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COPY FURNISHED CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
ANALYSIS OF LUE CONVERSATION: PROVIDING ACCOUNTS,
FINDING BREACHES, AND TAKING SIDES

Michael Moerman
UCLA

ERRATA

Page Line
5 12 Insert colon between "story" and "i.e."
36 Utterance #232. Insert "no use" as gloss for bracketed words #232:4-6.
43 13 Insert "which should not be confused with the analysis" between "analysis" and "itself."
44 18 Delete final comma.
49 14 Insert "are" between "CLs" and "used;" insert "so as to" between "used" and "invoke."
65 Utterance #102. Delete "W," add "?" at end.
66 Utterance #107. Replace "seargeant" with "sergeant."
66 4 Replace "if" with "is."
69 11 Add "--" after last word.
69 18 Replace first "of" with "or."
73 14 Delete last word ("to").
73 15 Replace "interact" with "use."
74 8 Enclose "not stated before #196a" in parentheses and delete the comma which follows the phrase.
74 15 Replace "perhpas" with "perhaps."
101 Replace "Shuts" with "Schutz."
I will concentrate on utterance VIII.1#204 and show its appropriateness as an account, that it recognizes a breach, and that it provides a culpable reason for that breach and thereby allies its speaker with the storyteller. I claim for each of these cumulative features and their analytic components that they are oriented to by participants in the conversation. In analyzing #204, I will make use of perspectives and concepts which are generally useful for the analysis of natural interaction.

VIII.1:204

![Table](image)

visit all over market

(So), [She] (must have just) went visiting around the market.

Providing accounts. One prominent feature of conversations is that their participants orient to the sequential placement of the utterances which compose them. The situated intelligibility which an utterance has for participants frequently depends upon the particular ways in which they tie that utterance to particular preceding ones. Since at the present stage of our work "ticing" is a gloss for a number of different relationships (some unanalyzed) among utterances, it might prove helpful to point informally to an instance of ticing without analyzing its specific features. Consider the conversational
fragment III.1#333-335. The speaker of #335 clearly made use of #334's status as an answer to the question asked by #333.

III.1

#333

N  bā kēw myu pīn sa- nān
I  N  PRN  to be  what  h

Ba Kaew, what's wrong with you there?

#334

W₁  tūn

pimples

#335

W₂  tūn  mēj  pō khwät

pimples  chiggers  dig

[Probably] pimples (from) chiggers burrowing in.

For #334 to have this status, its speaker presumably attended to and analyzed #333 sufficiently to know that it was a question which, b) she might answer by, c) saying tūn. My purpose in presenting this fragment is to take advantage of the reader's intuitive recognition of tieing. It might well be the case that an adequate analysis of the specific ties among III.1#333-335, their interactional work, and the member knowledge which they imply would require a paper no less elaborate than this one. This should not be discouraging, however, since I hope that the analysis of #204 will show that an adequate account of a single stretch of talk provides procedures and results which tell us things we would otherwise not know about other talk, about conversation, and about the societies in which both occur.
The reader will observe that #204's ties (both forward and back) to other utterances are essential to all of the analytic features that I will develop in this paper.

Regardless of initial lay notions to the contrary, it is not the case that stretches of talk are typically transparent with respect to topic. Without analysis, III.1#333-335, for example, might equally well be taken as being "about" pimples, chiggers, or (a boy named) bá këw. This observation implies that it can be a participant's task as speaker to constrain and as listener to analyze the topic or focus of an utterance or of a stretch of talk.

In the utterances which precede VIII.1#204, C repeatedly calls attention to a single feature of his story: the elapsed time for which the speaker of #204 accounts. That C does this in #196b:11-17, #196d, #198:8-12, and #201 was pointed out to me by a graduate student. I mention this not merely to be generous, but as evidence of our claim that public data and procedures permit cooperative work, and to support my hope that analysis of a conversation need not require conventional ethnographic knowledge of the language or culture of its speakers. This is a hope, not a conviction, because it seems likely that participants themselves require detailed knowledge of their language and culture in order, in this instance, to analyze C's utterances for their references to elapsed time. That an American reader can also recognize the focus on elapsed time does not imply that he must have used the same cultural and linguistic resources in order to do so. My understanding of what the Lue resources are is presented in Appendix A. I have segregated them there
[He sent her] to go buy n'ampla and cigarettes and matches. [He was] afraid (that) [she] wouldn't be quick, so [he] bought [her] (a) bike. Although (as far as) from Ban Maq here to the market, it took [her] an hour.

The soup pot, the curry pot is set down [all ready]. Don't be long(!) [Just] buy some n'ampla.

[But she] really took (a whole) hour!
As a convenience to the reader and, more importantly, because as a facsimile member of Lue society I must rely upon the reader's judgment of whether or not they are central to the analysis offered here. In the Discussion section of this paper I will return to the issue of whether the analysis of conversational interaction requires ethnographic knowledge.

That participants notice the focus which C provides is suggested by #202 (whether that utterance is given its literal or idiomatic reading) and implied by #204's ascription of an intervening activity to the actor who went to market.

VIII.1:#202

W ko wä nän lə
CNJ say D PRT
Just like that. (Idiom)
Said already. (Literal)

#204 provides an account of what "must have" happened between going to market to buy things and returning. It does this by supposing a temporally extensible activity (EN, #204:1) to have occurred between going and returning. I will show how participants knew an account to be appropriate, and how they knew that it was a delay (for this is what an interposed temporally extensible activity would account for) which was to be explained.

Although #202 and #204 are both appropriate, they differ in what they accomplish interactionally and in what they show their speakers to have taken account of. There is no need to suppose the
speaker of #202 (literal) to have taken account of more than C's repetition\textsuperscript{12} or (given the idiomatic reading) of C's focusing on some topic in what he has said so far. Uttering #204, on the other hand, requires knowing that there has been an accountable delay in a particular actor's returning from market.

VIII.1

\begin{verbatim}
#196d            1   2   3   4   5   6   7
C    kân    luk  bân ma-n hân paj kă-t na
   although from N    D    go market          PRT

   8   9   10   11
paj   pin  cŏ-mo-n ni
   go    is  hour      PRT

Although (as far as) from Ban Mîtq here to the market, it took [her] an hour.
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
#196e            1   2   3   4
C   phâj   wā-  sak tă- 
[who says any time]

   can't be

(It) can't [take as long as an hour].
\end{verbatim}

How could participants know that it would be appropriate to provide an account? For this, I think, C's use of "can't happen" (#196e) for a feature of his own story is especially informative. For "can't happen" to be intelligible at all, participants must tie it to some other utterance(s). According to my informant, what C says "can't happen" is precisely what he has just said (in #196d) did happen.
My analysis of #204 indicates that its speaker and other participants (on the basis of what they subsequently do with #204) also analyze #196e for its ties to #196d:9-11. Their understanding, then, is something like, "(It) took an hour (and) can't [have taken an hour for her to make that trip]." Since #196e must be tied to some other utterance(s) to be intelligible, and since the utterance to which it is tied is #196d:9-11, it seems fair to suppose the speaker of #20e to have oriented to the commonplace paradox contained in my expanded translation. As a commonplace paradox, the tied pair of utterances mean something like: "If things were as they should have been, this couldn't have happened. Yet it did happen." It may be generally the case that a commonplace paradox makes providing an account or giving an explanation appropriate. The explanation which #20e proposes, and this may be generally true of explanations of commonplace paradoxes, is an account of "What wasn't as it should have been." It must, however, be observed both that (as #202 indicates) such a paradox does not require a explanation, and that its status as a paradox (and not, for example, a dispute) depends upon the inconsistent utterances having both been made by the same speaker, C.

Producing #204 requires having attended to and analyzed more than #196e, its ties to #196d, and that C said both. Before turning to the orientation, analyses, and cultural knowledge which #204 requires, let us consider who can be said to have the capacity for those things.

The conversational events analyzed in this section are interactive in the minimal sense that accounting for an utterance requires us to
suppose that its speaker had oriented to and analyzed other utterances (often spoken by other participants) and oriented to the analyses made of utterances by other participants. There is therefore no reason for supposing that the knowledge explicited is unique to a specific individual. Who, then, can be said to possess it?

As a consequence of having lived in the village and in the house where recording VIII.1 was made, I know many things about the individual who spoke #204. There is no a priori reason to suppose that any one (or any combination) of those things (such as: sex, age, wealth, genealogical position, weight, religion, complexion, native language, order of birth, cooking skills) is required to account for the utterance. Except as developed by the analysis itself, there is no reason to suppose that considerations of personal motivation, social class, or ethnicity are involved in producing or accounting for an utterance, a conversation, an interaction. For the anthropologist, the main interest of this observation is that there is no reason to suppose that the common culture of participants in these conversations is either completely shared by or restricted to the set of individuals whom it is correct and sometimes convenient to assign a single ethnic label (Moerman 1967, 1968a). Some of this common culture may be restricted to the persons who produced this very conversation, some shared by their fellow villagers, some peculiar to the Tai-Lue, some to the normal members of every society. There is some reason to hope that the techniques used in this paper will permit our learning the incidence (including the universality) of the rules they develop. There is even more reason for regarding them to be immune from some problems of sampling (by region, sex, role, and other social categories).
First, the constraint of natural interaction requires us to show more than one native actively using some piece of knowledge so as to permit them to interact. Restricting our touchstone of common knowledge to that shown to be known and used in actual interactions precludes our having any initial concerns or claims about whether that knowledge is also shared by other actors who happen to be correctly categorizable with the same ethnic name.

Second, and in part out of recognition of the obscurantism of an enterprise which limited its subject matter to a "tribe" or to what W said to K on tape VIII, we must build a model of the speaker/listener which tells us how much of what transpires on our tapes could be accomplished only by those individuals whom we happened to record. I have already argued that the knowledge required for properly speaking #204 cannot be restricted to the individual woman who spoke it. Let us consider whether it is reasonable to suppose that knowledge to be restricted to individuals who "occupy" a particular "role."

In Lue materials, as in American ones, there seem to be some asymmetrical conversational activities (e.g., inviting-accepting) bound to reciprocal pairs of actors (e.g., host-guest) in such a way that for the activity to take place at all there must be actors categorized appropriately to it. I propose that for III.1#14 to be an invitation, W must be taken as a host, Mr as a guest. As between the pair guest-host, it is guests who say or otherwise indicate
Can (I) sit here?

No. Come on up to the house.

Well! That's it. I'm going.

Are [you] going already [?]

I'm leaving now.

Yes.

And when I have free time; I'll come visit you.
Hey, wait a minute, wait a minute, come sit down and talk here first.

Sit down right here in the middle.

If you're going, then go.

that they are leaving (VIII.2#898; I.1#1563/5); hosts who acknowledge their departure (VIII.2#899-900; I.1#1564, 1566, 1567). I am suggesting that there is sometimes a bonding between activities (and consequently the situated utterances which accomplish those activities) and actors (and consequently the situated individuals so formula:ed) which would provide members with these resources and constraints:
a) In some circumstances, making a host's utterance can be a bid for being considered a host (VIII.1#188/9).

b) In some circumstances, the individuals formulated as host may be able to prevent an activity from getting done by not himself doing it.

c) An individual who is a guest may be able to get something done by means of making it a host's duty to do it. So, for example, a speaker may utter the first of an utterance pair anticipating that if no one else offers the second, then the host must as host do so.

These candidate observations suppose that there are scenes recognizable to members as having hosts, that members have knowledge which permits them to recognize a host, and that such a host in such a scene can always be called upon to do a host-like activity. If it is such a host-like activity to acknowledge leave-taking, then VIII.1#228 makes its speaker a host. It is possible (although I doubt) that #204 is somehow the kind of utterance which a proper host will have to make if no one else does. This would permit those present to regard #204's speaker as predictable and its absence as interpretable.

