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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (3 Sep 70) FOR OT UT 70B033 15 September 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Gordon J. Duquemlin, Deputy Senior Advisor of II Corps Tactical Zone, RVN, Period 1 December 1969 to 6 July 1970. (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Gordon J. Duquemlin, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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KENNETH G. WILKINSON
Major General, USA
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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG Gordon J. Duquemin

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Reference paragraph 6, AR 1-26.

2. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Gordon J. Duquemin. The report covers the period 1 December 1969 through 6 July 1970, during which time BG Duquemin served as the Deputy Senior Advisor of II Corps Tactical Zone, RVN.

3. BG Duquemin is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP - II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE
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MACTN-IIC-DSA

3 July 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone

THRU: Senior Advisor
II Corps Tactical Zone
APO 96350

TO: Commanding General
US Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCG - DST
APO 96375

1. The purpose of this report is to record the experiences and insights gained by the Deputy Senior Advisor (DSA) of II Corps Tactical Zone during the period 1 December 1969 through 6 July 1970. This report is made in accordance with AR 1-26 dated 4 November 1966 and USARV Regulation 1-3 dated 7 June 1968. It is hoped it will be valuable for use by those charged with development of doctrine, training modernization and improvement, case studies, and evaluations of the effectiveness of Vietnamization and development programs.

2. Summary

a. Introduction

II Corps Tactical Zone encompasses 47% of the land mass of the Republic of Vietnam, while containing only 18% of Vietnam's people. This fact is central and must be grasped at the outset. The Corps has 12 provinces and 2 special zones, Cam Ranh Bay and Dalat City.

Most of the people are located in the coastal low lands, while the central area, dominated by the mountains of the Ann Bight Range, is almost unpopulated, having only a small number of people in the Central Highlands of the west. Also unique, within this Corps area is the friendly troop density, which is comparatively low, the Corps being an economy of force area for both the GVN and the U.S. While there have been fairly large concentrations of ARVN and U.S. troops in the more populated areas, the ARVN divisional areas of responsibility are quite large. To illustrate, the 23d Division Tactical Area is larger

1 This section provides an overview of the entire report.
b. Overview of the Enemy Situation

Apparently, the enemy has set aside his concept of cutting South Vietnam along the Pleiku — Qui Nhon axis for the more lucrative objectives of Saigon and the Delta to the south. However, the II Corps area still provides many possibilities for hostile success and the enemy believes the opportunities for success are worth his efforts. His strategy has shown a definite pattern over the last few years. In the Central Highlands, he moves into Kontum Province in the spring during the dry season seemingly bent on destruction of border camps and the small concentrations of population. These operations last several months until he is driven out of country by excessive losses and/or the need to resupply and refit.

He then retrain and moves south within the Cambodian sanctuary. This movement generally occurs during the rainy season. He then attempts another entry near the II/III Corps boundary where a lengthy campaign of stand off and ground attacks takes place aimed at border camps and population centers. These operations in the Central Highlands are designed to involve maximum friendly forces into the battle. Thus, as ARVN units are committed from the more populated low country, local enemy forces are free to attack the pacification effort. The enemy has had limited success in these tactics and there has been some regression in the Hamlet Evaluation Scores during the first half of this year, but at a great cost in manpower and materiel to the regular NVA units.

In the lowlands the enemy operations are also cyclic in nature with high points of enemy initiated actions followed by lulls. While he cannot seize and hold a location for any period of time he does maintain his presence through these tactics. These tactics coupled with terrorist incidents tend to discredit the GVN’s capability to protect the people. However, it now appears that his summer-fall time table has been seriously disrupted by the Allied operations in Cambodia. The enemy must now recover from the significant food and equipment losses he has suffered and must re-establish his LOC through an unfriendly territory. These conditions along with the increasing capability of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces will undoubtedly cause a readjustment of plans and future operational patterns.

At present it is not possible to forecast his future actions. Certainly, he must secure his LOC and rebuild his bases in Cambodia.
if he is to continue his efforts. To gain time, a more cooperative attitude by Hanoi at the Paris Peace Talks may result. Time offers the enemy an advantage because of the steady reduction of U.S. combat power in South Vietnam. He may gamble, as he strengthens his position in Cambodia, that the departure of the U.S. combat units will leave the ARVN relatively weak and make conquest of South Vietnam comparatively easy. The probable reorientation of the enemy supply line and the lack of the Sihanoukville port of entry may cause reconsideration of his strategy to divide South Vietnam through the Central Highlands.

Any comment about the enemy situation would not be complete without some remarks about the nature of the foe. One must admire the organization, indoctrination, discipline, perseverance, and tenacity of this enemy. He continues to be a formidable opponent, despite his lack of sophisticated items of warfare. On the other hand, it is easy to credit this opponent with being nine feet tall. He is not, He has problems: long supply lines, increasing hostile environment, lack of adequate food supplies, over centralized control, and lack of rapid mobility.

o. Overview of the Friendly Situation

As an advisor, one becomes so deeply involved in day to day activities that it's difficult to accurately measure the progress of the developing Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The disappointments of the moment cloud the eyes to the progress that is occurring. The Vietnamese Army is developing with satisfactory progress in some areas but just inching toward the goal in other areas.

During this period ARVN operations varied from pacification support to multi-regimental offensives - the latter conducted against enemy intrusions along the western Cambodian border. The major battle of Quang Duc which began in October 1969 involving nearly all the II Corps infantry units at different times, came to a close in December 1969. Many smaller operations were conducted within the corps boundaries during the early months of 1970, but with only modest results. Two of the more successful were Tat Thang 7 and Tuyen Duc 17. A major battle centered around the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp beginning on 1 April and terminating on 8 May. Units of both ARVN divisions were employed under the control of the 24th Special Tactical Zone.²

² On 1 May 1970 the 24th STZ was redesignated as 22d Division (Fwd).
This campaign dealt the enemy serious personnel losses but it was also costly to the ARVN in the form of casualties and destroyed equipment. With the end of the Dak Seang battle, ARVN's attention was directed towards the movement into Cambodian base areas. The first of these started on 5 May with elements of the 22d ARVN Division moving into Base Area 702— operation Binh Tay I along with the 4th U.S. Infantry Division. The ARVN reaction to this short notice was remarkable and the operation was well executed. A sizeable cache was uncovered by the 4th U.S. Infantry Division. Although the ARVN finds were not as spectacular, they did seriously disrupt the enemy logistical base and training camps in the area. The emphasis soon shifted south into Base Area 701 during Binh Tay II, an all ARVN operation. Sizeable amounts of enemy weapons, material, and food stuffs were uncovered, returned to South Vietnam, or destroyed. Unfortunately this operation was short lived but it served to provide the 22d ARVN Division with a tremendous boost in morale. Binh Tay II was followed by Binh Tay III, opposite the southern 23d Division Tactical Area into Base Area 740. Here again, sizeable enemy stores were uncovered at a minimum cost to ARVN forces. This operation also provided a spark for the 23d Division and it developed intelligence for later exploitation. During Binh Tay III, Phase II, the 23d Division again moved into Cambodia in an operation aimed at an area between Base Area 740 and 701. While this proved to be a less rewarding operation, it was executed in a highly professional manner despite the increasingly bad weather. It also was a solid step for the ARVN in that they developed good intelligence and followed it up with forces on the ground. The final major operation in June was the rescue of over 7500 Cambodian military and civilian personnel from La Bang Siek and Ba Keu, Cambodia. This operation was executed on short notice and made in the face of a sizeable and increasing enemy threat. The friendly casualty cost was negligible - four killed and eight wounded - when one considers that approximately 3500 Cambodian soldiers with considerable amounts of equipment have now been retrieved to the relative safety of South Vietnam. The professionalism, boldness of execution, and skill of the ARVN Army during this operation was outstanding.

During heavy contacts and even during many of the routine operations, the errors of the Vietnamese Army are glaring. The individual soldier is brave and dedicated. With direction, he will fight with courage, skill and tenacity. What is lacking is leadership in its broadest sense and at every level. Initiative and supervision is apparently so foreign to the Vietnamese culture that it is difficult to instill it in the military. This cannot be attributed to the lack of good leadership training. Each division training center regularly conducts courses in troop leading.
MAGTH-UC-D8A

3 July 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone

procedure for junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Taught by skilled professionals, these courses approach U.S. training standards. The almost fatal proclivity to over-centralisation of authority, and the unwillingness to delegate power have stultified the development of leadership at all levels.

The most serious problem in Vietnam is this lack of leadership and motivation in the Armed Forces. Every field, military, civilian, and political, needs several times as many high quality individuals to meet the demands of these crucial years. The Vietnamese Army like all bureaucratic establishments finds it difficult to rid itself of dead wood and tolerates incompetence and poor performance and appears to be incapable at policing itself in this area.

Despite these glaring deficiencies, II Corps units have made sizeable advances. A particular bright note is in the ARVN logistical system. Recently it has shown it can support a division sized force during sustained combat (Dak Seang) and react quickly to support hasty operations (the Binh Tay series). While the maintenance picture is not as good, it is on the right track and positive progress is measurable.

ARVN artillerymen are technically proficient in firing missions from semi-fixed small unit positions. A major deficiency does lie in the lack of knowledge and trust of their own "Red Legs" by the ARVN Infantrymen. Too often they will turn to advisors for US gun ships or air strikes instead of using available artillery. FSCC work needs continued emphasis and improvement. There has been a quantitative increase in air mobile operations during this period, utilizing both VNAF and U.S. aircraft. Every unit is proficient in air mobile operations and techniques at this time.

Progress is being made in the Political Warfare area. The New Horizon Plan has provided definite improvement in units. The preparation for and take over of the 4th U.S. Infantry Division civic action program in the vicinity of Camp Enari by teams from the 47th Regiment was particularly noteworthy.

As suggested before, training runs the scale from poor to excellent. Programs conducted in the division and central training command training centers are very well done. Arrangements have been made to upgrade the technical skills of individuals and teams through on-the-job training with U.S. units. These programs have ranged from
mechanics to long range patrols. The battalion training program at the La Soi Training Center is very professional, but unfortunately several of the II Corps units have been unable to complete this course because of operational requirements. The glaring weakness remains the "In-Place" training conducted by units during periods of stand down and reserve. This is partially due to inertia in the units but the ever pressing operational demands of the moment also play a part. For example, an unforeseen enemy action with a resulting operational commitment is sure to disrupt the best laid training plans. Nevertheless, by and large ARVN Commanders are not interested in training and consequently training suffers.

