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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (M) (11 Feb 71) - OT-UT - 710686
- 18 February 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 22 June to 21 December 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Col John L. Gerrity, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96378

AVHDO.DO

1 8 J an 1 9 7 1

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - Colonel John L. Gerrity

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by Colonel John L. Gerrity. The report covers the period June to December 1970, during which time Colonel Gerrity served as Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. Colonel Gerrity is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVLC-GO

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Commanding Officer
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVLC-GO
APO San Francisco 96257

Country: Republic of Vietnam
Debrief Report by: Colonel John L. Carrity
Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Inclusive Dates: Command - 22 June to 21 December 1970
This Report - 7 June to 7 December 1970
Date of Report: 10 December 1970

1. This report is rendered pursuant to Army Regulation 1-2e and United States Army Vietnam Regulation 1-3, both entitled "Senior Officer Debriefing Report". I have not followed the format outlined in these guides, feeling that if there is any substance in this report, I could best convey it as an accounting of what I considered to be significant. I have adopted as the starting date of my report, not the day I assumed command, but rather the day following termination of the report of the previous Regimental Commander, Colonel Benn A. Starr. This starting date will lend a degree of continuity and effectively cover the past operations of the Regiment, avoiding reporting gaps.

2. I have, whenever appropriate, included conclusions and recommendations. Many of these have been made before by previous commanders. However, they remain valid, and as denoted would have done much towards increasing the effectiveness of this Regiment.

   [Signature]

   JOHN L. CARRITY
   Colonel, Armor
   Commanding

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PART I SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Summary: During the period of this report, the Regiment conducted operations in Cambodia and moved to operational areas in the heart of MR3 where it participated in what is categorized as low-intensity counterinsurgency operations. At the same time, other factors were at work which impacted significantly on the areas requiring command attention and effort. A careful balance had to be struck among the competing demands of combat operations, resource conservation, maintenance, training, drug abuse and human relations. As the tempo of combat operations was reduced and replacements came increasingly through assignment of relatively short term troops from redeploying units, the latter areas assumed ever greater importance. In short, during the period the Regiment turned the corner away from concentrating on combat operations toward meeting a broad spectrum of equally important requirements. The trick was to make the turn without losing the spirit that marked the Regiment's greatness. Any success achieved in that endeavor reflects the leadership of the troop-level officers and non-commissioned officers who carried it off.

2. Conclusions and recommendations: It is recognized that many agencies would be involved in action on the recommendations to follow. This report does not attempt to specify those agencies, but leaves that to be done by the addressers in the course of review. Where additional personnel or equipment are needed specific recommendations will be submitted in consonance with the TADCO program.


      (1) ......... Doctrine for the employment of armored cavalry as set forth in current field manuals is basically sound. Further emphasis is needed concerning:

         (a) The role of armored cavalry in denying freedom of the battlefield to the enemy in counterinsurgency operations.

         (b) The use of screening operations to interdict the lines of communications essential to the functioning of the enemy's system.

      (2) ......... Doctrinal emphasis be placed on:

         (a) The overall role of armored cavalry in counterinsurgency operations.

         (b) Screening operations by armored cavalry in counterinsurgency operations.

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b. Combined Arms - The Employment of Armor and Infantry (Reference text: Para IV-5)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) There is a need for infantry to be employed with armored cavalry in counterinsurgency operations. Experience has shown that dependence on the infantry squad organic to cavalry platoons is not practical.

(b) Combined arms teams with armored cavalry and airmobile infantry as the maneuver elements, are the optimum task organization.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Review the concept of providing organic infantry in the armored cavalry regiment in the light of the experiences of this Regiment.

(b) Study organizational concepts to incorporate into the Regiment the capabilities found in task organizations including armored cavalry and airmobile infantry elements. Such a study should address the concept of providing air cavalry units to the armored cavalry regiment as well as the infantry structure of the air cavalry troop. (See d. (2) (b) and (c), below).

c. Improvement of Territorial Forces (Reference text: Para IV-6)

(1) Conclusions: The armored cavalry regiment can best improve the effectiveness of indigenous territorial forces through the conduct of combined operations.

(2) Recommendations: As additional doctrine is developed for the armored cavalry regiment in counterinsurgency operations, the use of combined operations with indigenous territorial forces should be stressed as a primary means of improving the effectiveness of those forces.

d. Air Cavalry Troop Operations (Reference text: Para IV-7)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) The Air Cavalry Troop is uniquely effective in finding the enemy in an environment of low-intensity counterinsurgency operations.

(b) At least one additional air cavalry troop could have been effectively employed by the Regiment throughout the period.

(c) When ground elements are not within quick reaction reinforcing range of the soro rifle platoon, an airmobile reaction force is necessary.
(d) Chemical warfare capabilities can effectively complement air cavalry operations.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) In future low-intensity counterinsurgency operations employ air cavalry forces to the maximum.

(b) Provide the armored cavalry regiment with at least two air cavalry troops.

(c) Consider the need for airmobile quick-reaction forces to support the zero rifle platoon. In this regard, consideration should be given to including additional infantry rifle strength in the air cavalry troop.

(d) Continue to develop chemical warfare capabilities to be employed in conjunction with air cavalry operations.

e. Combat Support Operations - Fire Support Operations (Reference text: Para IV-6a)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) The armored cavalry regiment has a valid requirement for an FSE in the Regimental IOC.

(b) The splitting of the howitzer batteries organic to the armored cavalry squadrons, necessary for covering large AO, introduces a significantly increased possibility of error and firing incidents.

(c) The MTOE for a battery must have sufficient personnel and equipment to operate two fire direction centers.

(d) Adequate ART fire coordination channels between the Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) at Province and the RF/RF units in the field do not exist.

(e) RF/RF units do not clear all mortar fires through the CFSCC before firing.

(f) Ammunition expenditures were reduced without sacrificing the overall effectiveness or security of the command.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Consider standardization of an FSE in TGL 7-512, Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop.

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(b) Consider modification of TOE 6-37G, Field Artillery Battery, to add the necessary personnel and equipment to operate the fire direction centers.

(c) Establish and maintain a communication link between the RF/PF units and the CFSCC at Province to coordinate and clear fires for units operating in the field.

(d) Exercise of efficient management of ammunition expenditures by intensive target evaluation and full use of all available firepower means be continued by commanders at all levels.

f. Combat Support Operations - Engineer Operations (Reference text: Para IV-8b)

   (1) Conclusions:

      (a) Fire support base construction should be thoroughly planned in advance and, when possible, basic construction completed before the FSB is occupied.

      (b) Traffic within the FSB must be controlled with separate track and wheel vehicle roads.

      (c) The greatest threat to an armored cavalry regiment operating in low-intensity counterinsurgency environment is the anti-vehicular land mine.

   (2) Recommendations:

      (a) Include in unit tactical SOP, procedures for both hasty and deliberate occupation of fire support bases. The SOP should include separate track and wheel road systems.

      (b) Place priority attention on the development and deployment of an effective mine detector for use against non-metallic as well as metallic mines.

      (c) Continue the emphasis on disseminating information on enemy mining techniques in the Republic of Vietnam.

   g. Combat Support Operations - Communications (Reference text: Para IV-8c)

   (1) Conclusions:

      (a) The FM radios used with antenna towers and mountaintop relays provided reliable and effective communications.
(b) There was limited need of AM Voice and Radio-Teletype equipment to communicate over extended distance.

(c) A signal support unit could have been effectively employed to enhance the regiment's communications and reduce the number of nets in Operation.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Review the amount of AM Voice and NIT equipment authorized the armored cavalry regiment with a view towards a substantial reduction when operating in this environment.

(b) Consider providing the armored cavalry regiment with a signal support unit to provide a communication center, expanded cryptographic maintenance, and multi-channel VIT links from the regiment to squadron.

b. Combat Support Operations - Civic Action and Psychological Operations
(Reference text: Para IV-8d)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) Civic action programs must continue to emphasize self-help by the Vietnamese with this principle being clearly established at the onset and followed throughout.

(b) The most effective PSYOP technique employed by the regiment was quick reaction broadcasts by Hoi Chans.

(c) Air support for PSYOPs missions is increasingly critical as US redeployment progresses.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Emphasize Vietnamese self-help in Civic Action Programs.

(b) Use Hoi Chans in quick-reaction PSYOP broadcasts as much as possible.

(c) Establish the machinery necessary for proper priority allocation of the declining available PSYOP air support.

1. Combat Support Operations - Intelligence Operations
(Reference text: Para IV-8a)

(1) Conclusions:
(a) Competent personnel with intelligence training are required for liaison with US and GVN units and agencies.

(b) Aerial photos, invaluable to company/troop commanders in supplementing map coverage, have been virtually impossible to obtain.

(c) Knowledge of the effectiveness of the sensor program and its limitations is lacking. Also, exchange of information/lessons learned on the unattended ground sensor (UGS) program has been minimal.

(d) A regimental sensor section must be added to the MTCE.

(e) The AH/FFS-5 is not rugged enough for armored cavalry operations. In addition, maintenance down time is excessive.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Examine the feasibility of establishing an intelligence liaison team organic to the MID and MIC in a counterinsurgency environment. This team's minimum strength should consist of one officer and four non-commissioned officers with interrogation MOS's.

(b) Evaluate the aerial photography system to determine the feasibility of providing ground commanders at company/troop level with up-to-date photography of his area of operations on a continuous, timely basis.

(c) Formalize and disseminate available sensor doctrine and lessons learned.

(d) Modify the armored cavalry regiment MTCE to include a UGS section.

(e) Develop the necessary modifications to increase the durability and ruggedness of the AH/FFS-5 radar. Repair capabilities for these radars must be improved to include contact teams for on-site repair.

J. Operations Security (Reference text: Para IV-C)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) The CIRCE wheel for coding numerical information (e.g., coordinates and frequencies) has significantly reduced COM&LC violations.

(b) Secure voice radio/telephone equipment has enabled the bulk of Regimental traffic (Regiment-Squadron) to be transmitted by this mode.
(c) Fixed operational patterns are among the greatest OPSEC weaknesses.

(d) Pre-operation preparations are also a significant source of OPSEC compromise.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Continue the use of the CIRCE wheel code.

(b) Continue programs to provide reliable secure voice equipment down to troop level and for aircraft.

(c) Continue emphasis on changing operational patterns.

(d) Continue emphasis on avoiding pre-operation preparations which disclose the area and scope of pending operations.

k. Training (Reference Text: Part 7)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) As the tempo of combat operations declines, individual and unit training become increasingly important.

(b) Some in-country specialist training beyond the capabilities of the Regiment continues to be necessary.

(c) CONUS and ITT replacements require additional training in "hands on equipment" skills before integration into gaining units.

(d) In-country transferees require some formal orientation/refresher training before integration into gaining units.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Emphasize individual and unit training as Vietnamization progresses.

(b) Ensure the continued availability of in-country specialist training in theater-peculiar MOS as well as critical shortfall MOS.

(c) The monitoring of USARV training requirements by CONUS training agencies to remedy common shortcomings be continued.

1. Artillery (Reference text: Part VI)

(1) Conclusion:
(a) An organic direct-support aviation maintenance unit within the Regiment is desirable. The problems associated with consolidated aircraft maintenance (i.e., scheduling, tool allocation, and personnel allocation) are still being studied in an attempt to determine the optimum system.

(b) Backup direct support maintenance units do not follow the standardised maintenance management system.

(c) When back-up DS units are changed, sufficient time must be provided to the supported unit to effect coordination and reconcile requisitions.

(d) The establishment of a goal for reduction of flying time is necessary in order to effectively reduce blade time.

(e) A secure FM system is highly desirable for all aircraft assigned to the Regiment.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Review the aviation maintenance capability of the armored cavalry regiment with a view towards providing an organic direct support maintenance unit in the Regiment's ICE.

(b) Require backup direct support maintenance units to follow the standardised maintenance management system.

(c) Require a two-week to one-month notification prior to changing the back up direct-support maintenance unit of any aviation unit.

(d) Conduct a comprehensive study of the FM secure voice system of aircraft with a view towards providing secure radios to all aircraft supporting ground units.

(e) Set goals for flying hour expenditures regardless of the intensity of combat.

m. Administrative Operations (Reference text: Para VII-2)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) The assignment of Keystone personnel with less than sixty days remaining on their tours creates a costly burden on the gaining command.

(b) Enlisted personnel (Grades E6 to E8) with profiles continue to be assigned to combat units despite their duty limitations, creating supervisory and morale difficulties.
(c) Unit Personnel Offices at squadron level should be consolidated into the Regimental headquarters as a Regimental Personnel Office.

2. Recommendations:

(a) Return to CONUS for reassignment or LTC those personnel from redeploying units who have completed ten months or 5/6 of their normal service tours.

(b) Revise Army regulations governing the assignment of senior enlisted personnel with profiles. A soldier should be required to waive his profile or accept training for a non-combat MOS.

(c) Reorganize the existing personnel activities of the armored cavalry regiment into a consolidated personnel office LAN the guidelines contained in DA Pamphlet 656-8.

n. Maintenance (Reference text: Para VII-4)

1. Conclusions:

(a) Class IX supply was unsatisfactory.

(b) The TAMG system has not worked.

(c) If the TAMG system is to remain in operation, more qualified enlisted personnel must be provided to support it and junior officers must receive more training in the system.

(d) The MTOE of the Regiment should be modified to include maintenance management personnel in the 3-4 section.

(e) The proposed D33 for attachment to the regiment in early 1971 will improve the maintenance posture of the regiment only when an effective tech supply capability has been established.

2. Recommendations:

(a) A review of the Class IX supply system be conducted to increase the availability of high-demand items.

(b) A review of TAMG be made to greatly simplify the system.

(c) Adequate trained personnel be available to support TAMG, and officers be better trained in this system.
(d) Provide TOE maintenance management personnel for the Regimental section.

(e) The proposed DSU, to be attached to the Regiment, be attached only after all sections are at 95% strength with qualified personnel and the tech supply is stocked with at least 60% of its A5s.

6. Automotive Equipment (Reference text: Para VIII-6)

(i) Conclusions: The requirements set forth in the automotive equipment section (Para VIII-6) are necessary to improve armored cavalry counterinsurgency operations.

(c) Recommendations: Action to produce modifications or engineering improvements in automotive equipment be taken as listed below:

(a) The M551 Sheridan:

1. an improved engine offering more horsepower but generating less heat.

2. Cased ammunition to replace the combustible cartridge.

3. A hydraulic system to replace the present turret configuration or significant improvement of the present system that will result in a reliable and easy to maintain turret system.

4. Improved turret controls to provide fire capability within 10 seconds of target acquisition.

5. More durable main seals that will require less frequent exercising.

6. A stronger battle rack that will carry combat loads common to operations in Vietnam, or rear deck carriers to supplement the battle rack.

(b) The M68A3 Main Battle Tank be provided an improved quality control program to eliminate internal defects in the engine.

(c) The M109 Howitzer be provided an improved elevating cylinder repair kit to increase the life of the cylinder.

(d) The M88 Tank Recovery Vehicle: Replace the gasoline engine with a diesel powerpack.

(e) The M572 Light Recovery Vehicle:

1. A redesigned boom to provide a crowd capability (articulating boom).
2. A strengthened magnetic clutch housing to reduce high failure rates.

3. Improved idler arms to prevent breaking when turning with a load.

(f) M548 Cargo Carrier: Improved lubrication system in the transfer to prevent bearing failure.

Installation Coordination (Reference Text: Para IX)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) Complete security of vacant buildings is not feasible without actual guard posts which are unacceptable from a manpower viewpoint and would be debilitating on morale. Buildings to be vacant for any length of time should, therefore, have valuable items such as fans and electrical fixtures removed and the buildings boarded up and posted off-limits.

(b) Units closing out property books on bases not being turned over to the ARVN should be allowed to transfer garrison mess equipment to the installation manager for use by subsequently assigned units.

(c) A unit of regimental size does not have within its TOE the capability of adequately performing the functions of installation coordinator. TDA authorization is necessary.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Direct installation engineers to secure vacated buildings by removing valuable items and completely boarding up each building.

(b) Direct redeploying units to coordinate with the installation engineer prior to removing garrison mess property from a residual basecamp.

(c) Prepare a standard TDA for each installation to perform installation coordination functions.

(d) Place the standard TDA authorization, recommended above, under the control of the unit commander assuming the responsibility of Installation Coordinator.
q. Human Relations (Reference text: Para I-1)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) There is a need for a human relations council at Regimental, squadron and troop level. These councils should be integrated, but with the majority of members from minority groups. One member must be in the chain of command.

(b) The work of the council must be focused on opening all channels of communication and solving problems, not just talking of them.

(c) This program works best when it is demonstrative rather than declaratory. An absence of paper has promoted the credibility and success of the program.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Human relations (racial) councils be employed down to troop/company/battery and separate detachment levels, with members selected for their sense of fairness. One member be from the chain of command.

(b) Councils be organised and structured around action programs rather than theoretical models.

(c) Commanders and leaders at all levels be exhorted to report any incident with racial overtones through the chain of command to this council. Spot reports should continue on up the chain of command.

r. Drug Advisory and Amnesty Program (Reference text: Para I-2)

(1) Conclusions:

(a) The Drug Advisory and Amnesty Program must be continued and expanded. Despite initial success, much more remains to be done.

(b) The terms "suppression" and "amnesty" need to be changed at least in the communications that reach the men. "Advisory" and/or "assistance", or some other less forbidding term might be better from the standpoint of soldier acceptability. For this program, "acceptability" to the young soldier is a meaningful criterion.

(c) Better in-country facilities are needed to treat drug abusers if real progress is to be made.

(d) There is a constant danger of making the program so attractive that it draws shab drug addicts who seek lighter duty, or worse
yet, becomes a factor in the decision to try drugs on the basis "the
program will save me toward the end of my tour".

(e) The grim reality of hard drug abuse and the difficulty
of overcoming the habit has to be driven across prior to the decision
to experiment with these drugs. This is most effectively done by former
users of the same age group and with the same values system as the man
who is considering use of drugs.

(f) Some former hard drug users should be given full time
assignments as counsellors at squadron level to help deter drug use and
help other men reject the habit.

(g) Greater leverage is required by higher headquarters and
perhaps by the President of the United States to cause Vietnamese
national authorities to eliminate local drug pushers. Even at its best,
the present effort is inadequate and it sometimes appears that local police
are in league with drug sellers. Drugs are available at almost every
roadside stand in the Regimental area of operations and are sold openly
by people of all ages, to include children.

(h) The programs directed against marihuana and hard drugs
must be separated.

(i) Greater effort must be made to teach the commanders,
officers and senior noncommissioned officers how to detect drug users.

(j) The recommendations of dedicated junior officers on how
to solve the problems frequently need to be balanced with other views and
tempered with more complex judgments.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Consider changing the names of the Drug Suppression
and Amnesty Programs to terms more acceptable to young soldiers for whose
benefit the programs are intended.

(b) Increase and improve the in-country facilities to handle
drug users. An entirely separate facility is required for initial treatment.

(c) Increase the number of medical personnel available to
units, especially enlisted specialists trained in social work and
psychological counselling.

(d) Continue to balance sympathy and understanding with
disciplinary and administrative action until the problem is solved.

(e) Make greater use of former users and provide some
temporary institutionalized position as counsellors for these men in the
Regiment so they can be best utilized without the ignominy of lacking some authorized assignment.

(f) Increase leverage on the Vietnamese to eliminate drug pushers.

(g) Separate the marijuana and hard drug programs and make the latter the first priority at every echelon.

s. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Conclusions:

(a) The solution is relatively simple and capable of both tight control and continuous review. Since it is standard to consider every man during his twelve month tour for one meritorious service and two achievement awards, authority to make these awards should be delegated to the Regimental Commander.

(b) Valor awards could continue to be referred to higher headquarters, although authority to award the Bronze Star for valor would also best be handled by the Regimental Commander.

(c) During the present climate of distrust of field grade awards, the latter could be referred to higher headquarters for review in all cases.

(d) For personnel in grades E-1 through O-3, report of awards made could be submitted to higher headquarters on a recurring basis.

(e) The entire award process within the regiment could also be controlled and reviewed by frequent, recurring inspections, thus eliminating a major reason for the lack of award authority.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) Grant the Regimental Commander authority to make Bronze Star and Army Commendation Medal awards not to exceed a total of three in number to those individuals he determines merit such awards in grade E-1 through O-3.

(b) Grant the Regimental Commander authority to make Bronze Star and ARCOM valor awards on the same basis as described in the preceding subparagraph.

(c) As a corollary action, grant the Regimental Commander authority to make impact awards in those selected cases where he has authority to grant BSM and ARCOM awards.
(d) Allow the Regimental Commander to award Bronze Star and ARCOM service awards at the end of a tour based on roster input furnished by unit commanders as reviewed and approved by the Squadron and Regimental Boards.

(e) In all other cases, recommendations for award continue to be forwarded to higher headquarters.
PART II THE SETTING

1. The Area of Operations: The primary areas of operation of the Regiment during the period 7 June to 7 December were in the Fishhook area of Cambodia and the heartland of Military Region 3 to the north and east of Saigon, (Map 1). Much of the latter area is densely populated with two major cities Bien Hoa in Binh Duong Province and Bien Hoa City in Binh Hoa Province as the critical population centers of the area. Pacification had made great strides in the southern districts of Binh Duong and the area around Bien Hoa City, but both of the AO contained jungled areas concealing VC bases and activities. Both areas were viewed as critical to the enemy's hopes for any type of takeover in SVN.

