher in Soviet plans for the new helicopter carriers had not yet been made clear in Soviet military literature by the end of 1968. However, the fact that efforts to overcome the Soviet lag in antisubmarine warfare had already involved the use of helicopters suggested that the carriers were likely to be employed as ASW platforms, an impression strengthened by the carrier Moskva's reported ASW training activity in the Mediterranean in the fall of 1968.

Understandably, Soviet naval authorities have spoken with great satisfaction of the trends which culminated in their navy's breaking out of its traditional confinement to closed seas around the Soviet littoral. Speeches marking the observance of Soviet Navy Day in July 1967, and again in 1968, were notable for their frequent sounding of the theme that Soviet sea power had extended its reach to "remote areas of the world's oceans previously considered a zone of supremacy of the fleets of imperialist powers," and that henceforth its mission would include "constantly cruising and patrolling wherever required in defense of the state interests of the Soviet Union."

Such utterances by Soviet admirals, though doubtless colored by pride of service, reflected an assessment of the changing role of Soviet sea power that was without precedent in Soviet history. Certainly, the notion that
the navy's task was to look after the worldwide "state interests" of the USSR was new to the Soviet political vocabulary. The increasing incidence of harassment at sea between Soviet and U.S. naval units, the intrusion of Soviet intelligence-gathering ships into U.S. waters, and such moves as the entry of a Soviet screening force into the Sea of Japan after the Pueblo incident, all seemed to reflect this new conception of the role of the Soviet navy.

2. Other Trends Bearing on the Global Mobility of Soviet Forces

Apart from the naval and maritime trends noted above, the period following Khrushchev's ouster was marked by other developments bearing upon the Soviet Union's capacity to project conventional military power into distant areas. The improvement of an airlift potential, for example, went forward under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, which like its predecessors looked to the airplane to help satisfy the civil and military logistics demands of a vast country with a thinly-developed road and rail net. Among the more celebrated products of Soviet air transport technology unveiled in the early years of the new regime was the AN-22 heavy transport, an aircraft which went into production in the fall of 1966 to provide a means for long-range, large-load airlift theretofore unavailable to the Soviet Union. One of its potential military uses was displayed in July 1967 at the Moscow air show, where AN-22s took part in a simulated combat landing of airborne troops with several types of missiles and self-propelled guns. Presumably, these aircraft
could also be used to ferry troops and equipment to distant theaters of contention.

The quick seizure of Prague by Soviet airborne troops on the night of August 20-21, 1968, provided what was doubtless the most graphic demonstration of Soviet combat-landing capabilities, although this operation was conducted in Central Europe, within easy range of Soviet base areas, and was therefore not wholly representative of the Soviet Union's airlift potential to more distant regions. A geographically more extended effort, illustrative of the Soviet logistical, rather than combat-landing, capacity beyond the borders of the Soviet Union was the massive air-resupply operation mounted promptly after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war to replenish Nasser's forces. The airlift to Yemen later in 1967 and in 1968 was a repeat performance on a smaller scale. Vietnam provides the best general example of the lengthening of the Soviet Union's logistical reach far beyond its borders. Although airlift has played a minor role there, partly because of Chinese restrictions on overflights, the supplying of North Vietnam by sea and rail in the 1965-1968 period furnished creditable evidence of the Soviet Union's capacity to conduct a major and sustained logistical effort over long lines of communication, at least under conditions where it does not have to face military interdiction.

Deficiencies in the means of protecting lines of communication distant from the USSR against determined interdiction doubtless remain among the more serious handicaps yet to be overcome, although it is worth pointing out that under the "rules of the game" which have thus far grown up around Third World conflicts the problem of
interdiction has not arisen for the Soviet Union. A related problem, bearing on the Soviet Union's ability to lend logistical support or make its military presence felt on various distant fronts in the Third World, is that of geographic and political access. The Soviet Union's traditional unwillingness to acquire overseas bases may remain a barrier to setting up military shop in some regions, just as appropriate access routes to areas of contention may be blocked by the uncooperative attitude of intervening states. In this respect, however, potential base arrangements and "calling privileges" have been one legacy of Soviet military aid programs in some areas, of which the Middle East is currently a prime example, and Soviet diplomacy seems capable of softening the attitudes of a number of states that sit astride strategic access routes beyond the Soviet borders. The improvement of Soviet relations with Turkey, whose cooperation has been an essential factor in Soviet naval access to the eastern Mediterranean, comes to mind in this connection.

With respect to the ability of the Soviet Union to project its military influence into distant limited war situations, experience is also a relevant factor. Soviet forces as such have not been openly engaged in Third World military hostilities, although there is a rather lengthy list of occasions, from Indonesia in 1962 to the Middle East in 1967-1968, not to mention Vietnam, where Soviet personnel in the guise of military advisers and technicians found themselves to some extent involved in active combat. It may be assumed that such cloaked exposure to limited war situations is no substitute for the experience of organized unit activity, particularly in the complex
problems of employing coordinated ground and tactical air
power. Nevertheless, the observation of, and twilight
participation in, various conflicts undoubtedly has brought
home many useful lessons in the conduct of local war. The
Soviet role in Vietnam, for example, not only has yielded
experience in dealing with problems of logistics support
and technical backup but has afforded the opportunity for
combat-testing of air defense and other weapons systems
in a limited-war environment. At the same time, Soviet
military professionals apparently have kept an attentive
eye on the development of new U.S. technology and techniques
as applied to the war in Southeast Asia; indeed, judging
from the Soviet military press, there seems to have been
some concern lest Soviet military thought and practice fail
to keep pace with innovations spurred by the American effort
in Vietnam. 96

Interest in the improvement of airborne and amphibious
assault capabilities, a trend already in evidence toward
the close of the Khrushchev period, 97 became more pronounced
under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Besides the development
of new air-landing methods and equipment, increased emphasis
was given to airborne operations and airlift reinforcement
in connection with various Warsaw Pact field exercises. 98
Although these training operations -- like the actual air-
landing assault during the invasion of Czechoslovakia --
were Europe-centered and of restricted geographical scope,
the lessons learned were doubtless not without some applica-
tion to the problems of conducting operations in more distant
areas. Likewise, the potential for amphibious assault was
enhanced, not only by the addition of helicopter and landing
ships, but also by an increase in the size of Soviet marine
forces, or "naval infantry," to around 7000 to 8000 men, who were distributed among the several Soviet territorial fleets and trained for special landing operations.

One can by no means identify all of the developments sketched above as well-meshed parts of a purposeful long-range plan to acquire capabilities for active use in local conflicts beyond the USSR's borders. Some of these developments probably were improvised responses to particular crises rather than the fruits of long-range planning; others were by-products of Soviet military and economic aid programs; still others, the outgrowth of efforts to improve the mobility of Soviet forces in the European theater and to achieve a more balanced general war posture. However, despite their varied origin, they did seem to suggest, as a Yugoslav strategic writer put it in 1967, that the Soviet Union had begun to embark upon "a policy of countering the strategy of local and restricted wars" by providing itself with the kinds of military capabilities necessary to conduct "that selfsame local and restricted war."

The implication here that the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership began moving toward a more active role for military power in support of its commitments and interests in distant areas of contention can only be tested with the passage of time, for not only the availability of the requisite forces is involved but also the willingness of the political leadership to take on the military and political risks that recourse to limited war might entail. To the extent that doctrinal considerations are relevant to this critical policy question, it can be said that Soviet military preparations during the first
five years of the Brezhnev-Kosgin regime were carried out against the background of a military doctrinal discussion which -- while by no means representing a sharp break from the previous orientation of Soviet doctrine toward the problems of general nuclear war -- nevertheless tended to place more emphasis than before on the possibility of having to deal with nonnuclear and limited warfare situations in various potential theaters of conflict, including Europe. A brief review of pertinent developments in Soviet military doctrine may therefore be appropriate at this point.

D. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS

Although toward the end of Khrushchev's tenure some attention had been given to the need for improving conventional as well as nuclear warfare capabilities, it was mainly after his ouster that Soviet military theorists recognized more explicitly the importance of having Soviet forces prepared for a wide range of operations below the level of general nuclear war. Besides departing from the monotonous cliché that any hostilities involving the nuclear powers would almost automatically bring their strategic arsenals into play, some Soviet military men soon began to voice other ideas that were at variance with standard doctrinal positions on limited warfare.

Thus, for example, General S. M. Shtemenko stated in early 1965 that Soviet military doctrine did not "exclude" the possibility of nonnuclear warfare or of warfare restricted to tactical nuclear weapons "within the framework of so-called 'local' wars." Later the same year, another
military man, General N. Lomov, carried this thought a step further by applying it to the situation in Europe. Noting that the American strategy of "flexible response" meant that local wars might "take place in Europe," Lomov said that such wars "are fought, as a rule, with conventional arms, though this does not exclude the possibility of employing tactical nuclear weapons." Lomov's observation that one might envisage a local war limited to conventional means or to tactical nuclear weapons even in Europe was promptly qualified by the caveat that "the probability of escalation into a nuclear world war is always great and might under certain circumstances become inevitable." But in any event, he wrote, Soviet forces should be prepared not only for general nuclear war but also for operations "with conventional arms alone" or with "limited employment of nuclear weapons."

Other military writers subsequently expanded on this theme, stating that current Soviet military doctrine called for the armed forces to "be prepared to conduct world war as well as limited war, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons." This prescription for a doctrine of multiple military options bore a rather close resemblance to the American doctrine of flexible response; indeed, Soviet writers sometimes employed essentially the same language in describing the one as the other. It is worth noting, however, that Soviet military literature acknowledged in only the most oblique fashion any debt it may have owed to the U.S. version of flexible response.

The typical Soviet treatment of the subject presented the United States as having been driven to adopt a doctrine of flexible response, with its associated "concept of limited
wars," after the Soviet Union's attainment of powerful strategic forces made it too dangerous for America to bank any longer on waging a preventive general nuclear war against the USSR. According to the Soviet exegesis, U.S. advocacy of limited wars antedated the birth of flexible response in the early sixties, but the limited war concept took on new importance for the "imperialist aggressors" when the United States, in its role "as the world gendarme, was forced to resort to the use of arms with increasing frequency" to suppress "the stormy national-liberation movement in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." Furthermore, according to the Soviet argument, U.S. and NATO planners also began to apply the doctrine of flexible response to the European theater, hoping to work out principles for conducting limited war in Europe without risk of its being transformed into general war. In short, though Soviet military writing continued to condemn the Western doctrine of flexible response as reflecting merely a persistent search for "safe" paths of "imperialist aggression," Soviet strategists may well have concluded that it was time to overhaul their own doctrine.

Among the more emphatic proponents of a broad-gauged Soviet military doctrine that would accord an enhanced value to conventional forces and would allow for a less rigid reliance on strategic nuclear weapons alone was Marshal I. I. Iakubovskii. In July 1967, shortly after being appointed commander of the joint Warsaw Pact forces, Iakubovskii wrote an article in which he argued that nuclear weapons should not be treated as "absolutes," especially in theater force operations. He also noted
with some satisfaction on this occasion that the efforts of Party and government in the past few years had improved "the capability of the ground forces to conduct military operations successfully with or without the use of nuclear weapons."

Such comments by Soviet military leaders, together with the kind of doctrinal discussion alluded to above, certainly suggested the recognition, under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, that general purpose forces should be placed in a posture that would enable them to deal with situations in which it might not be expedient to bring Soviet strategic nuclear power to bear either militarily or politically. However, it did not follow that the new regime had abandoned reliance upon Soviet nuclear arms in either a military or a political sense, as some Western observers were tempted to conclude from such articles as that by Marshal Iakubovskii. Not only did the large Soviet investment in a strategic force buildup testify to the contrary, but even Soviet proponents of better-balanced forces continued to concede priority to capabilities for conducting general nuclear war. In early 1967, for example, not long before his death, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovskii stated categorically that in Soviet defense planning "first priority is being given to the strategic missile forces and atomic missile-launching submarines -- forces which are the principal means of deterring the aggressor and decisively defeating him in war."

The late Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii was another well-known military authority who consistently upheld the view that the responsibility of Soviet strategy was to plan for
the use "above all of missile-nuclear weapons as the main means of warfare."¹¹⁶ Sokolovskii's last contribution to Soviet military literature, the third revised edition of *Military Strategy*, issued under his editorship in early 1968, gave increased space to discussion of the Western doctrine of flexible response, but on the whole it showed much the same preoccupation with the problems of nuclear war and the paramount danger of surprise nuclear attack as the previous editions.¹¹⁷ In this Sokolovskii was not alone, for most Soviet military literature of the Brezhnev-Kosygin period likewise remained centered on questions concerning the "revolution in military affairs" brought about by nuclear weapons, missiles and other technological advances.¹¹⁸

Indeed, this period witnessed a revival of the doctrinal argument about nuclear war as an instrument of policy, with the lines drawn between those asserting that it was theoretically and politically unwise to succumb to the notion that "victory in nuclear war is impossible" and those warning that theorizing on the prospects of nuclear victory should not be carried too far.¹¹⁹ A related theme upon which Soviet doctrinal writing continued to dwell dealt with the need to achieve military-technological superiority, and here, too, the emphasis was on nuclear-missile technology. As one Soviet military theorist put it in 1966,

Despite the fact that conventional arms, as before, have an important place in the technical equipping of armies, the decisive means of combat in modern war is the nuclear weapon, which is new in principle. Therefore, it is precisely the quantity and quality of nuclear munitions and
their means of delivery which provide the basis for the military-technical superiority of one side over the other.\textsuperscript{120}

Some two years later, the same writer, Lt. Colonel V. Bondarenko, asserted that it was wrong to suppose that because conventional arms retained their usefulness under certain circumstances this meant the end of the military-technical revolution. Rather, he said, new opportunities for traditional arms arose precisely because of the presence of nuclear-missile weapons provided by the ongoing military-technical revolution, a process with "its own logic of development."\textsuperscript{121} (Besides contributing to the debate on conventional versus nuclear arms, which included the argument that it would be a "more serious" mistake to over-emphasize the importance of conventional arms than that of nuclear weapons, Bondarenko in this article also raised questions which seemed to bear on even broader issues of Soviet military policy and civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{122}) Another writer, taking note of concern about the increasing cost and complexity of modern weapons systems, conceded that it was essential to make optimum use of resources, but argued that in the last analysis the maintenance of technical-military superiority required that the quality of advanced weapons systems and not their cost should be the governing consideration.\textsuperscript{123}

From all this one could gather, not only that there was a continuing internal debate under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime over the broad general issue of developing and modernizing the Soviet armed forces in such a way as to enhance the prospects of meaningful "victory" in the event of nuclear war, but also that those in the Soviet Union
who favored greater emphasis on preparation for limited wars and a corresponding shift of resources in this direction had not, as of early 1969, managed to make their case fully persuasive. Especially interesting in the context of the present study may be the fact that Soviet thinking with respect to theater warfare in Europe appeared to have emerged from the doctrinal debate of 1965-1969 without having shifted radically from where it had stood at the close of the Khrushchev period.

This is not to say, of course, that there were no changes in the Soviet outlook. As we have seen, it had been recognized that limited conventional or tactical nuclear operations in Europe ought not to be "excluded" from the realm of possibilities, especially in light of the flexible response doctrine adopted by NATO. This admission, if not a radical break from the doctrinal assumptions of the Khrushchev period, marked at least a noteworthy trend in a new direction. Also, several joint Warsaw Pact exercises now included an initial phase of conventional operations which apparently took into account the possibility of delayed resort to nuclear weapons on both sides. And at least one large non-Warsaw Pact exercise within the Soviet Union itself, the "Dnepr" maneuvers of September 1967, to which we shall give attention in the next chapter, appeared to be primarily a test of Soviet conventional warfare capabilities.

For the most part, however, the basic features of the Soviet outlook on warfare in the European theater persisted with little change. Thus, Soviet opinion remained largely skeptical with regard to the chances of keeping any East-West military hostilities in Europe within bounds. This
skepticism was typified early in the Brezhnev-Kosygin period by a Soviet military writer who dismissed the notion of "waging a local nuclear war" in Europe with these words: "It is obvious that a war in Europe, which is saturated with nuclear weapons and missiles, would immediately assume the broadest dimensions." Even later, as Soviet military literature gave more attention to NATO's doctrine of flexible response, the general view was that efforts to hold the line at conventional operations or the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons would prove unavailing. In fact, as noted in an earlier chapter, when the NATO Council in December 1967 formally endorsed a flexible response strategy, the Soviet Union denounced the concept on the grounds that it might "raise false hopes that a military conflict in Europe can be kept within local bounds and not allowed to develop into a big war with use of all means of extermination."

Just as there apparently was no basic revision of the belief that any military conflict permitted to arise between the opposing blocs in Europe would pose great danger of escalation to general nuclear war, so there was no essential change in the thinking of the professional military on how theater warfare in Europe would be fought in the event that war should occur. Soviet military literature continued to prescribe the familiar principles for theater operations, cast largely in a context in which the early use of nuclear weapons by both sides was assumed. These principles included prompt seizure of the initiative, use of surprise and rapid offensive exploitation through the depth of the theater, with even more stress than previously on tank and airborne operations.
Soviet theater warfare doctrine having been described at some length in an earlier chapter, we need not dwell on its features here. But before leaving the subject of doctrine it may be worth noting that the persistence of a nuclear orientation in Soviet thinking on theater operations in Europe looked somewhat less anachronistic in 1969 than it may have appeared in the early and middle sixties, when efforts were under way within NATO to sell the concepts of graduated response and larger conventional forces. Those efforts, as we have seen, had begun to have some impact on the thinking of Soviet military leaders, some of whom urged that more attention be given to preparing Soviet forces for conventional theater operations. But by the time NATO officially adopted a flexible response strategy, in December 1967, there were new pressures to reduce NATO's conventional force levels. This meant that, despite its formal commitment to flexible response, NATO in effect was left in a position in which it would be compelled to resort to nuclear weapons rather early in the event of war. In light of this, the nuclear-oriented Soviet theater doctrine carried over from the Khrushchev period had, as it were, acquired a new lease on life. Moreover, the situation arising out of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 seemed more likely than not to perpetuate this state of affairs. For, unless NATO responded by bolstering its conventional force posture substantially -- a doubtful prospect at best -- the forward deployment of additional Soviet theater forces in Central Europe promised to make it all the more necessary for NATO to count on early resort to nuclear weapons in the event of an East-West military clash in Europe.
XVII. THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE TOWARD EUROPE

The maintenance of the Soviet Union's power position in Europe was one traditional feature of its military policy which continued to receive undiminished attention under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Neither the Vietnam conflict and friction with China in the East nor the Soviet Union's interest in promoting an atmosphere of relaxation in the West that might hasten the demise of NATO seemed to counsel any significant redisposition of the military power deployed against Europe. Not only were strong formations of Soviet combined-arms theater forces kept in place in East Europe and the Western USSR, but a large force of Soviet MRBM-IRBM missiles remained targeted against NATO Europe, thus perpetuating the redundant capabilities built into the Soviet military posture toward Europe in Khrushchev's day. Indeed, developments growing out of the Czechoslovak crisis and invasion in 1968 saw larger Soviet combined-arms forces temporarily deployed in Central Europe than at any time since the years immediately after World War II, laying the Soviet Union open to the charge that it had disturbed the customary balance of forces in the European arena.

With respect to the role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet policy, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime initially saw fit to continue Khrushchev's policy of closer military cooperation with the East European members of the Pact, aimed both at improving the collective military capabilities of the Warsaw alliance and at tightening its political cohesion in the face of polycentric tendencies in East Europe. Later, with the onset of the crisis over
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet aim of improving the collective military efficiency was overshadowed by the need to employ the Pact as an instrument for restoring Soviet political control over the reform-minded Czechoslovaks. Because Czechoslovakia happened to be a key link in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact's military structure, its occupation could be presented as a necessary move to ensure the security of the Warsaw bloc against alleged military threats from the West. Whether, in fact, the naked police action against a member state of the Warsaw bloc would ultimately prove to have strengthened the Pact as a military coalition against NATO remained to be seen, for the resentment bred by the invasion might well leave Czechoslovakia a grudging and unreliable ally at best. For the short term, however, the forward deployment of additional Soviet forces upon Czech territory was doubtless regarded in Moscow as having stiffened the military posture of the Pact toward the West.

In this chapter, we shall be concerned with developments affecting the Soviet Union's military posture vis-à-vis NATO Europe, as well as with those germane to its management of military affairs within the Warsaw Pact. To begin with, let us examine several considerations bearing on the evident resolve of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to keep substantial Soviet forces positioned in the European theater, despite various circumstances that might have seemed to argue for reducing them.

A. CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Although the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime proved unwilling to depart from the past Soviet practice of keeping a large
military presence in Europe, several considerations suggested that under some circumstances the Soviet leaders might find it expedient to alter this policy. One of these was the perennial problem of holding down defense costs, especially at a time when measures to strengthen the Soviet Union's strategic posture and to improve the global reach of the general purpose forces were driving the demands upon Soviet resources upward. If the Soviet leadership were to find it possible to lay aside such political preconditions as a German settlement, this might open the way for mutual troop reductions in Europe, which could reduce for both sides the costs of maintaining the military standoff there, and which might, in any case, be a by-product of future negotiations aimed at a freeze or a lowering of strategic force levels.

A second consideration arguing for a more flexible attitude on the forward deployment of Soviet forces in Europe was the inconsistency between these forces and the Soviet Union's policy of cultivating cooperative relations with the countries of Western Europe. While it might be argued, as Soviet propaganda frequently did, that few West Europeans believed any longer in the "old myth" of a Soviet military threat and that the time was ripe, therefore, for the European states jointly to work out new pan-European security arrangements, so long as the Soviet military presence in the center of Europe loomed as large as ever, European members of NATO were likely to be very reluctant to jeopardize their protective ties with the United States. In short, if a Soviet policy of reassurance toward West Europe were to be made credible, a few gestures in the direction of Soviet troop reduction would certainly be of some help.
Third, there was the problem of China, which had potential military as well as political dimensions for the Soviet Union. Although an outright military collision between the two Communist powers was perhaps not a matter of immediate concern to Moscow during the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, it gradually became a less remote possibility. In the spring of 1966, for example, the Soviet leadership reportedly felt obliged to castigate Peking for telling the Chinese people that it was "necessary to prepare themselves for a military struggle with the USSR." During 1967, amid increasing rumors of border incidents, the Soviet Far East was visited by several top leaders, including Kosygin, who in a speech at Vladivostok on January 10 advised Soviet military officials in the area that the "anti-Soviet policy of Mao Tse-tung has entered a new, dangerous phase." In March 1969, the widely-publicized series of border guard clashes along the Ussuri gave testimony to the increasingly vexed state of Sino-Soviet relations.

In view of these developments, one may assume that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime found it prudent to conduct a running reappraisal of its military policy and planning to take into account a potential "two-front" threat in Europe and in the Far East. While such a reappraisal would have been likely to confirm the wisdom of proceeding with the buildup of Soviet strategic nuclear power as insurance against China's developing atomic capability, it no doubt would have raised also the question whether Soviet theater forces in the regions bordering China should be permanently strengthened, and if so, whether this requirement might best be met by shifting some forces from the
European theater to the Far East. The answer apparently was that the Soviet Union should indeed bolster its military garrisons in Asia, but not at the expense of the general purpose forces deployed in Europe.

Finally, in addition to the economic burden of maintaining large Soviet general purpose forces in Europe and the possibility of being able to transfer some of them to Asia, there was still another consideration that might have argued for downgrading the traditional theater role of these forces in Europe. In light of a Soviet foreign policy line looking toward the breakup of NATO, the emergence of a new European collective security system, and the military disengagement of the United States from the European continent, the future need for a Soviet theater force posture of past dimensions in Europe might appear to be of declining importance. In effect, if the Soviet-American competition were envisaged as shifting gradually toward the Third World and becoming essentially extra-European, then Soviet military policy would require strong strategic forces and more mobile conventional capabilities to hold up the Soviet end of the global competition, but there would be a correspondingly lesser role for the once dominant ground-air theater forces deployed mainly against Europe.

Obviously, however, none of these arguments carried sufficient weight with Khrushchev's successors to prompt a reduction of the Soviet Union's traditionally strong military foothold in Europe. Besides such general factors as the simple inertia of two-and-a-half decades and the long-time priority attached to the Soviet Union's ability to keep Germany in check, a number of other considerations
may have persuaded the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to sit tight with respect to the Soviet military presence in Europe. For one thing, any substantial change in deployments in Europe, even if carried out in the context of mutual troop withdrawals, would have left the Soviet leaders vulnerable to Chinese allegations that they were in "collusion" with the United States to ease the European situation and permit the transfer of American troops to Vietnam. Moreover, quite apart from Chinese criticism, to which the Soviet leaders may have been inured, an unreceptive attitude toward American suggestions for troop reduction in Europe gave Moscow a way of making felt its opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Secondly, the Soviet view of the appropriate path to new security and disarmament arrangements in Europe apparently presupposed the political settlement of the German problem, requiring at a minimum West Germany's recognition of the German Democratic Republic and acceptance of existing frontiers in Europe. So long as such a settlement remained as elusive as ever, insistence upon linking it with any new security arrangements involving military disengagement in Europe was tantamount to saying that Soviet troops would stay put. To the Soviet leaders this probably made the more sense as West Germany's weight within the Western alliance continued to grow, especially after France's military withdrawal from NATO.

A third factor, related to the gradual erosion of NATO's posture, also may have had a bearing on the Kremlin's resolve to keep the Soviet Union's own military posture toward Europe essentially intact. In the face of recurrent evidence, from about mid-1966 on, that political and economic
pressures upon American policy might be leading toward a substantial unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, the Soviet leaders may have thought that by simply sitting tight they could watch their relative military position vis-à-vis West Europe grow stronger without having to offer a major quid pro quo. Under such circumstances, the chances of their being able to engineer a European political settlement to their own liking may well have looked promising enough to the men in the Kremlin to make them decide to outwait the other side.

A fourth impediment to Soviet troop withdrawal was probably the belief that it would produce immediately deleterious effects on Soviet disciplinary efforts in East Europe while offering only uncertain long-term political benefits in West Europe. The 1966 Bucharest declaration was revealing of this caution on the issue of troop reductions. In it, the Soviets proposed phased and gradual reductions by both East and West Germany, but where their own troops were concerned they offered only the ultimate and more remote goal of "withdrawal of forces from foreign territories."

Finally, whatever thought may have been given to paring down the Soviet military presence in Europe during the first two or three years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the clinching argument against doing so undoubtedly came when the reform movement in Czechoslovakia gathered momentum in early 1968. Until this ferment within one of the key Northern Tier countries of the Warsaw Pact subsided or was otherwise resolved, the Soviet Union was hardly in a position to consider reducing its military foothold in the East European countries ringing Czechoslovakia. As matters
turned out, the resort to arms in August 1968 to crush the Czechoslovak reform experiment and the ensuing occupation created a new situation in which the prospect for any significant dilution of Soviet military power in East Europe seemed to have been indefinitely postponed.

B. TRENDS AFFECTING THE SOVIET THEATER FORCES AND THEIR EUROPEAN ROLE

If the invasion of Czechoslovakia conveyed primarily the political lesson that the Soviet Union would not shrink from applying raw force to preserve its hegemony in East Europe, it also told something about the military capacity of the ground-air theater forces which had been employed to conduct the police action against a member of the Warsaw bloc. These forces -- illustrative of the general-purpose theater forces with which Western Europe would have to contend in the event of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw bloc -- acquitted themselves well in the swift surprise invasion of Czechoslovakia. Their performance, about which we shall have more to say later, doubtless brought satisfaction to those military leaders who, from the outset of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, had lobbied against any tendency to downgrade the theater forces and their continental role in Europe. Indeed, it might be said that the employment of the theater forces in the Czechoslovak crisis, first as a major instrument of pressure and ultimately for intervention, capped a series of steps through which the theater forces regained a firmer footing in the Soviet scheme of things than they had enjoyed at the end of the Khrushchev period.
1. Developments Boosting the Status of the General Purpose Forces

Among steps relevant to the improved status of the theater forces was the restoration, in 1967, of a separate command for the Soviet ground forces, the service which accounts for the bulk of the manpower in the theater forces. This command headquarters had been abolished in 1964, at which time the ground forces were subordinated directly to the General Staff in the Ministry of Defense as part of Khrushchev's effort to streamline the military establishment. An article in Krasnaia zvezda on December 24, 1967, which identified General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskii as commander-in-chief of the ground forces, provided the first official indication that the command of the ground forces had been restored, although its re-establishment may have taken place sometime earlier, after Pavlovskii's elevation to the post of deputy defense minister in April 1967. According to Pravda of January 20, 1968, Pavlovskii's recent military assignments had included a tour as commander of the Far East Military District, which gave him first-hand knowledge of an area of growing sensitivity in Soviet military planning. The reintroduction of the ground forces command under him could be interpreted not only as a boost in prestige for these forces but also as a practical reflection of their increased weight in the Soviet military picture. Much the same could be said when, some months later, Pavlovskii turned out to be the Kremlin's choice as commander of the invasion forces and, temporarily, the chief occupation authority in Czechoslovakia.
Another, earlier development suggesting that the general purpose forces had risen in status under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was the recognition of their long-term requirements for a generous supply of trained manpower, as made evident by a new military service law adopted in October 1967. Under the new law, the length of service for conscripted personnel was reduced by one year and compulsory retirement was prescribed for some high-ranking military grades. Apart from the latter provision, which allowed for a much-needed rejuvenation of the military high command, this measure appeared to trade off certain short-term military disadvantages for long-term advantages particularly relevant to the general purpose forces -- the principal user of military manpower in the mass.

By reducing the term of service, the measure promised to lower temporarily the technical proficiency of conscripted personnel, but, by increasing the number of youths inducted annually by 30 to 40 per cent, it would also create a far larger trained reserve to be called upon should it become necessary to expand the size of the Soviet conventional military establishment so as to match a prospective adversary who possessed massive conventional military power. It was this aspect of the new service law which doubtless led some Western experts to regard it in part as a long-range precautionary and warning measure aimed at China, although it would also have an obvious bearing on the Soviet Union's ability to meet the manpower requirements of any "two-front" situation calling for the simultaneous use of theater forces in Europe and the Far East.
2. **Size and Deployment of the Theater Forces**

While attention was thus given to broadening the long-term manpower base of the general purpose forces, there was no apparent move on the part of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, at least up to the Czech crisis in mid-summer of 1968, to boost the standing size of these forces. Throughout the period from Khrushchev's removal to mid-summer 1968, for example, the over-all strength of the ground forces remained at an estimated level of about 2 million men out of a total of slightly more than 3 million in the armed forces, and the number of ground force divisions was kept at about 140.\(^{21}\) No substantial change in the categories of combat readiness and the personnel strength of these divisions was reflected in published Western estimates.\(^{22}\) Tactical air strength available to the combined-arms theater forces likewise remained fairly constant, at an estimated figure of nearly 4000 aircraft.\(^{23}\)

Whether the permanent strength level of the theater forces would be somewhat higher as a result of the mobilization of reserves which occurred in connection with the intervention in Czechoslovakia was not clear at this writing. Various units participating in and supporting the invasion apparently were brought up to combat strength by the call-up of reserves during July and August 1968,\(^{24}\) but there were no reports that the over-all number of around 140 divisions in the theater forces had been increased. Thus, while a temporary rise in both personnel strength and combat readiness of some of these divisions did take place, it might be supposed that as tensions growing out of the Czechoslovak episode subsided, the standing size of the
theater forces would return to approximately what it had been before the invasion.

With regard to the territorial distribution of the theater forces, the over-all pattern of deployment was left much the same under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime as it had been at the time of Khrushchev's ouster, with two notable exceptions. One of these had to do with steps taken to bolster the Soviet posture in Asia; the other was the influx of additional theater force elements into East Europe in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In the first case, so far as the public record permits one to judge, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime began gradually, in 1965 and 1966, to shift some Soviet forces to the Asian military districts of the USSR, and the stationing of some Soviet troops in Outer Mongolia was reported in 1967. However, this strengthening of the Soviet posture in Asia apparently was accomplished by internal redeployment of Soviet units and not by any significant withdrawal of forces stationed in East Europe or immediately adjacent western areas of the USSR. Occasional rumors of Soviet plans to withdraw sizable numbers of troops from East Germany were heard in the summer of 1966 and again in early 1967, but Western sources repeatedly noted that there was no evidence to confirm them. What is more, Moscow itself made no claim that Soviet forces had been withdrawn from East Europe; had they been, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would have passed up the opportunity to seek political credit from such a move. Again, after the Ussuri border flareup of March 1969, there was no indication that Soviet troops were to be withdrawn.
from Europe to stiffen the Soviet position in the Far East. On the contrary, although additional Soviet forces may have been dispatched to the Far East, the Soviet Union also apparently was on the verge of sending more occupation troops into Czechoslovakia.28

With respect to the deployment of theater forces in East Europe, the picture remained essentially stable from the end of the Khrushchev period until the onset of the Czech crisis, with a total of 26 Soviet divisions outside the Soviet Union, supported by about 1200 tactical aircraft. Most of these forces -- 20 divisions and about 800 aircraft -- were stationed in East Germany; the remainder in Hungary and Poland. At the same time, Western estimates placed the number of Soviet divisions in the European USSR at about 60, of which 25 divisions were credited with being capable of commitment to theater operations in Europe within two weeks of the outbreak of war.29 As for the strategic missile units deployed in the Western USSR for employment against targets in the European theater, their strength, too, remained where it had leveled off during the Khrushchev period, at about 700 MRBM and IRBM launchers in fixed sites.30 As mentioned previously, there were indications pointing to the development of mobile missiles in the MRBM-IRBM category, but it was not clear whether these mobile types were meant to replace or to augment the existing MRBM-IRBM force targeted against Europe.

With the unfolding of the Czech crisis in the summer of 1968, the Soviet Union began a series of maneuvers and troop movements which had the effect of substantially increasing the forward deployment of theater force elements in East Europe. As noted earlier, there was considerable
confusion as to how many Soviet troops were involved in the several field maneuvers (in which allied Warsaw Pact troops also took part) prior to the August invasion. The size of the invading forces, as well as the number of troops that stayed on into the occupation period, also remained subject to rather widely varying estimates. For the number of troops directly involved in the invasion of August 20-21 and the peak buildup which took place within the next few days, the estimates began at 250,000 to 300,000 and ran up to 650,000 with the number of divisions ranging from around 20 to 35. The bulk of these were Soviet forces, padded by an estimated 2 to 4 Polish divisions, elements of 2 to 3 East German divisions, and contingents of less than division-size from Hungary and Bulgaria. Furnishing tactical support for these forces were an estimated 400 to 700 combat aircraft, plus about 250 transport aircraft that landed a divisional force of Soviet airborne troops in Prague on the night of the invasion.

Precisely where within the range of estimated figures the size of the invasion forces actually fell can only be surmised. Taking it as a rule of thumb that Soviet military planners would have sought a force superiority of about two to one over the 14 potentially opposing Czechoslovak divisions in order to ensure the quick suppression of any resistance, one might hazard a guess that roughly 22 Soviet divisions plus 4 or 5 other Warsaw Pact divisions were introduced into Czechoslovakia. Given a presumed Soviet division "slice" of 15,000 to 20,000 men, this would come to between 400,000 to 500,000 troops. Some of the rear support elements included in this troop total, as already noted, may have remained outside the country in adjacent border areas.
Since part of the invasion force was assembled from Soviet units previously stationed in East Europe (East Germany, Poland, and Hungary), it was not immediately obvious what the deployment of additional forces from the USSR itself may have been. However, according to various accounts based on NATO sources, it would appear that at least 10 to 11 additional Soviet divisions plus supporting elements—a net increment of perhaps 150,000 to 200,000 men—were deployed from the USSR to augment the 26 divisions already in place in East Europe prior to the invasion.

How large a share of this incremental theater force would remain in Czechoslovakia to occupy the country and man its borders against the West was left an open-ended question during the first two or three months after the invasion. In the unequal negotiations between Dubček and the Soviet leaders in October, as well as in the one-sided treaty "legalizing" the occupation which the Czechs were obliged to sign on October 16, the Soviet Union declined to commit itself on how many troops it would keep in Czechoslovakia or how long their "temporary" stationing would last. This gave rise to anxious speculation in Prague about the intended size of the occupation force, ranging from hopeful Czech comments that it might soon be whittled down to two divisions to more pessimistic appraisals that it would remain at least three or four times that size.

But by early December 1968, following the first announced withdrawal of some occupation units several weeks earlier, reports from Prague indicated that the bulk of the Soviet troops had been removed, leaving behind a force estimated at between 60,000 and 100,000 men in four to five
divisions, which presumably would constitute the garrison "legalized" by the status-of-forces treaty signed in Moscow the previous October. Although the Soviet Union itself remained silent on its long-term occupation plans for Czechoslovakia, doubtless having made them contingent upon that country's progress toward "normalization," it appeared, as winter set in, that Moscow had settled for an occupation force representing perhaps about one-third of the troops brought in from the USSR during the invasion. Thus, the forward deployment of Soviet theater forces in East Europe remained only marginally greater than the level traditionally maintained in that region. To some extent, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Soviet invasion force may have been spurred by Western charges that the Soviet Union had upset the postwar military balance in Central Europe by introducing large forces into Czechoslovakia. But this is a separate question, to which we shall return presently. First, let us review briefly various measures taken under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to improve the capabilities of the Soviet theater forces.

3. Measures To Improve Theater Force Capabilities

Concurrent with doctrinal trends during the first years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime which had given renewed emphasis to the need for enabling the theater forces to cope with a broad range of operational conditions, various measures were taken to improve their capabilities for operating in both a nuclear and a conventional environment. In the ground forces, these measures included the provision of more tubed artillery to increase conventional
firepower; the incorporation of a motorized rifle division in tank armies, the further introduction of new equipment such as the T-62 medium tank, mobile anti-aircraft weapons, and modified tactical missile and rocket launchers; the increased application of cross-country fuel supply techniques; and attempts to improve command and control through wider automation.\footnote{41} As the new commander of the ground forces and other Soviet officials occasionally pointed out, even if one did not take into account the nuclear weapons at the disposal of these forces, their firepower had been greatly increased by improvements in both the quality and the quantity of conventional weapons available to them.\footnote{42}

In tactical air units, replacement of older aircraft with MIG-21 and Su-7 fighter bombers and the Yak-28 supersonic light bomber continued; meanwhile, several new aircraft types, including a variable-wing aircraft resembling the American F-111, were displayed at the Moscow air show in July 1967, indicating that further modernization of tactical air units was in prospect.\footnote{43} In training exercises, as previously mentioned, emphasis was also put on quick airlift reinforcement for theater forces, although, according to some Western studies of the Soviet threat against NATO, these forces remained deficient in the balanced support elements that would be needed for any lengthy, large-scale operations in Europe.\footnote{44}

With respect to preparations for possible operations in local areas outside Europe or the Eurasian mainland, some elements of the general purpose forces were, of course, involved in what we described in the preceding chapter as an effort by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to extend the
reach of Soviet conventional power. But, although the improvement of amphibious landing, airborne, and naval capabilities helped to broaden the prospective operating zones of the theater forces, and perhaps foreshadowed the day when a stronger Soviet military presence might be projected into the Mediterranean basin on the southern flank of NATO, the main share of resources and energies devoted to the general purpose forces still went largely into preparing them for their long-standing theater role in Europe proper.

Among the training activities illustrative of the continued European orientation of the theater forces was the "Dnepr" exercise held in the western USSR in September 1967. Billed as the largest of its kind in recent years, this exercise involved extensive ground-air maneuvers in the Ukraine and Belorussia, presumably to test the preparedness of the theater forces for their continental role in Europe. Although large-scale exercises of the theater forces as well as other elements of the Soviet armed forces are held from time to time as a normal part of the training cycle, they almost never receive a publicity comparable to that accorded the "Dnepr" maneuvers. The September 1967 maneuvers included tank and motorized infantry penetrations up to 500 miles, helicopter landings and airlift reinforcement, as well as supporting tactical missile and air strikes. Although some Soviet accounts mentioned the participation of strategic missile units, no explicit reference was made to simulated use of nuclear weapons, suggesting that the Soviets were interested in underscoring the conventional warfare aspects of the exercise.
An additional point of some interest was that other Warsaw Pact military personnel did not participate in the "Dnepr" exercise except as observers. Inasmuch as for several years previously the Soviet Union had habitually given wide publicity only to theater exercises involving joint collaboration with other Warsaw bloc forces, this departure from custom might be taken to mean that Moscow was again envisaging circumstances in which Soviet forces might find themselves operating in the European arena outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact. If this were so, it not only would imply that by 1967 Soviet relations with the rest of the Pact members had deteriorated more than was apparent on the surface; it might also suggest that Soviet military policy toward the Warsaw Pact was beginning to shift away from the principle of greater reliance on East European forces, which had been adopted during the Khru- shchev period. As we shall see presently, the merits of this principle were again to be tested by the events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. For the moment, however, we are interested in what the military operation against Czechoslovakia revealed with respect to the capabilities of the Soviet theater forces.

4. Czechoslovakia: The Theater Forces in Action

It must first be said, of course, that the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia lacked one essential ingredient of a realistic test of theater forces in action: organized armed opposition. Nevertheless, the operation provided an opportunity unparalleled since World War II to observe the performance of a large force of combat-ready Soviet
armored and motorized rifle formations, together with rear echelon and air support elements. The invasion brought together, under Soviet command, forces from five countries in a massive coordinated operation -- on a scale almost as large as would be involved in a major military thrust against NATO's central front in Europe. By contrast, the military suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 had involved the active use of only seven Soviet divisions.

Western accounts (the only ones to provide any military details of the Czechoslovak invasion) are generally agreed that the operation was impressive. Meticulous planning and advance preparations were manifest in the assembly of forces for the operation and in the high degree of tactical surprise achieved, in keeping, incidentally, with Soviet doctrine that a theater attack is best launched under the cover of field exercises. The operation itself was conducted without an observable hitch, almost with field-manual perfection. In particular, the seizure of Prague by airborne forces, quickly backed up by nighttime armored penetration from the country's borders was faultlessly executed in the brief period of about four hours.

In the wake of this performance by the forces which in effect constituted the core of the Soviet Union's conventional striking power in the European theater, several points stood out. First, even though the ground-air combat units had been put through their paces under conditions much less severe than on a live battlefield, the size and coordinated nature of the operation had nonetheless imposed exacting demands on communications and logistic support elements; this test, it seemed, had been met efficiently, suggesting that Western assessments of deficiencies in the support of theater forces might require some revision.
Second, the theater forces had been raised to a higher level of combat readiness than at any time in recent years, and they had demonstrated a capacity for a quick initial strike and mobile penetration that seemed to meet the prescription of Soviet theater warfare doctrine for rapidly unfolding offensive operations. To the extent that some in the West, especially in West Germany, still felt concern about a possible Soviet attempt to carry out a swift action against an exposed objective, such as Hamburg or Berlin, and thereby present the West with a fait accompli, this was hardly reassuring. At the same time, however, despite the tactical surprise achieved by the invasion forces, their buildup and positioning had required several weeks of preinvasion maneuvering, which gave NATO strategic warning and thus provided at least an opportunity to put Western defenses on the alert.

A third point relevant to the capabilities of the Soviet theater forces was that some of the combat-ready formations introduced into Czechoslovakia had come equipped with tactical missiles that customarily are allotted a nuclear role. According to Western reports, Soviet tactical missile units moved into a closely guarded military area vacated by the Czechoslovak troops at Mlada, north of Prague. Although it was not known whether these units actually brought along nuclear warheads, their inclusion in the invasion order-of-battle was a tacit reminder that the Soviet theater forces could call upon nuclear as well as conventional firepower. Inasmuch as the establishment of Soviet control over Czechoslovakia was hardly a task requiring nuclear arms, this reminder presumably was meant to put NATO on notice that the Soviet forces had come...
prepared to fight a nuclear-equipped adversary, if necessary.

Finally, perhaps the principal and most contentious point to emerge in a military context in the immediate aftermath of the invasion was whether the introduction of additional combat-ready Soviet theater forces into Czechoslovakia had upset the European military balance and adversely affected the stability of deterrence in Europe. During the first three postinvasion months, while the bulk of the Soviet forces remained in Czechoslovakia, it was widely asserted in the West that the new lodgment of Soviet military power opposite West Germany's southern flank in Bavaria had altered the long-standing balance of power. While not necessarily to be taken as indicating that the Soviet Union intended to take military action against Western Europe, its entry into Czechoslovakia and the resultant forward concentration of Soviet theater forces in Central Europe were seen as a destabilizing element in the European military environment. Not only were these forces so positioned as to give the Soviet Union certain military advantages in terms of territorial access and reduced warning time for a potential jumpoff against southern Germany or Austria, but their forward deployment could compel NATO planners to lower the threshold for employment of nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO area.

On the other hand, different views also were advanced in the West as to the net effect of the Soviet theater forces buildup in the Northern Tier of the Warsaw Pact. Some observers held, for example, that the forward deployment of additional Soviet forces was offset by the probable unreliability of the Czechoslovak armed forces, thus leaving
the over-all military balance between the two alliances essentially unchanged. As for the impact of the Soviet military presence in Czechoslovakia upon the stability of the European military environment, it could be argued that the very buildup of Soviet forces in Central Europe, by making it likely that NATO would be obliged to seek earlier recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of an attack, might serve as a further deterrent to any intemperate Soviet action against the West. Nevertheless, until about mid-November of 1968, following a series of internal NATO studies and reviews in the wake of the invasion, the prevailing opinion within NATO seemed to be that the European military balance had been, in General Lemnitzer's words, "significantly altered to the disadvantage of the West" by the influx of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia, and that future NATO political and military planning should be based on the assumption of the "unpredictability" of Soviet behavior.

In November, however, with the accretion of evidence that most of the Soviet forces were being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, the argument that the August invasion had unhinged the European military balance began to lose conviction. Whereas the deployment of eleven added Soviet divisions and supporting elements in Central Europe certainly could be considered to have tipped the previous fine balance of conventional arms, the same could hardly be said about the presence of only four or five additional divisions, which were less likely to be poised against the West than preoccupied with keeping the Czechoslovaks in line. Indeed, at the ministerial session of the NATO Council in Brussels on November 15-16, 1968, the issue of the military balance no longer was emphasized;
rather, the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia, together with Moscow's new doctrine of intervention (the "Brezhnev doctrine"), was said to have given rise to uncertainties in the face of which the NATO allies were obliged to reassess and improve the state of their defenses.