Even if VIII.1#204 is a host's remark in these senses, our model of the listening required to speak it is nevertheless not unique to the individual named W. If

(1) a), b), or c) above hold or

(2) if the absence of a host's remark is noticeable or interpretable to whomsoever or

(3) if any individual might sometime talk as host, then any host component of our model of the speaker of #204 is general to
competent members. I make this point somewhat elaborately because it is typical but wrong for anthropologists to suppose as a working practice that there is a one-for-one correspondence between individuals and "roles" and to further suppose that the only role knowledge which they must explicate is that peculiar to a given individual. To put the issue epigrammatically, for a society to have a king, the king must know how to act like a man (since he is not always kinging) and all men must know how kings act (so that his proper behavior is recognizable). For the present data, even if "doing hosting" is involved in accounting for VI:1.1#204, we cannot suppose the knowledge needed for uttering #204 to be restricted to some set of individuals who (and who alone) are always and merely hosts. Performing such an activity requires that those who are audience to it also know how to recognize and interpret such a performance. It further requires common detailed knowledge of how such a performance is properly done on the particular situated occasions which make it appropriate and which provide the relevance of the member categorizations the performance uses.

In this section I have attempted to show that the intelligibility and appropriateness of an account depend upon, and are visible to, analysts and participants through orienting to and analyzing sequential utterances, their speakers, and the ties among them. In subsequent sections I shall examine the "content" of #204 as an account in order to see the knowledge which its speaker must have used and what he accomplished interactively by saying it.

Recognizing a breach. I must now return to two features of #204 which the preceding section merely took for granted. How does
its speaker know and show that a delay in returning from market is
to be accounted for? How does its speaker know and show whose delay
it was?

Consider, with respect to the second question, that #204
does not specify any actor to whom the activity (#204:1) is ascribed.
I think that it is nevertheless quite clear that for #204 to be the
account for which participants take it, there is no mystery about who
went in. My general argument about this accomplishment is that
natural conversation wherever it has been examined shows its parti-
cipants to orient to an alignment among the actions and the actors
talked about. English pronouns provide speakers of that language
with a linguistic resource for doing this. Lue utterances often lack
pronouns or other lexical indicators of actors. In both Lue and
English (and presumably in other languages as well), linguistic
resources are insufficient for the conversational task of aligning
actions and actors. For accomplishing this task, members additionally use shared and sanctioned knowledge of the social world. At the
present state of our work, I propose that some of this knowledge is
conveniently handled by the analyst as category-bound activities
and as context-bound typifying ascription. Both of these concepts
make use of the notion of categorization labels (CL). All three of
these concepts are useful beyond the present data. Since they have
utility for the analysis of conversation and interaction by both
Lue and Americans, my depiction of them will be somewhat more
elaborate than my immediate purposes (accounting for VIII.1#7046)
require.

The actor whose tardiness #204 explains must be one who went
to market. Producing #204 therefore requires participant analysis of the utterances which indicated who that actor was. The requisite participant analysis may be elaborate in that #196b, which tells of going shopping (#196b:1-10):

   a) is syntactically ambiguous for subject,
   b) names no actors,
   c) even if regarded as a single utterance with #196a, names an actor (#196a:1) who has not been mentioned before.

VIII.1

#196a

1 2 3
C lá*n ni* ni
grandchild PRT
nephew/niece

Now this lan

#196a'

k hoca; hý
NG can Q
[You] can't?

#196b

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C caj pá*j sý* nán pn* kőp bâ*w li* kás
to go buy CNJ cigarettes and

8 9 10 11 12 13 14
an ka? fa*j ni kó* bâ* le*w jâj
he's matches PRT fear NG fast even

15 16 17
sý* lot thi*p hý*
buy bike INDR

[he sent her] to go buy râmpla and cigarettes and matches. [He was] afraid (that) [she] wouldn't be quick, so [he] bought [her] (a) bike.
The course of the story and, specifically, #215 and #217:1-9; 19-27 indicate that participants take it that the actors who performed the actions mentioned in #196b are those mentioned in #190. Specifically, lina'yan, hereafter termed A_2 (as the second actor mentioned in #190), was the person who went (#196b:?) to buy (#196b:3) some items (#196b:4, 6, 9). It is also A_2 whom the speaker of #204 supposes to have done. The p5-15x (hereafter termed A_1 as the first actor mentioned in #190) was the person who feared (#196b:11). VIII.1#196b:11-17 then reads, "[he] feared (that) [she] wouldn't be quick, so [he] bought [her] (a) bike." These ascriptions between actors and actions were also made by my informant and me. What resources do the teller, audience, analyst and informant use for naturally and automatically making these ascriptions?

Lexical and syntactic knowledge is insufficient for these ascriptions. The word caj (#196b:1), if it appears in the conversation at all, can be used here as a verb ("to use, to make use of, to send"), to mark a passive form, or as both ("A_2 was used or sent to... "). My informant and I understood both that it meant "was sent by" and that it was A_2 who was sent by A_1. It is clear that participants made the same actor provisions. Let me propose two Lue norms (E_1 and E_2) which provide for the actor ascriptions which participants make for #196b. At this point in the argument, I propose then less out of serious interest in their content, than in order to discuss the concept, of which E_1 and E_2 are examples, of context-bound typifying ascriptions.

3_1. If there is a p5-16x who has a 16-n and one uses the other to go buy such things as those listed by #196b:4-9, then it is
Old people send [her/them on errands]. Insert #216. [She/They] don't have a bike (so) [old people] buy one for [her/them].

"Did [you/she] ride fast? From here to the market and back and then give [it to him, saying], ["]Here dear grandfather," when [I/you] want to go anywhere, INSERT #218 [I will] tell the old people first.
typically the former who so uses the latter and typically the latter who goes to buy such things.

\[ E_2 \]

If a .person has a 1an and one buys a bike for the other, then typically the former buys it for the latter.

Later in this paper, I will consider \( E_1 \) and \( E_2 \) as specific ethnographic statements about the Lue and as instances of how members and analysts of any culture make use of norms. In order to explore the notion of context-bound typifying ascriptions, however, let us consider, first, the American sequence:

01 The woman heard the baby cry.

02 She picked her up.

I do not believe that Americans will find the subject and object of 02 ambiguous with respect to the actors given by 01. This lack of ambiguity is based on members' knowledge of category-bound activities (Sacks 1966-1967). That is, there are some activities (e.g., crying) so bound to actors (e.g., baby) that a member hearing that the activity was done when the actor was present supposes that the actor did the activity. In addition to such activities which are, in the context of a conversation, uniquely bound to an actor, there are some pairs of actors (e.g., mother/daughter) and some asymmetrical paired actions (e.g., spanking) such that a member hearing the activity transpired between the actors knows which performed and which received it. My analysis offers no reason not to believe that the Lue make similar use of such context-bound typifying ascriptions.

In the data under examination, 02 is retained as the actor who "was used to go shopping" through means other than her pronominalization
(as xaw or ran) or repetition, whether partial (1·nî·) or complete 1·nayxam nî?). Rather, she is categorized as 1än and this categorization, I shall argue, is basic to the way in which the story was understood generally and to the way in which #204 was used specifically.

The actors mentioned by or provided for the utterances in my corpus are only very occasionally merely human. That is, individuals are typically formulated by such labels as male, peasant, headman, Lue, etc. I call such formulating labels categorization labels or CLs. 22 Since most, perhaps all, individuals can correctly (by the rules of the culture that does the labelling) be assigned more than one non-synonymous CL, 23 the correctness of a CL is never sufficient to account for its actual use on situated occasions. (Moerman 1965a cf. Moerman 1965). For this, we will need rules (which presumably take correctness into account) of relevance and appropriateness.

Section 1 of Appendix A is intended to show that an individual categorized as 1än can and (in the context of this conversation) must also be a 1än; an individual categorized as p5·l6·cy can and (in the context of this conversation) must also be the p5·l6·cy of that 1än. Although, the demonstration is relegated to an appendix, three of its features have sufficient potential for further work on my Lue corpus and sufficient detailed resemblance to features of American conversation for me to discuss them here.

The first productive feature is the mutual relevance of CLs from the same collection. Sacks (1966, 1967) has demonstrated for American conversation that when one speaker uses a CL from a collection (e.g., "I'm a doctor" from the profession collection)
subsequent speakers will typically use CLs from the same collection (e.g., "I'm a lawyer," not "I'm from Milwaukee"). Without conversational data, I have pointed to the same phenomenon among the Lue (Moerman 1968a). He has also:

a), remarked on the phenomenon of "teams" of CLs. These I formulate as small, closed sub-sets of CLs, all from the same collection, with the property that the correct categorization of an individual with a member CL implies that there exists some other individual who can be correctly categorized with some other member CL (e.g., Correct categorization of some individual as "short-stop" requires that there be some other individual who is correctly categorizable as "pitcher.") and,

b), demonstrated that co-membership in a team is a resource used to resolve collection-ambiguity (e.g., Should "baby" be heard as a CL from the family collection or from the stage-of-life collection?) by hearing CLs which could come from the same team as members of that team (e.g., Hear "the baby" of: "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up." as a member of the family collection because "mommy" is a team-mate in that collection). I would argue that the Lue do much the same and thereby hear #190:3, (p5·16·r) which is collection ambiguous, as a kinship term by virtue of (1\̂n) #196a:1, its team-mate. At least, A₁ and A₂ are heard to be in a relationship, and kinship may be its form.
The second productive feature concerns actors in stories. In C's story, as in others I have examined in my Lue corpus, the actors to whom actions are ascribed are limited to those specifically mentioned and to their team-mates (like the mē-thāw [#208:2] of the present story).

The third feature, like the first discovered by Sacks in American conversation, is category consistency by which, at this point in the analysis, I mean no more than that alternative interpretations of the relationship between A₁ and A₂ (i.e., uncle-niece, prominent man-young girl, patron-client) are consistent with one another and all are consistent with the run of the assymetrical paired actions between them (e.g., A₁ scolds A₂, A₁ sends A₂ shopping, A₂ goes shopping for A₁, A₁ buys a bike for A₂).

I take it that I have now (par.ally through Section 1, Appendix A) established how it can be and that it, indeed, is the case that the lān of 196b:1 is the same actor (A₂) as the lān of #190 and that she is the lān of the pō-lō: (A₁) of #190. It is more interesting to consider the interactional relevance and consequences of this categorization, since I will argue that the categorization must be oriented to and used by participants in order for them to have made the sense which the data show them to have made of C's story, and specifically needed by the speaker of #204 in order for that speaker to know that A₂ has delayed. The most general observation is that conversation requires alignment of actors with actions, that such alignment is done here with a CL (a 'mere descriptor," if you like), and that this CL (and, I would assert, every categorization label or "mere descriptor") is not interactionally neutral.
Appendix A, Section 2 identifies some of the linguistic and (unsituated) cultural resources which participants have and may have used in order to know that C's focus was on:

a) the trip to market,

b) the time the trip took,

c) and that the time was long. I argue there, however, since the distance (#196d:2-4) and especially the time (#196d:8-10) are ambiguous, that this information--while perhaps necessary--is insufficient for participant knowledge that A_2's sloth, not her alacrity, is to be accounted for. In order to account for participants knowing that it is A_2's delay which is to be explained I must suppose them to have oriented to and relevantly analyzed that:

a) this is a story in which A_1 scolded A_1 (#190:3-6)

b) that A_1 and A_2 are in the relationship analyzed above,

c) and (some of that:) A_1 feared (#196b:11-13), obviated (#196b:14-17), forbade (#198:8-12), and was inconvenienced by (#198:1-7; #203) just such delays.