Despite a well developed and sophisticated personnel system on paper, it has some serious weaknesses. Personnel strength reporting is not timely and the replacement system cannot meet the demands of heavy combat losses. Desertion and AWOLs are the most serious personnel problems within II Corps. While statistically this problem is reflected under personnel administration, the causes are wide ranging and every staff area has responsibilities in this matter. Among the most important factors toward the solution to this problem is to improve the low level leadership and indoctrination in patriotic motivation.

d. The Advisory Function

"What is the role of the advisor?" The Vietnamese Army is in being; it is equipped; the troops are trained; and they are being employed with varying degrees of success against the enemy. As I see it, the principal use of the Advisor at this time should be to assist in the request for and the employment of US combat support assets. In this role, the term "advisor" is a misnomer suggesting the more appropriate descriptive phrase "Combat Assistance Team" as opposed to "Advisory Team". On the other hand, there will always continue to be a purely advisory function, although toward a different objective than has previously existed. With the RVN Army in being, with all the tools of the trade bolstered by continuing success on the battlefield, the need for pure advice on basic functions such as organisation, administration and logistics, is relegated to the past. Today's advisor and those of the future, will, for lack of a better name, serve as a "Devil's Advocate" and a "pusher". Every effort of the advisor must be directed towards motivating the ARVN to effectively employ his forces against the enemy. The ARVN Commander must be inspired to seek and keep contact until the enemy is destroyed. In his role of the Devil's Advocate, the advisor must be honest in discussing the employment or lack of employment of his unit. If the unit is not oriented on the
enemy, he must get it pointed in the right direction. If the unit is not being employed properly, he must convince his counterpart to engage in an effective training program, while developing the available intelligence to find the enemy. If the ARVN unit is overly relying on U.S. combat support, the advisor may have to withhold this support to force the ARVN commander to employ his own supporting artillery and organic weapons. For every excuse of his Vietnamese counterpart that a unit cannot be fully and effectively employed, the advisor should contrast ARVN with its modern weapons and mobility to that of his enemy - a foe forced to live like an animal in the jungle, scavenging for food, fighting disease, and suffering every inconvenience. The advisor's most important task is to insure his ARVN commander is supervising the execution of his orders, making sure they are understood and are being vigorously and aggressively executed. By the same token, the ARVN commander must make his presence seen and felt on the battlefield. In sum, having been provided with the tools of the trade, ARVN must be motivated and then prodded into employing their own assets to the fullest extent.

Based upon observation gleaned from two tours in the Highlands, I believe there is reason for optimism when one assesses the US efforts to "Vietnamize" the war. From the II CTZ side of the house, the success of our programs cannot be measured entirely in terms of body count. Progress and success of our efforts are visible in terms of successful ARVN command and control, staff planning, and increased professionalism exhibited by ARVN combat, combat support and combat service support units. Progress must also be measured by the enlargement of secure areas, extension of LOC's and the security provided to a higher percentage of the population. This trend of improvement must be nurtured, while at the same time II CTZ and ARVN units continuously must be influenced to increase their efforts to build on what they now possess. If ARVN accepts the status quo and rests on its laurels, regression and increased aversion to find and fight the enemy will result. In the final analysis, ARVN alone can do what must be done. Overcentralization of command and decision, lack of aggressiveness and failure to utilize all assets in battle can be reversed in a fortnight by decisive command action. Time is now crucial in the Highlands. It is time to carry the battle to the enemy at the double-time. It is a question of will -- the answer to which is vital to the survival of Vietnam itself.

3. Conclusions:

with perhaps some minor exceptions as will be noted in subsequent
sections of this report, ARVN does not need any new programs to become a competent, professional military force. Rather, the ARVN must refine and improve upon their existing programs. They must consolidate their gains and develop finesse in all their endeavors. Having been taught to walk, they must now be trained and inspired to run. Standards of performance for the ARVN units, officers, NCO's, and soldiers must be raised to successive plateaus of performance as intermediate goals are achieved. Commanders and staff officers at all echelons from the JGS to battalion level must demonstrate their interest in how programs and plans are being executed and demand that high standards be established and obtained.

All military operations of the ARVN and the territorial forces (RF/PF) must be more closely coordinated and controlled. It has been my observation that operations conducted by a Province Chief in his role as Sector Commander have not been coordinated with those in adjacent provinces or with the Division responsible for the Tactical Area in which the province is located. Operations against the enemy on the Pleiku and Kontum border and the city of Dalat are prime examples of the lack of cooperation and overall control problem. The necessity for central direction, coordinated planning and execution of military operations is of such importance it raises the question should territorial forces be part of the pacification program and under the Province Chief? Why not under the Division Commander and permit the Province Chief and his team to concentrate on strictly civic problems?

As the US troop withdrawal continues, the ARVN must assume some of the roles heretofore performed almost exclusively by US units. A first step in this direction was taken with the provision of ARVN Civic Action Teams in the villages and hamlets in the vicinity of Camp Enari by the 47th ARVN Regiment when the 4th U.S. Infantry Division moved to Camp Radcliffe. A further suggestion in this direction would be organization of ARVN MAT teams and their use to replace US MAT teams now working with the regional, popular and territorial forces. A bonus effect of the successful accomplishment of these new roles would be increased esprit and pride in accomplishment in the ARVN units participating and development of the needed ingredient of self confidence.

The year ahead is crucial for the ARVN, the populace, and the GVN. Each day the question will be asked, "Is Vietnamisation proceeding to the end desired?" If the question is to be answered in the affirmative, the key is motivation of the military, the government and the diverse elements within the population to want it to succeed. In this respect, we and the US Press should emphasize accomplishments as opposed to a steady diet of shortcomings and adversities. We, the military, the press, and the American public must accept that we are building, that we are not trying to tear down a country and a people. Thus we should constantly emphasize the positive instead of the negative and to
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MACTN-III-DSA
3 July 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone

I take some pride in our accomplishments here as we have justifiably done in Europe, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other parts of the world. In substance, it is all right to recognize deficiencies and shortcomings, but not exclusively nor to the extent that the good is not equally recognized.

Now that the ARVN has been provided the tools of the trade, the traditional role of the advisor will change to that of a "pusher" or "expediter" to spark the ARVN into employing his new army and its weapons against the enemy. As such, the advisor will seek to assure that the ARVN forces are targeted on and stays with the enemy until he is destroyed.

4. Recommendations:

Having been general in my conclusions, my recommendations will be specific. I recommend:

a. Vigorous execution of this years' Combined Campaign Plan, entailing employment of ARVN forces in the contested and border areas with territorial forces continuing their missions in the ever expanding secure area.

b. Increased efforts through training and experience to develop aggressive, competent and dedicated leadership at all levels.

c. Revitalization of existing programs that are aimed at motivating both the populace and the military to pursue the war to a successful conclusion.

d. Reductions in U.S. overhead at headquarters and installations and incremental reductions in the advisory effort at battalion, regiment and division levels.

e. Withdrawal of advisors from artillery units except those specifically involved in the coordination of fire support.

f. Withdrawal of advisors from armor units but maintain an armor advisor at the Corps level.

g. Providing heavy equipment to engineer units with the concurrent withdrawal of advisors except those specifically involved in maintenance of such equipment.
h. Early implementation of IFFV plan for reorganization of II Corps Tactical Zone headquarters and colocation of IFFV and II CTZ headquarters.

i. Insisting that all ARVN commanders at all echelons visit their subordinate units to assure that their orders are understood and that they are being executed as intended.

j. Pressuring ARVN to replace ineffective officers by elimination rather than transferring. As an alternative, those determined to be ineffective demoted to that grade in which they can effectively carry out their duties.

k. Stressing initiative on the part of leaders and flexibility of execution during all phases of ARVN training.

l. Revising the ARVN replacement system as necessary to accommodate sudden heavy combat losses with qualified infantry fillers.

m. Increased efforts devoted to improving maintenance in all ARVN units to include more OJT with U.S. units.

n. Greater coordination between ARVN units and territorial forces in operations against the enemy.

o. Organizing ARVN MAT teams and training them to take over from the U.S. as the U.S. troop draw-down continues.

p. Limiting advisor tours at battalion level to six (6) months; at regimental and division level to one year; and extending all advisor tours to 18 months.

q. Further integration of Montagnards into the Army, inclusive of the Military Academy, on the same basis as any Vietnamese citizen.

r. Confining CORDS activities to the civil side of government and the police function, exclusive of the territorial forces which should be under military command.

5. Epilogue.

In discussing the ARVN, I am forced to draw from my experiences during three tours in Korea, before, during, and after the Korean War.
MACTN-IIC-DSA
3 July 1970
SUBJECT: Debriefing Report, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps Tactical Zone

The Korean Army progressed from a hopeful beginning, through defeat and despair, to an Army which is today helping a neighbor country against the forces of communism. Today, one observes a Vietnamese Army comparable to that of the Koreans when the Korean Armistice was signed in July 1953. The Korean Army existed, needed a shaking down and eventually evolved into a formidable military force. The difference in that Army and in today's Vietnamese Army is that the ARVN must fight during the shakedown period. I am confident, however, that the Vietnamese Army will meet the test if they will "bite the bullet" and maintain their momentum.

Time is running out -- the US drawdown is continuing. Concomitantly, ARVN must come of age, fill the void and destroy the enemy's will and determination.

2 Inclosures

1. Annex A - Enemy Situation
2. Annex B - Friendly Situation

GORDON M. DUQUENCN
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Senior Advisor
1. **Enemy Situation in II Corps, December 1969 - June 1970.**


   (1) The focal point of enemy activity during the last quarter of 1969 was in the vicinity of BU PRANG and DOC LAP in Quang Duc Province where a major offensive was launched by B-3 Front. The 66th and 28th NVA Regiments, the K-37 Sapper Battalion, C-1 Engineer Company/B-3 Front, K-28th Recon/Sapper Bn, K-394th Arty/Inf Bn, K-33 and K-32 Arty Bns were all identified during the battle.

   (2) The battle began on 28 October 1969 with standoff attacks against three fire support bases in the vicinity of BU PRANG. The tempo and frequency of these attacks increased during the remaining days of October. On 1 November, these attacks intensified and included 85mm and 105mm artillery fire from Cambodian bases and significant ground probes forcing the three fire support bases to move.

   (3) On 2 November, activity was highlighted by an enemy ambush of a US convoy on QL 14 and the downing of a Cobra gunship and two LOH's north of the junction of QL 14 and LTU 83. A fierce battle developed and prevented the extraction of the relief force until 5 November. Identified enemy forces included the 28th Regt, K-394 Bn, and the 37th Sapper Bn. The enemy suffered heavy casualties and returned to standoff attacks against military installations in the area.

   (4) On 15 November a heavy attack by fire on Camp Bu Prang was followed by a ground attack continuing into the next day. Forward air control aircraft over the area received 12.7mm fire and 37mm ground to air fire. On 17 November an all day battle ensued east of BU PRANG, and the enemy suffered heavy casualties. Sharp platoon and company clashes of short duration occurred in both the DOC LAP and BU PRANG areas from 18 through 20 November. These usually developed when ARVN forces moved out of night positions. At dawn on 23 November the enemy attacked BU PRANG employing sappers supported by small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and rockets. The attack was repulsed. The remainder of November saw small probes by enemy forces and indirect fire attacks in both the DOC LAP and BU PRANG areas.