2. Terrain: The terrain in the Regimental AO consisted of densely populated zones, cultivated areas, plantations, and densely jungled areas and swamps. Both AO had major lines of communication, QL 13 in the west and QL 7 in the east. The major restrictions terrain-wise were the cultivated areas around the population centers (see Map 2) and the dense jungles and swamps (see Map 3). Two major rivers border the AO, the Dong Nai River and the Song Be River.

3. Weather: The wet season (Northwest Monsoon) prevailed. The Regiment encountered some difficulties due to heavy rains during the withdrawal from Cambodia and later during October and November. Air operations were adversely affected by clouds, but were seldom stopped by weather alone.

4. The Enemy: Between 7 June and 7 December, the Regiment faced two different types of enemy forces. During the first portion of the period, between 7 June and 28 June 1970, the Regiment operated in Cambodia against the Regiments of the 7th NVA Division, supported by elements of the 6th Arty Command, COSVN. The 165th Regiment was the enemy force most frequently contacted, having the mission of protecting the remaining caches in Cambodia from Allied discovery and evacuation or destruction. Upon withdrawal from Cambodia, the Regiment assumed new areas of operation near heavily populated areas in the center of Military Region 3, and the type of enemy changed from main force NVA units to main and local force VC units (Map 4). In the western AO, the only main force VC unit, the Dong Nai Regiment, reorganized into separate battalions beginning in May 1970. Enemy activity was characterized by economy of force tactics which included avoidance of contact with either the Regiment or ARVN units. The enemy was primarily concerned with maintaining his infrastructure, recruiting personnel, procuring supplies, and reestablishing his contact with the people. In the eastern AO, the pattern of enemy activity was basically the same. Although the 274th NVA Regiment and the 74th Arty Regiment remained intact, regimental sized operations were not conducted and the tactics of these units were designed to avoid sustained contacts with US, ARVN and Allied forces. The 274th Regiment usually employed company-sized forces. Much of the activity, energy and manpower of these units was expended on procuring supplies. In both AO, the enemy primarily targeted the indigenous military forces,
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MAP 1: Regimental AO (7 December 1970)
MAP 2: Critical Areas in Regimental AO
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MAP 4: VC Military District Organization in MR 3
5. Friendly Forces: During the period, the Regiment was under OPCON of either the 25th Infantry Division or IETV. Additionally, various units of the Regiment were placed under the operational control of other major headquarters. That status is shown on chart 1. Chart 2 shows units that were under regimental operational control.
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**Legend:**
- **II FFORCE:**
- **25th Inf Div:**
- **1st Cav Div (AK):**
Chart 2: Units CPCT to 19th AFR 7 Jun to 7 Dec

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PART III THE ENEMY

1. An Overview:

a. The past six months have been tremendously significant in terms of the VC implementing strategic decisions made in mid-1969 by the Lao Dong Party and CGSVK. Following the general offensive of Tet 1968 and its disastrous military repercussions, CGSVK re-evaluated its political and military situation and published CGSVK Resolution 99, which admitted the military failure of Tet 1968 and called for an end to "the strategic offensive concept and (the assumption) of a defensive position". This resolution marked the beginning of a return to guerrilla warfare, very similar to the enemy effort before 1965. It was followed by Resolutions 144 and 136 which both reiterated the need to return to a level of guerrilla warfare. These resolutions were designed to protract the war in anticipation of US withdrawal from South Vietnam and in the hope that eventually a coalition government in South Vietnam could be agreed upon.

b. When the Regiment returned from Cambodia it assumed two areas of operation in which the enemy was in the midst of implementing these resolutions. Since then the enemy has been in a state of flux as he has attempted to preserve, reorganize and rebuild his bases of support which have been deteriorating since Tet 1968. Enemy activity in the Regimental areas of operation has been at an extremely low level since 1 July 1970. The enemy has employed economy of force tactics primarily against indigenous military personnel who, in light of US disengagement, pose the long range threat to eventual enemy victory. This tactic was also prompted by diminished resources and the feeling that personnel and munitions must be conserved and expended as economically as possible. Contact with US troops simply did not offer as large a return on the enemy investment of men and material in terms of military success or political impact as did an attack on Vietnamese personnel. Political impact was particularly important to the enemy at this time. It is probably not an overstatement to say that the enemy in MR 3 is presently resigned to the fact that a military success is impossible and that his effort must therefore be exclusively a political one. Economy of force tactics in a situation like this, which include small harassing attacks, propaganda efforts, and terrorism, are significant only to the extent of their political impact.

2. Tactics:

a. Counter-pacification Tactics: After the Cambodian operation, VC strength dwindled and all hope of successful military operations vanished. The major anti-pacification target became the FSBP and the VC's stated battlefield switched from the district to the hamlet/village level. Much of what is understood about this effort is from captured VC documents. As the VC now view their own situation, the greatest threat to their hopes of political success would be an inability to control the hamlets and villages.
(1) The PSDF, as a program, is intended to enlist the maximum number of citizens in the support of the GVN. The VC simply cannot afford to allow the GVN to usurp popular support from them at the "rice roots" level of the villages and hamlets where they have traditionally received their greatest support. VC tactics against the PSDF have included:

(a) Paralysis of the PSDF via the injection of penetration agents into its structure to assist in spreading disaffection and to assist from the inside when that group is attacked militarily.

(b) Propagandizing the people to struggle against the "unjust" GVN Pacification Program.

(c) Appeal to local members to make confessions and deliver weapons to the "Revolution."

(d) Use of such measures as assassinations, kidnappings, and impressment as indoctrination measures against those who do not respond to their initial appeals.

(2) One VC high-ranking cadre, now a US agent, reported that the VC in Binh Duong Province would allow the people to continue in the PSDF if they would report to the VC on Allied military information and/or pay taxes to the VC. The agent stated that to target a PSDF for assassination, final permission had to come from the SR-5 level. This fact gives some indication of the tight control over the use of terror against the PSDF.

(3) Another recent development in the VC effort to counter-pacification has been the creation of "Suicide Anti-Pacification Groups" in SR-5. According to captured documents, these groups will physically occupy areas of 2 to 3 villages and will be exposed to great danger. It is assumed that these groups will be required to penetrate and operate in the hamlets and villages rather than in jungles around them. Captured documents also indicate that some cadre are resigning from the Party rather than become part of these "suicide" squads. Obviously, the VC feel a desperate need to act immediately at the village and hamlet level to prevent the open destruction of cadre. To date, these groups are believed to be still in the organization phase.

b. Mining: The Regiment's mining experience, since arrival in MP 3 has consisted primarily of booby-trap or anti-personnel mines. Vehicle mining was low-scale when compared with operations earlier in the year. The vast majority of both type mines were detonated or found in the western a0. This is believed to be caused by two factors. First, the western a0 has a greater guerrilla and VCI/sympathizer population and has had personnel capable of building mines and booby-traps. Secondly, the western a0 actually has more regional and popular forces conducting operations, thereby increasing the enemy's need for such defensive devices.
Generally speaking, the enemy booby-trapped areas where he wished to deny Allied forces easy access, areas of likely Allied operations and the area of his own bases. Anti-tank and anti-vehicular mining were centered on unpaved roads such as LTL-16 around Binh My and Binh Co, and were usually accompanied by warnings, both verbal and written, to the populace that the mine had been placed. Enemy forces also mined likely avenues of approach such as plow cuts or the sides of streams. Detonation for anti-tank mines was normally by "slapstick" of which there are two primary types (figure 1). The consistency in style of construction of these two types indicates that two-man manufacturing sites were probably responsible for the enemy's total production of these detonation devices.

Booby traps consisted basically of grenades, both Chicom and captured US fragmentation grenades, detonated in a variety of ways, pressure release being the most common. Booby-traps had little effect on track vehicles, and were only marginally effective against infantry or dismounted cavalry. Some instances of the employment of captured US claymores and booby-trapped automatic ambushes were discovered toward the end of the reporting period.

The statistical experience in mining and booby-trap incidents by the 11th ACR and the GVN's Provincial and Popular Forces is shown on chart 3 to 8.

The use of standard mine detecting equipment was of limited value in detecting VC homemade mines. The VC used non-metallic materials, usually cement, to encase their explosives thereby avoiding detection through the mine detector. The trained eye and experienced well-trained soldier were the greatest tools in detecting VC anti-tank mines.

c. Enemy Sapper Emphasis: The essence and emphasis of the political decisions and strategic changes in the last two years has been translated by the military arms of the Viet Cong into the utilisation of sapper techniques for military action. Although the concept of sappers is not a new technique to the NVA or the VC, a quantitative change has taken place. Most VC main force units operating in the Regiment's AC have received some training in sapper or sapper-style techniques as part of the disbanding and reorganization for the protracted guerrilla war.

On 7 June 1970 the Ki Battalion, Dong Sai Regiment conducted a sapper attack on FSB Normandy III against elements of the 15th Division. This was the first indication that the Dong Sai had received sapper training. Intelligence has confirmed that the No Dong Sai Battalion received sapper training in the jungles of Tan Uyen in September 1970. It has been reported that Chau Thanh District intended to create three sapper platoons in October 1970. Captured documents have also indicated that Tan Uyen and Phu Gia districts have also been tasked by Headquarters, SR-5 to establish sapper platoons in their areas. The strength for these new units was a change in the enemy's plans, not in his overall strength.
TYPES OF PRESSURE/ELECTRICAL DEVICES FOUND IN SR-5

PHUOC HOA RUBBER

PRESURE

GROUND LEVEL

DINH MY - BINH CO AREA TYPE

PRESSURE

GROUND LEVEL

Figure - 1

Bare wires make x inside hollowed log

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CHART 3: 11th ACR Anti-tank Mining Experience, 7 June - 7 December 1970

CHART 4: RT/HP Mining Experience in 11th ACR AO, 7 June - 7 December 1970

CHART 5: Total Allied Mining Experience, 7 June - 7 December 1970
(2) By converting conventional infantry into sappers, the enemy essentially responded to his pressing need for economy of forces. Although his strength has not substantially changed, if he is capable of training and motivating these new units, his capability to disrupt and demoralize the various pacification cadre could be greatly enhanced. This emphasis on sapper units is one more indication of the enemy's intent to protract the war in RVN. These small sapper groups will probably be used for political objectives rather than strictly military objectives.

d. LOC Interdiction: During the Regiment's operations along JL-1 and JL-2C in the eastern AO, the VC did not make any serious attempts at interdiction of the primary LOC or disruption of traffic. The ambushes that did occur were relatively small-scale and almost always conducted against single vehicles. The tactics employed involved a quick hit-and-run ambush with no attempt made to capture prisoners or weapons. The VC generally employed RPG-2 fire and small arms but have also used command-detonated claymore mines and 82mm mortars. These ambushes were believed to be conducted by the 2nd Bn, 274th Regiment to meet a quota required by 15C-7 Headquarters.
PART IV TACTICAL OPERATIONS

1. Operational Highlights:

a. Regimental operations during the period were in two distinct phases. The first phase was completed late in June, and included extensive tactical plow operations in Cambodia and the subsequent withdrawal of the Regiment to Vietnam. The second phase began in late June and continued through the remainder of the period. The Regiment was concerned primarily with operations to eliminate or destroy enemy forces, neutralise enemy base areas and logistic systems, and to upgrade territorial forces.

b. During June, in Cambodia, some plow security was provided by 1st Squadron from FSB Colorado while 2nd and 3rd Squadrons conducted reconnaissance operations from FSB Sisson and FSB Susan, respectively. The highlight of the operation was the discovery of a large hospital complex with more than eleven (11) tons of medical supplies (See Map 5). To effect the withdrawal from Cambodia the Regiment, minus 2nd Squadron, was placed OPCON to the 15th Infantry Division while the 2nd squadron remained OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

c. During the second phase, the Regiment operated in two AO:

(1) Eastern AO, portions of Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces, where 3rd Squadron and later 1st Squadron directed their activities primarily against the 274th TC Regiment and Trang Bom District forces.

(2) In the western AO, portions of Bien Hoa and Binh Duong Provinces, S-5 was targeted by the 2nd Squadron and subsequently by the 3rd Squadron. On 9 September the 2nd Squadron was placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and moved to an AO in Binh Tuy Province.

d. Maps 6 and 7 show Regimental dispositions and movements. Inclosure 3 contains an expanded description of the operations during the period.

2. Results:

a. The casualty data on chart 9 shows the operational results of the Regiment since 1966 in terms of KIA, WIA, and kill ratios. Depicted also are the complete statistical results of the Cambodian Operation.

b. The primary results of the Regimental operations during the period of this report are not reflected in casualty data nor are those results quantifiable. The most meaningful result is in what the enemy was unable to do because of the Regiment's presence; clearly he was unable to accomplish his basic goal of disrupting the SVN pacification programs in the area. On the contrary, the SVN pacification program was facilitated and significant progress, particularly in the area of population security, was made.
Chart 9: Casualty Data, 7 June to 7 December 1970

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3. Organization for Combat:

a. Physically the Regiment was organized in the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh AO and Bien Hoa - Binh Duong AO with the regimental base camp at Di An and all functions conducted as far forward as possible. Functions conducted at the regimental Base included: The Cavalry Training School, legal section, awards and decorations elements, postal units, finance section, Regimental museum, and processing for R&R, leave and rotation. Additionally, the Regimental headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 919th Engineer Company, Air Cavalry Troop, 37th Medical Company, and other attached units operated out of Di An. In November, aircraft DO support provided by the 368th Transportation Detachment and the 124th CS Maintenance Detachment were relocated from Long Dien to Di An.

b. Squadrons maintained personnel sections, property book officers, awards and decorations operations and limited S-1 replacement processing elements at the Regimental Base Camp. All other functions were performed as far forward as possible, normally at the squadron fire support base.

c. Beginning 9 September 69 and continuing through the remainder of the period, 2nd Squadron was under the operational control of 1st Cavalry Division (AM). This necessitated a forward maintenance and supply activity at Han Van (15988968), located more than 100 kilometers from the Regimental Base Camp at Di An.

d. On 17 November A Troop, 1st Squadron, was placed under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to secure a 45 day home flow operation north of Song Be. This operation extended the Regimental supply lines more than 100 kilometers north from the Di An Base Camp.

4. Principles of Employment:

a. General: Employment of the Regiment included a withdrawal from Cambodia followed by what can be categorized as low intensity counterinsurgency operations in Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. Missions assigned included retrograde, offense, reconnaissance, screening and security. Reconnaissance was the most frequent mission.

b. Withdrawal from Cambodia: This operation combined the principles of a delay on successive and alternate positions with armored Cavalry Squadrons as the basic elements. (For this operation, the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division was under OPCON of the Regiment.) The operation was complicated by public announcement of the overall timing which, of course, made the enemy's job much easier. Initially it had been planned to withdraw 11th ACR elements (1st and 3rd Squadrons) through the 3/4 Cavalry, which was nearest the border; however, after the passage of one squadron (1/11) the plan was modified and the remaining squadrons (3/11 and 3/4) withdrew successively. This modified plan was more simple and it would
have facilitated control of fires had the enemy made a serious attempt to interfere, which he did not.

c. Low-Intensity Counterinsurgency Operations:

(1) Operations in MR 3 following the withdrawal from Cambodia were targeted against elements of the enemy's sub-systems including remaining main and local force units and their logistic support. As described in the intelligence portion of this report, it is emphasised that during the period, remaining enemy forces operated in small groups intent on avoiding contact. Thus while the Regiment continued to exercise the concept played a lesser role than it had in the past. Massive reconnaissance-in-force tactics were seldom remunerative, since the enemy habitually gained the few minutes necessary for small group evasion. Instead, offensive operations were directed at specific targets developed by Air Cavalry Troop operations and other intelligence sources primarily Hoi Chau and prisoners. Again, these operations served primarily to keep the enemy off balance and to destroy his system of bases, since successful evasion was the rule. In this environment, principal success in eliminating the enemy was achieved in screening operations astride the trail networks supporting the enemy's overall system. Reconnaissance, therefore, focused heavily on trail networks, and the automatic ambush became a basic tool. Although there were exceptions, the enemy was generally able to detect and avoid vehicular strong points even when widely dispersed in single positions. Dismounted ambushes were also used; however, necessary proficiency in this fine art was never fully achieved. Security missions centered on support of Rome plow operations, security of fire bases and night laagers, and reaction in support of Vietnamese territorial forces.

(2) Thus, while the preponderance of firepower continued to make armored cavalry the most potent ground force on the battlefield, its effect in this environment was primarily that of a deterrent. The enemy simply could not afford to mass or mount any type of sustained offensive operation. The importance of this deterrent effect should be given doctrinal emphasis for counterinsurgency operations; given the low cost in manpower, no other force can achieve such an effect.

d. Conclusions: Doctrine for the employment of armored cavalry as set forth in current field manuals is basically sound. Further emphasis is needed concerning:

(1) The role of armored cavalry in denying freedom of the battlefield to the enemy in counterinsurgency operations.

(2) The use of screening operations to interdict the lines of communications essential to the functioning of the enemy's system.
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e. **Recommendations:** Doctrinal emphasis be placed on:

(1) The overall role of armored cavalry in counterinsurgency operations.

(2) Screening operations by armored cavalry in counterinsurgency operations.

5. **Combined Arms - Employment of Armor and Infantry:**

a. The infantry rifle squad organic to the cavalry platoons of the Regiment was not maintained or employed as such. Fluctuating personnel strengths generally led to squad personnel being used to round out other crews in the platoon and the squad's carrier was employed as an additional scout ACAV. While squad personnel often formed the nucleus of elements employed in dismounted roles, a consistent pattern of each platoon having a fully proficient rifle element simply was not achieved. Nevertheless, there was a continuing need for infantry, particularly in the conduct of detailed ground searches and in operations when a degree of stealth was necessary. This need caused the Regiment to actively seek attachment of US infantry or to conduct combined operations with Vietnamese territorial forces. Both sources were available during the period. US infantry was preferred, primarily because of its relative staying power; however, the Vietnamese territorial forces, (primarily the RF) proved themselves remarkably well (see para 6 below).

b. In this regard, operations of the 2nd Squadron under OPCON of the 1st Cav Div (AM) demonstrated the effectiveness of combined armored cavalry-airmobile operations. This combination of capabilities, when employed with imagination and boldness, is ideally suited for counterinsurgency operations.

c. **Conclusions:**

(1) There is a need for infantry to be employed with armored cavalry in counterinsurgency operations. Experience has shown that dependence on the infantry squad organic to cavalry platoons is not practical.

(2) Combined arms teams with armored cavalry and airmobile infantry as the maneuver elements are the optimum task organisation.

d. **Recommendations:**

(1) Review the concept for organic infantry in the armored cavalry regiment in the light of the experiences of this Regiment.

(2) Study organizational concepts to incorporate into the Regiment, the capabilities found in task organizations including armored cavalry and airmobile infantry elements. Such a study should address the concept of providing air cavalry units to the armored cavalry regiment as well as the infantry structure of the air cavalry troop. (see para d(2)(b) and (e), below.

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6. Combined Area - Improvement of Territorial Forces:

(1) Late in June, as the Regiment initiated operations in its Long Xanh, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa AO, it was, in addition to its specific AO missions, given the general mission of improving the effectiveness of the Vietnamese territorial forces (RF and PF). The Regiment discarded as impractical the option of direct training assistance. Cavalry troops simply were not qualified by training, experience or outlook to impart instruction in the fine art of small unit infantry tactics and techniques. Instead, the Regiment turned to the conduct of combined operations, which proved to be an effective means of accomplishing the mission. Successful combined operations led to increased confidence and aggressiveness on the part of the territorial forces. Thus the main contribution of the Regiment toward improving the territorial forces was in providing the impetus to get them to operate away from their static posts. Total combined operations are shown at Chart 10.

(2) Conclusions: The armored cavalry regiment can best improve the effectiveness of indigenous territorial forces through the conduct of combined operations.

(3) Recommendations: As additional doctrine is developed for the armored cavalry regiment in counterinsurgency operations, the use of combined operations with indigenous territorial forces should be stressed as a primary means of improving the effectiveness of those forces.

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NOTE: 2/11 ACR covers period 7 June to 9 September 1970.

CHART 10 COMBINED OPERATIONS, 7 JUNE TO 7 DECEMBER 1970

7. Air Cavalry Troop Operations:

a. Employment of the Air Cavalry Troop changed considerably from operations in Cambodia to the operations in MR3 AO. In Cambodia, the Troop operated primarily in support of operations and contacts of the ground reconnaissance to find the enemy. This role assumed increased importance as the enemy progressively adopted small unit guerrilla tactics. The Troop was habitually employed under Regimental control with support for squadron operations provided on a mission basis. In mid-November, the Troop was assigned its own AO, AO Thunderhorse, an extension of the western AO to the Song Bo River (Map 11: Regimental AO, Part II). At that time, the size of the Regimental AO began taxing the VR capability of the Troop. Besides its own AO responsibility, the Troop continued to
be tasked for support of squadron operations. Throughout the period, standard air cavalry tactics and techniques were employed. Two areas, however, warrant further discussion.

(1) The Aero Rifle Platoon: Although the aero rifle platoon was used to assist in search of enemy base camps and to implant sensors, it was normally employed to develop potential target areas. While many of these latter operations permitted quick reinforcing reaction by ground elements of the Regiment, the need for airmobile reaction forces for operations in remote areas was clearly indicated. The absence of such reaction forces, airmobile infantry, under Regimental control at times limited the use of the aero rifle platoon. At the close of the period, the platoon was experimenting with the employment of automatic ambuses; however, it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this tactic by the platoon.

