THE SINO-SOVET CONFLICT AND THE WEST

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July 1962
Since the dramatic developments at the 22nd Soviet Party Congress last year, no one can seriously doubt the existence of a profound dispute between Russia and China. But opinions vary widely as to its causes, its likely future development, its consequences, and its significance, if any, for Western policy. The purpose of this article is to provide a framework for exploring some of the implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for the West.

It should be emphasized immediately that Western policy towards the Communist world cannot be based solely, or even principally, on the Sino-Soviet conflict. In formulating our policy, many other considerations must be weighed. Moreover, as a result of the dispute, dangers as well as opportunities are opened to the West, and such opportunities as are offered are limited. In some respects the dispute has complicated and intensified our problems. We can no longer assume, for instance, that basic Communist policy in Southeast Asia originates entirely in Moscow. We shall be faced increasingly with the need to evaluate not only Soviet policy and intentions, but also

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those of Peking and even of such key third parties in the Communist
movement as the North Vietnamese, who to a large extent call the
signals for the Communists both in Laos and in South Vietnam. Our
dangers may increase if Peking's charges that Moscow is soft towards
the West goad the Russians to pursue the offensive more vigorously.
Not only do the problems confronting the West thus persist; our
ability to exercise leverage on either Russia or China, and thereby
to influence their relations, remains extremely limited. Even assum-
ing we used the few instrumentalities we possess as well as we pos-
sibly could, the United States, as the leader of the "imperialist"
camp, will remain the major enemy of both Russia and China, and this
situation will greatly limit our ability to exploit the rift. In
the final analysis, a secularization of Communism's messianic and
universalist ideology can be brought about not by a strategy aimed
at manipulating developments within the Communist world, but only
by one designed to strengthen the unity and vitality of the non-
Communist world.

To recognize the severe limitations in our ability to profit
from the rift is not to underrate the importance of the Moscow-Peking
quarrel for the entire non-Communist world. Indeed, the bitter and
prolonged rift has altered the nature of the Communist Bloc, perhaps
irrevocably, and has had a considerable impact on both Soviet and
Chinese policies in many parts of the world. While we may not be
able to widen the breach much by our own actions, we should con-
sider our objectives and tactics towards the Bloc in the light of
the dispute. Up to a point, the West has always been, so to speak,
the tacit third partner in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Its action or lack of action, its strength or weakness, its resolution or irresolution, have affected the course of the dispute considerably and will continue to do so since the conflict in part concerns Communist Bloc strategy towards the West. Conversely, certain Western problems arise directly out of the Sino-Soviet dispute. What attitude should we take, for example, to the Albanians, now that they have broken with Moscow and accepted Peking's support? Should we, in the light of the Sino-Soviet conflict, reevaluate our strategy towards Communist China? In short, Western policy is bound to affect and be affected by the rift between its two major antagonists. Although our ability to influence or to manipulate this rift for our own purposes may be small, and although there are many uncertainties about what course will benefit us most, we must try to determine what new problems, new dangers, and new opportunities the rift presents -- and we must adjust our thinking and our policies accordingly.

Before we can talk about policy, however, it seems to me that we must have clearly in mind what are the essential causes of the dispute and what the future shape of Sino-Soviet relations is likely to be. To my mind, the basic underlying cause of controversy is the rivalry for leadership in the Communist world movement, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America where the Chinese aspire to hegemony. This rivalry manifests itself in many ways. First, there is the towering image of an all-knowing Mao which the Chinese have been creating since 1958. Mao is said to be the "most out-standing" of all living Marxist-Leninist theoreticians; he alone has adapted
Marxism-Leninism to the needs not only of China but of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Second, there are implicit Chinese claims that their own revolutionary model, both for seizing power and for "building socialism," is more relevant to the underdeveloped areas than the Soviet model. Third, there is abundant evidence of intense Chinese activity throughout the emergent areas of the world, where the Chinese are operating independently of, and often in obvious competition with, Moscow. In some of these areas, the competition between Moscow and Peking overrides their common interest in world revolution: here the immediate question is not whether a given country goes Communist, but whether Moscow or Peking gains the predominant influence. There is acute rivalry in the large, pro-Communist trade unions and student organizations in these areas, as well as in the local Communist parties.

There is also competition for influence over existing nationalist governments. The intensity of the conflict can be gauged by the following: while China is engaged in a bitter border dispute with India that has involved sporadic local violence and could lead to war, Russia supplies India with large-scale economic aid and helicopters used to patrol the disputed border areas, and offers to supply military equipment of a later vintage than that sent to Peking.