   (5) As December opened the enemy force appeared to be weakening. Ground probes lessened in intensity and frequency, contact became more difficult to establish, and while indirect fire attacks...
continued throughout both areas, they became more sporadic and less intense. On 14 December the last significant enemy contact occurred when the enemy lost 36 KIA near BU PRANG. Enemy forces withdrew from the BU PRANG and DUC LAP battle areas in mid-December.

b. Tet 1970

(1) Early in January the positioning of enemy forces, substantiated by prisoner interrogations, indicated the enemy planned a wide scale offensive through II Corps during the Tet holiday period.

(2) Contrary to reported enemy intentions to intensify action, no large military encounters occurred. Some attacks by fire and harassments were recorded to include 57 violations by the enemy of his self-declared four-day Tet cease fire.

c. 1970 Spring Campaign - Dak Seang.

(1) From Tet through the month of March 1970, enemy activity was light and sporadic. On the night of 31 March - 1 April, the enemy launched a high point of coordinated indirect fire and ground attacks throughout the II Corps Tactical Zone. Among the more significant attacks were those at Song Mao, Binh Thuan Province, where heavy enemy losses resulted; at Dalat, Tuyen Duc Province, at the Political and Psychological Warfare College, where 15 GVN Chaplains were killed; and at Dak Seang Special Forces Camp, Kontum Province. Terrorist activity occurred in nearly all the II Corps provinces as evidenced by hamlet intrusions, assassinations of GVN hamlet officials, explosions, and mining incidents.

(2) The battle of Dak Seang was a division-size operation conducted in western Kontum Province. At 0100 hours on 1 April 1970, elements of the 26th NVA Regiment supported by indirect fire weapons, initiated a surprise attack on Camp Dak Seang. At the same time, artillery units of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment moved into positions on "rocket ridge" southwest of Tan Canh for the purpose of harassing headquarters, communications, and logistical installations in the Dak To II/Tan Canh areas and interdicting the main LOC, Highway 14 and 512.

(3) As the battle progressed it became evident that NVA preparation of the battle area had commenced 60 to 90 days prior to the attack. Prior to 1 April 1970, negligible enemy activity was monitored or reported in that area. Extensive development of the battle area, staging areas, and LOC's were undetected by allied surveillance.

(4) The enemy continued standoff attacks through 11 April against Camp Dak Seang and Fire Support Base Tango which had been
established south of the camp. Ground probes were conducted against the camp, all aircraft in the area received heavy ground-to-air fire, resupply aircraft were shot down. Enemy forces, estimated at three battalions, in the vicinity of the camp pinned down the two friendly relief battalions.

(5) 12 April was marked by increased enemy activity throughout the area of operations. The Special Forces Camp at Dak Pak, 31 kilometers north of Dak Seang, received a heavy volume of enemy fire, followed by a ground attack that seized a portion of the camp. The position was restored after several days of fierce fighting and extensive air attacks.

(6) Despite heavy casualties during the period 13-26 April, the enemy increased the intensity of his standoff attacks against Camp Dak Seang, FSB Tango, and the friendly maneuver units attempting to relieve the camp. On 27 April, enemy activity abated, but every attempt of friendly forces to maneuver met heavy resistance. Subsequently, the enemy began to withdraw from the battle area and return to Cambodian sanctuaries. He left small unit covering forces and sporadic standoff attacks occurred through 6 May. The Dak Seang Battle was officially terminated on 8 May 1970. In the 38 days of battle, the enemy lost 1974 killed in action.

d. Other Developments in II Corps.

(1) With the exceptions mentioned above, enemy offensive activity was relatively dormant throughout the II Corps area from December 1969 to June 1970. After the major attacks, the major enemy units operating in the Highlands remained out of country, while local force and guerrilla units continued to conduct harassing activity in their traditional AO’s. In the coastal provinces, the 3rd NVA Division, the only division size enemy unit in II Corps, was subjected to constant allied offensive operations. There was a surge in enemy activity between 31 January and 6 February consisting of highway interdiction, isolated attacks by fire against allied installations and ground attacks against RF/PF units. Other surges occurred on 1 May and 3 June; however, these highpoints of activity were sporadic and lacked coordination. In late-6 enemy activity was light and interspersed with short-duration surges.

(2) Terrorist incidents of abductions and assassinations increased in II Corps during the first six months of 1970, particularly in Phu Yen and Darlac Provinces. The majority of the persons abducted were released after being subjected to propaganda lectures stressing the need for increased food production and condemning the GVN pacification program.
The strong interest of the VC in recruiting youths in Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, and Kontum Provinces continued. District Committees directed subordinate Action Arrow Teams to impress teenagers between the ages of 10 and 14 years for training in sapper duties. Other youths were to be sent to North Vietnam for training.

Operations against the NVA Cambodian base areas by II Corps began on 5 May 1970 and extended through 27 June 1970. These operations completely disrupted whatever blueprint the B3 Front had for the remainder of their Highland Spring-Summer Campaign. The 66th, 26th, and 24th NVA Regiments and 631 and 394 Bns withdrew into Laos or Cambodia to avoid contact with allied units operating in their base areas 701, 702, and 740.


a. COSVN Directives

(1) COSVN Resolution 9, promulgated in July 1969, provided detailed explanations of future Politburo/COSVN strategy and instructions on how to achieve a decisive victory in the immediate future. The resolution established the basic framework for future operations by describing the GVN pacification program as a most serious threat, strongly emphasizing the necessity for small unit operations, and stressing the importance of sapper and guerrilla tactics.

(2) A pamphlet issued in September 1969 by the Propaganda and Training Section of COSVN states “one of the new initiatives taken recently by headquarters of the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces called for the dispersion of all troop units into small elements”. The pamphlet, entitled “Firmly Retain Our Immovable Determination and Move Forward to Achieve Total Victory”, lists four requirements which the dispersion of troops is designed to satisfy. One is to prevent attacks against large units by US and GVN forces; a second is to ease the difficulties in supplying large units; and a third is to facilitate a wider deployment of VC units; and finally the pamphlet states that troop dispersion is designed “to move a number of elite cadre and soldiers from troop units to sapper units”.

(3) The emphasis on small unit tactics is also found in a document labeled “COSVN Resolution 14/MQ-NH”, dated November 1969, and believed to be COSVN Resolution 10. This COSVN document stresses the importance of building up guerrilla units consisting of three to five man cells. Further, the “primary mission” of the guerrilla is to attack People’s Self Defense, Popular, and Regional Forces, and also “to attack village officials, police, and pacification cadre”.

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The latter are terrorist functions. The document states that "guerrillas should be armed with grenades, mines, explosives, and rudimentary weapons...where conditions permit, rifles can be used".

(4) This succession of directives – CSVN Resolution 9, the Propaganda and Training Section pamphlet, and the directive on guerrilla warfare – together provide a context within which the increasing enemy reliance on terrorism and sapper activity can be understood.

b. Disruption of Pacification Program.

(1) The prime military function of the pacification program is to deny the enemy access to the hamlets and to reduce his contact with the people. It is apparent that the program has hurt the enemy cause and he resolved to reestablish control of the countryside during his Spring and Summer Campaign. According to the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) figures, approximately 90% of the Republic of Vietnam is now under GVN control. This poses a serious problem for the VC, even conceding that the HES figures may be somewhat inflated. This is especially true in regard to local forces and guerrillas who depend heavily on the local populace for food, money, labor, and in many cases with refuge from allied attacks.

(2) The enemy intends to regain control of the hamlets by several means. The established method is the use of military force to intimidate the inhabitants, usually through small scale sapper attacks or terrorism in an attempt to discredit the GVN and frighten the people into bending to the VC will.

(3) The VC also have a long range plan. They intend to organize young men and women who will be trained to establish cells in villages and, in turn, to coordinate operations with revolutionary youth groups. They also intend to infiltrate personnel into existing GVN organizations at hamlet level. The infiltrators can perform a dual role; first, as intelligence agents and second, as communist proselyters in the hope of persuading organizations to lean toward the communist line. They also intend to convert New Life Hamlet Chiefs and other high ranking hamlet officials to the VC way of thinking, again with a future political motive in mind.

(4) Although the pacification program has always been the target for the enemy, it appears they are switching from a generally persuasive anti-pacification tone to more coercive techniques. Their propaganda and proselyting activity have been greatly hampered by the presence of GVN forces in hamlets and it is necessary that they counter pacification if they hope to achieve their goal of controlling South Vietnam.
c. Evaluation of Strategy and Tactics.

(1) Success or failure of the Viet Cong insurgency will depend on the degree of voluntary support that the people of the RVN give to the VC. In their effort to gain popular support, the VC have promised to give the people smoother running, more accessible, and less corrupt government. The VC have offered to institute a series of reforms in the distribution of land, a more equitable revenue collection system, and a public education system that will be open to all citizens and allow each individual to rise as high as his capabilities permit. Such reforms have been desired by the people of the RVN for years, and the VC have tried to exploit these aspirations for the utmost political gain.

(2) The VC have utilized a variety of methods to educate the populace to their political program. They initiated an extensive propaganda program which extols the "virtues" of the VC and points out the "injustices" of the GVN. They instituted civilian and military proselytizing campaigns to urge and encourage RVN military personnel and GVN administrators to desert their positions and join the VC. They have issued directives in II Corps to establish a land program by confiscating the land of absentee landlords and distributing it to the people. The VC have originated an education system in several provinces which extends into the secondary level. They have also tried to organize civil health programs throughout South Vietnam but with little success.

(3) Initially, the VC political program was successful in gaining the support of the people but there have been numerous indications that the populace has become disaffected with them and has been less responsive and cooperative to their overtures for support. The most obvious reason for this lack of support is the loss of confidence by the populace in the VC's ability to win the war. Serious military defeats suffered since the TET offensive of 1968 have demoralized local forces and many VC. Many people are also growing tired of the VC tax policy. Allied operations have continued to capture food and supplies and interdict supply routes causing the VC to intensify their efforts to collect supplies from the people resulting in severe economic hardships in most VC controlled areas.