Although at the time it remained to be seen what responsive measures NATO would prove willing to carry out and how painful the Soviet Union might find them, it did appear that the Soviet leaders had been somewhat embarrassed by charges that the USSR was upsetting the balance of forces in Europe. At least, by choosing to pull back most of the forces they had sent into Czechoslovakia, they conveyed the impression that they were more interested in returning to something like the status quo in East-West military power in Europe than in bolstering the Soviet military posture against the West by leaving substantially greater conventional firepower deployed at NATO's doorstep. For its part, NATO had been made freshly aware of the mobile capabilities of the Soviet theater forces and of the Soviet Union's potential for tipping the conventional arms balance on the European continent at short notice should it once again elect to increase the forward deployment of these forces in Central Europe.

C. THE WARSAW PACT AND SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

As previously noted, Soviet policy with respect to the Warsaw Pact initially bore much the same features under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime as in the Khrushchev period. Thus, the Warsaw Pact was called upon to play two basic, though sometimes rather incompatible, roles in Soviet policy: first, as a military coalition to
counter NATO and augment the Soviet Union's own military capacities against the West; second, as an internal mechanism for promoting political cohesion within the bloc and, when necessary, enforcing Soviet control over potentially errant bloc members.

Although reconciling the Pact's internal policing function with the task of improving its collective military efficiency against the West was to become increasingly troublesome for the Soviet Union, especially after the 1968 crisis over Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime for a time appeared to be making reasonably good progress in building up the military potential of the joint Warsaw Pact forces. Among steps contributing to this end were joint field exercises, commanders' conferences, and Soviet military mission activities in the various Warsaw Pact countries, all aimed at a more thorough integration of the East European armed forces into Soviet operational plans. At the same time, the Soviet Union also went ahead with programs for the reequipment and modernization of the Pact forces, particularly those of the Northern Tier countries, in order to bring their capabilities better into line with their enlarged theater responsibilities.

1. The Pattern of Joint Warsaw Pact Training Exercises

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of Soviet military policy toward the Warsaw Pact under the new regime was the practice of holding multinational field maneuvers of Pact forces in various parts of East Europe, with at least one major joint exercise a year and one or more of smaller scope. Between the time of Khrushchev's removal,
in the fall of 1964, and August 1968 about seventeen such joint theater maneuvers took place, compared with nine during the Khrushchev period. As the detailed listing of these maneuvers under the preceding footnote indicates, the Pact forces most frequently involved along with Soviet troops in East Europe were from the countries of the Northern Tier: East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In keeping with her pivotal role and location, East Germany took part in nineteen joint exercises -- more than any other Soviet ally -- and was the host territory on fourteen occasions.

The trend toward emphasis on the Northern Tier countries grew much more pronounced after the advent of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime; only one of the seventeen exercises held after the autumn of 1964 -- that involving Rumanian and Bulgarian participation with Soviet forces, in August 1967 -- took place in the Southern Tier area. The two largest and most highly publicized of the joint exercises prior to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 -- "October Storm" in October 1965 and "Vltava" in September 1966 -- both occurred in Northern Tier territory, although the "Vltava" maneuvers in Czechoslovakia drew Hungary into association with the Northern Tier for the first time. The majority of the maneuvers were staged in a land battlefield setting, occasionally with coordinated naval exercises and coastal landings in the Black Sea or Baltic areas. Joint exercises involving only naval units of some of the Warsaw Pact countries also were held from time to time, but usually without the publicity accorded the combined ground-air maneuvers. The same was true of periodic joint air defense exercises.
The scenario followed in most of the exercises had hostile forces launching the first attack, being contained, and then destroyed by a counterattack of Pact forces. In most of the larger exercises, including "October Storm" and "Vltava," there was a simulated nuclear exchange initiated by hostile forces. (By contrast, in the non-Warsaw Pact "Dnepr" exercise in the Soviet Union, in September 1967, as previously observed, attention was given primarily to the conventional character of the operations.) From the fall of 1964 on, airborne and amphibious landings also were more frequently demonstrated in the combined exercises. Soviet officers directed the majority of the joint maneuvers, but at one time or another each East European country, except Hungary, was accorded the well-publicized honor of furnishing the nominal exercise commander. The size of the larger annual maneuvers ranged from about 40,000 to 60,000 troops, and their active duration -- not counting assembly period, post-exercise ceremonies, and so on -- was around three or four days. The smaller exercises involved fewer troops and generally had an active phase of one or two days.

In assessing the maneuvers that took place during the first year or so of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, some Western experts argued that the military value of the joint Warsaw Pact exercises was clearly secondary to their political function of demonstrating the unity and common purpose of the bloc. This view rested partly on the propaganda character of the extensive Warsaw Pact literature on the joint maneuvers, and partly on the argument that the welding of the several armies of the bloc into a single, integrated military force was not likely to be
served by maneuvers involving for the most part only relatively small formations of selected Pact forces, in contrast with the NATO practice of wide-scale unit participation in annual exercises. In particular, it was questioned whether the modest scale and short duration of most of the maneuvers provided an adequate test of the logistical support capabilities of the Pact forces for extended, theater-wide campaigns.

Although such criticism probably was valid until about 1966, it would appear somewhat dated in light of later developments. The frequency and scope of the joint maneuvers not only increased substantially in 1967 and 1968, but as suggested by the series of exercises that culminated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- the forces of at least the five participating Pact countries doubtless gained much collective military experience in operational coordination, logistical support, joint field and staff activities, and the like. To be sure, the "integrated" military enterprise which unfolded against Czechoslovakia was largely dominated by Soviet forces, emphasizing once more that the main burden of any Warsaw Pact military undertakings in Europe was still on the Soviet Union. Indeed, the very concept of joint Warsaw Pact forces unified in a common cause was severely shaken by the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Despite the fact that the joint exercises of 1968 were linked much more intimately with Soviet efforts to halt unfavorable internal trends in the Warsaw bloc than with the task of improving the Pact's collective military capability against an external foe, there was no indication that the Soviet Union was writing off the chances of
achieving better-integrated Pact forces through the medium of joint maneuvers. On the contrary, after the invasion, in urging the countries of the "socialist commonwealth" to strengthen their military alliance against the "growing aggressiveness" of NATO, Soviet spokesmen stressed that joint maneuvers would continue to have "an important place" among various "practical measures for improving collective defense." At the same time, the circumstances in which joint military exercises occurred in early 1969 suggested that the Soviet Union was also quite prepared to perpetuate the use of such exercises for the purposes of internal Warsaw bloc politics.

2. Modernization of the Pact Forces with Emphasis on the Northern Tier

Parallel with the practice of holding periodic joint maneuvers, the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime also continued the programs instituted under Khrushchev to reequip and modernize the East European armed forces. This activity became more selective, however, with the flow of new ground and air equipment from the Soviet Union tending to favor the Northern Tier countries. Polish, Czech, and East German divisions, for example, were the main recipients of such Soviet matériel as T-55 tanks, self-propelled AA guns, and amphibious personnel carriers, and their tactical air units were strengthened by additional deliveries of advanced aircraft like the MIG-21 and the Su-7. The Northern Tier countries also apparently were encouraged and assisted in placing their own defense production industries on a more nearly self-sufficient basis, using standard Soviet specifications to insure compatibility of weapons and equipment.
The chief exception to this sharing of arms production technology lay in the nuclear and missile fields, which the Soviet Union manifestly intended to reserve to itself. Tactical missile delivery systems, the first of which had been furnished to the East European countries under a program started by Khrushchev in 1964, continued to be supplied in modest numbers by the Soviet Union, as were air defense missile systems of the SA-2 type employed in North Vietnam. Nuclear munitions, however, remained in Soviet hands, as had been the case from the beginning. As we shall see presently, however, the problem of nuclear sharing and control within the Warsaw Pact evidently was a source of some difficulty for the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.

From the standpoint of size, the East European components of the Warsaw Pact -- like the Soviet Union's own forces -- remained fairly stable during the first years of the new regime, although here, too, some differentiation was apparent between the countries of the Northern and those of the Southern Tier. Rumania, for example, reduced the level of its armed forces by some 30,000 men in the mid-sixties, and Hungary also apparently cut its forces slightly; but in the other Pact countries there were no appreciable changes. By mid-1968, the over-all number of men under arms throughout East Europe stood at between 850,000 and 900,000, of which the three Northern Tier countries had supplied some 600,000. Of the total of about 62 East European divisions, the Northern Tier countries accounted for 35, and their air forces owned some 1700 of the 2400 combat aircraft in the East European inventory. In naval forces, Poland and East Germany...
together continued to overshadow the remainder of the East European Pact members. Czechoslovakia, the landlocked member of the Northern Tier trio, had no navy, of course, but her army and air force strength was close behind that of Poland, the strongest military power of the Warsaw Pact apart from the Soviet Union itself. 69

The August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia produced at least a temporary change in the Warsaw Pact strength in East Europe, although most of this was due to the forward deployment of additional Soviet theater forces. Whether the four East European Pact countries that took part in the invasion mobilized some of their reserves was not made clear, but Rumania -- the notable abstainer from the intervention -- was prompted to bolster her regular forces and militia during the postinvasion period, when rumors were rife that Rumania might be the next target of disciplinary action. 70 The most significantly affected armed forces, of course, were those of Czechoslovakia herself. Although no formal cutback in their size was announced, they were effectively neutralized until the outcome of the Soviet-imposed "normalization" process had become clear. In October 1968, according to some reports, the Soviet Union was insisting on a housecleaning within the Czech armed forces that was to include a one-third reduction in their size -- a step which the Prague government itself might have welcomed in view of its economic difficulties and of the fact that its forces were virtually immobilized by the occupation anyway. 71

In terms of the over-all military posture of the Warsaw alliance, it may be presumed that the process of training and modernization of the East European forces
which went forward under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in the three-and-a-half years before the Czech invasion had helped to bring these forces, especially the Northern Tier group, somewhat closer to the standards of combat capability and readiness governing the Soviet Union's own theater forces in the European arena. Whereas in 1964, toward the end of Khrushchev's rule, no more than half of the East European forces had been considered fit for fairly early commitment to combat operations, during the next couple of years, according to some Western estimates, the proportion crept up to about two-thirds. However, this picture of steady progress toward improvement of the Warsaw Pact's military potential was not without its negative aspects. Even before the policing operation against Czechoslovakia, whose effects might well damage the integrity and military effectiveness of the Northern Tier regional structure upon which Moscow had previously bestowed a great deal of attention, a variety of problems in the management of Warsaw Pact military affairs had confronted the Soviet leadership. At least some of these problems were likely to make the attainment of a well-integrated military posture difficult and uncertain.

D. PROBLEMS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY AFFAIRS

Several of the issues which faced the Moscow leadership in the management of military relations with the other Warsaw Pact members were essentially carryovers from the Khrushchev period; others emerged after his departure. Among the first category was undoubtedly the question of how to share the economic burden of Warsaw Pact military
activities. One aspect of this problem -- the question of who should pay for the maintenance of Soviet occupation forces -- went back to the early days after World War II when Soviet troops were first stationed in East Europe. In the course of time, according to the limited data available on this question, the Soviet Union gradually reduced the charges for Soviet troop maintenance in East Germany from $900 million annually in 1949 to $350 million in 1957, and reportedly lifted the obligation entirely in 1959. After status-of-forces agreements were signed with Poland and Hungary in 1957, these countries, too, presumably were freed from direct support of Soviet garrison costs. However, as suggested by Rumanian complaints in 1966 about the expense of maintaining Soviet troops in East Europe, the question apparently had not been laid to rest. As no Soviet troops had been stationed in Rumania herself since 1958, the complaint suggests the expenses of Soviet troop maintenance may have been prorated within the Warsaw Pact.

A second aspect of the cost issue, on the other hand, seemed to cut the other way, to judge by occasional hints from Moscow that a large and perhaps undue share of the overhead for collective Warsaw Pact defense was being borne by the Soviet Union. In particular, the Soviet Union emphasized that it was carrying the burden of resources for the nuclear "shield" behind which the rest of the Eastern bloc took shelter. One may suppose that the Soviet leaders were not enthusiastic about helping to foot the additional bill for the procurement and training programs designed to bring the various national forces of the East European countries up to a common level of modernization
and integration. Unfortunately, little information is available on how these costs may have been distributed, but the chances are that each country was expected to pay its own way.

In this connection, the military budgets of the various East European Pact members tended to follow the upward curve of Soviet military expenditures in the period after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime came to power. As the size of their forces remained essentially unchanged, this suggests that the budget increases were meant to absorb the costs of reequipment and modernization. The sharpest of these annual budgetary hikes came after the Soviet announcement, in October 1967, of a 15 per cent increase in Soviet military outlays for 1968. In the next few months, all but two of the other Pact countries boosted their military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent. The exceptions were East Germany, which in December 1967 announced a surprising increase of more than 50 per cent, and Rumania, which acted last with a mere 4 per cent increase.

Another Soviet step which some of the East European countries appeared ready to emulate was the reduction in terms of service prescribed by the new Soviet military service law in the fall of 1967. Early in 1968, East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia indicated that they would follow suit. Rumania had anticipated the others by several years, having cut back the term of service for draftees from 24 to 16 months in 1964. At the time, this move had not been welcomed by Soviet officers concerned with improving the military efficiency of the Warsaw Pact forces. Nor were they likely, in 1968, to regard the reduction of compulsory military service in other East
European countries as a useful contribution to the collective efficiency of the Pact, but by then it had become a matter of East Europe's following the Soviet example, and they were in a poor position to complain.

1. Nuclear Policy Issues

Among other Warsaw Pact policy problems that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime inherited from Khrushchev was the issue of nuclear access and control within the alliance. Although this issue came to the surface in the Warsaw Pact less frequently than did the comparable question in NATO, the preservation of the Soviet Union's jealously-guarded nuclear monopoly evidently was not without troubles for the Soviet leadership. Perhaps the first development in the context of the Warsaw Pact that had posed at least potential problems of nuclear policy for the Kremlin was the decision under Khrushchev to provide the East European forces with the means of nuclear delivery in the form of tactical missiles and advanced fighter-bomber aircraft. This step raised a series of policy questions concerning the arrangements, both in peace and in war, under which nuclear warheads for these delivery systems might be made available to the Soviet Union's allies.

However, Moscow cast little light on such arrangements. Despite the fact that East European forces were given training in nuclear warfare methods during joint exercises, and although there were some indications that "joint nuclear forces" had been formally established, the Soviet Union repeatedly declined to comment on its procedures for controlling nuclear access within the Warsaw alliance, in contrast to the detailed disclosure of nuclear safeguards
and controls within NATO. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was generally assumed (and, in the opinion of the author, rightly so) that the Soviet Union had seen to it that nuclear warheads were kept well out of reach of its allies, an impression bolstered by the occasional informal remarks of Soviet officials. 81

Whether its partners for their part were altogether satisfied with the nuclear situation within the Warsaw Pact was far from clear. From time to time, there were hints that some of the East European countries were finding the Soviet formula for management of nuclear matters in need of revision. At least two separate issues seem to have been involved: that of East European access to nuclear weapons, or nuclear sharing; and that of participation in nuclear planning and strategy. With respect to the first issue, there was some suggestion that the question of East European access to nuclear weapons was raised at the Pact consultative meeting in Warsaw in January 1965, which had been convened to consider new Warsaw Pact defense measures in the event that the West's MLF project -- with its supposed granting of nuclear access to West Germany -- were to be carried out. 82

Presumably, any discussion of countersteps by the Warsaw alliance would have touched on the question of opening similar "access" to its members, especially East Germany, upon whose initiative the January meeting apparently had been called. However, pointed Soviet reminders after this meeting that "the security of the socialist countries is guaranteed by the nuclear-missile might of the Soviet Union," 83 could be interpreted as a rebuff to any East European pleas for some form of nuclear sharing. 84
the Warsaw Pact partners did indeed bring serious internal pressure to bear against Moscow on the access issue, it was probably pretty well deflated by 1968, when the nuclear nonproliferation treaty provided the Soviet Union with a handy instrument to formalize permanently its nuclear monopoly within the Warsaw alliance.

On the issue of broader consultation within the Warsaw Pact on nuclear strategy and the use of nuclear weapons, Rumania appears to have taken the initiative in questioning the Soviet Union's right to decide such matters for itself. As previously noted, Rumania had taken constitutional steps as early as mid-1965 to insure against being committed to war by a Soviet decision; and in May 1966, a leaked proposal of apparently Rumanian origin for reform of Warsaw Pact procedures included a demand for prior consultation on nuclear employment. This challenge to the Soviet Union's prerogative of nuclear decision-making came to the surface after a private session of Pact leaders in February 1966 in East Berlin, where the Soviet spokesmen reportedly had balked at Rumanian insistence on a larger East European role in Warsaw Pact military planning. Later, as differences arose between Bucharest and Moscow over the proposed terms of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, a further dimension was added to Rumanian criticism of the Soviet nuclear monopoly. By siding with those states that were questioning the adequacy of guarantees offered by the nuclear powers for the defense of nonnuclear countries, Bucharest seemed not only to be challenging the Soviet Union's right to use nuclear weapons without consulting the other Warsaw Pact members but also to be implying that Moscow might prove reluctant to employ its nuclear arsenal in their defense.
That Rumania was not alone in harboring such doubts was suggested by the remarks of a Czech radio commentator in early 1968. Discussing the problems facing the Warsaw Pact consultative meeting in Sofia in March, the Czech spokesman took note of Rumania's attitude on the point that "nonnuclear states will not have access to the great powers' nuclear weapons," a point which, he said, "also concerns the other members of the Warsaw Pact."88 The nature of this concern, he indicated, had grown in part out of "certain changes" in Soviet military doctrine, especially as pertained to the concept of local wars, according to which "it is, in fact, very probable that the other countries of the Pact would become a theater of war, without sufficient guarantees of nuclear defense." Although the commentator held out hope that "differences of opinion between the socialist countries" on such matters could be "successfully bridged," he also left the impression that other Pact members might join Rumania in raising potentially divisive questions about Soviet nuclear strategy. In his words,

If the creators of Soviet strategic concepts today no longer consider it necessary to reply to an attack on one of the socialist countries with a nuclear strike causing wholesale destruction, the Warsaw Pact member countries might ask some questions similar to those which some time ago caused de Gaulle to quit NATO.

2. Pressures for Reform of the Pact's Military Command Structure

In a sense, nuclear policy issues were but one aspect of a broader set of problems relating to command and decision-making within the Warsaw Pact with which the Brezhnev-
Kosygin regime found it necessary to deal. Although the need for changes in the Pact's organizational and command structure was publicly recognized almost from the outset of the new regime, the views of some of the East European Pact members concerning the nature and the purpose of such changes evidently differed widely from those of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the reforms advocated by some of the Soviet Union's partners called for a new command machinery, and a new balance of power in decisionmaking, which implicitly challenged the traditional structure of Soviet authority within the Pact.

As it stood when the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime took office, the Warsaw Pact command structure was such as to allow little room for East European influence upon the operational and strategic leadership of the Pact forces. The supreme commander and the chief-of-staff of these forces were Soviet officers, with control over all national units assigned to them, and a special branch of the Soviet General Staff was known to serve as the planning and coordinating center for Pact military activities. The head and the majority of officials of the Joint Secretariat, an administrative body located in Moscow, were likewise Russians. Extant Soviet literature on the direction of joint Pact operations in wartime suggested that Soviet military men would exercise command on the major fronts, and control over the integrated air defense system of the bloc countries rested in Soviet hands. Moreover, the Soviet military missions maintained in the various Warsaw Pact capitals apparently exercised influence over the national military establishments outside formal Pact channels as well as through them.
Although the Soviet Union showed some deference to its Warsaw Pact partners by such palliative devices as placing East European defense officials in nominal charge of occasional joint military exercises, it took no steps in the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime that promised to cut into the substance of Soviet control. When key posts in the Warsaw Pact command structure fell vacant, for example, they invariably were refilled with Soviet officers. In the military planning and strategy of the alliance, the Soviet Union likewise yielded little to any pressures for change from its allies.

Pressures for reform of the Soviet-dominated command structure had first been publicly reflected, in 1966-1967, in the Rumanian proposals for nuclear consultation and for rotation of the supreme commander's job among non-Soviet officers. Again in early 1968 it became known that the March meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee in Sofia had debated "certain problems connected with the work of the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact." The conferees had failed to agree on measures for reform of the Pact command structure, but, according to Rumania's Ceausescu, they undertook to "draw up proposals for improvement of the activity of this command," to be submitted within a six-month period. Less than three weeks later, however, Pact leaders were convened in Dresden in connection with the Czech crisis. Rumania was not invited.

According to the communiqué of the Dresden meeting, "the determination was unanimously confirmed to carry out practical measures in the immediate future to consolidate the Warsaw Pact and its armed forces." On the face of it, this suggested that the Soviet leaders had tired of
trying to reach an accommodation on Pact reforms with Rumania, and had seized the opportunity presented by the latter's exclusion from the Dresden meeting to wrap up a set of reform measures more to their own liking. Precisely what "practical measures" were to be carried out in the immediate future to consolidate the Pact's command structure was left undisclosed. It might be presumed, however, that at this particular time the Soviet Union was interested in measures that would permit tighter centralized military control within the alliance and that would help Moscow to deal more effectively with any member states it might regard as prone to shirk their Pact commitments, such as Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

The fact that Czechoslovakia had been pressing privately for substantial Pact reforms along lines espoused more publicly by Rumania came into the open during the July phase of the Soviet-Czech crisis of 1968, largely as a result of disclosures by Lt. General Vaclav Prchlik, then chief of the Czechoslovak Central Committee's department of military and security affairs. In a memorable press conference on July 15, at a time when Soviet troops were still on Czech soil after a joint Warsaw Pact exercise in June, General Prchlik called for basic revision of the Warsaw Pact to insure "the real equality of the individual members of this coalition." Stating that non-Soviet representatives on the Pact's joint command had been relegated to liaison roles, Prchlik said: "This is why our party presented proposals in the past for the creation of the prerequisites for the joint command to competently discharge its functions." Such prerequisites, he said, should include arrangements to permit
non-Soviet representatives "to participate in the whole
process of learning and deciding, in the whole command
system. So far the proper conclusions have not been made."

Prchlik's remarks touched also on several other areas
of needed reform: guarantees to prevent use of the Warsaw
Treaty by a group of its members against another member;
strengthening of the Pact's Political Consultative Com-
mittee; reaffirmation of the principle that no Pact mem-
ber has the right arbitrarily to station forces on an-
other partner's territory; and creation of appropriate
conditions for an individual state to contribute its own
views on military doctrine. Most of these criticisms were
endorsed in somewhat more diplomatic language the next day
by the Czechoslovak Defense Minister Martin Dzur. 101

In a harsh rejoinder to Prchlik, the Soviet press
accused him of distortion and slander, refusing to con-
cede that officers of "the Czechoslovak and other frater-
nal armies" had been treated as other than "equals among
equals," and charging that his "irresponsible statements
about the Warsaw Pact" were directed against "the inter-
est of the socialist community." 102 Nevertheless, it
is reasonable to suppose that the critical attitude to-
ward Soviet domination of Pact arrangements that was
voiced, first, by the Rumanians and later by Czech
spokesmen was in some measure shared by other East Euro-
pean members of the alliance. At any rate, some months
after the Czechoslovak intervention itself, which tempo-
arily caused the discussions on reorganization to be
shelved, the Soviet Union found it expedient to embrace
organizational reforms by which it seemed, on the surface
at least, to be yielding to pressures for a broader East
European voice in the management of joint military activities.

3. Questions Bearing on the Future Military Role of Moscow's Warsaw Pact Partners

During the first few years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the Soviet Union, in general, had tended to accord the East European armed forces growing weight in both peacetime and potential wartime contributions to Warsaw Pact defense. Several factors may have helped to account for this. First, the reliability of the East European forces, with the probable exception of Rumania, could be regarded by Moscow as reasonably good, even though there may have been some residual doubt about how the East European armies might conduct themselves under adverse circumstances. Second, the military effectiveness of the East European forces, especially those of the strategically situated Northern Tier countries, had steadily improved, and though these forces still fell somewhat short of the capabilities of the best Soviet units, they represented nevertheless a respectable share of the Warsaw bloc's theater warfare potential in Europe. Finally, the Soviet Union's military dependence on the East European countries also seemed to grow gradually in keeping with the policy of closer military integration pursued since Khrushchev's day.

True, this dependence on the Warsaw bloc allies had in one sense been reduced by such factors as the sizable Soviet strategic missile forces trained on Western Europe from the USSR itself, forces which could serve either deterrent or war-waging functions without much regard for
belt of Warsaw Pact territory that lay in between. Other considerations, however, suggested that on balance the Soviet Union's need for the military cooperation of its Warsaw allies had tended to increase. For example, in the event of war under nuclear conditions, the difficulty of deploying large Soviet reinforcements from the USSR would place a premium on having effective Warsaw Pact forces already in position close to the arena of European conflict. In the event of nonnuclear hostilities, large East European forces trained and equipped to supplement Soviet conventional theater capabilities also would be a valuable asset, the more so if renewed doctrinal speculation on the possibility of conventional operations of substantial scale should prove right.

Even in the more likely event that no major East-West military conflict broke out in Europe, there were other things to be said for a Soviet policy of greater military dependence on the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. For example, the presence of competent and reliable allied forces in East Europe could give the Soviet Union considerable flexibility in managing local crises where it might wish to avoid direct involvement of its own military power. Or, should the Soviet Union find it necessary to withdraw some of its troops from East Europe in connection with new collective security and arms control arrangements, the existence of viable East European armed forces again would serve as a useful prop for Soviet policy. Finally, close military cooperation with East Europe could prove an important symbolic, if not a direct military, asset for Moscow in any confrontation with Maoist China which might arise.
From the early part of 1968 or perhaps some months before, however, developments in East Europe began to call into question many of the assumptions underlying a Soviet policy of placing greater reliance on the East European armed forces. In particular, the turn of events in Czechoslovakia ran increasingly counter to Moscow's hopes of improving the military cohesion of the Warsaw alliance by bringing the Northern Tier countries into tighter association with the Soviet Union. Although in March 1968 Czechoslovakia went along in principle with the findings of the Dresden meeting and disavowed any intention of cutting back her Warsaw Pact commitments, the Dubcek regime's policies offered little promise that the country was prepared to accept more binding military and political links with its Northern Tier neighbors. On the contrary, the more independent direction in which Czechoslovakia appeared to be moving threatened to undermine even the existing military arrangements in the Northern Tier.

From a strategic standpoint, Czechoslovakia occupied perhaps a slightly less critical position in the Northern Tier area than did either East Germany, where the lodgment of Soviet military power was vital to the Soviet Union's security and political interest in maintaining a divided Germany, or Poland, through which passed the Soviet line of communications with the German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, the forward location of Czechoslovakia, and particularly the possibility of losing military access to her territory, doubtless constituted important factors in Moscow's decision to intervene in August 1968.

If in an immediate sense the intervention enabled the Soviet Union to plug a potential breach in the Northern
Tier by introducing substantial forces into Czechoslovakia, it could hardly have failed to raise anew some fundamental questions concerning Soviet military relations with the other Warsaw bloc countries, including the extent to which the Soviet Union would henceforth be able to count upon the military contributions of the East European members of the Pact. In one form or another, perhaps the central military policy issue for Moscow was whether to continue in the direction of closer multilateral cooperation with the other Warsaw alliance members or to scrap this principle in favor of other military arrangements in East Europe, possibly outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

A number of factors suggested that the Soviet Union was likely to pursue the first alternative, continuing its efforts to improve the military potential of the East European armed forces and their capacity for joint action. Militarily, the doubtful status of Czechoslovakia's forces gave added significance to those of neighboring East European countries as a supplement to Soviet conventional theater capabilities. Soviet access to East European territory was still required, for the same military reasons as before: to provide a defensive cushion against any armed incursion from the West, and to put Soviet forces in a position to launch offensive operations against Western Europe on short notice, should such a move ever seem necessary. This requirement, too, would be served by a policy of close military cooperation within the bloc. And, of course, the Soviet Union had a continuing need for the Warsaw Pact on other grounds: as an integrating institution that could hold the bloc together, as an instrument of internal conflict resolution, and as
the legal cover for any further policing and disciplinary action that might become imperative. In this connection, the action against Czechoslovakia did not necessarily mean that the basis for collaborative military planning and preparation within the Warsaw Pact had been irreparably damaged. Leaving aside the armed forces of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the other East European forces still were ostensibly amenable to Soviet direction; indeed, their cooperative role in the invasion may have enhanced their apparent reliability and given Moscow cause to feel that the East European military elites remained favorably oriented toward the Soviet Union despite the Czechoslovak episode.104

On the other hand, it was quite obvious that Moscow's cooperative allies had been useful mainly to provide window dressing, and that Soviet military power was the reality which counted in the disciplinary action against Czechoslovakia. To Soviet troops, moreover, had fallen the task of reinforcing the sector of Warsaw Pact defenses thinned by the temporary neutralization of Czechoslovakia's armed forces. As for the reliability of the East European armies in general, and of the Czechoslovak national forces in particular, some question concerning their wholehearted dedication to Soviet interests must certainly have crossed a few minds in Moscow. It might, therefore, be supposed that in some Soviet quarters there were second thoughts about going ahead with a policy of greater dependence on the collective contributions of the East European Pact forces. The Czechoslovak experience, for example, may have fortified sentiment within the Soviet defense hierarchy in favor of giving forthright priority in planning and resources
to the Soviet Union's own theater forces. If so, there was a ready-made argument at hand that the requirement for forward deployment of Soviet forces in vital areas of East and Central Europe could be met through the bilateral defense treaties which had been renegotiated with various Pact members in 1967, without further diversion of effort and resources to the multilateral Warsaw Pact organization, which in any real military emergency would at best serve only as a facade for essentially autonomous Soviet action.

But even though on purely military grounds the Soviet Union might get along without serious inconvenience if it were to deemphasize the multilateral contributions of the East European Pact members, this course entailed other drawbacks. It would, for example, call for an increase in expenditures for the Soviet theater forces and would undercut the argument for having the other Pact partners share more of the economic burden of collective bloc defense. Above all, the question remained whether Moscow could find an acceptable institutional substitute for the political-integrative and policing functions of the Pact, which obviously were still of acute interest to the Soviet Union in the wake of the Czechoslovak experience. A few signs appeared in the fall of 1968 that, at the urging of East German leaders, the Soviet Union might be toying with the idea of a new, selective grouping in East Europe that would in effect relegate Rumania and Czechoslovakia to secondary status within the Warsaw Pact. Such a grouping of Moscow's hard-core supporters could be envisaged as the organizational instrument to accompany the Brezhnev doctrine of intervention in a "socialist
commonwealth" with no institutional form of its own, whose perimeters would be both defined and defended primarily by the Soviet Union.

However, the Soviet leadership gave no indication that it was seriously prepared either to take up the East German suggestion for a restructuring of the Pact along more selective lines or to fall back upon a strictly bilateral pattern of military relationships in East Europe, either of which alternatives would put further strain upon the already-damaged fabric of bloc unity. Rather, by early 1969, Moscow appeared again to be looking mainly toward the multilateral machinery of the Warsaw Pact (and of CEMA) as a basic means of exercising its control in East Europe and restoring unity within the alliance system. This became evident at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest on March 17, 1969, a meeting which also illustrated that Soviet military relations with the East European countries were still encumbered by unresolved problems, despite the fact that the events of August 1968 had made clear once more the Soviet Union's authoritative role in the alliance.

At this first full meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders since the Czechoslovak intervention seven months before, the Soviet Union again collided with Rumania over various issues, with results which, from the former's viewpoint, were at best mixed. The most obvious setback for Moscow was its failure to obtain Pact condemnation of China as the aggressor in the Ussuri incidents, a move blocked by Rumania with perhaps tacit support from some of its East European neighbors. A reported appeal from Brezhnev that each member country send "symbolic military detachments"
to the Sino-Soviet border area to demonstrate Warsaw-bloc backing of the Soviet Union fell by the wayside, presumably because the East European delegations were reluctant to override Rumanian objections that the Pact was a Euro- oriented alliance with no charter to interfere in relations between the Soviet Union and China. On the other hand, all the delegations endorsed a proposal for a European collective security conference along the lines of that advanced in the Bucharest declaration of July 1966.

Another item of conference business was the adoption of measures to "further perfect the structure and command bodies" of the Warsaw Treaty organization. They consisted primarily of the formal establishment of a Council of Defense Ministers, which already existed on an informal basis, and the setting up of a more integrated joint staff structure. Although these organizational changes were generally interpreted as Soviet concessions to Rumania and other Pact members for a more meaningful voice in joint activities rather than as steps permitting the Soviet Union to tighten its control over the national armed forces of the East European countries, their practical effect might be to satisfy the Soviets more than the Rumanians. By drawing Rumania into participation in various joint bodies, for example, Moscow could make it more difficult for her to maintain independent positions against a presumed majority of Soviet supporters. The hint in Communist commentary on the Budapest meeting that the prices of more equal participation in Pact activities would include taking on a larger proportionate share of the joint expenses also suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union salvaged more from its "concessions" to the Rumanian viewpoint than met the eye.
In any event, whatever might come of these organizational compromises, the Budapest meeting served as a landmark of sorts in Soviet military relations with East Europe. Not only did it indicate that the Soviet Union meant to hold fast to the multilateral principle in Warsaw bloc military affairs, but it also suggested that the need for a show of bloc solidarity against China had become a pressing factor in Moscow's shaping of its Warsaw Pact military policy. Should the Soviet Union persist in efforts to enlist East European military cooperation against Peking, even on a symbolic basis, this would amount to a significant shift in the original conception of the Warsaw Pact, widening its scope from an alliance facing westward against the NATO countries to one that also faced eastward against another, major Communist power.
XVIII. SOVIET POLICY IN THE SETTING OF A CHANGING POWER BALANCE

In previous chapters of this study of Soviet power and purpose in Europe, we deferred discussion of a number of questions relating to the changing military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States and to its effects upon both the European and the wider, global aspects of the relationship between the two countries. The time has come for us to take up these matters in this concluding chapter.

Trends in Soviet military policy and programs under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime up to mid-1969 contributed, as we have seen, to a perceptible shift in the Soviet-American strategic balance—a shift which could perhaps best be regarded as part of a larger historical process, still under way, marking the Soviet Union’s emergence as one of the world’s two global superpowers. Needless to say, though its ultimate effects upon world politics were scarcely predictable, the narrowing of the margin between Soviet and American power promised to have significant implications for the future. It not only gave “new bite”—to use Carl Kaysen’s apt expression—to the immediate question of whether the United States was on the verge of losing its long-held strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, but it also raised other far-reaching questions concerning such matters as the course of the global competition between the superpowers, the stability of mutual deterrence, and the conduct of the Soviet Union on the international scene in the decade ahead.
Before we venture into some of the implications of a changing power balance, however, several considerations bearing upon the future strategic power relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States merit attention. First, an admonition should be sounded concerning the contingent and precarious nature of today's assumptions about tomorrow's military balance. The precise character of any new correlation of forces that may emerge in the coming decade is unpredictable. It will depend in part upon what the United States chooses to do about its own defense posture and in part upon the willingness of the Soviet leaders to raise the ante still further and upon the capacity of their economy to stand the strain. Our inability to say what sort of strategic posture will satisfy the Soviet leaders is another source of uncertainty: Is their aim "parity" with the United States or "superiority" for the Soviet Union? And, obviously, any arms limitation agreements that may be reached in the strategic arms talks or other negotiations also will help to determine the emerging Soviet-American strategic balance.

Even the measurement of the strategic power relationship in terms of "parity" or "superiority," one must emphasize, is in itself an exercise fraught with ambiguity. These are elusive concepts, and the mere arithmetic of toting up the forces on each side does little to clarify the relative balance. Indeed, controversy has flourished over how to identify the level at which it becomes militarily -- or, for that matter, politically -- meaningless to exceed a major nuclear adversary in numbers of weapons, megatonnage, deliverable warheads, and other attributes of strategic forces. It was perhaps the need to find a
less controversial concept that brought into vogue the term "sufficiency," used at a press conference in early 1969 by President Nixon to describe an appropriate level of strategic arms. Nevertheless, difficult though it may be to define what would constitute a meaningful shift in the power balance, it remains evident that the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime dedicated a substantial and costly effort in the period up to mid-1969 to improving its relative power position vis-à-vis the United States. Among the pivotal questions to be asked, therefore, as the Soviet Union and the United States apparently were clearing the way for the start of their long-delayed strategic arms talks in the mid-summer of 1969, was this: Would the Soviet leaders prove to be essentially content to rest on the strategic gains they had made in almost five years of strenuous effort, or were they disposed to press actively for a still more favorable power position? And how, in either case, might the strategic arms limitation talks fit into the picture of Soviet policy?

A. SOVIET STRATEGIC AIMS AND THE ARMS TALKS

Although no categorical answer to the above question was possible in mid-1969, a plausible case could be made for the likelihood that the Soviet leadership would be satisfied to settle for a situation of approximate parity with the United States rather than seek superiority. The central arguments in support of this view hinged upon economic considerations and assumed Soviet political incentives.
Economically, the main argument held that growth investment needs, satisfaction of rising consumer demands, and other claims on Soviet resources were such that without setting Draconian priorities for additional strategic programs the Soviet Union would be hard put to it to meet the higher expenditures that a further major round of strategic arms procurement would entail -- even though several new strategic systems had been funded through the R&D stage and apparently were available for procurement and deployment. Signs of a slight slowdown in the rate of industrial growth in 1968 lent some support to the thesis that the Soviet economy was hurting from the large military programs of the preceding few years. A second economic argument rested on the assumption that within the Soviet military establishment itself, pressure groups for nonstrategic forces, such as the navy and ground forces, were interested in capturing more defense resources for their purposes -- both to improve Soviet capabilities for mobile, conventional operations in distant areas and to bolster the posture of the Soviet theater forces in a continental environment complicated by the Czechoslovak problem in Europe and new difficulties with China in the Far Eastern borderlands -- and that these groups, therefore, would be amenable to settling for parity with the United States on the strategic level.

Politically, perhaps the most persuasive argument for this probability was that the Kremlin would find a climate of acknowledged parity favorable to the pursuit of many of its more important foreign policy objectives. Besides permitting the Soviet Union to deal politically with the United States as a strategic equal, a parity
situation could be expected to undermine the remaining European faith in America's pledges to defend Europe even at the risk of nuclear war; also Washington was likely to be reluctant to intervene militarily against Third World "national liberation" movements without the backup of a superior strategic posture to deter Soviet counter-moves. A related supposition concerned possible doubts within the Kremlin leadership -- born of past experience with American response to bomber and missile "gap" situations -- that any margin of strategic superiority attainable by the Soviet Union would last long enough to yield political dividends significantly greater than those to be derived from a parity position. Finally, it could also be argued that, even if the Soviet leaders were persuaded that a lasting reversal of the strategic balance was not beyond reach, they had before them the lesson of the United States itself, which despite its long period of strategic superiority had not managed to extract vital political concessions from the Soviet Union. The Kremlin leadership, in weighing the costs of striving for superiority, could well ask itself whether it would do better.

If the outlook of the Soviet leaders actually ran along the lines sketched above, their interest in entering strategic arms limitation talks with the United States might reasonably be construed as a "genuine" willingness to achieve mutual agreement on strategic force levels. From Moscow's viewpoint, the negotiations would not only serve to moderate the future course of the strategic arms competition and spare the Soviet Union the economic burden of questionable investment in further ABM deployment and new delivery systems; they would also provide a forum in
which the United States finally would have to concede publicly and unequivocally that the Soviet Union was no longer its strategic inferior, an admission from which the appropriate political conclusions might then be drawn.

As suggested above, one important conclusion that Moscow probably would hope to see drawn would be that America's European allies had best give up banking upon a U.S. commitment to protect them and begin looking for other security arrangements. The Kremlin might also hope that a strategic arms limitation agreement with the United States would produce political dividends for the Soviet Union in the form of increased European suspicion, especially in West Germany, that local European interests might be sacrificed to superpower politics between Washington and Moscow, leading to the conclusion in Bonn and other European capitals that it would be wise to start cultivating separate understandings with the Soviet Union.

For such reasons of Soviet self-interest as those adduced above -- or, if one preferred, on the strength of a variety of other, more magnanimous Soviet motives -- a credible argument could thus be made in mid-1969 that the Kremlin leadership had come to a point where it was ready and willing to rest on its strategic oars. However, a somewhat more skeptical interpretation of the Soviet attitude on the parity-superiority issue and the concomitant role of the strategic arms talks also called for attention, at least until events might shed further light on the Soviet position.

This variant view of the situation began with recognition of the Soviet Union's long-standing doctrinal commitment to the goal of quantitative and qualitative
superiority, a goal often pushed into the background by stubborn realities but never forsworn. The present generation of Soviet leaders, it could be argued, having finally managed to draw close to the Soviet Union's major adversary in most elements of strategic power, was as likely as not to have sensed an opportunity to forge ahead of the United States, particularly since the latter -- unlike its previous responses to strategic gap alarms -- had stood by during the rapid Soviet strategic buildup of the late sixties without lifting the fixed ceiling it had set for its own strategic forces in the early sixties. Furthermore, evidence that the USSR's missile expansion programs were continuing unabated during the first half of 1969 after having passed an assumed leveling-off point, and the fact that the Soviet development of follow-on strategic systems gave no signs of slackening, also suggested that the strategic buildup had gathered a momentum which the Kremlin leadership, or at least its hard-line elements, might be loath to check before seeing whether it would bring the Soviet Union a clear margin of superiority over the United States.

Like the argument on parity, this alternative appraisal drew on readings of the Soviet Union's economic capacity and political incentive for an additional round of strategic arms procurement, but it interpreted them somewhat differently. On the economic side, in this view, concern about being outweighed by the United States in the matter of resources probably was less of a brake on Soviet competition in strategic arms in 1969 than it had been in years gone by, and for at least two reasons: first, because Soviet industrial output, despite a slight
decline in rate of growth, was still increasing, according to Soviet claims, at the respectable rate of more than 8 per cent annually; and second, because the United States itself, beset with meeting domestic economic needs and the costs of the Vietnam war, appeared reluctant to restore its own strategic arms expenditures to the levels it had been willing to accept in the past.11

Politically, the principal argument in support of this view rested on the assumption that Moscow would feel more confident of achieving its foreign policy objectives in a climate of recognizable Soviet superiority than in one of mere parity. Although the Soviet leaders were not thought to entertain any realistic expectation of achieving a strategic posture so predominant that it would permit the Soviet Union to initiate war with impunity, it was believed that they might have set their sights on reaching a position in which they could approach crisis confrontations or bargaining sessions with the United States confident that the latter would swallow diplomatic defeat rather than risk a military showdown. The Soviet Union's need to calculate its strategic requirements in terms of an emerging nuclear rival in China as well as with an eye to America was another possible incentive, in this view, for aiming at something more than parity with the United States.

Positing a Soviet outlook along the above lines, the strategic arms talks could still have the function in Soviet policy of ratifying the Soviet Union's standing as a strategic power on a par with the United States, but in this case the Kremlin presumably would be less interested in bringing the strategic competition to a halt than in manipulating it to Soviet advantage. In negotiations
that could be expected to stretch out inconclusively for a considerable time, Moscow might hope, for example, to inhibit the United States from funding any major strategic force improvements, qualitative or quantitative, while the Soviet Union quietly pursued unilateral programs, hopeful of avoiding early and unequivocal detection.  

Although a Soviet approach of this kind might be explained on grounds of short-term advantage, such as improving the Kremlin's bargaining power or leaving the Soviet strategic posture temporarily stronger if the talks should break down, it would certainly involve the risk of provoking a major renewal of the U.S. strategic effort, not to mention the damage it might do to the prospect of negotiations in other areas. Therefore, any transient advantage to be gained would hardly make sense unless the Soviet leadership were, in fact, prepared to engage in an unlimited contest for strategic superiority.

Little in the way of fresh insight into how the strategic arms talks might mesh with Soviet strategic aims was to be derived from the Soviet Union's public attitude toward the talks in the period following their postponement because of the Czechoslovak invasion. In essence, the official position was that Moscow was interested in getting the talks under way at any time, but no more so than the United States.

There was, however, a suggestion of something less than a consensus within the Soviet leadership. On the one hand, a number of officials, and Kosygin in particular, indicated on several occasions that Moscow was ready, even eager, for an early start on the talks. In mid-November 1968, Kosygin apparently took pains to convey this view
to former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, and a few days later to Senators Claiborne Pell and Albert Gore, during their visits to Moscow. In view of Kosygin's presumed concern with the impact of strategic arms spending on the Soviet economy, there was some ground for supposing that he may have been speaking for elements of the leadership who were desirous of getting negotiations under way so as to head off a new round in the strategic arms competition.

On the other hand, there were signs that enthusiasm for launching the talks was by no means universal in Soviet leadership circles. Not long after the United States reportedly made known, in November 1968, that the period of mourning for Czechoslovakia was over and that it was again prepared to talk, Washington officials were said to have learned that Moscow was no longer pressing for negotiations. This could be taken to mean merely that Moscow had cooled off on entering discussions with the lame-duck Administration, and preferred to wait for President-elect Richard M. Nixon to take office. But in view of a continuing discordant undertone in some Soviet elite statements, and especially in the military press, in late 1968 and early 1969, it was also possible that there were definite misgivings within the Soviet leadership about the desirability of seeking agreements which might cut off efforts to surpass the United States in strategic forces. Indeed, internal pressures from Soviet hardline and military lobbies for a green light on further strategic programs, and the likelihood that, if they prevailed, the United States would be motivated to respond in kind may have accounted for Kosygin's apparent eagerness to see the talks initiated.
In any event, it remained for the actual negotiations, the outcome of which was not yet in sight at the time of this writing, to bring out more explicitly whether the Soviet collective leadership looked upon the talks as a meaningful step toward curbing further strategic arms competition or mainly as a device to slow down a new cycle of U.S. strategic programs while pressing ahead with its own. But whatever direction the talks might take before running their course, they could hardly be expected to reverse the process by which the Soviet Union had gradually whittled down the strategic margin of its main Western adversary. At the least, the talks were likely to register a transition from the long-standing inferiority of the Soviet Union to putative parity with the United States.

B. IMPLICATIONS OF A SHIFT IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN POWER RELATIONSHIP

It is by no means a foregone conclusion, of course, that a change in the power relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States will necessarily have deeply disturbing effects upon the stability of mutual deterrence and upon their global political rivalry. One may well argue that so long as each nuclear power retains the capacity to inflict upon the other retaliatory destruction of "unacceptable" dimensions -- a variously defined criterion, to be sure -- deterrence will continue to operate as before and shifts in the strategic power balance are likely to have relatively little political impact. Even though changes -- especially rapid ones -- in technology, weaponry, force levels, and other aspects of the strategic environment generally are conceded to
introduce many elements of uncertainty into the situation, it can also be argued that uncertainty itself may contribute to mutual restraint and discourage any political maneuver that might upset the deterrent balance.

