<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AD NUMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD523509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO: UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIMITATION CHANGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; APR 1972. Other requests shall be referred to Army Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oag, d/a ltr 2 may 1975 ago, d/a ltr 2 may 1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
DAAG-PAP-A (M) (17 Nov 72) DAFD-OTT 1 December 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Major General Arthur H. Sweeney, Commander, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, 27 Nov 71 - 10 Apr 72 (UL)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) 2 July 1971.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Major General Arthur H. Sweeney, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 525-14, as a result of subject report should be provided to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanders
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Transportation School
(Continued on page 2)
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army (DWSA)
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Military History
OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Office, of the Director of Defense Research & Engineering
Commanders in Chief
  Pacific
    US Army, Pacific
    US Army Europe
    US Readiness Command
Commander, US Army, Alaska
Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command
Chief of Staff, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commandants
  Armed Forces Staff College
  Defense Intelligence School
  Industrial College of the Armed Forces
  The National War College
Senior Army Representative, Education Center, Marine Corps Development &
Education Command
USAF Air Ground Operations School
Defense Documentation Center
Commanders
  US Army Land Warfare Laboratory
  US Army Logistics Doctrine, Systems & Readiness Agency
  US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project Office
The Air University Library
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA NANG
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96340

AWCO-CG

10 APR 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (RG3: CSFOR-74) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AWAO-30
APO 96340

1. (U) Reference: USARV Supplement 1 to AR 525-14, Subj: as above

2. (U) General: This report is submitted in accordance with the reference.

During my tenure as Commander of United States Army Support Command, Da Nang, the nature of the logistical support mission shifted from one of pure support and services, under combat conditions, to almost pure retrograde and redeployment under the Keystone program. The height of the support mission occurred during LAM SON 719 when the command had two General Support Groups, a Transportation Group, a major Terminal Command and a Depot operating at maximum effort. From the end of LAM SON forward the retrograde and redeployment mission began to compete with increasing vigor for available resources. Between January 1971 and April 1972, the strength of the command dropped from about 12,000 to under 3,000 with most of those remaining being directly involved with the redeployment program. Brief comments and observations are listed below, with more detailed discussion by functional area in the annexes to this report.

3. (C) Comments and Observations:

a. The highlight of the Da Nang Support Command's performance during my tenure was the logistic support for a combined US - Vietnamese force in a large-scale operation of the war - LAM SON 719. The support given by USARV, ICCV, and CONUS NCCs in gathering sufficient equipment to support this operation was outstanding. The rapid withdrawal of US military forces from the Republic of Vietnam saw huge quantities of supplies and equipment, including significant excesses, retrograded from this area. The accelerated closure of the Da Nang Depot necessitated an all out effort but with a high degree of teamwork between depot and transportation personnel the closure was accomplished in record time. Even with the inherent problems associated with material retrograde and unit standdowns, Da Nang Support Command was able to render timely and sufficient support to all customers throughout this period.

b. Ammunition service was characterized by tremendous fluctuations in balance on hand and issue rates caused by sporadic tactical operations and the withdrawal

Inclosure

CLASSIFIED BY: MG Arthur H. Sweeney
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1978
of US Forces. Insufficient lead time prior to large planned tactical operations such as LAM SON 719 required extraordinary transportation efforts to move the large tonnages required to properly support the operations. Conversely, early termination of operations necessitated retrograde of large amounts of ammunition from forward ASPs. Ammunition service was further characterized by Vietnami-
zation and phase out of United States Army ammunition supply points. Facilities were transferred to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam or closed as the withdrawal of American Forces continued. ARVN assumed the responsibility for ammunition support to all remaining US Forces in Military Region 1 on 23 February 1972. This was the first service support function completely Vietnamized.

c. Maintenance activities during my tenure were highlighted by intensive support during operation LAM SON 719, a demanding and highly fluid redeployment and retrograde support mission, and by special efforts to upgrade equipment for transfer to ARVN under Project 981. Salient among my several observations pertinent to maintenance support is the fact that organizational and operator maintenance was almost universally poor both in divisional and non-divisional units. For the most part this statement pertains to general purpose vehicles and heavy weapons. Apparently, few commanders were able to properly motivate their personnel in this direction in what was predominantly a retrograde environment. Consequently, direct support maintenance units assumed disproportionate importance as customers became increasingly dependent on them. The Class IX supply system was generally quite responsive, but required daily intensive staff attention to make it so. Apropos of general maintenance capabilities, I question the desirability of employing TOE maintenance units for long-term production line operations as was done in support of Project 981, and the maintenance annex to this report contains elaboration on this point.

d. Effective transportation management is vital to any logistical operation to provide the proper mixture of highway, rail and sea transportation. Such management and attention must be oriented to the commodity or class of supply being transported. With the standdown of the 1/5 Mech Bde, the 23d Inf Div, the 101st Airborne Div, and miscellaneous units throughout MR1, the management of assets became of utmost importance. Shuttles of LSTs and YFUs were closely managed to offload heavy equipment into Da Nang, while rail and highway were utilized to their maximum for cargo compatible to that configuration. As requirements for transportation assets decreased rapidly throughout MR1 during January to March 1972, the transportation companies were phased down accordingly, and civilian tariff trucking became a transportation mainstay.

e. Retrograde and Disposal operations became one of the largest tasks of this command starting in May 1971. To accomplish this task, the 92d Composite Service Battalion was formed and given the sole mission of operating centralized Keystone and retrograde processing facilities at Da Nang. The normal retrograde of unserviceable, worn out items decreased in quantity during the second quarter of FY 72, while at the same time the task of retrograding the equipment of retrograde units sharply increased. Major emphasis was required
on Keystone operations in order to meet the processing and shipping
requirements for equipment being turned in by Keystone units. Starting in January 1972 Local Nationals were hired to man the Keystone facilities and they proved adaptable to this operation.

f. As the Vietnamization program accelerated, the primary energies of my Engineer staff turned from monitoring construction and R&D efforts to Sector coordination. The manifold problems one might normally associate with sector coordination were minimized through timely planning and constant surveillance. I was surprisingly pleased with the smoothness of this operation. In another area, temporary type construction in a combat zone is good logic. However, I feel our experience here in Vietnam should revitalize our thinking along the lines of a positive, staged program to improve the military living conditions in identifiable base areas.

g. In the area of personnel, I found the majority of expertise in the field grade officers. Most company grade officers do not desire command; those who do, are strong leaders, commanded often times at the risk of their lives due to the possibility of grenade incidents. The young officer (Lieutenants) tends to identify with the young soldier and thus loses communication with the Senior Non-Commissioned Officers. Misuse of personnel by MOS was occasioned by the fact that the Army does not have MOSs peculiar to retrograde operations. These operations should be civilianized.

h. The incidence of drug abuse by soldiers in my command was a function of various individual and environmental factors. Two factors emerged as being strongly influential in determining the rate of drug abuse throughout my command. They were the assignment of those individuals who throughout their lives have rarely, if ever, demonstrated the ability to behave in a mature and responsible fashion and the high drug availability in the Da Nang area. Enforcement and elimination programs were more successful in the fight against drug abuse than the exemption and education programs. I feel that the latter two programs would have been more effective had they been backed by more resources than they were. The experience here in the Support Command, I feel, clearly demonstrates that any successful drug program must place continued emphasis on reducing the availability of drugs and the prompt identification and elimination of drug abusers.

i. Security of an installation must be a defense in depth. It is not enough to establish a perimeter defense relying on a denial of penetration. A well trained sapper will penetrate the best perimeter and without additional defensive provisions he will most likely perform his mission and depart undetected. Electronic sensors will assist in the defense of installations, but additional research effort is necessary to reduce false activations and to provide some degree of discrimination. Since a logistical command has numerous items of high market value the problems of theft and pilferage are great. Under
these conditions, Local National security guards proved to be of limited value and had to be augmented with US security personnel. Without US supervision LN guards fell victim to threats and intimidation by the criminal element and often worked in complicity with the thieves.

4. (C) At this time all functional responsibilities and units of the Support Command have been transferred to the 5th Transportation Command in preparation for the discontinuance of this headquarters. This transition went very smoothly and no unforeseen obstacles were encountered. The future will see a continued reduction in the logistical support forces required to provide support throughout Military Region 1. To this end, the 5th Transportation Command has already begun to consolidate its resources under its two main units, the 57th Transportation Battalion and the 277th S&S Battalion. Increased emphasis is also being placed on contracting normal logistical support functions to even further reduce the presence of US Military personnel in Military Region 1.

ARTHUR H. SWEENEY, JR.  
Major General  USA  
Commanding

Annex A - Command and Control  
Annex B - Supply  
Annex C - Ammunition  
Annex D - Maintenance  
Annex E - Transportation  
Annex F - Retrograde  
Annex G - Engineer  
Annex H - Personnel  
Annex I - Combat Security  
Annex J - Provost Marshal  
Annex K - Comptroller
1. (C) On 27 November 1970, I assumed command of a dynamic on-going Support Command (as shown in Figure 1) that had the primary mission of providing logistical support and services to all US and Free World Military Assistance Forces in Military Region 1. After initial appraisal of my new organization, I reorganized the staff into nine principal staff sections and eight special staff sections as shown in Figure 2. This staff structure provided me maximum flexibility and expertise in each of the critical support areas. I have maintained this structure throughout my period of command. During my first month in command at Da Nang, I spent much time in making my estimate of the situation particularly as pertained to available logistical resources vis-a-vis the Support Command's mission assignment. After numerous visits and discussions with my staff, with my major subordinate commanders, and most important with my customers, one common theme continually recurred - the overall inadequacy of Support Command resources to respond to any peak workload or emergency. This was particularly evident in the areas of land transportation, ammunition personnel, and security forces. Based upon this assessment, I sent an "Adequacy of Resources" letter in December 1970 to the Assistant Deputy Commanding General for Material, USARV identifying specific needs in each area and providing examples of shortcomings in available assets. The Deputy Commanding General, USARV, promptly reviewed my request and responded by providing these additional resources and directed implementing action. Fortuitously, some of the transportation, ammunition, and maintenance units I had asked for to accomplish my normal mission began to arrive prior to the unexpected operation LAM SON 719.

2. (U) As these additional resources began to arrive, initial planning for Operation LAM SON 719 was begun. Although my assessment of the command had the long range plan in mind, i.e., the redeployment and normal support effort, it pointed out other areas that would require augmentation if the command was to play a viable role in an operation of this magnitude. Support of this operation in northern Military Region 1 received much of my personnel attention and became my primary mission for the next four months. Logistical support to southern Military Region 1 continued to be provided through a greatly reduced 80th General Support Group at Da Nang. Because of the short fuse requirements of LAM SON 719 I stripped out many units from the 80th General Support Group to augment the logistical support effort in the north.

3. (U) To successfully support the LAM SON operation, it was necessary to fragment the 26th General Support Group, in the north, into four separate elements. The headquarters remained at Phu Bai with the 2d Maintenance Battalion and the nearby port facility at Tan My. A Base Support Activity (BSA) was formed at Quang Tri and identified as the 26th General Support Group (Forward). Assigned to the BSA was the 63rd Maintenance Battalion and HQ, 8th Transportation Group, which was brought up from Qui Nhon to control the critical assets of two transportation battalions, the 39th and the 57th. Two Forward Support Areas (FSA) were established in western Quang Tri Province at FSB Vandergrift and Khe Sahn respectively.

4. (U) Each FSA was organized with a security company and separate platoons for...
transportation, ammunition, POL and supply and services. This composition provided each FSA with the capability and flexibility required for its mission. Additional line-haul trucking was provided by the 8th Transportation Group and coastal shipping was provided by the 5th Transportation Command thru Tan My and Dong Ha. The SUPCOM's POL pipeline from Tan My and U.S. Air Force "bladder birds" insured adequate JP4 was available for the increased number of air sorties flown in support of the operation. Further, to accommodate this increase in activity and widely dispersed area of operations the 26th General Support Group was augmented by a total of 1,775 personnel to bring its strength up to 5,875 at the height of the operation. LAM SON 719 was successfully terminated on 4 April 1971, and once again we began to direct our resources toward an accelerated redeployment.