(4) The VC are aware of their decrease in popular support and have initiated steps to counter this loss. They have directed that gains of the GVN accelerated pacification campaign be nullified and that this program be thoroughly disrupted. Their plan is to force the people back to VC-controlled areas and cut off the GVN resettlement areas. Methods vary from selected terrorism to promises of land, security, and better government. They have also used force to keep
people now living in VC-controlled areas from leaving. Additionally, the VC have targeted pacification personnel such as RD Cadre and FSDF, hoping to undermine the pacification program and show the people the inadequacy of GVN security. They have also initiated a reverse Chieu Hoi program to entice ralliers to return to support the VC cause with the promise that returnees will not be punished. The VC have conducted reindoctrination sessions for their cadre to ensure they are properly motivated and are willing to make sacrifices for the party cause. The VC have also continued the program of sending young people to North Vietnam for training to ensure that a base of properly motivated, well trained and well educated cadre will be available to continue the VC program among the people. 

(5) Despite the indications that the population is giving less support to the VC they still have substantial numbers of people who actively and voluntarily support them. It cannot be assured that people have given their support to the GVN which has also made promises of reform, but until recently has done little to implement such programs. As a result, many people have little more confidence in the GVN than in the VC. These people appear to have adopted a "wait and see" attitude and withhold support from either side, remaining uncommitted until one side clearly demonstrates the capability of providing for their welfare.


(1) The pressures on the North Vietnamese have to be immense as a result of the Cambodian change of government and the knowledge that their sanctuaries are no longer invulnerable to attack. The main pressures stem from their principal advisors and suppliers - the Soviet Union and Communist China. China has recognised and sponsored the Sihanouk government in exile; the Soviet Union has not yet seen fit to recognise that government. In fact, Moscow sent up a trial balloon on 16 April 1970 when their United Nations envoy proposed a new Geneva Conference after the French had first suggested new negotiations. A short time later Moscow retreated by stating that convening a conference would be unrealistic "at the present time". However, the option for such a conference was left as a possibility. The North Vietnamese have several choices. They can:

(a) Rebuild their Cambodian Sanctuaries after the allies have completed their sweep operations, make them more secure and defensible, and continue to pursue the protracted war policy against the Allies. The GVN has indicated that it will give assistance to the Lon Nol government and continue to fight inside Cambodia. This choice of Hanoi could detract from devoting its full efforts to fighting and
supplying their forces in South Vietnam and allow the South Vietnamese to increase and strengthen its control of areas in South Vietnam.

(b) Attempt to minimize their setbacks in Cambodia and South Vietnam, avoid further military confrontations, and hint at the possibility of negotiations in order to gain time. However, in all their resolutions and policy statements, the North Vietnamese are adament that they would never negotiate from a position of weakness.

(c) Consolidate their position in northern Cambodia and southern Laos, while conducting hit and run operations in central and southern Cambodia, harassing the weak Cambodian forces and tying down South Vietnamese assets in support of the Cambodians. This choice would slow their operations in South Vietnam and allow the South Vietnamese to get on with Vietnaminisation and the Americans to withdraw forces as pledged.

(2) So far, Hanoi has chosen to conduct wide scale operations against the Cambodians and to continue its Spring-Summer Campaign in South Vietnam. But with the logistical crisis that will soon be a reality, this course of action may have to be altered to avoid further setbacks.

(3) Based on the historical record and the tenacity of the North Vietnamese Communists, it is most probable that they will rebuild their sanctuaries at whatever sacrifices and press on with their protracted war policy. The political reaction in the United States to the decision to conduct operations in Cambodia is probably the deciding factor in this choice. Ho Chi Minh made a prophetic remark in Paris at the time of the French Indochina war that led to the defeat of the French at Dienbienphu in 1954. He said, "You will kill 10 of our men and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who tire of it". After eight years of fighting in the jungles of South Vietnam it appears that this simple philosophy of war is beginning to hold true.

(4) A review of the past strategy of the North Vietnamese Communists and pronouncements made since the Cambodian operations lend further credence to the probable Hanoi choice of action for the future, particularly as far as II Corps is concerned. The crux of the strategy is based on the second phase of General Vo Nguyen Giap's long range plan which called for the establishment of large bases from which a "strategic mobility" effort could be launched to force the GVN into a defensive posture. This strategy was to counter the tactical mobility of the GVN and FwMAF. The object of "strategic mobility" was to mass a large number of maneuver battalions in several widely scattered areas. These maneuver battalions would tie down large numbers of Allied forces to static defense roles, and permit the NVA/VC
to attack specific positions at times of their own choosing. The build-up of the number of battalions, and particularly the infiltration of larger NVA units, would be done covertly with the object of initiating the larger sized attacks by surprise. Giap's version of "strategic mobility" was a defensive/offensive strategy which had the following objectives:

(a) To develop strong multi-division forces in dispersed areas that were secure and accessible to supplies.

(b) To entice FWMAF forces into prepared enemy positions so that the entrenched communist forces could inflict heavy casualties on them.

(c) To continue countrywide guerrilla action to tie down Allied forces, destroy small units, and extend control.

(5) As recently as June 1970, the NVA and VC emphasized in guidance put out to their people that the war would be won in the highlands of MB-5, an area that the enemy envisions as a "killing zone". The mountainous and jungle terrain favors VC operations in that the highlands are closer to the NVA buildup areas near the DMZ and the relatively secure base areas in Laos and Cambodia. These factors make the highlands a much more favorable battle area for the NVA/VC than for FWMAF forces. The enemy is also able to place sizeable forces on the entrance routes to the heavily populated coastal areas. In order to use the highlands as the killing zone in the war for control of the RVN, the enemy hopes first to establish what they call an "equilibrium of forces" in the highlands, and then to launch an offensive in one or more districts. The enemy has always hoped to launch ever larger attacks in the highlands, to concentrate his troops and firepower, and with improved command and control, to attack and hold important objectives. The objective is to control the Pleiku - Qui Nhon axis, a classic element of strategy which long has been a primary goal of the NVA/VC. The Dak Seang Battle of April-May 1970 contributed further evidence that this strategy has not changed.

1 Incl
Map, Enemy Base Areas, II CTZ
ANNEX B

Friendly Situation

1. (C) Strategy.

a. During this period the ARVN units of II Corps deployed to defend the western boundary of Vietnam while seeking to destroy the enemy in his in-country base areas in Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, Phu Yen, Dalac, Tuyen Duc, Pleiku, and Kontum Provinces in coordination with FWSAF and CIDG units. During May and June search and clear operations were extended into Cambodian Base Areas 701, 702 and 703. For a detailed listing of the ARVN force structure see paragraph 13.

b. ARVN forces were gradually shifted from the pacification role in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen and replaced by territorial forces. This movement was greatly accelerated by the requirement for additional maneuver units to employ in the Dak Seang battle and the need for forces to participate in the Cambodian operations. As the period closed the emphasis shifted back toward pacification because of regressions in village and hamlet security. Furthermore, President Thieu launched an accelerated pacification and development plan for the last half of 1970.

2. (C) Major Operations. Major operations were conducted continuously as II Corps units attempted to seize and retain the initiative against the enemy.

a. The Quang Duc Campaign. This operation was concluded during this period ending officially on 28 December 1969. Friendly casualties were 165 KIA, 496 WIA, and 23 MIA. Enemy casualties reported totaled 1838 KIA and 1 CIA while 113 small arms and 14 crew served weapons were captured.

b. Operation Tat Than 7. This operation was conducted from 12 - 15 February 1970 by the 24th STZ, three Highland Scout Companies and B Troop, 7/17th Cavalry targeted against one 6th Battalion, 74th WVA Regiment in the vicinity of Kontum. The operation was characterised by multiple insertions of Highland Scout Companies exploiting targets of opportunity that were selected by the Air Cavalry troop. This was the first successful operation employing an air cavalry troop by the 24th STZ and set the standard for other operations within Pleiku Province. The results of this operation were: Friendly: 3 KIA, 10 WIA. Enemy casualties were 36 KIA, 3 CIA, 2 DET, 1 small arms and three crew served weapons captured.
c. Operation TuVan Duc 17. From 12 March to 1 April 1970, the 11th Ranger Battalion; the 4th Battalion, 53rd Regiment; the 23d Division Recon Company; three RF companies; and B Troop, 7/17th Air Cavalry pursued and destroyed the headquarters of the 810th Main Force Battalion west of Dalat City. Using the multiple insertion technique in conjunction with the Air Cavalry Troop, the Rangers dominated the battlefield. Results of this operation were: Friendly: 17 WIA, while enemy forces suffered 72 KIA, nine small arms and four crew served weapons captured. Additionally, the combined forces captured approximately 2.5 tons of supplies and equipment. One bunker complex and one training area were also destroyed.

d. Operation Tat Thang 17 and 18. This operation was conducted by the 22d Division (Fwd) (formerly 24th STZ) from 3 April to 8 May in response to heavy enemy attacks by NVA forces against the border camps of Dak Seang and Dak Pek. The operation was characterized by the employment of a multi-regimental force combined arms team including: the 42d Regiment, 2d Ranger Group, 47th Regiment (-), 45th Regiment (-), 3d ACV Squadron and the 14th ACV Squadron (-). The initial objectives were to relieve pressure on the besieged camps and later to clear the surrounding area of enemy units. Massive amounts of artillery and air power were employed during the operation. The size of the operation tested the ARVN combat support and combat service support systems, both of which adequately supported the operation. The results of the operations were: friendly: 293 KIA, 1329 WIA, 87 MIA, and 10 small arms and crew served weapons lost. Enemy: 1741 KIA, 4 CIA, 76 small arms and 28 crew served weapons captured.

e. Operation Binh Tay I. This operation was conducted by the 4th U.S. and 22d ARVN Divisions inside Cambodia Base Area 701 against enemy logistic, communication and rest areas from 5 May to 25 May 1970. The Vietnamese part of the operation was a multi-regimental sized search and clear operation employing the 40th Regiment (-), the 3d ACV Squadron (-) and the 2d Ranger Group (-). The ARVN commander successfully employed multi-battalion combat assaults coupled with thorough searching techniques to exploit area intelligence. The major activities centered around the destruction of numerous food production, rest and training areas. Results were: Friendly: 17 KIA, 111 WIA. Enemy: 124 KIA, 5 CIA, 7 DET, 9 small arms and 33 crew served weapons captured. Significant items captured or destroyed included: 12 tons of ammunition, 30 tons of rice, 40 boats, 990 head of livestock and 291 structures.

f. Operation Binh Tay II. This operation was conducted by the 22d Division inside Cambodian Base Area 702 against enemy logistics, communication and rest areas from 14 May to 29 May 1970. The operation was a multi-regimental search and clear operation employing the 40th Regiment,
47th Regiment (-), 3d ACAV Squadron (-) and the 14th ACAV Squadron (-). The commander successfully employed multi-battalion size forces to exploit intelligence and uncover numerous enemy cache complexes. The major activities centered around the destruction and extraction of numerous weapons, ammunition and food caches. Results were: Friendly: 7 KIA, 36 WIA, Enemy: 76 KIA, 5 CIA, 1 DET, 584 small arms and 432 crew served weapons captured. Significant items captured or destroyed included: 1016 weapons, 4,000 uniforms, 2 tons of medical supplies, 81 tons of rice, 8 tons of food, 997 head of livestock and 30 tons of ammunition.

