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AGAM-P (M) (5 Feb 68) FOR DS DC

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: IV Corps, MACV, Republic of Vietnam

1. Reference: AR 1-26, 4 November 1966, subject as above.

2. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing report of Brigadier General William R. Desobry, former Senior Advisor, IV Corps, MACV, Republic of Vietnam.

3. The contents of this report and the opinions expressed therein should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or view of the Department of the Army or any Army command, installation or agency.

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MACV ADVISORY TEAM #86
APO 96215

IV

DEBRIEFING REPORT
OF
BG. WILLIAM R. DESOBRY
August 1965 - January 1968

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, IV CTZ
ADVISORY TEAM 96, APO 96215

RCS - CSFOR - 74

Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debrief Report by: Brigadier General William R. Desobry, 024262

Duty Assignments: Deputy Senior Advisor, 6 August 1965 - 2 June 1966
Senior Advisor, 3 June 1966 - 14 January 1968

Inclusive Dates: August 1965 - January 1968

Date of Report: 1 January 1968

1. This report covers activities which have taken place in IV Corps Tactical Zone from August 1965 to January 1968.

2. Annexes A through L to the report are specific subject areas which are commented on because of their significance to the conduct of the war in IV CTZ.

ANNEX A — Intelligence
B — Strategic Planning and Tactics
C — Artillery
D — Air Operations
E — CORDS
F — Signal
G — Army Aviation
H — Naval Operations
I — Transportation
J — Herbico
ek — Personnel
L — Logistics
M — Medical
N — Engineer

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SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES - IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE AUGUST 1965 - JANUARY 1966

1. (U) This report is a summary of the activities which have taken place in the IV Corps Tactical Zone from August 1965 to the present. During this period I was assigned as the Deputy Senior Advisor from 6 August 1965 to 2 June 1966 and Senior Advisor from 3 June 1966 to 14 January 1967. The activities reported will be those associated with the changes in combat posture and overall development of ARVN, and the expansion of the U.S. assistance effort during the period.

2. (C) In August 1965 the Viet Cong had set a definite strategic pattern in the IV Corps Zone which called for:

   a. Destruction of ARVN forces through offensive action.

   b. Elimination of government control in the countryside through destruction of outposts and attacks on district and provincial capitals.

   c. Complete control of Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces and National Highway 4 in Dinh Tuong Province in order to cut the Delta off from Saigon.

   d. Domination of Chuong Thien Province which was to be the staging area and critical point from which control was to be gained over Southern Kien Giang Province, Bao Lieu Province and An Xuyen Province.

   e. Continuation of efforts to gain control of the population and resources of Phong Dinh, Ba Xuyen, Vinh Long, and Vinh Binh Provinces.

At that time the Viet Cong had 13 main force battalions, 13 provincial mobile battalions, 90 separate companies and 66 local guerrilla units. Fifty-four percent of the population was under Viet Cong control. In addition to being able to replace their own losses, local intelligence estimates placed the number of recruits being sent north to the III Corps Tactical Zone at approximately one-thousand per month.

3. (C) In order to accomplish this strategic design the Viet Cong relied heavily on their well established base areas and comms liaison routes - see enclosure #1. The main supply route for the Viet Cong was from the sea into the Binh Dan, Thanh Phu, Long Toan, Da Doi, upper and lower U Minh Base Areas thence inland to local base areas such as the Cam Son, Cang Long and Twin Rivers. Some supplies, particularly medicines and explosives came from Cambodia into the Plain of Reeds and Seven Mountains Base Areas. This same base area - comms liaison complex was used to move men and supplies into the III Corps Tactical Zone.
4. (C) Viet Cong Main Force and Provincial Mobile Units were made up of well trained, well led and highly motivated individuals. They were reasonably well armed. Main Force units possessed modern weapons of the Chicom-Soviet and East German-Czech types. Provincial Mobile units had some of these types of weapons but also relied rather heavily on captured U.S. weapons. District and local forces were armed almost exclusively with captured U.S. weapons and an assortment of bolt action rifles of the Mauser type. Antiaircraft weapons were present but not too numerous. All units were up to strength with Main Force battalions being carried at 600 effectives and Provincial Mobile battalions at 500 effectives. There were strong indications that the Viet Cong were making a serious attempt to create 11 additional Provincial Mobile battalions.

5. (C) During the late summer and fall of 1965, severe battles were fought culminating in severe losses on both sides. During this period the ARVN developed the ability to conduct highly professional air mobile operations, particularly in the 21st ARVN Division. At the same time the combat effectiveness of the three divisions steadily increased. This is due primarily to a more pronounced offensive spirit and increased U.S. combat support. Steady improvements were noted in some sectors of RF and PF.

6. (C) January and February 1966 were the last months that the Vietnamese forces lost more weapons to the Viet Cong than were captured. In the winter and spring of 1966 the ARVN went completely over to the offensive. Through May 1966 the ARVN killed on the average approximately 1000 Viet Cong per month with May 1966 the high when 1669 Viet Cong were killed. In June and July 1966 the Viet Cong refused battle and regrouped. The tempo picked up in August and continued for the remainder of 1966 at the normal rate. 1966 is marked as the year the ARVN gained and held the initiative.

7. (C) 1967 marked the beginning of a meaningful pacification and revolutionary development program. On the U.S. side this effort has been strengthened by the adoption of the CORPS organization. Each Division Tactical Area selected critical RD areas and allocated five Maneuver battalions plus engineer units to the program. Although this reduced each divisions offensive capability by approximately one-third, the divisions have been able to sustain their offensive capability and in some instances make substantial improvements. The first half of 1967 followed generally the pattern of 1966. July through September the Viet Cong were difficult to find. However, beginning in late October the intensity increased culminating in the most severe fighting in IV Corps since 1965 during late November and throughout December. December 1967 recorded the highest Viet Cong and friendly losses for the two and a half year period. Viet Cong killed totaled 2013, friendly 630. At the end of 1967 GVN controlled approximately 60 percent of the population and the ground had been prepared for significant steps forward in pacification and revolutionary development.
To the uninitiated, the campaign in the Delta might well appear to consist of a random series of small operations of short duration based upon a day to day assessment of the situation. This is not the case. The campaign is conceived and directed to:

a. Destroy enemy forces including the infrastructure and their will to fight.

b. Open up lines of communications such as important rivers, canals, and highways.

c. Protect the population, economic resources, and centers in government controlled areas.

d. Pacify and bring under government control contested areas, their people and economic resources.

e. Destroy the enemy base areas and the Viet Cong logistical system.

9. (C) Each Division Tactical Area has certain critical areas to protect and a series of goals. These and progress or lack thereof are discussed by area below:

a. 7TH ARVN DTA. This DTA contains the two most critical provinces in IV Corps. They are (1) Dinh Tuong and (2) Kien Hoa. Dinh Tuong Province is the key to the Delta. It contains the largest population 580,000 and the most vital section of National Route 4, the most important highway from Saigon to Cal Mau. Highway 4 is ringed by the Viet Cong Plain of Reeds Base Area on the north and the Cam Son Base Area on the south. The Viet Cong make their main effort in this province. In 1965 and 1966 the 7th ARVN Division was hard pressed to make headway in Dinh Tuong. However, in early 1967 the 2nd Brigade U.S. 9th Division - the Mobile Riverine Force - moved into Dinh Tuong Province at Dong Tam. This force assisting the 7th ARVN Division has been able to make some progress particularly in the Cam Son Base Area. In order to offset this increased friendly combat capability the Viet Cong moved the 263, 267 and elements of the 516th Main Force Battalions into Dinh Tuong to help the 261 Main Force and 514 Provincial Mobile Battalion. Although all five Viet Cong battalions have been hit repeatedly they remain strong and well equipped. Severe fighting remains to be done but should be successful particularly when the build-up of the U.S. 9th Division at Dong Tam, Vietnamese Marines and increased Special Forces/ILD/B/CIDG north of Highway 4 is completed in early 1968.

Kien Hoa presents a most difficult military, pacification and RD problem. The terrain which contains the largest coconut plantations in Vietnam is the most difficult terrain in the entire Delta. The population is fractured, is disident and in general has little if any
history of loyalty to Saigon. The infrastructure is deep rooted. The 7th ARVN Division has had little success operating here in the past two and one half years with the exceptions of the Binh Dai and Thanh Phu Base Areas which have been reduced to marginal effectiveness. In the scheme of things Kien Hoa will have to come after additional progress has been made in Dinh Tuong. Go Cong Province presents a most favorable area for pacification and RD since the Viet Cong except for local forces have been drawn off to Dinh Tuong. Kien Tuong Province will be discussed under Border Provinces.

b. 9TH ARVN DTA. This DTA which up until 1 January 1968 included seven provinces was the largest DTA in the Delta. Except for certain critical areas, this is the least active area. It contains the least number of Viet Cong units. The most important areas are Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Sa Dec, and southern Kien Giang Provinces. An Giang Province is not considered here because it is 99% pacified due almost entirely to the efforts of the Hoa Hao religious sect.

During 1965/1966 the principle effort in this DTA was to whittle down Viet Cong main force, provincial mobile, and local guerrilla strength. Very little was accomplished in pacification. Some intrusions were made into the Long Toan, Cang Long, and Seven Mountains Base Areas. In general the 9th ARVN Division operated successfully against the Viet Cong but progress was painfully slow.

In 1967 the pace quickened due primarily to the RD effort which hastened strong Viet Cong reaction and forced the 9th ARVN Division to act more aggressively. The main points of contact have been in the RD areas of Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces. In Vinh Long the most important step forward was the opening of the Nang Thit River-Nicolai Canal. This vital waterway had been closed to GVN since some time in 1962-1963. The Nang Thit-Nicolai RD campaign not only produced significant RD and economic results but also caused a Viet Cong military reaction which led to 9th ARVN Division military victories. Early in 1967 the Viet Cong moved the 306th Main Force Battalion from the 21st ARVN Division area to the Nang Thit. On Easter Sunday this battalion along with the 509th Provincial Mobile Battalion made an all out attack against the RD area and suffered a significant defeat. This was the most important single battle in the history of the 9th ARVN Division and permitted this division to gain the upper hand and initiative in the vital Vinh Long-Vinh Binh area. In Vinh Binh Province the main RD effort has been centered in the Cang Long area, adjacent to the Nang Thit and in the middle of a rich rice area almost completely under Viet Cong influence. This RD campaign, coupled with the Nang Thit, caused the Viet Cong to concentrate the 306th Main Force Battalion, the 509th and 501st Provincial Mobile Battalions in a counter action role. All three battalions suffered severe defeats in 1967. As a result, the vital Nang Thit-Cang Long area is not ready for pacification. This could lead to the pacification of the rich Binh Minh-Vinh Long-Tra Vinh-Tieu Can area. The Vinh Long-Vinh Binh RD campaigns are a
classical example of the opportunities that can be created by tying the military and RD campaigns together in an area vital to both GVN and the Viet Cong and forcing a Viet Cong action and GVN counter action.

c. 21ST ARVN DTA. ARVN has accomplished its best military results in the 21st ARVN Division. This is due primarily to the leadership and skill of the Division CG, Major General Nguyen Van Minh. This division is an aggressive fighting force, and extremely well led down through most of its echelons.

In mid 1965 the 21st ARVN Division was emerging from primarily a defensive force deployed around Provincial capitals to an offensive force geared to the destruction of Viet Cong Main Force and Provincial Mobile Battalions. At that time, the division faced strong, well led Viet Cong Battalions. Main Force Battalions 303, 306, 309, and 310 were located primarily in the U Minh-Thin Rivers area. These battalions made frequent attacks throughout the DTA with the support of the Provincial Mobile Battalions, U Minh 2 (An Xuyen), U Minh 10 (Kien Giang-Chuong Thien), Tay Do (Phong Dinh-Chuong Thien), and Soc Trang Dynamic (Ba Xuyen-Bac Lieu).

In 1965 the primary efforts of the 21st ARVN Division were directed at the destruction of the Provincial Mobile Battalions. Defense concentrated on Provincial capitals, district towns, and airfields. In 1965 the division and Viet Cong units made repeated contacts of major proportions. Both sides suffered severe losses. However, of significance, is the fact that while the 21st ARVN Division was able to recoup and become more proficient, the Viet Cong, particularly the provincial mobile battalions, steadily deteriorated.

During 1966, the division increased its offensive actions and generated considerable momentum. The result was a drastic reduction in Viet Cong combat efficiency. All provincial mobile battalions were reduced in strength, 200-300 combat effective and these in most cases hastily retrained. The Main Force Battalions retained a relatively high degree of combat effectiveness. In 1966, the 21st ARVN Division undertook its first real RD effort in IV Corps, the pacification of the Ba So Road area south-west of the Can Tho-Binh Thuy complex. The success of this project taught the Division and IV Corps Headquarters the importance of a coordinated RD-military campaign.

By 1967 the success of the 21st ARVN Division against the Provincial Mobile Battalions had forced the Viet Cong to employ their main force battalions further forward with emphasis on Chuong Thien Province. 1967 was characterized by severe fighting against these units. Results were encouraging. The 303rd and 309th suffered significant losses in January and February. The 310th was deactivated after suffering a defeat in Chuong Thien and its personnel were used to fill up the 303rd and 309th. The 306th moved to the 9th ARVN Division DTA in an attempt to stop the Ngo Thit-Nicolai RD campaign. By late summer early fall both main force
and provincial mobile units were down in strength and were using young boys from age 14 to 17 in relatively large numbers. In the fall these units were reequipped with modern Chinese and Soviet weapons and began the annual winter-spring campaign. In the period 6-20 December the 21st killed 194 Viet Cong and captured 235 weapons in a battle fought in An Xuyen-Chuong Thien-Bac Lieu Provinces. ARVN losses were 96 killed and 193 wounded. This was the most successful single battle fought in IV Corps in the past two and a half years and attests to the combat proficiency of the 21st ARVN Division at this time.

During 1967 the 21st ARVN Division concentrated its RD effort in Phong Dinh Province in the Ba Se area and in the Vinh Ky salt flat area south of Bac Lieu. Some success was achieved, particularly in Vinh Ky. Because of significant military progress, conditions have been set for major RD progress in Ba Xuyen Province, northern Bac Lieu Province, and southeastern Phong Dinh Province, the richest areas in the DTA. It is probable that important Ba Xuyen Province will be pacified in 1968. Plans have been made to accomplish this.

d. BORDER AREAS. During the past two and a half years major efforts have been made to realign and strengthen forces in border areas. The basic objectives of this program have been to add depth to the border surveillances forces, and penetrate and occupy the Seven Mountains and the Plain of Reeds Base Areas. During this period five special forces A camps have been successfully converted to regional forces. One camp has been closed and one camp turned over exclusively to Vietnamese LLDB control. These actions have permitted concentration of forces in more critical areas. Two camps have been constructed in the Plain of Reeds area lending depth to the border camps in the most important infiltration areas and also giving significant help in the Plain of Reeds Base Area. Two U.S. led Special Forces/CIDG mobile guerrilla companies were formed and operated successfully over extended periods of time in the Seven Mountains and in Long Toan. These companies have also been trained in PF rescue operations and have participated in such operations. A Mike Force has been created and functions as a mobile strike force in all of the border provinces. The small boat potential has been significantly augmented both in local sampans and airboats. Most important, the tempo of operations was steadily increased and in late 1967 the U.S. Special Forces/LLDB/CIDG were averaging 2000 company and platoon size operations per month, ninety percent during the hours of darkness. Fifty percent of the forces available are now employed in the field at all times on operations of one to three days duration. Plans are now being implemented to construct two additional camps in the Plain of Reeds areas and to increase the Mike Force to ten companies - seven rifle companies, one reconnaissance company, a Headquarters, Service and Artillery Company and an airboat company with seventy airboats. In sum, strength in the border provinces has been significantly increased as has the intensity of operations. This is quite important as there are strong indications that the Viet Cong are making greater use of Cambodia above the Kien Phong/Kien Tuong boundaries for refitting and re-supplying their units in Dinh Tuong Province.
10. (C) SUMMARY. By late summer of 1967 Viet Cong strength in both main force and provincial mobile battalions had dropped off considerably. Untrained youths from 13 to 17 years of age were found in significant numbers. In August and September the Viet Cong avoided contact wherever possible. During this period they apparently recruited and increased quite extensively in order to fill up their depleted ranks. By late October when their most intense winter-springs campaign opened up throughout the Delta it became obvious that the Viet Cong had filled up their units and had equipped them with the latest Soviet and Chinese automatic weapons and rockets. In addition, they had removed their 75mm recoilless rifle and some of their 81mm mortar units from the battalions and placed them at the regimental level. This gave the Viet Cong the flexibility to employ their artillery units on independent missions and accounts for the large increase in shellings of district and provincial towns and airfields. The Viet Cong also moved some of their most effective cadre down to the village and hamlet level in order to gain better command and control of their local forces and guerrillas. This has permitted the Viet Cong to launch coordinated attacks at all levels especially in Dinh Tuong Province along Highway 4. This also accounts in some measure for the sharp drop off in Chieu Hois.

November and December 1967 witnessed a sharp increase in Viet Cong activity and large scale attacks. This resulted in a stiff Viet Cong-ARVN confrontation which led to the most intense fighting in the two and a half year period. The Viet Cong in November lost 1294 KIA, 568 VCC, and 588 weapons captured. The Vietnamese lost 464 KIA and 393 weapons. In December the Viet Cong lost 2013 KIA, 469 captured, and 804 weapons captured. The Vietnamese lost 600 KIA, and 469 weapons. The pace of the fighting continued into January 1968 and remains at a high level at this writing.

By the end of 1967 the situation in IV Corps was as follows:

a. The Viet Cong main effort was directed at Highway 4 in Dinh Tuong Province with the objective of cutting Highway 4 and gaining control of the Province. The Viet Cong units leading the effort were the 263rd and 261st Main Force Battalions, reinforced by companies of the 515th Main Force Battalion and the 51st Provincial Mobile Battalion. Sapper units aided and abetted by local guerrillas were engaged in mining the highway at frequent intervals. The 7th ARVN Division less the 16th Regiment, with two Vietnamese Marine Battalions attached and supported by the Mobile Riverine Force of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division was engaged in offensive battles designed to destroy the Viet Cong and protect Highway 4. The 7th ARVN Division and supporting units were generally successful but at the time of this writing results were inconclusive.

b. In the center the Viet Cong had failed to stop the Mang Thit-Nicolai RD campaign. Viet Cong efforts to control the rice harvest in Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Province had failed. The 9th ARVN Division was operating successfully in these areas and had generated an increased offensive spirit.
CONFFDENTIAL

e. The 21st Division had soundly defeated the Viet Cong and
were in a pursuit posture. This opened the way for large scale destruc-
tion of Viet Cong units and a significant move forward in the pacification
and its campaign in the future.

li. (C) ADVICE AND THE ADVISOR RELATIONSHIP. It is now significant to
note that the war is being fought and the government structure operated
in IV Corps primarily by the Vietnamese. Although the Vietnamese receive
considerable combat support from the U.S. and there is a large advisory
effort both military and civilian, the responsibility and the major part
of the effort is Vietnamese. It is also significant to note that the
area of IV Corps includes a large portion of the total population of
South Vietnam and the bulk of the rice production. Thus it can be said
that this is one of the most important areas in the country and is one
of the main objectives of both the Viet Cong and GVN. This is a most
proper arrangement because if the Vietnamese can win the struggle in the
Delta the victory in this important area will be theirs and in the process
they will have developed a viable and respected government.

Contrary to many news media writings the Vietnamese are brave and
skilled soldiers. When well led they accomplish good results even under
the most severe conditions. Whenever they receive good generalship they
inevitably achieve significant victories. The best example of this is in
the 21st ARVN Division. The same applies to the Regional and Popular
Forces who are severely handicapped by the fact that most are deployed
in indefensible and obsolete watch towers and outposts. This leads to
defeat piecemeal and a low level of offensive spirit. The subject of
outposts is discussed in the Annex Strategic Planning and Tactics.

In IV Corps there has always been a close advisor-counterpart rela-
tionship. This is best characterized by a sense of mutual respect and
confidence. In most instances the advisor acts as an assistant commander
making certain never to step over the line to full command except in rare
instances when requested to do so. The advisor at all levels is required
to act in both a military and civil capacity. Because of the combat
environment in which he lives and operates and the many and varied prob-
lems he must solve, the advisor at the end of his tour has received
invaluable training and experience. There is no doubt that many well
trained junior officers, enlisted men and civilian administrators are
being developed in this program. There is no doubt that many future
leaders will come from this group of outstanding individuals. The day
to day accomplishments of these highly dedicated individuals, although
seldom spectacular, have brought great credit to the United States.
This is fully recognized by Vietnamese officials and the civilian population.
1. (C) COMMENTS

a. As in any war, timely reaction to current, hard intelligence is a key to success in this conflict. However, good intelligence is even more important in the counterinsurgency effort than on the conventional battlefield because of several factors.

(1) Since the enemy chooses to fight only at a time and place of his own choosing unless forced into a direct confrontation, it is necessary to find him before being able to fix, fight and finish him.

(2) Due to the very nature of this conflict and the resulting troop dispositions, the enemy is capable of attacking any military installation or population center from any direction, with various means at his disposal, and at the time of his choosing. Since security forces are inadequate to defend the many potential enemy targets simultaneously, timely and accurate intelligence coupled with aggressive use of such intelligence is essential to deny the enemy the opportunity to exercise initiative through execution of sneak attacks.

(5) As a result of better friendly combat successes through the more timely employment of effective intelligence, the enemy has dispersed his forces to avoid detection and retaliatory actions such as air strikes, artillery fire or ground tactical operations. Although never a sophisticated enemy, the VC have thus attempted to deny our modern weapons systems suitable targets for effective employment. Integral to this war are unique enemy dispositions which defy comparison with any classic battle field formations. Therefore, timely intelligence rapidly exploited is the key to success.

b. Since IV Corps Advisory Group does not have a Field Force or similar headquarters superimposed over it, the duties of the G2 Advisor have been unique when considered with other tactical areas. This staff officer has been charged with the duties and responsibilities inherent in the functions of AGF, G2; Corp G2 Advisor; coordinator of the military intelligence community in IV Corps Tactical Zone; and the intelligence supervision, administration and logistic control of division and sector intelligence advisory personnel. Therefore, particular care is exercised in the selection of the Corps Senior Intelligence Advisor to assure fulfillment of all associated tasks of both command and staff nature.

c. Although the field of intelligence has become quite complex it is not highly specialized. Successful combat intelligence officers are those who possess experience with the many facets of the intelligence system, and also have a combat arms background. In the IV Corps area both qualifications are of paramount importance. Currently, the majority of MI officers and enlisted advisors are young and inexperienced, with a minimum of formal service training. Despite these limitations, these advisory personnel are doing an excellent job of...
learning by doing. These personnel should eventually represent a de-
cided asset to the II Branch as trained and tested senior officers and
SOC's.

d. The intelligence staff officer cannot estimate the enemy
directly in the classic terms of enemy capabilities. Although essen-
tial for assessment of the enemy on any battlefield, these capabilities
are of less importance in this type of war. Since the insurgent has
the capability to do many things in many places at many times, the com-
mander must know what the enemy is really up to. The intelligence offi-
cer who knows his enemy throughout and places himself in the frame of
mind of the Viet Cong is the most successful.

e. The acquisition of tactical intelligence has improved as
the areas under SVN control have expanded through SVN operations, pa-
acification and revolutionary development activities. The net intelli-
gence result of these activities has been two-fold. First, because
the populace has gained faith in the SVN through its efforts to wrest
an area from the VC and its developmental assistance and continued pre-
sence to assure pacification, the populace has begun to voluntarily pro-
vide information of VC locations and activities. Secondly, the VC have
been denied base and operational areas, tax bases, sources of recruits,
intelligence sources, and safe havens. This has greatly decreased the
VC capability to move major units undetected or to conduct other activi-
ties, such as reconnaissance, without being reported to friendly forces.

f. In the Mekong Delta, it is an exercise in futility to
conduct a search operation of short duration in a suspected area without
definite and specific targets. The end product often will be negative
contact with the enemy coupled with friendly casualties resulting from
mines and booby traps. Since available assets and the environment do
not permit friendly forces to spend prolonged periods of time in an a-
rea, and since the enemy rarely stays in an area for more than three
days at a time, it is imperative that operations be based on current,
definitive intelligence concerning the enemy.

