Arms Control Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

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Arms
Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH
ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in Arms Control & Disarmament are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however.

It includes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS


Constructs a systematic model of Europe's future for the next 15 years—a model which does not need to make the assumption that spontaneous developments will turn spontaneous developments to political benefit. Achminow considers the variables in future development, especially the active communist policy, and the possibility of a conventional third war around the year 1975. The model excludes the question of a third war in the Soviet Union and the United States as decisive for Europe's future. Crises outside this area will influence the future of Europe in a different way than those occurring within.


This article examines the influence of the area to which the student belongs to the development of the student's views on war and peace. The student's views are analyzed to find out whether the student's views are more abstract or concrete than those of the parent. The influence of the area to which the student belongs is related to the area of the student's views on war and peace. The influence of the area to which the student belongs is not necessarily decisive for peace as something which must be actively obtained and maintained.


Surveys recent developments in Marxist thought on social classes, the state, culture, philosophical anthropology, and methodology. Birnbaum contends that Marxist social thought is currently enmeshed in an intellectual crisis so profound that it threatens the very foundations of Marxism. He traces the root of this crisis to the exhaustion of the possibilities for internal development of the traditional Marxist categories and to historical changes that have so transformed social realities as to make earlier Marxist formulas inapplicable to the present. Four puzzling features of modern Marxist sociology: the failure of capitalism to follow its predicted course, the appearance of unexpected structural characteristics, e.g., social classes, in Socialist societies, the uncontrollable growth of nationalism among the "proletariats" of the Third World, and the emergence of unexpected new mechanisms of imperialism domination and exploitation in the West. Additionally, Marxism has been shaken by its encounters with advanced forms of bourgeois thought not evidently subsumable under any of the inherited Marxist formulas. It may be that these problems can be solved satisfactorily without transforming and transcending the Marxist heritage, and it is this case that the "crisis in Marxist sociology may mark the beginning of the end of Marxism."


Selected presentations from a briefing session organized by the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study and the Johnson Foundation at Racine, Wisconsin, to provide an opportunity for give-and-take probing between China experts and journalists. The first two chapters analyze the causes and implications of the Cultural Revolution, whereby Mao Tsetung attempts to control the party bureaucracy by halting the support of students, peasants, workers, and soldiers. Mrozir explains the influence of Mao's doctrine on China's foreign policy and asserts that its "chauvinistic nationalism" has been modified despite possible shifts in real politics. Lewis briefly summarizes the situation of China's participation in Vietnam, and the final chapter contains estimates of
the potential strength of China's armed forces, concluding that the Chinese capability for offensive action is now more in contrast to their enormous capability for defensive action.


Bibliographical notes:


Background papers on major areas of Soviet policy and politics in the post-Khrushchev era, which were submitted but not included in Thomas B. Larson's study DISARMAMENT AND SOVIET POLICY: 1954-1966. The authors' assessments show the significant differences in the interpretation of the general direction and political orientations of the Soviet leaders in the period. These differences are not only interesting but natural, since it is extremely difficult to evaluate the factors because of the contradictions, ambiguities, and lack of simple answers, which are characteristic of the present phase of Soviet development.


The era of bipolarity, based on the premise that Russia and the United States were the only two centers of world power, is now ended. This change is significant because the small nations have not managed to create a superpower, to the end, internationalization has been the foremost weapon for fragmenting bipolarity. This indicates that the world may be expected in a period of transparent nationalism. If this trend attempts to function in a positive fashion, the world will be a better place for the present moment, and it is expected that the post-week system will be a transition to a different balance of power. In the latter case, the 1960's will be merely a transitional period leading to a new system of international relations in a world where between the system of the 1930's, when Europe was the center of world political and of the 1940's, when Europe became a vacuum in world politics, there exists regarding implications of the present changes that the liberation of Eastern Europe by the American power under the Iron Curtain, the occupation of the American and Russian armed forces in Europe, and the situation in the former Marshall plan countries which will all influence the future trends of power and Western power than in the present trends in the eastern bloc. A power struggle will remain, Spain-Japan will remain as a dynamic element in Asia, and the threat Little Havana, Jerusalem, Yalta, and Ceylon will be threatened, though not with the same historical direction. The United States and Russia decided not to reach a showdown over Africa, and this will eventually hold true for Asia, with the Vietnam War representing the end of Western intervention. Both the Communists and the free world will reconsider and reformulate the entire meaning and practice of communism. The cold war will continue, but with no significant change in Soviet-American relations, and the "great issue of the new era" will be influence and society rather than power and security—a greater importance being attached to influence than power and to an internal examination of the social order in each country. The revolutionary ferment of the 1960's may end in a revolutionary period comparable to that ushered in by the Bolshevik Revolution, and Europe will play an increased role in world affairs.


A great effort by the Soviet Union to undermine the very foundations of Western Christian civilization is increasingly evident in Central Europe, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and Latin America, and in the aid granted by the Soviet Union to the civil strife in the United States. The Western World is now very near to a choice between submission and nuclear war. If the Soviet Union attacks West Germany, the only effective immediate response would be NATO will be capable of using nuclear weapons because available conventional forces are totally inadequate. Meanwhile the military potential of the United States, France, China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines are considered friendly nations fighting against aggression are subdued, and the order of the United States and the United States are the key players in Europe and the United States are the key players in Europe and the political changes of the 1960's may end in a revolutionary period comparable to that ushered in by the Bolshevik Revolution, and Europe will play an increased role in world affairs.
European federation will be a difficult and long-term enterprise, composed of many stages. Zdenko Stambuk reviews European economic problems, stressing that, although national economic antagonisms exist, all European nations stand to gain from the establishment of European economic independence and inter-European economic and commercial exchanges, including trade with Eastern Europe. Concludes that the greatest possible degree of political and economic integration is essential.


Partial contents. -- Change and the industrial system. -- The imperatives of technology. -- The nature of industrial planning. -- The structure. -- The corporation. -- The general theory of motivation. -- The goals of the industrial system. -- Prices in the industrial system. -- The management of specific demand. -- The regulation of aggregate demand. -- The nature of employment and unemployment. -- The control of the wage-price spiral. -- The industrial system and the union. -- The educational and scientific estate. -- The industrial system and the state. -- The industrial system and the cold war. -- Education and manipulation. -- The future of the industrial system.

A study of the modern industrial system, which is composed of those large industrial corporations brought into being during the last 70 years to exploit the potential combination of advanced technology, elaborate organization, and massive capitalization. Galbraith argues that the requirements of a large-scale manufacturing firm are the same in matter what its ideological environment, and consequently all advanced industrial systems are converging toward a single structural model, which he calls the New Industrial State. Thus in Communist countries there are strong trends toward autonomy for productive enterprises, while in capitalist systems the market has been superseded by a planned economy in which the corporation becomes a part of the penumbra of the state. This convergence of industrial systems is good in that it tends to drain all substance from the ideological quarrel between capitalism and communism and thus opens the way for such urgent measures as disarmament.

On the other hand, the union of the industrial system with the state threatens to subordinate personal beliefs and all higher goals to the needs of production. The New Industrial State is the outgrowth of technological and organizational imperatives beyond the capacity of man to control, and Galbraith believes that only vigorous political activism among the "educational and scientific estate" can block the inherent tendency of the industrial system to subordinate all other purposes to its own.


Contents. -- Great strategic concept. -- We are fearless. -- The nature of U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger. -- From its repeated failures, by Jen Ku-ping. -- The fatal weakness of the military strategy of U.S. imperialism, by Jen Ku-ping. -- U.S. imperialism's strategic dispositions of pulling down the Western wall to repair the Eastern wall, by Jen Ku-ping. -- The people's revolutionary strategy will triumph over U.S. imperialism's counter-revolutionary strategy, by Tung Ming. -- Study the "talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong."

Compilation of articles that praise Mao Tse-tung's thesis that imperialism is a paper tiger and forecast the revolutionary peoples' ultimate victory over their reactionary enemies. The United States is said to have prepared one way for its own doom by alimenting the masses; its armed strength will be of no avail when the people "awake" and unite in a worldwide struggle against imperialist forces.


Attempts to identify the major sources of support for more aggressive military initiatives in defined war. Hamilton uses material drawn from studies of the 1952 and 1964 election to determine the preferences of various social groups or combinations of preferences. He finds that the upper middle class is markedly more prone than the lower class to favor a tough policy. This finding contradicts the generally held view that derived from the work of S. M. Lipset, that aggressive attitudes are a characteristic of lower class authoritarianism. Hamilton also finds a suggestive positive correlation between the tough attitude and the amount of attention devoted to mass media, particularly newspapers and magazines.


A background briefing, study guide, and bibliography on Communist China. The text is devoted primarily to an analysis of the origins and meaning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to a survey of recent U.S. diplomatic and trade policy vis-a-vis China. The bibliography covers only recent publications and includes sections on general background, the Cultural Revolution, China and the United States, China and the United Nations, foreign policy, arms control, and nuclear weapons, personal accounts, reference works, bibliographies, U.S. government publications, and periodicals.

Arms Control and Disarmament

Asserts that the existing plans for European reunification have little chance for realization in the near future. Hoffmann discusses, among other things, De Gaulle's notion of an 'Europe of the fatherlands,' Breitenger's concept of Atlantic cooperation for the reunification of Europe, and the need for recognition of NATO.

14


Interview with Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener of the Hudson Institute.

Reviews a number of the predictions made by Kahn in The Year 2000. He foresees a world divided between the developed and underdeveloped nations, with the latter housing 75 percent of the global population but lagging far behind the advanced nations in economic output. People in the post-industrial societies will enjoy more leisure but less individual freedom. The United States and the Soviet Union will remain the world's top economic and military leaders, followed in descending order by Japan, West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Communist China. Kahn estimates that about 15 nations will possess nuclear missiles by 2000. Although he warns that proliferation could lead to limited nuclear exchanges among the lesser powers, he concludes that a relatively stable world political climate will substantially decrease the likelihood of global nuclear war.

15


Notes: p. 148-170.

This article presents a profile of the peace thinking of a Norwegian elite sample, and tests some hypotheses derived from Galtung's center-periphery theory. Data were collected in 1967 by interviews and questionnaires, mostly structured, among a foreign policy-elite sample and--for comparative purposes--among a so-called opinion-maker sample. These data are not to some degree compared with a Norwegian survey data. The main findings are that the elite's peace thinking, as shown by its operational peace profile, is centered around stability, evolutionary change, and gradualistic peace policies. Middle-range or regionalistic policies are preferred to long-range (globalistic) and short-range (extra-national or individual) tough policies to soft (or idealistic) ones. The so-called projected hypothesis derived from the center-periphery theory is given substantial backing, and it is established--although with some important modifications--that the elite may be seen as a ultra-center of society. (Abstract supplied)

16


Lectures delivered in 1956 during the inaugural year of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, as its first major effort at public service. "11 graphical references included in "Notes" (p. 198-206).


Explores "the ways in which both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on other governments' foreign policy decisions." Specialized in psychology, sociology, anthropology, public opinion, and communications discuss the application of their disciplines to the "public" diplomacy. While the experts sometimes present conflicting views of the world situation, they all apparently agreed that closer collaboration between students of human behavior and professional diplomats would greatly improve international understanding.

17


Articles on the theory and practice of intervention. Rosenau proposes an operational definition of intervention that stresses its "convention breaking" and "authority oriented" characteristics. Young suggests that intervention can be defined only in relation to specific historical contexts. Zartman recognizes that interventions are a major feature of modern international politics but believes that through system changes their frequency can be reduced. On evidence drawn from African and Arab politics, Zartman argues that intervention is "an inherent adjunct of nation-building, regionalism, and revolution" and points out that normative and analytic theories based on Western experience are inapplicable in underdeveloped regions. Belfer predicts that the United States will have to continue to intervene in the affairs of other states and calls upon it to abandon "the rhetoric of Wilsonian idealism" in order to construct "realistic" intervention theory. Scott recommends that a legal code to govern interventions be drafted, based on the principle that intervention is often legitimate but ought to take place under international constraints. Wriggins warns of the subtlety of the problems encountered in the use of economic and military assistance to influence other states, while Yarmolinsky suggests two ways to improve the rationality of decisions relating to inter-
ventures. Kahan calls upon the United States to reassess its global security interests as preparation for the formulation of a more realistic intervention policy in Asia. The book reviews are critiques of recently published studies of subjects relevant to specific problems of intervention theory and policy.


Projections for the international political system in the last third of the 20th century. The authors have constructed a "standard" or "surprise-free" world for the year 2000 by extrapolating current trends in international politics. They assume that the world today is in a situation much like that of Europe in 1815—at the end of a long period of violence and disruption and at the beginning of a long period of relative peace and security. This assumption rests on two others: that the détente between East and West is permanent, and that the arms race will continue but reach a point of instability. Within this general framework, the authors discuss in greater detail the political prospects for China, the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, Afro-Asia, and Latin America. They also discuss the problem of nuclear proliferation, speculating that Japan probably will become the sixth nuclear power and that by the 1990's there may be as many 50 others. Although the arguments against nuclear proliferation are not decisive, the present statesman must assume that the harmful consequences are likely to outweigh the beneficial ones.


Bibliographical notes.

Contents, --Introduction, by Daniel Bell. --Change and continuity. --Comments on science and technology. --Some "surprise-free" economic projections. --A quantitative scenario. --Postindustrial society in the society in the standard world. --International politics in the standard world. --Some canonical variations from the standard world. --Some possibilities for nuclear wars. --Other twenty-first-century nightmares. --The international system in the very long run. --Policy research and social change.

Speculations on the course of world history in the last third of the 20th century. The authors believe that systematic speculation of this type can assist the policymaker to reach decisions that will make the desirable future, if not unduly, at least less unlikely, while at the same time putting him in a position to deal with whatever contingencies actually arise with maximum flexibility. The intent of the present work is prophetic and heuristic rather than apodictic; it is meant to serve as a broad framework for further, more detailed studies of specific problems. In their concluding remarks, the authors assert that "man's increasing Faustian power over nature (including man) poses the central predicament of the modern age. Man has gained enormous power over the forces of nature, but this power has itself become a natural force that threatens to destroy humanity. The Faustian urge to overpower the environment, or even human beings when they stand in the way of progress, ought to be moderated, and institutions that protect freedom of choice and dissent ought to be preserved.


References from the past few years and the word "convergence" has become commonplace in the political writings of Western economists, sociologists, "politiclists," and "socialists" to denote the mutual assimilation of the capitalist and socialist systems and the increasingly similar development trends of the two. The convergence theory is based on the face of contemporary reality, which implies that the competitive polarization between the "forces of socialism, peace, and democracy" on one hand, and those of reaction, imperialism, and war on the other. The hostility of all its proponents to socialist ideology—the "scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism"—belies the central message of assimilation behind the "two systems" theory. The theory was clearly devised to obviate the historic commutation of capitalism by socialism when all other anti-Communist means have failed. Its advocates fail to realize that the Socialist revolution spreading throughout the world engenders "not from outside influences such as wars or the 'export of revolution' but from growing contradictions within capitalist society itself." Convergence theorists believe in the alleged ideological decolonization of the systems as a means to eliminate wars and dissolve the Socialist society, but they consider limited wars, such as in Vietnam, compatible with peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism. This theory is a part of the global strategy of world imperialism. It may find some support among nominal Marxists, but none among the true ones.


Lauds books published by the East German foreign relations institute (Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der Deutschen Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaften Walter Ulbricht) (Potsdam - Babelsberg: Herbert Krüger, German Borders and European Security. Klaus Bolliger and Hans Marettaki's USA Global Strategy in Europe; Renate Winneke, Dietelmann Weidemann, and Horst Westphal's Foreign Policy of Afro-Asian States; Harry Wunschke's The United Nations; and Gerhard Reinast's Cosmic Law.


Partial contents, --pt. 1. Analysis and commentary on the USA Western European data collection: The USA surveys' tools for policy and analysis, by Richard L. Merritt. International images and USA research, by Leo P. Crespi. --pt. 2. The USA West-
Introduces to the research community data gathered during the U.S. Information Agency's International Public Opinion Survey and demonstrates the usefulness of these data both to governmental analysts and social scientists. In part I the authors have used USAI survey data; therefore the articles, which are concerned with various aspects of international affairs, demonstrate both the relevance of international survey research and techniques for data processing and analysis. Part 2 includes, in tabular form, a categorized inventory of questions asked in France, West Germany, Italy, and Greece. It is hoped that these data will contribute to an understanding of the processes involved in international politics.

23
JX3391.07. 1968
Bibliography: p. 493-509.


Argues that an approach to world politics requires a framework for organizing data. The overall patterns of modern world politics result from sharp differences in modernization -social, economic, and political- among and within nations. The shift in distribution of world power among states caused by this differential modernization is an underlying cause of war and conflict.

24
APLMB, v. 16
Translated from Die Zedt, Hamburg.

Western Europe's policy of pursuing détente with both Russia and the East European countries contains an inherent contradiction. If the West maintains closer ties with the satellite nations, they become independent, and the Soviet Empire in East Europe is threatened, and Russia is alienated. Thus, closer ties with Russia can be maintained only if détente is not pursued in this area. Regardless, West Europeans should cultivate closer relationships with the satellite nations and understand that détente is impossible as long as the hard-line Russian Communists are in power. Further, the West should not underestimate the ideological elements of Russian policy and should realize that developments within Russia-growing alienation between the people and the party-are responsible for the Soviet leaders' refusal to allow liberalization in Eastern Europe.

25
JX1901. J6. v. 12
References: p. 300-301.

Two major theoretical perspectives are evident both in the small group literature on n-person coalitions and in traditional international politics literature. One stresses relative power, as in balance-of-power theories and in the site principle. The other emphasizes cultural, political, or economic bonds. This paper shows how these strands may be brought together, and considers barriers to testing the theory. Episodic games, deterrence situations, situations of imperfect information or high uncertainty, where the costs of gaining the decision are high or where bargaining costs are high, will mitigate against successful prediction from the theory. Measurement problems include gauging national power on an interval scale, the effects of distance on power, and the degree to which the power of an alliance can be indexed by the sum of its components' power. Permutations of power may vary from the objective measures scholars devise. The difference between peacetime and wartime alliances, and between zero-sum and non-zero-sum situations, must also be examined. (Abstract supplied)

26
APLMB, v. 16
Translated from L'Express, Paris, Newsp.

While the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia "has a pale thing" in comparison with nuclear war, world catastrophe will not necessarily be avoided by ignoring this crisis. If Soviet leaders are capable of miscalculating in the current military intervention, they may miscalculate in future decisions that upset the atomic status quo-an equilibrium possibly just as precarious as the Brasilia agreements. The serious consequences of the Soviet actions are that U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations may be crucially altered, and Soviet foreign policy and foundations of the nation's security have been placed in a frightful ligi. The invasion, which represents a return to the past, has affected countless structures, e.g., the possible modus vivendi between the two Germanies. The deeper connection between such seemingly unrelated political milestones as the development of the American presidential elections, the troubling effects of the Human Rights organization, the May explosion and June panic in France, and the aggression against Prague lies in a return to the past through fear of what the future holds-a retreat to the old order. This indicates that the world "no longer knows what to move toward, or where to look for hope." The return to Stalinism is "the culminating point of a year rich in disillusionment and regression."

27
DJD261. D4. v. 20
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT


Bressers' meeting's praise of the Soviet Communist Party's "leading role" in the international Communist movement. Honecker notes the prevailing opinion at the meeting that the common policy of all Communist parties, based on fundamental Communist goals, takes precedence over their particular policies, dictated by local or national considerations. By their one-sided appeals for what they consider "equal rights, autonomy, sovereignty, and independence," some delegations displayed a tendency to yield to the pressures of bourgeois ideology. This can only harm proletarian internationalism.

20


In waging the cold war against the free world the Communists have adopted the strategy of indirect approach, an age-old policy that enables a smaller power to weaken a stronger one by attacking only the most vulnerable points: of the latter. It is the strategy of revolutionaries and is particularly suited to totalitarian regimes since it is based on secrecy and deception. Although Americans should not "look for a Communist under every bed," they must remain vigilant against the penetration tactics of the Communists and recognize the vulnerabilities within the democratic system. Totalitarianism has no place for ethics and lulls advantage of the openness of a free society by encouraging the alienation of significant social groups. Despite the Communists' failure to divide and undermine American society, there is no reason to believe that they will not patiently continue directing their cold war arsenal---"insurgency, warfare, proxy, penetration, espionage, subversion, sabotage, blackmail, assassination, and open and hidden propaganda"---against the United States.

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Violence is a dominant theme in human history, and Konrad Lorenz has advanced the hypothesis that its source is instinctual aggression. At present there is no way of confirming this hypothesis directly, Lorenz' evidence is indirect and in the form of conjectures about the instinctual endowment that early man would have required in order to survive. These conjectures are plausible enough, but in the last analysis the concept "aggression" is too imprecise a term to be useful for either ethical or biological explanation. Imprecision leads to confusion of ethical and culturally variable concepts with biological and genetically coherent ones, which in turn vitiates Lorenz' treatment of the relationship of aggression to culture. He has overlooked the possibility that problematic violence is in a large degree "not internal to individuals but has been externalized in institutions" or that it may be reactive and historically or culturally conditioned. He has ignored man's capacity to choose between psychologically indifferent means, including violence, and failed to consider man's ethical situation in nonethical communities such as the army. These considerations would seem to undermine any thesis that war is a result of individual aggressiveness or that the answer to war is individual or social psychotherapy. What man must learn is how to cope with the products of civilization, not his animal instincts. Lorenz has neglected another aspect of man's nature: the impulse to create. This creative "instinct" bears looking into, for destructiveness is not impossible to overcome except by a more powerful principle, and it is no longer believable that Reason is that principle.

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References: p. 330-331.

The paper examines the bearings on international relations theory of opposed-systems designs: systems analyses done to aid decision-makers in national and international organizations in choosing policies on arms and arms control. Such studies concern the choice of complex ends---and means to accomplish ends---that stand a good chance of being at least partially opposed by some governments. Like systems engineering, opposed-systems design has a large and important technological component. While operational research deals with specified equipments and organizations in the face of opposition similarly constrained, opposed-systems design considers alternative objectives, long-time perspectives, a wider variety of technical and organizational means, more varied environments, and more uncertainties. The paper describes the relation of the theoretical models used in opposed-systems design to various traditional and behavioral or quantitative theories of international relations: theories of foreign policy decision, theories of the balance of power, etc. Connections and contrasts are displayed in particular by reference to an extended example of the effects of distance on "power." (Abstract supplied)
B. FOREIGN POLICIES

Regard the recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an event fraught with long-range consequences for international, especially inter bloc, relations. Augstein considers the political behavior Janos-faced--toward both peaceful evolution and violence. Since the Soviet Union is already saturated with conquests, Western foreign policies should appeal to the former Soviet trait. The German Federal Republic and NATO should therefore de-emphasize their military postures vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.


Dr. Barzel shows that it is impossible to meet simultaneously the demand made so often, that the Oder-Neisse line be recognized as Poland's Western boundary and that the "GDR" be recognized as a sovereign state. A sovereign state cannot determine the boundary between another sovereign state and a third party. In all of the Allied power agreements--with full accord of the Soviet Union--it was agreed that Germany continues to exist within the boundaries of 1937 and that the final determination of the western border awaits the policy conference. Barzel believes Bonn's silence on the question of the expellees whose claims to ancestral homelands remains. He feels, however, that a policy renouncing force must lead to a peaceful order in Europe. Thirteen million human beings who lost their homes through no fault of their own have chosen, within the Federal Republic, not to follow the path of extremism, revenge and hatred but are destitute of reconciliation with the Poles in a new Europe which honors human rights and respects among nations. (Supplied summary, modified)


CASTRO'S interest in exporting the Communist revolution to the Latin American Continent stems from the need which he has felt since the famous 1962 missile crisis--for solid economic support for his regime independent of the Soviet Union. He has high hopes that the success of the Communist revolution, especially in oil-rich Venezuela, may free him from Soviet bondage. The Soviet Union, which conducts a true world-power policy, considers the time not yet ripe for achieving its ultimate goal in Latin America. It concentrates therefore on intermediate objectives--winning the cooperation of existing Latin American governments and the gradual elimination of American influence there. Moscow realistically considers Latin America the most difficult region with which its foreign policy must cope in the Third World.


[Supplied summary, modified]. The foreign policy of the West German coalition government, as reported to the news of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and how the Government's official stand on the crisis was finally formulated. The coalition partners agreed to continue the West German defense policy toward the East, although for the time being on a "pilot-light" basis only: to postpone signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, because of doubt about the Soviet signatory's good faith; "to increase the defense budget by a hundred million German marks"; and "to put aside all plans for reduction of armed forces in Central Europe."


I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Discusses the effect of the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Germany on the formation of new political groups and the consequences for the future of Germany.

The first hundred days (June-July 1967). -- A bigger East European Community yields bigger results. -- Common interests with Great Britain. -- Koestler's death. -- The Oder-Neisse boundary. -- For non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. -- The war in the Near East concerns all. -- Scandinavia and Europe. -- For a regulated coincidence. -- For assistance in the Near East. -- A second wind for détente policy. -- German foreign policy after two World Wars. -- Partnership in Latin America. -- Improvement and expansion of the European Economic Community. -- The first year. -- International relations on a community level. -- For peace in the Near East. -- Words on a day of national mourning. -- Not to please an unnatural master. -- The responsibility of the Germans for Europe. -- Bibliography. -- Index.

Chronologically arranged texts of the West German Foreign Minister's public pronouncements from December 1, 1966, to November 30, 1967. Brandt expounds on the need for peace in Europe, based not on the balance of terror but on East-West cooperation that in the long run would neither preclude nor impede solution of the German problem. The German Federal Republic supports all provisions of the draft nonproliferation treaty aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. It declines, however, to accept provisions that would hinder peaceful utilization of nuclear energy by non-nuclear nations.

38 Breznev, Dr. CONSOLIDATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Review of international affairs. v. 19, June 20, 1968: 8-10.

Yugoslavia has been in favor of the progressive effort in Czechoslovakia from the beginning and welcomes the announcement of the May plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party that the change in Czechoslovak society and socialism has been completed. The change was made possible mainly through the support of the working class. But some top-ranking officials of the Socialist countries unfortunately cannot recognize that the change was a reflection of a profound internal need of the Czechoslovak people and regard it as an imperialist offensive. They do not understand that this mistrust in the West is based on anxiety in the face of the fact that these people exert, the resulting encouragement of the conservatives, and the false rumors they spread violate the principle of equality of intervening powers, reactions among Asian countries. He recommends that the United States not engulf the Asian problem so that it becomes an American one, but that it allow Asians to choose their own life while giving them the assistance and protection they need.


Compilation of declarations of Czechoslovakia and the intervening powers, reactions of countries throughout the world, and decisions of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Government during the period August 20-31, 1968, with a brief summary of Czechoslovak history since 1919.


Discusses the effect of the occupation of Czechoslovakia on the foreign policy and political thought of West Germany. The occupation shattered the West German Ostpolitik of 1963, which assumed that friendly relations with the East European countries could be established. This policy was based on an erroneous interpretation of the Soviet principle of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. The West German politicians overlooked the repeated Soviet
DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: REPORTS AND COMMENTS.

10-12.

Novost Review of a group of world concerned territorial and the intelligence services and the government's concern for a place in the United Nations. China's territorial integrity (Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu), and trade without discrimination. However, China still claims hegemony over the Socialist world and leadership of the international working class movement. Therefore the change in China's foreign policy will be slow. The fundamental characteristic of the process underway in Asia is the struggle for war against pressure and interference and for complete and genuine independence in foreign policy matters. They want to cooperate with the outer world in accordance with their own national interests, if China continues to behave exclusively and denies the principle of equality in relations with other countries it will face serious loss of prestige in Africa and complete isolation, from which China itself will suffer most.

46 [FAITHFULNESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL DUTY]

The defense of Czechoslovakia is not an internal affair of the country but a concern of all socialist countries and a problem regarding the defense of socialism. Socialism and communism are essentially international. National problems can be solved only with regard to the common interests of the socialist countries and in cooperation with all branches of the international Communist movement. Every country, according to Lenin, must assume a preponderant class position and not imbibe in 'neutralism' if fundamental problems of socialism are at stake. As the situation in Czechoslovakia endangered the solidarity and security of the Communist bloc, there would have undermined the Warsaw Pact. everyone who understands the interest of socialism must act to the country's advantage, and the new facts of China's Socialist countries imper-
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

and governmental structure of the Socialist states, their Marxist-Leninist principles, faithfulness to the Communist ideals, and international solidarity. It represents a strong wall against subversion and is therefore strongly attacked by the enemies of the Communist bloc, of which Czechoslovakia is a member.

Translated from Pravda or Izvestia, from Aug. 21 to 26, 1968.

Complete or condensed texts of official statements, appeals to the Czechoslovak people, and Soviet press reports on the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact armies. Includes full text of the article "Defense of Socialism is the Highest International Duty," the first official justification of the invasion, published in Pravda on Aug. 22, 1968.

A case study by Dr. No's book reveals several analogies between Great Britain's and Norway's foreign policies since Britain has become a "middle power." Both countries must reconcile their international obligations with their national security in order to maintain their neutrality.

Chronicles Switzerland's relations with the League of Nations and the United Nations and defends its neutral policy. Freymond believes the Federal Government should intensify its contacts with U.S. agencies and vigorously inform the Swiss people regarding U.S. activities. He concludes that Switzerland must maintain its neutral status so that it can continue to serve the world through such organizations as the International Red Cross.

Stresses the need for willpower, foresight, and innovation to meet the dangers to U.S. security in the next decade. Harrigan calls for creativeness in developing new weapons and military doctrines, in relating political and military means to one another and to the ends of security, and in encouraging public support for foreign policy. He warns against those who mistakenly believe that the United States can safely retreat from its global responsibilities or who advocate defeatist foreign policies and affirm the reasonableness and moral legitimacy of the current U.S. role in world affairs.

The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations has become a Japanese national issue, with the Liberal Democratic Party openly pushing for improvement. While maintaining diplomatic relations with Nationalist China, Japan has recognized the need to continue private trade relations with Communist China. Despite political obstacles, the trade has expanded because of Japan's value to China in speeding up economic development and to Japan in meeting the needs of rapid economic growth. In forming its future diplomatic policy, Japan cannot afford to ignore the trade because of its importance for future economic expansion. Fortunately, a stabilization of relations is preventing external elements—mainly the U.S. policy which forced Japan to conclude a peace treaty with Nationalist China and aid in the American military and diplomatic containment of China. It is hoped that during the Vietnamese negotiations the United States will reexamine its China policy, because an overemphasis of the Chinese threat may cause a revival of Japanese militarism.

American's Vietnam dilemma indicates that new policies must be considered for meeting future revolutionary upheavals. Alternative policies could be the withdrawal of all contacts with the underdeveloped world or neutrality toward the revolutionary movements. Neutrality, the most constructive concept, calls for halting military aid to reactionary regimes, stopping covert revolutionary activity, accepting revolutionary nationalisms as the most suitable order for guiding many developing nations through internal states of change, and continuing humanitarian programs of food, medical aid, and nonmilitary assistance. In adopting a neutral policy the United States will be accused of aiding international aggression.
movement that threatens to engulf the country and of condoning evil for expediency's sake by its acquiescence to the rise of Communist regimes. But the alternative policy of engaging in military actions abroad can bleed America white, and the rise of many nationalistic revolutionary states will probably result in inter-state warfare among themselves rather than military action against the United States. Further, although communism has perpetrated evil, if one "cannot and should not seek to minimize the weight on that side of the scale of human suffering, one should also have the courage to strive whatever weights belong to the other side." America must make the effort to adopt a neutral policy if the Nation will ultimately stand for German revanchists consider the recognition of East Germany white, and the rise of many nationalistic, open-mindedness, and self-reliance. German statehood a surrender. They do not want a neutral policy if the Nation will. Ultimately stand for German revanchists consider the recognition of East Germany white, and the rise of many nationalistic, open-mindedness, and self-reliance. German statehood a surrender. They do not want a neutral policy if the Nation will. Ultimately stand for German revanchists consider the recognition of East Germany white, and the rise of many nationalistic, open-mindedness, and self-reliance. German statehood a surrender. They do not want a neutral policy if the Nation will.

