THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL

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INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a frame of reference in which the subjects of arms control, limited war, and peacekeeping may be related to both current Soviet disarmament policy and to wider questions of the Soviet Union's aims and behavior on the international scene.

In the first portion of the paper I intend to sketch only briefly the main lines of recent Soviet disarmament diplomacy, and to offer a few comments on what seems to me to be the most significant about it. Mainly, in the second and principal part of this paper, I hope to invite some reflection on certain broad trends of Soviet development that seem to me to bear in a meaningful way on the international climate in which arms control and peacekeeping arrangements may be pursued during the next five or ten years. With this manifest of intentions, then, let me turn to the first part of the discussion.

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I. CURRENT ASPECTS OF SOVIET DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY

Students of the subject have never agreed among themselves whether disarmament as a goal in itself carries great weight in Soviet policy. They have, however, generally agreed that the Soviets place great importance on disarmament from the standpoint of political utility, strategic advantage, and propaganda opportunity. All three of these elements are in evidence in the disarmament menu currently being offered by the Soviet Union.

GCD

Let us look briefly first at GCD -- General and Complete Disarmament, a staple item on the menu since 1959. While GCD is still ostensibly the principal object of the negotiations of the 17-Nations at Geneva, it has in fact tended to fade into the background, while various proposals for partial measures -- as well as some disputative spillover from the Vietnam situation -- have preempted the attention of the conferees. The Soviet draft treaty on GCD (Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control) presently on the agenda was tabled at the opening session of the 17-Nations' Conference in March 1962.¹ It need not be described in detail here -- three stages, taking four years in all, with nuclear delivery vehicles to be

eliminated in the first stage and nuclear weapons to be completely destroyed by the end of the second stage. At its conclusion, with all "national armies disbanded," small detachments of militia would remain for maintenance of "internal order" and "general peace and security."

Since this proposal was submitted, the Soviet Union has offered what it terms several "important steps in meeting the West halfway" on GCD, namely: to permit retention by the U.S. and USSR of a "strictly limited" number of ICBM's (as well as AMM and SAM types of missiles) up to the end of the disarmament process, as a "protective umbrella"; to allow a higher level of conventional forces in the early stages; and to extend the total disarmament period from four to five years. While offering these "concessions," the Soviet Union has at the same time insisted that the U.S. draft Outline of April 1962 is "unacceptable" as a basis for agreement on various grounds. These include, according to the Soviet gravamen: failure to provide complete destruction of nuclear weapons unless foolproof verification methods are devised; calling for an international peacekeeping force which might have nuclear weapons; leaving U.S. foreign bases intact in the first stage; making "inordinate" inspection

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3Ibid.
demands for intelligence purposes; and proposing various forms of international jurisdiction that would amount to "restricting the sovereignty of states."\(^5\)

Besides seeking to present the Soviet GCD position in a favorable light compared to that of the United States, the Soviet Union during the past few years has employed its advocacy of GCD as a weapon in the polemics with Peking. In essence, the Soviets have argued that Chinese skepticism about the possibilities of achieving general and complete disarmament while "imperialism" still exists furnishes further proof that Peking is not really interested in peace. This use of the GCD issue in the Sino-Soviet polemics to demonstrate the warlike nature of the Peking regime probably reached its peak in the 1963-64 period, and since then other issues have received more attention than GCD in the quarrel between Moscow and Peking.

As it stands today, the Soviet position on GCD is somewhat more malleable than it was previously, but most of the essential sticking points still remain unresolved. Meanwhile, the relative priority of GCD in the over-all Soviet approach seems to have shifted.\(^6\) No longer is Soviet disarmament policy avowedly fixed on attainment of a totally disarmed world by the shortest possible route. Although Soviet spokesmen recurrently allude to the need for progress in GCD, and upon occasion assert that American activity in Vietnam has more than ever made


the problem of general and complete disarmament "extraordinarily important," one has the impression that the vigor of Soviet advocacy of GCD has appreciably declined. It is difficult to judge whether this connotes a tactical pause, or is traceable to more deep-seated considerations -- such as Soviet reflection upon the future problems of being China's neighbor or a growth of confidence in the stability of mutual strategic deterrence.

In any event, however, a shift in the Soviet approach has become evident in the past two or three years, exemplified by the turnabout admission that the "ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament can be facilitated" by seeking partial measures and separate steps.  

**PARTIAL MEASURES**

The reemergence of Soviet interest in the partial measures approach began in the latter phase of Khrushchev's rule, and was attended by several initial accomplishments made possible perhaps by the then-prevailing political desire in both Moscow and Washington to nurture the spirit of détente in Soviet-U.S. relations. These accomplishments scarcely require recitation, for they stand out conspicuously on the rather bleak landscape of contemporary arms control endeavor. Most conspicuous, of course, is the partial nuclear test-ban treaty of

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8 Shestov, International Affairs, p. 57. See also Dallin, op. cit., p. 126.
August 5, 1963. Completing the list are the Washington-Moscow "hotline" link agreement of June 20, 1963 and the U.N. resolution of October 17, 1963 which banned the orbiting of mass destruction weapons in outer space, along with unilateral declarations in April 1964 of intent to cut back the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. It might be noted, incidentally, that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission reported in November 1965 that there was "no evidence" that the Soviet Union had actually carried out the cutback in nuclear materials production that it had announced in 1964.9

Several assortments of partial disarmament measures, many of which had cropped up in one form or another in Soviet proposals prior to launching of the "GCD period" of Soviet disarmament diplomacy in 1959, have been offered by the Soviet Union in the past two years or so. Without going here into either the antecedents or the subtleties of these successive assortments of partial measures,10 let me simply set down the list of eleven measures given in the last formal Soviet memorandum on the subject on December 7, 1964:11


10 The first formal Soviet compilation of partial measures in the latter days of the Khrushchev period was given on January 28, 1964 in "Memorandum of the Soviet Government on Measures to Slow Down the Arms Race and Ease International Tensions," Pravda, January 29, 1964. For list of these, see present author's article cited in footnote 6 above, p. 124.