Since 1958 Peking has been attempting to establish itself as the Constantinople of the Communist world. Indeed Mao's interest in establishing an Eastern sphere of influence for himself can be traced back to his writings of the 1930's and 40's, when he was already contending that the "new democratic republic" to be established in
China would be the transitional type of state to be adopted by all revolutions in the so-called "colonial and semi-colonial countries." No sooner had the Chinese Communists taken power in 1949 than they began to claim that their own path to power, "the road of Mao Tsetung," was in general the road to be taken by other "colonial" countries. Mao's writings were called "the development of Marxism-Leninism in the East." In summary, there has been latent in Maoist writings for three decades a claim to Chinese leadership of the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped areas. Moscow has persistently refused to recognize such a claim. At various times over the past decade, the resulting disagreement has boiled to the surface.

Why, it may be asked, have Moscow and Peking not been able to divide the world into spheres of influence in which each would reign supreme? For one thing, both parties recognize that such a division could never be stable. Nothing but naked force could prevent a European Communist state such as Albania from defecting to Peking or an Asian party such as the Indian from defecting to Moscow. Even if there were no overt defection, there would be no way of abolishing factionalism; one faction could look to Peking for policy guidance while another looked to Moscow. Moreover, the policies pursued by one partner in its own sphere might violate the interests of the other.

Since the international Communist movement does not seem to be compatible with shared authority, the only alternative for Moscow and Peking is an arrangement in which one of them is clearly recognized as the senior, the other as the junior partner. It is
inconceivable that Moscow could ever reconcile itself to a junior status. The evidence of the past four years suggests that Peking will not easily accept that status either. It follows that China's restiveness will grow as she approaches great-power status. Moreover, even if the two powers draw closer together on strategy and tactics towards the West, the power struggle in Asia, Africa, and Latin America will continue.

In spite of its seriousness, the rift is not irreversible; nor is an open break inevitable or even likely in the near future. Events since the 22nd Soviet Party Congress suggest that, although the rivals are too far apart to resolve their differences quickly, they both recognize the damage they would suffer from the washing in public of their dirty linen. There has been little change in the positions taken by each side on the important questions of ideology, strategy, and authority. But there has been a notable effort to mute ideological polemics and to resume some limited cooperation on the conventional diplomatic level. Thus, the Chinese ambassador has returned to Moscow after a prolonged absence; trade protocols have been concluded between China and most of the countries of the Soviet Bloc; there has been an increase in the number of Chinese cultural, "friendship," and trade union delegations in Moscow; and so on.

For some time to come, the relationship between Moscow and Peking will probably move in the shifting middle ground between reconciliation and complete disruption. A complete settlement appears unlikely because there is no room at the top for more than one of the Communist powers. But the two powers will continue to have major interests
in common. Both want to advance the Communist cause in non-Communist areas. Both would like to see an erosion of the American alliance systems in Europe and Asia, and the neutralization of the erstwhile allies. Both would like to preserve at least the nominal unity of the international Communist movement. Both have an interest in maintaining the 1950 Treaty of Alliance, which pledges each to provide military and other assistance in the event of an attack on the other by Japan or a country allied to Japan. To the Chinese, the treaty is important for both offensive and defensive reasons. As long as the treaty is operative, the United States will be uncertain as to how far it can go in opposing Chinese initiatives without risking war with Russia. This constraint should be worth a great deal to the Chinese. China must also value the defensive benefits of the treaty, for the large movement of troops to the coastal provinces last June testified to the growing Chinese Communist concern over a possible invasion from Taiwan. The Russians, for their part, will have a continuing interest in deterring any kind of Western attack on China and particularly an attack of such magnitude as to threaten the Communist regime in China.