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The events in Czechoslovakia, a relatively small European country, it would seem, prompted an unbelievable reaction in the whole world. This reaction resulted from the evaluation of the events by the bourgeois leaders, press, and some members of the "progressive circles" as fitting into the scheme of inter-state conflicts customary for capitalist countries—hence the scream about intervention, violation of the rules on relations between large and small states, sphere of influence, etc. Actually, if considered from the Communist viewpoint, the events are not a clash of interests of great and small powers, but a struggle between two social systems displayed within one state. In such a case, according to Lenin, the formal features of events cannot be placed above their content. Thus it is correct to underline imperialist pressures and protect socialist states from being undermined by the imperialists. The imperialist propaganda quite artfully disguises the formal aspects of the bourgeois international law and only temporarily impress some representatives of the progressive circles. But these people will soon realize that the intentions of the West to dispossess Socialists to the point where pressures must be taken for the sake of the future of the Socialist world and the entire world as well. The repercussions of the entry of Soviet armies into Czechoslovakia prove that the main thrust of the imperialist camp has been beaten by the sagacious policies of the Socialist countries. The map of Europe would have been changed in the imperialist favor had there been any other Case than Czechoslovakia, which has a great strategic value, from the Socialist countries.
Indian uncooperativeness, the United States had no choice but to make Pakistan the keystone of the containment policy in southern Asia. However, after a period of fruitful cooperation in the late 1950's, the Kennedy administration— with the support of a powerful India lobby of American intellectuals— turned back to the older "India first" policy. Since Pakistan's primary aim in cooperating with the United States was to get support for a favorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, this new favoritism toward India was bound to have negative consequences for U.S.-Pakistan relations. U.S. aid to India during its confrontation with China in 1962 left the impression that the United States intended to make India the dominant power in southern Asia. But the decisive blow was struck when postponement of the Aid-to-Pakistan consortium in 1965 convinced Ayub Khan that the U.S. would never support a just settlement for Kashmir. Already in 1962 the Pakistanis had begun their rapprochement with China. With its anti-Communist commitments and the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan faced the hostility of the three largest nations in the world and in exchange for this exposure seemed to get nothing from the United States— certainly an intolerable situation. Termination of U.S. military aid to India and Pakistan in 1965 was wise, but in the future economic aid should be predicated on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with United Nations resolutions on self-determination. This, plus a joint guarantee of the frontiers of the two states, might succeed in reducing their military burdens to more reasonable levels.


This study is an attitudinal analysis of five Soviet elites—the central Party apparatchik, and four specialist elites: the central economic bureaucrats, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By content analyzing representative elite journals for the years from 1952 through 1965 data were collected to measure the development of gruppovshchina (groupism) since Stalin. The data suggest: (1) the specialist elites increasingly manifest a sense of group self-consciousness and ascribed group status, and (2) over time the specialist elites develop a distinct set of policy orientations which differentiates them from the Party apparatchiki, and challenges the dominance of the apparatchiki in the Soviet political system. (Supplied summary.)


Second article in a section entitled "The Czech Crisis..."

Russia may use force to prevent a pro-Czechoslovak Rumanian-Yugoslav entente, in light of Ceausescu's and Tito's reactions to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito has affirmed that Yugoslavia will defend its freedom—no matter where the danger comes from, while the Rumanian leader has announced that an invasion of his country would be considered an act of war. Bucharest took a dangerously uncompromising stand over the invasion, but it had little choice: had Romania not reaffirmed the inalienable right of Communist parties to decide their own internal course and had it not asserted the principle of equality and noninterference in domestic affairs, it "would have found itself back under the Russian thumb like Poland after 1956."

Rumania has severed its last remaining ties with the Warsaw Pact and Comecon because of its stand against Russia— this it did even without being occupied by "fraternal forces." However, these reactions indicate only part of the price Russia will have to pay for its invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Mayer, Peter. COHESION AND CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM. A STUDY OF MARXIST-LENINIST CONCEPTS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. 256 p. HX44, M335


An investigation of the historical and ideological sources of Communist discord, Mayer describes the theoretical foundations of the Soviet approach to Communist unity as these were laid down in the Stalin-Trotskii dispute over socialism in one country and then traces the application of this theory in Soviet relations with foreign Communist parties, China, and Eastern Europe. While the central theoretical concept of Marxism-Leninism is "proletarian internationalism," Soviet practice has always rested squarely on the policy of building socialism within the framework of the nation-state. With the appearance of an alternative center of national power in China, a split in the international movement was inevitable, not because the Soviet and Chinese parties each adopted policies designed to "maximize national points of strength, and minimize those which led toward weakness," but because of "the almost pathological Soviet inability to know where to draw the line regarding insistence on the implementation of their own policy wishes and priorities." These matters raise the perennial question of the role of theory in Soviet policy. The specific historical form of the question is, "What happens when the partisans of a "single-strand determinist conception of human history" are brought face to face with diversity?" Mayer suggests that the role of theory may be crucial; in decisive respects the bitter schisms that now plague the Communist movement are the outcome of a social philosophy which leaves no room for pluralism.

Mayhew, Christopher P. BRITAIN'S ROLE TOMORROW. London, Hutchinson [1967], 192 p. map. UA647, M454


Argues for Britain to withdraw East of Suez and offers a program that would assure Great Britain an
honorable place in future world politics. Mayhew contends that Britain’s East of Suez policy is anarchist, counterproductive, too expensive, and its economic and political consequences are a serious hindrance to what should be Britain’s role in Europe. The author proposes a 3-stage program that envisons Franco-British nuclear cooperation, German reunification, a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and arms inspection and control. He concludes that the program is ambitious but not impossible or irrational.


The Western world still cannot reconcile itself to the fact that a Socialist and a capitalist Europe is today a political reality, and it tries to draw the cold war line between East and West European countries. George Ball, U.S. Undersecretary of State and representative to the United Nations, described the U.S. strategy in his book The Disciplines of Power and in an interview with a correspondent of the French magazine Réalités. He maintains that Western Europe, united as a confederation of states, will gradually draw the East European countries from the Socialist community one by one. This concept clearly ignores the creation of European collective security and the Soviet principle of coexistence between countries with different social systems. The Soviet Union supports a pan-European system of collective security, European cooperation, and the development of mutually beneficial relations between the capital- ist and the Socialist Europe. These ideas agreed upon at the Brasilia meeting are the support of many people in capitalist Europe who are sick of the presence of American soldiers on the soil of their countries, and they represent a constructive program for peace and security in Europe. The Socialist countries agreed at Brasilia to pursue a common European policy, rebuild anu attempts to revive the results of the Second World War and the existing frontiers in Europe, insist on the inviolability of the Munich agreement, and support East Germany and all forces fighting for democracy and progress. The fight for European cooperation is inseparable from the fight against imperialist attempts, open or covert, to exploit the unresolved issues in East European countries. The conference recommended the conclusion of a general European peace congress where the European peoples could make their voices heard, for in the future wars there is a real chance to influence their destinies and governments.


Translated from Pravda (Leningrad) from Aug 22, 1968

Soviet Report: The invasion of Morocco is the final act in a series of actions--the secret UN resolution--the United States' agreement to allow the French to evacuate the French garrison in the Sahara--the invasion of Chad--the Arab states' support for the invasion.

Fuller and oftener tests of Soviet reports on the events following the invasion of Chad's Sahara, the recent Turkish invasion, and the recent Israeli attack on the Egyptian population, and interpretations of the causes of the invasion.


RXX, F4, v. 23

Argues with the Zhigmow Brzezinski article published in the January 1968 issue of Foreign Affairs and reprinted in the May 29, 1968, issue of the West German Deutscher Tag. The author notes that America’s role in the technological Zeitgeist (America in the Technological Age). Brzezinski’s forecast that the world will become divided into two superpower blocs is as reactionary and misleading as some of Mao Tse-tung’s ideas and as Ian Plache’s thesis of “The world is one in its technological development, divided into two superpower blocs” is misleading. The author concludes that it is not a superpower bloc that is the most powerful force in the world but the most powerful force in the world is the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents. Brzezinski’s idea of “the national interest” is the opposite of the United Nations, which consists of all the other continents.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT


Complete or continuos extracts of a large parts of articles from Soviet newspapers on the foreign press in Czechoslovakia after a visit to the Warsaw Pact armies.

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Traces India's relations with the Indochinese states and analyzes Sino-Indian relations in respect to Southeast Asia, a region of interest to both countries. The major force behind India's post-war foreign policy was Nehru, whose imprint of views was evident on every aspect of government life but none so exclusively as foreign affairs. Sekhar believes India's postwar foreign policy to be realistic and realistic that it disturbs the relationship between China's support of North Vietnam and the Chinese behavior in the Himalayas.


Analyzes China's policies, intentions, and capabilities in relation to other Asian powers, especially India, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and assesses its intentions and capabilities from a political, geographical, historical, economic, and industrial perspective. Sekhar concludes that China is firmly resolved to achieve a dominant position in Asia and has embarked on a great world power, but it rules all the possibilities of a Chinese military invasion of India both in the medium and long term. Condemn of the growing tension between China and Pakistan will not help India and Indian attitudes. Sekhar advocates political and economic cooperation with our Asian neighbors, weakened in military preparations.


Analyzes Southeast Asia relative to Pakistan's foreign policy. ANWAR, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, says the development of the United States is the key to understanding the relations between Pakistan and Southeast Asia. ANWAR believes the presence of the Soviet Union in the region is a cause for concern in the United States. This book analyzes the American approach toward Asia and the region, their foreign policy, and their influence in the region, and how they have supported, and continue to support, the interests of the United States.
States and cultivate relations with the Soviet Union, while deepening its influence in Southeast Asia. Through emphasizing their Islamic bond and developing trade arrangements, Pakistani diplomats are attempting to woo their Eastern neighbors, although not as ardently as many East Pakistanis desire.


Explains the origins and motives of India's nonalignment policy and describes its fluctuations from 1947 until the present. The policy, defined and conducted by India's leaders, has largely reflected popular sentiment and has been supported by the Communist Party of India, which takes exception to the Government's bourgeois views on international affairs.


Suspects Bonn of plans to achieve hegemony over Western Europe, which would endanger the peace in Europe. Schwa. considers the new West German efforts for West European integration in noneconomic areas a means toward that goal.


Address by Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the U.N. General Assembly, stating Canada's position in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, apartheid, the population explosion, and the relation between these problems and the U.N. Sharp believes the U.S. will never become an effective peacemaker, until it reflects the world as it is and represents all the nations of the world, especially Communist China, which plays an important part in the international community. Canada is exploring the possibilities of entering into diplomatic relations with Communist China because such a large country must not remain shut off from the rest of the world and unrepresented at the U.N.


Traces the origin and progress of the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia, pointing out that it owes its existence to a delicate balance between conservative, centrist, and liberal forces within the Communist Party, and calls attention to a number of serious tests ahead for the regime in domestic and foreign policy. Czechoslovak policy toward the U.S.S.R. is currently one of "loyal independence," and there is an underlying Slovak opinion as well as strong sentiment favoring a more radical alteration of foreign policy. Bearing a major internal crisis in Czechoslovakia itself, the current bloc is unlikely to intervene directly, but other, nonviolent "economic and psychological" can be expected. It is possible that Czechoslovakia will go the way of Romania or even Yugoslavia, or that it will make a complete break with the Communist camp.


Points out the dilemmas of South Africa's foreign policy in supporting the existing regimes of its neighboring countries. The nation's security requires stable regimes of its neighbors, which in turn calls for increased economic cooperation by South Africa. This could cause South Africa to intervene in the internal strife of these countries and thus escalate conflicts there, which might adversely affect the nation's security. For the time being the Organization of African Unity has proved its impotence to seriously threaten South Africa's position in the world.


Rejects recent arguments purporting to show that Japan is about to embark on a radically new and more assertive foreign policy, probably of a rightwing, nationalist type. Stockwin argues that Japanese policymaking is subject to strong domestic political constraints and consequently there is likely to be a "great deal of movement, but little real progress" in Japanese foreign policy." He describes how these restraints--sharp political divisions between the parties and within the electorate, factionalism in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), and a tendency of the LDP leadership to subordinate politics to economics--prevent radical new departures in policy on the crucial issues of the nonproliferation treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Okinawa, and relations with China. Although some changes are inevitable, Japanese Governments are likely to avoid fundamental revisions of political or military policy for some time to come.


Using as his title and point of departure the motto of Thomas M. P. V. M. N., first president of Czechoslovakia, who said "The Truth Shall Win," the author "interprets the tragedy of the second Republic, the CSSR, which added a second "S" to its name for "Socialist." He analyzes the reasons for the brutal Soviet attack on its brother state in the Warsaw Pact. They are mainly reasons of a geopolitical-strategic nature, but also the fear that Slovak aspirations towards self-determination could spread to Ukraine in the Soviet Union, plus anxiety that with developments in the CSSR the stability of the Ulbricht and Gomulka regimes could become questionable. This event points up the fact that a new third bloc has formed alongside the Communist bloc of the Soviet Union, and that of Red China. For the western world it contains the warning, once and for all, that Communism is no joking matter, that we must face
Shall Win. (Supplied cooperation the old slogan can be fulfillod--The Truth
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April, 1968: 351-358.

Vetter, Gottfried. [Dk. ELOPMENT OF GERMAN


U.S. strategists began recently to implement with zeal the "bridge building" policy that has become an official weapon and new tactical approach in the struggle against the world Socialist commonwealth. This policy is accompanied by a new doctrine based on a differentiated policy toward the Socialist countries, by which the West would establish the closest possible relations with the Socialists in Eastern Europe, especially those that American strategists consider "vulnerable." These countries must be given economic aid and concessions in foreign trade, and the West must try to "bridge building" techniques and an atrocious campaign of insinuations and outright lies. At present American propaganda seems to operate on two fronts, using ideological sabotage against Socialist countries on one hand, and hammering the growing influence of communism and the Communist movement on the other. This growth was best demonstrated in the Italian elections, in which the Communist Party won about a million votes. Under various pretexts and using various methods, the Americans are trying to persuade the world that communism is in a crisis and that a "decommunization of Marxism" is underway in Czechoslovakia. The idea is ridiculous and the phrase itself verbal nonsense. Furthermore, trade is being used to build bridges to Socialist countries and to "drive a wedge into the economic relations and cooperation among them." In the present situation the machinations of the imperialists must be watched with high revolutionary vigilance. In order to prevent nationalist and revisionist elements from undermining the world Communist system, the struggle against imperialist ideological sabotage and the effort to consolidate the commonwealth of Socialist countries must be given high priority.

Walther, Gebhardt von. [PECULIARITIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY] Eigenarten der sowjetischen Aus-

A slightly abbreviated version of a lecture delivered on May 9, 1966, to the members of the Deutscher Gemeinschaft fur Auswirige Politik, Bad Godesberg.

Soviet foreign policy emanates from an east-Slavic mentality und - ideas that have been long conditioned by the Communist storehouse of concepts and semantics entirely different from the standard ones. No one outside the Politburo really knows what decisionmaking process determines Soviet policy. All this accounts for a gap in understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the West that is much wider than generally supposed. The Russian nation is nonaggressive by nature; its historical experience and traditional distrust of the West explain its pathological security complex and passion for peace. But this people is unusually critical and suspicious of its own government. Hence the constant need for Soviet leaders to prove to their own people that no facet of their foreign policy endangers peace. The overriding concern of Soviet policy is to avoid uncalca-calable risks to the nation. With clearheaded realism Russian policymakers evaluate enemy and friend alike solely in terms of power. Compromise, an important element in Western political thought, is totally alien to Soviet thinking, which considers any concession a symptom of weakness, error, or lack of political talent. Russian foreign policy has traditionally combined ideological considerations with those of national interest. Ambivalence between emphasis on Communist ideology and Russian national interests sometimes reinforces, sometimes weakens one or the other. Soviet policy has always tried to keep many options open to best attain its long-range goals. The history of Soviet policy on Germany since the end of World War II demonstrates that it is the most consistent policy in the world, despite all appearances to the contrary.


 Moscow and East Berlin's long-range plan for West Berlin is to sever the city's umbilical cord with the German Federal Republic and Western powers and eventually "mow West Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. Soviet and East German propaganda has consistently considered West Berlin's ties with West Germany a violation of the Potsdam Agreement. However, the Communists do not see such a violation in East German interference in West Berlin domestic affairs, which they...
advocate on the ground that the alleged revival of
nationalism and fascism in the city threatens the German
Democratic Republic's security. Moscow's new
moves against the city, conducted through the East
German regime, are much subtler than Moscow's
overt actions of 1948-49 and 1956.

WORLD STRATEGIC PICTURE: A WIND OF CHANGE
BLOWS IN EASTERN EUROPE [by] S. G. Coanadór,
map.

An account of the events leading up to the emergence
of Alexander Dubcek as the Czechoslovak National
Party leader and a study of Russia's reaction to
Czechoslovakia's reform movement. The Soviet Union
believes the changes in Czechoslovakia will adversely
affect the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and
damage Russia's claim to world Communist leadership,
already diminished by the withdrawal from Soviet control
of Yugoslavia and Albania. Czechoslovakia also
offers economic advantages to the Soviet Union by way
of the profitable Russian war machine. The author
concludes that Russia's leaders are badly divided over
Czechoslovakia and that this division could have far-
reaching repercussions.

Yost, Charles W. WORLD ORDER AND AERICAN
RESPONSIBILITY. Foreign affairs, v. 47, Oct. 1968:
1-14.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, Americans may become
somewhat reluctant to become involved in the affairs
of other states. Yet world tension is unlikely to dimin-
ish in the foreseeable future, and as a responsible
world power the United States must do everything possi-
ble to limit international conflicts that involve the inter-
ests of the superpowers and could escalate into wider
hostilities. Unfortunately during the next decade the
United States can expect little help from its allies in
checking worldwide violence. Individual European
states are unwilling and unable to risk responsibilities
outside the Continent. Strong psychological and politi-
cal factors will most likely inhibit the Japanese Govern-
ment for many years from assuming a large role in
maintaining the security of East Asia. Ms. Jans of the
Organization of American States will be able to partici-
pate in peacekeeping activities in Latin America, but
nowhere else. Thus, for at least the next 10 years, the
Soviet Union will become the United States principal
"partner" in maintaining world order. Despite their
many unresolved differences, both powers are anxious
to avoid situations that could lead to nuclear war and
share a "mutual interest in containing any aggression by
China. Moscow of the high stakes involved, every
effort must be made to turn competition between the
superpowers into cooperation. American and Soviet
leaders should concentrate on ending the arms race and
finding solutions to the troubled situations in the Middle
East and Southeast Asia. Since there will be many situ-
ations where neither its allies nor the Russians will be
willing to cooperate in checking outbreaks of violence,
the United States will continue to be confronted with
"unilateral responsibilities, arising from previous
commitments or from continuing interests, for the
maintenance of international security." However, the
Vietnam situation has demonstrated to the United States
that it must limit its responsibilities to assisting only
those countries that are threatened by overt aggression
or by unpopular insurgency efforts. In addition to
restricting its military and economic support to only
competent and representative governments, the United
States should seek the support of North Vietnam and
Communist China in "neutralizing" Southeast Asia and
endeavor to create effective multilateral machinery to
keep the peace in the Middle East and Africa.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

The Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1967 Campaign.


Chronicles the events leading up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the stages of the war, and the postwar developments.


Although the massive destructive powers of nuclear weapons will probably continue to inhibit their usage in the 1980's, the risk of conventional warfare will by no means be eliminated. Conventional conflicts are particularly likely in the areas of the world not covered by the nuclear deterrent. However, brief confrontations that do not involve the risk of escalation could occur even within the deterrence zone. Furthermore, an alteration of the present strategic situation could substantially increase the possibility that major conventional wars could again break out among the big powers. By the 1980's, evolutionary developments should substantially improve the capabilities of conventional weapons. New materials will undoubtedly increase the durability and versatility of existing systems, and new techniques of production should greatly reduce their production costs. Advances in electronics are expected to increase the accuracy of firepower and the efficiency of tracking and interception operations. While the new techniques will offer military planners a number of options in the next 20 years, they must make their selections in a framework of uncertainty since the relative values of the new techniques can be accurately determined only on the battlefield. Conventional wars of the future will take three basic forms, depending on whether the adversaries are technologically unequal, extremely unequal, or reasonably well matched. When the opponents are technically unequal, the superior power will launch a swift attack to establish a fast attack before the machinery of escalation is set in motion. Conflict between two markedly mismatched adversaries falls under the category of guerrilla warfare. War between relatively evenly matched opponents is fortunately not very realistic. It could result only from a conjunction of grave political disagreements between two developed nations and the neutralization of nuclear deterrence. Such a war could assume the shape of a blitzkrieg or could develop into a prolonged conflict similar to the two World Wars. In the absence of a juridical process for settling disputes, nuclear sanctions must be maintained to impose limits on the conflicts that will inevitably erupt as a result of continued tension in the world.


Predicts the effect future weapons and warfare will have on mankind. Unless nations disarm, the future holds a horrifying assemblage of weapons that will be capable of killing all life on earth. A safeguards system can be established with a detection system effective enough so that no country will risk the political ignominy of being caught. And the assumption that China, the main stumbling block to disarmament, will not negotiate is foolish because it has never been tested. Then, once disarmament is achieved, there will be no reason for maintaining chemical and biological research institutions.


Guerrilla warfare is becoming the only means by which the underdeveloped countries can confront modern military forces with a good chance of success. As long as the nuclear superstate continues, guerrilla warfare will be the principal military factor of our time as underprivileged nations seek to rid themselves of corrupt governments and Great Power spheres of influence.
Despite the new weapons available to major powers, guerrilla movements will continue to flourish. The only means of defeating guerrillas is to lay waste the entire country with nuclear weapons. However, because this is an irrational political objective, the only strategy open to regular forces is to implement a combination of economic and military measures. To eliminate guerrilla warfare it is necessary to dispel the conditions that cause it. The situation in the underdeveloped countries is critical, and unless there is a fresh, concerted effort by the powerful and rich nations of East and West to help these countries, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia will undergo violent revolutions. And because they will not be permitted to take their course swiftly and without foreign intervention, long guerrilla wars will ensue.

The role of the guerrilla in insurrectionary warfare is vital to the success of any counterinsurgency strategy. In the Chinese Nationalists' military strategy, the guerrillas were used to control transportation, reduce insurgent attacks, and protect railway and communication lines. This strategy failed because the forts were too dispersed to contain insurgent penetration. But the greatest Japanese and Nationalist failures were in the political area. The Japanese might have been able to exploit their political devices more effectively had they been less medieval in their tactics, while the Nationalists' failure to pursue land reform and strengthen peasant organizations contributed in large measure to the ultimate Communist victory.

The Chinese Nationalists' military strategy was defensive; its aim was to control transportation, reduce insurgent attacks, and induce the guerrillas to attack the network of fortifications. This strategy failed because the forts were too dispersed to contain insurgent penetration. But the greatest Japanese and Nationalist failures were in the political area. The Japanese might have been able to exploit their political devices more effectively had they been less medieval in their tactics, while the Nationalists' failure to pursue land reform and strengthen peasant organizations contributed in large measure to the ultimate Communist victory.

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II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT


Examines the kinds of warfare that have threatened the peace world War II period of peace. Threats to peace have come from "the poor, dark, southern nations" where ideas of liberation, freedom, self-determination, and equality have bred a hope which makes reality unbearable. This era will be catalogued in history "as a period of rebellious outbreaks, popular upheavals and bloody rooting"- localized sub-war breeds of despair and fought in the name of economic equality.

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On the assumption that any future war will involve the use of nuclear weapons, Soviet military planners are giving considerable attention to the problem of what tactics should be used when large zones of radioactive contamination are on the line of advance of Soviet armies. The early belief that contaminated areas would have to be bypassed has given way to the view that an attack can be pressed directly through these zones. Tactical doctrine stresses the need for a rapid advance to minimize radiation exposure, and specialized items - armored reconnaissance vehicles, protective clothing, and an ideal raid on preplanned - have been developed to aid this kind of operation. Primary emphasis, however, has been on mental and physical conditioning of the individual soldier rather than on technological innovations. The Soviet military are committed to the doctrine that men, not technology, remain the decisive factor in the battlefield, and they emphasize this viewpoint in the ranks with the slogan that "a man morally committed to the truth of his cause cannot be stopped."

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Contents. - The framework of policy. - Problems and policies. - Russia, China, and the Korean War. - Peking's reactions. - June-July-August military and diplomatic stalemate. - The treaty nations across the parallel. - Peking crosses the Yalu. - Multilateral behind intervention. - In retrospect. 1

Examines the extent to which Chinese Communist policies evolved from developments surrounding the Korean War and the way in which the Korean War illuminates the question of limited war. This study offers insights into "the stability of limitations: the problem of testing their observance by the enemy, ... the question of how one side communicates to the other the conditions which might induce it to override such limitations," and the role of expectations of enemy behavior. The Korean War clearly illustrates the dangers of communication failure in a limited-war situation.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS


Stresses the versatility of air-cushion vehicles, which have been tested for their military usefulness in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Canadian park ice and Near Eastern deserts.

100 Archer, Robert D. THE SOVIET WARRIORS. Yale University Press, 1968: 398 p., illus., bibliog., TLS50, A786, v. 50

Reports Soviet achievements in the development and production of air-superiority aircraft. From the devastation they suffered in the two World Wars, the Russians learned the importance of air superiority and began concentrating on developing advanced fighter aircraft shortly after World War II. While the current force of about 3,000 air superiority and all-weather interceptors was primarily created to counter the long-range bomber threat of the early sixties, the Russians also recognize its importance in garnering world prestige and its usefulness in local as well as global military operations. Thus, unlike other major powers, the Soviet Union persists in enhancing its fighter capability. It is certain that the NATO powers do not respond to the Soviet challenge by developing comparable aircraft. The consequences for the West could be disastrous.


A detailed examination of the structure and component parts of an atom and their function in a nuclear explosion. Included is a discussion on fusion and fission bombs. Brown concludes that the increase in yield per unit from the moderate size fission bomb to the larger of the hydrogen bomb is not as great as might be expected because half of the total energy in standard hydrogen bombs is provided not via the fusion route but via the fission one.


Bibliography p. 217-2;
The Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) has advantages: It reduces the effectiveness of U.S. area-defense ICBM early-warning radar systems, possesses greater speed than the ICBM, and has the ability to "dump its lethal load on targets anywhere below its flight path." But Pentagon officials feel that its advantages are outweighed by its disadvantages: less accuracy and payload, greater building and maintenance costs, and greater problems of command and control than ICBM’s. Because of these deficiencies in the FOBS, the United States decided to reject building an orbiting nuclear weapons system. In trying to decide why the Russians want a FOBS, the Pentagon concludes that the “bombs would probably be used against U.S. Strategic Air Command bases and 'soft' prime military targets as part of a massive nuclear assault" on the United States. But another possible reason is the Chinese threat. The only U.S. defense against the FOBS is deterrence, but a recent development—an "over-the-horizon" radar system—will provide approximately a 15-minute warning against attack. U.S. officials do not feel that the creation of an orbital bombardment system destroys the nuclear balance, but it does add more fuel to the nuclear arms race.

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UFO C155 1968

Traces the history of chemical weapons and discloses the underlying trends in their development. Although chemical warfare existed centuries ago, it was not practiced on a large scale until World War II when delivery systems had progressed sufficiently to harm large numbers of the enemy. During World War II gas warfare was limited to incendiaries, but research on all types of chemical weapons continued at an increasingly rapid rate during and after the war. Among the currently available chemical weapons are incendiaries made of phosphorus and oxidizable metal powders: napalm: tear and nausea gases, which generally cause no permanent damage: blister gases, which induce violent reactions and could lead to death or permanent disability: defoliants: and the lethal blood, choking, and nerve gases. Besides the toxic agents, chemical arsenals include a variety of psychic poisons that can cause mental delusions and even permanent madness. In the absence of effective international controls the already awesome destructive potential of chemical weapons could grow even greater. Since chemical weapons are generally an outgrowth of constructive civilian scientific breakthroughs, it appears that the world is faced with the decision to either eliminate science or eliminate war.

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Varied programs and studies, both military and civil, have developed variety systems and display systems that may realize the operational potentials of VSTOL aircraft. One of the more promising systems is the SAILS (Instrument and Automatic Systems LANDING System) for VSTOL Aircraft. The system’s advantages are for military operation and close with a review of the possibilities of SAILS in the civil sector. (Abstract supplied.)

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Surveys the offensive potential of biological weapons and the defensive problems they will create. Biological warfare is the production and dissemination of biological agents that have substantially increased the possibility of using them to harm the enemy without damaging one’s own forces. However, despite the strategic advantages, biological weapons have not yet been utilized on a large scale because of ethical restraints, improved technical problems in their deployment, lack of knowledge of their long-term ecological consequences, and
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Inadequacies in biological defenses. Before these inhibiting factors disappear, efforts should be made to rechannel biological warfare research into more constructive areas and institute international controls to prevent the development, testing, and production of biological weapons.

The U.S. military stubbornly avoids public discussion of its controversial work in chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Yet this program is a major component of the U.S. defense effort. Publicly the military is just as evasive about Soviet CBW efforts, although Pentagon officials have testified before Congress that the Russians do engage in extensive CBW research and development. The odiousness of CBW weapons has exposed the program to sharp and often emotional attacks. In response to this criticism Government officials most often use the deterrent argument, but they also contend that current research projects are essential for the development of effective CBW countermeasures, or that they offer the hope of discovering more humane methods of warfare. Some proponents argue frankly that only with these weapons can the United States expect to hold its own in a major war with China. Critics argue that chemical and biological weapons are superfluous to a country with a nuclear arsenal. Some argue that the efforts of these weapons cannot be geographically confined or completely foreseen, while others predict that they will proliferate rapidly among the smaller nations. In the Vietnam War, where non-control gases and defoliants are now being used, critics fear the danger of escalation to the use of lethal agents. Proponents and critics of the CBW program are united on two critical points: that a chemical-biological war must be avoided, and that a CBW arms control agreement is one possible way to do this. What is needed at this juncture is an open, rational public debate of the political and military implications involved. If the public were advised of the terrible potential of chemical and biological weapons then the need for controls; the CBW arms race would be greatly increased.

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Ditlich, John D., THE OUTLOOK FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, in Nuclear, 14th, July, 1968: 43-63, 184, 185

Although multiplication in the capabilities of nuclear weapons will increase their threat to future generations, the created dangers lie in an increase in the number of these weapons. Despite continuing efforts to limit the effects of nuclear blasts, technical and scientific progress allows make of death-producing revolutionary changes in the kind of nuclear weapons. Bunker-buster is much larger and more effective than previous bombs. However, there is a case of uranium being detectable in the tiny bubbles, since the size of the bubbles is inadequate at areas only sixteen feet large, and is theorized in a detection technique. A few separate shots of a bullet could be lethal, and a more dielectric detector could be used in the world. However, these small applications prove to their construction at the present time. World tactical nuclear bombs are feasible but impractical, since they would tend to devastate the territory being defended and could lead to the use of larger nuclear weapons. Although no radically new kinds of nuclear weapons are likely to appear for many years, the world still faces an uneasy future because of the threat from existing nuclear arsenals. The superpowers have already stockpiled the explosive equivalent of over one million tons of TNT, in the absence of adequate arms control measures these stores could multiply substantially, and many other nations could acquire nuclear weapons, unless the two countries can be persuaded to halt their nuclear competition. It is conceivable that one day the size of the world's arsenal will be limited only by the available amount of reasonable material.