(1) Reduction of Military Budgets.
(2) Withdrawal or Reduction of Foreign Troops on Foreign Territories.
(3) Dismantling of Foreign Bases.
(4) Prevention of Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
(5) Ban on Use of Nuclear Weapons.
(6) Nuclear-Free Zones in Central Europe and Elsewhere.
(7) Ban on Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests.
(8) Destruction of Bomber Aircraft.
(9) Non-Aggression Pact Between NATO and Warsaw Treaty States.
(10) Prevention of Surprise Attack.
(11) Reduction of Total Numerical Strength of Armed Forces.

A readjustment of this list -- reflecting a shift of emphasis in Soviet thinking on partial measures -- was set forth early this year in Kosygin's message to the Geneva conference a few days after its reopening on January 27, 1966.\(^{12}\) Kosygin's enumeration of partial measures, which paralleled closely one given by Gromyko in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 1965,\(^{13}\) omitted the last four items listed above, and at the same time put major emphasis on a non-proliferation treaty and related strictures against the use of nuclear

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weapons. Kosygin's failure to mention numerical strength reductions was an interesting oversight, which may have been related to internal Soviet controversy over the size of Soviet force levels in light of the worsened international situation. The chief point of interest in his message, however, as in Gromyko's presentation at the U.N. several months earlier, was the attention given the non-proliferation question. It further underscored the importance this issue has acquired in Soviet policy, for reasons which perhaps are rooted less in Soviet objections to the principle of nuclear-sharing than in active concerns bearing directly on Soviet political and strategic interests.

14 For a discussion of the sensitive issue of Soviet troop levels in internal Party-military circles, see present author's "Military Policy: A Soviet Dilemma," Current History, October 1965, pp. 205-207. Kosygin's failure to mention the other three measures in question did not necessarily indicate they had all been finally dropped from Soviet consideration. The destruction of bomber aircraft (a more sweeping measure according to the Soviet formula than the parallel U.S. proposal for a "bomber bonfire"), apparently has been set aside. Soviet rejection of a U.S. proposal to scrap "thousands" of nuclear weapons as part of a transfer of nuclear materials to peaceful purposes probably took the edge off the bomber destruction proposal. (See The New York Times, March 9, 1966.) On the other hand, the Soviet proposal for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression accord, another item not mentioned by Kosygin has continued to receive attention in Soviet commentary, and is a proposal of such long-standing that it is unlikely to be shelved.
NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE GERMAN QUESTION

The first Soviet proposal for non-proliferation goes back to September 1957, but it has been largely in the past two or three years that the Soviet Union has shifted its attention from the test-ban issue to non-proliferation as a means of dealing with the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. It appears quite clear that Soviet interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons -- apart from the general tendency of the nuclear powers to look with a jaundiced eye at the ambitions of others to enter "The Club" -- has centered mainly on impeding nuclear progress by West Germany and Communist China.

Although any hopes Moscow may have once entertained of checking China's attainment of nuclear status are no longer relevant, the Soviet leaders evidently count on the leverage of a prospective non-proliferation agreement -- whether a formal treaty is actually consummated or not -- to forestall creation of an Atlantic nuclear force (MLF or other arrangements) through which Germany might gain closer access to nuclear weapons.

How valid may be the sources of Soviet anxiety that NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements would place Bonn in a position to make unacceptable demands on East


Germany and the Soviet Union, and whether in fact Soviet long-term interests might not be better served by integration of West Germany into a system where other countries would continue to wield a nuclear veto -- these are not matters for argument here. The fact remains, however, that a fixation over the German question seems to be embedded in the Soviet "political psyche," and will very likely continue to dominate Moscow's treatment of the non-proliferation issue. This means, in my opinion, that the Soviet Union will continue to place a higher priority on blocking NATO sharing arrangements than on making adjustments for the sake of getting a treaty signed -- which, of course, is precisely what the Soviet declaratory position indicates. It probably also means that the Soviets will try to exacerbate differences within NATO by continuing to focus the non-proliferation dialogue on the dangers of Bonn's participation in NATO nuclear arrangements. The Soviet draft treaty on nuclear non-dissemination, which was tabled by Gromyko at the U.N. on September 24, 1965, is very specific in forbidding not only the actual transfer of nuclear

17 F. Burlatskii, "The Atom Bomb and National Security," Pravda, January 10, 1966; Editorial, "Echo of Vietnam in Geneva," International Affairs, No. 10, October 1965, pp. 5-6. Some of the Soviet themes on non-proliferation have been concerned with defending the Soviet Union against Chinese accusations that a non-proliferation treaty represents a collusive attempt to maintain a U.S.-Soviet nuclear monopoly. The chief Soviet counter to this charge is that Soviet nuclear power protects "the entire socialist commonwealth" against "imperialist aggression." See, for example, Burlatskii, loc. cit. above. For background on earlier Chinese charges of U.S.-Soviet attempts to preserve a nuclear monopoly, see Dallin, op. cit., pp. 237-273.
weapons and control over them within any military alliance, but also the transfer of information which "may be utilized for manufacture or application of nuclear weapons." 18