VIII.1

The soup pot, the curry pot is set down [all ready]. Don't be long(!) [Just] buy some nampla.
Although (as far as) from Ban Maq here to the market, it took [her] an hour.

[He sent her] to go buy nampla and cigarettes and matches.

[He was] afraid (that) [she] wouldn't be quick, so [he] bought [her] (a) bike.
26.

VIII.1#203

C  bâ·w  li·  tî·  su·b  ko·  bâ·  mi  cigarettes  RLIV  smoke  CXJ  NG  have

[The old folks] didn't have any cigarettes to smoke.

That is, locating that trip time is excessive (or, at least, that there has been a relevant and sanctionable delay) depends upon participant knowledge that:

a) there is a relationship between A₁ and A₂,

b) that the relationship has been breached (which is what the story, as announced by the scolding [#190], is about), and

c) that delaying—given the circumstances narrated between the actors as the story categorizes them—constitutes just such a breach. I had already argued that Lue discourse permits terms other than #196b:1 to be used for A₂, and that the term which is used establishes a relationship between A₁ and A₂ which permits E₁ and E₂. My argument here is that the relationship provided by the CLs allows participants to use what C narrates in order to know that the relationship has been breached. This permits participants to know that C is focusing on, and that it is appropriate to account for (see preceding section), A₂'s delay.

Features of the immediate interaction (perhaps along with abstract cultural knowledge of geography, taxonomic opposition, and time) are needed for participants to make the sense that they do make of C's story. It is only through the relationship established by the categorization labels that the events of the story show that A₂ had dawdled.
although A₁ is anxious that she be prompt (#198:11-13) and has provided her with a bike so that she can be (#198b:11-17); that A₁ has specifically ordered her not to take a long time (#198:8-12); that A₂'s meal awaits her return (#198:1-7, 13-16). Through her Á\, A₂ has committed the breaches of annoying and inconveniencing A₁, and of being disobedient, selfish, and ungrateful. These breaches, and the notion of breach itself, are located by participants legitimately expecting A₂ to do things specifically other than and opposite to what she has done. This expectation is based upon members' notions of what kinds of behavior are proper between A₁ and A₂.

That A₁ could have scolded A₂, that he did so justly, that she could in general have behaved improperly to him and could specifically have been annoying, selfish, disobedient, ungrateful, and inconveniencing all depend upon there existing between A₁ and A₂ a relationship which she has breached and which breach his scolding notices and punishes. Participants' ability to find the story as intelligible as they do find it depends upon their having a notion—and rules for applying it here—of proper role behavior in such a relationship. of how that relationship is violated, and of how such violations are sanctioned. In this simple Lue tale we, and the participants, can see Lue society working at the task of making sense of itself.

The reflexivity of the phrase is not accidental. Hearing that A₁ scolds A₂ is a listeners' basis for supposing them to be in such a relationship that A₁ can scold A₂. Knowing them to be in such a relationship makes it sensible for participants to address
themselves to the justice, not the possibility, of such a scolding and provides criteria of justness. Hearing that he has given her a bike provides for their being in just such a relationship that he might do so. This relationship, in turn, provides criteria of gratitude which are involved in the justness of the scolding. Hearing that he sends her to do casual shopping provides for their being in such a relationship that he may do just that. Only a relationship which allows him to give her orders permits disobedience; only one in which he gives her a bike permits ingratitude.

The CLs used for the actors, together with the actions that transpire between them, specify the relationship between $A_1$ and $A_2$ through that relationship, human and moral sense is made of their actions. For participants to have made sense of the story, in just the ways in which they did make sense of it, they must have normative notions—confirmed and conveyed by the story itself—of just how people like $A_1$ and $A_2$ should behave. Connected to these notions are expectations of how such persons typically misbehave.

Just what is this relationship which the CLs tell participants should obtain between $A_1$ and $A_2$ and which provides the productive form for the very detailed and context-bound typifying ascriptions? Those who write about Thai society give great attention to a paired relationship, commonly called "patron-client" when not in the context of kinship and phi in the context of kinship. The first member is said to be senior to the second, his junior. The senior controls, directs, and materially rewards the junior who obeys, respects, and performs minor services for his senior. I claim that $3_1$ plus $3_2$ shows this description of
patron-client to be a norm known, needed, and used by members and to also show that pō·lō·ŋ and lān are proper possible CLs for patron and client, respectively. Disobedience, ingratitude, selfishness, lack of concern are breaches typically ascribed to clients of patrons, to junior of seniors. ēw'ing, commonplace for everyone, is perhaps "proverbially" expectable of young persons and of journeys to town and other places of interest. That is, committing just these breaches by means of ēw'ing is "normal" in exactly the American sense that members know "the typical manner in which offences of given classes are committed, the social characteristics of the persons who regularly commit them, the features of the settings in which they occur, the types of victims often involved" (Sudnow 1965:259).

Categorization labels, like the lān of #196b:1, are not merely descriptors, but do the interactional work of formulating individuals into actors and of invoking norms. It appears that normative ascriptions, the entailment of moral qualities, the provision of typifying activities, and other components of the sociology done by members is done on and by means of categorization labels and their known-to-member properties. In order to participate in interaction (or, at least, to tell and be audience to stories) members must orient to and make active constant use of the properties stereotypically associated with CLs.

In C's story, participants have only the properties of ı's, lāns, and pō·lō·ŋs to bring under the norms (and, specifically, under the typifying ascriptions) which they know in common. In order for their conversation to be coherent, just as participants
find it coherent, they must know and actively use just these norms. Locating breaches and normative expectations depends upon the social relationship that participants, through the resources of the story--and crucially through the CLs--know exists between $A_1$ and $A_2$ and, since the events and characters of the story are typifications, between "people like them."

Whatever participants might otherwise know about some $i-nayam$ and her $po-lo-z$ is irrelevant to C's story. Participants need no knowledge of whether $A_1$ or $A_2$ exist as an individual. If either does exist, there must be further predicates (e.g., fat, dark, homely, fond of betel) with which it would be culturally correct to describe him. Neither the analyst, to account for the interaction, nor those present, to have participated in it, need know any of these. More importantly than its being limited to the actors it announces, C's story is limited not to the correct predicates for those actors as individuals, but to the known-in-common properties of the CLs that have been used to formulate them plus information specifically given in the story. What participants must know is told them by the ways in which the actors are labelled and by stated details. By virtue of being given the CLs, participants know and use the normative properties of those CLs and of the relationships between individuals so labelled. To make situated sense of C's tale they need additionally, just as we do, stated information: especially the scolding, and also gifts of a bicycle, motives for that gift, running errands, etc. Given the relationship established by the CLs, participants use this additional information in order to know that this relationship has been breached.
A₁ and A₂ are inference-rich solely through the titles (including the informative Ø which Lue usage requires precede names. It is sometimes understood about titles, including kinship terms, that they—or their semantic components—reflect and arise from what is somehow important in the society that uses them. I propose, alternatively, that it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of some "real" independent social order which lies behind the words used to talk about it, and to which those words provide access as its index. The social importance of the entailed properties and semantic components of titles consists of the required use of titles as CLs. The importance of sex, relative age, and normative expectations between patrons and their clients to participant understanding of this conversation can be seen directly in the conversation itself. To put it baldly, relative age is important to Lue society in that it is a semantic component of titles like ₁ and p5-16-2. The work of understanding an interaction in order to participate in it is done on CLs. A participant always has, and—in this instance—sometimes has no more than, the title CL on which to work.

Taking sides. I have shown that and how #204 was both produced through and indicates participant analysis of A₂ having delayed. In this section I will argue that its speaker provides a culpable reason for that delay, which thereby justifies A₁ having scolded, and consequently allies with the story-teller. The general interest is in the interactive properties of telling and being audience to stories. Specifically, I will argue that the particular activity (华南) which #204 ascribes to A₂ is explanatorily adequate,
intelligible, commonplace, and politic. In terms of these considerations, I find it strikingly elegant and perhaps uniquely apt.

As an activity which is temporally vague (but extensible), éyw is adequate for explaining A₂'s having taken a longer time than she might otherwise be expected to. There are activities, like plowing or eating, which are temporally specific in the sense that members regard them to typically take some known amount of time. éyw—which one can gloss as "traipsing about, wandering about, visiting around, goofing around, sight-seeing," etc. does not present itself as one of these. This makes the activity a useful one to interpose in order to explain almost any normal (See p. 29) yet noticed delay in returning from market. Interposing it suggests that the speaker of #204 must have attended sufficiently well to know the order of delay that #204 assumes the task of explaining.

Further features of the ascribed activity which make it an adequate explanation of A₂'s delay are generality and lack of category-boundness. By "generality," I mean to observe that any action which involves moving from place to place can involve éyw. By "lack of category-boundness," I mean to observe that the members of any CL for humans (except infants) can éyw and so, therefore, could A₂ have. This generality and lack of category-boundness does not show the speaker of #204 to have been inattentive, since it would have been possible (in some unsituated, but otherwise culturally available sense) to have ascribed specific (e.g., ran out of gas, stayed overnight) or category-bound (e.g., delivered a sermon) activities inconsistent with the actions or actors of the story.

The generality and lack of category-boundness of éyw are
related to its intelligibility as an activity which all are likely
to have regarded themselves as having done and, to therefore be able
to ascribe to others, in almost all situations. It is this which
also makes the interposed activity commonplace.

The features of #204 which I have located so far (i.e., that it pro-
vides an account, accounts for a delay, and ascribes an activity
which is general, commonplace, and always ascribable) do not require
categorial knowledge about its speaker. If they are cor-
rect at all, they impute orientations and analyses unrestricted among
participants. While recognition of the culpability of what is
ascribed by #204:1 is similarly general, the politeness of making
such an ascription involves the co-categorization of its speaker with
C via the events and actions of the story. I have less confidence
in the merits of the following analysis of specific co-categoriza-
tions than in the general observation that story-telling is inter-
active stuff. Informal observation of Lue and American stories
suggests that story-teller and audience orient via the story to their
co- and cross-categorizations. This may be one resource which mem-
bers have for sometimes feeling that a story-teller has mis-taken
them by the stories he tells, for a story's potential for insulting
and correcting its audience, and for judgments of the propriety
of a story to the occasions on which it is told. These matters,
however, are only suggested by my analysis.

In order to indicate that ascribing an activity which is as
commonplace, normal, general, etc. as #204 can be interactionally
pointed, consider that among the Lue, English (Austin 1961) and
Americans there are ways to account for a blameable action (such
as delaying in this context) which serve, or are offered, to excuse, justify, or "explain away" that action. "\#204:1 is not one of these. First, it recognizes that there was a delay which, given the story as analyzed so far, might justify a scolding.

Secondly, it assumes the normal operation of the relevant institutions which justify the scolding. I find it quite striking that knowing the normal operations of society permits such sparse information as the speaker of "\#204" is given to produce a "correct" explanation of A_2's delay. In some purely logical (and hence fantastic) way she might have supposed A_2 to have been abducted, elected Prime Minister, evaporated, transformed into a chicken, etc. Just as an American father who wonders, "What on earth could have happened," to his daughter who is twenty minutes late from school does not, in fact, suppose that any thing on earth could have happened to her, but knows quite well the few things that might have, so W assumes the normal operations of her society in making the ascription she makes.

Thirdly, "\#204" does not propose an excuse or justification for the delay. Consider some activities which my familiarity with the village make me think would be possible (unsituated) excuses or justifications. A girl cyclist might take a long time returning from market because the bike broke, the bike was stolen, she lost her money, she lost the goods, the goods were unavailable, she was detained against her will, something happened to her, she delayed in order to do a good deed, she had an accident, etc. In contrast to these events, A_2's having \#w'd is in this instance culpable, and
specifically scoldable.