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Describes the structure, component parts, navigation and weapon systems, and flight patterns of Great Britain's military jet airplane, "Harrier," included is a chronological listing of flight tests.

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Kelly, Oct., UNEXPECTED SOVIET ADVANCES IN SUBMARINES STIR REAL CONCERN IN CONGRESS. Navy. 6th, Aug., 1968: 6-11, Illus.

V, N49. N28, v. II

An account of current disputes over U.S. submarine construction, chaos over modernization of the attack submarine fleet that protects deployed Polaris missile submarines. The question is whether to proceed rapidly with new construction on the basis of available technologies or to delay in order to incorporate the advances expected from experiments with electric drive and high-speed submarine designs.

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T503, C524, 1968

Operational Vietnam tests lasting eighteen months proved the US Navy and Army ground effect vehicles to be very successful under fighting conditions. The vehicles were Bell-Boeing's Sea Skimmer, built under license to the British Hovercraft Corporation. Our report states the hovercraft mission in the Vietnam War was to assist interdiction missions, patrol against infiltration, enemy transportation, weapons and the evaluation of operational effectiveness. (Abstract supplied)

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Describes the potential for utilizing the earth's physical environment in order to attain natural advantages. Both current and potential developments in the geomorphol exchange of ideas is considered in forecasting.
weapons systems capable of triggering extreme environmental changes. Although the vast quantities of energy involved in weather systems make it unlikely that man will be able to modify the weather through "brute-force" techniques, scientists will probably greatly expand the present capabilities for working with the instabilities in the atmosphere to manipulate the weather. Advances are also expected in the field of climate control, including techniques to alter the energy of the sun, the nature of the terrestrial surface, and the transparency of the earth's atmosphere to various forms of radiated energy. Future geophysical weapon arsenals could also include methods for inducing earthquakes and tidal waves and utilizing lightning to raise or lower power levels over certain regions of the earth. Eventually hostile nations may be able to wage secret wars by infecting floods, droughts, storms, and other "natural" disasters upon one another. However, before such weapons are developed, in addition to increasing his understanding of environmental science man must carefully examine the complex political, legal, economic, and sociological consequences of deliberate environmental modification.


Describes recent developments in the design of the deep sea transducer, a device for generating and receiving underwater sound. For the foreseeable future, sound will continue to be the chief means of underwater communication, navigation, mapping, and surveillance. The increased operating depths of modern submarines and the use of bottomed surveillance devices has created a demand for transducers capable of operating independently of the surface at greater depths and for longer periods of time.

McGrath, Thomas D. THE NATIONAL INSURANCE POLICY ASW COVERAGE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Proceedings, v. 94, May 1968: 45-56, illus. VI 08, v. 94

Examines the weapons, surface vessels, tactics, and communication systems of anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The main surface ASW vehicles consist of destroyers, ASW frigates, and the P-3 Orion aircraft plane to replace the VP-2 Neptune in current use by the Navy. Since World War II, the submarine itself has developed ASW capabilities and tactics associated with an effective element in ASW. McGrath concludes that although present ASW programs are adequate, new programs will be needed in 5 years. Because new systems will require 5 to 10 years for their development, such programs must be initiated now.


Describes the use of satellite communications to link forces of the U.S. Army that become isolated because of distance, terrain, and weather, and atmospheric anomalies.


Reveals the development of a new radar system by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation for the follow-on version of the E-2A drone planes now operating in Vietnam. The new radar, derived from Grumman's AN/APS-111(XN-1), will detect smaller targets and filter out more ground clutter than the E-2A's present APS-96 radar. In addition to improved operational capabilities, the new system should prove almost four times more reliable than the APS-96 because of an improved cooling system, a more stable transmitter, and increased use of solid-state and microelectronic components.


Reveals Air Force plans for a $14.5 million modification of its backup intercept or control (BIC) system, a radar monitoring and guidance network that is designed to take over should the Nation's frontline control centers ever be hit by an enemy attack. Two new BIC sites are under construction, bringing the total to 15, and improvements in data processing equipment and techniques should enable the system to do twice the number of radar tasks it handled previously.

Nahm, Louis M. MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NAPALM BOMBING. Yale scientific magazine, v. 42, Apr. 1968: 16-17, illus. Q1 V18, v. 42

Napalm is easily and inexpensively manufactured from common chemicals. It is a tough and stable gel insensitive to changes in temperature and not subject to deterioration in storage. In use, it will adhere to most surfaces on contact and produces a high burning temperature and concentration of carbon monoxide. It is used in incendiary bombs, fire bombs and incendiary land mines and flame throwers. Napalm burns are usually deep and extensive. Phosphorus may be unshelled in the wound and continue to smolder long after the initial injury. Nephritis, retinopathy, respiratory embarrassment, shock, fluid loss and sepsis are other complications contributing to a high mortality rate. Nедaimal work leads to severe contractures and deformities. Multiple and mutilation seems to be the most frequent in high-amid children. In addition to burns, carbon monoxide poisoning is a constant cause of death. It has been noted that secondary burning could be as destructive as burn as a nuclear warfare. The smoke and soot from napalm bombing raids on Japanese cities caused many more casualties than the nuclear attacks. Burns are the major cause of injury in these large scale incendiary raids and high-velocity ordnance temperatures and carbon monoxide rates must be additional hazards. It was observed in Germany that bomb shelters, in particular, developed extremely high concentrations of carbon monoxide.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The newly developed bombing computer BT 9 R from Saab is an improvement of the older BT 9 already used by the Swedish, American, French, Danish and Swiss air forces. The BT 9 R has several advantages: exact ground target calculation with the use of laser range finders; horizontal bombing; and the incorporation of the newest technology in microcentralization.

Our article handles the various operation types (base bombing, identification point bombing, air-ground missile firing), the fire accuracy of the system and closes with a description of the components of the whole unit. (Abstract supplied; modified)


The new armored brigade designed for nuclear warfare will have 50 faster and more powerful armed combat tanks and modernized atomic artillery that will have an increased launching speed and range and will be free of the limitations of the "Hornet Judi" batteries. It will be charged with obtaining enemy information either through its sun with the divisional reconnaissance regiment or by increasing threats through any gaps in the enemy line. In postatomic combat and exploitation operations the armored brigade will avoid cover and wooded areas and direct its attack across open country. If the enemy throws in its armored reserves, the armored brigade will signal for anti-air support and artillery coverage that will enable it to continue its operation without recourse to a new friendly atomic attack. Although the preliminary phase-initial assault-and the complementary phase-the exploitation operation-have been the subject of detailed study, the hinge phase-the encirclement operation-constitutes the critical point of the whole operation. The mastery of this phase will be a great challenge for those who will have to implement the operation of the new armored brigades.


A supplement, by J. L (Orlando) and J. F. Meyer, to Analysis and Design of Flight Vehicle Structures, edited by E. F. Bruch, which was first published in 1962 and under the title Analysis and Design of Missile Structures. An introduction to the central field of missile structures with a limited presentation of the preliminary load stress analysis and structural design principles of typical ballistic missiles. Brief technical descriptions of various missiles important to U.S. defense are included.


The immediate and long range prospects of phased array radar systems. While the type of radar with its electronically tunable beam is more versatile than the mechanically rotated conventional radar, it is not expected to become operational for about 4 years because of weight and cost problems. Many electronics firms are now studying these problems and with their own or military grants are working on the development of phased-array systems.


Describes the Pershing IA, which—when it becomes operational—will be one of the most cost-effective weapons of any major weapons system. The Pershing IA will be more reliable and have greater mobility than its ancestor the Pershing. This second-generation missile system, now mounted on wheels rather than tracks, has an automatic countdown facility, computer devices, and a capability for testing itself and isolating any malfunctions. Rud also discusses Project SWAP, in which all Pershing ground support equipment and computer gear needed to fire a missile will be reequipped without any reduction in combat readiness.


Lists boosters, missiles, and aircraft deployed or under development by the U.S. Air Force. Each item is accompanied by a brief description of its capabilities, status, and contractors.


Describes the effects of a nuclear explosion on various areas. The shock wave is greater in the absence of buildings which face the nuclear explosion than in a gym. The destructive force of the shock wave increases in proportion to increases in the slope gradient, while effect is smallest at the top of the reverse slope. Military equipment and troops should be stationed in slopes which face in an opposite direction to the direction of the nuclear explosion. These troops, which affect the action radius of light radiation, also suggest that large-scale preparations against nuclear explosions. However, the stationary troops in populated areas is bad because the additional loss is the result from building collapse.


A review of We All Fall Down. The Prospects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, by Robin Clarke. In writing We All Fall Down, Robin Clarke has analyzed that a German may discuss chemical and biological warfare (CBW) without undue emphasis, but at the same time he must address some important issues. Thus his statement that
Strategic, participatory, or associated technical efforts in this work is a threat since it would decisively affect the trilateral disarmament process and resolution. Clarke discusses the possible implications of an international agreement to prevent CWW and how this may help to solve the technical problems involved. He also argues that an alternative approach to Britain's own CW research findings might not only lead to a greater understanding of potential enemies, but also to the use of scientific techniques that offer some hope of advantage. With this in mind, Britain has little choice but to participate in the work of experts and the participation of scientists and the medical profession in this work both ethical and political spirited.

"One ounce (of C. botulinum toxin) would be sufficient to kill sixty million people" is true and yet highly misleading, since the figures are accurate only if the agent were administered in individual doses. He also warns against giving the artificial development of new pathogens as very unlikely in the near future. Vaccines against biological weapons do raise some difficult problems, but they are not insurmountable as Clarke seems to suggest. His assertion that vaccinating a whole population would be too costly hardly stands up when compared with that of ships and aircraft. Clarke estimates that the chance of a biological attack succeeding is about one in three, but this is pure speculation. He argues that the absence of practical defense preparations means that the Government believes CWW is feasible, but this is not true. Nevertheless, he may be right in saying that biological warfare is not very attractive militarily because of the unpredictability of its long-term ecological effects. Chemical weapons are much superior to this respect, and some have the added advantage of being nonlethal. Clarke discusses the possibility of an international agreement to prevent CWW, but at this stage the technical problems seem to be insuperable. He also suggests that Britain's own CW research is naive as well as dangerous since it would mean declaring much sensitive information to potential enemies. A national war will use any available technique that offers some hope of advantage. With this in mind, Britain has little choice but to participate in the work of experts and the participation of scientists and the medical profession in this work both ethical and political spirited.


Some potential developments in aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft and predicts an ever heavier commitment of scientific and technological resources to military purposes. Since there will be many more possibilities of weapons than the most economically advanced nations will be able to develop, new technologies will have to be made by nations primarily as a measure of their effectiveness in relation to the costs. Cost-effectiveness analysis is exceedingly complex and is subject to the somewhat religious in assumptions about future technology and advanced areas of potential enemies. However, regardless of this subjective, cost-effectiveness analysis is the best available process for determining defense policies, and in the development of modern technologies and raising weapons costs.


The future of nuclear energy in Canada, particularly as it is related to national resources, and the deployment of new nuclear power sources, is discussed. The study, which is based on A. L. Bur, analyst of the University of Calgary, was conducted by the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

A study report of a Canadian nuclear industry. Research activities, status, and future demands.

Heavy water production, economic opportunities in power reactor design, construction and operation are discussed.


Outlines West Germany's plan for modernization of its military equipment through 1972. The plan is flexible enough to allow upgrading every 5 months and provides for substantial improvement of the land forces' flexible response capability and modernization of naval flexible response capabilities.


Robots weapons can transform the whole character of war by making the human soldier completely obsolete. Robot soldiers can seek and destroy an enemy no matter where he is. They can carry enough fuel to run for a week, operate with impunity in highly radioactive areas, and with lasers or plasma torches blind all human eyes looking at them. In radioactive areas robots immune to both chemical and biological agents and attack. They can also use armed and unarmored robots alongside unarmored human soldiers. Robots aircraft will displace the human requirements of safety design comfort, and durability that severely restricts destructive payload. The aircraft will be guided by computer systems that will deliver them to their targets more accurately and rapidly and will require no courage or risks on their tasks. Other robot weapons systems will include walking tank that can be used to move the direct nuclear hit, robot controlled missile systems that will carry conventional explosives and be directed at terminal targets such as ships, robots submarines that will travel 3,000 kilometers at depths of 1,000 meters and nuclear torpedoes designed, manufactured, and deployed for use in the ocean's interior. Nuclear power weapons systems will integrate the information storage, decision making, sensor input, and pattern recognition. Whether the major changes will be recognized as equivalent to nothing more than a redefinition or reclassification of existing weapons and technology.
UGI, M65, v. 22

Surveys the present status and future prospects of ABM radar development. The decision to deploy a true ABM system is expected to boost the current radar market and encourage further radar research and development to maintain the "one-upmanship" required in the offense-defense game. A number of projects are already underway that are intended to complement the Sentinel's first-generation large phased-array radars, including development of an advanced-design array radar, studies of hardsite defense techniques, and studies of mobile equipment for ABM systems. According to a top Air Force official, "the complicated threat and the rapidly growing number of functional responsibilities faced by the radar sensor have vastly complicated the task of planning, producing, and using complicated radar systems."

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

Z6723, U35, v. 48

For some years Mao Tse-tung has been involved in a running dispute with Chinese military professionals over military strategy and army organization. The controversy has tended to stress the dominance of technological over human factors in modern war and to manifest the conflict between Mao's opposition to the use of troops for social work and his attempt to replace the hierarchical military organization with a "proletarian democracy." The technological approach to warfare also emphasizes the healthy respect among Chinese military men for U.S. nuclear power and the concomitant recognition of the need for defense with the Soviet Union, whose nuclear strength is the sole means currently available for deterring the United States. Mao, of course, is aware of the significance of nuclear weapons and has pressed forward with their development. At the same time, however, he has insisted that the "spiritual nuclear bomb" of a people's war is adequate to deter or defend against a U.S. attack and has refused to consider defense with the Soviet Union on any terms except his own. The Vietnam War has exacerbated these differences, but Mao seems to have won the upper hand by purging most of those who opposed him. He is fortunate for him that he did so because, with the collapse of the Cultural Revolution, the army is the only nationwide unifying force left in China.

135

UG635. GTA1252, v. 8

Recounts recent developments in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and evaluates its present situation. During the fifties squadrons were doubled in size, new squadrons added, and tactical airfields increased in size. The air force plunged into a period of stagnation. Loss of American military aid confronted military planners with the problem of reconciling defense requirements with limited national resources. The role of the Air Force was finally redefined in relationship to air support Norway can expect from its allies in time of crisis. With the uncertainties of its future finally dispelled, the outlook for the Air Force is brighter considering even though it will never reach the heights it attained during its "prosperous" years. Its intercepter capabilities will probably be phased out, and it will concentrate on the maintenance of a radar warning system, limited numbers of maritime patrol, transport, and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and a retaliatory force of fighter bombers.

ARMED FORCES OF WARSAW TREATY MEMBER COUNTRIES. Soviet military review, Sept. 1968: 22-23. illus. P&G RR

Describes the Warsaw Pact exercises held in the summer of 1968: operation North, which studied problems "arising from the defense of the socialist countries in the event of attacks from the ocean and sea"; operation Newman, a logistics exercise; operation Sky Shield, which tested the combat efficiency of fighters, radar operators, and rocketeers; and a joint command and staff exercise. The object of these exercises was to develop common methods of carrying out combined land, sea, and air operations.

Aron, Raymond. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO NEUTRALITY. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, summer 1968: 267-269.
DS39. A65, v. 6

General Ailleret's formula, "defense in all directions," is a concise paraphrase of Dr. Gaulle's pronouncement that France must acquire the capacity to act at any point in the world because she risks being destroyed by missiles launched from any point." The formula is also a summary statement of the military policy of a neutral state; but Gaullist spokesmen have studiously refrained from making this observation. They speak instead of the impossibility of foreseeing the future enemies of France and they need to deter those who might intimidate France or attempt to use its territory in a war France would prefer to avoid. To those who argue that France cannot possibly finance U.S. or Soviet weapons technology, the Government retorts with the doctrine of "minimum" or "proportional" defense. To the objection that the strategy will prove too costly, the Gaullists reply that nuclear weapons can be financed by a cutback in conventional forces. This cutback can be made without any French policy cannot be authentically neutral, but even without these considerations, one can detect significant differences between Gaullist neutrality and a genuine neutrality such as Switzerland's. Switzerland does not intervene in the world's conflicts, but "Gaulist France intervenes, at least with words, in every conflict in the world." Whereas the Swiss antagonize no one, it will be only a matter of time before France antagonizes everyone.
Russia's race to achieve strategic superiority is taking place in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. Russia's exploitation of the political instability endemic to the area signals its intention to fill the political vacuum caused by Britain's withdrawal of forces from East of Suez. Russia is acquiring base facilities in Yemen and Port Sudan and is backing a guerrilla movement against Mozambique, which is based across from the strategic island of Madagascar. In fact, Soviet "national liberation warfare" techniques are being employed wherever possible throughout Africa, particularly along its Red Sea-Iranian coast. On the other side of the Indian Ocean, Russia has been active in India and Ceylon. It has promised India naval vessels, thereby hoping "to lay the groundwork for a Soviet naval air presence in that part of the world," especially in the Andaman Islands. These islands would be advantageous bases for the new Soviet unprofitable in the future as it is now. Regardless of aggression against the US or work for a Soviet naval air presence in that part of the world, especially in the Andaman Islands. These islands would be advantageous bases for the new Soviet unprofitable in the future as it is now.

Regardless of their attractions, neither a maximum nor a minimum approach to deterrence would be advantageous. While a massive first-strike capability would be somewhat psychologically reassuring, it would not be in keeping with America's image as a "peaceful power." It would not be a practical goal in view of the enormous technological and economic resources now available to the Soviet Union. If the United States maintained just enough arms to throw some doubt on whether an aggressor could successfully launch a first strike, extensive funds would be released for use in domestic programs. However, large force reductions would seriously weaken America's defensive position and tend to invite an "enemy attack. Thus the United States must continue to offset any advance the Soviet Union intends, give a helping hand to Czechoslovakia, where creeping revisionism could have undermined the principles of the common defense. The Warsaw Pact is a union of sovereign states based on equality and fraternal relations. The present situation requires improvement of the defensive capability of every Socialist state and the commonwealth as a whole and a strengthening of political and military cooperation. That is our contemporary goal of action.

Modern war exacts a heavier death toll from the civilian population than from the armed forces. A deterrence credibility depends largely on the credibility of the nation's civil defense, which must prepare and carry out all measures in the civil area for the population's survival of war and for aiding the freedom and ability of the armed forces to conduct operations. NATO's flexible response strategy provides for three gradations of defense: conventional defense, deliberate escalation, and a general nuclear strike. In the first two, civil defense plays the crucial role. In fact, military defense without civil defense would be impossible for the German Federal Republic. Yet the Federal Republic has so far spent about 160 billion DM for its military defense and only 4.5 billion DM for civil defense.


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II THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT


Suggests a defense posture that would be compatible with Great Britain's future in world politics. A major decision to be made in the 1970's will be to decide on whether or not Britain will be able to maintain a viable long-service regular army in the absence of the indentation of fairly frequent postings outside the UK and Germany. If it cannot, Britain may have to resort to a short-service volunteer army. Also, Britain must decide whether to replace its submarine ballistic missile force. Unless the superpowers decide to cut back their nuclear stockpiles, the best European deterrent against a Russian attack would be a mobile land-based system rather than an ineffective ABM network. Brown hopes that by 1980 there will be an integrated European force. One logical outcome of such an evolution would be the development of a WEU (Western European Union) group within the United Nations. He concludes that the transfer of Britain from a great to a middle power will be slow and difficult.

144 Cameron, Robert A. NATO AND THE NUCLEAR REALITY. Air Force and space digest. 21, SI. Aug. 1968: 52-56. US003.A65, s 51

The formation of a NATO nuclear consultation committee may be a new era of strategic planning in the alliance. While a good deal of effort has been devoted to nuclear problems within NATO, its overall strategic thinking has not yet fully adjusted to the realities of nuclear weapons. Since a European second-strike nuclear force would duplicate the capability provided by the Americans, NATO needs only a small tactical nuclear force (the enemy must overawe him for his attack to succeed, and which, if overawed, would be sufficient provocation to elicit the big stick.) NATO can best exploit its nuclear deterrents by abandoning any pretenses to a strategy of flexible response and assuming a nuclear defense posture. At the same time, it must improve the arrangements for nuclear weapons control. While it is still a safe bet that the US will reach the point of degeneration sooner than most of its allies, lack of control is difficult to reconcile with an announced policy of nuclear deterrence. Therefore now that the nuclear consultation committee has stimulated thinking on a Europe-oriented nuclear policy, the countries of Western Europe should begin striving for a greater measure of nuclear autonomy.


History abounds in national or international successes and failures engendered by, respectively, the right or wrong concept of war. An optimal concept of war requires that defense potential, will, and credibility be in accord. A modern concept of war depends largely on weapons efficacy. Contemporary development of war technology projects a picture of forbidding that a great war between industrial nations is simply out of the question as a rational means of policy. One may assume that all-out war will never happen. Limited wars are increasing, and the growing interdependence of nations and the conflict of interests between the big powers will enlarge the shockwaves each local war generates. A faraway war may easily spread to Europe, a force field of those interests. German security requires a growing sensitivity to extra-European events, and the Western and Eastern German concepts of war should be diversified and multilayered. A distinction must be made between the NATO concept of war from Europe and the American concept for "worldwide engagement." The latter should certainly be better differentiated.

146 CHALLENGES TO DOBY'S TIGHT REIN ON NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBS. Space armaments. v. 50, July 1968: 8-30, 32. TL591.A796, v. 50

Alarmed by the increasing strength of the Soviet submarine force, Congress in the Defense Department are pressuring Defense Department officials to improve U.S. undersea warfare capabilities. Despite assurances by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that the Nation's submarine forces will adequately counter Soviet advances, legislators and Navy submariners fear that the U.S. force of 101 first-class nuclear-powered submarines envisioned for 1973 will not offset the estimated Soviet force level of 200 nuclear submarines. The armed services committees of both houses have joined longtime submarine crusader Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover and the new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Thomas Moorer, in attempting to convince the Pentagon of its error in rooting out the development of higher performance attack submarines. "Seminis' boys," backed by L. Mendel Rivers, the "patron saint of submariners," recently authorized an extra $33.9 million for submarine construction and development, and Rickover persuaded the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to release $8 million for the development of a reactor for an advanced submarine. If the pressures continue the Defense Department may back down to its refusal to build more and better submarines, particularly since it is based largely on findings by systems analyst Alain Enthoven, who, as one of McNamara's protégés, may not carry so much weight under the administration of the more pragmatic Clark Clifford.


Deplores the American bombing of Pathet Lao-held areas and claims that American military leaders in Asia cannot justify invasions into Laos. "The US has been in search of '40,000 North Vietnamese' troops. Decry- the government's 'government of national unity' for Laos, envisioned in the 1966 Geneva agreements, is not feasible because the Vietnamese government is powerless against the Pathet Lao. The Laotian prob opposes will be settled at Paris only if the Americans agree to the demands of both Hanoi and the Pathet Lao and stop the raids.

29
Review Russia's postwar diplomatic efforts to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe and discusses Czechoslovakia's strategic significance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Delmas believes Russia invaded Czechoslovakia to guarantee that Czechoslovak territory will be available for medium-range missile bases. The loss of such territory because of ideological heresy is crucially significant in view of the Soviet Union's inferiority in submarine missiles of the Polaris and Poseidon type. The author concludes that the Soviet Union knew that America would not intervene in Czechoslovakia because it is strategically unimportant to the United States and NATO.

Russia's nuclear capability has provided the nation with greater maneuverability. No longer must Soviet imperial expansion depend upon piecemeal expansion of its land frontiers; now the Russians can acquire an overseas empire dependent only upon sea-borne lines of communication with the homeland. The Soviet Navy, applying this newly found freedom to today's Soviet aims—the realization of the eternal Russian dream of controlling the Turkish Straits, the Middle Eastern region, and the warm waters of the Indian Ocean—has emerged in a new and active role. Indications of increased Soviet naval power are the Black Sea Fleet's acquisition of two large amphibious-assault ships, each with a troop capacity of 2,000 or 3,000 marines, resembling LPH-types capable of both airborne and waterborne-assault operations; the passage, during 1967, of 267 Soviet warships into the Mediterranean with only 62 return passages; and the visits of Soviet warships to Bombay and ports in Iraq. British evacuation of Aden and the scheduled withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 would create a Western power vacuum and encourage Soviet ambitions. The presence of the Soviet Fleet in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf would increase Soviet prestige and influence in the Middle East and along Africa's East Coast, enable Moscow to bring increased pressure on Iran to accept Soviet arms and economic aid rather than American, possibly lead to Soviet influence in India, balancing Iraq's oil-depending Red China, and pose a threat to the United States and the free world. The United States, preferably with Britain and Australia, must prevent an increase of Soviet naval influence in this area.

West German strategists will have to rethink Germany's strategic doctrine in view of America's disengagement from Europe, the withdrawal of Atlantic troops from the Federal Republic, and the widespread belief that there is no threat of a Soviet invasion. Germany's strategic doctrine, which is based on "forward strategy" and nuclear deterrence, has become obsolete because of the shortage of conventional troops in Europe and a loss of faith in flexible response. An effective "forward strategy" would require twice the number of conventional forces stationed in Europe today, and a viable flexible response strategy for Germany would entail possession or coexistence of nuclear weapons. Some German leaders are advocating an independent German force within a European atomic force as an alternative to the present doctrine, while others maintain that NATO will continue to fill all the only security against invasion. A demilitarized West Germany could solve its strategic problems and might be a good idea in light of NATO's adverse political, military, and economic effect on Germany.

Czechoslovakia's participation in the Warsaw Pact and the broader anti-Western strategy of the Soviet bloc is a Western interest of major importance. The United States and NATO must ensure that the Western European nations continue to be a part of the Cold War. The loss of such a buffer against Soviet expansion would have a significant impact on American security interests.

France will not achieve a minimum deterrence threshold until its strike forces have a reliable survival capacity. Of the three weapons systems in the French strategic strike force, only its surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have a real deterrent value. Its nuclear submarines will not be operational until 1975, and its Mirage IV's have limited deterrent use. This force structure strains the national budget to the limit. If the effort were made to provide all capabilities indispensable for a self-sufficient nuclear arsenal, the cost would plunge France into bankruptcy. A European nuclear defense pool would solve France's nuclear credibility gap, but a prerequisite would be a European political union.

June, 1968: 151-54
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Addresses the strengths and capabilities of the French Air Force. In addition to serving as the backbone of De Gaulle's nuclear deterrent policy, the Air Force provides substantial tactical support for the ground forces. Currently the principal deterrent role is filled by the well-equipped, highly trained Strategic Bomber Force, led by 1972 land- and sea-based missiles are expected to replace the supersonic Mirage IV bombers. The Mirage IV's will then be moved into the Tactical Air Command, implementing its squadrons of Mirage II fighter-bombers, interceptors, and reconnaissance planes. Besides its strategic and tactical forces the French Air Force has an Air Defense Command, a Military Air Transport Command, an Air Force Schools Command, and an Air Communications Service. With its efficient organization, excellent equipment, and top quality personnel France's air arm is a "powerful instrument of defense" that is "up to the standards of the best air forces of the world."


Analysis of the Vietnam conflict covering the background, conduct, and implications of the war. Detailed profiles are presented for each of the key Vietnamese personalities involved in the struggle for power in South Vietnam, followed by an examination of significant political and military operations. Glyn concludes that American aid was essential to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam and stresses that the American presence in Southeast Asia must be continued. In the past Vietnam period if the region is to remain free of Communist domination. In addition to concluding defense agreements with the nations of Southeast Asia, the United States must strengthen those governments against Communist threats through extensive economic aid programs.


Blames the "accountant mentality" of Pentagon systems analysts for an inadequate U.S. response to an increasingly aggressive Soviet naval strategy and estimates the kinds and quantities of naval forces the United States will need to meet this threat in the 1970's and 1980's.


Rebuts the thesis that modern technology has reduced the significance of seapower. Harrigan argues that this view makes the mistake of confusing seapower in the too-narrow terms of big ships and big guns with the recognition of its broad geopolitical basis and the variety of its component elements. The view also overlooks the adaptability of naval forces to new technology, which should be evident from recent progress in areas like deep-sea exploration, nuclear power, naval weaponry, sea-based airpower, and airborne warfare. Recent breakthroughs in the exploration of the seabed raise the hopes of exploiting the resources of the ocean floor, and this promises an additional expansion of the role of seapower in the modern world. Thus the Soviet seapower challenge is real, and ways must be found to meet it.


Advocates of the withdrawal of British forces from the Middle and Far East obviously do not remember the lesson handed down by American experience in the two World Wars and do not see that Britain's isolationist policies are analogous to the events that led to the fall of the Roman Empire. Transferring British troops to home shores only creates a delusion of defense since a "last ditch" strategy is not valid in a world of continuing Communist aggression and European disharmony. As long as the Communists threaten the security of free nations, Britons cannot safely assume that "keeping out of world affairs there will be able to remain at home in peace." Britain cannot defend itself alone, but if it does not maintain the capability to aid weaker nations in time of crisis, it cannot expect outside aid for itself.


Warns that "the balance of power in Europe is shifting decisively" favor of the Soviet Union. Hinterhoff argues that Western reliance on the balance of terror and a passive policy of containment has paralyzed the will of Western statesmen and led them to the erroneous belief that the status quo in Europe can be maintained indefinitely. The Soviet Union, however, is not interested in supporting a status quo, and its armaments efforts have been aimed at a slow erosion of the second-strike capability of the United States and thus undermin the credibility of the Western deterrents, nuclear and conventional. Hinterhoff traces the progress of this erosion in military doctrine, strategic hardware, naval forces, and troop strengths and then relates the resulting shift in the strategic balance to recent political and military events in NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Hinterhoff, Eugene. ROMAN OF WESTERN DETERRENT. PT. 2. THE AUTHOR BRINGS HIS STUDY OF OPPOSING CAPABILITIES TO A CONCLUSION. Cosmopolitan, the Irish defence journal, v. 29, July 1968: 201-205. U138, v. 28

See also item no. 159 in this bibliography.

The erosion of America's strategic deterrent has been accelerated by Russia's ABM system and the "shutting out" of the NATO shield. The Soviet ABM has greatly disturbed West Europeans, who were already disillusioned by the withdrawal of the medium-range Thor and Jupiter missiles, by leaving them insecure to face with Russia's nuclear capability. This makes NATO's forces look as inefficient as a child's toy. Western Europe has become a Soviet nuclear hostage because NATO does not have an effective counter-measure to Russia's medium-range missiles. NATO's flexible response and forward defense strategies,
which depend on superior conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons, are in jeopardy because of France's withdrawal and proposed American troop reductions. In addition, Soviet political and military penetration into the Middle East has threatened both the U.S. 6th Fleet and NATO's southern flank. The Russians are quickly filling the vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal East of Suez and, in a time of political crisis, will be able to control the flow of oil from the Near East to Western Europe, strangling it into submission. The weakening of America's second-strike capability and NATO's defenses is paving the way for a Russian victory and the realization of long-range Soviet objectives.