Comforting as it may be to view matters in this light, however, one can hardly dismiss the possibility that in a new setting of either strategic parity or Soviet superiority many of the familiar assumptions of the past about the stability of deterrence and the political conduct of the Soviet Union in the international arena will no longer hold good. This applies especially to conditions where changes in the strategic balance have been accompanied by the Soviet Union's growing capacity to project naval forces and other nonstrategic elements of its military power into distant areas. The development of such capacities not only has been a notable factor in reshaping the over-all power balance and in giving the Soviet Union, for the first time in its history, the credentials of a global military power; it also has opened up the prospect that the USSR and the United States -- pursuing their differing interests in the dynamic environment of Third World instability -- may have to reckon with a new order of problems arising from the "overlapping" of their military presence in trouble spots around the world.\(^\text{19}\)

The question of a possible breakdown in the system of mutual deterrence that has operated in the past does not center on the spectre of a deliberate resort to nuclear war. Although, in theory, one can devise scenarios in which an aggressor with an appropriate combination of offensive and defensive forces might hope, by striking the first blow and dealing with only disorganized residual
counterblows, to escape effective retaliation, it is generally assumed that in the real world of decision no rational leadership will care to put such a case to the test. Rather, threats to the stability of deterrence may lie in the possibility of the two powers' stumbling into war because of a reassessment of the risks involved in trying to translate a changed correlation of forces into political advantage.

A cardinal feature of the past structure of deterrence was its asymmetry, both military and political. Superior American nuclear power coincided with a political posture oriented mainly toward defense of the international status quo; the Soviet Union's inferior strategic power went along with political-ideological aspirations to reshape the world order along Communist lines. In this setting, the one-sided weight of American strategic power, together with Western superiority in globally mobile forces, set definite limits to the range of risks the Soviet Union was willing to run in pursuing its political ambitions. Perhaps one of the prime questions to be asked, therefore, is whether the novelty of no longer laboring under a markedly unfavorable power balance may tempt the Soviet leaders to embark on bolder policies and to accept a wider range of risks than hitherto.

Some students of Soviet affairs, this writer among them, find it prudent to assume that the Soviet leadership may indeed accept greater risks in the process of trying to extract political gains from a changed strategic equation, thus introducing new elements of turbulence into international relations. In Europe, which still constitutes in Soviet eyes a focal arena of world
politics, the strain on deterrence might increase considerably in a situation where preponderant Soviet conventional strength was no longer checkmated by superior American strategic power; this would be all the more true in the event of a strategic arms limitation agreement, which in a sense would serve as a substitute for an American pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, the caution characteristically displayed by every generation of Soviet leaders toward the risk of military conflict in Europe might decline, possibly to the point where the Soviet Union would try to effect political changes by the threat of direct military pressure. Alternatively, of course, Soviet leaders might go no further than attempting to persuade Europeans that, in the absence of yesterday's American nuclear guarantee, they had best work out tomorrow's security arrangements along lines proposed by Moscow.

In trouble spots elsewhere -- such as the Middle East -- where the presence of U.S. and Soviet military power might overlap, even a slight propensity in the Kremlin to press for political gains commensurate with the Soviet Union's stronger military posture could aggravate existing instabilities and even lead to a Great Power confrontation. Moreover, a Soviet Union advertised as the strategic equal of the United States and possessing an improved capacity to intervene in local situations would probably find itself under new pressures to come to the help of clients in other continents, where previously it was excused from becoming directly engaged because it obviously lacked the means to do so. If the United States were to enter on a period of neo-isolationism, or at least
what might be described as a post-Vietnam mood of withdrawal from extensive global commitments, the resultant situation might seem to offer the Soviet Union an added invitation to break out of its erstwhile containment onto a wider global stage.

None of this is to argue that Soviet leaders would be likely to step so far out of character that they would court a confrontation with the United States. But the combination of a stronger military posture and the more vigorous assertion of what they regarded as the Soviet Union's global interests would probably raise the incidence of dangerous situations and the possibility that in some major crisis, believing themselves in a position to make the other side back down, the Soviet leaders might blunder into actions with imaginably unhappy consequences. The impression of an incumbent regime prone to act unpredictably under the pressure of the Czechoslovak crisis does nothing to increase confidence in the collective judgment of Soviet leaders.²³

There are those observers of Soviet leadership behavior, however, who doubt that the Soviet risk-taking propensities will rise as envisaged above, and who hold that engrained caution toward the risk of war is likely to dominate the Kremlin's outlook, even though the power balance may look more favorable to the Soviet Union than before.²⁴ In this view, Soviet anxiety to avoid dangerous confrontations, coupled with concern about diversion of resources to sustain a highly competitive military situation, would probably discourage risky probing against Western political positions. Although more militant, hardline tendencies in the Soviet leadership have coincided with the strengthening
of the country’s relative power position, these elements have thus far had their way only with regard to such intra-bloc issues as Czechoslovakia; it remains open to question, in this view, whether there will be any appreciable extension of militancy to Soviet conduct outside the bloc. The need to mend fences in the West while girding for possible enlargement of border conflicts with China is another factor deemed likely to temper militant anti-Western tendencies in Moscow.

Whichever of these contrasting appraisals may come closer to the mark, the whole question of future Soviet conduct turns, of course, on many considerations other than those pertaining to a newly-emerging power balance that have been touched upon here. At bottom, perhaps, what is chiefly involved is the direction in which the Soviet system itself is moving. Although one can offer only a vastly oversimplified comment on this complex issue, it would seem that there are at least two broad possibilities. 25

The first of these is that, despite the regressive, neo-Stalinist tendencies that have emerged in the past few years, the Soviet Union may basically be evolving in a direction that will find its leaders prepared to play a more responsible and stabilizing role in international politics. Internal changes at work in Soviet society as well as external factors may be helping to reshape the outlook of the ruling elite, bringing its influential elements around to a view that favors lasting accommodation with the ongoing world order over ambitious attempts to reconstruct it in accordance with an outworn dogma. Graceful adjustment to reform and liberalizing
tendencies at home and within the Soviet bloc might, in this case, be facilitated by a new military power balance with the West which convinced Soviet leaders that they were at last secure from external danger.

Though it is not to be supposed that the Soviet leaders could easily shed their habitual suspicion of the Western world, various "imperatives" for a Soviet-American rapprochement might increasingly make themselves felt; they would include such needs as the avoidance of nuclear war, containment of Communist China, and tackling the worldwide problems of overpopulation, food supply, pollution of the biosphere, space and underocean exploration, and the like. Thus, in spite of continuing ideological conflict and unresolved political issues, the Soviet Union in this climate might exhibit a growing receptivity to the idea that the two nuclear superpowers should extend their groping search for cooperation and accommodation. The moderation of military competition, in particular, might in this instance become increasingly attractive to both sides. Just as their apparent mutual interest in heading off an unrestricted strategic arms race had led gradually toward strategic arms limitation talks, so the two superpowers might find it expedient to seek new "rules of the game" to mitigate the prospects of explosive entanglements in various global zones of contention.

On the other hand, however, there is the alternative possibility that the Soviet Union may be moving in a direction that is far more grim, backing into the future on the basis of old policies and habits more likely to promote global ferment and discord than world stability. Its leaders, grown old in their ways and perhaps still prisoners
of a rhetoric of class struggle rooted in the past, may find it impossible to set the Soviet Union on a new track at home and abroad. Instead, fearful of a threat to monopoly Party rule from discontents within the Soviet bloc and fancied ideological subversion from outside, the Soviet governing elite may revert increasingly to the suppression of internal societal change and to a hostile external stance toward the West.

In this environment, there not only would be a premium on the further strengthening of the Soviet military posture, but the influence of orthodox hardline elements who argue that Soviet security can only be assured by gaining the upper hand in military power would probably grow within the leadership. Although some recognition of mutual interests, such as the avoidance of nuclear war, would doubtless remain, the area of potential collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States could be expected to shrink, and there might well be much less disposition in the Kremlin to believe that the Soviet Union ought to cooperate closely with the other nuclear superpower in reducing the sources of international tension and instability.

One would prefer, of course, to conclude on a hopeful note, suggesting that the present generation of leaders has every good reason to seek the security and prosperity of the Soviet people by generally guiding the country in the first of the alternative directions sketched above. This, however, would presuppose a rather marked transformation of the world outlook of the ruling elite, and would call for what the Soviet leaders might well regard as too drastic a reorientation of the internal and external
policies to which they have been wedded. Whether the in-
cumbent leadership or the generation of leaders that steps
into the shoes of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime will prove
capable of breaking with the past and setting out upon a
more enlightened course remains therefore a question to
which the answer -- be it hopeful or discouraging -- can
only be furnished by the future.
NOTES

Part Three: The Brezhnev-Kosygin Period
Its First Half-Decade

XI. OVER-ALL TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER
KHRUSHCHEV'S SUCCESSORS


2. Precisely what may be the size of the inner oligarchy which comprises the collective leadership, and what relative ranking should be ascribed to its members, are matters upon which Kremlinologists in the West do not wholly agree. The nominal figure of "some twenty" cited here is based on the combined membership of the Party Politburo and Secretariat after the 23rd Party Congress, in April 1966. Counting overlapping assignments, 23 men occupied the 19 places in the Politburo and the 10 in the Secretariat. Some of these men also held top posts in the Council of Ministers, so that it seems appropriate to identify this group of 23 as an "interlocking directorate" controlling both Party and government. For a useful set of charts which bring out the interlocking character of the top leadership, see Frederick C. Barghoorn. Politics in the USSR, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Mass., 1966, pp. 397-410.


7. Stalin was the other holder of the title of General Secretary, which was changed after his death to First Secretary. Restoration of the Stalinist title for the top Party office at the 23rd Congress was accompanied
by a change of the name of the Party Presidium back to Politburo. See speech of N. G. Egorychev, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee CPSU, proposing the title change to the 23rd Party Congress, Pravda, March 31, 1966; "Resolution ... on Partial Revisions of the Statutes of the CPSU." Pravda, April 9, 1966.


9. Brezhnev, for example, made all of the principal speeches during the several days of jubilee ceremonies in Moscow and Leningrad leading up to the November 7th celebration. Occupying the center of the stage with Brezhnev were Kosygin and Podgornyi, but neither shared the symbolic honor of delivering commemorative speeches, not even in Leningrad, which is Kosygin's home territory. See Anatole Shub. "Brezhnev Looms Above All in 50th Anniversary Fetes." The Washington Post, November 6, 1967; Henry Kamm. "Three Soviet Leaders Honor Leningrad." The New York Times, November 6, 1967.

10. See Barghoorn. Politics in the USSR, p. 368.

11. The first of this trio of Shelepin's associates to be demoted was Tikunov, who was relieved from a high post in the police hierarchy in September 1966. On May 18, 1967, Semichastnyi was replaced as head of the KGB by Iu. V. Andropov, and on June 27, 1967, after an intervention at a Central Committee plenum where he reportedly criticized the Soviet handling of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Egorychev was removed from his post as First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. A few months later, in October 1967, Egorychev was dropped from the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. See "Chronicle" and "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR on the Appointment of N. A. Shchelokov as Minister of Protection of Public Order USSR," Izvestiia, September 18, 1966; "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR," Pravda, May 19, 1967; "Plenum of the Moscow City Committee USSR," Pravda, June 28, 1967; "Resolution of the Supreme Soviet USSR on the Release of Deputy N. G. Egorychev from the Duties of Membership in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR," Pravda, October 13, 1967.

12. The speeches of various leaders and editorials in the Party press have abounded with exhortations to avoid such things as "voluntarism," "subjectivism," "administrative


15. Interestingly enough, this reform did not settle the problem of Party supervision of the economy. Within a year, exhortations to avoid excessive economic intervention by Party representatives were dropped, and the new line taken was that Party officials must not stand aside when difficulties arise and the economic managers require outside advice and assistance. See, for example, editorial, "The Cause of the Entire Party and the Entire People." Pravda. October 1, 1965.


21. The first tentative experiment based on the Liberman proposals actually began during the Khrushchev period. when two clothing factories were placed on the system of "direct links" between producer and user in July 1964. Kosygin. in April 1966. announced the beginning of the new system of planning and management under the successor regime. Report of A. N. Kosygin to the 23rd Party Congress. Pravda. April 6. 1966.


26. Fears that adoption of various features of a market economy might have undesirable social and political consequences have been expressed by some Soviet theorists. For a useful examination of this question, see Valeri M. Albert, "Who's Afraid of Economic Reforms?" Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, No. 457, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, May 30, 1967.

27. Soviet grain harvests announced by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime for other years were, in million metric tons, as follows: 1964 = 152; 1965 = 120.5; 1967 = 147.6; 1968 = 169.2. See Pravda, February 3, 1966; January 29, 1967; and January 25, 1968; Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, No. 5, January 1969, p. 8.

28. Report by N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, Pravda, October 11, 1967. Industrial output growth rates given by Baibakov were 9.4 per cent for 1966-1967, compared with 8.6 per cent in 1961-1965, while agricultural output growth rates were 4.2 per cent compared with 2.4 per cent in the earlier period. According to figures given by Baibakov about a year later, the industrial growth rate achieved in 1968 declined slightly to 8.3 per cent. See his report in Pravda, December 11, 1968.

29. See the chapter "Comparative Growth of the Soviet Economy," in Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-1967, Materials Prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., May 1968, pp. 11-18. The annual figures from which the three-year averages were derived for comparative purposes were: 1962 = 4.2; 1963 = 2.8; 1964 = 7.9; 1965 = 6.2; 1966 = 7.1; 1967 = 4.3 per cent. It may be noted that the growth rate during the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has tended to flatten out at about the estimated rate of 5.5 per cent previously projected by Western specialists for the 1964-1970 period. See, for example, Stanley Cohn, in New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Part II-A, p. 126.
30. The eighth Five-Year-Plan has had a curious history. Set forth initially in tentative draft outline in February 1966, and later in more detail at the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966 and at the Supreme Soviet session of October 1967, its formal adoption and ratification by the Supreme Soviet was periodically postponed for several years, presumably because of differences of view over resource allocations and other difficulties. Only successive annual plans for the years 1966-1969 were approved, leaving a "final version" of the entire plan still formally unratified with only a year of its lifetime remaining. For all practical purposes, however, the guidelines laid down at the 23rd Party Congress, with modification in each annual plan, seem to have been governing. See Pravda, February 20. April 6, 10, 1966; October 11, 1967; January 25, 1968. See also Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-1967. p. 4.

31. At the 22nd Party Congress, in October 1961, Khrushchev had laid out a set of ambitious goals for 1970 as part of a longer-range 20-year program of economic development which was supposed to leave the U.S. economy far behind. Key targets for 1970 were scaled back on the order of 13 to 17 per cent (and some by as much as 68 per cent) by his successors in early 1966, at the time draft directives for the eighth Five-Year-Plan were promulgated. For an examination of these cutbacks, see Keith Bush. "The New Five-Year-Plan," Problems of Communism. July-August 1966, pp. 1-7.


35. The 1963 plan figures given by Baibakov called for a growth rate of 8.6 per cent for consumer goods production in 1968, compared with 7.9 per cent for producer goods. Whether this was to be a short-term spurt favoring consumer- over producer-goods growth rates was left unclear, since there was no announced change in the planned average annual increase for the two categories under the 1966-1970 Five-Year-Plan, which leaves producer goods in the traditional priority position, with 8.7 per cent as compared to 7.7 per cent for consumer goods. In terms of actual output, the production goals for 1970 give producer goods a very large margin, of course (250 billion rubles of planned output, compared with 100 billion for consumer goods), owing to the much larger starting base of the former. Pravda, October 11, 1967.


37. The unattributed expenditure residual in the 1968 budget announced by Garbuzov was set at 9.4 billion rubles, compared with 5.3 billion in 1967. Pravda, October 11, 1967.

38. The possibility that investment for long-term economic growth may have suffered somewhat after the reallocation of Five-Year-Plan priorities announced in October 1967 was suggested both by a drop in projected over-all investment growth for the 1966-1970 period from 47 per cent to 43 per cent and by the 1968 increases in expenditure for defense and consumption purposes. See Bush, "The Supreme Soviet Session of October 1967," pp. 6, 12.


42. Brezhnev at the 23rd Party Congress cited the flagging hold of the Komsomol upon Soviet youth, and urged measures to repair "serious deficiencies" in this youth organization. (Pravda, March 30, 1966.) In June 1968, the top Komsomol leadership was replaced in an effort to make the organization more effective in inculcating a correct ideological approach to life among its members.

43. See Regal, "Party Criticizes Ideological Neutralism . . . .", pp. 3-6.


45. "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR. On Formation of a Union-Republican Ministry for the Protection of Public Order USSR," Pravda, July 28, 1966. In November 1968, MOOP in turn was renamed the Ministry of the Interior, and the police forces under its jurisdiction were again strengthened.

46. In the fall of 1966, for the first time in Soviet history, the new regime created a centralized USSR Ministry of Education, and upgraded the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences to all-union level. This centralizing measure, intended to give better control over educational policy, was accompanied, however, by provisions to allow more flexibility in dealing with local problems. See Pravda.

47. A joint Party-State decree in August 1966, for example, outlined a sweeping new recreation and physical education program designed, apparently, to counteract the malaise among Soviet youth over which the authorities showed growing concern. Pravda, August 25, 1966.


50. Rumiantsev's Pravda articles in February and September 1965 were widely regarded as a new charter for the intelligentsia, whose members were assured that, while their works would still be subject to socialist values, arbitrary attacks on individual writers would no longer be tolerated. See "The Party and the Intelligentsia," Pravda, February 21, 1965; "The Party Spirit of the Soviet Intelligentsia's Creative Labor," ibid., September 9, 1965.

51. Aleksandr Tvardovskii, the editor of Novyi mir (New World), was among the more articulate spokesmen for the liberal intelligentsia. See, for example, his article, "On the Occasion of the Jubilee," in the jubilee issue of Novyi mir, No. 1, January 1965, pp. 3-18. Among the writers of liberal bent whose works appeared in Novyi mir, lunost' (Youth), and other journals during the 1965 period of


53. Siniavskii and Daniel were sentenced on February 14, 1966, to seven and five years, respectively, in a forced labor camp for having published abroad (under pseudonyms) writings judged harmful to the Soviet regime. The trial drew bitter criticism in the West. See "Trial in Moscow Scored in West," The New York Times, February 15, 1966. For a description of the trial resting on a transcript which found its way to the West, see On Trial: The State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak," translated, edited, and with an Introduction by Max Hayward. Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1966.


55. Underlying much of the tension between liberal and conservative or "dogmatist" factions within the intelligentsia was the issue of the Stalinist past and the question whether continued critical treatment of Stalinism by liberal-minded historians and writers was having a negative effect on the ideological outlook of the Soviet population, especially the younger generation. For previous discussion of these matters, see Chapter IV, pp. 88-96.

56. Solzhenitsyn, author of the poignant One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, published during the Khrushchev


59. See, for example, F. Burlatskii and L. Karpinskii, "En Route to a Premiere," *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, June 30, 1967.

60. The Sakharov "manifesto," a lengthy essay originally entitled "Thoughts on Progress. Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," had been privately circulated among Soviet scientists before a text that had reached the West appeared in *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968. A far-ranging document written, as Marshall Shulman has put it, "in the great tradition of the moral conscience and sense of social responsibility of the Russian intellectual," the Sakharov essay argued that intellectual freedom is essential to human society and that the division of mankind into opposing political-ideological systems threatens it with destruction. In what amounted to a version of the convergency theory, Sakharov foresaw the prospect that the capitalist and Communist systems would draw closer to each other in a number of essential respects, leading, he hoped, by the end of the century to a situation in which the Soviet Union and the United States would address themselves cooperatively to solving global problems of poverty, health, overpopulation, and the like for the benefit of mankind, and perhaps making possible progress toward creation of a world government.

Existence of the Sakharov manuscript was not directly acknowledged in the Soviet Union, although, following its publication in the West, its theses were indirectly attacked
in references to proponents of "futurology" who "deny the need for a revolutionary transformation of the world." (Viktor A. Cherpakov, "Problems of the Last Third of the Century," Izvestiia, August 11, 1968.) Sakharov himself, presumably because of his stature as a scientist, was spared personal abuse from Soviet media, although little is actually known about what pressures may have been brought to bear upon him. At 47, Sakharov had been the recipient of high Soviet honors for his work in physics, including important theoretical contributions to the Soviet thermonuclear bomb and development of controlled thermonuclear fusion. One can assume that his views on intellectual freedom and enlightened reform of the Soviet system are sympathetically regarded by many of his colleagues, though few have been as bold as he in committing them to paper. For a perceptive discussion of the Sakharov case, see Marshall D. Shulman, "The Sakharov Manifesto," Saturday Review, November 23, 1968, pp. 51-53ff. See also the Sakharov essay in book form with an Introduction and notes by Harrison Salisbury, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1968.


62. For previous reference to Nekrich's book in connection with the "rehabilitation" of Stalin, see Chapter IV, pp. 94-95. Nekrich's expulsion from the Party for highly critical treatment of Stalin has been widely interpreted as a sign of the regime's antipathy to intellectual freedoms. For a searching analysis of the Nekrich controversy, including a translation of his book, see Vladimir Petrov, "June 22, 1941": Soviet Historians and the German Invasion, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, S.C., 1968.


66. The other defendants in the Ginsburg case were Iurii Galanskov, Aleksei Dobrovolskii, and Vera Lashkova,
all young and relatively obscure members of the literary "underground." Ginsburg and Galanskov were sentenced to five and seven years, respectively; the other two received lighter sentences.

67. In addition to questioning the charges against the defendants, critics of the trial condemned its arbitrary judicial conduct, the packing of the courtroom with a hostile audience, and the harsh sentences meted out to Ginsburg and Galanskov, who apparently based their defense on the right to free expression nominally guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. For pertinent pretrial accounts, see Henry Kamm, "Four Dissidents Face Trial in Moscow on Anti-Soviet Propaganda Charge," The New York Times, December 10, 1967; Raymond H. Anderson, "Trial of Four Young Dissidents Opens in Moscow," ibid., January 9, 1968. For accounts of the trial itself, which were relayed to Western news sources by friends and relatives of the accused, see The New York Times and The Washington Post for January 9 through 15, 1968. See also Blake, in The New York Times Magazine, March 24, 1968, pp. 126, 129.

68. See "A Litvinov Sends Account of Secret Trial to West," The New York Times, December 27, 1967. See also Richard C. Longworth, "Litvinov Urges Younger Generation of Russians To Speak Out Frankly," The Washington Post, January 16, 1968. The secret trial in September 1967, which Litvinov disclosed despite KGB warnings not to do so, involved Vladimir Bukovskii, a 25-year-old writer, and two companions, E. Kushner and V. Delone. Accounts differ as to whether the street demonstration which brought their conviction was in protest against the detention of Sinyavskii and Daniel or against the arrest of the Ginsburg group.

69. More than 400 Soviet intellectuals signed the several protest documents against the Ginsburg trial and the arrest of Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin, a mathematician and son of a famous Soviet poet. In connection with it. That this many Soviet citizens were willing to stick out their necks suggested a much broader base of sympathy with their views. For a breakdown of the occupations of the signers, and for a generally excellent analysis of the significance of the protest movement, see Paul A. Smith, Jr., "The Moscow Protest Movement of Early 1968," a paper read before the Washington Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, April 30, 1968.
70. See Richard Reston, "Party Gets Flea for Soviet Writers," The Washington Post, February 29, 1968. The appeal, which was not acknowledged by the Budapest conference, said in part: "We appeal to the participants in the consultative conference to fully consider the peril caused by the trampling on man in our country." The conference itself is discussed in Chapter XIV.

71. In addition to the Ginsburg affair, which drew the greatest attention, it also became known that the regime's crackdown on dissent had wider ramifications. In late 1967 and again in March 1968, for example, small groups of intellectuals in Leningrad were brought to trial on conspiracy charges growing out of the previous arrest of some 150 to 300 persons, some of whom were students and professors at Leningrad University. In the Ukraine, students and professors were also among the victims of a wave of arrests beginning in 1966, which came to light in February 1968 in letters of protest written by a Ukrainian newsman and smuggled to the West. See "4 in Leningrad Jailed as Plotters Against the Regime," The New York Times, December 22, 1967; Peter Grose, "15 in Soviet Tried Secretly in 1966," ibid., February 9, 1968; "7 on Trial in Leningrad as Subversives," The Washington Post, March 15, 1968; Blake, ibid, The New York Times Magazine, March 24, 1968, pp. 122, 124.

72. The Czechoslovak developments are taken up in Chapters XIV and XV. Signs that liberal influences from Czechoslovakia were particularly disturbing in the Ukraine, where aspirations for intellectual freedom had joined with Ukrainian nationalism to cause continuing restiveness, were to be seen in strictures laid down against reformist sentiment there in mid-1968 by Party officials. See Raymond H. Anderson, "Czech Ferment Spreads to the Ukraine," The New York Times, July 14, 1968. In Soviet intellectual circles, despite the regime's tightening of controls on expression of sympathy for the Czechoslovak reform movement, an occasional approving voice was heard. One was that of Professor Andrei Sakharov, who, in his previously-mentioned manuscript circulated privately in Moscow, said that the Soviet Union should "support the bold initiative" of the Czech reformers, rather than try to suppress them. See also fn. 60 above.

73. In addition to scientists, members of the Soviet Writers' Union who signed protest documents were warned to recant or face expulsion from the union. See "Soviet Party

74. Among those so warned were Pavel Yakir, scientist and son of a Red Army leader purged by Stalin; retired Major General Petr Grigorenko; and relatives and friends of defendants at the Ginsburg trial. See Anatole Shub, "Soviet Police Crack Down on Authors," The Washington Post, February 18, 1968. For a general description of various security measures invoked in 1968 to isolate resident foreigners in the Soviet Union from the population, see Shub's article, "Alien Is Lonely in Today's Moscow," ibid., July 7, 1968.


76. See "Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at XIX Conference of Moscow City Organization CPSU," Pravda, March 30, 1968, and "Resolution of the Plenum of CPSU Central Committee, adopted 10 April 1968: On Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for Unity of the World Communist Movement," Pravda, April 11, 1968. Like Brezhnev's speech a few days before, the Plenum resolution emphasized that a sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle between communism and the capitalist West had taken place. Whether internal dissidence in the Soviet Union or the reform movement in Czechoslovakia was the main source of the Soviet leadership's heightened concern is difficult to say, for these threats to Soviet orthodoxy were interconnected.


78. As discussed in a previous chapter (Chapter IV, pp. 88-96), a cautious rehabilitation of Stalin had begun as early as 1965, seemingly to counter the notion that the
period of his rule was a sorry aberration in Soviet his-
tory. This trend grew more pronounced as the Brezhnev-
Kosygin regime "regressed" toward dogmatic defense of
orthodoxy, capped by the Czechoslovak suppression. In
effect, the leadership increasingly leaned toward neo-
Stalinism without some of the more overt features of
Stalinist terror. As men like S. Trapeznikov maneuvered
to clamp conformity upon Soviet intellectuals, word appar-
ently went out to stop writing about Stalin's mistakes.
Military memoirists, among them Marshal Zhukov, came for-
ward to give more sympathetic portrayals of Stalin's war-
time role, and in the Party's leading theoretical journal
a review article in early 1969 explicitly appraised Stalin as
"an outstanding military leader." See E. Boltin,
"Stirring Pages from Chronicles of the Great Fatherland

79. For a perceptive account of the alienation of
Soviet intellectuals and the general apathy of the Soviet
public toward their plight, see the series of three
anonymous articles, beginning with "Neo-Stalinism: An

80. Khrushchev in July 1964 had scheduled a 26-party
conference to make preparations for a new world conference
strenuously opposed by Peking. For a detailed examination
of the conference issue, see William E. Griffith, Sino-
Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, Center for International
also the present author's The Soviet Union and the Sino-
pp. 5-8.

81. Postponement of the scheduled conference came
after Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow in November 1964 had
failed to resolve differences between Moscow and Peking.
When eventually held, in March 1965, the conference was
whittled down from 26 to 19 parties, for the Chinese and
their client parties refused to attend. As a result of
the meeting, the idea of a world conference was buried
for the time being.

82. Editorial, "Why Khrushchev Fell," Red Flag,
November 21, 1964, in Peking Review, No. 48, November 27,
1964.

84. See, for example, "The Supreme International Duty of the Countries of Socialism," Pravda, October 27, 1965.

85. The success of Soviet maneuvers in isolating the Chinese was pointed up by the 23rd Party Congress in Moscow, to which all ruling parties sent representatives except the Chinese and the Albanians, and where Brezhnev announced with satisfaction that all foreign Party representatives present endorsed the Soviet "unity" line for the world Communist movement. The isolation of China was marked similarly at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in November 1967. See Report of L. I. Brezhnev to the 23rd Party Congress in Pravda, March 30, 1966; Report of Brezhnev to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet USSR, and the Supreme Soviet RSFSR, Pravda, November 4, 1967; and "Red China Ignores Bid to Soviet Fete," The New York Times, October 29, 1967.

86. The idea of a conference was first reopened in Sofia on November 14, 1966, by Bulgarian Party leader Todor Zhivkov, who said that conditions for such a meeting were "ripening." The following day Brezhnev approved the idea, although making no specific commitments to a conference. See "Report of Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, to the Ninth Bulgarian Communist Party Congress," Pravda, November 15, 1966, and L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the Ninth Bulgarian Party Congress, Pravda, November 16, 1966.

87. The opening of Soviet attacks on Mao and his "false leadership" began with a major Pravda editorial of November 27, 1966, entitled "Apropos of Events in China." The anti-Mao campaign gathered momentum thereafter, with charges, among other things, that Mao was imperilling world Communist unity by his "chauvinist" policy, that he was violating Marxist principles by establishing a "military-bureaucratic state," and that he was guilty of "advancing territorial claims" against the USSR. See particularly, Pravda articles of February 16 and August 16, 1967; and two special articles, "On the Nature of the 'Cultural Revolution' in China" and "On the Political Course of Mao Tse-tung in the International Arena," published in Kommunist, No. 7 and No. 8, May 1968, pp. 103-114 and 95-108, respectively.
88. See "50 Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution; Theses of the CPSU Central Committee," Pravda, June 25, 1967.

89. The question of border incidents and Soviet troop movements to the Far East areas facing China is taken up in Chapter XVII.


91. In a previously-cited article, for example, it was stated that "the activity of Mao Tse-tung and his group shows that the cult of personality and the obliteration of inner-Party democracy undermine the leading role of the Party and jeopardize its very existence." (Kommlnist, No. 8, May 1968, p. 107.) Another Soviet statement, circulated prior to the Budapest "consultative" conference, said: "What is now taking place in China arouses growing concern and anxiety among Marxist-Leninists throughout the world. This is understandable, for the very existence of the Communist Party of China as one of the largest units of the international Communist movement is being jeopardized." See Moscow dispatch, "'Wave of Discontent' Threatens Communism in China, Soviets Say," The Washington Post, April 24, 1968.

92. Although the Soviet Union described the series of Ussuri incidents as a "bloody provocation" which testified to Mao's warlike readiness to "sacrifice half the population of China and even of the world," and indicated that it was prepared to deal appropriately with "any attempts to talk to the Soviet Union ... in the language of weapons," interestingly enough it was Moscow which first struck a reasonable stance by proposing to cool off the Ussuri crisis through border negotiations. See "The Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group in the International Arena," Kommunist, No. 5, March 1969, p. 107; "Statement of the Government of the USSR," Pravda, March 30, 1969.

93. Some of the evidence concerning the Soviet Union's initial peacemaking efforts derives from a secret exchange of letters between Moscow and Peking, in which the latter accused Moscow of advocating "peace negotiations" as part...
of "the line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for domination of the world." The contents of these letters was made public several months later by the British journalist Edward Crankshaw. See "Peking Pushes Moscow to the Brink: Letters Tell of Vietnam Clash," The Observer, November 14, 1965. See also Chinese reference to Moscow's advice on negotiating the February 1965 crisis in Peking Review, No. 46, November 12, 1965, pp. 15-16.


95. This matter is treated in Chapter XIII, fn. 80.

96. There was nothing in the public record at the time to indicate that behind-the-scenes activity by the Soviet Union helped prepare the way for President Johnson's March 31, 1968, announcement of a bombing reduction and his accompanying offer to begin talks with Hanoi. Throughout the period of haggling over a site for the talks, the Soviet Union's public role was that not of an intermediary but of an uncompromising partisan censuring the United States for not accepting the DRV's choice of Phnom Penh or Warsaw. What part, if any, Soviet diplomacy played in reaching the agreement of May 3 which was followed by the opening of talks in Paris on May 13, 1968, also remains to be divulged.


102. See, for example, "The Policy of the Party Expresses the Living Interests of the People," Pravda, September 27, 1965; and "The Highest International Duty of the Countries of Socialism," ibid., October 27, 1965.


109. For figures on Soviet military budgets and more detailed discussion of this subject, see Chapter XVI, pp. 253-254.

110. See, in particular, Chapter XVIII.


112. It is hardly necessary to point out that classification of the Soviet leadership in terms of hard-soft, hawk-dove, conservative-liberal, dogmatist-pragmatist, or similarly polarized groupings vastly oversimplifies the situation, where in practice alignments along many other axes of interest, institutional position, and outlook undoubtedly exist. However, even though precise identification of various interest-group alignments and syndromes can not be readily made, it may still be assumed that important Soviet foreign policy decisions under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have tended to reflect a kind of "committee compromise" among contending preferences and views within the ruling oligarchy.

113. In the matter of intrabloc relations, on the other hand, it can be argued that hardline advocates within the collective leadership gradually managed to get their way, as attested to by the crackdown on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and promulgation of the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty."

115. For text of this speech, see *The New York Times*, January 5, 1965.

116. See, for example, "Observer" commentary on the President's message, *Izvestiia*, January 6, 1965, which signaled the first of a series of negative responses to Johnson's proposal of an exchange of visits with the Soviet leaders.

117. See Campbell, in *Current History*, pp. 198-199.

118. Besides calling for bridge-building steps such as removal of trade barriers, improvement of communication, and possible mutual troop cutbacks in Europe, President Johnson's speech was notable for avoiding stress on questions likely to raise Soviet hackles, such as German reunification or NATO nuclear-sharing proposals. For text of the speech, see *The New York Times*, October 8, 1966.


120. The space treaty signed on January 27, 1967, besides incorporating a ban on orbiting of mass destruction weapons, established rules for aid to astronauts and recovery of space vehicles and prohibited claims for sovereignty over other planets of the moon. For text of the treaty, see *Department of State Bulletin*, December 26, 1966, p. 953. Subsequently, a sequel to the space treaty dealing with aid to astronauts was worked out and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 1967.


122. One issue of peripheral importance upon which Moscow declined to act during this period was that of reciprocal consular arrangements. The U.S. Senate on March 16, 1967, after heated debate, ratified the consular treaty which had been negotiated in June 1964 in Moscow. Despite this move from the American side, which was widely represented as a sign of goodwill, ratification by the Soviet Union was held up for another year. It was
eventually announced on May 4, 1968, as one of the first of a new series of Soviet gestures signaling a warmer phase of cooperation.


124. Not surprisingly, the Chinese made precisely this accusation in connection with Soviet interest in nonproliferation negotiations. See, for example, the text of Peking's letter of refusal to attend the 23rd Party Congress of the CPSU, *The New York Times*, March 24, 1966.

125. On August 24, 1967, after having reached agreement on a proposed nonproliferation treaty several weeks before, the Soviet Union and the United States presented identical texts of the treaty, minus the unresolved article on inspection, to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). For the text, see *The New York Times*, August 25, 1967.

126. Soviet-U.S. differences on inspection to prevent diversion of peaceful atomic activity to military purposes did not hinge on problems of inspecting each other, since inspection was to be applied only to states not possessing nuclear weapons. The USSR insisted that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should inspect atomic activities in West Germany and other countries belonging to the European Economic Community from the outset. The United States, on the other hand, in deference to the wishes of Germany and other members of the EEC (except France, which spurned the treaty altogether) to be inspected by Euratom, supported the idea of a gradual transfer of inspection from Euratom to the IAEA. For discussion of these inspection differences, as well as reservations expressed by various nonnuclear states toward the treaty, see statements by various participants in the ENDC negotiations, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., July 1968, pp. 125-688 passim. See also Thomas B. Larson, *Disarmament and Soviet Policy*, 1955-1968, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969, pp. 151-156.

127. The first complete draft of January 18, 1968, was revised after the objections raised by some of the allies of both the U.S. and the USSR, as well as nonaligned
countries. (For Soviet-Rumanian differences over the treaty, see Chapter XIV, pp. 159-160.) The amended joint draft was presented at Geneva on March 11, and submitted to the UN General Assembly on March 14. There it met further criticism, which led to Soviet-U.S. acceptance of changes designed to provide stronger security guarantees to nonnuclear powers and to enjoin the big powers to make more urgent efforts to end the arms race. This final amended version was endorsed by an Assembly vote of 92-4, with 22 abstentions, on June 10, 1968.

128. For text of the final treaty document signed on July 1, 1968, see The Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1968, pp. 8-11. On the same day the treaty was signed, the Soviet government issued a memorandum proposing nine disarmament measures upon which it was prepared to begin negotiation. These were: a ban on use of nuclear weapons; a proposal to end manufacture of nuclear weapons and reduce stockpiles; limitation and reduction of strategic delivery means; a ban on nuclear-armed bomber flights beyond national borders and limitation of nuclear-armed submarine patrols; prohibition of underground nuclear tests; ban on chemical and biological weapons; liquidation of foreign military bases; establishment of nuclear-free zones and regional arms reduction, including the Middle East; and a proposal for peaceful use of the ocean floor. See Pravda, July 2, 1968.

129. The initial holdouts included West Germany, India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada. Half of the 34 nonnuclear countries possessing atomic reactors were not among the initial signatories. Two of the world's five countries possessing nuclear weapons--China and France--also were conspicuously missing from the list of adherents to the treaty.

130. For further discussion of some of the treaty's political implications, see Chapter XIII, pp. 121-122.


132. In his State of the Union message of January 10, 1967 (text in The New York Times, January 11, 1967), President Johnson noted, as an added inducement for Soviet agreement to an ABM moratorium, that the United States was
still deferring deployment of an antimissile defense system of its own. To give further weight to American interest in the subject, Llewellyn Thompson, the distinguished American diplomat returning in January for his second tour as U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, took with him a personal letter from the President intended to help in getting diplomatic soundings on ABM talks under way.


134. Among signs that internal policy differences in Moscow may have arisen over the question of ABM negotiations was the publication of a Pravda article on February 15, 1967, in which Kosygin was made out to be more receptive to the idea of an ABM moratorium than his actual remarks in London a few days before warranted. Two days after the Pravda article, written by F. Burlatski, Western news agencies in Moscow reported that the article had been privately repudiated by Soviet sources who claimed that the regime's position on ABM negotiations was negative, as would be made clear in a new article. However, a corrective article did not appear, suggesting that the issue was at that point too contentious to handle. On March 31, a strong statement by a military spokesman of the case for continuing with an ABM deployment program appeared in a Red Star article stressing the importance of strategic defense measures along with the value of a powerful offensive posture. (This article is discussed in Chapter XVI.) Both the article and its timing again suggested that an internal ABM policy controversy might be going on, with various parties seeking to influence the debate. For further comment on this subject, see the present author's prepared statement furnished to the Subcommittee on Military Applications, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress, 90:1, and published in Hearings on the Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, November 6 and 7, 1967, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 63-75.
135. See Secretary McNamara's speech in San Francisco, The New York Times, September 18, 1967. See also McNamara's subsequent elucidation of the rationale behind the "light" or "thin" ABM system in an interview with Life magazine, September 29, 1967, pp. 28a, b, and c.


138. The Washington-Moscow "hot line," established by agreement in 1963, was put to use by the Soviet leadership during the early hours of June 5, 1967, ostensibly to insure that Washington would understand that no direct Soviet military intervention in the war was contemplated. See Chalmers M. Roberts, "U.S.-Russian Efforts Told," The Washington Post, June 9, 1967; Murrey Marder and Carroll Kilpatrick, "'Hot Line' Helps Keep Big Powers Cool," ibid.

139. See, for example, A. Kafman, "U.S. Big Stick to the Mediterranean," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 8, August 1967, p. 75.


141. A massive Soviet airlift to resupply Nasser's forces and to ferry in replacement aircraft for his badly battered air force was one of the first Soviet measures taken in the days immediately following the Israeli victory. (See further discussion of this airlift in Chapter XVI.) Subsequently, further steps to rebuild the various Arab forces were undertaken, including a large increase in the number of Soviet military advisers and technicians. Among accounts of Soviet support to the Arab countries in the post-hostilities phase of the S-Israeli conflict, see Peter Grose, "Russians at U.N. Say Arabs Must Be Re-equipped," The New York Times, June 21, 1967; Hedrick Smith, "Rebuilding of Egyptian Army Seen as 2-Year Task," ibid., August 21, 1967; idem, "U.S. Sees No Peril in New Shipments," ibid., October 12, 1967; idem, "Soviet Comeback as Power in Middle East Causes Rising Concern in West," ibid., January 15, 1968; William Beecher, "Role of Egypt's Russian Advisers Is Worrying U.S.," ibid., October 22, 1968.
142. See Chapter XIII, pp. 138-149.

143. See fn. 122 above. The Soviet announcement by TASS on May 4, 1968, one day after opening of the Paris peace talks, stated that the ratification action on the consular treaty had been taken on April 26, 1968.


147. The view that the missile-talk decision met with continuing internal opposition rests on several rather indirect bits of evidence. One appeared in Gromyko's June 27 speech, when he said: "To the good-for-nothing theoreticians who try to tell us . . . that disarmament is an illusion, we reply: By taking such a stand you fall into step with the most dyed-in-the-wool imperialist reaction, weaken the front of struggle against it." Although leaving unnamed the theoreticians whose advice he was rejecting, Gromyko apparently was attempting here to rebut internal objectors to the missile talks. Another sign of opposition was the disparity between statements by such leaders as Gromyko, Brezhnev, and Kosygin indicating that the military might of the Soviet Union had successfully "contained" imperialism and thereby forced the latter to seek mutually acceptable means to limit the arms race, and views
advanced in a military periodical to the effect that "aggressive imperialist quarters" were still "taking desperate steps" to prepare their armed forces for a "surprise nuclear strike against the Soviet Union," from which it was argued that "there might be no time to build up forces" after war started, making it necessary for the Soviet Union "even in peacetime to have a stable superiority over the probable adversary." See Col. I. Grudinin, "Qualitative and Quantitative Determination of Forces," Komsomol Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 11, June 1968, pp. 15-22. This line of argument, though not unfamiliar, carried the suggestion that at least some Soviet military opinion was questioning the wisdom of entering talks which might cut off further Soviet efforts to achieve superiority. For some thoughtful but speculative Western analysis of these indications of internal opposition, see Victor Zoiza, "Russian Military contests civilian decision to shift priority from armament buildup," The Washington Post, July 5, 1968; Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Brezhnev makes reply to missile-talk foes," ibid., July 9, 1968. See also fn. 134 above.

148. "Senate Defeats a Move to Delay Sentinel System," The New York Times, June 25, 1968. The Senate ABM debate resulted in one significant change in the rationale behind deployment of Sentinel, bringing out the point that the system was expected to provide "a limited degree of protection" from Soviet attack, as well as its originally announced purpose of defending against a future Chinese missile capability. See letter to the editor on the subject by Senator Henry M. Jackson, The Washington Post, June 24, 1968.

149. See Chapter XVIII.


151. See, for example, speech by Marshal A. A. Grechko, Pravda, May 2, 1968.

152. President Johnson's private plea for cooperation was reportedly contained in a letter sent to Premier Kosygin in April 1968. His public overtures came in a commencement speech at Glassboro, N.J., on June 4, in an address before the UN General Assembly on June 12, and in remarks at a White House ceremony on June 13, 1968. See Max Frankel, "Johnson letter sent to Kosygin," The New York Times,
May 9, 1968; idem, "President Makes Another Appeal to the Russians," ibid., June 14, 1968.


156. U.S. officials, reportedly on President Johnson's orders, declined to comment publicly on the Czechoslovak-Soviet tension, and there was no attempt to mount a propaganda campaign either in support of the Czechs or to exploit Soviet attempts to dictate to Prague -- a rather glaring contrast to Soviet readiness to condemn U.S. "intervention" anywhere around the globe at the drop of a hat. On July 22, 1968, Secretary Rusk protested to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin over Soviet accusations against the United States in the Czechoslovak case. See Benjamin Welles, "U.S. Terms Charges by Moscow False," The New York Times, July 20, 1968; "U.S. Denies Czech Meddling," The Washington Post, July 23, 1968.


158. For further discussion of this "evidence," see Chapter XIV, pp. 175-176 and 188-189.

159. Because the maneuvers in West Germany, involving 30,000 West German troops and only small French and U.S. supporting elements, were not under formal NATO auspices, the decision on July 24, 1968, to relocate them was made by Bonn. However, U.S. and NATO interest in the matter was obvious. See Philip Shabecoff, "Bonn Shifts Maneuvers Away From Czech Line," The New York Times, July 25, 1968. It was significant that precisely as the controversial West German maneuvers were being rescheduled to take place in September at a different location, the Soviet Union announced that large-scale maneuvers of its own forces were
in progress along Czechoslovakia's eastern borders. The Soviet maneuvers will be discussed later in these pages.

160. An eloquent expression of this sense of frustration over the West's self-imposed restraint in the Czech crisis was voiced in July 1968 by Sir Fitzroy Maclean, a Member of Parliament, in a letter to The Times of London, in which, recalling Munich, he said: "Today Czechoslovakia is once more threatened with armed aggression. It seems scarcely conceivable that, in such a situation, no word of warning should be uttered by any Western statesman, that the matter should be referred neither to the Security Council nor to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

161. By early 1969, after a period of "mourning" in the West over Czechoslovakia, there were indeed signs that the new American Administration hoped to enter an "era of negotiation" with the Soviet Union, while the latter in turn appeared interested in returning to an atmosphere suitable to conducting strategic arms talks and negotiations on other matters with Washington. See Chapter XVIII, p. 343.


2. This seventh meeting of the Warsaw Pact, held, according to Kosygin, at the initiative of the GDR (see Leipzig speech by Kosygin, in Pravda, March 2, 1965), went on record as opposing a NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement "in any form whatsoever"; should such plans be implemented, the Warsaw Treaty states would be "compelled to take the defense measures necessary to ensure their security." See "Communiqué on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty," Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), January 22, 1965.

3. In addition to reiterating long-standing Soviet opposition to any NATO nuclear-sharing plans that would allegedly put nuclear weapons in Bonn's hands, the new Soviet regime also expressed a negative attitude toward creation of a special NATO committee for nuclear planning and consultation, as proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in June 1965, and later (in November 1965) brought into being. In July 1965, the McNamara committee proposal was characterized by one Soviet source as "perhaps even more dangerous than the MLF." See Observer, "Undermining European Security," Pravda, July 20, 1965.