5. (C) Keystone (Oriole Alpha) Increment VIII, which covered the period 1 May through 30 June 1971, was the first major redeployment effort in Military Region 1. Logistic support was provided on an area basis. With this in view, the plan for redeployment of SUPCOM subordinate units was predicated on the closure of the main supported installations and locations in an area rather than on the redeployment of particular supported units. This concept insured sufficient responsiveness and flexibility to provide continuous logistical support as well as meet the requirements of the redeployment and retrograde effort. The overall concept envisioned a roll back to the Da Nang logistics base with units redeploying from north to south and with installations closing in the following order in Northern MR1: Dong Ha, Quang Tri, Camp Evans, Camp Eagle, Phu Bai and Tan My. Conversely in southern MR1 the units were to redeploy from south to north starting with the closure of LZ Bronco and then by the main base at Chu Lai. This reduced the logistical mission in southern MR1 to support of the US Advisory Group Personnel remaining at Quang Ngai and Chu Lai.

6. (U) The redeployment concept was implemented and, except for the requirement to maintain an FSA at Quang Tri beyond the scheduled date, installations began to close on schedule. By June 1971 the structure of the command had been modified by the redeployment of units and changing mission requirements to that shown in Figure 3.

7. (C) As the pace of the redeployment effort increased during the next seven months major elements of the command began to feel the impact of the drawdown for the first time. The closure of Chu Lai saw the 277th S&S Battalion virtually eliminated, but later reconstituted in Da Nang as the Long Range Support Battalion. In the north the 26th General Support Group was reduced to a Task Force Headquarters and finally became the small Northernmost Support Detachment. This Detachment was assigned to the 277th and will remain at Phu Bai indefinitely, as the activity through which advisors and other units in the north request and receive supplies. While this action was taking place, Headquarters, 80th General Support Group in the south was also phased out. Many other units were moved or reorganized to keep pace with the increase in retrograde of equipment and material. Port operations continued at a high level. The port facilities at Chu Lai and Tan My were both retained until the last major U.S. units were withdrawn from those areas and then the ports were turned over to the Republic of Vietnam. These facilities greatly assisted the movement of equipment and material into Da Nang and reduced the burden and hazards of line-haul trucking.
8. (C) The Da Nang area became the focal point of all retrograde activity in MR1 from the outset; it continued to gain in importance throughout the entire period. The Da Nang port complex, Deep Water Pier, Tien Sha Ram, and bridge ramp were utilized to the utmost and on many occasions were totally congested with retrograde equipment and supplies. The main problem with backlog was the general inadequacy of shipping, in both quantity and scheduled off shore destinations, and lack of timely disposition instructions for the large quantities of supplies and material being generated. A contributing factor was the poor weather conditions of the monsoon season. For days at a time ships could not be loaded because sea conditions made the operation of floating cranes unsafe.

9. (C) Throughout the SUPCOM's redeployment phase, I have followed a firm plan to reduce the size and number of my supporting units to an austere level, yet fully capable to accomplish essential missions and tasks. Several times in the course of each redeployment increment, I had the staff re-analyze all the remaining units to be redeployed. Evaluation of their location, type and quantity of equipment, and the size of the units involved usually led me to make more rapid or deeper cuts into the remaining logistic units. One of the basic purposes of these extra cuts was to reduce manpower to only that which could be employed on a full, long work-day basis. This in turn helped stem the tendency of some to turn to drug usage, a condition that seems to be accentuated by idle time. For this reason, I prohibited the formation of provisional units to be used for guard duty only, and insisted that each unit participate fully in securing its own area.

10. (U) During the last three months there has been increased activity to consolidate the organizational structure. Figure 4 depicts the organizational structure on 1 March 1972 as the SUPCOM entered its terminal phase. On 1 March 1972 termination of Project 981, the program for maintenance upgrade of equipment being turned over to the Vietnamese, ended the requirement for the USA Maintenance Battalion; and it was phased out by the end of March. The last U.S. ammunition supply point in Military Region 1 ceased operation in late February, ending the mission of the 154th Ordnance Battalion which then redeployed as well in March. The U.S. Army Depot, Da Nang began planning for closure in September 1971. As time progressed, it reduced its inventories and transferred its wholesale responsibility for Class II, IV, VII and IX to U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh. The Class I retail and wholesale responsibility was turned over to the 277th SGS Battalion as well as much of the reduced stocks. Since the 277th SGS Battalion was to be a long term support unit, it was determined to collocate it at the depot covered storage area, and much of the stocks were transferred in place. This along with early decisions to centralize stock control, establish a new AT code for Class I and break bulk and shipping to zero balance with one Material Release Order (MRO) per Federal Stock Number per location expedited the closure in a professional and orderly manner. The U.S. Army Depot, Da Nang completed standdown and was inactivated 1 April 1972.
11. (C) By the end of March, the Support Command was reduced to a single organizational entity, the 5th Trans Comd. As mentioned earlier, deeper cuts were made into the logistics forces as each redeployment increment progressed. In February 1972, I saw that the small logistic force which would remain in this Region after 1 April 1972 did not require a headquarters of the size and type of my own command. Therefore, I started a plan to phase out Headquarters, U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang by 15 April 1972, thus leaving the 5th Trans Comd as the senior logistics command in Military Region 1. The plan was based on the prior completion of two main objectives:

a. The U.S. Army Depot, Da Nang would complete closure and phasedown of the 63rd Maintenance Battalion and the 184th Ordnance Battalion would be complete. This objective was met by 1 April 1972.

b. The proper staffing of Headquarters, 5th Trans Comd with experienced personnel and background files would be provided from the SUPCOM staff. This staffing would include an overlapping time period in which the 5th Trans staff would "carry the ball" while a small SUPCOM staff would monitor and assist when necessary. To this end all staff functions were transferred to the 5th Trans Comd by 15 March 1972.

12. (C) At this time all actions required to transfer functional responsibility and units to the 5th Trans Comd have been completed. The transition phase went very smoothly and no unforeseen obstacles were encountered. The future will see a continued reduction in logistical support forces required to provide support throughout Military Region 1. Even as this report is being written, the 5th Transportation Command is consolidating its resources under the 57th Transportation Battalion and the 277th S&S Battalion to progress towards this goal as rapidly and efficiently as possible. Increased emphasis is also being placed on contracting normal logistical support functions, to even further reduce the presences of U.S. Military personnel within Military Region 1.
FIGURE 1

NOVEMBER 1970
ORGANIZATION OF HQ, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA NANG

FIGURE 2

10

MARCH 1972
ANNEX B
SUPPLY

1. (C) In late November 1970 the Da Nang Support Command was responsible for the provision of Classes I, II, III, IV, VII, and IX supplies to units within Military Region I (MRI). The retail mission was performed at that time by the 80th General Support Group (southern MRI) and the 26th General Support Group (northern MRI) with maintenance and supply and service companies located at Quang Tri, Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. As US military units left MRI, supporting units stood down until, in April 1972, one supply and service battalion was left at Da Nang to support all of MRI.

2. (C) GENERAL SUPPLIES (Class II, IV, VII, and IX)

   a. The mission of wholesale receipt, storage, and issue of these supplies was performed by the US Army Depot, Da Nang through February 1972. At that time the wholesale mission was assigned to US Army Depot, Long Binh. The retail distribution mission was performed by direct support units of the Support Command or combat divisions.

   b. In January 1971 LAM SON 719, one of the largest joint US-ARVN combat operations in MRI, was initiated. Logistic support was gigantic, bringing to bear all the support activities of Da Nang Support Command to a highly successful completion. The limited distribution of available planning information severely hampered initial logistic developments. The short period between conception of the operation and D-Day did not allow sufficient time for marshalling required resources. The majority of equipment to fill priority requirements (less Class IV) came from sources other than the US Army Depot, Da Nang. Many of the items were shipped out-of-country to include CONUS, Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. The effort from these areas, especially CONUS NICPs, was outstanding in every respect. Materials and equipment were shipped utilizing supply directives from ICCV and US Army Depot, Da Nang. However, major items ordered prior to project code "GWS" created a problem in identification at port facilities which was overcome by a strict screening of incoming assets. As the operation progressed requirements continued to develop, especially for major items of equipment. A major problem was the lack of TOE/TDA authorisation for the equipment. Initially there was no question as to tabular authority. The mission dictated whether or not equipment was issued. This was further complicated by combat losses and units' failure to report them. Despite continuous efforts, many reports of losses were not made until after the operation ended. Towards the end of the operation, authorisation became a problem as USARV and ICCV began to require justification. By the time units began to submit requests for loans the operation was beginning to phase down and the equipment was no longer needed.

13

CONFIDENTIAL
c. One of the biggest Class IV problems was obtaining sufficient matting for repairing the airstrip at Khe Sanh. Matting was obtained from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in-country and out-of-country. Class II items such as sleeping bags, blankets, ponchos, and liners became a problem as many additional troops were moved north without any of their basic equipment. Of course, the supply DSUs were not geared to support this large increase in demand for these type items; however, the US Army Depot, Da Nang; DCSONG-USARV; and ICCV were quick to respond to fill all these requirements.

d. Recognizing that the materials and equipment involved in LAM SON 719 would involve millions of dollars, it was directed that a system of checks and document controls be initiated in order to leave a well-defined audit trail. An audit team was formed and tasked to reconcile the sub-depot stock records, to verify the receipt of items at each of the receiving areas, and to effect liaison visits with the receiving points for the purpose of checking transportation control documents, manifests, tally sheets, etc. This technique proved highly successful and, upon termination of the operation, all major items of GS equipment had been accounted except for a small number that were surveyed.

e. Unlike other classes of supplies, Class IX requirements were impossible to determine. Several hundred different lines for electronics, automotive, armament, and track equipment were involved. Lists of known high mortality, critical repair parts were formulated for wheel vehicles, heavy artillery, and some signal equipment. These lists were submitted as requirements with some parts being received by maintenance units. However, considering the entire operation, this approach was not completely successful. On several occasions, "push packages" were developed. It was hard to evaluate whether or not this procedure was successful, but verbal feedback indicated that many items were removed from deadline as a result of these packages. Toward the end of the operation Class IX support reverted to normal supply procedures.

f. After LAM SON 719, Da Nang Support Command began to phase down support operations in the northern part of KRI. The technical supply elements of maintenance companies in the northern province were eliminated and picked up by the 63d Maintenance Battalion at Quang Tri. In August 1971 the 63d Maintenance Battalion moved to Da Nang to support the ARVN maintenance program leaving the 178th Maintenance Company along with a Forward Support Activity created from the 26th General Support Group to support the Quang Tri area. On 14 Oct 71 a dedicated staff section designated as KELLOC (Keystone Logistic Operations Center) was established to monitor the receipt, storage, upgrade, and transfer of depot and Keystone assets to RVNAF.
The section drew upon ACoFS Supply and ACoFS Maintenance for personnel and support. It acted as a clearing house for aspects of Project 981 assets upgrade and transfer and provided a contact point and liaison for all interested parties. Equipment for transfer came from two major sources: Depot AAA stocks and Keystone depot assets.

g. On 24 Oct 71 Typhoon Hester struck the northern coast of South Vietnam. Its devastating winds and rain slammed into Chu Lai and Da Nang destroying buildings, power lines, and communication lines. Emergency requirements for power generation equipment, clothing, and lumber for rebuilding structures came in from all units in MRI with an overwhelming response. Power outages required immediate replacement of generators from USADD and other emergency supplies. XXIV Corps and ACoFS Supply set up a coordination team to process all essential requirements and issue to units on a temporary loan basis such supplies as communication equipment, tentage generators, etc. Lumber and roofing materials were issued during the typhoon with full knowledge that it would in all probability have an adverse impact on the retrograde program. It was felt that the situation demanded immediate response and that we could make up the retrograde equipment later. The destruction of the 40C Area Warehouse was critical to the clothing supplies of the Central Issue Facility (CIF). By shifting normal field laundry to contract civilian laundry and working the 334th S&S Co field laundry in Da Nang to capacity on those clothing supplies water damaged, losses were kept to a minimum. After the typhoon, action was taken to return loaned major items to depot stocks.

h. November 1971 saw the first big wave of rapid drawdown of combat units in MRI. The rapid drawdown of forces in MRI resulted in a great deal of activity in ACoFS Supply and during virtually the rest of the time that USASUPCOM, DNG was in existence, was the overriding factor by which all operations were governed. In mid-November, the Chu Lai combat support base was successfully closed and a smooth shift of the support mission from Chu Lai to Da Nang was planned and implemented. The 277th Supply and Service Battalion terminated its area of support as the 23d Infantry Division moved out of the Chu Lai area. The Forward Support Activity at Quang Tri also closed as the US Forces departed that area. In February 1972, the 2d Maintenance Battalion, which included the Supply and Service Company, terminated its area support as the 101st Airborne Division moved out of the Phu Bai area. This left the Da Nang Supply and Service Battalion which later became the 277th Supply and Service Battalion. It was placed under the US Army Depot, Da Nang since the 26th General Support Group and the 80th General Support Group both were to stand down in February 1972, and was later transferred to the 5th Transportation Command before depot stand down.
1. The US Army Depot, Da Nang began planning for closure in September 1971. Even as the planning progressed, the depot transferred its stock control operation to ICCV on 1 December 1971. Disposition instructions for supplies and equipment were requested early in the phaseout. Initially large numbers of FROs were received but amounted to only small tonnages. Volume dispositions finally were received in the middle of January 1972 and the depot immediately began large tonnage shipments. At that time transportation assets became a problem. Initially sufficient line haul assets, ships, and Sea Land Vans were not available to move the huge quantities of supplies and equipment processed for shipment by the depot. This problem was gradually overcome after maximum command effort was exerted. Through the latter part of January until the middle of March the depot shipped over 62,000 short tons - 1200 short tons per day - of Class II, IV, VII, and IX. The Class I mission and stocks were transferred intact to the 277th Supply and Service Battalion on 10 February 1972.

