STUDY S-212

U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE BEFORE 1950
The Roots of Public Law 920

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES DIVISION

May 1966
SUMMARY OF STUDY S-212

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This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defense and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

CONTRACT OCD-OS-63-134
SUBTASK 4113-C

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
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This history was unintended. The research that produced it began as a study of the existing civil defense operational organization in order to find ways for improving that organization. It was assumed at the outset that "civil defense operational organization" meant the existing state civil defense organizations who were responsible for civil defense operations in the event of a civil defense emergency. This meant something similar to the World War II "civil defense corps" which, at present, goes under the nebulous name of "disaster services." Indeed, an examination of Public Law 920 and its accompanying legislative history indicates that the intent of Congress was primarily to establish a civil defense corps under the aegis of the individual states.

The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) has been operating under difficult conditions since its inception. In this respect it shared the fate of the agencies it succeeded: the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. The Executive and Congress were indifferent, if not openly hostile, and public apathy was paralyzing, except during periods of international crises. Despite these difficulties, OCD can point to accomplishments--particularly the implementation of the 1960 fallout shelter program. Unfortunately, the current civil defense organization can point to very few significant achievements in the area of disaster services. At best there exists a bare outline of a skeleton disaster-services organization in which most people concerned with civil defense vest little faith. And it must be admitted that the lack of faith seems justified.

The initial study of this organization compelled the investigators to conclude that mere recommendations for changes, possible improvements of procedures or organizational structures, or even more far-reaching
reforms would probably be ineffective. The more the organization was studied, the more persistent became a prior question: **How did the current situation come about?** Something seemed to be vitiating all attempts by able and well-meaning men to set up some reasonably effective civil defense organization. There was no reason to believe that the same forces would not vitiate the effects of changes proposed in the IDA study. To identify these forces, it seemed advisable to turn to the past.

We began by studying the changes in organization and policy introduced by the new administration in 1961. But this study raised as many problems as it solved and, perforce, led to a study of the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization period of 1958-1960. This, in turn, led back to a study of the Federal Civil Defense Organization of 1951-1958, and finally to the "roots" of civil defense--as far back as World Wars I and II. From this base, a coherent, meaningful picture began to emerge.

This historical survey led to the judgment that very many of the events essential to an understanding of the present civil defense organization took place before the enactment of Public Law 920, particularly during the years immediately following World War II. It was, therefore, important to study these years in detail.

The present effects of these past events are greatly enhanced by the fact that they seem to have been forgotten. It is fair to say that those persons currently involved in national civil defense do not have an accurate picture of how and why Public Law 920 was passed and how civil defense was initially set up. This inaccuracy impedes a correct diagnosis of current difficulties. Although it is obvious that the lessons of history are not an adequate basis for current policy decisions which should be made in terms of contemporary goals and needs, it seems reasonable, nevertheless, to believe that today's policy-makers and implementers will find their tasks easier to the

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1. It would be more correct to say "organizations"; there are over fifty organizations comprising the states and territories of the United States.
extent that they have a true picture of the history of civil defense—a true picture of the "inheritance" they received when they assumed the responsibilities for our contemporary national civil defense effort.

This study of history disclosed something else of importance. It was implied above that the civil defense operational organization (i.e., disaster services) is but one aspect of the OCD program. No one will deny that this aspect carries little weight in the current program. Yet, history clearly discloses that, at the very least, in the public mind a civil defense corps is practically synonymous with civil defense. The public-at-large do not comprehend any civil defense effort except in terms of some tangible, efficient life-saving organization either actual or potential. The fact that, for many reasons, all attempts at establishing such an organization during the decade of the 50's met with rather dismal failure, conjoined with the relatively low priority given to this matter in the current program, goes very far in explaining the current public apathy toward civil defense. And it follows that much, but most assuredly not all, the indifference and hostility toward civil defense on the part of the Executive and Congress is but a reflection of the general public attitude. It can, therefore, be argued quite cogently that public (and, therefore, Executive) acceptance of any civil defense measure or program recommended by OCD will depend far more than we now imagine on the treatment given to the problem of a civil defense operational organization. In contributing to our understanding of this problem, this history may make its most significant contribution.
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SUMMARY

This Study was originally aimed at improving the current civil defense operational organization, by which is understood the "civil defense corps" or disaster services. But it was soon apparent that the serious difficulties confronting the current civil defense operational organization could not be easily remedied because they are an inheritance of a "forgotten" past; in other words, those difficulties, which have plagued civil defense organization from the beginning, are symptoms whose causes stem from past events. The seminal events that have been affecting civil defense until this day seem to have taken place before the enactment of Public Law 920. Hence, this period between the beginning of World War II and 1950 was chosen for a detailed historical study.

Civil defense became a military problem with the emergence of the airplane in World War I as a weapon of war. These "flying artillery platforms" made possible direct attacks upon the civil population, even though the armies defending that population were not defeated in the field. Such attacks upon civilians undermined the purpose of the field armies which was the defense of civilians and, hence, lowered their morale; attacks on the home population also weakened the armies in the field by depriving them of materiel.

Although not too effective in World War I, the airplane left a legacy of fear. The European belligerants of World War I feared, to some extent, that the next war would be lost not on the battlefield but on the home front (a new term) as a result of aerial bombing. Civil defense as a necessary concommitant of future wars became an accepted fact.
Of all the European countries exposed to air warfare, only the British took civil defense seriously enough to do something about it. By all accounts, the British civil defense organization during World War I was quite impressive. It is credited with a significant contribution to Great Britain's resistance, especially when she was relatively isolated and alone. The success of British civil defense was not created in a vacuum. Much credit must be given to a long and continuous basic planning effort (1922-1935) and to careful detailed planning and implementation from then until the outbreak of World War II.

For the United States, World War I experience had but an indirect influence upon its subsequent civil defense efforts. With her entry into that war, America was swept by a wave of patriotic fervor and spy hysteria. One result was a more or less spontaneous organization of the civilian populace to support the war effort and protect the country from espionage and sabotage. During the final weeks of the war, the "spontaneous" organization crystallized into a final form which later was to serve as the basic model for World War II civil defense organization: ostensible Federal leadership with little if any effective legal power over a complex of quasi-independent State and local government organizations.

As the probability of US involvement in World War II grew, the nation embarked on a crash rearmament program. This program was expected to create many civil problems, and to depend heavily on high public morale. Hence a civilian organization based upon the World War I model was reestablished. Its original primary purposes were to alleviate civilian problems caused by the expanding rearmament effort, to maintain a high civilian morale, and to help protect the country against espionage and sabotage. With the fury of the air war in Europe increasing, especially after the bombing of London in the "first blitz," the demand arose, especially among the city governments, for the quick formation of a civil defense organization to provide air raid protection. An Office of Civilian Defense was created by executive order and Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York City was appointed its first Director. He established a protective service.
corps rather rapidly, but in doing so he bypassed the States, neglected the organization he inherited and belittled its original mandate. This created quite a furor and was blamed (by LaGuardia's successors) for later troubles. Hence, in their subsequent activities, they rigidly adhered to channels. As a result of all this, by the end of World War II, the organization that sprang up "spontaneously" during World War I was legitimized by both custom and ostensible success. As World War II began drawing to a close, fear of air attack upon the continental United States vanished; President Truman abolished the Office of Civilian Defense on June 30, 1945 without making any provisions for a successor organization or even a planning group.

With the first atomic explosions in July and August of that year, the sense of danger to the continental United States from air attack reemerged, but only, it seemed, for the military. In 1946 the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, established by the Secretary of War in 1944, issued a special report on the effects of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; to be followed, in 1947, by two additional military reports. The military position and advice to the government was clear: Civil defense was a necessity and to be effective it would have to be planned for very carefully by a competent group working for a long time. But the civilian authorities in both the Administration and the Congress did not seem to be interested.

After waiting in vain about a year for action, the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) established an Office for Civil Defense Planning in accordance with some of the recommendations of the earlier military reports. The only report made by this group—called the Hopley report, after the Chairman of the office—was issued in November 1948. The Hopley report is a comprehensive blueprint for a local civil defense organization and a State organization. Prior to its delivery to the President and the NSRB staff for approval, it was "surreptitiously" distributed widely throughout the United States to all State and local governments and to many patriotic organizations interested in civil defense. The President was faced with a fait accompli.
The Executive did not think that an operational civil defense organization was needed at the time; hence it rejected the Hopley report. However, it did agree that as part of the overall planning for future emergencies, civil defense should be considered. The overall responsibility for emergency planning rested with the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). Thus, the responsibility for civil defense planning was transferred from the Department of Defense to the Board. For various reasons the Board did not succeed in this mission.

Meanwhile, international tension was rising. In the Spring of 1948 Czechoslovakia was taken over by a Communist palace revolution. In the summer of the same year Berlin was blockaded. Using the Hopley report as a guide, the larger states and cities began to organize embryonic civil defense organizations. When the Soviet Union's explosion of an atomic device was announced in September 1949, these organizations emerged as a loud and potent public voice. Congress became interested, and the Administration was subjected to considerable pressure to establish an operational civil defense organization. The Administration found itself in a difficult position: on one hand it still did not think an operational civil defense organization necessary; on the other hand it had to respond to increased public and congressional pressure. It embarked upon a program ostensibly responding to the public demands while hoping to stem and slow down the development of a national civil defense organization. Had not the Korean War broken out at the end of June 1950, it probably would have succeeded.

With the Korean War, public concern for civil defense would not be denied. By the onset of winter, 1950, some sort of civil defense organization existed in almost all states and most major cities as well as in many medium size cities. Hundreds of thousands of citizens had enlisted as volunteers. The demand that the Federal government legislate a civil defense law and assume both administrative leadership and financial responsibility for a national operating civil defense organization could not be disregarded. But the opposition of the Executive to such an organization grew stronger with the war. Not only was the organization still considered to be unnecessary—no one
in either the military or the executive considered the country to be in danger of an air attack—but now it would compete seriously for scarce resources needed for the nascent rearmament program.

The NSRB was completely unprepared for this surge of public interest and had no viable plans for action. The senior officials of the NSRB hurriedly drafted personnel from the Department of Defense—personnel who had participated in the earlier military studies as well as in writing the reports—and had them rapidly improvise a "national plan for civil defense" and a suggested civil defense law. The "plan" that emerged was a watered-down version of the Hopley report. The effect of the law was to strip the Federal government of all real responsibility for civil defense. From the outset this should have been recognized as an unsound basis for a successful civil defense effort. All studies then available insisted that national civil defense could not succeed without serious Federal involvement; but then there is no reason to believe that the Administration wished it to be a success. Nor did Congress seem to give the matter much substantive thought. The bill was passed in record time with little discussion or evaluation, and the FCDA was established on very shaky ground.

Several pertinent "lessons from history" are suggested by this Study:

(1) Much of the current civil defense posture and organization is not the result of careful planning nor of lessons learned from experience in earlier wars, as it is thought to be; rather, it is the fruit of hasty improvisation, forced by the pressures of events, and is often a compromise with interests that were inherently opposed to an operational civil defense. Its main features, which are currently not questioned because of the prestige accrued to them with time, are therefore most likely poor and should be questioned, reevaluated, and most probably changed in many respects.

(2) With the failure of the civil defense organization during the 1950's and because of blindness to the history of the civil defense law and "national plan," new causes of the current state of affairs were sought and found. The study strongly indicates that these are not causes of civil defense failures, but results of the failures. This confusion of symptom with sickness does not contribute to a solution for the problem.
Perhaps the main reason for both congressional and public apathy toward civil defense lies in the lack of a master plan for a national effort, one in which every aspect of the ongoing Federal civil defense program could fit. Both the military study groups and the NSRB agreed that such a plan was absolutely necessary before any attempt was made to implement an operational organization. Much can be learned about the formulation of such a plan by studying the activities of the Office for Civil Defense Planning after it issued the Hopley report, and by studying the extended British planning effort between World Wars I and II.
Civil defense became a problem distinguishable from military defense with the development of the airplane as a weapon of war. Before the airplane, civil and military defense were synonymous; when the enemy was close enough to harm civilians military defense had already failed: the defending army was already routed, or at least losing the battle, and civilians were beyond defense. The airplane, however, could pass over the defending armies and attack the civilians directly. This type of attack, therefore, was not the result of a victory but rather was aimed at contributing to one. To the extent that such attacks upon civilians could have an effect upon the outcome of the war being fought, civil defense became a military and national necessity above and beyond the "natural" mission of armies to defend the civilian population from attack.

After the very limited experience in World War I, the argument that attacks upon civilians could not but contribute to the defeat of the national armies seemed, a priori, unquestionable. Three general, independent bases for this view emerged in popular thinking at that time: First, the mainspring of morale and esprit-de-corps for the conscripted armies that do the fighting in modern wars is the defense of the homeland, the motherland, the fatherland, etc. In the mind of the conscript, however, these terms mean parents, wives, children, and aged. Hence, if these can be struck down despite his being at the battle, what point is there in continuing to fight? Second, modern warfare demands a continuous supply of provisions and arms from the rear, the realm of civilians. To the extent that civilians can be successfully attacked, the supply will be affected and the armies materially weakened. Third, attacks upon civilians
force the military to divert scarce resources and manpower from the front lines to defend them, thereby further weakening the fighting armies.

This new vulnerability of civilians suggested the need for additional steps to defend the civilian population—steps which were not considered to be the customary military steps—e.g., bomb shelters, rescue squads, fire fighters, and distribution of gas masks. This led to the coining of a new term in the vocabulary of war: "passive defense;" a term which later became another source of confusion.

Civil defense became identified with passive defense, with the "non-military" steps taken for the defense of civilians; yet the relationship between passive and active defense remains obscure, so that it is still difficult to determine clear-cut responsibility for each within the nation.

The Germans initiated direct attacks on civilians in World War I with their early zeppelin and later aircraft bombings of British cities. These attacks created great fear and occasional panic among the civilian populace, reactions which greatly affected the thinking concerning civil defense needs and problems between the World Wars. A British historian of World War I writes that after the July 12, 1917 German attack on London—an attack involving only 15 bombers with a load of 126 bombs totalling just about four tons, there was marked demoralization among the populace. He goes on to write:

The public outcry obliged the Government to recall two of the best fighting squadrons in France for home defense, and for several weeks many of the London Underground railway stations were packed nightly to suffocation. It was estimated at the time that some 300,000 people descended to these shelters every night, and that at least half a million more slept

1. World War II experience demonstrated that this was oversimplified; civilians showed striking ability to cope with air attacks.
in cellars. The mere rumor of a raid was sufficient to stampede thousands to these refuges.2

Two developments after World War I did much to strengthen the general belief in the dependency of the fighting effectiveness of armies upon an "inviolate" home front. German militarists, in order to save the prestige of the defeated German armies, invented the Dolchstosslegende. They argued that the German army was not defeated on the battlefield but was "stabbed in the back" by the "home front"; had the home front maintained its morale and its support of the German armed forces, the war would not have been lost. A necessary implication of this argument is that the greatest and most impressive military force known to the world at that time was defeated by the failures of the very civilians it was intended to protect. The inventors of this legend obviously felt that there was an intellectual predisposition to accept it in post World War I Europe, and to the extent that the argument was accepted--and it was widely accepted--it could only strengthen the general belief in the great vulnerability of the home front to direct aerial attack.

2. R. D. Sloan, Jr., The Politics of Civil Defense, unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1958, p. 38. Sloan was here quoting from Brigadier General P.R.C. Groves, Behind the Smoke Screen, Faber and Faber, London, 1939. It may well be that writing some twenty years after the events Gen. Groves' memory was affected by the prevailing public opinion concerning the effects of air warfare and that the account is exaggerated to some extent, nevertheless, there is no cogent reason to doubt that it is essentially true. That Gen. Groves' account seems to be somewhat exaggerated is indicated by the treatment of this subject in the authoritative British Government history of civil defense: T. H. O'Brien, Civil Defense, Her Majesty's Stationary Office and Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1955. O'Brien writes (pages 18-19): "At some times and places during 1914-18 the British public, as this narrative has noticed, had reacted to air bombardment with a mood of indignation; at other times and places it had shown some tendency to panic. It was not surprising that individual members of planning bodies between the wars held various opinions on the vital subject of the probable public reaction to the sustained, heavy, attacks now possible."
Out of this intellectual atmosphere there emerged the theories of Giulio Douhet, regarded by some as the only truly distinguished name to date among the military strategists of air power. Douhet asserted that future wars would be won in the air and that the only way to use air power effectively would be through bombing; using contemporary terminology, it can be said that he greatly favored strategic over tactical bombing. To quote Brodie (p. 92):

... his insistence on the devastating morale effects of bombing, his conviction that civilians are far less able than soldiers to endure the blows that air power can deal, and his references to the greater vulnerability of the targets exposed to air attack as compared with those exposed to naval or land artillery fire all confirm the impression that fundamentally Douhet reposed his faith on the bombings of cities per se, on the attack against urban populations.

Between the two World Wars almost all thinking about the vulnerability of the home front to air warfare was greatly affected by Douhet. (In fact, he influenced much thinking after World War II, despite experience in that war, which showed the home front to be far more resilient and resistant to severe attacks than had been previously imagined.) The belief that urban populations were vulnerable to air attack was reinforced early in 1938 with the air attack on Barcelona. This attack, near the end of the Spanish civil war, was widely reported in the world press and the ensuing panic of the Barcelona population was drawn in lurid details.

This supposed vulnerability of urban populations, combined with the government's awareness of the inadequate state of civil defense in Great Britain, may have played a significant role in the Munich crisis:

When Mr. Chamberlain, flying home from Munich, felt deep thankfulness that London's sprawling East End had been spared the disaster of air bombardment he again reflected the prevailing emotion of his countrymen. The high tension of

this short dress-rehearsal gave way to universal relief that the horrors of large-scale air assault had been averted, springing from new realization that the nation was still 'lamentably' unprepared to meet this type of warfare.4

Of the Allies, only Great Britain continuously thought about and planned for civil defense between the wars. Because of the importance of British experience in civil defense and its great influence on the American effort, this planning period and the initial organization of the British Civil Defense organization will be reviewed in Section 2. For the present it is enough to note that by the time World War II broke out, Great Britain had a functioning civil defense organization with a reasonably coordinated operational plan.

The major Axis powers, Germany and Japan, also had functioning civil defense organizations when the war began. On the one hand, because of the nature of their governments--highly centralized authoritarian dictatorships--it was easy for them to set up such organizations. They were also aided by the fact that their populations accepted the governments, accepted regimentation, and followed orders--if not with enthusiasm then with little resistance. On the other hand, because these governments were planning aggressive war, they had to play down the need for civil defense and could not really admit its importance, even if they believed it. In Germany, civil defense became a political football at the highest level with senior government heads (Goering, Himmler, Speer, and Goebels) competing for its control. Hence, although the lower operating levels

4. T. H. O'Brien, Civil Defense, pp. 164-165. O'Brien's sources for this statement are: Felling, K., Life of Neville Chamberlain, 1946, page 321, and Churchill, W. S., The Second World War, Vol. 1, page 265. This interpretation of the role played by a lack of civil defense ability in the resolution of the Munich crisis supports the argument of contemporary American strategic thinkers that a viable civil defense organization is necessary to enable the American president to counter nuclear blackmail in negotiations. The argument is strengthened by the consensus of contemporary historical studies of the events leading up to World War II that had the British and the French been more resolute, Hitler would have backed down.
of the German civil defense organization were reasonably well-disciplined and trained, the dissension and competition at the top of the organization precluded careful advanced planning. When the air war against German cities began to increase rapidly, German civil defense found itself unprepared and was forced to improvise. As a result, in both planning and accomplishment, German civil defense always lagged behind its inherent ability.\(^5\)

Japan started public air raid drills and public training in various fire-fighting techniques in the early 1930's, several years earlier than comparable actions in both Great Britain and Germany. This training program was under the aegis of the Home ministry, a ministry which did not have much power in the pre-World War II Japanese government. The public drill and training program was undermined to a great extent by the active enmity of the Japanese military, who refused to consider the possibility that anybody would ever get through their defenses. The result was a well-disciplined but "puerile and inadequate" civil defense organization.\(^6\)

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5. The conflict between the top-level German leadership and the operational section of the civil defense organization is reflected in a recent book: Hans Rumph, *The Bombing of Germany*, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston (N.Y. 1963) This somewhat vindictive account of the air war against German cities, by a general in the German civil defense organization, stresses the role played by German civil defense in saving lives and maintaining civilian morale. One gets the impression in reading Mr. Rumph that he is still fighting old superiors and that therefore his account about the accomplishments of civil defense and its help to the German war effort may be exaggerated, yet, at the same time, one cannot also help feeling that the exaggeration is based on a healthy dose of truth.

6. This evaluation of the civil defense organizations of Britain, Germany, and Japan is taken from the War Department Civil Defense Board study headed by Major General Harold R. Bull and released to the public in February, 1948 by the National Military Establishment under the title of: *A Study of Civil Defense* (pp. 3-7). (This study is commonly known as the Bull Report and will so be referred to henceforth.) The information upon which this evaluation is based comes from a study conducted in 1945 by the U.S. Army Provost Marshal. Both studies will be discussed in some detail in Section 4.
Many civil defense lessons can be learned from World War II. One of special significance concerns the utility of preplanning for civil defense. It is true that all the planning before World War II proved to be inadequate because the reality of the ensuing air war proved to be quite different and much more severe than anticipated; nevertheless, the mere existence of a civil defense organization and plan of operations, despite the poor organization and poor planning, proved to be instrumental in saving many lives and much property.

In evaluating the effect of the civil defense organization in the three countries considered, the Bull report (footnote 6) acknowledges that, with respect to Britain, "the advance planning effort of the Home Office can well be credited with averting complete disaster when the enemy struck" (p. 5). With respect to the Japanese effort, an effort it had just characterized as being "puerile and inadequate," the Bull report submits that it "accomplished four principal results":

1. Conflagrations were confined to the areas bombed.
2. Vigorous, mass post-raid activities restored the essential utilities to an extent limited only by the lack of reserve materiel.
3. Although shelters were extremely crude, casualties were significantly limited.
4. Evacuation plans for children were most effective.

Much has been written about the great raids on Hamburg in 1943 and its subsequent fire storm. In its fury and destructive intensity it resembled an atomic attack. Although the German civil defense organization of that city was admittedly saturated and overwhelmed, a senior German civil defense official active at the scene reports the following (Rumph, pp. 90-91): In addition to fighting fires the men in the fire brigade rescued about 18,000 people. The rescue services saved 6,200 people trapped in shelters and dug out 232 people from ruins. The first aid services treated 1,772 people on the spot and sent 6,700 more seriously wounded casualties to special medical centers. About 5,000 people were evacuated from the fire areas. Local first aid stations treated 3,976 serious casualties and about 20,400 less serious casualties. This is not a performance to be belittled.
A second significant lesson can be found in the nature of the planning errors made. Both the recuperative power of cities and civilians and the ferocity of the planned attack are almost always underestimated. It can be said that before World War II, civil defense planners were too pessimistic in their estimates of the effects of air warfare. The actual ferocity of the air war, the actual amount of tonnage dropped upon the cities, went far beyond the expectations of the planners, yet the performance of the civilians of all belligerents under attack far exceeded the most optimistic expectations.

The last lesson to be mentioned here points to the significant role of local civil defense organizations. When attacks came it was local organization and know-how, i.e., self help, that was found to be the most important immediate determinant of civil defense effectiveness. The "puerility" and inadequacy of Japanese civil defense stemmed largely from its well-disciplined centralization. The local civil defense organizations followed the central plans obediently and did not display much imagination or initiative. The British effort, on the other hand, although also starting out as a highly centralized venture, did exhibit the necessary flexibility, and local authorities took over decision-making responsibilities as the occasion demanded. The reason for the efficacy of self help and local responsibility is obvious. To bring help from the outside, that is from the central authority, takes time; for the central authority to make local decisions takes time—it has to receive and digest information, and coordinate that information in light of its centralized responsibility. But it is precisely time which is of the essence for saving lives and property in coping with both the attack and the immediate consequences of the attack. In addition, decisions made by central authorities cannot be optimum since the authorities cannot be aware of many local contingencies known only to those on the spot. From the Bull report onward, American authorities planning for and attempting to establish a viable civil defense posture in this country have cited this lesson in support of their activities or proposals,
yet, with time, its meaning became so distorted that not only was it of no help to the American efforts, but it actually became a handicap.\(^7\)

Several observations are in order with regard to the panic and demoralization of civilians under air attack. Certain preconceptions based mainly on the World War I and Barcelona bombings, prevail in contemporary thinking: One can still read that public demoralization and panic under air attack will vitiate any civil defense program.\(^8\)

With the wisdom of hindsight and the tragically rich experience of World War II, we now know that, contrary to the expectations of Douhet and others, urban and civilian populations under attack can exhibit the fortitude and bravery of well-trained soldiers. Problems of civilian morale are not intrinsically different from problems of military morale; given similar psychological conditions one will be as brave or as cowardly as the other.

During World War I, Great Britain was subjected to two types of concerted aerial attack: attacks by zeppelins, from May 1915 to June 1916, and attacks by two-engine Gotha bombers a year later. The zeppelin raids did not induce panic, but nervousness and anger which culminated, in at least one instance, in riots and the sacking of presumably German-owned shops in Hull. The known incidents of population panic occurred during the airplane raids toward the end of the war. These attacks began when the war had already been going on for three years, a frightfully bloody stalemate with no respite in sight. In addition, the British military forces did not know how to cope with these attacks and were regarded by the population as deficient. The attacks reoccurred after a lull of nearly a year,


during which time it was believed that the problem of aerial attacks had been beaten. Three factors—general war fatigue, feelings of helplessness because of seemingly military ineffectiveness, and the great disappointment and letdown at the resumption of the air war, created a favorable setting for panic. Public tension and nervousness reached its height during the summer of 1917, when the Gotha bomber attacks were at their peak. With the onset of winter the intensity of the attacks diminished, and reasonably reassuring active and passive defense measures against air attacks were developed; the public morale began to rise.⁹

The air attack on Barcelona took place under similar, if not worse, conditions. Again it was toward the end of a long and bloody war, and now the side supported by the populace of the city was losing. In addition, the Spanish Republican forces had, by that time, no effective military means to cope with such attacks and the population knew it.

It is also interesting to note that when the Germans resumed bombing Britain with the V weapons following the Allied invasion of Europe in World War II, the psychological situation was very similar to that of the previous war when the Germans used the Gotha bombers. After years of demonstrated heroism and fortitude, British public morale, by all accounts, sank precipitously.

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⁹. The information in this paragraph is taken from O'Brien, pp. 7-11. Concerning the relatively widespread war fatigue among European civilians during the last years of World War I a Swedish military psychiatrist writes that "hysterical collapses and similar symptoms of psychological illnesses were common" to a noticeably higher degree than was customarily the case. (von Geryerz, W., Psychology of Survival: Human Reactions to the Catastrophes of War, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1962, page 20.)
A somewhat more detailed treatment of British civil defense planning between the wars is justified on two grounds: First, after the outbreak of World War II in Europe, when the United States seriously began rearming and preparing for its subsequent involvement in the war, it was discovered that little knowledge was available in this country on how to organize a civilian defense effort. Hence, much of the American World War II Office of Civilian Defense Organization was modeled on the British effort. The British World War II Civil Defense Organization significantly affected American practices so that to understand the American effort it becomes important to know something about the British effort. Second, despite obvious differences among the major powers, Great Britain is, both politically and socially-psychologically, the nation most similar to the United States. The situation faced by the British authorities after World War I was in many ways similar to the situation the American authorities faced after World War II. Since it is acknowledged that the British were reasonably successful in their efforts before World War II, their experience in planning may therefore serve as a valuable guide in helping the United States in a similar effort.

British peacetime planning for active civil defense extended over most of the twenty-one years between the two wars. It can be divided into two easily distinguishable phases. The first phase lasted until the spring of 1935. During this phase civil defense concerned only the top strata of the government and the entire subject was shrouded

in secrecy. The second began with the establishment of an Air Raid Precautions Department within the Home Office. Civil defense was then "declassified" and action begun which was soon to involve more and more people at the local government level and among the public at large.

The end of World War I found Great Britain in an unprecedented state of both economic and morale exhaustion. Another war, or serious preparations in the event of another war, were literally unthinkable. O'Brien writes (p. 6): "It seems fair to say that a large part of the nation continued right up to the startling international events of 1938 [the Munich crisis] to comfort themselves with the idea that the war which ended in 1918 had been 'a war to end war'. ....Neither the material resources nor the will for rearmament were readily available." On the other hand, the British military authorities, upon whom the responsibility of defending the country rested, had to plan and make preparations. Their judgment was that air attacks against Britain "were overwhelmingly justified on military grounds by the results" (O'Brien, page 11). The new weapon had proven itself in the recent war and it was bound to play a major role in any future war. But it was a weapon still in its early development, and although it had passed its first tests, its precise role in future wars remained obscure.

The American situation at the end of World War II was quite similar. The country had experienced a public fatigue that made another war unthinkable; our military were confronted with a new, revolutionary weapon that had just been tested in the war past, and whose role in any future war, while certain to be significant, was obscure. The initial reaction of both countries to the problem of civil defense was also similar--governmental secrecy. It should be noted at the outset that there was also a very significant difference between the American and British situation. The British

2. Both military reports to be discussed in the following section were originally classified.
took fifteen or sixteen years to realize that a future war was more
than academic and to identify their potential enemy—Nazi Germany;
America, however, was confronted with a real, known enemy within a
matter of a few years after the end of World War II. As will be
seen, this difference had very significant effects upon how the re-
spective governments went about planning and setting up a peacetime
civil defense organization.

In November 1921 the Committee of Imperial Defense, at that time
the British Cabinet's highest organ for planning national defense
measures, requested the principal Service experts to report on the
problem of possible future air attacks on the country. The report
appeared within a year and was obviously based upon the lessons
just learned. It hypothesized an attack from France, the only
power at the time that could possibly attack Great Britain, who
was assumed to drop an average monthly tonnage of bombs five times
larger than the total tonnage dropped by the Germans during the pre-
ceeding war. In addition, the view was expressed that the effects of
such attacks on public morale would be proportionately much greater
than the ensuing material damage. It is interesting to note in this
context that the "escalation" of weapon effects which has been so
troublesome to American civil defense planners also confronted the
early British planner in miniature. In 1922 they estimated that the
hypothetical enemy would drop 150 tons of bombs upon London during the
first day of attack and 110 tons of bombs during the second day; in
1923 the estimates rose to 168 tons and 126 tons respectively. The
initial report caused "some consternation in high quarters" (O'Brien,
p. 12), a consternation which was increased with the reestimates of
1923.

At a December 1923 meeting of the Committee on the Coordination of
Departmental Action on the Outbreak of War, the Air Ministry suggested,

3. The total tonnage dropped by the Germans during World War I
was about 300 tons; in the British "scenario" used for planning pur-
poses, the French were credited with the ability to deliver 1500 tons
of bombs a month. During the peak of the London blitz (Sept. 7-Nov. 2,
1940) Germany delivered approximately 2600 tons of bombs per month.
with the concurrence of the Home Office, that the Home Office was the appropriate Department to initiate a scheme of air-raid precautions. The Committee of Imperial Defense, however, seemed to think that such a step was premature. Instead, it decided to appoint an Air Raid Precautions subcommittee to be headed by a Home Office official, a decision soon approved by the government.  

The committee met for the first time on May 15, 1924 under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Home Office. Six additional members of the Air Raid Precautions Committee represented the Committee for Imperial Defense, the three Service departments, the Ministry of Health, and the Office of Works. The Committee also had the authority to co-opt, as it saw fit, additional members from other government departments, an authority it immediately began to exercise; it also extended invitations to other departments to participate to the extent that the topics under discussion would be of interest to them. And the invitations were generally accepted. The result was a hard core of permanent planners representing the most important ministries and departments concerned plus a "floating" body of experts from the other departments in the government.

The caliber of the permanent members of the Committee should be noted. They were all from the senior administrative class of the British Civil Service, a class which, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, (1965 Edition), "is concerned with advice on broad questions of policy at the highest and most general levels." The Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, who served as the chairman of the Air Raid Precaution Committee, occupies the highest civil service position in the Home Office. Its incumbent at that

4. The choice of the Home Office as the agent primarily responsible for civil defense was not based on careful consideration but rather on experience in the war just concluded. German night bombing was almost completely dependent upon lights for navigation, hence blackouts emerged as a very important defense measure. Initially the military services undertook the responsibility for implementing the blackouts where necessary. But implementing blackouts demanded civilian cooperation and the military services were not effective in this. After a period of frustration, the responsibility for "lighting
time, Sir John Anderson, later Viscount Waverly, eventually entered politics and rose to become the Home Secretary. He presided over the deliberations continuously for almost eight years. The representative of the Committee of Imperial Defense, Sir Maurice Hankey, had been the Secretary to that Committee since 1912 and, in addition, the Secretary of the British Cabinet since 1916. He held those two positions until his retirement in 1938 but was later called back to serve as a member in the World War II Cabinet during 1939-1940. The other members of the Committee were of similar caliber. The Committee functioned for eleven years almost unchanged in personnel and its only responsibility for that period was planning. Since membership was an added responsibility to the normal responsibilities of the members, and since the members represented a wide spectrum of the Government departments affected by civil defense requirements, whatever plans emerged were almost guaranteed to be in harmony with the government functions at large.

The terms of reference of the Committee were: "to inquire into the question of Air Raid Precautions other than Naval, Military, and Air Defenses, and to prepare an annual report of progress with such precautions for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial Defense." (O’Brien, pages 14-15.) It was a temporary Committee and was expected to produce a report within a year.