In the coming years, we may expect Sino-Soviet relations to fluctuate between tolerable and bad. Looking somewhat further into the future, the deaths of Mao and Khrushchev could open the way to reconciliation but it seems unlikely, for the reasons given above, that any reconciliation could be permanent.
Within the international Communist movement, the Sino-Soviet rift has accelerated the already existing trend towards diversity and independence of the USSR. The Communist Bloc never was as monolithic as is sometimes imagined in the West. But it was a tightly disciplined association of states under the rule of a Soviet-dominated hierarchy. There was seldom much significant variance between the policies, foreign or domestic, of the Bloc members. By and large the Bloc and non-Bloc parties were responsive to Soviet demands and followed Soviet policies. Today all this is changing. The Sino-Soviet rift has accelerated a process of change in the Bloc that has been under way since Stalin's death. Increasingly one can observe important differences in domestic views on socio-economic matters in the Bloc states. Poland, for example, has not yet collectivized its agriculture and retains a larger margin of domestic freedom than, say, East Germany. The process of de-Stalinization has gone much further in Poland and Hungary than elsewhere. As long as Moscow and Peking offer different roads to socialism, such diversity is likely to increase. Moreover, along with political and economic differentiation goes a growing measure of independence of Moscow. Neither of the two Asian satellites, North Korea and North Vietnam, followed Moscow in attacking Albania at the 22nd Congress. Perhaps even more
significant, Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, although European neighbors of the Soviet Union, did not follow Moscow in breaking diplomatic relations with Albania. ¹ This decision was probably made against the wishes of the Russians who were clearly anxious to demonstrate to the Albanians that they must surrender or face diplomatic isolation. Had Moscow and Peking remained united, it would have been difficult for the smaller Bloc members to gain even such a limited amount of independence of Moscow. With the two large Communist powers at odds over basic questions of foreign and domestic policy, however, the smaller parties, particularly those in Asia, can increasingly play Moscow off against Peking and thus gain greater independence of both.

The Sino-Soviet conflict also weakens Soviet control in another way. Large conferences of all the parties can no longer agree on a common line, so that Moscow must increasingly rely on personal visits to the satellites in order to change policy. Thus, after deciding earlier this year to seek anew a rapprochement with Tito, Khrushchev journeyed to Bulgaria and Rumania, the two satellites which together with Albania have been most hostile to such a rapprochement. While the Soviet Premier evidently succeeded in his purpose, it is quite likely that he had to undertake genuine bargaining with the

¹ The motivation was probably different for Poland than for Rumania and Bulgaria. The Poles, while disagreeing with Albania, nevertheless support the right of local communist parties to domestic autonomy. The Rumanians and Bulgarians share some of the Albanian world view, particularly the hostility towards Yugoslavia.
satellite leaders. Diplomacy has thus replaced diktat within the Communist Bloc.

One can observe significant differences between Communist states even in their attitudes towards the West and major East-West issues. The North Korean Party, for example, like the Chinese, has demonstrated much more hostility towards the Kennedy administration than has Moscow or most of the European Bloc. At the other extreme, the Poles have expressed a greater fear of war and a livelier interest in disarmament than most other Communist states.

An important task for Western policy makers in the coming decade will be to encourage the incipient pluralism in international Communism by creating conditions that favor it. The instrumentalities for exercising leverage on the Bloc, of course, are all too limited. Nevertheless the non-Communist countries do have a variety of economic, political, and cultural relations with the Communist states, and they could harness these to a common purpose.

In its economic relations with the Bloc, the West might exercise some leverage if it had a unified approach. Lately it has become especially clear that the Bloc as a whole is extremely interested in increasing trade with the West. There is no question but that the Bloc needs such trade more than the West, a fact which in itself is significant. In the past, the West has been limited in its economic relations with the Bloc only by a number of export controls which have been interpreted much more strictly in the United States than elsewhere. Our approach to trading with the Bloc has been guided
by the negative principle of deciding what not to export rather than by any positive attempt to define our purposes in entering such a trading relationship.

This approach is deficient in two respects, I believe. First, it is impracticable. In most cases the U.S. will not be able to stop many of its allies from selling a variety of goods to the Bloc. Western trade with Communist China, for example, is almost certain to increase as a result of the radical decline in Chinese trade with the USSR and the East European Bloc. In 1961 Sino-Soviet trade was down by about half of the volume for the year preceding. While this decline may only be temporary, a substantial reorientation of Chinese trade may be taking place. Two of the four Chinese commercial attachés have been formally withdrawn from the USSR and have not been replaced. Hints have been thrown out in Peking concerning a desire for increased trade with the West and possible exchanges of technical personnel. Peking seems prepared to abandon its earlier insistence on political prerequisites for trade with Japan, and the Japanese have indicated that they will increase trade with China to the same level as that conducted by West Germany and Italy with China. Negotiations have already taken place for the supply of British aircraft to China, and there are indications of Chinese interest in turbines, generators, and other equipment which, presumably, they no longer obtain from the Russians.

Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are reportedly forming ambitious plans to develop a wool market in China, and Canada seems to believe that China can provide a steady and expanding market for
food products. The Commonwealth countries, in particular, will be under heavy pressure to increase trade with the Bloc if their traditional markets are constricted as a result of Britain's joining the Common Market. A new trading relationship between these countries and Communist China would probably lead to diplomatic recognition by such of them as have not hitherto recognized the Communist regime. There is already substantial trade between the Bloc and some of our European allies. Western trade, for example, accounts for 40 per cent of Poland's overall trade turnover and 30 per cent of Hungary's. West Germany contributes vitally to the East German economy through its trade with her. Given the hard economic facts of life, there is little that the United States can do, even if it so desired, to bring about a decline or prevent an increase in the present East-West trade.