Reviews modern Western strategic concepts. Kampe discusses the principles, prerequisites, and kinds of deterrence; massive retaliation and flexible response strategies; and the doctrine of multipolar nuclear arms sharing and the special interest of various countries in certain of its strategic aspects. The main Western strategic doctrines, although differing among themselves, concur that modern war has ceased to be Clausewitz's "continuation of politics by other means," that its strategy rests in the value of deterrence, and that the most important deterrent against Communist aggression is nuclear weapons. The future development of strategic doctrines depends on "political changes; the development of weapons technologies, especially ABC weapons; and the proliferation of nuclear weapons."


Reprinted from Foreign Affairs, July 1968. D400, F6

For nearly a decade the Soviet Union and the United States have been deterred from attacking each other by the knowledge that such a move would invite a devastating counterattack. However, recent and projected changes in Soviet and U.S. strategic forces could seriously undermine the stability of mutual deterrence. While the U.S. response to Russian increases in striking power and the Soviet ABM have so far been limited to upgrading the efficiency of existing systems, congressional and public pressures could eventually result in an extensive broadening of strategic forces. Since increases in the numerical strength of the adversary do not necessarily jeopardize the soundness of America's second-strike forces, an upward surge in weapons production and development would needlessly propel the superpowers into a dangerous new round of the arms race. Furthermore, rapid changes in force structures could seriously hamper and distort the interpretation of the military situation by political decisionmakers, thus endangering the stability of mutual deterrence. Rather than overreact to the Soviet weapons buildup, the United States should take advantage of the approaching parity between the superpowers' offensive forces to initiate a "freeze" on force levels. While such an agreement would be difficult to conclude, it is essential if the risks inherent in the uncertainties created by "the uncontrolled forward thrust of technical change in weaponry" are to be avoided.


Explains the functions of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (CDC), emphasizing its concern with blueprinting future land combat systems and improving today's Army. The CDC helps bring Army doctrine for combat and combat support into line with the capabilities of the field army, helps keep the
combat service support of the battle area updated, aids in advancing communications that can link the battlefield with the White House, and determines what material capability is needed to meet a specific threat. The helicopter provides a specific example of CDC's usefulness. The helicopter previously had limited use in wartime; today, dignified by doctrine provided by the CDC, it has become the symbol of combat mobility in Vietnam and has thrust the Army into a new dimension of combat.
of destruction renders the nuclear force inadequate to deter lesser forms of aggression; therefore substantial conventional forces are required. Although the United States recognizes the utility of the arms race and would prefer to reach an agreement to ultimately reduce offensive and defensive nuclear forces, it must prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining a first-strike capability, even at the price of some loss of face. An attempt to achieve a first-strike capability would be futile because it could not be acquired secretly; spiraling of the arms race would ensue with no ultimate change in the security balance. An example is the recent Soviet deployment of an ABM system. Thus far the United States has taken steps to ensure that its offensive weapons can penetrate future Soviet defenses. If the Soviet Union expands its ABM deployment, the U.S. response must be realistic: A massive ABM deployment would be ineffective and cause the Russians to build up their offensive capability, canceling any U.S. gains. Instead the United States must expand its offensive forces to preserve its assured-destruction capability. This is the more reasonable course for “the root of mankind’s security does not lie in his weaponry; it lies in his mind.” The world does not need “a new race toward armament, but a new race toward reasonableness.”


The essence of the deterrence concept is a nation’s assured-destruction capability. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States possesses a first-strike capability—the ability to eliminate the targeted nation’s retaliatory forces—but both possess a credible second-strike capability—the ability to retaliate if attacked. The significance of U.S. nuclear superiority over Russia is limited because the Soviet Union could still deter the United States with an assured-strike. Thus the fear
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their NATO forces because they lack the unity character-ic of a national defense establishment and are incorporated into other national forces. Canada's 'NATO Navy and Air Force play a nuclear role in the alliance that is distasteful to most Canadians. In addition, Canadians criticize the North American Air Defense Command because it binds Canada to America as a junior partner and because the bomber threat no longer exists. Canadians also condemn America for its decision to deploy an ABM system even though they would like a share of the protection if the system works. However, so long as America can deter Russia and the threat to Western Europe diminishes, Canada would reject any attempt by the United States to construct missile sites on its territory. Although few Canadians believe America would seize Canadian territory in peacetime, many fear "powerful political and economic economic and military factors upon which Canada relies so heavily for its welfare." Canada would prefer to play a peacetime role in the international community because it is a militarily weak factor in the Atlantic alliance, but because of the recent dismissal of the U.S. Air Force support for such a strategy is rapidly waning.

REFERENCE: p. 284.

Two dialectical tendencies in military affairs have characterized the ethos of Tanzania under Julius Nyerere. Nyerere is a marked distinction of professional men under arms at home and in inter-African affairs.

The author is in military or quasi-military solutions to some of the remaining colonial problems in Africa. Chances in Nyerere's original position on these matters are described and related to certain events such as the Tanzanian army mutiny of January 1964. The commitment to the idea of necessary mili- tary solutions for colonial problems has emerged partly out of Tanzania's leadership in the Pan-African Freedom Movement and partly out of the subsequent change of Dar es Salaam as the headquarters of the QA Liberation Committee. This militancy has interacted with Tanzania's aspirations of the new political leadership in the development process. The notion that more than one party might lead to a civil war and the notion that development is an exercise in an economic form of battle have been major aspects of Tanzania's political ethos. The soldier, the state, and the socialist have had to devise a new interrelationship in the political personality of the nation. (Abstract supplied)

REFERENCE: p. 42.

Even though nuclear power can be multiplied by feedbacks so long as it maintains a sound second-strike capability, most strategists have not for- saken the idea of developing an independent nuclear power. The magnitude of the decisions is overwhelming. The number of missile launchers and numbers armed, Russia has produced over 1,000 warheads. The United States claims at least 3,000 deliverable to the United States. The United States claims数额 ahead in land-based missiles with launchers and launchers in submarine-based missiles. However, Russia is in last turn, as its land- and sea-based ICBM launchers and expects to catch up to the United States by 1975. By then both countries will probably also possess missiles equipped with multiple independently-guided warheads. Moreover, each country has also begun deployment of a limited ABM sys- tem. The American Sentinel system is much more sophisticated than the Russian system, although neither will be able to adequately limit damage from a Russian or U.S. attack.

REFERENCE: p. 126.

The gradual consequences of France's withdrawal from NATO is the alliance's loss of French airbase and territory, which has reduced the available space for auxiliary installations and deployment of allied forces. This loss has ruptured NATO's communication and logistics systems. The withdrawal of French troops from the organization has depleted an already inadequate conventional force level that is a result of the West's commitment to a flexible defense strategy -- "a euphemism destined to reassure the bourgeois." This strategy does not protect Western Europe from Communist aggression. The implementation of it during war would mark the beginning of a nuclear war. In fact it the Soviet Union attacks Western Europe, NATO would have no means to transfer or launch total warfare. An increase in NATO's conventional forces, at least to the level of those in the Warsaw Pact, would eliminate "lack of desire to make one of these decisions. However, the source of such an increase will not be France because the supreme commander of NATO's forces cannot count on French forces, any more than he can count on those of Switzerland."

REFERENCE: p. 137.

This attention to China's potential as a seapower, Niu believes that China's maritime forces are a more serious long-term threat to the free world than the American nuclear weapons. China has a long naval tradition and is really a coastal, but a heartland, power. The free world is essentially a maritime alliance, and this part of it is in South-east Asia and the West- ern Pacific. It is highly vulnerable to hostile penetration from the sea. Unlike Japan, China possesses an ade- quate base of manpower and resources and gives suffi- cient naval forces may yet succeed in doing what the Japanese failed to do-establish a "co-prosperity sphere" for Asia.

NOTES:

REFERENCE: p. 239.

2. Symposium, Naval and international influence of the use of the United States in its major decisions on major ship design and construction. According to Admiral Mullen, 'defense leadership is not a matter of expertise. The key people in the Department of Defense as an administrative and staff work to become experts in the Pentagon. The professional staff of the Service Secretaries and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rickover believes Defense Department analysts are technically illiterate and cause major errors to be made in planning U.S. naval requirements.

The significance of Britain's withdrawal of forces East of Asia is that the burden of maintaining peace and security in Southeast Asia will fall to the United States. Americans will not accept such a role, however, without the active support of other powers, including those of Southeast Asia. A promising development in Southeast Asian security that would greatly diminish the United States' future security would be strengthened by Russian-American cooperation, which would greatly diminish the Chinese threat.

Although differences over regional security questions exist within ASEAN, it is a viable economic and social organization and may eventually provide the impetus for a regional security system for Southeast Asia. However, the area's defense most for some time continue to be guaranteed by the Great Powers, particularly the United States. In fact, Southeast Asia's future security would be strengthened by Russian-American cooperation, which, in turn, may make obsolete the fixed, underground-based system. Above all, a sea-based MIRV can reduce the leverage of a potential arms race by placing down the number of launchers and thus within the framework of strategic deterrence.

Although a few spokesmen argue that the United States does not have vital interests in Asia, most top policymakers of the past century have been convinced that the security of the United States is closely linked to the Orient. This belief was dramatically demonstrated during World War II and is currently being reaffirmed in Vietnam. Contrary to the opinion of a small minority, Communist China constitutes a threat to U.S. interests since it not only has the nationalistic and ideological aspirations for territorial expansion but also gradually acquiring the capability to carry out such aspirations. While the United States has little reason to fear a direct attack by the Chinese, it must be prepared to prevent China from taking over its Asian neighbors and thus creating an unfavorable shift in the world balance of power. Besides, war against China would effectively erode the power base of the United States and lead to further international competition.

Withdrawal of American troops to Vietnam or to some intermediate position such as Australia appears to the containment mentality. However, neither action would provide a convincing deterrent, and both presuppose the existence of strong national forces on the Asian mainland. While withdrawal to a line just off the coast of Asia would assure the protection of U.S. interests in the West Pacific, with the highest time of containment running along the existing boundaries of U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence would form a distinct barrier against Chinese aggression on the mainland. The United States cannot afford the formation of a coalition government in Vietnam but must strive for a Vietnam Government that is democratic and closely allied with the United States. It must attempt to strengthen all states in the path of Chinese expansionism and back them up with the necessary military support until such time as the Chinese threat is a threat to Asia and not to the U.S. security.

If Russia's ballistic missile force becomes more effective, the United States will have to decide which strategic delivery systems it will use to maintain its assured destruction and damage limitation capabilities, and what the criteria. Without the nuclear monopoly of these systems. The most important criteria for selecting U.S. missiles to counter various feasible Russian strategies are cost, weapons reliability, and survivability. The Poseidon missile will be the only U.S. strategic deterrent capable of sea-based systems without necessitating a larger investment in submarines. Furthermore, a mobile sea-based system would be more reliable in the face of enemy independent reentry vehicles (IMRVs), which in turn may make obsolete the fixed, land-based system. Above all, a sea-based MIRV can reduce the leverage of a potential arms race by placing down the number of launchers and thus within the framework of strategic deterrence.
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The American military presence in Asia is overwhelming, but the full extent of troop deployment is difficult to ascertain. Top U.S. Government officials who have access to this information are unwilling to discuss the issue. The United States must eventually account for this tremendous overseas extension of its power and wealth. If an international conference on Southeast Asia is convened, it is hoped the United States will state clearly and succinctly "what its military forces in Asia are designed to do." A convincing argument must be made not only for the sake of the Asians but also for the average American, who has begun to worry about the extent of the U.S. overseas commitment.

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Slav Rm
Translated from Zavistis, Aug. 29, 1968.
Slav Rm

The Western imperialist powers are using the events in Czechoslovakia to create a new wave of war hysteria. On the one hand, West Germany is advocating a hard-line military strategy for NATO and more Bundeswehr troops. While, on the other, the United States is using the "communist threat" to "put pressure on its allies, in order to harness them still tighter to the American war chariot." Australia, which is actively supporting Washington's criminal policies in Vietnam, is being transformed into a bridgehead of American imperialism in Asia. "Despite public opposition to the Vietnam War the Australian Government will continue to press for greater military appropriations. However, the progressive forces in Australia will not be intimidated or deceived by the imperialists, who seek to strangle the freedom and independence of other countries.

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DSB: A462, v. 8

Maoist military doctrine begins with the assertion that men and politics are superior to warfare and technology. Defensive doctrine assumes (unreasonably) that the United States will follow a nuclear strike with an invasion of mainland China, and the Maoists say that this invasion can be defeated by a people's war waged in depth by aroused and politically motivated masses. Offensive doctrine outlines the use of closely coordinated political, economic, and military means to promote revolutionary seizures of power in underdeveloped regions in order to surround the capitalist world city in Europe and North America. These Maoist theories have come under fire from Chinese military professionals who resent the intrusion of politics into the armed forces and have serious doubts about the supremacy of man over machine on the battlefield. These critics would like to see China's Armed Forces equipped with the new sophisticated weaponry, and, for military reasons, they desire a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Mao's military doctrines are rooted in the past and static progressive doctrines are rooted in the present state of readiness. He discusses the strategy of flexible response, the recent withdrawal of four U.S. Air Force squadrons from Europe, and some of the problems of civil-military relations in Europe.

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ISSL2, v. 23

Britain's Navy will soon be confined to an almost exclusively European role. By the early 1970's the Navy will have lost 5,500 men and will be equipped with four Polaris submarines, four assault ships, three cruisers, 12 missile-carrying destroyers, four nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines, about 55 frigates, 40 minesweepers, 30 conventionally powered patrol submarines, and various support vessels. The fleet's primary mission will be to enforce the doctrine of graduated, flexible response, which means it must be prepared to react to threats ranging from local harassment of merchant shipping to the blockading of maritime access to Western Europe. In order to realize its objectives the Navy should avoid delays in the rebuilding program, maintain an effective amphibious element, deploy more than the planned number of hunter-killer submarines, and bolster NATO forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
better use of that political organization than has been done heretofore and to keep it functional. He feels sure that it would be a serious mistake indeed if, after the lessons of this summer, the Americans were to affect a withdrawal of troops from Europe. (Supplied summary, modified).


Projects possible trends in strategic defense emanating from the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system. With the establishment of near-nuclear parity between the superpowers and the approaching unity of the two sides in exchange between an ICBM and an ABM, a strategy based solely on deterrence may prove obsolete. If the Sentinel becomes an integral part of America's strategic posture there will probably be efforts to integrate it more closely with other surveillance systems and develop closer coordination between offense and defense through the establishment of a force management and control system. Furthermore, other defensive systems may be deployed to supplement the Sentinel's work, including the Navy's second antiballistic missile intercept system, the Air Force's airborne antiballistic missile intercept system, and the forward area ballistic missile intercept system, among others. Improvements in surveillance, warning, prediction, and display capabilities should greatly boost the effectiveness of the interceptors.


Describes the recent growth of Soviet maritime power. The article reviews Soviet progress in shipbuilding and repair, overseas base acquisition, merchant shipping, fishing, and oceanography. It puts particular stress on the implications of the Soviet effort to develop specialized amphibious forces. The Soviet Union became convinced of the crucial importance of seapower through direct and frequently painful confrontations with Western naval might during and after World War II. It has come to recognize that, while the sea is NATO's greatest source of strength, it is also the point at which the alliance is most vulnerable.


Much attention has been given recently to the estrangement between the United States and Europe, and with good reason. Some discontent is normal to any alliance, but there is danger that transatlantic discord within NATO will get out of hand. The major disagreement is over the meaning of defense. Some Europeans argue that defense has eliminated the danger of war in Europe and therefore European military forces can be greatly reduced. The United States disagrees but finds its capacity to deal with European problems restricted by its commitments in Vietnam. Consequently, some European states are showing a marked propensity for seeking national solutions to their security problems. France works to disarm NATO, some Germans—fearing a Franco-Soviet deal—explore the possibility of a united but neutralized Germany, and Britain becomes increasingly bitter against the Common Market. Faced with this rebirth of nationalism in Europe, the United States is seriously considering bilateral collaboration with the Soviet Union in attacking the world's major security problems. This disintegration can be stopped if the West will recognize "that a real detente does not exist." The Communist world and its relations with the West are undergoing profound changes, but the Soviet Union has not renounced its global aims, and the public should be made aware that European integration and Atlantic cooperation are as essential as before to Western security and world peace.


Pt. 1 was annotated as item 1567 in v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography. For pt. 2, see next item.

A comparative study of the NATO Defense College and the U.S. National War College. Part 2 relates the history of the National War College and evaluates its student body, faculty, and curriculum. Stillman points out that the growing complexity of war prompted establishment of the War College to produce officers with interservice training and familiarity with the political and economic aspects of security policy. The school is a center for "fourth world" fusionist ideals of the combined civil-military approach, but service loyalties and military values both run counter to this concept and have restricted the school's educational effectiveness and general influence.


For pt. 1, see item no. 1567, v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography; for pt. 2, see preceding item.

A comparative study of the NATO Defense College and the U.S. National War College. Part 3 compares the teaching method, student body, faculty, and organization of the two colleges. The NATO Defense College has the one great advantage of having a genuine experience in internationalism for its students; it was otherwise it has grave institutional and political weaknesses as well as inadequate standards of scholarship. The U.S. War College has no serious institutional or political problems, but because of its narrow national and military focus its student body is insufficiently exposed to cosmopolitan experiences and the hard academic disciplines. Stillman recommends curricular and faculty changes at the War College to bring about a better balance of instruction between broad international issues and technical subjects and suggests structural changes at the NATO college to give it a more independent and influential role in alliance affairs.


Reports on the first Five Power Commonwealth Defence Conference, in Kuala Lumpur. The conference
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was more concerned with examining future defensive capability than with future commitments and contingencies in the face of British withdrawal. While the five nations-Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia—noticeably disagreed, certain accords were reached. The basis was laid for joint air defense through, and possibly after, 1971, and Britain left the other four powers with the feeling that it would have a "continuing interest" even after withdrawal was complete.

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Reviews the challenges to be met by the Royal Air Force as set forth in "The Defence Estimates 1968." While Air Force officials regret the substantial personnel and aircraft reductions proposed in the policy paper, their morale remains high, and they are approaching the problem of covering a wide variety of tasks with a relatively small force level in the same spirit that won them the Battle of Britain. The aircraft that survived the Government's economy drive are not quite up to the standard of those that were cut, but through adequate planning they can be utilized to give "...lighting power and deployment capability required for unforeseen circumstances."

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Slay Rin

The 1968 command staff exercises conducted by the Warsaw Pact countries' armed forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union; the North command staff exercises in which the staffs and tanks of Poland, East Germany, and Russia participated; and the Sky Shield exercises of the air defense troops on the Eastern Front, have been noted in the words of the newspaper Military Times. The command staff exercises in Czechoslovakia involved a high level of development of all classes of forces, types of weapons, and staffs. They demonstrated the increased skills of the commanders as well as the training of the units and sub-units and the firm fighting morale and preparations to perform the most complex and diverse combat tasks.

The political consciousness and vigilance, the willingness to fulfill their duty in freeing the great cause of socialism, and the high level of their ideological convictions are the most important components of the troops' combat readiness. The present situation requires unrelenting efforts to raise the defense capability of every Socialist state and the entire Socialist commonwealth and to strengthen the political and military cooperation of the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization, who are facing the aggressive activities of the United States and West Germany. The Warsaw Pact armament must be an insurmountable barrier against any aggression.

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For every level of industrial development there is a corresponding level of sophistication in defense technology. A nation can move to a more sophisticated level of weaponry before it has the appropriate industrial base only if it is willing to make enormous economic sacrifices. China, committed to world revolution and fearing the United States, has tried with Soviet aid to make a great leap forward into advanced military technology. India, which is plagued by financial difficulties but faces no major threat to its security, has proceeded more slowly and economically. India has developed a conventional arms production capability and for economic, not military, reasons have made considerable progress in electronics and nuclear energy. But the growing threat from China is forcing a reevaluation of Indian security policy. What course India will take depends on whether it makes its nuclear threat credible, and this in turn depends in part on the success or failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy effective ABM systems. Difficult decisions will have to be made, should India be forced to procure a high-cost defense technology of its own. It might seek outside assistance, but the only states capable of giving it are the United States and the governments that make up the nonproliferation treaty, and they are unlikely to honor any such request. On the other hand, it would be prohibitively costly for India to make a great leap forward into advanced military systems with its own resources. This--the dilemma raised by India's confrontation with China--is the most debated issue in India today.

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The middle-of-the-roaders, not the hawks or the doves, are responsible for the failure of U.S. policies in Vietnam. The administration's strategy of gradualism has led to heavy losses of American soldiers and material without weakening the political influence of the enemy in the south. By deciding to step down from top policy-making positions, President Johnson and Robert McNamara have shown that some key officials already recognize and admit the failures of the nonproliferation treaty, and they are unlikely to honor any such request. On the other hand, it would be prohibitively costly for India to make a great leap forward into advanced military systems with its own resources. This--the dilemma raised by India's confrontation with China--is the most debated issue in India today.

202


Reviews Russo-Czechooslovak relations and the effect the democratization in Prague will have on East-West relations and the world balance of power. The Russians believe that Czechooslovakia is, geopolitically, the key to the East-West military balance on the Continent. An independent Czechooslovakia would leave the Russian frontier open to invasion and, in the eyes of the Soviets, would render the concept of liberalization and freedom throughout the East European bloc. If the liberal Czechooslovak Government wishes to remain in power, it will have to agree to tougher censorship, absolute fidelity to the Warsaw Pact, and the establishment of a cordon sanitaire between West Germany and Russia.

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203

Excerpts from the May 28, 1968, "warning" by the Soviet Union that the West German Emergency Laws could have a serious effect on European security. The new laws, if adopted, would enable the West German Government to raise at almost any time a paramilitary force of several hundred thousand to transform the peacetime economy into a wartime one and to militarize the entire country. The Soviet Union is ready, together with the other peace-loving states, to take all necessary measures to ensure that these forces shall never again disturb the peace of the peoples of Europe.

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Portion of the hearings were noted in v. 3, no. 1, "from 225, and the chapter entitled 'Basic Issues' was noted in v. 2, no. 4, item 146, of this bibliography.


Staff reports and testimony presented before the subcommittee during its general review of the Atlantic alliance. Troubled by recent signs of growing solidarity among NATO members, the subcommittee examined the alliance's political and military strategies, and the impact of nuclear arms limitations. The papers emphasized NATO's importance to the vital interests of the United States and recommended measures for strengthening the alliance.

205

In response to political and economic pressure to reduce U.S. foreign military bases, the administration has established a study group headed by Robert McNamara, a former defense secretary, and retired General Robert Wood to evaluate America's overseas bases network. Although the study group may indicate a need for additional bases to fill the voids caused by Britain's withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and the Far East, it is expected to recommend an overall reduction in America's overseas bases, including U.S. NATO forces, if the defense with Russia can be reestablished in the wake of the Czech occupation. Improvements in weaponry, equipment, and mobility; increasing resentment of foreign nations over the presence of American troops, the cutoff of some $2.3 billion annually, demands for the closure of U.S. bases by countries that have shifted toward the Communist camp, and military developments in hostile countries adjacent to U.S. bases are among the many considerations that will influence the study group's conclusions.

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Reports on the U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR) and examines the reorganization and relocation of U.S. troops that resulted both from De Gaulle's ultimatum for allied withdrawal from French territory and from efforts to correct the unfavorable balance of payments. Except for occasional anti-Vietnam demonstrations, relations between USAEUR and the natives remained less than ideal. Programs to introduce understanding, both within USAEUR and the allied troop and between USAEUR and the civilian community, are under way.

207

The three Nordic countries, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, have often been described as recently appraised in all fores of NATO's further development as the weakest points of the Atlantic organization. However, as the time for NATO's renewal approaches, the results of their attitudes have crystallized, and there is little chance that they will remain in NATO. A traditionally oriented toward Western Europe and unable to organize a Nordic defense alliance, they feel that NATO still offers military, political, and economic advantages. Besides, they want to preserve the so-called Scandinavian system of power. As Finland is bound by a treaty with the Soviet Union and Sweden is neutral, Norway and Denmark must remain in NATO in order to provide security. In the present situation they doubt that NATO could be disbanded, but they want it to become a mechanism for bilateral negotiations to ease the international tension. Today the extralatine countries are more important and have a larger scope of action than the bloc countries. A neutral Nordic area could be instrumental in intensifying international cooperation and promoting intra-European ties.

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What role should military power play in national security? Traditionally, states have increased their military power to guarantee their security, but today this policy produces a "dilemma". Military power may be increased with no increase in relative security. In fact, gains in military strength may
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Organizations, weaponry, and military tactics of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. The book contains more than 200 illustrations of weapons.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1 Biological


Urges an ecological model of the highly complex behavioral and biological links between warfare and disease. Alland suggests that the health patterns of a given society depend on an ecological relationship between its members, disease organisms, vectors, and reservoir populations. He argues to reduce the incidence of disease by making genetic and behavioral adjustments appropriate to the given ecology, but if the latter is disturbed an increased disease rate and lowered viability may result. He cites the plaque epidemics of European history to illustrate the theory and then applies it to present-day events in Vietnam. In that country, deforestation, the interruption of public health services, population movement, overcrowding, physical and psychological stress, and other disturbances have greatly increased the probability of serious epidemics and of long-term damage to the population.

213 Amur, S. M. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: A NEW THREAT TO LIFE ON EARTH. Science chronicle, v. 6, April/June 1968: 507.

Biological weapons could potentially pose a greater threat to mankind than thermic or chemical weapons. As little as one milligram of a deadly virus would have the destructive equivalent of a hydrogen bomb or 100,000 kilograms of nerve gas. Since biological weapons are designed to resist immunization and treatment and to break down the body’s natural defenses, their mortality and spreading rate is extremely high. In addition to creating disease and suffering, the use of microbes in war could have very serious ecological effects—possibly the end of the human race. Despite their destructive potential, however, biological weapons will not become viable until researchers have devised adequate means for their delivery and control. A group of scientists from 13 countries, known as the Puwah study group, is currently endeavoring to create public awareness of the grave consequences of the continued development of bacteriological weapons and to marshal public opinion into demanding a ban on further research.


Partial contents: --Radioactivity: death of an atom; --Nuclear radiations; --Atomic fission: an atom splits in two; --Power from the atom; --The atomic fission bomb; --Energy from nuclear fusion; --Biological effects of nuclear radiations.

P&G RR

The methods which are commonly used during peace-time for the determination of radioactive substances in food supplies and in potable water can largely be adapted to the conditions of a chemical field laboratory. However, they are frequently too tedious for use during crises. This is particularly valid for the determination of radioactive substances which cannot be determined by 

Spectroscopy. This includes 

y-rays without x-components or without y-emitting daughter-radioactive substances. Their number is small, if one only takes into consideration the radioactive substances released by the explosion of nuclear weapons; however, this group includes radioactive strontium which is known to be particularly dangerous and, as account of this, the chemical separation process cannot be foregone. The radioactive-chemical separation process may, to a certain extent, be accelerated by knowingly accepting the losses of the sought radioactive substances, after the addition of a known amount of inactive carrier substances, and by determining the percentage of the carrier value at the end of the analysis. The radioactive-chemical result is identical to the chemical result. If, in urgent cases involving food supplies, the determination in the process-range is foregone, then considerably smaller samples will be adequate and the time required for drying and incineration, as well as the measurement times, will be correspondingly shorter than in the case if one is working at the low present activity range. The distribution of the test material in a thin layer on 12A-sheet metal permits shortening the time to the availability of the raw ash to 60 minutes with a few food materials. For the evaluation of this method, the tracer-technique observation of every analytical step by direct y-determination is of considerable value. For radioactive strontium, the year-emitter 89Sr was found useful as a radioactivity indicator. (Abstract supplied, modified)


Qi, Y, v. 42

Criticizes the use of herbicides for defoliation and crop destruction in Vietnam. Gallatin describes the various types of chemical compounds used, the methods by which they are applied, and the extent of application. He discusses the chemical and biological mechanisms involved in defoliation to the extent that they are known but stresses that this knowledge is based almost exclusively on laboratory experiments or field applications in areas with plant and animal ecologies very different from Southeast Asia. Scientific ignorance of the biological environment in Vietnam means that the United States cannot foresee the overall and long-term effects of the large-scale application of herbicides. Possibly direct harm to the human population will result, as well as suicidal and lasting damage to the soil and agriculture of the country.


RA41, A41, v. 58

Updates the results of a continuing epidemiologic study of coronary heart disease (CHD) in Hiroshima. Since 1958 a sample of 20,000 A-bomb survivors and others has been subjected to intensive clinical and mortality study at the Atomic Bomb Casualty Committee in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing an opportunity to observe the natural history of disease in the Japanese and its modification by various radiation. No relationship was found between radiation exposure and the incidence and prevalence of CHD.


Discusses the chief difficulties encountered in predicting the impact of radiation exposure on the effectiveness of military units in combat. The nonavailability of data from real combat experiences in nuclear war makes predictions of this kind very uncertain both for units as a whole and for the individual soldier. Furthermore, what constitutes 'combat effectiveness' is largely a matter of command decision and thus is contingent on the exigencies of battle.


P&G RR

Reports on the symposium of Fachverband für Strahlenschutz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, held May 27 through June 1, 1968, at Interlaken, Switzerland. Meserschmidt outlines the papers on radiation effects delivered by American and British experts, among others. Despite some protestations that discussion of defense against nuclear attack would be inappropriate, the meeting dealt with such matters at the urging of Swiss participants and the Swiss Government in particular, which is still concerned with the nuclear war danger and adequate defense measures to preserve the Swiss national heritage. Among the participants were experts from East European countries.


HBI E26, v. 58

2 Economic
Industrial concentration is not, as Professor Galbraith believes, an unavoidable consequence of humanable economic and technological forces. Rather it is the outgrowth of discriminatory and privilege-creating economic policies. American firms have invoked Government protection to avoid the danger of what Schumpeter has described as the "perennial gale of creative destruction." The petroleum industry is a good case in point, but the military-industrial complex is a better example. The complex is not a conspiracy but a natural coalition of interest groups. It was brought into being, and is now sustained, by defense and space contracting, research and development funding, patent grants, stockpiling, alienation of the public domain, and international trade restrictions. Recently the complex has grown so powerful that it controls the Government, its creator, has ceased to be its master and become instead its instrument. But precisely because it is a creature of policy and not of economic necessity the complex can be controlled and its influence reduced. The Government should cease interfering in competitive markets and resume its role as an indispensable state that enforces private privilege. When intervention is unavoidable, the Government should adopt policies that encourage the decentralization of power, where monopoly is inevitable, it should apply management techniques that will ensure its control over contractor performance.

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Attacks the Johnson administration's 10 percent tax surcharge decision. Eisen argues that President Johnson's only real motive for the tax surcharge was "the need for manipulating American public opinion in favor of himself, his party, and his policies." This kind of self-serving is characteristic of American leadership as a whole. U.S. foreign policy, for example, is not directed at external targets but at the American people themselves in order that the leadership can keep itself in power. Social scientists must cease answering technical questions from the political leaders of the moment and instead begin to concern themselves with the ends of policy. Otherwise, they will become involved in a game being played with the American people that serves the interests of the leadership alone.

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Bibliographical footnotes.

Surveys the economic aspects of defense procurement in Europe and attempts to demonstrate its place in the wider context of general economic activity. The countries examined--Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Holland, and Belgium--were chosen because of their proportionately large share of the total West European defense procurement expenditure and because most of Europe's defense-related industrial activity takes place within their boundaries. The main questions considered are: What have these countries bought in the years 1955-64? How much have they spent on different categories of equipment? Did they buy this equipment at home or abroad? What resources for the design, development, and production of defense equipment do they possess, and how are they organized?