Decisions made initially had a profound effect on the closure, including centralization of stock control, shipping to zero balance with one FRO per FSN per location, transferring stocks in place for the residual supporting force, and establishing new AT codes for Class I and break bulk activities. Never before had a major US Army Depot retrograded a predominance of its usable stock from a theater of operation in such a short time overcoming limited transportation resources problems and numerous internal problems inherent in such a complicated operation. The closure of the depot truly represented a milestone in logistical accomplishment in the Republic of Vietnam.

j. Depot support responsibility was transferred to US Army Depot, Long Binh in February 1972 leaving the 277th S&S Battalion and support units of the 196th Infantry Brigade to support all Army units in MR1. Several problems were encountered by the US Army Depot, Da Nang in its closure. Lack of timely disposition often slowed operations or caused effort to be diverted from one area to another. Lack of transportation assets and ship's bottoms was a lesser problem. As the Depot approached its final closure date, personnel shortages had to be overcome by the use of military troops from other units and broader use of civilian contractors. However, the Depot's closure was a significant accomplishment in record time and extremely orderly.

k. As the pace of standdown quickened changes in policies and procedures multiplied in such areas as requisitioning objectives for DSU's; retrograding excess material found on post or generated by standdown; cancellation of unneeded outstanding requisitions; capture and utilization of serviceable expendable supplies such as paper products, office supplies, etc, from Keystone units; and lateral transfer of Post, Camp and Station Property. In order to keep our units abreast of the changes in policies and procedures, the scope of the Evaluation and Assistance Team's operation was expanded to include unit level supply activities.
1. Directly related to drawdown was the establishment of the Central Issue Facility (CIF) at the Freedom Hill R&R Center operated by the 334th S&S Company in support of the 510th Replacement Company. The CIF began full scale processing of personnel on 29 October 1971. Since then, approximately 31,500 personnel have been processed out of country and 5,500 have come into country through the CIF.

r. One of the problems associated with Class II and IX parts supply was that of reducing in the forward areas the volume of supplies on the ground. In some cases this was accomplished by the consolidation of direct support technical supply operations. While this resulted in a consolidation of several hundred lines that were common to each operation it also created another problem. The number of personnel authorized the average technical supply element could not possibly identify, segregate, pack, and ship the excess supplies generated by the consolidation of items which became fringe to the operation. This problem existed not only at Quang Tri, but also at other locations where the command had technical supply units as well as in those of divisions. Accordingly, arrangements were made with the US Army Depot, Da Nang to set up a processing line which could receive such excesses from the outlying units, process them, and either place them in stock or ship them to other destinations. The foregoing procedures allowed the command to greatly reduce on-the-ground stockage of Class II and IX parts. Daily convoys returning from north of the Hai Van Pass and from the southern part of Military Region I continued to bring back supplies which reverted back into the Army Supply System. The immediate benefit is that the command regained visibility of these items. In the processing of returns, those items which were identified as belonging on the authorized stockage list of the depot were segregated and placed in stock. Those items that were identifiable but fringe to the operation were packed in suitable containers and shipped to Okinawa/Sagami.

r. To insure availability of critical repair parts to artillery and mechanized units north of the Hai Van Pass, procedures were established to prestock closed loop and heavy artillery (HAP) parts at Quang Tri and Phu Bai. This prestockage proved advantageous to Da Nang Support Command and the supported units by significantly decreasing the down-time of critically needed major end items such as 5-ton tractor trucks, M548 track vehicles, and self-propelled artillery. Placing the stock of the critical items with the user eliminated the requirement for larger stocks of these items at Da Nang Depot and emergency situations caused by lack of necessary transportation at times these items were needed, to include calling for combat essential air lift missions.
o. Class IV support for US and ROK military forces in MRI was a major supply problem. The majority of Class IV items to include all lumber and barrier materials continued to be controlled items and USAICCV approval was required for each issue. Items such as pipe, culvert, peneprime, timbers, and cement (for which there was little demand) remained on-hand in excessive quantities while items such as dimension lumber, plywood, and barrier materials remained in short supply. The shortage of barrier materials was relieved in part during January and February by a decrease in requirements due to stand-down of units and the return to the supply system of barrier material in the possession of those units. The shortage of lumber and plywood resulted in a "release for retrograde only" policy. This resulted in sufficient assets to allow continuous retrograde but with minimal repairs/construction in MRI.

p. As a final note, the supply system worked well in MRI. The depot insured that supplies were available and the maintenance/supply units insured they reached supported units. By a combination of centralized stock control under ICCV in December 1971 and wholesale support from US Army Depot, Long Binh in February 1972 support became more difficult but nevertheless the supplies arrived. Too often shortages were found in units with assets in the depots. Almost invariably it could be traced to lack of proper requisitioning by the supported units. Commanders need to take an active interest in their supply organisation to insure support is available when needed and where needed.

3. (U) Class I

a. During LAM SCN 719, Class I support was provided to US and ARVN troops through US supply channels using land and air transportation. No major problems were encountered during this operation.

b. Da Nang Support Command recognised a potential overstockage of Class I perishables in May 1971 and started action to alleviate the problem. From July to September 1971 this overstockage was at a critical level. This was compounded by power outages in July and August, diversions from Quin Nhon to Da Nang, and extremely poor refrigeration facilities in Da Nang. To compensate for these problems US Army Depot, Da Nang transshipped refrigerated Sea Land Vans direct to supply points without unloading, cancelled or diverted shipments and initiated an intense reefer repair program. As result of these problems a loss of approximately $380,000 resulted. However this loss was a small percentage of the overall dollar value of the issues during this period.

c. In October 1971 Typhoon Hester caused extensive damage to the Depot and Chu Lai Class I points. By judicious resupply of the Chu Lai area a serious problem was averted.
The Class I point at Chu Lai was closed 3 weeks after the typhoon due to troop withdrawal and was not rebuilt.

d. During November 1971 most US military units departed the Chu Lai and Quang Tri areas and these Class I points were closed. Support for the remaining US units was by direct delivery from Da Nang to Chu Lai and from Phu Bai to Quang Tri. As a result of troop withdrawal from the Phu Bai area this Class I point was closed in February 1972 leaving only the Da Nang Class I point operational. At this point supply of Class I was all from the Da Nang Class I point delivered by air or contract line haul.

e. In January 1972 the Class I function of the US Army Depot, Da Nang was transferred to the 277th Supply and Service Battalion due to phasedown of the Depot. No problems were encountered.

f. Contractor supply of Class I was initiated in November 1971. The first contract provided bread to the Da Nang area and was expanded to include units in northern MRF by January 1972. In December 1971 negotiations were started for contract supply of fresh fruits and vegetables and became operational on 1 April 1972. March 1972 saw action initiated to contract all maintenance for equipment required to operate the Da Nang Class I activity.

g. With the exception of summer 1971 overstockage there were no significant problems in Class I operations in MRF.

. (C) Class III

a. Operation LAM SON 719 taxed this command's bulk petroleum handling and distribution capability to the maximum. At the height of the operation we were issuing approximately 208,550 gallons of fuel daily from the operational sites. Bulk petroleum was provided from the BSA at Quang Tri to the FSAs by a combination of 5,000-gallon semi-trailers; 1200 gallon tank trucks; 500 gallon collapsible drums; and USAF C-130 Bladder Birds. During the operation, the Tam Ky to Quang Tri JP-4 pipeline proved invaluable as up to 400 percent of pre-operation quantities of JP-4 were transported through the line. The line suffered no enemy damage or destruction and amazingly little pilferage during the operation. Over 7,000,000 gallons of JP-4 were transported through the line thus relieving a significant highway burden on QL-1. In addition to military linehaul, commercial fuel deliveries by Cong-Ty Shell from Da Nang were used to deliver fuel to Quang Tri during the operation. The lack of responsive engineer construction capability for leveling POL operational areas and constructing berms seriously impaired early POL operations. The late arrival of critical POL distribution equipment had a degrading affect on early POL support.
b. The 43 mile JP-4 pipeline from Tan My to Quang Tri was operated very successfully through 26 October 1971 when the pipeline segment from Camp Evans to Quang Tri was closed. Between the end of LAM SCN 719 and 26 October 1971, an average of 430,000 gallons and 225,000 gallons of JP-4 were delivered monthly to Camp Evans and Quang Tri respectively. During this period line breaks and fuel losses were minimal with losses representing less than 1 percent of the total fuel delivered monthly. Mechanical line break probably caused by attempted pilferage slightly outnumbered line breaks caused by suspected enemy activity. On 21 December 1971 the remaining Tan My to Camp Evans portion of the pipeline was cleared. The line clearing operation was accomplished in an unorthodox manner by back pumping the line from Camp Evans to Tan My. It was not known at the time whether or not the line could be back-pumped, but the operation was attempted because sufficient storage for linefill was not available at Camp Evans; and it was hoped that a significant quantity of fuel could be reclaimed. The operation was highly successful with over 142,000 gallons of on-specification JP-4 being back pumped to Tan My storage for later use.

c. On 1 July 1971, the mission of operating the Da Nang Package PCL Products Depot was transferred from the 334th S&S Co to the 525th QM Co. This depot provided wholesale package product support to Chu Lai, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai until Class III mission at those locations was transferred to RVNAF. This depot continues to provide propane for all US activities in MRI and direct support for package products to US activities, less advisor personnel, throughout MRI.

d. Since the beginning of Shell contractor fuel deliveries in late June 1971, the quantities of fuel line-hauled by contractor outside the Da Nang area continued to increase through 30 November 1971 when transfers of MRI petroleum facilities to RVNAF began to reduce overall US fuel requirements throughout the Military Region. Contractor truck deliveries reached their peak in September 1971 when a high of 1,857,041 gallons of fuel were delivered. Contractor line-haul was found to be a very reliable means of delivery thus allowing for the reduction of military linehauls.

e. Use of the Vietnamese National Railroad to haul bulk fuel railcars to Phu Bai from the Shell terminal in Da Nang began in early July 1971 reaching a high of 1,160,849 gallons shipped in September 1971. While the rail lines were disrupted on several occasions by enemy activity, the length of the disruptions seldom exceeded 48 hours, and, therefore, had little effect on fuel movement.
f. Repair of the China Beach mooring facility in Da Nang began early in August 1971 and, due to several difficulties which included non-availability of repair materials and Typhoon hyster, was not completed until 12 January 1972. This left the Da Nang area with only one operational mooring throughout most of the 1971-1972 northeast monsoon season.

g. The period from 1 November 1971 to February 1972 was characterized by the turn-over of most KRI petroleum facilities to RVNAF. The petroleum terminal at Quang Tri was transferred on 9 November 1971. On 27 November 1971, the bulk petroleum terminals at Chu Lai were transferred to RVNAF. This transfer involved 8.5 million gallons of storage and 4.5 million gallons of fuel. The petroleum terminal at Tan My Island was turned over on 1 February 1972. Significant in this transfer was the US construction of a barge/coaster off-loading facility at the quay wall in Tan My Port. The US operated a monobuoy tanker discharge system on the South China Sea but, due to the lack of repair capability and the cost of operation, RVNAF declined the transfer and use of the monobuoy. The Phu Bai Class III facilities were transferred to RVNAF on 2 February 1972. Certain packaged petroleum products and drummed fuels were also transferred at Phu Bai.