It did. The report considered civil defense problems under eight headings:

(1) education of the public;
(2) warning;
(3) prevention of damage;
(4) maintenance of vital services;
(5) repair of damage;
(6) movement of the seat of government;

restrictions" was transferred to the Home Office which acquitted itself well. An important lesson had been learned: when the success of a program depends upon the cooperation of civilians, it had best be administered by a civilian agency.
(7) legislative action required; and
(8) department responsibility for all action recommended.

"Prevention of damage" included such considerable problems as:
blackout requirements, camouflage, shelters, gas warfare defense,
and evacuation. It was also recommended that the Committee become a
standing committee and continue its work along the original terms of
reference.

For each of these problem headings the Committee considered what
additional planning would be necessary, what information would be
necessary as a prerequisite for planning, and what concrete actions
could be taken immediately. The Council for Imperial Defense approved
the report and forwarded it to the Cabinet for consideration.

The time was Spring, 1925, when it was truly believed that uni-
versal peace and international disarmament was at hand. Therefore,
the Cabinet regarded any action that would relax the secrecy of the
proposals as unwise, yet it felt that preparing for civil defense
must continue. Hence, it authorized reconstituting the Air Raid
Precautions Committee into a permanent committee and instructed it to
continue with the more detailed planning inherent in its report while
still maintaining a very tight security on its activities.

The Committee reconvened on February 1, 1926 and began to work
anew. Its first step was

... to ask Departments concerned with preparation
of plans to attend its meetings with the two-fold
object of (1) arriving (so far as possible) at a
common conception of the conditions which would
result from air attack, and (2) elucidating points
presenting difficulties in the drafting of particuiar
schemes for which Departments were responsible.
(O'Brien, p. 28.)

Deliberations had hardly begun when it became clear that much of
the detailed planning could not continue until answers were given to
two questions: First, to what extent should London be evacuated?
Second, what form of civilian control should be adopted for this and
other purposes? The Ministry of Health suggested that a civilian
general staff was needed. This suggestion was soon "validated" by
the need to cope on a national basis with the general strike of 1926. In order to avert chaos, something similar to a civilian general staff did emerge within the Home Office to effectively control the vast emergency measures taken and the suddenly increased body of 200,000 special constables (only 86,000 of which having had prior training) raised to support the police. The concept of a civilian general staff was here to stay.

Simultaneously, the committee decided to set up ad hoc committees to consider the problems of the care of evacuees and the treatment of casualties.

In March 1927, the Air Raid Precautions Committee was again faced with a continuing problem: secrecy. Planning in the defense against gas warfare had progressed faster than all the other schemes. Both the additional research needed and action called for were greatly hampered by the tight security regulations. In addition, in the preceding month, Professor Noel Baker broadcast a "peace" speech in which he attempted to enlist and arouse the public in support of the Geneva disarmament negotiations by stressing the horrors of a future war. He concentrated on gas, claiming "all gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise means to protect the civil population from this form of attack." (O'Brien, p. 31.) The Committee knew better, but was bound by security not to reply.\(^5\)

They therefore requested the Committee on Imperial Defense to relax security regulations with respect to defense against gas warfare. The request was granted and then approved by the Cabinet. However, soon after the Briand-Kellog pact was signed, and because of the changed socio-political climate, the plans for expanding these activities were suspended. Nevertheless, many small departmental committees were established to work on specific limited problems; the "web of planning" began to grow noticeably.

By 1928 the attention of the Air Raid Precautions Committee turned to the type of central body necessary for coordinating

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5. Similar arguments were and are being voiced in the United States. The difference, however, is that now most of the relevant information is public.
all these activities into one general plan. It began by considering the type of organization appropriate for war, and then worked back to deciding what should be established during peace. The first issue to be considered was the choice between dispersal of responsibilities among existing departments and services or the creation of a special Ministry to deal with all aspects of civil defense. The first alternative was the choice in the Committee's first report published three years earlier. The intensive planning since then strengthened that choice; it was considered both more effective and more economical to utilize existing Departments and services than to set up an ad hoc organization.

Given this decision, the next problem was how to establish a central controlling agency for the double purpose of coordinating policy and consultation over plans. Major policy decisions were, of course, the responsibility of the Cabinet, but these would necessarily entail many lesser decisions taken at lower levels. A committee of Ministers of the Departments most directly involved in civil defense was proposed, to be presided over, during war, by a Minister of the War Cabinet. A second committee was proposed to cope with the more prevalent and "mundane" problems of consultation among the various departments, and coordination of the various plans. This committee was modeled after the military Chiefs of Staff Committee, members of which, while still responsible as individuals to their respective services, had the joint responsibility of advising the Committee of Imperial Defense on matters concerning all three services and in overall national defense. It was recommended that this second committee be composed of officials from Departments directing civil defense functions and be presided over by the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Home Office. Finally, decentralization to the various Departments was to be accompanied by centralization within the Departments; that is, each Department should organize some central office or division for its civil defense responsibilities. The Air Raid Precautions Committee urged immediate adoption and rapid implementation of this plan since they were strongly influenced by a conception of a "knock-out blow;" i.e., they anticipated
an aerial "blitzkrieg" like Rotterdam.

The plans were approved by the Cabinet at the end of January 1929, and the Air Raid Precautions Committee was formally reorganized, with no basic change in personnel, to implement the plans; henceforth, it was known as the ARP (Organization) Committee. It bore the responsibility of civil defense planning for the next six years.

Concomitantly, detailed operational planning continued and various problems were faced, some being solved while others were struggled with without solutions being reached. Of special interest to Americans is the problem of shelters, the responsibility of the Office of Works. By 1929 the Office concluded in a summary report that:

1. it would not be possible to provide adequate civilian protection in the existing building;
2. the cost of constructing shelters on a large scale was prohibitive; and
3. although the London subways could be used for shelters, they probably should not be, since they would be needed for transportation.

Instead of shelters, evacuation was recommended. The ARP Committee had no alternative but to accept the recommendation of the experts; but they directed continued study and experimentation. It should be noted, however, that money for experimentation was lacking.

From its initial steps civil defense planning had concentrated on the London area for two reasons: (1) London was the "natural" military target in Great Britain and the first and strongest attacks would probably be launched against it; (2) the problems of civil defense of London were the most complicated and their solution would serve as a guide for the solution of the problems of the smaller communities. With the reorganization of 1929, the concentration on London continued, now having received some formal recognition.6

The period 1929-1935 was one of both international and national confusion. The international economic crisis swept the world; the

6. Something similar occurred in the post World War II civil defense effort. Almost exclusive interest was concentrated on the designated target cities.
Japanese opened the China war; National Socialism took over the government in Germany, and, for quite a while Great Britain had an unstable government (the MacDonald era). In addition, old hopes died hard, and despite the impending breakdown of European peace, most of the British public and many within the Government really refused to believe that another war was possible. This atmosphere had its effect upon the ongoing preparations to set up a viable civil defense organization. The prevailing secrecy rules hampered planning more and more. The Committee requested their relaxation several times during this period, only to be rebuffed, although some minor extensions were granted. The security stricture of involving as few persons as possible at the lower levels of government hampered progress since many of the plans were reaching "theoretical finality." Nevertheless, by the end of 1931, a first draft of an ARP Committee handbook had been completed.

By 1932, it became obvious that the Permanent Under Secretary of State of the Home Office, until then the chief administrative officer of the planning effort, could not assume the responsibility for administering the developing civil defense administration as well. The Committee recommended that a new authority with a commandant on top should be formed for that purpose; since the planning was primarily focused upon the London area, the jurisdiction of the authority was restricted to that area. The recommendation was approved by the Committee for Imperial Defense in August of that year and a commandant for the London area assumed the post by April 1933. The next few years were spent in building up the control authority, largely on paper because of the security restrictions.

With the main problems of London in the hands of the newly appointed commandant, the ARP Committee turned its attention to the problems of organizing civil defense in the rest of the country. Three alternatives were considered as possible backbones for that organization: (1) the police; (2) the emergency strike organization (which proved effective in maintaining the necessary public services during the general strike of 1926 and was retained in skeleton form);
and (3) the local governments. The decision was in favor of the latter. A special subcommittee studied the financial and administrative implications of this decision. It submitted various suggestions for administration, including the concept of dividing the country into administrative regions. By and large the suggestions were accepted by the Ministerial committee; with respect to finances, however, the conclusions were equivocal and were shelved. The web of planning expanded and some consultations with local authorities began, but the problems of finances were not mentioned.

By the end of 1933, the commandant of the London ARP authority submitted a detailed plan for setting up a greater London ARP organization with an accompanying price tag of £150,000. The total national expenditure on passive defense at the time was only about £20,000 per annum; no Cabinet decision had yet been taken on rearmament. The Committee therefore considered the program to be premature, arguing that so large an expenditure should not be undertaken until the danger of war assumed greater proportions. With the approval of the Committee of Imperial Defense, the ARP Committee decided to devote its attention henceforth primarily to problems of organization and to undertake material preparation only if it did not involve heavy expenditure.

Financing began to assume some urgency by 1934. An efficient gas mask and other anti-gas measures had been developed by that time and a problem arose of how to manufacture and store or distribute the masks and equipment. This was placed at the Ministerial Committee's doorstep. Even more pressing was the developing stalemate in the limited discussion with the local authorities which had been authorized the year before. All progress was stymied because it was unclear who should pay for what.

At the same time, faith in the effectiveness of disarmament had weakened and Great Britain began to consider rearming. Germany emerged as the potential enemy and the Air Staff concluded that the most effective defense against air raids would be a counter-bombing of German air fields and industries. Hence, it argued, the most weight in rearming should be given to building up the RAF; neverthe-
less, some enlargement of the "slender" existing provision for the antiaircraft defense of London and a program of public education about air raid precautions was also proposed. As in the United States, twenty years later, active offense was being given priority over passive defense as the best means of defending the civilians, with active defense somewhere in the middle. A significant change in policy was impending.

On July 19, 1934, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, announced the five-year program for expanding the RAF. During the ensuing parliamentary debate on rearmament, he also disclosed on July 30, that the government had been planning civil defense measures for some time and that the public would soon be told what it should do. The secrecy hampering civil defense planning had broken down. The administrative and financial proposals submitted a year before by the special subcommittee were reviewed anew by the Ministerial Committee, with the additional participation of the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. In its report to the Cabinet, the Committee stressed that expenditures on civil defense must be increased and that the national government must assume the responsibility for certain of these services. Shelters, because of their cost, were specifically excluded. Early in 1935, the Cabinet approved the report and authorized an expenditure of £100,000. Yet neither Parliament nor the public, with the exception of the few general statements made by the Prime Minister during the debate, knew anything of the scope of the plans or of its implications. The ARP Committee now turned to the problem of publicizing its plans.

The Committee began to draft a circular in which the threats of air warfare were to be described as well as the steps to be taken in defense against it. It is unnecessary to go into the details of this circular. Suffice it to say that it was prepared in about six months, during which time it was cleared with all authorities involved as well as by the Cabinet, and was issued to the public on July 9, 1935. With this a new era in British civil defense commenced; the implementation of eleven years of high-level coordinated planning was embarked upon.
Basically, the circular consisted of a comprehensive statement of the Government's position with respect to civil defense and called upon the local governments and industry to cooperate in creating a civil defense organization. In addition, it called upon the public to learn the rudiments of self-defense and to be ready to volunteer for civil defense duties in their communities when called upon to do so. All concerned were urged to cooperate, and enforcing legislation was considered unnecessary. The circular guided civil defense activities for the next two years; planning decreased in importance as the main emphasis of the ARP Committee shifted to implementation. By and large the government committed itself to help the local authorities in establishing an organization and to various expenditures, though the details of the expenditures were vague. Aid in the construction of shelters was specifically excluded, however, although the local authorities were encouraged to do so if they so wished. Emphasis was placed on the fact that civil defense "must be organized locally." The vagueness about expenditures was justified by the argument that the national government was not asking the local authorities to undertake any activities which called for appreciable expenses, but rather to undertake planning at a local level, an area which until then was neglected for reasons of secrecy.

Local authorities were advised to delay their planning until the receipt of memoranda and guidelines to be issued by the Committee. In addition conferences were to be held in which planning problems and goals would be discussed. The public at large was told that they would soon be issued handbooks and that the British Red Cross, the Order of St. John, and St. Andrews Ambulance Association would soon initiate training courses for self-protection. (Arrangements for this had already been made in the earlier planning period.)

With the declassification of the civil defense effort, the ARP Committee and its staff were reconstituted as an ARP Department within the Home Office. Initially, however, work proceeded very slowly. With the exception of the Home Office, whose Minister was wholly committed to civil defense, the other Departments dragged their feet.

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"The baby was not theirs;" and the public at large, industry, and to a lesser extent the local authorities, finding it difficult to take the possibility of a new war seriously, could not get enthusiastic about the project. The Department had to reconsider its tactics.

One of the first things it did was to meet with the Ministers concerned to discuss setting up staffs within their respective ministries to assume responsibility for the part the ministries were to play in the program. It also decided to go ahead with those aspects of the program for which it was not dependent upon others and for which it had reasonably finished plans—the defense against gas warfare. Realizing also that setting up the organization would involve much more effort on its part than anticipated, it requested permission to increase its staff.

Administratively the ARP Department, although located within the Home Office, reported to the Committee on Imperial Defense together with the other three services. Although the Imperial Committee was not "against" civil defense (after all, it had been involved and had supported the civil defense planning effort since its inception in 1924), it cannot be said that civil defense had a high priority. Great Britain was beginning its rearmament effort and there was not much time for anything else. The various requests of the ARP Department were approved but it was not until April 1937 that the ongoing civil defense activities and the proposed program could be reviewed seriously.

The ARP Department's procedures in dealing with local authorities are instructive. First, contact had to be established with the local authorities. During the initial half year of its existence, the Department head participated in 26 conferences with local authorities in which the issues entailed in civil defense were explored. After these conferences, burden of the activities were taken over by Inspectors; meetings were continued, and problems were raised and discussed. 7

7. The Office of Inspectorship in Britain sees to it that the government regulations and/or standards accompanying grants in aid
The immediate outcome of these meetings was quite spotty; some local authorities seemed to take to civil defense seriously while other just listened politely. Two major reasons are given for this relative inactivity. Primarily, there were the problems of finances. Despite the fact that the central Government undertook to participate in the financing of the civil defense effort, the details of its participation were lacking. Some local authorities did not mind too much, but many, including the London County Council, did. Secondly, the local authorities were quite responsive to the popular political opinions and moods. The Labor opposition to the Government began to use civil defense measures as a point of criticism and as an indication that the Conservative Government is not really interested in pursuing peace, and Labor's strength predominated in the urban communities. Finally, it should be added that despite the Government's rearmament program, the community at large still did not believe that war was imminent. Some local governments, notably Nottingham, were cooperative and the Department started to work with them on local planning as a pilot study to gain experience.

Meanwhile, work proceeded with increasing tempo in the field of anti-gas warfare measures. Authoritative handbooks were issued, a government factory for manufacturing gas masks was set up, and a school for training personnel was established. Of the various civil defense programs planned and prepared for by the ARP Department, the anti-gas warfare program was the most highly developed by the time the war actually did break out. With the wisdom of hindsight and are observed by the local authorities and non-governmental organizations. Inspectors of the ARP Department could not function in such a manner since a) it did not distribute, at that time, grants in aid, and b) it had no coercive powers. Instead of which, the ARP Inspectors served rather as missionaries for civil defense (their own description of the job). Actually they played a far more important role—they served as mediators and communication links between the local authorities and the ARP Department. The plans and organization sketched out in the circular were no more than sketches, they were not blueprints. The Inspectors played a crucial role in filling these sketches out until they did become viable blueprints.
within the framework of a narrow cost-effectiveness standpoint it may be argued that this was a waste of energy and effort. But this is a limited way of looking at the matter. The real success which the ARP Department experienced in this area played an important role in keeping it alive despite the many failures and lack of accomplishment in the more important area of setting up an organization at the local levels. Expenditures for anti-gas warfare were more than offset by the resulting increase in morale and improvement in motivation on the part of those involved in the civil defense effort. In addition, the public accepted this part of the civil defense program more than any other, thus creating the ground for future acceptance of the rest of the program.

As 1936 progressed, additional progress was noted. Agreements were reached with the British Red Cross and kindred organizations to establish first aid and civil defense rescue training schools and close to £4000 were allocated for that purpose by the central government. Parliament authorized the formation of an Air Raid Warden Service, a service which was to turn into perhaps the most successful and distinctive aspect of civil defense. Plans for emergency fire brigade services were also announced.

However, the nebulousness of the financial responsibility for the civil defense efforts led to a hardening of attitudes in the local governments, who insisted that the matter be cleared up before they would act. This, in turn, led to a significant slowdown in the stimulation of public awareness of and participation in civil defense problems, because it is difficult and dangerous to involve the public without a reasonably functioning organization at local levels. The problem of finances was tackled by the central government early in 1937. Conferences were held with the representative organizations of the local authorities. Their position, by that time, was that defense in any form is a national concern and should therefore be wholly financed by the national government. Local governments hesitated to incur any expenses since they pointed out that the ARP Department had no legal authority to spend any money and they might
not be refunded. The Home Office brought this to the attention of the Cabinet which decided that the whole matter of legislation had to be restudied. The new study was assigned to the Defense Policy and Requirements Committee.

Agreeing largely with an analysis submitted to them by the Home Office, the Committee reached the following main conclusions. It first distinguished three distinct time periods for civil defense: peace time, warning time, and war time. Full civil defense readiness, comparable to the readiness of military forces, was deemed inadvisable in peace time because of its disrupting effect upon the normal life of the community. Hence, plans for civil defense were to be so formulated that full readiness could be achieved within a short time called the warning period; the Home Office recommended that the warning period be set at four days but the length of time was left open in the final report. It was agreed that negotiations with the local authorities should start, with the central government willing to assume 60 percent of approved civil defense expenditures during peacetime; although it was expected that the government would assume far greater responsibility for funding during the warning period and war time--the Home Office recommending 100 percent--it was decided not to discuss the figure.

But the conclusions were withheld from the public and the local authorities; a new problem had arisen which demanded prior solution. The central government civil defense organization was in need of review. Formulated in 1935, the original idea underlying the government civil defense organization was for the effort to be carried out by the various departments in conjunction with their normal activities; the Civil Defense Department within the Home Office would assume responsibility for overall planning and coordination of the entire effort, since the idea of establishing an autonomous organization in charge of civil defense had been considered and rejected. However, as already noted, the various departments involved during this period of voluntary cooperation, neither exhibited much initiative nor expended much effort, and the Department was forced to assume much of the
responsibility itself. The ARP Department thus began to develop a kind of autonomy despite the policy decision taken two years earlier. An overall review and evaluation of the national civil defense effort was clearly in order.

A subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defense was accordingly formed under the chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher. The Committee report was submitted to the Cabinet at the end of June, 1937. Although it made no radical proposals it was a clear statement of strengths and weaknesses of the existing civil defense efforts as well as a clear statement of the discrepancy between what existed and what was needed. One significant lesson from experience was recognized: the functions of the ARP Committee were changed; instead of being merely a planning and coordinating body, it was given executive responsibility, even though the thesis that civil defense was an interdepartmental responsibility was formally retained. The report outlined in reasonable detail the civil defense organization needed for Great Britain, an outline which was incorporated in substance in the final ARP bill which was to be enacted into law within six months.

The several studies of civil defense problems and the cumulative lessons of two years of "free cooperation" showed that this period was necessarily reaching its end, that most of what could be accomplished under such conditions had been accomplished. A new, more forceful law became necessary.

On July 7, 1937 the Home Secretary informed Parliament that he was beginning consultations with the local authorities on a new Air Raid Precautions law. The consultations concerned the administrative responsibilities of the local authorities and the problem of finances, the government's position on finances being the one sketched out in the preceding paragraphs. A deadlock developed, with the local authorities insisting that the central government assume responsibility for all the extra expenditures entailed in civil defense; it was to be resolved by a series of compromises. There was no known conflict between the departments and ministries of the central government.
The second reading of the bill began on November 15, 1937. For the first time, civil defense was extensively discussed in Parliament. The bill was approved in both houses and royal assent was received on December 22, 1937. It went into force on January 1, 1938. With this act, the work on setting up a functioning civil defense organization began in earnest. This was possible because the act compelled the local authorities to set up civil defense plans for their jurisdictions, to forward them to the Permanent Secretary of State of the Home Office for approval, and then to assume the responsibility for implementing them. The general guidance for such planning as well as the problems of coordination of individual plans remained the responsibility of the central authorities who by now had close to fourteen years of continuous experience in this area.

The act empowered the permanent Secretary of State to prescribe, by regulation, the matters to be included in the plans as well as to relieve the local authorities of any of the obligations which these regulations might prescribe. In addition, the local authorities were authorized to incur expenditures for their plans with the understanding that the central government would reimburse between 60 and 75 percent of them—as high as 85 percent under certain extreme conditions. (A clause was introduced into the act requiring a review of these procedures after a period of three years to evaluate to what extent they were successful or needed to be modified.) It should be noted that where the individual citizen was concerned, civil defense still depended upon voluntary cooperation, a feature which was not changed throughout the war. Despite planned dependence upon voluntary cooperation, little activity at this time was directed toward the enlistment of volunteers; the emphasis was on drafting a viable local plan and training a professional cadre before asking the public to donate its effort.

Although a formal organization did not emerge rapidly, the ARP act did have a striking effect on planning and, with the development

8. Needless to say, except during actual war emergency, it is difficult to see how the American Federal Government can legislate in such a manner to compel State governments to take action.
of plans, on recruiting a full-time cadre. The staff of the ARP Department began to grow and its budget was increased commensurately. A national civil defense plan, to be added as a supplement to the Government War Book, was drawn up, entitled "Civil Defense Emergency Scheme Y." The accelerated planning activities of the local authorities necessitated many conferences with the ARP Departments in which the growing staff of Inspectors played an important role. Compromises were made on both sides and the problems hampering progress were ironed out. Soon there were 230 local authorities with the responsibility for planning civil defense organizations and there was no dearth of problems in supervision, coordination, and reconciliation of differences.

Despite all the activity there was a noticeable lack of tangible accomplishment. To make matters worse, as planning progressed new problems emerged and the old ones began to look more complex than initially imagined. Hitler invaded Austria on March 11, 1938, and the ARP Department felt compelled to issue a call for one million volunteers; but the volunteers did not come forth. The morale of those in the Department tended to drop. Sir John Anderson, who had presided over the ARP planning committee during the first eight years of its existence, was called to head a committee to review the progress made and the problems encountered since the enactment of the new law. He reported to Parliament in June that the problem of civil defense organization was so vast and so complex "as almost to induce despair." (O'Brien, p. 120.)

Then came Munich. As noted in the preceding section, the lack of readiness of British civil defense may have played an important role in the outcome of those events. But as a result of the Munich crisis the "magic ingredient", which seemed to have been previously lacking in the British civil defense effort, was added; there was a change in national and public sentiments and a change in motivation. Within a year a civil defense organization with trained volunteers was a going concern, an organization which commanded the respect of all those who either observed or studied it in its performance during World War II. Years of hard effort yielded desired results.

AMERICA'S LEGACY FROM THE TWO WORLD WARS

Although some air attacks had already been launched against London by the time the United States entered World War I, direct attack upon American civilian targets was literally impossible; civil defense as such was therefore not relevant to the American scene. However, with the American declaration of war, a wave of what could only be described as hysterical anti-German fear swept the country. One aspect of this wave was the fear of internal subversion by German agents and sympathizers, a fear reinforced by several accidents in munition factories and a "mysterious" explosion in New Jersey (the notorious Black Tom explosion in which several hundred people were killed). All the incidents that could be attributed to sabotage were displayed prominently by the public press and were so identified in the minds of the people. A sinister, widespread, and very clever conspiracy was imagined and saboteurs were believed to lurk in every nook and cranny of our large country. With this background, volunteers flocked to the organizations set up to protect both the homeland and the civilians.

When it was realized that the United States might not be able to avoid getting involved in World War I, a "Council of National Defense" was established (August 29, 1916) by an act of Congress. The Council

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comprised the Secretary of War, (chairman) and the Secretaries of the Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The Council was charged with coordinating industries and resources for national security. With America's entry into World War I, on April 6, 1917, the National Council created a State Councils Section, and three days later (April 9, 1917) it requested the Governors to set up State Councils of Defense, which in turn were to set up local Councils of Defense. Furthermore, on April 21, 1917, the National Council appointed an eleven-member women's committee to organize and coordinate the war activities of the nation's women. The nation's response to these calls was immediate and enthusiastic. Within a few months, State Councils were established in all the states, and local councils proliferated. By the end of hostilities, about a year and a half later, there were about 182,000 functioning local units throughout the country. In addition, there was the parallel organization set up by the women's committee which eventually encompassed about 80 percent of the counties in the country. All this was accomplished by volunteers with minimal expenditure and with no recourse to compulsion either at the Federal, State, or local levels.

Although originally the main emphasis of these organizations was on patriotic duties such as anti-saboteur vigilance, selling Liberty Bonds, making patriotic speeches, and writing letters to "the boys," with time other activities began to assume importance. The organization became aware of local needs stemming from dislocations caused by the war and took organized steps to counter them. Boards were established to combat rent gouging. Legal aid to drafted men and their families was supplied where needed. Their activities branched into the areas of public health, welfare, economic stability, and the conservation and production of critical material. In short, they began to turn into a cohesive community organization with broader aspects and implications. But the armistice soon put an end to this and the organizations were disbanded.

It would be too much to expect that so extensive an effort, set up so rapidly, with no formal coercive powers, and with no prior
experience, would not encounter organizational difficulties. And they were encountered. Unfortunately, here there is a gap in history. McElroy writes:

Yet, with all this machinery, the Council of National Defense had made so little impression upon America's vast population that few of those who survive today can recall anything about it; and many fail to recall the fact that it existed. ... We have lately made an effort to repair that omission, however. As early as May 23, 1940, a serious attempt to discover the organization and activities of these State Councils of Defense as of June 1917 (sic). ... But the plans for these State Councils were so varies (sic) and the records they left so inadequate, that it was hard to draw any conclusions from them as examples. (McElroy, pp. III-3, III-4.)

What was recoverable was quite skimpy and no broad picture can be reconstructed, no generalizations can be made.2 The organization of this vast effort took its final form on October 1, 1918, when the separate State Councils Section and the Women's Committee merged into one Field Division and a clear organizational structure was formulated. However, the Armistice was declared six weeks later and the proposed reorganization was never implemented; what remained was an untried paper organization.

In its broad outlines this reorganization set an important precedent: it was to be followed by the civil defense efforts both during and after World War II. Henceforth, when people thought of civil defense they immediately and uncritically thought about a three-level chain of command starting at the Federal level, through the States, down to the local levels.3

2. The results of this research are found in a publication of the Office of Civilian Defense: Defense Council System in World War I, OCD publication 4011, January, 1944.

3. It may be argued that under our federal system no other kind of civil defense organization can function. This may be true, but the point is that the issue was neither thought about nor demonstrated. As will be seen, when the nation realized that it was on the verge of entering World War II, it just took many of the forms developed during World War I to facilitate its preparedness program, changing them and improvising as needs developed.
The World War I experience left two other heritages which had an effect on planning in World War II. Patriotism, morale-building, and other social activities were accepted as the "natural" responsibilities of a civilian organization established to protect and strengthen the "home front" during a war—a heritage which caused many difficulties for the World War II Office of Civilian Defense and in turn, had a critical effect on some key thinking underlying Public Law 920, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. In addition, it laid the basis for the national "faith" in volunteers. Henceforth, any civil defense organization was uncritically understood to be almost entirely a volunteer organization (including the administrative structure).

As in Great Britain, there was no public thought given to civil defense between the wars; but unlike Britain, neither was any significant thought given to it by the professional military planners. However, it should be remembered that whereas after World War I, it was conceivable (but improbable) that France could bomb Britain, it was not conceivable that any enemy could bomb the continental United States; there was, therefore, no point in planning for such a contingency.4

The outbreak of World War II forced the United States to reevaluate the chances of another involvement in war. They looked to be high. On May 29, 1940 President Roosevelt reestablished the Council of National Defense based on the still-existing 1916 law. In addition, he appointed a National Defense Advisory Commission consisting of seven members with himself as chairman; the responsibility of the commission was to survey, coordinate, and advise in the interests of national cooperation.5

4. The American situation with respect to civil defense after World War II was, roughly speaking, similar to the British position at the end of World War I and, despite later divergences, our initial reaction to the problems of civil defense was also roughly similar to the British.

5. The members of this commission were Americans prominent in various fields of endeavor: William S. Knudsen, Edward R. Stettinius, Sidney Hillman, Chester C. Davis, Ralph Budd, Leon Henderson, and Harriet Elliot.
Some of the states simultaneously exhibited initiative in setting up Defense Councils modeled after those of World War I which were more directly civil defense oriented, as the term is currently understood, than was the Federal effort. (The destruction of Warsaw and Rotterdam from the air was an important spur to this effort.) New York was one of the first to take independent action. By the summer of 1940, Governor Lehman strengthened the State National Guard and called a conference of all the mayors from cities with populations over 30,000. On July 2 of that year he designated his Lieutenant Governor as the State Defense Coordinator and on August 1 he established the New York State Council of Defense comprising leading representatives of labor and industry. The State Council was rapidly given statutory recognition and authority by the State legislature. Local councils were also established in the cities and counties. In addition to worrying about protective services, that is, protecting civilians against an air attack and caring for them after the attack, these manifold layers of councils also assumed responsibility for aiding in civilian production, labor and housing, in maintaining morale, in enlisting volunteers for various worthy causes: "drives" of all sorts, and other worthwhile public activity designed to heighten public morale and help the rearmament effort.

Michigan was another state to establish a council structure before Federal initiative in the area. Although organized slightly differently than in New York State, its responsibilities were somewhat similar with programs in "production, land use, 'consumer protection', recreation, a 'school morale program', and ... civil defense. This latter function defined broadly as including steps to counter 'sabotage, rebellion, air attack, or invasion.'"6 The structure of the council organization later to be set up in most of the other states was quite similar to the one in Michigan.

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With the rearmament effort growing rapidly, the National Defense Advisory Committee (NDAC) was soon flooded with various problems concerning the states such as the location of new military camps, the establishment of defense industries, government contracts, and the relocation of labor with the accompanying social problems which this entailed. The Committee did not wish to be encumbered with such problems; it interpreted its role as being concerned with broad policy rather than details. A decision was therefore taken to establish a Division of State and Local Cooperation within the NDAC to cope with them. This Division served as the organizational nucleus for what was to become the Office of Civilian Defense during World War II.

The Division of Cooperation was formally announced on July 31, 1940 with the appointment of Mr. Frank Bane, the Executive Director of the Council of State Governors, as its Director. As its main functions, it would

1) Serve as the channel of communications between the Council of National Defense and Advisory Commission and the State Councils, 2) keep the State and Local Councils currently informed regarding the National defense program as it develops ..., 3) receive from the defense councils in the States reports upon problems of coordination requiring Federal attention ..., 4) clear information between defense councils in different States regarding matters of organization, administration, and activity. (McElroy, p. IV-1.)

It is evident that the original concept behind the Division was to facilitate the newly initiated rearmament program and not much more. It originally saw itself as primarily facilitating production by coordinating and keeping the channels of communication open.

Within two days, on August 2, 1940 President Roosevelt sent a memorandum to the State Governors advising them to reestablish State and local councils of the World War I type if they considered such action warranted. The memorandum contained this significant paragraph:

It is contemplated that State and local defense councils ... will confine their attention purely to defense programs and will not extend their interest to normal
programs to public, quasi-public, or private agencies unless they impinge directly upon matters of defense. (McElroy, p. IV-2.)

This is another example of the tacit understanding that the entire organization should primarily facilitate the production needs of the rearmament effort.\(^7\)

As the rearmament effort progressed, other problems began to force their attention upon the division, most of them stemming from the relocation of labor. For example, by the end of September of that year, it was discovered that 129,000 new housing units were needed in 216 communities. Closely associated with this need were parallel needs such as sewage, public safety, school, transportation, and public health. Private industry and local governments found it increasingly difficult to cope with these swelling needs. But the records show that the states were primarily interested in using the Division of Cooperation to obtain government contracts or other amenities stemming from the accelerated rearmament effort, and were slow in reacting to the social welfare problems stemming from that effort. The Division Director, Frank Bane, was restricted to asking the states to cooperate with his division; he had no coercive power nor did he seek any. In addition, he refused to consider the alternative of bypassing the state and local governments to cope directly with such problems as they arose. Hence, the Division was soon reduced to exhortation and propaganda, in an effort to get the majority of states to cooperate in a broader endeavor then merely that of obtaining contracts. However, the states alone should not be blamed for this development. In meetings between the Division and state representatives during the Fall and Winter of 1940 and 1941, many states said they would be willing to go along with the Division program were they to be given some firm guidelines as to what should be done and how it was to be done.

\(^7\) The response to this call was surprising. According to the Civilian Defense Manual on Legal Aspects of Civilian Protection, Office of Civilian Defense publication No. 2701, nearly 6000 local defense councils were established by November 1940.
But, having been set up hastily with a staff and director relatively inexperienced in this field, the Division could not formulate useful detailed guidelines and had to restrict itself to generalizations.

The August 2, 1940 call by President Roosevelt told the states to model the defense councils after World War I experience without going into any details. But this ignored two problems: First, not much was recalled of that experience, as already noted; and second, the "coherent" integrated World War I organization was never implemented. Thus, whatever could be learned from experience varied greatly among the states. Problems of uniformity of state organizations and of a chain of command emerged early. By December 1940 a model draft for State Councils in the form of a statute was distributed to the Governors for their consideration. A chain of command from the Federal authorities through the states to the local governments and authorities was also suggested.