**g. Operation Binh Tay III.** Operation Binh Tay III was conducted by the 23d Division inside Cambodian Base Area 740 against enemy logistical, communications and rest areas from 20 May to 12 June 1970. This operation was a multi-regimental operation employing the 45th Regiment (-), the 8th ACAV Squadron (-) and the 44th Regiment (-). The ARVN commander successfully employed his forces to exploit intelligence and thoroughly search the base area. The major activities centered around the destruction and extraction of numerous enemy food, weapons and ammunition caches and the capture of a large amount of enemy transportation assets. Results were: Friendly: 24 KIA, 65 WIA, Enemy: 145 KIA, 1 CIA, 1 DET, 586 small arms and 127 crew served weapons captured. Other significant items captured or destroyed included: 25 tons of ammunition, 144 bicycles, 1000 bicycle tires, 23 trucks, 406 tons of rice and 2 tons of medical supplies.

**h. Operation Binh Tay III, Phase II.** Operation Binh Tay III, Phase II was a multi-regiment size search and clear operation north of Base Area 740. It was targeted against NVA rear service areas, rest areas and supply sites based upon intelligence gathered during Binh Tay III. The operation began on 20 June 1970 and was terminated on 26 June 1970. This multi-regiment force consisted of the 45th Regiment (-), the 44th Regiment (-), the 8th ACAV Squadron (-) and the 413th Scout Co., 404th Scout and 3/53 (-). Results were: Friendly: 2 KIA, 2 WIA, Enemy: 2 KIA, 1 AK47, 2 bicycles, 2 HG, 1 magazine, 550 lbs rice, and 550 lbs salt. While not spectacularly successful, it did provide the opportunity for the ARVN forces to follow up on intelligence they had developed.

**i. Operation Binh Tay IV.** Operation Binh Tay IV was instituted in response to a request from the Commanding General, Cambodian Military Region 5, to evacuate Cambodian military forces and civilian refugees from the garrison at Ba Kev and LaBang Slek. The concept of the operation required a multi-regimental force to operate and secure the highway from the Cambodia - Vietnam border west to LaBang Slek to provide a route for the withdrawal of military vehicles and equipment. Simultaneously, C-7A and C-123 aircraft airlifted civilian refugees from LaBang Slek to Pleiku. The operation began on 23 June 1970 with the following units.
participating: TF 311 (3d ACAV - and the 11th Ranger Bn), TF 214 (14th
ACA V - and the 23d Ranger Bn), TF 240 (40th Regiment), and TF 247
(2 Bns of 47th Regiment). Additionally, one company of the 22d Ranger Bn
was airlifted to Long Binh to assist in airfield security. Final results
of the operation were: Friendly: 2 KIA, 8 WIA, Enemy: 4 KIA, 1 ABN
and 1 Btl R/L captured. A total of 8644 Cambodians were moved to Camp
Enari which consisted of 3805 military personnel and 4839 civilians.

3. Effectiveness of Operations. While II Corps units were
successful in each of the above operations, serious weaknesses exist
which must be overcome before the Vietnamization Program is successful.
Of these weaknesses, the more pronounced include:

a. Motivation. The present Vietnamese Army was born in war and has
struggled to develop during almost continuous fighting to survive and
protect the country. It was close to defeat in 1965 before the Free
World Combat units were committed. It has experienced a number of Western
schemes which promised great successes but invariably ended in the status
quo. The people are tired of war and have learned that indifference
provides a degree of protection as the control of their hamlet shifts
between the opponents. From this environment, the Vietnamese must select
the soldiers and leaders to secure the future of their country. It is little
wonder, that it is extremely difficult to motivate and unite the country
in a common cause; however, this is a major fundamental requirement to bring
this war to a successful conclusion.

b. Leadership. Related to the above is the failure or at least extreme
weaknesses of the leadership in the Armed Forces. It is recognised that the
demand for leadership throughout the country in every field far exceeds the
supply. While there are extremely capable officers in the military, their
capability is too often unrecognized by early promotion and assignment to
jobs of greater responsibility. Less able officers are frequently
retained and advanced. In the rare case when an officer is relieved, he is
often assigned to another important position. Although there may be a way
to rid the officer corps of 'dead weight', these steps are seldom, if ever,
taken. Another problem in the leadership area is the tendency to
overcentralize. Commanders seldom issue guidance to the staff for the
development of plans and orders. The commander will often do it all himself.
Ideas from subordinates seem to be discouraged and rarely flow up the chain
of command. On the other hand, despite the rigidity of the system,
orders which expose a unit to considerable danger in the face of the enemy
may be ignored or only half-heartedly executed. There appears to be a wide
gap between each level or rank and little feeling of responsibility for the
welfare of subordinates.
c. Coordination. With the present arrangement of Free World Military Forces, the regional forces, the quasi-military organisations, and the ARVN, it is difficult to maintain the common aim toward a single goal. The Vietnamese regular military establishment is also factionalised into many specialist organisations such as Marines, Rangers, Airborne units. This tendency toward overspecialisation has added to the burden of command and control.

d. Command Supervision. Related to all of the above is the need to inculcate the idea that active, on the spot scrutiny of the execution of orders is the only way to insure success. ARVN prepares excellent mission type operations orders but the commander will seldom visit to check how these orders are executed. When he does, the subordinates do perform well for the most part. In defense of the ARVN commander, it must be recognised that he is saddled with a large administrative burden. His personal signature, for example, is required on many routine papers which would be handled by the Staff in a US unit.

e. Desertion. One of the most critical problems facing the Vietnamese military today is desertions from among the combat units. Large numbers of men leave these units each month and have to be apprehended and punished before they are returned to the ranks. Many escape because of the limited population control. Contributing to the cause for desertion is the growing affluence of the Vietnamese society, together with limited assistance to soldiers and their families. Although there is a dependent quarters construction program, it is very slow in producing the required shelter. Other steps requiring positive measures include sufficient rice and other basic necessities in commissaries to meet authorized quotas, and better transportation arrangements for personnel on leave.

f. Tactical Employment. While individually the various components of the military are reasonably well trained and able to master the skills required, the ARVN have yet to completely master the combined arms effort so necessary to successful combat operations. For example, infantry commanders will call for gun ships before using their own direct and indirect fire weapons. They have yet to gain the required confidence in their own artillery in the close support role. Because of their limited Manning and trained personnel in the area of fire control, US augmentation is required to man fire support coordination centers during the large scale operation.

A. (C) Combined Operations.

a. A number of combined operations were conducted during this period, and the Vietnamese forces gained a great deal from these experiences. The opportunity for combined operations will be reduced in the future as...
additional U.S. forces are withdrawn.

b. The 44th Regiment and Task Force South habitually conducted combined operations in Binh Thuan Province ranging from platoon to battalion in size. The majority have been search and clear operations north of Song Mao and on the II/III Corps border. The most successful operation was a reaction to an enemy attack on Song Mao on 1 April. A hasty counterattack was developed using US Air Cavalry and artillery support plus ARVN and RF/PF Units. This counterattack accounted for 106 enemy dead with low friendly losses.

c. The 40th and 41st Regiments have conducted combined search and clear and pacification operations in Binh Dinh Province with the 173d Airborne Brigade and elements of the 4th US Infantry Division. These operations were conducted at the small unit level in most instances; however operations have been conducted against the 2nd NVA Regiment, 3rd NVA Division in the Sui Cau Valley involving U.S. and ARVN battalions.

d. No combined operations involving ARVN forces with ROK have been conducted to date - but several are planned for this fall. On the other hand brigade and regimental size forces from the 4th U.S. Infantry Division and 24th STZ have participated in combined campaigns in the Chu Pa Mountains.

e. Another type of combined operation changed from a rare happening to a common occurrence. The 215th Helicopter Squadron, VNAF was married with U. S. gunships, slicks and hooks with increasing frequency throughout the period. While some details of coordination and control remain to be developed between ARVN and VNAF, the VNAF helicopter pilots prove to be both competent and courageous, and performed admirably.

5. (C) Employment of Artillery.

a. Qualification. The II Corps Artillery units have proven to be well trained and competent to perform assigned missions. The 10 ARVN artillery battalions have averaged firing 38,000 rounds per month and maintained a very low accident and incident rate. Artillery proficiency is demonstrated through the very low rate of approximately two delayed responses to fire requests being attributed to gun crews or fire direction centers. The units frequently participate in air mobile operations and have proved their proficiency in this technique.

b. Employment. ARVN artillery is often employed in two tube platoons firing from relatively fixed positions. On the average, the 10 battalions occupied 60 positions throughout the II CTZ. From these positions fire is provided to support ARVN maneuver forces, RF/PF units and PSDF elements. There is seldom an opportunity to mass fires because of the dispersal of tubes. Some of these firing elements have occupied the same static position for several years because they are being used as LOC protection.
c. **Problem Areas.** Splitting of the firing batteries coupled with personnel shortages and the necessity of furnishing liaison personnel to district and province headquarters has limited the number of forward observers that can be provided to maneuver units. Due to this situation, effective fire support coordination centers have not been established, and units are short FO’s. This has also contributed to the unsatisfactory use of artillery by the maneuver elements. Fire support and fire planning has not received the proper emphasis either on the battle field or in training.

d. **A Partial Solution.** RF/PF artillery Platoons are being trained to replace the ARVN units performing static missions along LOC’s. This will relieve many of the causes for the problems stated above. With proper emphasis and coordination with the maneuver forces, a better utilization will be gained of all artillery assets. Massed fires continue to perform a key role in the destruction of enemy forces and should be used with greater frequency.

6. **(C) Armored Cavalry Operations.**

a. **Analysis.** ARVN armored cavalry has been employed in II Corps almost exclusively along lines of communication with the mission of highway security and convoy escort, even though trafficability off the LOCs is generally good in the dry season. Armored cavalry units have experienced little enemy contact in the hinterland. Only when the VC are cornered or when they believe they have the advantage, will they give combat to armored cavalry units. Conversely, armored cavalry units have enjoyed their greatest success on LOCs in reaction to ambushes or in exploitation missions. For these specific reasons, the corps commander and his division commanders have repeatedly resisted JGS requests to change the mission of the armored cavalry units from LOC security to exclusively combat maneuver operations.

b. **Organization.** The 3d, 8th and 14th ARVN Armored Cavalry Squadrons are organized with two APC (M113) troops and a tank (M41) troop. This ratio of tanks to APCs provides suitable mix of combat power for both LOC security and for classic armor sweeps. The M41 tanks are generally limited to using rounds from their main gun because of target selection. Also the M41 tank provides more firepower than the APC with its 50 caliber and 7.62 co-axial machine guns.

c. **Maintenance.** Maintenance of tracked vehicles is the most significant problem area for armored cavalry units. Power packs for the M41 tank have been rebuilt numerous times and these engines must often be replaced. Availability of repair parts has not been a significant problem; however, the 14th ACAV has experienced some shortages in diesel repair parts. There is a current shortage of major end items. Presently, the 3d ACAV is short
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one M41 tank and one M548 Cargo Carrier. These vehicles were turned in for repair and evacuation but never replaced.