h. As of 2 February 1972, only the Da Nang Petroleum Terminal Complex remained under US operational control. The 525th Quartermaster Company (Depot) is the unit assigned the terminal operating mission. The unit was under the direct operational control of this headquarters until the transfer of the Office of the Director of Petroleum from this headquarters to Headquarters, 277th Supply and Service Battalion on 6 February 1972. In December 1971, this command recommended that operation of the Da Nang FOL Terminal Complex be turned over to a contractor. This recommendation was initially supported by both USARV and MACV; however, due to the uncertainty of the US Air Force presence at Da Nang Air Base, it was decided in February 1972 to retain US Army operators for the terminal complex.

i. The Class III mission of the Da Nang Support Command was, until 6 February 1972, carried out under the staff supervision of the Director of Petroleum under the staff guidance of the ACoS Supply. On 6 February 1972, the petroleum staff function was transferred to a petroleum division created within the headquarters of the 277th Supply and Service Battalion. The petroleum distribution system in KRI has been extremely responsive and professionally operated. Maintenance and repair of sea discharge lines has continued to present problems. The US Navy, through ISSA, has provided maintenance necessary to keep the lines operational.
5. (U) **Field Services**

a. Three services were provided to troops in the field: laundry, graves registration/mortuary, and bath.

b. Laundry services were accomplished by four contract laundries located at Chu Lai, Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Hue, and four field laundries located at Phu Bai, Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Quang Tri.

c. The 625th Supply and Service Company field laundry supported LAM SON 719 operations from Quang Tri initially but, as the operation proceeded, transportation became critical. Thus one machine was moved to each forward support area to give localized support. They remained from 26 February 1971 until their return to Quang Tri 28 March 1971.

d. After LAM SON 719 troop withdrawals throughout MRI began. As a result field laundries were closed and contract laundries terminated until, at the present time, one contract laundry supports the Da Nang area and one contract laundry supports the Phu Bai/Hue area.

e. Laundry support throughout MRI was highly satisfactory, normally giving 1-day service in static situation.

f. Graves registration activities in MRI were performed by graves registration points in Chu Lai and Phu Bai to support Support Command and non-divisional units and the Da Nang Mortuary to support all of MRI. During LAM SON 719 the Phu Bai Graves Registration Point rendered support to the 15th Infantry Division, when requested. As phasedown occurred both graves registration points were terminated and the Da Nang Mortuary was closed on 29 February 1972. The sole remaining support for MRI is the newly activated graves registration point located in the old site of the US Army Depot, Da Nang main storage area.

g. Bath support was provided to troops in northern MRI on fire bases and other remote areas without sufficient bath facilities. If an adequate water supply was not available, water was brought to the bath site in 5000 gallon tankers. This service was terminated with the redeployment of the 101st Airborne Division.

h. All field services were performed in an outstanding manner. Those few complaints received were expeditiously resolved.
CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C
AMMUNITION

1. (U) Ammunition service in MR1 was provided through six permanent ammunition supply points (ASPs) located throughout the region. Small capacity temporary forward ASPs to support deep tactical penetrations were established as required. Under normal deployment conditions a single Ordnance ammunition battalion could have provided the necessary command and control of these ASPs, however due to the geographical expanse of MR1 and its attendant communication difficulties I found it necessary to assign the separate Ordnance companies to local support battalions for command and control less ammunition stock control. The stock control function was assigned to my ACOFS, Ammunition. This arrangement gave me strong command and control lines to the companies and provided greater responsiveness and flexibility in the management of stocks throughout the region.

2. (C) Large scale operations such as LAM SON 719 and 810 were initiated without the benefit of adequate logistical lead time. This placed a tremendous burden on the transportation system during the initial phase of the operation. During LAM SON 719 fifty-seven combat essential (CE) air resupply missions of more than 500 short tons of ammunition were required to maintain an uninterrupted flow of ammunition to the tactical units. Early termination of both LAM SON 719 and 810 left large quantities of ammunition in the forward ASP's and the transportation pipe line. When these stocks were moved into the local permanent ASPs, stockage levels skyrocketed beyond storage capacities. This condition persisted in some cases for several weeks until expenditures were able to bring the levels to within bounds.

3. (U) Project 981 shipments of ammunition for ARVN compressed US ammunition resupply shipments from a period of 90 days to less than 45 days during October and November 1971. This accelerated receipt of ammunition coupled with the rapidly decreasing expenditure rates would have caused our stockage levels to far exceed our storage capacities throughout this region. Large transfers of assets to ARVN at sea, diversion of ammunition ships and adverse weather conditions in the Da Nang harbor reduced the rate of receipt to an acceptable level during the period.

4. (C) Vietnamization of ammunition service in MR1 was begun in concert with the withdrawal of US Forces. ARVN did not plan to use our facilities at Duc Pho, Camp Evans or Da Nang; therefore, these facilities were closed out and the ASPs at Quang Tri, Chu Lai and Phu Bai were transferred to ARVN on the dates mutually agreed to. The ASP at Duc Pho was closed in June 1971. The ASP at Quang Tri was transferred to ARVN on 25 July 1971. This was strictly a real estate transfer. The Chu Lai ASP was transferred to ARVN on 2 November 1971 with over 4,500 short tons of ammunition on the ground. Because of the high stockage posture of my remaining ASPs, every round of ammunition that could be transferred at Chu Lai was. In the end, I found it necessary to ship 4,000 short tons of non-common and non-transferable stock from Chu Lai to other ASPs in the region. Camp Evans ASP was closed on 15 December 1971.

23
3. (C) The transfer of the Phu Bai ASP on 1 January 1972 was the most significant. With the ASP and its more than 8,000 short tons of ammunition ARVN also accepted the responsibility of supporting all US Forces in northern Military Region 1. This included two brigades of the 101st Division. This was the first time a sizeable US Tactical Force in contact with the enemy received their total ammunition support from a foreign nation. The totally successful ammunition support provided by ARVN in the North allowed me to accelerate Vietnamization of ammo support in the Da Nang Area from 1 April to 25 February 1972, thus totally Vietnamizing ammunition support in MR1 five weeks ahead of the original target date.

6. (C) Closure of the Da Nang ASP required the movement of more than 13,000 short tons. We moved 7,500 short tons to ARVN's facilities in the Da Nang and Chu Lai. 1,000 short tons of required items were shipped to US installations at Cam Rahn Bay and Long Binh. We also shipped off-shore over 2,000 short tons of retrograde ammunition thus closing the first US ammunition facility in MR1 on 5 March 1972. The key to our success in the rapid closures and transfer operations was early comprehensive planning meetings with ARVN and timely publication of transfer and support agreements. I found the IALC commanders and staff officers both willing and capable of assuming the added responsibility of support residual US Forces in MR1.

7. (U) The retrograde of unserviceable, economically repairable, and excess non-common ammunition to off-shore facilities increased in importance and magnitude as our Vietnamization effort picked up in tempo. The lack of an organic ammunition renovation capability in MR1 greatly increased the complexity of preparing the ammunition for shipment. Retrograde boxes and pallets had to be constructed by an Engineer Detachment and the transported to the ASPs throughout the region before any substantial preparation could begin. Because soft wood was the only stock available in adequate quantities to make the required number of boxes and pallets, a significant amount of rework had to be accomplished on locally packaged retrograde ammunition after it was in the transportation pipeline. Soft wood containers are not strong enough to handle the weights normally associated with ammunition.

8. (U) Military quarantine requirements made it mandatory that all retrograde ammunition be washed and certified at dockside. Although the washing could be accomplished without any special equipment other than a good water pump, it did consume a large amount of man hours, and it required a considerable amount of valuable staging area at the port.

24

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (U) On 27 November 1970, the command's maintenance assets consisted of eight companies providing direct support and two companies providing general support.

   a. In Quang Tri Province, the 63d Maintenance Battalion, consisting of the 63d IMS Company, 528th Light Maintenance Company, 178th Light Maintenance Company and 555th Maintenance Company provided direct support to three heavy SP artillery battalions and one air defense artillery (ADA) battalion of the 108th Artillery Group, one combat engineer battalion of the 45th Engineer Group with an attached tank company and other non-divisional units. This battalion also provided back up support to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

   b. In Thua Thien Province, containing Camp Evans, Camp Eagle and the Hue-Phu Bai-Tan My Port complex, the 2d Maintenance Battalion, with its 2d IMS Company, the 67th Light Maintenance Company and the 578th Light Equipment Maintenance (LEM) Company, provided DS maintenance services to all non-divisional elements including one heavy SP artillery battalion (Corps) and one combat engineer battalion, and back up support to the 801st Maintenance Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). The 578th LEM Company additionally provided general support maintenance for communications and electronic equipment, generators and refrigeration equipment for all Military Region I (MR-I).

   c. South of the Hai Van Pass the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company and 85th Light Maintenance Company in Da Nang provided general maintenance support to all of MR-I and area DS support in the Da Nang area respectively. The 596th Light Maintenance Company under the 277th Supply and Service Battalion provided direct support in the Chu Lai area and back up support to the 725d Maintenance Battalion of the 23d Infantry Division (Mechanized).

   d. During January-March 1971 and the conduct of operation LAMSON 719, the 63d Maintenance Battalion at Quang Tri was the base support maintenance element and the primary source of supply for repair parts, temporary maintenance, augmentation (contact teams), maintenance float, and evacuation support. Direct support maintenance to US ground forces at FSA 26-2 (Khe Sanh) was provided by contact teams from the 178th Maintenance Company (Divisional Direct Support), the 63d Main Support Company, and the 43d Engineer Detachment. The 2d Maintenance Battalion's 67th Maintenance Company (Divisional Direct Support) and the 196th Engineer Detachment at FSA 26-1 (FSB Vandergrift) provided direct support maintenance to all US ground forces in the AO except units organic to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Two additional units were required to
2. (C) During LAMSON 719, the operational readiness rate of combat vehicles was maintained at a satisfactory level, sufficient to support requirements of tactical units. Failure of crews to keep dust and mud-clogged radiators and filters clean resulted in engine overheating and premature failure. There was a much higher usage rate on all engines than during normal operations. The same condition was prevalent on heavy construction and materiel handling equipment. There was little, if any, organizational preventive maintenance performed on any equipment. Vehicles were used until they merely gave out, and were then fair game as a source of parts, normally leaving a "basket case" to be repaired by direct support units.

a. As an alternative to the normal Class IX supply procedures which proved insufficiently responsive to inordinately high demands, a special system of pushing repair parts forward from depot to customers was developed and known as the "push package" system. Parts requirement of each critical item of equipment were developed in quantities computed to sustain end item densities throughout operation LAMSON 719. This technique assisted the normal Class IX system by prestaging required parts at forward areas and resulted in maintaining acceptable operationally ready rates for most critical equipment.

b. During LAMSON 719 the entire maintenance effort was applied toward combat service support of tactical elements. Repair parts stocks were depleted and maintenance backlogs rose to unacceptably high levels, requiring two to three months of hard-work for support units to recover. Immediately after LAMSON 719, large-scale redeployments and retrograde began. Maintenance units were severely taxed receiving retrograde equipment, SCRAM coding for Keystone units, and at the same time trying to construct a considerably increased demand history and reduce large work backlogs. The almost simultaneous outset of LAMSON 719 and the Keystone program was dictated by an amalgam of strategic, tactical, and logistics considerations, and there was no alternative open to the Support Command but to proceed with both. Tactical requirements held precedence over logistics, and a logistical buildup in the area to satisfy both requirements might have compromised the intent and scope of LAMSON 719. However, more comprehensive and coordinated prior planning at the highest levels might have reduced the impact of this dual occurrence on combat service support resources.
3. (U) By February 1971, experience had proven that military unit support maintenance on fork lifts was only marginally effective. Both commercial and rough terrain fork lifts required considerable maintenance effort. Downtime had been in excess of 20 percent, primarily as a result of repair parts. Furthermore, lack of qualified maintenance personnel compounded maintenance problems. On the job training was initiated to overcome this, but personnel turbulence severely dampened the effectiveness of the OJT program. In April 1971, Philco-Ford Corporation Fixed Field Maintenance was contracted to perform all MHI maintenance for the Da Nang area. The contractor had only a little more success with responsiveness of the supply system; however, the continuity of maintenance skilled personnel helped to alleviate the effects of the shortage of repair parts. Cannibalization efforts by the 633d CC&S Company continued to provide a limited source of repair parts, and more careful handling by qualified and experienced maintenance personnel increased the yield of serviceable components from this cannibalization effort. The contractor operated organizational maintenance facilities at Bridge Ramp and Depot in addition to the organizational and direct support level maintenance workshop at their main plant at China Beach Compound. The efforts of these contractor operated facilities brought the deadline rate down to below five percent by February 1972.