By this time, the war in Europe had been going on for over a year. Rotterdam and Warsaw had already been battered by air attack and Great Britain was being subjected to the first of many fire raids. The Division of State and Local Cooperation had, however, been primarily active in "civilian mobilization" to help the rearmament effort and in community action to ameliorate difficulties stemming from rearmament. But the pressure was growing to establish protective services, that is, to take preparatory steps to actively protect civilians from an air attack and its aftermath. An Advisory Committee on Fire Defense was established during November 1940. After studying the effects of the fire raids on London it instituted a program to train local community firemen to combat the new menace. A bulletin on protective construction was issued and other bulletins on air raid precautions, medical problems, warning, blackouts, etc., were planned. But the main emphasis of the Division remained civilian mobilization and the rigid adherence to channels for dealings with the States. This sparked a "rebellion."
On January 31, 1941 the executive director of the United States Conference of Mayors sent the President a report highly critical of the Division activities, demanding much greater speed in providing protective services and greater interest on the part of the Federal Government in local problems. The Conference of Mayors also suggested a reorganization of the Federal civil defense effort to consist of a Federal Civil Defense Board with Federal regional offices and local civil defense boards. The President took this critique seriously and had a long conference with Frank Bane about it.

The work on civilian mobilization went on. On February 24, 1941, President Roosevelt asked Congress for $150 million for ameliorating the problems brought about by the rearmament program; it was made clear that only expenses beyond those normally incurred by the various communities would be reimbursed. When this request became known, the Division was flooded by requests for financial aid from States and local governments which, had they been honored, would have amounted to an astronomical figure. It is fair to say that the great majority of these requests were not thought through carefully and could easily be interpreted as an attempted raid on the Federal treasury on the part of the state and local authorities. But the days of the Division were numbered and action was not taken by Congress.

By March it became clear that a change was to take place and that the responsibilities of the Division would be transferred to an autonomous organization. The Division's planning and organization activities almost stopped as everyone waited to see what would happen. Perhaps the main reason for the impending reorganization was the growing conviction that something more than an Advisory Committee to

8. McElroy is not clear in his account of this plan but he seems to imply that the mayors sought to by-pass the states. It should be noted that Mr. Bane was the Executive Director of the Council of State Governors and was originally "borrowed" from that organization for 90 days to set up the Division. This may explain his "bias" to the states.
the Council of National Defense was needed for the job; the Mayors' critique and recommendation did carry weight with the President. In addition, although nothing in the records available to the writer clearly indicates this, it seems that the director of the Division, Mr. Frank Bane, being a "Governor's man," evoked hostility on the part of the mayors. It thus seems not pure chance that the first director of the forthcoming Office of Civilian Defense was a mayor, Mr. Fiorello LaGuardia.

Nevertheless, in its last months of existence, the Division did successfully negotiate with the US Army Air Corps and set up the volunteer civilian aircraft observer corps which was to function without much change for the rest of the war. It also sent out an important policy circular to the States decrying racial and religious discrimination in the newly emerging war industries as impeding war production. One activity which never abated was the distribution of literature. Although McElroy makes it clear that in his opinion Bane was far more sinned against than sinner, he nevertheless writes: "Despite impending change, the Division of State and Local Cooperation continued to flood the States with literature and reports so voluminous that frequent complaints were heard from officials whose duty it was to study them." (p. IV-21.) The Division's final contribution was a detailed plan of aid to communities based upon the community requests mentioned earlier and upon the Division's engineering surveys. It was forwarded to William S. Knudsen, the Director of the Office of Production Management.

Mayor LaGuardia was clearly a "city man". He had earlier, as mayor of New York, sent a mission to London to observe the blitz. In announcing the report of the mission he came out very strongly for the need for protective services, the burden of which was to be borne primarily by the cities rather than by the states. This clearly reflected the opinions of the mayors' report mentioned earlier. In his negotiations with the President, prior to his appointment, he insisted that the proposed civil defense organization be set up as a cabinet department with clear and strong authority with "the power
to draft men, to coordinate all public health agencies, and to subsidize cities in order to protect them from attack." (McElroy, p. V-1.) The President demurred, however, since that demanded an act of Congress which would take time, and was not certain to pass. Nevertheless, after a period of negotiations, the President and LaGuardia reached an agreement. On May 20, 1941, the formation of the Office of Civilian Defense was announced in Executive Order 8757 with LaGuardia as its volunteer director while still retaining his post as mayor of New York City.

The highlights of this order were:

(1) The Office of Civilian Defense would be within the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office under the direction and supervision of the President.

(2) The duties and responsibilities of the Director of the Office of Civilian Defense were:

(a) to serve as the center for the coordination of Federal activities which involve relationships between the Federal, State, and local governments;

(b) to keep informed of community problems arising from the defense effort and take steps to secure the cooperation of appropriate Federal departments in meeting the emergency need of the communities;

(c) to assist the State and local governments in establishing the defense councils and other agencies designed to coordinate civil defense activities;

(d) to study and plan measures designed to afford adequate protection of life and property in the event of an emergency, and sponsor and carry out such civil defense programs;

(e) to promote activities designed to sustain the national morale and to provide opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the defense program;

(f) to maintain a clearing house of information on state and local defense activities;

(g) to review existing or proposed measures relating to civil defense activities and recommend additional measures that may be desirable or necessary; and
(h) to perform such other duties relating to participation in the defense program by state and local governments and agencies as the President may prescribe.

(3) With the President's approval, the Director would organize and manage the Office of Civilian Defense.

(4) A Civilian Protection Board was to be established to advise and assist in the formulation of program to meet the various civil defense needs of the nation.

(5) A Volunteer Participation Committee would be established as an advisory and planning body to consider proposals and develop programs that would sustain national morale and provide opportunities for constructive civilian participation in the national effort.

(6) With the approval of the President, the Director could appoint additional committees as he found necessary or desirable.

(7) The Director was authorized to employ personnel within the limits of the funds either allotted or appropriated to the Office.

These responsibilities included those of the superseded Division of State and Local Cooperation, soon to be known as War Services, but it brings to prominence responsibility for defense against air attack proper, the Protective Services. This basic division within the Office remained for its duration. The administrative staff of the old division was transferred to the new office, a transfer which almost guaranteed a built-in conflict with the new Director.

True to his words, LaGuardia directed almost all his effort to setting up effective protection services. He openly dismissed the importance of the war services, calling it "sissy stuff." This, of course, could not go over well with his inherited staff and with the existing activities in the State Councils who were by now committed to it. In addition, he practiced what he preached with respect to the state defense councils--he bypassed them, tending to communicate personally with the local defense councils. LaGuardia's general idea seemed to be the mobilization and organization of the entire populace into a disciplined and trained force with an "officer" staff of Federal directors at all levels, and with himself as sort of Commander-in-Chief of the total effort. It is true that he did not
intend to impose Federal directors from outside the states and communities, but rather to "federalize" the heads of the existing state and local councils. The American tradition of state and local autonomy, however, seemed to play little if any role in his thinking. Needless to say, neither his inherited staff nor the existing defense councils, especially at the state level, viewed this with equanimity. Fears concerning LaGuardia's intentions were expressed even before his official assumption of duties, fears which soon turned into a mounting chorus of protest and indignation.

The initial impact of LaGuardia's activities on the existing organizational structure, at the Federal, State, and local levels was to introduce great confusion. No one person, especially not one who could devote only part of his time to the effort, could replace the organization; hence, the organization continued to function as it had earlier under Frank Bane. LaGuardia, as already noted, belittled this aspect of his responsibilities and did not interfere with it directly. However, many of his activities, especially in his public appearances and contacts with the mayors, went directly counter to the organizational activities and the various agreements and understandings that had been reached. He did manage to get quite a lot of newspaper publicity and actually generated a wave of volunteers who wished to help, but the Office of Civilian Defense was not ready to use them. In reviewing this period a senior US Army Officer, active in the protection services, wrote that its most common fault was "the general indiscriminate registration of interested persons, without any plans for follow-up training or assignment for them." (McElroy, V-35.) This is mentioned here because it was repeated some ten years later with more lasting effects.

Nevertheless, LaGuardia has much to his credit. He established the regional structure of the national civil defense organization, a structure still with us, and he did lay the foundation for a relatively impressive protective service organization that functioned during the war. Perhaps, his most important contribution towards the success of the "Protection Branch" of the Office of Civilian Defense.
were the agreements reached with the American military. Both the top and basic administrative personnel for this branch consisted of active officers of the armed forces; the protection of civilians was in the charge of a General and the protection of industrial plants and production facilities in the charge of an Admiral. At a lower level, eighty field officers were assigned to the Washington and regional offices where they worked quietly and effectively. Considering the fact that the Protection Services were set up on a crash basis as part of an organization that produced great public and political turmoil and was ridden with serious inner administrative squabbles, this cadre of professional administrators achieved notable success. They had little difficulty in establishing working cooperation with both the continental commands of the US Army and the local and State organizations responsible for the public safety.

At their peak of activity, the Protective Services contained, in addition to the relatively small staff of employed professional administrators, approximately ten million volunteers organized in a Citizen's Defense Corps of which over 8,570,000 had some definite duty. At its peak development, under James Landis, the Corps provided the following specific services:

1. A communication system for the entire corps. It consisted of priority of telephone lines from the War Department Aircraft Warning service to control centers maintained by the local defense councils who then forwarded the incoming messages to local radio stations and the block air raid wardens. The telephone network was backed up by an amateur radio operator network and a messenger service. Towards the end of the war the information from the War Department began being routed through "War Rooms" that were established at the regional and State levels in order to effect greater coordination, but these procedures were never developed beyond a rudimentary stage.

9. It is interesting to note that although, following the British model, the air raid warden assumed central responsibility for immediate implementation of civilian defense measures in the event of an air attack, there was no warden service as such, as was the case in the effort in the 1950's.
(2) Facilities for training volunteers in emergency fire fighting. Since 80 to 90 percent of the damage in Great Britain was due to fire, first priority was given to this activity. In addition, the Federal authorities supplied existing local fire fighting organizations with additional needed equipment to be used in case of an emergency.

(3) Instruction in the building of shelters and identifying or modifying existing structures so that they could be used as shelters. Although there was no Federal shelter construction plan as such, the Office of Civilian Defense did issue instructions on how to construct shelters and identify or modify existing structures. The primary responsibility of the Citizen Defense Corps under this heading was the actual rescue service. Members of this service were trained in first aid, tunneling, shoring, and other techniques necessary for recovering people or bodies from debris.

(4) Training in decontamination and the use of gas masks. Both the British and the Americans greatly feared the use of gas against civilians. Teams were trained in decontamination and gas masks were made available to workers in critical industries and services. The defense against gas, however, never did play as important a role in the American effort as it played in the British effort.

(5) Camouflage of vital facilities. This became the responsibility, under the Army guidance, of trained volunteers of the Corps.

(6) Restoration of essential services. In cooperation with existing authorities, the Citizen's Defense corps had personnel trained in restoring such essential services as transportation, traffic control, communications, public safety, and police functions. In addition, there were road repair crews, utility repair units, and demolition and clearing units.

(7) Evacuation and the care of evacuees. This was looked at as the primary responsibility of the Federal government, upon the decision of the US Army. The state and local authorities were warned not to take any action much beyond planning, in connection with evacuation. The exigencies of World War II never forced a serious consideration of this problem.

One final and very important point remains concerning the protective program. As early as September 18, 1939, Director LaGuardia signed an agreement with the War Department in which it assumed all responsibility for research, development, and standardization of equipment necessary for the defense of civilians and other related
activities such as blackout requirements and camouflage. The military also undertook the primary responsibility in setting up and carrying on the extended training program. Hence, throughout its existence, the civilian authorities of the World War II Office of Civilian Defense could, as far as the War Services were concerned, rely on a hard core of competent disinterested professionals, the military officers and organizations involved, to administer, to carry out research, development, and implementation, and to pursue the training effort necessary for these services. It is not surprising that almost all critical accounts of the Protective Services effort are quite favorable, although all question whether they were organized effectively to cope with the heavy saturation bombing that developed at the end of the war.10

The situation with the War Services was radically different. Although the Office of Civilian Defense has yet to be subjected to a dispassionate historical study, tradition has it that it was continuously beset by both inner and outer conflict and, as a result, was quite ineffective. By and large, tradition, albeit exaggerated, seems to be correct in this instance.

There are several reasons for the difficulties encountered by the War Services, and a very important one goes back to the days of the New Deal. The New Deal was accompanied by an enthusiasm and zeal for reform, particularly in matters of social welfare and organization, which cut across many established mores of the American communities. It was rather commonplace in the 1930's to conclude that the traditional forms of the American society had not been able to keep up with the rapidly changing world and the industrial revolution, and that new forms had to be established. By and large, the change advocated

10. This is not too damaging a criticism of the effort. When originally designed, saturation bombing was not anticipated. By the time saturation bombing was perfected it was quite obvious that the United States could not be subjected to such an attack, hence there was no need to change the organization. Were the probability of such an attack to rise, the American organization could most probably have been effectively streamlined just as the British organization was.
was in the direction of a stronger executive leadership that would direct more and more aspects of local social life and assume a strong and presumably permanent role in the guidance of local community welfare, organizations, and activities. As is well known, this tendency in the Roosevelt administration evoked the resistance of many elements, commonly called conservative, in the local and State governments as well as in Congress. It is obvious that many of the staff of the original Division of State and Local Cooperation, recruited as they were from the executive branch of the government, were to a varying extent sympathetic to this tendency.

The "official" historian of the Office of Civilian Defense, Robert McElroy, whose unpublished history of the Office served as a basic reference for this section, is probably an extreme representative of this group. He makes it quite clear that he always considered the Office as more than a temporary war agency but saw its main role, after the war, as a continuing central body for organizing and educating local communities, beginning in the United States and then being applied as a model among the community of nations. How this was to be done is never made explicit, but the faith and enthusiasm were strong. McElroy also makes it clear that his aspirations were shared by many within the organization. It is not surprising, therefore, that those opposing the more ambitious reforms and ideals of the Roosevelt administration took the first opportunity to attack it via the Office of Civilian Defense. That opportunity arose very early in the history of the Office.

11. McElroy definitely conveys the impression that his viewpoint was shared by many both within the organization and the Executive Offices. But he is so emotionally involved in the issue that it becomes difficult to view him as an unbiased witness. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that perhaps the main reason this history was never published is that, among other things, it is a case of special pleading for the continuing of the Office of Civil Defense as a permanent agency of the United States Government once the was is terminated.
As already noted, LaGuardia disregarded the War Services and, bypassing the Division of State and Local Cooperation, concentrated almost exclusively upon setting up the Protective Services. In addition to demoralizing the organization he inherited which was almost exclusively concerned with the War Services, LaGuardia also incurred criticism from the Executive Branch proper. Both the Bureau of the Budget and Eleanor Roosevelt pressured him to attend to the entire mandate of the Presidential order. To make a rather long story short, the pressures mounted until LaGuardia invited Mrs. Roosevelt to join the Office as an Assistant Director to take charge of the War Services (then called Division of Volunteer Participation). Her appointment was announced on September 22, 1941, and what followed cannot be called anything less than a turbulent five months.

Mrs. Roosevelt, already quite a controversial figure who had served as a prominent newspaper scapegoat for many of the criticisms levelled at the New Deal, undertook her new responsibilities with what observers and commentators of that scene called "her characteristic energy and zeal." Unfortunately, she was handicapped by a lack of experience in running a complex organization and had inherited a rather demoralized staff which she promptly proceed to enlarge at the higher levels by recruiting many well-meaning volunteers. Things were bound to go wrong, and they did. There is no need to go into details; suffice it to say that several of the many programs undertaken by the Division lent themselves easily to an attack, rife with political overtones, both in the Congress and in the press. The memory of the ensuing furor lingered on to the 1950 civil defense legislation.

With America's entry into the War after the attack on Pearl Harbor, matters were bound to come to a head. Perhaps the fundamental reason for this was that once the country was at war, the mobilization, organization, and defense of its civilian population could not be directed by volunteers anymore, and especially not by a part-time volunteer. This fundamental inadequacy was, of course, aggravated by the public and governmental clamor raised by the activities of the Director
and his assistant. It became evident that a full-time salaried
director, "untainted" by the ongoing controversies, was needed.

The man picked to replace LaGuardia and Mrs. Roosevelt was
James M. Landis, the Dean of the Harvard University Law School. He
had already arisen to become the civil defense director of the New
England region under the old office and was therefore integrated with
the organization which had been so slighted by LaGuardia. This
seemed to guarantee that the new director would represent and respect
the War Services responsibilities. His transition to the post was
gradual. On January 9, 1942, Mr. LaGuardia announced that Mr. Landis
had been appointed as the Executive Officer of the Office of Civilian
Defense and would take over the responsibility of the Office admini-
stration in order to enable the Director "to devote more time to
perfecting the organization throughout the country." (From LaGuardia's
press announcement as quoted by McElroy, p. VII-5.) Mr. Landis took
over effective administrative responsibilities from that day onward.
On February 10 of that year, Mr. LaGuardia resigned and Mr. Landis
assumed functional directorship, although he was not formally appointed
until April 15, more than two months later. Mrs. Roosevelt resigned
ten days after Mr. LaGuardia.

Landis's task was to "normalize" the entire effort. He was con-
fronted, as already indicated, with a demoralized organization fraught
with internal conflicts and misunderstandings. This, in turn, had
led an irate Congress to refuse to finance the War Services activities
and had led the public, to the extent that it thought about these
matters at all, to consider much of the effort a joke. What was needed
was a smoothly functioning organization, a program which could be
implemented and demonstrated to others, the elimination of programs
and aspects of programs which had become the butt of ridicule, and
above all, no controversy. By and large, this was accomplished, even
though close inspection will show that it proceeded neither smoothly
nor in all circumstances successfully. Emphasis was first placed on
organizing the Protective Services, then on the security of industrial,
commercial and public utility facilities, etc., and finally, as allied
successes made an attack on the continental United States less and less probable, it shifted to the War Services. By August 1943, Landis had reached the conclusion that the local organizations of both the Protective and War Services were functioning adequately enough, that the developmental stages had ended, and that a special Federal Office for Civilian Defense was no longer needed; he construed the responsibility of the Federal office to be the establishment of State and local organizations. When declaring his intention to resign he suggested that the responsibility for continuing guidance of the Protective Services be transferred to the War Department, and of the War Services to the Federal Security Agency. The War Department opposed this shift and the Bureau of the Budget concurred in the opposition; Landis's resignation was accepted, but the Office continued to function for nearly two more years more as a caretaker than anything else. It was abolished by President Truman on June 30, 1945.

In their cooperation with and aid to the World War II Office of Civilian Defense, the American military exhibited an interesting ambivalence which should be noted. On the one hand, were it not for the assistance of the military, the Office would have probably not succeeded in establishing the reasonably effective Protective Service organization. As already noted, the administrative backbone of the Protective Service Branch within the Office of Civilian Defense consisted of general and field officers on active duty; the military assumed the responsibility for research and development of techniques and equipment for civilian and plant protection as well as the procurement of the necessary equipment, and they also assumed the basic responsibility for the training and indoctrination effort required. On the other hand, however, various students of the World War II efforts have criticized the military for not having the interests of civil defense (particularly the defense of civilians) at heart.

Landis's recommendations that the Office of Civilian Defense be abolished and that the War Department assume responsibility for the Protective Services were not implemented primarily because of the
strong opposition of the War Department. La Guardia made an identical suggestion upon his resignation which was also opposed just as strenuously by the Department.

A second reason, which on its face carries more weight, was that the existing civil defense organization was harmed by several unilateral actions taken towards the end of the war by the military authorities without prior coordination with the civilian defense authorities. These were the abolition of the volunteer observers corps and the closing down of the military civil defense training courses at the Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. These actions stunned the organization, at both the Federal, State, and local levels at a critical time when there were serious doubts as to the need and purpose of the effort. They aggravated the crisis by (1) indicating that the military did not consider the civilian-defense people important enough to consult about these serious steps regarding the civilian defense, and (2) indicating, by their actions, that civil defense is not necessary.

It is important to note this ambivalence since it was and is still used to justify the argument that the professional military are traditionally opposed to civil defense, and that they cooperate with civil defense authorities pro forma because ordered to do so by the President. It then goes on to blame intransigence by the military for the acknowledged failures of the civil-defense effort after World War II. The argument will be considered when it becomes relevant within the historical context. For the present, it will suffice to say that "good," "objective" reasons can easily be adduced for the War Department's refusal to assume direct responsibility for the civil defense organization, though they may not have been well taken in view of the broader picture. Similarly the actual slighting of the Office of Civilian Defense during the last year of the war by unilateral decisions can also be seen as a consequence of unique contingencies at the time and need not be interpreted as a basic military opposition to civilian defense. It is probably true, however, that the military were, at best, neutral to the War Services activity of the Office of Civilian Defense and were not convinced of its utility.
The heritage of American civil defense experience during the two World Wars, a heritage which was, willy nilly, to affect the post-World War II civil defense planning and thinking, can therefore be summarized as follows. With World War I the basic framework for a national civil defense organization emerged based on a chain of command of Federal, State, and local Governments. This was expanded during World War II to include the intermediate level of Federal regions. This organizational framework grew like Topsy and has been with the country so long as to assume the status of the "natural" institution. Nevertheless, since the civil defense organization was never put to an actual test during either war, and never critically analyzed nor questioned, it is not necessarily an effective form of organization.

In a certain sense, the organization was tested during the LaGuardia directorship. The relative chaos that emerged when LaGuardia attempted to deal directly with the city governments can be regarded as the result of a "test." But all this demonstrates is the truism that any organization will become confused and its activity will suffer when its titular head disregards it and acts unilaterally; in no way does it demonstrate the objective in effectiveness of the organization as such.

The confusion following LaGuardia's stewardship was the great negative lesson of World War II. All subsequent discussions about civil defense organization stress the necessity of a firm chain of command, a stress which was incorporated in the body of Public Law 920, the Federal Civil Defense Act. Another negative lesson stems from World War I. This was the fusion of the morale and patriotic responsibilities of a civil defense organization with the social reform and community organization ideas of the New Deal period. The strong impression left by this combination upon Congress was enough to guarantee that Public Law 920 would be written to exclude specifically any possibility of a revival of War Services in any guise. Again the wheat was not separated from the chaff: No attempt was ever made to analyze whether and to what extent the War Services are necessary.
for a viable civil defense effort or, what is more probable, the extent to which a civil defense organization can economically and effectively assume the responsibilities of War Services without detriment and even with benefit to its primary responsibility of defending life and property in case of an enemy attack.

Finally, there was the negative lesson of finances, from the days of the Division of State and Local Cooperation: to the extent that the Federal government is willing to pay most or all of the bill, state and local authorities may ask for pie in the sky to be paid for from Federal coffers. This lesson was reflected in Public Law 920.12

Superimposed upon all this, and remaining relatively unchanged until the present, was the organization of the Protective Services, which were modelled largely upon the British civil defense organization.

12. Needless to say, this lesson was also learned from other circumstances in other contexts.
Most histories of American civil defense, by and large of limited distribution, assert that with the end of World War II national interest in civil defense disappears, only to reemerge about three years later, in February 1948, with the publication of the Bull report. This is not strictly true. Although for the public civil defense submerged when the Office of Civilian Defense was abolished on June 30, 1945, it was very much alive within the national military establishment during this period. The Bull report was not the beginning step in a renewed interest in civil defense but, in many ways, the conclusion of much serious consideration of the subject.

On November 3, 1944, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established, pursuant to a directive from President Roosevelt. Its mission was to study the effects of the air war over Germany for two purposes: to help plan the impending expansion of the air war against Japan, and to help assess and evaluate air power as a military instrument in the interest of future planning for national defense. On August 15, 1945, President Truman requested the Survey to similarly study the effects of the air war over Japan, and in particular, the effects of the two nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The survey staff consisted of 300 civilians, mostly professionals and scientists, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The study was very thorough and covered, among other topics, many aspects of civil defense, including organization, effectiveness, and problems of the German and Japanese civil defense efforts.
The Survey issued many reports during 1945-1946, as well as two summary reports. The information gathered by the Survey and presented in detail in its reports served as the raw material for much of the deliberations and planning among the military during the next few years. What is of significance in the present context is that the Survey was the first to study the effects of nuclear bombardment and, as a consequence, to proclaim in no uncertain terms first that an effective civil defense against nuclear weapons (Hiroshima and Nagasaki vintage) is possible, and second that it is mandatory for the United States to continue planning and preparing for civil defense, now that the war was terminated, as it "naturally" was expected to continue planning and preparations for active military defense.

In June of 1946 the Survey issued a special report on nuclear bombardment entitled: The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The report is one of the earliest descriptions of the atomic bomb with a brief account of how it works, its main effects (heat, radiation, and blast), and how it compares to conventional weapons. It details the effects of the atomic explosion on property and people as well as its psychological effect upon the population, and its contribution to the Japanese surrender. Its final section is entitled: "Signposts," and begins:

The danger is real—of that, the Survey’s findings leave no doubt. Scattered through those findings, at the same time, are the clues to the measures that can be taken to cut down potential losses of lives and property. These measures must be taken or initiated now, if their cost is not to be prohibitive. ... If we recognize in advance the possible danger and act to forestall it, we shall, at worst suffer minimum casualties and disruption. ... The foregoing description of the atomic bomb has shown clearly that, despite its awesome power, it has limits of which wise planning will take prompt advantage. (Survey, Effects, p. 38, emphasis in original.)

The report suggests that immediate planning for action be initiated in four areas:

(1) shelters and construction,
(2) decentralization,
(3) civilian defense, and
(4) active defense.

Under the first heading not only is a national shelter program intended but the Survey also recommends that the construction of new buildings be modified to make them more blast- and fire-resistant. By decentralization is meant not only the dispersal of industry, but also the replanning and redesign of our existing cities to make them less vulnerable to an attack. The Survey's recommendations with respect to civilian defense are:

Because the scale of disaster would be certain to overwhelm the locality in which it occurs, mutual assistance organized on a national level is essential. Such national organization is by no means inconsistent with decentralization; indeed, it will be aided by the existence of the maximum number of nearly self-sustaining regions whose joint support it can coordinate. In addition, highly trained mobile units skilled in and equipped for fire fighting, rescue work, and clearance and repair should be trained for an emergency which disrupts local organization and exceeds its capability for control.

Most important, a national civilian defense organization can prepare now the plans for necessary steps in case of crisis. Two complementary programs which should be worked out in advance are those for evacuation of unnecessary inhabitants from threatened urban areas, and for rapid erection of adequate shelters for people who must remain. (Survey, Effects, p. 41.)

It is interesting to note that civilian defense--or the World War II version, civilian defense--is conceived in terms of life saving by actions taken before, during and immediately after an air attack upon civilians. Only the fire-fighting abilities can be construed as property saving, but it is very difficult to disentangle the life-saving aspects of fire-fighting from its property-saving aspects. Inherent in this passage is the concept of a
highly competent central civil defense organization, obviously at
the Federal level, guiding and coordinating local efforts and
buttressed by a cadre of professional emergency mobile services.
This is clearly modeled after the British effort, which, presumably
the authors of the report knew well. Much in this passage is still
viable in the contemporary scene.

Before this special report by the Survey appeared, in fact, in
August 1945 (eleven days before President Truman asked the Survey to
study the effects of the air war over Japan), the Office of the
Commanding General, Army Service Forces, sent a memorandum to the
Provost Marshal General instructing him to study plans for civilian
participation in defense against enemy action aimed at civilians.
The memorandum was a result of a decision taken earlier, on July 16,
1945 by the Deputy Chief of Staff, which approved the recommendation
for such a study.

As guidelines for the staff making the study, it was suggested
that the evaluation of the following be considered:

(1) the World War II Office of Civilian Defense;
(2) the comparable agencies of allied and enemy countries;
(3) the current surveys of the United States Bombing Survey
Board; and
(4) the contributions of State Guards to civilian defense in
World War II.

The study was expected to recommend which agency was to be responsible
for future study and planning, and which for the implementation of
the plans.

The Provost Marshal General issued his report, classified
CONFIDENTIAL on April 30, 1946. It was entitled Study 3B-1, Defense
Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians. The highlights of the
contents and recommendations of this report are presented below.

Civil defense must be considered an integral and essential
element of overall national defense. It must also be considered
to have strategic importance because of its effects upon the
productive power of the population, the preservation of people as
sources of manpower, and the maintenance of morale. Civil defense concerns itself with the mobilization of the entire population for the preservation of civilian life and property from the results of enemy attacks, and with the rapid restoration of normal conditions in any area which has been attacked. In its fullest sense, however, civil defense includes more than the above, more than merely the protection of civilians and their property. It also includes the protection of industrial plants, water supplies, transportation and communication systems—in short, the whole economy of a nation at war. The study deals primarily with the methods by which the objectives of civil defense in the more limited sense can be realized. It explicitly makes no attempt to emphasize the procedures, techniques, and types of organization whose proven worth is general knowledge. Rather it seeks to identify preventable failures and to develop logical and acceptable means for their correction, as well as to recommend new fields of activity in keeping with modern weapons and future possibilities.

A generally unanimous opinion was found among both experts and laymen who had experienced air attacks: as long as war is a possibility, civil defense must be recognized as a primary component of overall defense and must be removed from its former inferior and haphazard role. This was most closely achieved in the British effort, an effort unreservedly admired by the study. The arguments that atomic attacks can destroy a people's will to fight, regardless of the existence of a civil defense organization, or that some attacks can be so severe as to render a civil defense organization ineffective, are denied. Hence, the development of civil defense plans, and the means for implementing these plans must be undertaken without delay. (These words are stressed in the original.)

The study is the first and perhaps the only comprehensive treatment of the complex network of important internal security responsibilities of the many Federal agencies active during World War II. Given this wide dispersal of responsibilities and the need for "coordination by agreement," internal security during World War II
was about as effective as could be expected, but the study questions the basis and intrinsic efficacy of such a wide dispersal. Instead, it argues for a centralized pre-planned and well-qualified security leadership with authority (the word is stressed in the original) to lead and direct. The responsibility for planning and leading the proposed national civil defense effort should be vested in the military.

Finally, the report rejects the argument that planning for passive defense can be construed as a war-like act.²

Eleven of the fourteen exhibits supplementing the report contain substantive information which serves as the evidence upon which the discussion, conclusions, and recommendations of the report are based (the other three are formal). The eleven substantive exhibits summarize the lessons of World War II with respect to civil defense, industrial and internal security, and so forth. Four of these exhibits consider the nature and effectiveness of the civil defense organizations of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. One exhibit discusses the civil defense implications of the two atom-bomb attacks upon Japan. One exhibit discusses the role and determinants of civilian morale during war. One exhibit concerns the performance of the State Guards during World War II. And four exhibits concentrate on internal security (mainly industrial) and problems of vital facilities and stockpiling of critical materials.

For the purposes of the present discussion, only material pertaining to civil defense in the limited sense, i.e., the saving of civilian lives and property, is of primary interest. The evaluation of foreign civil defense organizations has been repeated in the Bull report, whose general nature has been indicated above (see footnote 6, Section 1). It will be useful to cite in some detail the evaluation of the Office of Civilian Defense to be found in Exhibit No. 6 of the Provost Marshal's report.

The first criticism, already explicitly noted in the report proper, is that neither the Office nor its Director ever had any

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² Appendix A is a more detailed summary of the conclusions and recommendations of the Provost Marshal's report.
real authority; the words used to describe the duties and responsibilities of the Office and the Director are: "advise," "assist," "advisory," "planning," "provide opportunity," etc. As the effort grew in magnitude and complexity, this limited mandate proved to be a tremendous handicap to the Office and the Director. In particular, it hampered coordination and many local authorities—crucial for any effective civil defense—were often overwhelmed with and confused by conflicting instructions and information issued by other authorities (such as other government agencies and various military commands) as well as by the Office itself. The ensuing confusion, for which the local authorities cannot be blamed, often paralyzed action at their levels.

Another criticism, also explicitly noted in the report proper, was the poor planning. There were two main respects in which planning was faulty: First, the lack of an overall master plan to coordinate the more detailed and particular planning which was often quite good; and second, the lack of time to check out plans on a small scale before their being implemented, in order to guard against unforeseen contingencies and the omission of small details that often vitiate the best laid plan. An example of the latter can be seen in the fire-fighting program. Whereas careful study correctly foresaw the types and numbers of equipment needed for many of the cities, much of the delivered equipment was found to be useless upon delivery because of a lack of standardization among the various manufacturers and users. Coordinate with the lack of planning was the lack of trained personnel, both administrative and technical.

These two lacks can be directly attributed to the fact that the American World War II civil defense program was a crash emergency program; good planning and the development of an effective personnel structure both take time, and it is time which is most at a premium when embarking upon a crash program. In distributing kudos to those responsible for the British civil defense effort the Home Office is singled out in the report for special praise (somewhat erroneously as shown in Section 2) for having had the foresight of starting planning early enough in 1935.
Needless to say, the war services and general welfare responsibilities assigned to the Office of Civilian Defense came in for severe criticism. It was unambiguously asserted that even if they had been well organized and administered, which they certainly were not, they would not have belonged within the Office since they were so different in scope and specialization that they could only introduce confusion. As it was, because of the difficulties in organizing and administering them, confusion was compounded. The report expressly states that it considers the confusion engendered by the war services, in conjunction with the lack of authority by the executive order, as the two most important of the three causes responsible for most of the difficulties and failures of the Office of Civilian Defense during its period of operation.

The report takes pains to point out that the picture is not all black and that much of the program of the protective services branch of the Office of Civilian Defense was successful and commands respect; this has also been indicated several times above. It attributes the success primarily to two factors: the aid given to the protective services by the United States military (see p. 43 above) and the fact that these services were carefully modeled after the British organization. The report goes as far as to assert that: "it is worthy of note that three of the major weaknesses of the United States Office of Civilian Defense were on vital points in which the British procedure was not followed." (Stress in original.)