2. (C) COLLECTION:

a. General. There has been a considerable growth of agen-
cies and activities involved in the collection of intelligence infor-
mation. To ensure a coordinated effort with minimal duplication, and
full acquisition and exploitation of intelligence information, the Corps
G2 advisor was delegated the responsibility of coordinating all US mil-
itary collection activities within the IV CTZ. This has resulted in
a close knit intelligence community which rapidly and freely dissemi-
nates information down, laterally, and up, to interested headquarters,
agencies and activities. This in turn, has provided more complete in-
telligence information for exploitation at all levels.

b. Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Aerial surveil-
ance and reconnaissance employing photographic and electronic sensor
equipment as well as visual observers developed extensively during

this period. With the build-up of Free World Forces in RVN commencing in the summer of 1965, the primary reconnaissance capabilities of the US Air Force were expanded to King Size and centrally located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in support of all CTZs. US Army CV-1 Mohawk aerial surveillance companies were deployed in general support of all CTZs and MACV. One Mohawk company was assigned to IV Corps. O-1 Bird Dog reconnaissance airplane companies were deployed to all CTZs, with two companies located in the IV CTZ. As a result, extensive aerial surveillance and reconnaissance assets were available in support of IV Corps by late 1967 to provide accurate and timely intelligence for target acquisition as well as coastal and border, inland waterway and Viet Cong base area surveillance. Reconnaissance airplanes also were utilized in direct support of operational requirements to fly critical installation cover during the hours of darkness (night time airfield coverage), radio relay, convoy cover, operational cover, and artillery and naval gunfire adjustment. Organic US Army IV Corps surveillance and reconnaissance assets have greatly increased the ability for immediate response and rapid readout of information obtained.

(1) Photographic Reconnaissance: Varied format, large and medium scale photography of large areas and long strips was provided by US Air Force high-performance jet aircraft, and was of primary value for supplemental and detailed interpretation of Viet Cong base areas, recon-liaison routes, and border infiltration activities in the IV CTZ. Medium and small scale mapping photography of the extensive rice producing areas in IV Corps was also obtained during the 1966 and 1967 harvest seasons. US Army Mohawk aircraft provided a highly responsive, but limited scale and format photo back-up capability. Mohawk night photo capabilities were employed in support of critical installation and LOC cover.

(2) Hand Held Photography: Hand held photographic system (primarily Asahi Pentax Spotmatic 35mm camera with 50 and 200mm lens attachments) used from O-1 Bird Dog aircraft was a valuable supplement to conventional aerial photography for timely orientation and close-up photos of critical areas. Optimum results were obtained when hand hold missions were planned in detail based on other intelligence. Hand hold camera systems were available down to Division advisor level in the IV CTZ, and were increasingly utilized at Corps level to confirm or deny suspected Viet Cong base areas, operational and supply activities. Expanded use of hand hold cameras down to Sector level is planned as more camera systems are received.

(3) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR): Organic Mohawk aircraft were employed to provide repetitive nightly airborne radar coverage of up to 80% of the IV CTZ beginning in September 1967. Previous SLAR coverage was limited to coastal and border areas. SLAR provided large area mapping and moving target cover of IV Corps waterways during the hours of darkness, enhanced by infilght and ground data terminal station readout capabilities allowing IV radio reports to Sector TOCs, Special Forces and naval forces. Targets acquired by SLAR and immediately reported to Sector or naval patrol boats were often engaged
by armed helicopters, artillery or river patrol boats. Limitations of SLAR were small scale presentations of the imagery and low-resolution qualities. SLAR has been particularly useful in the detection and data base collection of water traffic in the Mekong Delta.

(4) Infrared: Organic Mohawk aircraft and US Air Force aircraft flew IR heat sensing missions over Viet Cong base areas and infiltration and command and control routes in IV CTZ. The IR sensor was particularly effective in detecting cooking fires and cannan movements in Viet Cong base and operational areas during the early evening and early morning hours. Attenuation of heat returns in areas of dense vegetation resulted in IR missions being flown between 1,000' and 2,000' for best results. IR missions were also flown in direct support of FIRMFLY (armed helicopter interdiction missions) over specified free fire zones. Targets acquired from IR in-flight presentations were reported to FIRMFLY and engaged after Sector clearance.

(5) Visual Reconnaissance: VR performed by US Army, US Air Force light O-1 observation aircraft developed into a primary means of aerial surveillance and intelligence collection over the IV CTZ. With US Army advisor and US Air Force FAC O-1 aircraft assigned at Corps, Division and Sector levels, approximately 85% of the IV CTZ was covered by visual reconnaissance each week. Visual reconnaissance of Sector areas is the primary responsibility of Sector US Army O-1s backed up by US Air Force FAC aircraft as available. Night time visual reconnaissance of US Army airfields at Can Tho, Soc Trang and Vinh Long was initiated in August 1967 as an additional defensive measure as the installations grew in size and importance. Primary VR O-1 aircraft were also used to adjust artillery and naval gunfire, provide convoy cover, and act as radio relay on division operations.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION:

a. Accurate estimates are of paramount importance in the intelligence effort due to the clandestine nature of this war. Since the enemy disposition is unique and his capabilities cannot be considered in the classic sense, an accurate estimate of his intentions becomes all the more important. These estimates are based on thorough background knowledge of the enemy, current intelligence, analysis of enemy movements, locations, strengths, and recent activities. Accurate statistics, pattern analysis and other data are maintained as a base. As these data are compiled, it becomes more apparent that the VC are creatures of habit regarding geographical movements, in addition to displaying certain patterns relating to the times and types of their attacks. At the corps level, a system was devised that graphically portrays, by time and space, all reported VC movements and incidents. This recording system is complemented by maintaining detailed 3D situation maps that trace all known enemy movements and include field fortifications, supply points, installations and command and control routes. As the base data has accumulated with time, it is being expanded in depth to include such factors as climate, moon phases, light cycle, schedules of crop harvesting, and socio-logical considerations. The product of this analysis has been invaluable.
in the designation of VC base areas, commo—liaison routes, and is reach-
ing the point where it is becoming easier to predict enemy locations in
advance together with their probable courses of action. Pattern analy-
ysis is conducted also at division and sector levels, each confined to
their particular geographical areas of interest. As this system of analy-
ysis continues to expand, the information and intelligence gained be-
comes of greater mutual benefit to all levels concerned. Corps receives
better information from subordinate echelons, and in turn is able to
furnish better intelligence back to division and sector, as well as to
higher headquarters.

b. Other factors which have improved intelligence production
are more rapid communications and the establishment of uniform report-
ing requirements. Further improvements are anticipated pending the avail-
ability of secure communications to all sectors, and a more rapid and
efficient capability for the reproduction of hard copy INTSUMS and PER-
INTREPS.

4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. It is often difficult in this type of war to distinguish
between intelligence and counterintelligence. Frequently the product
of counterintelligence agencies is of greater value to the positive in-
telligence analyst and vice-versa. A review of the intelligence organ-
ization should be made to explore the feasibility of merging intelli-
gence with counterintelligence efforts in the counterinsurgency environ-
ment.

b. Neutralization of the VC infrastructure at all levels is
one of the requirements for final victory in the Delta. Although the
elimination of the infrastructure has been inherent to many tactical
operations, the progress has been slow. The implementation of the ICZ
Program has provided a positive means for identifying and neutralizing
the infrastructure at the district level while contributing to sub-
sector tactical intelligence. Since the ICZ Program was established
in July 1967, a total of 20 District Intelligence & Operations Coordinat-
ing Centers (DIOCC's) have become operational in this Corps area.
The present forecast is for (60) of these centers to be operational by
August 1968.

5. (C) SUMMARY:

a. During the past 29 months much progress has been made in
the field of intelligence collection, production and pattern analysis.
The addition of US collection assets has aided the ARVN effort immeas-
urably. The intelligence advisory effort has worked continually to strength-
en and refine ARVN intelligence procedures at all levels. Progress has
been particularly gratifying at the Corps and division echelons where
those G2 staffs are functioning in a thoroughly professional manner.
Sector Intelligence is improving, but will always require close attention
as this is the level where we have young and often inexperienced
advisors guiding and working with equally young and inexperienced

COMMENDS
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counterparts. The most gratifying aspect in the improvement of sector intelligence is that guidance and training is now reaching them from higher ARVN headquarters. This indicates a degree of self-sufficiency.

b. As a result of improved intelligence and its exploitation, more successful operations have been conducted. These in turn have instilled a confidence of the GVN in the people who then complete the cycle by voluntarily providing better intelligence for further operations which have steadily reduced the land areas and population controlled by the VC. The VC in many instances have been forced to revert from battalion and larger size operations to company and smaller unit actions. They remain dispersed as frequently as possible in order to avoid detection and consequent retaliatory action. Although the current VC estimated strength is nearly equal to that recorded for 1965, this is accounted for in large measure by the greatly reduced caliber of their combatants in terms of age and training. It is routine to capture VC ranging in age from 13 to 17 years of age who have received no formal military instruction. This weakness in their ranks is causing their operations to shift steadily downward. Main Force units are now assigned missions of Provincial Mobile Force units, who in turn are taking the place of the guerrillas. Through the continued improvements in collection and dissemination of intelligence, and the employment of this product against both the organized military units and the infrastructure, the VC threat in the Delta is being steadily and decisively eliminated.
1. (C) The basic strategy in IV Corps has been to conduct offensive operations against Viet Cong units at all levels wherever and whenever they can be located. Coordinating with this offensive posture, IVN has conducted a defense of key installations such as provincial and district towns, fortified areas, and airfields. Offensive operations are also conducted to protect and open up lines of communications such as roads, rivers and canals.

2. (C) This strategy is broken down into specific tasks outlined in two annual plans (1) the Dry Season Plan and (2) the Wet Season Plan. Planning is broken down into roughly two six month periods in order to force the NVN into keeping the plan up to date through constant review, keeping implementation active, and adjusting to an ever changing situation.

3. (C) Specific tasks and critical areas designated are in the following categories:

   a. Destruction of specific Viet Cong units.

   b. Protection of lines of communications such as the Han River-Moc Lo Canal, Lac Ve Canal, Sa Da Canal, Go Co Canal, Van Long Canal, Ho No Canal, Highway 4, the Ben Tre-Bac Giang Provincial Highway, and Route 11 from Can Tho to Vy Tinh.

   c. Security of specific installations and areas such as the Can Tho-Sinh Thuy complex, Vinh Long, Soc Trang and Long Xuyen Airfields, Ba Viem Cement Plant, An Thoi FW Camp, and the Cho Gao Communications Center.

   d. Elimination of Viet Cong Base Areas such as the Upper and Lower U Minh, Ben Doi, Long Tean, Tram Phu, Binh Dinh, Ganh Long, Seven Mountains and Plain of Reeds.

   e. Elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

   f. Concentration of pacification and RD efforts in critical and rich areas such as Dien Bien, Phu Hien, Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Vinh Phuc, Phong Binh, Ba Xuyen, and Binh Lieu Provinces.

   g. Protection of the rice harvest and movements of crops and livestock to market.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10

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4. (C) ARVN has been generally successful in implementing this strategy and has been able to focus its efforts on essential and critical tasks while employing economy of force measures elsewhere. Gradual progress is in evidence in all major areas. Realignment of Division Tactical Areas on 1 January 1968 is a major step forward. On this date the 44th Special Zone with headquarters at Gao Lanh, Kien Phong Province was established. The 44th Special Zone, with DTA status, includes Chau Doc, Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Province. This is a border surveillance and economy of force zone. Realignment permits the 7th ARVN Division to concentrate its troops and efforts in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and Go Cong Provinces in that priority. Likewise, the 9th ARVN Division may now concentrate on Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, and Sa Dec Province in that priority. The 21st ARVN Division, which is in a far better posture vis-a-vis the Viet Cong and is the best offensive division, has been given the added responsibility of Kien Giang Province. This removes the barrier of the Kien Giang-Chuong Thien provincial boundary and permits the 21st ARVN Division to operate across the boundary and into the entire Upper U Minh Base Area, almost a sanctuary in the past.

5. (C) The backbone of the tactical deployments in IV Corps are eleven airfields which are kept at sufficient stockage levels of JP4, aviation, gas and armed helicopter ammunition to permit initiation of air mobile operations without prior resupply. This permits rapid action and reaction and denies the Viet Cong prior warning by observation of a logistical build up. This system was installed in 1965.

6. (C) The primary offensive arm in IV Corps are the ARVN Infantry and Ranger Battalions, the M13 squadrons which are employed as armor, the helicopters of the 13th Aviation Battalion, and Tactical Air. Artillery is normally available but in very limited quantities. Each ARVN Division is required to place five infantry battalions on permanent RD duty - a static role. This leaves the 7th ARVN Division with seven infantry battalions, two ranger battalions and one M13 squadron for offensive operations and defense of installations in the DTA. The 9th ARVN Division has six infantry battalions, one ranger battalion and one M13 squadron available while the 21st ARVN Division is in the same configuration as the 7th ARVN Division. When divisions operate in or adjacent to an RD area they will frequently employ an RD battalion. Also from time to time ranger battalions are shifted from one division to another for a specific operation. In addition, battalions from the general reserve are sometimes made available for short periods.

7. (C) ARVN operates at four levels - division, regiment, sector and battalion. In the first three instances Regional Forces, Popular Forces and CIDG are frequently included.
8. (C) The terrain in the Delta is characterized by heavily vegetated canal lines bordered by rice paddies. In the dry season the rice paddies are hard and offer little if any cover or concealment. In the wet season the paddies are filled with water about knee deep. In the Viet Cong base areas the water in the vicinity of the tree lines is anywhere from waist to hip pit depth with grass growing above the level of a Vietnamese head. The Viet Cong move by sampan along the canals and rivers or by foot along the banks. Throughout their base areas and contested areas they have constructed defensive positions along the canal lines characterized by large, thick mud bunkers, automatic weapons positions, and individual spider holes. All positions are well camouflaged and sited for all around defense and flanking counterattacks. If the Viet Cong are caught in a defensive position, they will habitually withhold fire until friendly troops are well within fifty meters in an effort to cause maximum casualties and shock and become so entangled as to prevent artillery and tactical air strikes. Artillery fires and tactical air bombardments are extremely effective but effects are somewhat dampened by the spongy soil conditions which tend to soften the explosions. If a position is not overrun or penetrated by night fall the Viet Cong will normally counterattack, then break contact and disperse as far away as fifteen kilometers by daylight. They carry out their wounded, weapons and dead in that priority. They are skillful at clearing the battlefield and unless overrun will normally leave very little if anything behind. They are good record keepers and reporters, so a position overrun will normally provide many valuable intelligence documents. Prisoners are usually willing to talk freely particularly if offered Chieu Hoi status and are the most valuable source of intelligence.

9. (C) Attack of a Viet Cong canal defensive position is generally done in two ways. First, the initial assault is done by helicopter borne assault troops preceded by tactical air, artillery, and helicopter gunship bombardment. A build up then takes place in an effort to surround the Viet Cong position and reduce it through tactical air, artillery, gunship bombardment. The position is then searched at daylight the next day. Although this tactic undoubtedly produces results, they are difficult to assess because the Viet Cong have normally cleared the battlefield during the hours of darkness. The second method is essentially the same as the first except an assault is launched to get troops on the canal line either on the Viet Cong flank or by penetration then attack down the canal line to overrun the position. This second tactic produces by far the best results but also results in greater friendly losses. The second method is the preferred method.

10. (C) The 21st ARVN Division has developed the most advanced air mobile tactics and organization for combat and therefore their methods are discussed herein.
11. (c) The CG, 21st ARVN Division has designated the three
Regimental Commanders as Deputy Commanders and their headquarters as
division light CP's. He has placed his Deputy Commander with a light
CP at a fourth location. This overcomes the friciton normally found
between the Province Chief and the Regimental Commander who are nor-
mally of equivalent rank. The Regimental Commander/Deputy Commanders
are responsible for the conduct of all military operations except those
designated as sector operations. The Division CG has the option of
commanding the operation using a light CP augmented by personnel including
advisors from his headquarters or permitting the light CP to command
and control.

Each province is required to furnish the Division CG with likely
Viet Con'g positions and locations on an overlay in the form of numbered
objectives and check points. Each province is divided into four zones.
The Regimental/Deputy Commanders are then furnished books, pages of which
are overlays of the entire area broken down into zones. The overlays
have numbered check points and objectives only. These overlays are
completely changed every ten to fourteen days and treated similar to an
SOI.

When the Division CG is ready to go on an operation he will instruct
the Regimental Commander to study certain pages. Usually this is done
the night before the operation is to start. He will also issue orders
for certain units to be prepared to move out the next day by air or over
land. He frequently instructs units to move during the night to new
locations prepared to operate the next day by a certain time. In this
manner, he positions his forces to begin operations early in the morning.
The plan including the specific area of operations, objectives and routes
is not disclosed until the operation actually starts. With his required
forces in the ready position the CG, staff, U.S. Advisor plus the U.S. ALO
go airborne over the target area in a Command and Control helicopter. The
helicopter air mission commander is a helicopter company commander and
pilots the C&C ship. The Division CG, armed helicopters, and intelligence
teams on the ground make a last minute reconnaissance and assessment, the
operation is planned in the C&C helicopter and initiated by means of
fragmentary orders to subordinate units. The operation is then developed
to its finality based on the tactical situation as it actually exists not
as a preconceived maneuver. This method permits maximum flexibility and
security. It requires a high degree of professionalism and the ability
to execute orders rapidly. Once on the ground this division prefers to
assault the canal line at both flanks of the Viet Cong position, and then
attack down the canal line in an effort to overrun the position. Through-
out the operation the division employs tactical air, artillery, and heli-
copter gunships in support. Frequently all three elements are engaged
simultaneously. Gunships are also used for reconnaissance of adjacent
areas. The 21st ARVN Division has been highly successful in employing
this type of operation and tactics. Its ability to gain surprise over
the Viet Cong has been remarkably high and is improving.
12. (C) The most serious deficiency in disposition and deployment of troops in IV Corps is in the area of the Regional and Popular Forces. There are approximately 50,000 Regional Force Troops and 60,000 Popular Forces. This is the largest ground force available to IV Corps. The bulk of these forces are deployed in and around Province and District capitals. They occupy over 2000 watch towers and mud outposts in squad, platoon and company configuration. The basic idea of the outposts is to give security to the adjacent towns, villages and hamlets and protect critical points such as bridges and canal junctions. Actually the outposts in most instances afford very little security, and are excellent fixed targets for Viet Cong attack. The Viet Cong have become very proficient at attacking and overrunning these positions. With the advent of recoilless rifles and rocket launchers in large numbers the outposts have become largely untenable and obsolete. Major advisory effort has been made to consolidate outposts into company size patrol bases as a minimum and to move the Popular Forces into the hamlets. Although the Vietnamese are well aware of the vulnerability of the outposts they are extremely reluctant to make a major change. They have in some instances consolidated squad size installations into Platoons but in the main have attempted to strengthen the outposts by redesign, thicker mud walls and increased barbed wire and concertina. However, the fact remains that these installations are rather easily attacked, a source of weapons for the Viet Cong and the only way the Viet Cong can gain local victories and intimidate the population with relatively small forces. It is doubtful if the Vietnamese will make major changes unless absolutely forced to do so by the Viet Cong. The reluctance for change in this matter is almost universal among the Vietnamese including their best officers. However, in late 1967 the Viet Cong armed their units including guerrillas with numerous rockets of the B40, B50, HP7 type. The day is obviously near when the Vietnamese will be forced to make a drastic change and move from static posts to mobile operations at the local level. The alternative is to continue to improve the current system with resultant unacceptable heavy personnel and weapons losses and a severe loss of population and area control.

13. (C) Highly sophisticated tactics and techniques have been developed and used during flood seasons in the border provinces. These tactics were particularly effective during the fall of 1966 in Kien Phong and Kien Thong Provinces. Severe flood conditions caused the Viet Cong to disperse into the Tam, forests and along the few canal lines still above water. Areas were searched by the GVN, Regional and Popular Forces mounted in sampans and assault boats. These forces were covered and assisted by armed helicopters, command and control helicopters, FAcs and fighter bombers. Whenever possible a quick reaction force of fifty men with five helicopter transports was in reserve. U.S. Navy PBrs were moved into the flooded area and rendered invaluable fire support. The basic method of operation was a boat sweep of Viet Cong.
areas directed from the air. Viet Cong units were surrounded, attacked by fighters and armed helicopters and then overrun by boat assault. Individual Viet Cong camps attempting to leave the area or fleeing from the assault were stopped by hovering helicopters. The down draft of the main rotor was used to strip the camouflage. Ladders were used to drop into the sampan for a detailed search. In those instances where Viet Cong or suspects refused capture they were lifted into the helicopter by boat hooks. Viet Cong who jumped into the water to avoid capture were surfaced by hand grenades and then lifted into the helicopter by boat hooks. Wide areas were searched using these tactics and techniques with excellent results. Each fall, equipment is assembled and troops trained in order to take advantage of the flood condition as they exist at the time.

14. (C) In summary the strategy, strategic planning and tactics employed are basically sound. Vital areas and tasks are given the required priority. Tactics are flexible and take full advantage of the combat support available. The major weakness is in the deployment and employment of Regional and Popular Forces in essentially a fixed static role.
ANNEX C – ARTILLERY

1. (C) ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT:
   a. Since August of 1965, artillery structure in IV CTZ has remained relatively unchanged. There are six divisional 105mm howitzer battalions and one non-divisional 155mm howitzer battalion in IV CTZ. With two exceptions, each of these battalions has three batteries of six howitzers each. The two exceptions exist in the 9th and 21st Divisions where one battalion of each division recently received and additional six howitzers which have been formed into a fourth battery. Both divisional and non-divisional battalions are emplaced in section or platoon firing positions located throughout the CTZ. From these positions, artillery covers approximately 16,000 of the 37,000 kilometers in IV CTZ (43% coverage).

   b. Employment of artillery by platoon is necessitated by the requirement to support revolutionary development activities, province and district headquarters, outposts and USAF-CIDG camps throughout the CTZ. Control is decentralized and clearance to fire in the territorial defense role is granted by the District/Province Chief. Considering the limited resources available, only by dispersing artillery can maximum coverage of these areas be obtained. At the same time, this dispersal severely restricts the artillery available to provide continuing support for operations. Operational support is provided using either of two methods. If an operation is within the sector of fire of one or more territorial positions, it is supported by that position. If not within the sector of fire of a defense position, one or more platoons are displaced. As air movement resources have become more readily available, more frequent displacements of artillery have occurred, enabling commanders to place more reliance on artillery support. With the arrival into IV CTZ of an additional CH-47 company, the capability to rapidly displace artillery in support of operations will be further increased. Without sufficient resources available to support and vulnerable to VC attack. Therefore, at present, District/Province Chiefs are reluctant to allow artillery to be displaced overnight. In the 9th and 21st Divisions, this has been partially resolved with the organization of the aforementioned fourth battery. Upon completion of training, two platoons will be employed in each DTA as mobile artillery with a primary mission of providing close, continuous fire support to maneuver elements for the duration of an operation. Organization of a similar battery in the Upper Delta DTA (7th Division) if completed as planned will provide this division with a similar capability.

2. (C) IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED:
   a. Foremost in any program to improve artillery in IV CTZ must be the consideration to furnish additional artillery support to the three divisions. Provision of an additional 105mm battalion to each division would contribute to the overall ability of artillery to provide close and continuous fire support throughout the Division Tactical Area. It would allow that artillery presently employed in a territorial defense role to
b. Coupled with the requirement for additional artillery there is a need for riverine or river mobile artillery to be employed along the numerous rivers and canals in IV CTZ. Effectiveness of this type artillery has been proven during operation of the 9th US Division Mobile Riverine Force. Priority operational areas within IV CTZ are almost entirely located along major rivers and canals. Riverine artillery, if available, would provide ARVN with the capability to support operations along waterways in these priority operational areas without having to rely upon air transport of artillery weapons.

c. Two additional capabilities are required to improve the artillery's ability to deliver fire. Providing ARVN with a meteorological and survey capability would enable artillery units to develop more highly refined firing data which would enhance effectiveness and accuracy of these unobserved fires.
ANNEX D - AIR OPERATIONS

1. (C) GENERAL: Tactical air support in IV Corps during the reporting period has kept an ever increasing pressure on enemy forces. This has been done with all resources available from both US and VN Air Force and has effectively assisted the RVN maneuver elements in their destruction of the enemy.