4. (U) In late spring of 1971, an extensive reorganization for maintenance support and reordering of mission priorities commenced as the Keystone program and redeployment of units received increased emphasis. In May 1971, the 578th Light Maintenance Company was detached from the 2d Maintenance Battalion and moved from Phu Bai to Da Nang, where it continued its limited GS level capabilities and mission for communications-electronics support. On 18 June 71, the 578th LMC Company, the 633d Collection, Classification and Salvage (CC&S) Company and the 156th HM Company were attached to the 92d Composite Service (CS) Battalion. On 21 June 71, the 85th Light Maintenance Company at Da Nang and the 528th Light Maintenance Company at Quang Tri exchanged unit designations. The redesignated 85th Maintenance Company at Quang Tri was stood down, while the 528th Light Maintenance Company, now in Da Nang, was given a local area support DS mission. On 28 June 71, the newly organized 92d CS Battalion was assigned the mission of Keystone processing, maintenance, and overall support for MR-1, and in July its attached 156th HM Company lost its GS maintenance mission and became purely a service unit operating the Single Item Processing Point (SIPP) for cleaning, classifying and processing of Keystone vehicles and large items for offshore shipment or other disposition.
5. (U) a. On 16 August 71, the 63d Maintenance Battalion Headquarters and its 63d IMS Company at Quang Tri moved to Da Nang to assume the mission of maintenance upgrade of equipment for transfer to ARVN pursuant to Project 981. The battalion's 178th Maintenance Company in Dong Ha moved to Quang Tri, was detached from the 63d Maintenance Battalion and resubordinated directly to HQ, 26th General Support Group to provide US maintenance support in the Quang Tri area. The 63d Maintenance Battalion HQ and IMS Company moved into Camp Adenir, Da Nang, and set up maintenance shops in the Da Nang Service Area, previously occupied by the 156th HDM Company. The 528th Light Maintenance Company and 578th LIM Company were resubordinated to the 63d Maintenance Battalion, leaving the 92d CS Battalion with no more than organic organizational maintenance capability. The entire DS-GS maintenance support capability in Da Nang was consequently concentrated in the 63d Maintenance Battalion attached to the 80th General Support Group. Two companies within the battalion, the 63d IMS Company and the 578th LLM Company, were dedicated principally to the mission of repairing equipment for Project 981 and transferring it to ARVN. The 528th Light Maintenance Company retained its US maintenance mission for the Da Nang area.

b. The duration and scope of the Project 981 maintenance program required the 63d Maintenance Battalion to set up production line operations to accomplish the mission of upgrading Keystone-generated equipment. This line system was in operation until March 1972. Experience gained from this method of operation indicates that TOE maintenance units are not suited for assembly line maintenance production over extended periods. This unit was assigned the mission of upgrading (repairing) several hundred vehicles and large numbers of heavy and light weapons for both ARVN and Depot stocks. The unit in its TOE configuration did not have sufficient quantities of personnel skills and tool sets to permit double shift, continuous line operations entailing complete repairs to large quantities of equipment. This was particularly true considering the high standards of repair required, and further considering extra duties normally associated with TOE units, such as guard and detail commitments. Units which are required to perform line-type maintenance operations should be organized under TDA, rather than TOE. TDA units could be tailored to meet task requirements, and augmented as necessary.

6. (U) During September 71, the Quang Tri Combat Base was reorganized as Forward Support Area 26-1 (FSA 26-1), and controlled directly by HQ, 26th General Support Group. Its role was to provide support for northern MR-1 with the 178th Maintenance Company as its sole maintenance resource. On 8 October 71 a mechanical maintenance platoon of this company was relocated to Camp Haskins in Da Nang and placed under operational control of the 528th Light Maintenance Company. Its purpose was to provide continuous contact team type direct support to the 57th Transportation Battalion, a critical, heavily committed line-haul unit.
7. (U) On 14 October 71, a dedicated staff section was organized in the headquarters to monitor upgrading and transfer of depot and Keystone equipment assets to ARVN. This section, named KEYLOC (Keystone Logistics Operations Center), drew upon ACofS Supply and ACofS Maintenance for staffing and support. It became the clearing house for all aspects of asset upgrading and transfers and provided a contact point and liaison function for all activities involved in this process. On 15-16 October 71 a maintenance planning conference at HQ, USARV, established the initial long-run maintenance upgrade program taskings for individual line items of equipment.

8. (U) Typhoon "Hester" caused extensive damage in southern and central MR-I on 23 and 24 October 71. Injuries and destruction were most acute in the Chu Lai area. Da Nang suffered extensive property damage but no serious injuries to US personnel. Maintenance areas and living quarters were damaged to the extent that normal operations could not be restored for several days. The 578th LBI Company was hardest hit in the Da Nang area and required ten days to resume mission activities.

9. (U) The Da Nang Support Command was tasked at the end of October 71 with providing backup DS maintenance support and full Class IX support to several newly formed ARVN units. For the most part, these were 175mm heavy artillery and M48A3 medium tank equipped battalions in northern MR-I, and DS support was provided by the 2d Maintenance Battalion at Phu Bai and FSA 26-1 at Quang Tri. These support requirements continued through 31 January 1972 and included extensive maintenance training and contact team work.

10. (U) On 30 October 71 the 178th Maintenance Company (-) was moved from Quang Tri (FSA 26-1) to Camp Baxter in Da Nang and attached to the 92d CS (Keystone) Battalion. It was used to augment the battalion's manpower pool needed for Keystone processing.

11. (U) At the end of October 71 the Quang Tri combat base was almost completely closed out. On 1 November this was completed and Forward Support Activity 26-1 at Quang Tri was inactivated. During this same time the Chu Lai Combat Base was being drawn down, and on 27 November the close out was completed and the 596th Light Maintenance Company stood down. This left requirements for support in Da Nang, Phu Bai, Camp Eagle and Camp Evans under the active supervision of Da Nang Support Command. The process of standdown was soon to delete all but a much reduced residual garrison at Phu Bai and the Support Base at Da Nang. The 277th S&S Battalion (-) from Chu Lai was transferred from the 80th General Support Group to 5th Transportation Command on 7 December to facilitate support continuity during further draw down, and by 21 December the Camp Evans combat base was completely closed out.
12. (U) Further revisions to the support structure were made during January as the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) continued redeployment. Task Force Northernmost (TFN) was activated on 11 January to coordinate all support requirements in northern MR-I (north of the Hai Van Pass), and on 17 January the 2d Maintenance Battalion less the already Keystoming 67th Maintenance Company was transferred to TFN from 26th General Support Group. That same day Camp Eagle Combat Base was closed. In southern MR-I the 92d Composite Service Battalion was transferred from Headquarters, USA SUPCOM-DNG, to the 5th Transportation Command on 15 January, and on 20 January the 63d Maintenance Battalion was transferred from 80th General Support Group to Headquarters, USA SUPCOM-DNG. The 80th General Support Group and the 26th General Support Group were inactivated on 27 and 30 January respectively, and requirements for US support of the ARVN 101st Artillery, 1st ADA (AW) Battalion, and 2nd Tank Squadron were terminated 31 January. Therefore the end of January saw TFN supporting a sparsely populated northern MR-I with the 2d Maintenance Battalion's IMS Company (-) providing maintenance support, and maintenance support of southern MR-I provided by 63d Maintenance Battalion under SUPCOM itself.

13. (U) The month of February 72 brought further reduction and consolidation of support functions in MR-I. On 1 February the Da Nang S&S Battalion (Provisional) was inactivated, and its mission and assets reassigned to HQ, 277th S&S Battalion. In the north, a detachment sized portion of 2d Maintenance Battalion's IMS Company was transferred from that unit and designated the Northernmost Support Detachment directly under TFN. The remainder of the Battalion was transferred to the 5th Transportation Command, and moved from Phu Bai to Da Nang for completion of standdown, which was completed on 1 March. On 15 February the COMDEL maintenance mission of the 578th Maintenance Company was transferred from 63d Maintenance Battalion to the 277th S&S Battalion, and the 63d Maintenance Battalion, consisting of 63d Headquarters and Main Support Company and the 578th Maintenance Company, began the standdown process. This was completed 31 March, leaving the 528th Maintenance Company the sole non-divisional DS maintenance unit in MR-I.

14. (U) The Project 981 Maintenance program continued as scheduled until 1 January 72, when a revised tasking for the next six months was transmitted by Headquarters USARV. The 63d Headquarters and Main Support Company, tasked with this maintenance mission, continued production at full capacity and soon had completed most of the revised program. During the period 7 February through 7 March the 981 program for MR-I was prematurely phased out. On 1 March USARV terminated the Project 981 maintenance program in Da Nang.
15. (b) Between 15 and 28 February a concept was generated and defined for the Philco-Ford Corporation Industrial Repair and Retrofit in Da Nang to take over direct support maintenance functions for HR-1 from the 528th Maintenance Company and Transportation Motor Pool functions from the USASUPCON-DNG TMP. This concept, written into purchase request and commitment format, was delivered to USARV by the Philco-Ford Contracting Officer Representative.

16. (U) Between 10 February and 1 April 72, commodity maintenance staff functions of ACofS Maintenance were phased into S-4, 5th Transportation Command. The Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team was the first to be transferred, followed shortly by the Engineer Maintenance Officer. Automotive, COM-ILL fjid Armament maintenance functions were transferred in March, with the Contracting Officer Representative for Philco-Ford transferred last. This was accomplished to provide staff continuity for maintenance functions, and close coordination was effected between S-4, 5th Transportation Command, and the remainder of the ACofS Maintenance staff to insure smooth transition of staff responsibility to 5th Transportation Command upon standdown of the Support Command Headquarters.

17. (C) Throughout the eighteen months encompassed by this report, several problem areas achieved positions of preeminence and were constantly worrisome. These warrant special mention and elaboration because for the most part they were never satisfactorily alleviated or corrected.

a. The primary problem with maintenance in Military Region I was extremely poor organizational maintenance management, or complete lack of it. The psychological aspects of operation in a largely retrograde environment impacted severely on overall effectiveness of organizational maintenance. Many units and commands allowed organizational maintenance to slip completely, as they had adopted the attitude that, regardless of unit efforts, equipment would be ultimately turned in, and performance of organizational maintenance was an unwanted bother. In most cases only maintenance sufficient to keep equipment running was performed, with preventive maintenance completely disregarded. A high density of unauthorized "convenience" vehicles devoured PLLs and ASLs to the detriment of the overall fleet. In further retrograde situations the importance of proper organizational maintenance must be stressed and stringently supervised at all levels.
b. In a fluid, retrograde environment, maintenance units were not always aware of whom they were supporting or of equipment density. In several cases DSU's supported in excess of 100 separate units. Some they contacted frequently, others hardly at all. When a supported unit was seldom in contact and moved or gained equipment, unless the DSU was made aware of such changes it could not provide proper support, especially with respect to on-site maintenance. A workable policy should be instituted and enforced requiring notification from supported units of any changes in attachment, mission, location, or equipment density. This policy would enable DSUs to maintain current information necessary to render the most effective support possible.

c. The Water Blaster, used to clean equipment to Dept. of Agriculture decontamination standards, was an item critical to the retrograde mission. The 1500 GPM Pump was used to supply water to the Pre-wash Points at the Single Items Processing Point (SIPP), and was likewise critical. Both these items had high non-operational rates. These high deadlines were caused in part by the fact that these items were non-standard, therefore difficult to support. Organizational maintenance procedures had to be developed in-country for both these items, and because of the urgency of the critical mission they served, they were utilized far in excess of their design capabilities, allowing little time to perform these organizational maintenance requirements. Non-standard diesel engines were replaced by military standard gasoline engines on older units, partially solving the difficulty of maintaining the Water Blaster, however the pump problem was never really solved. These pumps were obtained from DoD, and repaired through cut-and-try methods and cannibalization acquisition of repair parts. Local Nationals were eventually hired to operate the water blasters, releasing military personnel to concentrate on the performance of maintenance under intensive staff supervision. This action further reduced the water blaster deadline rate. From study of the Keystone cleaning process, it was concluded that this mission was well suited for contractor operation. In the immediate future, a contract should be let for this type of operation. This arrangement would be more advantageous to the US Government in terms of manpower commitment and cost.

d. There were numerous accidents involving the M107 175mm SP Gun. A few of these were obvious ammunition failures, but several others indicated possible design fault in the equipment itself. Thorough on-site investigation of these accidents was very difficult, as dependable information was rarely available. Units did not leave the accident scene untouched, and personnel interviews were answered with uncertainty. However, indications are that the M107 carriage, mount and recoil mechanism lack sufficient strength to adequately absorb the repeated thrust of sustained Zone 3 firing. The M107 had a higher incidence of automotive chassis difficulties than did the M110 8-inch Howitzer. Observers and crew personnel offered the opinion that during sustained Zone 3 firing considerable tube whip was noticed after each firing. This tended to support a hypothesis that sustained Zone 3 firings set up over-design nodal vibration
patterns in the gun tube possible resulting in tube failure. Thorough technical evaluations should be initiated by WJCOM and MUSCOM as a joint project. Carriage, mount and recoil system design should be re-evaluated for adequacy for use in emergency combat environments requiring sustained long range (Zone 3) firing. These evaluations should be based on technical test results for general application, rather than fault finding on the basis of individual accidents or specific situations.

e. The problem of Local National civilian interference with road travel in Vietnam was frequent and widespread. Road-closures caused by civilian disturbances often resulted from the slightest incident, whether US personnel were at fault or not. In several areas, such closures were clearly an extortion technique, precipitated by accidental injuries or fatalities to civilians. When these road closures occurred, supported units could not reach their DSU's for assistance, and maintenance units could not provide contact teams other than by air. Similarly, repair parts could not be supplied by air, and retrograde transportation was halted entirely. Generally the local constabulary were of little assistance in curtailing such vigilante tactics, except to prevent serious injury to US personnel. Allowing Local National civilians to continue such interference unchecked hindered efforts in both active logistical support of combat units, and retrograde of US materiel from Vietnamese soil.