4. See Chapter VI, pp. 164-166.


7. See Chapter VI, pp. 169-171.

8. In his East Berlin speech, Kosygin noted that "it would be unfair to place the responsibility for the crimes of Nazism on the present-day youth of West Germany," but nevertheless he attacked Bonn's "ruling circles" for wanting to "absorb the German Democratic Republic." See Pravda, May 8, 1965. See also "East Berlin Revisited: Kosygin Reassuring," The Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1965.


11. Meetings of the Bundestag in Berlin had been regarded by Bonn as a symbolic means for strengthening the Federal Republic's ties with West Berlin, and for the same reason, no doubt, had been bitterly protested by the GDR. Such meetings were convened annually from 1955 to 1958, when Khrushchev's campaign against Berlin led to their suspension. The meeting of April 7, 1965, marked the resumption of this practice, against which "retaliatory" East German-Soviet measures were taken. Prior to the April 1965 Bundestag session, the Soviet Union on March 23, 1965, officially protested to the Western Big Three against plans for the meeting. See "In the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Izvestiia, March 27, 1965.

12. Soviet treatment of the situation had generally sought to minimize the idea that a genuine crisis was in the making, as illustrated by the comment that the "retaliatory measures . . . to Bonn's revanchist move affect only the participants of the unlawful Bundestag meeting." Pravda, April 7, 1965. On the other hand, Brezhnev in a speech on April 8 in Poland denounced the meeting in strong terms as a move blessed by the Western powers in order to reassert Bonn's claim to "something that does not belong to West Germany" and to "produce new tension" in Europe. See "Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev," Pravda, April 9, 1965.

13. The Federal Republic's effort to improve its image in the East had been under way, of course, before the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime came to power. This effort of the Erhard government was particularly associated with Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder. Aimed mainly at various
East European countries, but also with an eye to reducing Soviet hostility toward Bonn, it had led, among other things, to establishing West German trade missions in Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria prior to Carstens' visit to Moscow.


16. These and other criticisms of West German policy, linked in part with Soviet efforts in late 1965 to make it clear that Moscow would not tolerate any arrangements in connection with a nonproliferation treaty that would leave room for West German nuclear access, also were directed toward rebutting a major policy statement by Erhard in December 1965. See particularly, Gromyko's Supreme Soviet speech of December 9, 1965, Pravda, December 10, 1965, and Kosygin's interview of December 6 with James Reston, The New York Times, December 8, 1965. In talks with various Western visitors, including the Danish Prime Minister, Jens Otto Krag, in October and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in November 1965, the Soviet leaders evidently also gave private emphasis to the hardened tone of their public criticisms of West German policy.


18. On the question of frontiers, the Peace Note reiterated Bonn's position that Germany's 1937 frontiers remained valid under international law "until such time as a freely-elected all-German government recognized different frontiers." This formula left open the question whether Germany would ever get back the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line held by Poland, as well as the question of the FRG-GDR boundary, but it naturally drew no approval from
the Soviet Union, which remained adamant in its position that no settlement of the German question is possible which does not recognize the present status of European boundaries.


20. See, for example, Gromyko's speech of April 2 at the 23rd Congress, Pravda, April 3, 1966.

21. See Chapter V, pp. 101-105, for discussion of the various Soviet proposals for a European security conference put forth in 1954 and early 1955. The gradual revival of the idea of a European security conference after Khrushchev's ouster began, not with the Soviet leadership, but with Poland's Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, who broached the subject in a UN General Assembly speech on December 14, 1964. (See "Conference on European Security Urged by Poland in U.N.," The New York Times, December 15, 1964.) The Rapacki suggestion was endorsed in the January 20, 1965, communiqué of the Warsaw Pact meeting in Poland, but the first high-level Soviet leader to take up the theme was Brezhnev, who on April 8, 1965, during a visit to Poland included the idea of a conference of European states in a "program of measures" for guaranteeing European security in the face of West German policy, described by him as "the mine which threatens to blow up Europe's security." See Pravda, April 9, 1965. Brezhnev's return to the European security conference theme in his March 29, 1966, speech at the 23rd Party Congress was soon followed by other Soviet suggestions on the subject, culminating in the Bucharest declaration of July 1966.


23. Although Poland (on April 29, 1966) and Czechoslovakia (on May 7, 1966) gave negative replies to Bonn's Note, arguing as did the Soviet Union that it was a misleading document which marked no change in the FRG's "revanchist policy," some of the other East European addressees, notably Rumania and Hungary, avoided making polemical answers, suggesting something less than bloc unanimity behind the position taken by the Soviet Union. At this time, of course, Rumania was engaged in exploratory
dialogue with Bonn which was to lead to establishment of diplomatic relations between the two governments in early 1967.

24. Among other steps set out in the eight-point Soviet counterproposal were: conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty; elimination of foreign military bases; liquidation of military blocs, including NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization; renunciation of nuclear weapons by both German states and creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; development of closer political, economic, and scientific relations among European states; and the admission of both German states to the United Nations. See "To Make the European Situation Healthier, To Strengthen the Peace and Security of Peoples," Pravda, May 19, 1966.

25. During the German governmental crisis in the autumn of 1966 which culminated in the fall of the Erhard government and the formation in November of the CDU-SPD "Grand Coalition" headed by Kurt Georg Kiesinger, the Soviet Union maintained a relatively restrained "wait-and-see" attitude. Not long after installation of the Kiesinger government, however, Soviet attacks on FRG revanchism and neo-Nazism were resumed, spearheaded by a particularly sharp outburst from Kosygin during his visit to Paris in December 1966. See, for example, Waverley Root, "Kosygin Assails Bonn at Reception in Paris," The Washington Post, December 3, 1966; Henry Tanner, "Kosygin Asserts Fascism Is on the Rise in Germany," The New York Times, December 3, 1966.


27. Ibid., p. 17.


30. The new Soviet Ambassador to France was Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A. Zorin, whose high standing in Soviet officialdom compared to that of his predecessor,
Sergei A. Vinogradov, was widely interpreted as evidence of Moscow's desire to promote closer Soviet-French contacts.

31. One implication of the television agreement, like subsequent agreements to cooperate in the field of space research, was that French technology, and thus of course, France itself, was taken more seriously in Moscow than in Washington. See Grosser, *Franco-Soviet Relations Today*, p. 46.

32. Among such differences were the respective Soviet and French attitudes on the German issue. Gromyko, for example, at a press conference in Paris on April 30, 1965, gave the impression that France had accorded de facto recognition to East Germany. Shortly thereafter, a French spokesman carefully pointed out that, while France took into account the existing division of Germany, this should not be considered the diplomatic recognition of the GDR. See "Talks With French Hailed by Gromyko," *The New York Times*, May 1, 1965.


35. In addition to the high ceremony with which de Gaulle was received in Moscow and during a six-day tour to other Soviet cities, he became the first Western leader to be taken to the Soviet Union's space-launching center at Tyura Tam (or Baikonur) in Central Asia. See Henry Tanner, "De Gaulle Visits Soviet Space Site: Sees a Launching," *The New York Times*, June 26, 1966.


39. Ponomarev was head of the CPSU's international department. See his speech to the anniversary meeting of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, held in Prague, October 21-23, 1965. The speech, entitled "The Historic Significance of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and Our Time," may be found in *World Marxist Review*, December 1965, pp. 5-12.


41. In Finland, the Communist Party was formally admitted in May 1966 into a four-party government coalition headed by Social Democrats. Marking the inclusion of Communists in a Finnish government for the first time in eighteen years, this move was praised by Kosygin during his visit to Finland in June 1966. See UP International dispatch, "Finnish Coalition To Include Reds 1st Time Since '48," *The New York Times*, May 22, 1966; Peter Grose, "Kosygin Praises Finnish Coalition," *ibid.*, June 15, 1966.

42. For discussion of some of the limitations of a Popular Front approach for the Communist parties of Western Europe, see William McLaughlin, "Return of the Popular Front," *Radio Free Europe*, February 10, 1966.


45. Kosygin's acceptance of an invitation to visit London reversed an earlier cancellation of a projected visit in April 1965.
46. Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksei I. Adzhubei, had called on Pope John XXIII in 1963, when Soviet attitudes toward the Vatican first began to thaw slightly, but Adzhubei's official standing, whatever his family ties with Khrushchev, was a good many rungs below that of Foreign Minister. Gromyko's Papal visit in 1966 was followed the next year by Podgorny's visit. The latter, of course, stood even higher in the Soviet hierarchy than Gromyko.

47. See Robert C. Doty, "Gromyko Sees Pope: They Talk of Peace," The New York Times, April 28, 1966; Leo J. Wollenberg, "Gromyko Asks Europe Summit Talks," The Washington Post, April 28, 1966. Following Gromyko's visit, Soviet propaganda broadcasts to West European audiences again sounded the refrain that "an all-European summit conference" was needed to deal with the threat to peace posed by West Germany's "militaristic" policies, and also claimed that "the new Soviet proposal" for such a conference had evoked lively interest throughout Europe. See, for example, G. Verbitskii commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, May 2, 1966; A. Olekhin commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, May 7, 1966.


49. Although it was a fairly common attitude among West Europeans in the mid-sixties to look upon the technological gap as another of the many irritants in U.S.-European relations, by 1967 there was a growing tendency in West Europe to recognize that the lag in technology was more a product of management shortcomings and other factors in European society than a reflection of American attempts at domination. See, for example, Clyde N. Farnsworth, "West Europeans Attribute Continuing Technology Lag Behind the U.S. to Inferior Management," The New York Times, December 13, 1967.

51. The stress on a "European settlement" was, for example, a feature of the Bucharest declaration of mid-1966, which we shall take up later in this chapter.


53. Secretary McNamara's views on a reciprocal reduction of forces were given while he was testifying before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations on June 21, 1966 (The Atlantic Alliance). See also Chalmers M. Roberts, "U.S. Would Match Red Troop Cuts," The Washington Post, June 22, 1966. The question of mutual troop reductions also emerged from the hearings in the House of Representatives on NATO. The report on these hearings recommended, among other things, that "new initiatives [be] undertaken to pave the way for a possible reciprocal reduction in land forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact." See The Crisis in NATO, p. 9.

54. President Johnson in his October 7, 1966, speech suggested that "If changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could -- together with the other steps that I have mentioned -- help gradually to shape a new


58. Apart from commentary in the United States on the matter of troop reductions which might have been expected to stimulate Soviet interest in the subject, there were various exploratory suggestions from political figures in Europe. Among the potentially most interesting of these from the Soviet viewpoint was the trial balloon sent up by Dr. Rainer Barzel of West Germany, who, in a June 15, 1966, speech proposing fresh inducements to the Soviet Union to enhance the prospect of reunification, included the suggestion that Moscow might be ceded the right to maintain Soviet troops in a reunited Germany. However, Barzel's proposals fell flat, neither eliciting much support in his own country nor arousing any show of interest in Moscow. See Max Frankel, "West German Proposes Offers To Speed Reunification," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1966; Thomas J. Hamilton, "Reunification Debate," *Ibid.*., July 5, 1966.


61. In some cases, this interaction took the form of dependence, an example being the dependence of the Ulbricht regime upon the other Warsaw bloc countries to support the GDR's international position on the existence of two sovereign German states. In other cases, it took the form of revival of old rivalries, such as Hungary's resentment over Bucharest's attempts to assimilate the Magyar minority in Rumania, and the reciprocal mistrust of the Rumanians concerning Hungarian intentions toward Transylvania. See J. F. Brown, The New Eastern Europe, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966, pp. 190-191; Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe, p. 229.

62. Although the domestic variants of communism in East Europe had not worked out precisely the same in any of these countries, there was a broad pattern characteristic of the region. Internal development in the East European countries, as in the Soviet Union itself, reflected a process of change, with the rise of competing interest groups and trends toward "market" versions of socialist economies, but with neither a visible decline in the political monopoly of the ruling parties nor the emergence of anything resembling a genuinely constitutional system. In some cases, a struggle between two internal elements -- the Party-State apparatus on the one hand and the economic-technical intelligentsia on the other -- seemed to be under way, but there was little basis for judging whether the outcome was likely to be a clear verdict in favor of one or the other, or an uneasy compromise between the two. See Skilling, ibid., p. 231.


69. This version of Gomulka's sponsorship of the Northern Tier grouping was given by Władysław Tykocinski, for many years chief of the Polish Mission in Berlin, who sought political asylum in the West in May 1965. See "Poland's Plan for the 'Northern Tier': An Interview with Władysław Tykocinski," *East Europe*, November 1966, pp. 14-15.

70. Ibid., p. 15. One should note, however, that the Soviet Union did not institutionalize the separate status of the "Northern Tier," which would have tended to formalize yet another division in the Warsaw bloc.

71. Although no formal expulsion of Albania from the Warsaw Pact took place, Albania's departure was for all practical purposes complete after the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, where the Soviet Union "lost a satellite" and China "gained a bridgehead in Europe." Cf. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe*, pp. 201-202. Yugoslavia had also been "lost" to the Soviet Union, of course, in 1948, before the Warsaw Pact was formed.

72. See, for example, Brown, *The New Eastern Europe*, pp. 189-190.

73. See pp. 64-66. Ulbricht himself, of course, was adept at allowing himself room for maneuver, not only vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but in East German leadership politics between hardline and moderate factions.

75. Communiqué on the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty, Pravda, January 22, 1965. For possible implications of this meeting with regard to the question of nuclear sharing within the Warsaw bloc, see discussion in Chapter XVII.

76. See, for example, "Unrealizable Designs," Izvestiia, February 11, 1965.

77. See "The Old in a New Package," Izvestiia, June 18, 1966. See also Harry B. Ellis, "Moscow Slams Door on Barzel Détente Hopes," The Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 1966. For previous comment on the Barzel proposal, see fn. 58 above.

78. For commentary on the Apel suicide, see Paul Wohl, "East Germany Rocked by Loss of Key Planner," The Christian Science Monitor, December 9, 1965; Anatole Shub, "W. German Says Apel Left Notebook, Bonn Links Suicide to Russian Pact," The Washington Post, December 11, 1965. Communist sources dismissed as "impudent inventions" Western reports that Apel's suicide was in protest against the trade pact. See editorial, "Lowest Level," Neues Deutschland, December 8, 1965; commentary, ibid., December 9, 1965; TASS broadcast, December 8, 1965.


81. Kosygin paid the first call on Gomulka less than two weeks after Khrushchev's ouster. Both Kosygin and Brezhnev conferred privately with the Polish leader immediately after the Pact meeting in Warsaw in January 1965, while in April 1965 they headed another Soviet delegation to Warsaw to renew the Soviet-Polish treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.

82. For text of Brezhnev speech see Pravda, April 9, 1965.


84. Brown, The New Eastern Europe, p. 185. It should be noted, however, that by February 1966 Poland


88. Ibid. The aptness of sending Anastas Mikoyan to Budapest in April 1965 as an envoy to soothe Kadar lay in the fact that Mikoyan had been closely associated with Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy, widely regarded in East Europe as the charter for greater East European autonomy.

89. The Hungarian comment on Bonn's Peace Note recited a list of "compelling facts" which had led Bonn "to open a diplomatic conversation with the socialist countries of East Europe." It then stated, however, that the West German initiative "is nonetheless significant as it is indicative of Europe's changing conditions whose influence even Bonn cannot evade." See "Communiqué on the Note of the German Federal Republic to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic," Budapest international broadcast, June 3, 1966.
90. For example, Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter in April 1965 broached the idea that the countries of Central Europe and the Danubian Basin might move to enlarge their contacts in the interest of common action to improve the international situation -- a suggestion implying emergence of a grouping within the Warsaw bloc that would not necessarily draw its inspiration from Moscow. For discussion of this and other similar expressions by Hungarian leaders, see "An Alternate Foreign Policy for Hungary?" Radio Free Europe, March 29, 1966.

91. An example of this treatment occurred in the fall of 1966 when the "Vltava" joint Warsaw Pact military exercise was held in Czechoslovakia, a Northern Tier country. Hungarian military elements were invited to participate, a symbolic welcome marking the first time that Hungary had been associated with a joint exercise of the northern grouping. Further discussion of the various joint Warsaw Pact exercises will be found in Chapter XVII.

92. Novotny showed his pique at being taken by surprise by Khrushchev's ouster when he declined to attend the 1964 anniversary celebration of the October Revolution in Moscow, sending Jiri Hendrych in his place. Brown, The New Eastern Europe, p. 172.


94. Soviet dissatisfaction with the raw materials situation was illustrated by statements that it costs the Soviet Union three or four times as much in investments to produce a given value of raw materials for export to East Europe than it would to produce machinery of equal value for export to the region. See Michael Kaser and John Michael Montias, "Policy Factors in East-West Trade," in The Atlantic Community and Eastern Europe: Perspectives and Policy, The Atlantic Institute, Paris, July 1967, p. 61. See also "Soviet Aid to Bloc Foreseen," The New York Times, July 4, 1966.

95. Czechoslovakia, for example, adhered to the line taken by Poland and the Soviet Union in giving a negative
response to Bonn's March 1966 "Peace Note." It should be noted that the Novotny regime also sided with the Soviet Union to lecture the Rumanians for over-accentuating "irregularities and distortions" in the relations of national parties with the Comintern -- an historical issue brought up by Ceausescu, the Rumanian leader, in a memorable speech on May 7, 1966.

96. On September 14, 1965, during a visit to Moscow, Novotny said that "all must strive" toward a world party conference "at an appropriate time" in order to discuss "a number of urgent problems" of the world Communist movement. Pravda, September 15, 1965. Again in late 1965 and early 1966, the Czechs took it upon themselves to endorse a world conclave which many parties were still opposing. See "An Important Step in the Building of Socialism," Pravda, January 8, 1966; Communiqué on Novotny talks with Spanish CP Representatives, Rude Pravo, January 20, 1966. Later in the autumn of 1966, the Bulgarians joined the Czechs in carrying the ball for the Soviet Union on the world conference issue, leading to Brezhnev's open "approval" of the idea in November 1966, as discussed in Chapter XI, p. 30. Out of these maneuvers came the "consultative meeting" of 65 parties in Budapest in February 1968, from which Rumania made a dramatic exit, and which we shall come to later.

97. The initial Soviet tactics included not only conciliatory gestures and friendly speeches but also attempts to lay the blame for past deterioration of Soviet-Rumanian relations on Khrushchev, one of the few instances in which the new Soviet leaders sounded this note in East Europe, where Khrushchev's ouster was generally regretted. See Brown, The New Eastern Europe, pp. 187-188; Remington, The Changing Soviet Perception, pp. 74-81.


102. For a Soviet account of this speech which was cautiously noncommittal on its negative implications with respect to the Warsaw Pact, see "Unity Is a Dependable Shield," Izvestia, June 17, 1965. For a concise general account of Ceausescu's tactics in challenging Soviet domination, see David Binder, "Ceausescu of Rumania: Man Battering at the Kremlin Wall," The New York Times Magazine, May 29, 1966, pp. 10, 45ff.


106. Brezhnev speech at September Party Plenum, Pravda, September 30, 1965. The talks to which Brezhnev referred had occurred throughout September, when leaders of virtually all the East European countries trekked to Moscow in quick succession, including Ceausescu, who brought with him the first top-level Rumanian Party-government delegation to visit Moscow since 1961. The meeting with Ceausescu was described as "sincere and frank," and the resultant communiqué avoided any reference to Soviet-Rumanian differences over Warsaw Pact matters. See "Communiqué on the Visit to the USSR of the Party-Government Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Rumania," Pravda, September 12, 1965.

107. The reference to policy coordination at the United Nations was doubtless aimed at Rumania, which had shown a growing tendency to vote independently of the Warsaw bloc.

108. Most of the East European leaders were notably silent on their own attitudes toward Brezhnev's reorganization proposal. One of the few to comment publicly was Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, who stated on December 11, 1965, that "We note with satisfaction . . . the settlement of certain questions for coordinating foreign policy." It has generally been assumed, since Soviet and Rumanian spokesmen did most of the talking about reorganization, that the issue was drawn between their two countries. However, the fact that other East European leaders failed to register public enthusiasm for the Soviet proposals could be interpreted as a sign that there may have been quiet opposition to the Soviet case and perhaps even some sympathy for the Rumanian position. For views of two well-informed Western analysts on this question, see Remington, The Changing Soviet Perception, pp. 83ff; Fritz Ernarth, Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968, The RAND Corporation, RM-5909-PR, March 1969, pp. 33-40. See also Chapter XVII, pp. 289-290, 307.
109. The Political Consultative Committee, which met only periodically, the Permanent Commission, which nominally was supposed to make general foreign policy recommendations, and the Joint Secretariat were the principal Warsaw Pact organs with which Soviet reorganization recommendations may have been intended to deal, although the Soviets did not spell out publicly what changes they had in mind. As noted earlier in this chapter (see pp. 83-84), the several existing policy organs of the Pact provided no effective means for systematic policymaking and centralized enforcement of decisions; presumably, it was this situation which the Soviet Union hoped to remedy by its proposals.

110. ^^^ Chapter XVII, pp. 326-331.


113. Ceausescu's speech linked the nationalist theme of the right of the Rumanian people "to decide their own fate" with the right of each Communist party to determine its own policies without pressure from outside influence. Soviet manipulation of relations with the Rumanian and other parties through the Comintern in the past was assailed, and irredentist grievances against the Soviet Union were again aired, with Ceausescu going beyond previous Rumanian hints, in June 1964 and July 1965, of resentment concerning the "lost" provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. These provinces had been taken over by the USSR in 1940 after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, which Ceausescu also criticized for its adverse effect on Rumania's national interests. For portions of the Ceausescu speech, see "Rumania Is Silent on Brezhnev Trip," The New York Times, and "Rumania Jabs at Soviet Role," The Washington Post, May 12, 1966.


115. These leaks to both the Western and the Communist press had the apparent function of keeping Rumania's skirts officially clean, while permitting rumors to suggest Rumanian opposition to Soviet policies. See "Rumanian Rebuff to Soviet on Cost of Pact Reported," The New York Times, May 17, 1966; "Bucharest Silent on Note," ibid., May 18, 1966; "Rumania -- Moscow's France," ibid., May 22, 1966.

117. In late May and early June 1966, while visiting Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev anticipated further attacks on the Rumanian position in two speeches in which he argued for strengthening the Warsaw Pact and indirectly chided those who might be "naive" enough to call for loosening the Warsaw military alliance while the military bloc of the North Atlantic alliance still existed to serve "the policy of the revanchists and militarists." See David Binder, "Brezhnev, in Prague, Urges Stronger Warsaw Pact," The New York Times, June 1, 1966; idem, "Brezhnev Warns Again on Divisions in Red Bloc," ibid., June 3, 1966.

118. The meeting of foreign ministers in Moscow produced a heated clash between the East German and Rumanian ministers over the question of Rumania's independent policy toward West Germany, with the Rumanian official, Corneliu Manescu, threatening to pull out of the meeting. At the concurrent meeting of Pact military officials in East Berlin, the fact that Northern Tier countries and a large Soviet contingent provided the representation to the exclusion of Southern Tier officials led to speculation that reorganization plans to lend formal substance to the Northern Tier grouping may have been discussed. If so, however, nothing concrete emerged from this meeting or the subsequent Bucharest conference. See Peter Grose, "East Bloc Aides Meet in Moscow," The New York Times, June 7, 1966; David Binder, "East-Bloc Clash on Bonn Reported," ibid., June 16, 1966; "Pact Arms Chiefs Meet in East Berlin," The Washington Post, June 13, 1966; "East Bloc Generals Meet with Ulbricht," The New York Times, June 13, 1966.

119. For text of Kosygin's speech, see Pravda, May 18, 1966.


122. One of these points was the joint offer to send volunteers to Vietnam if Hanoi should request them, an offer which had not previously been made by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, although the Soviet Union had publicly voiced its willingness to allow Soviet citizens to "volunteer" as early as March 1965 (Pravda, March 24, 1965). The declaration also put all the Warsaw Pact members on record for the first time as being prepared to furnish aid to Vietnam proportional to any escalation of the conflict by the United States, a position previously taken by Brezhnev at the 23rd Party Congress and in a speech to Soviet military academy graduates just before the Bucharest meeting. For the full Bucharest communiqué, see Pravda, July 8, 1966.

123. Of the two joint statements issued in the communiqué on the Bucharest conference, that on European security has generally come to be referred to in Soviet bloc circles as the "Bucharest declaration." See Stephen S. Anderson, "Soviet Russia and the Two Europes," Current History, October 1967, p. 205 (a condensed version of the declaration accompanies this article).


126. See fn. 24 above.

127. The declaration did note "as a positive phenomenon" that there were some circles in West Germany opposed to "revanchism and militarism" in favor of "normal relations between the two German states." It also stressed the "growing influence" of other forces in West Europe aware of the need to work toward "mutually advantageous relations among all the states of Europe" and toward "the complete independence of their countries and the preservation of their national identities."


129. The author is indebted to Richard Lowenthal for offering this insight into the implications of the Bucharest proposals for Soviet European policy.
XIII. SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICY AFTER THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE

1. This round of visits included a trip by Kosygin to Paris in December 1966 and another to Ankara later that month; Kosygin's visit to London in February 1967; and a trip to Rome, in January 1967, by Podgorny, who, like Gromyko the summer before, called on the Pope. In November 1966, Podgorny had also visited Austria.

2. See Chapter XI, p. 43.


5. I. Orlik and V. Razmerov, "European Security and Relations Between the Two Systems," International Affairs (Moscow). No. 5, May 1967, p. 3. For other examples of this propaganda campaign, see M. Voslenskii, "Union for the Sake of Aggression," Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star). September 13, 1966; Anatolii Antonov's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast. September 26, 1966; M. Kazakov, "Fraternal Alliance." Pravda, May 14, 1967. In April 1967 at Karlovy Vary, in a speech to be discussed later in this chapter, Brezhnev, too, added his voice on "the question of military danger in Europe today." "Is the threat so serious?" he asked. "Yes, comrades, there are grounds for this. While we do not want to exaggerate the danger of war, neither do we wish to underestimate it."


7. Kosygin was the first prominent Soviet leader to introduce the theme that the rise of neo-Nazism in West Germany posed a new threat to peace. He did so in a speech on December 2, 1966, during his visit to Paris, citing electoral gains of the German National Democratic Party (NPD) as evidence of neo-Nazi trends over which "even the most heedless should be alarmed." See Henry Tanner, "Kosygin Asserts Fascism Is on the Rise in Germany," The New York Times, December 3, 1966; Waverley Root, "Kosygin Assails Bonn at Reception in Paris," The Washington Post, December 3, 1966.
8. Herbert Wehner, West Germany's Minister of All-German Affairs and one of the chief architects of Bonn's Ostpolitik, is also credited with having fathered the idea of "regulated coexistence" with East Germany.

9. See Chapter XIV, fn. 3.

10. See The New York Times, December 14, 1966. In this speech Kiesinger not only made a bid for better relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe; he also gave high priority to repairing Bonn's ties with France, toward which end he met with de Gaulle about a month later. With respect to America, Kiesinger reaffirmed that the Federal Republic's bonds with the United States in NATO were of "vital importance," but at the same time he took up a stance more independent of Washington than that of either Adenauer or Erhard before him.


13. Diplomatic relations were established on January 31, 1967. See further discussion in Chapter XIV.


15. Such reservations were suggested by Kosygin at his press conference in London on February 9, 1967, where he tempered critical remarks on West German "revanchism" with refusal to echo the GDR's condemnation of Rumania, stating that it was up to the Rumanians themselves to decide whether establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn was a step in the right direction. See The New York Times and Pravda, February 10, 1967.


18. See discussion of this Peace Note, Chapter XII, pp. 68-72.

19. Among these efforts was a West German appeal for improving relations between the two parts of Germany through high-level contacts between leaders. This proposal and the lengthy exchange of unfruitful responses which followed it are taken up in the next chapter. From its position on the sidelines during the Bonn-GDR exchanges, the Soviet Union occasionally assailed "the stubborn unwillingness" of the Kiesinger government to accept the GDR's terms for "normalization" of relations. See, for example, remarks by Kosygin at Kishinev, September 30, 1967, Sovetskaia Moldaviia (Soviet Moldavia), October 1, 1967.

20. David Binder, "Soviet Reported Taking Initiative on German Split," The New York Times, October 14, 1967. See also first article cited in fn. 17 above. Many of the details of Soviet demands on this occasion and in subsequent confidential Soviet-West German talks on a renunciation-of-force agreement came to light later in July 1968. In Izvestiia of July 11, 1968, the Soviet government revealed parts of its exchanges with Bonn, including a hitherto unpublished note of October 12, 1967. Brandt in turn held a press conference on July 12, 1968, in which he expressed regret that Moscow had chosen to resort to further polemical attacks on West Germany instead of "quiet and factual discussion of problems." At the same time, Brandt's remarks underlined the steady escalation of Soviet demands. See Philip Shabecoff, "Bonn Discloses Russian Demands," The New York Times, July 13, 1968. Even this airing of Soviet-West German differences did not result in burying the idea of a force-renunciation agreement, however. Gromyko returned to the subject in a major foreign policy speech on June 27, 1968, noting that the Soviet Union was still interested in an exchange of views on an agreement, but adding that progress would
require "recognition of the fact of the existence of the GDR -- our friend and ally whose security is inseparable from our own." This was the speech, incidentally, in which Gromyko also gave notice that the Soviet Union was prepared to begin talks on ABM and missile limitation with the United States. See Pravda, June 28, 1968.


22. Besides officially demanding for the first time a disavowal of the FRG's constitutional position that West Berlin is an integral part of the Federal Republic, the statement also called for recognition that the Munich Treaty of 1938 on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was void ab initio.

23. See Chapter XII, pp. 66-68.


26. As some speculation had it, Brezhnev was for a very hard line on Berlin, backing Ulbricht's position, while Kosygin was inclined toward a softer and more subtle approach. See, for example, David Binder, "Red Bloc Upset by German Issue," The New York Times, December 21, 1967.

27. For accounts of the Soviet proposal, as partly disclosed by Western sources, see David Binder, "Moscow Offers New Berlin Deal," The New York Times, January 16, 1968; Dan Morgan, "Soviet Envoy Tells Bonn To Halt Displays of Unity with West Berlin," The Washington Post, January 17, 1968; "The Russians Change Their Tune," The New York Times, January 21, 1968. Much the same ground as that in the aide-memoire was apparently covered again in a meeting on January 18 between the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, Petr Abrasimov, and West
Berlin's Mayor, Klaus Schütz. This aide-mémoire, incidentally, marked the first time the Soviets had addressed a major communication to Bonn on Berlin matters without also addressing the Western occupation powers.

28. The most recent meeting of a Bundestag committee in West Berlin prior to this Soviet note had been in October 1967. The "work week" meeting of the committee provoked a Soviet protest at the time, but in much milder form than had greeted the last plenary session of the Bundestag in Berlin, in April 1965.

29. This protest took the form of a letter from the Soviet ambassador in the GDR to the American, British, and French ambassadors in West Germany. See "Unlawful Activity of the FRG in Western Europe," Pravda, February 15, 1968.

30. This statement, critical of Bonn for having chosen to regard earlier Soviet protests on neo-Nazism as "interference in the domestic affairs of the FRG," was released at a Foreign Ministry press conference in Moscow on February 24. An interesting point, in connection with the notion that the Soviet Union was prepared to apply a combination of pressure and persuasion in its relations with Bonn, was that the statement drew a clear distinction between "Nazi elements" and "the majority of citizens of the Federal Republic who hold other views." See "To Stop the Activity of Neo-Nazists," Izvestia, February 25, 1968.


33. As usual, it was not possible to determine whether the Ulbricht regime had itself taken the initiative with Soviet assent, or whether the GDR was simply acting upon instructions laid down in Moscow. The author tends to the view that the GDR probably urged the access curbs upon Moscow in the first instance, but that the latter retained control of the harassment campaign.

34. See "Neo-Nazis Warned of Red Travel Ban," The Washington Post, March 12, 1968. This East German move came a few days after a Bundestag committee had met again in West Berlin, from March 4 to 8, 1968. The Soviets on March 4 publicly condemned the committee "work week."

35. "German Reds Cut Access to Berlin," The New York Times, April 14, 1968. The first high official barred from driving to Berlin from West Germany was the city's mayor, Klaus Schütz, who was stopped by GDR border guards on April 26. Schütz was President of the West German Bundestag as well as mayor of Berlin. Soviet propaganda treated his trip as a "deliberate provocation," and defended the measures taken by the GDR as "legal and necessary" actions in light of the allegedly "intolerable nature of Bonn's encroachments on West Berlin." See N. Polianov, "What the Fuss Is About," Izvestiia, May 2, 1968; E. Grigor'ev, "Illegal Claims," Pravda, May 3, 1968.

36. "East Germans Set New Berlin Curbs," The New York Times, June 12, 1968. The reason given by the GDR for these measures was the passage by the West German Bundestag, a short time previously, of the so-called "emergency laws" for dealing with crises.

37. Western protests were strung out in a series of statements and notes following the June curbs. See, for example, Dan Morgan, "3 Allies Call Curbs on Berlin Invalid," The Washington Post, June 13, 1968; Morton Mintz, "Rusk Protests to Soviet over E. German Curbs," ibid., June 16, 1968; Benjamin Welles, "Western Allies Denounce East German Travel Curb," The New York Times, June 13, 1968; "West Protests on Berlin Curbs," ibid., July 4, 1968. At virtually the same time that identical three-power notes were delivered in Moscow on July 3 calling upon the Soviet Union to fulfill its obligations for insuring normal traffic to Berlin, Brezhnev made a speech in which he declared that the West would have to accept the measures instituted by the GDR. See Pravda, July 4, 1968.
38. For discussion of developments in Czechoslovakia and their impact on Soviet policy, see Chapters XIV, XV, and XVII.


43. See fn. 30 above. Among factors contributing to a possible shift in Moscow's evaluation of the Bonn leadership was the entry of Social Democrats into the German government via the Grand Coalition of 1966 for the first time since the days of the Weimar Republic. Although, historically, the thesis that Social Democracy was the "main enemy" and "greatest danger" to communism had long dominated the Soviet outlook -- and indeed had lain behind Stalin's policy of supporting the Nazis against the Weimar Republic in the early 1930s -- the situation three decades later had changed significantly. In particular, following formation of the Grand Coalition government, the West European Communist parties sought to persuade Moscow to disown the theory of "social fascism" under which Social Democrats were branded the "main enemy," and to adopt a
cooperative policy toward the new coalition in Bonn. These urgings had no palpable effect on Soviet policy in 1966, but a revision of the underlying attitude toward Social Democracy may have begun to take shape at this time -- to emerge somewhat more clearly in early 1969, when such Soviet leaders as Suslov and Ponomarev criticized the "main enemy" thesis in what then appeared to be a possible prelude to a major reorientation of Moscow-Bonn relations. For speculation on this matter, see Anatole Shub, "Soviet Shift on Bonn Breaks with Party Policy Dating to 1928" and "E. German, Soviet Ties Show Strain," The Washington Post, March 27 and 28, 1969.

44. See Hassner, Change and Security in Europe, p. 13. The West German tendency toward a more independent foreign policy stance was illustrated by Chancellor Kiesinger in a speech on March 11, 1968, in which he said that as much as Germany values its membership in NATO, the Western alliance should not stand in the way of a détente toward East Europe that could help to end the division of Germany. Likewise, while acknowledging the U.S. contribution to Europe's security, he pointed out that the U.S.-Soviet arms race tended to cement the status of a divided Germany, making it important to seek a policy course toward a European peace system that would eliminate a permanent East-West demarcation line through the middle of Germany.

Other shifts in long-standing West German attitudes also were apparent, although they did not necessarily indicate agreement on what direction the recognition of "realities" should take. One example of such a shift was Brandt's statement of March 18, 1968, to an SPD conference, in which he violated a 19-year-old taboo of West German politics by suggesting that it was time to recognize the permanence of the Oder-Neisse boundary between Germany and Poland. Speaking for the other half of Bonn's coalition government three days later, Chancellor Kiesinger of the CDU expressed reservations on the subject, but as noted by some observers, reaction in West Germany to Brandt's initiative was "surprisingly mild." (See David Binder in The New York Times, March 24, 1968.) In the same connection, Heinrich Albertz, former mayor of West Berlin, speaking on behalf of an independent citizens committee on July 11, 1968, not only urged acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line but also advocated full-scale recognition of East Germany as a step which might help to create conditions favorable to the survival of West Berlin.

46. For discussion of the sharp deterioration of Soviet relations with West Germany which ensued in the immediate wake of the Czech invasion, see Chapter XV, pp. 234-239. It is worth noting, incidentally, that even before the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1969 evinced some interest in reopening a post-Czechoslovakia dialogue with Bonn, talk of a second Rapallo as a possible alternative for West German policy was heard in some German circles. See, for example, Chalmers M. Roberts, "Bonn Has Stake in Nov. 5," The Washington Post, September 22, 1968.

47. Kosygin, for example, on his trips to London and Ankara in December 1966, as well as during his Paris visit in February 1967, had lobbied for the Bucharest European security formula and for pan-European technical cooperation, through which he claimed Europeans could close the "technological gap" and end the "brain drain." He also alluded to the desirability of abolishing NATO. Podgorny, during his Austrian visit in November 1966, solicited support for a European security conference and praised Austrian neutrality, but he also warned his hosts against making any "arrangement with the Common Market." He again plugged the virtues of a security conference on his visit to Italy in January 1967. See "'Active Coexistence' Upheld in Podgorny's Talks in Rome," The Washington Post, January 27, 1967.

48. For a representative Soviet treatment of the themes that the Bucharest call for a security conference had received a favorable response in the West and that it had stimulated a "West European movement in favor of withdrawal from NATO," see S. Beglov, "European Security Problems: Dialogue Goes Ahead," International Affairs, No. 3, March 1967, pp. 44-49.

49. See "Speech by Head of CPSU Delegation Comrade L. I. Brezhnev," Izvestiia, April 26, 1967. The implications of the Karlovy Vary meeting for internal Soviet bloc affairs are discussed in the next chapter.
50. Other Soviet representatives also pushed Brezhnev's theme that technical and scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union would enable Europeans to liberate themselves from dependence on the United States. One of these was Vladimir Kirillin, the Soviet Minister of Technology, who pressed for an all-European agreement on scientific-technical cooperation at a meeting of the ECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) in April 1967. Another was A. Iakovlev, the Soviet aircraft designer, who argued in June 1967 that European countries were capable of solving the most complex technological problems without U.S. help. See "Economic Cooperation Needed Among All European States," Soviet News, April 18, 1967, p. 28; A. Iakovlev, "1967 Aviation: Achievements and Perspectives," Pravda, June 26, 1967.


52. The question of NATO's future role and its interest in moves to help bridge the East-West division of Europe had been under wide discussion in the West from the fall of 1966, paralleling the reconciliation policy of the new Bonn coalition government. The NATO Council of Ministers Meeting in Paris in December 1966 adopted a proposal by Belgium's Foreign Minister, Paul Harmel, to study and evaluate the alliance in terms of changed European conditions, which subsequently led to the Harmel Report. It was these developments upon which Brezhnev sought to dash cold water in his Karlovy Vary speech. See Anthony Lewis, "NATO Vows Moves To Increase Ties with Soviet Bloc," The New York Times,

53. Earlier Soviet commentary had also taken a negative attitude toward Western attempts to transform NATO "from a purely military instrument into one for settling political relations with members of the Warsaw Pact," but not in such strong terms as did Brezhnev. See, for example, Beglov, in International Affairs, March 1967, p. 49.

54. Brezhnev was incorrect in stating that NATO's members would have to decide on extension of the alliance at the time its 20th anniversary came due (April 1969). Article 13 of the treaty permits members to withdraw upon one year's notice after the treaty has been in force 20 years (it was signed on April 4, 1949, and entered into force on August 24, 1949), but the treaty contains no provision requiring a decision to extend its life. Later Soviet commentary in 1968 dwelt on differences within NATO over interpretation of Article 13, suggesting that the French view permitting withdrawal without waiting for one year was the correct interpretation. See Iurii Zhukov, "NATO: To Be or Not To Be?" Pravda, March 12, 1968.


56. See, for example, Anatolii Potopov's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, June 15, 1967.


64. Moscow radio broadcast, December 17, 1967.


68. Marshal Zakharov's visit to France in October 1967, hailed in a Soviet broadcast of October 15 as a contribution to "strengthening Soviet-French ties and the cause of peace in Europe," was the first visit by a head of the Soviet General Staff to a Western country. Marshal Malinovskii, as Defense Minister, had of course visited France in 1960 with Khrushchev.


73. For example, de Gaulle's repeated references to the permanence of the Oder-Neisse boundary and his description of the former German town of Hindenburg as "the most Polish of all cities" apparently served as an irritant in Paris-Bonn relations.


76. See, for example, I. Volodin, "Why the Sorbonne Is Closed," Izvestia, May 6, 1968; Iuri Zhukov, "The Background Story of the False Prophet Marcuse and His Noisy Students," Pravda, May 30, 1968. The latter article, among other things, contained a harsh criticism of the ideas of Herbert Marcuse and the "New Left" in the West, which it linked with the philosophy of "the Mao Tse-tung group" as the source of inspiration for the "politically adventurist" and "ultra-revolutionary" French student radicals.


82. In September 1967, for example, the Soviets signed two large contracts with British companies for the purchase of machine tools and instruments. The same month a British aviation delegation toured Soviet aircraft plants. See "British Minister Meets Soviet Aircraft Designers," Soviet News, September 19, 1967, p. 131.

83. Brown visited Moscow in May-June 1967, where, in addition to private conversations with Soviet officials, he gave a public lecture on foreign policy questions that was notable for its frank refutation of Soviet "revanchist" charges against the West German government. Wilson had been invited in February to visit Moscow in July 1967, but the Soviet government later found this time "inconvenient" and his trip was postponed until January 1968. See "Visit of Mr. George Brown to Moscow," Soviet News, May 30, 1967, p. 116; "Wilson, Soviet Chief, Confer on 'Problems'," The Washington Post, January 23, 1968.


87. From mid-1967 on, as Soviet concern over developments in East Europe grew, references to dissolving the opposing alliances had disappeared from Soviet propaganda.

88. Lev Andreev's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, September 6, 1967.


93. Initial Soviet attacks on the new Norwegian government's NATO policies abated somewhat after the visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister John Lyng to Moscow in November 1966. Although Norway's NATO affiliations, and especially the presence of West German officers on NATO staffs in the northern area, continued to be criticized, Soviet-Norwegian relations took on a warmer tone in 1967.

94. The communiqués marking the Tidemand visit in October 1967 noted that he had talked with Kosygin as well as with Soviet defense officials, but they were non-committal on the matters discussed. It was announced that Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Defense Minister, would pay a return visit to Norway at an unspecified date.

96. Andreev's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, August 27, 1967. Among items denied by Soviet spokesmen were periodic reports in the Western press in 1966-1967 that unidentified submarines, suspected to be Soviet, were appearing in Norwegian waters and fjords. Soviet propaganda later seized on the crash of a nuclear-armed U.S. bomber in Greenland to emphasize the risks that Scandinavian countries were running by being tied to NATO. See Iu. Goloshubov, "Scandinavian Alarms," *Izvestiia*, February 8, 1968.


98. These included the visit to Sweden in August 1967 of a group of Soviet MIG-21 fighters, the first time a Soviet military air unit had flown to a Western country. There also were several exchange calls of naval vessels at Leningrad and Stockholm, and a visit in September 1967 to Sweden by the head of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. *Pravda*, June 3, 1967, June 21, 1967; "Aviators' Visit Ends," *Pravda*, September 1, 1967; Admiral Gorshkov leads delegation to Stockholm, Moscow radio broadcast, September 11, 1967.


100. G. Deinichenko, "Congressmen's Mistake," *Izvestiia*, November 18, 1967. Only occasionally did Soviet commentary express displeasure over Swedish relations with the United States, as when Swedish universities were criticized for doing research allegedly helpful to U.S. military programs. See, for example, Iu. Iakhontov, "And What about Neutrality?" *Pravda*, February 15, 1968.

101. See Chapter XII, pp. 76-77.


105. One of the first signs of a warming up of Turkish attitudes toward the Soviet Union following the Cyprus conflict in the fall of 1964 had been the visit of a Soviet parliamentary delegation to Turkey in early 1965, at which time the Russians reportedly pledged to support the Turkish position on a settlement of the Cyprus issue. See "'Soviet-Turkish Frontier Should Be Made a Frontier of Growing Friendship.' Delegation of Soviet MPs in Ankara," Soviet News, January 5, 1965, p. 6. For a general assessment of these and prior Soviet efforts in the sixties to improve relations with Turkey, see Geoffrey Wheeler, "Soviet and Chinese Policies in the Middle East," World Today, February 1966, pp. 64-78.


107. As pointed out by the London Economist on December 2, 1967, the Soviet Union sought to play the Cyprus crisis of November 1967 both ways, assuring the Turks of full Soviet backing while advising Makarios that "Turkish threats are bluff and that as a genuine neutralist he must do everything in his power to resist the pressures of the Anglo-Americans."

108. See A. Sharifov's commentary in Izvestiia, September 30, 1967, as well as Moscow radio broadcast of the same day. See also "Joint Soviet-Turkish Communiqué," Pravda, September 30, 1967.


110. As stated, for example, by an "Our Radio" (clandestine) broadcast in Turkish to Turkey, September 29, 1967.
111. In March 1968, for example, Soviet commentators noted with satisfaction that Turkey was among the NATO countries "seeking revision of the Atlantic Treaty." See Iurii Zhukov, "NATO: To Be or Not To Be?" Pravda, March 12, 1968.


113. Russian aspirations in North Africa and the Middle East, which go back at least to the end of the seventeenth century, probably first took on meaningful form under Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century. Her policy included military aid to Egypt in order to threaten the Turkish empire from the rear, and in 1784 she reportedly agreed to support Egypt's independence in return for the right to station Russian troops in Alexandria and other Egyptian cities. Under the last of the Czars, Russia's long-time ambition to obtain access to the Mediterranean was reemphasized in diplomatic maneuvering in 1914 aimed at Russian annexation of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. Like his Czarist predecessors, Stalin cast his eyes toward the Middle East. In 1940, dickering through Molotov with Germany for spheres of influence, he specified that the area "in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognized as the main area of Soviet aspirations." After World War II, Stalin sought to establish a Soviet foothold from Iran to the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Besides attempts to detach parts of Iranian and Turkish territory, his moves included: a 1945 proposal for "combined defense" of the Turkish Straits; a request for bases in the former Italian possessions of Libya, Eritrea, and the Dodecanese Islands; and a demand in 1946 for revision of the Montreux Convention.