The present policy of export restriction is not only impracticable, it fails to exploit the need of Communist countries for trade with the West. No American administration has yet developed a consistent policy designed to do this. A policy which might do this, it seems to me, would look towards working out with our Western allies a set of common political principles that would underlie our trade with the Bloc. We should impress upon our allies the importance of selectivity in trading with the Bloc countries. Trade, as well as political and cultural relations, should be intensified with those Communist states which are moving towards, or maintaining, moderation in their external policies, some degree of independence from the USSR, and genuine de-Stalinization and reform in their internal policies. Where a Communist state meets some but not all of these
requirements, the West should insist at least on some signs of movement in a favorable direction. Clearly we should avoid the impression of rewarding the more militant of the Bloc countries. At the same time, we should explore the possibilities of securing some degree of moderation in return for a minimum economic commitment that could be subsequently withheld or increased.

It would be desirable not only to have a common trading policy based on an agreed political strategy, but also to have a single negotiating agency through which European countries would establish terms for trading with the Bloc. The Common Market may facilitate establishing a centralized bargaining agent. Such centralized Western trade with the Bloc would make it more difficult for the Russians to play one Western country off against another. It would also help bring U.S. and West European trade policies closer together, since it would be easier for the United States to harmonize its policy with that of a unified European agency than with a variety of separate national policies. Finally, a central bargaining agent would make it easier to apply commercial sanctions.

The decision as to which of the Bloc countries meet specified criteria for trade and aid must be left with the Executive department and cannot be considered a suitable matter for Congressional legislation from year to year. The Congressional action last June to bar

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2 This idea was developed by Horst Mendershausen. See The European Community and the Soviet Bloc, The RAND Corporation, May, '62.
aid to all Communist states demonstrated how domestic political considerations and lack of understanding can combine to inhibit a policy designed to take advantage of, and promote, pluralism in the Bloc. Such actions merely harm our efforts to encourage liberal elements in the Bloc and give a powerful argument to those Communist conservatives who want to reduce ties with the West and to link their economies more closely to the Russian-dominated CEMA.

We are already practicing a policy of selectivity in relation to Poland and Yugoslavia. This should continue and most-favored-nation tariff treatment should be given both to Yugoslav and to Polish products. Polish and Yugoslav enterprises should be allowed to obtain regular commercial credit in the United States. Limited development loans and credits should be considered for both Poland and Yugoslavia. The Battle Act should be amended in order to give the Administration more flexibility in regulating trade with Communist countries. We might consider ways of inhibiting the negative impact of the Common Market on the Yugoslav economy.

Were the Administration to adopt this line, it would have to explain to Congress, to the American public, and to our Western allies the desirability of, and the rationale behind a selective approach to trade with the Communist world. The guiding principle should be to provide Gomulka and Tito, and any who wish to emulate them, with sufficient leverage to maintain or increase their independence of the Russians. At the same time, we should impress upon these two, with whatever subtlety circumstances permit, that the West will not give them a blank check and that we expect them to follow independent and moderate policies.
It must be recognised, at the same time, that there are limitations on the ability and even the desire of dissident Communist states to depart substantially from Soviet-approved positions. Being Communist, as well as dissident, these states will share a number of common interests and goals with the Soviet Union. Their independence, therefore, can be assessed only in relative terms, a difficult task that can be performed better by Administration experts than by members of Congress. The essential issue, as Ambassador Kennan has pointed out, is not whether we should continue to aid Yugoslavia or Poland, but whether the Administration is to be allowed the latitude and flexibility necessary to manage our commercial relations with the Communist countries. Depriving the Administration of flexibility in dealing with the Bloc can only interfere with a process of evolution that will go on anyway and will prove to be in our interest. A United States Administration that means to profit from the Sino-Soviet dispute will have to be skillful enough to recognize the significant differences between one Communist satellite and another, and bold enough to withstand much domestic opposition to discriminating between them.

