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2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
SUBJECT: Senior Officers Debriefing Report (Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, Jr.) RCS CSFOR-74

THRU: Commander
United States Army Base Command, Okinawa
APO San Francisco 96331

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached is the Senior Officers Debriefing Report prepared by Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, Jr., final commander of Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFAsia).

2. SAFAsia was inactivated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 28 June 1974.

3. Two (2) copies have been prepared and are furnished; one (1) Commander, USARASCO and one (1) Commander, USARJ.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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CONFIDENTIAL
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Debriefing report by: Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, Jr.
Duty Assignment: Commander, Security Assistance Force Asia
Date of Report: 28 June 1974

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: This report is based on personal observations and impressions made during my tenure as SAFAsia Commander. Although the greater portion of the unit's activities were conducted away from the island of Okinawa, I was able to keep abreast by conducting frequent command visits and by personally debriefing all returning mission personnel. The following remarks are general in nature and are provided to assist pertinent Army agencies in the event of reactivation of Security Assistance Force Asia or a like unit. Additionally, current planning envisions the utilization of Special Forces units within PACOM on a limited basis. Hopefully this report will be of some assistance in implementing their missions.
2. (C) OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Organization: SAFAsia is composed of a nucleus of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the following four attached units: the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion, the 400th Army Security Agency Special Operations Detachment, the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment and the 539th Engineer Advisory Detachment. Task organized on a permanent basis, the unit provided a pool of highly trained personnel whose skills and resources were formed into tailored teams and committed to designated Pacific Command (PACOM) areas to perform a variety of tasks.

b. Missions: As USARPAC's Unconventional Warfare Force, SAFAsia had five basic missions:

   (1) Maintain Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFAsia) in accordance with appropriate force structure guidance and insure that trained forces were prepared for commitment in support of USARPAC operations, plans and directives.

   (2) Deploy, as directed by CINCUSARPAC, SAFAsia elements in support of cold war, contingency and general war missions.

   (3) Insure that area orientation and language proficiency remained focused in SEAsia, China and Korea enabling SAFAsia to maintain a dual cold war/hot war capability.

   (4) Continuously evaluate potential areas for employment of SAFAsia elements as MTT's and ATTF's and submit recommendations to CINCUSARPAC as appropriate.

   (5) Maintain 12 Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DART's) to be deployed at the direction of USARPAC within 48 hours notification with aviation assets.

c. The Disaster Assistance Relief (DAR) mission became a formal tasking in USARPAC LOI dated 24 Sep 73. Although SAFAsia has been called on to perform DAR mission in Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines on previous occasions, it had not
received a standing mission tasking. A subsequent USARJ LOI dated 19 Oct 73 required the integration of SAFAsia's aviation assets into the Disaster Assistance Relief Plan. A test conducted by USARJ, 25-26 Feb 74, upheld SAFAsia's readiness posture to perform the mission. In addition, a Disaster Assistance Relief Exercise, Wen Shan IV, was conducted during March and April 1974 in Taiwan. The apparent success of the exercise also attested to SAFAsia's ability to perform its latest assigned mission.

d. Area of Operation: SAFAsia's operational area encompassed PACOM's area of responsibility. Physically located on the island of Okinawa, Japan, SAFAsia was capable of deploying to virtually any section of its area of operations within five hours by jet aircraft. Although the island of Okinawa itself did not offer the total training environment necessary for SAFAsia to maintain its readiness posture, its proximity to Japan, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Trust Territory of the Pacific and the available training facilities in those areas, enabled SAFAsia to maintain a high state of readiness at all times. The ability of SAFAsia to conduct training off-island served a two-fold function; one, it assisted the unit in maintaining its area orientation program by having personnel train in actual contingency areas; and two, it provided a broad spectrum of training environments from mountainous arctic to tropical jungle terrain.

