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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Reports:

Colonel James Henslick, SA, 6th (ARVN) Div, 24 Jan 73 - 22 Mar 73

Colonel Lucian Rawls, Jr., SA, 6th (ARVN) Div, 24 Jan 73 - 22 Mar 73

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2. Transmitted herewith are the reports of, COL James Henslick and COL Lucian Rawls, subject as above.

3. These reports are provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the authors. The reports should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, they should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Delta Regional Assistance Command
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MACR-60-00

22 March 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
COL LUCIAN R. RAWLS, JR.
Senior Advisor, 9th Division (ARVN), MACV FCB-74

THRU: Commander, IRAC
APO 96393

THRU: CONUS
APO 96222

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ACC: FCCT UF
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Country: Republic of Vietnam Debriefing Report by
Colonel LUCIAN R. RAWLS, JR.

Duty Assignment: Senior Advisor, 9th Infantry Division (ARVN)

Date of Report: 22 March 1973

1. (U) The following report is submitted in accordance with the provisions of AR 525-14, dated 2 July 1971, and is based on the personal observations and professional judgment of the undersigned.

2. (U) This report covers that period extending from the announcement of the cease fire by the President on 24 January 1973, through the 22nd of March 1973, the date on which MACV Advisory Team 60, (9th Division, ARVN) officially ceased operations and terminated the U.S. Advisory function with the 9th Infantry Division, ARVN.

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Enclosure 2

"NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION"

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5. (c) The period immediately prior to and for the 30 days following the effective date of the cease fire, was characterized by a massive effort on the part of enemy forces to seize and establish control over strategic areas within the 9th Division TAOR. The response by the 9th Division to those efforts by predominantly NVA Forces was magnificent. The division was successful in ejecting enemy forces from the border area, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy forces and capturing significant quantity of individual and crew served weapons. The division maintains control over that part of the TAOR in the vicinity of the Cambodian border.

4. (c) This period also was characterized by the total withdrawal of U.S. supporting assets, to include the Senior Advisor Helicopter which had previously been employed in supporting the activities of the 9th Division Commander and the Senior Advisor. The transition from U.S. tactical and administrative support to total reliance on VNAF for both Helicopter and Tactical Air Support went smoothly. The division adapted to the reduction in total assets available in a most professional manner. The essential requirements are still being provided for adequately. Alternate and often less efficient courses of action have been adopted in the execution of assigned missions due to a decrease in assets; however, the missions have been accomplished most effectively. The division and its commanders are sufficiently flexible to adapt to the current situation and to make optimum use of the resources that are available.

5. (c) For a short period following the withdrawal of U.S. helicopter assets, particularly the Cav Pack, VNAF maintenance capabilities could not keep pace with requirements for helicopter support, therefore certain requirements could not be met fully. The solution adopted was to share available assets during the most critical period immediately following the cease fire. Available assets were allocated in usable numbers to one unit in the NI and to another unit in the PH. Thus providing a means to meet critical requirements in each major unit.

6. (c) a. For the 9th Division, the first thirty days of the cease fire was characterized by the assignment of additional areas of responsibility, requiring a major shift of divisional forces to meet an intensified combat situation throughout the Division TAOR. The division responded to each new requirement with determination and efficiency, achieving considerable combat success against NVA forces in northern Kien Phong Province in the vicinity of the Cambodian border.
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MACDR-60-CO

SUBJECT:  Senior Advisor Debriefing Report
COL LUCIAN R. RAWLS, JR
Senior Advisor, 9th Division (ARVN), RSCSCS FOR-74

22 March 1973

(C)  b. The second phase of the cease fire period (X+31 to X+53) was characterized by a reduction in the number of incidents to a level similar to that which existed prior to the cease fire. The division continued to demonstrate its high level of combat readiness and flexibility by meeting each enemy threat and shifting maneuver battalions as required throughout the TAOR.

(C)  c. During this letter phase, the division has taken full advantage of the quarter period to rotate each maneuver battalion and cavalry troop through a five day stand-down for maintenance, training and recuperation. This has done such to raise the morale and efficiency of each unit. The division has initiated the first phase of a unit refresher training program by placing one company from the 14th Regiment and one company from the 16th Regiment in a four week unit refresher training program at the Division Training Center. The Division reconnaissance Company is currently participating in a five week Refresher Training Program at the Chi-Lang Training Center. The Battalion Refresher Training Program for each battalion in the Division is scheduled to begin in April.