The erosion of Communist ideals and organisation brought about by Polish and Yugoslav ideological and economic innovations is easy to illustrate. Polish journals and newspapers are eagerly read wherever they are available in the Bloc because they often contain news and articles not carried in local media. The Yugoslav press is considered so "subversive" that it is not generally available in the Bloc countries. The Polish theatre has been described as the
most experimental in Europe; its plays are often thinly veiled attacks on the more totalitarian aspects of Communist rule or on the basic assumptions of the Communists. The first abstract art exhibition seen in Moscow was a Polish one and it created considerable stir amongst Soviet intellectuals. In the realm of foreign policy, Tito and Gomulka both anticipated Soviet emphasis on the dangers of nuclear war and have vigorously attacked the high-risk strategy advocated by Peking. The continuing assaults on "revisionism," particularly heavy in the Stalinist satellites, testify to the fear of the Old Believers that their rule can gradually be undermined by Western ideas and influence transmitted via the dissident Communist countries.

When a Bloc country, even one as ill-disposed to the West as Albania, actually breaks with Moscow, the West should be receptive to requests by it for economic and political support of a limited kind. It should make known that such support will continue and increase provided the country in question maintains a moderate attitude towards the West. This could make the difference between a Bloc country's temporary defiance of Moscow and a long-range decision to try to go it alone. Yugoslavia, for example, cut its ties with the Bloc only after it knew it could obtain Ruhr coal. Once a Communist country breaks with the Bloc, there is a chance that no matter how militant it was prior to the break its policies may change as Yugoslavia's did after its break with Moscow in 1948. Albania, since its schism with Moscow, has moved rapidly to improve relations with its non-Communist neighbors, Italy and Greece, and has indicated a
desire to improve relations with all capitalist states. If Communist states that have broken with Moscow are denied Western economic and political support, it will only serve to deter other Communist states from seeking greater independence of Soviet dictation.

POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

The most controversial problem we face in our strategy towards the Communist world today concerns our approach to Communist China. Two diametrically opposed strategies have been suggested in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict. One school of thought contends that we should continue to isolate China from the world community and to maintain our present trade embargo. In addition to the familiar arguments advanced for this strategy, it is contended that any Western wooing of China might have the effect of making Russia more aggressive. It is also argued that American isolation of China has been a powerful factor in causing Sino-Soviet tensions, and that any reversal of this policy might reduce them. It is suggested that American overtures to China would have the effect of strengthening her position in the Communist world. Finally, it is argued that the establishment of economic and political relations with Communist China would enable that country to overcome her present severe economic and political difficulties, and to reestablish her former high rate of industrialization. Hence, it is said, we would be strengthening a power that might well turn out to be our principal enemy in the coming decade.

The opposing view argues that it is unrealistic to expect the Communist regime in China to be overthrown without risking nuclear war, or to collapse of its own weight. We should therefore adopt a
strategy designed to bring about a change in Chinese Communist thinking and objectives. The rift with Russia, it is contended, and the severe economic crisis at home, provide us with the opportunity to establish first a trading relationship with Peking, and then a political relationship that can be used to try to moderate the attitude of China and to achieve some limited agreements with her.

American isolation of China having greatly contributed to her militance, the view continues, a change in this policy will make it possible for the more pragmatic elements in her ruling elite to assume the ascendancy.

Although some of the reasoning behind each of these positions is undoubtedly valid, there is, it seems to me, much to be questioned in them. It is dubious, for example, that modest overtures to Peking from the United States would have an appreciable effect on the USSR, much less make it more aggressive. Peking has already shown considerable interest in reorienting its trade pattern towards the West, and this interest has been reciprocated. These developments have produced no noticeable change in Soviet behavior. On the other hand, it is even more dubious that, in the short run at least, such overtures would succeed in appreciably moderating Peking.

Any strategy towards China must be a risky one based on a number of imponderables. Yet it is possible to conceive of a policy, between the two positions just described, that would be alive to the possibilities of tactical change in Chinese Communist behavior. If Peking does increase its trade with non-Communist countries substantially, it will have to balance its desire to support "liberation wars"
against the possible loss of important Western supplies, provided that the Western suppliers have succeeded in convincing China that economic sanctions would be applied to counter such support.

If the Peking leaders decide that the militant forward strategy they have been advocating since 1958 has not paid off, or is too risky without Soviet support, they may well revive the "Bandung spirit" in the hope of making gains by more peaceful tactics. There are already indications that a "good neighbor" policy is being pursued selectively in such countries as Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, and Cambodia. While, in the near future, many considerations will inhibit a sharp swing to the right in China's foreign policy -- not the least of which is the Chinese commitment to the more radical elements in the international Communist movement -- the possibilities for some degree of change are present. Moreover, Chinese Communist verbal and ideological attacks on the West have always been less restrained than Chinese military policy. The widespread image of a reckless leadership ready to risk a nuclear Armageddon has never been supported by Chinese behavior in the face of superior power. However much Mao may "strategically despise" the American enemy, he has consistently shown his "tactical respect."