These provisos, which would preclude both access to and training in the use of nuclear weapons by Germany and other non-nuclear members of NATO, happen to cut both ways, of course. They would prevent the Soviet Union from carrying out the kind of joint exercises that have been held from time to time since 1961 with other Warsaw Pact forces, and in which simulated nuclear strikes and associated nuclear training activities have taken place. The Soviet Union has also furnished nuclear-delivery systems in the form of tactical missiles and advanced aircraft to her East European partners in the Warsaw Pact, although presumably nuclear warheads have been withheld. These and other trends toward closer military integration within the Pact obviously pose problems for the Soviet Union, 19 which must choose, in a sense,


19 For discussion of these trends within the Warsaw Pact, see present author's The Evolving Nature of the Warsaw Pact, The RAND Corporation, RM-4835-PR, December 1965, especially pp. 11, 17-18, 23-27.
between greater military efficiency and a more potent counterthreat to NATO on the one hand, and her own proposals against proliferation on the other. The Soviet Union's reluctance to furnish information on present nuclear control arrangements within the Warsaw Pact leaves it uncertain whether she is trying to enjoy the best of both worlds for the time being. But if it comes to a clearcut choice, I suspect the Soviets would not hesitate to pay the price of permanent denial of nuclear access to their Warsaw allies in return for barring the same path to West Germany.

In connection with the current placing of the non-proliferation question high on the Soviet disarmament agenda, it should be noted that this has drawn bitter criticism from Peking. As in the case of the test ban, the Chinese have charged that Soviet interest in non-proliferation is part of a collusive Soviet-American attempt to perpetuate a superpower duopoly in the nuclear

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20. What the Soviet Union has apparently preferred up to now is a certain facade of nuclear cooperation with her Warsaw Pact allies, combined with the substance of Soviet nuclear monopoly. A somewhat similar Soviet response to China's desire for nuclear aid, which proved unpalatable to the latter's sense of sovereignty, has been suggested by some of the Sino-Soviet polemical materials, and may have been one of the factors leading to the rift. See discussion in the present author's work cited in footnote 19 above, pp. 38-39.
That the Soviet Union has gone ahead despite Chinese attacks on its non-proliferation policy testifies both to the intractability of the Sino-Soviet dispute and to the evident importance which the Soviet Union attaches to employing a prospective non-proliferation treaty as a means of blocking German access to nuclear weapons.

**BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE**

Soviet proposals of one kind or another for banning the use of nuclear weapons go back to the initial Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan in 1947 and to the "Stockholm Peace Appeal" of the early fifties, and were for many years a central feature of a Soviet effort to inhibit the United States from deriving political advantage from its superior nuclear posture. With the advent of the GCD period of Soviet disarmament diplomacy, the issue of a nuclear ban remained on the agenda, but was given somewhat less attention than previously. Only after China exploded its first atom bomb in October 1964 and at the same time proposed a world-wide conference to negotiate a prohibition on use of nuclear weapons did the Soviet

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Union again revive its own advocacy of such a proposal, pointing out that this was a long-standing Soviet position.  

A new element was added to the Soviet position in Kosygin's February 1966 message to the Geneva Conference, linking the notion of a ban on use of nuclear weapons directly with a non-proliferation treaty and inferentially with the German question. Taking up where the previously-discussed question of guarantees to non-nuclear states had left off, Kosygin expressed the Soviet government's readiness to add to its draft treaty "an article on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states -- parties to the treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their territory."  

It is hardly necessary to point out that the last clause of this proposal has rather sweeping strategic and political implications. Besides fortifying the principal objective sought by the Soviet Union through the non-proliferation treaty itself -- that is, denial of nuclear weapons to Germany -- it would also have the effect of:  

1. Precluding the deployment of U.S. weapons in Germany, which would greatly reduce the NATO capabilities confronting the Soviet Union in Europe, especially with an uncooperative France also in the picture;


Raising similar questions about the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of allies elsewhere in the world, including Vietnam, if this were ever to be contemplated.

In short, were enough countries to sign up on the Soviet dotted line, the Soviet Union could hope by this particular measure to go far toward achieving the neutralization of forward U.S. nuclear power which she has sought over past years through such proposals as foreign base withdrawal, nuclear free zones, bans on nuclear use, and so on.

The case of the B-52 accident and the missing bomb at Palomares in January 1966 proved to be, from the Soviet viewpoint, a fortuitous propaganda opportunity to focus anew on the issue of U.S. bases and nuclear weapons. Soviet spokesmen at Geneva and elsewhere not only made rather hasty and tendentious charges that the Palomares incident was a violation of the test-ban treaty, but also dwelt on the theme that U.S. nuclear bases on foreign territory pose grave dangers for the people of such countries. Some Soviet commentary also raised the spectre of accidental war ensuing from incidents like that at Palomares, even though the

incident itself seemed to demonstrate quite the opposite. The chances are, however, that the question of accidental war was not taken very seriously by the Soviets themselves. In general, the Soviet Union seems to be persuaded that various unilateral measures taken in the past few years with respect to command and control and the posture of strategic forces have served to reduce the danger of accidental war.

SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND THE "THIRD WORLD"

European-oriented problems like those of NATO nuclear arrangements and Germany, along with the general question of the over-all strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, have been and apparently continue to be the central preoccupations helping to shape Soviet disarmament policy. However, problems arising in the so-called third world also impinge upon the current Soviet arms control approach.

From the Soviet viewpoint, the formulation of a policy line in the third-world area is complicated both by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the rivalry between Moscow and Peking as champions of "national-liberation" struggles, and by the strain which the deepening Vietnam crisis of the past year has placed upon Soviet-American relations. In effect, the more the Soviet leaders tend toward a "hard" line that reduces their vulnerability to Chinese charges of letting down the revolutionary struggle in the third world and of "collusion" with the
United States, the more they jeopardize the chances of maintaining some semblance of détente in Soviet relations with the United States -- assuming this to be still a desideratum of Soviet policy, a subject which we shall take up more fully later in this paper.

Ambivalence, that much-overworked word, seems to best describe the Soviet attitude toward arms control as it applies to third-world problems. On the one hand, Soviet interest in supporting national-liberation movements in some of the underdeveloped countries tends to limit Soviet willingness to contemplate arms control agreements that would embarrass such support, as for example, embargoes on arms shipments and other types of aid to particular countries or regions. Similarly, international peacekeeping arrangements that might be used to inhibit rebel activities in certain circumstances, as in the Congo case, are regarded with suspicion. In particular, "cooperative" peacekeeping measures which might be construed as entering into a quasi-military alliance with the United States seem virtually ruled out so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, in light of the sharp ideological and power competition with Peking for leadership of third-world revolutionary movements.

On the other hand, however, Soviet interests also have seemed to call under some circumstances for cultivation of a peacekeeping role in the third world, as in the case of the India-Pakistan clash. Even the development of international peacekeeping mechanisms to contain and pacify local conflicts may seem useful to the Soviets, depending on the particular situation. This may apply particularly to arrangements offering an opportunity to check Chinese influence without the appearance of direct Soviet action or of Soviet "partnership" with the United States. Furthermore, the symbolic value of arms control agreements, or merely of discussions, seems to carry some weight in Soviet eyes, either to demonstrate to critics in Peking that a "peaceful coexistence" line is possible, or to help reduce the temperature of an active crisis that may pose the danger of widening conflict.

These contradictory elements of the Soviet attitude have been reflected to some extent in the stand taken by Soviet disarmament negotiators at Geneva. Last September, for example, when the Geneva talks were about to be recessed, Tsarapkin expressed the view that arms control negotiations could not be separated from what he termed U.S. "aggression" in Southeast Asia, in the Congo, and in Santo Domingo, implying that Soviet

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interest lay less in trying to advance a fruitful arms control dialogue than in trying to extract full propaganda advantage from troubled situations in the third world.

By the time the Geneva conference reconvened in early 1966, however, a somewhat different Soviet attitude was apparent. Tsarapkin then took the position that the war in Vietnam should not be allowed to rule out the possibility of progress in arms control negotiations. The "dangerous circumstances" in Vietnam, he said, impose "special responsibilities" on the conferees "to halt the progress of the arms race." If a non-proliferation agreement could be reached, he added, this "could improve the climate for the solution of other problems as well."29

While Tsarapkin thus seemed to be saying that negotiations in Geneva need not bog down entirely over the Vietnam issue, this did not necessarily mean that a basic policy shift toward a new measure of cooperation with the United States had occurred. In fact, other Soviet spokesmen seemed intent on defending the long-standing Soviet line that Moscow's disarmament proposals actually serve the cause of national-liberation movements by creating "a more favorable environment" for revolutionary struggle in the third world.30 In this connection, Soviet

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advocacy of non-proliferation was singled out by some commentators for the contribution it could make to weakening "imperialist" positions in the third world. Thus, as one Soviet commentator put it, "the struggle for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not only aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war, but is directed also against the imperialists and colonialists, who would like to hold on to their position by means of nuclear weapons."\(^{31}\)

Besides regarding Western nuclear power as an obstacle to the success of the national-liberation struggle, Soviet spokesmen have made the point that the buildup of U.S. conventional forces has become a main element of U.S. "aggressive" policy, "directed primarily against the national-liberation movement."\(^{32}\) The problem of escalation of local wars also has been cited in Soviet commentary to buttress arguments for a non-proliferation agreement. Thus, one writer early this year linked the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons "by a large number of states in different parts of the world" with increased danger that "even local conflicts, which in present circumstances can be smothered, might swifly develop into a nuclear clash, threatening the whole world with a thermonuclear holocaust."\(^{33}\)

\(^{31}\)Grinev, Izvestiia, February 23, 1966.