Because this critique is still relevant it will, at the risk of sounding redundant, be cited in full:

First of these was the long period of preparation. More than four years elapsed between the time in July 1935, when the Home Office announced the organization of its Air Raid Precautions Department until the time when the Air Raid Protection Service was called upon to function. That period of time permitted the Government to build slowly and soundly; to formulate plans and to modify them as further study indicated necessary; to try out various procedures and techniques, strengthening those which showed their worth and discarding those of slight value of effectiveness; to accumulate and
distribute essential supplies; finally, and in some ways most important of all, to lead the thinking of every man, woman and child in England, Scotland and Wales toward a calm but realistic recognition of the approaching danger so that when it came, they were mentally and emotionally conditioned to meet it.

The fact that this country was not called upon to face air raids and bomb attacks does not excuse the lack of preparation to meet the contingency. The attack on Pearl Harbor might just as well have been on New York, on Washington, on San Francisco, and it might equally as well have come any time within the preceding two years. Even if it had come six months later than it did and had been aimed at some objective within the continental United States, there is every reason to believe that the citizens of the country would have been equally unprepared to meet it. All of the bombing which European countries had undergone for two years before Pearl Harbor had still not aroused public thinking to the realization that it could happen here. To be sure, after the shock of 7 December 1941 had subsided, people literally flocked to local defense councils to enroll in the civilian defense units. But no one can say that one month or three months or even six months later, any city of any size in the country had a civilian defense organization and a civil population which was trained and equipped and disciplined to meet even a moderate air attack as were the people of Great Britain.

A second vital point was the leadership, both in thought and in action, which the British Government exercised, and the legal authority with which it clothed itself and subordinate units of government when the need for authority arose. The first British announcement that steps were to be taken to prepare against possible future air attacks stressed the fact that there were no signs that such an eventuality might come. It went even further. It restated with emphasis the intention of the Government to use every possible and reasonable effort to maintain peace, not only within its own borders but throughout the world. Nonetheless, the plans as announced showed that already considerable careful thought and study had been put into them before they were presented to the nation and they started people thinking. The period between 1935 and 1937 was mainly occupied in preparatory action, breaking down prejudice and apathy and enlisting the cooperation of local authorities. Meetings and conferences were held in various centers
throughout the country, attended by local authorities and other persons and groups who would be intimately concerned. All of this had two valuable results. First, such activity as was undertaken by groups and individuals was coordinated under Home Office guidance. (There was no well-intentioned but poorly directed individual work on the part of over-enthusiastic local groups, such as took place in the United States.) Second, public opinion was molded to the point that, when the Act of 1937 gave the Home Office authority to enforce its plans and to expand them further, the idea did not come as a shock and public reaction was cooperative and based on confidence.

A third outstanding feature of the British program was that it set for itself only one objective—the protection of its civilian population, their homes and their businesses from damage by air attack. Nowhere in any of the circulars, memoranda, handbooks, etc. of the Air Raid Precautions Department is any other subject discussed. No mention is made of anything which did not lead directly to that end. In consequence, no time or money or energy was wasted on unrelated activities. No doubt, provision was made for such activities as were needed, but they were under other and more suitable auspices, and the thinking and planning of the Air Raid Precautions Department, and of all of the personnel in subordinate units, was focused on its sole mission.

The recommendation in this report that the Plans and Operations Division of the War Department General staff set up an interim agency was followed in part. A first step in that direction was taken with the setting up of the War Department Civil Defense Board within the Department for further study and planning.

The War Department Civil Defense Board was established on November 25, 1946 in a memorandum signed by General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff. It was charged with formulating the War Department views and policies concerning:

(1) the allocation of responsibilities for civil defense to existing or new Government agencies;

(2) what responsibilities should be handled by the War Department and their allocation to new or existing staff agencies;

(3) the structural organization, from the national level down to the operating groups, and the authority which must be vested in it for the adequate discharge of its duties; and
(4) the actions which the War Department should undertake pending the foregoing determinations.

The Board was to submit its report to the Chief of Staff, through the Director, Plans and Operations Division, WDGS. Its tenure, unless otherwise directed, was to last until February 28, 1947. It was chaired by Major General Bull who was Eisenhower's Chief of Operations during the war. Its other members were five major generals, one each representing the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, the Plans and Operations Division, the National Guard Bureau, and the Executive for the Reserve and ROTC Affairs, and one brigadier general—the Provost Marshal General. In addition, there were six field officers in advisory capacity one representing each of the following: Intelligence, Personnel and Administration, Organization and Training, Service, Supply, and Procurement, Plans and Operations, and Research and Development.

Fifty-nine witnesses appeared before the committee including Bane, LaGuardia, and Landis, as well as the Army wartime commanders of the defense regions in the country, the senior investigators of the USSSB, experts on weapons effects and so forth; in all, an impressive list. Both the caliber of the members of the Board and the caliber of the witnesses are clear evidence that the matter was given high and serious priority.

The Board issued its report, classified CONFIDENTIAL and entitled: Report of the War Department Civil Defense Board, on February 28, 1947 and adjourned. The report was declassified by authority of the Secretary of Defense on January 13, 1948 and issued to the public, minus its appendices, on February 15, 1948 under the title of A Study of Civil Defense; it soon came to be known as the Bull report, after the Board Chairman.

Civil defense is defined in the Bull report as the organization of the people to minimize the effects of enemy action. Specifically, it is the mobilization, organization, and direction of the civil populace and necessary supporting agencies to minimize the effects of enemy action directed against communities, including industrial plants,
facilities, and other installations; to restore and maintain those facilities essential to civilian life; and to preserve the maximum civilian support of the war effort. Explicitly eliminated from consideration under this definition were:

(1) active defense measures, which may utilize civilian volunteers such as aircraft warning systems, and which are primarily the responsibility of the Armed Services;

(2) problems of internal security which are the responsibility of other government agencies; and

(3) activities such as salvage, victory gardens, recreation, bond drives, etc., which should be supervised by other agencies.

A review of World War II civil defense in Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States follows in the report. Its substance has already been presented and need not be repeated. One sentence from the review of the American effort should be quoted, however, since it lends weight to an opinion quoted elsewhere: "The almost unanimous opinion of witnesses before the Board was that a civil defense organization would confine itself to emergency protective services and that extraneous activities should be supervised by other agencies." (p. 8.)

The basic concepts underlying civil defense are then reviewed. They are self-help, the responsibilities of the various echelons of government in the United States, mobile reserves, civilian morale, and the role of the armed forces.

**Self-help.** This principle, which came to play a predominant role in later thinking and planning for civil defense, was viewed pragmatically by the Board, not as a matter of basic principle as it was later to become. The Board anticipated a massive attack of great destruction occurring simultaneously in many localities. Immediate emergency help from outside the community was almost precluded by definition; even help relatively soon after the attack could not be depended upon. Hence, to the extent that the individuals involved knew how to behave in the event of an emergency, and to the extent that that local community itself was organized to
render emergency services before help could arrive from the outside, all immediately concerned would be in a better position to cope with an attack and to save lives and property. Everything in the report seems to indicate that self-help was considered a stop-gap necessity for effectiveness immediately after the attack which was to be replaced by organized help and reconstruction by governmental authorities as soon as possible.

**Governmental responsibilities.** The general responsibility of each echelon of government is to organize, train, and equip for civil defense within its boundaries. This includes support through organized mutual aid and the employment of mobile reserves to cope with situations beyond the capabilities of lower echelons. The municipalities must provide the organization to furnish and operate the protective services to deal with situations beyond the efforts of its self-help groups. The states must be able to render quick support to the lower echelons when needed, to direct mutual aid between the communities, and to handle requests for Federal assistance, when needed. The Federal Government must provide guidance and coordination in planning, organizing, and training for civil defense. It should employ mobile reserves, effect mutual aid between states, and, when required, assume control.

**Mobile reserves.** It is essential that there be both Federal and State mobile protective services: fire fighting, rescue, medical, and others.

**Civilian Morale.** Essential factors in the development of high public morale, and consequent public interest and participation are full and authoritative information concerning civil defense status and problems, recognition of the necessity for required action, confidence in the efficiency of operation and in ability to cope with the situation.

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3. This is a rather confusing responsibility since the borders of the respective echelons of government in the country overlap, e.g., the city's boundaries are generally contained in a county, the county's boundaries are always contained in a state, and the Federal Government's boundaries contains them all. The confusion is somewhat dispelled as the report gets into more detailed responsibilities below; but not too much.
Armed forces. The armed forces primary mission requires devotion to active measures, both offensive and defensive. They must not divert effort and facilities to civil defense, except to meet dire emergencies beyond the capabilities of the states when the national interest is involved. 4

Next follows a delineation of the scope of civil defense; an enumeration of the many fields to be embraced by the planning which will confront all levels of government, American industry, and the American public. This enumeration, shown in Table 1, is not claimed to be exhaustive.

A special section of the report stresses the need to establish a Federal agency responsible for the overall planning required to implement any civil defense program, and for coordinating the implementation. The intense British planning activity is cited as a reference and guide.

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4. There is a very significant difference in the role assigned to the armed forces in the Bull report and in the earlier military report, a difference whose implications may not have been apparent to framers of the Bull report, but which now, with the wisdom of hindsight, can be pointed out clearly. To try to understand the source of the difference, some speculative "psychologizing" is in order. The Provost Marshal's staff seemed to have been primarily concerned with the requirements for creating an effective civil defense effort without considering the problems confronting the armed forces as such or problems of future military policy and postures. For them, the lesson of civil defense in all four countries studied is that it requires a quasi-military organization as a backbone in order to have any hope of success; in coldly and pragmatically evaluating the American scene they realized that the only group within the nation that can both plan effectively for such an organization and run it, at least at the outset, is the professional military. Hence, this in itself, although there were also other reasons which they clearly indicate, was sufficient for them to involve the armed forces deeply in every aspect of the national civil defense organization. The Bull report staff necessarily had to look at the thing differently, both because of their position and mandate; they had to take basic present and future military policies and problems into account. In their delineation of the role of the armed forces in the proposed civil defense effort they were obviously reflecting a policy decision that was made at the highest echelons that they had to live with and with which, most probably, they found themselves in accord.
Table 1
SCOPE OF CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING IN THE BULL REPORTa, b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>The Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The civil defense organization— from the national level down to and including the municipal level</td>
<td>Dispersal</td>
<td>Informing the public regarding future possible wars and the need for civil defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The degree of required uniformity within the state and municipal organizations</td>
<td>Underground Sites</td>
<td>Educating the public regarding the need for setting up a civil defense organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The degree to which the proposed organization should be completed within peacetime</td>
<td>Protective construction</td>
<td>Mobilizing and training the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number and types of emergency services to be needed</td>
<td>Internal and external plant protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The standardization of equipment for the protective services</td>
<td>The protection of essential communication and transportation facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile reserve requirements and movement plans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply reserves for critical areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The repair and restoration of essential community services</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Passive defense measures against existing and new weapons</td>
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<td>Inter- and intra-state mutual aids and Federal assistance</td>
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<td>Manpower requirements for the organization</td>
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<td>The integration of civil defense plans with other national security plans, including internal security</td>
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<td>The legislation necessary to provide for the various civil defense measures</td>
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b. A significant distinction made in the Provost Marshal's report is affixed in this enumeration. That report distinguishes the broader from the narrower aspects of civil defense—the latter being restricted to the saving of lives and personal property. It then goes on to stress that the civil defense organization it discusses should be restricted to the narrow aspects of civil defense in order to be effective and that other agencies should be responsible for the broader aspects of civil defense. Here the two aspects are lumped together indiscriminately.

c. This is a euphemism for a shelter program. It will be recalled that in the early stages of the British planning effort shelters also became a "nomen non grata."
The proposed civil defense organization is sketched in broad strokes. The report states that the Board had little difficulty in determining what it considers sound principles of organization for state and local groups, but that it did have difficulty with how best to organize the proposed Federal agency.

The civil defense organization at both the state and local levels should be directed by state and local civil defense directors heading their respective Civil Defense Councils with emergency powers for effective action. Although the details of these councils may vary with local conditions, they should meet generally accepted requirements to satisfy a needed overall national uniformity. The local Director and Council will bear the main responsibility for directing civil defense in its limited sense—the saving of life and personal property; the State Director and Council will be responsible for supervising the local effort, coordinating action between the local communities, and directing the various protective services under State control.

Since, in the event of emergency, the existing protective services of the community, e.g., the police force, the fire departments, and emergency utility repairs, will be needed, the organization should, during peace, be closely related to and coordinated with them. For the same reason, the organization should also assume the responsibilities of emergency disaster relief and thereby incorporate the organizations which already exist in many States and local communities for that purpose.

The State and local civil defense organizations should be centered about a nucleus of paid personnel, some full-time and others, such as directors, State police officers, fire marshals, etc., part-time, since it is expected that they will also continue their key positions in the existing State and local services. The need to select competent people to form this nucleus cannot be overstressed. The need for volunteers at the operating level will be light during peacetime, and will increase in proportion to the imminence and magnitude of an emergency. Since large volunteer participation is not likely before
a recognized threat of war, the peacetime organization, including the mobile reserve units, will probably, be on a skeleton basis with trained volunteers filling in as the emergency becomes apparent.

A system of Federal regional offices is recommended to coordinate activities among the states and between states and the regional military commands. These regional offices should be organized to supervise, to coordinate, to furnish technical advice and assistance to the operating civil defense echelons, to provide liaison, and to undertake direct action as required in an emergency. Although not desirable, it may also be found necessary, if civil defense is to be handled as a single enterprise, to establish sub-areas wherever a dense urban population overlaps State and military boundaries.

At all levels, concerted and coordinated civil defense planning and operations must await national direction. Effectiveness cannot be expected unless authoritative national decisions concerning policy are made known. These decisions should be the responsibility of a board reflecting cabinet-level decisions transcending any individual department; the National Security Resources Board, then under consideration, was recommended. Two major problems upon which decisions must be taken before any civil-defense planning can be effectively carried out are manpower allocations and the assignment of responsibilities to and coordination of internal security. Other board decisions of national economic, social, and political importance, and of major interest to civil defense relate to the dispersion of industry, the use of underground sites, protective building construction, city planning for local dispersal, and evacuation planning.5

In order to carry out these decisions, and to plan, operate, and supervise the national civil defense effort in all its phases, a Federal operating civil defense agency would be required. After considering various alternatives the Board recommended that this

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5. Here shelters are not even implied euphemistically. Neither is the problem of financing raised. Again this parallels the British planning effort, in which these problems were avoided as long as possible.
agency, staffed by civilians, be placed within the then-proposed Department of Defense as a separate agency directly under the control of the Secretary of Defense. The major advantages of such a proposal are:

(1) that its responsible head would be at a cabinet level;
(2) that the necessary integration of personnel and the continuous close contact between the civil and military in planning and operation would be continuously assured; and,
(3) that the civilian composition of the agency ensures control by officials familiar with civilian problems, organization, and procedures, consistent with the necessary coordination with the military, while, at the same time, permitting the military to remain free for their primary mission of operations against the enemy.

The disadvantages of the proposal are:

(1) that it will add an additional burden to the already heavy load of responsibility anticipated for the new position of Secretary of Defense;
(2) that the public may misconstrue the funds allocated to civil defense as being part of the budget of the armed forces, thereby giving an inflated impression of the size of the military budget; and
(3) that the public may object to too great a concentration of power within one department.6

Since sound planning is a necessary condition for the establishment of any successful civil defense organization, the report devotes a special section to this subject. Before a national master plan can be formulated, it is essential that the planning authorities confer with the State and local authorities, as well as with representatives of the major urban areas, and with industrial and technical military and civilian experts. The plan should emerge as these various views and interests are reconciled. Such a reconciliation is absolutely necessary to achieve the public support required for the vast volunteer effort ultimately sought. Once a master plan is formulated, the legal requirements enabling its implementation

6. The advantages listed above are those of principle, whereas the disadvantages are contingent and can be coped with; it seems obvious that the latter could not prevail.
should be considered. The legislation should assign responsibilities and determine the financing of the effort. Implementation should start only after legislation is available.

The board recognized that to do these things adequately would take a long time. It also recognized that its recommendations could be interpreted to mean that all planning cease until the Federal agency proposed above assumes the planning responsibility, a period which may require years. It considered such a delay an unnecessary risk. Interim planning should go on and it strongly recommends that, until the proposed agency can take the matter over, the Department of Defense (or the War Department, were the proposed reorganization to fail) continue the interim planning under clearly defined authority and responsibility by an executive order or a congressional mandate.

The Bull report, classified as CONFIDENTIAL when originally submitted in February 1947, was declassified on January 18, 1948 by order of the Secretary of Defense and issued to the public on February 14, 1948 in a general news conference "guaranteeing" front-page coverage in most newspapers; the New York Times, as an example, devoted two full pages to the matter. On February 22, 1948 Mr. Russell J. Hopley, the president of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, was asked by the first Secretary of Defense, Mr. James Forrestal to organize and direct a committee to plan for establishing a civil defense organization for the nation. Mr. Hopley agreed. On March 27, 1948 Mr. Forrestal created the Office of Civilian Defense Planning within the Department of Defense with Mr. Hopley as its director.

The directive setting up the Office of Civil Defense Planning consists of a memorandum, dated March 27, 1948, addressed to the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, the Military Liaison Committee, and the Director of the Office of Civilian Defense Planning. The Office is declared to have been set up in order to:

(1) develop detailed plans and establish an integrated national program of civil defense;
(2) secure the proper coordination and direction of all civil defense matters affecting the National Military Establishment; and

(3) provide effective liaison between the National Military Establishment and all other relevant agencies, governmental and private, on questions of civil defense.

Consistent with the above, and to the extent possible and desirable, the Office was also expected to:

(1) initiate interim measures for the furtherance of a civil defense system;

(2) provide the states and their subdivisions with guidance and assistance in civil defense matters; and

(3) provide guidance and assistance to Federal Government agencies, both within and without the National Military Establishment, in the same matters.

Finally, the Office was responsible for drafting model legislation necessary for implementing the proposed plan and system to be developed by the Office.

Details as to what is required in such a plan and the steps to be taken to meet the requirements are specified. The resources available to the office are given. Finally, "civil defense" is defined; the term is used to denote

the organized activities of the civilian population:
(1) to minimize the effects of any enemy action directed against the United States, and (2) to maintain or restore those facilities and services which are essential to civilian life and which are affected by enemy action.

Generally excluded are matters of internal security, active defense, strategic relocations of industries, services, government, etc., and economic activities in anticipation of future emergencies which are considered the responsibility of the National Security Resources Board. The Office, however, should advise the NSRB concerning the relationship of such matters to civil defense and, to the extent requested, work closely with the NSRB.

The events related above raise an interesting question: What took place between the submission of the classified Bull report on February 28, 1947, its declassification in January of the next year, and its presentation to the public on February 14, 1948 in a manner

7. The National Military Establishment was later to become the Department of Defense.
aimed at capturing the public’s eye? Why so long a delay? Hard evidence is not available, and if it exists, it is probably in some forgotten files; what took place can only be conjectured. It may be argued that the delay was not inordinately long. The Bull report was formally accepted by the three services, and this is not a matter which necessarily proceeds rapidly. In addition, 1947 was the year of the National Security Act and the vast reorganization it entailed; this in itself would be sufficient reason for delaying action on the Bull report. But the argument to be developed below, admittedly based upon circumstantial evidence, will be that during that delay an attempt was made to commit the Executive to accept the findings of the Bull report. I will argue that the Executive procrastinated for so long that Secretary Forrestal decided to force the issue and acted, to a great extent, unilaterally. As the narrative proceeds, the reasons for this argument, and its significance, should become clear.

The announcement of the impending establishment of the Office of Civil Defense Planning accompanied the release of the Bull report to the public. The New York Times featured the story on the first page of its February 15, 1948 issue under the headlines. **Civilian Defense To Be Established--Forrestal to Set Up Interim Organization as Soon as He Can Find Suitable Head.** The headlines and the body of the news report seem to indicate that the Bull report was declassified and released to be public only after the decision was reached by Secretary Forrestal, and only Secretary Forrestal, to establish the new office as a public justification for the step to be taken. To quote the New York Times report: "Secretary Forrestal's move to set up a civilian defense organization followed the board's recommendations." But did it?

In two important respects Forrestal's plan deviated from the Bull report. Although it was admitted that the Office to be established is interim, the whole tenor of the reporting indicates that it was seen as a first step in the direction of establishing a nationwide civil defense system. The directive just cited above supports this view, since the responsibilities assigned to the new office were too
broad for merely a short term interim committee. Hence, in this respect, Forrestal's action did not strictly follow the Bull report's recommendation; the report conceived of a truly interim committee.

The establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense deviated from the Bull report's recommendation in another, even more serious, respect. The report did not simply recommend that the National Military Establishment set up an interim organization for civil defense planning; it recommended that this be undertaken only as a result of a presidential directive or a mandate from Congress, and that such be requested. No such directive or mandate was forthcoming. The report gave no reason for this specification, but two seem plausible. The first, and probably the one of less intrinsic importance, is effectiveness; any plan initiated and sponsored by the military which affects civilian life would not be as effective as one initiated and sponsored by the President or Congress. The second, and much more important reason, is that the passive, non-military defense of American civilians is not a traditional, and possibly not even a constitutional responsibility of the American Military Establishment, and it should not be assumed by the military unless so ordered by higher responsible authorities.

The significance of these departures from the recommendations of the Bull report and of the delay in releasing that report is illuminated by the manner in which its successor, the so-called Hopley report, was released to the public. The Hopley report was released on November 13, 1948. The New York Times of November 14, 1948 reported: "Mr. Forrestal released the proposed program without formally endorsing it himself or canvassing any of the interested Government agencies on its contents. 8 He explained that 'the widest public understanding' must be gained before the plan can receive official approval." It seems that Secretary Forrestal, in releasing the Hopley report with a plea for public acceptance ("understanding") as a prior prerequisite to official approval, was actually attempting to create public pressure for his plan.

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8. This is not strictly true. As will be seen, opinion of the interested Government agencies was canvassed, in a way (see page 82 below).
In its own right the Hopley report remains the most detailed and complete plan available for setting up an operational civil defense organization in the limited sense of life saving and property protection in the event of attack. In this respect it is a direct and integral continuation of the planning initiated by the military with the Provost Marshal's report. The staff responsible for the report consisted of an imposing array of professional and expert talent in many fields relevant to civil defense, forty-nine in all, and was augmented by ten advisory panels and 138 other experts and specialists in the fields such as medicine, radiological defense, chemical defense, communications, fire services, police services, and the transportation services.

The bulk of the Hopley report, over 250 of its 301 pages, consists of a carefully detailed discussion of each and every position of the recommended civil defense organization at the state and local levels. There is a very careful breakdown of all the tasks entailed in the above, as well as an estimate for manpower requirements both for peacetime operations and for expansion when required due to an emergency. All in all it is an admirable blueprint for a comprehensive operational civil defense organization. 9

The day before the Hopley report was issued to the public, members of the staff of the Office of Civil Defense Planning mailed out several hundred copies of the report to all State governments, most of the city governments and other forms of local governments, public organizations that were interested in civil defense, etc. When a person involved in this early distribution was asked why it was done he answered that they wanted to be sure that all elements of the Nation interested in civil defense would get a copy.

Upon releasing the Hopley report to the public, Secretary Forrestal also announced that the Office of Civilian Defense would continue its operations and would issue manuals to the State and local authorities to guide them in implementing the proposed program. No manuals were ever issued.

9. The Hopley report is summarized in Appendix B.
Three and one half months later, March 4, 1949, on the same day that President Truman announced the appointment of Louis A. Johnson to succeed Forrestal as Secretary of Defense, he also announced the rejection of the Hopley report recommendations.
The Bull report states (p. 2) that in August 1946 the Acting Secretary of War informed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that, in the opinion of the War Department, civil defense was a matter of as significant and direct interest to the civilian agencies as it was to the military agencies of the government. He therefore suggested that the Bureau consider civil defense in conjunction with the overall study it was making for the President in accordance with the Reorganization Act of 1945. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget replied:

There can be no argument with your basic point that considerable work must be done in civilian defense planning during peace time if we are to be prepared for a future emergency. It is apparent also that we should move promptly to fix primary responsibility in an appropriate agency.

My main question is whether this phase of national preparedness planning should be considered by itself or whether the organization of all phases of the broader problem have to be considered together. We are now giving some attention to the whole question of how a National Security Resources Board, as recently endorsed by the President, should be organized. We have tentatively been looking on civilian defense planning as one aspect of the general problem with which that Board should be set up to deal.

In any event, you may be sure that we will consider your suggestions carefully in conjunction with our work for the President in carrying out the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1945.

1. The main sources for the material in this section are the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings held in the Spring of 1950, The New York Times, and the Archives and Records of the United States Government. With respect to the latter, it must be admitted that no thorough study of the Archives and Records was made, neither sufficient time nor manpower being available. It is doubtful whether a more thorough study would significantly change the general picture that emerges from the partial study, although, of course, many details that would both enrich and increase its coherence would most certainly be found.
However, there is no evidence that civil defense was given any serious thought by the Executive branch thereafter. It was not until the Executive, its civilian agencies, and departments were confronted with the Secretary of Defense's actions in conjunction with the Hopley report that attention was given again.

On November 9, 1948, four days before he released the Hopley report to the public, Secretary Forrestal sent a copy of the report to the Cabinet members constituting the National Security Resources Board and to the then Chairman of the NSRB, Mr. Arthur M. Hill. In the covering letter to the Report the Secretary wrote: "Since I consider that the lack of a permanent civil defense organization represents a serious deficiency in our national security structure, I believe prompt action is necessary." Therefore, the Secretary continued, he intended to release the report to the public on November 13 and requested the NSRB members to submit their critical comments on the report by December 15, 1948.

This letter and the accompanying 301-page report, spelling out in detail a functional civil defense organization down to the lowest community level, appeared to the recipients as a bolt from the blue. Staff members of the Departments and agencies involved studied the report and wrote evaluations for their respective heads, almost all of which were accompanied by the caveat that the time was too short for a comprehensive, basic evaluation. The general tenor of the official replies was similar; it was felt that further study was necessary before moving to establish a national civil defense effort and that the proper agency for the study was the NSRB.

First and foremost, among the more specific problems raised for careful study, was that of the proper place for the proposed organization. Strong doubts were expressed as to whether it should be in the National Military Establishment (later to become the Department of Defense). Off the record, these doubts turned into convictions. In fact, it may not be unfair to say that an implicit consensus seemed to have been reached among the civilian departments and agencies within the Executive Branch concerning the motivation underlying the writing and public distribution of the
Hopley report; it was looked upon as a power play by the military branch of the government aimed at creating a base of power so that, in the event of war, it could impose its control over the civilian sector of the nation. In this, the Military Establishment seemed to be aided and abetted, albeit perhaps unwittingly, by civilian authorities primarily at the local levels, who presumably did not grasp the issues involved. This fear was also expressed by national commentators in the public press.²

With the wisdom of hindsight, and viewing the matter from a contemporary perspective, it may appear that the emphasis given here to a fear of a "military takeover" is exaggerated. But let the reader try to place himself in the position of these civilian officials and this President. The rather unorthodox manner in which the Hopley and Bull reports were publicized has already been discussed. Furthermore, the Hopley report was in one way radically different from the two earlier military reports. Whereas the two earlier reports stressed planning for civil defense almost exclusively, deferring the setting up of an operational organization and thus indicating that the organization should not be considered before a viable national plan could be completed and accepted, the Hopley report seemed to recommend a detailed organization plan to be implemented immediately; it was interpreted as a call for immediate action. But the President and his staff knew that the best military thinking in the country did not envisage any immediate threat of air attack. Why, then, this call for a large national organization if not to create a fait accompli under the control of the National Military Establishment? It is true that a careful reading of the Hopley report would show that such was not intended, but there was no time to read it carefully.

². At this point, it should be stressed that no documents were found in which this stark opinion was explicitly enunciated, though quite a few documents and subsequent actions imply it to one degree or other. This consensus was most probably one of common feeling rather than of overt expression and gave a common tone and purpose to many of the subsequent important policy decisions, activities, and, ultimately, is reflected in Public Law 920 itself.
Planning for American civil defense, in this instance as well as in many others, could have benefitted from a British planning practice informally called the "ten year rule." Until revoked by the Cabinet, all British planning for civil defense proceeded under the assumption that a major war would not break out for at least ten years, the base for this projection being updated daily. This enabled people to plan without feeling themselves under pressure. The "ten year rule" was cancelled in November, 1933. Had a common estimate as to the probability of a major war been shared by the Executive and the military, the Secretary of Defense would either not have acted so precipitously or the rest of the Executive would have shared his apprehension and so fundamental a misunderstanding and cleavage could not have arisen.

A more substantial argument against involvement of the military establishment was also raised: Would this added responsibility not dilute its efforts in regard to its primary mission, the active defense of the nation? This was the issue raised by the Bull report in overriding the recommendations made in the Provost Marshal's report. The Office of Civilian Defense Planning, headed by Hopley, did specifically take this objection into account in formulating its recommendations; the fact that the civilian reviewers seemed to overlook this is another instance demonstrating the hurried review of the document.

A second problem to be raised concerned the basic adequacy of the plan. At the time, prior to the development of fusion weapons and missiles, the military considered that a future war, albeit much more destructive, would be basically similar to the recently concluded war. No radical new problems were anticipated. Hence, the organization proposed in the Hopley report was essentially an expansion of the "ideal" kind of protective services aspired to, but not achieved by,


4. This misunderstanding has its humorous overtones. To the extent that the military thought about participation in civil defense, they considered it to be an exclusive responsibility of the Army. But the Army, according to the evidence, was girding for the interservice conflict which was to erupt with the establishment of the Department of Defense and categorically refused to be encumbered with the added responsibility. In addition, the Army command felt, probably correctly, that the funds it would have to divert to civilian defense would not be replaced.
the Office of Civilian Defense during World War II. Civilian authorities within the Executive raised the question whether World War III would be anything like World War II, and if not, then how adequate would a civil defense organization be if based upon the World War II experience. It was, therefore, agreed that before any action was taken concerning civil defense, and certainly before an organization was set up, a consensus must be reached as to what the nature of a future war would be like. No such consensus was available; in fact, serious disagreement existed on the topic among the experts, both military and civilian.5

A similar problem had to do with the allocation of resources. The time was 1948 and the military budget was quite tight. In order to set up the recommended organization, resources from other defense efforts would have had to be diverted. Would such a diversion be justified in terms of the overall demands upon the limited resources?

Questions were also raised as to whether this kind of decision by committee, without the involvement of and consultation with other government bodies or state and local authorities, was in principle democratic. What effect would such an organization have upon local responsibility and initiative? Is it wise to start out with such a detailed plan? Isn't it preferable to lay down broad guidelines and let the details be ironed out with implementation? Should the entire proposal be implemented at once or should priorities and steps be first determined? And so forth. In short, everyone agreed that there was a need for more thinking and evaluation before a stand could be taken; the National Security Resources Board seemed to be the proper body to take over responsibility.

At this point it will be useful to leap ahead somewhat and present what was unofficially the "official" judgment of the NSRB on the Hopley report. Soon after assuming the chairmanship of the NSRB in the Spring of 1950, Stuart Symington asked Paul J. Larsen, then head of the

5. And a consensus on this matter has yet to be reached. Here something can be learned from the British "freezing" their basic scenario in 1923 and using it as a base for planning despite its acknowledged implausibilities.
Civilian Mobilization Division, for his opinion on the Hopley report. In a memorandum dated July 2, 1950 Larsen criticized the report on eleven counts:

(1) Military control of the organization would divert the military from its main responsibilities and lead to complete military control of civilian affairs.

(2) Although as an organization plan, it contains some useful listing of problems to be considered, it offers no practical guidance for their solution.

(3) The plan exhibits an inverted emphasis of organization development starting from the top and going down, with details at the lower levels deemphasized, whereas careful planning at the lower levels is most important for a sound organization.

(4) There is little or no guidance as to who is responsible for what. Sufficient emphasis is not placed on the complex problem of the relationships between the three levels of government.

(5) The dispersion problems are inadequately treated.

(6) There is no consideration of weapons effects, effects which are yet to be determined.

(7) A large Federal bureaucracy is recommended, duplicating existing facilities.

(8) The entire concept of mobile reserves, with the exception of medical aid and monitoring facilities, is both uneconomic and unnecessary.

(9) There is insufficient recognition of the problems of metropolitan urban areas.

(10) Little emphasis is placed on a preliminary study of available resources and anticipated needs, a study which should precede the planning of an organization.

(11) The plan restricts itself to passive defense only, whereas current NSRB planning considers civilian participation in active defense as well.

The note concludes, however, that there is no desire on the part of the NSRB to discredit the report. It states that the study has value as an outline of a civil defense organization and that, as such, it has been recommended to State and local authorities as a useful guide. Those who think that these concluding comments contradict criticism number two above are probably right.
Before continuing with the narrative of civil defense planning, a brief discussion of the National Resources Planning Board is required in order to achieve the proper perspective.