In the light of these facts, the United States might consider the sale of food to China on a small scale in order to determine the impact, if any, of economic assistance on foreign policy. As a minimum quid pro quo the United States could demand the release of American political prisoners. We might also consider such a modest step as approving an international air route from Paris to Peking, as
a sign of our readiness to expand relations with China under the proper conditions.

We might send to China an informal delegation of highly respected Americans to learn from the Peking leaders the limits within which bargaining with the West may seem worthwhile to them. At present, it must be admitted, the area of worthwhile bargaining probably seems very small to them. But much depends on the pressures currently affecting the leaders in Peking. China's receptivity to Western approaches will be affected by such factors as her domestic situation, the balance of power, the extent of her dependence on Western suppliers, and by changes in her relations with the USSR.

A wider range of Chinese Communist relations with the Western allies could be to our advantage, but only if the West pursued a cautious and united policy, if China were made to recognize the contingent nature of Western assistance and if the Peking leaders were made aware that they must meet certain criteria for these relations to be maintained.

It is not suggested here that China's appetite for power can be appeased by a few gestures. Although it is advisable to keep the door to Peking slightly ajar, the most compelling problems the United States will face in the coming years are not how to negotiate with China but how to contain her and how to prevent her from dividing the United States from its non-Communist allies. One of Peking's major goals has been to eliminate U.S. power from Asia and to separate the U.S. from its allies throughout the underdeveloped world.
Moreover, messianic, radical, chauvinist, and xenophobic elements have been especially apparent in Chinese Communism over the past few years and, as the USSR has discovered, they will not easily be eliminated or muted. The Chinese extremists insist that the Communist Bloc must vigorously instigate and support "liberation wars" in various parts of the underdeveloped world. Negotiations with China may well be impossible unless the West demonstrates to Peking that it has both the will and the capacity to resist indirect aggression, and that the risks of escalation are considerable. Up to a point, we should remember, Russia is also interested in restraining China's more ambitious ventures and we have at least this common interest with Moscow.

Because Moscow has made it quite clear in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute that it has no intention of being drawn into hostilities with the United States in areas now only of marginal interest to it, a vigorous American response to Chinese-sponsored "liberation wars" in Southeast Asia need not appreciably raise the danger of nuclear war. In the event of a new crisis the U.S. should intervene quickly so as to prevent the local Communists from gaining a foothold and calling for Soviet support. The Russians will have much stronger motives for supporting "liberation movements" once the latter have been partially successful than at the outset when, in most cases, they will no doubt urge extreme caution on the local party. Because Peking believes, or has believed in the past, that the West can be forced to accept local defeats as a result of its unwillingness to risk nuclear war with Russia, the United States
must be prepared not only to assume a high degree of risk, but also to make credible its willingness to do so.

The off-shore islands will continue to present a difficult problem for American policy towards both Communist and Nationalist China. As long as the Nationalists unwisely insist on maintaining large forces on these islands, the Communists can raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait at will. It should not be ignored that this is also an option for the Nationalists, who could put us in the awkward position of having to support an attack on the mainland of which we did not approve, or leave them to almost certain defeat by the Communists. If Communist China believed that the United States would support a Nationalist assault on the mainland, it would be forced into closer relations with the USSR. The United States, therefore, should continue to emphasize -- as President Kennedy did last June -- that its commitment to the Nationalists is exclusively defensive. At the same time the United States, until it can persuade the Nationalists to withdraw from the off-shore islands, must also continue to deter the Communists from attacking these islands by associating their defense with the defense of Taiwan itself. Backing down in the face of Chinese Communist military pressure can only encourage the Communists to take greater risks.

Another difficult problem for the United States is to decide what attitude to take towards the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. It is quite likely that were both Communist partners UN members, they would vote differently on some important
questions. On Kashmir, for example, China would probably continue to support Pakistan, while Russia backed India. There would probably be important differences in the Soviet and Chinese attitude towards aid to underdeveloped areas and disarmament. Also, there would very likely be major differences in their attitudes towards United Nations interventions in the colonial or former colonial areas. In 1960, the Chinese, in their public statements, made it quite apparent that they did not agree with the Soviet vote supporting the initial UN intervention in the Congo. Had Peking been in the UN at that time, it probably would have opposed the Russians and the West and sought to block UN intervention. China's admission to the United Nations, then, would have mixed effects. It would give greater public exposure to differences in the Bloc and thereby exacerbate them. At the same time, it might weaken the United Nations' capacity to act as a cushion between the two opposing power blocs.