The survey reveals an increase in European defense-procurement expenditures and an expansion of defense-production resources during the 10-year period. Volume 2 reviews the defense procurement procedures of the seven countries. The general defense policy for each is summarized briefly, followed by an explanation of its military procurement policies and a description of its defense industry.

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P&GP RR
Pt. 2 appeared as item no. 722 in v. 4, no. 2, of this bibliography.

Compilation of statistics that support Hennis's thesis expressed in his earlier articles that "war is an essential structural characteristic of world policy" and that American bourgeois-capitalist society increasingly depends on the military establishment. The world's military expenditures are so heavily concentrated in the United States and the Soviet Union that the arms race is almost completely bipolar. China would need a "nucleotide" and France a "seventh" increase of its military expenditures to achieve, respectively, the Soviet and the American armament level.

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Congress and the President will encounter many difficulties if and when they attempt to reduce defense spending in the post-Vietnam period. The Federal Government currently accounts for three-fourths of the nearly $30 billion earned annually by the aerospace companies, and company workers and officials will make every effort to maintain and even increase this spending level. Aerospace industry representatives are already "campaigning for new strategic delivery systems even though the development of multiple independently-guided reentry vehicles should adequately maintain America's assured destruction capability without the addition of costly new aircraft and missiles. Congress appears to be more responsive to the aerospace demands than to the repeated assurances of Defense Department officials that the U.S. deterrent is not endangered now or in the foreseeable future. Only two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee voted against deployment of a light ABM system after listening to Pentagon testimony about the present weaknesses of the U.S. deterrent. Continued pressure by industry and union officials after the Vietnam War will make it exceedingly difficult for the President to reduce the budget funds formerly expended on the Southeast Asian conflict. It appears that Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex was prophetic: "It may have become a machine like a nuclear chain reactor with fission controls, so that it defies a power reduction."

225
Details the adverse effects on the American national economy of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Maresztki considers the escalation of the war by the United States responsible for the "rapid acceleration of the crisis tendencies" in the U.S. economy. The main cause of these tendencies is the high degree of militarization of the U.S. monopoly capital. The Vietnamese movement of national liberation has brought U.S. global strategy into this critical situation, and only through that movement can peace be reached.

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UGS35. GT1252, v. 8

Great Britain would be wise to draw on U.S. experience in the use of economic analysis for improving the efficiency of its armed forces. Operating in an organization that is not highly motivated toward efficiency, military managers would be greatly aided by the adoption of cost-effectiveness techniques, i.e., methods for seeking either the cheapest way to attain desired objective or to achieve the maximum-effectiveness from an established budget. In addition, economists could work closely with military experts in improving budgeting and accounting techniques, solving problems of procurement and logistics, and formulating equitable contracting procedures for the acquisition of advanced weapon systems.

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H4B, 626, v. 58

The close, long-term relationship between the Department of Defense and its major civilian contractors has led to a convergence of the two in a new relationship where the distinction between private and public sectors of the economy has disappeared. Private suppliers have taken on the characteristics of Government arsenals, with the Defense Department making the decisions and assuming the risks once reserved for business management. As a result, the ability and willingness of defense-oriented firms to compete in the open market has drastically declined. These developments do not imply a conspiratorial military-industrial complex, nor do they support Professor Galbraith's thesis that all firms are becoming part of the governmental administration apparatus. Evidence of significant structural differences between defense-oriented and market-oriented firms suggests the contrary of Galbraith's hypothesis. Expectations of large defense cutbacks have provoked demands that alternative uses be found for defense firm resources, but would it be wise to expand a branch of industry possessed of the "mentality of a government arsenal"? One benefit of disarmament might be the "opportunity to reduce if not eliminate this semimilitarized branch of the American economy."

3. Ethical and Social

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Notes: p. 207-209.

Religion, especially in its institutionalized church form, has always prescribed universal love and brotherhood and proscribed against killing and violence. Yet the institutionalized church has always rationalized and come around to the support of the war and institutionally organized killing by its national community. This disarray between religious norms and practice has historically disturbed ideals and intrigued students of religion. This paper is concerned with how a universalistic-religion confronts and resolves the dilemma - war versus a particularistic socio-political system. It discusses (1) the theoretical bases for the non-pacifist attitudes and behavior of the institutional churches within the framework of the sociological 'Church-Sect' concept, and (2) the available data to lend support to the major hypothesis, that the church as a social institution (as opposed to the sect) is both reflexive and supportive of society's values and practices and that the church, therefore, functions primarily as an agent of conservatism rather than as an agent of social change. These postulates are strongly supported by four sets of data and empirical evidence. The first fully supports the implication that outright opposition to war - conscientious objection - would be more evident in the sects than the churches. The second study supports the thesis that the church, through the chaplaincy system, resolves the value conflict in favor of society in a manner to support the values and objectives of the socio-political system in war. The third study supports the postulate that the church is accommodative in that its stand on social issues depends largely upon the mood and sentiment of its parishioners rather than the standing upon its own religious values. The last set of evidence sheds light on the thesis that the church remains essentially a conservative force by compartmentalizing its radicalism within the campus ministry - i.e., the church is a conservative rather than change-inducing agent vis-a-vis society. (Abstract supplied, modified)

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All conscientious objectors should be exempted from military service - selective as well as absolute. The four arguments against legally exempting selective conscientious objectors presented by the majority of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service "failed to make even the beginning of a case for differential treatment of absolute and selective conscientious objectors." Furthermore, there is no basis for this legal distinction, assuming that one places a high priority on the right to life and that conscientious thought and conduct are central values of civilized society. "Forcing conscientious objectors to fight and kill may be permitted under some circumstances, and there is no reason to treat absolute pacifists differently in such situations, except possibly practical consideration."

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["1942"] 352 p
Partial contents: --How calamities influence our affective and emotional life. --How famines influence our behavior. --How calamities influence the vital processes. --The influence of calamities upon political, economic, and social organization. --How calamities affect the religious and ethical life of society. --Sorokin concludes that as long as any of these calamities continue society will experience an increase of various mental disturbances, psychic diseases, and emotional and affective instabilities.


Recent actions by the Army Research Office (ARO) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) indicate that the Defense Department is in danger of questioning the renewal of contracts of its researchers who openly criticize the Vietnam war. The ARO and the ONR notified mathematicians on their research projects who signed a published statement condemning the war that their contracts would not be renewed. Because of its tradition of utilizing the "best people," the Defense Department wants to avoid alienating the academic community and disavows that these actions point to a new policy toward Vietnam dissenters. However, strong congressional pressure to cut off the funds of Government-backed researchers who publicly protest the war, plus the conviction of some Pentagon officials that the Defense Department is justified in raising the "question of conscience," may turn an isolated incident into a general trend.

4. Other


The reasons for opposing conscientious objection to particular wars prove insufficient upon examination. Some contend that during war the nation is involved in a life or death struggle and permitting individual citizens the right to object on the basis of personal convictions would constitute too great a danger. However, eliminating from the armed services those who morally object to a particular war actually increases the safety factor. Others claim that allowing the individual to object to specific wars is unreasonable and cannot be tolerated in a law-governed community. Nevertheless, the United States may at times act immorally, and individual citizens must pass judgment upon their government's actions. Some assert that letting each citizen the privilege of "opting out" in crises situations is an invitation to chaos. But obtaining the status of conscientious objector is not a matter of simple option; it entails careful documentation and examination. Others maintain that it would be difficult to determine the legitimacy of applications for this status and that efforts would be encouraged. These predictions are probably false, but it seems that escape from military service by deception, that would be the "price that can be paid by a society whose only concern is the "humanity and justice of its laws." Legislation allowing conscientious objection to a specific war would establish a safety valve for the system. They do propose by individuals to participate could act as a restraint upon political leaders and could help prevent grave international crimes by "honourably motivated but narrow-minded or irrational leaders."


Although the United States cannot conveniently withdraw from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), it could probably pursue its policy goals more effectively in the Middle East and Asia if it were free to operate on a bilateral basis. Unlike NATO, SEATO and CENTO are not soundly based upon a community of interests. Most non-European countries allied themselves with the United States primarily because of expectations of aid rather than concern over the Communist threat. Many have become disillusioned because their membership did not garner them special consideration in regional disputes. However, despite the fact that the alliances are not the best answers to problems in diverse areas and involve the United States in "intranational squabbles," they do provide a political leverage in negotiations with the Russians. SEATO and CENTO can never become as effective as NATO in the implementation of U.S. policy. Modern alliances are not just fighting alliances and must provide the framework for economic and political cooperation as well as mutual security. NATO best fits the concept of the contemporary alliance and could eventually lead to a partnership that could protect "a stern power, political and economic—and if necessary, military—to all corners of the globe."


Reviews the functions, purposes, and provisions of international patents and technical data. These agreements facilitate the transfer of technical information and patent rights between governments but are too broad to cover "specific cooperative defense programs involving research, development, and production." In such cases an executive agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding, is negotiated to protect private proprietary rights. But until lawyers pay more attention to the entire field of intellectual property, intergovernmental relations will continue to force the law to be a more question of diplomacy than of precedent.


The protracted power struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Lin Shao-chih has brought about the long-standing Marxist principle that "the party must control the gun." Centralized government in China has been replaced almost everywhere by an as
yet indeterminate form of military rule. This transformation of the Chinese political structure came about during the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and is perhaps its most significant result. In the early phases of the Cultural Revolution the People's Liberation Forces (PLF) gave evidence that it would be an efficient and unhesitating instrument of Mao's rule. However, the PLF was not able to take part in the factional struggle with Lin without itself becoming a prey to factionalism, and for this reason regional military commanders began to adopt an increasingly neutral attitude toward the political antagonists. In practical terms, this meant a policy of maintaining local order with military force irrespective of the faction that claimed political control. By July 1967 the party had distanced and Mao's political offensive had collapsed. The PLF—though itself still troubled by regional and factional divisions—was the only instrument of state power still intact. Consequently local authority passed completely into the hands of the military, who also strengthened their influence over a greatly weakened central government and party. This is the situation at present. What the future will bring—increasingly centralized military rule or a revival of warlordism—is uncertain. 


Examine the law of treason and the problems of general criticism of the war effort, more specific forms of expression that could possibly lead to subordination in the armed forces, obstruction of recruitment or resistance to conscription, and protection of wartime dissent against illegitimate harassment. Theoretically the first amendment affords a substantial measure of protection, but if freedom of expression is to withstand the pressures of wartime, the "rule of full protection for expression, as distinct from action" must be applied, making it necessary to define and refine concepts of expression and action...


References: p. 373.

The paper summarizes an investigation of the effects of psychological and situational variables in a study of retaliation which was designed to simulate aspects of accidental nuclear war. An experimental game with options to attack and to retaliate was presented to 196 college students. The factorial design explored the effects of accidental attack, expected iteration, social influence, and timing conditions upon the use of retaliation. Measures of authoritarianism, orientation to military-political strategy, and attitudes relating to nuclear war were obtained. Statistically significant findings were that expected iteration and social influence inhibited retaliation while authoritarianism fostered it. The 'low' interaction variables did not have significant effects. The most important finding was that the possibility of accidental attack did not appreciably inhibit retaliation. (Abstract supplied)

Comments by Roger Galley, Manager of Scientific Research, and Pierre Moreau, Minister of the French Armed Forces, on the scientific and military repercussions of the French H-bomb explosion. The bomb caused little radioactive fallout since it was detonated under perfect weather conditions and at a high altitude, but "it will not have any beneficial effects on civil industry." Messiere believes as long as France has the H-bomb no country will attack it. France can now look forward to beeping up its force de frappe with a nuclear submarine fleet and multiple independent reentry missile. These weapons systems will greatly strengthen not only the military but also the political power of France's striking force.


Reprinted from Neues Deutschland, Apr. 20, 1968.

According to the new Socialist concept all citizens of the German Democratic Republic are responsible for the defense of their country, a duty which has priority over personal and social interests. Today socialism is protected by a union of Socialist states and their military coalition, of which the Soviet Union is a leading force. This unity is based on the conviction that East Germany is worth defending, that the citizens must be educated to patriotism, Socialist internationalism, and deep brotherhood in arms with the Soviet Army and the armies of other Socialist states. The defense of their country and of socialism is the citizens' international duty, which they must fulfill in a potential war imposed by the imperialist aggressors and for the final victory of peace. The children of the citizens should begin their military training in schools, and parents, teachers, and youth organizations must all be responsible for their education.


The Senate should not approve funds for the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system. By intensifying the arms race it will increase the likelihood of nuclear war. The ABM's effectiveness remains uncertain because advance testing under actual conditions is impossible, and since the ABM cannot stop more than a fraction of incoming missiles the enemy can reduce its effectiveness by attacking with more missiles. It will endanger the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the proposed U.S.-U.S.R. talks on limiting offensive and defensive weapons, and the 1963 test-ban treaty. Finally, considering the pressing social and economic problems of the N.A.T.O. and the world, "proposed expenditure" for the ABM represent fiscal irresponsibility. Many maintain that the system is needed against China, but would not be so mad as to make an utterly suicidal attack against our vastly superior nuclear might. Some also contend that the ABM would increase the difficulty for newcomers in mounting a nuclear threat, but challenging the goads in hopeless anyway. Although a year's test explosion in deploying the system would increase the cost of completing it, the delay would foster repea-
II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT


The existence of modern weapons of mass destruction prompts numerous fears about the future of mankind. The new weapons tend to dehumanize warfare, thereby lessening regard for the degree of suffering they inflict and lowering traditional barriers to the use of "inhuman weapons." In the absence of effective controls, there is always the danger that these terrifying weapons might become available to pathological national leaders. The prospect of a Hitler armed with nuclear weapons is frightening, but even "normal" leaders could not, adequately by nationalism to attempt to annihilate "the enemy." Unfortunately, because of widespread personal insecurity nationalism is on the ascendant at a time when it should be considered another static and lethargic. In this atmosphere there is a great danger that the very existence of weapons could contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy: they are there; why not use them? Because of the horrifyingly destructive, once unleashed, the potential for the development of weapons and strategy, military expertise in technological matters is vital. Thus a military profession as a whole must make great efforts to provide newer weapons and "employ them" if they are to be accepted as a matter of fact. It is not sufficient to take the historical step of reappaling some of the treasured national sovereignty in the interests of peace, if peace is to be achieved and maintained.

242 Lorince, Gabriel. RIFT IN THE KREMLIN. New statesman, v. 76, July 12, 1968: 36. APN, N84, v. 76

The U.S. Senate vote authorizing work to begin on America's ABM system helped to startle doves (who advocate a dialogue with the United States on the limitation of offensive and defensive weapons) into their dispute with the military-industrial faction. Seventy-two hours after the vote, Russia offered to hold disarmament talks to talk down the missile race. The doves were also helped by the conclusion of the nonaggressive treaty on the SALT limited tactical nuclear threat, and the Nixon administration's diplomatic overtures and Richard Nixon's presidential nomination. Further, the nuclear arms race in the superpowers has strengthened the "Small State" lobby, which has induced most members of the Senate to resist further testing.


The escalation of the Vietnam War has had adverse consequences for the United States politically, economically, and militarily. The basic failure of McNamara's strategy of gradualist warfare is its public recognition of a strategy to end the war. It has thus contributed to the escalation, along with the U.S. underestimation of its adversary's will to continue to the conference table.


Traces American civil-military relations and examines both the fusion of military and political considerations and their effect on the military establishment. The military's minor role in national affairs remained during and after World War II, and military leaders became increasingly involved in many phases of national policy and planning. A new concept of military-civilian cooperation appears to be emerging, but tradition presents a barrier and may delay its acceptance, thus making coordination of military and civilian roles a major administrative problem. Miles cites Walter Millis' conclusion that "the civilian and military elements in our society have become so deeply intermeshed that neither the uniformed officers nor the administrative bureaucracy nor the representative legislature speak from any firm, independent position of principle or policy." This is the real problem in civil-military relations, as opposed to the "ascendancy of the civil Secretary of Defense or the military directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Today national objectives require "an optimum blend of both the military's and the political's" view of the world. The impact of the fusion has both threatened and challenged the military establishment. An aggressive Secretary of Defense with new management techniques has presented a threat to the old system of service compartmentalization and to static military concepts. His efforts to centralize decisionmaking have resulted in increased civilian command and control. This situation challenges military officers to accept the procedures and responsibilities involved.

245 Moro, Koichi. JUDGMENTS OF PARIS. Japan quarterly, v. 15, July 1968: 298-300. UGC, C274, v. 15

America's continued escalation of the Vietnam War has caused Japanese to act in a fashion for the United States to reach a low ebb. While the Japanese Government has consistently followed a pro-American policy in Vietnam and cooperation between the two governments has increased since November 1967, the gap between the Sato government and the Japanese people has widened. The "moral and political" and strategic arguments produced in America in an attempt to justify the bombing have failed to convince the Japanese. They believe the South Vietnamese people must be allowed to determine their own fate, and they have handed the coups over to the Vietnamese. They also believe that America will give serious consideration to the proposals of the Gaulle and U Thant for a return to the 1954 Geneva resolutions calling for neutralization of the Indo-China peninsula.

Growing concern over the unforeseen consequences of technological innovation—part of a more general anxiety about the growth of impersonal and arbitrary power in a planned social order—points to a troubling decade ahead for research and development (R&D) programs. The central problem with R&D has been the merging of Government bureaucracy with private contractors into a whole to which the old ethical standards and accounting practices are no longer applicable. The challenge is to find a new system of values and institutions to protect political freedom and pluralism as individual initiative and property once did. The problem is not so much to control technology as it is to control the interest groups that make public policy, and the solution is not to eliminate these groups but to increase and diversify them by insuring that no group with interests at stake in an R&D decision is excluded from the decision-making process. In short, R&D must be politicized; the experts must be stripped of their mystery and overrated authority and made to submit to politics. In conjunction with this essential step, a balanced set of national priorities must be drawn up; Government-civilian contract relationships must be formalized to guarantee the interests of both parties; performance variances in the form of 'in-house' capabilities must be maintained, at least where they do not exist in the civilian economy; and new methods of R&D funding, e.g., codetermination with foundations, must be tried experimentally. But the pivot is still politics, troublesome, unavoidable, and good for the nation."

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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has revealed that the Pentagon's nonmilitary research program is characterized by lavish spending for many projects of dubious quality that frequently have little relevance to defense needs and are potentially embarrassing for the United States. Focusing upon the many nonmilitary studies in the social and behavioral sciences and "think-tank" research, the committee has challenged the policy underlying multibillion-dollar defense programs in an attempt to trim the spiraling defense budget. In allocating responsibility for this research program, the committee indicts the Defense Department's research role being criticized by a growing number of Senators, who are disturbed by the "safe" and exempt of its research, members of the academic community, who fear the conversion of social science into a Pentagon service industry, and members of the military, who contend that emphasis upon social science research detracts from the military's efficiency and will be divided into five teams, each of which will spend 12 days on the ocean floor. Although the main purposes of the $6 million experiment--which will include studies of human physiology, deep-water salvage, underwater construction, seismology, search and rescue procedures, and Commercial Shelf gas--are scientific and commercial, the Navy is also interested in its long-range military applications. Techniques learned from Seabath I have been applied to the construction of undersea surveillance bases, monitoring stations, navigational devices, and weather stations.

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The problems of combating military developments, operations, and agencies, and of improving the contributions of the social sciences to political-military policy making have been acknowledged. The size and the intensity of U.S. military development efforts in other nations' internal wars and nation-building operations with the increasing absence of the social sciences to contribute to the identification and evaluation of military programs in intervention areas. The ability to identify nations and subnational regions likely to be involved in future emergencies would constitute a breakthrough to the lead time for development planning and intervention itself. Although political and military assessments of potential insurgency theaters exist, social science can improve the data base on which these assessments are based and thereby facilitate theater identifications. The optimal formulas that identify potential insurgencies, however, require that development aided does not remain evolutionary conditions are not enough. A precise study of revolutionary behavior is necessary in order to human development operations for the various stages of a revolution. Once a revolution is identified as corresponding to one of six stages, which range from initial conflict-alignment to the withdrawal of a revolution, arms development aims at behavior at this stage can be initiated and the conditions for moving to another stage can, in theory, be prevented from occurring. Where properly identified and well planned, development operations can significantly strengthen a nation's ability to initiate insurgencies.

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The alleged slowdown in the construction of the Soviet limited ADB system confirms the planning assumption of the ADB system's weakness. The ADB would consume roughly one percent of the annual Soviet national income. With its small amount of ADB's, the ADB would still have a devastating effect on a broad attack. In contrast to other weapons, however, the ADB must be locally effective. If that is the case then there will be a serious drawback. The technical difficulties of ensuring such reliability are formidable, and the costs would be prohibitive. In addition a large body of scientific space by automation would be needed. It would be difficult to maintain a large body of relatively independent and effective major systems without the U.S. being able to maintain any major.
II THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

...more's worth in a nationwide radar and computer network on which a more effective missile defense chain can be built "when that ever becomes possible."


Outlines the military applications and management tools of operations research (OR). Van Gelder defines some of the analytical tools of OR, dynamic programming, game theory, symbolic logic, and search theory, and notes that definitions help to isolate the terms and prevent confusion in their use. These tools can be applied to such military problems as equipment replacement, transportation and logistics, simulation, and network analysis. The author concludes that OR should be widely used in the Australian Services because of its almost universal acceptance in business as an invaluable aid in the isolation of research and industrial problems.


Enumerates the principal reasons why there is no popular demand for civil defense. First, the artificial defense establishment is too powerful, second, a tragic backdrop is unacceptable to think about, third, people do not believe such a disaster could happen. Warner concludes that "whether or not there is content can be insured by closing our eyes to these dangers."


Deployment of ABM systems by the two superpowers could strategically stabilize if these systems are so constructed as not to threaten the second-strike capability of the opposing superpowers, while remaining completely effective against all third powers. This raises the question for both superpowers of convincing the other side that active systems really is ineffective against it although demonstrably effective against third states. It also establishes the need to resist all pressures to escalate from a light to a heavy ABM system. The momentum toward expansion of a light system is powerful, but it can be resisted. The possibility that active defense will make superpower guarantees to non-nuclear powers more realistic and thus reduce the attractiveness of possessing nuclear weapons should not be overlooked because of preoccupation with the bipolar strategic balance. ABM deployment also has implications for the international power structure as a whole since it is likely to reverse the trend toward diffusion of power that began in the early 1960's. The impact of ABM deployment on alliances cannot be predicted. Certainly some states will be tempted to range themselves closer to the superpowers but, since this will involve a loss of independence, many may turn to nonalignment or a Gaullist solution to their security problems. For the immediate future however, the third states will probably attempt to avoid painful decisions by opposing all ABM deployment by the superpowers. To the extent that this restraint the superpowers from deploying heavier ABM systems the effect will be salutary.
III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

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Partial contents: --International law as law. --The allocation of legal competences among states. --The limitation of violence in international conflict. --The development of international social and economic welfare legislation. --A climate of opinion on international relations: the development of an international political culture. --Bibliography.

An introduction to international law and legal organization. Coplin's major concern is to construct a theoretical framework that will "come to grips with the operational role of international law in the contemporary world." His explanation of the way law functions to limit international violence stresses the central theoretical value of conceptualizing force in terms taken from the bargaining process, while his assessment of its contribution to the more general goals of a rational international order rests on the proposition that law is instrumental in creating "an international political culture through the socialization of a consensus on the nature of the state system."

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LL

The basic Soviet philosophy concerning the substantive nature of the law of nations is the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between "socialist and non-socialist states." While extremely positivist in its articulation, the doctrine in certain respects resembles some conceptions of early natural-law schools, although it does not share their classical rationalization. Based on Marxist-Leninist dialectic, it is intensely political, merely dressed in legal trappings, and totally unconcerned with a code of principles applicable to all nations.

Its goal is to influence non-Soviet disarmament and pave the way for Soviet world domination. In its ultra-positivist rejection of certain long-established basic principles of international law, the Soviet Union finds allies in the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa, which argue that they have not participated in the formulation of those principles. Soviet positivism serves to protect Soviet states' interests against legal principles to which the Socialist state has not expressly agreed. The Soviet concept of natural law, on the other hand, offers "a technique to warrant any and all departures from previously accepted restrictions, justifying the legal means by the end pursued." This fits well into the Soviet doctrine on wars of national liberation and its parent doctrine of "just war" which legitimates gross violation of the right of every state to be free from outside interference and makes defense against such an unlawful act an international illegality if the violation serves Soviet or Socialist interests. The same reasoning applies to the legality of belligerent action during hostilities. Unless the Soviet Union discards its doctrine of world revolution, the prospects for an evil United 88 International norms serving the generalized interests of all nations-states of the world must remain as elusive as they have been since World War II."

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LL

Discusses abortive attempts by the United Nations to define aggression. Hazard contends that unless such attempts are limited to discussions instead of polemics there is little chance a viable official definition will ever be found.

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LL

Explains that the current occupation rights of the United States over Guantanamo "were not founded upon and did not arise from or grow out of any treaty or agreement between Cuba and the United States but were established before Cuba became a subject of international law. Consecutive American-Cuban agreements used the term 'leased' in reference to Guantanamo strictly within the framework of the municipal legal system and not within that of the law of nations. Since Cuba never acquired ultimate sovereignty over Guantanamo, neither the rebus sic stantia doctrine nor the principle 'pacta sunt servanda' [treaties are to be kept] can have any legal effect on Cuban-American relations in regard to occupation rights."

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LL

Analyzes principles regulating modern warfare—the Nuremberg precedent and conventional international law—to determine if they provide a legal basis for selective conscientious objection. O'Brien discovers that many of the traditional laws of war and the Nuremberg principles are no longer relevant to the type of conflict underway in Southeast Asia. He concludes that the most justifiable position for an individual is general conscientious objection.
III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

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Text is quoted "with the addition of words omitted from telegram."

Text of the February 8, 1968, telegram from Secretary of State to all diplomatic posts, which stresses the illegality of North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo because it was on the high seas and never violated the North Korean territorial sea. As a commissioned vessel of the United States Navy the Pueblo was entitled to "absolute immunity from any jurisdiction other than that of the flag state"--the traditional rule of international law. "The seizure of foreign war ships or other attacks upon them are much too dangerous and provocative acts to be permitted by international law."

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Explores the implications of the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command "for the international system and for the international legal order." The authors consider at length the French case against NATO, which comprises, among other things, the risks of entanglement in "unwanted" war, the reduced credibility of the American nuclear deterrent on which the NATO defense concept rests, and the "illegal" change of NATO strategy. The French invocation, although not by name, of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine was not, since NATO has evolved beyond a traditional military alliance of questionable stability into the embodiment of institutionalized Atlantic collaboration and thus a subsystem of the existing world order. In the case of France, NATO review and termination rules should have taken precedence over recourse to the rebus sic stantibus doctrine. The concept of 'partial withdrawal from an international organization is hardly compatible with rational development of international organizations." However, in this case all parties concerned have accepted France's unilateral action as a lesser evil than its possible withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty.

261


Discusses that "offences against international law--crimes against peace, humanity and human rights as first laid down in the London Four-Power Agreement of August 8th 1945 and later generally acknowledged as international law--e.g., the convention of December 9, 1949, against genocide--are expressly included in the German Democratic Republic's new penal code. Winnacher, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice of the Republic, points out that such crimes do not fall under the statute of limitations.

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Points out that "unlike outer space, ocean space is not a 'lawless realm,' and its legal history cannot be ignored" in any international convention on use of the deep-sea floor. Modern technological developments have opened up numerous possibilities for exploitation, including military, of the floor. Young discusses the Continental Shelf Convention and doctrines that may be of consequence for legal control of the floor and considers exploratory efforts by the United Nations and the United States that may help future international legislation.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

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The U.S. Government attitude toward the United Nations is ambivalent. The United States first criticized U Thant's public appeal for a bombing halt as meddling in U.S. Far Eastern affairs and then, when an American naval intelligence ship was seized in the Far East, demanded appropriate action by the U.N. Security Council. This ambivalence has undercut U.S. basic interests because America now has no effective voice for objections to violations of world peace. The United Nations needs an identity that transcends the foreign policies of its members; insistence on national sovereignty at the expense of world government has increased world insecurity. The United States should be definitely committed to the principle of world peace; this could represent a new beginning for American influence in world affairs.

BLZ700, P76, v. 26


"A condensation of a lecture delivered at Stanford University as a part of the Stanford Union's Century 21 Project."

An effectively nurturing world order based on the rule of law is composed of international institutions empowered because, interact, and enforce rules and decisions. Suggestions for attaining this world order include drawing all major powers into the world community's main institutions with membership an obligation rather than a privilege; improving the rule-making and decision-making capacity of U.N. organs; conferring power of the General Assembly to adopt basic rules of international behavior; strengthening the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction and giving it the right to interpret the U.N. rules; enforcing decisions of international tribunals by improving peacekeeping forces; and hastening disarmament by halting unnecessary arms trade and placing both arms trade and the restriction of arms under U.N. control.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES


UL.Rh, v. 113


Outlines the problems of peacekeeping as Wilson experienced them as U.N. Chief of Staff in Cyprus. He notes the importance of carefully selecting senior officers, maintaining good relations between national contingents, preliminary briefing for all ranks of a U.N. force, establishing a colocated political-military headquarters, ensuring that senior officers understand how the diplomatic machine works, quick and accurate reporting to U.N. headquarters in New York, and careful drafting and interpretation of U.N. mandates. The U.N. Force Headquarters should be built up on an international basis, and the force commander must think supranationally and give careful consideration to those powers to employ force that he wishes to possess. Political training for senior officers should be required, and contingency planning for future theaters of operations is needed.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS


TMLS1, A765, v. 50

Despite its small staff of about 230 people and an annual budget that has never exceeded $4 million, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has steadily increased its influence in policy-making since its establishment in 1961. "Its Director is the principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control affairs. ACDA is in fact closely integrated with the State Department and maintains strong ties in the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, although it does not always get its own way in policy disputes with these agencies. Most Congressmen support ACDA's efforts since, as one spokesman pointed out, "No one really wants to be caught as being opposed to peace." An America's government agency for arms control and disarmament matters, the Agency is responsible for initiating and implementing arms control policies, conducting international negotiations in disarmament matters, and sponsoring research on the technical, economic, social, political, and diplomatic aspects of arms control. ACDA is the focal point in the U.S. Government for arms control matters, but proposals for action can originate anywhere and are often submitted for analysis to task groups composed of, representatives from both the Government and private sectors. Significant policies are always coordinated by ACDA's senior policymaking body, the Committee of Principals, which is composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, AEC, NASA, and USA, and the special assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Science and Technology. While eventually the Agency may be forced to assume responsibility for managing major systems for arms control, it has to date preferred to let other agencies direct the development of scientific monitoring devices and for the foreseeable future will probably remain a "sparkplug rather than an engine" in arms control affairs.
(2) A principal prerequisite of Europe's unification and rise,

3.3. Principal factors of the present European policy of collective security: the European Union and the nuclear force field, and its preliminary usage, the "WPAU" (European Union).

Advocates establishment of a pan-American world union as a means of saving the third from applying the Armageddon. Brandstätter sees in man's political, economic, social, and technological developments the effects of "cosmic magnetism," a part of the "universal force field" defined by Agni Yaga, among others.

22


An investigation into the psychological roots of war. Using evidence obtained from content analyses of political speeches and writings and from prescriptive studies of public opinion, Fieldcliff claims to have established a correlation between militarism and an "authoritarian faith" on the one hand, and pacifism and a "democratic faith" on the other. He argues that authoritarian faith originates in traumatic childhood experiences of aggression and guilt, and on this basis suggests methods by which authoritarians can be won over to democratic and peaceful principles. To apply these methods on a sufficient scale, "all we need is a world connect one world parliament, world police, and world court.