World War II found the country ill-prepared to cope with the vast planning and resource management job demanded by the war effort. "Alphabet soup" war agencies proliferated like mushrooms. Overlapping of responsibilities, inefficiencies in implementation, debilitating conflicts generated by the previous conditions, etc., flourished. And finally the Executive Branch, in order to meet the demands of the global war, expanded haphazardly to a degree unimaginable but a few years earlier and, with the cessation of hostilities, found itself unable to "regress" to its earlier size of the halcyon days. The lessons of the War were recognized by both the Executive and Congress and the first steps toward applying them were taken with the passing of the Reorganization Act of 1945 in December of that year. This Act authorized the President to reorganize (with Congressional approval and specified exemptions and restrictions) executive agencies and functions below those of Cabinet rank. The purpose of the reorganization was to increase the economy and efficiency of executive operations. President Truman therefore instructed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to obtain the recommendations of all the departments and agencies covered by the Act, and to take the lead in preparing recommendations for reorganization for his consideration.

The first and major outcome of these actions was the "National Security Act of 1947." Congress declared that in enacting the Act its intent was, among others, to: "provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; [and] to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security; ..." The Act established the basis for a Department of Defense (then called the National Military Establishment) and three civilian agencies: the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board. The legal responsibilities of the NSRB are found in section 102 (c) of the Act:
It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including:

1. policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the event of war;
2. programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural and industrial resources for military and civilian needs for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and conditions;
3. policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, or products;
4. the relationship between potential supplies of and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;
5. policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;
6. the strategic relocation of industries, services, government and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's security.

In attempting to clarify for themselves what Congress intended their specific responsibilities to be, senior members of the NSRB studied the Senate Armed Forces Committee hearings on the law. They reached the conclusion, among others, that the Committee was intending to create an organization which would carry on the functions and duties performed by the following organizations after the commencement of hostilities in World War II:

(a) The War Production Board
(b) The Petroleum Administration for War
(c) The War Foods Administration
(d) The Office of Price Administration
(e) The War Manpower Commission
(f) The Office of Defense Transportation
(g) The Shipping Administration

6. It is interesting to note that in the self-definition of their responsibilities the Office of Civilian Defense of World War II was not mentioned. Although Section 102 (c) (1) can be interpreted to include the War Services Branch of the above Office, it was not so interpreted.
All in all, the committee had laid down a vast mandate with very little, if any, past experience to serve as a positive guide; to the extent that experience was available it was of the negative sort, indicating what not to do. Furthermore, the NSRB did not intend its limited staff to undertake the actual planning. It rather viewed its responsibility as that of guiding the planning and coordinating the execution of the plan; the actual planning was to be carried out by the operational departments and agencies of the Executive Branch whose heads, together with the NSRB Chairman, constituted the Board. Hence, from its inception, the staff members of the NSRB tended to define their job as delineating various planning tasks in their broad aspects, identifying the agencies, departments, or other bodies within the Executive Branch most suited to undertake detailed planning, and, with the approval of the Board, delegating the detailed planned responsibilities.

The NSRB has been judged to have been a failure. The reasons for this judgment are many, reinforce each other, and cannot be gone into here. Two important factors contributing to the failure were unstable leadership and successive administrative reorganization. In considering the NSRB's handling of civil defense planning, one must never forget that it was greatly affected by these. A brief chronology makes this very clear. The first chairman of the Board, Mr. Arthur M. Hill, disagreed with the President's decision to restrict the NSRB to an advisory status only; as a result of the war scare accompanying the Berlin crisis of summer 1948, Mr. Hill requested that the President give the NSRB the power to "integrate and coordinate" the plans it recommended. He resigned his post on December 15, 1948, soon to be followed by his Vice Chairman, Mr. Reginald E. Gilmore, and by several other senior members of his staff. The President nominated

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7. Since the NSRB probably represents the first serious attempt to establish a body with capability for broad, national planning for future resources needs, and since, with our growing national complexity and interdependence, such a body may become quite necessary in the not too distant future, a careful study of the failure of the NSRB may be desirable.
ex-Senator Mon Walgren for the vacant post and assigned Dr. John R. Steelman to the position of Acting Chairman until Mr. Walgren's confirmation by the Senate. After a rather messy public squabble, the confirmation was refused. Dr. Steelman was forced to continue as Acting Chairman for over sixteen months, heading an organization which did not have a prior basic policy nor was he in position, by virtue of his temporary status, to formulate a basic policy. During his tenure, a major reorganization of the NSRB took place (Reorganization Plan 4, August 20, 1949). He was eventually replaced, on April 26, 1950, by NSRB's second permanent Chairman, Mr. W. Stuart Symington. Within two months after Mr. Symington's assumption of the Chairmanship, the nation found itself in a state of undeclared war in Korea with the NSRB not being in any position to assume its legal responsibilities in time of war. One can imagine the impact of this failure upon the struggling staff and the newly appointed and able chairman. And this was the period during which the NSRB had responsibility for civil defense planning.  

To return to the historical narrative interrupted on page 85, simultaneously with the announcements that Secretary Forrestal was replaced by Louis Johnson, and that the Hopley report was rejected, the Acting Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, John R. Steelman, released to the public the memorandum he received from the President. It stated, in part:

> Under present conditions the essential need of the Federal Government in the area of civil defense is peacetime planning and preparation for civil defense in the event of war, rather than operation of a full-scale civil defense program. Therefore, I see no need to establish at this time a permanent organization, such as a proposed office of civil defense. Rather, I see a definite necessity to continue planning for civil defense and an immediate need to fix in a responsible agency definite leadership for such planning.  

8. Unstable leadership can, in turn, be viewed as being caused by other things, such as lack of a clear mandate. This is a proper subject to be considered by a study of the NSRB.
Since peacetime civil defense planning is related to, and a part of overall mobilization planning of the nation in peacetime, I have concluded that the National Security Resources Board, which is charged with advising me concerning the coordination of such over-all mobilization planning, is the appropriate agency which should also exercise leadership in civil defense planning.

I would like, therefore, for the Board to assume such leadership in civil defense planning and to develop a program which will be adequate for the nation's needs. In doing so, the Board will undoubtedly find it necessary and advisable to call upon the other agencies of the Government and to consult with representatives of the states and local governments in developing the detailed planning for air raid warning, disaster relief and all other aspects of civil defense for which they are most appropriately qualified. As a result of the Board's considered analysis of how best to undertake this responsibility, I would like the Board's recommendations concerning necessary actions, including any legislative proposals which may need early attention.

The responsibility for preparing a civil defense planning program was given to the Mobilization, Procedures, and Organization Section directed by William A. Gill. The President's memorandum to Dr. Steelman was interpreted first as a deemphasis on either operational planning or implementation (which in any case was not part of the NSRB's mandate by Presidential definition growing out of Truman's disagreement with Hill) and second as an initiation of a broad-based problem formulation effort as a prelude to undertaking any more defined operational planning effort.

The problem formulation effort consisted of two major parts. It was decided to explore what current ongoing study and research within the NSRB would also be of use in planning for civil defense. In addition, problem areas of importance for civil defense, for which new studies would have to be initiated, had to be identified. Then the responsibility for actual planning could be assigned to both government agencies and to groups within the NSRB qualified to do the work.

The report of the Mobilization, Procedures and Organization section identified, among others, the following ongoing NSRB research efforts as also being relevant for civil defense planning:

1. manpower studies, including rosters of physicians, nurses, sanitary engineers, dentists, etc.;
2. studies of strategic relocation, including industrial dispersion;
3. resource studies on water, power, housing, transportation and communication facilities; and
4. inventories of health and medical supplies, facilities and equipment.

Many facilities and resources of the Federal Government were, according to the NSRB, already engaged in planning in these areas and the plans would then be useful for civil defense purposes. In addition, five problem areas, unique to civil defense planning, were identified—problem areas which no ongoing studies covered. They were:

1. civilian participation in active defense;
2. wartime disaster relief;
3. peacetime disaster relief;
4. internal security; and
5. volunteer war activities (the World War II war services).

Provisions would have to be made for them.

NSRB Document 112 was discussed with both the President and the Board, and was approved in principle by all but one member. The planning responsibility for two of five problem areas was delegated: the Department of Defense would be responsible for planning civilian participation in active defense, and the Federal Works Agency for planning wartime disaster relief—the area which, until that time, was almost synonymous with what was considered to be civil defense. The other three problem areas were left in abeyance, presumably to be considered as the planning effort progressed.

The delegations were officially made on June 3, 1949 and Mr. William A. Gill was designated as coordinator of Civil Defense Planning. It seems obvious that this new responsibility of the NSRB could not have been felt to be more urgent than its original

legislative responsibility to plan for total mobilization and coordination of the nation's resources in the event of war; a strong case can be made that it must have been regarded as less urgent. First, and intrinsically, general planning for a total war effort must be considered more important than the more limited planning for only a small part of that effort which was less likely to be put into effect; in 1949, it was not at all accepted doctrine that any major war the country would get into would necessarily involve an attack on the continental United States. Second, much of civil defense planning as defined by the NSRB was, as already noted above, dependent upon other more general planning efforts which were yet to be set in motion; hence, much of the earlier planning had to achieve some measure of implementation before the NSRB could undertake a comprehensive national civil defense plan. In addition, it should be recalled that the entire organization was not in any state of dynamic, aggressive activity at the time. It was headed by an Acting Chairman, awaiting the appointment of a permanent Chairman, i.e., stable leadership; one of the few verified laws of organizational theory asserts that under such conditions every organization marks time. Be that as it may, by the beginning of September 1949 the NSRB staff responsible for civil defense planning consisted of only eight people.

The Department of Defense, however, took its "civil defense" delegation in its stride. Civilian participation in active defense was primarily a euphemism for the aircraft spotter organization developed during World War II, in which the civil air patrol played a secondary role. The military had quite a lot of experience in the area; they also knew how to plan for organizations and operations, and, as will be seen, they did manage to implement what they planned with minimum difficulties and impressive efficiency.

Difficulties arose almost immediately in connection with the responsibilities delegated to the Federal Works Agency. The delegation was made on June 3, 1949, but the FWA was scheduled to be administratively transformed into the GSA (the General Service Administration), on July 1, 1949; and another of the few verified laws
of organizational theory asserts that one should not expect organizational efficiency for several months both preceding and following such a momentous event in the life of an organization. Furthermore, whereas the delegation to the DoD was relatively simple and entirely within the Department's jurisdiction, the delegation to the FWA was anything but that. Entailing all that customarily came under the heading of civil defense, it was vast and not carefully thought through. It was, therefore, conceptually fuzzy in many aspects. Finally, it was agreed upon that the FWA would, in turn, redelegate much of the responsibility to other Executive agencies and departments. This opened a Pandora's box of administrative hassles and difficulties which anyone familiar with the Executive Branch can easily imagine. Such difficulties, however, are the stock in trade of all complex administrative organizations and, given time, they would have ironed themselves out. Within such a perspective it can be said that the NSRB civil defense planning effort started out smoothly. And it continued so for about four months.

In addition to defining the planning problem and allocating planning responsibilities, the NSRB had to cope with the impact of the Hopley report on the nation as a whole. Little is known on how the general public reacted to the report, but organized public opinion, i.e., newspapers, spokesmen for national patriotic organizations, state and, particularly, local governments in major urban communities reacted to it favorably and even with enthusiasm.\footnote{11} For whatever reason, these people were action oriented and wanted

\footnote{11. The way the November 14, 1948 Sunday issue of the \textit{New York Times} treated the "story" is a good index of the report's overall acceptance. It was the first time, since the end of World War II, that civil defense got any sort of a spread in that newspaper. It was printed on the first page at the top of columns two and three under the headline: \textit{Civil Defense Plan Mapped Against Enemy Action}, and continued for almost half a page in the body of the newspaper. The main story was accompanied by a second story giving background information to the report and an editorial was printed in favor of the report's recommendations. All in all the newspaper devoted close to 75 inch-columns to the subject, quite a considerable amount. Hanson Baldwin reviewed the report favorably in his column several days later.}
to get things done. The Hopley report was seen as an admirable guide for action and they expected the Federal Government to take concrete steps immediately to facilitate its implementation; they had neither faith nor patience with "planning," especially when, as they perceived, a "good plan" was already available. The President's rejection of the report was taken, at best, in poor grace and they tended to sit by the sidelines, somewhat sullenly, biding their time. Their time was to come.

It was necessary to calm public enthusiasm, restrain the vocal enthusiasts who were for immediate establishment of a civil defense organization, and set up some chain of command for ordered dissemination of information and recommendations. The spectre of the "LaGuardia era" emerged to haunt those with some memory. A ten point statement of policies for relationships with State and local governments in civil defense planning was formulated by the middle of September, approved by the members of the Board by the end of September, and mailed out to the Governors on October 5, 1949. It was labeled NSRB Document 121 and is cited in full on the following page.

In a covering letter, sent to all the Governors, the document is presented as the initial step in establishing basic policies for civil defense planning relationships among the many Federal agencies involved and coordinated by the NSRB, with the State governments and, through them, the local authorities. One paragraph from this letter merits being cited:

To be timely, realistic and useful, plans for minimizing the effects of wartime enemy attacks, and for repairing the damages from attack must call for joint participation of local, State and Federal governments in their implementation. It follows, therefore, that the development of civil defense plans requires the cooperative efforts of Federal, State and local governments on a continuing basis.

Had things proceeded "normally," i.e., as expected, both the letter and document would have had but one effect: the impact of the Hopley report would have been greatly weakened or nullified and premature activity, from the NSRB standpoint, towards setting up
POLICIES FOR RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING

1. The Chairman and staff of the National Security Resources Board will deal
directly with State governments, or through State governments with political
subdivisions within States.

2. Information or advice released by NSRB will be channeled to States; it is
assumed that States will relay the same to their political subdivisions
when appropriate.

3. Requests for information or advice received from political subdivisions may
be answered directly with copies of the correspondence going to the appro-
priate State governments; however, requests of this nature will be referred
to State governments for direct reply as State facilities for processing
them are developed.

4. NSRB will look to various agencies of the Federal Government for the develop-
ment of civil defense plans and preparedness measures. When understandings
are reached regarding assignments of this nature, State governments will
be notified. Where other Federal agencies are involved in civil defense
planning assignments which require the maintenance of channels of communi-
cation with States and local governments, they will be guided by the policies
outlined in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above.

5. NSRB will maintain contact with national organizations in the field of State
and local government on civil defense planning matters for the purpose of—
   a. Securing from them current statistical data and other types
      of general information; and
   b. Keeping them informed of civil defense activities of the
      Federal Government.

6. The NSRB will encourage States to adopt civil defense legislation which—
   a. Creates a State civil defense planning body;
   b. Provides for civil defense planning bodies in its political
      subdivisions;
   c. Charges the State officials and subordinate planning bodies
      with responsibility for both peacetime and wartime disaster
      relief planning and preparedness measures.

7. Although the report of the Office of Civil Defense Planning entitled "Civil
Defense for National Security," known as the "Hopley Report," has not been
officially adopted, and although the NSRB does not agree with all the recom-
recommendations made in this report, the NSRB does believe the report to be a
useful guide to the substantive areas in which planning must be done for
Federal, State and local civil defense.

8. The Federal Government is not prepared at this time to furnish to State and
local governments all of the information and guidance needed by them from
Federal sources to prepare well-integrated and timely civil defense plans
for State and local use in emergency. While the agencies of the Federal
Government are working toward the fulfillment of these needs, the NSRB will
encourage State and local governments to proceed as far as practicable with
their civil defense planning. In the process of this planning, it would
appear advantageous in the immediate future for the State and local govern-
ments to place major emphasis on plans for relief from the effects of peace-
time disasters. The experience gained in dealing with peacetime disaster,
if carefully evaluated, can constitute a realistic frame of reference against
which wartime civil disaster planning can be appraised.

9. The NSRB, directly or through other Federal agency channels, will transmit
to States—
   a. Information on activities in other States.
   b. Information on activities of Federal agencies.
   c. Policy guidance and planning criteria.

10. The NSRB and other Federal agencies will solicit from States current
information as to progress in State and local civil defense planning.
a national civil defense organization would have either greatly slowed down or completely stopped. The substantive message in both NSRB Document 112 and the covering letter is:

(1) that State and local plans must, in order to be effective, be coordinated and integrated with the overall Federal plan;
(2) that the Federal Government is not presently in a position to undertake this kind of coordination and has no ready plan;
(3) that it will be some time before such a plan will exist; and
(4) that if the States and local authorities wish to do anything, they too should restrict themselves to planning and should not undertake to establish operational organizations.

Administratively, the same effect was to be achieved by placing a functionally "viscous" barrier between the activist local governments and the Federal authorities—the state governments.  

On September 23, 1949 President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic device. With this announcement, the seed sown ten months earlier by the "surreptitious" distribution of the Hopley report began to sprout; eventually the fruits from that seed would make difficult a relatively orderly and planned progression towards a national civil defense plan and organization.

The announcement reverberated throughout the country, back and forth, its impact increasing as it went along. Supporters of the Hopley report raised their voices: Why doesn't the Federal Government do something! Congressmen, prodded by vocal constituents, sent pointed letters asking about the state of Federal civil defense preparations to both the President and the NSRB.

On October 8, 1949, John F. Kennedy, then a Congressman from Massachusetts, sent a letter to President Truman expressing amazement and shock that there was only one man working fulltime on the wartime

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12. Item 7 in the document concerning the Hopley report was obviously meant as a kiss of death. Had the report been explicitly criticized it would have reawakened controversy and have brought it back to the public attention. Later, however, when confronted with criticism that the report was neglected in NSRB thinking, this item was used as "proof" that the report was always judged to be important.
disaster relief program delegated to the GSA, and that he had only
been there for one week on assignment from the NSRB. The letter was
released to the press the following day.\textsuperscript{13}

Other letters, from persons then more prominent, quickly followed.
Nor was the press coverage complimentary. On October 2, 1949, the
Associated Press distributed a story about civil defense opening with
the sentence: "If American cities were attacked tomorrow the Federal
Government would be ready with two civil defense planning organizations
totalling about a dozen men who have no authority whatsoever."\textsuperscript{14} The
story was presumably printed in many American newspapers.

On October 31, the press carried a letter released by Bernard Baruch
explicitly supporting Congressman Kennedy's public position. On
November 17, a letter to the Acting Chairman of the NSRB by David
Lillienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was released to
the public in which he calls attention to "the country's lack of a
civilian defense policy at a time of mounting fears over the possibility
of atomic warfare."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Kennedy's letter overstated the case somewhat unfairly, though
it is easy to see that his impression was honestly come by. The GSA
had great difficulty in initiating its planning job. The difficulty was
attributed, to a great extent, to a lack within the GSA of any person
knowledgeable in civil defense matters. As early as the middle of July,
the GSA had requested the NSRB to transfer a "civil defense expert" to
its staff. Obviously the transfer took place by the end of September.
Given the NSRB's mandate and definition of its job, all this was normal.
It is also interesting to note how the letter was presented in the press.
The October 10, 1949 issue of the \textit{New York Times} writes: "Representative
John F. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, warned today that the United
States was laying itself open to 'an atomic Pearl Harbor' by indifference
to civilian defense planning. In a letter to President Truman, Mr. Kennedy
wrote he was 'shocked' to find the only one government official
was working full time on such plans, despite the President's announce-
ment that Russia had achieved an atomic explosion."

\textsuperscript{14} The sentence was factually true. Another, probably, factually
true sentence at the time might have been: "If the American people were
to be attacked by an epidemic of bubonic plague tomorrow, the Government
health authorities would find that they have very little if any sera
available to combat the epidemic and no plans at hand to manufacture
such sera in necessary emergency quantities." It is fair to say that,
at the time, the probability of an "atomic" attack on American cities
was considered to be of the same relative degree as an outbreak of a
plague epidemic.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{New York Times}, November 18, 1949, front page.
On October 10, 1949 Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, announced that the committee had voted to conduct public hearings on the state of civil defense planning the following week. This forced the NSRB to face the crisis directly. In any such hearings it could only point to a bare beginning of planning for civil defense planning which, judging by the public temper prevailing at the time, would not be too impressive. Luckily for the Board, for reasons that were not ascertained, the committee hearings were delayed in two steps: by the time they began in March 1950, the NSRB could present a case that passed muster, and the public temper had already begun to die down.

The rising furor of Autumn, 1949 forced the NSRB to reconsider its original plans. It was decided to strengthen and expand the Civilian Mobilization Office, responsible for civil defense planning within the NSRB, and to appoint a prominent person as its chairman. The expanded office was expected to:

(1) speed up the overall civil defense planning as scattered throughout the existing agencies;
(2) formulate an emergency civil defense plan that could be implemented as a stop-gap measure, to satisfy the public demand, until a full-fledged national civil defense plan could be proposed; and
(3) establish and maintain much closer contact with the state and local governments and the public.

It took some time to find someone to assume the chairmanship of the office; on January 21, 1950 Dr. Steelman announced that Paul J. Larsen, then the director of the University of California Sandia Laboratory at Albuquerque, N. M., would assume that position on March 1.

But the basic thinking underlying the NSRB approach did not change; one can argue that it could not change since, despite the public clamor, the Board was still considered by the President and those immediately around him as a broad planning agency with no powers of implementation. The NSRB was just not the proper agency to do what the vocal public wished done. In announcing Mr. Larsen's appointment, the Current Activities Bulletin of March 1, 1950, an internal NSRB publication, listed the following as his responsibilities: civil defense, health resources, housing and community facilities, strategic relocation,
and censorship. It seems, however, that Mr. Larsen was forced to restrict his activities to civil defense from his first day as chairman.

Before the appointment of a chairman, steps were also taken to establish some control and guidance over the state and local populations. Using NSRB Document 121 as a vehicle, a series of Civil Defense Advisory Bulletins (NSRB Documents 121/1, 121/2, etc.) were issued. I say "as a vehicle," because there seems to be no reason to believe that such bulletins were intended by the Board when NSRB 121 was issued on October 5, 1949. The last Bulletin, (121/6) was issued on October 18, 1950, and was a relatively trivial announcement of the initiation of civil defense training courses for nurses. Bulletin 121/5, issued May 18, 1949, is also relatively trivial, being an announcement of the civil defense areas in which the American National Red Cross agreed to cooperate to the best of its abilities. The first four bulletins (December 1, 1949, January 13, February 3, and May 10, 1950) are all of one cloth and seemed to be aimed at slowing down state and local initiative in implementing an operational civil defense organization. The NSRB program was described in detail, its comprehensiveness stressed, and the time it would take for completion implied. At the same time, it was also strongly implied that since responsibility for civil defense in the nation is jointly shared by the state, local and Federal governments, it would be rather unwise for anyone to go beyond paper planning before the NSRB comes up with its intended national plan, a plan that should guide and coordinate the entire national effort. In many ways, the state and local governments were exhorted and induced to do more than plan, or at most legislate, to the virtual exclusion of any further steps towards an operational status.

The four Bulletins also included additional information, which presumably was to guide the desired planning, and pamphlets, primarily in the areas of atomic weapon damage effects. It can be truly said that this information was, at best, only useful as a guide for planning policy; even if the state and local governments had had adequate personnel--people with the necessary skill and experience--the planning job demanded of them on the basis of these documents would have still been horrendous. It would be surprising had the NSRB staff,
presumably well aware of the difficulties and pitfalls in complex planning, really expected the state and local governments to succeed in their planning efforts guided by such general, almost truistic, information, and without a framework of a national plan. But the question arises whether the NSRB staff wished, at that time, for the other governments to succeed in the task. Complaints from the state and local authorities were not slow in arising. They were voiced in the press, at public meetings, in letters to Washington, and before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee hearings.

And it might have worked. By May 1950 internal communications within the Office of Civilian Mobilization clearly indicated that they felt public pressure upon the Office to have abated. Some members of the Office suggested that it might be valuable to maintain public interest in the problem, but the suggestion was not greeted with enthusiasm. This phenomenon is fairly common in public matters: An event, in this case Soviet explosion, creates a sudden wave of intense public concern, but if it is not followed up by anything spectacular, that concern wanes just as suddenly. With the subsidence of public interest, pressure from the state and local governments would most probably have subsided as well, though, normally, this would have taken more time.

Paul Lersen assumed the chairmanship of the Office of Civilian Mobilization on March 1, 1950. His first pressing task was to present the NSRB case before two Senate committee hearings that were scheduled to start executive sessions within a few days; his second pressing task was to respond to the chorus of criticism from the state and local governments and to establish working relations with them. But before Larsen's activities are discussed, it is important to survey, albeit somewhat cursorily, the public Joint Atomic Energy Committee hearings. (The Senate Armed Services Committee also held meetings but they were not open to the public.)

During the first two weeks of March, a number of executive sessions were held of which information is not available but during which,
paraphrasing a statement of the Committee Chairman, the committee considered every aspect of this problem at great length. It was then decided, to continue the paraphrase, to hold a few open hearings in order both to alert the people to the problem and to inform them what is being done about it. Five open hearings were held, the first on March 17, 1950 and the last on April 3, 1950.

Two groups appeared at the meetings: on one side, representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the NSRB, uncritically defending the Federal civil defense effort, and on the other severe critics of the Federal effort, primarily representatives of the cities, spokesman for the American Municipal Association, and the American Legion. It is significant to note that no representatives of the state governments appeared. The criticism was severe and angry. The mayors and their representatives argued that they were more than ready to cooperate with Federal and State authorities in getting civil defense going, but that they were impatient unless the Federal Government assumed firm leadership and guidance. As far as the city authorities could see, the Federal Government played a negative role; instead of being a source for guidance it became a source of confusion, with various authorities officially saying many different things. The evils of the World War II Office of Civilian Defense were re relating themselves. As one mayor put it tersely: "Civil defense cannot be run by committee."

By and large, all the critics were action oriented. The American Legion supported the Hopley report without qualifications. Although some of the mayors criticized the report, expressing fear of a military takeover of civilian affairs, they all accepted its basic approach: that it was necessary to create some form of civil defense organization as soon as possible.


17. The record also contains a 6th hearing held on December 4, 1950, but this occurred in both a different context and different social climate and is not considered here.
One criticism deserves special mention. All critics complained of being left out of things, of not being either consulted with or considered. This did not make sense to them. To quote Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles: "It has been our experience, and I am speaking as a result of rather frequent conferences in my own State among mayors and other municipal officials, that no one has taken us into his confidence. We do not know what we are expected to do." Parenthetically, it may be noted that the states, from the outset, did not serve as adequate links between the Federal civil defense authorities and the cities. The reasons for this varied with each state but were almost all a result of the prevalent complex web of state-city relationships.

The net effect of the critical appearance by the city authorities was, most probably, to isolate them even more. To anticipate the narrative, two instances occurred later that year which can only be described as a remarkable snubbing of city authorities. On August 8, 1950, when all those concerned with civil defense "knew" that the NSRB was on the verge of completing its national civil defense plan, Mr. Carl H. Chatters, Executive Director of the American Municipal Association, wrote a friendly letter to Mr. Larsen. Its concluding paragraph reads:

You will be coming out September 1 with a plan of civilian defense which will be vital to all of the cities in the United States. It will be their guide in setting up civilian defense organizations. I believe it is so important that we cannot overlook the fact that the municipal organizations and at least a selected group of competent municipal people should be allowed to inspect the sub- and contents of these new instructions before they have been given out. I wish you would let me know what plans have been made along these lines.

The reply to this letter was sent by Mr. Gill for Mr. Larsen on August 18, 1950. He first apologizes for Mr. Larsen not answering the letter, saying he had to go on a trip. Then he writes:

18. JCAE Hearings, p. 84.
He asked me to reply, advising you that he fully agrees with your suggestion on the desirability of submission of the recommendations of our September report to competent municipal advisers. He feels that consultation on functional and other aspects of the report has been exhaustive and regrets that time demands now preclude the possibility of further conferences before the release of the report.

May I assure you that your constructive advice and your assistance to us is appreciated, and that we look forward with pleasure and confidence to a continued cordial cooperation in our mutual efforts to promote effective civil defense activity.

The American Municipal Association would hold its annual meetings during the first week of December. The news that President Truman had established the Federal Civil Defense Agency, appointed its first administrator, and proposed the civil defense law to Congress, and that both Senate and House hearings were to be called almost immediately, came while these meetings were in progress. No one at the meetings seemed to have any inkling that this would happen. The reactions that this generated among the mayors and their representatives can be seen by the following interchange which took place at the Senate hearings on the civil defense law on December 6, 1950. Mr. Richard Graves, Executive Director, League of California Cities, was testifying for the American Municipal Association. He criticized as unrealistic the dollar for dollar matching program suggested in the proposed law. The Chairman of the Senate committee asked him if he had a counter-suggestion:

Senator Kefauver. One question further. You said that the matching proposal was unrealistic. Do you have any specific formula for matching of funds?

Mr. Graves. Well, not specifically; no, Senator, I have not. As a matter of fact, you must realize that when I left my State there was no Executive Order creating a Civil Defense Administration; there was no Civil Defense Administrator; there were no bills actively pending in committee, and there was no determination to hold hearings. All this happened in one week.

Senator Kefauver. I appreciate that, Mr. Graves. Mr. Graves. And we are not prepared. I read the bill for the first time the day before yesterday.19

It should be stressed that conscious intention to snub the local authorities and their representatives need not be imputed to the NSRB. People sensitive to psychological nuances will have no difficulty in understanding how easy it could be for Mr. Gill not to have sensed the contradiction inherent in his letter. He truly may have wanted cooperation with the local authorities, but it was just impossible for him to reopen consideration and discussion on the then ongoing activities. In addition, again despite the best intentions, direct confrontation of the NSRB officials with the local authorities was bound to be highly unpleasant for the former. They were bound by Presidential policy expressed in the memorandum sent to John Steelman (see page 90), which was in direct opposition to the "activist" demands of the local authorities and were in no position to alleviate or mitigate the ensuing conflict. What can be more unplanned and spontaneous than taking advantage of an existing buffer, the Governors and state governments, to dampen the conflict and avoid the necessity of facing the discomfort? This attitude is reinforced when the use of this buffer is in the mainstream of American tradition and conforms to the "lessons of the LaGuardia period" during World War II which were still being cited. It is easy to point out that they should have been aware of their difficulties and acted accordingly; after all, if one plans a complex organization based on voluntary cooperation, it is self-defeating to alienate, ab initio, those segments of the potential organization from which the greatest degree of cooperation will eventually be demanded. But those levelling such criticism almost invariably speak with the wisdom of hindsight.

Whatever the initial intentions or attitudes of the various Senators were with respect to civil defense, it seems that the NSRB presented its case well. The Senate Armed Services Committee did not even bother to hold open hearings; and the open hearings held by the Joint Atomic Energy Committee petered out without any report being issued. No legislation was recommended. Upon reading these hearings it becomes difficult to avoid the judgment that their primary intent was to try to assuage the harsh critics of NSRB activities. The representatives of the Federal Government were treated with the greatest courtesy and
were given full opportunity to expand their remarks by the means of benevolent leading questions; and the severest criticisms voiced by the critics were generally countered in a tolerant didactic tone aimed at creating understanding.  

To return to the main narrative, Paul Larsen exhibited a flamboyance in matters of civil defense from the outset which did not bode the civil defense planning effort well. A month after the announcement of his impending appointment was made, and before he had even moved to Washington, Larsen announced in Albuquerque that he would soon present a program for the defense of the nation's capital from atomic attack.

Our first job will be relocation and redesign of the present governmental office setup in the capital. Dispersion, even out of the Washington area, and underground installations either in or out of the capital, will be our chief means of defense. We may utilize underground shelters within thirty or forty miles of Washington.

This announcement was not well received by the President. When questioned about Larsen's remarks during a news conference, President Truman flatly denied any intentions of planning to evacuate or disperse from Washington. Larsen was thus forced to publicly repudiate his remarks. At a meeting held in New York City on April 13, 1950, attended by representatives of twenty Eastern states and the District of Columbia for the purpose of setting up a permanent organization for planning and integration of civil defense efforts in the area, Larsen declared, "I can tell you one thing--Washington will continue to be the National Capitol whatever happens. We have no plans to move any important functions out of the District of Columbia."

As already noted, Mr. Larsen spent most of the time during his first weeks in office preparing for and attending various congressional hearings. As soon as these were over, he turned his attention to the

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20. The fact that public interest in civil defense also began to die down by this time most probably played a role as well.
growing state and local civil defense organizations. Although public enthusiasm and interest was waning, the actions taken at the state and local levels continued; witness the just mentioned forum of twenty Eastern states. During the months of April and May, Larsen attended many meetings throughout the country. His initial message was very similar to that contained in the NSRB advisory bulletins issued several months earlier; the one difference being that whereas in the earlier bulletins local organizations were "tolerated", Larsen enthusiastically encouraged the formation of state and local civil defense councils and legislation. His general position was that whereas the need for implementing civil defense plans was not pressing, the need for making and coordinating such plans at the state and local levels was distinctly acute. It was made clear, however, that the acuteness was not linked to any specific international situation; no reason for the acuteness was ever given, nor was any asked for, it being taken for granted by all those he addressed.

But the state and local authorities demanded more from the NSRB. One demand has already been mentioned: firmer instructions and guides on how to plan. The second demand was that some target date be set for the publication of the "national plan." Up to that time, the NSRB had argued that the planning was complex and difficult and that there was no emergency, and the date for a publication of a national plan was left open, implicitly not in the immediate future. The advisory bulletins had been issued sporadically and could not serve as a firm guide. The state and local authorities demanded more definiteness and commitment in the NSRB activities.

Larsen accepted these demands in principle. On May 11, 1950, at a conference held in New York City by representatives of 250 American cities, President Truman, in a message dealing primarily with problems of rent control, also announced that a comprehensive civil defense guide for state and local officials would be issued towards the end of the year. Larsen addressed the conference the next day and repeated the President's assurance; he gave no details, however, the major portion of his address being a defense of the NSRB.
against the mayors' criticisms repeated at the conference. He did, however, encourage the continuation of legislation and planning along present lines until the report be issued.

