DILEMMAS OF CONTROL AND STRATEGY IN A PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY;
A DISCUSSION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS
OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING
IN A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

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1. INTRODUCTION

In its fullest conception, the problem of political control in the field of national security policy assumed the general dimensions it now presents in the late 19th Century -- after the Franco-Prussian War, by one reckoning, but after the extension of the suffrage and the rise of the yellow press, in addition, by another. The problem is composed, at any rate, of elements which can be associated with both. On the one hand, the enormous possibilities of combining resources in time and space in the prosecution of wars, and equally, the potential consequences of not being able to do so, put governments contingently in the hands of their military. On the other hand, the development of mass electorates and the mobilization of a mass public opinion in the politically developed states of Western Europe could be employed to push back the material and political constraints on the size of national effort in war.

The issue of control now had to be put in two ways, neither of them altogether new, but each involving stakes of an appalling order of magnitude. First, the question was how to keep the military establishment non-partisan yet still sensitive to and flexible about matters involving domestic values. A look at the changes which had to be made in U.S. force posture between, say, 1900 and 1920 will indicate how relatively new this problem was in American politics. Second, the question was how, given the mobilization requirements made evident by the Franco-Prussian War and the authoritarian centralization usually considered essential in mili-
tary operations (and reinforced by the application of new technical and administrative innovations which made greater centralization feasible), it was possible to maintain political control over war. Two additional factors are commonly associated with this second control problem, the nature of war itself and the radical separation of war and policy in certain Western political traditions. They are not, it would hold, the dominant variables, but dependent if persistent and troublesome ones nonetheless. They, in turn, posed additional questions: How to control war and those assigned to prosecute it when it seemed to be so uncontrollable, and how to control the actions of those assigned to prosecute it when it seemed to be so essential to the success of their efforts that they be free from controls or constraints.

It should be noted that, together, these questions pose the dilemma of strategic efficiency and domestic political control which pit authoritarian rationality against egalitarian pluralism, in theory. What is in the American context sometimes referred to as Hamiltonianism vs. Jeffersonianism.

The state as actor in foreign relations may be visualized as a political system composed of three sectors, the public governmental, the privileged governmental, and the nongovernmental or private sector. The public government consists primarily of the national legislature and the chief executive and his leading political subordinates or associates. The boundary between the public and privileged sectors is plain enough on the legislative-executive side because of a convenient constitutional arrangement in United States and in some degree other modern constitutional governments. But where it segregates executive branch officials it is, like the distinction between policy and administration, more an analytical convenience than a denotable fact. The privileged government sector is roughly the bureaucracy, or the executive branch beneath the highest political levels, called privileged because its ultimate assertion of hierarchical loyalty is in the claim of executive privilege. The private sector consists of a network of political interests which constitute or provide a political environment within which the government, public and privileged, functions. Together, the three sectors constitute, in one carefully explicated term, the national governmental process.\footnote{See, e.g., David B. Truman, \textit{The Governmental Process} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).}
The network of relationships which binds the private sector to the governmental sectors is the instrument of domestic political control. It may be considered to perform three major functions, cognitive, responsive, and aggregative. The cognitive function is to get produced, transmitted, and evaluated the information which serves as the basis of policy-making. The responsive function is to meet the objectives of policy with appropriate actions and programs. The aggregate function is the gaining of support for courses of action decided upon as government policies. Our attention will be limited in this paper to the cognitive and responsive functions as much as possible. We will, for instance, not be concerned specifically with the transactions within a political system among and within its sectors which produce not only consensus about a particular set of objectives but support for the measures undertaken by the government in pursuit of those objectives. To be sure, the distinction between response and aggregation is no more than a point of emphasis. Response deals with what to do and aggregation, how to gain consent and support for what to do. The first is primarily concerned with developing the best answer; the second for obtaining the best effort in support for it; though in politics the two are ultimately integrated.

In democratic political systems -- certainly in the United States -- responsiveness to political pressures is a legitimate mode of behavior in many though hardly in all cases. But it is also legitimate for government to respond to its own internally derived standards -- to standards of consistency and efficiency, and to the requirements for and the advantages of organized effort. Political responsiveness and operational efficiency then, form a kind of dialectic, a coexistence in which each imposes constraints upon the other. We will call this dialectic administrative politics. Our concern will be with the cognitive and responsive requirements for the making and execution of foreign and military policy and the constraints imposed upon them in the setting of administrative politics.