2. (C) TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT: Throughout the reporting period tactical air support, both preplanned and immediate, has been furnished on a timely basis. Aircraft have generally been available to support all operations, both in prestrikes of helicopter landing zones and to support ground troops once contact is made. Of all tactical air sorties flown over the past 28 months, almost half have been flown by VNAF. Even though the total number of tactical support sorties flown during the period has remained relatively constant, the reduction in the number of large scale operations has enabled more strikes to be made available for each operation.

3. (C) AC-47 (SPOOKY): The use of the AC-47 was initiated in April 1966. Since that time, the number of missions flown has steadily increased. A measure of the effectiveness of these flights can be gained by realizing that since AC-47's have been airborne on a nightly basis over the Can Tho/Binh Thuy perimeter, mortar/recoilless rifle attacks against these airfields have been reduced to zero. These flights are diverted to provide fire support to outposts, watchtowers and district towns undergoing attack or harassment and can arrive on station with a minimum of delay. Based on tests conducted in IV CTZ, development and deployment of the AC-130 "Super Spooky" will significantly improve the effectiveness of this weapons system.

4. (C) AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE: IV Corps had a lower priority for reconnaissance missions than the other three Corps, with about 18% of all reconnaissance missions in RVN being flown in IV Corps. However, approximately 95 percent of all missions requested have been flown. Recently, increased emphasis has been placed on obtaining photographic and SLAR coverage of Route 1 in Binh Tuong Province in an attempt to assist in keeping this portion of the highway open.

5. (C) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: A large increase has occurred in psychological operations in IV CTZ within recent months. For example, the number of loudspeaker sorties and the number of leaflets dropped have more than doubled within the past year. Combined with this is an increased emphasis on locally produced leaflets and broadcasts which have been determined to be more effective than those centrally prepared.

6. (C) B-52 STRIKES: Because of the large civilian population living in the Delta lower B-52 Strikes are flown in IV Corps than in other areas. The B-52 Strikes that are flown are targeted against Viet Cong Base Areas. All B-52 Strikes are followed up with ground exploitation. Since all but two of the base areas are in the coastal mangrove swamp areas exploitation is most difficult except during the dry season. This same condition exists in
the Plain of Reeds. Therefore B-52 Strikes are most effective from December through May. B-52 Strikes have been instrumental in getting ARVN to penetrate into the base areas. In addition they have had a significant psychological effect upon the Viet Cong and have been instrumental in the destruction of the Long Toan, Tan Phu and Binh Dai bases.

7. (C) DEFOILATION: An increase of approximately 300 percent in the number of defoliation sorties, amount of chemicals and area coverage has been achieved in the defoliation program within the past year. This program has been directed toward defoliation of VC base areas and not in crop destruction. The program has been instrumental in eliminating VC bases in which observation was denied by vegetation and thereby has restricted VC movements in those areas.
1. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) is the integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate, and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those coordinated military and civil actions to liberate the people from Viet Cong control; restore public security, initiate political, economic and social development; extend effective Government of Vietnam (GVN) authority; and win the willing support of the people towards these ends.

2. PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT: Prior to the establishment of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) similar functions were provided by the Office of Civil Operations. These activities had primarily a civil connotation and as such was not all encompassing in that the military side of pacification was omitted and as a result plans were often uncoordinated and lacking in a single direction.

3. RECONCENTRATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS:

a. During the early part of 1967, it became apparent that Revolutionary Development activities needed to be directed by one agency. Accordingly, on 23 May 1967, CORDS was established to provide for single management direction of these activities. The position of Deputy for CORDS IV CTZ was established to effect a maximum degree of control in areas which had heretofore been either purely military or purely civilian operations. The Deputy for CORDS IV CTZ is charged with the responsibility for field support to the GVN's RD program. He supervises the formulation and execution of all plans, policies and programs—military and civilian—which support the pacification program in the IV CTZ.

b. The Assistant Deputy for CORDS acts as the Chief of Staff of the organization and as such supervises and coordinates all staff activities to include joint and combined plans and programs for U.S. civil/military support of RD and U.S. Country Assistance Programs in IV CTZ. In addition, the Assistant Deputy for CORDS serves as point of contact with U.S. sponsoring agencies for RD programs and maintains liaison with these agencies in representing their interest in civil—new RD—program activities.

c. The Plans and Programs Division formulates guidance and develops detailed plans and programs for U.S. support of RD and related activities and Country Assistance Programs in IV CTZ (Appendix 1).

d. The New Life Development Division develops and recommends proposals and provides technical assistance for the provinces consistent with RD guidelines in the areas of Rural Electrification, Market Schools, Self-help activities, Public Administration, Education, Agricultural Affairs, Youth activities, Social Welfare and Handicrafts (Appendix 2).
e. The Revolutionary Development Cadre plans, implements, provides technical assistance and managerial control of U.S. support to the GVN's Revolutionary Development Workers and Census Grievance including support for the GVN People's Self-Defense Program and TOEX development within IV CTZ (Appendix 3).

f. The Chieu Hoi Division is responsible for technical and planning guidance and serves as the primary U.S. advisor to the GVN provincial agencies responsible for the Program. Necessary programs to obtain resources—men, money, and materials—are coordinated with various CORDS agencies and appropriate military staff elements to insure a successful implementation of the Chieu Hoi Program in IV CTZ (Appendix 4).

g. The Refugee Division supervises and evaluates existing and developing refugee situations and maintains a comprehensive knowledge of the refugee programs and activities in IV CTZ. This Division also recommends changes in priorities, emphasis or direction by liaison with Province Refugee Officers and assists them in resolving problems including Hoa Chan activities (Appendix 5).

h. The Public Safety Division implements support to the National Police by recommending and implementing procedures and planning guidance to IV CTZ National Police Headquarters in the form of assistance to the resources control activities, Public Safety Field Advisors and provincial police along with Marine Police and the National Police Field Forces (Appendix 6).

i. The Psychological Operations Division provides informational and psychological operation support to the GVN RD effort in the form of developing plans and activities, proposals, goals, objectives and guidelines for planning and offers advice on matters of public opinion, psychological operations, and psywar policy (Appendix 7).

j. The Public Health Division plans, establishes guidelines and offers implementing assistance to the health programs in IV CTZ. It allows for the judicious establishment of priorities for the use of health program resources within each province based on solid political as well as military and medical exigencies. Assists in the operation and establishment of medical facilities to include construction and personnel (Appendix 8).

4. FUTURE PLANNING: The overall concept for the future entails pacification planning covering the period 1968-1970. Although implementation is in the future development of guidelines and pre-planning conferences have already begun. The effort requires coordination on the part of CORDS, G-3 and RP/PP IV Corps and the appropriate GVN representatives. It is anticipated that a combined plan will emerge, which will be all inclusive and in accordance with directives established at HAG and with pacification desires of both U.S. personnel and GVN officials at IV CTZ.
5. **SUMMARY:** In the relatively short term of its existence, it has become quite evident that CORDS is getting quite close to the existence of joint efforts on the part of civil and military aspects of Revolutionary Development. Since its concept, there have been relatively few changes in the organization. It has come through its growing pains with no adverse side effects and all indications point toward continued improvements in the overall pacification by both U.S. and SVN forces.

Appendices

1. Plans and Programs
2. New Life Development
3. Revolutionary Development Cadre (Classified)
4. Chieu Hoi
5. Refugee
6. Public Safety
7. Psychological Operations
8. Public Health
CORDS IV CORPS

DEPUTY FOR CORDS

ASSISTANT DEPUTY FOR CORDS

DEPUTY ASSISTANT C/S FOR CORDS

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

PLANS & PROGRAMS

REV.

R&D

PUBLIC HEALTH

CHIEF HRT

PUBLIC SAFETY

REHAB

PSY. C/S
1. **CORDS**: The Plans and Programs Division is responsible for the formulation of policy guidance and developing detailed plans and programs for U.S. support of Revolutionary Development and related activities and Country Assistance Programs in IV CTZ.

2. **ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT**: Prior to the CORDS establishment the activities now carried out by this Division were conducted by CCO representatives and members of the IV Corps General Staff namely the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5. Between these two staff functionaires contact with various U.S.-sponsoring agencies was established and planning and implementation of Revolutionary Development programs was carried on in two separate directives.

3. **REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS**:

   a. The organization of the Plans and Programs Division was incorporated as directed by Headquarters USMAC Directive Number 10-12 dated 28 May 1967, into the overall CORDS concept. The Division is charged to formulate policy guidance and develop detailed plans and programs for U.S. support for RD and related activities and country assistance programs; develop CORDS IV CTZ position in respect to Chieu Hoi, Refugees, RD Workers, Public Safety, Public Health, Psychological Operations and Support areas; develop a planning base for these activities and draft general guidelines for accomplishing CORDS objectives; coordinate the civil, political, economic, social, psychological, and military aspects of pacification and link U.S. military/civil support to the GVN RD effort; to maintain liaison with the Chief of Staff, IV CTZ; coordinate the U.S. and GVN civil agencies concerned with planning and programming; recommend program policy guidelines, objectives and priorities for issuance to CORDS provincial elements and other staff divisions as a basis for their planning and project submission; reviews new program and project submission to assure consistency and conformance with approved RD policy guidelines objectives and priorities; develops and elicits, both periodically and on a continuing basis, project status information and evaluation of project progress from other elements of CORDS and sponsoring agencies.

   b. The Division, also, evaluates the extent to which U.S. objectives and program goals are being served by specific projects and programs to the extent to which they are mutually consistent and integrated; evaluates the US and GVN strategy, goals, and objectives in the light of changing conditions.

   c. Plans and Programs supervises the management of the reports system and prepares the CORDS, IV CTZ reports based on the provincial reports submitted in accordance with Joint MAC Directive 4-67 dated 30 October 1967, and all other reports concerning CORDS activities.
u. Plans and Programs Division is the focal point for economic warfare to include population and resources control within IV Corps.

e. In order to accomplish these objectives the Division is subdivided into three Branches each charged with a specific portion of the areas of responsibilities outlined above. The Plans and Programs Branch coordinates the planning of D, CIP, and overall pacification planning for future contingencies. This is accomplished by liaison with other US agencies and GVN officials. It coordinates with other CORDS divisions as appropriate and conducts unilateral and bilateral evaluations on a case by case response to enemy initiated incidents with special emphasis on RD Cadre teams and military missions in direct support and indirect support of the program. This Branch also, conducts special studies and inspections of province programs and makes recommendations to supervisory and/or subordinate CORDS echelons as appropriate. The Reports Branch formulates and recommends policy in accordance with current directives and Deputy for CORDS guidance, pertaining to all reports from provincial representatives and CORDS divisions, compiles, collates, and interprets theses reports for dissemination to higher and lower echelons. These reports comprise all pacification reporting systems within IV CTZ.

4. PROGRESS: Significant progress has been accomplished in all Branches of Plans and Programs. The most notable contribution in the area of progress have been the bilateral coordination and planning initiated with regard to the Revolutionary Development Plan, the Country Assistance Program, and the overall Pacification Plan for 1963. This was a coordinated joint inspection/review effort on the part of US/GVN teams, where in all provinces were visited on several occasions to insure continuity of effort for completion of guidelines spelled out in previous Joint Directives. This is worthy of extensive recognition since it is the first time, in IV CTZ, that joint planning has actually become a joint effort. Some progress has been accomplished in the Evaluation Branch by visits and coordination to determine extent of RD Cadre team efforts in conjunction with hamlet construction and support forces. Evaluations have been made on the extent of traffic flow on the Nicholai-Vang Thit waterway, infrastructure activities, 1963 CORD budget planning and other program support requirements. Consideration and recommendations have been incorporated in these areas. The Reports System has undergone an extensive overhaul in the past months and at this point progress cannot be determined.

5. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Coordination with GVN officials is mandatory in all phases of planning. Unilateral activities becomes a waste of effort. Counterparts are required for each CORDS Division Chief or activity to insure unity of effort and joint planning, and either the US must conform to GVN staff concepts or levers should be exercised to persuade the GVN to adopt US posture.
b. Joint inspection/tours by each headquarters has eliminated conflict of interest and duplication of effort on the part of activities visited.

c. The time factor in transmission of classified material must be taken into consideration where implementation of directives is required.

A time lead is necessary to permit adequate planning on the Province level.

d. There must be a resolve in the relationship between the ARVN Division in the GVN chain of command and the US chain of command. The lesson here is again to insist on counterparts at all echelons.

6. FUTURE PLANS:

a. Implementation of the 1968 Pacification Plan and initiation of subsequent plan will be the major objective, and joint participation and unity of effort will be stressed at all levels.

b. A continued program review of each aspect of pacification geared to developing greater effort will be pursued in 1968.

c. Visits by Evaluation and Reports & Analysis Branches personnel to all provinces, on a periodic schedule, to evaluate problem areas surfaced in monthly province reports will be conducted. Recommendation to appropriate CORDS division or higher headquarters through Deputy for CORDS will be submitted.

7. SUMMARY: Plans and Programs Division is operational and under the reorganization which established the CORDS concept, plays an integral part in the planning, coordination, and implementation of all aspects of the pacification effort.
Appendix 2 to Annex E - New Life Development Division

1. **SUMMARY:** The New Life Development Division consists of seven technical branches: Agriculture, Education, Logistics, Public Administration, Public Health, Community Development and Youth & Sports. More than 212 skilled personnel are involved in program areas covering all sixteen provinces. Sixty-two of these are Americans. In addition, New Life Development is responsible for the administration of Commodity Support under Public Law 480, coordination of CARE and Catholic Relief Society support and many other private agencies such as International Volunteer Service (IVS).

2. **GENERAL RESULTS OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT:** Until 1 November 1967, New Life Development Division was responsible for Public Health programs through the Public Health Branch, which has now become a separate division. Since all USAID/CCO/CORDS programs are planned for the coming calendar year under rather inflexible funding arrangements, programs remain operational and are developed as continuing efforts.

3. **REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS:**
   a. New Life Development Division has probably felt the effect of CORDS/CCO reorganization to the greatest extent as a result of the reporting requirements imposed. From the standpoint of personnel integration there has been little effect. The technical requirements of NLD personnel would preclude personnel integration in an advisory role.
   b. If military civic action units are assigned to CTZ then there will be a need for coordination and possible integration of forces.

4. **LESSONS LEARNED:** Primarily an insight into the military reporting function, and correct staffing procedures has been gained.

5. **FUTURE PLANS:**
   a. Provincial pacification plans are currently being developed using NLD input from throughout the CTZ.
   b. NLD's contribution will be a definition of responsibilities to the provinces by branches to carry on programs developed in the 1967 and now 1968 Country Assistance Program as well as in the RD Plan for 1968. The availability of AID funds is a definite advantage to the development of NLD self-help project capability.

6. **SUMMARY:**
   a. By and large the affect at CTZ level on the New Life Development Division as a result of the reorganization of CCO/CORDS has been minimal.
   b. The highly technical nature of most of the NLD effort has precluded the integration of branch and military personnel.
(d) The affect on provincial operations has been extensive and in most cases there has been a good spirit of cooperation.

(e) ATX funding for special projects has been a great source of encouragement to all field people and certainly eases some of the feelings of frustration normally encountered.

3 TYPES:

A = Agriculture
B = Education
C = Logistics
D = Public Administration
E = Public Works
F = Community Development
G = Youth Affairs
H = Rice Production
1. GENERAL:

a. The Agriculture Branch of New Life Development is responsible for a program that is the very core of successful pacification. Within its scope are several sub-programs the complexity of which almost defies condensed reporting.

b. Early in July a group of P.A.S.A. employees arrived, enabling us to place an agriculture man in each province. These men are real professionals with excellent backgrounds and recent contacts in agriculture who can exert the energetic leadership necessary to develop the dynamic programs desired. We believe they will produce outstanding results as their programs mature.

c. In addition to the provincial advisors we now have a staff of regional advisors who are highly qualified and as a unit would make a nucleus for the staff of an agriculture college. Several have their doctor's degree and the remainder their master's degree in their field of specialization. The function of a region office is to give immediate backstop to the province advisors as required and to program the expansion of the agricultural program in the Delta.

d. AID/Agriculture, Saigon, provides backstopping to the regional office in certain specialized fields. Cooperation between the two offices is very good.

e. Some of the more notable improvements in recent months are the elimination of duplication of effort and improved cooperation between the several sub-branches and the coordination of the agricultural program with the Refugee and Revolutionary Development programs.

2. GENERAL RESUME OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORPS ESTABLISHMENT: Any significant progress in the field of agriculture must, of necessity, be initiated long in advance of the actual harvest. The necessary spadework for the 1966-1968 production of 2,335,959 tons of rice and the looked-for increase of 1967-1968 production was accomplished through a continuing process of building the present organization, the recruitment and assignment of the agriculturists and the accomplishment of many studies and surveys and thousands of demonstrations to the Vietnamese farmer.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORPS:

a. The Agriculture Branch did not undergo a reorganization as a result of the OCO/CORPS reorganization.
b. In the provinces, agricultural representatives have been given duties not commensurate with their normal responsibilities and there has been some confusion as to the lines of authority relating to the application of technical skills. These problems are being ironed out as they occur.

4. PM FG: Any progress or achievement in agriculture in IV CTZ during the reporting period is the result of actions taken months before and by the same token action taken during the reporting period will not be visible until some future date. The broad and diversified scope of agricultural activity is shown as follows:

a. Irrigation: Next to security, our most important area of action is that of water control. We now have two qualified engineers serving as Regional Advisors stationed in Soc Trang and My Tho where their counterparts live. They are working very closely with their SVN counterparts to develop projects which will increase the ability of the farmers to double-crop their land with irrigation. Plans to irrigate approximately 75,000 hectares were recently submitted to the Ministry. Irrigation is probably the single quickest way to increase crop production since it makes it possible to raise two or three crops annually instead of one. In most cases each harvest will be considerably heavier than the one normally produced, because of better growing conditions.

b. Fertilizer: Much progress has been made in the distribution and use of fertilizer although additional improvements are still required. The black market so active a year ago has been eliminated and fertilizer is readily available. Most fertilizer distribution is now handled through private channels.

c. Animal and Fish Production:

(1) Increased production of protein, namely pork and fish, will be one of our main thrusts in the coming year. Much has been done toward this goal in the past few months. Hundreds of fish ponds have been dug and stocked. Fish hatcheries have been planned and approved for several of the provinces so that fingerlings will be more readily available. An ice plant is planned for construction in Rach Gia to promote better marketing of fish and improved equipment and techniques are being introduced to fishermen along the coast. A lighthouse is planned for construction in An Xuyen Province to help fishermen.

(2) Disease causes the death of many animals each year. A team of specialists are now working with SVN personnel to establish a laboratory capable of producing vaccines and sera to inoculate against these diseases. Products are expected to be produced in quantity for distribution beginning 1968. Training programs are now under way to enable SVN personnel at the provincial level to make the best use of these vaccines.
(3) A campaign was conducted in cooperation with the Army Veterinarian stationed in Can Tho to vaccinate dogs for rabies.

(4) The Delta Swine Association was organized in July with the aim of increasing production of hogs by the commercial producers. Exports in at least one province have increased by 25%.

(5) Public Law 480, Title 1, corn is now available to all livestock producers at a price they can afford to pay. This is expected to stimulate increased production by the smaller, independent producers.

d. Seed Multiplication:

(1) A comprehensive and sound crop variety testing program has been initiated and progress has been rapid. Of course the most talked about crop variety now being tested is IR-S rice. Several initial tests have been harvested with yields reported from 4.5 to 9 M. tons per hectare. The Regional Agriculture Office received 600 kg of IR-S seed this past week and has distributed this to the provinces for demonstration tests.

(2) Samples of sorghum seed were recently sent out for testing. Various vegetables, corn and other feed crops are now being tested.

(3) Farmers are being trained and organized to produce their own vegetable seed rather than rely on imports which are costly. Great progress has been made in this area during the current growing season. In one province an isolated area is to be planted to only one variety of watermelon from which the farmers will save seed for the next crop.

e. Plant Protection:

(1) The plant protection program was somewhat below expectations during the period in the area of insect and rodent control. During the past week a new plant protection advisor joined the regional staff and immediate progress in this area is anticipated.

f. Credit and Coops:

(1) Great interest has been evidenced in organizations of Coops and Farmers Associations run by the farmers themselves. Farmers have indicated a willingness to invest capital in such organizations and the groundwork for expansion of this program is beginning to take shape.

(2) Recently a series of twelve training programs was conducted in as many provinces which included training in operating Coops and Farmers Associations.

E-2-3-3
6. Home Economics: One of the newest and most popular programs in the entire Region has been that of the Home Economist. The Regional Advisor spends a major portion of her time in the field in response to the requests for help. We have asked for an additional advisor to be stationed in a selected province on a trial basis in the conviction that a major contribution toward pacification could be made by working with various groups of women who comprise approximately 60% of the population and exert a great deal of influence on the attitudes and opinions of the family. Home making and 4-H clubs have been reactivated in nearly every province.

b. Rice:

(1) Increased production of rice is the major goal and it is quite apparent that a big increase in production over that of a year ago will result. The higher price realized by farmers last season had an important part to play in this increased production. Also, there is the possibility that the GVN would buy rice at a price considerably above the price being paid by merchants. An increase of approximately 68,000 hectares planted to rice is noted over last year, perhaps due to the possibility of increased profits.

(2) Reports of movement of rice from Vietnam to Cambodia were frequent last year when the price was higher in Cambodia. This year the reverse trend is noted indicating that we need to be well aware that just increasing production will not necessarily get more rice into Saigon. It is apt to move toward the most attractive price.

(3) Estimated production of rice for 1967-68 season is:

- Total production: 3,000,000 to 3,250,000 MT
- Available for export: 800,000 MT

5. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Labor on Farms - Since labor to till the soil, plant the crops and reap the harvest is nearing the critical stage with our present crops, the question must be faced as to what the situation may be if by use of irrigation, new varieties and improved cultural practices, we are able to double our yields. It will certainly require more labor to harvest twice as much rice as we now harvest - approximately 30% more.

b. Storage of rice - It is recommended that we give consideration and take action to improve farm storage of rice. The farmers traditionally like to hold as much rice as they can on the farm - but lose to rodents, pests and moisture run about 25% of all rice stored by farmers. If the yields are increased a more acute problem will be inevitable. Steps are now underway to increase and improve storage facilities at central locations and to provide more adequate transportation to market.
c. Security at the My Tho Rice Experiment Station - One of the two National Rice Experiment stations in Vietnam is located in My Tho. It was reportedly overrun or under attack by the VC five times in the past month. VC squatters have occupied approximately 45 of the 55 hectares of land. Workers are limited to a few daylight hours to work on the remaining area. Under such conditions it is not at all surprising that few positive results are coming from the station. If it is to be productive, it must be secured; competent technical advisors provided and adequate support given to immediate needs.

d. Irrigation - Many small irrigation projects have been proposed but as yet not approved by the GVN because of inadequate budget. If funding could be provided thousands of hectares of land would come under irrigation to produce two or three crops per year. Most could be completed within four months and be ready for planting of the next main crop. In most cases the value of the first crop would be from 10-12 times the cost of the project.

6. PICTURE PLANS: The CAP and RD plan has already been completed for FY-68 and constitutes the operational program for each of the MLD Branches. At this time a provincial pacification plan is being written along the general guidelines contained in AB-143 and provincial agricultural advisors will participate with provincial staffs in its preparation.