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Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars since WWII, the United States has failed to establish world peace or to bring stability and prosperity to the newly developing nations. It has done no better on the homefront in dealing with the problems of race and poverty and is faced with a domestic crisis possibly more threatening than the foreign one. Ideas and programs to deal with these problems abound, but resources do not. Where will the money to get the needs of the United States to hold a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, to adopt some form of the enclave strategy, and to press vigorously for a negotiated settlement. But funds are needed now, not at some indefinite time in the future, and to get them the United States cannot let "trivial arguments of cost-accounting" stand in its way. The project led by a man on the moon, the superatomic transport, and Project Groucho must all be postponed. U.S. commitments to Europe must be reduced, and the deployment of additional missiles, offensive and defensive, must be delayed. Most of the funds released by these measures should go into domestic programs, but a significant fraction should be reserved for foreign aid, and the American people must make the necessary sacrifices, only in this way can optimism about America's future be restored.

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Operating in a framework of international cooperation, communication satellites could contribute enormously to world development and understanding. New satellites will soon be available that will bypass the necessity for the expensive ground relay stations used by present satellites. Such an inexpensive and effective way of reaching large areas of the population. However, the tremendous potential of these new broadcast satellites may never be realized unless a comprehensive international space communications program can be started. Such a program should promote the development of a network of broadcast satellites and encourage studies of international organizations of the benefits of space broadcasting. Pilot projects should be organized to demonstrate the potential contribution of space communications to national economic and political development, and national and international lending agencies should be persuaded to finance space broadcasting systems in less-developed countries. Although the United States should retain the option of communicating with hostile nations during a serious international crisis, it should assure foreign governments that under all other circumstances they will not receive political or commercial messages against their will. U.N. endorsement of international cooperation in space broadcasting should be sought and the International Telecommunication Union convened that it should begin assigning radio frequencies for space broadcasting operations. Finally, the space communications program should promote the use of satellites for publicizing U.N. activities and proceedings. Greater knowledge of U.N. objectives could substantially increase the chances of their realization. Furthermore, worldwide broadcasts of opposing national viewpoints could help clarify international misunderstandings and lay the groundwork for a peaceful international community.

Reports on the 1968 Pugwash Conference, Czechoslovakia overshadowed all other issues and a compromise report declaring that the Czechoslovak people should be allowed "to run their own affairs" was agreed to only after lengthy and emotional debate. Other reports called for general and complete disarmament, talks on ABM deployment, a comprehensive test ban treaty, conventional arms limitations, and regional arms control arrangements. The nuclear powers were asked to declare formally that they would not attack one another. The conference has managed to free itself from its financial woes but still suffers from the pretense "that scientists act as diplomats and politicians they do it scientifically and therefore better."


The growing disparity between living standards in the developed and the developing nations of the world is a source of international tensions and substantially increases the danger of war. How to reverse this trend is one of the greatest problems facing mankind today. The vast mineral resources beneath the ocean floor offer some hope of a solution, but only recently has man become fully aware of the great potential of these resources and begun to devise the technical means of exploiting them. It is likely that the legal status of these marine minerals will soon be decided by international convention. These resources should be reserved by that convention to all the peoples of the world. A considerable share of them should be designated for use in economic assistance to the developing countries. The benefits would be twofold: the means would be at hand to lift the developing states out of poverty, and the concern of the developed states to find a solution to the problems of underdevelopment would be demonstrated.


In an essay circulated within Soviet scientific circles, Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov made an unprecedented plea for rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He urged the two powers to abandon extreme ideologies and advocated utilizing the scientific techniques of open discussion and intense analysis of facts to seek a route to cooperation and disarmament. Although deeply committed to classic Marxism, Sakharov recommended changes in both Soviet and U.S. domestic and foreign policies to accelerate the "inevitable convergence" between socialism and capitalism. He suggested that the United States make the minimal economic sacrifices needed to increase its support of the poorer countries and discussed the need for greater intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union. Top U.S. scientists, including Paul Doty of Harvard, Jerome Wiesner of M.I.T., and Polykarp Kusch of Columbia, welcomed the Sakharov essay and felt it reflected a liberalizing trend among Soviet professionals. Sakharov's views on the perils of thermonuclear war are shared by many Americans, and his convictions regarding the impossibility of constructing an effective anti-ballistic defense system echo the opinions of physicists Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin published in the March 1968 Scientific American. However, many other scientists in both countries still concentrate on short-range or tactical problems and do not share Sakharov's world view.


Outlines the peace research activities of West German societies, foundations, and institutes: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik; Bonn; Forschungsstelle der Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, Hamboro, Wissenschaft und Politik; Forschungsinstitut für internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Ebenhause/Innsbruck; Gesellschaft für Friedensforschung, Munich, and several others. Summarizes recent studies of developing countries and the role of the United States in world politics.


Declares East Germany's dedication to promoting peace and security in Europe and proposes several measures...
III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

that could ease tensions on the Continent. The West
German Government is criticized for its revisionist
policies and its suppression of democracy at home.
Ulbricht emphasizes that until the Federal Republic
recognizes existing frontiers in Europe, there can be
no solution to the European security problem. Once
Bonn is willing to accept realities in Europe, further
steps can be taken to safeguard European security,
including the admission of both German states to the
United Nations, acceptance of the nonproliferation
treaty, conclusion of a treaty between the two Ger-
mans renouncing the use of force, recognition of the
territorial status quo in Europe, and the normaliza-
tion of relations between the two Germans.

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Proposes a peacemakers academy to teach men and
women languages, technical skills, and peacekeeping
methods. Its opening enrollment of 275 would ulti-
mately grow to between 10,000 and 20,000. Graduates
would serve 3- or 4-year tours of duty in development
projects or local conflict areas, where they would be
available for emergency service for the U.N. Waskow
believes it such an institution had existed a decade or
Arab-Israeli tensions might have been partly re-

He concludes that 10 years from now the world will wish
such an academy had been founded in 1957.

Werkheiser, Don. INVISIBLE TYRANNY, PT. 2.
TOWARD THE ALTERNATIVE OF MUTUAL CONVENI-
ENCE. Journal of human relations, v. 16, no. 2, 1968:
149-166.
Pt. 1 was abstracted as item 1655 in v. 4, no. 4, of
this bibliography.

Western man is caught up in an antiquated symbol
system that stifles thought and communication about
social evils. To escape from the invisible tyranny and
killer culture of the Western war machine, he needs a
new language to express his concern about the human condi-
tion. Human relationships are based on either single
or mutual convenience. A game simulation of these two
types of relationships has proved that, while the former
is the cause of all man's social afflictions, the latter
offers the one hope of escape to a better world. Guided
by the distinction between these relationships, a seman-
tic analysis of current symbol systems reveals the
hypocrisy and confusion of modern political and social
jargon but also points the way to the construction of a
new language more adequate to man's real needs. The
freedom movement everywhere has begun to turn to
violence, but this is futile. Men must learn to see the
truth of their present situation and then cooperatively
take their freedom into their own hands. This is the
only road to freedom and an end to war, strife, and
annihilation.
IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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JXI, US42, 1966


Traces America's increasing involvement in European affairs, especially since World War II. The two basic tenets of America's postwar European policy have been to assure the peace and security of the North Atlantic community and encourage the creation of a European condominium. Earlier policy toward Eastern Europe stressed containment, whereas present policy emphasizes peaceful engagement. For a quarter of a century war has not erupted on the European Continent, behavior of states. Emphasis is placed on the world's multistate system, has been undermined in the 20th century; the West should be skeptical of explaining present or future Chinese policies in terms of this traditional image. China has adjusted to the world's multistate system, and it has responded. The task of statesmen and peoples today is to prevent, delay, and limit violence to the greatest extent possible. The most significant step in this direction would be the recognition by all that the moral and positive laws are binding, or the behavior of states.

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D6470.4.C15545


Surveys China's relations with non-Chinese states, mainly during the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1912), and contends that they have some undeniable relevance to the problem of China in today's world. If a Chinese perception of the world order existed in the past, it was undermined in the 20th century; the West should be skeptical of explaining present or future Chinese policies in terms of this traditional image. China has adjusted to the world's multistate system, and it has responded.

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D6339.15, v. 23


Essays on the history of the cold war and aspects of East-West relations today. Haile discusses some of the historiographic problems encountered in attempting to interpret a historical movement as vast as that of the cold war and concludes that since every historian will see the struggle in his own terms there will always be not one but "a multitude of Cold Wars." Knapp reviews and criticizes recent historical writing on the cold war, particularly that of the younger "revisionist" historians. Gordenker relates the way in which the Soviet-American conflict has "necessarily conditioned the functioning and development of the new structure of international institutions intended to maintain and foster the post-World War II peace." Kindleberger describes the genesis of the Marshall plan on the basis of personal reminiscences as a participant in that event. Spencer examines the "role played by Berlin in the cold war, emphasizing the long-term diplomatic repercussions of the blockade of 1948-49." Ionescu considers the implications of the Austrian State Treaty and suggests that it was the harbinger of a trend toward neutrality in Eastern Europe. Haile identifies and discusses a "second phase" of the cold war, which is manifested "in the deadly impasse of relations between Washington and Peking" and colors the nature of every major problem in Asia. Howard describes the aims and methods of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, finding them "above all pragmatic and opportunist."
Points out that, despite the partial failure by the League of Nations to disarm Germany from 1922 to 1929, Germany's own efforts during that period represented the greatest disarmament achievement in the history of mankind.

287 Sowle, John Louis. FOREIGN CONFRONTATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PT. 1: Confrontation France vs. Comm. Arab States through diplomatic channels. Between 1956 and 1965 the Russians concluded 25 accords with various underdeveloped countries, five of which were Middle East states. However, despite the Soviet Union's influence in the Near East, the great majority of progressive Arabs remain allergic to communism. Russia will nevertheless continue to compete for hegemony in the Middle East and thus reduce the chances for a peace in the troubled Holy Land.


Trends of the various disarmament commissions established by the United Nations, from the Atomic Energy Commission to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The latter was created to deal with such questions as a freeze on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and the reduction of the danger of accidental war. Subbarao believes the nonproliferation treaty, a product of the 18-Nation Committee, will perpetuate the present nuclear weapons monopoly of the Great Powers. The author concludes that India favors the treaty so long as it does not discriminate against nonnuclear weapon states or impede the growth of peaceful nuclear science and technology.


"Munich" has become the symbol for any dictatorial surrender to a threat of force and a calling cry for those who fear the consequences of appeasing an enemy. Yet the great debate provoked by the Munich settlement and its aftermath has never been satisfactorily resolved. What is the real lesson of that tragic moment in history? The Munich Conference, like every other historical event, can be understood only within its own historical context--the European crisis that began with Hitler's assumption of power in 1933. Hitler was determined to overturn the Versailles settlement, and the destruction of Czechoslovakia was one part of this program. The democracies were committed to the defense of the status quo but were willing to settle for a rational and honorable compromise with the Germans. Neither the objectives of the Western Allies, nor the diplomatic machinery they invoked to serve those objectives, were at fault. The real cause of the tragedy lay in the unwillingness of Western statesmen to face up to the truth concerning Hitler's intentions.


While most of the U.N. members who abstained from voting on the nonproliferation treaty were sub-Saharan African states, and their reasons for doing so were chiefly nonmilitary and regional, the abstention of Japan, West Germany, and India poses a serious problem that pertains to the intentions of the superpowers, on which there are two contrasting views. Some hold that the United States and Russia want to establish a deal hegemony and divide the world between themselves. But this seems improbable because the two superpowers possess over 90 percent of the world's
nuclear capacity and the restrictions of the treaty seem to many a compromise. Others maintain that after the settlement of the Vietnam War a much stronger balance can be expected. They argue that the superpowers realize that the focus of the cold war now lies in the Third World and a conflict over there would be in neither's interest. Against this background the nonproliferation treaty may be important because it points to Communist China as tomorrow's major conflict area. After the Vietnam War and the Near East crises are settled, the superpowers might well agree to do nothing in regard to China that would affect the vital interests of the other and not to permit a third party to upset the balance. If such a defense materializes and the superpowers together assume the responsibility for international peace and security, the United Nations may then be able to turn its attention to the urgent problems in the Third World.

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Although the great effort to clarify the attitudes and intentions of the U. N. member states toward the nonproliferation treaty was not entirely successful, some countries still remain doubtful. The treaty has definite positive aspects. If it is accepted and applied it will end the further spread of nuclear arms, commit the nuclear powers to embark on the road of disarmament, lessen the fears of nuclear war, and enable the nonnuclear countries to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes under more favorable conditions. But it does not solve the problems of controlling the activity of the nonnuclear countries, and no steps have been taken by the nuclear powers toward their own disarmament. However, the emphasis by both the United States and the Soviet Union on the readiness to resort to more nuclear disarmament measures in the future and the fact that the time limits mentioned are not so vague as they used to be seem encouraging. Under these conditions the responsibility and role of the small countries is growing, and the Conference of Nonnuclear Countries to be held in Geneva in September 1968 might facilitate the settlement of many problems. But, rather than indulging in general declarations of positions or concentrating on problems of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the conference must discuss not only the main problem but also partial disarmament measures not directly connected with nuclear proliferation. The United States, Russia, and Great Britain have promised to participate, and they may expect to be confronted with more tangible propositions and demands from the nonnuclear countries and offered support for more determined efforts toward disarmament. Yugoslavia is ready to help in the search for a more adequate solution of the nonnuclear countries' security problems and in the creation of the process of disarmament.

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The nonproliferation treaty may be a significant turning point in the quest for disarmament. At a minimum, it has proved once again that despite ideological and political differences the nuclear powers can reach agreement on important security matters and mutual concerns. But more important than the treaty itself was the accompanying announcement that the superpowers were ready to negotiate limitations on their own nuclear armaments. With the deployment of ABM's and multiple warhead missiles, the nuclear arms competition is taking another upward turn, which must be stopped before it gets out of control. The Soviet Union, in its memorandum of July 6, 1968, offered arms control proposals in nine areas of concern, and it is possible to see opportunities for progress in each of them. Certainly a no-first-use pledge and a moratorium on the manufacture of fissile materials for weapons are within reach, as are a suspension of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems and extension of the test ban to underground testing. It would be worthwhile to see what more the United States has to say about limiting the movements of submarines and aircraft and about arms reductions in Europe. Other regional arms control arrangements, as well as measures to secure the peacekeeping and international law, China's foreign relations, the Vietnam War, the Nigerian conflict, and the Middle East situation are also discussed in the document, which notes that revolution and violence will increase if the relative growth rate in developing countries is not raised substantially.

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Examines the report 'Toward Justice and Peace in International Affairs' of section 4 at the World Council of Churches' Fourth Assembly in Uppsala, Sweden. The report urges nuclear disarmament for smaller nations and phased disarmament for nuclear powers, calls for a Soviet-U. S. moratorium on antiballistic missile systems and extension of the test ban to underground testing, as well as reliance on multilateral peacekeeping and international law. China's foreign relations, the Vietnam War, the Nigerian conflict, and the Middle East situation are also discussed in the document, which notes that revolution and violence will increase if the relative growth rate in developing countries is not raised substantially.

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Kohn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE VERY LONG RUN. In their The year 2000; a framework for speculation on the next thirty-three years, New York, Macmillan [1967], pp. 359-363, plus.

CHRS K3 1967

Reflections on the long-term prospects for the international political system. The authors recall a common theme of the 1960's that the new and oldinternational order, based on human aggression, economic inequITIES, and international anarchy together doom the armament system to rapid extinction. They challenge the theory to the extent that it has assumed the aspects of a dogmatic truth and argue that the present state system is equally compatible with a future of revolutionary stability or of widespread international violence. However, they do not deny the possibility of great structural changes to the systems, and a series of these possibilities are explored, including blue systems, condominium, conversion of powers, perfection of the United Nations, world federal government, world empire, community sanctions, and the decline of civilization. Finally, the various possible methods—peaceful and
IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

Violent: Whereby the current system might be transformed into a new one are commented upon.

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Although the outlook for general and complete disarmament in the foreseeable future is bleak, the current prospects for the conclusion of limited arms control measures are very good. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is currently seeking “incentives which may permit the U.S. to step off the open spiral down to hell, and hopefully take the rest of the world along.” Even though most nations are not willing to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, the majority are eager to limit the destruction resulting from international conflict and to divert the resources devoted to making war materials to more constructive purposes. Since nations are generally reluctant to accept restraints on arms production, and the ACDA officials have focused a good deal of attention on verification procedures that would assure the compliance of all participants with the terms of any arms control agreements that may be reached. Because governments often resist the intrusion by foreign nationals into their defense and scientific establishments, verification systems are needed that are minimally intrusive and can operate with or without the cooperation of all governments involved in the agreement. Among the possibilities under consideration are unmanned orbiting systems utilizing automatic sensors, recording devices, and data transmission techniques; satellite reconnaissance; high-altitude surveillance and offshore reconnaissance. Satellites appear to be the most promising of all proposed monitoring devices since they are very unobtrusive and offer “the potential of seeing anything larger than two feet in diameter on the surface from 100 miles up.” As long as diplomats are content with ambition, suspicion, and jealousy, they will be unable to negotiate arms control agreements on the basis of trust alone, but this does not prevent the enforcement of limited arms control measures for which sound verification procedures can be worked out. Thus, “granted only a minimal measure of good will and sanity,” nations may soon be persuaded to noticeably curtail arms competition.

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Modern weapons technology makes it more urgent than ever that all nations cooperate to check the arms race. Except for a 10-year period following World War I, all serious efforts to achieve disarmament during the past hundred years have been blocked by the militarists. They include the professional military staffs, armaments manufacturers and salesmen, members of patriotic societies, and national intelligence services. Despite the militarist passions aroused by the Franco-Prussian War and the two World Wars, national leaders have been unable to resist the pressures for arms expansion. Although the United Nations is in many ways a stronger organization than the League of Nations, its main achievements in the field of disarmament are limited to the test ban treaty and the treaty prohibiting military uses of outer space, neither of which have had universal adherence. Despite its bleak history, however, disarmament should not be considered impossible. The principal impediments, China’s apparent intransigence and the difficulty of instituting effective safeguards to guarantee compliance with disarmament measures, can eventually be overcome. The variety of successful international institutions already in existence that serve the mutual interests of the international community give an indication of the feasibility of worldwide cooperation. The elimination of national rivalries, the perfection of international institutions, and disarmament are all goals that should be pursued simultaneously. Success or failure in any one direction will affect progress toward the others. None is out of reach.

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Introductory essays on peace research. Biling describes the emergence of this discipline as a separate field of inquiry, identifies the major subdivisions of the field, discusses briefly its most pressing methodological problems, and concludes with an institutional survey and call for greater international cooperation. The roundtable participants exchange thoughts on the biological, and psychocultural roots of human aggression, with most of the discussion directed to answering the question of whether aggressive behavior is in some sense universal or unique to man. Boulding complains of the lack of hard information on the factors affecting war and peace and calls for creation of a worldwide system of social data collecting stations, like a meteorological network, which would be able to convert raw facts into "a form something like weather maps" for the guidance of statesmen. Bouthoul outlines the major concerns of polemology, the science of conflicts. He recommends a scientific study of the rhythms and cycles of war and peace in order to arrive at a functional paradigm instead of an hitherto, a purely emotional one. Rapoport discusses game theory as the science of rational decision in conflict situations. Game theory, according to Rapoport, by proving that modern wars are unrealistic, forces the conclusion that the states of the world must learn to substitute collective for individual rationality. Sachs analyzes the phenomena of "chance winds" the belief that what one’s own or one’s friends always best. He illustrates how minor events distort perceptions by tracing the changing attitudes of Europeans toward the Nazis.

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**Soviet**


DB44, 947 1966a

**Contents.** -- Preface. -- Retrospect. -- The changing terrain of international politics. -- Transformation in the Soviet system. -- The evolution of Soviet foreign policy and the cold war. -- A shift of emphasis in policy.

**Contents.** The cold war is no longer the dominating fact of international relations and describes the changes over the past decade within the Soviet Union and between the East and West that have altered the rationale and the weapons of the cold war. Shulman notes that as a consequence of mutual deterrence the conflict relationship between the Soviet Union and the West has passed from a stark postwar confrontation to a more ambiguous stage in which the balance of conflicting and parallel interests is less clearly defined.

The author recommends a shift of emphasis in Western policies that would recognize that the cold war does not provide an adequate framework for dealing with relevant international problems.


**Title.** Two other arms control agreements, Smich views the proliferation of conventional arms in Latin America, the decision to deploy an ABM, and the war in Vietnam as evidence that the United States has become obsessed with technology; he points to the outer space treaty and the nonproliferation treaty as proof that peripheral matters are being used to avoid the core real problem, nuclear disarmament. Since those Government agencies responsible for U.S. arms control policy seem designed to perpetuate a strategy of avoiding the important issues, a greater and more active concern with arms control is required outside the bureaucracy, and, in particular, a public constituency for an effective disarmament program must be created. The aim, of course, is to devise a new and imaginative arms control policy that will put ideas and politics in their proper place before things and possessions.

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Di13, 963, v. 9

**Abstract.** trend in contemporary peace research. Sengbusch points out that ignorance of power politics by peace researchers may deprive their work of the "public resonance" necessary under the present conditions of an organized negation of peace. On the other hand, their preoccupation with deterrence might make their research irrelevant. A seven-page bibliography is appended.


**Title.** A compilation, in chronological order, of the "basic documents on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other aspects of disarmament...arms control."

**Title.** This handbook, the seventh annual report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 30, 1968, concludes the volume.


**Title.** A study of the chances for a successful arms reduction agreement between the superpowers agreed to discuss the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons and the arms control disarmament. Varnum believes that an arms control agreement between the superpowers would be ineffective without the signatures of France and China. Although persuading China to agree to any arms limitation will be difficult, it will have to bear the responsibility of being a nuclear power before the world can become a safe place in which to live.


**Title.** "Presented at the Seventh Atom for Peace Award Ceremony, Rockefeller University." N.Y., Nov. 14, 1967.

**Title.** New technologies offer the hope of eliminating a major cause of war—the inequitable distribution of the earth's scarce resources. The potential benefits of nuclear technology alone would seem to be sufficient to sustain this optimistic forecast. Yet material scarcity is not the only cause of war. Optimism are mistaken in believing that the nuclear confrontation of the superpowers will simply dissolve with the advent of their technological Utopia. Paradigmally the recent failure to negotiate a freeze on the construction
of ABM systems may prove to have been a major arms control breakthrough. To the degree that active defenses are effective, the capacity of the world to destroy its people has been reduced and a kind of arms limitation already achieved. Why not concentrate U.S. diplomatic efforts on negotiating a limitation on defensive weapons while at the same time encouraging the expansion of defensive systems? Admittedly this approach faces a number of formidable difficulties, but the balance of terror is imperfect too, as well as much more destructive if it fails. Furthermore, the two supersowers already have decided to deploy ABM systems, and an adequate defense is in fact a prerequisite to effective arms control. The energy-rich world of tomorrow will be a world of material plenty, but it will also be a world of nations-states carrying into the future their habits of violence. A world in which nations occupy themselves with defensive rather than offensive preparations would be a safer place in which to live than one held together by the fragile balance of terror.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT


Describes the probable effects of nuclear weapons under various conditions of strategic and tactical warfare, estimates the cost of producing these weapons at different levels of economic development, and discusses their impact on international politics and the security of nations. The panel recommends approval of the non-proliferation treaty, negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, an agreement to reduce existing nuclear stockpiles, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones and effective security guarantees for the non-nuclear powers. But the panel goes on to suggest that only through general and complete disarmament can the nations of the globe achieve genuine and lasting security.


Undated Translation from Pravda, July 2, 1968.

Emphasizes Soviet measures for ending the arms race and implementing a plan of general and complete disarmament. The plan calls for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, reduction of their means of delivery, liquidation of foreign military bases, regional disarmament, and a ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Government asks the United States to do everything in their power to agree to these measures and end the arms race. It will, in cooperation with these states, work to curb the forces of aggression and remove the threat of international nuclear war.
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

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Notes the Bonn government's publication of documents pertaining to German-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of a mutual agreement renouncing the use of force and briefly summarizes their contents. In releasing the documents Foreign Minister Willy Brandt stated that they reveal the persistent efforts of the Federal Government to promote understanding with the Soviet Union regardless of the uncompromising attitudes of the latter. For nearly 2 years Bonn has attempted to persuade Moscow to agree to a mutual renunciation of force, but the Russians persist in maintaining that the Soviet Union "as a World War II victor in Germany retains the ultimate right to use force in Germany" and attach unconditional demands to their acceptance, including the recognition by Bonn of East Germany.

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Bourguiba states that "negotiations for negotiation's sake" are pointless and totally unrealistic in dealing with the Communists. Behind the facade of peaceful coexistence the Communists are still working toward the goal of world domination. They are not interested in peace and stability and only favor treaties in their own basic interests. On a number of occasions during the past two decades they have swiftly moved into political vacuums and encouraged insurgent activities. Efforts to "bank good will" with the Peking and Peking and Chinese have consistently failed. France and Great Britain have gained little by recognizing Communist China, and temporary bombing halts in Vietnam have not brought about reciprocal gestures of goodwill. Furthermore, the Communists have demonstrated many times their lack of compunction in breaking their word and have shown themselves masters of shifting to others the blame for their misdeeds. The Communists can be brought into productive negotiations only when they feel they have already attained their objectives or when they are confronted by overwhelming force on the part of their adversaries. Therefore, the President must approach the peace talks with caution and not be politically pressured into accepting "an unrealistic face-saving compromise agreement in Southeast Asia."

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While every attempt should be made to pursue "meaningful avenues to peace in Vietnam, past experiences have shown that "negotiations for negotiation's..."
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France's withdrawal, in July 1966, from the NATO military organization prompted Bonn to declare that France's right to station its troops in the German Federal Republic was inseparable from subordinating the troops to that organization. Paris, in rebuttal, called the German treaty of 1954 and the 1954 Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany a still-satisfactory basis for the stationing of Western troops in the Federal Republic. In the French view only practical provisions needed to be negotiated for the continued stay of French troops in the republic. The matter was finally settled in December 1966 by an administrative agreement between the two governments stating that the existing rights, based on the German treaty, to station French troops in the Federal Republic cannot be exercised only with the consent of the German government. Except for an ill-defined consent clause this agreement is in accord with the actual legal situation in regard to the presence of French, or American and British, forces in the German Federal Republic. The overriding legal basis for the presence of foreign troops is the '1945 occurrences', including the Potsdam agreement, whereby the Four Powers gained occupation rights in all Germany. The continuing right of the Three Powers to station their troops in the German Democratic Republic is indirectly recognized by the Moscow agreement of 1955, which defines the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops in that republic. The, among the Four Powers, and in regard to Germany as a whole, the wartime occupation of Germany as still in force as long as the German question remains unsolved. It follows that consent by the Government of the Federal Republic of which the German treaty and the Convention speak is not mandatory in so far for the Three Powers to exercise their rights in the Federal Republic. The same is true for the Soviet Union, exercising its rights in the German Democratic Republic, although the Moscow agreement has a similar consent clause. All this pertains to the Three Powers' and the Soviet Union's "outward relation" to Germany, which is a relation to that nation as a whole, i.e. their "inward relation" to Germany, which actually is a relation to a portion of the country, the Federal Republic, enjoys equal, fully sovereign status, and the presence of Western forces for the West's and the Federal Republic's defense purposes requires the German Federal Government's consent.

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Planes Israel's expansionist designs for the Arab refusal to negotiate and cites specific examples of previous Israeli breaches of peace agreements. If the Israelis want peace they must withdraw immediately to the 1949 armistice demarcation lines, complying with the Security Council resolution of November 12, 1967, and begin negotiations within the framework of the 1947 Partition Plan.

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When checked against the historical record, the contention that a people's revolutionary war can be halted in accordance with a cease fire and a negotiated settlement "reached is questionable. Insurgents may be willing to negotiate to save their political underground organization, obtain legal recognition for their party or for their guerrilla force as part of the country's armed forces, enter into a government coalition, or consolidate their position in part of the country with the intention of resuming the fight at a more opportune moment. They may also aim to become the de facto or de jure government of part of the country and gain the rest later by force or plebiscite, or they may seek recognition as the country's government to achieve independence by a plebiscite or force. But the insurgency must be contained in its initial stages. If not, considering the insurgents' limited willingness to negotiate, the government may be forced to continue the war.

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Abstract supplied

Negotiations among leader's and delegates were compared with negotiations among delegates in order to investigate the effect of role in the reference group on intergroup bargaining behavior. The negotiations of two groups of leaders and ten groups of delegates matched on initial positions were examined. Because of their greater flexibility and authority, leaders were expected to spend less time negotiating and have fewer deadlocks than delegates. Neither of these hypotheses was supported. Leaders and delegates, however, were found to resolve their conflicts in different ways. While delegates more often reached agreement through compromise, leaders were more likely to choose one party's position. Thus, delegates tended to converge upon the average of their initial positions while leaders showed a significant change in the risky direction. Leaders' and delegates' reactions to their negotiations were also analyzed. In general, the results suggested that leaders can be influenced more by other leaders than delegates can by other delegates. (Abstract supplied)

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HOW THE WAR IN VIETNAM MIGHT END. Time, v. 92, Aug. 9, 1968: 22-23. AP1, T37, v. 92

How the Vietnam War ends is important for America's future image both at home and abroad. Suggestions for decreasing the level of hostilities have varied. Hubert Humphrey suggests an immediate cease-fire. Arthur M. Cox urges a cease-fire, but only after procedures for disengagement have been formulated.
Rockefeller advocates creating a temporary "security buffer" between the two opposing forces, followed by the gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops, and Herman Kahn suggests further partitioning of Vietnam or the creation of a buffer state. Suggestions for determining who will rule and how once the war ends have also varied. One set of plans directed toward the higher goals of a reconciled government concentrates on formulating a conciliatory 'neutral government' in Saigon; another set aims at a temporary power-sharing arrangement by integrating the NLF as a political party and permitting its members to run for National Assembly and academic and think-tank plans advocate reconciliation at the lowest level—of hamlets, villages, and provices. William Pfaff contends that future peace and a viable settlement will depend on neutralizing not only Vietnam, but also Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and perhaps eventually Malaysia.

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Message to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, read at its opening session on July 16, 1968.

Identifies the arms control issues the United States believes require the immediate attention of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Johnson commends the Committee for its work in drafting the non-proliferation treaty but goes on to stress the urgency of negotiating an end to the nuclear arms race and an effective nuclear disarmament agreement. He also calls for arms limitations on the sea and for regional limitations on both nuclear and conventional weapons.

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A Middle East settlement can be realized only if the Arabs and Israelis modify their respective positions on the problems of Jerusalem, the refugees, and Arab-Israeli security. Whether threats of punishment or promises of rewards can induce them to change depends on their vulnerability to political and economic sanctions. Israel relies heavily on the United States for aid and development programs; in 1967 it was forced to evacuate Egyptian territory because of U.S. economic sanctions. Although Jordan receives aid from Great Britain, West Germany, and the United States, it has a greater maneuverability than Israel. Unlike Israel, Jordan can turn to the Soviet Union for military aid, and most of its losses resulting from strained relations with Western countries are offset by its richer Arab neighbors. By comparison Egypt is the least vulnerable because it trades with the Communist bloc and its losses from the closing of the Suez are made good by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. Furthermore, the territory it lost during the war is mostly desert and inhabited by Arab refugees. As matters now stand, unless outside pressure is applied to modify the belligerents' positions in the negotiations, there will be another war.