2. LIMITATIONS TO EMPIRICAL METHODS IN THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION

Some of the problems of analyzing administrative politics lie in the methods used. It may therefore be helpful to begin with a discussion of these methods, even if it is brief and somewhat arbitrary.
Pluralism has been nothing if not fashionable in American political studies. Among other things it has helped to justify the enlarged bureaucracies and the expanded executive powers -- the neo-Hamiltonianism -- which were a consequence of the economic and social crises of the inter-war period, and to explain them in terms of the same economic and social categories that actuated the social reform of that period. More broadly, it came to serve as the basis for the development of what has been called empirical democratic theory. Political pluralism has served not only to tame by explanation the executive and administrative power requirements of a democratic age but also to explicate other political functions associated with the modern democratic state.²

In the field of defense policy and politics, Huntington published a powerful elaboration of the pluralist argument in The Common Defense³ in 1961. In an earlier work he had attacked administrative pluralism as it applied to civilian control of the military, insisting that only if a clear line of division was maintained between military and civilian functions could control be "objective" and effective, and the military profession kept professionally intact.⁴ His theory ran across the grain of the pragmatic interpretations of politics reflected in the tenet of post-World War II public administration scholarship that policy and administration could not be separated, for Huntington's military non-military distinction rested on their separation. In The Common Defense, on the other hand, he surveyed from several perspectives the development of American military policy since World War II, each time explaining these developments in terms of a bargaining process within the executive branch of the federal government which he characterized as "legisla-

²For example, Gabriel Almond provided, in his The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), an enrichment of the systematic concept of public opinion, with particular reference to the potentiality of public opinion for rational behavior despite the notable inadequacies in individual opinions (i.e., gross inconsistency and a frighteningly meager and inaccurate information base) revealed by opinion surveys.

³New York: Columbia University Press.

tive," and which cut across, though by no means did it eliminate, distinctions like those upon which he had depended earlier in his concept of "objective" civilian control of the military.

The issue posed by Huntington's "qualified optimism" that the system works is fundamental to any appraisal of national security policy. The implication is that rationality in administrative politics rests upon the same premises as does rationality of outcome in the legislative process: that an open system of bargaining and debate will produce the most rational policy possible, even though the legislative process can be seen as wholly 'political.' The question, then, is whether administrative politics is, as Huntington asserts, comparable to legislative politics.

Rationality can be defined broadly with two standards. One is internal consistency, the other, correspondence. Bureaucracies try to be consistent, but get out of touch with reality. Popular assemblies are designed to be sensitive to the real world of public opinion at the price of internal consistency. Sometimes they are also more sensitive to reality in other forms than are the bureaucracies they sponsor. This is so, however, not because they have more competent intelligence facilities. Bureaucracies are likely to be superior in their perception of reality to the extent that perception depends upon an organized intelligence operation which gathers and processes information.

We may therefore identify as a schematic convenience legislative bodies with correspondence and executive bodies with internal consistency. If we are to take these relationships seriously, however, they need much greater refinement. A circumstance where the general statement would hold, for example, could be stated as follows: On the margin, the impact of Congressional interest in established (i.e., ongoing) public policies will usually be to challenge the administrative rationale of the program in the interest of facing more squarely a particular set of facts with which it must cope.

Pluralism, or group political analysis -- in this case they can be taken as the same thing -- has many strengths but three important inadequacies when it is used to deal with the problems of control and efficiency in the modern democratic state. (1) It explains the bureaucracy's cognition of political data found within the domestic political system far better than it does any sensitivity of the bureaucracy to data located outside it. (2) It is often more dependent upon perspectives of extreme detachment which limits its
utility to participants. And (3), it is a culture-bound, "shallow" analysis of what are in fact 'deep' political phenomena.

A particular problem for modern democracies, though one the dimensions of which are difficult to estimate in their conduct of foreign relations, is the great preponderance which they give in their responsiveness to their electoral constituencies. To the extent that the electorate is preoccupied with domestic, "bread-and-butter" issues, foreign policy can suffer for a lack of domestic political understanding. In the classical liberal model of this phenomenon the result would be passivity in foreign affairs as the state reflects domestic interest in the pursuit of material well-being through domestic means. Unfortunately, that version of things can be quite incorrect. Foreign adventures have been supported, as an observable fact, by publics which came to see them as solutions to problems of domestic well-being. This model of the democratic state, therefore, is not a particularly reassuring one with present levels of technology.