7. SUMMARY: The agriculture program in the Delta has a firm foundation and is even now showing results. We have mature professional men of many years experience in nearly every position and can expect results to snowball as time goes on. Province Senior Advisors are requesting a second and third agriculture advisor to help with the rapidly expanding activities, and five provinces now have a second advisor. Given reasonable security to work in the field these men are capable of generating a real program.
Tab 3 to Appendix 2 to Annex A - Education Branch

I. GENERAL: The Education Branch assists, in its advisory role to GVN officials, the development of the following major programmed activities for the IV CTZ:

   a. Hamlet primary education classrooms and high school classrooms construction program. This includes building construction and furnishing classrooms.

   b. Recruiting and training teachers to staff newly built classrooms.

   c. Distribution and utilization of free textbooks to primary and secondary schools.

Other activities assisted by the Education Branch:

   d. Development of trade and industrial education in the region.

   e. Helping the new University of Can Tho in its growth and development through contract teams.

   f. Up-grading teaching in both the elementary and high schools.

   g. Improving administrative techniques and practices in the educational system by working closely with the Primary Education Chiefs and the elementary and high school principals.

   h. Improving educational leadership through careful selection of candidates for scholarships in the U.S. and Third Countries.

2. GENERAL RESULTS OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT: Same number of activities were carried out prior to CORDS establishment.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORTS INTO CORDS: The reorganization into CORDS brought about the following changes:

   a. One NLD official was appointed to take care of Education and other fields in each province.

   b. Education Branch has reallocated its advisors to the provinces instead of operating from Can Tho. Each advisor now has four provinces to cover and they are posted in My Tho, Vinh Long, Long Xuyen and Soc Trang.

   c. Advisors are assigned by USAID to the Region, therefore, the line of authority is not USAID anymore but CORDS in the Region.

E-2-5-1
4. **PROGRESS:** Substantial progress has taken place in the Education Branch since May 28, 1967. The Education Branch has made the following progress:

   a. In May 1967 out of 875 classrooms allocated for 1967 to the IV CTZ, 63 (7%) were completed and 279 (32%) were under construction. In December 1967 the number of classrooms completed was 360 (41%) and under construction 369 (42%). There was an increase from 6% to 41% in classrooms completed.

   b. In December 1967 a total of 1,061 teachers had been trained, that is, 85% of the total number of teachers allocated for 1967 as compared to 12% in May 1967.

   c. With the addition of one General Education Advisor to the team, the Education Branch has been able to provide better technical services to the provinces. At present each one of the 16 provinces in the IV CTZ is being visited a minimum of four days every month. These visits provide an opportunity for our General Education Advisors to be in close contact with the Primary Education Chiefs and their School Inspectors and Secondary School Principals to improve school administration practices, improve distribution and utilization of textbooks and use of school commodities.

   d. CORDS has provided the Education Branch with the opportunity of becoming more closely affiliated with the military sector and sub-sector advisors thus improving the education program in the districts, villages and hamlets where it is difficult for GVN officials to travel. This new setup has improved greatly the distribution of textbooks to remote areas.

   e. An increase of 90% over the 1966-67 school year took place in enrollment in five of the junior technical high schools. Also, 223 refugee students have completed vocational training courses and 295 refugee students are enrolled in the junior technical high schools.

5. **LESSONS LEARNED:** Even though a great deal of progress has been made teacher shortage is still our main problem. Unless the GVN does something to stop the draft of young male teachers the drain of trained teaching personnel will continue to be a big handicap in the development of the educational program.

6. **FUTURE PLANS:** In the future the Education Branch will concentrate on stressing teacher training as the most important job to be done.

7. **SUMMARY:** Although it is still too early to justify big changes, CORDS has proved to be a more adequate organization to carry out our program because it has provided the branch with new resources with which to work.
Tab C to Appendix 2 to Annex E - Logistic

1. GENERAL: The function of the Logistics Branch of NLD is to provide commodity support to the many and varied projects sponsored under USAID/GVN programming; and to provide support and maintenance to CORDS personnel in the field.

2. GENERAL RESUME OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT: The development of the logistics program has been programmed over the past several years and the reorganization which resulted with the establishment of CORDS has in no way altered the programming.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS: The only change effected by the establishment of CORDS is that sign-off of commodities is now a function of the Province Senior Advisor instead of the NLD Advisor. The effect on programming has been negligible because of the long range nature of its function.

4. PROGRESS - LOGISTICS BRANCH: Logistical actions accomplished during the period 1 June to 1 December 1967 are:

a. Assignment of logistical advisors to all provinces to assist and advise the provincial officials in the proper receipt, storage and accounting for all issue of Public Law 480 commodities.

b. Finalization and implementation of a Basic Supply Regulation to be used by all agencies of GVN, such as, district, province, regional and the base depot at Saigon, in the handling of P. L. 480 commodities.

c. Selection and approval of provincial automotive shop sites in 15 of our 16 provinces. Sadec is not presently scheduled to have a maintenance shop as part of a National Maintenance System since Sadec was not a province when this program was developed. Action is presently being taken to obtain approval for a province maintenance shop for Sadec. Construction of these shops has started in several of our provinces.

d. Assignment of an automotive maintenance advisor, a Philco-Ford technical representative and four five-man teams of Korean mechanics provided by a contract with Philco-Ford. These maintenance people are visiting all provinces for the purpose of registering, inspecting and maintaining vehicles and automotive type equipment of all the Ministries of GVN except the Ministry of Defense.

e. Assignment to IV CTZ of a Central Procurement and Supply Authority (CPSA) representative for the purpose of establishing regional logistic warehouse complexes in Can Tho and Sadec. When established, these complexes will be utilized for receipt of wholesale shipments of commodities from National Depot complexes in Saigon for further retail shipments to our provinces.
5. LESSONS LEARNED: Implementation of the program can be interfered with if personnel are assigned functions outside the logistic program to the detriment of accomplishing mission for which Project "CO" personnel were hired.

6. FUTURE PLANS: Future plans and goals of the Logistics Branch are:

   a. Train the Vietnamese personnel at regional, provincial and district levels in the proper implementation of compliance with the provisions of MACV Basic Supply Regulations.

   b. Completion of Provincial Maintenance Shops as part of the National Maintenance system. Also the training of Vietnamese in the proper and efficient operation of these shops.

   c. Assist the Regional CPSA representative in acquisition of the required real estate in Can Tho and Sadoc to establish the programmed logistic warehouse complexes.

   d. As a short range goal train the Vietnamese in Can Tho to operate their small warehouse as a logistic complex. Personnel trained in this limited operation will provide a valuable training base from which to expand when the new regional logistic complex at Sadec and Can Tho are organized.

7. SUMMARY: The ultimate goal of all logistic advisors in IV CTZ is to train the Vietnamese to operate an efficient logistical system which would eliminate the requirement for the advisor.
1. **GOALS:** The function of the Public Administration Branch is to provide administration advice to all levels of government in region, province, district, village and hamlet. In addition, Public Administration provides training advisory services to all levels of government to implement administrative improvements through training of personnel. Special emphasis is also given to the area of urban planning via the activities of an urban planning advisor. This activity is being emphasized in cities which have these problems peculiar to high population density areas. The regional Public Administration staff also provides data and information to ADPA Saigon on general government administration improvements needed to implement more administrative improvements.

2. **RESUME OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORES ESTABLISHMENT:** The reorganization which resulted with the establishment of CORES has in no way changed the objectives and goals of PAB IV CTZ.

3. **PROGRESS:** The advisory effort in IV CTZ to regional, provincial, district and village-hamlet government has continued at the same high level for the past two years. With the additional urban affairs advisor assigned in June, an increased level of advisory effort in this area was instituted. In December of 1967 two Public Administration Advisors were assigned to two key provinces in IV CTZ, Diem Tuong and Phong Dinh. This is an effort on the part of PAB to afford intensive public administration advisory assistance at the provincial level and to the urban areas in those provinces. With the completion of the GVN national elections the advisory staff is preparing a training program for NLD/PAB personnel at the provincial level. This program is designed to develop an understanding of the new laws and decrees, the organization of the new government and its goals and objectives. A complete field survey of all personnel having the provincial public administration assignment and a briefing by each Senior Provincial Advisor on the status of provincial, district, village and hamlet government in their provinces was completed. This study was finished on 15 December 1967, and is to assist in the development of public administration training program for the provincial Dz assignees. The goals in 1967 in the village and hamlet training program were achieved. In addition, in August, a training seminar was held for all provincial training directors where methods of modern training techniques were presented. For the first time in IV CTZ a Deputy District Chief for Administration Seminar was held at My Tho on 28-30 November 1967. Eighty-nine Deputy District Chiefs for Administration were in attendance. The purpose of the seminar was to improve the administration and leadership abilities of the participants and to exchange experiences and ideas on district administrative problems. IV CTZ Deputy Province Chiefs for Administration and representatives from various national ministries attended in seeking solutions to the various district administrative problems.
4. IMPROVEMENTS: Village and hamlet governments are responding slowly due to the time needed for training, security problems, general lack of professional ability and the new experience of self-government after generations of colonial type administrative practices. The level of training to improve government proficiency must be geared to an extremely low level in order to be of value to most participants. The constraining influence of the district and provincial government on village and hamlets will take time and concentrated effort to overcome. We must improve our knowledge of village government operations in every district and every province throughout the region.

5. FUTURE PLANS: The plans for the year 1968 are as follows:

a. Assist in the establishment of responsive democratic local government by increasing the field advisory interest in local government.

b. Develop a greater understanding of the structure and actual functioning of province and district government.

c. Improve our knowledge of governmental finance via the Deputy Government Delegations Office.

d. Accelerate the advisory effort in the urban complexes of IV CIZ.

e. Improving the coordination of the field public administration assignments and making specific assignments for developing greater knowledge of the organization and the mode of operation of province, district and village government in order to recommend improvements.

f. Create a greater awareness and empathy for the development of responsive and honest government by all CORDS people so that they better understand the problems and our approach to solving these problems.

g. Continuing with the training of village and hamlet officials, developing of better qualified training instructors and starting on the training of administrative people in basic administrative techniques.

h. Coordination of the local development program by ensuring that functioning governmental organization exist in these villages elected for this program.

i. Other 1968 plans via Assistant Director for Public Administration Saigon which are anticipated will be:

(1) Improved training of trainers at National Institute for Administration.
(2) Administrative improvement in each of the Ministries - most of whom have Public Administration Advisors.

6. SUMMARY:

a. During the period of this report the foundation of democracy and local self government was established by law in South Vietnam. The elections were held for the end of Phase I and for Stage IV of the village and hamlet governments, the President and Vice President, the Senate and the House. To do this in a war time situation is truly unique and remarkable.

b. Now that the new government has been established, the building of the foundation of Vietnamese democracy has begun. This is being accomplished in the field of Public Administration: (1) by training and developing more responsive and better qualified government personnel; (2) by providing better training in public administration for CORES field personnel who are assigned the public administration function; (3) by increasing our advisory efforts via the addition of qualified personnel in civil, urban and rural government; (4) by increasing our knowledge of the actual problems being encountered at the village and hamlet level in the implementation of local self government.
Tab E to Appendix 2 to Annex B - Public Works Branch

1. GENERAL: The CORDS Public Works Branch is program coordinator and expeditor for programs in the fields of roads, waterways, water resources and electric power. The Branch also attempts to provide professional engineering service to all programs and is the only established source for engineering and technical assistance in the CORDS organization. In addition, the Chief, PW Branch, is Contract Representative for ADENG contracts in IV CTZ and is charged with monitoring OICG contracts sponsored by ADENG in IV CTZ. Chief, Public Works has counterpart relationship with Southern District Engineer, GVN PW, Can Tho.

2. GENERAL RESUME OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT: Under COO the Public Works Branch performed the following functions:

   a. Counterpart relationship and advisory assistance to GVN Public Works Southern District Engineer.

   b. Advisory assistance to GVN for equipment repair in the District Shop, Can Tho.

   c. Administrative supervision of the water resources program in IV CTZ.

   d. Engineering design, specifications, estimates and contract administration for construction projects. This effort was concentrated in Public Health projects but work was performed for Education, Ministry of Public Works and provinces on request.

   e. Inspect and accept contract construction performed for USAID by RWK on OICG contract.

   f. Assist in program planning.

   g. Inspect, analyze and report on program bottlenecks and recommend solutions to higher authority and to GVN officials at CTZ level.

   h. Coordinate PW, USAID and COO Public Works programs with military engineer advisors and ARVN 40th Engineer Group.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS

   a. There has been minimal change in Public Works Branch activities that can be traced directly to incorporation of the office into CORDS. The primary problems in Public Works have been lack of resources, trained manpower, materials and equipment and cumbersome administrative procedures. There has been no significant change in this situation. U.S. military units and DOD funding support the highway maintenance and construction efforts but this was initiated several months before the CORDS organization was instituted.
b. Another weakness has been difficulty in awarding contracts. A proposed contract for additional dredges for which funds were programmed months ago is still not awarded. The contract for the Region IV design engineer team, consisting of five Chinese engineers expired in early August. Decision was made in late May to renew the contract but to date it has not been signed and the team has not returned. This seriously limits engineering services provided by this branch to provinces, GVN and other CORDS activities.

4. PROGRESS - PUBLIC WORKS BRANCH:

a. The greatest progress for which this branch takes partial credit is the convincing of higher authority of the magnitude and importance of engineering effort in IV CTZ. This is reflected in the increased staffing approved in the recent CAP review.

b. The following have also been accomplished since 28 May:

(1) Successful wells have been drilled in An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Phong Dinh, Chuong Thien and Ba Xuyen Provinces.

(2) The price of road stone has come down as barges are returning to IV CTZ from Saigon and competing for business. As a result, NFW is buying stone and improving roads in Bac Lieu and Ba Xuyen for the first time this year. Most of the flood damage from the 1966 flood has also been repaired in the upper delta provinces, at least partially.

(3) Coordination between ARVN 40th Engineer Group and Ministry of Public Works Engineers has improved.

(4) A third SeaBee team came into IV CTZ 15 August and has successfully completed construction projects for Public Health, VN Navy housing and Phong Dinh Province.

(5) Plans are in progress for better support of rural road improvement and maintenance in 1968.

(6) Electric system at Ca Mau is being improved and repairs are being made at Chau Doc and Go Cong.

(7) Two new ferries were put in service in August and September – three more are scheduled before January 1st.

(8) Public Works, CORDS, IV CTZ, opened new sub-offices at Ny Tao in August and at Long Xuyen in November.

(9) The development of a new quarry at Nui Sap, An Giang, is being done by R&D on OICG contract funded by USAID.
(1) A program has been begun through CORDS NLD and MORD with assistance of US Air Force to buy lumber in northern provinces and fly it to provinces in IV CTZ.

(11) Studies of transportation systems in IV CTZ are underway by both military and civilian agencies. These studies include port improvements, ferries, bridges, roads, and canals. The military study is concerned with short term requirements - the civilian study with long term development of the Vietnamese economy.

(12) Vietnamese nationals are being trained in water supply, equipment, maintenance, drafting, surveying and contract administration and inspection.

5. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Flexibility and quick reaction to engineering problems at corps and province level cannot be achieved through award of contracts. If a job requires people, they must function as an organic part of a staff and not as independent contractors.

b. Correspondence and discussions indicate that many province advisors do not realize that many programs still depend on USAID and GVN ministries for materials, funds, and staffing. Communication between province advisors and corps technical staff needs improvement.

c. All programs of USAID, CORDS and GVN require engineering skills, analysis, planning, design, and execution; to prevent waste of a great deal of the effort expended. The greatest gap in the engineering advisory effort is in these areas.

6. FUTURE PLANS:

a. The CORDS Public Works Branch will be staffed to perform professional consulting engineering service. This is not the type of work the average military engineering unit is staffed to do.

b. As staff increases direct engineering assistance to province advisors and GVN officials will be provided. Engineering assistance in preparing projects funded with USN Nonies will become available.

c. Coordination with U.S. military engineers and units will become closer.

d. Well drilling and installation of surface water treatment systems will continue.

e. Upgrading of provincial electric systems will be attempted.

f. Rural, "farm-to-market" roads will receive increased attention.


7. SUMMARY

a. A good start is being made and opportunities for improvement are being recognized.

b. The task is formidable but success seems to be ultimately assured.
Tab E to Appendix 2 to Annex X - Community Development Branch

1. INTRODUCTION: The Community Development Branch of MLD is unique inasmuch as it consists entirely of Filipino Community Development officers. Twenty-four of them are currently assigned throughout the 16 provinces of IV CTZ.

2. GENERAL REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORDS ESTABLISHMENT: Prior to the establishment of CORDS, the present personnel of Community Development Branch were assigned to provincial slots as they arrived in the country. They were represented by a delegate to the contracting firm that represented their interests, i.e., USAID. They were responsible in the main for overseeing and advising the Vietnamese on the construction of self-help projects and their activities were not coordinated with their fellow CTNs in other provinces.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS:
   a. Recognition was given to what had been a body of contract hire CTNs by the Chief/MLD during October 1967 when Mr. Jose Sibayan was selected to serve as Branch Chief/Community Development Branch.
   b. From the very beginning the personnel have responded with enthusiasm built on national pride and a very strong sense of dedication and desire to serve the people of the Delta.
   c. The reporting requirement of CORDS as it relates to self-help projects has assisted greatly in adding depth and program orientation to what had simply been a 'job' effort.

4. PROGRESS:
   a. The Community Development Branch, though embryonic, is rapidly gaining recognition from all aspects. Individual team members are making real contributions of enrichment to the MLD program.
   b. Mr. Sibayan has published a field manual for community development officers serving in Vietnam. It has been selected for distribution throughout the I, II, III, and IV CTZ areas as the official MLD handbook for community development.

5. LESSONS LEARNED:
   a. There is no substitute for high morale generated from common purpose, dedication to duty, recognition of effort and a sincere desire on the part of management to demonstrate concern for subordinates.
   b. Nearly all of these men have fought subversion (HUK) in the Philippines and many have earned high military awards during the Bataan Death March, etc. They should have been recognized from the beginning and supplied with an identity.
6. **FUTURE PLANS**

a. A monthly pamphlet on community development is currently being prepared in order to allow an exchange of ideas on self-help to take place.

b. In addition, team members are being encouraged to speak up with program recommendations to American provincial advisors in the field, rather than quietly taking orders. Their CVN experience and rapport with the Vietnamese can expose the real aspirations of the people so minds and hearts can be won. Experience has shown quite frequently the simplest and least expensive projects are the most meaningful.

c. Other plans are a part of RD '68, CAP '68 or will be developed through the Provincial Pacification Plan.

7. **SUMMARY**:

a. The Community Development Branch is well under way - it is well organized; it had spirit; it reflects - through its activities - the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

b. The impact of this group of men should be felt very strongly during 1968.
Tab G to Appendix 2 to Annex E - Youth Affairs

1. GENERAL:

a. The function of the Youth Affairs Branch of NLD is to provide meaningful and constructive outlets for the energies of the youth of the Delta region by providing and developing organizations for sports, civic action and skills training and providing support for those activities. Participation by the young people will provide an opportunity for them to personally identify with their community in a positive way and create empathy to the GVN cause.

b. Further, its purpose is to give opportunity to the development of leadership among Vietnamese youth and to give these leaders training and experience in the solution of problems by the democratic process.

c. Finally the purpose is to make GVN aware and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the youth of the nation.

2. GENERAL RESULTS OF ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORPS ESTABLISHMENT: The CORDS/NLD Youth Advisor position was created in mid-July 1967. At that time the position had not been programmed for in the 1967 budget.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORDS: The Youth Affairs Branch was withdrawn from CORDS in November 1967 and placed under the jurisdiction of USAID.

4. PROGRESS:

a. In that the position had not been programmed in the 1967 budget it was difficult to implement any type of a meaningful progress. It was decided to support the existing ministry programs for the remainder of 1967 and not embark on any new youth program until they have been programmed for in the 1968 USLID/Youth Budget.

b. The grant of 1,240,000 VN of NLM funding permitted participation of Youth Affairs in the sports programming for the annual Vietnamese National Day Sports Program and the elimination competition leading up to it. It also enable participation of provincial teams in the Regional Junior Olympics held in Vung Long.

5. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. The two main sources of youth activities in IV COTZ are private youth organizations and the GVN Ministry of Youth Services. Assistance and guidance must be given these groups to help them develop their programs.

3-2-8-1
b. The raw material for effective leadership among youth is available in all the provinces. However, they need identification with some organized dynamic, democratically accounted operation that can compete for their loyalty against the NLF/VC.

c. The major weakness of the provincial youth programs is the limited assistance and attention given to those programs by officials at each GVN level. General operating guidelines, delegation of responsibility and an adequate budget are sorely needed. GVN channels need to be streamlined to permit funding certain spontaneous activities, so that the need can be met while interest in a project is high.

6. FUTURE PLANS:

a. Emphasis will be placed upon the development of private self-governing locally sponsored youth associations to involve local population in the development and support of your activities.

b. Support and assistance will be provided the Ministry of Education to operate and expand a school activities program.

c. Support and assistance will be provided the Ministry of Youth to establish a nationwide community recreation program.

d. Responsibility for the coordination of the Rural Youth 4-T Program with the youth development program will be undertaken.

7. SUMMARY: The program is focused on providing the youth of Vietnam with a meaningful alternative to the program of subversion and insurgency offered by the National Liberation Front. The youth of Vietnam represent the most valuable resource available to the long range development of the nation and for the most part of this potential has remained unexploited by the GVN.
Annex II to Annex F - Rice Production

1. SITUATION:

a. Previous to 1966 most of the USAID effort in Agriculture for the Delta area was directed and conducted from Saigon. The Ministry of Agriculture was and is centered in Saigon and advisors to serve as counterparts naturally fell into this pattern. Although considerable effort and funding was spent, there was very little meaningful contact with the farmers who comprise 80% of the population of the Delta. Trips were made by different officials to visit the provinces but at infrequent intervals. The lack of continuity probably was the greatest reason for the small impact upon the Agriculture program. At the present time, about the only residue noticeable from the efforts of previous programs is in the area of extension where 4T Clubs are still active. It was recognized that in order to effectively reach the farmers, men would have to be assigned to work on a permanent basis in the provinces.

b. Early in 1966 one American advisor was assigned to An Giang Province and regional advisor to Can Tho to work with the rest of IV Corps. Eight military officers with agricultural backgrounds were loaned to USAID, and assigned as agriculture advisors in provinces until direct-hire employees could be placed on the job. Those men made excellent contributions to the agricultural effort and helped lay the foundation on which we are now building a program which will be able to serve the farmers of the Delta, giving them the help they really need.

c. At the present time we have full time advisors in each of the sixteen provinces and two men in 5 of the priority provinces or where security permits them to have full time programs for two men. In addition a regional staff of technical specialists is available to help with specialized problems that the general agriculturalist in the province is not trained to handle. This includes plant diseases, fertilizer, insect control, seed production, irrigation engineers and such specialized areas.

d. The program now under way would appear to be geared to do what previous programs failed to accomplish – namely reach the farmer and give him help he needs to improve living conditions for himself and his family so that he will be a happy citizen. All work is done with and through the Ministry of Agriculture official in an effort to establish trust in the SVN.

2. THREATS OR DIRECTION OF EFFORT:

a. Rice production in the Delta reached an all time high in 1963 when Vietnam had a surplus to export. Since that time a decline has occurred which has required rice to be imported for Saigon consumption.
Reasons for this include:

(1) Large areas of land abandoned because of the war.

(2) Shortage of labor to adequately till the soil, (draft age men on farms are very scarce).

(3) Increase of salt water intrusion – lack of adequate irrigation and disastrous floods in the fall of 1960.

(4) Harassment by VC. Taxes which leave little for the farmer beyond his actual needs for existence – hence, lack of incentive for production.

(5) Low price in comparison to living costs – again creating lack of incentive for production.

(6) High rentals charged by land-owners, need for land reform programs to give the operators ownership.

(7) Credit for production costs not readily available. Merchants in the past have charged unreasonable rates of interest on funds the farmers must have to produce crops.

(8) Difficulties encountered in marketing products.