The speaker of #206 could have proposed some culturally available culpable activity (e.g., arson, conversion to Christianity, murder, prostitution) for which scolding would be a travesty of punishment. Instead, she proposes an activity:

a) which is properly scoldable;

b) the scoldability of which is tied to in subsequent utterances by C and others;

c) and which conforms with the story, as the story turns out, in that those who scold A₂ (#'s 230, 232, 234) are those who
[The old man said to the girl,"] Kid, when elders send [you] on an errand, why do [you] stop off and (waste) so much (time) like this?"

"Acting] like this is bad.[""

"["It's urgent to go and come back fast! (It's) old people (who) [you are] doing (things for).["

It would be good to bawl-[her] out.
should scold her and do not are themselves both blamed \(^{35}\) (# 220)
and punished by \(A_2\)'s resultant probable incorrigibility (#226, 237, 237a).

Any ascription which \(^{204}\) could have made, including the one
it did make, is interactionally consequential. The immediately
relevant consequences of \(^{204}:1\) are to provide justification and
content for the yet undescribed scolding of \(A_2\) and to maintain
(or perhaps provide) direction and coherence for C's story. In
referring to this coherence, I mean to hint at the observation that,
like mere fragmentary stretches of talk, \(^{36}\) stories are (to members)
"about something" but that knowing what they are about requires
analysis. Let us first observe that the content of the scolding
(# 230, 232, 234) is specifically for \(A_2\) dawdling (#230:6-7) and
not hurrying (#234:1-6) and thereby ties to and signals the appropriateness
of \(^{204}:1\). In the scolding, \(A_2\) is not abstractly told "never
to dawdle." Rather, she is told that errands for elders (#234:9-11) are urgent
(#234:1) business and that she should not dawdle when old people (#215:1-2;
#230:2-3; #230:4-5; #234:11), send her on errands (#215:3; #230:4-5; #234:11).
If specific ingratitude is relevant, it is toward old people (#215:1-2)
who have bought her a bike (#215:10-12). It is wrong to assume
that any of these features, or any data, are casual.

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VIII.1\(^{215}\)

Old people send [hers/their on errands]. Insert \(^{216}\). [She/They]
don't have a bike (so) [old people] buy one for [hers/their].

---

\(^{35}\) should scold her and do not are themselves both blamed

\(^{36}\) stories are (to members) "about something" but that knowing what they are about requires

\(^{204}\) could have made, including the one

\(^{230}, 232, 234\) is specifically for \(A_2\) dawdling (#230:6-7) and

\(^{234}:1\) is urgent

\(^{215}:1-2\)

\(^{215}:10-12\)

\(^{216}\). [She/They]
ch. take care of them until they're grown up, then why do they become crooks, why do they become dogs? that bite heads (i.e., ingrates who return evil for good) of old people.

Of the possible characterizations of A, e.g., male, kinship title, generous, inconvenient, disobeyed only one, "old person," is selected. The scolding specifically concerns the duties of children to their elders. The story, like the one that precedes and follows it, "concerns" ingratitude and disrespect of youngsters for their elders. In this story (as in those) one generation raises (21:1-2) the other (21:3-4) to become disrespectful criminals (21:3-4; 21:11-19). This is a bad way for them to behave (22:2). It is specifically a feature of this story that young people should be scolded (22:2) so that this won't happen. 

...
So here the old lady really went along with [her]. [But the old man said, "If you're permissive like this now, the kid won't be any good when [she] grows up." [Don't act like this.]]
The old woman didn't say anything. Knock. [The girl] was unteachable, (couldn't be taught). [She] just had no respect.

Sure [she] didn't respect anything. Whatever anyone says, [she] just stays as [she] is.

[If she] acts like that (when) [she's] still small, when [she] grows up, Buddha!
So. That old lady loved her grandchild. "Here" [she said]
There are no cigarettes--oh, no, no--There are no matches.
There's still a box (of them) here, go light them." [Alt.: and
[she] lit (one) for [him].]

[She] loved the grandchild.
when she grows up (#236; #237; #237a; #238; #241). The nē thāw
should therefore have scolded her (#227).

VIII.1#227

C kan wā mē thāw dat nā o
suppose T scold PRT EXCLH
old lady complain

Suppose the old lady had complained (or scolded).

It seems reasonable to suppose that C knew what kind of story
he intended to start by #190, and that he and other participants
had available to them and oriented to the preceding story
and the categorizations of the individuals present which that
story and #190 made relevant. Consider that the culturally correct
dimensions for categorization which are made relevant by the CLs of
the story are ambiguous for the speaker of #204.

Figure 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nē thāw</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: + = male, elder
- = female, junior
For the speaker of #204, is the scolding of #190 to be understood as "we women" (including A and excluding C) against "you men" or "we elders" (excluding A and including C) against "you kids"? Insofar as justifying the scolding amounts to taking sides (and is in that sense political), the speaker of #204 takes sides with old vs. young and thereby aligns herself with C. It is reasonable to suppose that C would have told his story differently (if he told it at all), and would specifically not have called for an account, had he not been able--on the basis of categorizations of participants made relevant by the story and story series--to anticipate that the account would align itself with him. Had he not gotten such an account as #204:1, he might have focused differently (if at all) on the me thaw with whom, had she proposed a different account, the speaker of #204 might have co-categorized herself. His anticipation, like my being able to point to choice among correct and relevant categorization devices, provides hard and situated meaning to the otherwise orphic observation that age is more important than sex in the Lue and Thai social and kinship systems. The observation further suggests that stories are political in the sense that they can, and perhaps must, be used to publicize category alliances. This is supported by ethnographic accounts of parables and anecdotes being used in judicial proceedings and institutional political councils. In contrast to such accounts, finding politics in C's story does not rely upon advance knowledge that some situations must by their nature be institutionally and dramatically political, while others are not. I would propose, more generally, that teller and audience to a story orient to their
co- and cross-categorizations via the CLs and activities of the story in such a way as to publicize their category alliances. This is a constant feature of story-telling everywhere; its conventionalized (but otherwise accidental) consequence is the practical utility of telling stories in order to accomplish politics, decision-making, and adjudication. A further consequence of the proposal would be to direct future work toward making visible how stories and story-telling interactionally accomplish the instructing and sociability which students of folk-literature claim for them.

DISCUSSION

As an ethnographer practicing in 1966, I have professional and perhaps transient interests in the procedures and results of the preceding analysis itself. A reader whose concerns are different from mine will have a different structure of relevancies. A "symbolic interactionist," for example, might find as the main interest of our work that it provides procedures for the description and analysis of conversation, which is so crucial, yet so vacant, in the theories of Simmel and of Mead. Linguists might view our work as demonstrating that discourse analysis—by participants and thus by analysts—requires extra-linguistic resources. Students of Kenneth Burke might consider our work an explication of his thesis that "language is an implement of action" (1936:220). Although the suggestions of many social theorists have sometimes been helpful, our work is now both too empirical to "follow from" a theory of society and too young to propose one. Nevertheless, the following discussion takes into account more general implications of our work than are demonstrated in my analysis.
Ethnoscience and ethnography. Tracing the detailed orderliness of actual interaction involved me in examining how members made use of what they know. So, for example, knowing that Ian can be a correct label for someone who is also correctly an I is insufficient to account for the situated use of Ian to so categorize her or for its conversational consequences. Knowing that an individual so categorized can look is insufficient to account for the situated interactive features of ascribing that activity to her. It is possible to use these observations for distinguishing between my interest in categorization and what has come to be called "ethnoscience" (Sturtevant 1964, Colby 1966). Ethnoscience is principally concerned with rules which will permit those who investigate a society to write a dictionary of lexemes which members of that society will recognize as providing correct categorizations. I am concerned with rules which can handle the considerations (that sometimes include correctness) that members actively use to orient to and recognize the appropriateness of categorizations, norms, and utterances on the situated occasions of their use, and to interpret, and sanction their interactive consequences. As Hymes (1966:5) points out, a member who knew only rules for correctness would be judged incompetent by his fellows.

The orderliness of conversation makes it apparent that the conversational situation in which an utterance occurs has a major influence upon its appropriateness. Two classes of situational features to which members can be shown to orient are conversational sequencing (e.g., "tieing rules") and conversational activities (e.g., "taking sides"). Our contributions here, then, are:
a) to share in and provide substance for the observation that rules of correctness are insufficient to account for the member knowledge which produces social action;

b) to observe that participants in a conversation do not necessarily orient to the correctness of each utterance. This implies that rules of correctness are sometimes unnecessary and suggests that the analyst must show (and cannot assume) member orientation to the correctness of the stretch of talk which he is analyzing;

c) to point to conversational setting as a major influence upon appropriateness;

d) to locate sequencing, activity, and relevant co-categorization as components of setting;

e) to delineate and demonstrate some of the ways in which sequencing, activity and relevant co-categorization work.

The preceding analysis shows that the members of a society make active use of categorizations and thereby accomplish such tasks as invoking norms, taking sides, etc. Members can also mis-categorize, presumably deliberately, so as to accomplish insult, praise, and other activities. The use, social consequences, member knowledge, participant analysis, and other components of the "meaning" of a word are all so heavily influenced by the setting—and particularly by the sequence of tied utterances—in which a word occurs that lexical definitions are only obscurely informative. This observation, which I am certainly not the first to make, provides building blocks, not stumbling blocks, for our work because we take account of, rely upon, and provide access to the settings which influence situated meanings.
The procedures used here do not rely upon knowledge of a real world external to the conversations analyzed. I do not have to assume that natives constantly orient to and maintain the position of a lexeme within a discrete semantic domain and a structured taxonomy. I do not rely upon asking natives questions. All of us, I think, even in the culture of which we are members, cannot be sure of the relationship between the question one intends to ask and the answer which one gets in response to it. As Fowler and Leland (1967:393-401) have observed, even taxons for ontologically identical referents within a demarcated domain can form a taxonomy distorted from native taxonomies by a striving for consistency, as well as by other unknown pressures of the situation in which questions are put to informants. Our techniques permit enquiry into the very properties of the chained question/answer sequences upon which both ethnoscience and conventional fieldwork are based.

A further, but perhaps inessential, distinction between our enterprise and ethnoscience is the kind of linguistic theory to which each is superficially analogous. Ethnoscience, and particularly the analysis of the semantic components of lexemes, resembles immediate constituent grammar. Our enterprise, despite its radically different ontological assumptions (cf. Moerman in press, note 15), vaguely resembles generative grammar. This resemblance results from and is warranted by our data, not our program. All competent members are able to—and to show their competence must—participate in a large number of proper non-replicate conversations. This implies that the rules by which they do so are probably finite,
and even small, in number and certainly generative and abstract in form.