18. (U) A concept was generated in late February 72 to expand the Philco-Ford Fixed Field Maintenance (FFM) contract to provide all direct support maintenance services for Military Region I. This contractor had demonstrated the capability, responsibility and motivation to provide outstanding support for all commercial vehicles and forklifts in MR-1. This direct support maintenance mission requirement of the 528th Maintenance Company, then tasked with responsibility for all DS maintenance for MR-1 were compared with the FFM's present and potential capabilities and capacities, and it was determined that FFM could easily accept phased transfer of the 528th Maintenance Company mission over a 45-day period. Personnel trained in DS areas which FFM did not at least support at that time, were readily available to them, and the only facilities improvement necessary was addition of a storage building for the expanded technical supply section. It was further envisioned that Philco-Ford should take over the operations of the adjacent TMP, for which they had already been performing all maintenance. Philco-Ford assumption of these missions would eliminate the requirement for the 528th Maintenance Company, a TOE unit, to be retained in the residual force, thereby facilitating drawdown of US Military forces in MR-1. Further, a responsible contractor would perform the maintenance mission more effectively and economically than any comparably US Military unit could, and provide much needed continuity
in this support function. Finally, a contractor, since he hires local nationals to work on the equipment, is well suited to train the Vietnamese people in the skills valuable to the enhancement of their country's technical development and industrialization.
ANNEX E
TRANSPORTATION

1. The success or failure of any support command is completely dependent on the transportation capability available to the commander. The organic units must be sufficient in number and their assets must be expertly managed. Common user airlift and sealift provided must be responsive to the needs of the Support Command to properly render the services and move the supplies required by our combat units. The easiest and most direct road to failure is to give insufficient emphasis to traffic management and transportation requirements. Management of the various modes is a challenge in the normal combat environment, but when involved in a tightly scheduled drawdown while still maintaining a combat support posture the coordination required to move units and equipment by air, land, and sea becomes phenomenal. The requirement to properly plan and schedule cannot be overemphasized nor can the requirement for a back-up plan of action be underestimated. Sound transportation planning with the necessary control and flexibility to make drastic changes during execution is vital to accomplishment of the transportation mission. The successful accomplishment of my mission in MR1 was in large part due to the efforts and attitudes of my transportation units and managers.

2. When I arrived in the command, my transportation assets consisted of the 39th Transportation Battalion (Truck) at Phu Bai, the 57th Transportation Battalion (Truck) at Da Nang and the 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) at Da Nang. These units had the mission of providing surface transportation support to all units in MR1. These organic units and their assets were managed and committed by a Movement Control Center in the office of my Assistant Chief of Staff for Transportation with field offices located at Phu Bai, Quang Tri, and Chu Lai. These offices coordinated with TMA offices who supplemented our assets with common user air and water craft. The system worked well and the support mission was accomplished, but support being rendered was not as responsive or as efficient as I desired. Therefore in a letter to USARV in December 1970 I requested additional truck assets and a command and control element to better manage the highway system.

3. In January 1971 planning commenced to support Operation LAM SON 719 and as I had foreseen during the month of December insufficient transportation assets were on hand to meet anticipated requirements. My staff set to work identifying weak areas and the following actions were taken: the 8th Transportation Group was reassigned from Qui Nhon, one hundred stake and platform trailers were obtained from the 2nd Logistical Command USATSA Fleet and pressed into service in northern MR1. These trailers plus replacement vehicles and additional provisional truck units placed us in a good posture to meet the highway requirements. As the operation progressed the support by highway was enhanced by thru putting RO/RO trailers from the port to the user in the field. The speed with which the large number of USATSA trailers were pumped into the system led to a problem in inventory control and it was several months before the majority were rounded up and returned to owning units.

a. The logistical air support requirement for LAM SON 719 necessitated positioning twelve C-130 aircraft at Da Nang Air Force Base. These assets
were locally controlled and contributed significantly to the overall success of the transportation operation.

b. The important part that the 5th Trans Comd's shallow draft fleet played in the operation cannot be over emphasized. Their LCMs, YFUs, and LSTs made possible the delivery of bulk and heavy items through the ports of Tan My and Dong Ha for onward movement to Quang Tri. Once again the key was local operational control of the vessels.

c. The major factor leading to success of transportation operations during LAM SGN 719 was the responsiveness of local assets. Operational control of the truck, air and water assets by local commanders and staffs gave us the added edge needed to successfully support the operation.

4. In March as LAM SGN 719 phased down my efforts were concentrated on getting supply levels back to normal and relocating my transportation units back to their home bases where maintenance efforts could be increased and equipment be put in top notch condition. In April and May these goals were reached and the units were back in their normal support postures.

5. June brought the challenge of Keystoneing the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Quang Tri. Extensive planning was nearly completed when word was received that their heavy vehicles would not be allowed through Hue or over the Perfume River Bridge. I surveyed the transportation routes and decided to set up a ferry service on the Perfume River between sites identified as Hue Ramp and Cornfield Ramp. YFUs and LCMs were used to move heavy equipment down the river to Tan My Port; light equipment was ferried across the river and off loaded to road march to Tan My. This operation proved very successful and the entire unit was moved without incident. However, the disadvantage of this type movement was the delay encountered by the river crossings. The ferry service was limited to daylight hours and could not commence until the Perfume River had been swept for mines each morning by the Vietnamese Navy Patrol boats.

6. Throughout July and August the shallow draft fleet was fully committed and the weather was perfect except for several days when an out of season tropical storm disrupted harbor and coastal operations. This storm indicated what could be expected in the forthcoming monsoon season.

7. During the next few months planning continued for the phase down of units and support of the redeployment of the major combat and combat support units in MR1. Transportation problems foreseen in the smooth withdrawal of these units included the probable curtailments of YFU and LCM shipping by monsoon weather conditions, and the continuing threat of civil confrontation resulting from highway accidents. Therefore, I decided to eliminate all but the most essential highway traffic, to make maximum use of my rail assets, and to increase intracoastal shipping. Highway traffic was limited to vehicles hauling perishable Class I cargo that could not be delayed, and this traffic moved in strictly controlled convoys. A number of LSTs were dedicated to MR1 for shuttle service between Chu Lai and Da Nang, and the US Army
Vessel LT Col John U.D. Page was assigned to the USASürc®f, ENG. This vessel was a major contribution to the successful redeployment of the 23rd Infantry Division from Chu Lai, and was in constant service in later redeployment and resupply efforts.

8. During September plans were completed for the merger of my Movement Control Center with the Traffic Movement Agency Office. I was a bit hesitant to relinquish control of my organic transportation assets during a critical period when a decrease in the response time could seriously affect my mission. However, on 1 October the merger took place without loss of efficiency. Movement of the 23rd Division out of Chu Lai progressed smoothly in spite of Typhoon Hester in mid-October and continuing monsoon weather. The Page operated between Chu Lai and Da Nang at a much faster rate and hauled more cargo than anticipated. As the movement of the 23rd Division neared completion, plans for turning over the port area to ARVN were completed and the turnover took place on 27 November 1971 without incident.

9. Upon completion of the movement of the 23rd Division my efforts were then diverted to the north to move the 101st Airborne Division. Once again every effort was made to reduce highway traffic by maximum use of rail and water, however, severe weather conditions restricted shipping and some units had to move by highway. The move was nearly completed by 1 February 1972 and the Tan My Port Facility was turned over to ARVN at that time.

10. With the withdrawal of troops well underway the requirement for organic transportation greatly decreased and I started phasing out my transportation units. In December 1971 and January 1972 my shallow draft fleet was put on limited operation and vessels were prepared for turn in. Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining disposition instructions for US Navy craft on loan to the Army but these instructions were finally received. Initially the YFUs were to be towed to Guam for turnover to the Navy, a long term operation. I was anxious to get these vessels turned in, so a test was conducted at Da Nang to see if the YFUs could be safely loaded and moved aboard the C-4 cargo vessel Trans Colorado using its twin 120-ton booms. The test proved successful and the Trans Colorado was dedicated to move the eleven YFUs to Guam. Four sets of special lifting slings were flown in from CONUS and the Trans Colorado was able to move four YFUs per trip.

11. By the end of February 1972 the requirement for the John U.D. Page had diminished and on 29 February the vessel departed for Okinawa from Da Nang with a load of retrograde. The vessel discharged at Okinawa and then proceeded to Subic Bay for overhaul and subsequent reassignment. The Page played a major part in meeting the Keystone and retrograde schedules in MR1 and I strongly recommend that vessels of this type be made available to Logistical Commanders in any area where intracoastal water routes can be utilized.

12. As I continued to phase down my transportation units, the requirement to supplement my military trucks with commercial trucks was realized. Tender of Service agreements were signed with seven trucking firms and those firms played a major role in the phasing out of the depot and meeting the daily local drayage and port clearance requirements. This was a major step in
ARVNizing the transportation system and the keen competition insured competent service at reasonable rates. It has been a quick learning process for the Vietnamese truckers and several companies are already breaking away from third country brokers and parent companies to set up and deal directly with the US Army.

13. With the turnover of the Da Nang Bridge Ramp in March 1972, the use of commercial trucks and contractor operated watercraft the phase down of transportation units is nearly completed. When the Da Nang Deep Water Port is turned over to the Civil Port Authority in May or June 1972, all major transportation units will have been ARVNized.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1. (U) One of the most important missions of the command has been that associated with retrograde of serviceable and unserviceable matériel and the disposal or sale of usable property and scrap metal. To provide the requisite emphasis on the important aspects of the command's mission, I assigned staff responsibilities for both areas to my Assistant Chief of Staff for Retrograde and Disposal.

2. (U) PROPERTY DISPOSAL

   a. In MRL, the support command was responsible for operating property disposal yards for the receipt, segregation, storage, sale or disposal of all excess property of US origin generated in the area. The Property Disposal Yards were operated at Chu Lai, Da Nang, and Phu Bai. A Property Disposal Company gave manpower and equipment support to the PDO yards in MRL. A field grade officer was placed as the Property Disposal Officer. Subsequently, he was replaced by a Department of the Army civilian during the civilianization of the Property Disposal Holding Activity, Da Nang. Under this program, all military personnel are being replaced by DACs and Local Nationals. Ultimate goal will be a complete civilianization of the PDUA and transferring its operational control to the US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam.

   b. Due to the drawdown of US Army units in MRL, the Chu Lai and Phu Bai yards were closed down and have been sold to, or in the process of being sold to, contractors. Both, the Chu Lai and Phu Bai areas were screened for additional accumulation of scrap metal. Those accumulations found, were identified and sold to contractors. In coordination with the Installation Engineers of the 23d Inf Div (Americal) and the 101st Abn Div (Airmobile), installations were screened for items to be abandoned in place and proper investigations were accomplished to insure that such acts were of benefit to the US Government. In addition, a satellite yard was temporarily instituted at Tan My Port in order to economize in the transportation of PDO items to other yards. Recoverable items were removed and retrograded. The remainder was sold in place to contractors.