(2) Chemical Operations: The 33rd Chemical Detachment was attached to the Air Cavalry Troop as the majority of chemical operations involved the Troop. Two particularly useful techniques employed were:

(a) Precision CS drops: Troop aircraft were employed to deliver non-persistant agent CS on known or suspected enemy locations. The E-158R2 fifty-pound CS canister cluster was effective in suppressing enemy activities. Dropped from an altitude of 3,000 feet, the agent was allowed 10 to 15 minutes to disperse throughout the target area. Then the area was engaged with airstrikes, artillery or gunsips. "Ferret Operations" such as these were used to drive the enemy from his safe bunkers into the open where he could be destroyed. Another application of the same technique was used during the withdrawal from Cambodia, during which an armored cavalry troop securing an engineer platoon was ambushed twice a day for two days in a row. The engineers were removing a Bailey bridge located about 5 kilometers from the NDF, reached by a single, restricted access route. E-158R2 CS canisters were dropped immediately in front of the troops as they proceeded down the road. All ground personnel were masked and the column was driven through the dense agent cloud. With the use of the CS agent, not one round was fired at the column in the remaining three days of the operation.

(b) Sniffer Missions: The XM3 Aircraft-Mounted Personnel Detector was effectively used in locating bunker complexes and train movement. Flown at low level early in the morning in primarily isolated areas, it was used to locate enemy forces where ground cavalry units could not be employed. Normally, an OH-6A was used to further recon activations and an AH-10 was on station to engage targets identified. Use of the sniffer after 1000 hours was ineffective because air pollution from helicopters also activated the device, giving false information as to enemy locations.
b. Conclusions:

(1) The Air Cavalry Troop is uniquely effective in finding the enemy in an environment of low intensity counterinsurgency operations.

(2) At least one additional air cavalry troop could have been effectively employed by the regiment throughout the period.

(3) When ground elements are not within quick reaction reinforcing range of the rifle platoon, an air mobile reaction force is necessary.

(4) Chemical warfare capabilities can effectively complement air cavalry operations.

c. Recommendations:

(1) In future low intensity counterinsurgency operations employ air cavalry forces to the maximum.

(2) Provide the armored cavalry regiment with at least two air cavalry troops.

(3) Consider the need for air mobile quick reaction forces to support the rifle platoon. In this regard, consideration should be given to including additional infantry rifle strength.

(4) Continue to develop chemical warfare capabilities to be employed in conjunction with air cavalry operations.

8. Combat Support Operations:

a. Fire Support Operations

(1) Regimental Fire Support Element (FSE): Under MTOE, effective 21 August 1970, the Regiment was authorized a FSE consisting of 5 officers and 9 enlisted men. The FSE was found to be essential for tactical fire direction, fire planning, coordination and clearance of all fires, posting of air warning data, as well as advice and assistance to the three organic howitzer batteries.

(2) Operations in expanded AOs: As U.S. tactical units were redeployed and Regimental AO expanded, squadrons were often required to split their organic batteries for effective coverage. When the battery was split, a shortage of fire direction equipment made it difficult to follow all safety and double-check procedures and still provide responsive support. Chances for error were thus increased.

(3) Combined Fire Support Coordination;
(a) When the regiment returned from Cambodia, fire support coordination became increasingly more complex. RF/FF units joined regimental units in combined operations or worked in small AO interspersed throughout the regimental AO. Maintaining accurate locations on all of these units and enforcing strict clearance procedures often proved difficult. The Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) in each Province Headquarters was responsible for clearing all fires and maintaining accurate locations of all RF/FF units in the Province. When these units were conducting combined operations with the squadrons, they did not have communications with Province Headquarters. Consequently, calls to the squadrons for fires in support of an RF/FF unit in the field were habitually denied by the CFSCC at Province level, because it only knew the area that an RF/FF unit was operating in and not its exact location. Thus the fires were denied because friendly forces were in the area, which of course they were, as they were the ones who had requested the fire.

(b) RF/FF forces have occasionally fired their mortars without obtaining proper clearance from the CFSCC, and some of the rounds have impacted dangerously close to regimental units.

(4) Reduction in ammunition expenditures: With the decrease in the level of enemy activity and increased emphasis on cost reduction, the ammunition support rate (ASR) was steadily reduced. By improved fire discipline, the regiment succeeded in reducing expenditures below the ASR while maintaining an adequate reserve. All targets received close evaluation prior to being engaged, and other delivery systems, such as mortars were more fully utilized. By effectively managing all delivery systems, ammunition reduction goals were met and exceeded without adverse impact on operational missions or security. Statistics on 155mm howitzer HE ammunition, the most critical item, are shown on chart 11.

(5) Conclusions:

(a) The armored cavalry regiment has a valid requirement for an FSR in the Regimental TOC.

(b) The splitting of the howitzer batteries organic to the armored cavalry squadrons, necessary for covering large AO, introduces a significantly increased possibility of error and firing incidents.

(c) The MGCE for a battery must have sufficient personnel and equipment to operate two fire direction centers.

(d) Adequate ARVN fire coordination channels between the Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC) at Province and the RF/FF units in the field do not exist.
CHART 11: 155mm HE ASA - Rounds Expended (in thousands)
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(e) RF/IF units do not clear all mortar fires through the CFSCC before firing.

(f) Ammunition expenditures were reduced without sacrificing the overall effectiveness or security of the command.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) Consider standardization of an FSB in TOL 17-52G, Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop.

(b) Consider modification of TOL 6-37G, Field Artillery Battery, to add the necessary personnel and equipment to operate two fire direction centers.

(c) Establish and maintain a communication link between the RF/IF units and the CFSCC at Province to coordinate and clear fires for units operating in the field.

(d) Exercise efficient management of ammunition expenditures by intensive target evaluation and full use of all available firepower means "as continued by commanders at all levels.

b. Engineer Operations:

(1) Fire Support Base Construction: Since the regiment returned from Cambodia, seven FSB have been constructed in the new AO. Generally, an engineer platoon with equipment augmentation was used to construct a base, landing zone, and supply storage area with protective wire.

(a) Major problems encountered in FSB construction were:

1. Construction and maintenance of a road system in and around the FSB. During the rainy season, tracked vehicles quickly destroyed the road network.

2. Simultaneous occupation of a FSB during construction resulted in neither being accomplished expeditiously. Moreover, coordination as to locations of preplanned areas for the TOC, mess facility, and vehicle parking areas proved difficult with construction progressing while the unit was moving in.

(b) Study of these problems led to innovations, exemplified in the construction of FSB Bandit II. While the Engineer Platoon constructed the new FSB, with a cavalry platoon for security, the remainder of the squadron continued to occupy the old FSB. FSB Bandit II was constructed with an interior base enclosing an area restricted to wheeled vehicles only, and including the TOC and mess facilities, with an exterior
bears for the protection of the tracked vehicles securing the FSB. When these bears and internal roads were completed, the FSB was occupied and the protective wire was installed. A landing zone and supply storage area were finished between bears. This technique allowed better construction of internal arrangements and smoother occupation of the FSB.

(2) Mine-sweep operations: Mine-sweep operations were generally limited to the secondary LOC, access roads and choke points. In Part III, para 26, the enemy’s mining activities are discussed in detail. Emphasis in the Regiment to counter these tactics was on thorough training in visual observation and strict enforcement of safety precautions.

(a) In numerous cases, mines found had clear visual indications that they were there. Signs stating in Vietnamese “Civilians do not pass” and barricades of sod or branches were used to warn local civilians. Continual observations of the mine-sweep area often pointed out the locations of the mines from these and more obscure indicators such as puddles or disturbed earth.

(b) Safety precautions included proper uniform for maximum protection and all around security of the sweep team. Probers worked alone with the rule “one man to a mine” strictly enforced.

(c) In spite of all the efforts to avoid or detect mines, vehicles continued to be lost to homemade non-metallic mines. The “slapstick” (figure 1, page III-4) was used to detonate these mines. Metallic content of the slapstick is so low that the mine detector does not pick it up. The vast majority of battle deaths during this period were from this type of mine.

(3) Conclusions:

(a) Fire support base construction should be thoroughly planned in advance and, when possible, basic construction completed before the FSB is occupied.

(b) Traffic within the FSB must be strictly controlled with separate track and wheeled-vehicle roads.

(c) The greatest threat to an armored cavalry regiment operating in a low-intensity counterinsurgency environment is the antivehicular land mine.

(4) Recommendations:

(a) Include in unit SOP procedures for both hasty and deliberate occupation of fire support bases. The SOP should include separate track and wheel road systems.

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(b) Place priority attention on the development and deployment of an effective mine detector for use against non-metallic as well as metallic mines.

(c) Continue the emphasis on disseminating information on enemy mining techniques in the Republic of Vietnam.

c. Communications

1. FM radio was the primary means of communications within the Regiment. There are nearly 800 of the FRC-25 and FCR-12 series radios primarily in tracked vehicles. The FRC-25/77 radios were also extensively used by the Aero Rifle Platoon and the troops in dismounted operations. The equipment consistently met or exceeded its planning range and with the use of antenna towers and mountain top relays, effective FM communications was maintained throughout the AO. The Regiment was allocated 115 FM frequencies, 10 of which were discrete (sole user) and the rest shared (common user). The Regimental operations and logistics nets required the use of 95 frequencies. The discrete frequencies were assigned to the major Regimental and squadron command nets which proved satisfactory, while the shared frequencies were a constant source of problems. Secure FM voice equipment was used on the major nets down to troop/company/battery level which did enhance the COMSEC program. However, problems with power, overheating equipment, and a shortage of mounting kits made it less effective than desired.

2. Both AM voice and radio Teletype (HTT) equipment was available in the Regiment. However, because of the success with FM communications it was not extensively used. HTT stations were operated at the Regiment to provide a backup to the landline teletype to the higher headquarters. AM admin/Log Nets were used to communicate with the 2nd Squadron while operating in the Han Tan area and A Troop operating near Long Be, both over 100 km from the Regimental Headquarters. The GRC-106 radio and GRC-122 Radio Teletype provided reliable communications at this distance when using frequencies in the five to ten megacycles range. The density of stations operating in this frequency range would have negated the more extensive use of AM nets.

3. Telephone communications at the Di An Base Camp was operated primarily by the area signal support units. This provided both internal base camp service and access to the Southeast Asia longhaul circuits and Tanden Switching System. The Regiment and squadrons operated limited telephone service to augment and provide a backup to the Di An Base System and telephone service with the Switchboard SB-22 in the forward Fire Support Bases. Telephone circuits were extended from the Regimental Headquarters to the squadron FOB using the four channel, AN/GRC-163. After overcoming the problem of untrained personnel, adequate equipment reliability was achieved by operating during scheduled periods of approximately four hours daily, to reduce the effects of overheating.
(4) The Regiment does not have an organic signal support unit as found in a division or separate brigade. Support was provided by the higher headquarters with a multi-channel VHF and teletype terminal solely to extend communications to the Regimental CP. With the Regiment assigned a fixed AO throughout this period there was no requirement for frequent moving of the CP or Squadron Fire Support Bases and a more sophisticated communication system could have effectively been employed with the squadrons. The use of Multi-channel VHF, teletype, and larger capacity switchboards, similar to that used within a separate brigade, would have both improved communications and reduced the number of TM frequencies required.

(5) Conclusions:

(a) The TM radios used with antenna towers and mountain top relays provided reliable and effective communications.

(b) There was limited need for AN/VRC and HVT equipment to communicate over extended distance.

(c) A signal support unit could have been effectively employed to enhance the Regiment’s communications and reduce the number of TM nets in operation.

(6) Recommendations:

(a) Review the amount of AN/VRC and HVT equipment authorized the armored cavalry regiment with a view toward a substantial reduction when operating in this environment.

(b) Consider providing the armored cavalry regiment with a signal support unit to provide communication center, expanded cryptographic maintenance, and multi-channel VHF links from the regiment to the squadrons.

d. Civic Action and Psychological Operations

(1) From 7 June to 7 December 1970, the Regiment continued to conduct Civic Action and PSTOP activities in Cambodia and in its new area of operation in MR 3.

(2) Cambodia: During the latter part of June 1970, civic action activities in Cambodia and Binh Long Province decreased as withdrawal from these areas was conducted. However, the Regiment continued extensive road security for the refugees moving from Cambodia to Vietnam and conducted MEDCAP whenever possible. PSTOP activities were severely curtailed due to non-availability of aircraft, weather conditions, and preparations for moving from Binh Long and Cambodia to its new AO.

(3) Military Region 3 AO:
(a) The new Regimental AO covered portions of three provinces and ten districts where great progress had already been made in these areas. Other US forces and MACV Teams had done considerable work in the past years and the AITC Civic Action and PSTOF programs were functioning smoothly in these heavily populated areas. Therefore, the Regiment's civic action and PSTOF efforts were expanded primarily in the northern portions of the AO where VC access to the population was the greatest.

(b) Civic action projects were limited to technical advice and assistance with the initiative being left to the Vietnamese. Moreover, the Vietnamese supply system was encouraged to support worthwhile projects. For example, in Bien Hoa Province, the regiment conducted a medical training program for 20 PP soldiers from An District. After completing the medical training from the regiment and, under the supervision of the 37th Medical Company, conducted MEDCAP in An District. This initially successful program faltered when the 37th Medical Company stopped supplying medical supplies, in order to force the PP supply system to function. MEDCAP and Integrated Civic Action Projects (ICAP) were conducted by Regimental Headquarters, the three squadrons, 519th Engineer Company, 37th Medical Company, and the 541st Military Intelligence Detachment. From June to December 1970, the Regiment conducted 116 MEDCAP/ICAP and treated over 6,000 Vietnamese as shown on chart 12.

(c) The Regimental PSTOF program in W 3 consisted of leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts, and armed propaganda teams face to face communications. In this program the major limiting factor was the availability of aircraft. As the AO's expanded, the Regimental aviation assets were only available for quick reaction missions. The 9th Special Operations Squadron at Bien Hoa supported these missions, however, an 02-8 twice a week was not sufficient to meet the requirements. Based on discussions with Hoi Chanh, quick reaction aerial broadcasts of a Hoi Chanh are the most effective PSTOF technique employed by the regiment. Amounts of leaflet drops, aerial broadcasts, and AT face to face communications are shown on Chart 13.

(d) Conclusions:

(a) Civic action programs must continue to emphasize self-help by the Vietnamese with this principle being clearly established at the onset and followed throughout.

(b) The most effective PSTOF technique employed by the Regiment was quick reaction broadcasts by Hoi Chanh.

(c) Air support for PSTOF missions is increasingly critical as US redeployment progresses.
## Chart 12: ICAP Conducted and Patients Treated in Regimental AC

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* Face to Face 2,613

## Chart 13: Psychological Operations

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(5) Recommendations:

(a) Emphasize Vietnamese self-help in Civic Action Programs.

(b) Use Hoi Chanhs in quick reaction PSTOP broadcasts as much as possible.

(c) Establish the machinery necessary for proper priority allocation of the declining available PSTOP air support.

e. Intelligence Operations:

(1) General:

(a) The Regiment's intelligence operations during the period were characterized by a change in scope, which was precipitated by a different type of adversary in a new operational area, and by the increased organic intelligence collection assets of the regiment itself.

(b) In the new AO, the regiment's intelligence requirements changed from tracking and fixing NVA divisions, regiments, and battalions to tracking and fixing enemy units which seldom operated in greater than company sized elements. Much of the enemy effort in the new AO was basically political in nature and new intelligence techniques, such as developing detailed information on VC personalities, were needed to identify and eradicate the small units and their political counterparts, the Viet Cong infrastructure. As the nature of the enemy changed, so did the nature of the enemy's logistical and commo/liaison systems. These systems, too, became decentralized, compartmentalized, and very difficult to fix and destroy. In the effort to find and destroy the enemy, standard intelligence sources were used with varying degrees of success. HUMINT sources: Hoi Chanhs, PW's, and captured documents were the most valuable sources of exploitable intelligence. Next in importance, as effective sources of information, were liaison with adjacent units and agencies and the reconnaissance provided by the Regiment's organic assets, both ground and air. Least effective as sources of information were the technical intelligence devices: SLAR, Red Haze, sensors, radar, and aerial photography. The weather, absence of large enemy units, and densely populated areas of operations all adversely affected the usefulness of these technical devices.

(c) The move into the new AO also changed the scope of the intelligence operations by increasing the Regiment's intelligence collection assets. This increase was begun by the collocation of the 541st MID and the Regimental Headquarters for the first time in 18 months. Prior to this time the regimental S-2 was directly supported by a BICC while the remainder of the MID stayed at the Regimental Base at Quan Loi and the Regiment's frequent moves. An extensive intelligence liaison program grew.
between the regiment, the 541st MI, and adjacent intelligence agencies after the collocation.

(d) In addition, because the regiment was essentially acting as a separate brigade, a sensor program was begun to augment the intelligence-gathering capabilities. This program grew into an organic sensor section, capable of emplacing, monitoring, and recovering sensors.

(e) An increase in the need for night detection surveillance devices led to an emphasis on the radar capability of the regiment. Problem areas in these fields are discussed in detail below.

(f) In conclusion, the intelligence operations underwent a fundamental change during the period as a response to the entirely different enemy situation. The intelligence program also expanded as the collocation of the 541st MI and the regiment allowed a more substantial liaison program and exchange of ideas.

2. Problem Areas:

(a) Liaison: The guerilla warfare environment placed special needs on the gathering of timely, complete and detailed information to permit rapid and effective reaction. The regiment's squadrons were deployed across three GVN provinces and the areas of operation included all or portions of ten GVN districts. This deployment created problems in coordination between agencies and units, both American and ARVN, which were overlapped by the 11th ACR area of operations. Agencies and units operating in the same areas had a tendency to withhold information from the others in hopes of exploiting it themselves. The regiment developed a system of daily and periodic liaison with these agencies, units and advisors. The emphasis has been placed on gathering and exploiting what others have learned. Personnel for this system were drawn from the 541st MI, generally enlisted interrogators and order of battle analysts. At the start of December six such EN were at district and province locations in the regiment's AO, with two more scheduled to go to the field by mid December.

(b) Aerial Photography: The emphasis in aerial photography during the period was to procure a usable product for the small ground unit commanders. What was envisioned were photos which accurately depicted the guerrillas' physical environment. Experimentation with different techniques led to the conclusion that current systems were not designed to produce this type of photography in appreciable quantities. In essence, the systems designed were more strategic than tactical in nature, and useful only to an imagery interpreter. Experiences taught that prime vertical map supplement photography was the most useful, followed by split vertical, high panoramic, and low panoramic. Unfortunately, prime vertical photography was most difficult to obtain. Additional problems were
presented by the scale of the various types of photos and the decline of US air assets in Vietnam.

(c) Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)

1. During the first part of the reporting period the use of sensors by the Regiment was limited by a lack of equipment and trained personnel. It was not until the Regiment became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division in Sep 70 that a viable organic sensor program, came into being. This division had a dynamic UGS program and assisted the Regiment in equipment, training and technical expertise.

2. The organization of the UGS section was developed by the Regimental S-2 and was based on the information gained from self-experience, other units and G-3 USAFV. It is as shown below: This configuration allows for an independent monitoring site for each area of operations to facilitate rapid response to activations by the squadrons. However, control of the personnel and available sensor assets remains at Regimental level.

(d) Ground Surveillance Radar:

IV-53
1. During this reporting period, the ground surveillance radar capability of the Regiment has shown a continuing upward trend.

Prior to October 1970 the radar assets of this unit consisted primarily of AN/FFS4 ground radars. During October the Regiment exchanged all of its AN/FFS4 radars for the AN/FFS5. Although the AN/FFS5 is a more reliable radar set, maintenance problems and downtime continued above an acceptable level, primarily because of the necessity of moving the sets by tracked vehicles over rough terrain. To counter this problem the radar is moved by helicopter whenever possible. Additionally, the radar usually had to be evacuated from the field for most maintenance problems. The unit radar mechanic was limited in the amount of repair maintenance he was permitted to perform.

2. The Regiment experienced a shortage of trained radar personnel during the period. Early in the reporting period the lack of qualified radar operators was not readily apparent, but seemed to surface with the exchange of the AN/FFS4 for the AN/FFS5. The reason for this shortage of radar personnel was two-fold. First, the lack of interest in the employment of the AN/FFS4 resulted in apathetic training and operational usage. Secondly, the radar operator's MOS had been changed from the 11D MOS to the 17K MOS in January 69. However, this change was not made to the Regimental MTOE at that time. Consequently, when this oversight was discovered in September 70 it was determined that during the intervening 21 months the Regiment had not been requisitioning personnel with that MOS and had only two personnel with a 17K MOS out of an authorized total of 12C. This problem has been greatly alleviated through proper requisitioning, the formation of an in-house training program and allocations for the AN/FFS5 radar operators course from the SEA Signal School in Long Binh.

3) Conclusions:

(a) Competent personnel with intelligence training are required for liaison with US and South Vietnamese units and agencies.

(b) Aerial photos, invaluable to company/brigade commanders in supplementing map coverage, have been virtually impossible to obtain.

(c) Knowledge of the effectiveness of the sensor program and its limitations is lacking. Also, exchange of information/lessons learned on the unattended ground sensor (UGS) program has been minimal.