At this point, another interpolation is in order. Larsen assumed the directorship of the Office of Civilian Mobilization at a time when the NSRB was undergoing a change of administration. W. Stuart Symington was being nominated for the position of Chairman of the NSRB to replace the Acting Chairman, John R. Steelman. Upon assumption of the chairmanship on April 26, 1950, it is doubtful whether Symington turned his attention to civil defense; the civil defense responsibilities of the NSRB were still of relatively low priority and he undoubtedly turned his initial attention to more pressing matters. The records studied give no direct information as to when the administration of the NSRB first gave serious consideration to the activities going on within the Civilian Mobilization Office; but there is an indirect clue. Larsen's memorandum to Symington cited above (p. 84) is dated June 2, 1950. It is reasonable to assume that, since the controversy around the rejection of the "Hopley Report" was being kept alive by the cities and some State directors, this would be one of the first things the new Chairman would ask about. It is therefore also reasonable to conclude that Larsen operated with minimum supervision and control during his first three months of tenure as Director of the Office of Civilian Mobilization. Persons acquainted with what was going on in the Office during that time assert that he took advantage of this and formulated many policies and statements on his own, often without even consulting his Office staff. Nothing found in the records either supports or denies this allegation. Be that as it may, barring a more comprehensive study of available documents than was conducted in the present instance, it is difficult to determine just how the policies of the next few months were decided upon and the extent to which they reflected support in the Board proper or the Executive Office.

During the first week of June, more details of Larsen's plans were made public. On June 4, 5, and 6, 1950 the New York Times published a
series of three articles and an editorial on the state of civil defense preparedness in the nation. That paper took an "activist" view and found the situation woefully inadequate. This it attributed to the lethargy preceding Larsen's appointment; the impression was strongly conveyed that things were now changing. The first article in the series was devoted almost exclusively to the NSRB and to Larsen's plans, and it contained what seems to be the first public announcement that the Federal Government would issue an interim national plan on September 1, 1950 to be replaced by a comprehensive long-range plan by 1953. Very few details about the former were given, and no details about the latter. The interim plan would be aimed at demonstrating how local communities could cope with an air attack by using the services, materials, and facilities at hand. On the day of the publication of this article, Larsen also appeared on a national television program where he repeated this in substance. It is interesting to note that preceding him on that program was Representative John F. Kennedy who demanded that the President immediately submit a national civil defense law to Congress.

Details of this interim plan were presented the next month at a talk given on July 2, 1950 before the California State Disaster Council, the body that, by California law, was responsible for civil defense preparedness. What was to be submitted would not be a blueprint for state and local civil defense organizations but a guide for state and local planning. The guide would specify what would be needed for the organization but would leave it to the state and local authorities to plan the organization to meet these needs. It would also specify the degree of Federal fiscal responsibility and participation in local programs. In addition to the guide the Governors of each state would also be given maps of presumed target areas within their respective states. This would serve in turn as a guide to all authorities as to where to place the greatest emphasis from the standpoint of national security. Finally, the results of the Washington, D. C., Seattle, and Chicago exercises would be distributed to give the Governors and the metropolitan centers additional guidance on how to set up the interim
civil defense organization based upon available facilities.

In these exercises hypothetical bombs were to be exploded over the cities. Based upon the information released by the Atomic Energy Committee and distributed to the Governors as appendixes to the NSRB advisory bulletins (NSRB Documents 121/1, 121/2, and 121/3) the damage to these cities would then be calculated, the resources remaining and needed to cope with the damage estimated, and a plan made for those cities regarding how to effectively use the remaining resources. These examples were then to serve as aids to the Governors in planning for similar contingencies for the critical cities in their States.

The guide, presumably, would have consisted of a series of "how to do it" manuals; no comprehensive description of the proposed guide being found, its intended nature has been reconstructed by scattered references to it. The decision to compile such a guide and issue it by September 1, 1950 must have been taken some time in May. As already seen, the first mention of a National Plan to be issued by the end of the year was made on May 11 at the mayors' meetings in New York City. The September 1 date for issuing the plan, and the disclosure that it would be an interim plan leading to a long-term permanent plan, were given on June 4. The first reference found in the internal Office of Mobilization Research communications to the manuals that were to constitute the guide is dated June 8, a memorandum informing Larsen that work on the second manual had begun. In a document dated August 14, 1950 the proposed content for 28 civil defense manuals is listed. In an unsigned memorandum to the Chairman of the NSRB, dated September 14, 1950, four days after the "National Plan" had already been sent to the President for approval, and four days before it was to be transmitted to Congress and released to the public, the titles of 41 prospective manuals are listed, as well as the tentative publication dates for ten of them.23

23. The "National Plan" mentioned is entitled: "United States Civil Defense;" it is also referred to as "The Symington Report" and "The Blue Book." It will be considered in the next section. Suffice it to be said in the present context that it bears little, if any, relation to the planning program under discussion.
This was to be the answer to the complaint that Federal authorities were not giving sufficient guidance to state and local authorities for their civil defense efforts. Was it an adequate answer? Larsen certainly thought so. To quote from an unofficial transcript of his remarks at the California meeting:

Now we believe that from these three documents [the guide, the maps, and the results of the three city exercises] coming out on September 1, that every Governor will have at his command, all the information that's needed to set up the kind of organization which is required within the State. He will have all the knowledge to transmit down to the political subdivisions of the State, that information which will guide the local counties and cities and rural communities in the type organization sic and how to plan for that organization to meet an emergency in the event of enemy attack on any community within the United States.

Whether Larsen's belief was justified can never be demonstrated. History was to make the matter academic; as far as the available evidence shows, it was never put to any empirical test.

No written records whatsoever could be found to indicate what Larsen had in mind for the long-range civil defense program that was to supersede the interim plan. Persons active in the NSRB indicate that it was to be centered around a mass blast shelter program for the entire population estimated to cost several tens of billions of pre-Korean 1950 dollars. For many reasons, this was clearly an impossible program at that time and there is little wonder that it seems not to have been committed to writing.

It is useful to summarize what was going on in the state and local communities and review briefly what was going on in the Department of Defense during the time now under consideration.

The variegated organized social action resulting from the short-lived public clamor for civil defense that arose after the announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion did not abate with the waning of public interest in the issue; it continued, albeit at a slower pace. Some reasons for this are inherent in the phenomenon itself; once organizations are set up and action is taken in response to a certain impulse, the organizations tend to continue in their activities even
after the impulse is gone, and consequently seek reasons to justify their continued existence. In this latter area they were aided by the NSRB reaction to their appearance, particularly by the advisory bulletins and other official contacts. Even if the intention of the NSRB authorities was to slow down the development of a civil defense organization, by the same token, their actions gave it some sort of Federal stamp of approval, thereby "legitimizing" and supporting the process.

The series of three articles appearing in the early part of June in the New York Times has already been mentioned (See page 106). The series criticized the Federal Government for doing "too little." One contention, repeated several times, was that were the country to be attacked in the immediate or even near future, there would be no civil defense organization worth its name in any state to help and protect the citizens. And this contention was correct. The author of the series points out in an astonished and somewhat indignant tone (as far as the New York Times reporting style permits) that there were still nineteen states and one territory that had as yet not taken any steps, either legislative or administrative, towards setting up a basis for a civil defense organization. However, the other side of the same coin shows that there were twenty-nine states and three territories that had taken action; and these included all the heavily populated and industrial states of the Union, with the exception of Massachusetts. The high level of activity of the American Municipal Association and individual mayors has already been noted; albeit in a more restrained fashion, the Council of Governors also set up a civil defense committee and continuously remained active. Newspapers of these first six months of 1950 carry quite a few items on meetings or conventions by professional societies, social, fraternal, patriotic, and political organization where committees for civil defense were formed or decisions in favor of civil defense taken. Although this movement did not show signs of growing, it did now show any strong signs of waning either; and it was certainly in a condition to expand vigorously given the proper social or political conditions. With the
wisdom of hindsight it becomes obvious that the NSRB was sitting on a volcano.

One of the main forces supporting this public posture were the concomitant activities of the Department of Defense, activities which, until now, have been neglected in this section. Louis A. Johnson served as Secretary of Defense throughout the entire period under discussion. He was consistently in favor of the civil defense position taken by his predecessor, James Forrestal. The evidence for this is conclusive. It was already mentioned that NSRB Document 112, which spells out in detail the proposed NSRB approach for civil defense planning, was sent to all the members of the Board for approval. Secretary Johnson was the only member of the Board to criticize Document 112 at length in writing. The main gist of his criticism is that of the "activist" position; what is needed is not broad planning, but planning for setting up a functioning civil defense organization. Secretary Johnson's critique being rejected, he then accepted the responsibility delegated to the Department of Defense—the responsibility for civilian volunteer cooperation in active defense measures—and proceeded to implement it with reasonable effectiveness.

Even prior to the official delegation of responsibility to it, the National Military Establishment began taking action which came to the attention of the public. On June 4, 1949 a six-day, ten-state air defense exercise, "Operation Lookout," was announced for early in September. The exercise was sponsored jointly by the Air Defense Command and the Office of Civil Defense Planning. It was to utilize both radar and civilian volunteer ground observers in a test of air-defense plans. A recruitment plan for supervisors and civilians to man an estimated 1300 ground-observer posts was announced. Ten Northeastern states were to participate in the exercise. The actual call for volunteers was made on June 28.

During the months of July and August there were many newspaper references to this pending exercise, finally set for September 10 through September 16. The actual exercise was covered in detail by the New York Times although not on the front page. Ideally, the exercise would have called for 1,195 spotter posts in the ten-state
area with 25,000 volunteers needed. Actually 539 posts were set up, manned by 11,530 volunteers. Considering the fact that this was a first exercise and conducted during peacetime, the military judged this turnout as being good.

On January 13, 1950, twenty-five Governors were invited to send representatives to Washington to hear the Air Force plans for establishing an aircraft warning service to be manned by volunteer civilian ground observers. A Defense spokesman pointed out that these plans had just been tested in the recently held "Operation Lookout," that they would require thousands of volunteers, and would eventually be extended to all the states. On January 20, the state representatives, meeting in Washington, decided to start recruiting 150,000 civilian volunteers immediately for that purpose. There are ample press releases and news items to indicate that the campaign for volunteers was carried on with vigor and reasonable success during the months of February to June of that year. The only aspect of civil defense activity in the nation to meet with a qualified approval in the critical New York Times review mentioned above, was the military effort. The review quotes military authorities as estimating that upward of 60 percent of the required observation post supervisors were already enrolled and in various stages of training. Once these were ready for their duties, recruitment of the remainder of needed personnel would follow. Concluding its coverage of the military effort the review states: "the project already has a fairly solid nucleus in ten northeastern states as a result of 'Operation Lookout' held last September."

Another aspect of the Department of Defense activity needs to be mentioned--an aspect not specifically delegated to it by the NSRB. It will be recalled that Secretary Forrestal intended that the Office of Civil Defense Planning issue civil defense manuals for additional guidance to state and local authorities. Because of the hostile reception of the Hopley Report by the Executive Office, the plan came to naught. Nevertheless, both Secretaries Forrestal and Johnson continued the Office. It was finally abolished on August 1, 1949,
presumably when Secretary Johnson realized that he had been unable to modify NSRB Document 112, and that in the light of that document the Office for Civil Defense Planning had lost its reason for being. At the same time, however, he set up the Civil Defense Liaison Office with a staff of about ten persons, headed by Lt. Col. (later Col.) Barnet W. Beers.

Col. Beers was one of the most experienced men in the military establishment with respect to civil defense. He was a member of the staff responsible for the Provost Marshal's study, Recorder for the War Department Civil Defense Board headed by General Bull, and Executive Assistant to the Director of the Office of Civil Defense Planning, Mr. Hopley; he played an important role in the writing of reports issued by these three groups and was thoroughly and enthusiastically committed to the common theme running through them all, i.e., the need for establishing an operational civil defense organization.

What did the Office for Civil Defense Planning and the Civil Defense Liaison Office do from the time of the publication of the "Hopley Report" to June, 1950? Those remaining in the Office of Civil Defense Planning after November, 1948 continued working on the writing of manuals and further planning.

The ostensible purpose of the civil defense office was to coordinate NSRB planning with the military plans. But as has been discussed above, very few plans were formulated throughout this entire period. In the Associated Press story of October 1, 1949 (mentioned above in connection with the public reaction to the announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion), the following sentence appears: "The Civil Defense Liaison Office, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Barnet W. Beers, is attempting to aid state and local authorities in solving civil defense organizational problems." It should be recalled that when these same authorities turned to the NSRB for practical advice, they were generally answered in a manner which aimed at delaying action rather than facilitating it. In addition, judging again by various Associated Press reports, the Colonel
and other spokesmen for the military were in some demand to speak before various meetings and groups. Their message was unequivocal: it is imperative to get a functioning civil defense organization as soon as possible for the sake of national security. They served as an important driving force behind a position antithetical to that of the Executive and the NSRB.

It can thus be seen that the attempts of civilian authorities to initiate a broad, comprehensive civil defense planning effort took place under conditions of extreme adversity. The responsibility for such planning was assigned to an organization, the National Security Resources Board, which had great difficulty in defining and beginning to implement its major responsibility, the planning of an overall national mobilization posture in the event of a major war. Obviously, serious planning for a civil defense posture could not be undertaken until the major planning responsibilities of the NSRB could get under way. To further complicate matters, the NSRB was confronted with an almost continuous crisis on the part of the state and local government authorities, reflecting the opinion of a substantial, well organized segment of the public at large, who demanded that some sort of civil defense organization be set up immediately. This demand could not be met and the NSRB authorities tried to cope with it by various delaying tactics, hoping that it would subside. They probably would have succeeded, had they had enough time; but time was running out.

On June 25, 1950 President Truman announced that North Korea had invaded South Korea.
"In 1945-56 the American people had chosen to scuttle their military might. I was against hasty and excessive demobilization at the time and stated publicly that I was, and General Eisenhower, then Army Chief of Staff, spoke out against it also." At the outbreak of the Korean War, the number of available combat-ready troops and supplies was rather small, and a nagging question persisted: What could have been the purpose of the Soviet Union in permitting this war to start? It seemed reasonable that one purpose could be to get the United States to commit most of the available American combat troops and materiel to the Korean theater. Were this to be accomplished, the USSR would then be in a position to undertake a blitzkrieg of its own against another country or group of countries along the Soviet borders. Once this lightning war were completed, the Soviet Union could then offer peace and, as a token of good will, might even be willing to retreat half-way.

This assumes a Soviet program aimed at maximum objectives; but there was no reason to believe that the Soviet Union's aims were so ambitious. The interesting thing about this maximum program is that even it precludes an attack upon the continental United States; the main purpose of the Soviets being the grabbing of territory in such a manner as to make the United States unwilling to fight to regain that territory. Pearl Harbor demonstrated convincingly that an attack on American territory proper is not a wise method of achieving such an end. An air attack upon the continental United States becomes even less probable when programs of lesser magnitude are considered.

In addition it should be kept in mind that the Soviet air force capability was rather restricted at that time. At best it could send heavy bombers on one-way, i.e., suicidal, missions over the United States and inflict heavy damage and many casualties, but it was to be strongly doubted that such strikes, necessarily limited in number,

2. Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N. Y., p. 345.
THE PUBLIC TAKES OVER: KOREA

The public's reaction to the announcement of the explosion of the Soviet atomic device was but a mere ripple when compared to its reaction to the announcement of the invasion of South Korea. Writing in a different context the eminent political scientist Louis J. Halle tersely describes the mood and temper of the times:

Not in its entire history had the American people felt themselves so desperately on the defensive. In September, 1949 they had been shaken by the news that the Soviet Union years earlier than anticipated, had produced an atomic bomb. By the end of the year Moscow had, as they say it, added the whole mainland of China to its empire. Six months later it had attacked Korea in an operation that might well be the prelude to an attack on West Germany. Most alarming of all, it was thought to have infiltrated the entire structure of American society with its agents, perhaps even to have gained a measure of control over the Government in Washington. Along the highways of Virginia, service-station attendants stopped scanning the skies for Russian bombers only long enough to scrutinize their customers suspiciously. Everywhere, notices of what to do in case of enemy attack sprung up. New York State instituted an air raid warning system, set up 600 observations posts, and recruited 14,000 "spotters." Plans were made for the evacuation of big cities. Food and medical supplies were stockpiled.¹

The narrative in this section deals with what followed: spontaneous emergency of a "grass-roots" civil defense movement, over which the Federal authorities responsible for civil defense lost all control.

The North Korean attack caught this nation relatively unprepared. As President Truman put it in his memoirs when discussing the attack:

could paralyze the country. The effect of such strikes would most probably be to infuriate the population and strengthen its will to continue the war until "victory or death." With this analysis in mind, and the fact that the American Strategic Air Force could, at the time, deliver a far more potent air strike against the Soviet Union than the Soviet air force could deliver against the United States, a Soviet air strike against the American civilian population ceases to make military sense.

One case can be made for a possibility of an air attack upon American cities. Were the Korean war to escalate into a war fought in Eurasia between the United States and the Soviet Union, and were it going very badly for the Soviets, then, taking a leaf from Hitler's notebook, they might have been goaded into staging a mass terror, revenge attack for no clear military purpose. But whatever people may think about Stalin, in this respect he did not resemble Hitler and such behavior on his part was not too credible. Nevertheless, a gnawing doubt may well have remained.

In any case subsequent behavior on the part of the President, those close to him, and the senior military personnel seems to indicate that they never really considered an air attack upon the United States to constitute a "clear and present danger" demanding immediate precautionary action. The problems which confronted them seemed to be radically different. First there was the military-political problem of containing the war in Korea while demonstrating that "aggression does not pay." This entailed fighting the war in such a way that the Soviet Union was not given an excuse for escalating it, if it so wished, nor frightened into escalation against its wishes.

Second, the United States was again confronted with the need to mobilize its resources rapidly, both to fight a limited war and to reassume a military posture that would enable it to meet all other possible threats on the Eurasian land mass. But a crash, "all-out" effort such as occurred during World War II was excluded for two reasons: First, such an effort would tend to belie the intention of
the strategic, political decision to confine the war to Korea; and second, the President was unwilling to pay the economic price demanded by such an effort, i.e., the functional dislocation of the peacetime civilian sector of the economy and an accompanying inflation.

Thus, the United States would have to mobilize this time under a new constraint: the strictest possible minimalization of national resources devoted to defense purposes—a minimalization far stricter than would be required by efficiency. Yet the main request by state and local authorities, as far as civil defense was concerned, was for resources, whether in the form of personnel, materiel, or money. Under such conditions, it is easy to see the conflict that could develop within the Executive Branch when confronted with pressing demands to allocate scarce resources to a project which it felt to be inherently unnecessary.

The national mobilization effort resulting from the outbreak of the Korean conflict put a strain on the entire Executive Branch of the government; it is hard to imagine any Executive department or agency escaping the imposition of new and urgent responsibilities. The strain "broke" the NSRB. It will be recalled that the NSRB was established in order to formulate emergency mobilization plans during peacetime and to assume the responsibility for implementing them in the event of an emergency. Now the emergency had arrived and it had neither viable plans nor a corps of personnel with administrative experience to implement whatever plans anyone could come up with. Other Executive agencies were brought in to fill the gap and new bodies were established to meet the needs of remobilization. An emergency group, set up within the Department of Commerce right after the outbreak of hostilities, formulated what was to become the Defense Production Act of 1950, Public Law 774, approved September 8, 1950. On October 4, 1950 the President established the Rusk Committee. The National Advisory Committee on Mobilization Planning was established on October 11, 1950; the Office of Defense Mobilization was created.
on December 16, 1950, and both the Defense Production Administration and the Defense Mobilization Board were created on January 3, 1951. Directly following the creation of these new bodies, the NSRB was stripped of most, if not all, of its operational responsibilities, and much of its staff was transferred to the Executive Departments, agencies, boards, and committees which has assumed these responsibilities.

It is not difficult to imagine the effect of this overall collapse of the NSRB on the Office of Civilian Mobilization whose name was now changed to the Civil Defense Office. Since overall pre-Korean planning within the NSRB was at a standstill, it meant that the great part of civil defense planning which was tied in with the effort was also at a standstill. In addition, major problems arose with the GSA which has assumed the responsibility for planning the most important aspect of civil defense from the public standpoint, i.e., planning for war disaster relief.

During the early part of July, 1950 the newly renamed Civil Defense Office reorganized and seemed to set itself one primary goal: to collect whatever information could be obtained and write the manuals so that at least some could be published by September 1. The impression to be gained from the reading of the Office records of that period is that its personnel, steadily growing in number, were almost exclusively preoccupied with this task. The pressure on all concerned to turn out the required manuals by September 1 had started earlier with the decision to publish a "National Plan" by September 1; this pressure had already led to a conflict with the GSA.

The decision to issue a National Plan by early September was communicated to Mr. James T. Gobbel, Director of Wartime Civil Disaster Relief Planning within the GSA. The first volume of the series of manuals which were to constitute the National Plan was to be written by his group. He was advised that an outline of each chapter should be submitted to a representative of the Office of Civilian Mobilization by June 15 and that if he had any questions
about the manuals they too should be submitted at that time. This Mr. Gobbel did. With the chapter outline he submitted close to five pages of specific questions on policy matters in fourteen major areas, requesting that they be either explicitly or assumptively answered; he felt that he could not prepare any sort of realistic civil defense plan unless he was provided with either answers or working assumptions for the questions asked.

Mr. Gobbel's fourteen questions were:

1. What kind of civil defense legislation will be included in the plan?

2. How will the responsibilities for civil defense be allocated among the Federal Government, the states, and the local governments?

3. What provisions are made for financing the national civil defense effort?

4. What kind of Federal control over the civil defense organization is suggested?

5. What arrangements will be made for the specification and procurement of civil defense equipment and supplies?

6. What provisions will be made for the ownership and control of the civil defense equipment and supplies?

7. Will there be provisions for commandeering the necessary equipment and supplies during emergencies?

8. What are the policies with respect to manpower requirements of the organization?

9. How will the personnel be recruited and placed?

10. What is the NSRB policy towards protective shelters?

11. What is the NSRB policy towards evacuation?

12. Will there be a warden service or is it unnecessary?

13. What is considered to be a "typical municipal organization" for various sized cities?

14. Are mobile reserves to be included in the organization or not?
In addition, Mr. Gobbel voiced his opposition to labeling the plan "official." Given the time allowed for "preparing, reviewing, approving, and printing the 'September Plan'" he believed it to be inevitable that it would contain numerous shortcomings and quite possibly, outright errors. He suggested rather that it be issued as a proposed plan and that the Governors and interested state and local officials be asked for their comments and approval. Only after such were obtained and, by implication, the plan was thoroughly reviewed within the Federal Government, should a national plan be issued.

The reply to his request was sent on July 5, 1950; none of his questions were answered nor was his objection to the issuing of an official national plan considered. Several weeks later the GSA notified the NSRB and the other agencies to which it in turn redelegated part of the responsibility for wartime disaster relief planning, that it was relinquishing its responsibility in the area. With this, delegated disaster relief planning all but ceased and the NSRB could not expect any manuals in this area to be forthcoming from non-NSRB sources.

The first drafts of the manuals being prepared within the Civil Defense Office began appearing early in August and were sent out for review. They encountered immediate trouble. Many shortcomings and factual errors were, as anticipated by Mr. Gobbel, found, and it is doubtful whether any of these first drafts were approved by the reviewers. Time was running out and no "National Plan" was in sight. A few days before September 1, 1950, the NSRB announced that the issuing of the "National Plan" was to be delayed.

As indicated at the beginning of this section, the above described activities of the Civilian Defense Office were precipitated to a large extent by the public reaction to the Korean conflict, especially as this reaction was expressed by members of Congress. A slight indication of the nature of the reactions will be given first and then the public reaction will be described in somewhat more detail.
No record can exist of the talk that occurred either over the telephone or during face-to-face meetings but, in the nature of things, and judging from the amount of written correspondence available, much of the former must have taken place as well. Two letters sent to the Chairman of the NSRB are examples of the accelerated correspondence which developed between Congress and the NSRB.

On July 12, 1950, Senator Estes Kefauver, writing as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Defense of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to Stuart Symington. In it he pointed out that since the hearings his committee had held in March of that year, the committee had been favorably inclined towards the efforts of Mr. Symington's staff and had recognized the progress that was being made. However, now the time elements involved had become much more critical than anticipated and "if it is humanly possible to do so, legislation in this field should be submitted to the Congress prior to September."

Another letter sent to Stuart Symington by Cecil B. Dickson, Coordinator of Information of the US House of Representatives, is dated July 10, 1950. In it he informs the Chairman that he has recently received many inquiries from Senators and Congressmen concerning civil defense plans which were originating with Mayors of cities. He interpreted this as indicating that the Mayors were unaware of the proper procedures for obtaining civil defense plans, i.e., by addressing their inquiries to the Governors of their respective states, and therefore thought it may be a good thing were the Chairman to advise the Mayors of the proper procedures. Mr. Dickson's interpretation was wrong; the Mayors were well aware of the procedures instituted by the NSRB, they were trying to bypass them as well as to apply pressure to have them changed. It scarcely need be noted, in addition, that many of the requests which Congressmen directed to Mr. Dickson were also sent to Mr. Symington's desk--many are to be found in the record, as well as others of the same genre.

A slight excursion into some quantitative analysis may be useful at this point in order to communicate some feeling for the impact of
the Korean conflict upon the public. Upon reading the press of the
time, the conviction arises that the coverage of Civil Defense re-
flected public interest and awareness. Figure 1 lists the number of
items on civil defense printed in the New York Times, for semi-
monthly periods from January, 1946 to December 1950, i.e., each month
is given two columns, the first column gives the number of civil de-
fense items appearing in the first fifteen days of the month, the
second column gives the number of items appearing in the remainder
of that month.

Out of a total of 506 items, 366, or slightly over 70 percent of
the total, appear during the last six months of 1950—the months
following the outbreak of the Korean hostilities. In addition, it can
be seen that the declassification of the Bull Report slightly increased
the public coverage; the "ripples" caused by the release of the Hopley
Report and the announcement of the Soviet explosion are also apparent.
Were this table to have presented the lineage devoted to the subject,
the difference between the pre-Korean period and the post-Korean period
would be much greater and the effect of the "ripples" would be more
striking. These would again be increased were the items to be weighted
for their display, i.e., by giving more weight to an item appearing on
the front page than to one "buried" inside. It is interesting to note
that not one of these items reflects opposition to civil defense. In
other words, they are all stories of people speaking for or taking
action in behalf of civil defense or criticizing others for not doing
enough for civil defense. If there was any opposition to civil defense
in the country during this time, it either did not come to the attention
of the News Editor of the New York Times or he did not deem that which
came to his attention to be newsworthy.

3. The analysis was restricted to the New York Times because it
was easily available. It is therefore biased to reflect the New York
metropolitan area more than any other area within the nation, an area
which was among the most active in civil defense throughout this
stretch of time. Nevertheless, the New York Times is the closest
thing in the nation to a national newspaper and the analysis is intro-
duced as an example rather than a "scientific" index of the public
feeling.
FIGURE 1  Semi Monthly Number of Items on Civil Defense in the New York Times 1946–1950
The information found in Figure 1 can be viewed in another way, which is also instructive. Since every item appearing in the figure is a story about an action or actions taken on behalf of civil defense by some actor or actors, the distribution of the classes of such actors with time will roughly indicate who was bearing the main burden of acting for civil defense during any given period. This information is given in Table 2.

Table 2

SEMI-ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF CLASSES OF ACTORS IN NEW YORK TIMES CIVIL DEFENSE NEWS ITEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Actor</th>
<th>Number of Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, Local Governments and Public Organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to Editor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How, specifically, were these newspaper items classified? All items reporting actions taken by the military authorities or speeches made by officers on active duty in the armed services and speaking as representatives for the armed services are included in the first class: the Military.
All actions taken by the President or by persons speaking as representatives of departments or agencies in the Executive Branch, etc., are included in the second class: Federal Government. The Red Cross, when appearing as a government agent, is also included in the second class.

The third class, Congress, raised some difficulties. Only those stories reporting on actions by Congress as a body or of committees of Congress or members of Congress acting as Congressmen were included. If and when a member of Congress acted primarily as a representative of his constituents he is included in the fourth class; there are about five or six items of this nature—the letter of John F. Kennedy offering the best example of this class. In addition, stories about committee hearings devoted almost exclusively to the testimony heard were included in the fourth class.

The fourth class consists primarily of announcements of actions taken by state and local governments or by their representatives and actions taken by various public organizations and associations, e.g., veteran organizations, political organizations, professional organizations, trade unions, etc.

The fifth class includes items representing the newspaper proper such as editorials, commentators—primarily Hanson W. Baldwin—and surveys or stories by reporters obviously initiated by the paper.

The sixth class consists of letters to the editor that were printed.

The table speaks for itself. If the last three classes are considered to "voice" the public reaction to civil defense, the preponderance of public reaction following the outbreak of the Korean hostilities is astonishing. Over 86 percent of the items appearing in the last half of 1950 are in those three classes.

What are the main contents in the news items appearing during the last half of 1950?

Items concerning military activities consisted almost exclusively of reports on successful progress in setting up the aircraft warning systems and the volunteer aircraft spotter organization. This was a
continuation of the activity which followed "Operation Lookout" and had also played a prominent role in the news coverage of military actions during the first half of 1950. To the extent that the public followed such matters, the picture communicated by the press was that the military was getting things done.

Prior to September 18, the date the "National Plan" was published in the press, most of the items have various government spokesmen, primarily from the NSRB, trying to reassure the public and promising that most of the civil defense problems will be well on the way to solution with publication of the plan. With the publication of the plan, items on Federal civil defense action disappear almost completely until December 2 when the establishment of the Federal Civil Defense Agency and the appointment of its first director are announced. After the establishment of the FCDA, Federal civil defense activities re-emerge in the news but in a context that is not germane to the present narrative since they concern FCDA activities. During this period, from July to December of 1950, roughly half the items in this class precede publication of the plan, one third of the items cover the activities of the FCDA, and the remaining items are straight reporting of the plan proper.

It is obviously difficult to summarize simply the wealth of the material to be found in the items in the fourth class, state and local governments, and public organizations. But a painstaking summary is not necessary. Suffice it to note that about one third of the items are of criticism, to some extent or other, of the Federal Government's actions both before and after publication of the "National Plan."
The rest of the items are primarily concerned with describing positive action in the fields of state and local legislation, and the actual setting up of a working organization on the local levels which included calls for tens and even hundreds of thousands of volunteers. In addition, beginning in November, a growing number of items appear describing conflicts and lack of coordination both within and among the many bodies and groups which were active at the local levels, conflicts and misunderstandings that were a necessary consequence of
the rather disorganized manner by which the bodies and groups were set up.

Civil defense was transformed, by its own momentum, into a "mass movement" over which the Federal authorities had lost all control and which swept with it the state and local governments. The rather frenetic rush and upsurge of local actions precluded careful planning and thinking at all levels. The careful admonition of all the military thinking on civil defense, an admonition of which the NSRB planners were aware of and accepted (i.e., that an effective national civil defense posture demands overall Federal coordination and leadership) was lost sight of; the principle of "self-help" was interpreted to mean local autonomy. All the Federal Government was now expected to do was to supply the material and financial aid required. But no legal base was available for such Federal aid; hence the cry that arose throughout the nation for a Federal civil defense law.

It became politically difficult for either the Executive or Congress to resist this public upsurge and clamor. This was the atmosphere in which, on September 18, the "National Plan" appeared. This was the atmosphere in which Public Law 920 was written and passed. As already noted in a footnote above (p. 108), the National Plan, entitled: The United States Civil Defense, NSRB Document 128, had very little in common with the main activity of the Office of Civilian Mobilization and the Civil Defense Office of the preceding months, and served as a source of additional confusion.
The narrative so far has disclosed a fascinating paradox. Despite many disagreements as to particulars, the need for a viable civil defense organization was recognized by the responsible senior authorities in both the Military Establishment and the civilian branches of the Government: the Executive Branch and Congress. Yet the basic plan underlying the national civil defense effort, the Public Law that stemmed from that plan, and the civil defense organization set up on the basis of that law, were coerced upon these authorities against their will by public pressure. The resulting law and organization were therefore a compromise by the authorities and as such shows the weaknesses inherent in coerced compromises. It is doubtful that the authorities had faith in the outgrowth of the compromise, the Federal Civil Defense Administration; behavioral evidence is available to indicate that they did not really expect the FCDA to succeed. The main reasons for such an expectation have been given in the preceding chapter: an attack on the United States was not considered to be a clear and present danger, and there was an overriding need to undertake a remobilization program in a peacetime economy with a scarcity of resources. Hence, it seems proper to look upon the FCDA and Public Law 920 as sops to assuage the public in order to permit the Government to more fully attend to problems which it considered far more pressing and important.

It must be stressed emphatically that this analysis does not imply that the actors on the scene at the time were actually aware of all the nuances explicated in the preceding pages and summarized in the above paragraph even though their behavior was certainly affected
by these factors. The expectation that the actors should have been aware of all this stems from a misperception of human thought processes and decision-making very prevalent in contemporary thought on how men think. It is wrongly assumed that men "naturally" think analytically, i.e., that before taking action they carefully analyze as many relevant factors of the situation as possible and then explicitly take as many of them into account as possible.

Rather, if the facts support any generalization, it is that men think intuitively, in the naive dictionary meaning of the word. That is, they consciously focus upon and attend to but a few salient aspects of the problem situation around which, implicitly, they organize the problem and then persevere at it until, at present mysteriously, a way of action makes sense. The effective problem solver does take the manifold of factors in the situation into consideration, however, even though he is not explicitly aware of doing so. Crucial factors play a role in determining the formulation of the problem similar to the role of tacit or implicit assumptions in an argument. The great German introspective and phenomenological psychologists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were aware of this role and coined several terms that pointed to it, e.g., apperceptive mass, problem positing, determining tendency, etc. Analytic thinking is neither "natural" nor easy; it demands both time perspective and real time; both available after the event, but obviously not available to the actors in the situation.