In view of this, the Sino-Soviet conflict cannot, in my judgment, be the determining consideration with regard to Communist China's admission to the UN. A number of other considerations must come into play as well.

THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

It has already been suggested that Sino-Soviet competition may continue to be very tense in the underdeveloped areas, particularly in Asia, as a result of China's ambition for leadership, if not hegemony. This competition holds both advantages and disadvantages for the West. As long as China and Russia pursue independent and competing policies, some of their strength will be dissipated, and we
shall gain. Still more Asian Communist parties will be torn into factions and perhaps, as in India, paralyzed at the national level by divergent allegiances. Furthermore, to the extent that local Communist parties out of power take Chinese advice and exert increasing pressure on their nationalist governments, they will worsen the relationship between themselves and the "national bourgeoisie" whom Moscow has so assiduously cultivated over the last five years. Sino-Soviet competition in Asia and Africa will enable even the smaller of the independent countries in those continents to exercise some leverage on both Russia and China. Finally, the abrupt deterioration of relations between China and India since 1959, and Moscow's decision to remain neutral in their border conflict have greatly exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations in South Asia. The Russians have evidently decided that they will not jeopardize their friendship with India no matter what the costs in their relations with Peking. The Chinese, for their part, have moved closer to India's arch-enemy, Pakistan, and supported that country's claim to Kashmir, a rather clear indication that Peking's ambitions and its determination to pursue an independent policy, outweigh its desire to heal the breach with Russia. Thus the Communist powers speak with sharply divided voices in South Asia and their attractive power probably diminishes as a result.

On the other hand, Sino-Soviet competition will be dangerous to the West wherever local Communist parties, with or without Chinese instigation, pursue strategies of armed struggle and "liberation" in order to gain power to extend it. Such parties will be in a good
position to blackmail both Russia and China for support, since each major power will want to prevent the other from gaining predominance. It is quite likely, for example, that a major influence on Soviet behavior in Southeast Asia over the past year or two has been the desire to ensure that Ho Chi-minh does not fall into the Chinese camp. Once Ho decided to sponsor armed struggle both in Laos and South Vietnam, the Russians either had to support him or risk his defection to Peking. Contrary to widespread opinion, Ho and other Asian party leaders such as Aidit in Indonesia are walking a tightrope of neutral independence in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Ho has in fact tried to mediate the dispute on several occasions over the past few years. Nevertheless, while most of these Asian parties desperately hope there will be no open break, because this might deprive them of their leverage by forcing them to choose sides, they are all quite alive to the possibilities of taking advantage of the present situation to pursue their own interests. And Ho's interest lies in reunifying North with South Vietnam, the principal source of rice for the food-short North.

Ho's increased leverage on Moscow as a result of the Sino-Soviet rift, has forced the Russians to play a less cautious game in Southeast Asia than they otherwise might. The fact that Russia sent planes with military supplies to support the Pathet Lao in Laos, who are under Ho's direction, can probably best be explained by Moscow's fear that if she did not intervene to help Ho, Peking would. The Russians would thereby let Ho fall into Peking's arms and lose control over Ho's actions. Moscow did not want to be placed in a
situation where the Chinese could control the risks of war with
the West. No matter what Moscow's reasons for aiding the Pathet
Lao, however, her intervention was of a kind that may well have been
decisive in turning the tide of battle in favor of the Communists.
Thus, while it is almost certain that Moscow is not particularly
interested in taking risks simply to bring about Chinese gains in
Southeast Asia, and that it fears a major war in peripheral areas,
it is another question whether it will take risks to support gains
by local Communist parties in Asia, operating more or less inde-
dependently of both Peking and Moscow.

In these complicated circumstances, the West has a strong
interest in persuading Moscow that it is too risky to support Ho
in military action, even if there is a danger of losing him to
Peking. At the same time, Western attitudes must be such as to per-
suade both Ho and the Chinese that the allied response to "liberation
wars" cannot be limited either geographically or in point of violence,
since any limitation would favor the Communists. In short, although
we must continue to show a willingness to combat guerrilla warfare
with counter-insurgency techniques, we must also make credible our
willingness to raise the level of violence and to extend the area
of fighting, to North Vietnam, for example, if the Communists do
not cease armed struggle. Our actions must provide Moscow with the
arguments to persuade both Hanoi and Peking that the Chinese-
prefereed strategy of armed violence is too risky. In our public
pronouncements, for example, we should echo Moscow's view, expressed
in its debate with Peking, that local wars between states will almost
certainly escalate. Moreover, we should demonstrate to Moscow that its support of "liberation wars" in Asia will be costly to its own policies in Europe and on major East-West issues. Decisions on whether or not to talk about Berlin and disarmament, for example, should be directly and consistently related to Communist tactics in Southeast Asia. We have an interest in convincing the Russians that the Communist movement cannot pursue violent tactics in one area while talking about "peaceful coexistence" elsewhere. We have an interest in forcing the Communist Bloc to choose between the Soviet and Chinese strategies and making it difficult for the Communists to pursue the two parallel policies they now employ as a result of Sino-Soviet differences.