(d) A regimental sensor section must be added to the MTOE.

(e) The AN/FFS-5 is not rugged enough for armored cavalry operations. In addition, maintenance downtime is excessive.

4) Recommendations:

IV-54
(a) Examine the feasibility of establishing an intelligence liaison team organic to the MID and MIC in a counterinsurgency environment. This team's minimum strength should consist of one officer and four non-commissioned officers with interrogation MOS.

(b) Evaluate the aerial photography system to determine the feasibility of providing ground commanders at company/troop level with up-to-date photography of his area of operations on a continuing and timely basis.

(c) Formalize and disseminate available sensor doctrine and lessons learned.

(d) Modify the armored cavalry regiment MIGE to include a UH section.

(e) Develop the necessary modifications to increase the reliability and ruggedness of the AN/FPS-5 radar. Repair capabilities for these radars must be improved to include contact teams for on-site repair.

2. Operational Security

   a. General: Operational security (OPSEC) was a matter of command emphasis throughout the period. Three areas of principal concern were communications security (COMSEC), stereotyped operational patterns and pre-operation preparations including reconnaissance, disposition of forces and preparatory fires. Although there was always some concern about the security aspects of combined operations with the Vietnamese territorial forces, no hard evidence of compromise was ever found.

b. COMSEC:

   (1) First, it is appropriate to compliment the agencies responsible for providing the CIRCE wheel and associated codes. This tool allowed the regiment to discontinue completely the use of a point of origin code, with this major source of compromise eliminated emphasis could be and was placed on discipline and proper radio/telephone procedures. While never perfect, COMSEC throughout the regiment reached a reasonably high standard. Emphasis was also placed on the use of secure voice capabilities and on 26 November the three principal regimental nets went totally secure with clear voice backup for aircraft or agencies without secure voice equipment. At squadron level, while total conversion to the secure node was not possible, emphasis continued on the use of the secure capability to troop level for passing operational instructions and related data.

c. Operational Patterns: There is little question that the enemy made maximum use of his knowledge of how we operated. Only limited success was made in altering operational patterns, which are largely dictated by
ponderous logistical requirements and systems, which per-it only minor variations in time. Some night operations and movements were conducted in an effort to distort the normal pattern, but these were exceptional and did not otherwise pay adequate dividends. At a small unit tactical level stereotyped operations were a major concern. Although young leaders were encouraged to use imaginative and innovative tactics and techniques, only moderate success was achieved.

d. Pre-operation Preparations: Continual emphasis was given to this area with reasonable success. The greatest weaknesses involved helicopter reconnaissance of routes of advance and objective areas and unit prepositioning near the operational area. The pattern of preparatory fires, including their withholding, was generally well conceived. Nevertheless, these fires were normally followed by a lull before ground maneuver elements reached the objective area (base areas are habitually located in heavily vegetated terrain); the enemy usually put this lull to good use.

Conclusions:

(1) The CIRCE wheel for coding numerical information (e.g., coordinates and frequencies) has significantly reduced OPSEC violations.

(2) Secure voice radio/telephone equipment has enabled the bulk of Regimental traffic (Regiment - Squadron) to be transmitted by this mode.

(3) Fixed operational patterns are among the greatest OPSEC weaknesses.

(4) Pre-operation preparations are also a significant source of OPSEC compromise.

f. Recommendations:

(1) Continue to use of the CIRCE wheel code.

(2) Continue programs to provide reliable secure voice equipment down to troop level and for aircraft.

(3) Continue emphasis on changing operational patterns.

(4) Continue emphasis on avoiding pre-operation preparations which disclose the area and scope of pending operations.
1. General: The importance of training within the Regiment increased sharply after the withdrawal from Cambodia. The decrease in enemy activity and contacts in the new AO coupled with the high turnover of personnel made it necessary to launch an extensive training program. Training to maintain professionalism was absolutely essential. Even with a growing training program, the "Allons" type esprit that prevails when units are having frequent enemy contacts with success cannot be replaced, not even by the best of training programs. It is, however, true that in the absence of frequent and significant contacts, training must be accomplished using every conceivable technique known to the commander.

2. Replacement Training:

   a. The training program for replacements was geared to training two classes of personnel:

      (1) CONUS and Inter-Theater Transfer (ITT) replacements

      (2) In-country transfers.

   b. The requirement for initial orientation and training of both CONUS and ITT replacements and in-country transfers was met at the Regimental replacement training school (Fierce Cavalry Training School). During the period, the course for new arrivals in-country was extended from 7 to 9 days and second tour personnel were no longer excused. A 2 day orientation/refresher course was added for in-country transfers; this proved particularly worthwhile in assisting the replacement in his readjustment.

   c. The training status of CONUS and ITT replacements was generally adequate but shortcomings existed in the following subjects in all grades:

      (1) Weapons training.

      (2) Maintenance procedures.

      (3) Emplacing mines and demolitions.

      (4) Crew duties.

3. In-country Specialist Training: The Regiment made maximum use of specialized courses available in other USARV units. 1st Cavalry Division's "First Team Academy", 25th Infantry Division's "Tropic Lightnin'; Academy" and 1st Signal Brigade's "Southeast Asia Signal School #1" were used. Typical courses were those for radar/radio operators, ML personnel, visual trackers, and helicopter load riggers.
4. **Individual and Unit Refresher Training:** Squadrons and separate units were required to institute extensive training programs designed to increase individual and crew proficiency in basic skills and small unit tactics and techniques. This training was particularly important in attaining and maintaining professionalism in the face of a reduced tempo of combat operations.

5. **Conclusions:**

   a. As the tempo of combat operations declines, individual and unit training become increasingly important.

   b. Some in-country specialist training beyond the capabilities of the Regiment continues to be necessary.

   c. CX/US and ITT replacements require additional training in "hands on equipment" skills before integration into gaining units.

   d. In-country transferees require some formal orientation/refresher training before integration into gaining units.

6. **Recommendations:**

   a. Emphasize individual and unit training as Vietnamization proceeds.

   b. Ensure the continued availability of in-country specialist training in theater-peculiar MOS as well as critical shortfall MOS.

   c. The monitoring of USARV training requirements by CX/US training agencies to remedy common shortcomings be continued.
PART VI AVIATION

1. General: The aircraft strength of the Regiment is forty-eight, twenty-six in the Air Cavalry Troop (nine OH-6A, and eight UH-1H), ten in the Regimental Aviation Platoon (two OH-6A and eight UH-1H), and the remainder in the three squadron aviation platoons each of which have four aircraft (two OH-6A and two UH-1H). The aircraft within the Regimental Aviation Platoon and the squadron aviation sections are primarily used for command and control, liaison, and courier missions.

2. Maintenance:
   a. Attachment of the 398th Transportation Detachment to the Regiment, and its augmentation with personnel from the service platoon of the air Cavalry Troop and Regimental Aviation Platoon maintenance section continues in effect. In early November the 398th was moved from Long Binh to Di An to join the regiment. This move significantly reduced the problem of delay in posting of records and the blade time required to move an aircraft to and from the maintenance point. The move also did away with the requirement for a forward contact team and centrally located the entire PFL, a portion of which had heretofore been located with the forward contact team.

   b. During the month of October, the Regiment's backup direct support unit was required to move from Bien Hoa to Phu Loi. During the move, responsibility for direct support shifted to another unit already located at Phu Loi. Due to an apparent lack of coordination between the two direct support units, a large number of requisitions were cancelled, causing parts delivery delays on up to two weeks. Also, the maintenance management procedure used by the two direct support units differed. Between the cancellations and procedural differences, valuable maintenance time was lost and numerous hours were spent effecting coordination to place the maintenance system in operation. After the move to Phu Loi was accomplished, the Regiment once again came under the original direct support unit and many of the problems of parts availability and maintenance were solved.

   c. CR rates are shown on charts 14 to 16.

3. Aircraft Equipment:
   a. UH-1H: In November 1970, the UH-1H assigned to the Regiment were modified with the KY-38 FM radio security system.

   b. AH-1G: The AH-1G modifications, which included repositioning of the tail rotor to the right hand side of the aircraft, installation of the environmental control unit (ECU) and the installation of the T-53-L13B engine continued. The XM-28 turret incorporating one M-134 minigun and one XM-129 40mm grenade launcher continued to be a problem. The crossover drive assemblies for the minigun ammunition storage boxes were also a dependability problem. These problems areas are still being studied.
c. CH-54: This aircraft was well suited for reconnaissance operations. The M-27 minigun was a very reliable system and well suited to the scout helicopter role.

d. Nighthawk: The nighthawk was a very fine system when employed in relatively open terrain or rivers and canals. Coordination on firing clearance was essential before launch.

4. Flying Hour Program  In late September 1970, a flying hour program was instituted, the main purpose of which was to reduce blade time (flying time) on all aircraft assigned to the Regiment. A goal of 11.5% reduction from the previous nine-month average was arbitrarily set. In actuality, a 38% reduction from the previous nine-month average was realized within the first two month period without seriously affecting the operational effectiveness of the Regiment (Chart 17).

5. Conclusions:

a. An organic direct-support aviation maintenance unit within the Regiment is desirable. The problems associated with consolidated aircraft maintenance (i.e., scheduling, tool allocation, and personnel allocation) are still being studied in an attempt to determine the optimum system.

b. Backup direct support maintenance units do not follow the standardized maintenance management system.

c. When back-up D3 units are changed, sufficient time must be provided to the supported unit to effect coordination and reconcile requisitions.

d. The establishment of a goal for reduction of flying time is necessary in order to effectively reduce blade time.

e. A secure FM system is highly desirable for all aircraft assigned to the Regiment.

6. Recommendations:

a. Review the aviation maintenance capability of the armored cavalry regiment with a view towards providing an organic direct support maintenance unit in the Regiment's T/O.

b. Require backup direct support maintenance units to follow the standardized maintenance management system.

c. Require a two-week to one-month notification prior to changing the back up direct support maintenance unit of any aviation unit.

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(d) Conduct a comprehensive study of the FK secure voice system of aircraft with a view towards providing secure radio to all aircraft supporting ground units.

(e) Set goals for flying hour expenditure regardless of the intensity of combat.
PART VII ADMINISTRATION, LOGISTICS, AND MAINTENANCE

1. General: Upon the return from Cambodia, the decreased tempo of combat operations allowed and required units of the Regiment to review their administration, supply and maintenance management systems.

a. With the combining of the regimental Forward, rear, and squadron rears in Di An, an extensive effort could be made to establish effective administration programs.

b. An intensive campaign was waged to correct all property book deficiencies. Excess equipment was identified and returned to the supply system.

c. During the entire period a continuous examination was made of maintenance standards and systems. The effort to improve the Regiment's operational readiness posture included several distinct but related programs.

2. Administration Operations:

a. General: Due to the Regiment's continued operation from forward locations under austere conditions, administrative systems and workflow were necessarily placed second in order of priority. The conclusion of the Cambodian action, the subsequent reduction in the tempo of combat operations and the combining of the Regimental Forward with the Basecamp at Di An Base triggered an intense effort to establish effective administrative programs for the Regiment. These are discussed in greater detail in each of the separate areas which follow.

b. Personnel:

(1) Initially, the personnel turbulence of the previous six-month period was considerably reduced primarily due to the large drop in battle casualties. (Chart 18). The redeployment of combat units from the Republic of Vietnam initiated the early DEROS program, thereby producing a higher loss rate through October, November and part of December. This loss rate was offset, however, with Keystone Robin personnel assets which more than adequately filled the gap. Only one problem developed as a result of the heavy input of Keystone Robin assets. Approximately two hundred personnel were received within one thirty (30) day period of mid-September to mid-October who were within sixty (60) days of DEROS. This created a false picture of the Regiment's strength. While these men were used, as effectively as possible, the nearness of their departure prevented many from being used in their MOS. To place them in highly responsible jobs for less than 1 month would have greatly increased the turbulence in critical positions. More effective utilization of personnel would be
achieved if personnel with less than sixty (60) days to Deatus, who have completed ten (10) months service in the Republic of Vietnam, and have no other contractual agreement in their files were immediately returned to CONUS.

(c) Throughout this period, the Regiment was able to maintain an effective strength posture (Chart 10) and has for the most part, operated overstrength in enlisted personnel levels.

(3) The Regiment continued to receive enlisted personnel in grades E-6 through E-8 with physical profiles who could not be assigned to field duty nor perform the duties required of their MOS. In almost all cases these were NCO with a combat MOS and no experience in other fields. Since this is a combat unit, only a limited number can be absorbed into non-combat positions. Action should be taken to reclassify these NCO into non-combat MOS prior to their departure from CONUS.

(4) Shortage MOS continued to be a problem despite the strong assigned strength posture of the Regiment. They fell into several important areas, each of which was critical, and for which replacements were at best difficult to train, not to mention the wear and tear on equipment resulting from such training (Chart 20). No other significant shortages continued for any length of time.

c. Postal Operations: Postal facilities were moved to renovated locations to provide more effective postal service. This action combined with more staff supervision of the 7th Army Postal Unit (APU) completely reduced the postal difficulties previously encountered. In November 1970, the 46th APU relieved the 7th APU of all responsibilities for APO 96289. With this transfer of responsibility, the 7th APO moved, in its entirety to the center of the Regiment's cantonment.

d. Consolidation of Personnel Operations: The Regiment is presently authorized a total of 4 warrant officers and thirty-three enlisted personnel to perform all personnel functions for an organization with an authorized strength of approximately 4500 officers and men. The Headquarters Personnel Office services 1200 to 1400 officers and men in addition to functioning as a supervisory activity and reporting agency for the three squadron personnel offices. The authorized manpower for personnel sections required to provide personnel services to this great number of men in a combat zone is completely unsatisfactory. In order to operate effectively, assigned personnel levels in these offices were doubled, with the greatest increase occurring in the headquarters personnel office due to its increased supervisory and reporting responsibilities. This M0S deficiency is further compounded by the redundancy of effort which occurs in a command of this size where personnel operations are split into separate chains of command and capability is fragmented into four separate offices. The magnitude of the duties of a unit personnel
11G20 - Indirect Fire Crewman AUTH: 108

17K20 - Radar Surveillance Spec AUTH: 105

17K40 - Radar Surveillance Spec AUTH: 18

Chart 20: MOS Shortages

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71T20 Main Data Spec AUTH: 24

76820 Auto Repair Parts Spec AUTH: 23

Chart 20: NSG Shortages (Continued)

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technician have so broadened in scope and volume in recent years as to render the task of devoting adequate time and attention to each area of responsibility a virtual impossibility. The consolidated personnel office provides for more effective supervision by providing greater specialization, a reduction in scope of responsibility and more rapid reaction to command requirements while also allowing for the establishment of more uniform personnel policies. The paramount issue is efficiency. The elimination of four supervisory channels in the present personnel operation, the supervisory advantages, and the consolidated personnel office's ability to react quickly, all lead to more efficient organization and operations.

e. Conclusions:

(1) The assignment of Keystone personnel with less than sixty days remaining on their tours creates a costly burden on the gaining command.

(2) Enlisted personnel (Grades E-6 to E-8) with profiles continue to be assigned to combat units despite their duty limitations, creating supervisory and morale difficulties.

(3) Unit personnel offices at squadron level should be consolidated into the regimental headquarters as a regimental personnel office.

f. Recommendations:

(1) Return to CONUS for reassignment or ETS, those personnel from redeploying units who have completed ten months or 5/6 of their normal service tours.

(2) Revise Army Regulations governing the assignment of senior enlisted men with profiles. A soldier should be required to waive his profile or accept training for a non-combat MOS.

(3) Reorganize the existing personnel activities of the armored cavalry regiment into a consolidated personnel office in accordance with the guidelines contained in DA Pamphlet 600-6.

3. Logistics:

a. General Concepts:

(1) During the Cambodian operations the Regiment was resupplied by a combination of airlift (CH-47 helicopter) and land convoys. With the termination of the Cambodian operations and the move to Di An, the same combination of air and land resupply continued, however, significantly more tonnages were moved by land as conservation of blade time was required.
(2) Classes I, II and III were provided by the 223rd Supply and Services Company with supply point distribution at Di An. Class IV, V, VII and IX were drawn from the appropriate depot or tech supply in Long Binh. Squadrons and separate units drew their own supplies, except for Class IV. Once drawn, the subordinate units were responsible for all distribution.

(3) Class IV was drawn by the Regimental S-4. Until early September all Class IV items were stored in and issued from the regimental staging area located at the northeast end of Long Binh. This area was closed and cleared in September and a small S-4 storage yard for Class IV was established at Di An. Unit issue was then made from this yard. This change was made to reduce transportation requirements and to improve the S-4 span of control.

b. Airlift:

(1) The Regiment remained dependent on helicopter airlift for the distribution of supplies from squadron fire support bases to the troop positions. Since July a sharp reduction has been made in the amount of supplies lifted from Di An to squadron and troop locations. This was necessitated by blade time restrictions imposed by IIFFV. (See Chart 21)

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NOTE: Tonnage for September, October, and November does not include approximately 100 tons per month flown for 2/11 by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

Chart 21: CH-47 Monthly Tonnage
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(2) In early September the 2nd Squadron was placed under OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (A/C). Their area of operations was well east of FSB MACE (vic Gia Ra Mountain). To support their operations a logistical base was established at FSB Riviera, near Ham Tam. Once established, the Squadron was supported by a land convoy every eight days. Classes I and IIIA were flown in every other day by USAF C-7A or C130 aircraft. A daily dedicated sortie of one U-2 (Otter) was provided by 1st ACD. The latter two flights were used to ease the administrative burden and to move personnel. The squadron also received CH-47 support from the 1st ACD. In general, supplies were lifted from FSB Riviera to troop positions. (Note: airlift provided to support 2nd Squadron’s operations are not included in the figures shown in chart 21).

c. Excess Equipment: A major effort was made to identify excess property and equipment. For equipment that was excess, and for which turn-in credit was not needed, the USAKV Free Turn-in program was used. If turn-in credit was required, the regular property turn in procedures were followed. Lastly, excess equipment that was not on the property books, but was considered mission essential, was picked up under the Vietnamese Asset Reconciliation Procedures (VARP).

4. Maintenance:

a. Problem areas:

(1) The major problem in the maintenance program continued to be an inadequate flow of Class IX repair parts. Since the operational pace had slowed, the Regiment no longer had the combat losses that previously provided 30% of the required repair parts and thus had to rely on the maintenance supply system which was not adequately responsive. For example, neither tires nor batteries could be obtained at the Direct Exchange (DX) point unless the vehicle was on the deadline report. Due to the shortage of fuel and electric repair kits and direct support level, the Regiment periodically had vehicles on deadline for two weeks or longer waiting for DX parts. FILL zero balances ran close to 50% throughout the period. This resulted in vehicles being deadlined and Red Ball requisitions being submitted. This latter action is expensive and needlessly inflates the deadline report with a corresponding reduction in the operational readiness rate. (See Charts 22 through 27).

(2) To improve maintenance support for the Regiment, Saigon Support Command was directed, in mid-November, to provide the Regiment with its own Direct Support Maintenance Company, to include a tech supply. While the advantages of having an organic direct support unit are clear, the unit that Saigon Support Command has been directed to provide may be an example of "too little, too late". Had this action taken place as little as two years ago when personnel and equipment were more readily available, the formation of a DSU would have been highly desirable. With the present
CHART 24: Deadline Rate, M109
M1LO9 AUTH: 18 O/H: 18
CHART 25: Deadline Rate, M113A1
M113A1 AUTH: 264 O/H: 266
CHART 26: Deadline Rate, M548

CHART 27: Deadline Rate, M578

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draw down and resultant high turnover of personnel, such action will be extreme difficult, especially since the key elements, tech supply, and electronic maintenance must be started from the very beginning.

(3) The Army Maintenance Management System (AMMS) continues to be awkward and exceedingly difficult to use in a combat zone. The personnel responsible for its operation are simply not adequately trained. There is a chronic shortage of trained AMMS clerks, and junior officers have not been trained to understand the system.

(4) The MTOL for the regiment does not provide any personnel for the S-4 section to manage maintenance, although approximately 75% of the effort of the entire S-4 section was devoted to maintenance management. This will become even more critical when the DSU is attached to the regiment. The S-4 will be required to provide this unit with the guidance and assistance that normally would be provided by the ES Battalion Materiel Officer. Until early September the regiment had a major serving in S-4 maintenance as well as a major in S-4 logistics. This was intentionally reduced to one major, S-4, who was responsible for both functions, and three captains were assigned to assist in maintenance management.

b. Maintenance Programs:

(1) Standdows: During the period July - September each squadron was given a three week maintenance standdown. Coordination was made with supporting ordnance to provide the extra parts and supplies to support this program. Each squadron received a CWS from the Saigon Support Command Team during the last five days of its stand-down. In general, the first two squadrons through the program received adequate support. However, the excessive drain they placed on the system depleted depot stocks and less than adequate supplies were available for the remaining squadron. Overall, the standdowns were effective in raising the maintenance standards of the units.

(2) Quarterly Services: Since the intensity of enemy operations was relatively low in the regiment's area of operation it became feasible for the squadrons to perform essentially full quarterly services (Q-checks) on a scheduled basis. In general, these services were performed one platoon at a time in the vicinity of the squadron FSB.