There is nothing inherent in the methods of group political analysis which ties it to this liberal model or prevents it from noting the potential or observable adaptations which allow the popularly-based state to address its tasks in foreign relations without translating them first into domestic interests, or from defining and explaining domestic interests in other terms than the material interests of classical liberalism. In fact, modern group political studies have considerably broadened the conceptions of motivation inherited from 19th Century liberalism with which they began.

A symptom of the inadequacy of methods as they actually are applied is the prominent use in political analysis of the analogue of the legal consummation of a commercial negotiation -- the contract -- in political analysis.

Bargaining is only one of several plausible versions of group political dynamics which can be used for analytical purposes, but it is seemingly precise and analytically convenient. It is a model of a single or a small cluster of events -- a transaction, as it is sometimes termed. Its limitations can be demonstrated by placing it in a larger analytical context (though still of group political processes) where other descriptions of what happened can be shown to account for as much or more data, and by exposing the prerequisites for effective bargaining. With respect to the former, aggregative models which describe the building of a majority in terms of an intricate process of mutual self-adjustment do not afford bargaining an explicit role, or
possibly any role at all. Explicitness, of course, may not be important. It may be possible to do a great deal of what amounts to bargaining implicitly without any actual negotiations and without an expressed 'deal.' This leads us to the second limitation.

The more bargaining is understood in political analysis to depart from the explicitness of a formal negotiation ending with an enforceable contract -- the more, that is, the political phenomena to be interpreted are taken as amounting to informal and implicit bargaining -- the more the political analysis involved is dependent upon the existence of a basic political or social order. Bargaining requires a capability to signal and communicate, to discern one's interests and derive means for achieving them, to interact, to predict the behavior of the other party, and possibly to sanction that behavior. Where these capabilities are formal and explicit, patently they are a part of the social and political order. Where they are implicit, they are equally dependent on that order. Implicit bargaining can be expected to reflect especially the problems of communication between the parties involved in the social and political context in which it takes place. It will reflect also the confidence of each party in its capacity to define and pursue its own interests, to predict the behavior of the other party and hedge against predictive error. The terms of the tacit bargain as well as the means by which they are reached should be expected to reflect expectations about enforcement which in turn rest on interpretations of the social and political order. However, since the selection and interpretation of the available data will depend upon their conformity to an abstract (if also implicit) mode, it should be expected that similarities among cases, not their variations, are stressed. Put this way, it should be clear that bargaining analysis can be only the beginning of a political analysis, although it may be a very good beginning indeed.

One effect of the emphasis on discrete or individual political transactions is the emphasis which it gives in turn to lateral political relationships. The conception of the political market place, like its prototype, the liberal economic market place, gives much prominence to decentralized, individualistic (actually, group, in the sense that that word is now used in political studies) activities and the over-all rationale for them. In order to gain a perception of the underlying dimensions of the social phenomena involved, it is necessary to probe beneath the formal prescriptions which must persist in the official versions of public and private
organizations. But the formal organization cannot simply be dismissed in political analysis. At the minimum, its existence will affect the structure of these phenomena; beyond that, in a nontraditional society, one in which the bureaucracy is viewed as an instrument of governing which should be modified whenever necessary for that purpose, the continued existence in the public bureaucracy of any particular formal arrangement must be taken as largely intentional -- as the consequence of some fairly active and influential convictions about its desirability. The formal organization sustains a network of relationships and a schedule of varied functions and controls which by no means eliminate individualistic bargaining, but equally, are not limited to these lateral activities. The political analyst, whether he calls himself a pluralist or not, is bound to recognize the former; he should not ignore the latter. Legitimate government is not just a condition; it is a more or less stable capability composed of men and resources. Unless we are to deny the legitimacy of government we are probably obliged to recognize the hierarchy and the division of function which are used both formally and informally to organize the resources and activities of government. They are therefore factors of special significance among the phenomena with which we are concerned: they are and they ought to be important in the government. They can be nothing less for the political analyst.

3. WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS?

Similar political methods will have dissimilar applications and consequences when they are applied in different sets of circumstances. An obvious categorization which will help to explicate the bureaucracy as a political arena in developed constitutional orders is one intended to systematize the differences in context imposed by the legal order within which bureaucracy works. It could be listed as extra-constitutional, constitutional, statutory, and administrative. Classes of politics could then be described with variations in the mixture of these four classes of the legal order. Party or partisan politics, for example, would have a high proportion of extra-constitutionality, a growing but still small element of statutory constraints, some structuring to accord with the constitutional entities the control of which is the objective of party activity, and very little constraint by governmental administrative act. Legislative politics,
for another example, would be predominantly though not exclusively constitutional, a mixture which would reflect the large role played by lateral relationship obtaining among fellow elective officials with independent constituencies, on the one hand, and the legislative-executive rivalry, on the other. The setting of judicial politics might be described as another variant mixture of these components. Leaving aside the question whether executive and administrative politics should be regarded as separate classes, let us examine the setting of administrative politics.

What is striking about this setting in comparison with legislative and party politics is the prominent role intention or conscious choice has played in its development. The bureaucracy operates within certain fixed limits which are traditional-conventional and legal-constitutional, but the predominant components of its setting are statutory and administrative -- rules provided by act of Congress or as an output of the executive chain of command. It is difficult to characterize the consequences of this mixture. The setting can be, and has been, changed more rapidly and readily than that of party politics; yet partisan politics is more flexible than administrative politics for it operates in a less structured setting. Being more the consequence of recent deliberate actions than legislative politics, moreover, administrative politics might be regarded as more rational in the anti-historical sense than legislative politics; yet legislative politics coincides more with at least one model of anti-historical rationality -- the market place for the free exchange of ideas. What we can say at the very least, then, is that the administrative setting can be and probably is controlled by deliberate act more than is legislative or partisan politics.

Theoretically, it should be possible to rank political acts along a continuum from an extreme one-to-one lateral relationship to an extreme superior-subordinate hierarchical relationship. We could approach the task of analyzing the lateral-hierarchica variation as a distributional-description problem, summarizing our findings with schedules or profiles of executive branch and legislative branch phenomena. But it might be very difficult as a practical matter to rank phenomena for their lateral-hierarchical value for reasons already discussed. The difficulty would be that each phenomenon occurs within a more general context in which the immediate relationship might have the characteristics, say, of a strongly lateral relationship while the behavior of each actor would in fact have been strongly influenced by hier-
archical pressures not in the foreground of the phenomenon. That, for example, has often been the problem of cabinet level activities in the U.S. government. Even when one keeps in mind the primacy of the President in relationship to each and every person involved in cabinet and NSC deliberations, it is possible to overestimate the lateral quality of cabinet-level deliberations. Presidential cabinets in the American system are a forum for providing the chief executive with advice which presumably he cannot get as conveniently any other way. But Presidents cannot count on their cabinet members either thinking of or telling them everything they as President want to be told in a cabinet meeting. In particular, cabinet members may be more willing to talk in private. What is unsaid though known may be much more important to the President than what is said. If he is aware of this problem he will take steps to evoke the responses he wants, but he can never be certain that he has had all of them.

Conceiving of the cabinet as a set of lateral relationships actually depends upon viewing the President as observer to its deliberations rather than as one who directs its course. When one recognizes that the President has interests intrinsic to his office, as it were, in who attends a meeting, what the agenda will be, what positions should be explored or staffed out beforehand, knowing where to get the best data and the best expert judgments concerning an agenda item, the apparent lateral character of the deliberation begins to yield to its hierarchical elements. In fact, to the extent that the cabinet is a President's cabinet, i.e., that it deals with issues and interests in his terms, it would perhaps be more appropriate to consider it a hierarchy-predominant phenomenon. The lateral character of its proceedings would then denote the extent to which it fell short of performing that function; that it operated instead as a forum in which equals met to bargain, deal, and exchange.

By looking for the evidence that behavior in a public or a private bureaucracy consists of implicit or informal contract-making one can normally fulfill his expectations readily, but quite possibly to the neglect of phenomena which have organic rather than individualistic analogues. To do that is to miss the crucial characteristic of administrative politics, the mixture of authoritarian and equalitarian elements, the lateral relationships and the hierarchy of authority. It is this hierarchical relationship which empirical political studies have been the least prone to take seriously.
Administrative politics takes place in an environment in which it is no more possible to neglect the hierarchy than lateral relations -- the foreclosing of competition within a bureaucracy which is the tangible manifestation of authority any more than the promotion of the competitive pursuit of competitive objectives. In addition to the openness of a public bureaucracy, particularly one in the American setting, including the competition in means and over ends, the flexibility, the redundancy, the sensitivity to fragmentary public wishes, the skepticism about collective judgments and objectives, there coexists something quite the opposite, a commitment to consistency -- and hence to inflexibility; to a centralized determination of policy and organizational objectives. In formal organizational terms it is the usual prescription of clear channels of authority and responsibility from top to bottom, with energetic leadership at the top. Less conventionally, what it amounts to is a commitment to the values of consistency and coordination in policy, and in an important measure to the capacity of the system to make the best decisions at the top.