In 1955, with Khrushchev in power and the Egyptian revolution having opened more favorable prospects for Soviet penetration in the Middle East, the USSR began a large-scale program of arms aid to the anti-Baghdad Pact countries, which was to alter the local military balance in the area. The Soviet role in the Suez crisis of 1956 helped to consolidate Soviet relations with Egypt, and shortly thereafter Syria became the next client state which the Soviet Union undertook to shield from alleged "imperialist" aggression, in this case, from Turkey. Again in 1958, the Soviet Union played the role of self-proclaimed "protector"
during the Lebanon crisis, asserting that Soviet warnings to the West and military maneuvers in the Caucasus had saved the new revolutionary government in Iraq from being crushed, although the Western view of what happened was that Lebanon and Jordan had been saved from an attempted takeover by pro-Soviet elements. Despite the difficulties encountered by the Soviets in staying out of the crossfire of internal Arab politics, by the end of Khrushchev's tenure the policy of supporting Arab aspirations against Israel and outside "neocolonialist" powers had gone a long way toward strengthening the Soviet position in the Middle East. This, in brief, was the background against which the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime took up the task of advancing Soviet interests in the area.


114. For an excellent discussion of the interests of various European countries in the Middle East, see Sources of Conflict in the Middle East, Adelphi Papers, No. 26, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 1966, especially pp. 2-6.

115. At the beginning of May 1967, the Soviet Union warned Syria and Egypt of an alleged large-scale Israeli military buildup on the Syrian border which had not in fact occurred. The warning, however, apparently helped to inflame the spiral of mutual Arab-Israeli suspicions which culminated in the June war. For discussion of this question, see Walter Laqueur, "The Hand of Russia," The Reporter, June 29, 1967, pp. 18-19; Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967, Adelphi Papers, No. 41, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, October 1967, pp. 15-27; Joseph G. Whalen, The Soviet Union and the Middle East: A Survey

116. See Chapter XI, pp. 48-49. An ambiguous Soviet threat of measures against Israel came after the Israelis had halted their advance into Egypt and turned their attention to Syria, possibly heading for Damascus. On June 10, a note handed to the Israeli Ambassador in Moscow warned that "unless Israel ceases military operations immediately, the Soviet Union jointly with other peace-loving states, will impose sanctions against Israel, with all the consequences arising therefrom." (See Pravda, June 11, 1967.) The broad term "sanctions" left the Soviet Union a good deal of elbow room, but it was given to understand that this might mean participation of Soviet forces in defense of Syria unless the Israeli advance was halted. A discussion of this episode may be found in John A. Baker, Jr., "Soviet Policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean," paper presented at Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., April 19, 1968, pp. 68-69.

117. The demotion of Nikolai G. Egorychev, a high Soviet Party official, in June 1967, was widely interpreted in the West as the result of an internal Kremlin split over policy toward the Middle East crisis, with Egorychev pictured as spokesman for a "hawkish" faction which urged more forceful Soviet intervention. Reports of internal Soviet policy of differences rested in part on an interview given to the French left-wing weekly, Le Nouvel Observateur, by an unnamed Soviet official. See Paul Wohl, "Desert War Surprised Kremlin, Press Reports," The Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1967. See also Victor Zorza, "Kremlin Split Over Mideast," The Washington Post, July 2, 1967; James Reston, "Washington: Diplomatic Reports from Moscow," The New York Times, July 7, 1967. The present writer is indebted to a colleague, Fritz Ermarth, for a somewhat different interpretation, which argues that Egorychev was probably speaking not for Kremlin "hawks" but for a faction critical of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership for squandering Soviet arms and prestige in support of the Arab states.

118. See Chapter XI, pp. 49-50. In addition to closer supervision of training activities in Egypt by
Soviet advisory personnel, estimated to number about 3000 officers, it was also reported in 1968 that some 300 Egyptian pilots had been sent to the Soviet Union for a rigorous training course in MIG-21 operations. Other reports indicated that 70 to 100 Soviet pilots were posted to flight duties with Egyptian units. See "Soviet Training 300 Egyptians To Pilot Supersonic Aircraft," The New York Times, June 18, 1968; Drew Middleton, "The Arab World: Soviet Role Widens," ibid., July 16, 1968.


120. This position was reflected in an article by Evgenii Primakov and Igor' Beliaev, "When War Stands at the Threshold," in the weekly Za rubezhom (Life Abroad), No. 27, June 30-July 6, 1967, pp. 7-8. Even prior to the Arab defeat of June 1967, Soviet proponents of "the breaking up ... and purge of the state machine" in countries with "national democratic regimes" (the category in which Egypt and Syria were placed) had made their voices heard. See, for example, R. Ul'ianovskii, "Some Problems of Non-Capitalist Development in Countries Undergoing Liberation," Kommunist, No. 1, January 1966, p. 115.

121. Soviet commentary on Nasser's release of political prisoners noted that this would help to put his regime "on a more progressive basis." See I. Beliaev, "UAR: People and Revolution," Pravda, July 23, 1967. The authors of the Za rubezhom article cited in fn. 120 above observed with satisfaction that a purge under way in late June 1967
in the Egyptian armed forces had already brought dismissal of "34 generals and more than 650 officers." Reports from Cairo in July 1968 suggested that the purge had been carried further, with obligatory retirements of some 200 officers in the early months of 1968. See "200 Officers Retired," The New York Times, July 5, 1968.


123. Israel did retaliate a few days later by shelling an Egyptian oil refinery at Suez, where there was no Soviet military presence to act as a deterrent.

124. The arrival of visiting Soviet bombers in Egypt was first publicized by a Moscow radio broadcast on December 3, 1967. Ceremonies welcoming the aviators were mentioned in a Moscow radio broadcast on December 9, 1967; in a Cairo radio broadcast on December 6, 1967; and by L. Chuiko, "Stars Over the Nile," Krasnaya zvezda, December 14, 1967.

125. The friendly reception tendered Soviet naval units in Algeria was described in a Moscow radio broadcast, September 26, 1967. In February 1968, following French evacuation of the naval facility at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria, the Soviet Union denied that it was seeking base rights at this facility or other "privileges in Algeria." However, in July 1968, while Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko was in Algeria to discuss military cooperation with the Boumediene regime, sources in neighboring Morocco -- also a recipient of Soviet military aid -- said that arrangements had been made to send Soviet technicians to Mers-el-Kebir. Reports persisted later in 1968 that Soviet personnel were in the process of rehabilitating the former French base. See Drew Middleton, in The New York Times, July 16, 1968; "Algeria Improves Ties with Soviet," ibid., November 17, 1968.


127. Withdrawal of British forces from Aden began in late August 1967 and was completed in November. On November 30, with the British departure, the National Liberation Front in South Arabia proclaimed the newly independent People's Republic of South Yemen. Some British forces remained in the Persian Gulf area, from which they are scheduled for withdrawal in 1971-1972.
128. It should be noted that Soviet activity in Yemen was not new. As early as 1928, the USSR had recognized the then new state of Yemen, and had made several trade agreements with Yemen's royalist government. Yemen also received some Soviet military aid prior to the republican revolution in 1962.


130. Rafael Arutiunov's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, November 28, 1967.


133. Lev Andreev's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, August 27, 1967.

134. Besides Soviet assertions to this effect, others also recognized that the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean had changed things. Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba, for example, noted in May 1968 that deployment of Soviet naval forces to the area, as well as Soviet arms aid to neighboring countries like Algeria, had undermined the old balance of power in the Mediterranean. See "Bourguiba Says Soviet Navy Is Upsetting Mideast Balance," The Washington Post, May 20, 1968.

136. The size of the Soviet Mediterranean naval force -- averaging around 40 combatant and auxiliary units, including perhaps a dozen submarines -- left it no match for NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. Peacetime resupply of the Soviet force in anchorages at sea or from Egyptian and Syrian ports was inadequate to sustain it under combat conditions except against local forces possessing limited air and naval power. Lack of unhindered access to the Mediterranean from home waters of the several Soviet fleets was another major liability confronting the Soviet Union should it become involved in a direct confrontation with NATO forces in the Mediterranean. See Chapter XVI, pp. 271, 276-277.

137. Explicit Soviet assertions to the effect that Soviet naval power had come to the Mediterranean to stay "in accordance with the interests" of the Arab states and "to insure the security" of the southern borders of the USSR itself were advanced in late 1968 after NATO, on November 16, had warned against any new Soviet intervention "affecting the situation in Europe or the Mediterranean." See V. Ermakov, "American Billyclub in the Mediterranean Sea," Pravda, November 27, 1968. See also Chapter XVI, fn. 79.

138. Soviet attempts to forge a common Warsaw Pact line toward the Arab states and Israel are discussed in Chapter XIV.

139. During the first half of 1968, the closest that Moscow had come to publicly reminding the Arab states of the need for concessions was reference in February to a possible two-stage approach to a settlement, whereby in the first stage the Arabs would be prepared to end the "state of war prevailing since 1948" in return for Israel's withdrawal from all territory occupied after June 5, 1967, while in the second stage the Arabs would be prepared "to reconsider the question of Israeli ship transit through the Suez Canal" provided the Palestine refugee problem were satisfactorily solved. See Igor' Beliaev, "Dirty Work," Pravda, February 18, 1968; V. Kudriavtsev, "The Aggressor Must Leave," Izvestiia, February 24, 1968. For the most part, however, public Soviet commentary in 1968 took the position, as had Kosygin in his January interview with Life magazine, that any possibility of settlement was contingent upon prior Israeli troop withdrawal from "territory seized by
the aggressor." See *Life*, February 2, 1968, p. 29. A similar stipulation accompanied the Soviet memorandum on disarmament measures of July 1, 1968, in which "reduction of armaments in various regions, including the Middle East" was proposed. *Pravda*, July 2, 1968.

140. See, for example, Robert H. Estabrook, "Soviets Said To Press Arabs for Peace," *The Washington Post*, April 9, 1968, and Eric Pace, "Moscow Pressing for Suez Opening," *The New York Times*, July 13, 1968. The whole question of how seriously Moscow urged concessions upon Nasser in private, and of the extent to which Nasser himself was amenable to moderating Arab demands for the sake of a settlement, remained subject to much speculation in 1968. According to some interpretations of Nasser's visit to Moscow in July 1968, a rift opened between him and the Soviet leaders over such issues as his "unrealistic" demands for further arms aid and his unwillingness to offer tangible concessions for a settlement; at the same time, however, it was also being reported that Cairo was putting out peace feelers of its own. See Anatole Shub, "Rift Seen as Nasser Ends Visit to Moscow," *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1968; Robert H. Estabrook, "U.N. Ponders Cairo Feelers," *ibid.*


142. These incidents included attacks on Israeli airlines and stepped-up activities by Arab guerrillas on the one hand, and Israeli actions such as a commando foray in the vicinity of the Aswan Dam and a raid on Beirut airport on the other.

143. This expression of the Soviet Union's interest in a political settlement to prevent a new outbreak of war "in that area which directly adjoins our southern borders" was voiced in a *Pravda* editorial on December 3, 1968. The editorial, which laid responsibility for Middle East tension wholly upon Israel and its "imperialist" supporters, did not specify the need for concessions from the Arab side, but the inference drawn in some Western quarters was that Moscow was aware that diplomatic pressure on its Arab clients would be required if UN mediation efforts were to


148. Soviet offers to Iran and Iraq in 1967 to assist them in the development of their oil resources were indicative of the Soviet Union's cultivation of these countries. In the case of Iraq, an "initial agreement" was reached on December 24, 1967, for Soviet help in developing a nationalized oil industry and marketing its products. In 1966, an agreement with Algeria had brought the Soviet Union into collaboration with that country's national oil industry as well. See "Oil Deal Aids Soviet in Mideast," *The Washington Post*, December 27, 1967; "Economic Cooperation With Algeria," *Soviet News*, August 9, 1966, p. 68.

Although these steps were not necessarily dictated by the Soviet Union's own need for access to new oil resources, since it was already one of the world's major producers, there were some potential gains for the Soviet economy from use of Middle East oil with its lower production cost. (See fn. 151 below.) However, the chief significance of Soviet entry into the exploitation of
Mid-East oil was doubtless the fact that it promised to increase Soviet political and economic leverage over a strategic commodity important to both West and East Europe. For a useful background discussion of the role of Middle East oil as concerns both Europe and the Soviet Union, see Baker, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," pp. 20-30; Sources of Conflict in the Middle East, pp. 2-10, 19-26; William D. Smith, "Soviet Entry Into Mideast's Oil Affairs Has Some Pedestrian Trappings," *The New York Times*, May 5, 1968.


150. For a concise analysis of considerations bearing on Soviet policy in the Middle East, see Arnold L. Horelick, Soviet Policy Dilemmas in the Middle East, The RAND Corporation, P-3774, February 1968.

151. From 1955 to 1968, Soviet economic aid to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, including Turkey and Iran, came to more than $2.5 billion, while military aid to the same countries approached $3 billion.

152. The cost in the Soviet Union of producing a ton of crude oil was about twice that in the Persian Gulf area. As pointed out by Baker, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," pp. 22-23, indirect evidence that the Soviet Union was interested in the use of Middle East oil both to conserve its own reserves and to permit investment in other areas of the Soviet economy was forthcoming in 1967, when Soviet crude-oil production targets for the future were scaled down substantially.
IX. SOVIET POLICY IN EAST EUROPE:
MID-1966 TO MID-1968

1. From October 17 to 22, 1966, Party and government leaders of the Warsaw Pact states and their defense ministers (plus representatives from Cuba and Mongolia) met in the Soviet Union, but no report on issues discussed was forthcoming. In the course of this gathering, one purpose of which was to familiarize the high-level guests with "the achievements of Soviet science and technology," a demonstration launching of missiles and space vehicles took place, similar to that staged several months earlier for de Gaulle. See TASS communiqué, "In an Atmosphere of Friendship and Cordiality," Pravda, October 22, 1966; Radio Prague broadcast, "Party Delegates in Moscow Review Defenses," October 23, 1966.

2. The agreement to establish full diplomatic relations was reached in Bonn on January 31 between German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt and Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu, but the exchange of ambassadors came only several months later, in July. See Philip Shabecoff, "Bonn and Bucharest Agree To Establish Full Diplomatic Tie," The New York Times, February 1, 1967; Dan Morgan, "Rumania's New Envoy Is in Bonn," The Washington Post, July 11, 1967.

3. The 1955 Hallstein Doctrine had ruled out diplomatic relations with any state recognizing the East German regime (except the USSR), and was in effect an instrument to uphold the Federal Republic's contention that it is the sole democratically-elected government representing the German people. Although Bonn issued a statement noting that this position was not altered by establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, it was clear that the Hallstein Doctrine itself was no longer operative with respect to other East European countries. The doctrine, however, continued to apply in the case of states not already having diplomatic relations with East Germany. Rumania, incidentally, also specified that establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn did not alter its support of the GDR.

4. As previously noted (Chapter XIII, p. 110), the new Grand Coalition government in Bonn had made it known, through a Bundestag speech by Kiesinger in December 1966
and other statements, that it was prepared to seek diplomatic ties with various East European countries. The GDR and Poland promptly assailed this initiative, declaring that Bonn must meet such prior conditions as recognition of East Germany and acceptance of the Oder-Neisse boundary. Soviet commentary was initially more restrained, but subsequently hardened into denunciation of Bonn's overtures as "the same old policy of nonrecognition of the results of the last war." On the other hand, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary reportedly expressed readiness to consider diplomatic ties without insisting on prior conditions, until pressure from Pankow and Moscow subsequently brought them into line. Among pertinent accounts, see Anatole Shub, "Bonn Is Optimistic on Improving Ties with East Europe," The Washington Post, January 18, 1967; editorial, "Revan- chists' Rights," Neues Deutschland, January 28, 1967; David Binder, "Stand Stiffened by East Germany," The New York Times, January 8, 1967; Harry B. Ellis, "Ulbricht Protests Bonn Ties with East," The Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 1967; David Binder, "Two Red Nations Respond to Bonn," The New York Times, January 26, 1967; Henry Tanner, "Rapacki Adamant in Stand on Bonn," ibid., January 28, 1967; Eric Bourne, "East Bloc Differs over Bonn Ties," The Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 1967.

5. See previous discussion of the Soviet note of January 28, 1967, Chapter XIII, p. 111. This statement, timed to coincide with Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu's arrival in Bonn, was probably not expected to dissuade him from accomplishing his mission.

6. See fn. 4 above. Bulgaria too may have fitted into this category, for prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Rumania, Bonn had carried on talks with the Bulgarian as well as the Hungarian and Czech governments on the same question.

7. Criticism of Rumania for establishing relations without having repudiated Bonn's "presumptuous claim to sole representation" of the German people was voiced in East Germany's Neues Deutschland, February 3, 1967. In a Scinteia editorial the following day, the Romanians retorted that the GDR had "disregarded the principles of Marxism-Leninism" in setting itself up as a "foreign policy adviser" to another socialist state. In addition to questioning Rumania's actions, the Ulbricht regime also pressed ahead with a series of new measures it had
instituted in January to curtail contacts between East and West Germany, as if to set an example for others to follow. Whether the Soviet Union was in sympathy with these steps was not clear, just as it had been uncertain whether Ulbricht himself or his Soviet mentors had taken the initiative in breaking off an incipient set of SPD-SED public debates in June 1966, immediately before the Bucharest conference. See, for example, Berlin dispatch, "Soviet Said To Bar German Debates," The New York Times, June 20, 1966.

8. Henry Kamm, "Ministers Meet in Warsaw," The New York Times, February 9, 1967. The Rumanian Foreign Minister, Manescu, rather pointedly stayed away from this meeting, sending a subordinate official in his stead. In a speech on February 13, Ulbricht denied foreign "speculation" that the site of the meeting had been shifted from East Berlin to Warsaw because of Rumanian objections. What agreement, if any, was reached at this meeting on how to respond to Bonn's new Eastern diplomacy was not divulged.


10. The East German treaties with Poland and Czecho-slovakia were signed, respectively, on March 15 and 17, 1967. See Paul Wohl, "Soviet Bloc Trio Shapes Entente," The Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1967. The text of the GDR-Polish treaty was broadcast by East Berlin radio on March 15, 1967, that of the GDR-Czech treaty on March 17, 1967; and the Czech-Polish treaty articles were broadcast by Prague radio March 1, 1967. For Soviet comment, see "Brotherly Solidarity," Izvestiia, March 19, 1967.

11. See Chapter XII, pp. 102-103. The Soviet bilateral treaty with Rumania, due for renewal on February 4, 1968, came up for consideration during the rash of treaty renewals in 1967, but nothing was done about it. Subsequently, the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet-Rumanian treaty on February 4, 1968, passed without its formal renewal, although its provisions allowed for an automatic five-year extension. Among reasons for this failure to reconfirm the old treaty formally were presumably its clauses calling for automatic consultation on all international issues and its stringent condemnation of West Germany, both of which Rumanian policy at the time would doubtless have found objectionable. Disagreement on the same points may also have stalled the negotiation of a new treaty.
12. See, for example, Ceausescu's Bucharest speech of February 20, 1967, in which he not only defended his country's establishment of diplomatic ties with the Federal Republic as a positive contribution "to developing European interstate cooperation," but also declared that "Rumania proceeds from the principle that the existence of the two German states . . . is the prerequisite for improving the atmosphere in Europe." The speech was broadcast by TASS International Service, Moscow, February 20, 1967.

13. The appeal took the form of a declaration addressed to the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), transmitted under cover of a letter from SPD Party Chairman Willy Brandt. It proposed a variety of measures to strengthen cooperation in economic, technical, and cultural fields, as well as to ease conditions of daily intercourse between the divided German territories. See "Bonn Socialists' Letter Asks Reds for Dialogue," The New York Times, April 14, 1967.


15. Besides a general rise in the volume of East European trade with West Europe (imports rose about 4 per cent and exports about 5 per cent in 1967), various "industrial cooperation" ventures between Western firms and East European countries continued to grow during 1967, and such steps were taken as the entry of Poland and Yugoslavia into GATT, of which Czechoslovakia was already a member. Czechoslovakia, in particular, moved closer in
the spring of 1967 toward an exchange of commercial missions and conclusion of a trade agreement with West Germany, and an agreement was signed in early August. Economic relations between West Germany and Rumania also broadened during this period in the wake of their establishment of diplomatic ties. See David Binder, "Bonn and Prague Sign Trade Pact," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1967; idem, "Brandt Carries Vow of Support from Bucharest," ibid., August 8, 1967; "Rumanian-West German Agreement Implemented," Bucharest radio broadcast, October 25, 1967.


17. Soviet commentary on the Karlovy Vary conference emphasized its "historic" character as the first gathering to bring together Communist parties from all of Europe, apart from worldwide conclaves like that in Moscow in 1960. See, for example, editorial, "In the Interests of Peace and Progress," Pravda, April 30, 1967.


20. A meeting between Tito and Brezhnev in January 1967, prior to Karlovy Vary, also had conspicuously failed to mend relations between the two countries. However, when Tito took up a pro-Nasser position during and after the Arab-Israeli war, Moscow and Belgrade found themselves close together on at least this issue. Practical expression of support of the Soviet line in the Middle East was to be seen in Yugoslavia's granting the rights of transit to Soviet aircraft during the air resupply effort to Egypt after the June war, and in her extending the use of her naval facilities to warships of the Soviet navy's augmented Mediterranean force. On the other hand, despite such cooperation, Yugoslavia remained opposed to Soviet policy in other matters, Tito's subsequent backing of the Czech reform government being a case in point.

21. See Chapter XII, p. 96.

23. See Chapter XII, pp. 96-97.

24. These versions, emanating from unnamed but presumably Rumanian diplomatic sources, were reported by UPI and Agence France Presse, respectively, on May 3, 1967. A further discussion of questions relating to Warsaw Pact reorganization will be found in Chapter XVII.


30. The communiqué issued by the December 1967 meeting in Warsaw, for example, was the first joint bloc statement to call upon all UN member states in the Middle East to recognize that "each of them has a right to exist as an independent national state," an evident concession to the Rumanian position, although Kosygin had broached the same idea in his speech at the UN General Assembly on June 19, 1967. On the other hand, Rumania also gave some ground by joining the communiqué's stipulation that Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory was the main condition "for restoring and maintaining peace." See "Communiqué of Conference . . .," Pravda, December 23, 1967; "Red Bloc Unites on Mideast," The Washington Post, December 23, 1967. For Kosygin's UN speech, see The New York Times, June 20, 1967.

31. For example, at the very time that the Pact foreign ministers were meeting in Warsaw in December 1967 to work out coordinated backing for the Arab states, Bucharest sent off a high-level delegation to Tel Aviv to negotiate a trade agreement with Israel, one result of which was a doubling of Rumanian-Israeli trade in 1967. See Peter Grose, "Rumania and Israel Are Expanding Economic and Cultural Ties," The New York Times, March 19, 1968.

32. See Chapter XI, pp. 30-31, and Chapter XII, p. 91.

33. The statement that conditions for a conference had finally ripened was made at a plenum of the French Communist Party by its General Secretary, Waldeck Rochet, on October 19, 1967. Soviet media promptly gave it wide circulation. See "For Peace and Socialism," Pravda, October 20, 1967.

34. The invitation was issued on November 24, 1967, in the name of eighteen of the nineteen Communist parties which had taken part in the fruitless March 1965 "consultative" meeting in Moscow. See Chapter XI, pp. 28-29. Cuba was the missing party among these nineteen, reflecting no doubt the deterioration of Castro's relations with the Kremlin. See "On the Convocation of a Consultative Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties," Pravda, November 25, 1967.
35. Editorial, "For Solidarity of the International Communist Movement," Pravda, November 28, 1967. Subsequent Soviet comment on the upcoming consultative meeting stressed that it would seek unity of action against "imperialism" without specifically mentioning the problem of China's opposition to the Soviet "unity line." Assurances were also given that the "independence" of all parties would be respected, that no single "guiding center" for all parties was contemplated, and that a "broad democratic approach" would be followed in preparing for the world conference. See, for example, Brezhnev's Leningrad speech, February 16, 1968, Leningradskaja pravda, February 17, 1968; editorial, "Before the Consultative Meeting," Pravda, February 22, 1968.

36. Among the notable absentees were six of the fourteen ruling Communist parties: China, Cuba, and Albania refused to accept invitations; Yugoslavia was not invited; and North Korea and North Vietnam found it expedient to stay away. Several other, nonruling parties did not put in an appearance for one reason or another, including those of Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Burma.

37. During January and early February, while making up their minds whether to attend the Budapest meeting, the Rumanians held a series of consultations with twenty other Communist parties, designed to set limits on the agenda. When the Rumanian decision to attend was announced on February 14, 1967, it was made clear that Rumania intended to defend its independent position and to lobby against convocation of a world conference on any terms that might suggest condemnation of China or other "absent" parties. In addition to the Rumanians, the Hungarian, Czech, and Italian parties also expressed varying degrees of concern about guidelines for the meeting, as did the Yugoslavs, who had not been invited. The statement of the Rumanian Communist Party's Central Committee Plenum on plans to attend the Budapest conference was announced in a Bucharest radio broadcast, February 14, 1968. See also Peter Grose, 'World's Reds Open Parley in Budapest in Disunity Monday,' The New York Times, February 23, 1968; Anatole Shub, "Rumanians Set Terms at Red Parley," The Washington Post, February 27, 1968; Paul Wohl, "Parley Seeks Red Consensus," The Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1968.

Rumania's dramatic walkout was preceded by demands of the Rumanian delegate, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, for a joint apology for Syrian charges that Rumania displayed a "destructive" and pro-Israel attitude.


43. The Czechoslovakian delegate, Vladimir Koucky, unlike the East German and Polish delegates, opposed adoption of a single, binding general line and told journalists that "we agree with the Rumanian comrades on most basic questions." He also spoke approvingly of "positive tendencies" in West German policy toward East Europe, in contrast to his colleagues' bitter attacks on Bonn. The Czechs, feeling their way under a new regime which had but recently ousted the Novotny Old Guard faction, were doubtless interested in preserving their freedom of maneuver without a head-on clash. It was also reported that the Czech and Hungarian parties would both seek to mediate the Rumanian differences with the other Budapest conference. See Jonathan Randal, "Anti-Bonn Policy Is Eased Further by Prague," The New York Times, March 3, 1968; Anatole Shub, "New Problems Rise for Soviet at Red Parley," The Washington Post, March 3, 1968; AP dispatch, "2 Soviet Bloc Nations To Coax Rumania," ibid., March 5, 1968.
44. One of the minor surprises of the Budapest conference was that the Italian Communist Party, which had long opposed the idea of a world conference for somewhat the same reasons as the Rumanians, fell quietly into line. See Henry Kamm, in The New York Times, March 3, 1968.

45. Rumanian sources indicated to the press on March 1, after a special Central Committee session in Bucharest, that the nonproliferation treaty and military questions such as Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact high command, were among issues which might be raised at the Sofia meeting. See, for example, "Rumania Hints at a New Showdown," The Washington Post, March 2, 1968. In light of subsequent disclosures by Ceausescu, it would appear that the Soviets anticipated trouble with the Rumanians over the nonproliferation treaty and managed to outmaneuver them on this issue. In a statement on April 26, 1968, citing examples of Soviet disregard for Rumania's views, Ceausescu charged that the Soviets had presented a joint declaration at the Sofia meeting endorsing the treaty without having given Rumania a chance to register its objections. See further reference to Ceausescu's speech in Chapter XVII, fn. 98. See also Henry Kamm, "Rumania Widens Rift with Soviet," The New York Times, May 5, 1968.

46. Soviet-Rumanian differences over the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) had become increasingly apparent after a joint U.S.-Soviet draft of a complete treaty was presented on January 18, 1968. The Rumanian delegate at the 17-nation disarmament talks in Geneva attacked this draft on February 6 as "profoundly discriminatory" against nonnuclear powers for several reasons, including its exclusion of the nuclear powers from inspection of peaceful nuclear activities and its failure to provide a security guarantee to nonnuclear powers. Pravda on March 2 rejected various arguments against the NPT, but did not single out Rumania as an objector, following the usual practice of focusing on Bonn as the chief obstacle to the treaty. On March 7, at Geneva, proposals for a security guarantee outside the NPT framework were offered by the USSR, United States, and Britain, but Rumania later found them inadequate. When the final, amended joint draft of the NPT was presented at Geneva on March 11, prior to submission to the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union rejected last-minute proposed changes by Rumania. But in a Pravda editorial of the same day on the Sofia Warsaw Pact meeting, the

47. For previous discussion of the sequence of negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty, see Chapter XI, pp. 43-46.


49. The declaration on Vietnam was much like that issued at the Warsaw Pact's summit meeting of July 1966 in Bucharest.

50. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the question of changes in the Warsaw Pact command structure had been debated at Sofia. See further treatment of this question in Chapter XVII, p. 328.

51. See further discussion of this matter in Chapter XVII, p. 326.

52. Rumania was not invited to attend the Dresden meeting, as Ceausescu disclosed in his April 26, 1968, speech (see fn. 45 above). However, it was obviously clear to those who arranged the meeting that Rumania -- a staunch defender of the principle that no Communist party has the right to interfere in the affairs of another -- would not take part in chastisement of the Czechs.

53. Seven of the fourteen ruling parties did not show up at the preparatory meeting in Budapest, to which fifty-four parties sent representatives. At the close
of the five-day Budapest meeting it was announced that November 25 had been set as the opening date for the world conference in Moscow. See "Communiqué of the Preparatory Commission for an International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties," Pravda, April 30, 1968.

54. Foreshadowed by a Ceausescu speech on March 22, 1968, promising some internal liberalization in Rumania, the April session of the Central Committee took some steps to put a more liberal face on Rumania's regime by reducing the powers of the secret police and endorsing a number of modest internal reforms. At the same session, Stalinist practices under Rumania's former ruler, Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej, were denounced, while the reputations of several other Rumanian leaders, purged during the Stalinist period under presumed Soviet orders, were restored. It was this aspect of the Rumanian housecleaning that served as a reproach to past Soviet influence within the country. See Peter Grose, "A Liberalization in Rumania Seen," The New York Times, April 29, 1968.

55. Immediately after the Rumanian Central Committee session, the Soviet Union opened a new barrage of anti-Rumanian propaganda, centering on an incident which occurred in early April during a visit of Rumanian Premier Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu to Finland, when they laid a wreath on Marshal Mannerheim's grave. Soviet propaganda zeroed in on this honoring of "the memory of a White General" by a delegation from a socialist country as evidence of Rumanian indifference to the imperatives of "the ideological struggle." See Anatole Shub, "Rumanians Criticized by Russians," The Washington Post, May 1, 1968.


57. Rumanian complaints of economic pressure, such as alleged Soviet footdragging in the delivery of goods and materials promised under bilateral trade agreements, had led to talks between Brezhnev and Ceausescu in Moscow in December 1967, without announcement of results other than that the two sides had exchanged opinions. See "Communiqué on the Visit to the Soviet Union of the Party-Government Delegation of the Socialist Republic of Rumania," Izvestiia, December 17, 1968. See also Anatole Shub, "Rumanian, Soviet Ties Near Crisis," The Washington Post, December 17, 1967.
58. A possible precedent for the tendering of concessions to the Rumanians had occurred in August 1967. At that time, Podgorny reportedly made a secret visit to Bucharest to smooth our Soviet-Rumanian differences. His visit was followed by Rumania's participation, for the first time in three years, in a joint Warsaw Pact exercise, suggesting that some mutual understanding on military questions had been reached to reduce tension between Moscow and Bucharest. See Anatole Shub, in The Washington Post, December 17, 1967.

59. These efforts to tighten up the organizational machinery of the Pact are discussed in Chapter XVII, pp. 328-329.


61. Novotny reportedly arranged Brezhnev's surprise visit to Prague on December 8, 1967, without consulting the Czech Central Committee. See Hanus J. Hajek, "What Next in Czechoslovakia?" East Europe, March 1968, p. 3. There is a strong presumption that Brezhnev threw his weight behind Novotny, although lack of specific charges to this effect by Prague after Novotny's ouster leaves room for assuming that Brezhnev may have tried to mediate as a neutral between the opposing Czech factions. For an interpretation along this line, see Fritz Ermarth, Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968, The RAND Corporation, RM-5909-PR, March 1969, pp. 63-64.
62. This plenum, one of three in the period from October 1967 to January 1968 in which the struggle to unseat Novotny was fought out, was held December 19-21, 1967. See Neal Ascherson, "Czechs Are Waiting Word on Novotny's Fate as Leader," The Washington Post, December 22, 1967; "Stalinist at Bay; Central Committee Discusses Novotny's Future," Newsweek, January 1, 1968, pp. 34-35.


66. The close relationship of Novotny to Major General Jan Sejna, who defected to the United States in February 1968 after an apparent attempt to rally the army on Novotny's side, strengthened the hand of the new, anti-Novotny leadership in carrying out a housecleaning of both military and civilian officials. Colonel General Vladimir Janko, who committed suicide in March, also was apparently implicated in the military coup plans, details of which remain obscure. The position of General Bohumir Lomsky, the Czech Minister of Defense and a deputy commander of the Warsaw Pact, also was left shaky by these events. In April 1968, he was replaced by General Martin Dzur.

67. Large crowds turned out in Prague to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the death of Jan Masaryk, who either jumped to his death or was thrown from a window on March 1, 1948, two weeks after the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. Rehabilitated along with his name was that of his father, Thomas G. Masaryk, first President of the Czechoslovakian Republic. Subsequent Czech moves to investigate the circumstances of Jan Masaryk's death, which raised the question of Soviet security police complicity, became one of many heated issues between Prague and Moscow in 1968. See Henry Kamm, "Masaryk's Grave Is a Shrine Again," The New York Times, March 18, 1968; Richard Eder, "Czech Party Paper Links Death of Masaryk to Beria 'Gorillas'," ibid., April 17, 1968; Raymond H. Anderson, "Role on Masaryk Denied by Soviet," ibid., May 8, 1968.
68. The first of these was a speech in Prague on February 22, 1968, marking the twentieth anniversary of the Communist takeover, with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders present. The second was a speech at Brno on March 16. Rude Pravo, February 23 and March 17, 1968. See also Anatole Shub, "New Czech Chief States Aims," The Washington Post, March 17, 1968.


70. Statement on March 21 Central Committee Presidium meeting, Prague radio broadcast, March 22, 1968.


73. Rumors of the use of joint military exercises to bring collective pressure on Dubcek ran along two lines. One version was that joint Soviet-East German formations were dispatched to exercise north of the Czech border during the Dresden meeting, a rumor given some substance by closure of various GDR areas to foreign travel. Another was that Moscow advised Prague that it had decided to schedule joint spring maneuvers in which Soviet and East German troops would move into Czechoslovakia to join in exercises with Czech units. As it subsequently turned out, maneuvers were held in Czechoslovakia in June, becoming by then an obvious instrument of pressure on the Czechs. See Henry Kamm, in The New York Times, March 24, 1968; Dan Morgan, in The Washington Post, March 26, 1968.


78. It was reported at this time that East Germany had confiscated Czechoslovak newspapers and imposed travel restrictions to prevent news of developments under the Dubcek regime from circulating freely in the GDR. AP dispatch, "Acts by East Germany," The New York Times, March 24, 1968.

79. Ceausescu's speech before the Party Central Committee, Bucharest radio broadcast, March 23, 1968. See also fn. 54 above.

80. The Polish crisis is discussed later in this chapter, pp. 171-175.


82. See T. Zhivkov's speech on domestic and international developments, Sofia radio broadcast, March 13, 1968.

83. When Dubcek was elected to succeed Novotny as First Secretary on January 5, for example, Moscow immediately sent him a congratulatory telegram, and various laudatory accounts of the new Czechoslovak leader appeared in the Soviet press, indicating that Moscow then regarded Dubcek as a satisfactory compromise choice with whom they could get along. Although the Soviet leaders later revised their opinion of Dubcek and sought to have him replaced, he was not personally attacked in the violent Soviet press campaign waged against Czechoslovakia in mid-1968 prior to the invasion.

84. Among the important appointments to high offices, taking their places alongside Dubcek and President Ludvik Svoboda were two outspoken reform leaders -- Oldrich Cernik as Premier and Josef Smrkovsky as President of the National Assembly. For a full list of the top government appointees, see "Czechoslovaks List New Cabinet; Young Intellectuals in Key Posts," The New York Times, April 9, 1968.

85. The action program, contained in a sixty-page document entitled "Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism,"
was released in summary form on April 9, although approved five days earlier. For a condensed version of the program, see "Excerpts from Reform Program of the Czech Communist Party," The New York Times, April 11, 1968. The foreign affairs portion of the program called for encouragement to "realistic forces" in West Germany, reflecting Prague's revised view of the German danger and its hopes for better relations with Bonn—tendencies which doubtless were disturbing to the Soviet Union. This section of the program also called for more Czech influence in developing the "military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact," and adoption by Czechoslovakia of her own position on fundamental questions of international policy.

Besides the freedoms of press and assembly, a crucial part of the domestic section of the action program concerned the scope to be given the various non-Communist parties and mass organizations grouped together in the National Front. Liberal reformers presumably hoped that the several token non-Communist political parties in the National Front would be allowed to form the basis for a political opposition outside the Communist Party, but this was clearly not the intention of Dubcek and his associates. In an interview on April 5 Dubcek made this plain, saying he saw "no reasons" for the existence of opposition parties in the country. (Prague radio broadcast, April 6, 1968.)

86. For a perceptive discussion of this question, see Ermarth, Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy, especially pp. 60-61.


88. The play was Dziady (The Forefathers), a work by the nineteenth-century poet Adam Mickiewicz depicting Polish suffering under czarist Russian rule. See Jonathan Randal, "Polish Students in 2d Day of Riots" and "Thousands in Poland Fight Police as Protest Mounts," The New York Times, March 10 and 12, 1968.


92. After some two weeks of turmoil, student sit-ins in Warsaw were at least temporarily abandoned before a show of militia force on March 23. See "Warsaw Students End Sit-in Protests," The Washington Post, March 24, 1968.


94. See, for example, commentary in the Polish army daily, Zolnierz Wolnosci, Warsaw radio broadcast, March 16, 1968; speech by Jan Szydlak, First Secretary of the Poznan Voivodship Party Committee, Warsaw radio broadcast, March 16, 1968; "Unruffled by Being Alert," Zolnierz Wolnosci, March 17, 1968. Incidentally, some of the steam was taken out of the Polish contention by Brandt's curiously well-timed statement at Nuremberg on March 18 calling for West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary. Although Brandt's words did not amount to an official shift of Bonn's position, they opened the possibility that a traditional obstacle to improvement of Polish-West German relations might be coming down.


96. This charge was made in the March 24, 1968, issue of Prawo i Zycie by Kazimierz Kakol, a journalist generally regarded as the mouthpiece of General Mieczyslaw Moczar, Minister of the Interior and himself a contender for Gomulka's mantle. Kakol attributed the alleged coup attempt to "a conspiratorial group connected with the
Zionist center," although some observers have interpreted the Kakol piece as part of a devious maneuver by Moczar to divert attention from his own plans. See Jan Nowak, "The Struggle for Party Control in Poland," East Europe, June 1968, pp. 2-3.

97. Among shifts of important officials close to Gomulka was the resignation of Edward Ochab as Chairman of the Council of State and his replacement by Marshal Marian Spychalski in April 1968. Spychalski's post of Minister of Defense was taken in turn by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, a professional soldier apparently not involved in the domestic political in-fighting. By putting the military establishment in his hands, Gomulka presumably kept it out of the hands of a Moczar supporter, thus thwarting the latter's effort to extend his own control.

98. At a two-day Central Committee plenum in July 1968, Moczar was elected to the Party Secretariat and made a candidate member of the Politburo, marking a double-step up the latter for this 54-year-old rival of Gomulka. See Reuters dispatch, "Moczar Gets 2 Posts in Polish Party Shift," The Washington Post, July 10, 1968.

99. It had been expected that General Moczar might be moved up to full Politburo membership at the November Party Congress, and that other leadership changes might bring a dilution of Gomulka's authority. However, Moczar was denied further promotion and Gomulka's position as Party chief was reaffirmed at the Congress, which was attended by a Soviet delegation headed by Brezhnev. Among Polish leaders demoted at the Congress was Adam Rapacki, the onetime prominent foreign minister, who was dropped from the Politburo. See Jonathan Randal, "Power Struggle in Poland Remains Inconclusive," The New York Times, October 31, 1968; idem, "Gomulka Retains Party Leadership," ibid., November 17, 1968.

100. The Partisan factional group organized around Moczar had its origins among World War II partisan members who stayed behind in Poland, as distinct from the Polish Communist elements who sat out most of the war in the Soviet Union and became known as "Muscovites." Besides some historical tension between the Partisan and Muscovite factions, the ultranationalist bent of the Partisans -- sometimes regarded as a crypto-Fascist outlook -- might well produce an anti-Soviet orientation were they to come to power. The younger technocrats and progressives grouped
behind Gierek, while not notable advocates of "democratization" in the Czech sense, were mostly interested in pragmatic solutions to Poland's economic problems. Their less doctrinaire outlook might lead them to seek wider contacts with the West, away from Poland's close ties with the Soviet Union. For background on the history of these factional groupings, see J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe*, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966, pp. 50-64.


102. "The March-April Plenum of CC Czech CP," *Pravda*, April 12, 1968. This account of the Czech Central Committee plenum which adopted the new "action program" withheld criticism of the program itself, but cast doubt on the ability of the Czech leadership to keep the reform movement under control. Perhaps the first harsh critique of developments in Czechoslovakia to appear publicly in the Soviet Union was an article in *Sovetskaia Rossia* (Soviet Russia) on April 4, 1968, in which it was asserted that "nationalism" and "revisionism" in Prague posed a threat to the unity of the Communist camp.


104. See Dubcek interview on May 6, *Rude Pravo*, May 7, 1968. On May 8, *Pravda* quoted Dubcek to convey to the Soviet public that official concern over Czechoslovak developments was now felt at the highest level in Moscow.

105. Party leaders from the GDR, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary met in Moscow on May 8 in what was evidently a new phase of the Soviet effort to mount collective pressures upon Prague. See "Arrival in Moscow of Leaders of Fraternal Parties," *Pravda*, May 9, 1968. It was reported at this time that the Hungarian leadership sought to moderate the stand toward Prague urged by such hardline Pact leaders as Ulbricht and Gomulka, a report made credible by the generally sympathetic attitude of Kadar, as displayed publicly during Dubcek's visit to Budapest in June. Later in the summer, as the collective squeeze on Prague tightened, the Hungarian leadership also shifted, though perhaps with some reluctance, to a tougher stance. See "Prague Warned," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1968; speeches of L. I. Brezhnev and Janos Kadar, in *Pravda*, July 4, 1968.
106. See, for example, Mikhail Alekseev commentary in Literaturnaia gazeta, May 15, 1968; editorial, "Charters of Brotherhood," Izvestiia, May 18, 1968. Similarly, in an article on the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Iakubovskii warned of Western "subversive" activities and "bridge-building" efforts aimed at driving a wedge into "the combat alliance" of the Warsaw Pact countries. (Krasnaia zvezda, May 14, 1968.) Other issues over which a sharp increase in polemics arose at this time included the Czech investigation into Jan Masaryk's death and a Soviet article by M. Shirianov in Sovetskaia Rossia of May 14, attacking the alleged crimes of Thomas Masaryk which aroused indignation in Prague.

107. Prague radio broadcast, May 17, 1968. Kosygin apparently decided to pick up an invitation which had been extended to him earlier by Dubcek. The possibility that a dogmatist faction in the Soviet Union may have attempted to prejudice the climate for Kosygin's visit by publication of the Shirianov article attacking Thomas Masaryk has been suggested by some analysts. See "USSR Attitudes to Czechoslovakia, May 13th-19th," Radio Free Europe, May 22, 1968.

108. In this connection, although the Moscow propaganda apparatus toned down its attacks on Prague during the Kosygin visit, it pursued one line suggesting that the Soviets were still hopeful of encouraging "healthy forces" in Czechoslovakia to take a hand in restoring Communist authority if Dubcek should falter. Specifically, on May 22 a Moscow radio broadcast cited approvingly a resolution adopted by a Prague People's Militia group to the effect that "we will not allow a disruption of our socialist system." The People's Militia, commonly regarded as a stronghold of support for the orthodox Party outlook in Czechoslovakia, subsequently became the object of more direct Soviet appeals to take up battle against "counterrevolutionary forces" in Czechoslovakia. See pp. 179-180.

109. The Kosygin visit took place at a time when Prague was increasingly troubled by Soviet footdragging on the Czech request for a hard currency loan of 400-500 million gold rubles, as indicated by a Prague radio broadcast of May 16, 1968. It may be surmised that Kosygin expected the Czech need for a loan to serve as bargaining leverage for curbs on the reform movement, but that the terms he set were too steep for Dubcek's taste. For the Czechs, there was doubtless bitter irony in the fact that Moscow
refused to help out with a hard currency loan despite Czechoslovakia's having previously granted the Soviet Union credits worth a half billion dollars for development of extractive industry in the USSR. See Burks, Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia, p. 4.

110. See "Mutual Maneuvers," Krasnaja zvezda, May 25, 1968. This original announcement stated that maneuvers would take place on both Czechoslovak and Polish territory, but it did not specify their size, which apparently remained a contentious issue between Prague and Moscow. In an interview with Rude Pravo on June 17, three days before the exercises began, Marshal Jakubovskii indicated that the maneuvers would be larger than originally stated, with troops from Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR participating.

111. In a May 21 interview on Prague radio and television, the new Czech defense minister, General Martin Dzur, stated that the question of maneuvers in Czechoslovakia on a "reduced scale" had been discussed during the Grechko visit. A day later, Dzur denied that there was any basis for Western press reports that the Soviet Union also raised the question of stationing 11-12,000 Warsaw Pact troops as a permanent garrison in Czechoslovakia. Despite Dzur's denial, it seems plausible that at some point during this period the Soviets may have proposed the permanent stationing of Soviet troops in Bohemia, ostensibly to stiffen Warsaw Pact defenses along the Czechoslovak-West German border, but also to gain greater political leverage against Prague. A similar Soviet desire to put Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia had, according to long-standing rumor, previously been rebuffed by the Novotny regime, and therefore was hardly likely to be palatable to the Dubcek regime.

112. Although alignments within the Czech Party leadership could hardly be specified with precision, it was generally felt that about one-third of the 169 Central Committee members consisted of firm Dubcek supporters, about one-third of orthodox conservatives, and the remainder of waverers. The decision to convene the 14th Party Congress on September 9, 1968, seemed to augur a cleaning out of the conservative faction before it could muster enough strength for a comeback, hence the Soviet disapproval. A new Party Congress would also, of course, be empowered to change the Party statutes, which could be expected to buttress the position of the Dubcek moderates. A Soviet
desire to prevent this Congress from taking place was later among the factors considered to have influenced the decision to invade in August.