Many other problems exist but these are probably the most important and the ones we are actively attacking in cooperation with the GVN.

b. A price increase to farmers was established last January and a bit increase is expected in production this season. This is due in part to better yields after the flood but also to the fact that the farmer has an incentive to produce more if he can make some profit.

c. One of the most dramatic operations of the entire agriculture program is now taking shape. A new, high yielding variety, IR-8 has recently been introduced and is now being tested. Small plots have been planted in each province and we will soon have information as to where we can expect best results from larger planting. We will have at least 30,000 H in production next season. Early tests indicate increased yields of from 2 – 5 times those of local varieties. It is easy to visualize what can be done if this program is successful. Our main concern is training programs to teach production methods for this new variety which must be handled somewhat differently from the local varieties. With GVN bearing the main responsibility for the program, we are confident it can be accomplished.
d. Land tenure programs are being studied and initiated. Irrigation projects will provide irrigation water for 75,000 H this next year, making it possible to double crop, special attention is being directed toward increased production of protein, especially fish and pork, credit is being made available to farmers at reasonable rates of interest. New crops are being tested for suitability, feed mills are being constructed to provide feed for livestock, diversification and increased production of secondary crops is increasing - especially vegetables - and progress is being initiated in many other areas.

e. It should be noted that it has been only in the past few months that well trained, experienced agricultural advisors have been in each of the provinces. Excellent reports are coming in already and we expect excellent results in the coming year.

f. All programs are initiated and conducted through the GVN officials of the Ministry of Agriculture who are learning how to adequately serve the farmers and will be able to carry out the programs on their own initiative once conditions return to normal. Lack of security is our one greatest problem in reaching and influencing the farmers.

g. Attached is a chart showing production figures for rice for the past few years, a GVN summary of a IV Corps meeting to discuss rice production, a GVN expose on rice production for Region IV, a recent paper on controls of rice and rice movement and a summary of problems which may be encountered with the expected increased production of rice this coming harvest.

h. The yield is estimated to be approximately 25 to 30% greater than last year with 800,000 MT of paddy available for export as compared to about 500,000 MT last season.

i. If security can be improved and an attractive price for paddy paid to the farmer maintained, it is reasonable to expect an even greater increase in production in another year.
### Rice Production

**IV Corps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Production</th>
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<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>3,373,903 tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>3,861,630</td>
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<td>3,754,280</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>2,866,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967-68 (Est.)</td>
<td>3,097,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 to Annex E - Revolutionary Development Cadre

1. (C) COMMENT:
   a. The RD Cadre effort is designed to win the people over from the VC and to establish the GVN presence in the countryside. The great difference between this program and earlier ones such as APA, PAT, etc., is that this program, when properly functioning, should establish viable institutions better able to withstand the pressures of the VC and more willing to support the GVN.

   b. Activities of the RD Cadre prior to the establishment of CORDS were along generally the same lines as those being followed today.

   c. The reorganization under CORDS has meant a better coordination of all phases of Revolutionary Development and has brought the various interested advisory agencies together under one U.S. umbrella.

   d. Largely as a result of experience gained working in Phase I hamlets, work in Phase II hamlets has progressed faster and more satisfactorily.

   e. With few exceptions, the self-defense capability of Cadre teams has not improved. In-province military training courses have been instituted, but it is too early to measure its effectiveness.

   f. Hamlet Self-Defense Forces are, from a practical standpoint, non-existent. A great deal of lip service has been paid to this idea, but nothing has been accomplished. These forces have been trained by RD Cadre who themselves have received only minimal military training and are not, therefore, qualified to instruct others. In addition, after a Cadre team has moved from a hamlet, there is no provision for continued and/or refresher training of personnel and such knowledge as may have been gained is soon lost.

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:
   a. Progress should be measured in terms of viable institutions, not by construction projects.

   b. Movement of RDG groups from one hamlet to another should be based on achievement of viable institutions as determined by careful in-depth inspection by joint US/VN inspection teams.

   c. Pressure to "show progress" by meeting programmed goals in a given year has resulted in serious regression in previously "pacified" hamlets.
3. (C) FUTURE PLANS: RD Cadre effort calls for more selective recruitment, over-recruitment to make it possible to weed out the least desirable elements, pre-Vung Tau training, post-Vung Tau training, closer liaison with the Technical Services, and a continuing effort to upgrade leadership at all levels.

4. (C) SUMMARY: It can be said that while the RD Cadre effort has suffered set-backs, notably the loss of 157 cadres to VC attacks during November, discernible progress made has been in upgrading Cadre performance.

3 Tabs
Tab A. Static Census Grievance Program
Tab B. ICDM Program
Tab C. EDW Program
Tab A to Appendix 3 to Annex B: The Static Census Grievance Program

1. (c) GENERAL: The Static Census Grievance Program (SCG) is a national GVN program, supported by the Revolutionary Development Cadre Division (RDC) of GVN. This program is an important and effective link between the hamlet cadres and the GVN. The SCG Cadre have access to the people to hear their aspirations and grievances (objectives one and two of the program), tries to solve these through his daily contacts with the local government and through the SCG Study Center at the province level.

2. (c) ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO GVN: The SCG Program started in Kien Hoa Province in mid-1964. The only similarity between the program and the one of today is the objective, to ascertain the aspirations and grievances (needs) of the people, to help solve these, to bring the people to the GVN, the GVN to the people. The "Kien Hoa Experiment" used mobile cadre in teams of from 3 to 5 to rove the countryside questioning the people. They spent anywhere from one week to two months in the villages. It became orientated towards "intelligence", did not effectively join the people and the GVN. These cadre did not gain the confidence of the people. The main reasons for this were: (1) the cadre were not known by the villagers; (2) they were largely young and inexperienced, did not inspire the people's respect; (3) the security forces with them tended to intimidate the people; (4) finally, no emphasis was placed on the solving of the few aspirations and grievances received. The potential of the program was noted and another was set up in Long An Province in 1965 more along the lines of the present program, employing older well-respected residents of the hamlet to be the SCG Cadre. This person not only knew the people, but also knew their needs; by assisting the people, they came to have confidence in him, gave him the VC information that is objective for three of the programs. There are presently SCG programs in 15 provinces in the delta.

3. (c) ORGANIZATION INTO GVN: The SCG Program is a provincial program, controlled by the Province Chief (P/C). He is the recipient of the information and reaps the benefits when the program operates efficiently. Accordingly, the effectiveness varies in each province in direct proportion to the interest shown by the P/C. Ideally, the program was developed to function as follows: The hamlet cadre receives the aspirations and grievances, he investigates and verifies these, solves them locally if possible; if not, forwards them to province where they are studied and if valid, are sent to the P/C for solving. By this action, the people feel that they have a "secure" contact with the GVN, and they tend the SCG cadre about the various VC activities in the area. This information is forwarded to the province where it is disseminated to interested agencies for their information or action.
4. (C) ACTION: In IV Corps it was noted that the SCG program was not getting the emphasis of the P/C's and the HDG Province Officers needed to make it effective. The HDG Chief (CHODS IV Corps) created a Regional Staff position for SCG. Four Vietnamese were hired and thoroughly trained to become the Regional SCG Inspection Team. They travel to each of the 15 provinces that have programs, inspecting and advising the SCG centers and hamlet cadre. They provide the liaison between the HDC Province Officer and the SCG personnel. Because there is now "active" rather than "passive" supervision of the staffs, the attitudes of the personnel in the program and of the P/C have changed. This experiment is proving successful; the other Corps areas are following the IV Corps lead, are doing the same. The SCG program is becoming an effective tool in reaching the rural population.

5. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: The program has long had the potential of being the most effective in the pacification effort. By adding emphasis to it, we are bringing it closer to its potential. We have learned that the program must have the complete support of the P/C and of his Service Chiefs. We must emphasize the solving of the people's aspirations and grievances, not just obtaining VC intelligence. If their needs are considered, they will have confidence in the GVN and freely give intelligence on the VC. If the program gets the "intelligence" stigma, the people will come to distrust it. We must carefully monitor the SCG's place in the DOICC's and in ICEX to assure that it is not so stigmatized.

6. (C) FUTURE PLANS: To continue a controlled expansion into the pacification areas, controlled so that it do not grow beyond the provincial capacity to manage it. To continue to emphasize the need for P/C interest in the solving of the aspirations and grievances of the people. To use the facilities of the SCG program to ascertain the attitudes of the people to verify the progress, or lack of it, in the other programs sponsored by the GVN.
1. (c) Continued:

a. The ICMX Coordination effort began subsequent to the formation of COADS. The 9 July 1967, MACVOPS Directive 381-41 was followed by the COADS, IV CTZ implementing memorandum dated 31 July 1967, appointing the Corps ICMX Coordinator, members of the IV CTZ ICMX Committee, and the Province ICMX coordinators. With the arrival in mid-September of a new Corps ICMX Coordinator, and the first input of IV CTZ ICMX staff personnel, a non-commissioned officer assistant Province ICMX Coordinator, and four advisors for District Operations and Intelligence Coordination Centers (DOICO's), the program began. During the month of October, the Province Senior Advisors (PSA), and the Province ICMX Coordinators were briefed by the Corps ICMX Coordinator concerning the ICMX effort. The PSA's were requested to brief their counterparts upon their return to the provinces. Also, during the month of October, the PSA's were provided with DOICO selection criteria, and were requested to evaluate each of their districts to determine within which it was most feasible to establish DOICO's. October also marked the input of three additional non-commissioned officers as Assistant Province ICMX Coordinators. During October, both the Deputy Commander, IV Corps, and the Director, National Police Directorate, IV CTZ, were briefed concerning cordon and search operations to be used in the neutralization of the infrastructure. During October and November, the IV CTZ ICMX Committee met weekly and its membership was added to until its current membership includes the IV CTZ G-2 Advisor, G-3 advisor, Assistant DE/COADS, Chiefs of COADS PED Division and Chieu Hai Division, the Deputy Chief COADS/PSTOPS Division, the COADS/Returne Liaison Officer, representatives from CPKDS/Pol, and the Corps ICMX Coordinator and his Deputy. In late November, in order to concentrate the Committee's effort in specific fields, four subcommittees were formed: the Intelligence Coordinating Subcommitte, the Legal Problems and Screening and Detention Camp Subcommitte, the Chieu Hai and PSTOPS Subcommitte, and the Cordon and Search Subcommitte. Starting in December, the full committee will meet once each month and at such time will be briefed by the chairman of each subcommittee.

b. During November, the provinces generally had completed formation of the province management structure for the ICMX Program. The efforts to collect the existing VC infrastructure intelligence, to collate, and to target individuals and exploit the intelligence was underway. Also, during November, LTC Haynh Ngoc Diep, Province Chief, Vinh Long Province, directed his subsector commanders to establish operations and intelligence coordinating centers in each of the seven subsectors.

c. During the same month, members of the Senior Advisor's Staff and G-3, IV CTZ, plus representatives of the National Police Directorate, IV CTZ, observed cordon and search operations conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry and National Police Field Forces in II CTZ. Upon their return, a briefing
and operational plan was prepared and submitted to the Director, National Police Directorate. Pending his approval, the U.S. and ARVN military staff will be briefed.

d. During November, IV CTZ was notified that funding would be made available through COMPS/PSD, Saigon, with which to accomplish construction of four facilities for temporary detention and screening of VC civilian detainees. Four facilities will be constructed within IV CTZ, of sufficient size to house some 3,000 inmates. Each one of the facilities will be established in the provinces of Phong Dinh, Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong and Vinh Long.

e. In November, IV CTZ was host to the visit of Mr. Robert Harper, the Saigon ICA staff representative who is attempting to resolve the legal problems which surround the apprehension and conviction of VC infrastructure by a court of competent jurisdiction. Other situations have surfaced since the inception of the program which must be resolved in order to obtain full IV CTZ program momentum. The National Police Field Forces are not prepared to fulfill their assigned mission as the strike force of the National Police in the neutralization of the infrastructure. Lack of national directives pertaining to the program continues to hamper the effort. The Chieu Hai Program is not, in every province, adequate to support an increased number of ralliers. VC penetration of the 7D Cadre, Police Special Branch, and ARVN has been surfaced which, in individual provinces, hampers program development. Additionally, the program is hampers in some provinces by allegedly corruption of individuals in key positions in various programs of interest to the ICA effort. These must be investigated and, if verified, that program must be cleansed in order to permit accomplishment of the neutralization effort. There was an addition of 12 more personnel assigned to the ICA Program in November — 7 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers.

f. During December, the ICA effort within IV CTZ will concern itself with the establishment of the operations and intelligence coordinating centers; with increased effort through the families of known VC to increase the number of ralliers.
Tab 4 to Appendix J to Annex H: PRU Program

1. (c) 2

a. The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) is an irregular, unconventional armed intelligence collecting organization targeted to neutralize the VC infrastructure. As the name denotes, the PRU is organized and operated as an integral province force. In IV Corps there are 16 such units varying in size from 9 to 110. In each province the Senior 100/0 Province Officer, assisted in most provinces by a military PRU Advisor, is responsible for the direction, coordination and support of the PRU teams/personnel. The PRU is an officially recognized force by the GVN and, as such, comes under the official jurisdiction of the Province Chief. All PRU operations are approved by the Province Chief or his Deputy Chief for security as well as being coordinated through the Province Senior Advisor or his appropriate operations officer.

b. Operations Background: The average regional strength of the PRU in IV Corps in 1967, given monthly fluctuations, is approximately 1200 men. By the end of October the combined forces of all the PRUs in IV Corps obtained the operational results of 1185 KIA, 380 WIA, and 580 captured for the first 10 months of 1967; of these 20 percent could be considered VC infrastructure. Conversely, the PRU suffered only 113 KIA and 117 WIA. Aside from these combat results, which entail only part of their primary mission, the PRU elements have submitted up to 1000 intelligence and reconnaissance reports for this year. Much of the PRU effectiveness is attributed to the fact that the PRU is the only GVN armed unit which consistently deploys in small units on night offensive activities. As with every program which operates corps-wide, the operational effectiveness of one province PRU varies on an irregular basis from month to month from another. Aside from this variance among the different province teams, many improvements have been made in the past four months which have measurably raised the level of proficiency and, consequently, those of the results obtained.

c. The most significant development, which has been directly or indirectly responsible for a number of improvements, has been the assignment of 16 military PRU advisors/coordinators in July to assist the Province Officer. With the addition of a full-time supervisor and manager of PRU activities, each PRU to whom the coordinators have been assigned has undergone significant reorganizations. The results has been that the units are better trained, their operations better planned and supported, and their operations more successful. The major emphasis since the inception of the coordinators has been to concentrate the PRU efforts more fully on the collecting of information and intelligence to be used in concerted effort to neutralize the VC infrastructure in all areas. The PRUs for the most part in provinces where they have achieved operational independence have, as a
result, more significant shifts towards a greater intelligence effort, away from its past tendency to indulge in straightforward counter-guerrilla activities.

2. (c) LESSONS LEARNED:

   a. With the increased concentration on/and supervision over PRU activities in neutralizing the VC infrastructure, two major difficulties have been encountered. Currently there is a definite scarcity of information on the infrastructure. With the increased intelligence efforts indicate difficulties have been encountered in obtaining enough intelligence to generate an accurate target. Furthermore, with regard to these problems, it is difficult to achieve continuity and, hence, momentum in the attack on the infrastructure. The PRUs in some provinces are assigned secondary roles in support of conventional military operations. Despite the dislocating efforts of these misapplications, and in order to overcome some of the intelligence problems, the INCS Division of COMDS is developing more sophisticated training to develop higher proficiencies in intelligence gathering.

   b. On the operational side, it has been learned that most of the infrastructure targets developed, live and operate in GVN denied VC "safe" areas which require deep covert penetrations. In order to react effectively to this, smaller long-range tactics are being encouraged, and increased helicopter support for deep penetrations and emergency extractions is being requested.

3. (c) SUMMARY: It has become evident that regardless of the internal efforts of the PRU, their effectiveness as a primary neutralizer of the VC infrastructure will not progress appreciably from its present level unless other organizations increase their complementary efforts. Currently, the INCS program is attempting to develop more quantity and quality on the intelligence gathering side. On the operational end of it, it is hoped that higher priority for helicopter support of PRU missions will be given to develop quicker reaction to this increased intelligence. At the end of November, however, both developments are still in their primary stages and have yet to assist the PRUs on an appreciable basis. If both can increase their support and assistance to a consistent level, then the PRU and its attack to neutralize the infrastructure will be considerably enhanced.
Annex A to Annex E - Chieu Hoi Division

1. GENERAL:

a. The Chieu Hoi Program is a Vietnamese program instituted under the Diem regime. After the fall of Diem the program fell into the doldrums for two years until it was revived due to US efforts in 1966. A Regional Chieu Hoi Advisor was appointed in May 1966 and Provincial Advisors were added in October of the same year.

b. As a result of the renewed interest in the program, the advisory effort and considerable military and psychological operations justified in the early part of this year.

2. ORIGINS OF PRE-CORDS ACTIVITIES:

a. Under the OSS and CCF setup the US advisory effort was tailored to the GVN Chieu Hoi Service organization. The program is planned at ministerial level with advice from the senior US Chieu Hoi advisor in Saigon and is implemented by the Provincial Chieu Hoi Chief's ensuring directly to Saigon. In each Region a HICN representative with considerable delegation of power, inspect and reports upon the Saigon initiated plan.

b. By advising the GVN official at each level how best to implement the Saigon plan and by providing the assistance of other US/ID and JCS/ID advisors, a coordinated and effective Chieu Hoi program was conducted. The coordination with the US and GVN military for utilization purposes was carried out by the MACV J2 Liaison Officer working in the Region from Saigon.

3. REORGANIZATION OF DIRECT/INDO-CALC: Under the single manager concept the US advisory effort no longer parallels the GVN organization. The GVN idea of a single manager for the program located in Saigon was converted into sixteen provincial US managers of the program each with responsibility for the other civil and military pacification programs. The Province Chieu Hoi Advisor becomes a staff officer answerable to his Province Senior Advisor, whilst the GVN official continues to be answerable to Saigon. A certain loss of mission interest has been experienced as a result and the program has suffered proportionately.

4. PROGRESS:

a. PsyOps activities:

(1) Perhaps the most progress advance has been made in this aspect of the program. The indoctrination phase has formerly been handled entirely by the Vietnamese Information Service who had sole under the
same minister.

(2) Starting with the 1967 Tot campaign, the COORD PsyOps Division, has largely in example shown what may be accomplished by the effective expenditure of funds.

(3) Since July, after a jointly signed policy was issued to Chieu Hoi and PsyOps advisors by the parent divisions in Can Tho, the Provincial Chieu Hoi Chiefs have slowly become aware that this part of the program was also one of their responsibilities.

(4) In June the first increase on the former 5,000,000 a month Chieu Hoi inducement budget was received in the provinces and as the Chiefs slowly learned how to spend it the quality of propaganda has improved from the hackneyed old nationally prepared leaflet drops and general appeal public broadcasts which had characterized the VIS effort. With the recent integration of S5 and S6 Advisory interest in the PsyOps field in most provinces there has been further improvement in coordination of effort and the more economical use of materials.

(5) At long last the APT are to be effectively armed with the signing of the weapon release order by General Kanh on 20 November 1967.

(6) The most effective PsyOps activities which have developed out of the above reorganization are as follows:

(a) Locally targeted and rapidly produced leaflets and tapes which are disseminated to restricted audiences through air drop, voice aircraft, vehicle and PDR-mounted loudspeaker, or more effectively still, by members of the Armed Propaganda Teams.

(b) Visits to Chieu Hoi Centers by known VC-connected families. Selected at district and village level, they are contacted and invited during APT missions and are transported using Chieu Hoi Inducement Funds to the Chieu Hoi Center. Here they are fed, subjected to films and other entertainment, propaganda lectures and after being conducted around the center are encouraged to talk to the Ho Chi Minh residents there.

b. Input:

(1) Attached as Annex A are the returnee figures for this year by provinces and the figures for the same periods last year.

(2) The causative factors for the falling off in figures during the last few months as compared to last year are many and rather obscure. The Chieu Hoi returnee rate reacts like the stock market. When the economy is buoyant and politics are on an even keel, share prices and returnee figures are both high. Some of the factors which could have affected the figures are:

\[ E = 4 - 2 \]
(a) Tightening of VC discipline as a countermeasure to the earlier inroads made on their ranks.

(b) No countrywide military activity comparable to the same period last year.

(c) Mounting of the winter/spring offensive with consequent raising of VC morale.

(d) Political doubts and insecurity before and after the two elections.

(e) Almost total paralysis of the Ministry for two months whilst the changeover was in progress leading to financial problems and nonpayment of rewards and allowances.

(f) Inactivity due to falling morale of Chieu Hoi Chiefs who see some of the best and most active of their number arbitrarily dismissed for incorrect party alignment.

(g) Due to the new President's conciliatory tones in press and radio towards a possible entente with the North or NLF, VC propaganda has followed the pattern, "At last we are to have a coalition, the war is nearing won, stay on the winning side, we will avenge all traitors as soon as we get to power."

c. Reception:

(1) Probably the most cheering aspect of the program, the construction of permanent buildings and improvements to the Chieu Hoi Centers has progressed surprisingly satisfactory.

(2) Generally speaking, treatment of Hoi Chanh has been fair and in accordance with promises made.

(3) One reception weakness occasionally marring the PayOps effort is the nonpayment or late payment of weapon rewards and other allowances. Recent cases which have occurred are in Kien Hoa, Bac Lieu and Ba Xuyen, the former due to the dishonesty of the Chieu Hoi Chief and the last two because of either malevolence or inefficiency at the Ministry. Malevolence because the Ba Xuyen Chief who is normally extremely efficient could have been "set up" in order to ease his current replacement by a young and totally inexperienced political friend of the new Minister.

(4) Medical calls, entertainment, recreation and reading facilities are provided to a greater or lesser degree in all centers.

d. Training and Other Activities:
(1) Political Indoctrination:

This is the weakest part of the training program, and yet it is the main reason for the existence of the Chieu Hoi Center. Instruction is given by either the Chief himself if he has nothing better to do at the time or by some cadre members and a very occasional guest speaker from VIS who frequently do not turn up. Instruction is haphazard, intermittent and rarely follows a syllabus. Eighty political indoctrination instructors are alleged to have been trained by the Ministry with a course completion date of 15 October 1967, but to date despite frequent requests, the trained men have not been forthcoming.

(2) Vocational Training:

(a) Most provinces have either established small pilot agricultural and animal husbandry plots or else have come to an arrangement with the provincial services to make use of their facilities.

(b) Whilst over $8,000,000 is already authorized to be spent in IV CTZ on vocational training plots, materials, workshops and instructors, less than one-sixth of this has been committed. During November large sums were prised out of some provincial treasuries, and it is anticipated that the bulk of the remainder will be freed during December. It is felt that spending reticence is due largely to fear of spending all of the funds too early and having to explain nonavailability of funds towards the end of the year.

(c) Despite USAID intransigence in relation to their contract obligations with Education Consultants Ltd., this firm's employees have conducted extremely efficient and useful training courses in masonry, carpentry, cabinet making, and sewing. Their program was, however, slow to start both because of GVN mistrust and lack of support from USAID in the form of transportation and training aids.

0. Tactical Utilization:

(1) Intelligence:

(a) Utilization of Hoi Chanh to support tactical operations has proven especially fruitful when the Hoi Chanh are:

1. Interrogated promptly for useable tactical information,

2. Used as guides to locate weapons, ammunition, and food caches,

3. Used as scouts to locate enemy troop units and installations, and
Used to assist other intelligence agencies in location and identification of VC infrastructure personnel.

(b) The two most important conditions which must exist in order to successfully exploit Hoi Chanh information are:

1. An acceptance of Hoi Chanh information by military authorities to be reasonably valid and

2. A capability to react quickly to the Hoi Chanh's information.

(c) Although there are weekly instances where Hoi Chanh are being exploited by sector and division level operations, the most benefit of Hoi Chanh information is being received by subsectors almost daily. This is attributed to the fact that the subsector Intelligence Officers and District Chiefs place much reliance in the validity of Hoi Chanh information because the information has had very little time to deteriorate in value.