Ultimately, the administrative dialectic can be resolved into a difference about cognition. The ultimate authoritarian position is that the truth can be known (i.e., the correct perception of and analysis of relevant conditions), and that the place it is the most likely to be known is at the top, which is the only place which can fully exploit the cognitive resources of the whole organization. The ultimate liberal position is that maybe there is no truth beyond what individuals in the system perceive, or claim to perceive, that if truth is to be perceived it will be done through individualistic methods, which means free and equal discussion, and since the results of even these methods will be highly imperfect, it is a good thing for the organization not to bank on any single answer or set of answers.

4. SPECIFYING THE SETTING OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS

The administrative politics of national security has its own particular if not entirely unique setting. Policy and programs must be responsive to both domestic and foreign political considerations. These two sets of considerations impose somewhat different requirements upon the cognitive and responsive capacities of a government bureaucracy -- the privileged government sector. Of the cognitive requirements, the domestic set are the least peculiar. They are met, as they are in
other areas of governmental activity, by the networks of political communication and transaction which are indigenous to the domestic political system and which link both the public and privileged government sectors with the nongovernmental or private sector of the system.

The communication links are mass and private media -- the press, radio and television, motion pictures, private correspondence, public meetings, private mail and telephone communication, and the variety of personal, face-to-face contacts of private interests and their representatives dealing with government officials in a whole range of different circumstances from the formality of a judicial proceeding or administrative hearing to the informality of a private session with a legislator or an agency official.

At one end of these communication links are the sensors and transmitters of the government. As receptors, they may be armed with the power of subpoena, or with the statutory right to know -- to ask, and to require an answer. They may search discriminately for information through investigators and researchers; or they may be passive, at least as initial receptors, recording or conveying whatever they encounter in the conduct of their business. What they sense may be data about the substantive problems with which the government is seized -- facts about economic conditions, scientific findings, social conditions. Or they may sense views and opinions about substantive issues. Or, much of the time, a combination of the two -- what we might call political information in the form of representations more or less partisan in character which at once provide data, express interests and convey opinions. Thus we may characterize, if only schematically, how the cognitive requirements of domestic political considerations for national security or any other kind of public policies and programs are satisfied. In particular, they provide information about the domestic consequences of national security programs and the range and character of support for programs and policies.

The cognitive requirements of the foreign set depend in part upon the same networks, though in different proportions. The mass media probably play a proportionately more important role, in comparison with the domestic pattern, in providing information about foreign conditions pertinent to American interests. Private interest representation probably plays a smaller role, though by no means a negligible one. The government, on the other hand, plays a proportionately more active and prominent role in the collection and processing of data about the foreign sector which it
uses, mostly through what is called the intelligence community. The special efforts of the intelligence community are justified on grounds of national security -- an assertion which in the present context is simply tautological.

Presumably the government could utilize many of the same methods or at least devote as many resources, or many more, to the collection of data about domestic conditions, although such activities directed at domestic affairs are always more likely to have discernible partisan uses than do their foreign counterparts. Moreover, some methods of data-gathering considered justified in the foreign realm would be considered out of bounds in the domestic realm. In part the difference in the methods of meeting cognitive requirements between the domestic and foreign realms is a reflection of the particular constraints under which the government operates in the domestic realm in the interest of maintaining a liberal democratic system internally. In part the difference reflects a difference in the availability of information to a national, privileged governmental sector between the domestic and the external realms. In part it is, in addition, a reflection of the different responsive requirements of the government between the two realms. In both realms, to be sure, efficiency is a partial requirement of responsiveness, as is denoted by the existence of certain basic prerequisites of managerial effectiveness in the privileged governmental sector in general.