1. The word "unconscious" is seemingly appropriate for the occasion; it will not be used however because of the mystical, mythological connotative baggage that it has accrued during the past few decades.

2. Many of the facts justifying the above analysis have already been presented. The "Blue Book," the Congressional hearings on Public Law 920, and the law itself support it; unless this analysis is assumed to be true, much of these documents does not make sense. Finally, there are other actions taken within a context outside the immediate purview of this narrative that also indicate the validity of this analysis. Without going into details, among the most important of these actions are: (1) taking away the responsibility of natural disaster relief from the FCDA; (2) the setting up of Project East River by the NSRB and the DoD; (3) the almost total loss of Congressional interest in civil defense once the law was passed; and (4) the fact that the military establishment after all its earlier efforts would have as little as possible to do with the FCDA.
Contemporary thinking about the origin of the American civil defense effort--to the extent that such thinking goes on--has lost sight of this paradox and consequently finds itself in trouble when trying to explain strange aspects of the record. It has, therefore, been forced into oversimplified explanations in terms of "good guys" and "bad guys" or "wisdom" and "stupidity." This is not of much help and is probably a hindrance because it further muddies already muddied waters. Many of the difficulties later to confront the FCDA stem directly from the paradox and hence become inexplicable when the paradox is not taken into account. Remedial action and policy decisions based on a faulty analysis of earlier civil defense failures must therefore be significantly wanting.

To resume the narrative, United States Civil Defense was released to the public on September 18, 1950 as the National Plan for civil defense. The first 103 of its 149 pages consist basically of a watering down of the Hopley report, with several significant changes in content, tone, and emphasis to be discussed later. Fifteen pages follow which purport to be a guide on how to plan for local civil defense. On the face of it these pages seem to be the manual that must have been written for the proposed experimental exercises that were to be held in Washington, Chicago, and Seattle. Newspaper reports indicate that the Washington exercise was held, but no evidence was found to indicate whether the Chicago and Seattle exercises were held. Be that as it may, whatever may have been learned in whatever exercises were held, was not communicated in this document.

At the end there is an appendix with four exhibits: a model state organization chart; a model local organization chart; a bill to authorize a Federal civil defense organization; and a suggested model for a state civil defense act. There is no proposed Federal organization chart.

4. See the resume of Larsen's speech above (p.189).
The suggested model for the state civil defense act is, with some minor amendments, a word-for-word copy of the suggested state act to be found in the Hopley report. It may therefore be presumed that the suggested Federal Act is also the one formulated by the Office of Civil Defense Planning and mentioned in the Hopley report but never published.

With the exception of the fifteen pages which were presumably taken from the exercise planning manual, the rest of the proposed "National Plan" seems to have been taken almost in its entirety from the Hopley report. How did this come about? The story goes, and there seems to be no reason not to believe it, that when the GSA informed Chairman Symington not long before the September 1 deadline that it would not meet its responsibility for war disaster relief planning, the Chairman realized that the NSRB could not, within so limited a time, produce anything that could pass muster. Turning for help he found it in the DoD Civil Defense Liaison Office headed by Col. Beers. Col. Beers had had rich experience and played an important role in writing all the other major national documents on civil defense until that time; he and his staff had little difficulty in producing the required first draft for the needed national plan.

Before proceeding to the discussion of the "National Plan," it is necessary to digress briefly in order to clear up the historical record. With the publication of the "Plan," Chairman Symington also announced the resignation of the Director, Paul J. Larsen. Although no publicity was given to the matter, William Gill resigned at the same time. Thus, the Office of Civil Defense lost its two senior administrators at a crucial moment in its existence. The acting directorship was assumed by James J. Wadsworth. Mr. Wadsworth had

5. It is interesting to note that it is accompanied by the following footnote: "Based on legislation developed by the Council of State Governments in the period 1941-1948."
joined the staff three months earlier, in June. His experience prior to joining the office was administrative, in the Government and in civilian organizations dealing with the government. Beyond these administrative abilities he seemed to have no particular experience with civil defense as a specialized problem area. During the few months preceding his appointment he had been primarily responsible for getting the manuals ready for publication. He was acting director for about six weeks, until December 1, 1950, when by Executive Order, President Truman established the Federal Civil Defense Administration and nominated Millard F. Caldwell to be its first administrator, a person who had no experience at all with civil defense. These were six weeks of relative inaction and time-marking. With the establishment of the FCDA a new history begins, a history beyond the scope of the present narrative.

The tone differentiating the National Plan from the Hopley report is blazoned forth on the first page. It is set in the opening paragraph: "Plans for civil defense, therefore, must be made with full recognition of the importance of maximum economy in the use of the available supply of men, money, and materials." Civil defense is defined as "the protection of the home front by civilians acting under civil authority to minimize casualties and war damage and preserve maximum civilian support of the war effort." (p. 3, not stressed in original.) Who the civil authorities are to be is not spelled out, but the entire context of the report indicates that they are the local governments: it is explicitly written out on the schematic representation of the proposed civil defense organization appearing on the opposite page that the assigned responsibilities of the State and Federal governments will be to "furnish aid and supplies as needed." The Plan goes on to assert that: "Civil defense rests upon the principle of self-protection by the individual, extended to include mutual self-protection on the part of groups and communities. ... Civil defense is conceived as a system which will depend largely on cooperation between critical target areas and the communities around them." (pp. 3 and 4.) No other principles are mentioned.
The schematic representation of the proposed civil defense organization on the opposite page has already been alluded to. It consists of four concentric circles. In the middle of the innermost circle is a figure of a man, the largest and most prominent figure in the representation, captioned the individual, calm and well-trained. Right behind him there is a group of four smaller figures standing together, an elderly lady and a young woman holding on to two children, captioned the family, the base of organized self-protection. Immediately behind them are the neighborhood and the community. In the second circle one finds the nearby cities whose responsibility is to move in mutual aid as needed; and in the third and fourth circles are the State and Federal Governments respectively.

The attitudes underlying this opening message seem clear enough. Not much should be expected from the Federal Government, or from the states for that matter. The civil defense emergency is regarded as the creation of the cities and local communities; they are to bear the main burden for it.

How does the Hopley report treat these matters? Civil defense is defined as "the organization of people to minimize the effects of enemy action. More specifically it is the mobilization, organization, and direction of the civilian populace and necessary supporting agencies to minimize the effects of enemy action...." (p. 1.)

At first glance, "the mobilization, organization, and direction of the civilian populace" may be understood to denote the same thing as "civilians acting under civil authority" but their connotations, implications, and insinuations are different. Of course, more careful consideration will show that the denotations are significantly different too. "Civilians acting under civil authority" does not denote "mobilization, organization, and direction."

Following the definition and principles in the National Plan is a discussion of responsibilities. "The responsibility of the Federal Government is to establish a national civil defense plan with accompanying policy, and to issue informational and educational material about both." (p. 5.) Had the occasion arisen it would have been
possible to argue, on the basis of this sentence, that the Federal Government had to a great part met its responsibility with publication of the Plan. However, several further Federal responsibilities were noted: "to provide courses and facilities for schooling and training, provide coordination for interstate operations, furnish some of the essential equipment, and advise the States concerning the establishment of stockpiles of medical and other supplies needed at the time of disaster." (p. 5.) And this is all the Federal Government committed itself to in this "National Plan."

The section on Federal responsibility concludes with a sentence that is irrelevant to the question of responsibilities, but otherwise revealing: "In matters of civil defense, the Federal Government will deal directly with the State, i.e., the governor. ..." If I were limited to producing only one bit of evidence to support the judgment that the senior authorities did not clearly wish the effort to succeed, I could not do much better than to cite this sentence. All experience to that date, of World War II and of the preceding year of intensified activities, seemed to demonstrate conclusively that this would not work. The careful planning under the military auspices recognized this. The mayors of the cities, whether their cities were designated "critical target areas" or not, took every available opportunity to decry this particular feature of Federal policy as a main factor in vitiating effective civil defense. It is difficult to imagine such a policy statement just slipping through, out of place, in the short and very important section dealing with the responsibilities of the Federal Government for civil defense. And, given all the above, it becomes even more difficult to imagine that anyone earnestly seeking the success of the proposed civil defense organization, among all those who participated in its review and authorization, could fail to raise questions about the appropriateness of this statement and at the very least try to have it modified or softened.

The responsibility "to provide leadership and supervision in all planning for civil defense, and direction of supporting operations
in an emergency" was unequivocally assigned to the individual States. With this the Federal Government stripped itself of responsibilities which had been the sine qua non for Federal participation throughout the entire preceding period of thinking about civil defense, including the NSRB planning. In fact, now that the "Plan" was published, there was practically nothing left for the Federal Government to do. It should be noted that these responsibilities were returned, at least in part, to the Federal Government by Public Law 920.

The Department of Defense and the military authorities were explicitly excluded from any responsibility for operation of the civil defense organization. Their responsibilities were limited to the following:

1. To render guidance to the Federal agency in determining potential targets.
2. To furnish information as to the probable nature of attack and recommending counter measures.
3. To determine the passive-defense measures required in support of the military.
4. To warn of impending attack.
5. To assist in the event of war-caused disasters where possible, upon the request of proper authority.
6. To dispose of unexploded ordnance after an attack.
7. To render technical assistance in training programs for key civil defense personnel.

Martial law in areas commonly administered by civil authorities would be considered only as a last resort, to be replaced by civil administration as soon as possible.

The main body of the plan (pp. 33 to 103) consists of a list of the different kinds of services that will be needed in the organization. The list is identical with the list to be found in the Hopley report; no services are added and some services are played down considerably. An instance of the latter is the treatment of defense against radiological, bacteriological, and chemical warfare; these are treated so skimpily as to afford very little guidance for action. In fact,
all the services are treated rather skimpily; 208 pages of tight writing in small type in the Hopley report are reduced to 70 pages of loose writing in large type.

The one novel aspect of the plan was the first version of what was eventually to become the "law of the land" with respect to civil defense--Public Law 920. This version contains most of the substance eventually to be included in the law, even though the act was greatly changed in many respects. Various motivations express themselves in this version, in later versions, and in the final act itself. It is not surprising to find that what was finally legislated was a compromise. But this is not necessarily bad in a law since it may lead to flexibility; if a law embodies various viewpoints it can systematically and legitimately be reinterpreted by shifting the emphasis from one viewpoint to another. The Federal Civil Defense Act therefore is inherently a rather flexible law, despite the limitations in the underlying compromise.

Since one is not necessarily aware of motivations, and especially since many groups and individuals contributed towards the final version of the law, the various motivations need not be consistent and may even be self-contradictory. The initial draft of the law to be found in the "Blue Book" contains a serious motivational conflict. On the one hand, as presumed above, its substance stems from the Hopley report--written by a group of men who assumed that the effective leadership of the national civil defense effort, and obviously the control without which leadership cannot be exercised, would reside in the Federal Government; on the other hand, the opening paragraphs in this draft, which detail the responsibilities of the Federal and

6. The word "motivation" is preferrable in this context to the word "intention." People are presumed to be aware of their intentions, whereas they are presumed not to be necessarily aware of their motivation. Motivations are judged, primarily, through actions and behavior; intentions are judged almost exclusively by words. When a person's actions conflict with his words, and if it is believed that he is truthful to the best of his ability, a judgment is reached that he is not aware of his motivation. Obviously, it is not necessarily the case that a person is always unaware of his motivations, nor even of a large percentage of them. The discussion which follows is speculative.
state and local governments, were obviously written by senior members of the NSRB, presumably in consultation with senior members of the Executive and White House staff, who looked upon the law and the emerging civil defense organization as an undesirable development forced upon them against their will. In Section 1 of the proposed act, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator is assigned the following responsibilities:

1. plan, review, and coordinate the civil defense activities of the Federal Government, as well as coordinate these with the activities going on in the states, territories, United States possessions, and neighboring countries;

2. develop a coordinated program of research;

3. develop a coordinated training program;

4. distribute supplies, materiel, and make necessary financial contributions;

5. assist the states in negotiating mutual aid compacts; and

6. take emergency action in the event of enemy attack.

Following this list of responsibilities at the end of this section is a "strange" sentence: "It is recognized that the organization and operation of civil defense is the responsibility of the States and their political subdivisions except for the coordination, guidance and necessary assistance from the Federal Civil Defense Administration as set forth in this act." (p. 126 stress not in original.) The fact that, human nature being what it is and human organizations being what they are, the delegation of all responsibility for the organization and operation of civil defense to other authorities all but precluded the Federal authorities from being able to meet their six responsibilities effectively, seems not to have been noticed. 7

Another motivational conflict stems from the time period which various people had in mind in connection with the proposed Federal civil defense organization. This conflict showed up in the

7. The next draft version of the law amended this considerably.
differences between the Senate and House versions of the law. There were obviously many people who viewed the whole matter as emergency action to meet the exigencies of the Korean War and presumed the agency to be temporary. This was the basic viewpoint underlying the House version of the law. Others, primarily in the Department of Defense Civil Defense Liaison Office and in the cities active in civil defense, viewed the matter as an opportunity for "sneaking in" a permanent agency, which, even though not established under optimum conditions, could then be improved with time and experience. This was the basic Senate viewpoint. 8

The third major motivational conflict involved in the act is more subtle. By their "nature" men wish to do a good job--a "truth" known for thousands of years. Under conditions where the total job or responsibility is very difficult, if not impossible, and where people are nonetheless forced to assume it, they then tend to focus upon those parts of their responsibility that seem to offer them a "fighting chance" to do well. Even more important, by focusing their attention energetically upon these parts, they are left with little if any time to attend to the disconcerting whole. And this enables people to function reasonably effectively in what would otherwise be a relatively intolerable situation. Nevertheless, this "defense mechanism" (for want of a better term) is not necessarily non-reality oriented. Success in the parts often helps to resolve difficulties and contradiction inherent in the whole. Much of the work of the Congressional committees, especially the House committee, can be understood in this light; there was very careful and meticulous study of the details of the proposed law--as there obviously should have been--with a systematic avoidance of the broader issues of the law as a whole.

8. It is interesting to note the many times during the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on the act that Senator Kefauver indicates that he is fully aware of the imperfections of the proposed law and his expectation that with experience it will be modified and improved.
Sections 1 through 5 and 7 through 15 deal mainly with matters that do not add to the substance of the law: Salaries, administrative implications of responsibilities, some instructions to the Administration, and other administration paraphernalia.

In Section 6, the Administrator is given emergency powers in the event of a disaster. These powers constitute a unique departure in American practices. Generally, they permit the Federal official in charge of national civil defense to commandeer any available civilian or governmental resources (except military resources) that he feels he needs either for the protection of civilians against an enemy attack or their assistance afterward. These powers are assumed not only in the event of an enemy attack, but even if the President declares a national civil defense emergency because an attack is imminent. Never before have such powers been given to an individual in the United States.

Although the suggested bill was introduced to the House on September 18, 1950 (H. R. 9689) and to the Senate on the next day (S. 4162), it met with much criticism and was not passed on for Committee consideration. The official legislative history of the bill states that, after the bill was introduced, the committee report and the bill were

... circulated to interested state agencies. Comments were received from the Council of State Governments, and the northwestern regional committee of the council was very helpful in submitting detailed corrective suggestions, while approving the broad framework of the bill.

During October and November, detailed suggestions were received from all the agencies and departments of the Government, and conferences were held with the interested agencies and others. Many of the suggestions were found very constructive and the bill was rewritten late in November. This revised bill was introduced in the House on November 30, 1950 (H.R. 9798) and in the Senate on December 1, 1950 (S. 4219).9

Although there is little doubt that some of the activities mentioned in the quoted paragraphs may have taken place, I would suggest that the picture emerging from this passage is highly exaggerated. The record, as found in the archives, does not indicate any such spate of activity. A comparison of the two drafts shows, with one interesting exception, practically no substantive change. The major difference between the two drafts is in style and phrasing. Whereas the first draft is discursively quite general and abstract, the second draft is far tighter and legalistic, as befits a proposal for legislation. This is not surprising if it is assumed, as I do, that the first draft of the law is taken almost verbatim from the draft written by the staff of the Office of Civil Defense Planning.

It was probably not presumed by the writers of that draft that it would be presented to Congress. Rather, presumably, it was merely intended to convey what should substantively be included in the law; once approved by the Federal authorities, it would be rewritten by legal experts as befits legislation. This is what most probably was done; the interim between the two drafts was probably devoted primarily to rewriting the proposed draft law by the legal staff of the NSRB.

The one interesting exception is a shift in the role of the Federal Government in the national civil defense effort. As already pointed out, the last sentence of Section 1 in the first draft states that the "organization and operation of civil defense is the responsibility of the States and their political subdivisions..." This is modified rather drastically in the parallel section, now Section 2 of the second draft. The first sentence of this section states it to be the policy and intent of Congress to provide for the protection of life and property in the country in the event of enemy attack. The second sentence goes on to state: "It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that in sharing responsibilities for civil defense with the States and their political subdivisions the Federal Government, to the maximum extent possible, shall provide
services of coordination and guidance ..." There are many other small changes in this draft strengthening the role of the Administrator and the responsibilities of the proposed agency in this direction. This, however, was soon "corrected." The comparable statement in the act as passed reads: "It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions." 11


11. Exactly how these changes were introduced is a process of interest to the student of social dynamics but is not germane to the present discussion. In fact, the rather thorough rewriting of the bill by the House subcommittee, particularly by Representative Carl Vinson, and the reasons for the many changes introduced can be found in fascinating detail in the printed record of the subcommittee's hearings: U.S. House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on Civil Defense of the Committee of Armed Services. Hearings on H.R. 9798 (To Authorize A Federal Civil Defense Program). No. 224. 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950.

The second draft version of the law was introduced in the House and in the Senate on November 30 and December 1, 1950 respectively. The Senate hearings, chaired by Senator Kefauver, were not particularly oriented around the proposed act; they rather surveyed the general problem of civil defense and the particular need for it at the time. The various opinions and nuances of thought with respect to civil defense which have been presented in the preceding pages are well represented in the hearings. Very little of a novel nature emerged from them, however. On the other hand, the House Committee, chaired by Representative Carl T. Durham, spent almost all of its time scrutinizing the bill carefully, amending, and rewriting it. By and large both committees were very friendly to the legislation and its sponsors. They worked rapidly and efficiently. On December 1, 1950 in reporting on the bills, Clayton Knowles wrote in the New York Times: "There is no expectation that the bill can be passed before the end of the year. ...The belief was that hearings would promote a public discussion helpful to the incoming 82nd Congress when it acted upon the subject." Yet the bill was ready for presentation to the House on December 22, 1950, on which day it was passed by a majority of 247 to 1. The House version was then presented to the Senate on the following day where, after being slightly amended from the floor, it was also passed by an overwhelming majority voice vote.
Although the law as passed contains the entire substance of the first draft proposal, much of that draft is expanded, clarified, tightened and delimited. In addition, the entire law is reorganized into four Titles, adding greatly to its clarity. Finally, there are additions to it which are not to be found in the two earlier drafts.

Two additions are significant. First, the key terms and concepts to be found in the bill are carefully defined, they are: attack, civil defense, organizational equipment, materials, facilities, United States or states, and finally neighboring countries. Second, provision is made for the creation of a Civil Defense Advisory Council to advise and consult with the Administrator with respect to general or basic policy matters relating to civil defense. It is difficult not to assume that this Council was set up at least in part to compensate for the effective power stripped from the Administrator when the committee "revested" primary responsibility for civil defense in the States and their political subdivisions. The Council was to consist of representatives of the Governors, the Mayors, and the public at large, and to the extent that the Administrator could speak for the Council he would functionally be speaking in the name of responsibility which the Federal Government did not wish to assume for itself. This would add to his effective power.

The most significant expansion of the earlier drafts had to do with the powers of the Administrator in the event of an emergency short of actual attack or a formal state of war. (The President may proclaim a national emergency for civil defense purposes if he anticipates an enemy attack upon the country.) The Committee was quite conscious of the fact that never before have such powers to commandeer resources and manpower been assigned to an appointed civilian official in this country. Yet nowhere does the committee express doubt as to their necessity. This emphasis on emergency powers is interesting. It seems obvious that once an effective national civil defense program exists, such emergency powers would become unnecessary, since such a program would provide the capacity to function effectively in the event of a catastrophe. It will be
recalled that in discussing the paradox buried in civil defense I said that although no one really believed that an attack upon the continental United States was even remotely in the offing, a gnawing doubt might nevertheless have remained. The inclusion of emergency powers for the administrator can therefore be taken as evidence that although no one really believed then that an effective civil defense organization was feasible, the gnawing doubt compelled the view that having a person with emergency powers was good insurance in the event of a catastrophe. These powers have a special status in the law; they have to be reviewed every four years by Congress to see whether they are still necessary—that is, Congress must explicitly vote to extend them for each four-year period. It follows, therefore, that every time the Congress votes to extend these powers, which it has already done three times, it also renders a judgment that the nation does not have an effective civil defense organization or program.

The second area of expansion had to do with the Administrator's authorization to disburse Federal funds. This is standard Congressional responsibility and there is no need to go into the details.

There was practically no discussion in the House, except to add a termination date (June 30, 1954) for the life of the organization. The bill, as passed through the House was then presented to the Senate. There was some debate in the Senate with particular reference to the emergency powers. Quite a few amendments were added, but only one of substance. It was made clear that the proposed Federal Civil Defense Agency was to be a permanent agency of the Government and not a temporary creation to meet the Korean crisis; the termination date was eliminated.

The House and Senate conferees had little difficulty in ironing out the disagreements between the two versions, and on January 12, 1951 the President signed Public Law 920. With this, a new chapter for American civil defense opened, a chapter beyond the scope of the present document.
Lessons from history can be grouped into three classes: Those which lead to the questioning of tacit assumptions which with time have acquired the characteristics of "self-evident, unquestionable immutability"; those which point to errors in the current historical interpretations of events, that is, they dispell "myths"; and finally, those which enable people to learn from experience--which can serve as guidelines and models for current action and operations. At least some lessons from each class will be identified and discussed below. I do not mean to present these lessons dogmatically as firm guides for future civil defense planning and operations. Although some or many may prove to be such, they may also be rejected as inappropriate at present. But if they are rejected as a result of serious analysis, then the basic issues involved in these lessons will be clarified. This cannot but help future civil defense planning and operations in the nation.

One further limitation should be noted before proceeding. To a certain extent the lessons to be learned from the historical period covered in this document are weakened by the failure to cover the history of the 1950's. Hence a gap exists between the period studied and contemporary civil defense. At times, this will necessitate references to the unstudied period. It is nevertheless hoped that much of value can still be learned despite the gap.

1. It should be clear to all that whatever is called "a lesson from history" is always a judgment based upon a study of history by a student of history. To the extent that the student does a competent job, his judgment is enlightened. However, despite the most conscientious and stringent labor, honorable intentions, or degree of scholarship on the part of the student, "lessons from history" cannot transcend the status of judgments.
In some respects, the most significant finding in the present Study with respect to lessons in the first class (the questioning of assumptions) is that Public Law 920 and the national civil defense organization that was set up on its basis were not the product of long and careful earlier planning by competent planning groups and committees. Rather it was an emergency improvisation, albeit based on previous work and experience, by an unwilling Executive department in response to a public demand for the immediate establishment of a nation-wide operating civil defense organization in depth, which the administration felt was both unnecessary and undesirable. The law has been presented, from its enactment, as the product of long and careful planning which took enlightened account of all previous relevant experience.

To meet some of the dangers brought about by the existence of a potential enemy capable of attacking cities within the United States, the Congress has established a Federal Civil Defense Administration and has authorized the establishment of a national civil defense program encompassing a broad scope of activities at all levels of government. Based on World War II experience in England, Germany, and Japan, the over-all program is the product of several years of study and planning carried on with the assistance of many private organizations and nearly every agency of the Government.

Once it is believed that the law and the ensuing Federal civil defense organization are the product of long and careful study and planning, they both become surrounded by an "aura of respectability" which they do not intrinsically merit. Were the "truth" to have

2. It may be proper to comment at this point, for whatever it is worth, that the writer feels, fundamentally, that the administration's reasons were well taken. Hence, the specification of what seems to be the fact of opposition by the administration should not be construed as a criticism of the administration for its position.

been known—were it common knowledge that both the law and the organization were products of last minute, rather harried improvisation—then when difficulties in implementation developed those involved would most probably have reexamined and reevaluated them carefully. More important, they may have gone back to read the earlier reports. This Study shows that the law and the organization go counter to the basic recommendations of these reports, and that the reports are replete with guides and recommendations for both effective planning and implementation of a civil defense organization. But the evidence indicates that this comparison was not made because Public Law 920 was assumed to be an integral continuation of these reports. The evidence also indicates that by now the earlier reports are literally forgotten. Hence, when difficulties arose, those responsible for civil defense in the United States, as well as those trying to establish an effective civil defense effort in this country, tended to seek and find the causes of the difficulties elsewhere. But, as will be shown below, the causes that were found were more in the nature of symptoms than causes of the failure of civil defense and focusing upon them in the quest for corrective measures was bound to be futile.

The strict division of responsibilities among the government echelons at the Federal, state, and local levels is today not even questioned. But this Study shows that it developed merely by accident and has no intrinsic justification beyond the fact that it fits the American political structure. The basic outlines of the present civil defense structure emerged "spontaneously" during World War I; hence the admirable fit with the national political structure—how could a "spontaneous" emergence end up otherwise? This organizational posture was never tested by any action in World War I; and the evidence for it from World War II experience is questionable.

The main criticism of the World War II Office of Civilian Defense follows two lines: First, the confused activities and turmoil connected with the War Services Branch, and second the "free
wheeling" behavior of its first director, Mayor LaGuardia. It was not necessarily what Mayor LaGuardia did that evoked the storm of criticism but the relatively arbitrary manner by which he did it. It should be remembered that LaGuardia succeeded in what he explicitly set out to accomplish: to establish a reasonably effective Protective Services Branch. It can be argued cogently that this success should be attributed to the fact that LaGuardia disregarded the Federal-state-local structure and dealt directly with those at the lowest levels who were responsible to him alone and not to the various civilian governmental echelons.

There is nothing holy about the present structure of the civil defense organization; it has been neither thought through carefully nor tested by experience. There is every reason to believe that it contributes more than its share to the difficulties the nation has faced in trying to implement Public Law 920. In the Provost Marshal's report a radically different type of organization is recommended. The inadequacy is also implied in the Hopley report, which points out the need for metropolitan-area civil defense organizations independent of existing legal boundaries. It was enacted into Public Law 920 only because it fit the immediate goals of the executive: not to get involved, and not to assume the responsibility for setting up an operational civil-defense organizat... If there is any serious intent today to establish a reasonably effective operating civil defense organization, this structure must be re-examined and reevaluated critically.

This history sheds some light on another aspect of the existing law which shows arbitrariness or, to be more precise, shows that

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4. Of all the World War II OCD actions, the actions of this Branch were least criticized and even lauded in the Provost Marshal's report, even though it was judged that the organization, as it was, would not have been too effective were the country to be subject to the heavy bombardment suffered by the other belligerents. But the probability of such bombardment of the continental United States during World War II was always very low.
it was determined by considerations extrinsic to civil defense—the matter of financing. Public Law 920 specifies that the Federal Government will cover only 50 percent of the civil defense costs. Where did the 50-50 split in allocation come from? There is no evidence that it was rationally thought through. The British central government, much poorer than the American Federal Government, contributed between 60 and 75 percent of civil defense expenses at the local levels and was authorized, in special cases, to go up as high as 85 percent of the total costs. Given the analysis as developed in the preceding sections, however, the 50-50 split makes sense. In fact it can be argued that it is the only division to which the Federal government could agree. On the one hand, once the executive decided to bow to public pressure and come out in support of a national civil defense effort it could not suggest that it contribute less than 50 percent of the needed financing since this would clearly be interpreted as attempting to undercut the effort. On the other hand, if the executive wished to do all it could to discourage a large civil defense organization, then an offer to contribute more than 50 percent of the costs would certainly be viewed by the proponents of an operational civil defense organization as encouragement and endorsement. Hence this split; it is neutral with respect to "civil defense endorsement." There is nothing holy about it—it is, for instance, not found in the Federal road building program. It is the product of a unique historical contingency and enough experience is available to judge whether it is effective or not.

Another tacit assumption still holding sway is that this country has carefully guided itself by British experience and that little is left to learn from that source. This is probably true, to a great extent, when one restricts oneself to the final product of the British effort—to their actual organization. But Section 2 of this document seems to demonstrate clearly that much can still be learned from the way they planned their civil defense in the 20's and early 30's and the way they went about implementing their plans.
This will be discussed in somewhat more detail at the end of this section.

Perhaps the most important finding of the historical review is that the Truman administration, at least at its higher echelons, opposed the setting up of a national civil defense organization but was forced into it by events over which it had no control. The impact of this attitude on the part of the President and his staff on civil defense was to be felt in the 50's, a period not covered here. In this study the series of contingent events, unanticipated and uncontrollable, which led up to this development were explored in detail; but the consequences of the executive attitude were not studied. It is obvious that the consequences had to be serious. It is difficult to imagine any effort on the part of an agency, department, or office of the executive branch of the government succeeding if the President and those immediately around him are not interested in its success. The evidence also indicates that the Eisenhower administration shared the same attitude towards a civil defense organization. A careful study of the history of American civil defense during the 50's would disclose that much of its difficulties and failures can be attributed, both directly and indirectly to this attitude. At the same time, it was not explicitly acknowledged. It was implied in Congressional hearings, particularly in the Kefauver hearings of 1955 and the Holifield hearings of 1956 and 1958, but not obviously. The inability or reluctance to face squarely the issue of Presidential attitudes to an operational civil defense organization led directly to errors in interpretation of events; here the second class of lessons from history (interpretations of history) becomes relevant.

With the disclosure of the dangers of fallout in 1955, there was a new surge of public and Congressional interest in civil defense, comparable to the surge following the announcement of the explosion of the Soviet atomic device in 1949. The activities of the FCDA were reviewed and subjected to a severe criticism, relatively friendly on the part of the Congressional committees but rather
extremely hostile on the part of the state and local governments and the representatives of the public. By and large the critique was directed at FCDA's failure in setting up an operational civil defense organization as intended by those who were behind the legislation of Public Law 920. Since the Presidential opposition to such an organization was not admitted publicly, other reasons for the failure had to be adduced. A large group, mostly outside the Government, had little difficulty in finding reasons; the FCDA was blamed as being incompetent from top to bottom. Those who had some greater access to the facts and knew more about the situation (mostly individuals within the FCDA and Congress) sought other reasons.

Three main reasons crystallized which, by the turn of the decade, soon were accepted seemingly uncritically by the "friends" of civil defense and its supporters. One still hears them today: if only public apathy towards civil defense could be overcome; if only Congress would allocate sufficient funds for civil defense; and finally, if only the military, i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would stop opposing civil defense.

It is true that these reasons are factual. The public is very apathetic towards civil defense today, and has been so, by and large, at least since 1958. Congress's record of refusing to allocate all the funds requested from it for civil defense is clear; though even a casual study of congressional allocations indicates that the matter is not at all simple. And finally there is no doubt about the military coolness towards the Federal civil defense authorities from 1950 to 1960.

But the historical period just surveyed indicates that it was not always so. The facts seem to be quite the contrary from 1945 to 1950. The military emerge as the most militant group within the nation actively fighting for the establishment of an effective civil defense organization in depth. The manifold attempts by the military authorities to arouse the public and the government in support of its position have been stressed in some detail above. The coolness of the military towards civil defense during the decade of the
50's must therefore be explained and cannot be simply assumed to have been a "cause." A careful study of the history of this decade will confirm the judgment made in Section 7 (footnote 2), that the FCDA was perceived as being doomed to failure and there was not much point in getting involved in the effort.

The record of Congress during this period is also one which today would appear to be surprising. There is no record of any hostility towards civil defense or toward the Executive Department's efforts at planning for and trying to establish a national civil defense posture. As already indicated above, the McMahon Committee public and executive hearings and the Kefauver Committee executive hearings held in the Spring of 1950 appeared to be very friendly and supportive. The same is true of the House and Senate hearings held in December of that year. Public Law 920 passed in record time, to the surprise of all concerned, and almost unanimously in both houses. Hence there must be reasons for Congress refusing to allocate the required funds in the decade of the 50's--reasons that cannot be attributed to Congressional antipathy to civil defense as such.

Something very similar must be said concerning public apathy. The history shows that the Korean war generated a public demand that forced the administration to act. A study of the history of the 50's will show that if, as may be argued cogently, local governments are taken to represent the "public will," the public continued to support civil defense rather vigorously until 1958, when the long and impressive Holifield hearings and the Gaither report gave birth to the 1958 "do-it-yourself" shelter program of the OCDM days. More than normal apathy and lack of interest appeared only after this program was announced.

5. It is true that since 1950 local and state civil defense directors, as well as newspaper editorials tend to castigate the public for being apathetic. But this is because they confused lack of militancy with apathy. However, there was no reason to expect the public to be militant about civil defense. It was only after the events of 1958 that the public really became apathetic, if one
A conceptual confusion seems to be found in the current discussion on public apathy and civil defense. Many voice the opinion that the public is apathetic because it does not militantly demand the creation of an operational civil defense organization. Non-militancy is not apathy. Apathy should be equated with lack of interest, and there are many things the public is interested in, is relatively favorably disposed towards, yet is not militant about. A careful analysis of the public opinion polls on civil defense indicates that at the very least, the public still has a latent positive attitude towards civil defense. The current apathy stems from a general loss of faith that anything effective will be done by the Federal, state, and local authorities and hence, by psychological implication, the belief that there is no real need for anything effective to be done in civil defense. Were this not the case (given the type of civil defense organization currently in being) and were the public to believe that civil defense is needed badly enough to be militant about it, the public would have to reach the conclusion that its governments, at all echelons, are intrinsically irresponsible in that they do not worry about the public welfare. This is too much to expect of the public.