7. (C) For the Advisor Team, the period of the report was characterized by significant reduction in the number of advisors assigned. Between the period 24 January and 27 January, the personnel assigned to the Regimental Combat Advisory Teams were withdrawn and reassigned to the Joint Military Commission. Certain of the personnel in the Division Headquarters advisory element were reassigned to meet other requirements. By X+10 Advisory Team 60 was reduced to four officers. On 28 February (X+31) the team was reduced to one officer, with the Senior Advisor remaining to continue the advisory function and to provide operational reports to Delta Regional Assistance Command and a daily overview and assessment of the situation. The Senior Advisor was assisted in the accomplishment of his mission by a staff of eight ARVN NCO's (interpreters) who function in a full spectrum of operational activity.

8. (C) Based on my observations during a period in which the 9th Division's capabilities were put to the ultimate test, the division is fully capable of meeting any threat and of accomplishing its assigned missions. The division is a mature, fully seasoned combat unit that can be depended upon to do more than accomplish its mission. The division repeatedly has demonstrated a "Can Do" attitude, with flexibility and mobility. These attributes have engendered a feeling of being ready to go anywhere at any time to accomplish any mission.
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MACDR-60-CO 22 March 1973
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
COL LUCIAN R. RAWLS, JR.
Senior Advisor, 9th Division (ARVN) FOR-74

9. (U) At Inclosure 1 is an assessment of the major functional areas of military activity as they pertain to the 9th Division.

1 Incl

as

LUCIAN R. RAWLS, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Senior Advisor
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

1. (C) Leadership.

   a. The division is fortunate in having a number of excellent, fully qualified leaders in the major command positions. Most specifically, the Division Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Regimental Commanders and in most instances the Battalion Commanders. The major leadership problem lies in the lack of depth at each echelon. To compound this problem, the division has been required to provide experienced officers to fill positions as Province and District Chiefs and to fill other similar positions requiring quality personnel if Vietnamization is to succeed fully.

   b. One of the most serious deficiencies in the officer leadership structure lies in the lack of an effective officer rotation program. Staff officers remain staff officers because they lack the troop experience necessary to effectively command a unit in combat. This is aggravated by the fact that staff officers are promoted regardless of a lack of command or combat experience, therefore the incentive to gain troop command and combat experience is lacking. As a consequence, the effective combat commanders remain in their command positions overly long, essentially because they are effective and because there are few qualified officers being groomed to replace them. In the long term an effective officer rotation program is an essential ingredient in a revitalized leadership structure.

2. (C) Command and Control. Command and control is highly centralized, with little discretion being left to the subordinate commander. However, in view of the scarcity of assets, the shortage of leaders and the requirements for security, centralized direction is required.

3. (C) Personnel. Casualties and desertions continue to produce an unacceptable level of turnover in all units. Thus requiring a major training effort just to maintain the maneuver units at the minimum strength required to conduct combat operations. The average daily present for duty strength in the infantry battalions fluctuates between 60 and 70 percent, occasionally dropping below the 60 percent level.
4. (C) Intelligence. The division's intelligence system is comprehensive and productive. The personnel assigned are trained and effective in their jobs. However, as is true in many instances, the production, analysis and distribution of intelligence is often not timely enough to produce the results desired. Utilizing all resources at their command in an effective manner, the division intelligence system more often than not produces good and accurate intelligence.

5. (C) Operations.
   
   a. The mobility of the division is excellent. It has demonstrated the capability to shift maneuver units rapidly over extended distances using all means of transport.

   b. The division has been most effective in the employment of airmobile assets, using them effectively and efficiently.

   c. Fire support is well planned and effectively employed. There has been an overreliance on the employment of artillery when other equally effective means could have been used. In general terms, the organization disposition and application of artillery and tactical air support has been excellent.

6. (C) Training. The division commander fully supports the training effort, insuring that the training base is utilized fully. Units are regularly withdrawn from operations for the conduct of training. A formal four week battalion unit training program will commence in April with each maneuver unit programmed to participate on a rotational basis.

7. (C) Logistics.
   
   a. Supply and distribution. Supply of major items of equipment is adequate. Distribution of supplies and the regular resupply of units in the field is accomplished through the use of all means available and has been accomplished in a timely and efficient manner.

   b. Maintenance. Major items of equipment are maintained at an acceptable level. Worthy of singular mention is the very high state of maintenance of the M-113 armored personnel carriers.
Inclosure 1 to Senior Officer Debriefing Report
COL Lucian R. Rawls, Jr., Senior Advisor, 9th Division (ARVN)
RCSCS FOR-74  22 March 1973

8. (C) Communications. The division communications system is excellent and exceeds that normally found in US units.
Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: COL James Henslick, SA, 2d (ARVN) Div, 6 Jul 72 - 27 Jan 73 & COL Lucian Rawls, Jr., SA, 9th (ARVN) Div., 22 Mar 73 (U)

COL James Henslick
COL Lucian Rawls

10 April 73

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