3. (FOUO) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: SAFAsia was under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), with the Commander, U. S. Army Japan (CDR, USARJ) exercising command, less operational control of SAFAsia elements located on Okinawa through Commander, United States Army Base Command, Okinawa (CDR, USARBCO). As a result, SAFAsia received direct operational and training guidance for other than local matters from USARPAC, however, to execute these directives, the unit was dependent upon USARBCO for administrative and logistical support. In addition to providing this support, CDR, USARBCO closely monitored SAFAsia deployments and mission accomplishments. This, as viewed by SAFAsia, has proven satisfactory from a command and operational aspect.
4. (C) EXPERIENCES IN COMMAND:

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) SAFAsia maintained a posture of readiness that enabled it to be committed in support of cold war, contingency or general war missions. To do this, training on Okinawa was conducted in Military Occupational Specialties, parachute proficiency jumps, language training and other individual training as required by Department of the Army. The individual and unit training conducted on Okinawa was strengthened and tested through the deployment of Advisory/Training Task Forces (ATTF's), Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) and Technical Assistance Teams (TAT's) to allied host countries throughout PACOM. This valuable training was supplemented by Field Training Exercises (FTX's), Command Post Exercises (CPX's) and Operational Readiness Training (ORT's). As a result of this realistic and extensive training, SAFAsia was capable of deploying on short notice via air, land or sea throughout the PACOM.

(2) In consonance with peacetime objectives, SAFAsia placed a great deal of emphasis on civic action missions primarily through the deployment of the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion and 539th Engineer Detachment. Operations were generally of sixty days duration with primary focus on the Republic of the Philippines and continuing activities in the Guam/TTPI geographical area. In the Philippines, activities centered on vertical and horizontal construction, medical and veterinary activities and area sanitation projects, while in Guam/TTPI, the main objective was to train indigenous journeymen in construction projects while improving public facilities and transportation capabilities.

b. Command and Control:

(1) While the command of SAFAsia is centralized, the cellular organization of the Special Forces Group and its attached units allows for decentralized control. Decentralization became especially apparent and necessary during off-island deployments of units and personnel. Selection of teams to perform particular missions was normally accomplished at battalion level, predicated on area orientation.
(2) Battalions prepared teams for deployment with maximum assistance from my staff. Upon completion of the preparation phase I was given a formal "briefback" delineating missions, both specific and implied, organization and concept. Upon completion of the mission, a debriefing was conducted within five working days and an after action report submitted. This allowed for continual mission evaluation both as to viability of mission and competence of team members.

c. Techniques of Employment: Because of the large and varied AO of SAFAsia, it was further broken down by assigning AO's to the line battalions. Battalions further delegated specific areas to their companies. This was particularly helpful in choosing teams for missions, with the added benefit of increasing the unit area study program by involving personnel in their area of operations. Movement to the AO was primarily by aircraft. During the conduct of ORT's and certain FTX's, parachute infiltrations were predominant. MTT's and ATTF's generally travelled by MAC aircraft from Kadéna Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.

d. Operations and Training: The major significant activities are as follows:

(1) KOREA:

(a) Continuous advice and assistance to Korea Special Forces units, through the Special Forces Resident Detachment, Korea.

(b) ATTF's for Republic of Korea Special Forces Brigades covering Demolitions, Airmobile/Pathfinder, Intelligence, Recondo, Military Free Fall Parachuting, Mountain Climbing and Special Terrain Parachuting techniques.

(c) Eight Operational Readiness Training exercises for Special Forces Operational Detachments.

(d) Aggressor support to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division Operational Readiness Training Test Program.
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(e) Participation in FOAL EAGLE FY-74, the annual joint/combined unconventional warfare exercise.

(2) JAPAN:
(a) Annual cold weather training.
(b) Company size FTX's.

(3) INDONESIA:
(a) Continuous Technical Assistance Team support.
(b) Two signal MTT's.
(c) One Engineer Technical Assistance Team.

(4) PHILIPPINES:
(a) Continuous USAID MTT.
(b) Two signal ATTF's.
(c) Two Civic Action Exercises
(d) Two Engineer Control/Advisory Detachment (ECAD) ATTF's.