\(^{33}\)Maratov in International Affairs, No. 1, January 1966, p. 19.
The same oscillation evident in Soviet arms control discourse between presenting the Soviet Union in the image of an active supporter of national-liberation conflicts on the one hand and as a proponent of improving the international climate through patient deliberations at the negotiating table on the other, also has been apparent in other areas of Soviet conduct. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union in January 1966 hailed with notable initial enthusiasm the Tri-Continent conference in Havana which set up an interim committee to "promote, increase and consolidate the national-liberation movement" in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. At almost the same time, on the other hand, the Soviet Union was making known to the world, on the heels of Kosygin's mediation of the India-Pakistan dispute at Tashkent, that it had hit on "something completely new in the practice of international relations," namely --

34 Pravda, January 3, 1966; Izvestiia, January 4, 1966. See also "Red Talks Unify UN Latins," The Washington Post, February 27, 1966; The New York Times, February 8, 1966. It may be noted that following the protests of several Latin American governments, the Soviet Union tempered its initial acclaim for the Tri-Continent conference, and offered the rather lame excuse that Soviet participants in it went to Havana as private citizens rather than official Soviet representatives.
"socialist diplomacy," by means of which hitherto obdurate international disputes might be resolved. Whether this new concept of the Soviet Union's peace-making potential -- with its implied acceptance of greater responsibility for peacekeeping in troubled areas of the third world -- will coexist comfortably with the Soviet Union's other self-image as a dedicated champion and active supporter of national-liberation conflicts, is a question which remains for history to answer.

Meanwhile, this would seem to be an appropriate place to turn from this all-too sketchy survey of recent Soviet arms control policy to the longer-range questions which I wish to address in the second portion of this paper.

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II. TRENDS BEARING ON PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The Soviet Union's behavior on the international scene during the next decade or so, and, in terms of the problem under discussion here -- its readiness to seek arms control and peacekeeping arrangements that could contribute to international stability and adjustment of conflict situations -- obviously will depend on many considerations. Among these, at least two seem likely to be of central importance.

The first is the question whether the Soviet Union is undergoing a basic change in the direction of giving up its aspirations to usher in a worldwide communist order. Or, to put it another way, has the operative behavior of the Soviet leaders come to mean abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist urge to remake the world, whatever ideological lip service may still be paid to such a goal? If so, at least one major source of international tension and potential conflict should diminish, though to be sure, others can be expected to arise.

The second, and by no means unrelated, consideration concerns the evolving character of the Soviet-American relationship. Although the bipolar pattern of the past twenty years is now giving way to a more diversified international system, and although the role of China as a challenger of the present international order will probably become a factor of increasing weight, it still seems reasonable to suppose that the relationship of the two superpowers will continue to be the dominant feature of the international scene for the next five or ten years. The direction in which this relationship may be tending -- toward undiminished antagonism or wider
recognition of shared interests -- is therefore also critical to the prospects for future stability and mutual efforts to extend the scope and character of peacekeeping arrangements.

Taking up the first of these questions, one finds a considerable body of evidence that a process of change is at work within the Soviet system, although opinions differ as to the rate of change and the direction in which it may be moving. Some of the evidence relates essentially to internal Soviet developments -- a presumed erosion of the Party apparatus' commitment to ideologically-oriented action; the emergence of what might be called "creeping pluralism" as various institutional groups find a bit more elbow room within the system; recognition by the Soviet leadership of the need for major domestic economic reform and investment; tendencies toward gradual embourgeoisement of Soviet society; and so on. Other evidence relates essentially to external developments -- the mutual interest of the nuclear superpowers in avoiding a world war; the Sino-Soviet dispute, which has not only punctured the myth of monolithic communist unity, but also has served to point up certain parallel areas of U.S.-Soviet interest; a more pragmatic Soviet world view which may have led to quiet shelving of the notion of a universal Soviet state and tacit acceptance of the more or less traditional concept of the national state as the terminal form of the Soviet system.

The inference drawn from this reading of Soviet trends by many observers is that the Soviet Union can be expected henceforth to behave more "reasonably" or more "conventionally" on the international stage,
defining its objectives increasingly in terms of Soviet national interests rather than those of world communism, and seeking to promote international stability rather than to inflame endemic unrest and difficulties among and within non-communist countries for the sake of communist political advance. An important corollary of this image of Soviet change is the prospect that the Soviet Union and the United States may come more readily to recognize that their adversary relationship involves a web of overlapping as well as conflicting interests, and that it therefore behooves both to begin "collaborating" more explicitly than hitherto in areas of common concern.

A somewhat less sanguine view of the situation is taken by others, who find it premature to assume that the benign transformation of the Soviet system is already well advanced. Granted that the process of change is at work, how deeply it runs and where it may lead -- according to this school of opinion -- is still very much an open question. Even though the Soviet system may be gradually losing its revolutionary character, and even though the Soviet leaders may be on the way to recognizing that rival forms of sociopolitical and economic organization in the world are here to stay indefinitely, this does not necessarily nor immediately smooth the path for extensive policies of accommodation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Indeed, it is argued -- and the present writer would tend to side with those who do so argue -- that the Soviet Union will continue for a long time still to be dominated by a ruling elite of strongly authoritarian outlook whose values and objectives will serve more often than not to
cast the Soviet Union in the role of a stubborn competitor, rather than an explicit collaborator, of the United States.

The term of art in this particular forecast is "explicit collaborator." Is there not room for a considerable range of "implicit" or "tacit" collaboration between the Soviet Union and the United States? And does not this prospect justify the optimism of those who hope that even if the two superpowers remain avowed antagonists for the foreseeable future, they may at the same time find it possible to maneuver carefully enough in the international arena to avoid an outright collision?

Perhaps the most appropriate answer is that Moscow and Washington have managed thus far in the nuclear age to do just this; hence, it should be conceded that the prospects for the future are at least as good, and that despite the high probability of recurrent tensions and crises, the two superpowers are likely to continue to avoid a frontal confrontation, and may even succeed in broadening the "cooperative" aspects of their adversary relationship.