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Munro, Barbara F., and Morton Deutsch. THE EFFECTS OF ROLE-REVERSAL DURING THE DIS-
B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

Baker, Ross K. SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TROPICAL AFRICA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Military reviews. v. 48, July 1968: 76-81. illus., 26723. U35, v. 48

Surveys the record of Soviet military assistance to Somalia, Mali, Tanzania, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria. Baker reports that, prior to the civil war in Nigeria, Soviet aid to tropical Africa was small and about equal to that of the United States to the same region. This was primarily because trop. al African states, even with outside assistance, are unable to muster the funds and technical competence to acquire and maintain modern weapons. Other reasons for the low level of aid were the reliance of most of these states on their former colonial rulers for advice and a generally low political priority of the region for both superpowers. Domestic political pressures are likely to further reduce U.S. military assistance to this area, but Soviet aid, in competition with that of the British, French, and Chinese, is almost certain to expand considerably.


Identifies the forces contributing to the Latin American arms race. Gebrardt considers the international, especially French-American, competition in arms sales to individual Latin American countries and describes abortive Brazilian-French efforts to turn Brasilia into "Latin America's nuclear capital." The prudent U.S. policy is regard to supplying nuclear fuel to foreign countries accounts for the failure of these efforts, which were partly responsible for Brazil's opposition to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty.


"Based on a paper prepared for the Ninth Annual Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies, on The Implications of Military Technology in the 1970's, held at Elsinore, Denmark, in September 1967."

Quantifies the distribution of major items of military equipment—small arms, combat aircraft, and guided missiles—by the industrial nations to developing countries. The international arms market "provides a tacit but clear major-power endorsement of military conflict...in the developing world" and produces political, economic, and social effects in underdeveloped areas that are not easily understood. Hogland notes that the same major powers that made a conflict possible usually join in common appeals for a cease-fire. This has occurred not only in the Near East but in the Horn of Africa, where both superpowers were involved in competitive buildups in the Somali Republic and Ethiopia. The author believes a greater international effort must be made to measure the scope of arms traffic and calculate its present and future effects on international security. Until then it will be difficult to confirm or deny the suspicion shared by political observers that the international arms market represents a net loss in international stability.


Discusses Soviet, British, French, and Portuguese involvement in the Nigerian civil war by supplying arms to the warring parties. Kreker stresses Soviet military support and propaganda for the Nigerian Government's operations against Biafra.


If the Biafrans are defeated they will resort to guerrilla warfare, thus frustrating British aims of restoring stability. "One Nigeria" is unattainable, but a compromise solution giving Biafra a large measure of autonomy, while maintaining close economic and other ties with the rest of Nigeria, might be negotiated. But the Biafrans will not accept Britain as a "disinterested mediator" until the British Government ceases its shipment of arms to the Nigerian Federal Government.


The uncontrolled arms race in the Third World seriously threatens the peace of the world. Military assistance to underdeveloped countries is wasteful and provokes political tensions that hinder economic and social progress. Russian arms shipments to strategically located Third World countries that are in no way threatened by the Western powers "have a clearly offensive character because their volume goes beyond the needs of a defensive posture." U.S. arms policy seeks only to counterbalance this military aid and maintain the balance of power between hostile neighbors. Only an agreement between the superpowers can put an end to the worldwide arms race and begin to relax the international tensions resulting from it.


Reports the Tunisian and Moroccan reactions to the Algerian arms buildup. With the $200 million in Soviet military aid it received during the past 3 years, Algeria has built up a military force that completely outclasses Tunisia's and gives it at least a 5-to-1 lead over Morocco. Although Algeria is now capable of mobilizing only a small percentage of its arsenal for
warfare, defense strategists in Tunisia and Morocco fear it may become a real threat within 3 or 4 years. Tunisia has responded to the Algerian military program by attempting to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries through diplomatic negotiations and by embarking on a military modernization program and encouraging increased civilian involvement in the nation’s defense. King Hassan of Morocco is attempting to narrow the quantitative armaments lead that the Algerians enjoy and is organizing a mass mobilization program similar to the Tunisian plan.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

AUSTRALIAN DOUBTS ON THE TREATY [by] X. Quadrant, v. 12, May/June 1968: 30-34.

The purposes of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) are not to be realized. Furthermore, a treaty is an attempt to negate history by depriving the nuclear powers of their rights to share fully in the growing benefits of the atomic age. The term “manufacture” in Articles 1 and 2 is not defined, leaving open the possibility that every activity relating to nuclear technology—no matter how innocuous the relation or purpose—will be drawn into the treaty’s net. Article 3, which grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsibility for applying the safeguards, offers even greater opportunity for widespread intervention in Australian domestic affairs. Reliance on the IAEA converts the treaty into a blank check for international control over the Australian economy and defense establishment. The treaty does not provide for withdrawal by a state when “extraordinary events” related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized (its) national interests, but this is certain to be an awkward undertaking. Then again, although three of the current nuclear powers have given security assurances within the U.N. framework to the nonnuclear weapon states, in the last analysis these are no more to be relied on than any other U.N. assurance or guarantee. Nor would ratification of the treaty bring Australia great benefits from the use of nuclear explosives for civil engineering projects, since these are largely precluded by the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. If the NPT were capable of achieving the purposes of its proponents it would be of inestimable value to the world. But since it is doomed to be ineffective, it should demonstrate a positive interest to help the NPT become effective and get underway.


Examines the arguments for and against Australian adherence to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Bull concludes that Australia “should adopt a generally favourable attitude towards the Treaty.” Australia’s interest in halving or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons and in supporting U.S.-Soviet political and diplomatic cooperation outweighs the slight military and economic disadvantages imposed by the treaty. On the other hand, in making its final decision Australia must consider whether the treaty is likely to acquire sufficient signatures to enter into force and whether it will get the signatures of those states whose adherence Australia considers to be a condition for its own adherence.

Since a number of nonnuclear-weapon states may soon be capable of launching a nuclear weapons program, steps should be taken immediately to curtail nuclear-weapons proliferation. Atomic bombs can be made from plutonium, and by 1971 seven nations that do not now possess nuclear weapons will be producing a sizable amount of plutonium as a byproduct of nuclear reactors operated for peaceful purposes. Moreover, some of these countries will have the financial resources to invest in the costly facilities needed for the development, production, and delivery of atomic weapons systems. An increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear arsenals is dangerous for it would substantially enlarge the risk of global nuclear war. Smaller countries armed with nuclear weapons might not develop the sophisticated command and control systems needed to minimize the danger of accidental war and might be tempted to use them irresponsibly. Because of the high costs and risks of nuclear-weapons proliferation, both the nuclear and nonnuclear powers must cooperate in the conclusion of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon states must be convinced that a treaty would not hinder their development of civilian power programs nor jeopardize commercial secrets. The five nuclear powers should encourage other countries to reject nuclear weapons by reducing their own nuclear arsenals.
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

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Proposals urging rejection of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in retaliation for Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia show little understanding of the need for arms control. The treaty might forestall a nuclear fiasco in the Middle East, and it sets the stage for further attempts to reduce nuclear stockpiles and focuses on the problem of achieving safety at a time when the security of nations depends on controlling or eliminating force. The treaty does have severe limitations—nations possessing nuclear weapons are not required to relinquish them or to limit their further manufacture—and further discussions are needed to abolish nuclear weapons completely. However, the major powers' unwillingness to relinquish national sovereignty presents an obstacle. Nations must realize that preoccupations with national power are outweighed by one gives up may contribute more to security than what one stockpiles.

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Describes the positions taken by various delegations at the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the proposed provisions of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

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Points out India's autarkic plutonium policy, aimed at enabling the nation to produce up to 100 atom bombs per year. Even as a nuclear-weapon state India would not be able to counterbalance Red China strategically and would therefore have to give up its present no-weapon policy.

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“Address of Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, March 11, 1966”

Text of the draft treaty, which would prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons and explosives by nuclear-weapon parties to non-nuclear-weapon states. It would bar non-nuclear-weapon parties from receiving such weapons and materials and would subject the peaceful use of these materials to non-nuclear-weapon parties to international control and safeguards, to prevent such materials from being diverted for nuclear weapons. The treaty would also set forth the "indispensable right" of all parties for peaceful nuclear activities.

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States that "the development of the relation of power between socialism and imperialism" now makes possible East-West disarmament agreements and a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Einhorn describes West German obstructionism in regard to the proposed nonproliferation treaty, outlines the history of relevant negotiations by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, emphasizes the German Democratic Republic's contributions to the Committee's work, and considers major provisions of the draft treaty.

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New Zealand's Representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations outlines the nonproliferation treaty and calls for its support from all nations. Ambassador Farrell concedes that, although the ideal world is one where no power possesses nuclear weapons, the international community must accept the "nuclear five." The choice is between holding the figure at five or seeing it climb to 10, 15, or even 20. He concludes that the treaty will not make the world safe and secure; however it is an indispensable first step toward future nuclear-weapons control.

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"Address made before a luncheon sponsored by 'Nuclear Week in New York' at New York, N. Y., on May 23, 1968.

Responses to economic and political objections to the nonproliferation treaty. Foster argues that, far from hindering the peaceful application of nuclear energy in non-nuclear-weapon states, the nonproliferation treaty will do much to promote it. Economically, the treaty will also be beneficial to the United States. But Foster puts primary emphasis on the significance of the treaty as a further step toward more far-reaching arms-control agreements. He states that the treaty will be ineffective unless it is followed within a reasonable time by other measures such as an agreement regulating the arms race between the superpowers. He argues that the logic of nuclear armaments' points inexorably in the direction of agreement and declares himself encouraged by recent Soviet statements on this issue.

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Statement delivered in the General Assembly's Political and Security Committee by the U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, which outlines annex B of the 18-Nation Committee's report on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and defends the treaty's prohibition against...
the development of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Ambassador Goldberg asserts that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have united in support of Annex B, despite their views on other matters, and "consider that their respective vital national interests demand that there shall be no nuclear aggression... from any quarter." He clarifies the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provisions in the treaty, noting they do not restrict nonnuclear-weapon states from enjoying the benefits of nuclear technology and research.

Indeed in some circumstances they may offer the best available means for averting violence, and arms control negotiations will have to take this into account. The superpowers have succeeded in eliminating the danger of accidental or spasmodic war, but the nuclear proliferation peril grows apace. The one significant attempt to deal with this problem, the Nonproliferation Treaty, is seriously defective. The United States can encourage wider acceptance of the treaty by adopting policies that will remove, or at least reduce, incentives that might tempt some states into acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. As to those nations that persist in refusing to sign the treaty, the United States should apply whatever sanctions necessary, moral or legal, to convince them to open their nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. If the United States and other concerned countries fail to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, America will have no choice but to continue its primary reliance on its armed strength. At the same time, however, it must continue to press for sound and enforceable arms control agreements and work to eliminate the major causes of war.

Armaments to defend cosigners against nuclear aggression and as safeguards against the NPT's consequences, the nuclear states to the nonproliferation treaty. The Atomic Energy Agency. Because the acquiring not only arsenals usable for defense but also that under the strategic nuclear umbrella national ages countries to "go nuclear on their own," thereoy Doctrine and practice have converged in the notion disruptive effect on NATO and its alienation of allies Inglis, David R. 68

involves, he notes, the "need to understand that the threat of nuclear blackmail, the administration's refusal to state unequivocally that nuclear spread is unacceptable, and the United States is now committed to such a war in Vietnam. The precarious military situation at the time has raised fears that the United States would be provoked into using nuclear weapons. The administration's refusal to state unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons would not be used amounted to a veiled threat against the Vietnamese and was short-sighted and foolish. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be high on the list of national priorities, but if nuclear weapons are used in some circumstances they may offer the best available means for averting violence, and arms control agreements and work to eliminate the major causes of war.

Nuclear weapons should be high on the list of national priorities, but if nuclear weapons are used in some circumstances they may offer the best available means for averting violence, and arms control negotiations will have to take this into account. The superpowers have succeeded in eliminating the danger of accidental or spasmodic war, but the nuclear proliferation peril grows apace. The one significant attempt to deal with this problem, the Nonproliferation Treaty, is seriously defective. The United States can encourage wider acceptance of the treaty by adopting policies that will remove, or at least reduce, incentives that might tempt some states into acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. As to those nations that persist in refusing to sign the treaty, the United States should apply whatever sanctions necessary, moral or legal, to convince them to open their nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. If the United States and other concerned countries fail to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, America will have no choice but to continue its primary reliance on its armed strength. At the same time, however, it must continue to press for sound and enforceable arms control agreements and work to eliminate the major causes of war.
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

letter of transmittal and his statement in support of the treaty made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 10, 1966. All three documents urge prompt Senate ratification of the treaty. In his letter of transmittal, Secretary Rusk reviews the major steps in negotiating the treaty and clarifies the meaning of each of its articles.


348 Johnson, Lyndon B., 348 nuclear weapons before acting which then is its might be existential a world Is it ver's nuclear attack, in critical measurement human immortality to check nuclear effort's to an emergency'' to improve the immunization to check nuclear nations, to 'aiding to diminish than time's to confront a situation between the nations will have to voice their state policies. As long as the treaty continues, the working of the treaty will be very difficult since changes can be made within the five years and must be approved by all the nuclear powers and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The situation is further complicated for Switzerland because the Swiss people have voted twice against renouncing nuclear weapons, and according to the Swiss Constitution the treaty must be submitted for popular approval. "To balance the many reservations there are only vague hopes of further steps toward disarmament." But there are real risks of further steps toward disarmament and to eliminate the threat of conventional conflicts that might grow into nuclear disaster."

349 The McManon Act of 1946, which bars the United States from passing the means and the know-how of nuclear-arms production to other nations, was the earliest form of the peaceful-nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Since then, the spread of technological knowledge has undermined that ban, only costs or political considerations now prevent many nonnuclear-weapons states from embarking on the production of nuclear weapons. Associated with the treaty, the U. N. Security Council's guarantee to nonnuclear-weapons states against nuclear threat and blackmail signifies the price the nuclear weapons powers who sponsor the treaty are willing to pay for its success. Moreover, unless minor states conclude these powers to begin nuclear disarmament, the guarantee has merely declaratory value. If the arms race between the nuclear powers continues, the working of the treaty will depend on the variable strategic conditions under which those powers will have to conduct their state policies. As long as each superpower's defense system remains disproportionately to its counterpart's offense system, an all-out confrontation between the two powers is unlikely. Geopolitical and organizational considerations also speak against direct conventional or subconventional war. But the use of third nations in their competitive worldwide game and the higher sophistication of weapons that cause numerous crises of far more devastating potential than those that occurred in the late forties and early fifties. Hence lies the main danger when a nonnuclear-weapons state allies itself with a nuclear-weapons one. Apparently the only means to check the terrorist tendencies of the superpower would be by threat by smaller nations to themselves or to in cease their nuclear armaments. No safeguard exists against a world power's nuclear attack on a third state, except the potential world political consequences, which themselves might be an adequate deterrent.
treaty. In the USA there have likewise been a number of voices warning against the treaty, such as that of the well-known atomic physicist, Edward Teller, "father of the hydrogen bomb." The Federal Republic of Germany is the only state in the world to have solemnly refused to produce atomic weapons as well as bacteriological and chemical weapons, and may not sign the pact until the question of guaranty has been clarified by both signatories. Doubts about entering into the treaty and as to the agreement's latent dangers have been expressed in this issue of the Journal by the Federal Minister for Scientific Research, Dr. Stoltenberg; Federal Minister of Finances, Dr. Arasaas; the Dutch Parliamentary State-Secretary, Mr. H. van der Ploeg; member of the Bonn Bundestag, Ernst Paul, and Professor Walter Guttenberg; Professor Walter Hallstein; Professor Alois Hohlfelder (France); and the finally adopted a resolution upholding security guarantees for nonnuclear states, "six years of painstaking deliberation marked by initiative and hesitation, retreat and advance. objection and compromise" came to a close.

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"Article will continue..."

As long as nuclear-weapons are not under a clear and concrete treaty obligation to disarm themselves, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will be ineffective in its raison d'être, the prevention of nuclear war. The proposed treaty would institutionalize international law by a hegemony of nuclear-weapon states over nonnuclear-weapon ones and tend to deprive the latter of the inalienable right to decide on the "security of their own physical existence...."

Articles 1 through 3—which prohibit the development of nuclear weapons and explosives to nonnuclear-weapon states, forbid such parties to accept such materials, and subject them to international control—constitute the treaty's substance. All other articles are merely sedatives for nonnuclear-weapon states to accept its discriminatory provisions. The complexity of matters dealt with by the treaty calls for separate analyses of its contents from the standpoint of jurisprudence, political science, the psychology of nations, and state ethics. A legal analysis of the treaty shows that it underlines the axioms on which the philosophy of state and the law of nations base their structures. General international law is based on sovereign states all equal in law, and statehood depends on the effectiveness of sovereignty. A sovereign state cannot renounce a weapon without which it would become politically and militarily helpless. The treaty confines the United Nations Charter in that it establishes discriminatory class-orders in the world of states. A political analysis of the treaty raises serious doubts as to its viability in the Hobbesian world it would further. Some argue that such discriminatory class-order would reduce the chances of nuclear war, but this is not valid since such danger now comes mainly from the big powers, not from the nonnuclear-weapons states. After all, it was not for the super-weapons but for the Japanese change in China, Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and Israel, the problem of division that plagued each of these nations and the world would already have been solved.

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Sheehan, V. **MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE**


[639, 1655, 1968]
MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY HELD ON MARCH 6 AND 7, 1968, IN SOFIA

FROM WILLI STOEPS'S REPORT ON THE

An interpretation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Soviet Union’s Memorandum on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament, submitted to the United Nations on July 1, 1968. Skowroński asserts that the treaty is proof that states belonging to different social systems can find solutions for international problems concerning the vital interests of mankind. The treaty will strengthen the security of the nonnuclear countries and should be signed by all because it is a very important step to complete and general disarmament.


Although the nonproliferation treaty treaty fails to restrict many facets of the arms race, it at least represents a significant step in the direction of arms control, and its defeat by the U.S. Senate would be a serious setback to future disarmament negotiations. A delay in Senate ratification is harmful, for it would discredit American diplomats and offer encouragement to key opponents of the treaty, such as India and West Germany. Contrary to the belief of some Senators, postponement of action on the treaty is not a particularly effective means of chastising the Russians for their intervention in Czechoslovakia. The treaty is principally an American project and does not substantially “impress Kremlin realists.” Because the treaty only inhibits the activities of nonnuclear nations the Russians agreed to recognize it “with a shrug of the shoulders.” Yearning for a personal solution of his contribution to world peace, President Johnson is avidly urging the immediate approval of the treaty. While acceptance of the nonproliferation treaty will not make up for Johnson’s lack of fruitful initiatives in all other aspects of arms control, the treaty should be given a small but meaningful advancement toward world peace and security.


As a longtime advocate of regional demilitarization, Poland enthusiastically welcomed the conclusion of a short nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Not only does the draft treaty represent a significant step toward broader disarmament goals but it also may prevent West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons and could promote regional disarmament agreements, including the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Although 10 years ago the Western Powers rejected Poland’s suggestion for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, the majority of the Western countries are now beginning to recognize the merit of the proposal. As revised in 1964 the Polish plan allows for all participants to agree not to produce or import nuclear weapons and asks the nuclear powers to promise to freeze, at existing levels, their nuclear arsenals. Agreed to in the area covered by the treaty, the nonproliferation treaty could pave the way to existing tensions in Europe through regional arrangements, it should be adapted without delay.

360 Socialistic Foundaution. DER DEMOKRATISCHEN GRÜNDE. [editor.] FROM WILLI STOEPS'S REPORT ON THE

West Germany’s “claim to sole representative of the German Democratic Republic” is its refusal to recognize existing boundaries, declare the Munich agreement null and void, and negotiate a mutual renunciation of the use of force with the German Democratic Republic; as well as its continued refusal to include West Berlin in the German Federal Republic and its ambitions in the area of nuclear weapons—all this underlines Bonn’s Eastern policy as a continuation of its aggressive plans. Bonn’s reluctance to support the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty can be explained by its present building of an autarkic nuclear-fuel cycle in West Germany that will enable it to produce nuclear weapons on its own. The Warsaw Treaty Organization’s most important task now is to prevent West Germany from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore the Sofia meeting strongly supported the nonproliferation treaty, which would contribute to European security. It also supported proposals by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam for a just solution of the Vietnamese question.

361 Tanaka, Ken. PACIFIC HYSTERIA. Far Eastern economic review, v. 60, June 20, 1968: 609-610. MCL, F18, v. 60

Although Japan has proved it can develop an atom bomb, the strong anti-nuclear-arms sentiment will probably deter its entry into the nuclear arms race. But attitudes toward an arms buildup and expansion of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have changed, as shown by the present SDF defense buildup program. The most important aspects of the program are its qualitative rather than quantitative expansion and the boost it gives to Japanese industry. Japan has supported the U.S. defense buildup on nuclear proliferation that intends to maintain its security nevertheless.


Comments by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in Committee I, (Political and Security) and in plenary session of the General Assembly along with the text of an Assembly resolution of June 12, 1966, commenting on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In his comments in Committee I Goldberg comments on Committee revisions to the draft resolution and draft treaty that relate to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, measures to halt the arms race, and security assurances and reviews the nuclear safeguards provisions of the draft treaty. In his plenary
session remarks, Golding states the U.S. view that the accession clause of article IX, which opens the treaty to "all states," does not affect the recognition of status of an unrecognized regime or entity which may elect to file an instrument of accession to the non-proliferation treaty. The United States, he says, reserves the right to object if an unrecognized entity should seek to assert privileges such as participating in a conference called under articles VIII or IX of the treaty.


Hai shi Ming ho (New China News Agency) release. English, Peking, June 18, 1968

In manipulating U.N. approval for the so-called nuclear nonproliferation treaty the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists have taken another step in their nefarious collaboration against the revolutionary peoples of the world. Under the guise of the treaty the American imperialists and their Soviet lackeys hope to preserve their nuclear monopoly and continue their nuclear blackmail policies. By offering protection to those nonnuclear countries that support the treaty, the two nations are attempting to isolate the Chinese people and vilify China's great nuclear achievements. A product of big power politics, the treaty is detrimental to the sovereignty and dignity of other countries. Confronted by spreading decay, in the capitalist world and the Soviet revisionist bloc, the U.S. outlaws and Soviet renegades colluded in railroadung the treaty through the United Nations in a last-ditch attempt to save themselves from their inevitable doom. However, far from helping them, the treaty merely demonstrates the unanswerable ambitions of the American aggressors and the Soviet betrayal of revolutionary interests.


A detailed legal commentary to the draft treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commended on June 12, 1968, by the U.N. General Assembly after the draft was adopted by the U.N. Non-Proliferation Commission. Willich analyses at length the existing and potential differences in interpretation of the treaty provisions and assesses their major implications for the future. He doubts that the safeguards in peaceful nuclear activities provided by the treaty can alone prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons program to a non-nuclear weapons or warheads in a nuclear weapons is really determinate to start such a program. Thus the challenge to the international system presented by continuing nuclear arms control is needed to be met by further structural innovation in that system. The commentary is preceded by an outline of technological prerequisites for a nuclear capability and by a description of the existing international legal framework affecting large states.

4 Other (Accidental War Command and Control of Weapons).


Address presented on Sept. 3, 1968, by West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt before a conference of nonnuclear-weapon countries in Geneva.

Emphasizes the tremendous security problems confronting the nonnuclear weapon states and stresses the importance of international cooperation in the field of arms control. In order to safeguard the sovereignty of all states, Brandt urged the prohibition of actual or threatened aggression by any type of weapon. While explicitly opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons he advocated that the peaceful uses of atomic energy be shared by all nations. He reviewed West Germany's past efforts to ease tensions in Europe and reaffirmed its support of arms reduction measures on the continent.


QI. 2, v. 219.

Great Britain's recent proposals on the control of chemical and biological weapons were motivated in part by domestic politics, but this should not be allowed to obscure their real significance. These proposals have the merit of going much beyond the Geneva Protocol of 1925, while at the same time avoiding any temptation to replace it. Their acceptance would set an international institution and should be preserved. The British government will present the disarmament conference with a firm plan on getting biologicals under control. This is a sensible idea, but a second suggestion that agreements might be policed internally by the international scientific community is not, there being no evidence to suggest that scientists as a group have either the knowledge or the inclination to act collectively as an international inspection agency. The problems of verification are not insurmountable, but even an impartial agreement would be worthless. Consideration of chemical and biological weapons cannot be detached from the more frightening possibility of nuclear war. Because of the technical sophistication required in large chemical or biological war, it is clear that these agents will be deployed in the states already possessing nuclear weapons, and this reduces greatly the possibility that they will ever be used. The current balance of terror operates here and is still the most effective way to avoid war.


AS 24.44 1964

Notes p. 132-135

The article reports an active reaction process which occurred between Japan and the U.S. in the years preceding World War II, focusing on the U.S. impact on Japan's decision to adopt an expansionist policy, and instead stimulated.
Japan's southward expansion and even its determination to go to war with the United States. Moreover, the activities of the deterrence policy are described in the context of the structure of Japan's foreign policy decision-making, and the psychology of the Japanese, in particular the military. (Abstract supplied)

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Explores the organization and deployment responsibilities of the U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) and the role of the Communication Support Element (CSE). USSTRICOM is one of seven unified commands operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The commander in chief of USSTRICOM (CINSTRICOM) is responsible for contingency operations in the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia. The CINSTRICOM organization has been deployed worldwide, to include the MIDEA area. The effectiveness of deployment operations depends on the command communications system. Although adequate communications existed, delays in troop deployment to Korea and Lebanon, standardized operating procedures developed by CSF, and other factors caused communications difficulties. The CSE organization is divided into four parts: element headquarters, two fire control center headquarters, and a support center. Here, concludes that the success of the joint task force missions in Chad, Mexico, and the Contras can largely be attributed to the flexibility and reliability of the communications support provided by CSF.

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The United States should conduct the strategy of assertive disarmament, according to the authors, by increasing the production of military weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Although the United States and China are not involved in any direct conflict, they are both involved in the struggle for world power. If the United States were to lose its nuclear supremacy in the event of a nuclear war, it might lose the struggle for world power. In this context, China would remain as an effective deterrent to the United States, and China would continue to use its large nuclear arsenal. To achieve this goal, the United States should increase its nuclear arsenal and continue to increase its conventional forces.

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In World War I both the Central Powers and the Allies used chemical weapons and it caused 7.2 percent of all war deaths—an enormous toll. Considering its early stage of development, chemical warfare has been conducted only against enemy unable to retaliate in kind, e.g., against the Arabs in 1935-36 by the Italians, and against the Chinese in 1937-43 by the Japanese. In recent years a school of thought developed arguing that under certain conditions chemical warfare is more humane than other kinds of instrumental war. Great Powers arguments have been aimed at a great variety of chemical and biological weapons, from most deadly ones to those having no lasting harmful effect on the human organism. Recently, Great Britain submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a draft treaty for banning the production and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. International relations in the use of certain weapons (for example, chemical weapons) is based on the belief that a lack of international agreements outlining the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons...
decisionmaking. Strategic planning is now heavily influenced by cost-effectiveness analysis. Automation gives the top command and control echelon the timely and plentiful information on field operations than ever before. Increased knowledge has led to increased responsibility for directing operations; data processing has tended to centralize military decisionmaking and tie it closely to diplomatic and political considerations. Thus tactical problems have become diplomatic problems. Computers have increased the precision and efficiency of military managers in allocating the support requirements of military operations. In the future computers can be expected to play an even larger combat role. Unfortunately the almost instantaneous transmission of information from remote areas will tend to turn a situation that may have previously gone unnoticed into an international crisis. Moreover, further refinement of centralized control techniques could encourage a tendency to resolve political issues by military rather than diplomatic means. As international relations become more and more militarized, national leaders become increasingly dependent upon assessments of reactions to potential policy moves. Individual pragmatism and judgment will be overshadowed by computerized intelligence and war game techniques. By enhancing the ability to predict enemy actions, computers will probably promote the ascendency of preventive wars.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas


Content a. --Introduction. --The present world political conditions. --The German-Polish boundary in the past and in diplomacy during World War II. --The Eastern territories in Poland's structure today. --Incorporation of the expellees into the Federal Republic. --Policy of the expellees' organizations. --The official policy of the Federal Republic on the boundary question. --Discussion of the Oder-Niesee problem in the present. --Prospect.

Considers Borne's official position regarding the Oder-Nieze Line untenable in terms of political realities and points to growing Western sentiment for recognition of the boundary as final, for the sake of peace and stabilization in Europe.


Since the June war there has been a radical shift in the thinking of educated and responsible Arab leaders. Egyptian and Jordanian leaders are now willing to accept the permanent existence of Israel and to negotiate with the U.S. plan for a peaceful settlement. Although acts of terror and counterterror continue, peace is still possible because the desire for it is greater than ever.


Ps. 1 and 2. Pt. 3 will appear in the winter issue.

Before order can be restored in the troubled Middle East, the basic causes and implications of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli confrontation must be clearly delineated. Despite British promises that its advocacy of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine would not result in the subjugation of the Arab population, the State of Israel was created at the cost of Arab lives and property. The Arabs resent the injustices of the past and feel they are justified in trying to expel the Israelis because of the "Israeli use of force in imposing the Jewish State on their territory." Increasingly hostile moves on the part of the Arabs, including border raids by Syria, Nasser's mobilization in Sinai and his removal of U.N. forces stationed there, and the recent conclusion of defense pacts among Arab nations, finally led to Israel's preemptive attack on June 5, 1967. Without firm assurance of Western assistance, the Israelis apparently did not want to risk an Arab attack. The 6-day war demonstrated the inability of the U.N. Security Council to keep the peace without the joint backing of the superpowers. The need for a guarantee of frontiers by some 'intermediate force' between the levels of the UNEF and the two super-powers. Moreover, the war indicated the need to balance the offensive weapons in the Arab-Israeli arsenals with more defensive weapons in order to make surprise attacks less attractive.


Translated from Corriere della sera, Milan, Newsp.

Russia has transformed the Middle East into a Soviet bloc by establishing a system of bases in the area. Since it plans to maintain and strengthen this bloc, Russia is against a peace that would reduce the Arab demand for arms and jeopardize the agreements on the bases, but it is also against a war with the United States and involvement in irrational Arab-provoked crises. Therefore, it favors a well-calculated cold war that aims to strangle Israel politically and thereby effect a change in the East-West power balance. Under these circumstances the disagreements between the Russians and the Arabs cannot be viewed at larger-power moderation against small-nation extremism; instead, they must be seen as a gap between the interests of Soviet imperialism and those of Arab nationalism, with the Soviet Union more extremist than the Arabs in their desire to maintain continual discord in the Middle East. The reality is that Israel faces Soviet encirclement; the challenge is even greater now that the Soviet Union is a Mediterranean power.