7. (C) Air Mobile Operations.

   a. Increased Use. During the reporting period, air mobile operations increased significantly throughout II Corps. For example, the number of combat assaults increased progressively as shown below:

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<th>22d Fwd</th>
<th>23d LTA</th>
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<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>April 1970</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   As the units gained confidence, the demand for air mobile assets often exceeded the means. To save blade time, extractions were severely curtailed and units were encouraged to maneuver back to their base, to gain greater familiarity with the terrain and provide a visible presence to the local population.

   b. VNAF Helicopters. Helicopters, fully manned by Vietnamese crews contributed to the increase in air mobile operations. As previously mentioned the 215th VNAF Helicopter Squadron provided "slicks" on a daily basis that have been used on combat assaults, resupply and medevac missions. This unit is still being equipped and trained for use of an H model gunship which will add to their capability. In the meantime, the slick crews have proven to be highly qualified. They can perform with a degree of skill comparable to their U.S. counterparts. Several problems of response and control have developed since working with VNAF but these are to be expected and are being worked out as ARVN and VNAF gain an appreciation for each others operational requirements.

8. (C) LRP Operations.

   a. Effectiveness of Long Range Patrols. Long Range Patrol (LRP) operations in II Corps steadily increased during 1969 to the point where, by December 1969, they were averaging 80 per month with over 25 sightings/contacts reported each month. After the Duc Lap - Bu Prang Campaign (October - December 1969) terminated, there was a let-down in LRP activities, and the number of operations decreased to approximately 30 with
less than 15 sightings/contacts. Renewed emphasis by advisors caused the program to again surge ahead with increased effectiveness. Although the number of operations from February through June 1970 increased to an average of only 36 per month, the average number of sightings rose to an average of 43. As can be seen from the following summary of LRP statistics, there was again a drop in LRP effectiveness after a major border campaign – that of Oak Seang (Apr - May). In the month of May, sightings/contacts dropped to a low of 15. Neither the 42d Regiment nor the 2d Ranger Group employed any teams during May.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{Feb} & \text{Mar} & \text{Apr} & \text{May} & \text{Jun} \\
\text{Enemy KIA (Confirmed/Possible)} & 29/0 & 3/0 & 43/133 & 3/3 & 2/1 \\
\text{Operational Teams} & 37 & 36 & 35 & 38 & 41 \\
\text{Personnel (Officers/EM)} & 31/270 & 32/268 & 32/255 & 29/282 & 28/273 \\
\text{Sightings} & 15 & 26 & 89 & 11 & 23 \\
\text{Contacts} & 7 & 4 & 22 & 4 & 8
\end{array}
\]

b. LRP Activities During Border Campaigns.

(1) Duc Lap - Bu Prang Campaign. At no time during the enemy build-up were LRP teams employed along infiltration routes from Cambodia. They could have provided early information of enemy intentions and locations which would have complemented information from other intelligence sources. Four ARVN LRP teams were under the operational control of the 8th Cavalry Squadron to aid in securing primary lines of communication (QL 14 from Ban Me Thuot to Duc Lap). These teams were employed to provide early warning of any enemy threat to the LOC.

(2) During the Dak Seang Campaign the proper employment of LRP teams continued to be a problem. However, the rangers did employ LRP teams twice during the campaign to great tactical advantage. The first time was to check out and secure a section of high ground for a combat assault by two companies. This was a successful reconnaissance and permitted the combat assault to be completed without friendly casualties or loss of aircraft. The second instance of successful employment was to find the remains of a US advisor killed in action. In addition, the team detected a regimental size CP and bunkers and called in airstrikes with the result of fifteen secondary explosions.

c. Current Status of LRP. During May and the first part of June, there has been a tendency of ARVN units to employ the LRP teams as security forces for regimental and divisional command posts or for road clearing operations.
Advisory effort is again pushing the advantages of the proper use of well trained, aggressive LRP's. ARVN commanders appear to recognize the need but like everything else they require prodding to gain the maximum effort.

9. (C) Prisoners of War

Processing and Interrogation. The evacuation, processing and exploiting of prisoners of war in II Corps has developed into an efficient operation. Prisoners are evacuated through the chain of command and information extracted by interrogation is exploited at each level. The II Corps Interrogation Center (CIC) at Pleiku monitors the status and location of each PW captured in II Corps and selects certain ones for interrogation at the center. Total PW's interrogated each month since December 69 in II CIC which have resulted in significant reports are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. of PW's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 69</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 70</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of a PW having information useful at a subordinate level of command, he will be held at that level long enough to exploit the information, and a mobile interrogation "go" team will be dispatched from II CIC to assist in and supplement the interrogation. Generally, PW's have proved to be good sources for order of battle and background information but they have provided few items of immediate tactical value.

b. Capture Rate. From December 69 to June 70, PW's were captured at a fairly constant rate of 30 to 40 per month (with the exception of Apr - May high point months). Monthly totals of PW's captured by ARVN units are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. of PW's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 69</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 70</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the two major border campaigns, however, this source of combat information was not exploited. In the Duc Lap – Bu Prang Campaign only seven enemy were captured, and in the Dak Seang Campaign, five enemy
were captured despite continued advisory effort urging a more satisfactory collection effort. At Dak Seang, the 7/17th Air Cavalry (US) accounted for two of the five prisoners. Contributing to this very low rate of captured as compared to enemy KIA is the lack of aggressiveness by the ARVN. By adopting a defensive posture when contact is established, the Vietnamese units permit the enemy to evacuate his wounded and to leave the battle area at will.

10. (C) Employment of Engineers.

a. Engineer Force Structure.

(1) Use of Engineer Units: Engineer units in the II Corps area are being utilized to their maximum capabilities. They are handicapped by obsolete equipment and limited number of available units. Furthermore, some units available are controlled by different agencies which detract from the accomplishment of the overall mission. For example, the construction engineers within II Corps Zone are controlled by the JCS through the Chief of Engineers. The Corps Commander has no control over their efforts and must use combat engineers on construction projects.

(2) TOE Equipment: Authorized TOE for ARVN engineer units do not compare favorably with U.S. engineer units. The TOE are structured to provide approximately forty per cent of U.S. capability. Greatly increased authorizations in both equipment and personnel will be required to equal the level of current US/ARVN engineer operational support and related accomplishments.

(3) Force Structure Increase: The force structure must be increased not only within the present TOE, but also by adding new TOE units to complement the existing units as the US engineer strength is decreased. The combat units need heavy equipment support companies or increases in TOEs to augment the loss of the US equipment support.

b. Engineer Equipment.

(1) Obsolete Equipment: A large portion of the ARVN engineer equipment is antiquated and difficult to maintain. Repair parts are not available or are difficult to obtain, thus the ARVN engineer is suffering from both age as well as from the lack of a responsive supply system. A modernization program is definitely required if the ARVN is to fill the void created by US troop withdrawals.

(2) Replacement Status: A few ARVN engineer units have been receiving more modern equipment, but the majority have not. A good example of this is dump trucks. Approximately 70% of the ARVN engineer dump truck assets are OSPJ (Japanese) dump trucks; these are being replaced on an attrition basis with the US model 2½ ton dump truck. Five ton dump trucks are being placed in selected ARVN units but at a woefully slow pace. Also, 290 earth movers are becoming available but again, not rapidly enough.
11. (C) Political Warfare.

a. General.

(1) Overview. Conceptually, Vietnamese Political Warfare doctrine provides the military personnel with motivated direction. It defines the role of the military in society and it aims at destroying the enemy's allegiance to his cause. Similar to psychological warfare (but encompassing much more), its purpose is to promote attitudes favorable to national objectives. The primary missions of political warfare are as follows:

(a) To create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to national ideology and leadership.

(b) To gain and maintain the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and enemy controlled areas.

(c) To destroy the loyalty of enemy troops to enemy leadership and objectives.

The Republic of Vietnam POLWAR organizations and cadre address themselves to the usual enemy-oriented psychological warfare problems. Additionally, they tackle the complex questions of allegiance, loyalty, civil-military relations and the problems of corruption, despotism, motivation, desertion, and troop/dependent welfare needs relating to ARVN units.

(2) Improvements noted. The Vietnamese are becoming increasingly aware that the time is approaching when they must reduce their dependence on the United States. The redeployment of the 4th Infantry Division from Pleiku Province had a sobering psychological effect upon the Vietnamese in this area. As a spin off, there has been a definite increase in ARVN attempts to gain and maintain the cooperation, understanding and support of the civilian population. One concrete result is the greater interest shown in the welfare and well being of the Montagnard people. In addition, II CTZ has recently requested authority to form an additional POLWAR company, a political indoctrination platoon, and a cultural drama team. Montagnards would make up the proposed new units.

b. Significant Political Warfare Activities.

(1) Transfer of US Civic Action program to ARVN. Prior to the redeployment of the 4th Division from Pleiku Province twelve-six man civic action teams from the 47th Regiment moved to the vicinity of Camp Enari and collocated with resident US CA teams in the Montagnard villages. After a period of from one to three weeks, the US CA teams moved back to Camp Enari and continued to visit the ARVN teams on a daily basis. Later, these visits were reduced to three times each week. They stopped in mid March when the 4th Division left the Highlands. This transfer of civic
action responsibility from a US unit to an ARVN unit was executed with minimum problems. It marks the first time a comprehensive, US managed civic action program of this magnitude had been transferred to an ARVN unit in II CTZ and perhaps in any Corps area. Only a few minor problems were actually experienced between ARVN civic action teams and the Highland people they were assisting. The operation, one of the most significant of its kind during CY 1970, is evidence that ARVN units when properly trained, motivated and supervised can execute meaningful civic action programs.

(2) Political Indoctrination Training. The Political Indoctrination section of the II Corps POLWAR office is responsible for training selected NCO’s in POLWAR and civic action. During CY 70, six POLWAR classes of 64 NCO’s per class and six Civic Action classes of 184 NCO’s per class are being conducted. The trained POLWAR NCOs return to their unit and assist the POLWAR officer in unit POLWAR activities. The Civic Action NCOs return to their companies and are used as a nucleus to form Civic Action/PSYWAR Teams. These teams will provide ARVN with the capability to take over the civic action responsibilities previously handled by redeploying allied units.