In order to account for the detailed orderliness and the interactive accomplishments which I have traced in a petty conversation, one could suppose that Lue villagers memorize very detailed sets of rules and long lists of the occasions for their appropriate use. However, it is difficult to imagine the grandfatherly guardians of Lue tradition instructing their small charges, "If you ever hear a story about a põ-ló-ní who scolds an há ..., then just jump in and say,..." Since interactive events are mutually oriented to for their orderliness, the knowledge which produces them must be stateable in the form of rules. Since the events are more detailed than the rules, the rules must be more abstract than the events, and generative of them. As a more intuitively familiar example than the data used here, consider the stunningly detailed regularities which Sudnow (1967:127-148) observed in the sequence of actions that transpire between doctors announcing to inquirers that a relative was dead upon his arrival at the hospital—regularities that extend to such minutae as conversational topics, eye contact, and posture. If such regularities are instinctive, we would expect—which is not the case—that all peoples everywhere transact the same business in just the same way. If we wish to account for the regularities through simple learning theory, we would have to suppose that the unfortunate woman who enquires about her husband on Wednesday must have come in to ask about her dead-on-arrival father on Tuesday. Clearly the most reasonable supposition is that
members know, orient to, and sanction highly abstract (or primitive) rules which generate actual action in an orderly and sanctioned manner. The abstractness or generativity of these rules means that we do not need to seek them solely in their most dramatic expression. It also suggests that the rules which are distinctive of gross institutions or elaborate rituals may, in their lack of productivity, be quite trivial, and, in their historical particularity, quite limited when compared to the rules which account for quotidian and universal actions like conversation. Furthermore, from the strikingly detailed correspondences between Lue and American conversation, there is reason to hope that the principled ways in which members make interactional use of their abstract knowledge is not only more interesting, but also more universal than the concrete norms and rules which ethnographers traditionally collect.

One component of our work is the sometimes tedious, but quite necessary, task of discovering, documenting, and demonstrating the existence and content of culturally invariant procedures for language use. Some of the detailed correspondences between features of Lue and of American conversation which we have located may turn out to be crude or mistaken. Further, our enterprise is too young for us to know the theoretical statuses of such analytic objects as CLs, assymetrical paired activities, question-answer pairs, sequencing rules, etc. We are nevertheless confident that we have begun the important task of building a science which can replace vacuous belief or unprincipled insight into the procedures, some of them culturally invariant, whereby members use talk to accomplish their social order. My use of findings from American conversation
represents confidence in our joint enterprise rather than personal diffidence. We claim for our procedures an ability to distinguish among the loci (e.g., personal, household, community, role, ethnic, universal) of the features they describe. The discovery of normative expectations between \textit{Ians} and \textit{phárogns}, or even between \textit{Lue} patrons and clients, is of only passing interest compared to the observation--subject to disconfirmation by using the same procedures on fresh materials--that it is a culturally invariant component of conversational orderliness for participants to be required to tie their utterances to other utterances in a conversation. I further suggest as culturally invariant that such tying commonly requires alignments among the actors and activities talked about, that categorization labels (CLs) are typically used as a resource for maintaining such alignments, that the CLs used invoke norms, and that these norms must be oriented to by participants if they are to make the sense which the analyst can show them to have made of the conversation. Even if this compound suggestion should be shown wrong in detail, its form recommends new tasks for ethnographers. They should:

(1) come to control the CLs, norms, and other abstractly correct specific units of particular societies so as to be able to

(2) trace the principled ways in which members of a society know which specific norms, CLs, etc. are relevant on the situated occasions of their use and the interactional consequences of using them, so as to

(3) determine the extent to which the principles discovered
(in (2), above) are culturally invariant.

**Abstract principles and native knowledge.** It is commonplace to observe that rules for correct behavior are somehow important to orderly social life. It must also be observed that such rules—whether the maxims or proverbs stated by natives or the structural principles or themes stated by the anthropologist—are, even when correct, insufficient to account for the actual activities under which they are retrospectively subsumed. Among the difficulties presented by even superficial observation or introspection are:

How is it known which rule is to be brought to bear in what manner on which aspects of all moments of every action? How are rules "brought to bear"? That is, what is the relationship between an abstract rule and the actual activities which members bring off so as to confirm it? Through demonstrating the orderliness of actual interaction, I could point to the ways in which participants in that interaction were informed of which abstract rules were relevant. By examining the actual interactional consequences of these rules being used, I could show how otherwise inert rules are actively used and sanctioned.

Contemporary ethnography contains no explicit and consistent procedures for relating actual on-going interactions to the abstract roles, norms, rules, institution labels, etc., which the interactions are supposed to somehow represent. There is characteristically no reason other than professional orthodoxy for supposing that what transpires between two individuals is, for example, re_ASSERTANTLY genealogical and not sexual, political, economic, etc. Anthropologists, like other people, make their world orderly by means of the language they use to describe it. Although the best
of them recognize that labels matter more for the native than other facts do (e.g., Leach 1954:97), anthropologists typically use labels in a manner unmotivated by native orientations to them. The reader of a field "note from an abangan informant" (Gertz 1960:27) is made to suppose that the speaker, who must have other culturally correct CLs as well, is talking as a spokesman for the category with which the anthropologist labels him. The reader who encounters the observation that, "of the fifteen plots acquired by gift, most were given by brother to brother or by father to son" (Moerman 1968b:95) is seduced by anthropological concern with kinship into supposing that genealogical connections motivated and explain the transactions. Only an overpowering faith in the omni-relevance of one's professional scheme of classification could recommend editing away the undoubtedly large number of social scenes which must have transpired between one event and "the next stage of this social drama [which] followed the month of the Chipenji gathering" (Turner 1957:270). Writing about one's own society (as inspection of the sociological literature confirms) offers no protection from the unmotivated use of norms and categorizations. Were it not for her sensitive, but inexplicit and perhaps accidental, use of what natives actually said to one another, Powdermaker's account of a traffic accident as an instance of race relations (1939:49) might just as well be an instance of norms about lawyers and laymen, townsmen and countryfolk, old cars and new.

The relation between norms and actions is a central problem for which the "ideal vs. real behavior" distinction is obviously
too gross and naive. The real issue is: How are norms made operative on the situated occasions of their use? How can abstract notions (whether the natives' or the anthropologist's structural/functional ones) constrain the variegated motility of concrete situated behavior. Perhaps an informal example will be helpful for showing that this cannot be discovered by asking natives questions about it.

In order to develop the point that the Lue, like the Americans, take it that a conversation must be about something, I asked my informant (in Lue), "If Mr. A tells Mr. C that he has talked with Mr. B, can C always ask what they talked about?" The answer was, "Yes, always." In asking Mr. Wongyai this question I was obeying the canons of good fieldwork by using his native language and by transforming my abstract concerns into specific details which he could follow yet presumably not deliberately adapt to his idea of what answer I wanted. Nevertheless, his answer, like any informants' abstract norm, is a puzzle, not a solution. I suppose that if a Lue ethnographer were silly enough to ask me the same question about the Americans, I too would answer, "Yes, always." A more accurate answer would be, "Yes, and no," for clearly the propriety of the question, "What did you talk about?" depends crucially upon how the question was placed in the conversation between A and C. If the question has already been asked of A during his conversation with C, it could probably not be asked again. Unless the question is asked soon after A's announcement, it probably cannot be asked at all. It may be that the question is permitted or required only as the second utterance of a conversation that begins with a report of some other conversation. The general difficulty is excising one
social event (the imagined question, in this instance) from its context (the imagined conversation between A and C) in order to use it as a criterion for some other event or class of events. Although we seem quite able to do this as members ("Tell me, did he propose to you?"), and although much of the social sciences rests upon its unexamined use, investigators do not have procedures for de-contexting one event for use as a criterion of other events and classes of events. Our work hopes to make explicit the contexted features of natural interaction to which members orient in making use of their productive abstract social knowledge.

In the data discussed, one can see precisely how (as $E_1$) normative expectation of $p^5\cdot l^6\cdot q^1$'s was actively used, to what affect, and with what probable sanctions (maintaining one's appearance as a competent member through being able to analyze the coherence of, and thereby properly participate in, a conversation.) The very feature of this data which initially makes the sanction appear only probable--it is a "story" told principally by a single individual--is also the feature which simplifies the member's task of recognizing some event as an instance of a particular norm. Every abstract rule requires for its effective use some way of knowing whether the immediate situation is to be handled as an instance of it. My interest in abstract norms is directed primarily toward members' situated use of them and only incidentally toward an inventory of correct ones. Some of the reasons for this should be apparent. If norms can be as specific and detailed as $E_1$ and $E_2$, ...
an ethnography whose task is their collecting would be uninteresting and endless. To judge from the ways in which participants used the norms for patrons and clients, and knew from the stated categorizations that they were to so use them, the meaning, use, sanction, and interest which such norms have for members is embedded in the conversational sequences which make those norms relevant.

Native and analytic knowledge. A dichotomy between "folk-models" and "analytic models" is basic to much contemporary cultural anthropology (Bohannan 1963), but the properties of these constructs, the differences between them, and their mutual relationships are obscure. Although I do not endorse the simple dichotomy, it provides a convenient way for discussing some features of my work.

Goodenough (1956) is usually credited with the signal observation that members do not necessarily order their affairs with respect to anthropological concerns. However, his proposal (1957) that ethnographers can master native principles by learning to emulate natives in a manner satisfactory to them fails on a number of grounds. One difficulty is that native standards for satisfactory behavior by a stranger may (for lay reasons as divergent as "politeness" or "prejudice") be quite different from the standards they hold themselves to. A further difficulty can perhaps best be presented through linguistic analogies of the sort which Goodenough and other "ethnoscientists" use. I am able to speak acceptable English partially through the use of grammatical rules which I am unable to state. I can speak Thai, more or less acceptably,
under a similar disability. One's introspectively based accounts of his behavior in his native society provide data for analysis, but are not themselves analyses. I see no reason why this is not equally true of how one accounts for his behavior as a facsimile member of another society (cf. Moerman, in press). My accounts of how I "made it" among the Lue are neither complete (in the sense that all analytic components needed to generate the behavior are stated) nor correct (in the sense that natives perform exactly the same analysis, and that the analysis generates an activity which, were one of them to do it, would be interactionally equivalent to mine). Our studies of conversation, on the other hand, accept the constraint of showing participants to orient to the analytic objects of the analysis which accounts for the features of their talk which we examine. We can therefore hope that the components of our models of the speaker/listener are relevant and active parts of member productive knowledge. The work represented by this paper permits me to propose that it is possible to distinguish between knowledge based on co-membership and knowledge based on formal analysis of conversation, but that doing such analysis relies upon having some member knowledge.

At the outset of the research of which this is a partial report, I had hoped to distinguish between the results of analysis and of member knowledge (and fieldworker facsimiles of such knowledge) in such a way as to permit ethnographic analysis of cultures known only through conversations recorded in them. Because of the normative and abstract correctness rules needed both for
translation and in order to trace member relevancies, I no longer think this possible. This paper was partially intended to explicate some of the ways in which participants made normative, shared, and sanctioned use of what they know. By virtue of having lived and studied among the participant individuals, I have come to know some of the things which they know. In principle there is thus nothing wrong with my making use of having acquired some of the knowledge which they have. Nevertheless, the present implication of these observations is that unless natives are trained to do analyses, the procedures used here can merely supplement but never replace conventional ethnography. It is my own conviction that these procedures are sufficiently superior to conventional ethnography to recommend that natives be trained to perform analyses which will explicate their own (and universal) interactional intuitions.

There is, however, some anecdotal evidence which supports belief in the possibility that interactions can be analyzed by strangers to the societies in which they occurred. Consider that untrained graduate students who knew no Thai (and who were told only that the tape they were given was a segment of a normal conversation) were able to make some sense of it. They assigned utterances to speakers and developed a notion (largely acoustic) of "interuption." When provided with a transcript (including gloss and translation), some students were able to formulate, develop, and investigate such analytic notions as "interuption," "acting as a host," "giving commands," etc. and to use these both to criticize one another's work and challenge the translation.
More advanced students and colleagues, none of whom know Thai, have made independent observations (informed, however, by the ethno- graphica contained in draft analyses) upon the data which have required me to modify my analysis. I would suggest that such episodes support our conviction that—in marked distinction to the rest of anthropology—the procedures we are using lend themselves to cumulative and cooperative progress, as well as supporting my now somewhat diminished hopes for sensitive and informative analyses of cultures by non-members.