(d) The Hoi Chanh do present a source of information about VC which is beginning to be realized by the military authorities.

(2) Integration:

(a) The most obvious example of integration of Hoi Chanh into military, or para-military units, is the hiring of Hoi Chanh by the PRU. In almost every instance where the PRU has hired Hoi Chanh, the Hoi Chanh have proven to be extremely capable and have gained the full confidence of other unit members.

(b) To integrate Hoi Chanh into RF/PV and ARVN forces came to accomplish as approximately 20 percent of the Hoi Chanh indicate a desire to fight for the GVN. The most difficult task, however, is to overcome the ill-feeling that RF/PV troops have toward the favored treatment given ex-VC, an education program was tried in Chuong Thien with favorable results.

(c) There is little reason to believe that a Hoi Chanh, once indoctrinated and properly trained, could not become a useful member of the ARVN military force just as they are attempting to become useful members of the Vietnamese society.

(d) In point of fact, Hoi Chanh are regularly being enlisted into ARVN, RF/PV, PRU and on a one-time basis, have been absorbed into RD as ten-man information teams in each province. Ba Kuyen and Phong Dinh have a 59-man RD team each whilst 43 Hoi Chanh who were to form another 59-man team in Chuong Thien have been used as fillers.
f. Resettlement:

(1) Despite the plan to complete at least one Chieu Hoi hamlet in each province within the calendar year 1967, this phase of the program is going at a very slow rate. So far only six of the provinces have established Ch Hoi hamlets, accommodating 4,200 families. Two provinces have recently initiated improvements on their selected hamlet sites before the start of actual construction. Six other provinces have had their sites and plans approved, although no construction has yet been started. The delay in the commencement of hamlet construction in several province is attributed to heavy rains and floods.

(2) No significant progress has been accomplished in the matter of issuance of permanent identity cards to ex-Hoi Chanhs. It still takes about four months before the National Police in Saigon issues ID cards, which happen to be one of the major requirements in any job opportunity. The private sector and even some GVN agencies are still reluctant to recruit ex-HO labor. The best employment opportunities open to the HO are the AST, PRU, RD and Kit Carson Scout Program.

g. Administration: Retired military officers have been recruited to replace retired Chieu Hoi Service Chiefs. It is hoped that the quality of CH Hois will improve and corruption will diminish by the offer of incentive pay to increase the salary of those officials. Chieu Hoi Chiefs have recently been relieved by military officers in Dinh Tuong, Bac Lieu and Chuong Thien, for reasons ranging from ineffectiveness to graft and corruption. Five other old CH Chiefs have been recommended for transfer or dismissal.

5. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Changes in administration, government setup or political structure as brought about by the recent elections always result in a very significant decrease in CH returnee input.

b. The Tet season, which calls for grandiose celebrations and family reunions, always produces the greatest number of returnees, notwithstanding the volume and intensity of PayOps efforts.

c. Slack in GVN military operations and step-up of VC terrorist activities result in very marked decrease in the number of returnees.

6. FUTURE PLANS: The program objectives for 1968 include the following:

a. To bring in, receive and resettle 22,000 VC with contingency preparations for 10,000 additional returnees. While this figure may seem unrealistic, it is anticipated that it may result from more extensive military pressure being brought to bear on the enemy.
b. To recruit, train, equip and operate 29 armed propaganda platoons.

c. To construct reception facilities in key districts.

d. To support increased use of returnees by MORD and other GVN programs.

e. To expand and improve the CH vocational training program and fully support it with US-furnished tools, equipment and instructors where necessary so as to facilitate job placement for released HC.

f. To set up employment agencies in each province for use by all jobless Ho Chi Minh.

g. To increase the use of HC in tactical and intelligence operations by both GVN and US forces, it is intended to expand the Delta version of the Kit Carson Scout Program to an establishment figure of three scouts per district, or a total of 270 scouts, not counting those employed directly by the 2nd US Brigade at My Tho.
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(upper figures show 1969 input, lower figures show 1968 input)
1. INTRODUCTION: The GVN refugee relief program is affected in three stages:

(a) initial reception and temporary care.

(b) rehabilitation through diversified training programs.

(c) re-establishment of former villages or the establishment of permanent resettlement sites at new and more secure locations. Success or failure of the program must be calculated by the accomplishment of these objectives.

2. REFUGEE PRIOR TO CORPS ESTABLISHMENT: For the first six months of 1967, little was done by the refugee service. Three temporary camps were constructed. Less than ten percent of the budget allocated was spent. Reasons for the slow pace of the program at that time were that the budget was late in being approved and the refugee problem had a very low priority in the Delta.

3. REORGANIZATION OF RELIEF INTO CORPS: The reorganization of the American effort into CORPS had little effect on the Refugee Division. With elimination of the functions of the G-5 office, which often dealt with refugees apart from the G-5 advisory effort, there became a unified effort for refugee relief. In several provinces the advisory role was given to a military officer.

4. RECENTLY: With the increased interest by CORPS, occurring in September Project Take-Off and increasing concern over lack of planner expenditure, pressure was brought on the Service Chiefs to make the program more responsive. Figures through the end of November show that 33 of the 32 planned temporary camps have been constructed; 55 of the 80 planned resettlement locations have been constructed; approximately one-third of the budget has been expended. In May of 1967 only one province was conducting a vocational training program for less than 50 students. As of the end of October, 223 students were graduated from the five technical schools. Two hundred and ninety-five students are presently enrolled. Provincial building programs are being undertaken in more than half of the provinces and last year many villages were given some of the vital statistics on refugee population.

5. REMARKS LIKELY: Long range plans depend on the answers to several questions. Will there be more extensive military activity in the Delta which will generate large numbers of refugees? What direction will the newly organized Ministry of Social Welfare-Refugees take? Barriers dramatic changes in the present situation, the refugee relief program will remain basically as it is now. With few changes in policy and procedure, the program can become truly responsive to refugee needs. A change in regulations which will encourage refugees to resettle themselves will improve the resettlement procedure. A change in procedure to permit immediate payment of temporary allowances and then rapid payment of resettlement allowances will also increase the effect of the relief given.
6. FUTURE PLANS: Future plans of a concrete nature include the construction of a 900-family resettlement center in Xiong Phong, the establishment of a vocational training school for refugees in Koc-Hea at the site of an abandoned RF training center, the conversion of an abandoned agrovillage into a refugee village in Ba Xuyen and a basic psyps program which is lacking.

7. SUMMARY: In summation, it is enough to say that the refugee program, on paper, is more than adequate. It is in administration that the program comes apart. Perhaps with the formation of the new Ministry and the establishment of District Refugee Relief Teams, the mechanics of the program will improve. Sometime within the next calendar year we should attempt to transfer the responsibility for refugee care and resettlement to the village level with province Service Chiefs acting as inspectors and advisors to the village council. Perhaps in a few years there will be no need for a refugee program.

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<td>Refugee out of camp</td>
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<td>Refugees resettled in 1967:</td>
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1. Mission:

a. The mission of the Public Safety Division is to assist the government of Vietnam in the development of a modern, professional law enforcement capability with sufficient force and effectiveness to maintain civil order and Public Safety and to counter insurgency. In furtherance of this mission, the Public Safety Division nationally supports certain GVN agencies. These include the Resources Control Program (encompassing the Identity Card Program), the National Police Field Force (NPFF), combating corruption within the National Police, National Police recruitment, construction and renovation of National Police facilities, command training for National Police, and increasing the career prospects of the police.

b. National Police increase in personnel also saw an increase in the PSD advisory effort to its present strength of 16 provinces PSD advisers, 8 province NPFF advisers, and 6 regional advisers. Six U.S. technicians plus TCN and Vietnamese employees serve the GDF.

2. Activities Prior to CORPS:

a. History: The National Police in 1964 started a recruitment and training program designed to raise the level of personnel from a midyear level of 22,000 men to 52,000 by the end of 1965. This brought a host of problem. Lack of proper and adequate training, lack of quality personnel, lack of adequate facilities, and corruption are but a few of the problems brought about by this large and rapid expansion.

(1) The Public Safety Division paralleled this expansion with a corresponding expansion of its advisory effort, especially in the operational areas, which includes this regional advisory program. Prior to 1966, an advisor was assigned two to three provinces and could not be effective since he was spread too thin. By November of 1966 each province in the area now comprising the IV OTZ was assigned an advisor.

b. In February of 1967 the National Police reorganized the Upper and Lower Mekong National Police Regions into the 16 provinces comprising the IV OTZ. PSD similarly reorganized and the present headquarters in Can Tho became the regional headquarters for this area. January of 1967 saw the GDF concept instituted and this provided the coordination of effort that has carried into the CORPS organization.

c. Advisory Effort: As mentioned earlier, there has been little change in the goals of the PSD program since its inception. Some areas, from time to time, have received additional or less emphasis. Some of the more important programs will be covered individually for the purpose of this report.
The Public Safety Division originated the concept and the National Police were given enforcement responsibility for a National Resources Control Program. This program is defined as an effort to regulate the movement of selected resources, human and material, in order to restrict the enemy's support or to deprive him of it altogether and to interrupt and destroy all enemy non-military communications. This is accomplished on three broad fronts: fixed and mobile checkpoints, rural internal security, and the Identity Card program and the family census program. The identity card program is a program where identification cards are issued to all persons 15 years of age and above. The object of the family which contains the vital information about each family, a family photograph, a list of all resources, and any Communist affiliations or tendencies. The first U.S. supported resources control effort in Vietnam dates back to 1961. Policemen were trained; however the effort was allowed to lapse owing to opposition within the GVN. The Resources Control Section was elevated to the Resources Control Block within the National Police structure and the program initiated in all provinces in the Delta. Fixed and mobile checkpoints were established in each to act as policewomen to assist in resources control operations in IV CTZ. Their purpose, of course, was to search female suspects. Although numerous problems were encountered with ARVN personnel, some degree of success has been encountered with the assigned of Q.C. (GVN Military Police) jointly with National Police to operate the checkpoints.

b. The resources control programs has been only marginally effective in depriving the VC of personnel and materials. In many areas the program is a source of graft and extortion, resulting in public hostility. Its lack of acceptance, coupled with a shortage of manpower, police over-specialization and lack of motivation, has had an adverse effect upon overall accomplishments. The Identity Card Program was established along with the general resources control program. Due to ease of duplication of the issued identification cards and because a growing number of youths above 15 years of age being recruited by the VC, a new plan is now in effect to issue identification cards to all people 15 years of age or older. The family census program was initiated by the National Police and this has been fairly successful in identifying suspected VC, draft evaders, etc.

c. Marine Police: A complete history and a long range development plan of the Marine Police is covered in paragraph 7 of this report.
a. **National Police Field Force:**

1. The National Police Field Force was developed as a lightly armed, foot-mobile force and prior to the CORDS reorganization had grown to a force of 15,000 in less than two years.

2. This has fostered the usual growing pains associated with any project where development and training is rapid. Co-ordination of assignments, logistics, etc., were/are but a few of the overall administrative problems. Prior to the CORDS organization there were four operational companies assigned to IV CTZ. Two of these companies operated according to the concept. Two companies were semi-operational. Three NPF advisors were assigned at that time.

f. **National Police:** As reported earlier, PSD advisors were assigned in each of the 16 provinces of IV CTZ prior to the CORDS reorganization. They experienced varying degrees of success depending on individual initiative, rapport with counterparts, resources available, etc. Progress was reported in fighting corruption, local training, administration reform, vehicle and equipment maintenance and those other practices that go to make a low infiltration unit. For example, a vehicle maintenance advisor was assigned to IV CTZ in November of 1966. He completed a survey of all NP vehicles and problems, instituted local training and training in maintenance of proper crop level, established a motor maintenance shop and generally improved NP maintenance. Similar examples could be cited in other areas. PSD funded construction for National Police projects generally fell behind schedule and were in varying phases of completion prior to CORDS.

4. **CORDS Organization:** The CORDS reorganization, generally, has resulted in tighter controls more specific planning, and a unification of reporting.

5. **Progress:**

   a. **National Police:**

   1. One of the most significant areas of progress in one that at first glance might appear insignificant, November 20 and 21 a meeting of all Province Chiefs of staff of the NPF Block in Saigon, all their PSD counterparts, and the Chief of Operations for PSD was held at the CORDS conference room in Can Tho. Each Province Chief
limited his discussion to a brief description of the general situation and devoted the remainder of his time to problems areas. A very frank discussion was the rule and many problems were surfaced. As problems were discussed solutions to the problems were also discussed and if they could not be solved locally they were referred to Saigon. The entire session was recorded and is being transcribed so attention to problem areas can be followed up in detail. This conference is believed to be a first in Vietnam and is hoped to be the first of similar quarterly conferences in the future.

(2) An anti-corruption program has been instituted in cooperation with IC CTZ National Police. This consists of acquainting the public with graft and corruption, a leaflet campaign to bring public awareness of the National Police’s concern for corruption, and rotation of personnel at sensitive areas such as resource control checkpoints. It is too early to discuss the results of this campaign which is just getting off the ground.

(3) A system of monitoring and reporting of all supplies obtained for counterparts has been instituted among field advisors.

6. NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCES (NPPF) : Prior to May 1967 there were four operational and two semi-operational companies in IV Corps. This has been expanded to 11 companies in various stages of operation due mainly to lack of equipment. Little progress has been made in persuading province officials to use the NPPF within the concept. A recent directive issued by Commanding General, IV CTZ, General Mahn, which orders the correct use of the NPPF is expected to help remedy this situation. See Tab A for details of how each company is deployed and their equipment problems.

7. MARINE POLICE :

(1) May 28, 1967, the Marine Police in IV CTZ had a total strength of 45 men and they were equipped with 4 LCPL craft based in Can Tho. Eleven of the 45 men were assigned to the Navy PAW program. The Can Tho section was based at a temporary site near the River Assault Group (RAG) base on the water front. The base at My-Tho was partially completed, but was being used by resource control police at My-Tho. One Marine Policeman was stationed there as a cadre. All work had stopped on the My-Tho base, and no work was being done on the permanent base at Can Tho.

(2) As of this date 332 men are assigned to the Marine Police in IV CTZ and 47 men are assigned to the PAW with operation Gene Warden. The Marine Police have a total of 29 patrol boats. Six of these are the old LCPLs and 14 are the new 461 police patrol boat (PPB). These boats are operating from Can Tho, My Tho and Long Xuyen. Their patrol area is from the Cambodian border to the Can Tho patrol area on the Saigon River and in a small area around My-Tho. Construction on the My-Tho base started again on 25 November and is expected to be completed by 29 April 1968. Land at Can Tho is now being filled and work on the base is expected to start in January 1968.
8. **LEADERSHIP CONTROL**: An anti-corruption program providing for the protection of resources control personnel was started since May 1967. It is too early to assess the results. The Resources Control Block of the National Police has been integrated into the Uniform Police to provide additional emphasis on the resources control program. Special Police and other intelligence agencies have been asked to funnel intelligence about resources control violations to the uniform police for action. Work is now being done to seek methods of indentifying medicines and other medical supplies to provide tighter controls over these vital products. Increased emphasis is being placed on mobile checkpoints as opposed to the fixed checkpoints.

9. **LESSONS LEARNED**: A lack of detailed planning and coordination hampers programs. This can be shown by examining placement of fixed resources control checkpoints. One checkpoint may be located just across the border from a checkpoint in another province where it accomplishes no real purpose. Proper and timely logistic support has not been obtained, due to lack of initiative. We fail to "sell" our programs to all levels of the GVN who will have a direct effect on the outcome of the programs. Witness improper NPP deployment. If GVN military and province officials were sold on the concept originally most of the problems would not have arisen. We have learned to closely monitor materials obtained for the National Police no matter what their source, since they often divert supplies obtained for a project from their own sources. We are relearning a lesson we knew previously. It does not pay to recruit personnel solely on the basis of numbers. We must look for quality tool. The value of cooperation and coordination among U.S. personnel is being proved. This is probably one of the most valuable lessons learned.

10. **FUTURE PLANS**:

a. **National Police**:

(1) Recruiting is being sharply emphasized in order to reach a force strength of 13,900 in IV CTZ. This compares with present strength of 13,950. Recruiting campaigns directed toward ex-military personnel in effect, by lowering the draft age to 18, the GVN provided a new source of manpower to the National Police. Since they are exempt from the draft if they are National Policemen, recruiting in that age group is up sharply.

(2) New construction is planned in IV CTZ. Presently under construction is a Directorate Headquarters. Planned on the same site are a IV CTZ training center, Marine Police base, and a signal office, other renovations in province and district are planned.

(3) Additional anti-corruption campaigns are planned, especially in the resources control program. The original anti-in effect will be extended. Training on the new level will be expanded. This will consist of field and all elements training in the main, but with specialized courses in resources control.
and other areas provided by a trained mobile instruction team which will visit each province on a rotation basis. A library of training films is planned on the Corps level so field advisors will have ready access to training films.

b. National Police Field Force:

(1) A SOP for cordon and search operations using NPF in conjunction with GVN and U.S. military has been drafted and is being reviewed by GVN personnel in IV CTZ. Initially the operations will be in conjunction with U.S. troops.

(2) Correct use of the NPF is envisioned in the near future since the issuance of a directive by the Commanding General, IV CTZ specifying how the NPF are to be used. This should aid in redirecting the NPF toward its primary mission of elimination of the VC infrastructure.

Additional NPF companies are planned for IV CTZ in 1968. The number of companies will be raised from the 11 companies now operational to 20 companies. Six of these companies will form a Corps battalion. Additional U.S. advisors are programmed and should be available in 1968.

c. Marine Police:

By the end of 1968, the Marine Police plan to have 767PB and 1321 of the 171 interceptor boats assigned in IV CTZ. These boats will be based at 10 bases and named by approximately 2,000 men. Policewomen are being considered for use on these boats. In increase to 100 men is planned for the Navy PEA operating in Operation Come Warden.

d. Resources Control:

(1) The Resources Control Program will be revised and expanded as more areas become pacified. Plans are in effect for better trained and motivated police personnel. This will be accomplished through a series of incentive awards and by training on the Corps level and by the use of mobile training teams.

(2) The number and location of fixed checkpoints in IV CTZ is now being studied and unnecessary, duplications will be eliminated. A IV CTZ Resources Control Committee with a representative from each province and from IV CTZ is planned to oversee the placement of the checkpoints and to accomplish overall resources control planning.

(5) A IV CTZ Resources Control Operations Center, to include maps and plotting devices, to insure that all land and water arteries are interdicted is planned. Increased emphasis on mobile as opposed to fixed checkpoints is planned. Plans for Police Special Branch to provide timely intelligence regarding matters of interest to the Resources Control Program, to include black market activities, are in the mill.
(4) Plans to mark medicines with an identifying label and establish tighter control on medicines are now being discussed with RSA personnel.

(5) Plans to stimulate interest in and insure that the Provincial Resources Control Committee is an on-going functioning entity are now being made.

(6) Plans, including monitoring and logistical support, are being made to implement the new identity card system. This should be in progress by February 1968. Delays have been caused by not receiving needed equipment in Saigon.

12. SUMMARY:

a. Although progress in the PSD program has not been as extensive and as effective as it ideally could have been, progress is being made. As we develop plans and priorities, we are trying to analyze critically each step we take. In IV CTZ we are trying to be flexible in our course of action but keeping the overall goals in mind.

b. In a program as large and as complicated as the Public Safety Division program, errors will be made but as we bring each phase of the program into sharper focus we believe they can be reduced to a minimum.

c. Co-ordination and co-operation among U.S. agencies has been an important factor in accomplishments to this date and PSD in IV CTZ will continue to do its almost to be an integral team member in our joint effort.
Appendix E - Psychological Operations

1. OVERALL: The period from 28 May 1967 to date have been marked by steady improvement in personnel, material assets and psyops programs.

2. ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CORPS ESTABLISHMENT: Prior to the establishment of COMUS, psyops was a dual effort with coordination of civil programs being exercised by the OCO Psyops Director Region IV and coordination of military programs being with G-5 Advisor IV Corps. Although attempts were made to combine these programs at both the Corps and Province levels, no concerted campaigns combining all available psyops assets were conducted. This period included the termination of the "get out the vote" campaign for the hamlet elections and the beginning of the Psyops program in support of the September 3rd elections.

3. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORPS: The CORDS reorganization gave to the Chief Psyops Division responsibility for the control and coordination of all Psyops assets in the IV CTZ. At this time, the IV Corps Psyops Advisor and the 49th Field Battalion Advisor joined the Psyops Division staff and direct support of all programs was assumed by the 19th Psyops Company (now the 10th Psyops Battalion). Similar reorganizations were made at the province level and although there were various methods of implementation, Psyops responsibility was assigned to one person in each province resulting in a more cohesive system with better control of the program at all levels.

4. PROGRESS:

a. Propaganda Efforts: The principal nationwide programs implemented during this period were in support of the hamlet elections, the Presidential and Senatorial elections on 3 September, the Lower House elections. A fall Chief Hoii Campaign was conducted to exploit the newly elected "government of the people" and was supplemented by ongoing provincial Chief Hoii programs. The success of the election connected programs was evident in the large turnout of the voters often in spite of concerted VC efforts.

b. Chief Hoii Campaign: Support and exploitation of the Chief Hoii program is a continuous effort in all provinces, supplemented from time to time by national level campaigns such as the fall Chief Hoii Campaign. Although the fall Chief Hoii Campaign was apparently not as successful as had been anticipated, the reason for this could well be tighter VC control at all levels in preparation for opening of the Winter-Spring Campaign, which has resulted in increased VC activities in all areas of IV CTZ.

c. Personnel: Substantial gains have been made in personnel during this period. From a total staff of 13 Psyops program has grown until to now have 25 Province Advisors and Psyops Battalion in 7 provinces. Nine Psyops battalions and an administrative officer for the Psyops Division are being required. Various personnel are required to bring the 10th Psyops Battalion up to full strength.
5. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. The use of combined ARVN/US Psyops Field Teams has proven most effective in the exploitation of VC incidents.

b. PBRs mounted with loudspeakers have proved to be an effective Chieu Hoi rally point.

c. Appeals tailored to the local situation are more effective than national appeals.

d. Face to face communications are the most effective way to deliver a message. Psyops teams accompanying military operations can reach many people in normally inaccessible areas.

6. FUTURE PLANS:

a. The Propaganda Support Center became operational in IV Corps in January. This center will permit us to exercise more effective control of the overall Psyops program both GVN and U.S. and will result in better utilization of all assets.

b. During the coming year, the 10th Psyops Battalion will build up to full TOE strength and will be able to provide more effective Psyops support in all areas.

7. SUMMARY: Overall Psyops Programs in IV Corps have shown steady improvement during this period and should continue to improve as more assets become available enabling us to mount more programs against selected local targets.
Appendix B to Annex E - PUBLIC HEALTH

1. GENERAL: The period from May to December 1967 is one during which substantial progress in the health program was realized. This progress was due, in part, to the realization of previous planning, but more to the high priority attached to the program in this Corps. This priority resulted in the program shifting to rural health, thus making it a very significant part of the pacification thrust.

2. REORGANIZATION OF EFFORT INTO CORPS:

a. This constituted very little real change except for affording slightly more resources such as the MACV (AID) funding sources. The purely technical lines of communication and policy creation authority remained open despite minor problems in the past. This concept affords the health program a "monitor" in each province, the PSA, responsible for the efficient performance of the seventeen Provincial Health Assistance Program (PHAP) teams in the field in this CTZ. Most importantly it allows for the judicious establishment of priorities for the use of health program resources within each province based on valid political and military as well as medical exigencies. This overcomes a deficiency, previously evident, in many areas where lack of local communication precluded this.

b. To date the MACORDS reorganization has afforded PHD in this Corps no additional personnel despite previous requests.

3. PROGRESS:

a. Hospital Operations: The sixteen provincial hospitals with their 4033 beds are each the site of major construction and renovation programs. The basic priority is providing adequate utility services (water, electricity and sewage) and ancillary service facilities (kitchen, laundry, laboratory, and X-ray). During this period, at Vn Thanh, Can Lanh, and Chau Doc complete new hospitals are being built. This tremendous increase in physical improvements has been made possible by more Corps delegation of action authority from Saigon in matters such as planning and contracting. The overall improvement in logistics and ability to support the program with construction commodities was also essential. The increase of A & B capability by MACORDS/PHD played an indispensable role in this progress. There are forty-three major construction/renovation projects underway or completed during the report period.