Turning more specifically to the character of this relationship, and to the central concern upon which it pivots -- that is, the mutual interest of the two superpowers in steering clear of a general nuclear war -- there would seem to be two principal areas in which events and a clash of interests might trigger such a war. One of these is in the so-called third world, where not only Soviet and American policies are in partial collision, but where rival Sino-Soviet claims for leadership of the world communist movement are being
tested. The other is in Europe, where the more advanced countries of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances confront each other.

With regard to the third world, it can be argued that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union in the last analysis possesses really vital interests in this area, and that neither stands to gain or lose sufficiently in terms of its own national security from what happens in the underdeveloped third-world countries to warrant carrying their competition here to the point of setting off a general war. By the same token, it can also be argued that the marginal nature of conflicting Soviet-American interests in the third world makes this one of the more promising arenas in which to seek more meaningful, even if not explicitly institutionalized, cooperation between the two.

The Soviet Union, the argument runs, has already recognized the need for a differentiated set of policies toward the underdeveloped areas. Only in some parts of the third world, mainly where competition with Peking is most intense, has it chosen to actively support local revolutionary developments. In other countries, as in parts of the Middle East and Africa, the Soviet Union apparently has made its peace with local nationalist movements -- be they "socialist" or "bourgeois" in cast -- and has allowed indigenous Communist Parties to be submerged. Given time, and further differentiation

\[36\] For an excellent discussion of the differentiation of Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries, see Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold War, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1966, especially pp. 66-72.
of Soviet policy in the third world, may not the Soviet Union come to recognize additional points of common interest with the United States, like that displayed in dampening the India-Pakistan crisis, or avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States in Southeast Asia? In the longer run, might not a desire to reduce the drain on Soviet resources from economic aid competition with the United States lead to identification of a mutual U.S.-Soviet interest in seeing the gap narrowed between the advanced countries and the laggard third world, between the have and the have-nots? At the basis of this view, perhaps, lies the assumption that the Soviet conflict with China is driving the Soviet Union toward a community of interest with the West, which may manifest itself first in a willingness to reach arms control agreements, and other understandings in the third world.

From another perspective, however, it would seem that each side perceives itself to have interests in the third world that are at least as conducive of conflict and abrasive relations as they are avenues for cooperative action. Such Soviet activities as being a major arms supplier to various third-world countries -- Indonesia, the UAR, Iraq, Cuba, Somalia, among others -- do not augur well for development of stability, even though a direct Soviet-U.S. clash of interests may not be involved. The Soviet military aid program alone seems to belie concern about reducing demands on Soviet resources where it appears that political ends can be served. In the case of such a temporary conjunction of U.S.-Soviet interest as the Kashmir cease-fire, one might suppose that mutuality of interest would rapidly dissolve should it appear that the new "flexibility"
of Soviet diplomacy was drawing the sub-continent permanently into the Soviet sphere of influence. Over the longer term, it might also be argued that this is a dynamic age of ferment and breakup of the traditional order in most of the countries of the third world, where, despite -- or possibly because of its competition with China -- the Soviet Union will find itself drawn further into the revolutionary process rather than seeking to underwrite stability and orderly change in concert with the West.

In immediate terms, perhaps the principal source of perturbation to be taken into account is the problem of Vietnam and its impact on the subtle and intricate character of the Soviet-U.S. relationship in the third world. The outcome of this situation remains quite uncertain at the present juncture. However, pressures upon the Soviet Union engendered by the crisis in Southeast Asia and by the sharpening competition with Peking could well prompt the Soviet leadership -- even against its better judgment -- to place a higher premium than hitherto upon material Soviet support of "national-liberation" movements in general and the Vietnam conflict in particular, creating a climate in which Soviet-U.S. relations are likely to be placed under increasing strain.

One should, however, recognize certain offsetting considerations that may work the other way so far as the Soviet Union is concerned -- strengthening, rather than reducing, the reluctance of the Soviet leadership to become more deeply involved in a challenge to U.S. power locally on various distant fronts in the third
world, including Vietnam. Perhaps the most trenchant consideration is again that of avoiding a showdown situation in which the danger of nuclear war might become acute. Despite some doctrinal shifts over the past few years in the apparent direction of greater readiness to become involved in limited wars, Soviet conduct evidently remains strongly conditioned by concern over escalation of local conflicts.

Another important consideration is the pressing need recognized by the present Soviet regime to make effective inroads upon the Soviet Union's accumulating internal problems. To the extent that a policy of deeper and more direct Soviet involvement in third-world conflicts would upset and delay programs of domestic economic improvement, a telling constraint would seem to apply against adoption of such a policy. So long as the character of Soviet involvement in situations like Vietnam can be kept on an essentially "proxy" basis, control


38 As testimony to the "proxy" character of the Soviet involvement in the Vietnam war, one may note that throughout the conflict to date, despite the potentially inflammatory situation of Soviet-made SAM missiles and AAA guns shooting down U.S. aircraft, both the Soviet Union and the United States apparently have found it in their interest to preserve the fiction of no direct Soviet involvement in the fighting. This, incidentally, can be considered a de facto form of arms control.
of sorts over an open-ended commitment can probably be more easily maintained.

Still another consideration weighing against a shift of Soviet policy toward a substantially more active military role either in the Vietnam case, or in other distant conflicts that may arise in the third world, turns upon the Soviet Union's traditional preoccupation with the military and political problems of Europe -- not the least of which, in Soviet eyes, is the problem of keeping a resurgent Germany in check. Were the Soviet leaders to shift their sights from this central strategic front in order to pursue a strategy of waging peripheral local conflicts with globally-mobile U.S. military power, they would not only run the increased risk of local escalation to general war, but they might find that the relative power position of the Soviet Union and its ability to influence the politics of Europe had suffered as well.