(5) PAKISTAN: Disaster Assistance Relief.

(6) GUAM/TTPI: Continuous Civic Action support.

(7) TAIWAN:
(a) Continuous advice and assistance to Taiwan's Defense Forces through Special Forces Resident Detachment, Taiwan.
(b) FTX WEN SHAN IV.
THAILAND:
(a) Project 404.
(b) Classified missions.

MALAYSIA: Undersling Equipment Training Survey.

CONUS:
(a) Mixed Gas School at Coronado, CA.
(b) Special Demolitions training at Harvey Point, NC.
(c) HALO Jumpmaster School at Ft. Bragg, NC.

ON-ISLAND TRAINING:
(a) Three SCUBA Courses.
(b) Two Basic Airborne Courses (to meet operational requirements and provide adventure training to PACOM units as directed).
(c) Special Terrain Parachute training on a continuous basis.
(d) Small Boat training.
(e) Disaster Assistance Relief related training.
(f) A Special Forces Officer Course (to qualify assigned officers in the basic Special Forces skills).
(g) EIB/EMB Testing.
(h) MOS training.
(i) Language Training/Area Orientation.
e. Intelligence:

(1) Intelligence required to support SAFAsia missions was provided through a combination of national level publications, local agency reports and aerial photography. The S-2 office conducted briefings for each deploying detachment in scope and detail appropriate to individual missions.

(2) The only information produced by SAFAsia was in the form of Civil Affairs Estimates. Although the ability to gather intelligence existed within the attached military intelligence detachment and at low level, within each Special Forces Detachment, the risk posed by discovery of such operations, when compared to the favorable impact of our assistance to local nations, precluded such activity.

f. Personnel Management:

(1) The strength of SAFAsia remained at a reasonably acceptable level. As a result of unit inactivations and overages in MOS's of other units within USARBCO, SAFAsia was obliged to accept non-airborne, non-Special Forces qualified personnel in soft skill MOS's (i.e., supply and maintenance) in order to fulfill the day-to-day operational requirements. This arrangement allowed us to make maximum use of Special Forces trained personnel in the hard core Special Forces MOS's (i.e., operations, intelligence, weapons, medical and engineer).

(2) The overall officer fill of SAFAsia has been adequate, although many officers were assigned to SAFAsia without appropriate Special Forces or Civil Affairs training. Despite the efforts of these officers to become qualified through extensive field training and correspondence courses, both they and SAFAsia were somewhat handicapped due to a lack of formalized Special Forces or Civil Affairs training.

(3) Because SAFAsia operations require officers to work with allied counterparts having rank two or three grades higher than their own, it is critical for successful mission accomplishment that only highly qualified, dedicated and professional officers be assigned to
this type of organization. Below is a profile of Majors, Captains and Lieutenants assigned to SAFAsia as of 31 May 1974. It should be noted that twenty-nine percent of the Majors are Regular Army with fifty-eight percent meeting the basic U.S. Army civilian education goals. Twenty-one percent of the Captains are Regular Army with sixty-six percent meeting the basic undergraduate degree requirements. It is significant that of the officers not meeting acceptable civilian education requirements, eight percent have been accepted in Army degree completion programs.

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(4) The loss of 33 officers during the Reduction-in-Force FY-73 had serious effects on the operational capability of SAFAsia. The majority of these RIF'd officers were Captains and consequently Lieutenants in many instances assumed 03 and higher levels of responsibilities. A concerted effort was made to resolve this problem by curtailing the normal tours of 12 of the Lieutenants and receiving fills for 26 Captains for the month of July 1974. This, of course, failed to materialize as a result of redeployment and inactivation of SAFAsia.