(1) These sixteen hospitals, the 17 PHAP teams have cared for an average of 2,000 inpatients monthly and performed an average of 1,000 surgical operations monthly of these 14,000 patients 7% to 12% are civilian war casualties.
(2) A vast improvement has occurred in medical logistics with the opening of the 14,000 square foot NON Regional Medical Depot in Can Tho. This is providing rapid reaction logistics to service for most critical or rapidly moving items of medical supply. The facility also renders medical equipment and vehicle maintenance service to the provincial health services. This CTZ is six months ahead of all others in having its logistics facility fully operative.

(3) The Assistant Nurses School in Can Tho graduated its first class of fifty trainees as a beginning toward alleviating the critical medical manpower situation in the Corps. Once again, this Corps was six months ahead of all others.

(4) The CORDS general duty nurses on the PHAP Teams are carrying on regular formal in-service training and informal OJT in order to improve the effectiveness and scope of nursing.

b. Public Health:

(1) The "Rural Health Program", originated in and unique to this Corps, is of paramount importance. It carries to a larger segment of the populace GV/NON presence in providing services that cannot be provided by the enemy in those areas it controls. This program, basically, is one of utilizing PHAP personnel resources at the sub-sector level full time to work with the District Health Chiefs (NON) in improving physical facilities and improving logistics. They are also assisting in providing direct medical care, immunization programs, school health programs, communicable disease reporting, epidemic control, and in environmental sanitation efforts. These rural health personnel (VN & U.S.) are providing outpatient care for an average of 360,000 people monthly and giving an average of 100,000 immunizations monthly.

(2) Thus far, urban sanitation is being attacked as a major front with the establishment of refuse pick-up capability in Can Tho, My Tho, and Long Xuyen. Ice plants, ice cream factories, restaurants, hotels, and markets are being inspected with some improvements noted where the province officials are willing to take preventative action.

4. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. It has become obvious that we are dealing with two efforts simultaneously; i.e., to upgrade the quality and scope of medical services offered by GV/NON by a long-range development program, and to alleviate the impact of war on the civilian populace by providing immediate hospital based medical care services.

b. The lesson learned is that these two goals are not always compatible when trying to achieve developmental programs. The problem is simply that of designing the most efficient medical care possible but still working within the framework of the antiquated NON policies in a counterpart relationship.
5. STRATEGIC PLANS:

a. Unless fiscal policies change, plans at present call for continuation and consolidation of the present effort. The exception to this will be the addition of two MSH teams to augment MSH capability to staff the new hospitals for Vi Thanh and Cao Lanh.

b. Continued emphasis will be on a significant input into the pacification effort.

6. SUMMARY:

a. Over the last six months the health effort in this Corps has continued to lead the other Corps in all activities. This has been due, in part, to excellent communication and cooperation between all elements at Corps and sector levels.

b. The program will continue to supply not only a humanitarian service, and a long range development goal, but also one of the most potent psywar weapons in our arsenal.
1. (C) The Communications - Electronic support provided in the IV Corps Tactical Zone has expanded with the advisor effort. In August 1965, the Delta Signal Company (Provisional), 39th Signal Battalion provided the administrative communications support for the IV CTZ. The only telephone service provided by US units linked the Corps Headquarters with each of the Division Headquarters and the US Army Support Command facilities at Vinh Long and Soc Trang. Long distance phone service was provided through Vinh Long and Soc Trang to Saigon. In March 1966 the 581st Signal Company was activated absorbing the Delta Signal Company and several signal detachments in IV CTZ.

2. (C) In October 1966, the 52nd Signal Battalion was activated because the programmed communications support for the IV CTZ could not be provided by one signal company. Initially only the Battalion Headquarters and Company A were activated with the three remaining operational companies being formed in March 1967. Each company was assigned to a division tactical area with Company A remaining for Corps Headquarters support. To date thirteen of the sixteen provinces are provided telephone service, and six are provided secure teletype service. The three provinces that do not have telephone service, now have the equipment on site with the radio systems being tested. Secure teletype service to all provinces is scheduled for completion by December 1968.

3. (C) Tactical telephone service is furnished to US Advisors by the RVN Division Signal Companies. Two RVN signal units, IV Corps Signal Battalion (US) support throughout IV CTZ.
ANNEX D - ARMY AVIATION

1. (C) GENERAL:

a. Army Aviation has played a vital role within the IV Corps area. In August 1965 combat assault helicopter resources had reached the peak of planned support. Four helicopter companies were then assigned to the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion. Two of the four units were drawn from resources in COMUS in 1965 to increase the IV Corps Commander's air mobility and flexibility in the Mekong Delta. The advantages gained through the addition of these units with their mobility and aerial fire support has enabled the commander to reverse the tide of battle.

b. The 13th Combat Aviation (Delta) Battalion is assigned to IV Corps under my operational control. I have employed the battalion commander as my Aviation Staff Officer. The mission of the battalion has been to provide tactical air movement of ARVN combat troops in air-mobile operations, move combat supplies and equipment within the combat area and conduct aerial surveillance of the Corps Tactical Zone.

c. The growth of the three IV Corps Army airfields has kept pace with the arrival of new units, particularly during the last three months. The most significant construction projects were:

   (1) Cantonment Construction, Can Tho - Construction of 1560 man cantonment was begun at Can Tho. Sixteen of the planned 26, two story billets have been completed and occupied. A 500 man mess has been constructed during this period and is now operational. Waterborne latrines and additional mess storage facilities under construction are nearing completion.

   (2) Security - Dempsey Compound, Can Tho - Construction of a double apron concertina fence along the airfield boundary with eight 40' watch towers has materially improved the internal security of this installation.

   (3) Aircraft Revetments - An aircraft revetment construction program was begun in July with a goal of providing revetment construction program was begun in July with a goal of providing revetments for all aircraft. By the end of December sufficient revetments have been constructed for all assigned as well as limited transient aircraft.

2. (C) HISTORICAL: From the 1965 strength of four assault helicopter companies, the resources have grown to eight companies. In August 1965 the Delta saw the arrival of the first reconnaissance airplane company (O-1). In July 1967 a second reconnaissance company (O-1) was added. The following month a surveillance airplane company (O-1) was assigned followed by an armed helicopter company (OH-13) in October. The units are stationed at
three major Army Aviation Airfields in the Delta: Vinh Long, Soc Trang, and Can Tho. I have charged the battalion command with the operation of these airfields. In addition to these current resources, IV Corps is programmed to receive a support helicopter company of medium (Chinook CH-47) helicopters next spring. The 235th AMC will be replaced with the new AH-1G Bell Huey Cobra in January 1968.

3. (c) TACTICS:

a. Geographical Considerations: Tactical operations in the Delta depend primarily on the availability of airmobile transportation. This alluvial plain is interlaced with a heavy network of rivers and canals. Cross-country trafficability for surface movement is highly restricted by these barriers. During the Southwest monsoon season the plain is flooded; restricting most habitation to the canal and river banks. The VC military forces have been tailored to operate in this environment. ARVN military forces were at a distinct disadvantage until the introduction of vertical mobility.

b. Helicopter Tactics: With four helicopter companies assigned, there has not been sufficient support to enable the three divisions to operate simultaneously. Consequently, I have employed the technique of holding all helicopter assets at Corps level. These assets are then allocated to a division for a limited period of time. This policy has enabled the Corps commander to influence the tempo of action in each Division Tactical Area as needed. Armed helicopters have been employed in several roles. The primary role of escort has been modified to allow a more varied use. Helicopter transports are flown unescorted at 2500' from the staging area to the release point. This frees the armed helicopters to be utilized in aerial reconnaissance of the Landing Zones. After escorting the transports in and out of the Landing Zones, the armed ships then revert to the role of providing aerial direct fire support for the assaulting troops. When the troops are moving without contact the armed ships are employed as air cover and security. A command and control helicopter is habitually utilized to provide continuous battle field control. The ground commander, selected members of his staff and the senior division advisor together with the aviation mission commander constitute this aerial CP. Continuity of command is maintained over the battle area by utilizing an alternate aircraft for relief.

c. Reconnaissance: An organized aerial visual surveillance (VR) program began in August 1965. 32 O-1 aircraft were utilized. These aircraft were placed in direct support of the three divisions and 15 sectors. Operational control was exercised in each by the supported headquarters. My O-2 advisor exercised staff supervision to tie the Corps effort together. A minimum of four hours of daily VR was flown in each sector. This effort provided 50% coverage of the Corps area. Subsequently I submitted a request for additional VR assets. This request resulted in a second O-1 unit being assigned to the 13th OCS in July 1967. IV Corps now enjoys a daily coverage of 80% over the present 15 sectors.
d. Surveillance: In October 1967 a new dimension was added to the Corps intelligence program with the assignment of a surveillance airplane company (OV-1). Infra-red flights are now targeting the major LOC's, coastal and border areas each night. Additionally, SLAR (radar) covers 80% of the Delta every night and 100% every other night.

e. Target Acquisition, Airfield Security and Direct Aerial Fire Support: Armed helicopters provide critical day and night direct aerial fire support. Light fire teams are employed to provide active and passive determent; airfield security; interdict enemy lines of communication; relieve units installations and outposts under attack; and support airborne assaults. The availability of armed helicopters as a reaction force to the expanded target acquisition means has been greatly improved with the addition of the 235th Armed Helicopter Company. New concepts of employment of Firefly teams and quick reaction fire teams are being developed to take advantage of this new potential.

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. Organic Army aviation plays a large role in the logistical requirements of IV Corps. Air Force assets allocated to IV Corps barely satisfy needs. I have had to consistently utilize a portion of troops transport assets to perform resupply, liaison, courier and troop welfare requirements. Some relief was gained in September 1967 by the attachment of three CH-47 medium helicopters from XVII. Judicious use of these aircraft has allowed some logistical transport relief.

5. (C) SUMMARY: Army Aviation support in IV Corps has been a prime means of allowing ARVN Forces to effectively counter the NLF military offensive. Allotted support has not been sufficient to allow full deployment of available ARVN Forces. An urgent need exists for additional airborne support. Present planning provides for a medium support helicopter company to be assigned to IV Corps to meet the needs of the large logistical transport task still remaining to be satisfied. The assignment of an armed helicopter company will allow me to furnish direct aerial fire support and quick reaction against acquired targets. This augmentation is contributing greatly to Sector small unit operations, to support outposts under attack, and suppress large scale enemy movement and activity.
ANNEX II - NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) GENERAL: The Naval Forces presently involved in support of IV Corps ZTV include the VN 4th Riverine Area Command (River Assault Groups 21, 23, 25, 28, 31, 32, and 33) CTF 116.1 (Game Warden Operation - Phiha, Seals and Sea Wolves), and CTF 115. Other Naval forces include CTF 117 in support of the U.S. Ninth Division and CTF 115 (Market Time Operation) in the coastal waters surrounding IV Corps. In August 1965 the 4th Riverine Area Command was the only Naval Force operating within the boundaries of IV Corps. At that time CTF 115 commenced operation Market Time along the coast. On 30 October 1965 the first PBF (Swift Boats) joined the Market Time Operation. On 9 May 1966 CTF 116.1 Game Warden PBFs commenced operations from Can Tho. On 12 April 1967 CTF 117 commenced operating in IV Corps in support of the US Ninth Division.

2. (C) FOURTH RIVERINE AREA COMMAND: The Vietnamese Navy Organization in IV Corps consists primarily of eight River Assault Groups located two each at Navy bases at Can Tho, Long Xuyen, Vinh Long and Ky Tho. These RAGs have a primary mission to provide troop lift and fire support in support of ARVN operations along the rivers and canals. Each RAG is configured to lift one ARVN Battalion. The utilization of the RAGs in their primary mission averages about 10% of their monthly usage. The remainder of their operating consists of combat patrols. There has been a major and continuing effort on the part of both US Navy and US Army Advisors to interest the various ARVN Divisions in taking additional advantage of this valuable asset. In general these efforts have had little success. To offset this low combat usage the present Vietnamese Navy Fourth Riverine Area Commander has urged his unit commanders to become more aggressive in their patrolling and in originating and supporting small unit operations. These efforts have borne fruit and although they are on a small scale they are generally successful. For example during the past six months the River Assault Groups have participated in approximately 40 small unit operations with Provincial Reconnaissance Units and local PFs. The vast majority of these operations were conducted at night with a minimum of additional assets and produced excellent results. It requires constant organization on the part of the Navy Advisors to keep the RAGs busy at present we are meeting with some success. The fact remains that until the ARVN takes interest and uses some imagination in planning operations in these areas where the RAGs can be utilized the usage rate of this force in its primary mission will remain scanty. Fourth Riverine Area Commander has requested IV Corps to provide three companies of troops to come under the operational control of the RAG Commanders at Can Tho, Vinh Long, Ky Tho to be used in reacting to tactical intelligence along the river banks and major canals and on the island complexes. This request is valid due to the excellent intelligence available in these areas. The problem now is reacting to tactical intelligence. Generally there is a lack of immediate availability of troops. The fact that the information is generally good is shown for example in the 23 operations that RAG 23 has conducted with the Ba Xuyen Province PBFs during the period June through November 1967. These operations using intelligence available through VNN channels have produced the following results:

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMISSIONED OFFICER

DOD DIA 5102.10
a. Personnel:

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<th></th>
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<td>1 WIA slight</td>
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<tr>
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b. Material:

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</thead>
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<td>10 Weapons</td>
<td>1 POW camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Junkes</td>
<td>1 20 bed hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sampans</td>
<td>1 Radio repair station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Rounds ammo</td>
<td>5 Info/tax stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Kilos documents</td>
<td>14 Fortified bunkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 Structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Many important infrastructure members.

c. The RAGs are in general commanded by competent experienced and aggressive officers. The noncommissioned officers who serve as boat captains in the majority are excellent. The major personnel weakness lies in the inexperience of the junior officers. The discipline and morale of these units is outstanding as evidenced by the extremely low desertion rate. It can be safely stated that without exception the RAGs are combat competent.

3. (c) OPERATION GAME WARDEN:

a. The River Patrol Force (TF 116) is a mobile naval force made up of air, water and ground units. Since its introduction into IV Corps Tactical Zone, the primary mission of Operation GAME WARDEN has been to conduct patrols and inshore surveillance in order to enforce curfews and prevent Viet Cong infiltration, movement and resupply along across the major rivers of the Mekong Delta.

b. The first GAME WARDEN units to arrive in IV CTZ were 10 PATs which commenced operations in the can Tho area in May 1966. Since then, their number has increased to 90 which are located at Binh Thuy, Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Xy The and aboard three LSTs which operate in the Bassac, Co Chien, and Han Luong rivers. The River Patrol Force has increased the number of their helicopter light fire teams from the original two to six and they are located at Binh Thuy, Vinh Long, Dong Tam and aboard each of the LSTs. Three platoons of Seals were introduced into IV CTZ in early 1967 and are located at Binh Thuy, Vinh Long and Xy The.
c. PBR patrols are the primary means of accomplishing the GAGE WARWARDEN mission. Each patrol is made up of two boats and each patrol carries a VN National Maritime Policeman. The PBRs stop, board and search waterborne craft in their area to ensure that only legitimate cargo is being transported. Initially, this led to frequent engagements with Viet Cong watercraft, resulting in heavy enemy losses. Such incidents have become less frequent due to reduced enemy use of the major rivers as a means of transportation. There are times when the Viet Cong are forced to venture onto the major rivers simply to get to the other side. Through various intelligence sources, the Viet Cong's major lines of communications across the rivers have been discovered and River Patrol Force units have shifted accordingly to take advantage of this information.

d. PBR patrols have also forced Viet Cong tax collectors to leave the patrolled rivers. This has not only reduced Viet Cong revenue, but has also reaped a good deal of good will from the people. When PBRs first entered IV CTZ, their primary objective in psychological operations was to make sure the people understood what PBRs were doing and why. Since this has been accomplished, the emphasis has been shifted to pro-GVN type PsyOps messages. This PsyOps effort has caused a very noticeable change in the attitude of the people on the river toward PBRs since GAGE WARWARDEN operations began. They are no longer afraid of patrols and increasingly approach them for MILOAPS, to volunteer information on Viet Cong activities and to Chieu Hoi.

e. Close cooperation also exists between PBR patrols and most of the outposts along the rivers. Frequent MILOAPS, MILOCAPS and intelligence gathering visits help to build and maintain a good working relationship. PBRs are frequently called on to support outposts under attack. No outpost receiving such support has been overrun.

f. The Navy helicopter operations in IV CTZ are primarily a supporting arm for PBR and SEAL operations. As the number of Navy Helicopters has increased, GAGE WARWARDEN has been able to employ them for air patrols along the major rivers and canals. This tactic has met with a deal of success in interdicting Viet Cong watercraft in Specified Strike Zones and in harassing the Viet Cong's efforts to build counter-PBR bunkers and fortifications.

g. The River Patrol Force SEALs operating in IV CTZ conduct reconnaissance patrols for intelligence collection, establish outposts to observe watercraft traffic and interdict enemy line of communications. The SEAL team results are constantly improving as experience is gained.

h. In addition to their primary support mission of providing a base for 10 PBRs and two helicopters, the 3 on-station GAGE WARWARDEN LSTs have proved to be a very effective weapon for conducting 40mm and 81mm HAT fire missions. They now fire almost daily on request of the sub-sector advisors and have had very encouraging results.
1. Recently VC's have been making random incursions into the smaller waterways which were previously safe havens for the enemy. This tactic will probably be used more frequently as experience in these operations is gained and should materially assist in returning the adjacent land areas to CVN control.

j. Current expansion plans for the River Patrol Force calls for an increase of 30 second generation improved MHS plus substantial increase in Navy helicopter assets. This expansion will bring even greater pressure on the Viet Cong.

4. (C) NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT:

a. Naval gunfire within IV Corps is coordinated and controlled by the ANGLICO detachment assigned to Advisory Team 96. Naval gunfire observed destruction missions, unobserved M2I missions and operational support missions have been fired in support of ARVN 7th Division in Kien Hoa Province; ARVN 9th Division in Vinh Binh Province; ARVN 21st Division in An Xuyen Province and USSF on Phu Quoc Island, with excellent results.

b. During 1967, Naval gunfire support was also provided for US and RVN Korines operation "DECK HOUSE V"; US Special Forces operation "BLACX JACK"; and US Navy Seal Team operation "SALLOW DRAFT".

c. Naval gunfire support in IV Corps has increased significantly since July of 1965, as reflected by the fact that: During the last half of Calendar Year 1965 an average of over 2,000 rounds of 3 inch ammunition or larger were fired each month with excellent results reported. This was increased to an average monthly ammunition expenditure of over 4,000 rounds of 3 inch ammunition, or larger, during Calendar Year 1966, with excellent results reported. Thus far in Calendar Year 1967, during 8 months of Naval Gunfire Support Ship availability, an average monthly ammunition usage rate of over 4,300 rounds per month, for the same calibers of ammunition, has been established. Results continue to reflect substantial losses to the VC due to Naval gunfire in IV Corps.

d. Naval Gunfire support is adversely effected by hydrographic conditions existing along much of the IV Corps coastline. Alluvial mudflats extend considerable distances into the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. These mudflats have little or no gradient and in some areas they extend to seaward for such distances that Naval gunfire support ships cannot approach the coast within maximum effective range of their armament. This is most critical when the Naval gunfire ship assigned is armed with 5"/38 caliber weapons.

e. Naval gunfire has recently been further hampered by the low relative priority for Naval gunfire support assigned to IV Corps as compared to the priorities assigned to the other corps areas. This problem area is best exemplified by the months of July and August 1967 when no Naval gunfire support units were assigned to IV Corps.
It is considered that naval gunfire support has a substantial role in support of IV Corps objectives and should receive continued support from IV Corps headquarters.

3. (c) Operation Market Time:

a. The Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115) was activated as a combined US Navy - Vietnamese Navy effort in July 1965. The primary mission of this operation was to counter the Viet Cong insurgent infiltration of arms, supplies and personnel along the coastal areas.

b. The Market Time units in the IV Corps area consist of VNN Coastal Groups of the 3rd and 4th Coastal Zones, VNN Fleet Command ships, and US Navy and US Coast Guard ships and boats based at Cat Lo and An Thoi.

c. Coastal Surveillance Centers to control and coordinate the at-sea operations were established in Cat Lo and An Thoi as a combined US, Vietnamese operational center. Full utilization of patrol areas and patrol units was evolved as a result of close working relationships which quickly resolved several mutual interference problems. Joint study of the effects of monsoon weather seasons resolved problems of proper utilization of assigned units during adverse weather seasons.

d. Three major trawler infiltration attempts were stopped by Market Time units. In December 1965 a 100' steel-hulled trawler was detected attempting to infiltrate by Ca Mau Point and was turned back. In May 1966 a 100' steel-hulled trawler carrying over 100 tons of arms and equipment was detected and sunk off the Song Ba De River. In January 1967 another 100' trawler was detected and sunk at Rach Xang Chim.

e. These major infiltration failures plus the continued control of coastal shipping by Market Time units has had a very adverse effect on Viet Cong resupply in IV Corps. The low ammunition and equipment supplies of the VC can be at least partially attributed to the efforts of the Coastal Surveillance US-VN operation.

f. Today new equipments, increased radar coverage, and new tactical innovations are continually being evaluated and employed. Equipment such as magnetic charge detectors and starlight light intensification devices have enhanced detection capability. Shallow water coastal infiltration by small sampans is being countered by Market Time small boat counter operations, in water flats as shallow as one foot. Coastal waters are being employed. Intelligence network are being exploited and quick reaction to current information is stressed.

g. Operation Market Time has been and continues to be a valuable ancillary effort in the IV Corps campaign against the Viet Cong.

6. (c) SUMMARY: During the period of this report we have seen a gradual buildup of naval forces in the Delta. Both the US and Vietnamese Navy have increased their efforts and are making their presence felt by the...
enemy. Their operations are generally well coordinated. There have been
the cases in which NVA units operated under direct control of the Senior
US Navy Office in support of CTF 116.1 operations. These operations
were moderately successful and carried out quite smoothly. River Assault
Group Utilization in support of ARVN remains a problem. Perhaps the
example set by CTF 117 and the US 9th Division will carry over into ARVN
operations. The Market Time operation (CTF 119) appears to be satisfactory
in general; infiltration by sea. Vietnamese Naval personnel are being
trained for independent operation of PCF (Swift) craft in the coastal
waters.
ANNEX I - TRANSPORTATION

1. OVERVIEW: From August 1965 to 31 December 1967, great progress was made in the overall area of transportation in IV CTZ. From a restricted use of highway and water assets in 1965, caused by VC interdiction and harassment, the IV CTZ has expanded the use of those lines of communication for both military and civilian traffic. Traffic now has relatively unrestricted movement on major routes during the daylight hours.

2. National Highway 4, the only major road into the Delta has experienced a slow but steady increase in traffic, both northbound and southbound. Current weekly figures show an average of 5000 vehicles traveling Route 4. Major inter-provincial routes have shown an increase of vehicular traffic corresponding to that of Route 4. Damage caused by VC interdiction efforts are repaired in minimum time thus permitting resumption of the normal flow of vehicles. Traffic surveys are presently being conducted to determine the actual amount of traffic between major points in the Delta.

3. The most notable achievement on waterways has been the opening of the Mekong River/Nicholai Canal for normal traffic. As a result, transport of rice and other foodstuffs to Saigon has been made faster and easier. This waterway also has carried a steadily increasing number of sampans to and from Saigon. The lower portion of the Bassac River from Can Tho to the South China Sea was charted and opened for LCU, LST and other deep draft vessels. By reducing the travel distance from Saigon and Vung Tau, increases in tonnages of all classes of supply have occurred. Cargo tonnages for US cargo alone coming throughout Can Tho Port have increased 5000 percent since 1965.