In studying a stretch of talk, one concentrates on its features which prove most amenable to analysis. This paper is concerned to some extent with an analytically acceptable reformulation of rather traditional notions of cultural norms. An analyst who approached the same data without my professional biases might well be able to describe more interesting and productive features which make no use of conventional ethnographic knowledge. He would, however, be constrained by the faults and the unexplicated strengths of my data.

The difficulties of translation, which affect all ethnography, are especially apparent in the methods used here. Although the data analyzed and the procedures for analysis are more public than in any competing kinds of ethnography, the reader must rely upon my transcription, gloss, and translation. Its phonemic inconsistencies and my reference to the possible non-existence of #196b:1 reveal that the transcription itself is imperfect. It would have been misleading for me to "clean it up" since it was
in this form that it provided the data for the analysis. Moreover, even were it perfectly phonemicized, it would, of course, provide only a pale facsimile of what participants had to work with, lacking, as it does, kinesthetic, paralinguistic, and extr situational information. I think it impossible either for participants to analyze their own interaction or for analysts to know everything that participants take account of. The methodological caution is that we can never hope to explain all the features of an interaction to which members might orient; we must avoid false explanations (e.g., by a lexical demonstration of a feature for which participants used intonation) of the features which we do analyze.

**Summary**

It is possible to subject entirely public data of actual social interaction to explicit analytic procedures without either reliance upon private or conventional knowledge about such things as culture, class, role, motive, etc., or assumptions that some actual data are less informative than others.

These procedures and their results:

a) tell us things which we would otherwise not know about how members of a society make use of their cultural resources;

b) are cumulative. A result or procedural refinement obtained at one time informs analysis of further data;

c) are productive in that results obtained from analyzing one piece of data can be tested against and used to account for further data.
The utility of identical procedures on Lue and American conversation, together with the close-grained similarities of the results obtained, indicates that it is possible to discover detailed and powerful universals in the ways in which members of any society do conversation and therein mutually orient to, confirm, and sanction their cultural knowledge.

Competent conversational participation requires member orientation to and use of abstract generative social knowledge which can be explicated through such analytic objects as categorization labels, typifying ascriptions, etc.

Analyzable features of conversation are used by participants so as to accomplish interactive tasks which the analyst can thereby locate.

It is possible to isolate some features of natural settings to which members orient. This permits distinguishing between correctness and appropriateness, tracing the operation of appropriateness rules and their interactive consequences, and confusing neither set of rules with the extrinsic concerns of the social science professions.

It is possible to distinguish between knowledge based on co-membership and knowledge based on formal analysis of conversation, but doing such analysis relies upon having some member knowledge.
NOTES

1 The equipment and field time for making recordings in Thailand was sponsored by grants from the Center for Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley and the Committee on Research of the Academic Senate, University of California, Los Angeles.

2 The sequenced data required for my arguments are provided in Appendix B. Fragments of that conversation, and of others, are also provided where referred to. The data are referred to by a Roman numeral, which designates the tape number, followed (after a period) by the Arabic number 1 or 2, designating the track. The Arabic number which follows the number sign (#) provides the serial utterance number. This is sometimes followed by a colon (:) which precedes the number of the specific word being referred to. Copies of the original tape recording are available for the cost of dubbing and postage.

3 An informant, bilingual in Lue and Central Thai, made the initial transcript. We then listened together to modify his transcript. I usually deferred to his hearing of the tape and
when I could not, noted both versions. Glossing and translation was done by me after discussion (in Lue, Central Thai, or Yuan) with the informant. The informant, whose assistance I gratefully acknowledge, was Mr. Dheerawatana Worgyai.

4 My use of "the society" or other named societies is as a gloss. Elsewhere (1968a), I have pointed to the oddness of assuming that all predicates about social activities have an ethnic label as their object. There is little reason to regard any of the conversational principles discussed in the enclosed paper as relevantly Lue, and none for considering them peculiar to the Lue.

5 I accept responsibility, but not sole credit, for this analysis which incorporates detailed suggestions from Anita Krakowski, Jerry Krakowski, Harvey Sacks, and Emanuel Schegloff.
Throughout this paper, material required for intelligible translations is added to the gloss, but enclosed in parentheses (for items which I feel are given by syntax) or brackets.

This is one reason why "a semantic theory [that] cannot be expected to account for the way settings determine how an utterance is understood" (Katz & Fodor 1964:486) is insufficient for the analysis of natural conversation.

The plural is not editorial. It refers to the work being done on conversational analysis by the group whose members are occasionally mentioned in this paper.

In both Thai and English, phrases which are otherwise idiomatic are sometimes given a literal reading. I do not know whether this ever becomes an issue for members, but suggest it as an issue for linguists to investigate.

The reader will observe that #204 lacks actors. That and how participants know to which actor the activity is ascribed will be developed below.

Given the importance of sequenced context to participants' orientations toward the meaning of an utterance, my use of "repetition" is not analytic. Specifically (and among other features), members may orient to the very fact that an utterance is being said for a
second time so as to make its second saying perform a different activity (e.g., reprimanding) from its first (e.g., asking).

13 Evidence that an utterance of one type requires a subsequent utterance of another type might consist of participants orienting to and interpreting the absence of the second in the presence of the first. That questions require answers can be shown in this way for both Luo and English. That a summons requires a reply has been demonstrated, for English, by Schagloff (1967). The present run of data will not support the claim that a paradox requires (in this strong sense) an explanation.

14 The voice that says #204 sounds rather like the one that says #228. The voice that says #228 sounds like the one used by the woman who lives in, as "mother of the household" (me: han), the house where the recording was made. That this observation is phrased so strangely and relegated to a footnote results not from my uncertainty about its accuracy, but from methodological insistence that member's knowledge that a particular individual sometimes is correctly categorized as "occupying" a role does not constitute an analyst's account of what that individual is (perhaps otherwise) doing.


16 Paul Newman's discussion of Terra narratives suggests that speakers of that language require social knowledge for aligning actions with the actors indicated by sex-neuter pronouns (personal communication).
17 If one supposes that the ability to participate in conversations is a members’ criterion of competence, capacities which might be required for any conversation (although not necessarily the capacities required for every and all conversations) are among those of all competent members of (a) society.

18 Instanced by who was scolded, by whom, and for what, as discussed below.

19 Since ḷ, is a title for females and ṁ is one for males, I can facilitate reader comprehension by sometimes using "she" or "her" to refer to ḷ and "he" or "him" for ṁ.

20 The informant’s initial transcription was caj ṁaj. He revised this to ṁaj. In numerous subsequent listenings, I hear caj ṁaj. The uses of bad data are considered in the Discussion section.

21 The alignment of actors with actions is somewhat less transparent to inspection in a Lue transcript than in an English one, since a Lue utterance may, like the utterance upon the member-analysis of which it is based, lack actors (whether pronominal or not).

22 This paper uses individual as an analytic object: a human being not formulated with a CL. The data themselves contain no individuals, since any label which members use for a human being, even "human being," is a CL in that the label and its situated use have interactive implications. In this paper, personal names
are CLs with no special status aside from intended consistency-of-
individual-as-speaker in the transcript and in my references to it.
That is, I hope that an individual speaker categorized in the transcript
by a name (e.g., "C," "W_1") in the left margin is always the same
individual.

Since many CLs can correctly be assigned to more than a single
individual, an unsituated CL is insufficient for the unique designation of
an individual. Even such an apparently unique designator as "the present
king" requires temporal situation in order to accomplish unique
designation. That this is not true of all CLs is suggested by such
CLs as "the first king of France" or "Jesus Christ." The apparent
uniqueness of the second does not derive from its being a proper
name since these, unless conversationally situated and participant
analyzed, can rarely do unique designation (see I.1#99-108).

I.1
#99
mk Yes, [he] really likes trouble.
#100
NA Who?
#101
mk Him. Nan (a title) Phian (name) (and) those (guys) there.
#102
NA W Which Phian.
#103
mk Nan Phian.
#104
K I haven't yet gone to look for the caw thaw, but [we]
discussed it.
#105
NA Which Phian?
#106
K on our own.
Because they otherwise behave like CLs, and since their correctness is insufficient to account for their situated use, and since unsituated names can be referentially ambiguous, I see no reason at this point not to regard proper names as a collection of CLs.

The use of CLs is not a subject solely of academic interest. Rather, it is the source of some important unsolved practical problems. Individuals will starve because they are categorized as "Indian" by "Americans." The evil of discrimination consists largely of treating individuals as members of categories which they reject in the situations in which they are so treated (Schutz 1964:259).

A large set of dangerous policies (variously termed "imperialism," "tribalism") seem to consist of aggressive (or selfish, or defensive) behavior concerted by means of the enthusiastically shared common categorization labels of those who carry out the behavior against other individuals who are taken to share some other CL. It is these observations (and my dream of subverting their situated automaticity) which furnish the emotional basis for my interest in how CLs are assigned and used and in how behavior is concerted through them.

Those listed (Lue, headman, peasant...) are all correct CLs for the individual whom the data of this paper label "K."
24 I am not fully confident of my argument that additional (to that set out in Appendix A, Section 2) information is required for participants to know that the time is unusually long for such a trip. It is clear, however, that even this knowledge is not the same as knowing that $A_2$ relevantly and sanctionably delayed in returning from market.

25 Participant knowledge of these things requires them to analyze, not passively record (if such is ever possible) the relevant utterances. This may be suggested to the reader by the absence of actors or quotation markers from the gloss of the relevant utterances.

26 See Appendix A, Section 2.

27 See Taking sides, below.

28 The issue of productive knowledge is considered in the Discussion section.

29 "Suggests" because supposing some temporally vague, extensible, and generally ascribable activity may be just the thing to do if one has not attended closely. Nevertheless, I will argue below that #204:1 shows its speaker to have attended to the sequence of tied utterances beginning with #190.

30 So permitting translation as "[She] (must have) dawdled..."
Although the speaker of #204 is female (see Providing accounts, above), I have heretofore avoided any reference to "her" and "she." Since my current argument is that #204's femaleness is relevant to the feature of #204 now being analyzed, I drop that rather strained practice.

The speaker of #204 might have refused to recognize a delay by saying something like, "It always takes me that long, too."

It may be that justifying the scolding and making use of the normal operations of social institutions provide the "must be" of #204:5.

#204's acceptance of the sparse formulation is not interactionally inert. Its speaker could have refused to accept the typicality of the actors and asked or supposed such considerations as, "Was I nanxam a cripple?" This would have both excused the delay and challenged the justice of the scolding which it occasioned.

As a more general matter of social control (Hoerman, in press) it may be that those who have the right to scold thereby have a duty to scold and, through the folk theory that scolding is corrective, find that their reputations are implicated by the misbehavior of those over whom they have that right/duty.

See Providing accounts, above, and especially its comments on III.1#333-335.
There are a number of related candidate observations about series of stories which I have not yet either fully substantiated or developed into an argument. My impression from the ethnographic literature is that many peoples tell stories and proverbs in rounds or series. My impression of American data is that stories and jokes frequently come in rounds and series. Stories in my Lue corpus are usually in series or rounds. It is my distinct impression that the focus or "point" of a Lue or an American story is heavily informed or constrained by the other (and especially the preceding) stories in the round or series. It is conceivable that the very series of utterances examined in this paper—perhaps until #204 could, were they part of a different series and made by a speaker and before an audience correctly categorizable as "young," constitute a story about how demanding, nagging, unsympathetic, and petty old folks are. If stories and proverb do, indeed, get much of their "point" from the series in which they are told, this would help to account for:

a) the ambiguity of multiplicity of meanings which natives and folklorists consider to be a feature of (isolated) stories and proverbs,

b) the observation that these forms do usually come in series or rounds and not in isolation. If it is typical for the "point" of a story or proverb to derive essentially from the series of similar items (together with the category alignments of participants) in which it is told, there is little to recommend the content analysis of isolated stories and proverbs.