(5) In spite of SAFAsia's redeployment and inactivation, effective 30 June 1974, we have maintained a vigorous training and Civic Action Program up to and including 31 May 1974 and limited
training until 15 June 1974. We have also successfully completed, with a satisfactory rating, an AGI on 17 May 1974. During the AGI preparatory phase, two major FTX's of 30 days duration were conducted; a DART Exercise in Taiwan and a joint/combined UW FTX in Korea.

(6) Morale, Health and Discipline: The morale of SAFAsia personnel remained excellent. This attitude in my opinion, can be attributed to meaningful training, challenging TDY deployments and stabilizing accompanied tours. The reenlistment rate has been the highest in USARBCO for the past two quarters, attesting to the job satisfaction of our assigned personnel. The drug abuse and racial conflict problems that existed within the unit have been within manageable proportions. The health and physical condition of the unit has been outstanding. As evidenced by the USARBCO monthly statistics report, the discipline of SAFAsia was good with the number of military and civilian violations being less than that of comparable sized units on Okinawa.

(7) By my choice, this unit stood an Annual General Inspection which was concluded two weeks prior to the scheduled stand-down period for redeployment to CONUS. As attested by the IG, USARBCO, the morale of SAFAsia personnel was very high. During this inspection, this unit received only the most favorable comments.

(8) As I reluctantly redeploy and inactivate SAFAsia, I make the following recommendations as applicable to unit strength and morale should the organization be reactivated in the future:

(a) If non-Special Forces qualified enlisted personnel are to fulfill soft skill (i.e., supply and maintenance) MOS's, they should be airborne qualified or at a minimum, airborne volunteers.

(b) Without exception, all officers should be formally trained in appropriate Special Forces or Civil Affairs courses.

(c) Higher headquarters should insure that Captains are close to a 100 percent TOE fill at all times, as they are the key operational personnel of the unit.
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g. Logistics:

(1) In conjunction with the USARBCO staff, the Inactivation/Redeployment plan for SAFAsia was developed during the period 1-12 April 1974 and presented to CDR, USARBCO on 17 April 1974. All phases of the plan were accepted.

(2) On 18 April, a team from the United States Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (USAJFKCENMA), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, arrived and identified items of equipment required by USAJFKCENMA. A list of the selected equipment was forwarded to the Director of Logistics, USARBCO, requesting approval for shipment.

(3) During the week of 29 April, the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion began preparing documentation for turn-in of all equipment in preparation for inactivation. The 539th Engineer Detachment, the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment and 400th Army Security Agency Detachment began packing Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), less Tactical Wheel Vehicles (TWV's) for shipment and prepared Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) equipment and TWV's for turn-in. Equipment was transferred from USARBCO and other SAFAsia units to fill TO&E shortages of the 539th Engineer Detachment, 441st Military Intelligence Detachment and the 400th Army Security Agency Detachment. All supply actions were completed by 7 June for the above units.

(4) On 3 June 1974, the Special Forces units (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Special Forces Battalion, 2nd Special Forces Battalion and 1st Special Support Battalion) began preparation for inactivation. Equipment identified and approved for shipment to USAJFKCENMA, Fort Bragg, was assembled at 1st Special Support Battalion for packing and shipping. All Special Forces units had closed their Property Records by 28 June 1974.

(5) Between 6 May and 28 June 1974, the following installations and buildings were released to Director of Facilities Engineers, USARBCO: Site Yara, Camp Hardy, Site Sunabe, Camp Chinen, Cordell Training Area, Camp Sansone, Camp Kuwae SCUBA Facility, Namihira Army Annex, Yomitan Army Annex and ten barrack and headquarters buildings in the Zukeran area.
h. Civil Affairs:

(1) Civil Affairs activities were conducted primarily through SAFAsia’s 1st Civil Affairs Battalion and 539th Engineer Detachment. In the Republic of the Philippines, these activities were centered around Civic Action exercises conducted in remote provincial areas. During the reporting period, the provinces of Bohol and Northern Samar were targeted for these exercises. The Bohol ATTF was a 60 day venture involving 42 personnel, while Northern Samar employed approximately 47 personnel for 45 days. Survey personnel are not included in the above figures. The exercises encompassed medical, dental and veterinary activities, horizontal and vertical construction projects, sanitation engineering and public health improvements.