3. (C) RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

   a. The Retrograde program was one of extreme importance to the command. The timely recovery of repairables and battlefield losses had profound impact upon the supply system, the maintenance system, and the property disposal operations. Through the Close Loop Support Program, unserviceable critical items were shipped to their off-shore/in-country rebuild facilities. This program was intensely managed to insure the timely return of serviceable items to the field. Whenever possible, a direct exchange system was established in the field for CLS program items. In addition to
the Retrograde of unserviceable items, the command undertook the task of processing the equipment of standdown units through the Keystone project. It was in the processing of Keystone equipment where the command met its greatest challenge in the area of retrograde.

b. The Collection, Classification and Salvage Company was tasked with the processing of unserviceable, economically repairable items to be shipped to the appropriate repair facility. The CC&S Co has been operated separately from the depot, a practice utilized by other support commands. A constant problem which has required inordinate command emphasis has been the return of unserviceable items properly preserved. Proper documentation not arriving with the retrograde item from outlying areas was another concern for the command.

c. During LAM'SON 719 the normal retrograding of materiel from northern MR was stopped in order to get greater utilization of shipping for moving supplies and equipment forward. The loss of time in backloading the retrograde materiel and then unloading at Da Nang could not be tolerated. As logistical requirements lessened and shipping could be held for backloading, the embargo on retrograde was lifted and materiel was shipped to the CC&S activity for processing.

d. All unserviceable retrograde items from Quang Tri, Phu Bai and Chu Lai combat bases were evacuated to the Da Nang area for retrograde processing or PDO. The task of processing unserviceable items included the cleaning of equipment to meet the standards of the US Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Service. The cleaning was accomplished through water blasting stations manned by US Army personnel. As we entered the 1972 calendar year, the task of processing unserviceable major items was transferred to the Multiple Items Processing Point and the Single Item Processing Point operated by the Keystone Battalion. This was accomplished due to the increased manpower reductions and standdown schedule imposed by HQ, USARV. The Keystone project came to full swing during the fiscal year 1972. Equipment of standdown units was processed through the Keystone Bn MIPP/SIPP sites. As in the case of unserviceable retrograde, materiel was required to meet the quarantine standards of the US Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Service.

e. Beginning in the latter part of the fiscal year, LN labor was used in increasing numbers in order to release US Army personnel to other more technical facets in the processing operation. During the present fiscal year, this command processed the 1/5 Mechanized Infantry, the 23rd Inf Div (Aerical) and the 101st Abn Div (Airmobile) in addition to their supporting units thru the Keystone project.

f. In the area of serviceable excesses, the command has retrograded all Depot assets in excess of the needs of the residual units. The move required close coordination with HQ, USARV, US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam, and shipping authorities. Processing of supply classes II, IV and IX were mostly accomplished under contract in a very satisfactory manner. All serviceable assets were redistributed against the needs in USARV commands, other Pacific commands, and CONUS.
1. (U) I have mixed emotions concerning the engineer effort in support of my command. On the brighter side, once a project was approved and necessary materials were available the engineer effort could move very swiftly. An excellent example of this was the phase IV change to the Keystone facilities, (USARV Project 1362). USA Engineer Command Vietnam (USAECV) major troop HQ in MRL, the 45th Engr Gp tasked their only construction battalion (84th Engr) to accomplish vertical construction at two locations and horizontal work at five sites. What had been estimated as two weeks effort was completed in one week during November 1971.

2. (U) The best example of the other side of the picture is illustrated in the R&U area. Necessary phase down policies such a "Make do" or "Do Without" for new work spilled into the R&U area. No major upgrading and in some cases not even essential maintenance was accomplished in numerous base contonement areas. This had its toll on troop morale and became a source of individual Congressional interest. In the future I recommend a progressive program to improve living conditions in the base areas as these areas become more secure.

3. (C) I discussed in my after action report on LAM SON 719, that the initial limited distribution (LIMDIS) policy for release of information caused a lack of early planning by my SUPCOM Engineer. Engineer support for Forward Support Areas (FSA) at Vandergrift and Khe Sanh was tasked to the 45th Engr Gp by the XXIV Corps OPLAN. The support to be rendered included the construction of minimum essential operational and logistical facilities. The magnitude and urgency of the tasks assigned to the 45th Gp were under-estimated in view of the weather prevalent in the TAOR and the time-phasing for completion. Highway QL-9 and the assault airfield required such heavy engineer effort that the mission of construction operational and logistics facilities was given only token effort at Vandergrift and no effort at Khe Sanh. The thinly spread tasked engineer support required a change in the concept of the operation. Dozers were taken from special designated assets and assigned to the FSA which built their own logistics facilities. This caused a diversion of logistical and supervisory effort and decreased the speed at which the FSA at Vandergrift was organized and made operational. The importance of engineer support for such extensive operation must be stressed during early planning stages. The security classification assigned need-to-know information must be taken into account.

4. (U) A valuable lesson was learned in the aftermath of Typhoon Hester's devastating blow in late October 1971. Hester was reported to be the worst tropical storm on record in this northern area of Vietnam. Gale forces ranging from 60 to 100-plus miles per hour and heavy rainfall caused untold damage to our pitiful, already weatherworn, temporary wooden SEA HUTS. These comprised our primary troop living billets. Yet other community facilities
and considerable personnel property suffered the same fate. Only through exhaustive self-help efforts by all personnel in every unit were we able to recover in a minimum number of days. Critical building materials were controlled by XXIV Corps and issued by Installation Engineer Da Nang and USA Depot DNG against a system of priorities. These priorities were jointly established by my engineer and the engineers' staffs at XXIV Corps and Northern District Engineer. The most critical item was sheet metal. The majority of our roof construction consisted of sheet metal and we found those roofs that were not sandbagged were of course the ones with the most damage.

5. (U) As the Vietnamization program progressed, a critical area in which my engineer staff became involved was transfer of bases and/or facilities to ARVN and other GVN agencies. I was assigned to coordinate Sector III by XXIV Corps. This sector was bounded on the north by Monkey Mountain, on the south by Marble Mountain, on the east by the South China Sea and the west by the Song Han (River) and Bay. It also included the bridges spanning the Song Han connecting Da Nang East to Da Nang West. Also the Bridge Cargo (port) Facility on the west side and adjacent to the bridges was added to Sector III.

6. (U) Sector Coordination required almost daily contacts with: Installation Coordinators/Installation Commanders, XXIV Corps, G4, Real Estate Section; Philco-Ford Real Property Officer; Installation Engineer, DNG; Northern District Engineer; ARVN First Area Logistics Command (IALC) and less frequent contacts with Naval Support Facility, DNG, ARVN I Corps and the DNG Air Force Base. It is understandable with the multiplicity of agencies and organizations being dealt with that problems would surface in Sector Coordination. The fact that no major problems did arise I attribute to the tenacity of my Engineer. In order to further assist Installation Coordinators/Commanders in preparing their camps and areas for transfer I established an Inspection/Disposition Team. This team had the expertise to give on the spot disposition advice on the myriad items that were found during their surveys.
1. The importance of skilled personnel with whom to perform the mission cannot be overemphasized. I found in the Da Nang Support Command that the experience was in my Field Grade Officers. Even with a full complement of Field Grade Officers at Group and Battalion level, I found they had to devote an inordinate amount of time in personal supervision. The majority of young officers in the grade of Captain and Lieutenant lack the experience, empathy and leadership necessary to effectively command a supply or service company. Those who do lead and command do a magnificent job, often at the risk of their own lives.

2. All too often I have seen the pattern repeat itself. Where a company is commanded by a mediocre commander and a weak First Sergeant, the unit was rife with racial strife and drug abuse. Replace these personnel with strong leaders who follow the principles of leadership and insist upon discipline, and there will in all probability be one or more grenade incidents in the first four weeks directed against the commander and the First Sergeant. This form of insipid rebellion is distasteful and I feel a definite product of the American society today. A strong Army must have discipline and leadership.

3. The majority of young officers today are solely interested in serving their time and getting out as quickly as possible. It is unfortunate but they do not accept the challenge of leadership; rather they seek to avoid it or, often they ignore it, figuring that someone else will do it for them. Those who do accept the challenge, and are strong enough to survive the test will be magnificent commanders in the future. All too often, the young Lieutenant identifies himself with the troops and is more sympathetic toward them than he is to the needs of the service. Likewise, this creates a communication barrier between the young officer and the older enlisted men. This break-down of communications is, I believe, one of the more serious problems facing us today.

4. The incident of drug use by soldiers in my command was the result of various environmental and individual factors. As a result of a study conducted at the Drug Rehabilitation Center and a survey conducted by my Assistant Chief of Staff Personnel and Inspector General two factors emerged as being strongly influential in determining the rate of drug use throughout the command.

   a. The first factor which was uncovered by the study conducted in the Drug Rehabilitation Center found that significant number of drug users in the Support Command were generally weak individuals of low intelligence, poor family backgrounds, previous experience with drug and criminal activity and scholastic dropouts. Basically they are individuals who throughout their lives have rarely, if ever, demonstrated the ability to behave in a mature and responsible fashion. I feel that a support command gets a disproportionate share of this type soldier. This type of soldier is more easily assigned as a truck driver, ammunition handler or duty soldier.

   b. The second factor is that of drug availability. The survey conducted by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Inspector General, in
which some 15 company size units were visited, strongly indicated that
the ease with which soldiers can obtain drugs (heroin) can be correlated
with the rate of drug abuse throughout the command. When one consid-

ers that Support Command, Da Nang installations are interspersed among var-
ious civilian communities and that the majority of soldiers work on dif-
ferent compounds than they live on, control over the individual soldier's
personal actions is difficult. The combination of assigning soldiers
who have a history of underachievement and placing them into an environ-
ment with high drug availability is, I believe, the main reason for the
rate of drug abuse in my command.

5. An evaluation of the four phases of the USARV Drug Program, i.e.
Exemption, Enforcement, Elimination and Education, indicates Enforcement
and Elimination to be the most effective in combating drug abuse. While
the Exemption program enjoyed a modicum of success, it is doubtful that
any exemption program could contribute significantly to the reduction of
drug abuse since rehabilitation requires long periods of intensive coun-
seling and it asks the drug abuser to demonstrate that sort of determina-

tion and maturity which would have kept him off drugs in the first place.

6. The drug education program conducted throughout my command was directed
primarily at the non-user. The survey mentioned above showed that educa-
tional efforts directed toward the drug abuser in most cases is nonproduct-

ive. Our experience also shows that the degree of success attained as a
result of our educational efforts was not so much a function of interest
and enthusiasm on the part of the instructors as it was a function of their
recognized expertise and credibility.

7. The experiences here in Support Command, I feel, clearly demonstrates
that any successful drug abuse control program must place continued em-
phasis on reducing the availability of drugs and the prompt identification
and elimination of drug abusers.

8. I have experienced shortages in most of my Military Occupational
Specialty Codes and at the same time I have had to undertake missions,
peculiar to Vietnam, that did not fit into the MOS pattern of the US
Army. A prime example was the 92d Composite Service Battalion, whose
mission was the retrograde of material and equipment from RVN. The
uniqueness of this situation caused my Adjutant General and his personnel
to intensively manage the individual soldier, not for what he was trained
for, but more for the mission I had to accomplish. In the majority of
cases these young men realized the necessity of the mission and willingly
performed outside of their MOS in an outstanding manner. Thru their
efforts my command met and exceeded its retrograde goals month after month.