In any event, it is very questionable whether a militant public, as such, is desirable. A militant public did rise in the Fall of 1950. By the Spring of 1951 over a million individuals volunteered for civil defense duties; professional and patriotic organizations, business associations and trade unions, etc., assumed civil defense responsibilities. The net result was chaos and confusion, conflict and frustration. A study of the two years of the Caldwell administration of the FCDA would demonstrate that even were it to have had executive support and adequate finances it would probably have not succeeded in its task because of the unwieldiness of the spontaneous organization generated by public militancy.

disregards the temporary spurts of interest generated by the political-military crises of the early 1960's. This public apathy reflected itself in the local governments losing the active interest in civil defense they had consistently displayed prior to that year.
The history surveyed in this document suggests a conclusion which would be greatly strengthened by a careful study of the decade of the 50's: the above causes currently being cited to explain the lack of success of American civil defense efforts by proponents for civil defense are wrong. Rather than being causes for lack of success they are effects, the consequences, of the lack of success. Mistaking consequences for causes does not help in solving real problems.

The history just studied also has something positive to offer to current civil defense problems: guidelines for action. Since its inception, friendly critics of the Federal civil defense effort have pointed out that it is absolutely imperative for the Federal authorities to formulate a national plan. This criticism has been summarized in a nutshell only recently by Hanson Baldwin, writing in the March 15, 1965, issue of the *New York Times*:

> The weakness of the civil defense program, as the experts see it, is that it has been presented in too much of a piecemeal, technical fashion, and that well-rounded, comprehensive arguments--transcending the shelter program alone--that would show how millions might survive a nuclear holocaust have not been presented to either Congress or the public.⁶

This criticism is already found, in essence, in the House Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations report accompanying the Third Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1951--a year in which the FCDA's request for funds was pared down from $403 million to $34 million. It was strongly repeated in the Project East River Report of 1952 and re-emphasized in the 1955 review of the project. Both witnesses and Congressmen level it in the Kefauver hearings of 1955 and the many Holifield hearings held from 1956 to 1960. Yet this friendly critique does not seem to have had much effect.

The Federal civil defense effort can be characterized, from its inception, as always having a program but not a plan. This is not said with the purpose of castigating those responsible for the

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6. Stress not in original
Federal effort. There are many good reasons why it was quite difficult for them to benefit from the criticism, but the fact stands out and speaks for itself.

It is important to understand what is meant by "having a program, but not a plan." If, despite many differences, the military and the Executive (NSRB) approaches to the problem of civil defense in the late 1940's have anything in common, it was that both recognize the need for extensive, comprehensive planning before implementation. Notable accomplishments were achieved in this area during this period, accomplishments that can still be studied with profit. Unfortunately, probably the two most significant documents of this period, the Provost Marshal's report and NSRB Document 112 have been gathering dust in the United States Archives all these years; it is doubtful whether they have even been remembered since 1951. It cannot be stressed too strongly that both these documents still merit careful study today by anyone who wishes to think through basic problems of planning for national civil defense.

The Provost Marshal's report has already been discussed in Section 4. However, it is proper to recall, in the present context, that the report explicitly restricted itself to pointing out pitfalls and dangers to be avoided. The history of civil defense indicates that many of these pitfalls and dangers were not avoided and the undesirable consequences implied in the report by and large did materialize. This adds impressive credence to the substance of the report. Hence, the various steps in planning a comprehensive civil defense plan found in this report and reproduced in detail in the present document in Chapter 4 and the Appendixes, should be studied carefully. It will be found that they can still serve as a valuable guide for contemporary planning.

NSRB Document 112 has not been treated in detail here. (Its main outline has been presented in Chapter 5.) Its main purpose was to propose a program for NSRB civil defense planning. What is important in the present context is the backup material to be found in the document: a detailed summary of the activities of the Office
of Civil Defense Planning after the release of the Hopley report. This matter has been neglected until now. It turns out that after the release of the Hopley report, the Office, with a reduced permanent staff of twenty-three persons (excluding secretaries), continued the task of developing a general civil defense plan. Within six months there were 23 work projects in process, each planning a more or less complex part of the proposed civil defense effort. Each project was being implemented by a staff consisting of at least one person from the OCDP and experts from other interested bodies and organizations from the government, the military, and the civilian sectors. Along with the actual planning group, 48 advisory committees were set up and 31 additional committees were proposed. The staff of these committees also consisted of experts from the government (including staff members of the OCDP), the military, and the public. The purpose of these committees was to advise, guide and help the project teams in their work, as well as to critically evaluate the plans as they took shape. The committees were also to serve a major role in the implementation of the plans, if that time ever came. All in all, this is an enlightened example of what the historian of the British civil defense effort would undoubtedly characterize as "the web of planning."

Again, as was the case with the Provost Marshal's Report, it must be asserted that no one today considering the problem of planning a national civil defense effort can afford to neglect this document.

Thus, in saying the Federal civil defense effort has always had a program but not a plan, "plan" refers to a comprehensive blueprint in depth for a national civil defense posture. Since a comprehensive plan cannot be implemented immediately in toto for many reasons, that part of the plan being implemented by Federal authorities becomes the program for those authorities. Both the

7. There is not much point in listing these projects; those interested should read the original document which is available at the National Archives.
Congress and the public expect such a plan to include a blueprint for a well-organized, well-equipped, and well-trained civil defense corps that can operate effectively at the local levels. Unless such a blueprint is available, in terms of which all other activities and aspects of the Federal civil defense efforts fit and make sense, neither the public nor Congress will support the Federal efforts. This seems to be the nub of Hanson Baldwin's criticism cited above. In and of itself a fall-out shelter program is unimpressive and cannot command public support; were it an integral part of a comprehensive blueprint, of a master plan, however, the matter would be entirely different.

The foregoing paragraph should not be construed to mean that the only effective means of defending the public is by a comprehensive civil defense corps. There may be other ways, far more effective, to defend the public. What is stressed here is what is presumed to be an objective fact: to the extent that the public and Congress think about civil defense, this is what they consider to be a necessity. Unless these considerations are taken into account, i.e., unless the Federal authorities do come up with a comprehensive civil defense blueprint, or unless the issue is faced forthrightly and the public is given convincing reasons why its expectation is wrong, the Federal civil defense activities are doomed to the continued impotence and failure which have characterized them since their inception.

There is much to learn from the British planning effort, even though it is obvious that because of time (different historical periods) and place (different nations) much will be found that cannot be implemented in the United States in general and at the present time in particular. Despite this, the British effort can well serve as both a stimulus and guide for future American efforts, as it had already served during the years here studied.

First and foremost one has to point out the continuity of British planning. The planning committee established in 1924 remained basically unchanged for the first eleven years of planning (until civil
defense was declassified in 1935) through a period of relative political turmoil and four governments. Once declassified, civil defense underwent several major organizations, but the body of experts and the staff that developed during the first eleven years remained with the effort and provided the necessary continuity of administrative know-how and hard experience with the subject. It was only during the years 1946-1949, when the military establishment was the main proponent for civil defense in this country, that the United States could point to anything like planning continuity—primarily in the person of Col. Barnet W. Beers and his immediate staff—and, as just stressed, this ended up in the closest approach to a comprehensive plan that this country ever achieved. The discontinuities of the NSRB period have been discussed in detail above, and a study of the succeeding years will not show a better picture.

The caliber of the British group of planners has already been stressed, hence, it need merely be mentioned here for the purpose of recall. Whether the United States can emulate Great Britain in this respect is not clear; not that this country lacks planners of such a caliber, but that it seems to lack the equivalent of the senior administrative class of the British civil service with its status, experience, power and continuity. The fact that each member of the British civil defense planning committee was also a senior member in a relevant Cabinet Ministry or Department in which he had executive responsibility could not but help. It meant that each decision taken by the committee involved and committed the respective Ministries and Departments to a greater or lesser extent.

Even more to the point was the practice of the planning committee to refer each policy decision for approval to both the Committee for Imperial Defense and to the Cabinet. The planning Committee suggested policy decisions, but did not decide upon them. Generally, the Committee for Imperial Defense reviewed the policy recommendations and, after approving them, forwarded them to the Cabinet for approval. The net result of this was that all the plans and policies of the planning committee commanded at least some degree of allegiance and
and commitment at the higher-level administration of both the military and civilian sectors of the government; this did not necessarily include the middle and lower levels of the administration since, because of secrecy and for other reasons, they were neither included in the deliberations nor necessarily briefed about them. Neither does it mean everything was a bed of roses; but conflict was contained and cooperation enhanced. How different the picture in the United States! Those responsible for civil defense in our country were generally ignored by and often in conflict with the rest of the executive branch of government, as well as with the President himself.

The "ten-year rule" mentioned rather cursorily above was another effective aid for British planning. It is very difficult to overestimate the importance of the fact that, until 1933, all those involved in planning for civil defense "knew" that they had at least a ten year time span ahead of them before an operational civil defense would conceivably be needed. This greatly reduced the pressure for tangible results and created an atmosphere fostering effective basic planning. For basic planning to be effective, it has to have a broad scope and comprehensiveness; pressure for tangible results is inimical to the necessary scope and comprehensiveness. To the extent that a responsible and competent planner has the time which affords him the opportunity for low-pressure planning, his efforts are bound to be more fruitful. The "ten-year rule" lowered the pressure on the British planners. In contrast, in the United States almost all thinking and planning for civil defense since the end of World War II, has been bedeviled by a fear that an "atomic Pearl Harbor" is lurking around a corner. A good example of the products of this fear is the "surreptitious" distribution of the Hopley report, with its unforeseeable and, with the wisdom of hindsight one can say, regrettable consequences.

Two aspects of the British planning effort whose contribution to the success of the British effort cannot be underestimated, are particularly enlightening since they deny two principles at present uncritically accepted in the United States as prerequisites for
for effective planning. They are

(1) the "freezing" of a future war scenario at an early date for planning purposes, and

(2) the concentration upon gas masks and anti-gas rescue services.

It will be recalled that the original scenario that served as a guide for civil defense planning was drawn up in 1922 and updated somewhat in 1923 with France as the presumed aggressor. It was not reconsidered for the next decade, until the mid-thirties, when it became evident that any next war would be fought with Germany, not France. British war planning and civil defense planning changed to take this into account. But no new scenario needed to be written. The eleven to twelve years of planning based on the "frozen" scenario had created a master plan sufficiently articulate and flexible that it could be quickly and meaningfully modified to meet changing circumstances without requiring complex calculations reflecting changes in the external threat.

Such "freezing" was not achieved in the United States for various reasons, many of the more important of which, such as rapid spectacular changes in weaponry, political exigencies, and public clamor, were beyond the control of those involved in civil defense planning. The effects of the lack of freezing are to be found in almost any phase of civil defense history studied. A good example is the consistent delay and critique of planning while waiting for authoritative estimates of enemy weapon effects. This already appeared in the NSRB planning effort. Quite a few internal communications were found complaining that planning cannot start until the AEC commits itself to an estimate of damage to result from any enemy attack. The AEC, understandably, was reluctant to commit itself. As the pressure would grow it would commit itself; but this commitment was soon to be rendered "obsolete" because of radical changes in weapons or in the means of their delivery. To the extent that action was undertaken on the basis of the "obsolete" estimate it was then often publicly criticized as being inadequate, but the more common effect of all this was the suspension of comprehensive planning while
waiting indefinitely for the authoritative, "frozen" estimate of weapon effects, or, more generally, for an authoritative scenario. Had the British example been followed, comprehensive planning based on a scenario admittedly implausible would have started early—the choice of France as the enemy in 1922 was admitted by all concerned to be implausible. The plans would have been pretty well advanced by the time changes occurred which demanded some re-evaluation of the scenario. It would then, most probably, be found that not much of the existing plan need be changed and that the web of planning could continue with little disruption. In the United States, with every major perturbation planning tended to be suspended, forgotten, and often lost. It was then generally resumed, de novo. No web of planning can develop under such circumstances.

British preparation against gas warfare makes a fascinating study. By the time the war broke out, in September 1939, the nation had enough gas masks to distribute to every man, woman, and child in the country. In addition it had a well-trained and well-equipped cadre of decontamination squads. Defense against gas was an area in which, throughout the entire effort, most progress in planning, implementation, and organization had always been made. Yet, gas was not used as a weapon throughout the entire war. Strictly from the standpoint of cost vs effectiveness, it must be concluded that all the human energy and material resources invested in this aspect of the British program were a complete waste. Nevertheless, an argument can be developed that this expenditure of resources and effort was crucial for the overall success of the effort. It was, many times, a source of motivation and encouragement for those planning and trying to implement the plans. All too often the morale of the planners was low and on the verge of breaking. The difficulties confronting them seemed insuperable for many reasons. At those times, the value for the planners of knowing that in at least one area of civil defense they were doing a competent job—getting things accomplished—cannot be overestimated. It is completely irrelevant that gas was not used as a weapon. It is almost certain that had
there not been the success in the area of defense against gas warfare, the accomplishment in all other civil defense areas would have been noticeably less.

It need not be assumed that "freezing" the scenario or focusing on anti-gas defense were carefully thought through by the British. On the contrary, it is more reasonable to assume that they were not thought through, but just done intuitively because it was felt to be the proper thing at the time; this unanalyzable feeling of propriety is the primary stock in trade of expertise which is to be expected of the British administrative civil servants. Another aspect of this expertise was the refusal to consider the always very expensive shelter programs and the less expensive but socially more dislocating evacuation programs while focusing upon the relatively inexpensive defense against gas warfare. All too often in the American effort the problem of an "unthinkable" billion dollar shelter program preempted almost all other civil defense considerations, thereby harming the entire effort. It may be assumed that had the United States been successful in setting up a civil defense corps--a cadre which could be expected to effectively expand when necessary--it would have been much easier, and perhaps simply easy, to obtain the necessary funds from Congress to implement a reasonable shelter program.

Finally, much can be learned from the British on how the National Government authorities involved the local governments and the public: proceeding slowly, first involving the local governments, then establishing a cadre of trained personnel who knew their jobs, and only then, after all the spadework was completed, turning to involve the public at large. The care they took in publishing manuals and guides, and the quality of the publications, as well as the small number of publications, is equally impressive.
Appendix A

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS OF "STUDY 3B-1, DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ACTION DIRECTED AT CIVILIANS"

REPORT BY THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

APRIL 30, 1946
Appendix A

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY 3B-1

The following conclusions are contained in the Provost Marshal's Report:

(1) Atomic warfare does not eliminate the possibility of effective civil defense but, rather, increases its importance.

(2) World War II experience leads to the formulation of the following cardinal principles of civil defense and protection:

a) Each individual is responsible to protect himself, his property, and to engage in organized civil defense activity. Self-help by the individual is the keynote.

b) The owners and operators of facilities, utilities, institutions, and enterprises are responsible to protect their own personnel, equipment, and premises.

c) All echelons of government are responsible to insure the protection and welfare of their people; to organize, train, equip, and direct efficient units in each category of defense and welfare, capable of rendering quick support to lower echelons when needed, and capable of rendering aid to adjacent communities upon direction from higher authorities.

d) The Federal Government has four main responsibilities. During peacetime it should maintain continuous intelligence and scientific study for the establishment of policies, procedures, techniques, and plans, and for directing their implementation by the lower echelons. During a national emergency, it should authoritatively direct the execution of those plans and procedures through a national unified organization under one command. It should also, during emergencies, furnish support to lower echelons by means of strategically placed mobile units throughout the country. Finally, it should direct, supervise, and enforce passive programs for safety, fire prevention, personnel security, anti-sabotage, etc.
e) The responsibility for establishing and maintaining a continuing civil defense is properly that of the military establishment.

f) A strong, unified over-all command for civil defense is vital. This command should direct an organization capable of completely mobilizing, training, equipping, and directing civilians for self and organized protection through all echelons of government.

g) Adequate planning well in advance of an emergency is essential for the training and equipping of the needed mobile units.

h) In the absence of a national firefighting service, standardization to facilitate mutual aid is vital.

i) A national shelter program and other passive defense policies must be planned at once and be continuously studied and updated.

j) State guards cannot be used effectively as a nucleus for civil defense organizations, but, if adequate planning is made far enough in advance, they can serve in emergency as firefighters, and in police and rescue work.

k) The population at large must be adequately informed at all times as to the reasons for and the general status of civil defense planning. It is essential for morale that the public have the knowledge that a competent agency is prepared to assume effective leadership in the execution of well prepared plans to meet any eventuality.

l) Despite many shortcomings, the Office of Civilian Defense and the organization under it is the greatest example of voluntary citizen action ever undertaken. The shortcomings can be attributed to three main reasons: the absence of a unified command and authority to enforce the responsibilities allotted to it by Executive Order. The allotment to it of responsibilities extraneous to actual civil defense matters. And the total lack of advance planning which found the nation unprepared.

m) Advance planning and actions well in advance of an emergency should include: updated inventories of essential materials and facilities available; maintenance of reserve stockpiles of critical materials; studies of dispersal of facilities as well as emergency evacuation of civilians; development of intelligence detection systems as well as warning systems.
n) A trained civil defense corps not subject to the draft should be established.

The formal recommendations of the report are:

(a) A permanent civil defense agency should be created within the military establishment. It should consist of the required civilian and military specialists and should operate directly under the War Department General Staff with executive authority to coordinate and direct all elements involved in civil defense as may be necessary.

(b) The permanent civil defense agency should develop and operate in three phases as follows: Phase I - Administration and planning; Phase II - Preparation, training, and equipping; and Phase III - Operations. Various steps in planning, preparing, and operating for these three phases are suggested in detail. They will be summarized below.

(c) The military evaluation of vital facilities should be continuously made available to the agency.

(d) In planning and adopting any form of universal military training, training in all phases of civil defense be included.

(e) Pending the formation of a separate agency, an interim agency should be formed at once to operate under the Plans and Operations Division, War Department General Staff. To insure that no lapse of activity occurs, the Provost Marshal General will continue civil defense study and planning until the new agency is established.

To return to the detailed steps recommended with respect to the three phases of recommendation b above. The first step for Phase I, the foundation for all that will follow, calls for the formulation of specific and comprehensive plans, but plans that are flexible--to be able to cope with the many unforeseeable unique contingencies always to be found upon implementation, and as a result of changing circumstances.

The second step calls for an examination of what legislation is necessary for the implementation of the plans. The legislation should assure adequate financing for the plan and establish the authority required for achieving effective coordination between the many agencies at the Federal level as well as between the Federal government and the State and local governments.
As a third step an "intelligence section" should be set up that could maintain, updated, all information from official sources concerning the nature of and probability of an enemy threat as well as all updated information concerning available countermeasures to the threat—the latter implies close relations with the scientific laboratories working on military problems.

The fourth, and probably simultaneous, step is the development, in cooperation with the "War Department Bureau of Public Relations," a program to introduce the proposed plan to the public as well as one to keep it informed of pertinent current and future plans. This will promote confidence and will encourage cooperation and participation on the public's part when needed.

The fifth step calls for development, within the armed forces, but including civilian components, of mobile civil defense battalions thoroughly trained in all phases of civilian protection, and equipped for mass feeding, firefighting, medical service, and heavy rescue.

And finally the sixth step calls for the development of a detailed plan and curriculum for a comprehensive national training program for civil defense. Two aspects of this training plan should be implemented during Phase I: a training school should be set up to qualify training staff personnel and instructors, and another school be set up to train key personnel, both military and civilian, in civil defense staff organization, functions, and procedures.

Phase II should not be undertaken until Phase I is well on its way towards successful completion. Its steps are:

1. Establish regional offices under the headquarters of each Army area or some similar military subdivision.

2. Establish liaison with the State and municipal governments, Federal agencies, industries and utilities within the regional areas.

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1. It is interesting to note that the county governments, later a source of conflict within the civil defense structure, are not considered.
(3) Organize and implement the extension of planning to the lower echelons.

(4) Supervise the development, by the State Governments, of the skeleton structure of the civil defense organization within the population.

(5) Expand the training program to include personnel at the lower echelons.

(6) Supervise at all levels the development of emergency health and welfare measures.

(7) Supervise the development of plans for progressive and total mobilization of the community for civil defense in case of a rising or occurring emergency.

(8) Supervise the development of the facility security program and utility protection program.

(9) Initiate and supervise civil defense training within all army units.

(10) Develop a skeleton structure for mobile units within all components of the military organizations.

(11) Develop policies in connection with dispersion of populations, industries, shelter construction and other passive defense measures as required by higher authority in connection with the progressive developments, and prepare detailed plans for their execution.²

Since Phase III consists of operations it does not contain steps anymore but a series of recommended actions to be taken depending upon the severity of the emergency to be declared.

Upon the declaration of a limited national emergency, the civil defense agency should:

(1) Direct and supervise, through the State Governments, the mobilization of the existing civil defense organization within the civilian population, and procure and train additional personnel.

² Note that all steps until this one are relatively inexpensive. Implicit in this schedule is the principle that vast, expensive civil defense investments and programs should not be considered until an effective cadre for the civil defense organization is at least in potential being. Such considerations appear as the last step in Phase II, the last step in setting up the organization; Phase III presupposes the country being confronted with either a limited or full emergency.
personnel to bring the skeleton structures organized during Phase II to full strength, according to the plan.

(2) Put into effect such evacuation measures as have been planned.

(3) Expedite the construction of shelters, dispersal of facilities, and other passive defense measures as had been planned.

(4) Accomplish total enrollment of the civilian population within the civil defense organization, according to the plan.

Upon the declaration of a full national emergency the agency should direct and supervise the total mobilization and operation of the civil defense activities.3

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3. Implicit in these phases, although unfortunately not spelled out, is a very important principle concerning the involvement of the public-at-large in general, and of masses of volunteers in particular--one is tempted to suspect that the reason this principle remained implicit is that it appeared self-evident to the writers of the report. Up to the time a limited or full national emergency is declared neither the public at large nor a call-up for volunteers is contemplated. The civil defense agency's duty to the public until that time is to keep it informed what is transpiring and why; the civil defense organizational structure, until that time, will consist of professionals, both military and civilian, for whom civil defense is a paid, career responsibility. The public should be involved and volunteers called upon only after the nation is officially in some state of real emergency and the danger of an attack upon the nation's cities is clear and present.
Appendix B

SUMMARY OF CIVIL DEFENSE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
( THE Hopley REPORT)
Appendix B

SUMMARY OF CIVIL DEFENSE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The Hopley report consists of four sections and a series of appendices. The Sections are:

(1) An introduction to the report which discusses the need for civil defense, the essential functions of civil defense, and the basic principles underlying the plan proposed in the report.

(2) The proposed civil defense organization for four governmental levels is outlined. They are: the Federal government, State government, local government, and metropolitan urban areas.

(3) The required civil defense operations and services are discussed in detail for all levels under six main headings:
   a) medical and health services and special weapons defense;
   b) technical services;
   c) plans and operations;
   d) training
   e) public information; and
   f) and research and development.

The first three headings are further broken down into individual services.

(4) The legislative requirements at the Federal, State, and local levels, necessary for the implementation of the program, are sketched out.

The report contains four appendices. The first is Forrestal’s directive establishing the Office of Civilian Defense. The next two appendices list the persons in the Office and in the advisory

Office of Civil Defense Planning, Russell J. Hopley, Director, November 1948.
panels. And the fourth appendix gives seventeen organization charts: the first chart is that of the Office of Civil Defense planning; the other sixteen charts, in a nutshell, comprise the recommended Civil Defense Organization.

The introduction of the report immediately posits the lack of an effective civil defense as a missing link in the defense structure of the United States. "Without a sound and effective system of civil defense, the people and the productive facilities of the country are unprepared to deal effectively with the results of an enemy attack on our country." (page 1) Civil defense is defined as "the organization of the people to minimize the effects of enemy action. More specifically, it is the mobilization, organization and direction of the civilian populace and necessary supporting agencies to minimize the effects of enemy action directed against people, communities, industrial plants, facilities and other installations—and to maintain or restore those facilities essential to civil life and to preserve the maximum civilian support of the war effort." (page 1)

With the above in mind the report suggests a national civil defense program which proposes:

A National Office of Civil Defense, with a small but capable staff to furnish leadership and guidance

2. They are: (1) the proposed Federal organization for civil defense; (2) a suggested model for a state organization for civil defense; (3) a local organization for civil defense; (4) a proposed organization for a medical and health services division; (5) a radiological defense division; (6) a chemical defense division; (7) a communications division; (8) fire services division; (9) police services division, (10) engineering division, (11) transportation division; (12) an outline of steps in civil defense action; (13) proposed organization for a mutual aid and mobile reserve division; (14) mobile reserve battalions; (15) a mobile reserve battalion, and finally (16) an air raid warning and aircraft observer division.

3. This definition is roughly equivalent to the one found in the Bull report although it emphasizes somewhat more, a trend towards generalizing civil defense activities from life-saving proper to broader responsibilities of the reduction of national vulnerability against an attack and enhancing national recuperation after an attack.

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in organizing and training the people for civil defense tasks.

Basic operational responsibility to be placed in States and communities, but with mutual assistance plans and mobile supporting facilities for aid in emergencies.

Maximum utilization of loyal volunteers, existing agencies and organizations, and all available skills and experiences.

Well organized and trained units in communities throughout the United States, its territories and possessions, prepared and equipped to meet the problems of enemy attack, and to be ready against any weapon that an enemy may use.

Intensive planning to meet the particular hazards of atomic or any other modern weapons of warfare.

A peacetime organization which should be used in natural disaster even though it may never have to be used for war. (page 2)

The various services and functions entailed in an effective civil defense organization are listed and discussed; there are the services for which proposed organization charts are given in the fourth appendix. Finally, the basic principles underlying the plan are discussed:

The individual, given such training as can be provided, does everything possible to help himself in an emergency. The family seeking self-protection, operates as a unit handling its own problems as far as it can do so. The community, organized and equipped, puts its civil defense organization to work to meet the crisis. If these facilities and efforts are inadequate, mutual aid and mobile reserves from other communities come to the rescue. When these means have been utilized to their limit, military aid comes to the assistance of civil authority. And in the final stage, other steps proving inadequate, martial rule comes into play. (page 14)

The problems of leadership and responsibilities for the proposed organization were discussed with representatives of the Governors

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4. Here, too, an interesting shift in emphasis, whether intended or not, is to be found; from the total context of the report, it may be assumed that the shift is unintended. The individual is placed first in the "pyramid" of responsibilities, whereas in all treatments of civil defense, to date, the responsibilities of the Federal authorities were considered first and discussed in most detail.
and Mayors organizations. All agreed that the primary operating responsibilities for the organization should reside in the State and local governments; the governors emphasizing and citing World War II experience as justification that the chain of command should go through the states to the local communities. As the same time, however, all agreed that overall leadership and responsibility must be a joint responsibility of the Federal, State, and the local governments.

The proposed plan aims at flexibility in several ways. It aims at establishing an organization that can be expanded rapidly in the event of an impending war or the outbreak of a war, and, in addition, can be modified relatively easily to fit the circumstances of such an event. Although plans are proposed for the State and local organizations, they are to be conceived of as broad guidelines to be modified to fit unique needs and conditions of individual governments as may be found necessary. In addition, with time and experience, it may be discovered that some of the broad guidelines themselves may have to be modified in part or in whole. Finally, before the proposed plan can be implemented in toto, it will have to be supplemented by manuals, instructions, and materials to aid in organizing and training activities.

Although the proposed Office of Civil Defense would be a new agency, the program should be built on the principle of the utmost utilization of existing agencies and facilities at all governmental levels. One of the main problems and responsibilities of the proposed Office should be the coordination of the many governmental agency activities involved, in particular the agencies in the National Military Establishment.

With respect to personnel, the first principle in civil defense must be the organization of volunteers for major activities. During wartime as much as 15,000,000 will probably be necessary. It is also conceivable that virtually every man, woman, and child may have to be assigned tasks in the organization fighting for the nation's life. Full use should be made of all existing community organizations
An oath of office and loyalty should be expected from all, and the organization should avoid all political taint or diversion from its primary task.5

Finally, it is stressed that the peacetime uses of the proposed organization should be carefully considered. They will obviously consist of training, tests, and exercises. At the same time, it is asserted that the organization should assume responsibility for coping with the natural disasters which are often inflicted upon a community. This is an area where the civil defense organization can demonstrate its utility to the community and enhance its prestige and efficiency.

Five basic organizational units or sectors are considered: the national office or the central Federal organization; the regional offices of the Federal organization; the state organizations, the local organizations, and finally metropolitan area organizations.

The report considers it essential that there be established a central agency to exercise leadership and direction to the national civil defense effort as well as to coordinate all plans of the states and local authorities, the various agencies within the Federal Government, and the military planning for active defense of the nation. Such an agency can operate only at the highest level of the Federal Government. Hence, it must be established within the executive branch of the Federal Government. Two alternatives seem feasible: it may report directly either to the President or to the Secretary of Defense. The report recommends the latter alternative because of the continuing

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5. Here there is a very significant change in the conceptualization of civil defense. The passage on personnel can easily be interpreted, and may well have been meant as such, that the proposed civil defense organization consist primarily of volunteers. This goes counter to the considered judgment of the military planners—it should be kept in mind that although the Office of Civil Defense Planning was within the National Military Establishment, it was primarily a civilian effort, military aid being administrative and technical. Military thinking, as well as the lessons from World War II, seem to indicate that although volunteers are necessary for actual operations, they cannot be used effectively unless there is a well-trained cadre of professionals directing them at all levels, a cadre which almost by definition cannot consist of volunteers.
need for coordination of civil defense activities with the many agencies responsible to the Secretary. In addition, the proposed agency should have representation on the munitions Board and the Research and Development Board to expedite the integration of civil defense plans with the military plans. It should be charged with the following responsibilities:

- Establishing and administering, as an integrated part of the overall strategic plan for the defense of the United States, the national program for civil defense and estimating the total civil defense manpower and material requirements for carrying out the program.
- Coordinating and directing all civil defense matters affecting the National Military Establishment and other governmental agencies, developing the most effective means of accomplishing the mission of civil defense and allocating responsibilities, manpower, and equipment among the participating agencies and political subdivisions.
- Developing a coordinated program of research into problems pertaining to the civil defense of the Nation.
- Providing effective liaison between other governmental and private agencies and the National Military Establishment through serving as a central source of authoritative information on questions concerning civil defense.
- Developing and supervising a program for training the participants in civil defense.
- Guiding and assisting the several states, territories, and possessions in working out operating procedures and arrangements for mutual assistance and directing civil defense operations in the event of a national emergency. (pages 18-19)

At the same time, the report recognizes that the proposed agency should merely "give authoritative leadership, coordination, and direction to the planning and development of the civil defenses of the Nation; but ... the states and localities should be primarily responsible for carrying out the operating aspects of the program ...."6

6. The report at this point deviates quite significantly from the preceding military analyses of civil defense which were considered above, a deviation which is more an act of omission rather
But the Hopley report contains a serious flaw. Nowhere are there guidelines of how to plan for this organization and how to implement the plan. As has been seen, the military reports concerning civil defense go into some detail regarding such matters. Military planners well know that planning for the best of all possible postures can easily be vitiated unless the planning and implementation process is itself carefully planned and considered. The Hopley report consists of a detailed "end-posture" which, were it to have been achieved, would have given the Nation a reasonably viable civil defense capability in the early fifties as well as a "living" than commission. By what authority will the Federal agency be able to assume the responsibilities mentioned in the report? How will the Federal agency be able to exercise authoritative leaders', coordination, and direction if the States and local governments are primarily responsible for carrying out the operating aspects of the program (soon to be redefined in P.L. 920 as the primary responsibility for carrying out the national plan for civil defense)? The issue of authority was of foremost importance in the considerations of the military planners. They pointed out more than once that during World War II the German, the Japanese, and the American civil defense efforts all suffered seriously in many ways because of divided or lack of authorities, while the clear authority structure in Great Britain contributed much to the success of the latter country's civil defense effort. The framers of the Pull report were so conscious of the need for clear-cut authority that they concluded their report with the admonition that the National Military Establishment not continue its planning for civil defense unless it be given either executive or legislative authority to do so. Surely this omission of considering the problems of authority was neither a result of neglect nor chance. The omission must have been calculated. This conclusion is reinforced when, to anticipate something soon to come, the proposed model legislation of the report is given. No proposed legislation for the Federal organization is given; only legislation for State and local governments is found. And it is the legislation which serves as the basis for authority at all governmental levels. If the assumption just proposed that the establishment of the Office for Civil Defense Planning was a unilateral act on the part of Secretary Forrestal holds, this omission begins to fit into a pattern. Were the Secretary on his own to propose Federal legislation without the approval of the President he would be exceeding his authority. And this he and the Office carefully avoided doing.
organization that could change effectively with changes in weaponry and changes in the strategic, political world situation. But nowhere in the report is there the slightest guide as to how to proceed in implementing its proposals.
The historic background of Public Law 920, the Civil Defense Act of 1950, is examined in order to illuminate the causes of the difficulties now confronting those concerned with national civil defense in their efforts to establish an operational or potentially operational civil defense organization. The hypothesis of the Study is that many of these difficulties are an inheritance of a forgotten past. The study of this period shows that many of the events leading up to the enactment of this law, as well as the intent of those involved in its legislation, are probably radically misunderstood at present. Understanding of events prior to the enactment of the law sheds much light on many current defense difficulties and, as such, is useful for future planning.