Without trying to extend the list of pros and cons, one can say that there are at least as many reasons for the Soviet leadership to prefer a patient and cautious effort at political advance in the third world as there are for adoption of policies that would transform the third world into a more turbulent arena of open conflict with the United States. The crux of the matter, perhaps, is whether the rival Chinese prescription for more militant third-world struggle succeeds. The final returns are not yet in, but should the Chinese line be validated by events, say in the Vietnam "test case," then pressure upon the Soviet leadership to take up a
more extreme and aggressive posture in the third world might become difficult indeed to resist.\(^3\) This prospect would be heightened should leadership of the "anti-imperialist" dynamic in the third world seem likely to pass into Peking's hands as a result of developments in Southeast Asia.

In Europe, a somewhat different situation presents itself so far as the problem of minimizing acute strains upon the Soviet-American relationship is concerned. Here, as distinct from the third world, Soviet policy has tended increasingly to become one of power-bloc maneuvering against the advanced industrial countries of the West, rather than one of seeking to encourage and re-invigorate revolutionary activities by Western Communist parties.\(^4\) Here also a real nexus of vital interests of both sides is to be found, and a serious attempt by either side to press for major political gains seems likely to be regarded as unacceptable trespass upon the interests of the other. For this very reason, perhaps, both sides in a sense have collaborated in a major peacekeeping operation in Europe for a number of years; it has been shaken from time to time by the pressures of the Cold War, but never to the point of real breakdown.

In the Soviet case, since the failure of Khrushchev's efforts from 1958 to 1962 to impose a unilateral solution

\(^3\) See the present author's *The Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, pp. 25-26, 39-40.

\(^4\) See Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War*, pp. 56-57.
with respect to Berlin and the German question, caution has governed Soviet European policy, which has shown little taste for tampering with the delicate balance in Europe. How long this relative quiescence may prevail, given the political dynamics of an evolving Europe, is one of the major imponderables upon which Soviet-American relations will turn in the period ahead.

It might be said that various pressures already seem to be at work for reactivation of more vigorous Soviet policies in Europe. Some of these arise out of adamant Soviet opposition to proposed nuclear-sharing arrangements within NATO. Should the present Soviet non-proliferation campaign fail to block such arrangements, the Soviet Union has threatened that it will take vigorous, though unspecified, countermeasures. Other pressures arise from Soviet difficulties in maintaining the cohesion of the Warsaw bloc, the members of which have displayed varying degrees of national restlessness that could threaten to erode Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Other subtle hints also have come from the Chinese that Moscow should create new diversions in Europe, where, according to Peking, the Soviets have been "colluding" with the United States to ease the

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European situation and thereby permit transfer of American troops "from Europe to expand the war in Vietnam."42

Thus far, the Soviet leaders have resisted this particular siren song from Peking. They may, however, for reasons of their own, come to feel that diversionary moves of some sort are in order in Europe. The stepped-up pursuit of divisive diplomacy against NATO, for example, utilizing perhaps a Moscow-Paris axis to fan discord within the Western alliance, might seem to constitute an inviting approach, calculated especially to impede renewal of the NATO agreement a few years hence. Whatever the reasons, it seems fair to say that a Soviet disposition to disrupt the present delicate equilibrium in Europe would place Soviet-U.S. relations under strains comparable to those in earlier phases of the Cold War.

At this point, assuming that neither in the third world nor in Europe will the situation get so far out of hand as to bring on the ultimate catastrophe of a nuclear war, in which case further speculation about the future might be largely irrelevant anyway, it would seem appropriate to consider the role that military power is likely to play as an instrument of Soviet policy in the decade ahead. Is there a reasonable prospect that either major changes in Soviet society or in the

outlook of the Soviet leadership itself may lead to marked
depreciation of military power and instrumentalities for
support of Soviet policy objectives?

Any answer to this question is necessarily speculative,
and subject to one's own conception of the process of socio-
political change. To begin with, one can dismiss the
chances that in the next decade -- or even in the more
distant future -- Soviet society will arrive at the
utopian communist stage once envisaged in Marxist-Leninist
scripture, where all institutions of state power, in-
cluding the military, were expected to "wither away."

Anchoring one's expectations in what appear to be the
realities of the world as it is, the next five or ten
years seem unlikely to bring truly radical changes in
Soviet society and patterns of behavior. Assuming this

43 Obviously, the author's own conception of the
process of social and political change shows through in
this statement. He tends to believe, although this is
a disputed question among cultural anthropologists and
others (see, e.g., F. M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology,
that the basic dimensions of a culture cannot ordinarily
be shifted in a population in less than two or three
generations. This is not to say that change and innovation
do not occur on a shorter time scale also, but simply that
some zones of a given culture are much more resistant to
rapid change than others. There may occur, of course,
critical junctures in the life of a society when a
revolutionary break severs the old from the new. But
such a revolutionary break does not seem, to the author
at least, to be in prospect in the Soviet Union today.
Indeed, in the Soviet case, even fifty years after a
revolution of sweeping socio-political dimensions, the
well-known perezhitki, or survivals of the past, persist.
Just so, many of the new "Soviet" values and forms of
behavior which have taken root in the Soviet period may
prove equally persistent fifty years from now -- even
to be the case, in the view of the present writer at least, military power will probably continue to be regarded by the Soviet leaders as an essential ingredient of Soviet policy, performing much the same functions it serves today.