(3) Operator/Crew Maintenance: As the level of enemy activity allowed the regiment the opportunity to concentrate more on maintenance, a program was started in October requiring each unit to devote 25% of its field time to maintenance of vehicles and maintenance instruction. This program included a requirement for one full day per week for each troop company. A part of this full day was devoted to operator level training on how to operate and maintain selected items of equipment.
(4) Wheel Vehicles:

(a) The initial focus of the maintenance effort was on the combat (track) vehicles in the squadrons. However, in late September and early October, CMI inspections were scheduled for the units of the Provisional Squadron located at Di An (Included: HET, aCT, 37th Med Co, 919th Engr Co, 33rd Chem Det and 541st MID). These units were not given the benefit of a standdown prior to their inspection. Each unit, with the exception of the 541st MID, failed its initial inspection. Re-inspections were scheduled until all units had successfully passed all phases of the CMI.

(b) A wheeled vehicle Safety Spot Check team was started in late September. The original purpose of this team was to reduce accidents. The team, consisting of two mechanics with a vehicle, would position itself near a gate of Di An Base Camp and would randomly stop regimental vehicles. They would inspect the vehicle, looking primarily at safety items (brakes, lights, tires, etc) and checked obvious first echelon requirements (water level, oil level, batteries, etc). The results were recorded on a DA Form 2404 and turned in daily to the C-4. They were then reviewed by the executive officer and returned to the units. This program aided significantly in reducing accidents and daily focused attention on wheel vehicles maintenance.

(5) The units in the Regiment conducted a massive FLL improvement program during the month of November. This program included a complete review of all technical manuals to recomputed the authorized FLL based on vehicle density; a verification of all data based on demand, an inventory, a reconciliation with 185th Maintenance Battalion Tech Supply, the re-requisitioning of all zero balance and below stockage level items, and the turn in of excess. Additionally, the Long Binh Army Depot was directed to issue on a one-time basis all zero balance items in the Regiment's FLL. This issue was to be directly to the units in one concerted effort to bring the FLL up to a satisfactory stockage level, (i.e. 80 - 85% full). This project was underway at the time this report was submitted and the results have not yet materialized. It is felt however, this will significantly increase the stock of FLLs and contribute to a higher O/R rate.

c. CMMEL:

(1) CMMEL Maintenance was also provided by the 185th Maintenance Battalion. The battalion placed a very limited repair capability with the DS contact Maintenance Unit and retained the bulk of the support capability in the Electronics Maintenance Platoon located at Long Binh. This required the Regiment and squadron's radio repairmen to deliver and pick up equipment from the Long Binh facility.
(2) Maintenance of the VHC-12 and PRC-25 series radios was satisfactory. The equipment is reliable and the unit repairmen did repair from 30-40% of the inoperative equipment and return it to the field. The effect of deadline radio equipment was further reduced by the float radios accumulated by the units. The deadline rate of radios in support maintenance averaged between 7 and 11% with the USAV standard of 15% exceeded only for short periods when replacement modules became scarce. There was no DX capability at the 1S maintenance unit.

(3) The ground surveillance radar maintenance was not as effective. The deadline rate averaged between 20 and 30%, sometimes moving as high as 50%, and rarely below the 15% USAV standard. The regiment had a total of 20 FPS-5A, FPS-5, and FPS-5A radars. The organizational level maintenance capability and authority was negligible requiring equipment to be evacuated to RG maintenance for all repairs. Once evacuated, the set was lost to the unit for nearly a week. The majority of radar sets were located at the troop level and carried in the tracked vehicles to be set up for operations in Night Defensive Positions (NDP). It is believed that the high deadline rate was attributable to the frequent movement of this relatively sensitive equipment and the shortage of trained personnel.

d. Conclusions:

(1) Class IX supply was unsatisfactory.

(2) The TAMM system has not worked.

(3) If the TAMM system is to remain in operation, more qualified enlisted personnel must be provided to support it and junior officers must receive more training in the system.

(4) The MTCE of the regiment should be modified to include maintenance management personnel in the S-4 section.

(5) The proposed DSU for attachment to the regiment in early 1971 will improve the maintenance posture of the regiment only when an effective tech supply capability has been established.

e. Recommendations:

(1) A review of the Class IX supply system be conducted to increase the availability of high-demand items.

(2) A review of TAMM be made to greatly simplify the system.

(3) Adequate trained personnel be available to support TAMM, and officers be better trained in the system.
(2) Maintenance of the VRC-12 and PRC-25 series radios was satisfactory. The equipment is reliable and the unit repairmen did repair from 30-40% of the inoperative equipment and return it to the field. The effect of deadlined radio equipment was further reduced by the float radios accumulated by the units. The deadline rate of radios in support maintenance averaged between 7 and 11% with the USAF standard of 15% exceeded only for short periods when replacement modules became scarce. There was no DX capability at the DS maintenance unit.

(3) The ground surveillance radar maintenance was not as effective. The deadline rate averaged between 20 and 30%, sometimes moving as high as 50%, and rarely below the 15% USAF standard. The regiment had a total of 20 FRC-44, FPS-5, and FPS-5A radars. The organizational level maintenance capability and authority was negligible requiring equipment to be evacuated to DS maintenance for all repairs. Once evacuated, the set was lost to the unit for nearly a week. The majority of radar sets were located at the troop level and carried in the tracked vehicles to be set up for operations in Night Defensive Positions (NDP). It is believed that the high deadline rate was attributable to the frequent movement of this relatively sensitive equipment and the shortage of trained personnel.

d. Conclusions:

(1) Class IX supply was unsatisfactory.

(2) The TAMMS system has not worked.

(3) If the TAMMS system is to remain in operation, more qualified enlisted personnel must be provided to support it and junior officers must receive more training in the system.

(4) The MTOE of the regiment should be modified to include maintenance management personnel in the S-4 section.

(5) The proposed DSU for attachment to the Regiment in early 1971 will improve the maintenance posture of the regiment only when an effective tech supply capability has been established.

e. Recommendations:

(1) A review of the Glass IX supply system be conducted to increase the availability of high-demand items.

(2) A review of TAMMS be made to greatly simplify the system.

(3) Adequate trained personnel be available to support TAMMS, and officers be better trained in the system.

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(4) Provide 70% maintenance management personnel for the 5-4 section.

(5) The proposed DSU to be attached to the regiment be attached only after all sections are at 95% strength with qualified personnel and the tech supply is stocked with at least 80% of its ASL.
PART VIII ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

1. General: The Regiment was organized under TOE 17-51G. Applicable approved MTOE are shown on chart 28. On 15 September 1970, Headquarters USARV, initiated a project designed to convert all authorization documents to the new "overlay" format prescribed in Ar 310-49, The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS). After 1 January 1971, the initial detailed MTOE in the new format will be updated to correct numerous deficiencies which exist in order to provide the Regiment with a set of authorization documents which properly reflect present requirements for personnel and equipment. Below are the significant changes accomplished by MTOE action to date.

2. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop:

   a. Staff manning augmentations were authorized to permit a limited capability for continuous 24 hour operation.

   b. an 55 (MAJ) and a Civil Affairs Team of one officer and four enlisted men were authorized to provide the Regiment with civil affairs and psychological operations capability. This section also assumed control of the Kit Carson Scout Program.

   c. A Casualty Reporting Team was incorporated into the Regimental Headquarters, to fulfill the requirements of the casualty reporting system.

   d. An Awards and Decorations Team was added to handle the administrative requirements involved with recognizing the achievements of Blackhorse Troopers.

   e. A Special Services Section was authorized to provide the services required for the maintenance of morale.

   f. The need for coordinating artillery and mortar fire clearances and for trained artillery officers to assist the squadrons in the efficient employment of their batteries was recognized when a Fire Support Element of five officers and nine enlisted men was placed in the Regimental Headquarters. It is felt that since this requirement for an FSE is so demanding, consideration should be given for the establishment of such an FSE in TOE 17-52G for the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (Part IV, para 8a).

   g. A Replacement Detachment was authorized within the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop to accomplish initial processing and mandatory in-country training required for replacements to the Regiment.

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## CURRENT ORGANIZATION AUTHORIZATIONS

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| TOTALS                     | 231 | 82 | 4181 | 44 | 4494 |

* Recognized requirement, not authorized

VIII-82

Chart 28: Current Organization Authorization
b. The Scout Section was equipped with the M113A1 in the Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV) configuration rather than wheeled vehicles.

3. The Armored Cavalry Squadrons:
   a. Squadron Headquarters and Headquarters Troop:
      (1) Staff manning levels were augmented to provide a 24 hour operating capability, and to handle functions such as civic action not provided by TOE.
      (2) The Air Defense Sections were deleted.
      (3) A Flame Thrower Section was added, consisting of three M132 flame tracks and three M4 track mounted flame service units. The XM45E1 track mounted service units were issued in lieu of the M4 but these proved unsatisfactory and are being replaced.
      (4) The Transportation Section of the Squadron Support Platoon was changed to authorize eight M548 tracked cargo carriers and reduce the number of five ten trucks from twenty-three to fifteen.
   b. The Armored Cavalry Troop:
      (1) All M114 command and reconnaissance vehicles were replaced by the M113A1 APC in the ACAV configuration. Additional Senior Scout Observers and Scout Observers were authorized to man the armament subsystem on the M113A1.
      (2) The Ground Surveillance Section was doubled in size, however it is still necessary to update the MOS of these personnel to the "174" series.
      (3) 81mm mortars and carriers were authorized to provide the support squads with a better weapon for close indirect fire support of the troop. Due to an error the 4.2 inch mortar and carriers were not deleted during the modification of the TOE.

   (e) Rifle Squad – One of the primary deficiencies was the lack of a usable rifle squad. It was determined that the authorization for rifle squads did exist, however with enlisted strength below 100%, vehicle crewman vacancies were filled from the rifle squad. Tapping the rifle squads for crewman vacancies is the common solution to this problem in cavalry regiments throughout the Army. Infantry requirements for use in low-intensity counterinsurgency operations are discussed in Part V, paragraph 4 (Principles of Employment).

   c. The Tank Company: The M60 tank was replaced by the M48A3 tank.

VIII-83
d. The Redtzer Battery:

   (1) A light tracked recovery vehicle was added to the battery headquarters.

   (2) The Battery Security Section was deleted because there was no clear mission for the section.

   (3) The Forward Observer Teams were authorized the M113A1 in the AAV configuration so they could remain with the armored cavalry troops. A fourth FO team is necessary for the tank company, but has not yet been added to the NBC.

4. The Provisional Squadron:

   a. 33d Chemical Detachment: Two truck mounted decontamination units were authorized to provide a defoliation capability for the Regiment. Two XM3 airborne concealed personnel detectors ("People Sniffers") are on hand but still must be authorized.

   b. 37th Medical Company: The Ambulance Platoon was reduced in size because the major portion of all casualties are care-advanced. These positions were "traded-off" to the 396th Transportation Detachment (Aft Maint).

   c. 396th Transportation Detachment (Aft Maint): The detachment was increased in strength to enable it to accomplish its DS maintenance responsibilities for the Regiment.

   d. 541st Military Intelligence Detachment: Vietnamese linguists were authorized in the Interrogation Section, and the Order of Battle Section was augmented to provide sufficient personnel to cope with the demanding task of keeping accurate order of battle data.

   e. 519th Engineer Company:

      (1) The Bridge Platoon Headquarters and two Bridge Sections were deleted due to the absence of a requirement for M476 Class 60 bridging.

      (2) The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge Section was increased with a third AVLB lamaher.

      (3) A fourth Engineer Platoon was added to provide engineer support to the rear elements of the Regiment and to provide back-up for the platoons supporting the three squadrons.

   f. Augmentation TDA: An augmentation TDA for the Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop was approved to facilitate the operation
of Di An Army Base. This document, however, fails to authorize the required personnel and these positions must be filled from available resources. A USARV Manning Adjustment of three officers and twelve enlisted men fills part of this requirement.

5. The Air Cavalry Troop:

a. The airborne positions of the TOE 17-78G were changed to delete the "F" MOS suffix.

b. A troop mess team was added to the Service Platoon.

c. Although the Air Cavalry Troop now has the AH-1G "Cobra" and crew chiefs (MOS 671X), neither are reflected in its authorization document. The MTOE should delete the two Air Cavalry Antitank squads and increase the number of Air Cavalry Rocket Squads to four. Alternatively, consideration should be given to reorganizing the Air Cavalry Troop under a modification of TOE 17-58G, Air Cavalry Troop, Armored Cavalry Regiment, rather than under its present modification of TOE 17-78G, Air Cavalry Troop, Armored Cavalry Squadron, Airborne Division.

6. Automotive Equipment: The following comments concerning the Regiment's equipment were made by the preceding commander, however, they remain valid and need continued emphasis.

a. M113A1, ACAV: The value of the belly armor kits for these vehicles was recognized and a major effort was made to obtain enough kits for 100% coverage of the M113 family of vehicles. Presently only 18 vehicles of the M113 family (less the M548) do not have belly armor kits. This vehicle is one of the most dependable in the Regiment's inventory with only occasional shortages in supply. The common items that habitually run in short supply are roadwheels, track, final drives, and wiring harnesses. Generally speaking, major assemblies are readily available.

b. N951 Sheridan:

(1) All current modifications have been applied with the exception of the searchlight guard and a very small number (approximately 6) of the other M48s in the 2nd Squadron. Problems continue to be encountered with the bustle rack which is not strong enough to carry combat loads. The reason given for not improving the bustle rack is such improvements would make the bustle too heavy and would affect the operation of the turret. Pre-assembled deck carriers would help solve storage of combat loads.

(2) Additional requirements needed to improve combat effectiveness:

(a) More horsepower is required to make the Sheridan suitable for jungle busting, recovering other vehicles, and easing the strain on the
engine during convoy escort when the vehicle is heavily loaded with ammunition, water cans, and personal belongings. I understand from the CDRUS M551 Project Manager that a modification has been developed to significantly lower engine temperature. This modification should be expedited in every way possible as overheating is a major cause of Sheridan engine failure.

(b) Caseless ammunition continues to prove unsatisfactory. While reported instances of secondary explosions are low (approximately 10% of all Sheridans combat lost since 1 Jan 70), such explosions usually kill or severely injure crewmembers. In addition to the hazard of secondary explosions, ammunition is frequently cracked, chipped, or water soaked and becomes unfit for combat use.

(c) The turret of the M551 continues to be unreliable. Maintenance of the turret is still not understood by most turret mechanics. While an influx of personnel with MOS 45K is expected in the near future, this action will merely treat the symptom and not the cause of failures. As presently configured the turret is extremely complicated, very difficult to maintain, and easily susceptible to damage through adverse weather and handling in the field. Responsiveness of the turret needs to be improved so that the time from target acquisition to firing, with battlesights, is reduced to a maximum of 10 seconds.

(d) Guntube seals have remained weak, requiring the gun to be exercised twice a week. Due to the remoteness of field locations and the dictates of particular tactical situations, it is often not practical to exercise the gun tubes each week, particularly if the A.C. contains numerous no-fire zones. Firing the main gun is the most effective and least time consuming method.

c. M48A1 Battle Tank: Fire control instruments are not used on the tanks as the great majority of targets are engaged at less than 300 meters with a canister round. Failure of the final drive did not occur as often during the last six months as it did during the preceding six months. During October and November tank engines began failing with increased regularity. Fuel contamination was eliminated as a contributing cause after steps were taken to remove water from the blivits. Inspection by a TAGCM Tech Rep indicates a piston ring manufacturing defect. Overall the Battle Tank has proved to be durable and reliable. It is especially valuable during the dry season for jungle busting and for its reliable firing system.

d. M125A1 Mortar Carrier: The Regiment now has only the M125A1, the last six having been acquired in October. This Mortar Carrier is a satisfactory vehicle with the same reliability of an ACAV.

e. M109 Howitzer 155MSE: Hydraulic lines rusted through frequently
and were very hard to replace. The most common other failures were the elevating cylinder, the fan vane assembly and the engine.

f. M58 Tank Recovery Vehicle: This vehicle should be diesel powered to reduce the danger of fire and to preclude mixed fuel requirements in the field. Currently 2 squadrons have an extra M88 on temporary loan, an expedient solution at best. Two additional 88's are needed in each squadron. This requirement is necessary due to the combination of recovery and maintenance related lifting missions. With the distances that frequently separate the squadron from its source of supply, all vehicles are subject to longer than average periods of down time, especially if the needed part is too large to carry on a Un-MH. Down time for the M88 has an immediate unfavorable impact on maintenance and recovery operations throughout the squadron. The M88 requires more maintenance than most combat vehicles, and an effective way to keep all the vehicles running is by utilizing a rotation system. One M88 is pulled from the field location and driven to the basecamp where it is completely serviced in accordance with the lube order. All other organizational maintenance is performed at this time. It is then returned to the fire support base and another M88 is brought in. Since each squadron is authorized only 2 M88's this program could have never been instituted had it not been for the temporary loan assets currently on hand within the Regiment.

g. M578 Light Recovery Vehicle: There are two major drawbacks to this vehicle; lack of crowd capability and chronic auxiliary drive failure. Without crowd capability on the M578 boom, the entire vehicle has to be inched forward and backward occasionally resulting in damage to major assemblies. Another drawback is the inability to pull a gun tube with the 578. The auxiliary drive continuously develops cracks in the housing. Replacement auxiliary drives are in critically short supply throughout EUC. Idler arms have shown a tendency to snap off at the hull when neutral steer is executed while carrying a heavy load.

h. M548 Cargo Carrier: This workhorse of the Regiment experiences only one major weakness; the transfer. As in the case with the M578 auxiliary drive, the M548 transfer is an exceedingly difficult assembly to replace.

i. Conclusions: It is concluded that the requirements set forth in the automotive equipment section are necessary to improve armored cavalry counterinsurgency operations.

j. Recommendations: Action to produce modifications or engineering improvements in automotive equipment be taken as listed below:

1. M551 Sheridan:

(a) An improved engine offering more horsepower but generating less heat.
(b) Cased ammunition to replace the combustible cartridge.

(c) A hydraulic system to replace the present turret configuration or significant improvement of the present system that will result in a reliable and easy to maintain turret system.

(d) Improved turret controls to provide fire capability within 10 seconds of target acquisition.

(e) More durable main seals that will require less frequent exercising.

(f) A stronger bustle rack that will carry combat loads common to operations in Vietnam or rear deck carriers to supplement the bustle rack.

(2) M48A3 Main Battle Tank: an improved quality control program to eliminate internal defects in the engine.

(3) M109 Howitzer: an improved elevating cylinder repair kit to increase the life of the cylinder.


(5) M578 Light Recovery Vehicle:

(a) A redesigned boom to provide a crowd capability (articulated boom).

(b) A strengthened magnetic clutch housing to reduce high failure rates.

(c) Improved idler arm to prevent breaking when turning with a load.

(6) M548 Cargo Carrier: An improved lubrication system in the transfer to prevent bearing failure.
PART IX INSTALLATION COORDINATION

1. General: When the regimental rear moved from Bien Hoa to Di an in April 1970, the Regiment assumed the responsibility for installation coordination from the departing 1st Infantry Division. Support provided to the 1500 - 2000 non-regimental troops residing at Di an included postal, special services, post exchange, education office, civilian personal office, central post fund, base defense, base development and services, and hold baggage shipment. A smooth changeover was insured as many of the personnel of the 1st Infantry Division merely changed patches and continued in the same positions. When the Regiment returned from Cambodia, the Regimental Forward, Provisional Squadron, and the three squadron rear moved all moved to Di an, which then became the official home of the Blackhorse Regiment.

2. Facilities Management:

a. During the period a continued movement of units in and out of Di an occurred. Most taxing on the efficient management of facilities was the standdown of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. There was no centralized portion of the base to open to them, so they were moved into small areas scattered over the southern half of the base. Electrical upgrade teams were required to make livable those buildings stripped when the 1st Infantry Division redeployed. Throughout the period, vacant buildings were subject to such stripping of wood and electrical equipment. The only way to completely secure vacant buildings was to have someone living in them.

b. Before the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division cleared Di an, use of the buildings they occupied was frozen pending a decision on making Di an a permanent standdown area. When the negative decision was received, the brigade commenced movement out of Di an with all their station property, including four complete mess halls. This necessitated the finding of new mess hall equipment for subsequent incoming units.

3. Base Defense: Base Defense of US Army Base Di an was assumed by the Regiment directly from the 1st Infantry Division on 1 April 1970. Until the Regiment returned from Cambodia, the defenses were manned by a security company whose duties were strictly defense of the basecamp. This Regiment, unlike other units in Vietnam does not rotate squadrons, or even troops into the basecamp. Thus, security has to be an additional duty of the personnel operating the squadron rear and the Provisional Squadron units. Tenant units provided their fair share of the perimeter defense. To insure continual high standards, 2 officers and 10 enlisted men man the base defense TOO and each unit details 1 to 3 men permanent guard supervisory responsibilities.

IX-89
4. Manning:

a. As soon as the Regiment assumed the responsibility of installation coordination at Di an, a request for increased military manning level was submitted to USAVC. This requested BM was based on the numbers of men 1st Infantry Division had employed to run the base. Of the 13 officers and 101 enlisted men requested, only 8 officers and 55 enlisted men were acknowledged as valid requirements. Thus the Regiment was required to levy tenant units and itself for 4 officers and 34 enlisted men. The type of jobs these personnel were to perform were permanent in nature rather than additional duties, and for all practical purposes, the units from which they had come no longer had any particular claim to their talents. As a result, the units were extremely reluctant to offer up high quality personnel. Support for the 3500-4500 troops operating in the field but dependent on facilities here cannot be provided by 4 officers and 22 enlisted men. Presently 9 officers and 66 enlisted men perform these support requirements. This is one of the major contributing factors to our headquarters overstrength, but a very necessary strength to adequately provide such morale-essential support.