4. Air transportation has been the primary mode of travel for US personnel entering, leaving or travelling within the Delta. As the number of USAV and supporting unit personnel increased, the available aircraft have continued to accomplish their mission. The securing of stage fields throughout the Delta has enabled scheduled passenger flights by C7A aircraft to fill the majority of passenger needs. Programs to repair and lengthen selected fields, some already in progress, will further enhance movement of cargo and personnel by air.

5. SUMMARY: All modes of transportation have steadily improved to meet the existing situation. Programmed expansion of port facilities, renovation of airfields and construction and maintenance of highways is further enhancing traffic flow in the IV CTZ. The majority of the programmed improvements are in process and should be completed by the end of fiscal year 1968.
1. (C) BACKGROUND: In early 1965, the Republic of Vietnam Combat Development Test Center (RDTC) was established. This was supported by a United States Research and Development (USRD) Field Unit of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Among the tasks assigned this unit were Projects 2 and 20 which dealt with the evaluation of crop destruction and defoliation materials and techniques. Based on the promising results of early tests, approval was sought for expanded defoliation trials. Approval was granted and aircraft made available in December 1961. Tests were conducted in January - February 1962 and an evaluation report submitted in May 1962. Following Department of Defense and State Department approval, defoliation operation began in Ca Mau. These trials began 3 September 1962 and were completed on 11 October 1962. Based on the results of this operation, action was taken to establish an operational capability in RVN.

2. (C) The use of herbicides for defoliation and crop destruction is primarily a Government of Vietnam operation that is supported by the United State Departments, USAID and the US Ambassador are empowered jointly to authorize US support of SVN requests for herbicide operations. Crop destruction operations are not authorized in IV Corps. Therefore the herbicide program in IV Corps encompasses only defoliation operations in order to:

   a. Provide security to lines of communications by removing dense vegetation from probable ambush sites.

   b. Remove jungle concealment from VC/NVA base areas, safe havens and infiltration routes.

   c. Provide increased visibility around installations.

3. (C) IV Corps has shown an increasing effort in herbicide operations since the defoliation trials of 1962. Command emphasis in this area has enhanced both offensive and defensive operations and assisted pacification efforts throughout the IV Corps Tactical Zone. Appendix I to this Annex graphically depicts the herbicide program in IV CTZ. The bar on the right of the graph covers both areas that have been sprayed during August - 3 December 1967 (COLORED AREA) and areas presently programmed to be sprayed during December 1967 - July 1968 (UNCOLORED AREA). The following is a chronological sequence of the IV Corps herbicide program during the period of August 1965 - December 1967:

   a. August 1965 - July 1966:

      (1) Kien Hoa 11,265 hectares

      (2) Vinh Binh, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu 9,000 "
b. August 1966 - July 1967:

1) Vinh Binh 240 hectares
2) Ba Xuyen 2,000 "
3) An Xuyen 35,000 "
4) Chuong Thien 1,400 "
5) Kien Tuong 2,912 "
6) Bac Lieu 6,000 "
7) Kien Hoa 3,200 "

TOTAL: 20,625 hectares

b. August 1967 - July 1968:

1) Completed (as of 3 December 1967):
   a) An Xuyen 21,328 hectares
   b) Kien Hoa 5,100 "
   c) Kien Phong 534 "

   TOTAL: 26,962 hectares

2) Presently Programmed:
   a) An Xuyen 5,000 hectares
   b) Kien Hoa 19,200 "
   c) Chuong Thien 7,000 "
   d) Chau Doc 7,200 "
   e) Vinh Binh 4,800 "
   f) Kien Phong 3,000 "
   g) Sodes 2,000 "
   h) Kien Tuong 1,500 "

   TOTAL: 50,752 hectares
(i) Dinh Tien; 1,500

TOTAL: 55,200 hectares
TOTAL OF (i) & (2) 83,162 hectares

2. (c) Efforts are presently being made to streamline herbicide processing in order that the program will be more responsive to the tactical commanders. Defoliation has hampered VC/NVA operations and will continue to obstruct enemy activity more with the expanding herbicide program in IV CTZ.

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1. (C) ENSRICHMENT: Authorized Regular Forces strength underwent little net change during the period and during the last sixteen months assigned strengths have also been relatively stable. In August 1965, 44,319 regular solders were authorized and only 38,093 assigned. By December 1965, the authorized strength had climbed to 50,000 but declined again - not reaching 45,000 until October 1966. Since then variations have been relatively small, with 44,977 authorized and 43,102 assigned on 30 November 1967. The most noteworthy strength increases have been in Regional Forces. In August 1965, 43,770 were authorized and 50,000 assigned. Growth has been almost constant, with 51,944 presently authorized and 49,931 assigned as of 30 November 1967. 65,037 Popular Forces were authorized in August 1965 and during each of the period, dropping to 59,395. Assigned Popular Force strength was 57,713 in August 1965, rose to a high of 63,021 in December 1966 and has since declined to the 30 November 1967 figure of 57,661, almost the same as the beginning of the period.

2. (C) DESERTIONS: Desertion continues to be a major deterrent to full RMAD combat efficiency in IV Corps, particularly for the Regular Forces, despite the harsher punitive measures provided in Service Law 17/66. In the twelve months ending 30 November 1967, i.e., the first year following implementation of the new decree, deserters from the 7th, 9th, and 11th Divisions were reported as 10,337, almost the equivalent of an entire division. Although this was a better showing than the 12,248 deserters from the same units during the preceding twelve-month period, December 1965 - November 1966, the current figures depict the magnitude of the Regular Force desertion problem. A somewhat brighter, but still unsatisfactory picture is presented for Regional and particularly for Popular Forces in the comparison shown below for IV Corps:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 65</th>
<th>Nov 66</th>
<th>Dec 66</th>
<th>Nov 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
<td>45126</td>
<td>45126</td>
<td>49322</td>
<td>51263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Forces</td>
<td>45126</td>
<td>45126</td>
<td>50112</td>
<td>52097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Forces</td>
<td>45126</td>
<td>45126</td>
<td>50112</td>
<td>52097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>134478</td>
<td>135288</td>
<td>154531</td>
<td>156497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three "battlefield labor" companies activated in the three divisions of IV Corps in early 1967 were assigned a total of 2335 convicted deserters as of 30 November 1967.
1. (c) A significant development in IV Corps concerned the formation of the 1967 test in the 2d Division Tactical Zone, a project stressing positive inducements for young men to report voluntarily in response to draft calls. Basically, the program offers the voluntary inducement of spending his first year of military service in Popular Forces near his home followed by a second year in Regular Forces and a third in Regular Forces. This incentive proved thoroughly successful throughout the test area, and in one province, in Hue, the response exceeded even the most optimistic forecasts. Overall results of the pilot program in IV Corps were considered to justify further trial of the system on a nationwide basis effective December 1967.

2. (c) IV CORPS PRISONERS: The newly opened IV Corps Prisoner of War Camp received its first prisoners on 7 April 1967 and grew rapidly thereafter. Prisoners were transferred to it from the province jails of IV Corps and from over-crowded camps in II and III Corps. It is presently operating at close to its rated capacity of 1900, maintained at this level through transfer to the newer camps on Phu Quu Island.

3. (c) II FEMALES: During these nearly two and one half years, the IV Corps Advisory Group has grown from less than 1000 to approximately 1000 officers and enlisted men. Throughout the period, I have been most impressed with the caliber of the individuals assigned to the group. Their adaptability, courage, and dedication have been a constant source of pride and in direction, as has been the performance of other American forces in the field, particularly the 9th US Infantry Division, the gallant Navy, and the Force River forces. Although the goal for advisors and US combat support personnel is an island-free nation; and that is the result of their efforts are also greater and are perhaps already beginning to outline the image of a IV Corps which can, without assistance, protect the people and natural riches of the delta from external aggression and foreign-inspired incursion.

4. (c) STRENGTH CHANGES: The most noteworthy strength changes were in the Regional Forces, particularly in the increase in authorized strength of 3,174 and the increase in assigned strength of 10,601 that occurred during the last two years. From August 1965 to the present, nearly 60,000 IV Corps soldiers of the Regular, Regional, and Popular Forces have departed. The success of a recruiting and induction pilot project, offering positive inducements for young men to report voluntarily in response to draft calls, conducted in the Corps Tactical Zone in 1967 was the basis of a decision to implement the system on a nationwide basis. The IV Corps Advisory Group has increased by 500 personal during the period. I have been most impressed with the professional competence of the individuals assigned and consider the personal situation satisfactory. I am proud of the
ANNEX II - PERSONNEL (CONTINUED)

combat performance of the great majority of IV Corps units and my dis-
satisfaction with the desertion rate does not overcome a general feel-
ing of optimism concerning the progress of those units toward self
sufficiency.
1. (U) GENERAL: Logistical support for the IV CTZ is provided by two agencies. The 4th Area Logistical Command provides support for all ARVN units and the common items or services required by the advisor organization. The 1st Logistical Support Agency provides support only to the US units in Class I, IIIA, VA and items of Class II that are not in the 4th Area Logistical Command inventory. Logistical support has continued to increase due to the influx of US units, increases in the number and intensity of ARVN combat operations and the enlargement of the RF/PF program. The increase will continue through 1968 due to planned increases in US units, the creation of a fourth tactical area and the continual enlargement of the revolutionary development program.

2. (U) AMMUNITION: Supply of ammunition has continued to increase with the expansion of combat forces and the increase of combat operations. The most significant growth has been in artillery and Class IIIA munitions due to increased ammunition supply rates. Artillery ammunition resupply has become critical at times due to delayed shipments arriving in-country from CONUS and the requirement to trans-ship from Nha Trang by water or road to Corps depots. To offset this deficiency the divisions are authorized a reserve stockage which is maintained at each division. This system has proved effective and has not required a reduction in artillery support.

3. (U) ARVN SUPPLY SYSTEM: The 4th Area Logistical Command maintains three depots, one in each Division Tactical Area (DTA). The depots supply the division support companies and the Administration and Direct Support Logistical Companies (ADSL) in the respective DTAs. The division support companies provide support to the divisional units whereas the ADSL companies provide support to the provinces and the units under the province operational control. This system has been very effective by allowing a greater dispersion of stockage and a more responsive reaction to the user's requirements.

4. (C) US LOGISTICAL SUPPORT:

a. US logistical support is provided by the 1st Logistical Support Agency operating out of GVN Theo and consists of Classes I, IIIA, VA and those items of Class II that are carried in US stockage only. The agency has grown from the initial 75 personnel to its present strength of 350. Support is provided to a force of approximately 9,000.

b. Class I supplies are delivered to eleven locations on a twice a week schedule by use of air transport. This system was started in November 1966 to reduce the man hour and equipment hours which were incurred with the use of land transport over the vast area of the CTZ.

c. Classes IIIA and VA are stocked at seventeen airfield locations. These supplies are used by the 13th Aviation Battalion in support of combat operations. Levels of supply have been required to be increased at each location due to a greater use of air in support of combat operations.

5. (U) SUMMARY: Logistical support within the IV CTZ is adequate at the present time. Logistical plans and programs are directed towards better and adequate stockage to meet known needs of units and support for combat operations. Engineer programs have included enlargement criteria to sustain the logistic plans for 1968.
1. (C) MILITARY PROVINCIAL HEALTH ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MILPHA): This program, providing military medical teams to help upgrade the civilian health program, has expanded greatly within the IV Corps Tactical Zone. From an original six teams deployed in November 1965 in Vietnam, the IV Corps now has nine MILPHA teams and five Free World Medical Teams (Spanish, Iranian, Australian, Phillipine and Korean) providing Provincial Health Assistance. All 16 provinces presently are supported by the MILPHA. In 1968, the support was expanded so that 45 districts have full time rural health technician assigned to assist civilian public health programs at district, village, and hamlet level. Large scale immunization and health education programs are in progress. These programs have been received well by the Vietnamese and continue to be a success within the CTZ.

2. (C) MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM (MEDCAP): The MEDCAP program continues to be highly successful within the CTZ. This program, which is Vietnamese operated with only US Advisor help meets a medical and psychological warfare need within the Corps area. The MEDCAP supply system has improved throughout the period. To present a new Vietnamese MEDCAP regulation is being formulated at JCS level which will enable the MEDCAP to reach more of the population by allowing RIF/PF medals to provide MEDCAP service to the local civilian populace.

3. (C) ARVN MEDICAL FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS: ARVN medical care at the battalion, regiment, and division level continues to be adequate. Hospital coverage is provided at four locations: Can Tho (600 beds), Long Xuyen (300 beds), Ny Tho (200 beds), and Gia Trang (500 beds). The Gia Trang Hospital commenced operation in 1966 and the modern hospital in Can Tho was opened on 1 Sep 66. Hospital care is adequate but not up to US standards. The Territorial Medical Plan which provides for a 20 bed dispensary in each district and a 100 bed dispensary in each province is progressing slowly. This plan was implemented during August of 1966. IV CTZ was authorized 75 district dispensaries, twelve 100 bed dispensaries, three station hospitals, and one field hospital. To date the Corps has 15 district dispensaries, 12 province dispensaries, and all major hospitals operational. More district dispensaries are being added monthly. New buildings will be constructed for many of the above facilities now occupying temporary structures. All construction should be completed in fiscal year 1969.

4. (C) ARVN MEDICAL SUPPLY: Amazing progress has been made in medical supply during the report period. In 1965 the Corps Medical Depot was housed in the thatched roof huts; supported only 60 accounts; filled only 40 percent of their requisitions each month; kept only 300 tons of medical supplies on hand; took 15 days to process a requisition; and issued 50 tons of supplies per month. In contrast, in 1967, the depot is housed in 12 on-roof buildings; supports 705 accounts; fills 92 percent of their requisitions; keeps 700 tons of supply on hand; averages seven days to process a requisition; and issues over 100 tons of medical supplies each month.

5. (C) US MEDIACAL SUPPORT: US Medical support remains relatively the same as in 1966. Each Province and District Advisory Team has a medical officer; a general medical officer operates a small dispensary at each Division Advisory Detachment; 17th Aviation Battalion dispensaries at Can Tho, Soc Trang, and Vinh Long provide dispensary type medical and dental care to their assigned personnel and
to advisory personnel presenting themselves for treatment. In early 1967.
the 3rd Surgical Hospital moved to Dong Tam. This hospital provides support
for the entire IV CTZ as well as for the personnel at Dong Tam. There is
one helicopter ambulance company stationed at Soc Trang for support of US
personnel within IV CTZ. Work load requires assignment of another company
to IV CTZ and one is available for assignment to the Corps when space is
allocated at one of the airfields.
1. (c) GENERAL: A unique engineering challenge is posed throughout the 37,000 square kilometers of alluvial flood plain which forms the IV CTZ portion of the Delta. 90 percent of the land is at or below the water table and with the exception of the two percent in the Seven Mountains area of China Doc, all land above water is inhabited and utilized. The net result is that all engineer planning for new construction starts with the premise that ground must first be produced upon which to build. Rock and general fill materials are available in unlimited quantities only in the Seven Mountains area. Except for sand from river bottoms and the mud-clay conglomerate of the rice paddies, virtually no construction material is available throughout the Delta. Although a road net of approximately 3,000 kilometers exists, it is of secondary importance, economically, to the vast inland waterway system. However, experience has shown that as a road net is secured and improved, the area prospers proportionally. Thus, the economic factor as well as the military logistical support factor have focused the engineer's attention on the land LOC system.

2. (c) ROADS AND BRIDGES: Recognizing the importance of land LOC's to the IV CTZ nation building program, the IV CTZ have expended considerable effort, and with great success, to road and bridge interdiction. During the past 27 months some 3,079 meters of road and 2,035 meters of bridge were destroyed. It is to the credit of the joint action of military and civil engineers that in those areas where security will permit all road damage has been repaired to permit at least one way traffic and 90 percent of the bridges have been repaired or replaced. These emergency repairs are of an immediate nature. Seldom has an important artery been closed for more than 12 hours. Obviously, this emphasis on repair has hindered new construction and upgrading. Only recently have sufficient engineer assets, funds, and the requisite security, been available to optimistically plan and begin to execute a major road and bridge rehabilitation and upgrading program.

3. (c) ROAD AND BRIDGE COMMITTEE: The organization of the IV CTZ Road and Bridge Committee in early 1967 formalized the loose but effective coordination of engineer effort between ARVN and the Ministry of Public Works. The buildup of ARVN engineer units and the recent introduction of US engineer units into the Delta has enlarged the membership of the committee and the scope of planning. Tangible benefits of the committee can be seen in a formalized and integrated LOC program for 1968, increased interest in and fund support of LOC activation in the Delta, more efficient management of the assets available, and a more powerful, coordinated, voice in national assets planning. The authority and scope of committee activities should increase dramatically in 1968 with the establishment of joint-use rock/land stockpiles and an adequate supply of materials flow into and through the Delta construction support system. With the limited engineering assets available, the fact that an ambitious rehabilitation and upgrading program is planned and underway, is evidence of the value of cooperative planning and integrated execution.

4. (c) UPGRADING OF NATIONAL ROUTE C4A: A limited start was made in mid-1967 when ARVN engineer units commenced construction of nine non-permanent two lane highway bridges on C4A. Completion of the three two raised the overall route classification to Class 6. Completion of the other seven by April 1968,
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will raise the capacity to Class 12. Upgrading is actually the third of
the three phase 1965 program for Route C4. All phases will be executed
simultaneously. The first phase is emergency repair, sufficient only to
maintain the traffic flow. The second phase is rehabilitation to pro-war
standard those portions of the road which have been badly damaged or weakened
by VC interdiction, 1966 flood damage, or poor maintenance. The third phase,
actual upgrading, to minimum national standards consists of construction
of an additional twelve semi-permanent bridges, contract widening and re-
surfacing of C4 from the III Corps boundary to Ky Tho, widening of the ap-
proaches to ferry sites, and the construction of 75 to 100 by-passes and
turnout areas. Prerequisite to the accomplishment of any phase of this
program is the establishment of materials stockpile sites and materials
flow system.

5. (C) AIRFIELDS. Although an adequate night traffic road not exists
in the Delta, the many unspecified areas require an extensive network of air-
fields for passenger travel, logistical resupply and staging helicopter borne
operations. In the past two years five new fields have been built, two more
are under construction and a program of upgrading is planned. Within the 16
Provinces of the Delta there are now 12 fields rated for 0-120 traffic, 20
for C-130 traffic and 32 for C7A traffic. The importance of these fields,
particularly those rated 0-123 or 0-130, as staging fields for tactical opera-
tions can not be over emphasized. Again, the lack of above water land in the
Delta makes the airfield the primary base for all tactical operations. The
major rehabilitation of three airfields is planned for early 1968, with at
least three more for late 1968. Additionally, a program to open a small fixed
wings craft airstrip at each district headquarters is under way.

6. (C) US ENGINEER SUPPORT: Until mid-1967 construction support by US
engineer units was practically non-existent in the IV CTZ. Recent interest
has focused on the Delta area through the development of the Dong Tam Base and
considerations for increased US effort in the IV CTZ. As a result, an engineer
battalion was relocated to Can Tho in October 1967. Although the actual US
engineer efforts available is small in comparison to the Corps need, the ben-
efits of technical advise, design and management support, and increased attention
at all levels to the Delta requirements, are incalculable. This battalion has
been integrated into the road and bridge program and is the primary agent for
airfield rehabilitation and upgrading. Ideally, one additional US construction
or combat battalion should be stationed in the Delta, probably in the vicinity
of Dong Tam, tasked to upgrading of C4s. Such an assignment would permit di-
version of ARVN combat engineer effort from Route C4, to other interprovincial
routes of equal importance to the IV Corps. The burden of engineer support in
the Delta for both US and ARVN forces falls generally on the ARVN engineers.

7. (C) ARVN ENGINEERS. Before comparing ARVN and US engineer units one
should realize that the ARVN unit is smaller by 102, has less equipment auth-
orized, frequently not all equipment has been issued, much of the equipment is
old and difficult to maintain, and the ARVN Class IV supply system does not
respond as abundantly and rapidly as the US system. Finally, the ARVN engineer
soldier is smaller in stature and physically not as strong as his US counter-
part. His technical capability is growing rapidly and his enthusiasm and ini-
tiative are gratifying. The 10th Engineer Group (Combat), a two battalion
organization, was assigned to the IV Corps in April 1966, eight months after activation. Since that time, primarily by on-the-job training, they have developed into an efficient and responsive work force, capable of accomplishing sophisticated construction of all types, as well as combat support missions. It is on these two battalions that the bulk of the non-divisional engineering requirements fall. Additionally, two companies of ARVN construction engineers entered the IV CTZ in July 1967 to assist in bridge construction and one battalion of construction engineers are engaged in Phu Cantonment construction on Phu Quoc Island. The total non-divisional engineering strength in the IV CTZ, less the small US element, is rated at four battalions.

8. (C) PHU QUOC ISLAND: Construction of a 20,000 man Phu cantonment on Phu Quoc Island began in August 1967. The project is JCS directed, designed and supervised by the ARVN Saigon Post Engineer, materials support staging from Vung Tau and Saigon, and tasked to the 54th Engineer Battalion (Const), 5th ARVN Construction Group. Beneficial occupancy is phased as each of ten separate 2000 man camps is completed. The entire project includes beach and wharf facilities, rehabilitation of an existing 4000 foot airstrip, guard cantonments, warehouse facilities, water supply and an extensive road net. Although construction is hampered by VC activity and the generally uncooperative attitude of the Phus, completion of the entire camp can be expected by early 1969. A US Combat Engineer Company has been tasked to rehabilitate the airstrip. Already more than 2100 Phus have been moved from mainland compounds throughout Vietnam to the Phu Quoc cantonment. A special security zone, under the command of the senior RVN naval officer, has been organized in the An Thoi area to integrate the security requirement of the Phu compound, the airfield, and the An Thoi Naval shore and afloat-junk fleet station.

9. (C) FORCE STRUCTURES INCREASE PROGRAM: Construction projects under the USP supported Force structure increase (FSI) program in the Delta actually started in mid-1966 with the construction of a military hospital and induction center in Can Tho. This program is entirely a contractor effort, initially USN but now only local Vietnamese civilian firms. The program, administered by the ARVN post engineer and supervised by his US advisor, has been gaining considerable momentum and is probably one of the smoothest engineering operations in the IV CTZ. To date 36 company size cantonments for both ARVN and RF forces have been completed, with another 30 under construction and 38 in the design phase. Although hampered by the usual site selection and preparation problems associated with construction in the Delta, this dynamic program has done much to improve the morale and health of the Vietnamese soldier.

10. (C) US CANTONMENT AND SUPPORT FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION: The problem of constructing support facilities for US operations in the Delta, as with other construction, revolves around the requirement to first build the necessary land. The development of the 600 acre Dong Tam Ecoe, requiring two dredges for twelve months to provide the necessary hydraulic land fill is only one example. The three most pressing requirements in the Delta have been the enlargement of Vam Long and Can Tho Airfields to accept more aviation companies, and the development of a sufficiently large logistical support activity in the Can Tho area. All three projects require hydraulic land fill. The first,
With Long, commenced land fill in November 1967. Hydraulic fill for about 350 acres for the logistical complex began in December 1967, with the Can Tho Airfield land fill project scheduled immediately thereafter. Base development planning has progressed to the degree that it appears US engineer construction effort will be available as soon as the hydraulic land fill is workable. These additions will permit some artillery, aviation and logistical unit buildup.

(c) CAN THO JOINT MASTER PLANNING COMMITTEE. With some 4,000 US military and CORDS personnel in the greater Can Tho area, representing all branches of the service, as well as approximately 10,000 RVNAP and local forces the Joint Can Tho Master Planning Committee was organized to coordinate and integrate, where possible, military space and support facilities requirements, with the least possible hardship on the Can Tho civilian community. While generally an engineer planning committee, the side benefit of the committee is its nature as a forum for airing joint problems such as traffic control, and military civilian relations. With military, governmental and local civilian representation, the potential of the committee is unlimited. Tangible benefits so far include an understanding of specific responsibilities to enable individual coordination, an accurate military - government land real estate map, temporary use of RV military areas by the US, and site selection for materials stockpiles and a civilian hospital.
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