These are several. Most essential perhaps -- to deter an opponent from launching an attack or to wage war if it should occur, functions sometimes described as providing a shield for the security of the Soviet Union and its allies against the "designs of imperialism." Closely related to these functions -- to lend authority to Soviet foreign policy in general, and to provide the rationale upon which the feasibility of "peaceful coexistence" rests in particular. Next in importance -- to ensure good conduct from Soviet partners within the communist world itself, where emergent nationalisms may breed disrespect for Soviet interests. Besides these outward- and inward-looking functions, another of major significance may be added -- that of discouraging Western military resistance to communist political and proxy warfare endeavors, or what may be called the "counter-deterrent" role of Soviet military power as a political weapon. 44

But let us suppose there are some surprises in store, and that during the next decade or so the Soviet Union not only sheds its revolutionary aspirations far more readily than one has assumed, but also accepts with good grace a more or less conventional great power role in world affairs. What then?

Plausibly, one might expect the "counter-deterrent" value of Soviet arms, as backup for a strategy of communist political advance that would be no longer essentially operative, to decline in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. It seems doubtful, however, that the other functions of Soviet military power would shrink to marginal importance, in terms either of Soviet security from external attack or the assertion of Soviet interests against the national pretensions of other states, including those ruled by communist regimes. On the latter score, the "containment" of Chinese encroachment upon Soviet interests could well become a growing problem in the next decade, counseling against the neglect of Soviet military preparations, even though the chances of an outright military collision between the two communist powers should remain remote. In this connection, incidentally, it is a matter of some interest that the Soviet leadership apparently saw fit to castigate Peking in private recently for suggesting "to the Chinese people that it is necessary to prepare themselves for a military struggle with the USSR."  

45 The quotation is from a purported recent letter from the CPSU to other Communist Parties, published in the Hamburg newspaper Die Welt on March 21, 1966. See Anatole Shub, "Russians' China Blast is Revealed,"
In light of the foregoing discussion, what concluding comments can be offered on our subject? Whether Soviet policy is mainly animated by a revolutionary drive to reshape the world or by an evolutionary tendency toward accommodation with it, two constants can be expected: First, it seems likely that the Soviet leadership will continue to look upon military power as a prime guarantee of Soviet security; second, it seems equally likely that the Soviet leaders will continue to pursue policies governed by the desire to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Both of these constants will help shape the general environment for arms control and peacekeeping endeavors. In the first instance, the importance of military power in Soviet eyes is likely to keep the Soviet leadership sensitive to changes in the military balance, in technology and in other factors affecting the "correlation of forces." Although Soviet efforts to translate such changes into political or strategic advantage might diminish under conditions of "evolutionary" development toward policies of accommodation, in any event the Soviet leaders will undoubtedly seek to prevent the other side

The Washington Post, March 22, 1966. For a background discussion of Sino-Soviet military relations, see also the present author's The Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. 40-49.

An illuminating analysis of the concept of the "correlation of forces" and its influence upon Soviet policy calculations may be found in Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy, pp. 77-97.
from exploiting changes to its advantage. Thus, in a sense, one can expect that steps affecting the military balance will continue to have something of the character of moves in a "shadow war." In the second instance, the desire to keep this shadow war from being transformed into the real thing seems to mean that some basis for recognition of mutual Soviet-American interest is embedded in the future under a wide range of alternative paths of Soviet development.

In the field of arms control, this joint concern for avoidance of nuclear war would presumably keep alive an interest in so-called "preventive" measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, and it might encourage continued discussion of measures to limit deployment of new weapons systems, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to slow down the tempo of research and development. Whether the prospect for agreement on such measures will be any better than heretofore is, however, an open question. Likewise, it remains uncertain whether the Soviet Union will begin to display an interest, notably absent up to now, in arms control measures and associated strategic doctrines intended to limit the scale and destructiveness of a nuclear war and to help terminate it if it should occur.

Beyond a conjunction of interests growing out of the problem of preventing a nuclear war, the environment of the future does appear quite sensitive to shifts in Soviet outlook and behavior. For example, recognition of broader areas of common concern and cooperation than has been the case up to now seems intimately dependent
on the Soviet Union's readiness to forgo a revolutionary strategy of communist political advance in favor of a stabilizing role in the international arena. Some signs of a shift in this direction have been noted, but the question is still whether a few swallows betoken the spring.

The question here of interpreting the direction of Soviet development is exceedingly difficult, for it is a matter of distinguishing between the "normal" interplay of rivalries within the on-going system of international politics and competitive conflict that aims at scrapping the system itself.

Which of these two tendencies best describes the Soviet case is perhaps the most vital question of all. In the author's opinion, the Soviet Union at best is moving only slowly and grudgingly toward acceptance of the on-going system of "normal" competitive striving among national states. If a final word may be ventured, the prospects for the future will not greatly improve until the Soviet leadership is more fully persuaded that the time has come to lay down its messianic burdens and get on with the business of satisfying the needs and inner aspirations of the society over which it rules. In that event, the Soviet rulers may come increasingly to perceive that Soviet security and economic well-being can be better served by seeking broader areas of cooperation with the United States, rather than acting upon the assumption that the policies of the Soviet Union and its chief Western adversary are grounded upon an irreconcilable clash of interests.