(a) Objectives. The New Horizons Plan consists of improving selected combat units in seven areas: leadership, administration, logistics, intelligence, training, operations, and political warfare. The plan is divided into three phases: Preparation, Implementation and Continuation. During the four month long Phase II, unit efforts are directed toward solving problems surfaced in Phase I. During Phase III, the unit evaluates the progress achieved and takes steps to seek continued improvement. Units selected are the 47th and 53rd Regiments.

(b) Achievements to Date. The 44th Regiment completed this plan on 31 December 1969 and a marked improvement in this unit has been noted. This is especially noticeable based on the increased kill ratio for this unit and an increased sense of responsibility on the part of commanders and of staff officers. The 42nd Regiment is currently undergoing Phase III of the New Horizons Plan. The 47th and 53rd Regiments started this plan on 1 July 1970.

(4) Cambodian Evacuees. In late June 1970, the Cambodian Government requested Vietnamese assistance to evacuate soldiers and civilians from LeBang Siek and Ba Kev in northwestern Cambodia. On 23 June, US and Vietnamese Air Force aircraft began the air evacuation of military dependents and other civilians from LeBang Siek. On 24 June, Operation Binh Tay 4 was launched by ARVN forces to effect a ground link-up with Cambodian forces. Evacuees were transported from Cambodia to the Pleiku area by fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and ground transportation. Excess buildings in Camp Shari south of Pleiku provided a convenient shelter for the Cambodians. A massive relief program was initiated utilizing both ARVN II Corps and Pleiku Province personnel and
assets in order to provide necessary food, water, medical care, blankets and other requirements for the evacuees. The excellent manner in which both II Corps and Pleiku Province personnel executed this operation reflects a great deal of credit on the personnel involved. Personnel of the II Corps POLWAR office and the 20th POLWAR Battalion, which supports II Corps, demonstrated a high degree of efficiency and flexibility and were deeply involved in the operation.

(5) Psychological Results of ARVN Operations in Cambodia.

(a) Enemy. Extensive use was made of PSYWAR operations in support of ARVN operations but direct evidence of results is difficult to find. The Cambodians did generate a renewed enthusiasm among PSYWAR personnel. A great deal of publicity was given to captured enemy weapons and supplies, numerous special leaflets were prepared and used. Two attractive special pamphlets describing the results of the operations were printed locally and received wide distribution. In late June, a concrete result was shown when 31 Montagnards who had been working for the enemy since 1965 - 1966 rallied to the GVN.

(b) Friendly. Friendly operations in Cambodia probably increased morale more than any event since the large scale introduction of US units in 1965. For the first time ARVN forces were fighting in another country. The capture of large quantities of enemy weapons and supplies with limited friendly casualties will be of great significance - both psychologically and militarily.

(c) Other Political Warfare Activities.

(1) Radio Pleiku Status. Radio Pleiku broadcasts with a 50,000 watt transmitter from 0530 to 0800 hours and from 1830 to 2400 hours daily. One hour per day is broadcast in the Jarei (Montagnard) dialect. The remaining seven hours are in Vietnamese. The enemy is the target audience but one hour per day is aimed toward the information/entertainment of ARVN soldiers and their dependents. The POLWAR Radio Section at II Corps produces the programs on tape and the tapes are broadcast by 4th US PSYOPS Group who operate the radio equipment. In November 1969, the antenna was damaged and the station had to operate on low-power until February 1970 when the antenna was repaired and full power restored. Letters have been received at the station from people located in southern IV Corps. Broadcasts are also received in eastern Cambodia and in the southern part of North Vietnam.

(2) Social Welfare. The Social Welfare Section of the II Corps POLWAR Office is charged with providing social welfare support to all military and civilian personnel subordinate to II Corps and their dependents. Social Service workers are stationed in each dependant housing area and in each headquarters down to regimental and provincial level. While the soldier is away, the workers help care for his family. If he is killed or hospitalized,
his family can look to the Social Service Assistant for help. Social Service workers also assist widows to obtain survivor benefits from the government and to move to another location. In the event of enemy attack on a dependent housing area the workers provide assistance similar to that of the American Red Cross in time of disaster. A recent example of this type activity followed a VC sapper attack on the dependent housing area of the 2d Ranger Group near Pleiku on 13 April 1970. On 14 April, Social Service workers from the 2d Ranger Group coordinated the distribution of a large quantity of food stuffs, blankets and tents, and of over 100,000 piasters donated by various military units and local civilian organizations.

12. (c) Training.

a. Analysis of Leadership Training. Although it has been reported in numerous SEFR reports that the major cause of poor performance on the part of ARVN troops is a lack of adequate leadership, this condition cannot be attributed to insufficient leadership training. Each division training center regularly conducts courses in troop leading procedures for Company Commanders/Executive Officers, Platoon Leaders and Light Weapon/Heavy Weapon Infantry Leaders. All of these courses are designed to improve the leadership ability of junior officers and NCOs. The courses are taught by skilled professionals and the POI and facilities of the training centers are more than adequate. The facilities and POI utilized closely approach US standards and the evaluation of the training presented is excellent.

b. Analysis of Individual Training. In the areas of Basic Recruit Training and advanced Individual Training, the two division training centers have excellent programs established for the rapid training of recruits and replacements. The physical plants of both training centers and the training received by both recruits and replacements can be considered excellent.

c. Analysis of Specialist Training. In the area of Specialist Training, JGS, through the Central Training Command, establishes quotas for specialist training. These quotas are sub-allocated to II Corps units to fill. It is interesting to note that all specialist school quotas received by II Corps have been oversubscribed. The management of specialist school quotas is closely monitored by JGS and measures are taken to insure that all quotas allocated to a unit are filled. The quality of specialist training provided within RVN is classified as good.

d. Analysis of Unit Training. The primary method of conducting unit training is through attendance at the Battalion Refresher Training Course, conducted at the Lam Son National Training Center. This program provides for each battalion sized unit in II Corps to attend the training center for training in the conduct of battalion size operations. Each battalion is scheduled to attend four weeks of training every three years. This training program has not met with great success in II Corps. Due to operational commitments it has been necessary to cancel the last two battalions that were
scheduled to undergo training. The 3rd Battalion, 42d Regiment reported to the training center on 23 March 1970 to undergo refresher training. However, while there the battalion was assigned the mission of providing security for the President of Vietnam. This mission, coupled with the early return to Tan Canh occasioned by the hostilities at Dak Seang, reduced the available training time to nine days. Although the individuals of II Corps units may be well trained in individual subjects, the essential training in functioning as a unit has recently been impaired due to operational commitments in the Highlands.

e. Analysis of In-Place Training. Although increased emphasis is being placed on the conduct of training during periods of standdown and reserve, and adequate training programs have been developed by the units, operational commitments again impair the success of the in-place training program. For some units it has become virtually impossible to conduct this training during the performance of combat or road security operations. The most significant problem with the In-Place training program is a lack of command interest by the Corps commander and staff. Steps are being taken to rectify this situation.

f. Analysis of Tank Crew Training. Presently there is no formal tank crew training conducted at the training centers. Each of the Armored Cavalry units conducts daily training in tank crew drill and maintenance of the M41 tank. The basic training conducted by the armor Command at the Armor School serves as the fundamental guidance for tank crewmen.

13. (C) Logistics.

a. ARVN Logistics: Since 1 December 1969, ARVN logistics have made tremendous strides toward self sufficiency, despite significant factors which tend to delay rather than aid progress. The most significant factors are:

(1) Force Structure Increases: Accelerated activation of new units has required a proportionate increase in logistical effort. However, due to a lack of trained logistical and skilled personnel, the additional requirements imposed on the system has had to be met with no substantial increase in logistical personnel and the system was not quite as responsive.

(2) Conversion of CIDG Forces to Territorial Forces: The conversion of CIDG along the Cambodian border, coupled with the conversion of MIKE Strike Battalion's to RF and PF units has added to ARVN's logistical problems. While the equipment to satisfy TOE requirements for these units was transferred directly from U.S. assets, The increased equipment density placed a tremendous support burden on the ARVN logistic base. Additionally, the non-existence of road nets to many isolated outposts, coupled with a shortage of air assets to resupply on a weekly basis, will require ARVN to increase on hand stockage levels at many of these outposts, thus placing greater demands on the ARVN logistics system.
b. ARVN Equipment Modernization.

(1) The introduction of modern, sophisticated U.S. equipment into the ARVN system has been accomplished so rapidly that ARVN has been hard pressed to train skilled personnel sufficient to handle increased equipment density. Despite this setback, the equipment deadline throughout the Corps has been amazingly low. This is attributed in part to the fact that a high percentage of the equipment received under the modernization program was new and has not required major repair or overhaul. As the life expectancy of this equipment decreases, the need for skilled personnel required to satisfy higher echelon and rebuild maintenance will increase.

(2) The status of modernization of ARVN equipment, in the categories of vehicles, weapons, and signal equipment continues to improve. As of the end of the first quarter CY 1970, the percentage of fill for equipment modernization was 90%. While vehicles and weapons have approached 100% fill, signal equipment supply shortages have precluded the realization of the overall goal. Sufficient signal equipment assets are expected to be in the system by 1 July 1970 to allow the overall goal of 100% to be reached. The shortage of spare parts and technological lag is causing the ARVN logistics system some problems. However, these problems are recognized at the national level and considerable effort is being made to alleviate them.

c. Maintenance Management.

(1) Until January 1970, II Corps did not have a maintenance management program which would enable the commander to adequately measure logistical aspects of combat readiness for his units. While maintenance management has always been one of the primary goals for advisors, it has been relegated to a secondary priority by ARVN. However, this situation is improving with increased command emphasis on maintenance throughout the Corps.

(2) One example, indicative of the recent management improvement efforts, is the establishment of a II Corps Command Maintenance Management Inspection Team. Since its activation in January of this year, the CMMI Team has served as a highly effective tool for measuring unit effectiveness by providing information never before available to Commanders for decision making. The resulting increased command emphasis on maintenance has brought about a reduction of deadline rates. A good illustration of the results in the area of track maintenance can be found in the fact that two of the three II Corps Cavalry Squadrons have consistently held their deadline rates under four percent.

d. Logistic Support of Sustained Combat Operations.

(1) In contrast to earlier operations, major sustained combat operations conducted in II Corps since January 1970 have been fought with equipment and supplies provided through ARVN resources. This can be attributed to an increased awareness at the Corps and ALC level of the importance of logistical planning. This self sufficiency has been extremely beneficial in
several ways. First, the necessity for U.S. advisors to short circuit the ARVN system by scrounging, operating as opposed to advising, and jump ing channels has been all but eliminated. Secondly, ARVN Commanders have gained self confidence in their own system. The ARVN logistical operators are trying harder and have been quite successful in satisfying this relatively new challenge.