On the whole, the Sino-Soviet rift should make it possible for the United States to take greater risks, particularly in Southeast Asia. In the past five years, Peking's basic assumption, also that of many in the West, has been that a missile gap would appear in the early 1960's and that the USSR would gradually acquire a decisive strategic superiority. It has been the very essence of Mao's strategy of "brinkmanship" that the Bloc could afford to pursue more revolutionary policies in the underdeveloped areas and to rely more strongly on armed struggle, subversion and civil war because the West, realizing that it was, or would soon be, strategically inferior, would not dare risk escalation and would therefore have to accept local defeats. In retrospect, it would appear that both the Chinese and the West were fooled about Soviet strategic missile strength. Indeed, it would not be surprising if the United States,
since it downgraded its estimates of that strength, turned out to have a much better appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities than China, so poor has been the cooperation and exchange of information between the two Communist powers in recent years.

If this view is correct, it must have come as a great shock to the Chinese leaders to learn that the United States now considers the Soviet Union strategically inferior to itself and likely to remain so indefinitely. If the Chinese believe the United States to be right, it will no doubt contribute to Peking's already poor view of Khrushchev's leadership. But it should also make the Chinese less anxious to pursue brinkmanship tactics themselves or to urge armed struggle on other Communist parties in Asia. For they will now have to assume that the West is well aware of its strategic superiority and can threaten effectively to raise the ante in any limited war. The main prop has been pulled from under the strategic concept that Mao has unsuccessfully pressed on the Russians over the past five years. There is some indication already that the Chinese recognize a new situation in world power relationships. There has been a notable decline in the publicity accorded by Peking to its thesis that, in grand strategy, the "east wind prevails," in other words that the socialist camp is militarily as well as politically stronger than the "imperialist" camp.

If the Chinese, who have always been careful to appraise the balance of forces between themselves and their enemies, are really becoming more cautious, a firmer U.S. line in Southeast Asia should be possible. We could then immediately take whatever steps are
necessary to close the Laotian corridor through which supplies and men reach the South Vietnamese rebels. We should also step up our assistance to Thailand which may soon be faced with a guerrilla problem in the Northeast near its Laotian frontier. Laos, it must be squarely faced, is probably lost to the Communists. But Ho's major objective has been rice-rich South Vietnam, not Laos which is of value only as a springboard from which to attack Thailand and South Vietnam.

Although foreign economic aid is clearly not a panacea for the numerous and complex problems of the underdeveloped countries, there is a particular reason, within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, why such aid is beneficial to Western interests. There is no question that the scale of Soviet aid to certain non-Communist countries, particularly India and Egypt, has been bitterly resented by the Chinese, who believe it means less Soviet assistance for themselves. Moreover, they feel at a disadvantage in that they do not have the resources to compete for influence in this manner either with the United States or with the Soviet Union. Yet the Chinese must offer such economic aid as they can, for one of their main goals is to establish their authority throughout Asia and Africa. They cannot allow these areas to fall to richer powers by default. Hence Peking continues to offer limited aid to such countries as Guinea, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Cambodia, despite its very serious economic crisis at home. By increasing certain of its own aid programs, the West may be able to force the Russians and the Chinese increasingly to compete both with it and with one another -- in an
area in which the West has the advantage. It goes without saying that aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations should not be the governing criterion for aid to underdeveloped areas. It is a factor not to be ignored.

To conclude, it might be well to recall the Sphinx's reply, in one of Robert Frost's poems, to a question asking for the wisdom of the ages. "Don't expect too much," was the oracle's answer. The falling out of our two major antagonists does not remove any of the intractable problems with which we are faced and, in some respects, it only complicates them. No vast opportunities have been opened for Western diplomacy. No magic doors open to the end of the cold war. The Sino-Soviet dispute may be very advantageous to the West only in the long run when the corrosive acids of nationalism might ultimately split the Bloc asunder. Yet Communism already speaks with several voices and one of the principal tasks of Western diplomacy will be to create an environment in which the voices of moderation can be given freer rein while the voices of militancy are restrained.