113. The text of the proclamation to Party members and all the people, issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee on June 1, was broadcast by Prague Domestic Service, June 1, 1968. See also "Czech Reds Promise Safeguards, Plan Congress," The Washington Post, June 2, 1968; report of Alexander Dubček to Brno Aktiv, Prague Domestic Service, June 3, 1968.


115. Among prominent Czech supporters of the reform movement attacked by the East German press were Professors Antonín Snejdarek and Jiří Filipec. For typical GDR diatribes against Czech reformers, to which Prague made strong ripostes, see Kurt Hager's speech to a philosophy congress on Marx, in Neues Deutschland, March 27, 1968; H. H. Angermueller, G. Kroeker, and J. Streisand, "Prof. Snejdarek and the European Concept of F. J. Strauss," ibid., May 11, 1968; Helmut Baierl addressing "Some Authors in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," ibid., May 12, 1968; Dr. Hajo Herbell, "Bonn Between Fear and Hope," ibid., May 24, 1968.

116. On June 21, for example, two well-known Czech liberals, Alexander Kramer and Ivan Sviták, were attacked for advocating reforms which would "allow full freedom for political demagogy" and undermine the Party's leading role. Gr. Ognev, "What Does 'The Student' Teach?" Komsomol'skaia pravda, June 21, 1968. See also V. Platkovskii, "The Major Force in the Struggle for Communism," Izvestiia, June 25, 1968.


119. Dubcek on June 27 referred to a Czech Party
Presidium statement issued immediately after the appear-
ance of "2000 Words," censuring the document for trying
to push the pace of democratization too rapidly. Some
other Czech officials, however, including Premier Oldrich
Cernik and National Front chairman Tračísek Kriegel, ex-
pressed a more moderate view of the document. Henry Kamm,
"Prague Spurns Plea for a Drastic Purge," The New York
Times, June 29, 1968.

120. Warsaw dispatch, "Poor Showing Held Cause," The
New York Times, July 17, 1968. According to Professor
John Erickson of the University of Manchester, England,
the Soviet general staff had already concluded, after pre-
vious joint exercises, that Czechoslovak forces would be
unable to contain a conventional NATO attack, and had
therefore raised the question of introducing Soviet forces
permanently along the Bavarian border. See statement of
Erickson's views in R. Rockingham Gill, "Europe's Military
Balance After Czechoslovakia," East Europe, October 1968,
p. 19. See also fn. 111 above.

121. On July 10, Czech Defense Minister Martin Dzur
said that 35 per cent of the Warsaw Pact forces engaged
in the June maneuvers had left Czech soil, and that the
remainder -- which apparently included all of the Soviet
forces involved -- would be withdrawn without delay. How
many Soviet troops were present was never accurately es-
lished. "Authoritative" Czech sources were reported
to have named a figure of 16,000, while other estimates
ranged from 6,000 to 24,000. The first of these Soviet
troops began to leave Czechoslovakia on July 13, accord-
ing to Prague, but their departure was halted the next
day. Thereafter, throughout July, despite several an-
nouncements by Czech spokesmen giving deadlines for their
withdrawal, most of the Soviet troops apparently stayed
on. See "Prague Uncertain on Soviet Troops," The New
Kamm, "Soviet Troop Withdrawal Halted in Czechoslovakia,"
The New York Times, July 15, 1968; idem, "Russian Forces
See also fn. 130 below.

122. Separate letters were sent to Prague during the
first week in July by the Central committees of the Soviet,
Polish, East German, Bulgarian and Hungarian parties,
demanding that the Czechoslovak leaders attend a joint meeting in Warsaw to explain why they had not dealt more firmly with "counterrevolutionary" elements. The Czechs declined this summons, but offered to hold bilateral meetings with each of the other parties. See Henry Kamm, "Prague Bars Call for Bloc Parley" and "Prague To Offer Bilateral Talks on Reform Steps," The New York Times, July 10 and 12, 1968.

123. I. Aleksandrov, "The Attack Against the Socialist Foundations of Czechoslovakia," Pravda, July 11, 1968. In 1956, the rationale advanced for Soviet intervention in Hungary had been that "counterrevolutionary" elements supported by the West were threatening the "foundations of the socialist order" in a fraternal country, whose "true patriots" had rallied to face this "mortal danger" and called upon the Soviet Union for assistance. (See, for example, Pravda, October 28, November 4, 1956.) The Aleksandrov article not only pictured Czechoslovakia as similarly threatened, but made the parallel explicit by charging that the tactics of those plotting to overthrow socialism in Czechoslovakia were the same as those previously used by "counterrevolutionary elements in Hungary who attempted to undermine the Hungarian people's socialist achievements in 1956."

124. The July 15 joint letter by the Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Communist parties was delivered to Prague on July 16, 1968. It was published in Moscow on July 18. For the texts of this letter and the Czechoslovak reply of July 18 disputing its charges, see The New York Times, July 19, 1968.

125. It was generally believed that Hungary, though a cosigner of the five-party letter of July 15, was not altogether enthusiastic about the squeeze being applied to the Dubcek regime. See, for example, "Current Developments," East Europe, August 1968, p. 35.

126. On July 18, the Soviet Union made public a message to the Communist Party Presidium of Czechoslovakia demanding that the top ruling bodies of both Communist parties meet on July 22 or 23 in Moscow, or alternatively in Kiev or Lvov. This summons for a gathering of the full membership of the Politburo and Presidium was unprecedented. See "To the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," Pravda, July 18, 1968.

128. "Rear Services Exercises," Izvestiia, July 24, 1968. These maneuvers, nicknamed "Niemen" and originally said to involve personnel of regular army units and reservists in logistics exercises along the USSR's western borders, were scheduled to last until August 10. An unusual amount of publicity was given the "Niemen" maneuvers, including several interviews with General Sergei S. Mariakhin, logistics chief of the Soviet armed forces and commander of the exercises, who described them on one occasion as the "largest" of their kind ever held in the Soviet Union. On another occasion he stated that simulated nuclear attacks were a part of the maneuvers, and it was also announced that major air exercises, named "Sky Shield," were carried out in conjunction with the war games. All of this tended to draw attention to the flexing of Soviet military muscle at a time when a showdown meeting with the Czechs was approaching. See Lt. Col. V. Andrianov, "They Inspect the Field," and "Kilometers of Courage," Krasnaia zvezda, July 25 and 31, 1968, respectively; Col. P. Kniazev and Lt. Col. V. Zaivorodinskii, "The Duty of Those Who Go in First," ibid., July 28, 1968; V. Gol'tsev, "On the Military Skill of the Expert," Izvestiia, July 30, 1968. For a later Soviet account of the "Niemen" and "Sky Shield" exercises, see Soviet Military Review, No. 9, September 1968, p. 22.

129. On July 29, the day when the confrontation at Cierna began, the Soviet Union disclosed that East German and Polish troops had joined in the border maneuvers. TASS International Service, Moscow radio broadcast, July 29, 1968; "At the Rear Services Exercises," Krasnaia zvezda, July 31, 1968.
130. The welter of reports concerning Soviet troop movements toward Czechoslovakia's borders gave the impression that preparations were under way for a massive military intervention, although again the actual strength of the forces involved remained obscure, ranging in press accounts from a few divisions to the bulk of the twenty-six Soviet divisions normally deployed in East Europe. Likewise, the number of Soviet troops still within Czechoslovakia was uncertain; some accounts gave a figure of around 8000 out of the original force which had entered the country in June. See Raymond H. Anderson, "Moscow Continues Prague Pressure," The New York Times, July 28, 1968; Richard Eder, "A Tense Test of Will," ibid.; Soviet Troops in Germany Are Reported on Alert," ibid., July 30, 1968; "Prague Reported Tense: Soviet Troops on Move," The Washington Post, July 30, 1968; "Red Bloc Forces Near Czech Border," ibid., July 31, 1968; Richard B. Stolley, "The Tense Watch on the Red Army," Life, August 2, 1968, pp. 24-27; James H. Billington, "Czech Stand: Beaver Against Rhinoceros," ibid., pp. 28-28C. See also fn. 121 above.


132. The official was Lt. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, head of the military department of the Central Committee, whose call for a basic revision of the Warsaw Pact in a July 15 interview, sharply criticized by the Soviet Union, led to the abolishment of his post and his assignment to "other duties" on July 25. Subsequently, Czech liberals rallied to Prchlik's defense, and, following the Cierna-Bratislava meetings, a partial step toward clearing his name was taken when on August 9 a previous government statement rebuking him was repudiated. At the same time, liberal Party elements nominated him as a Central Committee candidate. However, conservatives in the Czech Defense Ministry's Military Council struck back on August 15, reaffirming the previous rebuke to Prchlik and criticizing him for allegedly having disclosed secret information about the Warsaw Pact military structure. It thus appeared that the Prchlik case had become one of several focal points of controversy between conservative and reform-minded groups. See Henry Kamm, "Czechs Demand a Basic Revision of Warsaw Pact," The New York Times. July 16, 1968; "Whom Does General V. Prchlik Satisfy?" Krasnaia zvezda. July 23, 1968; Henry Kamm.

13. Soviet agreement to meet the Czechoslovak leaders on the latter's territory was disclosed on July 22. At the time, it was indicated that the entire eleven-member Politburo would attend the meeting, which would have marked the first simultaneous absence of the top ruling oligarchs from the USSR. As it turned out, two Politburo members stayed behind, D. S. Polianskii and A. P. Kirilenko. See "The Forthcoming Soviet-Czechoslovak Meeting," *Pravda*, July 23, 1968. See also Raymond H. Anderson, "Soviet Politburo Yields to Prague on a Parley Site," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1968.

134. Typical of the backing given the Party leadership was a manifesto published by *Literarni Listy* on July 26, which was widely circulated among Czech citizens as a petition pledging the country's support for a firm stand in the Ciera talks. For its text, see *The New York Times*, July 27, 1968. Subsequently, following the August invasion, the Soviets singled out this manifesto as an example of "artificially organized efforts" to "inflame base nationalistic passions," asking: "Can this be considered a normal method of preparing for talks with a friendly fraternal party?" See editorial, "Defense of Socialism Is the Highest International Duty," *Pravda*, August 22, 1968.

135. See Harry Schwartz, "Czechoslovakia Gains Allies in the Communist Camp," *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968; M. S. Handler, "Backing by Red Parties in West May Strengthen Dubcek's Hand," *ibid.*, July 30, 1968. While the rallying of Rumania's Ceausescu and Yugoslavia's Tito behind Prague may have given the Soviet leaders momentary pause, it also may have strengthened Soviet suspicions that a new version of the Little Entente was rapidly coming into being, with potentially disruptive implications for Soviet hegemony in East Europe. A revival of Czech-Rumanian-Yugoslav ties also would have had unpleasant connotations for Hungary, against which the original Little Entente historically was aimed, thus perhaps persuading Kadar to look somewhat less benevolently upon developments in Czechoslovakia.
136. The Soviet press later asserted that there had been a split in the Czech leadership at Cierna between a minority of "right-wing revisionists" led by Dubček and a majority favoring a "principled line" against "anti-socialist forces" in Czechoslovakia, but this apparently was largely an attempt to uphold the Soviet contention that "healthy" forces within the country had finally found it necessary to call for Soviet help. The fact would seem to be that the Soviet leaders were unable to coax a potential Kadar to step forward at Cierna to call for help in "saving socialism" in Czechoslovakia, and thus found themselves outmaneuvered. See "Defense of Socialism Is the Highest International Duty," Pravda, August 22, 1968.

137. The brief and uninformative communiqué issued at the close of the Cierna meeting on August 1 gave no indication of what agreements were reached, but it was generally regarded as an armistice document signifying a Soviet backdown from the demands of the five-party letter of July 15 in exchange for exercise of "self-restraint" by the Czech reformers. For the full text of the communiqué, see The Washington Post, August 2, 1968.

138. For the full text of the Bratislava communiqué see Pravda, August 4, 1968. There was, however, one prophetic point in the Bratislava declaration: It substituted for the traditional phrase "non-interference in each other's internal affairs" the words "fraternal mutual assistance."


140. For a challenge to the generally-held view that the outcome of the July crisis represented a Soviet setback and demonstrated that the Kremlin leadership lacked the stomach to use military force against Czechoslovakia, see Crosby S. Noyes, "Czechs Will Find Terms of Soviet Accord Stiff," The Washington Star, August 15, 1968. For a presentation of the various arguments, prior to the July-August crisis situation, that the Soviet leadership was unlikely to use armed force to impose its will upon Czechoslovakia, see R. T. Rockingham Gill, "Czechoslovakia: Will the Soviet Army Intervene?" East Europe, July 1968, pp. 2-6.
141. That the Dubcek regime's side of the compromise at Cierna and Bratislava had called for demonstrating self-restraint was rather soon made evident by the Czech Party Presidium's warning on August 14 against political activity which violated "law and order," and by other efforts to keep free discussion in line, such as the dismissal of liberals on the editorial staff of Rude Pravo, the Party daily, for alleged "lack of discipline." A threatened protest walkout by other staff members, as well as contention arising around the Prchlik case (see fn. 132 above), illustrated the internal tensions generated by Czechoslovakia's effort to pursue a liberalization program and at the same time avoid Soviet displeasure. See Henry Kamm, "A Discussion Curb Asked in Prague," The New York Times, August 15, 1968.

142. The article marking the renewal of the pressure campaign against Prague, signed by "Zhurnalist," appeared in Literaturnaia gazeta, August 14, 1968. Entitled "The Political Milk of Literarni Listy," it directed its fire against editors of the liberal Czech weekly for having allegedly urged the West to send "rescue divisions" into Czechoslovakia "if something should happen."


145. Prague radio broadcast, August 16, 1968.

146. The keynote article in this last-minute pre-invasion propaganda campaign came on August 18; it was by I. Aleksandrov, whose byline (believed to be a pseudonym) had appeared over an article on July 11 containing a rationale for intervention similar to that used in Hungary. (See fn. 123 above.) The new article charged the Dubcek regime with failure to curb "rightist reactionary" forces and warned that the "fraternal" countries which signed the Bratislava agreement were "fully resolved to rebuff the schemes of internal and external reaction." Soviet propaganda at this time also raised the threat posed to Czechoslovakia by the Sudeten Germans and zeroed in on the case of the Prague factory workers who had written a sympathetic letter to Moscow on July 30 (see fn. 131 above), with Moscow charging that these workers were being "persecuted" by subversive elements seeking to damage Czech-Soviet

147. The new maneuvers, described as "joint exercises of communication troops," began on August 10 along Czechoslovakia's northern and eastern borders with participation by Soviet, Polish, and East German forces. On August 16 the maneuvers were extended to Czechoslovakia's southern border, and Hungarian troops joined Soviet forces there. Among the participants in the subsequent invasion, only Bulgaria, which has no common frontier with Czechoslovakia, was not publicly included in the exercises. See "At the Headquarters of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries," Krasnaia zvezda, August 11, 1968; "Communication of the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency - MTI," Krasnaia zvezda, August 17, 1968.


149. See, for example, David Lawrence, "U.S. Knew of Buildup for Invasion," The Washington Star, September 4, 1968.


152. It might be surmised that the final invasion decision was taken on August 17. This was the day of a Politburo meeting in Moscow, following the return to the Soviet capital on August 16 of most of the senior leaders who had been "officially" on vacation in the Crimea. There does not seem to be any basis, however, for rumors to the effect that the senior leaders had been summoned back to
Moscow to be presented with a decision arrived at by subordinates during their absence. What the triggering factor in the invasion decision may have been remains entirely a matter of speculation. According to one view, the critical circumstance may have been the setting of a new date by Prague for holding the Congress of the Slovak wing of the Party at the end of August, prior to the September Congress of the entire Czechoslovak Party. The August meeting would have threatened to unseat such Slovak conservatives as Vasil Bilak, who was in constant touch with Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko in Prague. In this view, Bilak and other conservative Party figures had managed to persuade Chervonenko that internal dissatisfaction with Dubcek was mounting, and that, once Soviet troops arrived, they would be "welcomed" by a reversed majority (i.e., of conservatives) within the Prague leadership. For a presentation of this argument, see Richard Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage," Problems of Communism, November-December 1968, pp. 21-22. With respect to the question of when military intervention first may have been seriously contemplated, some observers have traced the likely date back to April 1968, when General A. A. Epishev, chief of the main political administration of the Soviet armed forces, reportedly declared at a Moscow Party meeting that the Soviet army was ready to "do its duty" whenever "loyal Communists" in Czechoslovakia might appeal for help. See Michel Tatu, "The Soviet Union," Interplay, November 1968, p. 5.

153. In addition to Soviet troops, which comprised the bulk of the invasion forces, the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria also furnished contingents to the invading forces. Since Bulgaria had not taken part in the publicly announced preinvasion maneuvers, perhaps because Bulgaria lacked a common frontier with Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian forces presumably moved through Soviet territory to assemble for the invasion. For more detailed discussion of the forces involved in the invasion and occupation, see Chapter XVII, pp. 299-304.

154. The seizure of Prague's Ruzyne International Airport to provide an airhead for the troops who invested the capital's key points and took the Dubcek leadership into custody was illustrative of the meticulous planning which went into the military phase of the operation against Czechoslovakia. For an account of the airport's capture, which involved coordination with Soviet Embassy personnel in Prague, see Kenneth Ames, "Coup at Airport Led Invasion,"

155. Details of how the Czech armed forces were immobilized have not been forthcoming. Presumably, the decision not to make a fight of it against hopeless odds grew out of the general belief of the Czech leadership that no provocation should be offered the invaders, thus depriving them of an ex post facto justification for the intervention. Although the Czech forces put up no organized military resistance, and in a sense may have "cooperated" to keep the population from engaging in more than sporadic clashes with the invaders, the Czech military establishment apparently did make a notable contribution to the operation of a clandestine radio network, which helped to sustain the unity of the country during the early days of the occupation. An interesting account of the role played by the clandestine transmitters and other passive resistance measures has been provided by Dr. Constantine Menges, member of the research staff of The RAND Corporation, who was in Prague on vacation during the invasion. See his Prague Resistance. 1968: The Ingenuity of Conviction, The RAND Corporation. P-3930, September 1968.

156. The first Soviet announcement of the invasion -- a TASS statement over Moscow radio in the early morning hours of August 21, which appeared later the same day in Pravda and Izvestia -- began with reference to the alleged request for armed assistance.

157. Beginning with an initial announcement over Prague radio, shortly after midnight of August 21, that the Pact forces had entered Czechoslovakia around 11 p.m. on August 20, Czechoslovak authorities issued a series of statements during the following hours. These included declarations by the Party Presidium and the National Assembly denouncing the invasion as an "aggression" which was taking place without the knowledge of the Czechoslovak
leadership, personal appeals from Dubcek and Svoboda for calm, and a request to the governments of the invading Warsaw Pact countries to withdraw their troops.

158. Soviet attempts to portray the invasion as a response to a call for assistance included publication of an unsigned appeal, which was then repeatedly referred to as having "fully substantiated" the "historic decision to request assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries" -- a fine example of circular logic. See "Appeal by Group of Members of the CCP Central Committee and C.S.R. Government and National Assembly," Pravda and Izvestia, August 22, 1968. See also Iuri Zhukov, "What Did They Strive For? The Calculations and Miscalculations of the Enemies of the Czechoslovak People," Pravda, August 21, 1968; editorial, "Defense of Socialism Is the Highest International Duty," ibid., August 22, 1968.

159. Among the orthodox stalwarts within the Czechoslovak Communist leadership who were considered likely collaborators with the Russians but who nevertheless held back from trying to form a government were Vasil Bilak, Alois Indra, Drahomir Kolder, and Antonin Kapek. In mid-October 1968, Kapek was reported to have assumed the leadership of a splinter group seeking, with Soviet support, to unseat Dubcek. Alfred Friendly, "Pro-Moscow Drive Opened in Prague," The Washington Post, October 13, 1968. One reason for Soviet reticence in naming potential collaborators immediately after the invasion may have been to avoid isolating them until their ranks grew and an alternative pro-Soviet government was formed. But when the potential collaborators found that they had in fact been isolated, they proved unwilling to form a government which could get no stamp of legitimacy from the Czechoslovak Party, the National Assembly, or President Svoboda. See Lowenthal, in Problems of Communism, November-December 1968, p. 22.

160. Svoboda arrived in Moscow on August 23 for talks with the Soviet leaders, heading a small delegation which did not include Dubcek, Oldrich Cernik, Josef Smrkovsky, Frantisek Kriegel, and other Czechoslovak leaders who had been arrested in Prague and taken to Moscow in manacles. Cryptic Soviet statements on Svoboda's arrival and on the August 23-26 talks did not mention that the incarcerated Czech leaders had been released to join the talks until after the talks were over. Pravda, August 24, 25, 26, 1968;


164. For references to these Soviet allegations, see Chapter XV, pp. 227-228. See also the White Book, *K Sobytim v Chekoslovakii* (On Events in Czechoslovakia), issued by "Press Group of Soviet Journalists," Moscow, 1968.

165. The original TASS statement of August 31 on the entry of Warsaw Pact troops had implied that in meeting a "threat to the socialist system in Czechoslovakia" the Soviet Union was averting a "threat to the foundations of peace in Europe." The coupling of the intervention with the preservation of peace was later reintroduced by various Soviet spokesmen, including Gromyko at the United Nations on October 3, 1968. The critical point that was skirted in these allusions to preservation of peace was who was likely to break the peace. Since the West had shown unmistakably that it did not intend to go to war over Czechoslovakia, the only implication left was that the Soviet Union was prepared to start a war to prevent Czechoslovakia -- or any other country within the Soviet bloc -- from moving out of the Soviet orbit. See M. Mikhailov, "Don't Be Confused, Gentlemen," *Izvestiia*, September 4, 1968; editorial, "To Strengthen the Peace in Europe," *Pravda*, September 20, 1968; "Excerpts from Gromyko's Address Before the United Nations General Assembly," *The New York Times*, October 4, 1968.

166. Brezhnev's name came to be associated with the postinvasion doctrine of intervention in the West, not in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev label was affixed to
the doctrine after Brezhnev expounded some of its features at the Polish Party Congress in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, but by that time both Soviet theoreticians and other Kremlin leaders had already begun to spell out the doctrine. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the United Nations on October 3. and Politburo member Kirill Mazurov in a November 7 anniversary speech in Moscow, were among those who preceded Brezhnev in airing the doctrine.

167. Perhaps the origins of the intervention doctrine go back to the concept of "proletarian internationalism" as it was understood in Lenin's latter days and in most of the Stalinist period, when all Communist parties abroad were obedient instruments of Kremlin policy, recognizing loyalty to only one "workers' homeland," the Soviet Union. Versions of the doctrine were later advanced under Khrushchev to legitimate the Soviet Union's "obligation" to intervene in Hungary in 1956, and to serve notice that once Communist regimes came to power they were to be regarded as irreversible. In a speech on August 14, 1958, for example, Khrushchev had said: "We are faithful to our obligations and our international duties . . . in the event of any new outside effort to change the order in a socialist country . . . we will not be mere bystanders and will not leave our friends in the lurch." Again, the document issued by the 1960 world meeting of eighty-one Communist parties in Moscow had stated that every ruling Communist Party was "accountable" not only to the "working people of its country" but to "the Communist movement as a whole," and that under the reciprocal obligations of proletarian internationalism it was the responsibility of the combined forces of the socialist camp to "safeguard every socialist country against encroachments by imperialist reaction." Similar doctrinal assertions that the individual sovereignty of Communist states is subordinate to the security of the "socialist commonwealth" -- a term which came into use around 1955 -- were to be found in abundance before the intervention was elaborated to fit the Czechoslovak case. For a Soviet treatise in May 1968 which expounded the notion of limits on national sovereignty within the "socialist commonwealth" and foreshadowed the use of the principle of "mutual friendly assistance" to justify Czechoslovak intervention, see I. Dudinskii, "V. I. Lenin's Ideas on the Socialist Commonwealth," Kommunist, No. 8, May 1968, pp. 26-37.


170. The Soviet Union's attempt to beat down the Czechoslovak leadership's argument that there had been no counterrevolution tended to center on the question of putting counterrevolutionaries on trial. Prague resisted the staging of political trials, while the Russians reportedly pressed for them to demonstrate that the invasion was justified. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Russian at Justice Ministry," The New York Times, October 8, 1968.


172. Kovalev, in Pravda, September 26, 1968. A similar point aimed at "non-aligned" Yugoslavia appeared in the CPSU's theoretical journal in October 1968, in an article warning that no state can be "absolutely independent of the system of states in which it exists" and that "proletarian internationalism . . . considers it necessary to guarantee the defense of any socialist state's sovereignty when it is threatened by the machinations of the imperialists." Iv. Georgiev, "Yugoslavia: 'New Variant of Socialism'?" Kommunist, No. 15, October 1968, pp. 96-97.


174. As expounded in the fall of 1968, the Soviet intervention doctrine was understood to apply to states in which communism had already established itself as the ruling order. This left ambiguous the question of the doctrine's application to any previously non-Communist country in which the Communist Party might in the future come to power, by parliamentary means or otherwise. Obviously, if the doctrine were construed to apply in such cases, even a "temporary" Communist electoral victory in a European country accessible to Soviet military power would have to be regarded as irreversible. Needless to say, under the shadow of this logic the West European Communist parties could hardly expect to find themselves welcome in the domestic political arena.
175. Speech commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the people's uprising in the Slovene Primorje, Ljubljana radio broadcast, September 15, 1968.


XV. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IN LIGHT OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. On the whole, the predictive record of Western analyses is rather poor with respect to the likelihood that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime would repeat the Soviet experience of military intervention in East Europe regardless of political cost. One of the few serious analyses before the event which foresaw tendencies within the Soviet leadership that might precipitate a move in this direction was the work of Robert Conquest. See his "The Limits of Détente," Foreign Affairs, July 1968, especially pp. 736-737. Other retrospective studies have brought out the point that the Czechoslovak intervention represented the logical culmination of trends in the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet collective leadership which had been visibly gathering strength for a couple of years before the event. See, for example, Richard Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage," Problems of Communism, November-December 1968, pp. 3-10; Fritz Ermarth, Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, The RAND Corporation, RM-5909-PR, March 1969.

2. See Chapter XIV, pp. 175-186.

3. Griffith traces the emergence of "covert social fascism" as a brand of reform communism in East Europe to the interaction, after 1953, between de-Stalinization and rising nationalism and popular pressures for economic modernization. In this view, the "substitution of nationalism for Soviet compulsion as the major mobilizational and interpretive factor in East European modernization [had] replaced the internationalist and pro-Soviet elements of the Marxist-Leninist tradition by populist, chauvinist, anti-minority programs combining integrative national traditions and hostilities with the drive for economic modernization, while still professing to be Marxist-Leninist." See William E. Griffith, Eastern Europe After the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, The RAND Corporation, P-3983, October 1968, especially pp. 2-10. Ceausescu in Romania and Moczar in Poland seem to be representatives of this trend, which, while disagreeable to the Soviet Union, probably appeared to Moscow as a less serious threat to Soviet-style orthodoxy than the kind of liberalization in politics which manifested itself in Czechoslovakia and to some extent in Yugoslavia.
4. It should be pointed out that the Czechoslovak leadership intended to keep reform within the context of a Communist system in which Party rule would remain dominant. However, intellectuals and professionals outside the Party apparatus, with perhaps some allies within it, apparently hoped for an embodiment of the liberal ethos in the new model of humanized Marxism which went beyond what Moscow felt were safe limits. See Richard V. Burks, *The Decline of Communism in Czechoslovakia*, The RAND Corporation, P-3939, September 1968, pp. 18-20.


6. For an interesting exposition of some of the problems making it difficult for the present Soviet ruling group to accommodate its outlook to reform communism, see Robert Conquest, "Communism Has To Democratize or Perish," *The New York Times Magazine*, August 18, 1968, pp. 22-23, 81-83.

7. There was speculation that Ulbricht in particular, after receiving a cool reception from the Czech leaders during a brief visit to Karlovy Vary on August 12, 1968, had concluded that the Dubcek regime was beyond redemption and urged Moscow to intervene militarily. While he may have done so, the decision was certainly Moscow's. See Henry Kamm, "Ulbricht Setback in Dubcek's Policy Is Seen by Czechs," *The New York Times*, August 14, 1968; *idem.*, "Why Did Moscow Switch?" *ibid.*, August 25, 1968; Dorothy Miller, "Military Intervention After Ulbricht's Visit to Karlovy Vary?" *Radio Free Europe*, August 26, 1968; *idem.*, "East Germany Urges Thorough Cleaning," *ibid.*, September 2, 1968.

8. The failure of Kadar and other top Hungarian leaders to comment publicly on the invasion, even though lesser officials in Budapest did so, was interpreted as an indication that they had not been enthusiastic about being associated with the undertaking. See Alvin Shuster, "Hungary Uneasy on Invasion Role," *The New York Times*, September 20, 1968; William F. Robinson, "Hungary -- What Now?" *Radio Free Europe*, October 28, 1968.

10. Dubcek's statement, after his return from the grueling Moscow talks of August 23-26, to the effect that the Czechs had "underestimated" the Soviet "strategic interest" in Czechoslovakia was among the factors cited to support this view. See, for example, Dan Morgan, "Strategic Concern Held Motive: The Whys of Soviet Invasion," The Washington Post, September 15, 1968; Paul Hoffman, "Moscow Concern on Security Seen," The New York Times, September 23, 1968.

11. The relocation away from eastern Bavaria of previously scheduled West German maneuvers was illustrative of Western efforts during the July crisis to avoid what might be interpreted as provocative moves. Likewise, during the August invasion itself, the West refrained from conspicuous announcement of the military alerts, maneuvers, and other "warning" signals customary in past crisis situations.

12. See discussion of the Soviet attempt to justify the invasion, Chapter XIV, pp. 188-191, and pp. 234-236.
below. If in the process of fabricating this invasion rationale the Soviet leaders managed to convince themselves that it was genuine, one must conclude that they were capable of putting themselves out of touch with reality to a truly alarming degree.


14. Neither the remarks of General Prchlik at his July 15 press conference nor those of General Dzur, the defense minister, contained a threat to leave the Pact. See discussion of Prchlik's remarks, Chapter XVII, pp. 329-331. The only Czech official upon whom the Soviets could pin the charge of having called "for 'neutralization' of Czechoslovakia, involving withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization" was Venta Silhan, who took part in the emergency 14th Party Congress of the CCP in a Prague factory on August 22. Since the alleged statements by Silhan were made at the 14th Party Congress after the invasion, they could hardly be presented as having been a factor in the decision to invade. See V. Kudriavtsev, "Counterrevolution Masked as 'Rebirth'," Izvestia, August 25, 1968; V. Zhuravskii and V. Maevskii, "A Rebuff to the Enemies," Pravda, August 27, 1968.

15. For comment on the strategic importance of Czechoslovakia within the Northern Tier, see Chapter XVII, pp. 333-334.

16. See discussion of this point later in this chapter, pp. 239-240.

17. See, for example, Drew Pearson, "LBJ's Czech Assurances Backfired," The Washington Post, September 17, 1968. See also denial by the State Department that any assurances had been given. ("U.S. Go-Ahead to Russia on Czechs Is Denied," The Washington Post, September 18, 1968.) The Soviet Union, incidentally, also made an indignant denial of Western press reports that it had informed Washington of the invasion in advance and had received assurances that the United States would not react. See Iuri Zhukov. "About One Political Diversion," Pravda, September 4, 1968.

18. Sometimes cited in this connection was the Rumanian case. In late August, immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when the Soviet press opened a campaign against Rumania, rumors abounded that Rumania was to be the next target, with maneuvers in Bulgaria
serving as the cover for invasion preparations. Although it was subsequently indicated that there was no evidence of invasion preparations, the possibility was taken seriously enough to prompt President Johnson's warning of August 30 to Moscow against any new military adventures in East Europe. Some believe that this warning may in fact have cut short incipient preparations for a move against Rumania. See V. Kudriavtsev, "Counterrevolution Masked as 'Rebirth'," Izvestiia, August 25, 1968; Commentator, "A Strange Position," ibid., August 27, 1968; Eric Wentworth, "Russian Envoy Calls on Ceausescu," The Washington Post, August 26, 1968; Hans Benedict, "Rumanian Citizens In Drills," ibid., September 1, 1968; "U.S. Doubts that Invasion of Rumania Is Imminent," The New York Times, September 2, 1968.

19. How large a risk the Soviet leaders were prepared to run is, of course, a salient question, but the answer must remain speculative. For what it may be worth, the author has heard it said by Soviet citizens who probably had no part in the decision that the Soviet leaders would have gone ahead with the invasion even if they had thought it meant World War III. In the author's opinion, the Soviet leaders probably were convinced before they acted that the West was not prepared to go to war over Czechoslovakia.

20. Another irony worth noting is that the intervention in Czechoslovakia coincided with publication of a book in the Soviet Union arguing that the USSR was a proponent of genuine diversity within the socialist bloc and that military pressure against another socialist state was unthinkable. Witness the following passage: "Socialist states are advocates of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs; they respect the laws and traditions of the fraternal countries, and consider it impermissible to utilize any means of economic, political, and military pressure in their mutual relations; they fight against any acts in inter-state relations designed to discredit or replace the composition of the party and state organs which the people have entrusted with the administration of the country." A. P. Butenko, ed., Mirovaia sotsialisticheskaia sistema i antikommunizm (The World Socialist System and Anticommunism), Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," Moscow, 1968, p. 148. For a review and translated excerpts from this book, see Dr. Wm. West, "The Invasion of Czechoslovakia Was Ideologically 'Impossible'," Research Bulletin, CRD 329/68, Radio Liberty, Munich, September 11, 1968, pp. 1-6.

22. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Bloc Games in Rumania Likely," The New York Times, November 30, 1968. It should be noted, however, that the Rumanians managed to stave off the holding of joint maneuvers in their own country. Instead, they consented, following the Budapest Warsaw Pact meeting of March 17, 1969, to participate in a joint staff exercise in Bulgaria to "symbolize" their reintegration into the Pact. See Chapter XVII, fn. 66.


24. See previous discussion of the Brezhnev doctrine, Chapter XIV, pp. 189-192. Though it could be argued that the doctrine was essentially an ex post facto justification for intervention in the particular case of Czechoslovakia, where Moscow felt its vital interests were in jeopardy, and therefore not necessarily a policy blueprint in general, few of the states affected were likely to care to test the doctrine by asserting their untrammeled sovereignty. Rumania was obviously a ripe target, for it lay within direct reach of Soviet military power. Yugoslavia and Albania, whose status within the "socialist commonwealth" was left rather ambiguous by the Soviet Union, were less threatened by the intervention doctrine, if only because they were not immediately accessible to Soviet power.

25. For discussion of signs that the Soviet Union may have considered but discarded the creation of a new organizational grouping to distinguish between "loyal" members of the socialist commonwealth (supporters of the invasion) and "second-class" members with tarnished credentials like Czechoslovakia and Rumania, see Chapter XVII, pp. 336-337.

27. See Chapter XVII, pp. 307-312.

28. Despite assurances of military officials in Prague that the Czechoslovak forces were still capable of meeting their Pact commitments, these forces were likely to be regarded by Moscow as potentially unreliable and not to be entrusted with manning a vital sector of the bloc's defenses until the outcome of the "normalization" process in Czechoslovakia became somewhat clearer. See Kenneth Amer, "Czech Army Called 'Fully Capable'," *The Washington Post*, September 18, 1968.

29. According to some Western estimates, for example, the extra expenditures connected with the buildup of Soviet theater forces in East Europe for the invasion and occupation could be expected to add at least a billion rubles, or about 6 per cent, to the Soviet military budget for 1968 alone. See William Beecher, "U.S. Aides Expect Soviet Union To Cut Force in Czechoslovakia," *The New York Times*, October 4, 1968.

30. Whether or not the Soviet Union, prior to its troubles in Czechoslovakia, had been in the process of shifting its attention to the Far East and the task of putting Mao in his place is a matter of differing opinion. The present author doubts that Europe had slipped from the top of the Soviet priority list. However, it can be said that active Soviet efforts had been building up to isolate Peking in connection with the world party conference in Moscow scheduled for November. These efforts were certainly set back by the invasion.

31. In a protest note of September 16, 1968, Peking charged that the Soviet Union in August had stepped up aircraft intrusions over northeast China in support of its "aggression against Czechoslovakia," implying concern in Peking that increased Soviet military pressure might be applied against China. The Czech invasion also prompted a great outpouring of anti-Soviet propaganda from Peking, much of it aimed at undercutting Soviet influence in East Europe, and seeking to portray the invasion as an example of "U.S.-Soviet collaboration for world domination." Somewhat illogically, the Chinese at the same time blamed the invasion on "sharpening contradictions" between the United States and the Soviet Union in their "scramble for spheres of influence." Peking's attempts to exploit the intervention


34. In announcing on November 25, 1968, that the world party conference was to take place in May 1969, the Soviet Union avoided any reference to the fact that disunity in the Communist movement stemming from the Czech invasion had required postponement of the conclave. The "preparatory" meeting at which a new time for the conference was apparently reached took place in Budapest, November 17-21, 1968. Subsequently, another preparatory meeting was substituted for the world conference in May, and the date for the main event was put off until June 5, 1969. See editorial, "To Strengthen the Unity of Communist Ranks." Pravda, November 25, 1968; Reuters dispatch. "58 Communist Parties Postpone Moscow Summit Conference." The Washington Post, October 2, 1968; UPI dispatch. "Soviet Overrides Dissent and Wins Red Parley in May." The New York Times, November 22, 1968; Henry Kamm. "World Red Talks Planned To Open in Moscow June 5." ibid., March 23, 1969.
35. This crowning indignity was visited upon the Czechs and Slovaks by new censorship regulations first disclosed on September 3, 1968, under which any criticism of the Warsaw Pact or the five Pact armies which had invaded the country was forbidden, and the terms "occupation armies" or "occupiers" were proscribed. See Tad Szulc, "New Czech Censorship Rules Bar Use of Word 'Occupation'." The New York Times, September 5, 1968.

36. See Chapter XIV, pp. 187-188.

37. Precisely what was to constitute "normalization" remained a contentious issue. The August 23-26 meeting in Moscow produced a fourteen-point agreement, not published in the official communiqué but made available to the Western press from notes kept by the Czechs. The conditions set out in this agreement apparently were interpreted differently by each side, for within six weeks the Soviets again required the Dubcek leadership to pledge fulfillment of the August 26 agreement at a second meeting in Moscow. For text of the fourteen points, see The New York Times, September 8, 1968.

38. The Soviet allegation that a bloody counter-revolution had been averted by the intervention fell flat in the face of the fact that the Dubcek regime had the solid support of the people. To account for the absence of any violent threats against the Czech Communist leadership, the Soviets invented the theory of "quiet counter-revolution," claiming that it was only the first stage of what would have turned out to be a violent counter-revolution. As put by a Pravda writer, the Soviets were right not to wait for "the shooting and hanging of Communists" before coming to the aid of "the champions of socialism" in Czechoslovakia. Just who these champions were, however, was not specified. See Sergei Kovalev, "On 'Peaceful' and Non-Peaceful Counterrevolution," Pravda, September 11, 1968. Subsequently, the Soviet press asserted that the sooner the Czechoslovak people learned to show friendship for the Soviet troops in their midst, the sooner a "genuine, and not a surface, normalization" would be achieved. See V. Beketov, "In a Village Near Bratislava," Pravda, October 7, 1968. For some accounts of the attitudes of the Czech population toward the occupiers, see Neal Ascherson, "Czech Town Turns Its Back on Newest Invader," The Washington Post, September 5, 1968; Dan Morgan, "Private Prague Report Tells of Wide Anti-Soviet Feeling," ibid., September 14, 1968; Murray


40. The October 3-4 meeting in Moscow, first scheduled for September 20, came after several postponements reportedly caused by disagreement over the agenda and the composition of the Czech delegation. When Dubcek finally went to Moscow, he was accompanied by Premier Oldrich Cernik and Gustav Husak, first secretary of the Slovak Communist organization. President Ludvik Svoboda and Josef Smrkovsky, head of the National Assembly, were among the Prague leaders reportedly dropped from the delegation at Soviet insistence. See Dan Morgan, "Delay Reported on Czech-Soviet Summit," *The Washington Post*, September 24, 1968; Tad Szulc, "Visit to Moscow by Dubcek Is Off," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1968; Henry Kamm, "Dubcek in Soviet for Crucial Talk," *ibid.*, October 4, 1968.

41. The communiqué of the October 3-4 meeting stated that the treaty would cover "the temporary stationing of allied troops in Czechoslovakia," and that the withdrawal of "other troops" would be "carried out by stages." No timetable was given for either the troops to be "temporarily
stationed" in Czechoslovakia or the "other troops" to be withdrawn. See "Communiqué," Pravda, October 5, 1968. Text of the Soviet-Czech Communiqué may also be found in The New York Times, October 5, 1968.

42. The treaty was signed in Prague on October 16, 1968, and published three days later. Like the earlier announcement, it called for the stationing of an unspecified number of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia for an indefinite period of time. There was no provision to compensate Prague for damage caused by the invasion. See "Treaty Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on Conditions for the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops on Territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," Pravda, October 19, 1968.

43. The so-called "compromise seekers" represented a centrist group among Czech and Slovak Communists. At first, they did not challenge Dubcek's leadership directly, but in the inner politics of the Party they moved to isolate him gradually by setting up a new "Executive Committee" of the Party Presidium as the top policy steering group. They included Premier Oldrich Cernik, who previously had been close to Dubcek, and Deputy Premiers Gustav Husak and Lubomir Strougal, who were key Party figures as well as holders of government posts. See Tad Szulc, "Dubcek Struggles for Survival," The New York Times, November 17, 1968.

44. Anti-Soviet student demonstrations occurred in October and November, while in December 1968 workers at major factories and the country's largest labor union, the metal workers, threatened to strike if leading "progressives" were ousted from the Prague leadership. See Karl E. Meyer, "Invasion Turned Czech Workers Into Revolutionaries," The Washington Post, December 20, 1968.

45. Jan Palach, a philosophy student, set fire to himself on January 16, 1969, to dramatize the protest of youth against the occupation. Several other young people followed his example of self-immolation.


48. Marshal A. A. Ghechko and Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov were the Soviet officials sent to Czechoslovakia, at the same time that it was indicated that additional occupation troops might follow them. See Chapter XVII, fn. 40.


52. For an excellent discussion of these points, see Marshall D. Shulman, "'Europe' Versus 'Détente'," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1967, especially pp. 391-398.

53. See Chapter XIII, pp. 121-122.

54. An emphatic presentation of the thesis that the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership consistently failed to exploit a fluid political situation in Western Europe long before its own Eastern bloc troubles came to a head in Czechoslovakia may be found in Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy*, pp. 52-59. For a somewhat divergent but not wholly dissimilar appraisal, which argued that the Soviet Union's successful seizure of the political initiative in Europe and the Middle East gave way, around the beginning of 1967, to retreat from a flexible diplomacy, as priority shifted to preserving the cohesion of the Soviet power sphere in East Europe, see Richard Lowenthal, in *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1968, pp. 5-9.

55. De Gaulle expressed his views on the invasion in a statement on August 21 and at a press conference on September 9, in which he castigated the Soviet Union but declared that the invasion had dealt only a "momentary setback" to France’s policy of seeking détente with

56. In Norway, leaders of the local movement for withdrawal from NATO renounced their former views, while Foreign Minister John Lyng declared that the invasion "shows the importance of our membership in NATO." Similarly, in Denmark the invasion brought at least a momentary end to debate over Denmark’s continued membership in the alliance. The Greek government condemned the invasion, but was rather guarded in speculating on what changes in Greece’s relationship might be expected. In Turkey, Prime Minister Demirel noted that events in Czechoslovakia had thrown politicians who questioned Turkey’s participation in NATO into "a terrible contradiction." Some public figures stated that "the importance of Turkey's membership in NATO has increased." Others, however, notably the Republican People’s Party leader, Ismet Inonu, treated the invasion as an internal Warsaw bloc affair and cautioned Turkey to "refrain from assuming a leading position in connection with the proposed increase of NATO forces." See "Crisis Strengthens Norway's NATO Ties," The New York Times, August 29, 1968; Greek government communiqué, August 22, 1968, Greek Embassy Press and Information Service, Information Bulletin No. 22, August 24, 1968; Demirel press conference, Ankara radio broadcast, September 14, 1968; speech by Turhan Feyzioglu, Ankara radio broadcast, September 23, 1968; editorial, "Hasty Judgments and Actions Must Be Avoided," Ulus, Ankara daily, September 12, 1968.

57. Chancellor Kiesinger’s call on August 23 for a NATO summit meeting met with little response, partly because it would have involved an invitation to de Gaulle, who presumably would have turned it down. See "Bonn Asks Study of NATO Defenses," The New York Times, August 24, 1968; Warren Unna. "W. Germans Seeking NATO Move for Czechs," The Washington Post, September 10, 1968. Perhaps the closest thing to a favorable echo from Kiesinger’s
appeal was word that the political commission of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, meeting in Rome on September 4, would propose a summit meeting of the Council's eighteen member-nations to discuss closer collaboration in the wake of the invasion, which that body regarded as "a menace to peace on the continent." See The Times. London. September 5, 1968.


60. For discussion of European criticism of the initial U.S. response in the invasion. see pp. 239-240 below.

61. President Johnson's August 30 warning to the Soviet Union came at a time when there were widespread rumors that Soviet forces might be preparing for an invasion of Rumania, although he did not specifically name Rumania. See Carroll Kilpatrick, "LBJ Warns Russia on 2nd Invasion." The Washington Post. August 31, 1968.


63. As described by a highly-placed official at NATO, the first collective decision after the invasion was to "lie low" -- that is, to avoid demonstrative measures like mobilization or implied threats of intervention in Czechoslovakia in order not to detract from efforts to condemn the Soviet intervention at the U.N. Security Council. See Harlan Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion." Foreign Affairs, January 1969. pp. 257-258.

64. According to Soviet propagandists, it was actually the West which had hoped to revise the existing balance by snatching Czechoslovakia from "the central zone of the defense system of the socialist countries"; when the intervention foiled the "far-reaching plans" of
the NATO leaders and the West German "revanchists," they resorted to the "theory" of a changed status as a propaganda "smokescreen." See Viktor Smirnov's commentary, Moscow radio broadcast, August 31, 1968; M. Mikhailov, "Don't Be Confused, Gentlemen!" Izvestia, September 4, 1968. Subsequently, as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact accomplices sought to construct a convincing alibi for the invasion, the argument that it was prompted by the need to keep Czechoslovakia from leaving the Warsaw camp and thus upsetting the "delicate balance" in Europe assumed increasing prominence. See, for example, "No Excuse for Propaganda About 'Threat from East'," Soviet News, September 10, 1968; V. Matveev, "Once More About Those Spreading Confusion," Izvestia, September 11, 1968; K. Petrov, "When Illusions Are Shattered," ibid., September 22, 1968. See also the explanation given by a Polish official, Jozef Winiewicz, in an interview with Drew Pearson, "Poland Explains," The Washington Post, September 22, 1968.