The events in Czechoslovakia might well have been a first, perhaps decisive, step toward a peaceful and democratic world. This development is not accidental, because totalitarian methods sooner or later ossify into dogma and the rulers become incompetent. "Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of the press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution." Political liberty and the rule of law are an essential defense against the corruption and ruination of the state. A democratic Communist state is a contradiction in terms, because no democratic state can have a single party. If a compromise like the Czechoslovak form of government evolves, the country will probably develop into one resembling the Scandinavian mixed economies, and the Communist Party will be transmuted into a kind of democratic Communist party, supported by the majority and purged of its despotic associations. Change will not be easy, but even in Russia social, economic, and intellectual forces are increasing pressure on the political system. Russia is ruled by a group, not by a single will; the rulers are generally mediocre, and therefore the present system has no great chance of surviving long. However the main problem in reintegration of the Communist movement into the world's political organization, so that the precarious truce based on the balance of armaments can be replaced by a genuine détente, which alone can guarantee world peace. It is hard to outline a policy adequate to a period full of surprises. Either provocations or retreat from the Western intellectual and military positions would strengthen the hard-liners on the other side. A flexible initiative toward German reunification might be a positive step. A greater readiness to cope with unforeseen events and a large expansion of diplomatic contingency planning seem to be indicated. The Communist world is in a crisis. Nobody can say for certain that it will democratize itself, but if it does not it might perish.

Bacskai states that the nondissertation of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite for solving European problems and cites the specific danger of the German Federal Republic's possession of nuclear weapons. He emphasizes the common points present in different proposals for European security submitted by the East and West, i.e., nuclear-free and limited armament areas, a nonaggression treaty, between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and an all-Europe security treaty. Dr. Sawicki points to 'the narrow margin assigned to the Atlantic Alliance as a mechanism which might be used to some purpose in the process of détente' and concludes that 'the more the détente encompasses problems decisive for security... the less apt will be the mechanism of the Alliance for the purpose of participating in détente.' Progress toward security will be made through bilateral channels and, perhaps eventually, through a multinational mechanism in which European members of NATO could pursue their national interests more effectively than through the alliance. He concludes that German reunification, which would destroy the existing political and military balance, will not lead to security.

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expulsion of the Sudeten Germans after World War II is only too well known. They now live in Western Germany. Dr. Goppel elucidates the policy of the West German government, which aims at a reconciliation and an understanding with Germany's eastern neighbors, with normal diplomatic and other contacts. The venture seems hopeless since it does not accord with Soviet strategy for the maintenance of the status quo. The author is nonetheless sure that this policy will succeed if Germans will succeed in creating a federated Europe with no frontier problems, with peaceful economic functions, and with freedom warranted to all its peoples. The insistence on the right of peoples to their homeland and to self-determination is one of the strongest weapons in the struggle against despotism and violence. Fundamental values such as personal liberty and human dignity cannot be bypassed in political discussion. These rights are also the rights of those peoples who must now live without freedom.

(Supplied summary, modified)


The Czechoslovak situation is important because the Soviet regime has moved a large portion of its armed forces to the West and is poised for a massive confrontation with the NATO countries apparently aimed at neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany. Soviet military thinking may envision other invasions of Central Europe, possibly a limited ground operation against West German territory. If the West Germans do not obtain security guarantees they may choose cold war neutralism, which would spare them a Red Army occupation, but the entire framework of free world's defense against the Soviet regime would be cracked. Thus they should receive firm assurance that U.S. troops, armed with tactical nuclear weapons, will prevent a breach of the frontier. Further, they need a permanent security guarantee—either their own defensive, tactical nuclear weapons—against the gigantic Soviet military machine. Because of the Central European crisis and the West German need for limited nuclear capability, the United States should not approve the nuclear nonproliferation treaty: instead NATO should be strengthened.


The new Constitution of the German Democratic Republic contains a "precise concept" for solving Germany's "national question." As the Constitution of the socialist state of the German nation, "it considers West Germany, another state belonging to the same nation. It solemnly commits the people and the Government of the German Democratic Republic, "now and in the coming decades," to the task of ending the division of Germany, which was forced upon the nation by imperialism. It obligates them to work for the gradual rapprochement of the two German states so they finally unite into one peace-loving Germany—"the basis of democracy and socialism." Unlike Bonn's ideas for solving the "national question," this concept is truly "national," for it postulates a nonseparatist consolidation of the nation. The rule of West Germany by capitalism makes it increasingly subservient to the global strategy of U.S. imperialism. The emergency is efficiently introduced by Bonn amid the authoritarian rule and more intensive expansion of the monopolies. This, combined with the Hallelujah Doctrine and Bonn's persistent refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic, only deepens the division of Germany. By signing the Paris treaties, Bonn has in fact renounced until the year 2000 the Federal Republic's freedom to deal with matters that concern all Germany. As new Eastern policy aims at camouflaging its revanchist and aggressive goals. The two German states are both subjects of international law, and their mutual relations should be predicated upon equal rights.


Surveys the Bab el Mandeb region, emphasizing its importance as the only Israeli gateway to Afro-Asian trade and as a factor in Soviet and U.S. global strategy. Viewed as a whole, the troubles of Yemen, Aden, Eritrea, and French Somaliland are directly related to the 1967 Egyptian thrust against Israel. Egyptian involvement in all four disputes stemmed from Nasser's master plan to isolate Israel by gaining shore approaches to the Bab el Mandeb artery. Failing in this attempt, Nasser was forced to shift his isolation campaign to the Strait of Tiran and confront Israel directly. With Soviet encouragement, Nasser will probably turn his attention once more to the Red Sea because Bab el Mandeb is a prize objective in the war against Israel.


Surveys the numerous problems confronting the 33-year-old Jordanian King. In attempting to maintain the respect he earned from his Arab neighbors during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War without completely alienating the United States, Hussein has placed himself in an extremely precarious position. He cannot break the unity of the Arab front by unilaterally negotiating with Israel for the return of the western bank of the Jordan even though his country cannot survive without this economically important territory. Palestinian refugees now constitute the majority of Jordan's population, and the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine is continually undermining Hussein's prestige by its terrorist activities. Only through a relaxation of tension in the Middle East can Hussein hope to pull his country through this perilous time.


The Near East is quickly becoming a dangerous hotspot which could erupt at any moment. The incidents along the Jordan River and the Suez Canal are manifestations of an untenable situation; the cease-fire line separating the Arab countries from Israel affects the Arab's vital interests so intensely and cuts so deeply into their territory, "that it cannot even
be considered temporary to say nothing of long-term." The line exists because those powers that could pressure Israel in terms of the U.N. Charter lack the will to do so. Consequently, the Arab States view the U.N. as powerless to achieve its aims in an area that involves its vital interests, and they now believe that the only means of rectifying the situation is by force. Whether there will be another war will depend on whether those powers "supporting Israel's organization perceive the peril of the policy they pursue." A revival of war would aggravate the international situation and detrimentally affect international cooperation.

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MID-EAST PEACE NOW--OR POSSIBLE WORLD WAR III?
Prev. world war III, no. 72, summer 1966: 1-6, illus., D731, P75, 1968

Russian Middle East arms shipments and the polarization of the Near East into pro-Western and pro-Soviet camps are the major sources of potential conflict in that area. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Russia has increased its arms shipments to Egypt until Nasser's armed forces now have a 4 to 1 "theoretical superiority" over Israel. Russian military assistance has included combat aircraft, missile craft, submarines, and rocket assault vessels. This policy not only "encourages military adventurism of Nasser and his ilk" but threatens the "United East-West detente." Furthermore, Russia and its allies refuse to accept any U.N. resolution even mildly in favor of Israel and, by threatening a veto, "make it impracticable" for other U.N. members to press complaints against the Arabs." Arab policies such as nonrecognition, border raids, support of the Palestine Liberation Organization also impede efforts to reach a peace settlement. To prove to Moscow its determination to prevent another war, the United States must match Russia weapon for weapon in supplies to Israel; this might also convince Moscow its determination to prevent another war. Russia and its allies refuse to accept any U.N. resolution even mildly in favor of Israel and, by threatening a veto, "make it impracticable" for other U.N. members to press complaints against the Arabs. "Arab policies such as nonrecognition, border raids, support of the Palestine Liberation Organization also impede efforts to reach a peace settlement. To prove to Moscow its determination to prevent another war, the United States must match Russia weapon for weapon in supplies to Israel; this might also convince Moscow its determination to prevent another war.

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Mieroszewski, Juleusz. IN CHANGING EAST EUROPE, THERE IS ONLY ONE ROAD TO ONE GERMANY.
AP/AR3, v. 16
Translated from Kultura, Paris.
AP54, KR5

East Germany is a separate nation constituting a threat not only to the Federal Republic by serving as a "Red Prussia" but also to Eastern Europe by serving as its gendarme. A democratic reformation of Germany is possible only if West Germany counterbalances the ideology of a "Red Prussia" with a policy of reconciliation and freedom toward Eastern Europe. Since the East Germans and the Russians can only be resisted in the East, a policy of cooperation with Eastern Europe is paramount.

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(Supplied summary, modified)

Analyses the possibilities for a reunification of Germany. Plischke states that the aims of the Federal Republic of Germany will be the restoration of Germany in unity in freedom and peace, a Germany in control of its own international affairs, Germany's vital interests, as defined by the late Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950's, have since remained relatively constant and unchanged. The focal point of this concept, a "national security/reunification/Berlin" relationship, was shifting by the mid-1960's so that the policy complex was more accurately depicted as a "national security/German reunification/European unity/power/prestige/detente" configuration. "Detente" has become the central cementing component of the West German policy system. The process of reunification might be pursued in any of seven ways. The most obvious alternative is that "the Germans would serve to elect an all-German agency to consummate the action. This possibility has thus far failed owing to the Communists' attitude. In the foreseeable future the most negotiable way to reunification may be to begin with a loose confederation of West and East Germany, a "federative continuum" that may lead to greater national integration. Finally, with the simple incorporation of one Germany into the other being unlikely, an entirely new, united German govern-

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Mitich, Fritz. GLEANINGS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION.
DB2007.7, ST4, v. 16

Propaganda is running high in Germany to persuade everybody to accept "matters as they stand" and to minimize the legal points of view. The author attempts in his documentation to put before the reader some of the by-products of the research carried out during the discussions on the German question. He gives an account of the status of territories under military occupation. The occupying power administers the land, but only the peace treaty can modify the status. The Potsdam Protocol on August 2, 1945, established Soviet and Polish administration over the Eastern territories of Germany. It is also evident that the Power of Potsdam could not determine new European frontiers.

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Plischke, Elmar. GERMAN REUNIFICATION--AN OPTIONS ANALYSIS.
DB2007.7, ST4, v. 16

Analyses the possibilities for a reunification of Germany. Plischke states that the aims of the Federal Republic of Germany will be the restoration of Germany in unity in freedom and peace, a Germany in control of its own international affairs, Germany's vital interests, as defined by the late Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950's, have since remained relatively constant and unchanged. The focal point of this concept, a "national security/reunification/Berlin" relationship, was shifting by the mid-1960's so that the policy complex was more accurately depicted as a "national security/German reunification/European unity/power/prestige/detente" configuration. "Detente" has become the central cementing component of the West German policy system. The process of reunification might be pursued in any of seven ways. The most obvious alternative is that "the Germans would serve to elect an all-German agency to consummate the action. This possibility has thus far failed owing to the Communists' attitude. In the foreseeable future the most negotiable way to reunification may be to begin with a loose confederation of West and East Germany, a "federative continuum" that may lead to greater national integration. Finally, with the simple incorporation of one Germany into the other being unlikely, an entirely new, united German govern-

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strongened this opposition, widened the division in the Chinese Communist Party, and further deepened the split between China and the Soviet Union. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution must be seen as a spectacular but futile attempt to suppress this opposition and thus ensure the integrity of Maoist foreign policy. Ever since China's detonation of a nuclear-armed missile in November 1966 Mao has claimed that he has a credible deterrent against a U.S. nuclear attack. But this line is for domestic consumption and Mao must know that his nuclear forces are still inadequate. Although this certainty will not prevent his continuing to give aid to the North Vietnamese and thus risking general war with the United States, it will restrict China's support to serving as a "rear base" of the Vietnam revolution.

The danger of war in Europe will persist as long as Germany is divided. The greatest threat to peace comes from the Soviet Union, which still clings to its hope of unifying the world under Soviet communism. A permanent solution to the problem of peace will come only with a change in Soviet policy, and this will come only when Soviet leaders are convinced beyond any doubt that the will of NATO cannot be broken or the demand for freedom in Eastern Europe stifled. Consequently NATO must resist every hostile Soviet pressure and encourage every manifestation of resistance to Soviet hegemony in the East. It must insist that any settlement in central Europe be based on the Potsdam agreements, which recognized the unity of the German nation and specified that the German-Polish border would be fixed by treaty. Once the Russians have abandoned their imperialist ambitions and permitted European tensions to relax, Germany can be reunited and a solution to the German-Polish dispute negotiated. The next step would be a unified Europe with an associated status for the East European states. This federation would be a third world power and in the only form in which an independent Europe can survive. But the key to this progress in NATO, which must be steadfast, courageous, and prepared "to make sacrifices and to intimidate effectively when necessary."

Ascribes the rise of Arab nationalism largely to the influence of Europe, the cradle of modern nationalism. Toynbee considers the United States Middle East policy unhelpfully biased in favor of Israel, which drives some Arab countries into the hands of the Soviet Union.

The various movements for independence movements in India and Burma are no longer internal affairs because of the increasing Chinese influence in areas of separatist activity. Toynbee in the U.S. attitude toward Burma's "swinging" neutrality and Burma and Indian efforts to draw closer together are
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

alarming because the movements might be forced to rely further on Chinese support, thereby threatening Burman's existence and thwarting efforts of the Indian Government to maintain the status quo in Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam. The situation in Assam and other areas along India's international border is chaotic. The hill people of Assam are divided: one group demands complete independence and the other, autonomy within an Indian Union, but the influence of the latter group is diminishing. The Burmese situation is critical because the minority peoples' separate demands seem irreconcilable. The future of these undesirable. However, the fact that they predicted America's failure in Vietnam does not necessarily justify following their prescriptions for the rest of the mainland. Their assertions that Southeast Asia is not a critical because the minority people's separatist military presence in other parts of Southeast Asia is alarming becuase the movements might be forced to rely further on Chinese support, thereby threatening Burman's existence and thwarting efforts of the Indian Government to maintain the status quo in Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam. The situation in Assam and other areas along India's international border is chaotic. The hill people of Assam are divided: one group demands complete independence and the other, autonomy within an Indian Union, but the influence of the latter group is diminishing. The Burmese situation is critical because the minority peoples' separate demands seem irreconcilable. The future of these areas depends upon the situations in China, India, and Burma; China may become the sole beneficiary of these internal disputes because of Indian and Burmese economic difficulties. The solution to this problem will ultimately depend upon those nations directly involved, with assistance from "friendly neighbors"; i.e., the Thais, but India's and Burma's actions must aid in finding an adequate and peaceful settlement.

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.


Attempts to arouse public sympathy for Cambodia, whose neutrality and independence are seen as targets of American imperialism. Cambodian history is surveyed from ancient to modern times, with emphasis on the Geneva agreements and claims of recent violations against Cambodian neutrality by the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam. "Under the fallacious pretext of preventing the Indochinese from becoming communists, American imperialism mascerates them and tries to make them slaves to its policy."


As the 'heartland' of the Western Hemisphere, the Caribbean region is as vital as ever to the strategic welfare of the United States. Although the introduction of long-range aircraft, nuclear-powered vessels, and guided missiles has somewhat lessened its importance, the significance of its proximity to the United States and its role as the gateway to the Panama Canal have by no means been eliminated. While the threat of a conventional military attack upon any of the Central American Republics is now minimal, recent efforts to infiltrate and subvert existing regimes are jeopardizing the security of these states. If the United States is to successfully light Communist incursions into the Caribbean it cannot afford to diminish its military presence in the area. In particular, it must not consider withdrawal from its naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although to date Castro has avoided a direct confrontation with the United States over its right to maintain the base on Cuban territory, he is expected to eventually demand the 1933 treaty that gave the United States territorial rights to the base area. It is on the ground that this agreement was concluded when Cuba was under foreign military occupation that Castro has already started his campaign against the treaty by refusing to issue the annual check sent by the United States for use of the base and its buildings. Fortifications in its vicinity to propagandize the need for protecting the "outpost of socialism" against the "threat of imperialism."


If America is defeated in Vietnam, the critics of the war may win support for their views that the U.S. military presence in other parts of Southeast Asia is undesirable. However, the fact that they predicted America's failure in Vietnam does not necessarily justify following their prescriptions for the rest of the mainland. Their assertions that Southeast Asia is not vital to America's national interests and that America would eventually meet political or military defeat on the mainland are highly debatable. Moreover, their analyses of the consequences of withdrawal are far from infallible. Those who do not foresee an ultimate Chinese takeover of the mainland believe that a balance of power can be achieved in the area, either through the offshore presence of the United States or by the Assans alone. Yet the American experience in Vietnam demonstrates the weakness of offshore military power, and the lack of effective leadership and stability in the Asian states would have a destabilizing effect that could undermine U.S. influence in the region. Furthermore, the arguments that China would be stopped from southward expansion by the emergence of Third-type regimes in the south, deficiencies in Chinese military strength, or the absence of Chinese aspirations for additional territory are not particularly convincing. Thus great caution must be exercised in drawing generalizations from the Vietnam experience and uncritically following the lead of anti-war critics who now advocate total withdrawal from Southeast Asia.


Reviews the U.S. position in regard to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The United States has spared no effort to protect its military strategic interests in Latin America. It refuses to include its territories (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) in the nuclear-free zone and asserts its quarantines for uncontrolled transportation of nuclear weapons through Latin American countries. Although Cuba has refused to take part in the disarmament negotiations, the United States agrees to include its territories in the nuclear-free zone. It supports "the drive of Mexico and other Latin American countries to save the continent from the danger of a nuclear war."

D. OUTER SPACE

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation Inspection Verification

The design and operation of a beta-ray spectrometer with two lithium-drifted allid semiconductor detectors in stack assembly are described. Examples [accompanied by diagrams] are given illustrating the rational application of this spectrometer to nuclide analysis of failed samples. The examples given relate to the strontium isotopes Sr 90 and Sr 89, the rubidium isotopes Rb 103 and Rb 106, and the transuranium nuclide Np 239. (Abstract supplied, modified)

Freedman, Helen W.

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Boh, Bruce A. ESTIMATION OF PKP TRAVEL TIMES.


A set of travel times for the core-waves PKP is derived from observations and tabulated. All values are tied to the 1968 P travel times for a surface-focus for 75°< L < 95° due to Herrin et al. Times for both the branches DV (100°< φ < 180°) and QH (125°< φ < 150°) are listed in more detail than previously, together with an extension for PKKP waves, from 110° back to 105°. Checks on the DF branch for 1220° - 1500° using observations from the 1965 LONGSHOT explosion provide no evidence for further revision of the first section of this branch. Special attention is given to the times of the DF branch (PKKP) for L < 150°. Delays at 150° and 162° of order 3 sec. reported by K. Engin in 1967 are not confirmed. There is a group of small arrivals about 1 sec. earlier than predicted by the present PKKP tables for 150°< L < 160°, respectively. These may indicate an error in the curvature of the present curve and, perhaps, a slight discontinuity in the inner core near a radius of 850 km. No evidence is found for a layer of any consequence with reduced P velocity in the inner core. Revised times for the branch AB (denoted by PKPq) are based mainly on readings from the Indian Ocean earthquake of February 17, 1966, and the Jeffreys-Bullen times. For L > 150°, the new empirical times confirm the curvature of the Jeffreys-Bullen curve for PKPq; however, near L < 152°, the observed curvature appears to be greater than that of the latter curve. The new times are of the order of one second earlier; this result is highly sensitive to the precision of the epicenters estimated for the 1965 shock. PKPq is traceable at least out to 1850°. Depth allowances for PKPq have been computed by T. Qamar, to provide a set consistent with the model Earth used by Herrin et al. in the 1968 P tables. (Abstract supplied)

Engdahl, Eric R., and others. COMPUTATION METHODS.


The surface-focus P travel time estimated by Herrin et al. (1968) entail a P velocity distribution from which smoothed travel-time tables of P, PP, and P-P are constructed. Theoretical considerations and computational processes used are described. It is shown that computational errors in the new travel-time tables are less than 0.01 second. (Abstract supplied)

Freedman, Helen W. SEISMOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND MEASUREMENT ERROR.


A seismological measurement, such as arrival time or, less directly, origin time, is an example of a measurement variable which can be considered as the sum of a parameter—the quantity being measured—and an error variable. Optimal methods for the estimation of this parameter vary with the probability distribution of the error variable. In particular, estimation in the presence of bias or of gross errors is discussed, together with the related problem of precision versus accuracy of the estimate. Errors in estimates of arrival times, origin times and hypocentral location contribute to variation in travel-time estimates; these are analyzed separately. Each of these, with the exception of focal depth, has a distribution which can be fitted to a mixture of a normal distribution and some contamination. The degree of contamination varies; methods for truncation are suggested. The presence of possible, often undetectable, bias in locations and travel times may make confidence statements about these parameters unreliable. (Abstract supplied, modified)

Greenberg, D. S. ARMS CONTROL Il: U.S. HEPHTISH CONDUCT BIG TROOP INSPECTION EXPERIMENT.


The United States and Great Britain recently completed a complex 3-month field test of techniques for verifying compliance with arms control agreements "at limit troop deployment in a given area. Operation "First Look" was carried out by 80 American military officers who, with the aid of weekly aerial reconnaissance runs, automatic camera camera, unmanned sensing devices, monitored the activities of 30,000 troops on a 2,000-square-mile training base in southern England. The acting inspectors were divided into subgroups to test different types of inspection techniques and were given varying amounts of freedom to roam about the base and gather information on troop movements. Although the British Defence Ministry and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have not yet completed their analysis of the information gathered during the joint experiment, the preliminary conclusions are that a relatively small number of inspectors can effectively detect changes in military forces within a large area.

Gupta, D., and W. Hädicke. PRINCIPLES OF AN INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM FOR SAFEGUARDING FISSILE MATERIAL FLOW IN THE PEACEFUL SECTOR OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.


The safeguards systems now used by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community subject an entire sector of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy to international control in order to detect or prevent the diversion of fissile material for nuclear-weapons production. The systems were introduced in the early development of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, when almost no commercial competition existed in relevant domestic or international markets. But now growing competition and advancing technology call for a modification of the systems to protect the commercial interests of individual companies and nations against harmful infringement. The amount of present control could
greatly handicap competitiveness in the field. International controls should therefore be applied only at selected stages in the fuel cycle of fissile materials. The control system should be instrumented as much as possible to prevent its use as a cover for industrial espionage. The nuclear research center in Karlsruhe is now developing such a system.


An iterative technique was used to locate some 400 earthquakes, estimate corrections to the Jeffreys-Bullen P travel times and estimate azimuthally dependent station adjustments (station corrections). An oversimplified model for the upper 700 km of the mantle was adopted in order to provide a standard for the investigation of regional variations in travel times. In the estimation procedure only data for epicentral distances in the range 20° to 100° were used, and the data were truncated to remove gross errors. The new P travel times are generally 2 to 3 sec. less than those given in the Jeffreys-Bullen Tables. (Abstract supplied, modified).


Azimuthally dependent station corrections for 321 seismological stations were estimated using data from 400 large earthquakes (1961-1964) and 20 large explosions. In the estimation procedure only data for epicentral distances in the range 20° to 105° were used, and the data were truncated to remove gross errors. In addition, estimates of variance of station error distributions were computed. (Abstract supplied).


Points to the achievements of U.S. satellites in maintaining surveillance of military activity in the Soviet Union. For the past 5 years the United States has been steadily stripping away some of the most valuable military secrets of the Soviet Union. "Using photographic and electronic data-collecting devices,spy satellites have provided the United States with accurate information on the deployment of Soviet offensive and defensive missiles and on the Chinese nuclear program. On a continuous basis, satellites are being used to monitor nuclear test explosions in the U.S.S.R., and to provide an early warning in case of a Soviet missile attack. In time America may be able to improve its spy satellites to the point where onsite inspection of disarmament agreements will be unnecessary, and it may be unnecessary to a far-reaching arms control pact would be removed.


Based on a new P, P' velocity distribution and observed P, P' travel times from nuclear explosions, the core is estimated to have a mean radius of 3477 km and a standard deviation of 0 km. Five velocity models were tested for the lowermost 90 km of the mantle. The P, P' data suggest that the P, P' velocity increases slightly with depth in this region. Tables of P, P' travel times have been computed for the preferred model and a core radius of 3477 km. (Abstract supplied).


Some of the statistical aspects of estimating travel-time anomalies and station corrections are considered. In order to estimate these quantities using earthquake data the events themselves must first be located. We investigated the use of the Gauss-Newton iterative technique to obtain a least-squares epicenter location employing Monte Carlo methods. Results of these studies indicate that the Gauss-Newton process converges to an absolute minimum and that confidence ellipses computed by linear techniques are reliable for reasonable networks of well-distributed stations. Also the Monte Carlo studies indicate that a least-squares solution may be inaccurate if appreciable travel-time anomalies or station errors means exist. We then expanded the location procedure to include the estimation of travel-time anomalies and station corrections. In order to obtain these estimates data from some 278 large earthquakes were analyzed by using a modified Seidl iterative process. (Abstract supplied).

7 Enforcement


Economic sanctions take the form of export and import embargoes, financial, transportation, and communication control, nationalization of property, preemptive purchasing, or other less direct measures to weaken the terms of trade or disrupt the markets of the sanctioned state. The effectiveness of these sanctions depends on the economic vulnerability of the sanctioned state and on the extent of success in isolating it from its sources of trade and financial support. Sanctions are likely to be successful only against the smallest, least developed states, but even here the results are uncertain. Economic sanctions against Rhodesia have failed because of key leaks in the sanctioning system and because the Rhodesian regime has made internal adjustments to offset the impact of the measures taken against it. This experience indicates that economic sanctions are not a promising means of enforcing arms control agreements. Economic rewards—such as those offered in the superpower treaties—would be far more effective than sanctions. A nation will not put itself in danger for more economic gain; as Adam Smith put it, for every nation "defense ... is of much more importance than opulence."

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F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

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Estimates in purchasing power equivalent (PPE) dollars the real costs of defense in 120 countries. Benoit describes his method of computing these costs from monetary costs expressed in units of local currency and stresses the tentative character of his results. He concludes that a realistic estimate of the benefits of disarmament must await more precise knowledge of the kinds and quantities of goods and services actually subtracted from output to civilian economies by defense establishments. Even then, prediction would be uncertain because the extent of benefits depends to a large degree on the social utility and productiveness of the new uses to which the released defense resources were shifted.

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With Vietnam peace negotiations underway and the United States and Russia in the first phase of arms control talks, the hope of reaching at least some of the nation's swords into plowshares thickens daily. Already Washington is studying the problems of how to smooth the economic transition to a more peaceful world and divert freed defense resources to urgent civilian programs. The crucial questions are: what immediate and long-term effects a defense cutback would have on the economy as a whole and how much of this cutback would be available for attacking civilian problems. Experts claim that if the Federal Government remains committed to high employment and social reconstruction, the transition to peace economy will be smooth. But this forecast has been challenged by the problem that inflation and balance of payments difficulties will limit Washington's flexibility in dealing with economic problems. Experts are also divided over the size of the "peace dividend" that can be expected for the civilian sector. Optimists feel that if a new President renews pressures to maintain a high level of military spending, it might come from non-military programs, and still recognize that the danger of increased unemployment makes an attempt to reduce the budget deficit timely. Then the peace dividend may go as high as $10 billion in the first year. In fact, few have been agreed to by the armament interests, which would hold up even in the case of a sudden breakthrough to an arms control agreement. And this is not likely to happen.

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

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The paper gives a brief review of new seismic equipment, developed at the O. J. Schmidt-Institute of Physics of the Earth, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and used for the recording of earthquakes and generated seismic waves. Instruments for the recording of weak and strong earthquakes on photographic, electrotactile sensitizable and heat sensitive paper as well as on magnetic drums are described; including equipment for long-term recording and instruments with automatic starting devices. Principles of operation and significant data of the instruments are mentioned briefly. (Abstract supplied, modified)

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The proposals that the seabed be reserved for peaceful purposes and its resources used for the benefit of mankind will be debated in the forthcoming sessions of the UN General Assembly. The two drafts of principles under consideration both state that an area of the seabed lies beyond national jurisdiction and urge the formation of an international regime to govern the exploitation of the sea resources. But, they disagree as to whether this regime would have full purposes or only limited objectives. The United States will have much influence in determining the extent of the area reserved for mankind and the kind of international regime that will administer it. An agreement would help greatly to eliminate the threat of conflict and bring nations together under world law.

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A neutral Laos is a fantasy, internal war is the reality. As the activity of the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese increased, the South Vietnamese, American and French extended the Vietnam conflict across its borders into southern Laos. Although the United States claims that it has followed the Laotian Agreements to withdraw all troops from Laos, the preference that air strikes are made without the support of ground forces is unappealing. More significant than the presence of South Vietnamese troops and U.S. advisers are the reports on Laotian internal bordering, the Northern provinces of South Vietnam and only do they gather information, but they also act as general purpose patrols, gathering the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. When the Vietnam War calls, negotiations for peace must include provisions relating to the Lao problem.

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Data collected from laboratory and field experiments and project feasibility studies in nuclear excavation research. The studies give evidence that nuclear explosives can be used in the construction of navigable channels, harbors, reservoirs, dams, underground...
storage facilities, and in rock quarrying. The advantage of nuclear excavation over conventional methods is economy of both money and time. The future development and application of civil nuclear explosives will depend largely upon the interest shown by the engineering profession.


Advances in oceanography and submarine technology will tremendously increase the strategic and economic importance of the deep sea. Submarine warfare will no longer be related solely to protecting surface sea lanes but will also be directed at protecting national exploitation of undersea resources. By the 1980's submarines will be able to operate for longer periods of time greater distances than at present and will be equipped with more sophisticated communication and defensive devices. Muster-carrying submarines will be far safer than they, are now, thus greatly adding to their deterrent strength. However, the new submarines will not be totally secure because of the development of highly effective antisubmarine surface vessels and aircraft, leading to a new concept of total naval warfare in which all the elements are engaged at once. Naval warfare could assume global proportions since rival contenders for undersea resources will not be bound by traditional national boundaries. If the oceans are not to become the battlefield of the future, the nations of the world must soon work out cooperative agreements regarding their utilization.


As the last great frontier, the oceans may soon become the setting for international competition unless a clear definition of ownership can be agreed upon by all nations. Recent advances in ocean technology and an increasing realization of the importance of ocean resources have greatly increased interest, both commercial and governmental, in exploring undersea resources. Projects brought forth the construction of deep submergence vessels and in the utilization of marine geophysical research programs, particularly in the oceanographers, research programs, partly due to concern that land resources are not adequate to provide for man's future needs but mainly because of the ocean's strategic possibilities. The seas could be used to test naval and naval forces systems, nucleonuclear weapons systems, solar systems, navigational aids, communications systems, and fixed military installations. Undersea military installations could have grave consequences for world peace. In testing the new naval installations and in the development of possible submarines, they would be subjects of vital concern to all nations and to the entire strategic balance. The loss of a single submarine would have equal or greater effects on the armed forces and could affect the strategic situation of nations for long periods of time.


An address made before the Symposium on Mineral Resources of the Deep Ocean, by the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs, urging arms limitation on the deep ocean floor. The author states that the U.S. and General Assembly should respond to the U.S. National Disarmament Committee to take up this question, with a view to deterring those factors vitally workable, verifiable, and selective international agreements. The use of the seabed as a platform for nuclear weapons would be a great potential danger to international stability and security.

425 SEALAB III. Undersea technology, v. 4, Aug. 1968


Articles describing the characteristics of the U.S. Navy supporting Sealab III experiment in deep-sea living and working. Sealab III will attempt to gain man's knowledge of the commercial, scientific, and military potential of the ocean floor and to test the capabilities of humans for long periods in the unique environment of the deep-sea environment. Many research projects will be conducted in the fields of engineering, physiological, navigational, and safety.
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