(2) In Guam/TTPI, the 539th Engineer Detachment continues, and will continue, to support the Department of Interior and Department of Defense Civic Action efforts in the Marshall Islands with a 12 man team and a liaison officer. Activities are primarily oriented toward construction projects to include schools, roads and airfields. Medcaps are also conducted among the local indigenous by the team medic.

(3) Recommendation: The Civil Affairs and Engineer ATTF’s be considered for continuation in the Republic of the Philippines utilizing CONUS based Civil Affairs and Engineer units. Indications from JUSMAAGPHIL and U.S. Embassy are favorable in support of this recommendation.

i. Psychological Operations: SAFAsia did not have organic psyops capability, but worked with the 7th Psychological Operations Group, also based on Okinawa. Primary psyops participation was during FTX’s by the use of leaflets, loudspeakers and audio-visual techniques.

j. Communications:

(1) Operations: All SFOD radio traffic to SAFAsia Headquarters was transmitted by either 300 word per minute "burst" or manual CW.
Continuous Wave (CW) was changed from standard International Morse Code (IMC) to "cut numbers" in order to more readily blend with normal code practices in the Orient. All messages were encrypted. Larger deployments requiring a high volume traffic capability were supported by AN/GRC-122 radioteletypes handling encrypted traffic. The SAFAsia base station operated continuously performing the mission it would be assigned in a wartime situation passing and receiving live and dummy traffic. Employing these types of techniques provided continuity without establishing a pattern.

(2) Training: Since there was well defined communications training conducted quarterly, increased emphasis has been on clandestine communications procedures and communications security. There has been a fine working relationship with the Security Agency for update briefings, technical and tactical advice and communications monitoring as requested. Since the implementation of this training, communication security increased two-fold, including telephone security. Clandestine communication procedures also improved as a result of the communications security training. This training was given to all personnel within SAFAsia.

5. RELATIONSHIP WITH HOST NATION FORCES/GOVERNMENTS:

a. Contact with host nation forces has been limited. During cold weather training in Northern Japan, some contact was made with members of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. In all instances excellent rapport was established.

b. Relationship with the host government on Okinawa was excellent, but a substantial anti-military element does exist. Since reversion to Japanese rule training was somewhat hampered but a realignment of priorities and implementation of less obvious activities insured the continuity of a valuable training program. Although the Disaster Assistance Relief Exercise, Wen Shan IV, in Taiwan, was cancelled in FY 73 due to political considerations, it was conducted this year (FY 74) at the invitation of the Republic of China.
6. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THIRD NATION FORCES: SAFAsia main-
tained excellent relationships with those third nation for-
ces with which contact was maintained. Most missions re-
quired the close working relationship that foments mutual
respect and admiration. The language/area study program was
of great value and assistance to SAFAsia personnel. Even
though many of the personnel did not have more than a limi-
ted vocabulary, the capability to speak a few words in the
native language has proven to be a great asset. This,
coupled with the willingness and ability to live "native",
earned SAFAsia personnel many friends throughout PACOM.

7. CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS: During the past year,
Okinawa has been troubled by strikes and work stoppages.
SAFAsia was the primary asset for USARBCO in support of
OPLAN 461 (Installation/Facility Security). During the
frequent implementations of OPLAN 461, we were required
to supply gate guards, walking guards and reaction pla-
toons of 25 men each. Generally, committed forces num-
bered from 25 to 75 personnel employed for periods of
three days.

8. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: Research and development
concepts have revolved around UW and DART Operations.
Probably the most important project was the refinement
of Rough Terrain Parachute Operations. While the idea
of parachuting into trees and rough terrain wearing
"smoke-jumper" paraphernalia is not new, the inherent
techniques required for a military operation are unique.
Such techniques as air and ground assembly, mountainous
terrain landing and special equipment development are
only three of the major facets that required refinement.
The equipment and associated written materials have been
forwarded to USAJFKCENMA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

9. (C) AREAS IN NEED OF INCREASED EMPHASIS:

a. With the redeployment of SAFAsia to CONUS and sub-
sequent inactivation, coupled with the inactivation of HQ,
USARPAC, there will be a need for CINCPAC assistance in
keeping the line open for Special Forces employment within
PACOM.
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b. When previous SAFAsia contingencies reverted to FORSCOM, the lines of communication lengthened considerably, both in actual distance and by an increase in the number of intermediate headquarters. Special Forces units will no longer enjoy the direct and semi-direct contact that was maintained throughout PACOM. The Taiwan Resident Detachment no longer exists, the Special Forces Resident Detachment, Korea has become an EUSA unit and the SAFAsia coordinator slot at JUSMAAGPHIL has terminated. For Special Forces and attached units to continue to perform roles within the PACOM, the assistance of CINCPAC will be absolutely necessary. While I do not necessarily advise the use of Special Forces to the exclusion of all other units, I do believe the missions in which we have been involved are more oriented toward Special Forces units than to conventional combat units. The ability to instruct in diverse subjects, their natural bent for working with indigenous forces and the individual "mission-orientation" philosophy displayed by most Special Forces personnel make them a more versatile asset.

c. A PACOM area orientation will develop in designated CONUS units as PACOM contingencies and missions are assigned. In order to strengthen this orientation and to enhance personal knowledge, frequent exposure to the PACOM area will be necessary. Area orientation alone will not suffice to insure good performance of units. I believe that the following proven peacetime missions (those previously assigned to SAFAsia for execution in PACOM) should be continued; the DART operations in the Republic of China, the TAT in Indonesia, the ECAD and CIVAC missions in the Philippines, the Army CIVAC mission in Micronesia and the ATTF programs in Korea. All of these nation building programs, while assisting our allies to help themselves during times of peace, also will afford United States Forces a continual opportunity to maintain and strengthen the bonds of friendship, cooperation and communication that currently exists. The favorable results of these programs will be vital to the success of the units assuming contingency missions.

10. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The redeployment of SAFAsia will create a void in the Pacific area.
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b. Due to the time-distance-cost factor, certain Special Forces missions within PACOM may be terminated. The bulk of the missions retained should be assigned to USAJFKCENMA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina in order to maintain a viable Pacific-oriented Special Forces unit.

c. Increased assistance from PACOM headquarters will be required to insure the continuing development of appropriate missions.

d. Because of the increased distance from home base, Special Forces Detachments will require the most experienced and self-reliant officers as mission leaders.

11. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Although the political situation on Okinawa mitigated against certain types of training, I found that beneficial training could be conducted in the remaining training areas as long as ORT/ATTF/MTT missions were available to augment that training with experience in areas of orientation.

b. The island of Okinawa provided an excellent base of operations due to its central location.

c. Proximity to USAF and USN units allowed SAFAsia personnel the excellent opportunity to conduct joint training.

d. While fuel shortages did have an adverse impact on SAFAsia's off-island missions due to a reduction in mission aircraft, deployments continued by utilizing MAC aircraft and naval vessels.

e. Below State Department level, Special Forces units have been found to be highly acceptable to host country military forces. This acceptance is based primarily on the high level of skill of the unit in immediately adjusting to changes in schedules, support and

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facilities. Special Forces have set a high standard of performance which PACOM countries have come to expect without exception. Selection of individuals and units for future contingency assignments must be carefully done to insure that this standard is maintained.

ELLIOTT P. SYDNOR, JR
COL, IN
Commanding
**REPORT TITLE**
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL Elliott P. Sydnor, Jr, Commander, Security Assistance Force Asia

**AUTHOR(S)** (First name, middle initial, last name)
Colonel Elliott P. Sydnor, Jr.

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