66. See Chapter XVII, p. 311.

67. The governments of Canada, Belgium, and Britain, as well as the United States, had been under pressure to withdraw more of their troops prior to the invasion. Assurances that such moves would be held in abeyance were given at a September 4 meeting of NATO's Defense Planning Committee, in which France was not a participant. See "Soviet Move Bars Cuts in NATO Now," The New York Times, September 6, 1968; "NATO To Redeploy Its Defences," The Times, London, September 5, 1968; Harlan Cleveland, in Foreign Affairs, January 1969, p. 258.

68. The United States, through statements by the President and other Administration officials, suggested that the initiative should come primarily from the European side of the Atlantic. Washington expressed its willingness to bolster U.S. combat capabilities in Europe by such actions as sending previously withdrawn fighter-bomber units and mechanized infantry to Germany for
maneuvers, provided the other alliance members also made extra efforts to do their share. Among the steps urged were bringing up to full strength the allied divisions currently assigned to NATO, speeding a program to improve the conventional capabilities of the West German Air Force, and improving procedures for rapid mobilization of reserves in the European countries. None of these measures fell in the category of a buildup beyond previously planned NATO levels; however, unless NATO's European members pitched in to do something about them, the implication seemed to be that the United States would feel disinclined to make good out of its own resources any deficiencies in NATO's posture that might be brought to light by the post-invasion review of Europe's defense needs. Among pertinent references, see Anthony Lewis, "NATO Build-Up Doubtcd Despite the Prague Crisis." The New York Times, September 8, 1968; Peter Grose, "U.S. To Ask Moves by NATO in Wake of Prague Crisis." ibid., September 9, 1968; Carroll Kilpatrick, "Europe's Unity Is Up to Europe: Johnson Urges Local Initiative Despite Czech Invasion." The Washington Post, September 15, 1968; William Beecher, "U.S. Maps an Interim Rise in Force in West Germany." The New York Times, September 17, 1968.

69. Among the military measures pledged were British increases of an RAF squadron and infantry battalion in West Germany, together with transfer of an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean; additional Canadian, Greek, and Italian naval contributions; West German improvement of conventional air capabilities and measures to keep more army noncommissioned officers in service; an increase in the size of Belgium's standing army; and maintenance of larger ammunition stocks by Norway. Further U.S. contributions pledged to NATO included assignment of more advanced F-4 Phantom aircraft to interceptor units in Europe; a program to build shelters for American combat aircraft in Europe; an accelerated program to improve NATO's electronic warfare capabilities; and reinforcement of three strategic reserve divisions kept in the United States for rapid deployment to Europe if necessary. An inquiry into the warning problem and development of new alert procedures also constituted part of the new NATO program. Deferred until January 1969, however, were decisions on the commitment of additional budgetary resources to cover new measures to be incorporated in the five-year NATO planning cycle up to 1973. See "Text of Communiqué Issued by NATO

70. According to Harlan Cleveland, 80 to 90 per cent of the new defense effort called for by the November program was pledged by the European members of NATO. See Foreign Affairs, January 1969, p. 261.

71. See Drew Middleton, "France Moving to Cooperation with NATO Again." The New York Times, November 21, 1968. For further comment on the establishment of the Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean and on Soviet reaction, see Chapter XVI, fn. 79. What further effect de Gaulle's resignation in April 1969 might have on French military cooperation with NATO remained to be seen at the time of writing.


73. See Anatole Shub, and his reference to the comment of Professor Leo Mates of Yugoslavia, in "Lessons of Czechoslovakia," Foreign Affairs, January 1969, p. 267.


75. One of the curious details to emerge from the Czech crisis was the apparent shift in roles customarily ascribed to some of the top Soviet leaders. According
to several accounts, derived evidently from Czechoslovak exposure to the Russian leaders in negotiations at various stages of the crisis, Kosygin and Podgornyi turned out to be among the toughest of the Kremlin group rather than the doves they had usually been pictured as being. On the other hand, Suslov, reportedly a leader of the orthodox hardline faction, was said to have taken up a conciliatory position, presumably in the hope of salvaging the November world party conference for which he was responsible. The crisis image of Brezhnev was that of a vacillator trying to straddle the hardline and moderate positions, more or less in keeping with the posture customarily attributed to him. It should be emphasized, of course, that these vignettes rest on rather uncertain evidence. See, for example, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Czech Invasion Viewed as Move To Block U.S.-Russian Summit," The Washington Post, September 11, 1968; Drew Pearson, "Soviet Invasion Poses Vital Questions," ibid., September 18, 1968.

76. See previous discussion of the successive Soviet attempts to justify the invasion, Chapter XIV, pp. 187-192.


78. The notion that the Bundeswehr, an army of twelve divisions without nuclear weapons, would march through Czechoslovakia to take on the massive armed forces of the Soviet Union was clearly ridiculous, and merely served to point up the threadbare character of the Soviet claim that the intervention had been a justifiable response to a military threat from the West. On the other hand, the Soviet Union doubtless was motivated to intervene partly out of concern that its own forward military position in East Europe would be jeopardized should Czechoslovakia prove to be an uncooperative partner. (See p. 199 above.)

79. One of the reported fourteen provisions of the August 26 Moscow Agreement was that outside forces would remain permanently in Western Bohemia to secure the frontier facing the Federal Republic. For a list of these provisions, see The New York Times, August 28, 1968. For Soviet statements on conditions for partial withdrawal of occupation forces, see E. Grigor'ev, B. Dubrovin, and V. Zhuravskii, "Prague: Everyday Life and Contrasts," Pravda.


83. David Binder, "Ulbricht Offers Talks With Bonn; Eases Conditions," The New York Times, August 10, 1968. The Federal Republic, in turn, indicated its willingness to explore the prospects for a compromise of various differences. A Bonn spokesman on August 16 also indicated that the Federal Republic was prepared to make a long-demanded conciliatory gesture to Czechoslovakia by declaring the 1938 Munich Pact "null from the outset." This may have sharpened Soviet suspicions that the ground was being prepared for restoration of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Prague. See David Binder, "Bonn Ready To Invalidate Munich Pact as of 1938," The New York Times, August 17, 1968.

84. Perhaps the possibility ought not to be overlooked that a Soviet-GDR conciliatory ploy toward Bonn after the Cierna-Bratislava meetings may have been intended to lull West Germany -- and incidentally, to throw the Czechs off guard -- while the invasion preparations were being completed.
As noted in Chapter XIII, pp. 119-120, the Soviet Union had specified in a memorandum to Bonn on July 5, 1968, that it reserved the right to intervene unilaterally in West Germany even if a renunciation-of-force agreement were signed. After the Czech invasion put Soviet intervention proclivities in a new light, Bonn prevailed on the tripartite powers to warn Moscow against exercising its claimed right under UN Articles 53 and 107 to intervene in Germany as a former "enemy state." This Western warning was issued on September 17. The following day, the Soviet Union reasserted its right to intervene in West Germany to suppress "a rebirth of German militarism and Nazism," citing as sanction the Potsdam Agreement as well as the UN Charter. See Vladlen Kuznetsov, "Far-Reaching Aims," Pravda, September 18, 1968.


See L. Volodin, "Apropos the Revanchists," Izvestia, September 20, 1968. Although Soviet warnings that steps would be taken against "illegal encroachment on West Berlin" were no novelty, in this case they took on a more forbidding aspect by being linked to the contention that the Soviet Union had a right to intervene under the UN Charter. It appeared at this juncture that Moscow might be preparing to renew the joint Soviet-GDR campaign of pressures against Berlin which had been conducted earlier in 1968. See discussion in Chapter XIII, pp. 115-120. The psychological effect of Soviet warnings concerning Berlin was reflected in public opinion polls showing a rising level of concern among the population, although official reassurances were given by the Mayor of West Berlin and others that Western commitments for the city's security had not changed. See "West Berliners Reassured by Mayor on Soviet Threat," The New York Times, September 21, 1968. See also Crosby S. Noyes, "Bonn Jittery as Soviet Threats Unanswered." The Washington Star, September 26, 1968; Drew Pearson, "Jittery Berlin: Western

89. The tripartite powers, noting that the real show of German militarism during the Czechoslovak crisis had come from Pankow, not Bonn, indicated in September that, if Soviet complaints against West Germany continued, they would charge the Soviet Union with violation of the Potsdam Agreement for having used East German troops in the invasion. See "Big-3 Allies To Protest Use of E. German Army." The Washington Post, September 24, 1968.

90. Obviously, there is some contradiction between this statement and the previously-made point that the Soviet Union's position toward Bonn was strengthened by the invasion's having cut the ground from beneath Bonn's Ospolitik (see pp. 235-236 above). However, temporarily at least, Moscow was unable to play the stronger cards it had acquired, and whether it would manage to do so in the future would depend not only on the suppleness of Soviet policy but on the character of U.S.-German relations and a host of other factors.


92. On de Gaulle's reaction, see fn. 55 above. De Gaulle's version of postwar European history, blaming the United States and Russia for arriving at a "spheres of influence" agreement at Yalta, was challenged by W. Averell Harriman, who argued that Soviet domination of East Europe came about not because of the Yalta agreements but because they were broken. See Donald H. Louchheim, "Harriman Answers de Gaulle," The Washington Post, September 12, 1968.

94. It was no surprise to anyone that the Soviet Union cast its 105th veto in the Security Council to kill the censure motion on the invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, the debate, especially that between George W. Ball of the United States and Iakov A. Malik of the Soviet Union, served to put U.S. condemnation of the Soviet action before the world. It also gave Czechoslovakia's representatives an opportunity to deflate the Soviet Union's claim that it had been invited to intervene. See "UN Council Votes To Discuss Crisis," *The New York Times*, August 22, 1968; Drew Middleton, "Czechs Send 2 Protests to UN; Troop Withdrawal Demanded," ibid.

95. Just prior to the Czech invasion, U.S.-Soviet agreement reportedly had been reached on a time and place for the strategic arms talks that were to begin in the near future. (Peter Grose, "Progress Made on Missile Talks," *The New York Times*, August 23, 1968.) Announcement of the agreement was held up by the invasion, however, and as pressure grew for the United States to demonstrate that it was not prepared to overlook the Soviet use of brute force in East Europe, the opening date for the talks was deferred. Secretary of Defense Clark H. Clifford gave public notice of the delay in a speech at the National Press Club on September 5, when he said, "We can continue to hope that at an appropriate time, these talks can take place." (See excerpts from Clifford's speech, *The New York Times*, September 6, 1968.) Reported Soviet suggestions that the talks be opened in Geneva at the end of September likewise met with apparent coolness in Washington. (See Benjamin Welles, "U.S. Cool to New Soviet Bid on Nuclear Talks," *The New York Times*, September 19, 1968.)

Besides deferral of the arms talks, the signs of U.S. disapproval included: cancellation of a scheduled symphonic band visit to the USSR and general review of cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and other countries which participated in the invasion; announcement that the Sentinel ABM system would be exempted from budget cuts; Congressional indication that ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty would be delayed; and new warnings to the Soviet Union from President Johnson against use of force "in areas of our common responsibility, like Berlin." (See Warren Unna, "Soviet Cultural Pacts Are Reviewed by U.S.," *The Washington Post*, August 31, 1968; Peter Grose, "Clifford Exempts Missile Defense from Budget Cut," *The New York Times*, September 6, 1968;


97. The Swedish Communist Party slipped from 6.4 per cent of the vote to 2.9 per cent and lost five of its eight seats in parliament, a defeat which the Soviet Union attributed to "the fierce anti-Communist propaganda unleashed by the Swedish press on the eve of the elections, particularly in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia." ("The Ruling Party's Success in Sweden," Izvestiia, September 17, 1968.) See also Wilfred Fleisher, "Swedish Socialists Triumph in Voting," The Washington Post, September 16, 1968.


99. See Doty, ibid. It should be noted that such threats as loss of financial support were not the only factor inducing Western European Communists to soften their criticism of Soviet policy. For example, the more the Soviets might succeed in restoring a façade of Soviet-Czech harmony under a post-Dubček regime, the more the grounds for public opposition to Soviet policy would be cut from under the West European Communists.


102. See Paul Hoffman, "Austrian Socialist Warns of Pressure by Moscow." The New York Times, September 4, 1968. Public concern in Austria about the country's neutrality reportedly included, not only the fear that the USSR might, under a "spheres of influence" arrangement, reoccupy the eastern part of Austria in a possible military move against Yugoslavia, but also the possibility that the United States might react by reoccupying the western half of the country. See Paul Hoffman, "Austria Seeks To Allay Fears." ibid.. September 19, 1968.


105. The chief exception to this bias, intermittently manifested under all postwar Soviet regimes, was, of course, Moscow's advocacy of various pan-European collective security schemes. However, since these proposals generally implied also a reduction of American influence in Europe that would leave the Soviet Union the predominant power in the area, they were perhaps not wholly an exception to the rule.


107. Soviet overtures to France were signaled by a request for the rescheduling in early January 1969 of a postponed meeting of the Grande Commission to discuss further economic cooperation, to which the French agreed. See Donald H. Louchheim, "De Gaulle Accepts an Early Date as the Soviet Suitor Returns," The Washington Post, December 5, 1968.

109. Tentative conciliatory gestures from Moscow to Bonn included an offer to reopen negotiations on a civil air agreement, and talks between Tsarapkin and Brandt in January at which the resumption of a dialogue on a renunciation-of-force treaty reportedly was explored. In early February 1969, a relatively mild Soviet note to Bonn broached the possibility of easing Soviet pressures on West Germany in exchange for her signature on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, while in March, after an incipient crisis over Berlin had subsided, it was rumored that Soviet thinking about a rapprochement with Bonn had reached the point of causing strain in Soviet-GDR relations. See Ralph Blumenthal, "Bonn and Moscow Seek Closer Ties." *The New York Times*, January 11, 1969; David Binder, "Moscow Offers Generosity if Bonn Signs Nuclear Pact." ibid., February 8, 1969; Anatole Shub, "E. German, Soviet Ties Show Strain." *The Washington Post*, March 28, 1969.

110. See Chapter XVII, fn. 110.

111. The Bundesversammlung that was to meet in West Berlin to elect a federal president there for the third time (the previous such elections having been held in 1959 and 1964) caused an incipient crisis in early 1969, with threats of "dire consequences" from the GDR. The Soviet Union blew hot and cold in backing up the Ulbricht regime's threats of retaliation, and at one juncture joint Soviet-GDR maneuvers were mounted along the Berlin access routes, reminiscent of tactics employed in July 1965. Following President Nixon's visit to West Berlin on February 27, and reported advice from American to Soviet officials that a major Berlin crisis would prejudice the climate for Soviet-U.S. talks, the election came off on March 5 without precipitating an East-West confrontation. But, although the immediate danger of a serious crisis had subsided, continuing East German harassment of commercial traffic suggested that, with or without Soviet blessing, the Ulbricht regime was bent on weakening West Berlin's economy and loosening the city's ties with West Germany.

112. The series of clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards that took place between March 2 and 15, 1969.
at Damanskii (Chenpao) Island in the Ussuri River touched off what was probably the most acrimonious exchange of insults in the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although border incidents were nothing new, the unprecedented inflation of this encounter in the propaganda of both sides indicated a serious worsening of their relations. The Soviet Union was the first to seek a deflation of this crisis; by mid-1969, Moscow had several times offered to open negotiations on the border issue with China.
XVI. SOVIET MILITARY POLICY UNDER THE BREZHNEV-KOSYGIN REGIME


2. See Chapter XI, pp. 36-37.


6. An emphatic statement of the need to work out a coordinated "military-economic policy" to insure weapons production in "properly substantiated proportions" appeared in an April 1967 article by Colonel A. Babin, "The Party -- Leader of the USSR Armed Forces," Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), April 6, 1967. Another treatment of the question, with emphasis upon "correct and effective use of resources" to "insure solution of all military-economic tasks," was offered by Colonel Ia. Vlasevich. "Modern War and the Economy," Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), No. 12, June 1967.


8. For discussion pertinent to this question, see Chapters XIV, pp. 186-187, and XVII, pp. 296-297 and fn. 66. Some Western observers credited Marshal Grechko with having succeeded where Soviet political leaders had failed in forcing Dubcek out of office, and suggested that this betokened a real shift in political power to the Soviet marshals. See, for example, Anatole Shub, "Czech Backdown Laid to Efforts of Grechko," The Washington Post, April 18, 1969.

9. As noted earlier, one of the sources of friction between Khrushchev and some of his more conservative-minded marshals had been their belief that he was putting "one-sided" emphasis on the importance of ballistic missiles. Although Khrushchev's successors apparently managed to still such criticism by sanctioning a more balanced force concept, it should be noted that this did not put an end to professional debate over the relative value of active strategic defense versus the offense. See fn. 52 and 53 below. For a relevant discussion of this issue during the Khrushchev era, see Chapter IX, pp. 264-266, especially fn. 26.

10. Published Soviet allocations for scientific research, of which a substantial share goes to support military research and development, have risen as follows:
1963 -- 4.7 billion rubles; 1964 -- 5.2; 1965 -- 5.4; 1966 -- 6.5; 1967 -- 7.2; 1968 -- 7.9; 1969 -- 9.


17. In the Khrushchev period, the Soviet ICBM force consisted of two types of liquid-fueled missiles, designated SS-6 and SS-7 by Western officials. The SS-7 made up the bulk of this force, only part of which was in hardened silos.

About two weeks later, Mr. Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in separate press conferences, both denied having imputed first-strike intentions to the Soviet Union on the basis of the SS-9 buildup. Mr. Laird said he had been talking about "capability," not "intentions," in referring to a first-strike threat. See The Washington Post, April 8, 1969.


21. A mobile, solid-fuel missile displayed in the annual Red Square parade on November 7, 1967, was said by Soviet commentators to be already operational, but the size of the missile in question suggested that it was probably a medium- or intermediate-range weapon, rather than an ICBM. See A. Shbigne and A. Shichalin, "Mobile, Strategic . . . .," Krasnaiia zvezda, November 11, 1967.


23. The Military Balance, 1968-1969, p. 5. A solid-fuel ICBM roughly comparable to the Minuteman was displayed in Red Square parades on several occasions during the Brezhnev-Kosygin period. Given the Western designation SAVAGE, it may have been the prototype of the missile in question.


26. The Soviet missile-launching submarine force, estimated to number around 75 submarines before introduction of the new Polaris-type in 1968, consisted of several types of missile-carrying submarines. About 35 submarines (some 10 of which were nuclear-powered) were capable of firing an average of three ballistic missiles each, and constituted the main strategic striking element of the force. The remaining 40 submarines (of which about 20 were nuclear-powered) were equipped to fire about four cruise-type winged missiles each. Although the cruise missiles could be used against land targets, their primary mission was probably against naval and merchant vessels. Both ballistic and cruise missiles in the Soviet force were of substantially shorter range than either the U.S. Polaris missile or its follow-on, the Poseidon. See *The Military Balance*, 1967-1968, p. 7; *McNamara Statement, 1968*, p. 54.

27. See, for example, Marshal Malinovskii's speech, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 2, 1966, and his article, "October and the Building of the Armed Forces," *Kommunist*, No. 1, January 1967, p. 34; see also speech by his successor, Marshal Grechko, *Pravda*, February 24, 1968. According to Western estimates, the Soviet Union in 1968-1969 possessed about 155 heavy bombers (M-4 BISON and TU-95 BEAR), together with about 50 similar types used as tankers. The Soviet strategic air arm also included a force of about 800 jet medium bombers (TU-16 BADGER and the newer TU-22 BLINDER), considered more suitable for striking Eurasian targets than for long-range intercontinental missions. See *The Military Balance*, 1967-1968, pp. 7, 8; *McNamara Statement, 1968*, p. 54; *Clifford Statement, 1969*, p. 42.
28. As announced by the Canadian Defense Department in March 1968 (see The Washington Post, March 15, 1968), Soviet long-range bombers conducted at least seven flights in early 1968 close to the North American continent: in the vicinity of Greenland and Labrador off the Atlantic coast and around the Aleutian Islands chain in the Pacific. Such flights were reported to be continuing on a routine basis in 1969. In the Khrushchev period, flights of Soviet bombers at such distances from the Soviet Union were unknown. See "Soviet Bombers Patrolling around North America." The New York Times, April 9, 1969.


30. In reply to an American diplomatic inquiry, the USSR in December 1965 denied any intent to evade the non-orbiting resolution (which subsequently was incorporated in the Space Treaty of January 27, 1967). The Soviet press took the position that the UN resolution barred, not the development or production of orbital missiles, but only the actual placing of warheads in orbit, which in a strict sense was true. See "Moscow Abjures A-Arms in Space." The New York Times, December 11, 1965; Observer. "False Doubts." Pravda, December 9, 1965.


32. FOBS was also potentially convertible into MOBS -- a similar satellite weapons carrier designed for delivering its payload against earth targets after multiple orbits.
33. The New York Times, November 4, 1967. Subsequent comment on FOBS by McNamara's successors indicated that there was still uncertainty concerning the purposes of this delivery system. Secretary Clifford, in his January 1969 posture statement, noted that the Soviets might be trying to develop the system for delivery of weapons against soft targets either via orbit or by depressed trajectory. Secretary Laird, in his statement on March 19, 1969, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, mentioned the possibility of FOBS' use against bomber bases, and also cautioned against assuming that FOBS carried no nuclear weapons.

34. See Evert Clark, "Soviet Resumes Tests of Orbital Bombing System," The New York Times, April 26, 1968; George C. Wilson, "Reds Resume Tests of Space A-Vehicle," The Washington Post, October 8, 1968. According to the latter account, U.S. military leaders believed that the Soviets were using the SS-9, their most powerful ICBM, to boost FOBS into orbit, and that a 10,000-pound payload could be carried by the orbiting vehicle.

35. For some speculative comments on possible military and political reasons for Soviet interest in an orbital bombardment system, see the author's testimony, Hearings, Antiballistic Missile Program, November 1967, pp. 91-92.

36. MIRV, which stands for "multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles," and MRV, an acronym for "multiple reentry vehicles," both have the effect of multiplying the number of warheads deliverable by a single booster. But MIRV, with its capacity for separate guidance of each warhead in the reentry package, is the more versatile and complex system.


38. For example, a Czech writer in September 1967, citing the large payload capacity of Soviet missiles, said: "With the introduction of multiple warheads, the change in the number of warheads which can be transported by American and Soviet rockets will alter the balance of forces from the now claimed American superiority of 3 to 1 to a Soviet superiority of 4 to 2." Jiri Hochman, "Rockets, Antiballistic Missiles, and Politics," Rude Pravo, September 23, 1967.
39. "USSR: Closing the MIRV Gap," Newsweek, September 9, 1968. This account, attributing its information to NATO sources, stated that the Soviet nosecone tested on a missile flight from Tiuratam to Kamchatka weighed about 12,000 pounds and carried four warheads, each weighing 2500 pounds. See also George C. Wilson, "Soviet Test of Warhead Is Reported," The Washington Post, September 4, 1968.

40. The growing Soviet inventory of SS-9 missiles with a counterforce capability against U.S. land-based ICBMs was, as previously noted, the principal basis of the first-strike threat pictured by Secretary Laird in early 1969 (see pp. 258-259 and fn. 18 above). The FOBS, with its reduced warning time against such soft targets as bomber bases, also lent itself to interpretation as a potential first-strike weapon. On the other hand, the SS-11 missiles, outnumbering all other types in the Soviet ICBM inventory, had characteristics making them more suitable for use against cities or nonhardened military targets than for counterforce first-strike purposes. Soviet targeting doctrine itself did not serve to clarify all the ambiguities in the Soviet force posture. For example, a dual targeting doctrine -- calling for both counterforce strikes against the adversary's nuclear delivery means and for attacks upon civil targets such as economic-administrative centers -- had long been preached in Soviet military literature and continued to be expressed during the period of strategic buildup under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. As for the first-strike issue, Soviet pronouncements ascribed intentions of striking the first nuclear blow exclusively to the "imperialist camp," but Soviet doctrine also continued to harbor an ambiguous injunction to "break up" and "frustrate" such an attack, which bordered on advocacy of preemption. See Wolfe, The Soviet Military Scene, pp. 77-80.


44. The GALOSH missile (Western designation), first paraded in Moscow in November 1964, was described by Soviet commentators as capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at long distances from defended targets, suggesting that it was an exo-atmospheric weapon designed to take on incoming missiles several hundred miles above the earth. See Pravda, November 8, 1964. See also Krasnaia zvezda, November 10, 1965. Although GALOSH has always been sheathed in a protective cannister when displayed in public, demonstration firings of the missile have been shown on Moscow television.


48. The FIDDLER was the first of the new long-range interceptors introduced into the PVO (Air Defense) inventory, which in 1968 was estimated to number about 3700 fighters of all types. Another improved interceptor in this force was the FLAGON-A, while the long-range FOXBAT was reported in early 1969 to be still in the development stage. See The Military Balance, 1968-1969, p. 6; Clifford Statement, 1969, p. 44.


50. General (later Marshal) P. F. Batitskii, commander of the Soviet air and missile defenses, and General P. A. Kurochkin, a deputy defense minister, in interviews in connection with the forty-ninth anniversary of the Soviet armed forces, took the optimistic position that Soviet ABM defenses could reliably protect the country against missile attack; two other senior officers, Marshal A. A. Grechko, soon to be defense minister, and Marshal V. I. Chuikov, head of Soviet Civil Defense, offered the more

51. According to estimates attributed to American officials in early 1967, the Soviet Union had spent up to that time from $4 to $5 billion on development of its ABM system, compared with something over $2 billion spent by the United States on development of the Nike-X missile defense system. See Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Spending on Antimissiles Put at $4 Billion." The New York Times, January 29, 1967.

52. Neither Soviet civilian nor military spokesmen have engaged in the kind of open debate about the pros and cons of ABM that has taken place in the West. Negative attitudes toward ABM generally have been expressed only obliquely in the Soviet Union. Thus, one may infer from the statements of some Soviet officers on the advantages of strategic offensive missiles that they hold a low opinion of the usefulness of investing in ABM defenses. For example, the commander of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Troops, Marshal N. Krylov, writing in July 1967, asserted that the "great speed" of ballistic missiles, "together with variable trajectories, especially upon approach to target, practically guarantees the invulnerability of missiles in flight, the more so when they are employed en masse." See "The Strategic Rocket Troops," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military-Historical Journal), No. 7, July 1967, p. 20. A rare example of more outspoken Soviet denigration of ABM defenses was provided on March 23, 1969, in a Pravda Ukrainy article by G. Gerasimov, who said that it was impossible to achieve 100 per cent interception, without which an ABM system could not be considered effective, and that in any case "investments in ABM can be neutralized by much smaller investments in additional offensive means."

that new methods of strategic defense like ABM, combined with powerful offensive forces, would give the Soviet Union a military posture capable of inflicting "speedy defeat upon the aggressor" and minimizing damage to the USSR. see Lt. Colonel E. Rybkin, "On the Essence of World Missile-Nuclear War," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 17. September 1965. p. 55; Rear Admiral V. Andreev, "The Dialectics of the Correlation of Forces," Krasnaia zvezda, December 13, 1967.


56. Secretary McNamara's announcement on September 18, 1967, of the U.S. decision to go forward with a "thin" ABM deployment did not, as some observers expected, prompt the Soviet leadership to enter talks on a mutual ABM moratorium. Initial Soviet commentary took the line that the U.S. decision was meant to appease pressure from political "hardliners" and from the U.S. arms industry, but that it would not satisfy those in the United States who advocated a "heavy" deployment costing $40 to $50 billion. For details on the response in the Soviet Union and East Europe to the McNamara announcement, see the present author's remarks, Hearings, Antiballistic Program, November 7, 1967, pp. 68-69.

57. See Chapter XI, pp. 52-54.

58. How confident the Soviet leaders felt about their existing ABM system and its potential for future development was not known. In this connection, an American appraisal, given by Secretary McNamara in early 1968, was that the existing GALOSH system "could provide a limited defense of the Moscow area but that it could be seriously degraded by sophisticated penetration aids." As for the future, McNamara expressed the view that U.S. offensive forces would have more "Assured Destruction" capability than "probably" would be needed even if the USSR should "deploy a substantial

59. Both Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford in the fall of 1968 and his successor, Melvin R. Laird, in early 1969 pointed out that, although the GALOSH ABM system around Moscow had come to a standstill about two-thirds of the way toward completion, research and testing of more sophisticated ABM equipment was going forward at a high rate. In the press conference on March 14, 1969, in which he announced his decision on the U.S. Sentinel program, President Nixon also took note of Soviet ABM activity, suggesting that some of it seemed related to defense against China. See Clifford Statement, 1969, p. 7; John W. Finney, "Laird Sees 'Rapid' Soviet Missile Gains," The New York Times, February 21, 1969; "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs." ibid., March 15, 1969.

60. The Soviet Union treated the U.S. domestic debate over ABM with unusual circumspection both before and after President Nixon's March 14 announcement of plans for graduated deployment of a modified Sentinel (later renamed Safeguard) ABM system. Although noting with disapproval that the Nixon administration "allegedly" hopes to use the Safeguard program as a "trump card" in negotiations with the USSR. Soviet commentators generally steered clear of arguments directed against ABM on technical or strategic grounds. A rare exception to this rule was the critical statement by G. Gerasimov cit-ed in fn. 52 above. For more typical Soviet commentary, see V. Matveev, "Armsments and Disarmament" and "The Road Ahead," Izvestiia, March 13 and 27, 1969; V. Paramonov, "Missiles and Business," Sovetskaia Rossia (Soviet Russia), March 26, 1969. For pertinent Western observations, see Murrey Marder, "Russians Reserved

61. For previous discussion of the initiation of such steps in the latter part of the Khrushchev era, see Chapter VIII, pp. 249-254. See also Thomas W. Wolfe, "Russia's Forces Go Mobile," Interplay, March 1968, pp. 28-33.

62. About 500 of the aircraft in the naval air arm in early 1968 were TU-16 BADGER medium jet bombers, many equipped to fire air-to-surface missiles. The remainder included some TU-95 BEAR turboprop aircraft for long-range reconnaissance missions, together with a miscellaneous assortment of flying boats, helicopters, torpedo bombers, and transport aircraft. See The Military Balance, 1967-1968, pp. 7-8.


66. V. Bakaev. "Reform and Management," Pravda, August 1, 1967. By the end of 1968, the Soviet shipbuilding program together with the purchase of commercial vessels abroad had placed the Soviet merchant fleet among the six largest in the world, with some 1500 vessels totaling about 11,000,000 deadweight tons. For a well-informed analysis of merchant shipping as well as naval advances in the Soviet Union, see Soviet Sea Power, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1969.

67. Among those who believe that, until the Soviet Union creates more balanced naval forces by building up carrier aviation, its sea power will essentially remain fitted for a traditional defensive role is Robert W. Herrick, a retired U.S. Navy officer. His book Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice was published by the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., in 1968 after some delay, attributed to controversy
over Herrick's interpretation. A somewhat similar view, apparently intended to caution against overreaction to Soviet naval advances, was expressed by Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius, who said in a speech on March 29, 1968: "Soviet sea power has been long in developing and no precipitate action on our part is required to maintain the strategic balance. Our fleet is far larger, stronger and more versatile than theirs and we intend to keep it so." See "Book Deprecating Soviet Navy Power Delayed for Disclaimer." The New York Times, March 31, 1968; "Ignatius Seeks To Allay Fears on Soviet Navy Gains," ibid., March 30, 1968.

68. See Malinovskii speech at the 23rd Party Congress, Krasnaia zvezda, April 2, 1966.


70. "Remarks by the Honorable Paul H. Nitze, Secretary of the Navy." Azalea Festival Luncheon, Norfolk, Va., April 21, 1966.

71. Although Soviet surface naval units began to appear in the Mediterranean only in 1964 during the building up of tension over Cyprus, submarines and intelligence-collection vessels had operated in small numbers in Mediterranean waters prior to that time. Before the Soviet break with Albania in 1961, it may be recalled, a few Soviet submarines had been based at the Adriatic port of Valona.


73. The U.S. Sixth Fleet, by comparison, represented a balanced naval force of some sixty warships, built around two large aircraft carriers. In addition to the Sixth Fleet, Italian and French naval forces, as well as British, operated in the Mediterranean.

74. It was only after the initial transit of a Soviet tank-landing ship from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean during the June Arab-Israeli crisis that photos of such vessels began to be published in the Soviet press. For
example, Admiral Gorshkov's article in the July 1967 issue of Soviet Military Review included a picture of a tank landing operation, although a lengthier illustrated version of the same article in another publication six months earlier did not.

75. As noted earlier (Chapter VIII, p. 253), the naval infantry, or morskaia pekhota, had been revived in mid-1964, after a long period of deactivation. Its training for special landing operations was given a good deal of publicity during the last years of Khrushchev's rule and under the new regime. At the Red Square parade of November 7, 1967, contingents of these troops, described as the "Black Berets," were singled out for laudatory comment. For a typical article describing the rigorous training and versatile qualities of the naval infantry, see Captain 2nd Rank N. Belous, "The Naval Infantry Is Taught To Win," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 7, April 1968, pp. 50-55.

76. See Chapter XIII, pp. 124-125, 140-141. The claim that the Soviet naval presence was needed to protect the Arab countries from the U.S. Sixth Fleet remained a theme in Soviet statements in 1968. See Vice Admiral N. Smirnov, "Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean Sea," Krasnaia zvezda, November 12, 1968.

77. Up to early 1969, the size of the Soviet Mediterranean force reportedly fluctuated from around thirty to more than fifty vessels, as units were rotated in and out from the Black Sea via the Dardanelles and from the Baltic via Gibraltar. In addition to one or two guided missile cruisers, the force included destroyers, submarines, landing ships, and supply auxiliaries. For about a month in the fall of 1968, the new helicopter carrier Moskva (see fn. 80 below) maneuvered with the Mediterranean naval force. It also was reported that Egypt-based TU-16 medium jet bombers flown by Soviet pilots carried out reconnaissance flights for the Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean during 1968. See Basil Gingell, "Russian Buildup in Mediterranean," The Times, London, October 1, 1968; Neal Ascherson, "Soviet Mediterranean Buildup Fits World Rather than Local Strategy," The Washington Post, October 26, 1968; Robert H. Estabrook, "Soviet Navy Stirs Concern at UN," ibid., November 15, 1968; Soviet Sea Power, pp. 67-72.
78. See Chapter XIII, pp. 141-142. In addition to Soviet goodwill naval cruising, the year 1968 saw the increased presence in the Indian Ocean of Soviet vessels involved in the recovery aspects of the Soviet space program, especially the lunar program. During the Soviet Zond-6 lunar shot in November 1968, Soviet vessels converging on the recovery area included several warships which later made a flag-showing call at Mombasa in Kenya.

79. For previous discussion of Soviet military and political interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East, see Chapter XIII, pp. 123-125, 137-149. As therein noted, one effect of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was the growth of disquiet in NATO, which led among other things to the establishment in November 1968 of a new NATO air reconnaissance command, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, designed to keep Soviet naval activities in the area under surveillance. There was sharp verbal reaction from Moscow to this step and to accompanying NATO warnings against Soviet military intervention in Europe or the Mediterranean area. In its reply to NATO, the Soviet Union made known its intention to maintain a permanent naval presence in the area, repeating earlier statements by Gromyko and other spokesmen that the Soviet Union was "a Black Sea power, and consequently, a Mediterranean power," and that as such it had an "irrefutable right" to station warships in the Mediterranean to "promote stability and peace" in a part of the world "which is in direct proximity to the USSR's southern borders." See TASS account of Gromyko's May 12, 1958, interview with L'Unità, Soviet News, May 14, 1968; L. Kolosov, "Mediterranean Problems," Izvestia, November 12, 1968; Admiral Smirnov, in Krasnaia zvezda, November 12, 1968; Drew Middleton, "NATO Bids Soviet Avoid Stirring Up a Crisis in Europe," The New York Times, November 17, 1968; V. Ermakov, "American Billyclub in the Mediterranean Sea," Pravda, November 27, 1968. Among other effects of the Soviet Mediterranean naval presence, incidentally, was the issuance of hints by Spanish officials that a higher price would be required of the United States for political and military cooperation from Spain, and even that Spain might move toward a position of East-West neutrality. See Benjamin Welles, "Soviet Sea Moves Disturbing to U.S." and "U.S. Cool to Spain on Fleet Proposal," The New York Times, April 17 and November 22, 1968, respectively; Richard Eder, "Move Perplexes Diplomats," ibid., November 22, 1968. For a

80. The first two Soviet helicopter carriers, named the Moskva and the Leningrad, reportedly can handle about thirty helicopters each. The decision to build these ships evidently was made before Khrushchev left office, but construction and fitting out of the first one was not completed until sometime in 1966 or early 1967. Initial Western disclosure that the Soviets were building such vessels came in October 1967 (see The New York Times, October 23, 1967), and there were later, unconfirmed reports that construction of a third helicopter carrier was about to begin. See William Beecher, "3d Soviet Carrier Believed On Ways." The New York Times, February 14, 1968.

81. See Chapter III, p. 63 and fn. 47.

82. Admiral Gorshkov, in Morskoi sbornik, February 1967, pp. 18-19.

83. The United States in 1968 had fifteen attack carriers in active commission, plus three others under construction or in conversion, representing a formidable lead should the Soviet Union wish to compete in this category of carrier aviation. In addition, the United States had eight ASW carriers, which, unlike the Soviet helicopter carriers, were suited to accommodate patrol aircraft and fighters in addition to helicopters. Perhaps the nearest U.S. equivalent to the Soviet carriers was the LPH amphibious assault ship (Landing Platform, Helicopter), a type of converted carrier accommodating thirty to thirty-five helicopters and about 2000 marines. In early 1968, the United States possessed eight LPHs, some of which were to be replaced by a larger and more versatile type (LHA). See McNamara Statement, 1968, pp. 119, 122, 129.

84. When the helicopter carrier Moskva spent several weeks with the Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean in September and October 1968, its activities apparently included ASW exercises. This does not, of course, rule out other types of missions, including landing operations, for the Soviet helicopter carriers. As pictures of the Moskva taken while it was in the Mediterranean indicate.


87. Following the Pueblo incident, a U.S. spokesman in February 1968 disclosed that a series of intrusions into U.S. territorial waters by Soviet intelligence ships had taken place during the previous three years, and that the ships had not been seized but had been told to move on. A Soviet spokesman, Marshal M. V. Zakharov, denied shortly afterwards that the USSR operated such ships near foreign shores, although he also added: "We will sail all the world's seas. No force on earth can prevent us." See "Mansfield Asks Caution on Spy Ship Questions," The Washington Post, February 7, 1968; "Soviet Aide: No Spying Near Coasts," ibid., February 17, 1968.


91. See Chapters XIV, p. 186, and XVII, pp. 308-309.

92. The air resupply operation on Nasser's behalf, which involved several hundred flights by Soviet transport aircraft, was quickly organized and set in motion. Although Tito's cooperation in permitting overflight and staging through Yugoslavia facilitated the mounting of this operation, it was nevertheless an impressive demonstration of prompt airlift resupply capability. The principal aircraft employed was the AN-12, an older aircraft than the AN-22, but by the same designer, Oleg Antonov. The AN-12, a four-engine turboprop transport, is widely used for Soviet military airlift, as well as by the civil airline organization, Aeroflot.

93. Sea routes from both Soviet Black Sea and Pacific ports have been used for shipment of bulk cargoes, transport equipment, and the like to Vietnam, but rail transport across China also has been used for military supply items, partly to reduce the risk of confrontation at sea with U.S. naval forces. See Paul Wohl, "How the Soviets Ship Arms Aid to North Vietnam," The Christian Science Monitor, January 1, 1966.

94. The author is indebted to a colleague, Fritz Ermarth, for this reminder. A notable exception to "rules of the game" under which the United States has not sought to impose military interdiction on Soviet logistical operations was the brief embargo against certain types of Soviet military shipments to Cuba at the height of the 1962 missile crisis.

95. With respect to Indonesia, A. I. Mikoyan disclosed in a speech in 1964 that Soviet military personnel on training duty in that country were prepared to take part in 1962 in fighting over West Irian, had the issue not been settled. Prior to that, some Soviet personnel were involved in the Korean war in the early fifties and
in the 1956 Suez affair. In Cuba in 1962, the organized Soviet strategic missile units sent there saw no action, but some Soviet technicians presumably lent a hand in manning the then new Cuban air defense system, which shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane. Again, in the Vietnam war, Soviet advisors and technicians were at some stages closely involved, under fire, in helping the DRV get its air defenses in operation. The June 1967 war in the Middle East produced widespread rumors that some Soviet military advisors were taking part in combat operations, especially on the Syrian front. In early 1968 a Soviet pilot was reported to have been shot down on a combat mission against the royalists in Yemen.

96. The bulk of Soviet military commentary on the Vietnam war has emphasized the difficulties encountered by U.S. forces, but occasional accounts of such new U.S. tactics as employment of airmobile units betray a professional Soviet awareness that the war has produced developments in military technology not matched by the USSR.


100. Andro Gabelic, "New Accent in Soviet Strategy," reprinted from Review of International Affairs, November 20, 1967, in Survival, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 1968, pp. 46-47. The Yugoslav author of this article, it should be added, also expressed the
view that the Soviet Union would find it a difficult and lengthy task to marshal the resources necessary for acquiring such military capabilities.

101. See discussion in Chapter IX, pp. 277-283.

102. One of the first military leaders to suggest after Khrushchev's removal that hostilities in Europe might not automatically involve nuclear weapons was Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov. In the course of criticizing in December 1964, a proposal in NATO for a belt of atomic land mines along the German border, he declared that the proposal would preclude the possibility of any hostilities' remaining nonnuclear, which seemed to indicate a belief that conventional warfare was otherwise possible. See Rotmistrov, "Dangerous Plans of the Bonn Militarists," Krasnaia zvezda, December 29, 1964. Marshal Malinovskii, too, suggested on several occasions that the Soviet Union might find itself involved in wars without use of nuclear weapons, although he did not specify Europe as the locale. Marshal R. Ia. Malinovskii, "The Soldier in Modern Warfare," Radio Volga broadcast, September 8, 1965, also appearing in Sovetskaia armiia (Soviet Army) of the same date.


105. Ibid., p. 22.

107. Compare, for example, the above-cited description of Soviet doctrine with the words of a Soviet general who wrote that "flexible response . . . the official U.S. doctrine since 1961 . . . envisaged preparations for waging any war -- a world or a local war, nuclear or conventional, large or small." Colonel General M. Povalii. "The Strategic Concepts of Imperialism: The Doctrine of the Aggressor and International Gendarme." Krasnaia zvezda, March 12, 1968.


110. Ibid.; Voennaia strategia, 2nd ed., p. 89.

111. The published Soviet literature in the Brezhnev-Kosygin period continued to take a similar view of American concepts for limiting and controlling the use of strategic nuclear weapons. As a Soviet writer put it in a chapter on "The Theories of 'Limited Strategic War'," American theorists adopted a "doctrine of 'limited strategic war' [in] an attempt to apply the rules of 'limited' local nuclear war to a "big war" involving the use of strategic nuclear-missile weapons." The purpose behind American efforts to develop "mutual rules" for "limiting nuclear-missile war," according to the writer in question, was "to untie the hands of the nuclear aggressors and to whitewash such a war from the moral point of view." See G. A. Trofimenko, Strategia global'nyi voyny (The Strategy of Global War). Moscow, 1968. pp. 123-145. In short, if private Soviet military thought became at all receptive to the idea of mutual "rules of the game" for limiting the use of strategic nuclear weapons, this was not reflected in open doctrinal writing. For a discussion of Soviet thinking on this subject during the Khrushchev period, see Chapter IX, pp. 285-286.

book *Iadernoe oruzhie i razvitie taktiki* (Nuclear Weapons and the Development of Tactics) in *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 28, 1968. The reviewer criticized the book's authors, P. M. Petruc', P. V. Shemanskii, and N. K. Chul'skii, for "overestimating nuclear weapons, absolutizing their role in close combat, and underestimating the potential of conventional arms."


119. Among pertinent Soviet contributions to the revived debate on nuclear war as an instrument of policy, see Lt. Colonel E. Rybkin, "On the Essence of World Missile-Nuclear War," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 17, September 1965, pp. 50-56; Colonel I. Grudinin, "The Question of the Essence of War," Krasnaia zvezda, July 21, 1966; editorial, "On the Essence of War," ibid., January 24. 1967; Sushko and Kondratkov, eds., Metodologicheskie problemy voennoi teorii i praktiki, pp. 33-34. As pointed out elsewhere by the present author (see cited article in Current History, October 1967, pp. 211-212), this debate in 1965-1967 seemed to center on the argument, not that the then-existing "correlation of forces" would offer a good prospect of Soviet victory if war should occur, but that future changes in the power relationship between the Soviet Union and its adversaries might do so. In effect, those challenging the "fatalistic" notion that nuclear war had become "obsolete" were arguing for further buildup of modern Soviet arms and especially for imaginative exploitation of the "military-technical revolution," whereas the contrary view apparently remained skeptical of the chances of salvaging victory in a nuclear war -- a view which led among other things to questioning the desirability
of additional large resource expenditures on preparation for such a war.


122. The Bondarenko article was notable, not only for its restatement of the thesis that the Soviet Union must pursue the race for military-technical superiority, but also for its blunt assertion that "political organizations and their leaders" might "fail to use the emerging possibilities" offered by the revolution in military affairs. Coming at a time when strategic arms talks with the United States were pending, this article appeared to put the Soviet political leadership on warning not to entertain agreements that the military deemed prejudicial to the defense of the country.

In addition to the Bondarenko article, there were other thinly-veiled warnings from military writers against utopian "illusions" that one can eliminate the danger of war and achieve security through disarmament agreements. See, for example, review article by Colonel E. Rybkin, "Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of War and Peace," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 18, September 1968, pp. 89-90. Another line taken up by military spokesmen in early 1969, in a series of articles devoted to Lenin's thinking on war and military affairs, also seemed part of a concerted campaign for maintaining a high level of Soviet military preparations and, by implication, against relying on arms control negotiations for Soviet security. These articles uniformly stressed Lenin's teaching that "imperialism" would remain implacably hostile to the Soviet state and that the danger of a war to restore the capitalist system would continue to exist until the historical transition from capitalism to communism was complete. For pertinent examples of such statements see Marshal A. A. Grechko, "V. I. Lenin and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces,"


124. The "October Storm" exercise in East Germany in October 1965, for example, began with a phase of conventional operations, but later included simulated nuclear strikes by the joint Warsaw Pact forces after the assumed "Western aggressor" had used nuclear weapons. The "Vltava" joint exercise in Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1966 also began with conventional operations, including an airlift of Soviet troops into the maneuver area. As a Czech general engaged in this exercise noted, the maneuvers were staged, "not only from the aspect of our own military doctrine, but also from the aspect of the military aims of the adversary. It is well known that the strategic military concept of the United States -- the theory of flexible response -- recognizes the possibility of wars with limited use of nuclear weapons or with conventional arms only." See the more detailed discussion of Warsaw Pact joint exercises in Chapter XVII.