It is not difficult to draw contrasts in responsive requirements, either. In the domestic realm the government is not expected to encounter or have to respond to situations in which its total physical security capabilities will be challenged or to have to deal with unified aggregates of power units or actors on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis. Both of these situations are precluded by the character of the domestic order, including the monopoly of organized violent means permitted the government. In the external realm, however, the government must be prepared to cope with both situations. In both an obvious advantage is unity, the capability of speaking with one voice and acting in a consistent and coordinated manner as a sovereign state. This responsive requirement is met through a range of structural and dynamic patterns in the U.S. government, ranging from the President's constitutional powers in foreign relations to the public tendency to support the President in crisis.

The contrast sketched above among cognitive and responsive requirements between those originating domestically and those which derive from external conditions suggests why
the most commonly used analytical methods developed to illuminate empirical democratic theory can be inappropriate for analyzing government, even democratic government, in the performance of its national security function.

5. THE ANALYTICAL CHALLENGE

It may well be enough in the pursuit of democratic theory merely to illuminate the political processes of which democratic orders are composed. That is not enough, however, for the development of policy analysis methods. A major advance in policy analysis where complicated operational capabilities are involved, such as in defense and foreign aid functions, is in the development and application of operations and systems analysis techniques, if only because they provide ways of asking and answering the questions which government officials want to deal with. These methods are, in effect, a powerful tool for specifying in particular contexts standards of internal consistency. Their uses are limited to the capacities of those who practice them to explicate and quantify policy objectives and operational functions.

One need not approve of every application or outcome of systems and operations analysis in the Defense Department in order to consider the extensive changes brought about by the incumbent administration there an important improvement in its operation. Indeed, one need not even approve entirely of the methodology of systems analysis in order to give some approval to its use. It is, of course, first and foremost an attempt to quantify operational tasks and functions; and to say the least, some factors and functions resist quantification. But to impose the task is to force the production and distribution of data organized, correctly or incorrectly, with reference to some purpose. Data of any reliability, organized in this manner, is not to be taken for granted.

The liberal ideal of the market place for the free exchange of ideas as the model of social rationality refers to a setting in which it is expected that reason will be articulated (and hence, prevail). But articulation is not costless. It consumes resources and can otherwise be disfunctional. If these costs are not offset by expectations of substantial gains to be made from articulation, it is difficult to justify. Under these circumstances organizations usually satisfy their needs for the appearance of
rationality with clearance procedures or some other form of administrative due process without specifying standards for appraising the substance or content of policy. At its worst such procedures produce discussions in which no one reveals his reasons why. At best it will attack the issues on their merits, but may have to do so without adequate or agreed upon supporting data.

At its best, operations analysis forces a consideration of issues on specified merits within a specified policy frame of reference and with questions of fact systematically linked to questions of policy.

But, like any intellectual or professional discipline or any rational system, it sacrifices comprehensiveness and correspondence for precision and internal consistency. It should therefore be entirely consistent to be enthusiastic about the utilization of operational analysis techniques in the Defense Department for its linking of data, analysis, and choices, critical of particular applications of them, and anxious to see the particular constraints of the analytical methods involved pushed back or transcended. Shifts in emphasis along these lines are already discernible in the Defense Department, as was indicated in a recent budget hearing when Congressman Laird asked Secretary McNamara, "When you get into this area of decisionmaking, you are relying more and more on cost effectiveness studies?" McNamara replied:

No; I think not. We are relying more and more upon sophisticated analysis of potential political-military conflicts and an appraisal of the advantage to the United States of alternative force sizes in relation to those contingencies, and the various applications of those forces in those contingencies. The cost effectiveness study as it would be narrowly defined...comes into importance only in choosing between alternative means of satisfying an established force requirement.5

Cost effectiveness analysis can be as useful and as limiting in policy analysis as the bargaining mechanism can

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be in the analysis of group political behavior. Both like-wise, are capable, it would appear, of considerable further adaptation. Both, however, need to be understood more in their political context than they now are. The interest of political science in political systems as well as in political transactions encourages the expectation that the narrowness of bargaining analysis will be reduced and possibly overcome. The challenge for policy analysis in the national security sphere, quite apart from the structural questions which it raises, is not only to refine the new, pragmatic theologies of operations and systems analysis as disciplines in cognitive consistency but to develop broader systematic representations of the context in which they are applied, and to find ways of dealing with political as well as material resources which will strengthen the cognitive correspondence capacities of internally consistent policy-making.