5. Conclusions:

(a) Complete security of vacant buildings is not feasible without actual guard posts which are unacceptable from a manpower viewpoint and would be debilitating on morale. Buildings to be vacant for any length of time should, therefore, have valuable items such as fans and electrical fixtures removed and the buildings boarded up and posted off-limits.

(b) Units closing out property books on bases not being turned over to the A.V.N should be allowed to transfer garrison mess equipment to the installation manager for use by subsequently assigned units.

(c) A unit of regimental size does not have within its TOE the capability of adequately performing the functions of installation coordinator. TDA authorize is necessary.

6. Recommendations:

(a) Direct installation engineers to secure vacated buildings by removing valuable items and completely boarding up each building.

(b) Direct redeploying units to coordinate with the installation engineer prior to removing garrison mess property from a residual base-camp.

(c) Prepare a standard TDA for each installation to perform installation coordination functions.

(d) Place the standard TDA authorization recommended above under the control of the unit commander assuming the responsibility of Installation Coordinator. IX-90
PART I  SPECIAL ISSUES

1. Human Relations:

   a. The Regiment developed an unstructured but effective program initially at Regimental level, subsequently at the squadron and, in a few cases, at troop level. The program centered on the black-white race relations issue but encompassed all minority groups. The council was formed to meet an acute situation which developed in mid-August 1970. At this time the NCO/EM Club had been literally taken over by a group of black militantes supported by a number of black Masters at Arms, who were in effective control of the Club. So acute was the situation that weapons were being carried into the club by members of the majority and minority groups. A mugging, usually an assault by a group of black soldiers on a white NCO, occurred during the first half of August on a nightly basis. Inside the club, members of both groups would be called to attention when the black leader arrived; whereupon he would give them parade rest before allowing anyone to sit down.

   b. In this tension-charged atmosphere the first known regimental Human Relations Council began functioning and as it still does today, without a single piece of paper. At the same time there were a number of fragmentation and C3 grenade incidents fortunately without serious injury to anyone, but racially inspired. The initial situation was resolved by closing the club for a period of three days, changing all the Masters at Arms, appointing a new manager, transferring key troublemakers (less than six) to remote field assignments and opening up channels of communication with minority group members. The results were dramatic and exceeded anything that could have been reasonably expected based on the action taken. There was an immediate cessation of racial incidents, with no further trouble at the NCO/EM Club; not a single mugging, assault on a NCO; and only one assault upon another man in which race tension was not the cause. So relatively favorable did the situation become that the Regiment has been able to accept several black militants who were in trouble in other units and successfully integrate them into the Regiment—thus far without incident.

   c. No claim is made to having found an optimal, let alone ideal, solution. Like every segment of U.S. society, the Regiment continues to sit upon a powder keg. The difference is that something positive is being done at the level of timely reaction to incipient crises before they mushroom into unruly crowd situations involving large numbers of personnel from both groups. More important is the positive program, directed against the basic causes of alienation and resentment by minority groups. The goal is a social climate in which minority group members believe justice and equal opportunity are being accorded them; thus making it unnecessary to resort to violent behavior to make their point. There is no way this climate can be simulated or "faked"; it must actually exist or be created. Of equal importance, the actions taken to create and preserve the new climate
must be of such a nature that they are believed and accepted by the minority groups. This is another case where the perception of what is happening is as important as the reality.

d. Conclusions:

1. There is a need for a human relations council at regimental, squadron and troop level. These councils should be integrated but with the majority of members from minority groups. One member must be in the chain of command.

2. The work of the council must be focused on opening all channels of communication and solving problems, not just talking of them.

3. This program works best when it is demonstrative rather than declaratory. An absence of paper promoted the credibility and success of the program.

e. Recommendations:

1. Human relations (racial) councils be employed down to troop/company/battery and separate detachment levels, with members selected for their sense of fairness. One member be from the chain of command.

2. Councils be organized and structured around action programs rather than theoretical models.

3. Commanders and leaders at all levels be exhorted to report any incident with racial overtones through the chain of command to the council. Spot reports should continue on up the chain of command.

2. Drug Advisory and Amnesty Program:

a. The relative success of the drug program lies in the fact it is a demonstrative one of rather intense involvement and commitment on the part of its activists. Unlike the Human Relations Program, a prototype drive program did exist in early 1970, but it was declaratory and made little headway. No disparagement of preceding commanders is implied. Virtually no unit in Vietnam had an effective program until very recently. During the period through the Cambodian campaign the heavy press of sustained major combat operations occupied the time and energies of all concerned. Further, it was not until mid-summer 1970 that the magnitude of the problem in all units in Vietnam was fully appreciated. In short, the Regiment was no quicker or slower than any other unit to recognize the problem and develop an action rather than a paper program. The problem in the Regiment is compounded by the well known high potency of drugs; their low cost and the fact they are available almost anywhere. Results were relatively good despite a late start in the latter part of August. The program began with a formal Regimental Council composed of one representative from each subordinate unit, key staff members, especially the Chaplain, Surgeon, and the Legal Officer. The three key elements of
the program continue to be education, amnesty and deterrent punishment. The program operates on a face-to-face persuasion basis with the active involvement of key officers and noncommissioned officers genuinely interested in helping personnel involved with drugs. A key factor in the Regimental program was the early and increasingly effective use of former drug users. Through trial and error it was learned that the greatest success was achieved when the program carried with it understanding and a sincere effort to provide personalized assistance. Individual attention, combined with an element of consideration and respect for the subject assisted in destroying the barriers to an effective program.

b. Another facet of the program was the early decision to experiment with a number of approaches and not attempt to impose a uniform program upon the entire regiment. At times this resulted in some incoherent sub-programs, but in the long run it paid dividends in ventilating what would not work to the satisfaction of all concerned. This unstructured approach helped win maximum support from the medical, chaplain, and legal officers in a way an authoritatively directed program would never have done. Although the three aspects of the program fused at almost every step of the way with the same person doing some of all three, they can be categorized separately.

(1) Education: So much ignorance and confusion existed through the early fall among users, would-be helpers, and those antipathetical to the program that a rather massive education program was required. Conducted at three levels it sought to accurately inform users, those sympathetic to their plight and those who believed any drug user should be summarily court-martialed and boarded. More formal and specific guidance was also prepared and regularly scheduled councils and educational programs were implemented. The initial training was programmed for the Pierce Cavalry Training School and presented between mid-September and mid-December to approximately 1,500 new personnel (both in-country transfers and men from COMUS). Other classroom sessions have been presented to approximately 380 officers and non-commissioned officers on the subject of supervisory responsibilities with regard to the amnesty program, counseling techniques, the legal aspects of the Drug Advisory Program, and detection methods. Heavy emphasis was placed on the importance of creating an understanding and well motivated personal effort on the part of supervisors at the unit level to assist personnel who request aid under the amnesty program. Command emphasis was used to demonstrate that the drug program held priority equal to operations and maintenance. Primarily for the drug user, known, suspected and potential, a crash program was carried out by a panel composed of a guitar-playing Chaplain, a doctor who did not necessarily believe there was anything medically wrong with using marijuana and a lawyer who painted the legal consequences, both civil and military, of drug use in appropriately stark terms. This panel which also reached every member of the Regiment proved to be most effective, largely because they were honest. Additionally the same panel which managed to achieve exceptional support with everyone
reached, also conducted special sessions with the officers and NCO's. Perhaps more than by any other medium their message was received by the "older generation".

(2) Amnesty: This part of the program presented initial difficulty because not all troop commanders were at first willing to respond in any but a punitive manner. Even as this attitude was overcome, it became apparent that the drug addicts and the professional men helping them were unwilling in some cases to seek amnesty from their unit commander. Fear of his reaction was unwarranted in most cases but fear was not the only reason. In a surprising number of cases the reason for not wanting to seek out the commander was shame and a desire to prevent a highly respected commander from the learning of the addict's degradation. Some insight was gained from this reaction on how addicts regard themselves. The amnesty program can be brought into action in individual cases where the man seeks help from either a commander, chaplain, surgeon or lawyer. Clearly, there is no requirement to bring in all four to make the program work, but even more clearly is the fact that the program can never operate to its full potential until a properly motivated and orientated commander joins the effort to help the man. Use of enlisted men with undergraduate and graduate degrees in psychology and counseling teamed with former drug addicts increased the effectiveness of the initial treatment phase of the amnesty program. The latter two groups of personnel are, of course, used in all other phases as well.

(3) Punishment: Where drug addicts break faith with the amnesty program in such a manner as to suggest more than momentary fall on the road to rehabilitation, disciplinary and administrative action was taken. The Army, while understanding, sympathetic and willing to provide effective help, can never allow itself to become so permissive an institution that it would even appear to condone drug users. This is true as an absolute with respect to hard drugs and relative until such time, if ever, that the use of marijuana might be controlled in some form. With respect to marijuana, first offenders were usually handled by Article 15, but the deterrent effect of court martial for repeaters or in aggravated cases was present.

c. One of the greatest lessons was the need to separate the program directed toward hard drugs from that against marijuana. Simply from the standpoint of allocating priorities, the attack on hard drugs must come first. Once the Regiment separated the two programs there was a bonus effect of clarifying issues, identifying targets and greater ease in establishing milestones. The reasons were:

(1) Men using marijuana refuse to believe it is harmful to them in any way and are contemptuous of anyone who classifies marijuana and hard drugs on the same basis.
(2) By “witch hunting” marijuana with its characteristic odor and relative ease of detection some men can be driven onto hard drugs because they are easier to conceal and use.

(3) Marijuana is an open question at present with respect to its injurious effect and will remain open until more evidence is in. On the other hand, it is indisputable that hard drugs destroy lives, personalities and are a factor in some major crimes.

d. A review of progress to date indicates that the drug advisory program is becoming more effective as the educational effort continues to become more sophisticated and relevant to the troops. Every soldier assigned to the Regiment now has received a minimum of one hour of informal seminar and one hour of formal instruction on drug abuse. Instruction to officers and noncommissioned officers concerning supervisory responsibilities has contributed materially toward the development of greater understanding of the problem, compassion for the drug user, and the difficulty confronting him. The impetus of the amnesty program has continually increased to the point where approximately 100 men have entered the program during the three month period beginning 10 September 1970. A total of 18 reversals have been experienced since the inception of the program.

e. The use of hard drugs is more common in the rear areas than at field locations. Troops in the field recognize the dangers of hard drugs from an operational point of view; consequently, usage factors are lower. Most line units estimate drug use to include marijuana at less than 10% for their troops in the field. Soldiers are so well aware of the fact that assistance is available that there is no adverse reaction when disciplinary or administrative action is taken. The men realize that recourse to legal action is a last resort which results from a failure on the part of the drug user to take advantage of the program.

f. Company grade officers provided essential assistance and useful insight into the drug problem, but their judgment on the best course of action to be taken was not always accurate. This was due partially to the relatively conservative values system of the average junior officer who ends up in a combat arms assignment in Vietnam. Some of the best troop commanders tended to be “hard liners” who believed a court martial and elimination was the best answer to the drug problem. In view of the number of men using or experimenting with drugs this was not a practical solution except for aggravated cases involving major offenders. The complexity of the problem does not admit to a single simple solution.

g. In December 1970 drug use within the Regiment was estimated as follows:

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Marijuana | Marijuana | Marijuana
---|---|---
Users | Experimenter | Total
EM 4272 | 775 (18.2%) | 877 (20.5%) | 1653 (36.7%)

Officer 316 (A very few young Warrant Officers use and experiment with Marijuana)

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Combined

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**CHART 30**

**b. Conclusions:**

(1) The Drug Advisory and Amnesty Program must be continued and expanded. Despite initial success much more remains to be done.

(2) The terms "suppression" and "amnesty" need to be changed at least in the communications that reach the men. "Advisory" and/or "assistance", or some other less forbidding terms might be better from the standpoint of soldier acceptability. For this program, "acceptability" to the young soldier is a meaningful criterion.

(3) Better in-country facilities are needed to treat drug abusers if real progress is to be made.

(4) There is a constant danger of making the program so attractive that it draws shams drug addicts who seek lighter duty, or worse yet, becomes a factor in the decision to try drugs on the basis "the program will save me toward the end of my tour".

(5) The grim reality of hard drug abuse and the difficulty of overcoming the habit has to be driven across prior to the decision to experiment with these drugs. This is most effectively done by former users of the same age and with the same value system as the man who is considering use of drugs.

X-9†
(6) Some former hard drug users should be given full time assignments as counsellors at squadron level to help deter drug use and help other men reject the habit.

(7) Greater leverage is required by higher headquarters and perhaps by the President of the United States to cause Vietnamese national authorities to eliminate local drug pushers. Even at its best the present effort is inadequate and it sometimes appears that local police are in league with drug sellers. Drugs are available at almost every roadside stand in the Regimental area of operations and are sold openly by people of all ages, to include children.

(8) The programs directed against marijuana and hard drugs must be separated.

(9) Greater effort must be made to teach the commanders, officers and senior noncommissioned officers how to detect drug users.

(10) The recommendations of dedicated junior officers on how to solve the problem frequently need to be balanced with other views and tempered with more complex judgments.

1. Recommendations:

(1) Consider changing the names of the Drug Suppression and Amnesty programs to terms more acceptable to young soldiers for whose benefit the programs are intended.

(2) Increase and improve the in-country facilities to handle drug users. A entirely separate facility is required for initial treatment.

(3) Increase the number of medical personnel available to units, especially enlisted specialists trained in social work and psychological counselling.

(4) Continue to balance sympathy and understanding with disciplinary and administrative action until the problem is solved.

(5) Make greater use of former users and provide some temporary institutionalised positions as counsellors for these men in the Regiment so they can be best utilised without the ignominy of lacking some authorised assignment.

(6) Increase leverage on the Vietnamese to eliminate drug pushers.

(7) Separate the marijuana and hard drug programs and make the latter the first priority at every echelon.
3. Awards and Decorations:

a. Two problem areas were definable: valor and meritorious service/achievement. In both cases the lack of authority by the regiment to award any decorations at all greatly penalised the members of the regiment. Because the system is so cumbersome and critically reviewed at so many different levels, each further removed from the act of valor or achievement, the unintended net effect was to discourage submission of award recommendations.

b. The problem is compounded because the regiment lacks adequate awards and decorations teams to make the necessary investigation and provide written descriptions and citations. The latter must satisfy distantly located boards who have no knowledge of the incident, achievement or service other than what is presented them on paper. Higher headquarters tend to siphon off talented enlisted writers; without TOE slots little is left at the regimental level. The dearth of awards and decorations talent in quality and quantity adversely affected the awards program of the regiment throughout the period of this report.

c. By contrast, the US divisions in the area had their own boards and authority to impact awards. The result was that the typical soldier of one division reportedly received a bronze star for his tour, while the 11th Armored Cavalry soldier received an ARCOM, if that.

d. Without roster authority, a privilege enjoyed by the divisions and some separate brigades, the efforts of the available personnel in the regiment were exhausted in writing up elaborate justifications for ARCOM service awards and a relatively few achievement awards.

e. Because of these facts few members received the possible maximum total permitted by current USARV and IIIFFV regulations of one service and two achievement awards although hundreds of men deserved such recognition. A number of Bronze Star awards were downgraded by the board. Reclama action was discouraged and invariably proved unsuccessful when attempted.

f. In the case of valor awards there was a distinct degradation incurred by the sheer inability to award these decorations in anything approaching a timely manner. In almost every case the only personnel with the necessary talent and skill to investigate the case and properly handle the complex administrative action were ke - command and staff personnel, already overtasked in their own areas. Inevitably, this means the award action was set aside until more pressing operational and administrative problems could be solved.

g. By way of further comparison the 5th Special Forces Group, not commanded by a general officer, has authority to award decorations up through the Silver Star. Although better control of awards may be
necessary, it does not seem fair to impose different systems with different criteria on men who have little or no choice of assignment. The price paid by career armor officers and noncommissioned officers who served with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is not only lack of tangible recognition, but extends into the future where they will continue to be penalized when competing before promotion, school selection, and special assignment boards.

h. Conclusions:

(1) The solution is relatively simple and capable of both tight control and continuous review. Since it is standard to consider every man during his twelve month tour for one meritorious service and two achievement awards, authority to make these awards should be delegated to the Regimental Commander.

(2) Valor awards could continue to be referred to higher headquarters, although authority to award the Bronze Star for valor would also best be handled by the Regimental Commander.

(3) During the present climate of distrust of field grade awards, the latter could be referred to higher headquarters for review in all cases.

(4) For personnel in grades E-1 through O-3, report of awards made could be submitted to higher headquarters on a recurring basis.

(5) The entire award process within the Regiment could also be controlled and reviewed by frequent, recurring inspections, thus eliminating a major reason for the lack of award authority.

i. Recommendations:

(1) Grant the Regimental Commander authority to make Bronze Star and Army Commendation Medal awards not to exceed a total of three in number to those individuals he determines merit such awards in grade E-1 through O-3.

(2) Grant the Regimental Commander authority to make Bronze Star and ARCOM valor awards on the same basis as described in the preceding subparagraph.

(3) As a corollary action, grant the Regimental Commander authority to make impact awards in those selected cases where he has authority to grant BSM and ARCOM awards.

(4) Allow the Regimental Commander to award Bronze Star and ARCOM service awards at the end of a tour based on roster input furnished by unit commanders, as reviewed and approved by the Squadron and Regimental Boards.
(5) In all other cases, recommendations for award continue to be forwarded to higher headquarters.
ENCLOSURE 1: WEATHER AND TERRAIN

1. Weather: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment assumed its areas of operation in central Military Region 3 during the Southwest Monsoon season. The Southwest Monsoon begins in mid May and lasts until late September. During this season the Regiment's AO receive maximum cloudiness and precipitation, which adversely affected both ground and air operations. Air operations were affected by low visibility caused by fog during the morning hours and rain showers in the evening. Maximum cloud cover was normally experienced in conjunction with morning fog or afternoon rain. Morning cloudiness usually dissipated by noon. Visibility below six miles occurred at any hour of the day in rain showers. Ground operations were also affected adversely by the weather particularly toward the end of the Southwest Monsoon season which was abnormally long this year and two November typhoons in the South China Sea.

Low level winds in the area were usually a reflection of the prevailing monsoonal flow, i.e. south to west during the Southwest Monsoon. Strong dusty surface winds were experienced in conjunction with rain storms. Temperatures in the area varied little as the annual range of mean maximum temperature is only 5 degrees, from 85° to 90°. The proximity of the two areas of operation meant that the weather affected both in essentially the same manner; the only differences were that slightly more fog and rain were experienced in the eastern AC.

2. Terrain: a. Terrain in both the western and eastern areas of operation is generally flat. Hilly terrain exists in the northwestern portion of the eastern AC along the Song Dong Hai. In this area, and directly south toward Highway 1 the rough and often swampy terrain coupled with multi-canopied dense undergrowth forest limited vehicular access. Terrain and weather adversely affected movement of Ranger Teams inserted along the Dong Hai River and the operations of a battalion (-) of infantry inserted south of the river in the central portion of the AC. Although the eastern portion of the eastern AC is generally open flat land, vehicular movement is limited by large cultivated areas. Soc Lu and Nui Fe mountains are also not accessible to track vehicles. Primary LCC in the eastern AC are Highways 1 and 20 along which the major population centers of the area are located.

b. Terrain in the western AC is also generally flat with large cultivated areas. There are scattered areas of brushwood, single canopy, light undergrowth forest and rubber separating the open cultivated areas. Trafficability was also adversely affected by precipitation in this area, getting progressively worse from the time the Regiment assumed the AC until the end of the Southwest Monsoon. The northeastern portion of the AC, known as the Catcher's Mitt, consists of a mixture of single canopy forest with light to heavy undergrowth and brushwood which has grown up in old Rome plow cuts and grasslands. Most of the area can be traversed by tracked vehicles but with some difficulty. Limitations to movement in this area consist primarily of areas which have been cratered by numerous B-52 strikes and in areas of drainage.
1. Introduction

a. At the termination date of the previous Senior Officer Debriefing Report, the regiment was still deployed in Cambodia. Enemy forces remained in a defensive posture with the primary mission of protecting undiscovered caches in the Fishhook area. The Regiment conducted security operations in support of extensive home plow operations designed to uncover these cache sites and facilitate observation after withdrawal. Enemy forces in the area during this phase of operations were the 165th NVA Regiment, the 209th Regiment, the 141st NVA Regiment, and the 208th arty regiment of the 69th Arty Command, COSVN. The 2nd NVA Division's most aggressive regiment, the 165th, was given the mission of harassing and delaying Allied thrusts toward the remaining cache sites in the Fishhook area. The 7th NVA Division's 209th Regiment was given a similar mission in the M комф area. Because the termination date of Allied operations in Cambodia was public knowledge, it was expected that the enemy would ambush Allied convoys during the withdrawal phase. However, the ambushes failed to materialize even though intelligence had placed the 209th Regiment astride the only logical withdrawal route out of Cambodia.

b. During the conclusion phase, or home plow phase, of the cross-border operations, the 165th Regiment was ordered to bear the trust of delaying Allied advances and if possible stop Allied attempts at seizing the remaining caches. To accomplish this the Regiment was reinforced with artillery support from the 208th Arty Regiment and the arty bn of the 7th NVA Division. Troops on security/recon missions in support of the home plow operations experienced two basic tactics by the enemy, the attack by fire and the tank hunter team. Troop NDFs and the Squadron FOBs received frequent but erratic mortar/rocket fire. The enemy was successful in delaying home plow cuts by using the tank hunter team concept where two to three NVA soldiers would conceal themselves along the home plow axis of advance and at an opportune time fire one 105mm round and one magazine of 40mm, spraying one or two vehicles. By the time reaction was possible the tank hunter team was able to flee the area. The combination of this tactic, frequent attacks by fire, and the extremely heavy rains during this period diminished home plow effectiveness below original expectations.

c. On the 28th of June the entire Regiment had withdrawn from Cambodia. The 1st and 3rd Squadrons withdrew through Tay Ninh Province to Di an. The 2nd Squadron, after withdrawing down Highway 13 to Loc Ninh, remained as a screening and reaction force for three weeks as VC forces completed redeployment to the interior of MR 3. The squadron had little contact as the enemy remained in Cambodia and continued consolidations.
d. The regiment's significant totals for the two months in Cambodia were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/C</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual weapons</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew served weapons</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tons of foodstuffs</td>
<td>133.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122mm rockets</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm rockets</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm mortar rounds</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm mortar rounds</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57mm R.E. rounds</td>
<td>9C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 (RPG-7) rounds</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 (RPG-7) rounds</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-20 (oversized 107mm)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammo</td>
<td>24,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3½ ton trucks</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1½ ton trucks</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Needless to say, the total success of these operations is not seen in these figures. The psychological shock to and subsequent dete-rioration of VC morale and strength inside SVN, the increased combat effectiveness of the ARVN and the new willingness of the GVN officials to assume the major bulk, manpower-wise, for the defense of their country, were perhaps more valuable results of the Cambodian operation.