126. This was the view taken in the 1968 edition of the Sokolovskii work Military Strategy. Although expanded treatment was given to Western conceptions of limited war
and to NATO's efforts to work out theories of flexible response in Europe "to diminish the risk of limited war being transformed into general war," the conclusion offered "with certainty" was that such theories were unlikely to work. See Voennaia strategiia, 3rd ed., pp. 82-89.


128. The points generally stressed in the Soviet literature on tanks are that they provide "one of the main means for rapid exploitation of missile strikes." and that they offer a high degree of protection against the effects of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons. Another routine claim is that Soviet tanks are superior to Western models in arm., firepower, and endurance. The literature on airborne forces generally singles out their ability to exploit quickly the results of nuclear strikes as their "most important role" in combined arms operations. The ability of the airborne forces to create a "second front" by landing well-armed contingents in the enemy's rear is another factor frequently stressed, and the experience of several maneuvers in East Europe is cited in this connection. For a sampling of this literature, see Colonel V. Petrukhin, "Powerful Arsenal of Victory." Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sил, No 4, February 1968, pp. 22-23; Marshal P. P. Poluboiaroy, "Tankmen," Krasnaia zvezda, February 29, 1968; Colonel I. Vorob'ev, "Maneuver," ibid., September 20, 1967; Colonel General V. Komarov, "Main Striking Force," ibid., September 10, 1967; Marshal P. Rotmistrov, "Time and Tanks," Izvestiia, September 10, 1967; Lt. General I. Taranenko, "Winged Transport of the Soviet Army," Krasnaia zvezda, January 25, 1968; General V. Margelov, "Attackers from the Skies," ibid., February 20, 1968. For a useful Western account of Soviet tank doctrine, see Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Armor: Soviet Arm of Decision?" Military Review March 1969, pp. 35-46.

129. See Chapter IX.

130. An interesting sidelight on nuclear doctrine was provided in November 1968 by the East Germans. A featured article in Ulbricht's press stated that the GDR's current military doctrine, worked out in agreement with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, envisaged that any war in Europe would be promptly transformed into an all-out nuclear conflict "from the very beginning or after a few days of conventional warfare." and hence that intensified
training of the GDR's armed forces for warfare under nuclear conditions was necessary. The extent to which this may have represented lobbying by the GDR for nuclear-sharing on the part of the Soviet Union (a subject we shall take up in the next chapter) is difficult to say. Nevertheless, the article would seem to reflect some tendency in Soviet bloc military circles to return to the thesis of early escalation to nuclear use. See Wolfgang Wünsche, "For the Joint Defense of Socialism: On the Principles and Tasks of the GDR Military Doctrine," Neues Deutschland, November 23, 1968. See also "A-War Stressed by German Reds," The New York Times, November 24, 1968.

131. For a discussion of response in NATO to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Chapter XV, especially pp. 225-230.
XVII. THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE TOWARD EUROPE

1. See previous discussion of the question of redundancy, Chapter VII, pp. 206-209.

2. For further discussion of the Soviet assertion that a military threat from the West was foisted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Chapter XV, pp. 199-200.

3. An indication that NATO was thinking of new initiatives in this direction came in early 1968, when it was announced after a meeting between President Johnson and Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, that the Western allies would seek to devise a new program for mutual East-West troop reductions and then try to "find a way to submit it to the Russians." Later, at the NATO Council meeting in Iceland in June 1968, a declaration was issued favoring "mutual and balanced force reductions" and calling upon the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe to "join in this search for progress toward peace." See Peter Grose, "NATO May Offer East a Troop Cut," The New York Times, February 20, 1968; Robert C. Doty, "NATO Council Urges an East-West Troop Cutback," ibid., June 26, 1968. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, NATO noted that a serious setback had been dealt the prospect of mutual troop reductions. See Chapter XV, p. 230.

4. As discussed in Chapter XIII, this Soviet line had been pressed from the time of the Bucharest conference in mid-1966, although enthusiasm for a European collective security scheme began to diminish somewhat in late 1967 as concern grew in Moscow over the erosion of the Soviet position in East Europe. One reason for Moscow's declining interest in the collective security idea presumably was that it would involve closer relations between West and East European countries, something which the Soviet Union was eager to discourage in light of the Czechoslovak problem. By the spring of 1969, however, the Soviet Union again saw fit to dust off the collective security proposal.

5. This statement appeared in a letter of the CPSU Central Committee circulated privately in early 1966 to "fraternal" parties, the text of which was first published on March 21, 1966, in the Hamburg newspaper Die Welt.


10. See Chapter XII, p. 81.

11. See Chapter XIII, pp. 113-114. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 4, 1967, Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed that U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe offered little "leverage" for prompting the Soviet Union to do likewise, one reason being Soviet insistence on linking troop reductions with "confirmation" of a divided Germany.

12. As previously noted (Chapter XII, pp. 80-81), the question of troop reductions in Europe began to receive considerable attention in Congress in the summer of 1966. The issue sharpened with presentation in the Senate on August 31, 1966, of the Mansfield Resolution, which called for a "substantial reduction" of U.S. forces in Europe. Laid aside after encountering opposition in the Senate and from the Administration, the Mansfield Resolution was proposed again on January 19, 1967, with 42 cosponsors compared to 32 in the previous session of Congress. On March 5, 1967, a staff study issued by the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson, took issue with the Mansfield Resolution and warned of "serious risks" in
substantial unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal. Secretary McNamara, appearing before a combined subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees on April 26, 1967, voiced the Administration's opposition to the Mansfield Resolution, testifying that the United States did not wish to "disturb" the "general power balance" in Central Europe by making large unilateral reductions.

Meanwhile, despite such warnings against unilateral troop withdrawals, the balance of payments question and other pressures were leading to steps in this direction. On May 2, 1967, following tripartite talks by U.S., British, and German representatives, it was announced that beginning in early 1968 some 35,000 U.S. troops and four fighter squadrons would be returned to the United States on a "dual basing" plan expected to reduce the balance of payments deficit by about $75 million annually. This move, which had been preceded in 1966 by the temporary withdrawal of 15,000 U.S. military specialists for Vietnam training duties, would, when completed, bring American strength in Germany down to some 220,000 men. While welcoming this step, Senator Mansfield indicated that it did not go far enough and said that the issue of further "substantial" cuts would be kept on the "front burner." On March 23, 1968, in a speech in Chicago, Senator Jackson, a vocal proponent of maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in Europe, cautioned that pressures for further reduction were growing and that continued maintenance of large American forces in Europe would depend on whether West Europeans believe "they are still needed there." On May 17, 1968, a somewhat similar sentiment was voiced by the new U.S. Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford, who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had advised the NATO defense ministers "not to expect the United States to maintain the present level of its forces in Europe."

Toward the end of June 1968, Senator Stuart Symington joined Senator Mansfield in urging a major unilateral cutback of American forces in Europe, proposing that the United States place a ceiling of 50,000 on these forces without expecting the Soviet Union to reciprocate. This, in brief, was the background against which the Soviet leadership might judge the utility of not responding to proposals for mutual troop reductions in Europe.

Among relevant sources see "Text of Mansfield's Statement to Senate on Resolution To Reduce Forces in Europe," The New York Times, September 1, 1966; Murrey Marder, "Mansfield Moves To Cut U.S. Troops in Europe," The
Abolishment of the ground forces command in September 1964, just before Khrushchev's ouster, was perhaps the last of a long list of measures which had not endeared Khrushchev to leaders of the ground forces in the Soviet military hierarchy. The date of this action became known only in 1968 with publication of a volume edited by Marshal M. V. Zakharov, 50 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR (50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968, p. 510.


16. Apart from boosting the prestige of the theater forces within the Soviet military establishment, the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia also may have contributed to an increase in the influence of the Soviet military command generally within the Soviet leadership. Owing to the inept handling of the political aspects of the intervention, Soviet military men almost by default were thrust into a combined military-political role as the only effective representatives of Soviet power in Czechoslovakia during the first days of the confused post-invasion period. Whether a permanent accretion of greater military influence in high Soviet Councils was among the effects of the invasion remains a debated question at this writing. See Chapter XVI, pp. 255-256.
17. The new military service law replaced one in force since 1939 (amended in 1950), under which terms of service in the army and air force were three years and in the navy, four, with call-up on an annual basis. Besides lowering these terms by one year, the new law reduced the draft age from 19 to 18, scheduled two annual call-ups in place of one, and provided for extensive premilitary training of 17-year-olds through the DOSAAF paramilitary organization. The latter provision presumably would alleviate part of the short-term proficiency problem, since under the old system a good part of the recruit's first year was spent in basic training, which DOSAAF's expanded program is intended to take care of. For Soviet materials and explanations concerning the new law, see "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Terms of the Implementation of the USSR Law 'On Universal Military Duty'," Pravda, October 25, 1967; "Fifty Years of Guarding the Achievements of the Great October," speech by Marshal A. A. Grechko, ibid., February 24, 1968; General A. Getman, "The Law on Universal Military Duty and the Problems of DOSAAF," Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star). January 13, 1968; and interview with General I. G. Pavlovskii, "Always Combat Ready," Pravda, January 20, 1968. For a detailed Western analysis of the new military service law, see Geoffrey Jukes, "Changes in Soviet Conscription Law," Australian Outlook, September 1968.

18. The officer retirement portion of the new service law prescribed compulsory retirement at age 60 for grade levels of colonel general, marshal of arms, and full admiral, but allowed for a five-year extension by the Council of Ministers. Marshal of the Soviet Union, the highest rank, remained exempted from the law. Despite these loopholes, the law did seem likely to spur retirements among the notoriously overage high command to make way for younger blood. In fact, a considerable speedup in advancement of younger officers (mostly in their fifties) to responsible positions in the Ministry of Defense and military districts did occur, although not necessarily as a direct result of the new law.

19. See fn. 17 above. A further point to be noted is that the general purpose forces would be somewhat less affected by a shorter service period than some of the other elements of the military establishment such as the air and missile forces, the navy, and the technical branches, in which there is a higher concentration of specialized skills.
20. See, for example, Strategic Survey, 1967, pp. 21-22. Other implications of the new law were to free young men for productive labor sooner and thereby ease the industrial manpower shortage, and also to provide patriotic-socialist indoctrination for a larger segment of Soviet youth in answer to the regime's concern about the ideological slackness of the younger generation. See previous discussion of the latter point, Chapter XI, p. 19.

21. The over-all manpower strength of the Soviet armed forces went up from about 3 to 3.2 million men, according to Western estimates, but apparently this small increase in the period preceding the Czech crisis went mainly to the rocket forces and the navy rather than to the ground forces. See The Military Balance, 1966-1967, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 1966, pp. 2, 4; ibid., 1967-1968, pp. 5, 6; ibid., 1968-1969, pp. 5, 6.

22. For a description of the three categories of combat readiness which apply to Soviet divisions, see Chapter VIII, p. 227.


24. An indication of this was furnished by Western press reports that some of the Soviet divisions which showed up at combat strength and readiness levels in Czechoslovakia had previously been among categories maintained at only partial strength and readiness. See Orr Kelly, "Russian Buildup in Europe Stirs Deep NATO Concern." The Washington Star, October 6, 1968.

25. The Soviet military districts bordering China from Manchuria to Sinkiang are, from east to west, the Far East, Transbaikal, Siberian, and Turkestan MDs. Published Western estimates do not delineate the Soviet strength in each of these military districts, but according to one estimate (The Military Balance, 1967-1968, p. 6), the number of divisions stationed east of Lake Baikal in 1967 was about fifteen. Several additional divisions presumably were deployed to the west opposite Sinkiang. As to how many divisions may have been shifted into these areas in the 1965-1968 period, reliable public data are lacking. One account by a Brazilian journalist based on an interview with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in late 1966 put the number of divisions allegedly moved in from
East Europe at thirteen, but this figure is highly suspect, if only because there is no evidence that any divisions were transferred out of East Europe. A buildup on the order of four or five divisions drawn from elsewhere within the USSR seems much more plausible. See Danillo J.G. Santos, "Russia Has 13 Divisions on China Border. Mao Aide Says," The Washington Post, December 11, 1966.

26. Soviet troops had garrisoned Mongolia from 1937 to 1956, but were withdrawn for a period of about ten years until after signing of a new Soviet-Mongolian People's Republic defense treaty in January 1966. In September 1967 Western press dispatches from Moscow reported that Soviet troops had reentered Mongolia "within the last few months," while at a holiday parade in November 1967 Soviet tank troops were paraded publicly in the Mongolian capital for the first time. See AP Moscow dispatch, "Soviet Troops Protecting Mongolia from Chinese," The Washington Star, September 14, 1967. In a UPI dispatch from London on July 9, 1968, K. C. Thaler mentioned unconfirmed reports that some Soviet missiles had been deployed to Mongolia.


28. See fn. 40 below.


30. Ibid.


32. The lower estimates were those given by NATO spokesmen; the higher ones were attributed to Western observers in Prague and to various Czechoslovak officials, including General Martin Dzur, the defense minister. Part of the large difference of around 300,000 between the low and high estimates may have grown out of differing distinctions drawn between combat formations and logistic-administrative supporting elements; some of the latter may have remained outside Czechoslovakia in adjacent

33. See Chapter XIV, p. 186, and fn. 154.

34. As a matter of comparison with this arithmetic, figures given to the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1968 by Senator John Sherman Cooper, who said that his information came from NATO and U.S. Defense Department sources, indicated that twenty-two Soviet divisions and three allied Warsaw Pact divisions had moved into Czechoslovakia. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Brosio Says NATO Could Not Act on Invasion of Czechoslovakia," The New York Times, November 12, 1968.

35. The defense correspondent of The Times of London, Charles Douglas-Home, in the edition of September 25, 1968, reported a NATO assessment that "11 new Soviet divisions were brought into Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union" in connection with the invasion. The figures disclosed by Senator Cooper on the occasion cited in fn. 34 above gave the following breakdown of the origins of the twenty-two Soviet invasion divisions: Eleven came from the Western USSR; eight moved in from East Germany; two from Hungary; and one airborne division was flown from the Soviet Union. In addition, according to Cooper, ten Soviet reserve divisions were upgraded to replace those sent from the USSR to East Europe.

36. See discussion of this treaty in Chapter XV, p. 211.

37. On August 28, for example, President Ludvik Svoboda had expressed the view that perhaps two Soviet divisions would remain in Czechoslovakia after a withdrawal process of several months. See Tad Szulc, "Soviet To Leave 2 Bloc Divisions on Czechs' Soil," The New York Times, August 29, 1968. In September and October, however, Western newsmen were being told by "highly placed informants" in Prague that the Russians would probably leave six to eight divisions, a minimum of around 100,000 men, in Czechoslovakia. See Szulc, "Czechs Are Told Most Soviet Units Will Go by October 28," ibid., September 24,

38. The first publicized exodus of invasion troops was on October 21, 1968, when some Hungarian units left the country. The first announced withdrawal of a Soviet unit came on October 24, when the Soviet press reported that troops returning to Kaliningrad via Poland had been welcomed home with roadside slogans proclaiming: "The Motherland Is Proud of You" and "You Have Fulfilled Your International Duty." See Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Hungarians Begin Leaving Slovakia," The New York Times, October 22, 1968; Lt. Colonel B. Briukhanov, "True Sons of the People," Krasnaya zvezda, October 24, 1968.


40. In April 1969, in connection with threats of new Soviet intervention to bring about changes in the Czechoslovak leadership and to demonstrate that anti-Soviet outbursts of the kind that followed a Czech ice-hockey victory in March would not be tolerated, there were reports that Moscow was on the verge of sending additional troops into Czechoslovakia. On April 12 the Prague government actually made an announcement to this effect, which was rescinded the same day without explanation. Whether this curious episode would be followed by the actual dispatch of more occupation forces was not known at the time of writing. See Alvin Shuster, "Prague Retracts Word that Soviet Is Sending Troops," The New York Times, April 13, 1969.

41. Kruzhin, in Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR, March 1968, p. 27; The Military Balance, 1967-1968, pp. 6-7. With respect to command and control, Soviet military writers frequently made the point that technical innovations in this field made possible through wider use of computers and associated equipment represent the third major stage in the military-technical revolution of modern times, the first two being the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles, respectively. See N. Ia. Sushko and T. R. Kondratkov, eds., Metodologicheskie problemy voennoi teorii i praktiki (Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966, pp. 69, 243-265, 279; Lt. Colonel V. Bondarenko and

42. Interview with General I. G. Pavlovskii, "Always Combat Ready." Pravda. January 20. 1968; speech of Marshal A. A. Grechko. "On the Draft Law of General Military Service." Pravda. October 13. 1967. The favorite illustration offered by these military leaders was that in comparison with a standard infantry division of 1939 the Soviet motorized rifle division of today has 30 times the artillery-mortar firepower. 16 times more tanks. 13 times more automatic weapons. and 37 times more armored personnel carriers. It is not, of course, the Soviet habit to give absolute figures which would make such comparisons more meaningful.


44. See reference to one such Pentagon study by Chalmers M. Roberts. "Can NATO and Dollar Both Be Sound?" The Washington Post. October 30. 1966. For earlier, more detailed discussion of Soviet capabilities for support and reinforcement of theater forces in Europe during the Khrushchev period, see Chapter VII, pp. 201-203. Many of the same limitations evidently continued to apply under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, although it must be presumed that some improvement took place, especially with regard to airlift reinforcement.


commander, emphasized that the invasion not only was a highly skilled military effort but was accomplished "without any tactical warning whatsoever." See "Bolstering of NATO Is Urged," The Washington Post, October 29, 1968. See also Raymond J. Barrett, "The United States and Europe," Military Review, December 1968, p. 4. Although the Soviet Union devoted its full propaganda resources to justification of the invasion, and occasionally cited Western sources to the effect that it was "faultless from the viewpoint of military science," there was a complete dearth of professional treatment of the operation in Soviet military literature, at least up to early 1969. For some typical Soviet accounts of the "humane" and "comradely" manner in which Soviet fighting men carried out their "international duty" in Czechoslovakia, see editorial, "In Defense of the Achievements of Socialism," Krasnaia zvezda, August 23, 1968; editorial, "True Sons of the People," ibid., August 31, 1968; editorial, "Fidelity to International Duty," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 18, September 1968, pp. 9-12; Viktor Shragrin's commentary, "For the Soldiers of the Soviet Army," Moscow radio broadcast, September 14, 1968.


50. For a representative view arguing that there had been little shift if any in the military balance, see R. T. Rockingham Gill, "Europe's Military Balance


52. Bernard Gwertzman, "Lemnitzer Urges Stronger Forces for NATO," The New York Times, October 29, 1968. The assessment that Soviet "unpredictability" must be given new weight in NATO planning was among a number of conclusions reportedly reached within NATO by mid-October 1968. Two others were that the new territorial deployment of Soviet forces along the Bavarian and Austrian borders had in fact had an important effect on the security balance in Europe, and that the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean posed a growing strategic threat of concern to NATO. See Tad Szulc, "NATO Council Urges New Policy Principles in Wake of Czech Occupation," The New York Times, October 17, 1968.

53. Precisely how the conventional balance in Central Europe stood prior to the Czech invasion was, it may be noted, a much-disputed issue in the West, with the answer depending on the way the opposing forces were measured. On the NATO side, available for use in Central Europe was a standing force of 24 divisions and around 2000 tactical aircraft. On the Warsaw Pact side in Central Europe were 26 Soviet divisions and about 1200 Soviet tactical aircraft, plus whatever portion of the ground-air strength of the East European countries in the central area might be deemed eligible for inclusion. The four relevant countries (the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) had a total of about 35 to 40 divisions and 1700 combat aircraft. On the face of it, NATO was therefore considerably outnumbered in conventional forces in the central area, though generally conceded to have a substantial edge in tactical nuclear strength. However, after adjusting the conventional force figures to take into account numerous factors such as the 60 per cent higher manpower and equipment levels of NATO divisions and the greater bomb load and endurance of NATO aircraft, and leaving the majority of the East European divisions out of the reckoning of combat-ready forces, some estimates concluded that "an accurate picture of all factors indicates rough equality" between the two sides. One such appraisal, which received wide attention, was given by Dr. Alain Enthoven, a U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, at a

54. On this point, the communique of the meeting simply stated: "The use of force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there have aroused grave uncertainty and demands great vigilance on the part of the allies." See "Text of Communiqué Issued by NATO Ministers," The New York Times, November 17, 1968.

55. See discussion of the Brezhnev doctrine in Chapter XIV, pp. 189-192.

56. The question of NATO's response was taken up in Chapter XV, pp. 225-230.

57. The following list gives pertinent data on some twenty-six joint Warsaw Pact exercises, from the first publicized maneuvers in the fall of 1961 down to August 1968.

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<td>1. Oct-Nov 61</td>
<td>SU, GDR, Pol, Czech</td>
<td>First publicized multilateral WP maneuvers for &quot;show of force&quot; during Berlin crisis. (Some previous unpublicized Soviet-GDR bilateral field training had taken place.)</td>
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<td>2. Apr 62</td>
<td>SU, Hgy, Rum</td>
<td>Minor exercise with token Rumania participation, but attended by Marshal Malinovskii to observe Hungarian performance.</td>
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3. Sep 62  SU. GDR, Czech  | Well-publicized exercise in Northern Tier area employing standard scenario frequently followed thereafter, with NATO attack, WP counterattack, and simulated nuclear exchange.
4. Oct 62  SU. GDR, Pol  | Partial Northern Tier exercise, with nominal Polish commander. (Unless otherwise noted, all exercise commanders presumed to be Soviet.)
5. Oct 62  SU. Rum, Bul  | First joint maneuvers in Southern Tier, with nominal Rumanian commander.
6. Jun 63  SU. Rum, Bul  | Low-key maneuver in Southern Tier.
8. Jul 64  SU. GDR, Czech  | Low-key maneuver, with nominal Czech commander.
9. Sep 64  SU. Rum, Bul  | Major Southern Tier exercise, including airborne, amphibious landings. Simulated use of nuclear weapons. Nominal Bulgarian commander.
10. Apr 65  SU. GDR  | Used as excuse to close Autobahn temporarily. Included airlift from SU.
14. Sep 66 SU, GDR, Czech, Hgry  
Highly publicized "Vltava" exercise, which advance billing claimed to be larger than "October Storm." First participation of Hungary with Northern Tier countries. Soviet airlift reinforcement. Simulated nuclear strikes.

15. Mar 67 SU, GDR, Czech  
Standard scenario of NATO attack, with nuclear resort after conventional phase.

16. May-Jun 67 SU, GDR, Pol  
Similar to March 1967 exercise.

17. Jun 67 SU, GDR, Pol  
Combined naval exercise in Baltic.

18. Jun 67 SU, Czech, Hgry  
Apparently small-scale, with token participation by Hungary.

19. Aug 67 SU, GDR, Pol, Czech  
Standard Northern Tier exercise, attended by new WP commander, Marshal Iakubovskii.

20. Aug 67 SU, Rum, Bul  
First Rumanian participation since similar Sep 1964 exercise. Amphibious and airborne landings. Nominal Bulgarian commander.

21. Mar 68 SU, GDR  
This exercise, not officially acknowledged by Soviet sources, was reported in the Western press to have taken place on short notice in the southeastern part of the GDR opposite the Czech border during the Dresden meeting of Pact leaders. Ostensibly, its purpose was to bring pressure on the Dubcek government.

22. May 68 SU, Pol  
Small joint Soviet-Polish maneuvers, announced as taking place "in accordance with the training plan" of the Warsaw Pact, following Western reports of Soviet troop movements along the Czech-Polish border.
23. Jun 68  SU, GDR, Pol, Hgry, Czech

These maneuvers, originally announced as a limited staff exercise, were expanded to a field exercise under the command of Marshal Iakubovskii, the Pact commander. They played a controversial role as a device to influence the policies of the Dubcek reform government in Czechoslovakia. (See Chapter XIV.)

24. Jul 68  SU, GDR, Pol

Joint naval exercises, the most ambitious undertaken by the Pact up to this time, in the Baltic, Barents, North, and Norwegian Seas. Soviet, East German, and Polish bases were used. These maneuvers, code-named "Sever" and commanded by Admiral Gorshkov, head of the Soviet navy, were given more publicity than any previous naval exercises.

25. Jul-Aug 68  SU, GDR, Pol, Hgry

Originally announced as the "largest logistical exercises" in Soviet history, these maneuvers at first involved only Soviet forces operating along the western frontiers of the USSR under General Mariakhin, but were subsequently extended to include troops of all the Warsaw Pact countries bordering on Czechoslovakia. These maneuvers, in connection with which the Soviet Union announced the call-up of reservists, were also part of the pressure on Prague during the July crisis. (See Chapter XIV.) Simulated nuclear operations and the "Sky Shield" air exercises were tacked on in the course of these maneuvers, to which the Soviets gave the code name "Nemen."
These maneuvers, which began the day the "Nemen" logistical exercises ended on August 10, were part of a continuing effort to apply pressure around the border areas of Czechoslovakia. It was originally announced that they involved primarily communications troops, but later it became known that they amounted to a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (See Chapter XIV.)


58. In the "Vltava" exercise, Poland, although a Northern Tier country, did not participate directly. However, Polish forces conducted well-publicized national maneuvers at about the same time. Some Soviet ground and naval forces may have had a role in the latter.

59. With a few exceptions which received wide public attention, such as the "Sever" exercise in July 1968, purely naval exercises are not included in the listing given in fn. 57, nor are periodic air defense exercises, which often involved cooperation among the various Pact countries.
60. The East European officials assigned nominal command were the defense ministers of the countries concerned, who are, within the Warsaw Pact command structure, considered deputies to the supreme Pact commander, a Soviet officer. The GDR defense minister, General Heinz Hoffman, was twice given the prestige assignment of exercise director, as was the Bulgarian defense minister, while the others each received one turn, except for Hungary, which was left out altogether.

61. For a well-argued example of this view, which applies, however, only to the first eleven joint maneuvers, conducted between October 1961 and October 1965, see Stanley Dziuban, The Warsaw Pact Maneuvers: Proof of Readiness or Psychological Warfare? N-369(R), Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va., August 1966.

62. Dziuban pointed out, for example, that only about 15 per cent of the field forces of the East European countries were involved in joint exercises through 1965, except East Germany, where he estimated the figure at 25-35 per cent. Subsequent exercises would have boosted these percentages, however, especially for the Northern Tier countries. Ibid., p. 14.

63. Ibid., pp. 16-17. It may be noted that the first large exercise to stress logistical capabilities was the "Nemen" exercise in July 1968, which was also in part a political-military demonstration aimed at Czechoslovakia.

64. See, for example, editorial, "To Strengthen the Peace in Europe," Pravda, September 20, 1968.


66. Three publicized joint exercises took place in the spring of 1969 at a time when the Soviet Union had sent Marshal A. A. Grechko and Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov to Czechoslovakia in connection with new demands that Prague restore orthodox, pro-Soviet leaders to power and enforce strict discipline over the population. The first of these exercises, from March 25 to April 11, was held in Bulgaria under the command of Marshal I. I. Iakubovskii and, according to the Soviet announcement, involved joint activity by Bulgarian, Soviet, and Rumanian "operational staffs." The second exercise, named "Vesna 69," ran from March 30 to April 4. It was held on Polish,
East German, and Czech territory, and involved communications troops of those countries and of the Soviet Union, under the nominal command of a Polish general. The third, April 14-16, was a bloc-wide air defense exercise commanded by Marshal P. F. Batitskii. While the last exercise may have had no particular political overtones, the others did. In the first case, Rumania's announced participation in a joint Pact exercise for the first time since August 1967 was presumably a symbolic bow to bloc unity and a partial concession to Soviet pressure for military re-integration of Rumania into the Pact, although Rumania continued to resist the holding of joint maneuvers on her own territory. The second "Vesna 69" exercise not only had the obvious political function of backing up new Soviet demands on Prague, but by involving Czechoslovakia's territory and troops it also constituted, in a sense, a test of Prague's adherence to the process of "normalization." See "Joint Exercise," Pravda. April 2. 1969; "Joint Exercise of the Armed Forces of the USSR. GDR. Czechoslovakia and Poland." Krasnaia zvezda. March 30. 1969; "PVO Exercise of Warsaw Treaty States." ibid.. April 15. 1969.

67. In some cases, the East European countries became suppliers of military items to the Soviet Union. Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, both produced light aircraft, helicopters, and jet trainers, of either Soviet or domestic design, for use by other Pact members including the Soviet Union. Production of advanced combat aircraft, however, remained in the Soviet Union.

68. See Chapter VII, p. 201.

69. Czechoslovakia's armed forces prior to the invasion of August 1968 came to about 225,000 men, with an army of 14 divisions and an air force of 600 tactical-type combat aircraft. Comparable figures for Poland were 270,000 men, with 16 divisions and around 800 combat aircraft, plus a navy of modest size. East Germany, the third Northern Tier member, had a total of about 126,000 men under arms, with an army of six divisions, an air force of 270 combat aircraft, and a navy slightly smaller than that of Poland. For detailed estimates of the military forces available to the various East European members of the Warsaw Pact in this period, see The Military Balance, 1966-1967, 1967-1968, and 1968-1969, pp. 6-8, 2-4, and 2-4, respectively. See also L.J.M. van den Berk. "After the Biggest Maneuver in German History: Military Developments
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, "NATO's Fifteen Nations, June-July 1966, pp. 102-104. It should be noted that, in addition to the regular military establishments of the Warsaw Pact nations, these countries continued to maintain paramilitary forces, such as border and security troops and People's Militias which in East Europe came in the aggregate to about 225,000 to 235,000 men.


71. See Alfred Friendly, "Soviet Design on Czech Army Seen," The Washington Post, October 16, 1968. With respect to the size of Czechoslovakia's armed forces, it has been conjectured that prior to the invasion the Dubcek regime may have sought to reduce its armed forces by several divisions, both because of the country's economic plight and because of a reevaluation of the West German threat, and that this contributed to Soviet displeasure with Dubcek's policies. That after the invasion the Soviets would themselves demand a cutback does not, on the surface, seem logical, unless Moscow by then regarded the Czech army as too unreliable to contribute much to Pact defense. See R. Rockingham Gill, East Europe, October 1968, p. 19.

72. See, for example, Benjamin Welles, "A New Look at NATO" and "New Soviet Arms Viewed as Increasing Military Threat to West Europe," The New York Times, October 27 and November 6, 1966.


74. See Chapter XII, p. 97.

75. See Chapter XII, p. 87. See also Colonel V. Alekseev and Lt. Colonel O. Ivanov, "Reliable Shield of Socialism," Krasnaia zvezda, March 30, 1968.


77. Marshal A. A. Grechko, then the Warsaw Pact commander, made trips to Bucharest in November 1963.
and again in May-June 1965, which were evidently prompted by Rumania's footdragging in military affairs, including the cutback in terms of service. See *The New York Times*, June 5, 1965; "Current Developments," *East Europe*, July 1965, p. 32.

78. See Chapter VII, p. 201.

79. A rare Soviet comment indicating that some kind of formal joint organizational arrangement for nuclear purposes may have been set up within the Pact was made in May 1965 by Marshal Grechko. In a speech celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, Grechko employed the term "the joint nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact" in stating that these forces "are always ready to rebuff any aggressor." Moscow radio broadcast, May 14, 1965. Articles and statements dealing with the various Pact armies also mentioned from time to time that they were prepared to fight if necessary with nuclear-missile weapons. Among the more specific statements of this kind was one by General Heinz Hoffman, the GDR defense minister, who said in November 1966: "The armed forces of the GDR are also ready and able to fight under the conditions of a nuclear-rocket war and to achieve victory." East Berlin ADN domestic broadcast, November 9, 1966. See also *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 8, April 1965, p. 70; and previous reference to 1968 GDR doctrine on nuclear training. Chapter XVI, fn. 129.


81. The author has discussed this question informally with various Soviet representatives at international conferences and elsewhere. Their attitude almost invariably has been that the Soviet Union will permit no erosion of its nuclear monopoly, with emphasis on not allowing the East Germans to have access to nuclear weapons.


85. See Chapter XII, pp. 96-97.


87. See Chapter XIV, p. 160.

88. Lubos Bobrovskii, Prague domestic service broadcast, March 6, 1968.

89. See Chapter XII, pp. 93-96. See also Chapter XIII, p. 106.


93. For example, Air Marshal V. A. Sudets, then commander of the Soviet Union's air defense forces, was publicly referred to in 1964 as being also commander-in-chief of Air Defense of the Warsaw Pact. See Garthoff, in East Europe, September 1965, p. 14. Sudets' successor, Marshal P. F. Batitskii, inherited the same dual roles.

94. Apart from their training and advisory functions, little is known of the role played in the East European countries during the past few years by the Soviet military missions, which were a holdover from Stalin's day before Warsaw Pact machinery came into existence. In one sense, the military missions may represent an alternative bilateral instrument for Soviet influence and surveillance over the national military establishments, either as a backstop to the Pact machinery or as a potential substitute for it if the Pact should ever be dissolved. Another purpose of the missions may be to
cultivate pro-Soviet lobbies within the various defense establishments, on the theory that such interest groups would offset any nationalistic tendencies within East European military circles.

95. For example, when Marshal A. A. Grechko gave up command of the Warsaw Pact forces, he was succeeded in July 1967 by Marshal I. I. Iakubovskii. At about the same time, when General P. I. Batov was relieved as chief of staff, his place was taken by another Soviet officer, General M. I. Kazakov. Again, just two weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kazakov's place was taken by General Sergei M. Shtemenko, also a Russian. Though the 68-year-old Kazakov's retirement was attributed to ill health, there was speculation later that he stepped down to make way for a more vigorous officer in light of the upcoming invasion. Shtemenko, a prominent Soviet strategist and ground forces leader, was seven years his junior. See Peter Grose, "Command Change in Bloc Recalled," The New York Times, September 4, 1968.

96. See Chapter XII, p. 97, and XIV, p. 156.


100. The full text of Prchlik's press conference was given in a Prague radio broadcast on July 15, 1968. For an account of the press conference, see Henry Kamm, "Czechs Demand a Basic Revision of the Warsaw Pact." The New York Times, July 16, 1968. See also earlier discussion of the Prchlik case in Chapter XIV, p. 181, and especially fn. 132.

101. General Dzur's comments in Rude Pravo of July 16, 1968, stressed Czechoslovakia's adherence to the Warsaw Pact, but at the same time cited various articles of the Warsaw Treaty itself to make the point that Prague's reform proposals were consonant with the purposes of the Pact. That Prague also may have been making trouble on
the reform issue during the Novotny regime was suggested by an anniversary article in Krasnaia zvezda, May 15, 1966, in which Dzur's predecessor, General Bohumir Lomsky, stated that bloc security must be approached in a "new manner" and that individual countries of the Warsaw Pact should have "larger responsibility."


103. For previous discussion of this factor as one of the motivations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Chapter XV, pp. 199-201, 235.

104. It is a controversial point whether the military elites of the East European countries were generally sympathetic to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, or whether they regarded it as an affront to national sovereignty. This writer would tend to assume the latter, but also would note that, in the view of such close observers of East European affairs as J. F. Brown, the senior officer corps in most of these countries had exhibited more solidarity with their counterparts in the Soviet Union than perhaps any other professional group in East European societies except the secret police. If so, it may well be that there was less censure of the Soviet Union among East European military elites than customarily assumed.

105. As pointed out earlier (see Chapter XIV, p. 153), one purpose of the renewal of the Soviet Union's bilateral defense treaties with the various East European countries in 1967 may have been to prepare a fallback position under which the Soviet Union would retain the right to keep a strong military presence in the region in the event that the Warsaw Pact arrangements, for one reason or another, were altered. For an argument that Soviet preferences from a military viewpoint alone had long run to the system of bilateral defense arrangements, see Bela K. Kiraly, "Why the Soviets Need the Warsaw Pact," East Europe, April 1969, p. 11.

106. According to Walter Ulbricht and other East German leaders, the idea of a new organizational grouping giving selective status to the Soviet Union and its four hard-cors supporters within the Pact was explored immediately after the Czech invasion. GDR statements also indicated -- without Soviet corroboration -- that Moscow and Pankow
were to have the guiding role in such a grouping. See David Binder, "Soviet Is Seeking New Red Grouping." The New York Times, October 31, 1968. See also Chapter XV, p. 205.

107. The post-Czechoslovak revival of Soviet efforts to promote closer integration of the Warsaw bloc through the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance was heralded by Brezhnev in a November 1968 speech in Poland, where he announced that a CEMA summit meeting would soon take place for the purpose of "strengthening" the organization. A session of the CEMA Council in East Berlin on January 21-22, 1969, apparently failed to produce much enthusiasm for tighter economic integration from most of the East European countries, including, surprisingly enough, the GDR. However, Soviet and Polish propaganda continued to push the idea prior to the opening of the CEMA summit meeting in Moscow on April 23, 1969. See Pravda, November 12, 1968; Tad Szulc, "Soviet Economic Bloc Stalled by Two Key Problems," The New York Times, February 2, 1969; I. Ikonnikov, "CEMA's Role in Cooperation Between the Socialist Countries," International Affairs, No. 4, April 1969, pp. 65-70; "On the Opening of the Session of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance." Pravda, April 24, 1969.

108. The brief official communique of the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact (Pravda, March 18, 1969) made no mention of Soviet efforts to censure China, but these efforts were described to the press by unnamed conference participants. See, for example, Anatole Shub, "Rumania Thwarts Soviets" and "Chinese Threat Obsesses Table-Pounding Brezhnev." The Washington Post, March 18 and 19, 1969.


110. The appeal issued at Budapest for an "early meeting" of interested states to work out procedures and an agenda for an all-European security conference alluded briefly to the European security arrangements proposed in the 1966 Bucharest declaration, but was noncommittal on the question of U.S. participation in such a conference.

111. The Budapest communique was vague as to the details of the organizational changes. but. according to accounts circulated by some of the participants. one new provision called for appointing a national deputy to the Soviet commander in each country in which Soviet troops were stationed. On the surface this appeared to be a further refinement of the original Pact statutes. which made each national Defense Minister a deputy to the Soviet Pact commander.

XVIII. SOVIET POLICY IN THE SETTING OF A CHANGING POWER BALANCE


3. For a caustic view of the inadequacy of the "numbers game" in appraising relative strategic forces, see Leonard Beaton, "Recounting the Missiles," The Times, London, November 1, 1968. Though a satisfactory formula for describing parity and superiority may be lacking, there are some definitions which avoid simple numerical comparisons. For example, parity may be defined as mutual possession of "assured destruction"; superiority as the capacity to inflict assured destruction upon an enemy while denying the same capacity to him through such "damage-limiting" means as active defense and/or a first strike. Even so, such a definition probably raises more questions than it answers.
4. For an example of such controversy in the United States, see account in *The New York Times*, July 12, 1967, of a study by the American Security Council sponsored by the House Armed Services Committee, together with an answering statement by the Department of Defense. On the Soviet side, although there has been far less tendency to question publicly the long-standing position that for the Soviet Union quantitative and qualitative superiority would be a good thing, an occasional Soviet writer, such as Gennady Gerasimov, has expressed the view that among major nuclear powers "superiority has become a concept which has no bearing on war." See Gerasimov, "Pentagonia, 1966," *International Affairs*, No. 5, Moscow, May 1966, p. 28. See also his letter on the same subject, "A Russian Replies," *The Washington Star*, July 16, 1968.

5. See "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs," *The New York Times*, January 28, 1969. Prior advocacy of the notion of "sufficiency" in preference to "parity" or "superiority" was advanced by Prof. George W. Rathjens in his pamphlet *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1969, p. 10. Soviet comment on President Nixon's "sufficiency" formula generally treated it as a step in the right direction, though one commentator, D. Kraminov, in *Za rubezhom* (Life Abroad), No. 6, issue of February 7-13, 1969, said that it merely allowed the generals to decide the extent to which nuclear weapons are "insufficient or sufficient for defense needs."

6. According to unnamed Washington sources in May 1969, the opening round of the strategic arms talks was expected to begin sometime in July. By early June, the prospective opening date had slipped a month or two, presumably to allow time for consultation with America's NATO allies on the U.S. negotiating position. See Chalmers M. Roberts, "U.S. To Propose Summer Talks on Arms Curbz" and "U.S.-Soviet Talks for Missiles Seen Delayed Until Fall," *The Washington Post*, May 13, June 4, 1969.

7. See Chapter XVI, pp. 261-263.

8. Soviet sources furnished slightly conflicting data on the rate of growth of industrial output in 1968. N. K. Baibakov, chairman of the State Planning Committee, reported in December 1968 that the rate of increase for
1968 was 8.3 per cent, down from 9.4 per cent in 1966-1967. See Chapter XI, fn. 28. In January 1969, however, the report of the Main Statistical Administration on economic performance for 1968 gave a figure of 8.1 per cent, which matched the planned goal for the year. See Izvestiia, January 26, 1969.

9. Rather early in the Kennedy Administration, the United States set ceilings for its strategic delivery forces (around 1050 land-based ICBMs, 650 Polaris SLBMs, and 600-700 heavy bombers); these levels, which had been substantially attained by the end of 1965, were not increased as evidence became available that a rapid Soviet strategic buildup was under way. The basic U.S. rationale evidently was that a stable strategic posture held at the long-established levels was preferable to an upward response that could stimulate a new round in the strategic arms race. The Soviet Union apparently attributed the leveling off in the U.S. strategic force effort primarily to the increased defense burden of the Vietnam war. With respect to budgetary effort, U.S. spending for strategic forces in the 1962-1966 period also declined appreciably, from about $11 billion in 1962 to about half that amount in 1966. By 1968, the figure had risen again to some $9 billion, but this reflected mainly an expanded R&D effort and not an increase in the established force levels.

10. In remarks to the Aviation-Space Writers' Association on May 12, 1969, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the Pentagon's Director of Defense Research and Engineering, stated that Soviet missile deployment was "moving even faster than anticipated and . . . having passed the assumed leveling-off point, their expansion programs are continuing unabated." This, according to Dr. Foster, had given the American intelligence community reason to "doubt most seriously" its earlier assumption that the Soviet Union was merely trying to draw even with the United States in ICBMs. See The New York Times, May 13, 1969.

11. For a Soviet expression of the view that internal pressures in the United States and the Vietnam war had demonstrated that the American economy could no longer provide "guns and butter simultaneously," see the review article by Yu. Arbatov, director of the American Institute of the USSR Academy of Science., "Complex Problems, Difficult Solutions," Izvestiia, January 11, 1969.
12. Whether the USSR could expect to make major changes in its strategic posture without detection is a moot question, though it is generally conceded that new technology would complicate the task of keeping track of Soviet strategic programs. Some programs, such as the installation of missile silos, the building of ABM sites, and the construction of missile-launching submarines, doubtless would be difficult to conceal, but others, such as deployment of mobile missiles and refitting of emplaced missiles with multiple warheads, could well escape detection for a rather long time. See Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race*, pp. 28, 39.

13. This, for example, was a Soviet commentary on a January 20, 1969, press conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which a new offer to begin strategic arms talks was made: "The USSR sincerely desires disarmament, but it must not be inferred from this that its interest is greater than that of others." Moscow radio broadcast, January 21, 1969.


17. Even before the invasion of Czechoslovakia caused the postponement of strategic arms talks, there had been signs of internal Soviet opposition to the initial decision of June 27, 1968, to enter such talks. (See Chapter XI, p. 52, especially fn. 147.) After the invasion the signs of controversy continued, taking two forms. One was editorial tampering in the military press with some government statements on arms control policy. For example, *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star) of October 4, 1968, in reporting Foreign Minister Gromyko's October 3, 1968, UN address, deleted his remarks on the subject of strategic arms negotiations, even though it mentioned other arms control proposals. Likewise, the Soviet press omitted reference to
the same subject in a UN speech of November 13 by Iakov Malik, the Soviet UN representative. The November 6 anniversary speech of Politburo member Kirill Mazurov in Moscow also received press treatment differing from the live version; the effect of the change was to censor out a statement expressing the Soviet Union's readiness to negotiate with the United States on "the whole complex" of questions involved in the strategic arms issue.

The second form in which apparent internal opposition manifested itself was the publication of several rather thinly-disguised polemical articles by military writers in late 1968 and early 1969. Among other things, these articles voiced doubt about the utility of arms agreements to assure peace; they reiterated the familiar theme that Soviet military policy should aim at the attainment of superiority, and cited Lenin's works to make the point that "imperialism" would continue to seek the military destruction of the Soviet Union until the worldwide triumph of communism. For previous reference, see Chapter XVI.

fn. 121.


20. Ibid., pp. 7-8.


22. Soviet proposals of one kind or another for banning the use of nuclear weapons were for many years a central feature of Soviet efforts to inhibit the United States
from deriving political advantage from its superior nuclear posture. In particular, a ban on first-use of nuclear weapons was closely linked to Moscow's European diplomacy, for it would in effect cancel out the guarantee of U.S. nuclear protection to Europe. The Soviet position outlined in advance of the strategic talks (see, for example, Pravda. July 2, 1968, and Izvestiia. January 21, 1969) continued to call for a ban on nuclear use. But even if such a ban were not to be specifically adopted, it seems likely that any agreement on strategic arms levels marking the end of the historical U.S. strategic advantage would be regarded as tantamount to a no-first-use pledge.

23. See Chapter XV, pp. 231-234.


25. See Chapter X, pp. 297-301, for a more detailed discussion of alternative views on the process of change in the Soviet system which was set in motion during the Khrushchev period.
**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA**

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An examination of Soviet European policies since 1964. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime elected to continue Khrushchev's foreign policies, which had been initiated by Stalin to upset the postwar status of Western Europe while preserving it in the East. These policies were primarily aimed at eroding NATO unity and undermining U.S. influence in Europe. However, the USSR failed to stem the erosion of Soviet control in the East without resort to force. Although the Soviets suffered several disadvantages from invading Czechoslovakia in 1968, the invasion helped them to (1) reestablish Soviet military credibility; (2) destroy Czech and similar reform movements; (3) deploy more troops in the Warsaw Pact's northern area; and (4) remind West Germany that the USSR controls negotiations with the East. With the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global military power in the late sixties, Soviet leaders might be tempted to pursue bolder policies. The forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks may serve to clarify Soviet intent.