9. Beginning in December 1971, the first of the USARV-wide curtailments
came into effect. This initial curtailment was accepted and did very
little to disrupt my command. However, as the curtailments continued
and replacements dwindled to almost nothing, I was forced to request
mission essential retention of approximately 600 US Army Support Command,
Da Nang personnel.
10. Some of these personnel, because of their MOS, were retained until their original DEROS, but a large number were released prior to the requested retention date. These releases were possible because, as the mission became more definitive, the requirements were less than had been originally anticipated and also because contracts were approved which enable this Command to have many of its functions performed by civilians with only a few military supervisors. In any future action of this nature, where the retrograde function is so important. I strongly recommend that consideration be given to civilianizing the retrograde functions as soon as possible, freeing the soldier to do the job for which he was trained, being more productive for their own self-satisfaction and to the US Army.
1. (C) Combat Security of Troop Installations: Installation defense consisted of perimeter barrier wire in the form of tanglefoot, concertina and chainlink fence. In some instances, however, MACV Phase III type barriers were utilized. Flood lights, Tower Guards and Roving Guard Patrols supplemented perimeter security. Installation Reaction Forces were formed to counter any perimeter penetration by the enemy. Bunkers and Personnel Shelters were constructed for protection against possible rocket and mortar attacks. Unattended Ground Sensor devices were implanted on several Support Command Installations to enhance perimeter security. The first sensor unit was installed in March 1971. The value of the sensor program was at best, questionable. False activations were the greatest disadvantage. After several false alarms, the sensor devices were considered worthless by the monitoring security force. Consequently, future activations were disregarded. Aerial support for the night defense of the installations in the Da Nang Area was provided by the 11th Combat Aviation Group. Such support consisted of two Cobras and a Flare Ship. With the exception of the Flare Ship, the support provided by the Gunships was purely psychological. Since most Da Nang Installations were located in areas densely populated with VN Local Nationals, approval for utilization of available gunship support was highly improbable. To insure that the combat readiness of Da Nang Installations was maintained at the highest level, each installation was required to conduct practice red alerts at least once a month. Additionally, monthly practice red alerts were conducted for all Da Nang East Installations. Such alerts were initiated by HQ, Support Command and under the control and supervision of Support Command Tactical Operations Center. During these practice alerts the effectiveness of Installation Reaction Forces and perimeter defenses was evaluated.

2. (C) Support Command TOC: The TOC was established to control defense operations throughout the Support Command with coordination responsibility for the integrated defense of the Da Nang East Sector. The Support Command TOC exercised jurisdiction over US Installations and shared no responsibility for Local National Villages, ARVN Installations or lines of communication outside of US Installations. Support Command TOC reported to the 196th Infantry Brigade on all matters and all requests for assistance, i. e., gunship and artillery support were requested through the 196th Inf Bde. Constant communications were maintained with the 196th Inf Bde and Da Nang East Section Coordinators. Communication with the 196th Inf TOC was by FM secure radio. The secure net had four stations, 196th Inf (NCS), 45th Eng Gp, Da Nang Air Base and Support Command TOC. If the secure network malfunctioned, radio communication was established with the 196th Infantry Brigade on their internal security net. Communication with the Support Command Installations and Da Nang East Section Coordinators was by the Da Nang East Security Net which consisted of eight stations, 1/1 Cav, E Co 50th Inf, five Section Coordinators and SUPCOM TOC (NCS). Communication was maintained on a twenty-four hour basis. Alternate communication to all
installations was by commercial telephone and tactical telephone.

3. (C) Port Security: Initially Port Security at the Deep Water Pier and Bridge Ramp was deficient in several areas. Perimeter and pier lighting was inadequate. Measures to counter swimmer/sapper attempts were nonexistent. In order to upgrade the defensive posture of these port areas various security measures were implemented. Additional perimeter and pier lights were installed to provide maximum illumination to the port's sensitive areas. Ships remaining at port during the hours of darkness were required to utilize "drop lights". Guards were also employed to deter swimmer/sapper operations. These security measures must be assumed successful since no sapper attacks were launched against ships in the Da Nang Area. Furthermore, the satisfactory results received during the Naval Port/Harbor Defense and Security Inspection of the Da Nang Ports in January 1972 were indicative of the adequacy of port security posture.

4. (C) Harbor Defense: The VN Harbor Defense Unit, VNNAV, countered waterborne threats against US Installations bordering the Song Han River and Da Nang Harbor. Eleven VN Harbor Patrol Boats were utilized for this specific purpose. Requests for VNNAV support were directed to the USN First Coastal Zone Advisory Element. Communication between Support Command TOC and the First Coastal Zone was by FM radio utilizing a predesignated frequency and tri-monthly call sign. In the event of a possible waterborne threat, the First Coastal Zone TOC Watch Officer would coordinate with his VN counterpart, who subsequently would dispatch the Harbor Patrol Craft to the scene of enemy activity. Fortunately, Support Command was never required to utilize the VNNAV's resources.

5. (C) Convoy Security: Routes frequently travelled by convoys of Da Nang Support Command were classified Green and required minimum security measures. With the exception of normal combat operations, security on QMi was not required. However, those convoys travelling through the Hai Van Pass were afforded aerial observation coverage by light helicopter or fixed wing aircraft. With the reduction of available aircraft, aerial convoy support terminated in December 1971. Following this period, an FM Secure Communications between the Convoy Control Center, Province Senior Advisor and XXIV Corps TOC was established to support convoys travelling through the pass. To complete this link a mobile FM Retransmission site was installed at the top of the Hai Van Pass. This procedure greatly improved the communications between convoys and those units capable of providing combat support.

6. (C) Ammunition Supply Points: Support Command operated five ASPs until 21 August 1971, when ASP 101 at Quang Tri Combat Base closed. ASP 105 at Chu Lai Combat Base was turned over to ARVN on 31 October 1971. ASP 107, Da Nang, was turned over to the Local National Police on 3 March 1972. Enemy sappers were successful in blowing a portion of the stocks at ASP 101 on 22 June 1971. Previously, ASP security consisted of a perimeter fence, perimeter lights, perimeter guards and a few sentry dogs. The 22 June incident painfully emphasized the need for a revamping of ASP defenses. An in depth study was conducted to upgrade the defense posture of the ASPs.
was determined that in order to successfully defend the ammunition stocks against a trained sapper, the ASP defense must be organized to accomplish one of the following:

a. Prevent the sapper from gaining entrance to the ASP.

b. Detect and locate him if he does enter the ASP.

c. Deny him access to the target (ammunition).

Upon implementation of this type defense, the Support Command successfully defended against one firm sapper attack (one sapper was killed) and detected several possible intrusions. Lights, guards, sensors and sentry dogs were used extensively. Lights and guards were employed on the perimeter and storage pads. Dogs and sensors were used along the most likely avenues of approach.
1. The Support Command Provost Marshal with his small staff exercises staff supervision over internal or physical security within my command. Since a logistical command has numerous items of high market value the problems of theft and pilferage are great. Units devoted solely to security were found to be of value in a limited sense. Gate guards are faced with the problems of being intimately familiar with numerous directives pertaining to vehicle and personnel access. Therefore, it is essential that these personnel be permanently assigned to that duty only. However, to maintain the necessary responsiveness to command, the gate guards should be assigned to the commander having responsibility for the installation. The Da Nang Support Command was faced with a major problem in that subordinate units were located on numerous small compounds. Each compound had one or more gates which presented a potential outlet for stolen goods.

2. Two security companies were organized within Da Nang Support Command to provide the necessary security personnel. One company was fragmented between two activities. The activity commanders were given responsibility and control for the portion assigned to him. This system proved to be quite successful.

3. The second company was retained in the Da Nang area to provide local security for many installations in the Da Nang Area. The company also controlled all Local National guards hired by Support Command. Originally the company, under the operational control of the Provost Marshal, provided the gate guards for all installations. However, this proved to be undesirable in that the installation commander had no control over the gate guards at his installation. Accordingly, the size of the company was reduced and installation commanders were required to provide their own gate guards. The reduced security company continued to provide security personnel to those installations or activities which had no resident troops.

4. The Local National security guards proved to be of limited value. It is essential that they be used to augment U.S. security personnel rather than replace them. Without U.S. supervision the LN guards fell victim to threats and intimidation by the criminal element or worked in complicity with those stealing U.S. supplies.

5. In an effort to improve internal security and detect thievery, electronic detection devices were used at key gates on an experimental basis. The devices were supplied by the Land Warfare Laboratory. Their effectiveness proved to be negligible. Both devices, hand held search paddles and vertical walk-thru devices, would detect only ferrous metals. When the device alarmed, it was necessary to search the individual concerned, yet the sensitivity of the devices was such that the alarm would sound on completely innocent objects. Also many items subject to pilferage would pass undetected unless they were composed of a ferrous metal.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
6. The Land Warfare Laboratory also provided ultra-sonic Arms Room Security systems (AROSE) to protect selected high value or sensitive storage places. Three separate systems were installed. One system proved faulty and had to be removed. The other two devices proved to be effective and reliable. The system has been recommended by the Land Warfare Laboratory for addition to the Army inventory.

7. The Support Command Provost Marshal operated in close coordination with the Da Nang Provost Marshal who provided area military police support. The close coordination and liaison enable the commander to be well informed of current crime problems. A serious rash of motor vehicle thefts was finally controlled by stringent command controls over vehicle use and security. Close coordination and a mutual understanding of command and military police problems led to a satisfactory working relationship.
ANNEX K

COMPTROLLER

1. During my tenure, the Comptroller has been my principal advisor in the management and utilization of fiscal resources allocated to the command. Constraints imposed on the availability of Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds have required the application of sound programming and budgeting techniques. In this regard, the Comptroller has proven most useful in making timely recommendations to reallocate resources to support high priority missions, while maintaining expenditures within the limits established for the command.

2. Contractual support has been an invaluable asset to the command, and has accounted for over 90% of my command operating budget. Not only have economies been realized in some areas through contractor operation, but also troop redeployments have been facilitated through contractor augmentation and/or replacement. I have used a Contract Review Board as a primary management tool in monitoring contractor performance. This board has been convened monthly, and has made recommendations to me regarding the curtailment, expansion, or continuation of contract services. Almost $700,000 in savings have been realized thus far in Fiscal Year 1972.

3. The Comptroller has also been assigned operational control of the 64th Finance Section, and has been instrumental in recommending timely adjustments in finance service operations throughout Military Region 1. For example, a forward finance office was established at Quang Tri to provide close and continuous support to the U.S. Army Forces involved in supporting the ARVN incursion into Laos during LAM SON 719.

4. Finance service in Military Region 1 has undergone several modifications since the termination of LAM SON 719. Until February of this year, U.S. Army forces located north of the Hai Van Pass were serviced by a Class B finance office at Phu Bai, with the main office at Da Nang servicing all forces south of the Hai Van Pass. In February, however, it became apparent that individual finance records must be collocated with an audotin facility, in order that pay change authorization data be transmitted on a prompt, recurring schedule to the U.S. Army Finance Center. Moreover, the 64th Finance Section, as a designated USARV draw-down unit, had realized a 50% reduction in staffing since November of 1971. Therefore, in late February, I directed that the Phu Bai office be consolidated with the main office at Da Nang, and that a customer service team be provided to the smaller density of forces in the Phu Bai area on a 4 visit per month basis.

5. In retrospect, the introduction of the JUMPS Pay System in the fall of 1971, while successfully implemented, did create special problems during a period of increased personnel turbulence. Class A agents servicing isolated firebases experienced difficulties in returning unpaid treasury checks to the 64th Finance Section for processing back to the Finance Center. Time lags in the submission of unit morning reports caused checks to be entered in the wrong unit payroll, as well as late adjustments to individual pay and allowances. A noted increase in pay inquiries reflected a lack of under-
standing in reading the leave and earnings statement. However, locally-improvised programs and orientations have alleviated the situation to some extent, and commanders have placed considerable emphasis on insuring that their personnel receive prompt and accurate payment.

6. The Comptroller has maintained an active cost reduction program throughout my tenure. In Fiscal Year 1971, the command exceeded its goal by more than six times, and accounted for 63% of the total USARV submission. In Fiscal Year 1972, redeployments have increased the difficulty of generating cost reductions, however, the command has succeeded in attaining its annual goal of $2.9 million by December, with submissions exceeding $3.6 million. With the transfer of this program to the 5th Transportation Command, a final drive has been planned for the fourth quarter of this fiscal year.

7. In addition to finance service, the command has also provided technical assistance in the areas of automatic data processing support and Assistance-In-Kind funding for US Army Forces throughout Military Region 1. The Comptroller has served as the focal point for maintenance, repair, reports consolidation, and equipment retrograde for all data processing installations. Moreover, the control, budgeting, and disbursement of Assistance-In-Kind funds has provided U.S. Army Forces throughout the region with additional manpower resources for daily hire and the important Kit Carson Scout Program. In calendar year 1971, the total Assistance-in-Kind support disbursed throughout the region amounted to about $VN 531 million.

8. In summary, my Comptroller section has been staffed with the requisite mix of skills which have been effectively applied in assisting in the accomplishment of my mission. The Comptroller has provided me with an objective, responsive trouble-shooting flexibility to cope with the problems of financial support of operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. REPORT TITLE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer Debriefing Report (MG Arthur H. Sweeney) - Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Support Command, Da Nang - Inclusive Dates 27 November 70 - 10 April 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG Arthur H. Sweeney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8c. PROJECT NO.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA, DAFD, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>