Appendix C provides a translation of the stories that C told
immediately before and after the one which provides the data for this paper.

38 Consider the interactive implications of an account of A's delay like, "I suppose she was having menstrual cramps, poor thing."

39 So, for example, componential analysis, as a tool of ethno-science, can provide a "correct" definition of "mommy" as "informal term for first ascending generation lineal female kinsman." It cannot account for the following real data:

   Boy₁: Ken, face it, you're a poor little rich kid.

   Boy₂: Yes, mommy, thank you.

Nor can it permit us to reckon with, let alone account for, the observation that persons who can correctly be categorized "mommy" are not always so categorized (or, at least, always so labelled) during the course of an interaction.

40 "Minutae" is used here in a folk or commonplace sense.

41 Readers familiar with the anthropological literature will realize that I cite this as an example of unusually good contemporary ethnography.

42 I would suppose it to also depend upon such considerations as the relevant statuses of A, B, and C; the presumption that the talk was not "private" or "privileged."

43 Although I think that it might have been a possible alternative to stipulate the form of tieing and deduce the substantive norms,
conventional ethnographic knowledge informed $A_1$ and $A_2$. It was part of the lexical knowledge (of $L_1$ and $L_2$) needed for demonstrating the correctness of the possible relationship between $A_1$ and $A_2$. It provided some legitimacy for the frequent suppositions which I made about what could have been said other than #196b:1 or #204:1.

44 One exciting promise of the procedures employed in this search is their potential for self-correction. To suggest this promise, it is more encouraging to point to possible future modifications of the analysis offered in this paper than to the shortcomings of its earlier versions. The conversational phenomenon which this paper calls "providing an account" may well be subsumed under more powerful devices, found in both Lue and American conversation, whereby a speaker can direct the sense that participants make of his topic by requiring them to decide among ambiguous semantic interpretations. This would associate "commonplace paradox" with irony and quotation as they occur naturally.

45 Translation seems especially problematic. The essential importance of sequencing for meaning might suggest that translation is impossible. However, it is a quite obvious and basic fact about the history of human civilization that translation is a possible and normal human enterprise. On the basis of my own efforts, I am at the moment quite partial to (but unable to demonstrate) the view that satisfactory translation consists of (heretofore unconscious) analysis of situated utterances in one
language for the interactional activities which they perform and their translation into situated utterances in another language which perform those same activities. The possibility of such an enterprise would, of course, rely upon the existence—which there is little reason to doubt—of interactional universals.
APPENDIX A

Cultural and linguistic resources

Section 1: $A_2 = \text{\textit{\textbf{I-napxam}} = l\text{\textit{an}}, A_1 = p5\cdot l0\cdot n; A_1$ is reciprocal to $A_2$. This demonstration is required for my observation that participants take the actor labelled $\text{\textit{\textbf{I-napxam}} in \#190$ to be the same actor as the $l\text{\textit{an}}$ of $\#196b$ and also for the other alignments of $A_1$ and $A_2$ made in my analysis.

The demonstration makes use of and develops the notion of a collection of categorization labels. For the moment, the reader can regard a collection as a set of CLs which seem, semantically, to belong together. Insofar as the notion proves useful to our work, it would be desirable to show that a collection belongs, for members, to a single delimitable semantic field and has, for the analyst of native activities, a distinctive set of properties to which members interact. An example of such a set of properties would be those prematurely claimed (Moerman 1968a) for ethnic CLs as used by the Lue: exhaustive, egalitarian, eternal, non-optative.

$E_1$ supposes that the $l\text{\textit{an}}$ is $A_2$, that there is some regular and contextually possible meaning in the relationship to have between a $p5\cdot l0\cdot n$ and a $l\text{\textit{an}}$ and that $\#196b:4-9$ are not just items mentioned in sequence, but constitute a list which has properties. Let us consider the first two suppositions.¹

How can it be shown that the $l\text{\textit{an}}$ is $A_2$? First, a $l\text{\textit{an}}$ (#208:5) who might have gone to town to buy such things riding (#217:1) a bike remains a character in the story, so showing a
possible constancy of $A_2 = \text{lān}$ for the story's subsequent continuity. Second, I hear and have no reason not to suppose that others including C hear #196 as part of a sequence that begins with #190 and is tied directly back to #190. As a basis for hearing this tie to #190, it is possible that NOUN nī nī or NOUN DEMONSTRATIVE nī? is used only when the noun has already been referred to in the same conversation.² If this hypothesis is confirmed by consulting the corpus, how was lān not stated before #196a, been referred to? If the hypothesis is disconfirmed, how might #196a nevertheless be tied to #190 through common actors?

The title p5·lō·q (#190:3) is restricted to mature male individuals; the title lī (#190:7) restricted to individuals who are female and junior.³ p5·lō·q is a CL which may come from more than one collection of such labels: kinship based, wealth based, residence based, and perhaps others. lā·n ("nephew/niece, "grandchild") is a CL in the kinship and age collections.

What of the relationship between $A_1$ and $A_2$? In the kinship collection, lā·n is reciprocal⁴ to p5·lō·q in the sense that:

(1) anyone whom $x$ properly calls p5·lō·q can properly call $x$ lā·n.

(2) if $y$ is said to be the p5·lō·q of $x$, $x$ will be said to be the lā·n of $y$.

(3) for $y$ to be properly labeled a p5·lō·q, there must be some individual $x$ who refers to $y$ as his p5·lō·q and to whom $y$ refers as his lā·n.

p5·lō·q, a member of more than one collection, shares the
kinship collection with lá'n; lá'n, a member of more than one
collection, shares the kinship collection with pś-ló'n. Within
the kinship collection:

(i) lá'n and pś-ló'n are in the relation to have in the sense
(listed above as (1)-(3)) in which they are reciprocals
(ii) every pś-ló'n must have at least one lá'n
(iii) a young girl can be a lá'n to a pś-ló'n; a pś-ló'n
cannot be a lá'n to a young girl.

Within all relevant collections of CLs: an individual categorized
as JLI (and named na'pam) must be a young girl; an individual categorized
as pś-ló'n cannot be a young girl.

Section 2: Knowing what C focused on.

What resources do participants have for knowing that C's
focus is on: a) the trip to market, b) the time of this trip, c)
that the time is accountably long?

a) The construction (#196d:.2-.7) "luk place y páj x" means, minimally,
from "place y to place x." It can also mean "to go from place y to place
x." The second reading is presumably confirmed by #196d:.9-.11 which
is made a comment on .2-.7 through the particle na (#196d:.8). Add-
ing actors, #196d:.2-.11 translates as To go from Ban Mang here
to market [and back?] took [her] an hour."

#196d:1 (kăn), is difficult to translate, important for the
translation of the rest of #196d, and conversationally quite im-
portant. Here and in other occurrences, my informant glosses kăn
as both (Central Thai) phieütë (V/)\]|1|5 ), meaning "only, merely" and
as [CT] në-të (\]|3\]|2 Clan ), meaning "even, including." The
ambiguous gloss would permit translation of #196:d as both "even
though it was fully as far as..." and as "even though it was only
as far as..." This ambiguity suggests that the best uninterpreted translation for "kan A B" is "although A, B." That is, the use of kan indicates that A and B are mutually relevant, that A and B both occur, and that this (mutual relevance and co-occurrence) are commented on. Somewhat more specifically, I take kan (and some situations of "but" and "although" in English) [Pollner and Zimmerman 1967] to mean: "Despite some of the implication of A, B." The question, now, is "despite which of the implication of A?"

b) Traveling time. Assume for the moment (as will be discussed under c), below), that participants hear both "Ban Mang" and "the market" to refer to the nearby Ban Mang and market which they often visit. The route between the two is frequently travelled, dusty safe, short, a well marked route, bordered by rice fields, and has a large (though presumably not infinite) number of other properties and implications. Which of these implications are we told, by kan, does not hold? The implication with which B is inconsistent. That is, #196d:.9-.11 states traveling time. Operating as B in the kan A B construction, it tells us that it is the traveling time implication of A (.2-.7) which is commentably disconfirmed. "An hour" is either too long or too short for the trip since the trip was

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{no} & \quad \{ \text{further than} \quad \text{more difficult than} \quad \text{less familiar than} \quad \text{more a place of sudden time consuming dangers} \} \\
& \quad \{ \text{closer than} \quad \text{less difficult than} \quad \text{less a place of time consuming dangers} \}
\end{align*}
\]

from ban man páj kā't. That is, #196d:.1 and .9-.11 means that it is the time "spent on the trip which is commentable on."
The comment on it (in addition to the kàn itself) is made as #196e, "can't be!" which thus ties to, comments on, and thereby demonstrates the commentability of, the hour trip of #196d. It is the kàn in its situated use which tells us what (elapsed time) both is and can't be.

c) Long traveling time. I have now provided for participants' knowing the relevance of travel time in the formulation: "despite all those things which make you expect this trip to have taken timeₚ, it took timeₚ." How might it have been known that "all those things..." make timeₚ accountably great, not accountably small? More specifically, what non-context resources do participants bring to bear on #196d:2-7 which lets them know, as they evidently do, that #196d:11 is a long time? On the basis of my conventional ethnographic knowledge of the society in which the recording was made, I can suggest some such resources, but think them insufficient.

For these villagers "an hour" is an approximate, even vacuous, unit of time which may be long, short, or just right depending upon how it is interpreted. A "real time" trip from the real Ban Mang to the real marketplace and back takes somewhat less than ten minutes by bike, about twenty minutes by foot. This indicates that elapsed time of one hour to go, shop, and return is not—for any unsituated sense—noticeably long.

(i) Even if an hour were a long time because participants are familiar with the distance in space and in traveling time from the known, real and local Ban Mang to the known, real and local market, villagers know that personal names and village names are not unique specifiers. It is often possible and frequently
known to be the case that more than one person or more than one village has the same name. Specifically, for the names of Lue villages in Chiengkham and for the particular name "Ban Mang" it is known that villages with identical names are to be found in the Sip Song Panna. It is also known that stories are frequently set in the Sip Song Panna. The audience for this story knows that C comes from the Sip Song Panna.

These considerations are intended to

(a) recognize the referential ambiguity of proper names for persons and places

(b) stipulate that some usages of such names requires that their ambiguity be resolved.

(c) posit that the instanced usage (VIII.1:#196d:1-.8) is of the kind that requires such resolution.

How is the resolution accomplished here in order to give the reading "the known, real, and local Ban Mang and market, between which we know the distance in time and space"? I suggest that it is done by the demonstrative, นัน (#196d:5), and thereby imply that demonstratives, even when syntactically required, are conversationally informative.

(ii) Even if the distance between the two real places of Ban Man and the Chiengkham market is simple and universally known, an analyst's use of it creates a number of problems. What right has anyone, even a member, to assert analytically (and not just as a stereotypic commonplace) that "everyone knows" something? Is there some general rule, like "always look near home first,"
which recommends my assuming that \( kā\cdot t \), "market" is here taken to mean "the Chiengkham market at which we do our shopping?" Must the analyst make, rely upon, and assume the members to also make a reality test, or may be hope for purely conversational resources?