2. General Strategy of the Enemy In Military Region 3:

a. Following the general offensive of Tet of 1968 and its military defeat, COGNY re-evaluated its situation and published political and military assessment and guidance in a basic document, COGNY Resolution #9.

(1) This document admitted the failure of the Tet Offensive and called for an end to the "strategic offensive concept" and an assumption of a defensive position. The greatest COGNY hope was to achieve the rapid de-Americanization of the war through withdrawal of US forces. (Ironically, this would later be called Vietnamization when implemented by us). The extended time lag in implementation of the new policy, the numerous subsequent resolutions and directives issued, and the high amount of manpower and effort extended to "educate" subordinates to accept the new defensive nature of the war, all indicate that the new policy was not readily and easily accepted by the VC under Headquarters, SVNLA. Basically, COGNY Resolution #9 called for winning the war through two means:

(a) Forcing the rapid withdrawal of US forces by taking
advantage of psychological shock created in the US by the Tet Offensive.

(b) Returning to guerrilla warfare as the military strategy and beginning of a protracted war.

(2) COSVN Resolution 71 issued for 1970 claimed the emphasis on guerrilla warfare as the key to decisive victory by creating the following conditions:

(a) achieving a cease-fire.
(b) The withdrawal of US forces.
(c) The formation of a coalition government.

(3) COSVN Directive #136 reiterated the key of the guerrilla warfare and also called for better leadership and increased emphasis on secret cadre and guerrillas.

(4) The above documents called for the guerrilla war concept but the sub-regions around Saigon did not actually implement that guidance until after May 1970. Then, SR-5 disbanded the Dong Nai Regiment and assigned the under-strength battalions to its districts. Sh-1 followed by disbanding its regiments, using the personnel to reinforce district local forces.

b. To understand the implications of this submission on the rank and file VC cadre, the military, political or logistical situation must be understood. It is relatively inaccurate to discuss VC military, political or logistical activities as separate entities. In reality these three areas are inseparable and are properly perceived as interrelated parts which together compose the enemy system. Any course of action the enemy chooses to follow cannot be classified as purely military, political or logistical as each type of activity inherently predicates the other. However, for the purpose of lucidity, the general areas will be discussed under their heading.

(1) Military

(a) During 1969 the VC altered what had been the pattern of the war for nearly four years by initiating a return to guerrilla warfare. This was a result of the expanding demands of the war, and the apparent limitations of available VC/NVA resources. Along with the realisation that it was no longer possible to challenge the allies on all fronts came the awareness that no longer could the VC operate in large units in SVN because of growing ARVN and Allied strength and successes. This awareness was translated into COSVN Resolution #9, a sweeping appraisal of the war effort including the re-establishment of small unit
insurgency as the means to achieve a rapid US withdrawal and/or a coalition
government and cease-fire. The basic change in tactics was the result of
a realistic assessment of VC capabilities and vulnerabilities and the changed
environment in which the enemy had to exist. Coupled with this was the
awareness of the increased importance of the political side of the war.

(b) Although this downgrading was called for in mid-1969,
implementation in MR 3 occurred in the middle of 1970 when subordinate
headquarters finally complied. LF regiments and LF battalions were
finally broken down and sent to reinforce district level VC in attacking
pacification. Generally speaking, the units at first were targeted against
the Vietnameseization Program and the KY/PP forces in their area. More
recently such units have switched their emphasis toward pacification and
the PCLF cadre as well as the ISS. This thrust was basically two
pronged:

1. The military proselyting section aimed at penetrating
the entire OVN and ARVN structure to spread disaffection and dissenion
and encourage desertion.

2. The civilian proselyting section aimed at undermining
and destroying OVN gains with the people through propaganda, taxing, and
selected terror, to target ARVN personnel through their families by subtle
coercion techniques.

(c) In early 1970 the enemy had instituted portions of
his overall program while continuing to develop others. The actual break-
down of main force units in MR 3 was evidently resisted by lower cadre who
probably viewed it as a defeatist tendency. By May of 1970, sufficient
"education" had been achieved to break the recalcitrant attitudes of these
cadre. More than likely, this completion of the "educational phase" of
implementation would have been further delayed had it not been for the
catastrophic implications of allied Cambodian operation. What had
initially been a choice in emphasizing smaller units activity became a
primacy in view of the disruption of logistic, rear area, and com-
mand-liaison support.

(d) The overall tendency since the completion of the september
reorganization in SR-5 and VC U-1 Province has been the steady decline in
the frequency and size of contacts made with friendly elements.

Political

(a) Generally speaking, no separate resolutions or directives
were forthcoming from COSTVTH that specifically dealt with political strategy.
Rather, there was a general call for increased awareness of the importance
of the political side of the post-Tet struggle. This need for political
awareness at all levels in the VC system has always been part of the VC
total effort. After Resolution #9 the change was qualitative rather than
quantitative.
(b) Initially, political effort was expended to overcome the reluctance of cadre to accept the doctrine of GVN Resolution 9. As the GVN pacification and Vietnamisation improved, specific political and propaganda tasks were developed. Current tendencies and trends in the political field are:

1. Aggressively attack pacification and Vietnamisation through military and civilian proselytising.

2. Undermine the GVN pacification thrusts by re-establishing associations and confederations at hamlet, village and district levels.

3. Rebuild the VCI structure through secret recruiting and training of personnel with legal papers, and through false ralliers who gain legal status.

4. Exploit all domestic disturbances throughout SVN to discredit the GVN by drawing attention to its excesses and shortcomings.

5. Decrease the size of meetings to conduct propaganda but increase the frequency of person-to-person meeting.

6. Prepare for the day when a cease-fire and coalition government may come by establishing secret VC cells in all communities to be activated at that time.

7. Use of selected terror to add force to what is said politically and discredit the GVN by physically demonstrating their inability to secure the people.

(a) The greatest threat to the enemy within the Regiment's area of interest, the pacification program, can be attacked on political grounds. Captured documents often contained directives to step up propaganda activity and to motivate political sessions among the people. The very fact that the enemy is able to move relatively freely through the people spreading his propaganda raises questions about the GVN's ability to control what happens within the country. The occasional acts of terrorism are perpetrated by the enemy for political impasses, to raise doubts about the GVN's ability to protect the people, and to firmly establish the enemy's presence within a particular community.

(d) Political methods, more subtle than terrorist acts have also been noted within the Regiment's area of interest during the reporting period. Guerrillas in Phu Cuong, for example, have employed a chain recruitment program, in which each member of a cell concentrates on enticing a friend or relative to join the VCI. VCI in Xuan Loc area also used this procedure. Political directives have been explicit in their recruitment
objectives for certain districts and villages. Documents were captured in August which listed villages in Di An District and directed that a specific number of VC secret cells be organized within each village, the number depending on the population of the village. VC also spread their ideology through various associations such as farmers, students, women and any group of people which by some common denominator could be logically formed into an association.

(e) Another important aspect of the political war is military proselyting. Several captured documents have indicated that the VC should step up an effort to appeal to ARVN, RF, and RQDF forces through their families. The manner in which these people are approached has ranged from speeches to leaflets, appeals through the soldier's family, intimidations and finally assassinations.

(3) Logistics: As with the political strategy, no single or group of resolutions have been promulgated to give guidance to the NVA/VC logistic effort. However, an overall evolutionary trend has developed. This trend has been similar to the military tendency, i.e. to disband large organizations and return to guerrilla warfare supply techniques.

(a) Since Tet of 1968 Offensive, the general trend has been to consolidate rear service activities in Cambodia and outside South Vietnam. As allied units began targeting the areas of the RSG operation and large supply interdiction began in early 1969, the efficiency, morale and effectiveness of the enemy's rear service groups gradually began to decline. As their effectiveness dropped, rear service groups initially were forced to stop supplying VC units in the interior of SVN. Headquarters, SVNLA ordered that all VC units and organizations begin providing for their own foodstuff needs in later 1969/early 1970. During and after the Cambodian operations all units in MR 3 were told to develop "self-sufficiency" programs to last from six to nine months. Rear service groups were completely disrupted during Cambodian operations and the NVA logistic effort was switched to the Cambodian front. The requirements of the Cambodian War and the breakdown of VC main force units in MR 3 lead to the development of the Shadow Supply System to supply the VC and VCI in MR 3. A detailed discussion of this transition is covered in Section D to this Inlosure.

(b) Generally, the logistic strategy in MR 3 has been to de-escalate the scope and missions of the rear service group’s activity and replace them with the Shadow Supply System. Under the Shadow Supply System, foodstuffs, medicine, and allied equipment such as cooking utensils and clothes, will be provided by legal purchases off the Vietnamese economy. Munitions will still be transported in MR 3 from rear service groups but by transportation companies. The multi-mission concept of the rear service group supporting VC operations is fading away. In response to the final acceptance of the return to guerrilla warfare on the military front and the secret political structure on the political front, the VC
are developing an independent and localised supply system to meet the needs of smaller units in a hostile environment.

(4) The significance of the past six months has been that the VC accepted and translated into action the guerilla war concept and initiated programs in the political and logistical fields to sustain a protracted war militarily and politically.

3. The Military Situation:

a. General. The enemy situation inside MR 3 for the period 7 June to 7 December 1970 is analogous to the situation during the pre-1966 political/guerilla conflict. The significant difference is that today the allied position is stronger and more stable than it was in 1965, and the enemy has assumed therefore a more defensive or covert posture. Presently, the enemy is in a state of transition, a period of accommodation. He is attempting to adjust to allied pressures by reorganizing and re-building his own organizations and using political tactics to confront the GVN and its programs. Enemy activity in MR 3 and the Regiment's area of operations has been at an extremely low level. The enemy has not initiated the vast majority of contacts. Instead he has been reacting to engagements initiated by the US and indigenous military units. Whenever possible, the enemy has avoided contact with the Regiment. Our experience in Binh Duong, Long Khanh, and Bien Hoa Provinces provides an excellent illustration of the enemy's capabilities and plans in MR 3. It also provides an excellent profile of what the enemy will do when confronted with regular army units regardless of type or country of origin. Because the Regiment operated in two separate AC, the details will be discussed separately.

b. SR-5 Activity.

(1) The Regiment's western AC is situated in VC Sub-Region 5. Sub-Region 5 encompasses the eastern half of GVN Binh Duong Province and parts of GVN Bien Hoa Province. The Sub-region was activated prior to Tet of 1968 to facilitate the command and control of movement of supplies and men into the area around Saigon. At that time Sub-Region 5 had major military assets that it deployed for the 1968 Tet Offensive. Much of the area had been traditionally sympathetic to the Viet Minh and active supporters of the VC. Following the Tet Offensives the Sub-Region concept was retained by the VC and it became one of the major targets of the intensified GVN pacification effort. The GVN has made great strides against SR-5 and during the period that the Regiment operated against SR-5 the enemy made significant changes in response to the GVN success. This change was dictated by the deteriorating military and political situation faced by the enemy subsequent to Tet of 1968. Although all the ramifications of the change are still not documented, a fairly clear picture has been pieced together. The reorganization of the Dong Nai Regiment by Headquarters, SR-5 is the single most important action conducted by the enemy in SR-5 in two years.
The reorganization is particularly important as it signals a major rethinking of VC strategy and concepts. For this reason a detailed account of this reorganization and its implications is presented here.

(a) By late Aug 70 and early Sep 70, ralliers and FD knowledgeable of SR-5 and the Dong Nai regiment were reporting a major reorganization and breakdown of the Dong Nai regiment. This change was dictated by the deteriorating military and political situation faced by the enemy subsequent to late 1966. The sheer loss in numbers of men plus the successful allied interdictions of supply lines and a rapidly spreading pacification program from early 1968 until the present forced this reorganization. The primary thrust of the enemy operation in SR-5 became political in nature with the military used in a supporting or supplementary role. The Dong Nai regimental headquarters was disbanded and the battalions assigned to District 40 in order to strengthen and rejuvenate the local forces.

Rebuilding of the local forces at the lowest level was most critical. The location of enemy units within Sub-region 5 is as follows: K1 Dong Nai Battalion is held in Thu Giao (L) as a mobile reserve force. The Battalion moves wherever its services are required within Sub Region 5's northern districts. K2 Dong Nai Battalion is held in Tan Uyen (D) operating with C301 Tan Uyen Loc 1 Force. To an unknown degree K2 and C301 have merged. It is known that their respective medical units and facilities have been incorporated. K2 Dong Nai Battalion is held in Chau Thanh (D) operating with C62 Chau Thanh District Local Force. K3 Dong Nai Battalion, which had left the Dong Nai in Sep 69 and had been redesignated the Thang Loi Group long before the rest of the regiment disbanded, is held as operating in D1 An, Lai Thieu, and Thu Duc Districts. By Aug 70 the Thang Loi Group had been divided among these district forces and the remnants of the organization, probably the command section, has formed into the "Silent Corridor", a covert commo-liaison network between SR-5 headquarters and the three southern districts.

(b) VC within each district area are capable of terrorist activities, but the entire significance of this type of activity lies in the political effects they produce. Acts of terrorism and propaganda activities are conducted against the populace and indigenous military personnel in order to discourage them. Dong Nai Battalions, located in the northern districts also have a primarily political mission. However, the region is less pacified and still has unpopulated areas for concealment enabling these forces to be more militarily oriented. Economy of force tactics, i.e. harassing sapper type activity, remains the only military operations from which the enemy can realistically hope to profit. The enemy is in fact committed to these economy of force tactics within the regimental area of interest is reflected in the recent sapper training received by K2 and K1 Dong Nai Battalions. In addition to sapper training for the Dong Nai Battalions, and presumably for the local forces with whom they operate, there are also indications that new sapper units are being formed within SR-5. A recent Boi Chanh reported that he had been placed
in charge of forming two new sapper platoons which would operate in Chau Thanh District. Captured Documents indicated that these units are called "anti-pacification Suicide Teams". This Ho Chi Minh also mentioned C500, which is supposedly a sapper company subordinate to SA-5 operating autonomously in Chau Thanh District. Additionally, captured documents issued on 21 September directed that sapper platoons be formed in Ian Uyen, Chau Thanh and Bien Hoa. There are also indications that a number of which have been assigned to sapper units.

(2) The one major military operation conducted by SA-5 during the period was an attack at Tan Binh FA complex on 26 September, the results of which were disastrous. Certainly this attack was prompted by a desire to win a psychological-political victory as well as a military victory. Indications exist that the VC expected inside assistance from members of the FSDT.

(3) With the reorganization, and retraining taking place, enemy activity within the western area of interest has been light. Enemy units have nothing to gain in sustained contacts with elements of the Regiment and have avoided contact wherever possible. The new small sapper units, unless surprised, are able to avoid track vehicles. The most effective weapon of the Regiment has been the automatic ambush.

4. U-1 Province Activity:

a. The military situation in VC U-1 province was a microcosm of VC activity in SA-5. U-1 Province had been created prior to T-6 of 1965 and had been called Sub Region 5. After that, COBVN changed it to a Province because of its lack of forces and land mass. U-1 Province's mission was the attack of the Bien Hoa Air Field and the Long Bien Military Complex. To accomplish this mission the province had 2 VC Sapper Battalions, D-1 and D-2. Politically, the province consists of three VC Districts, Vinh Cuu, Trang Bom and Bien Hoa City. Although no main force units are assigned to U-1 Province the 24th TC Regiment and the 74th Arty Regiment have operated in and moved through the Province area. VC local forces subordinate to the province are the Vinh Cuu Local Force Company C270, the Trang Bom District Local Force Company C260 and small village guerrilla forces.

b. The status of U-1 Province forces is largely unknown because of the extreme lack of contact with U-1 Province forces. The D-1 Sapper Battalion has not been contacted since July 1969 but has been mentioned as still in existence by a Ho Chi Minh in May 1970. The D-2 Sapper Battalion has not been contacted since 19 July 1969 and it may have merged with the D-1 because of low strength levels. Indications are that the local force District units C260 and C270, although still in existence, have assumed political missions rather than military.

Incl 2-9
c. Again in the western AO, the political and military aspects of the war are inseparable although as in the northern portion of the western AO, the unpopulated areas allow enemy units to maintain their unit integrity and operate in up to reinforced company groups. Economy of force tactics are employed by the enemy, normally indirect fire attacks, assassinations and recently, in ambushes of vehicles along Highway 1.

d. Historically enemy supply routes from War Zone D across the Long Kai River into Quang and VC Ha Long Province have passed through VC U-1 Province. Since allied operations have severely limited the capability of U-1 Province to attack the Bien Hoa Long Dien Military Complex, the majority of enemy activity has centered on these supply routes. During the wet season the speed and depth of the Long Kai River has severely limited the enemy's ability to move supplies. The lack of enemy manpower and natural barriers account for the extremely low level of enemy activity in the eastern AO during the reporting period.

e. Friendly contact with enemy forces has been restricted almost entirely to the populated areas in the southern and eastern portion of U-1 Province. In latter portion of the reporting period the 274th VC Regiment moved north to conduct operations against the Xuan Loc area and procure food from the villages around Xuan Loc. After a brief period of contacts with 3 to 5 man supply parties moving across Highway 1, the 274th Regiment was forced to circumvent the CV-20's screen by traveling east to War Zone D.

f. Enemy operations remain extremely low and although they will probably increase they will be primarily low key, and political and re-supply in nature.

g. Enemy activity statistics:

a. During the reporting period 11th ACR enemy activity statistically consisted of:

   (1) XLA's 10
   (2) F'Ts 2
   (3) H/Ts 2
   (4) Tons of foodstuffs 1.6
   (5) Captured weapons 1

b. During the reporting period enemy activity in the AO against all Allied forces consisted of: 544 contacts, 42 attacks by fire, 310 mining incidents and a total of 99 reported terrorist incidents.

a. General. No army can sustain itself in combat without a logistical system to keep combat troops fighting. Depending upon the sophistication of the weaponry and other military equipment, the dietary requirements of the troops, and the distance supplies must be transported to be utilized and consumed, armies have developed various logistical systems. The South Vietnamese Liberation Army is no different. The VNA developed a large and complex system of supply called the Rear Service System. As battlefield requirements demanded an increased logistic support effort, the VNA used the Rear Service Group concept to meet the needs of division and regimental combat operations. The basic unit operating in this system was the Rear Service Group. Since the Rear Service Group concept was utilized to sustain large maneuver elements on the battlefield, any change to augment or decrease this effort would be indicative of the enemy's assessment of his own strength and capability in future plans.

During the last 6 months such a change has taken place, as the enemy has reassessed his capability and adjusted to his new situation with a new system. To understand the impact and significance of this new system, the Shadow Supply System must be viewed vis-a-vis the old, the Rear Service concept.

b. The Rear Service Concept

1. A Rear Service Group is an enemy unit usually regimental size or larger, that is tasked with logistic support for NVA maneuver elements. The South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVLA). The groups are given geographical areas of responsibility and support any main force unit operating in that specific area. The general area of operation of these groups in Military Region 3 are shown on Map 6.

2. The first groups were organized between 1962 and 1965 and consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Rear Service Groups. Their primary mission was to procure foodstuffs and medicines for units operating in their areas and to transport war materials from the rear area into the front lines. Rear service activities were greatly expanded after 1965 to include medical evacuation from the battlefield, administering hospitals and dispensaries, and moving infiltrators to new units through their communication lines. Figure 3 shows the rear Service Organization of HQ SVLA in 1968. The organization shown on the chart remained intact until the middle of 1970. Initially each rear service group was composed of two pack-bicycle battalions for the movement of munitions and foodstuffs, one ordnance company, one ordnance workshop, three hospitals, two forward surgical stations, one quartermaster company, and specialized elements.
Map 8: Enemy Rear Service Groups Locations and Previous Areas of Responsibilities
Figure 2: Organization of Rear Service Staff, Headquarters, SYWLA

Inc. 2-13

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Gradually the size, type, and number of units evolved according to the areas needs. The classical example of this metamorphosis was the dividing of the 85th RSOG into the 50th and 70th RSOG prior to Tet of 68. These two units operated on the flanks of Phù Long (F). During this same period the 100th RSOG was organized in the Parrot's Beak area. Rear Service Groups have generally averaged an estimated strength of 2000 to 3000. 3,500 to 4,000 is believed to be the TOE strength for a Rear Service Group.