It is to make this hope slightly more reasonable that I prophecy⁶ that inspection of some corpus of conversations in this village will show that someone going to Ban Mang sometimes says that he's \( mō\cdot kā\cdot t \). That is, Ban Mang is counted part of the \( kā\cdot t \), in the sense of "town," and all villagers know this and use it somewhat independently of the physical proximity between the two.⁷

The resource for doing this is one of taxonomic opposition between a circle and its center. \( kā\cdot t \) can mean the town area, the shopping section, or the area of the daily market (\( kā\cdot t mō\cdot \))-place. The distinction of Ban Mang from the central \( kā\cdot t \) by means of the "from A to B (of which A is sometimes counted a part)" construction is like "from the [UCLA] campus to Westwood" in that the UCLA campus is sometimes counted as being in Westwood.
NOTES TO APPENDIX A

1 The third, which involves the issue of how the properties of things and of persons are mutually implicative, must be deferred for subsequent treatment.

2 Such a lexical marker of conversational tieing would be interesting in that its usage:

(1) would be in fact (not just in logicians' fancy) be restricted historically, to things previously mentioned.

(2) would be precluded across conversations. Specifically, NOUN ni- ni would never begin a conversation or topic as pronouns and proverbs (e.g., do, can, make) can in English conversation.

3 pō-lō-ŋ as a term of reference, pō-lō-ŋ + N and pō-lō-ŋ + Ø when used as kinship terms mean "elder brother of my parent" or "husband of elder sister of my parent." A person so categorized, whether or not a kinsman of the speaker, is always male and at least middle-aged. When not a kinsman, he is usually a prominent or wealthy person. I + N, I + "which," I + D are used for females. The term is sometimes said to be deprecating. After a girl marries, she is typically referred to as a "wife + TN (of husband)." Once she has children, she is typically referred to as "mother + N" or "mother + name of child." I regard pō-lō-ŋ, I, and all other title and kinship terms as CLs. For an interesting and ingenious discussion of I as a Yuan term of address and abuse see Wijeyewardene 1968.
Anthropologists will note that "reciprocal" is often used but rarely defined in discussions of kinship terms.

I phrase the issue in this somewhat awkward way (i.e., by referring to #196d:ll and not to cômô:n or to "an hour") in order to remain consistent with our basic orientation to utterances in conversational sequence and not to decontexted lexical meanings of words.

The absence of recorded data from my argument precludes using a more neutral word.

I believe that naming some place physically as close to the central market as Ban Mang is would be less emphatic of how long it took the girl to make the trip.
English words added to the gloss for intelligible translation are enclosed in parentheses when I judge them to be provided by Lue syntax. Words bracketed in the translation are extra-grammatical. They were usually provided by the informant, either volunteered (e.g., #193) or in response to such questions from me as phái ("who?") or sán kó? ("what's that?"). Additional conventions observed in the gloss are as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form in Gloss</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUX</td>
<td>auxiliary verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLSFR</td>
<td>classifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNJ</td>
<td>conjunction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Central Thai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Demonstrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Mr. Dheerawatan Wongyai, the informant. Used to indicate a disagreement between him and MM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCLM</td>
<td>exclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTR</td>
<td>future particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDR</td>
<td>marker of indirect object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr or MM</td>
<td>Michael Moerman, both as conversation participant and translator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>proper name of persons and places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form in Gloss</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>negative particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRN</td>
<td>pronoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>grammatical particle unglossed but incorporated in translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRV</td>
<td>pro-verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td>hesitation or pause marker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>question particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>reciprocal particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLTV</td>
<td>marker of relative clause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCLAIM</td>
<td>vocative - Somewhat like American, &quot;dear.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>woman speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>speaker identification uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Po Seu, what are you laughing at?

Hey, wait a minute, wait a minute, come sit down and talk here first.

Sit down right here in the middle.

That day, Naqxm.

Have i xi xab a bit.

(Go ahead and) xab.

[say that you] can't. (not person asked)
K  xâb  lu?  PRT  sing  so  that  [  T  ]  listen  PRT

Go ahead and xâb, xâb so Pânh can listen.

W  bâ-  nga  ba-  nga  nt-
NG  able  NG  able  PRT

[say] "I can't, I can't."  PRT: (Not the person asked. Without
ng would probably be person asked)

#195a

1  2  3
C  lâm  ni*  ni
grandchild  0  PRT

Now this lan

#196a

K  bôcâj  hû
NG  can  Q

[You] can't?

#196a1

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  #196b
C  caj  pâj  sê  nâm  pa*  kâp  bâw  li*  kôb
  to  go  buy  CNJ  cigarettes  and
  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15
  ân  ka?  fa-j  ni  kô*  bâ*  lew  faj  sê
  PÇF  matches  PRT  fear  NG  fast  even  buy
16  17
lot  thi-p  hû*
  bike  INDR

[he  sent  her]  to  go  buy  nampa  and  cigarettes  and  matches.  [He  was]
afraid  that  [she]  wouldn't  be  quick,  so  [he]  bought  [her]  (a)  bike.
Although (as far as) from Ban Naq (village) here to the market, it took [her] an hour.

It can't [take as long as an hour].
The soup pot, the curry pot is set down [all ready]. Don't be long(!) [Just] buy some nampla.

Child

Censey, play with me.

W

descend go below D

Go downstairs over there.

C

But she] really took (a whole) hour!

M

laugh

W

Just like that. (Idiom.)

Said already. (Literal.)

C

[The old folks] didn't have any cigarettes to smoke.
So, [she] (must have just) went visiting around the market.

There weren't any matches to strike. Just waiting around like that.

There aren't any matches in the house.

They're on the highfaj, Noi.
Oh, take care of them until they're grown up, then why do they become crooks, [why do they] become dogs that bite the head (i.e., ingrates who return evil for good) of old people?
Old people send [her/them] on errands. Insert #216. [She/They] don't have a bike (so) [old people] buy one for [her/them].

Oh mother, give it to me. I want it.

["?"Did [you/she] ride fast? From here to the market and back and then give [it to him, saying], ["]Here dear grandfather,["]when [I/you] want to go anywhere, INSERT #218 [I will] tell the old people first.
Child: Mommy, where are you going?

Mommy: That's right.

Child: But the old man said, "If you're permissive like this now, the kid won't be any good when [she] grows up."

Mommy: Don't act like this.

Child: So here the old lady really went along with [her]. [But the old man said, "If you're permissive like this now, the kid won't be any good when [she] grows up."

Mommy: Don't act like this.

Child: [She] loved the grandchild.
Who loved who?

Where are you going, Seij?

So then (continues talking)

Suppose the old lady had complained (or scolded).

If you're going, then go.
The old man said to the girl, "Kid, when elders send [you] on an errand, why do [you] stop off and (waste) so much (time) like this?"

Stop off.

"["Acting] like this is ba-t, ["]

[It's urgent to go and come back fast! (It's) old people (who) [you are] doing (things for). ["]

It would be good to [her] out.
(The old woman) didn't say anything. Knock. [The girl] was unteachable, (couldn't be taught). [She] just had no respect.

Sure, [she] didn't respect anything. Whatever anyone says, [she] just stays as [she] is.

[If she] acts like that (when) [she's] still small, when she grows up, Buddha!
kap fej ni
matches PRT

(Here are) the matches.

Put it down.

Put it down here.

kam dëw kën y' ta
moment single first NG yet

Just a minute, not yet.

Yeah, they go as far as not [teaching her] at all.

Here (you are) Hameen.

This thread isn't strong, is it?
End series of simultaneous utterances.
APPENDIX C


167 This thing, I say, is [worse] than [ignoring] parental 
зорос; [worse] than [ignoring] the old people's words, what the 
elders say who saw the sun before him, the old people of those 
days. Nowadays [our] knowledge, cleverness, intelligence--who 
do we learn it from? [We] don't learn from [our] fathers or 
[our] mothers, do [we]? Money and cash, how many hundreds and 
thousands do [we] spend? It's ten thousand, more than ten thousand, 
in order to (learn to) understand English, European of any kind, 
of all sorts--in order to be able to know them.

169 [Young people think that] if (one) doesn't have the money 
circulate again, (he) can't become a teacher, a policeman, a 
soldier, any kind [of official]. And if [the young people 
nowadays] come to their village, come to their home and see their 
parents speaking the old way (i.e., Lue), [they think,"] ridiculous 
these old people, it's no use, speaking with those old fashioned 
words!"

172 Like this: ["]How can [you] get by?"["', says the young man.""
What do you mean, how can [I] get by, boy? I plow my fields, and 
the fields are big to the extent of over ten rai."'[", the old man 
answers.

174 [I] plowed to raise my children to be big enough and tall 
enough already. [You] are big enough, everything enough already.
[But] now, nowadays [you] use a tractor and in just a minute 'brrrrrrrr' it's done.[""

177 In the time of the old people, they did it little by little, hurting their hands, plowing, hurting their hands, (working as) everyone's slave. Hurting their hands little by little, a little at a time, a little at a time, [Comfortable in believing that] someday it would be finished.

178* [For them,] enough to eat was sufficient, wasn't it?

179 Yes, enough to eat. Nowadays they consider only speed, wanting to go like a jet. Go zoom, go zoom, come zoom, come back zoom-- like that.

182 [They] don't just want a bicycle, don't just want to ride a bicycle, isn't that so? [They want first] a Honda, a Honda, and then (demand) an 850 cc. Suzuki.

184 In addition.

185* [They] only want to use fast things, right?

186 Yeah, [they] consider only speed.

186a* Yeah.


244 Ktw's fields still weren't finished. [No one helped one another.] Everyone just ran off [and the head of the household cursed them saying, "] mother cunt! [""

246 If [they] hired a servant to cook for them, [they] might be
afraid that (she) would poison them.

248  [Children whom no one has corrected] are dogs that bite heads (i.e., ingrates who return evil for good).

249* Yes, they do whatever they want to do, nowadays. They ignore what their parents say. (They) don't want to listen to anybody at all.

249a Yeah, (they) don't listen at all.

253 When they ask (their) parents for money and aren't given it [because the parents really don't have any] they complain, saying, "[They] didn't give (us) any money."

254* Yeah.

255 [And if] they get money, (they) just disappear [with it].

256 [They] really use up a lot [of money].

257 [They] eat it up without ever feeling full. [They] don't ever let (their) mouths or throats miss (anything). (It's just) not normal.

258a Where can [so much] money come from [for them to spend it like that]?

*Utterance spoken by an individual other than C.
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Abstract
Type recorded natural conversations in the Lao dialect of Tai are analyzed by procedures that do not depend on knowledge of a real world external to the conversations analyzed. Results show an orderliness of conversation that makes apparent the influence of the conversational situation in which an utterance occurs on its appropriateness. Two classes of situational features to which members are shown to orient are conversational sequencing (alerting rules) and conversational activities (taking sides). Lao utterances often lack pronouns or other lexical indicators of acting in both Lao and English, and presumably other languages, linguistic resources are insufficient for the conversational task of aligning actions and agents. To accomplish this task, members additionally use shared and sanctioned knowledge of the social world. Some of this knowledge appears capable of being analyzed as category-bound activities and as context-bound typifying ascription. Both of these concepts make use of the notion of categorization lemmas. The utility of these concepts for the analysis of conversation and interaction by both Lao and Americans is illustrated in the analysis. The paper includes a discussion of some implications of the analysis for the social sciences in general and for ethnography in particular. Results suggest that rules of correctness are insufficient to account for the member knowledge that produces social action. Rules of correctness are sometimes unnecessary. Members sometimes misclassify, presumably deliberately, to accomplish insult, praise, etc. The use, social consequences, member knowledge, participant analysis, and other components of the meaning of a word are all heavily influenced by the setting and, particularly, by the sequence of tied utterances.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY ACROS</th>
<th>LING A</th>
<th>LING B</th>
<th>LING C</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
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<td>Tel</td>
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<td>Natural language</td>
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<td>Generative grammar</td>
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