(3) The most recent estimates of strength for the Military Region 3 Rear Service Groups are:

- 50th 990
- 70th 1400
- 81st 2000
- 82nd 900
- 83rd 675
- 84th (N-7) 1500
- 86th 4100
- 100th 900

Chart 26

These strength figures are indicative of the enemy's capability and intentions. Current missions for RSOG's are to transport munitions into the interior of Military Region 3 and maintain stores and caches of munitions still in place in M.;).

(4) Numerous H/C and FW, captured documents and diaries have provided a picture of sagging morale, critical personnel shortages, and poor leadership due to lack of experienced cadre. Continual failure of interdiction let one FW of the 51st RSOG to report that morale in his unit was extremely low because resupply missions almost always made contact.

(5) Generally the past 6 months, including the Cambodian operation, have seen the further and accelerated deterioration of the enemy's rear service capability. In part this is due to the change in strategy of the guerrilla warfare phase, in part to his successes with his Shadow Supply System, but mostly to allied successes at disrupting this massive supply system.

- The Shadow Supply System:

(1) Due to the change in overall Communist strategy following Tet '68, the enemy's combat requirements at allied interdiction along the borders of SVN and in Cambodia, the LVA/VC have been faced with a continuously deteriorating effectiveness of the Rear Service Group concept discussed above. Naturally, the enemy was initially reluctant to admit that the Rear Service Groups were becoming incapable of functioning. In mid-'68 the initial evidence of this deterioration began to appear in captured documents. The 23rd RSOG operating in southern Tây Ninh
Province and SB-1 announced that it was incapable of providing any assistance to VC elements and units in the area. Since that time Rear Service Groups have gradually but steadily decreased the scope and effectiveness of their services. By the time of the Cambodian operation HCC were only providing foodstuffs to the NVN Main Forces. Small amounts of munitions and weapons were allocated to VC units but basically all support to VC units was stopped. CC37V issued orders that all VC subordinates would become self-supporting in food and medicine. Munitions were to be conserved. Hunting was forbidden in many areas to conserve ammunition.

(2) Because of this deterioration and the subsequent disruption of the remaining rear service groups that were in Cambodia, the enemy finally accepted the fact that his battlefield capabilities had substantially changed. In military region 3, guerrilla warfare had to be immediately instituted. Up to this time the enemy had attempted to maintain his historical regiment, but the cross border disruption, the lack of pacification, the difficulty of recruiting inside SVN and infiltrating from SVN and Cambodia, and the needs of his divisions in Cambodia precipitated a rapid and immediate return to guerrilla operations. The nature of the guerrilla's existence and the basically hostile area in which he operates precluded a highly sophisticated rear service group to support him. In addition, requirements in Cambodia demanded the maximum effort be placed there.

(3) Classically the guerrilla has drawn his support from a sympathetic or indifferent populace. In Military region 3 the enemy, not to fight a guerrilla war, but perhaps more important, he had to sustain his political cadre and his infrastructure for the future. Many of these cadre are known fugitives aggressively sought by the SVN. He also has a complex and sophisticated political and military structure that must be supported. His problem is much larger than merely feeding guerrillas.

(4) To accomplish his objectives, the enemy has developed a clandestine supply system that exists within and off of the economy of SVN. This system is known as the shadow supply system. As with all systems developed by the enemy, the SSC is decentralized and compartmentalized. It is also flexible and tailored to the specific needs of the organization it seeks to serve.

(5) A theorized version of the mechanics of the system is: US Greenbacks are received by the North Vietnamese from the Chinese for the purchase of goods from the South Vietnamese economy. To accomplish this the funds are disseminated down through the Finance and Economy chain of command until money is received by the using units. The using unit exchanges the money it has been granted by the GVN Black Market money exchanges for plasters at a favorable rate of exchange. The plasters are then used to purchase goods and means of transport on which the supplies are delivered to jungled areas and the using units. Throughout the
entire system, no hint of supplying the enemy need surface. Changing
money is common speculative business in SVN and all of Asia. The purchase
of foodstuffs and hiring of trucks for hauling is also common. In addition
such purchases and movements are so diffused that the system is not obvious.

(5) Allied intelligence has recently begun to uncover the extent
of this system. The 11th armored Cavalry Regiment recently interrogated a
man wash from B-7 supply section of SR-5. The A/C stated that the supply
section had been reorganized into 5 branches with 12 to 17 men per branch.
Each branch had the mission of collecting and purchasing foodstuffs from
a specific area of SR-5. The geographic areas were called supply points by
the VC. Branch II of the A/C's unit moved supplies purchased by legal
residents in Van 8inh Village. Branch II purchased and transported 6 to
7 tons of foodstuffs on each mission it accomplished. Thus, SR-5 has
reorganized its assets to give structure and organization to what had
previously been a local supply system. The magnitude of the supplies
acquired and the frequency of acquisition is regulated and controlled to
meet requirements, as long as funds are provided this system can continue
to function and grow.

(7) Medical supply is effected under the same basic system. Funds
are made available to purchasing agents and sympathizers in the major
cities of SVN. Medicines are purchased and exfiltrated as normal commerce
to VC users. Thus, some medicines are purchased by operators for
profit and some by VC cells operating in Saigon and other large cities for
the sole purpose of acquiring, and supplying medical supplies. By using
the free economy of SVN and the excesses permitted within this economy,
the VC have a system of medical supply that is actually less expensive
and more effective in terms of manpower and time. The only need visualizes
the expense of transporting 40,000 worth of pharmaceuticals from Hanoi
through SVN and down through the FWA supply system. Compare the
personal needed for such bulk movement with the personnel needed to
transport 120,000 lines down the same system into the hands of COWS. To
get 120,000 dollars into COWS would present no real problem since the
money would move through enemy held territory. By reducing transportation costs
and manpower needs, more money can actually be used for needed supplies.
Thus the system is not only less expensive to the enemy but actually
more effective and efficient for all parties in the enemy camps.

(C) In addition to the above advantages, the risk of interception
is also greatly reduced by the smaller bulk of the movable commodity.
Since such money movement is not solely utilized by the VC and is not
immediately suspected in SVN, the risk of money movement is negligible and
can be minimized further by decentralization and compartmentalization.
Unfortunately, a few well placed bribes can further reduce the risk of
interdiction. Finally, the free and open market tolerated by the COWS in
SVN reduces to a minimal level any risk in the actual conversion. In
short, the enemy is presented with everything he needs to lessen the
work of continuing his war effort with minimal risks.
(9) Thus, through the shadow supply system, the enemy has adjusted to the needs of operating on a new battlefield with a return to guerrilla warfare. Rear Service Groups are taking on a lesser degree of importance as the SS develops. Initial indicators exist that may give a picture as to what will happen to these enemy units in the future. The first indication noted is an increase in the reports of new transportation groups and units both inside SVN and Cambodia. These new transportation groups have been identified in SR-1, SR-5 and SR-4. They are believed to be recent additions to the enemy's order of battle. Additionally, the 84th BSG which operated out of War Zone L and supplied VC Military Region 7 has disbanded and been absorbed by MR-7.

d. Conclusions: The last 6 months have seen the adjustment of the enemy to numerous trends. He has been forced to finally accept the reality that he can no longer maintain main force VC regiments. He has been forced to downgrade his effort to stage II of Mao's classic definition of the Phases of Guerrilla Warfare. Allied interdiction of his supply system and Rear Service Groups have precipitated the development of the Shadow Supply System to replace the Rear Service Groups. The current system is capable of sustaining the low level of activity and could grow if the VC are capable of increasing their strength. However, if NVA forces were to again turn their attentions to SVN from Cambodia support from Rear Service Support Groups would still be required in any future operations in SVN. It is significant that the enemy has taken this step down in SVN. Conversely, any build up of rear service activities in or around MR 3 would be an early indicator of NVA intentions to begin a major sustained threat to MR 3. Border raids and massive ground probes supported by artillery fire on border posts by NVA are still within the capabilities of the NVA units when the SVN border can be crossed and returned to in one night's time. Anything on a greater scale than these raids will require more planning and preparation and rear Service support inside SVN, and currently is not within his capabilities.
INCLOSURE 3: OPERATIONAL JOURNAL

1. Withdrawal from the Kingdom of Cambodia: June 1970 (Map 5): During June the Regiment operated from its forward base at Quan Loi, Binh Long Province, with all three squadrons deployed in the Mekong-Snuol area of Cambodia. On 6 June, 1st Squadron, based at FSB Colorado (XU424147) and later FSB Kodak (XU449039), began securing the Rome plows of the 60th Land Clearing Company on a series of tactical cuts into the cache sites and base areas of the Fishhook region. The 3d Squadron was conducting ground reconnaissance and route security from FSB Susan (XU437141) along Route 1-7. 2d Squadron, located at FSB Sisson (XU666285), secured the Regiment's land line of communication along Route 1-7 and 1-13 in the vicinity of Snuol. The tactical Rome plow operations in 1st Squadron's AO were increased with the arrival of the 98th Land Clearing Company on 15 June. The next day a large hospital complex was uncovered which yielded more than eleven (11) tons of medical supplies. These tactical cuts were contested continually by elements of the 165th and 202nd NVA Regiments and resulted in the capture of over forty-five (45) tons of supplies and the destruction of over eleven hundred (1,100) bunkers by the time they were terminated on 23 June. On 19 June, realignment of forces for the return to RVN prior to the President's deadline of 30 June was accomplished. The Regiment less the 2d Squadron was placed OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and would withdraw through Katum (XT334898). 2d Squadron remained OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and would withdraw through Loc Ninh (XT338095). On 24 June the 3/4 Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division, was placed OPCON to the regiment. The 1st Squadron withdrew from Cambodia on 26 June, and on 27 June was followed by the 3/4 Cavalry. The 3d Squadron cleared Cambodia on 28 June. The withdrawal was harassed by the enemy through 27 June. The 2d Squadron under the control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) withdrew from Cambodia on 28 June. In the final days of the Cambodian operations enemy activity increased sharply. The NVA troops conducted ambushes and attacks by fire in the 3d Squadron's AO to hinder the Squadron in its attempts to remove bridges emplaced to the north of FSB Susan along Route 1-7. 1st Squadron also experienced stiff enemy resistance around the tactical Rome plow cuts. The 1st and 3d Squadrons in the period 20 - 26 June killed twenty-eight (28) NVA in a total of thirty-one (31) contacts. The enemy launched five (5) attacks by fire during this period. These engagements, although they did not prevent or delay the Regiment' withdrawal, did prove costly. Eleven (11) US soldiers were killed and seventy-four wounded. With the completion of the Cambodian operations the Regiment was placed OPCON to II FFORCEN and was assigned two (2) AO located east and west of Bien Hoa Sector. This permitted the regiment to move its forward base from Quan Loi to Di An, which was accomplished on 3 July.


Incl 3-1
On 5 July the regiment initiated operations in its eastern AO astride the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh Province boundary. 3d Squadron established FSB Petrie (YT202135) and began directing its efforts against the VC D-1 Province forces, the 274th VC Regiment, and the Trang Bom District Force. On 23 July, the 3d Squadron was relieved by the 1st Squadron, which then initiated operations from FSB Henderson (YT177122). 3d Squadron began a three week maintenance standdown at Li An. Operations in this AO included reconnaissance, screening, population and resource control with the National Police, and a plow security. The OPCON of ranger teams and infantry units from the 25th Infantry Division aided operations in this AO. VC Forces avoided the Regiment whenever possible throughout the reporting period.

a. Rome Plow Operations. During the period 1 - 26 August, the 69th Land Clearing Company Rome plowed a large area northeast of FSB Henderson. The AAV-1's of A Troop secured the operation to open the jungle areas which served as base camps for the Trang Bom District Force. On 17 October, the AAV-1's of A Troop secured the operation to open the jungle areas which served as base camps for the Trang Bom District Force. On 17 October, the 318th Land Clearing Company began Rome plow operations along the railroad which parallels Route QL-1 south of Trang Bom. B Troop provided security for the operation until 6 November, when A and C Troops secured the land clearing operations in Bien Hoa Province. On 16 November the Regiment's mission of Rome plow security in Bien Hoa Province was terminated. These Rome plow operations were devoid of enemy contact. On 17 November A Troop was placed OPCON to the 2d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and began securing Rome plow operations in the Song Be-Bu Gia Map area.

b. Population and Resource Control. Throughout the reporting period almost daily operations were conducted by the 1st Squadron with the National Police along Routes QL-1 and QL-2C. Two 155mm SP Howitzers were moved northeast of FSB Henderson in order to provide fire support for operations along the Dong Nai River and Routes QL-20 and QL-24. The National Police checkpoints did much to control contraband traffic and to apprehend individuals without proper identification. At night, operations with the National Police were augmented by mobile night patrols which were aimed at enforcing curfew restrictions on the highways. Numerous personnel with improper identification were detained and some VC suspects were apprehended. Perhaps the best indication of success was the improved stature of the National Police in the AO. Although ralliers did not present themselves to the Regiment, they did rally to the National Police and other GVN agencies in the AO.

c. Automatic Ambushes. 1st and 3d Squadrons employed automatic ambushes in the eastern AO during the reporting period; however, this tactic produced only limited results. Thirteen (13) automatic ambushes were detonated resulting in five (5) known VC KIA. 3d Squadron had two (2) of its automatic ambushes stolen in this AO.
d. Unattended Ground Sensor and Radar Employment. During the period 22-24 October, unattended ground sensors were emplaced in conjunction with reconnaissance operations conducted by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, and Team 1C, 75th Rangers, 25th Infantry Division. The ground sensors were placed south of the Dong Hai River and were covered by fire from the 155mm howitzers of 1st Squadron. Although the Ranger Team reported little evidence of enemy movement across the river, the ground sensors indicated significant activity throughout the next month. On 10-12 November, D Company, 1st Squadron conducted reconnaissance and secured the emplacement of more unattended ground sensors around the Cay Gao Rubber Plantation. Artillery was fired on medium and high-level sensor activations; however, the results remained unknown. There was a general upgrading of radar operations with emphasis placed on maintenance of radars and training of radar operators. Situational engagement by fire or held for intelligence purposes.

e. Ranger and Infantry Assistance. The 25th Infantry Division provided three (3) Infantry Companies, a Ranger Team, and a Reconnaissance Platoon to the 1st Squadron for operations in the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh AO for short periods. These units conducted ground reconnaissance in the area southwest of the Cay Gao Rubber Plantation. On 6 November, D Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, was placed OPCON to the 1st Squadron and conducted ground reconnaissance and screening operations in selected areas along route QL-1 between Trung Con and Xuan Loc.

f. Screening Operations in Coordination with ARVN Task Force 333. The ARVN Task Force 333 operating south of 1st Squadron's area initiated a sweep north toward route QL-1. In support of these operations, numerous strong points were established south of QL-1 by 1st Squadron. Up to three (3) armored cavalry troops, plus the Regimental Scout Section and the Air Cavalry Troop A/C FL Platoon (ACP) were used in the blocking force. This screen on route QL-1 was designed to produce some sightings and enemy contacts as elements of the 274th Regiment attempted to avoid the ARVN Task Force. On 2 October, a night ambush patrol of A Troop spotted and engaged 12 to 15 individuals. A light fire team and artillery supported in the contact as four (4) VC were killed and a considerable amount of equipment was captured.

g. Mine and Boobytrap Incidents. In the Bien Hoa - Long Khanh AO, sixty-two (62) mining incidents occurred. Thirty (30) of these incidents involved boobytraps and forty-nine (49) percent of all mines and booby traps encountered were found without friendly losses. During September through the end of the reporting period, these incidents were greatly reduced when only sixteen (16) devices were discovered.

h. Enemy Eliminated. Twenty (20) VC/NVA were eliminated in the eastern AO during the reporting period. Four (4) VC were captured, while the remainder were KIA.

On 10 July the regiment initiated operations in its western AO situated along the Bien Hoa - Binh Duong Province boundary. 2d Squadron established FSB Victor (MT896310) and began operations against the VC Sub-Region 5 (25-4) and the Dong Ha Regiment. Local force enemy units near Binh My and Binh Co villages were also targeted. On 13 August, 2d Squadron departed the AO and was replaced by the 3d Squadron, which had just completed a three-week maintenance standoff. On 9 September, after its maintenance stand-down at Di An, 2d Squadron assumed a new AO in Binh Tuy Province under OPCON of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AIF). In the western AO, 3d Squadron constructed FSB Bandit I (XN910317) and on 17 September moved to FCS Bandit II (XN906214). Screening operations east of the traditional VC supply points along Route LTL-16 were conducted with Infantry support from the 25th Infantry Division and extensive automatic ambuses.

a. Automatic Ambuses: 2d and 3d Squadrons successfully employed automatic ambuses in this AO. During the reporting period, forty-seven (47) enemy were killed in a total of twenty-eight (28) detonations. Eight (8) automatic ambuses detonated in which no creditable results were found. The VC in the AO made a distinct effort to remove automatic ambuses. During 3d Squadron's occupation of the AO twenty (20) of these devices were stolen and two (2) were subsequently found by the squadron. Both of these devices were boobytrapped by the enemy. Five (5) US troopers were killed when they activated one of these boobytrapped devices.

b. Population and Resource Control: Population and resource control operations were conducted in the Bien Hoa - Binh Duong AO along Routes LTL-1a and LTL-16 in coordination with the National Police and contraband items were confiscated.

c. Combined Operations: A large number of combined operations with the ARVN units were conducted in the Bien Hoa - Binh Duong AO. The majority of these operations consisted of ground reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force by platoon size elements.

d. Ranger and Infantry Assistance: The 3d Squadron was aided in its AO by A and C Companies, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, D Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and Iteams 2D and 2E, 75th Rangers, 25th Infantry Division. These teams were valuable in conducting detailed ground reconnaissance in the area east of Binh My and Binh Co villages.

e. Mine and Boobytrap Incidents: In the Bien Hoa - Binh Duong AO, mining incidents totaled two-hundred and twenty-nine (229). Eighty-five (85) of these devices were found without friendly losses. Although the preponderance of devices encountered were boobytraps of various designs, most of the mines hit were homemade antitank mines of considerable size.
f. **Enemy Eliminated**: 2d and 3d Squadrons in the Regiment's western AO killed seventy (70) VC/PA瓦 and had one (1) enemy soldier rally. There was one (1) enemy NW captured during the reporting period. Numerous other enemy soldiers were eliminated by capture and rallying to GVN agencies within the AO.

4. **Operations in Binh Tuy, Long Kanh and Binh Thuan Provinces; September - December 1969:**

On 6 September the 2d Squadron, under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), moved to Binh Tuy Province and established FSB Bolan (15992968). FSB Rivers (15990939), used throughout the period as a maintenance and resupply base, was also taken over from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Mid-September saw two troops of the squadron conducting screening missions targeted against the 33d NVA Regimental Headquarters south of Nui Ong Mountain, with F Troop securing a rice paddy cut along highway 366, and N Company securing FSB's and operating check points with the National Police. By mid-October two troops were conducting reconnaissance missions astride the Binh Tuy - Binh Thuan Province boundary while F Troop operated in Eastern Long Kanh, against elements of SR-4, MI-7 and local VC companies. During this time N Company was engaged in population and resource control with the National Police. From early November throughout the remainder of the reporting period, G Troop secured an engineer upgrade of Highway 366 while other elements of the squadron continued ground reconnaissance and population and resource control north of FSB Rivers.

a. **Automatic Ambushes**: 2d Squadron employed numerous automatic ambushes in its AO. During the reporting period, these ambushes were very effective with a total of thirty-one (31) enemy eliminated in twenty-three (23) detonations. Removal of the automatic ambushes by the VC did not pose the problem it did in the more populated AO. Only three (3) were stolen during the entire period.

b. **Population and Resource Control**: Population and resource control operations were conducted in the Binh Tuy AO along Route J-1 and secondary roads intersecting J-1. These operations consisted of mobile National Police check points secured by elements of the 2nd Squadron, and infantry units under the operational control of the squadron. Throughout the period more than 4,125 vehicles were inspected and 39,899 pedestrians questioned.

c. **Combined Operations**: Only a limited number of operations were conducted by the 2d Squadron. These operations were primarily search and sweep missions conducted with the 511 and 283 RF Companies and US infantry companies placed under the operational control of 2d Squadron by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).
d. Mine and Boobytrap Incidents: In the 2d Squadron's AO, there were a total of twenty-one (21) mining incidents. Of these, nine (9) were found without friendly loss. In this AO mines were of various types with homemade anti-tank mines causing the preponderance of vehicular damage. It is of note that only two of the devices could be classified as boobytraps.

e. Enemy Eliminated: The 2d Squadron killed thirty-one (31) enemy and detained twenty-eight (28) persons, two of whom were subsequently positively identified as VC.
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Col John L. Gerrity

Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 22 June to 21 December 1970.

Col John L. Gerrity

10 December 1970

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