(2) The responsiveness of the ARVN supply system to the requirements of the tactical commander have more than satisfied their most avid critics. Excellent examples can be drawn from the recent Dak Seang Battle and the Cambodian operations. During the early stages of both campaigns the Corps G4 effected coordination with his supporting ALC to arrange for and accomplish pre-stocking of supplies and materials in forward areas to satisfy anticipated requirements. Consequently as the operations grew intense, sufficient supplies were on position to satisfy tactical requirements.

(3) As viewed through the eyes of advisors on the ground, the logistical capability of ARVN to provide timely support of their own forces is limited only by the availability of supplies and equipment in the ARVN system.

e. Combined Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP): The Combined Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP) is a long-range Vietnamese initiated program for identification of logistical problems, determination of solutions, and implementation of corrective action. The essence of the CLOP is close coordination among all concerned II CTZ activities to achieve necessary command emphasis and policy guidance. The essential coordination will be brought about through the participation of the division, province, and ALC representatives and their advisors on both the division and Corps Combined Logistics Committee. Difficulty was encountered in getting this program off the ground at II Corps. However, the Corps Commander has now issued an order that CLOP be implemented. The first meetings of the corps and division level combined logistics committees will be held before the end of the 3rd quarter of 1970.

f. Ammunition. Storage and maintenance of ammunition has been a continuing problem. ARVN counterparts have been advised of all alternatives and have been directed to pertinent U.S. regulations and manuals. Further, the II CTZ G4 Ordnance advisor has personally inspected many of the ammunition storage facilities in the immediate area in order to be of further assistance in matters of storage and maintenance. Many of the distant areas of II Corps still need assistance.

g. Dependent Housing.

(1) GVN funded housing for CY 1970. The 1,280 units scheduled for CY 1970 were funded in December 1969. However, due to the Vietnamese system of funding for dependent housing, the projects approved by JGS usually do not receive funds for procurement of materials until June. This causes a late start in construction and usually causes an overlap to the next calendar year to complete the project.
(2) Self-Help Dependent Housing Program: The self-help dependent housing program continues to be delayed because of the further exhaustion of available sources of construction materials. This can be expected to develop into a trend as US units deploy from Vietnam. It has been concluded by a IFFORCEV letter dated 13 April 1970 that the self-help dependent housing program has served its purpose and does not require or warrant continuation. It seems that what is required to complete housing under construction, by way of priorities, can best be accomplished at the local level as civic action projects. Another method now in use for the building of housing by RVN units on a self-help basis is the removal of buildings from US installations turned over to the Republic of Vietnam. Camp Enari is presently one US installation turned over to the Republic of Vietnam where excess buildings are being used for dependent housing.

h. Medical Matters: All phases of the Medical Corps are improving. Progress is slow but ever present. Physicians are gaining both professional supply and administrative experience. Association with U.S. trained specialists has continued to produce mutual understanding, respect, and exchange of professional knowledge and expertise with a continuing upgrading of the quality of medical services. Despite this progress problems remain: lack of trained personnel, marginal supplies, marginal equipment, marginal medical maintenance capability, marginal treatment institutions, and the impediment of Vietnamese custom (family care rather than nursing care). The MACV Surgeon as well as the II Corps Advisory Group recognized these problems. Plans exist to improve the number and training of physicians and ancillary personnel. Work is progressing on the upgrading of hospitals. With the pull out of U.S. Hospitals, which had cared for large numbers of Vietnamese, this problem will become more acute but may be relieved somewhat by the turn over of U.S. Forces' treatment institutions to the Vietnamese. Teams of U.S. specialists stationed at key RVNAF Hospitals to counteract the loss of sophisticated expertise in the U.S. drawdown are in the plans. At present U.S. advisors and forces are maximizing efforts to teach Vietnamese in all medical areas.

(1) Improvement of 72nd Medical Group: In January of 1969 the 72nd Medical Group was formed. The purpose of this and similar groups was to furnish intra corps guidance and control of hospitals, medical supply depots, veterinary units, and preventive medicine units. The Commander of the Group, acting as the II Corps Surgeon, extends his technical control and guidance to the medical units organic to the subordinate divisions. Medical regulation and evacuation were to be a major function of the group. The young and inexperienced staff made little progress during its first year primarily finding itself in cramped quarters, possessing little authority, and without an adequate means of communication particularly with subordinate hospitals and medical battalions. Since the fall of 1969 the Group has begun to flex its muscles, reaching for greater control. Radio networks are planned and with training, the Group should gradually effect complete medical regulation within II Corps and coordinate regulation to specialty hospitals out of II Corps. The Group was the first to take over a U.S. compound.
On 2 February 1970, USARV transferred the 283rd Dust Off Compound to the 72nd Medical Group. This action permitted a consolidation of assets, provided for a dispensary cushion of up to 100 beds for emergency use, and provided an excellent helicopter pad and facilities for Dust Off control when plans for these materialize. The radio nets in the planning stage (some funds have already been allotted) remain major problems.

(2) Implementation of ARVN Nurse Corps: On 1 January 1970, the RVNAF Nurse Corps was born. This was the great step forward in upgrading all phases of nursing care from the Vietnamese custom of family care with its inherent problems that extend from neglect to spread of contagious disorders. Within II Corps all station hospitals, the 2nd Field Hospital and the 2nd Convalescent, have appointed a chief nurse and have initiated the organization of a nursing service. These chief nurses will attend courses in Saigon in preparation for their new and important duties. They in turn, and in cooperation with their commanders, will send other nurses to Saigon for instruction as head nurses, operating room nurses, intensive care unit nurses and instructors. The current efforts of the Senior Nurse Advisor in establishing these nursing services and supplementing the previously mentioned course of instruction are of paramount importance, since a proper nursing service will be the prime means of establishing hospital sanitation, post operative follow-up, and standardization of patient care. This embryonic nurse corps has barely started rolling and has a long, difficult, and trying road ahead.

(3) Joint Hospital Utilization (RVNAF and Provincial) Programs: In an effort to obtain a balance of assets in areas where military physicians and equipment lacked adequate buildings and Provincial Hospitals lacked physicians, the Minister of Defense and Minister of Health effected a marriage of Sector Hospitals in 5 provinces of II Corps. Over the past 6 months, the program has progressed well. A much more efficient single hospital has replaced poorly housed sector hospitals and understaffed provincial hospitals. Combining these facilities has caused some problems. There is a segregation of patients by their military or civil status rather than by disease or injury. Because of a variation in food allowance per patient, military and civilian kitchens are maintained. X-ray and laboratory services are usually jointly staffed but there is a separation of nursing staffs and custodial staffs. The hospitals are still working out problems with supply channels. The Minister of Health funds scheduled to take over resupply of expendables have proven inadequate, and the military medical depots are still furnishing many of the supplies. The program planned to extend to the subsector dispensaries has been delayed by lack of Minister of Health funds.

(4) Medical Evacuation: Medical evacuation remains a U.S. function. The program planned has failed to take hold. Four candidates for medical regulation and helicopter control training failed to materialize. Instead, two persons have acted more as interpreters in assisting the 283rd Medical
Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) than true trainees. The RVNAF Helicopters on daily dedication to Dust Off activities have been unavailable many days, and when available are hampered by regulations requiring dual plane missions. Immediate response has been rare and delay in response frequent. From January 1970 to 1 May 1970 RVNAF flew only 48 missions involving 84 patients. Vietnameseisation of dust off activities remains an important goal and will require increased efforts. True dedication of helicopters and pilots must be achieved. Previously mentioned communication nets are a necessity in order that missions are not delayed, arbitrarily overlooked or lost in transmission. The 72nd Group must eventually assume control before true Vietnameseisation of the II Corps dust off activities is accomplished.

14. (C) Personnel

a. General: Much improvement has been made during the reporting period in the areas of desertion control, leadership development and military police activities. However, US advisor administration still demands most of the G-1 advisors' time and effort.

b. Strengths:

(1) General. II Corps assigned strength generally has remained at or above 90 per cent of its authorized strength throughout the period. Several regimental size units experienced a period of low operational strengths due to casualties suffered during the Dak Seang Battle in April and May. The 42d Separate Regiment and the 2d Ranger Group shared the largest portion of these casualties. The replacements received by the 42d Regiment and the 2d Ranger Group in April still left these units with an assigned strength well below 90 per cent of that authorized, showing 84.4 per cent and 83.4 per cent respectively. By the end of May these units showed 77.6 per cent and 82.2 per cent of authorized strength. II Corps as a whole was at 88.7 per cent of its authorized strength of 47,136 at the end of April and 85.8 per cent by the end of May.

(2) Strength Reporting. There are two strength reports presently being used. The QD 22 (equivalent of the US Army Morning Report) which is required by JGS and submitted weekly, and the Personnel Daily Strength Report which is required by ARVN G1, II Corps. (This report has been recommended for implementation at JGS level, but as yet no action has been taken).

(a) The QD 22 is an extremely detailed report; however, casualty figures are furnished only twice during the month, on the 15th of the month and end of the month reports. As a result, JGS does not receive timely data on unit strength and casualties unless a separate report from II Corps G1 is forwarded.

(b) The purpose of the daily strength report is to give Corps headquarters meaningful, up-to-date strength and casualty figures.
While this is a daily report, recent experience has shown that the report is normally 72-96 hours old upon receipt at Corps headquarters. This is due primarily to a shortage of communication lines and the low priority assigned to administrative reports. However, this is an area which has shown considerable improvement, since reports received prior to December 1969 were taking 6-8 days to arrive.

(c) Replacements are allocated by JGS in accordance with an annual assignment plan. This plan does not take into consideration large losses due to combat operations nor does it provide a replacement pool from which a Corps may draw to replace a large number of unexpected losses as occurred during the Dak Seang Battle. There is a definite lack of flexibility in the ARVN replacement system. This is probably the weakest facet of the ARVN Personnel Management Program. It is realized, however, that the major problem stems from inadequate manpower resources.

d. Desertions: During the reporting period, desertions constituted the major drain on ARVN fighting strength in II Corps, 5808 desertions compared to 1956 casualties. The rate per thousand for regular force troops in II Corps has varied every month; the highest rate occurring in May, 31.4 per 1000 and the lowest in February, 16.8 per 1000. The 22d Division has had the lowest rate, 15.9 per 1000 during the month of February. The 42d Regiment and 2d Ranger Group have experienced the highest rates. This is largely due to the high cost of living, inadequate dependent schools, and the harsh, hazardous combat conditions. The overall desertion problem still stems from poor leadership at the small unit level, lack of or poor dependent and troop housing, lack of adequate commissary and PX supplies, and family separations. Desertion rates are at Inclosure 1 to this annex.

d. Leadership: Leadership from Corps to Regimental level shows some improvement and has been generally adequate; however, there continues to be a shortage of experienced personnel at the junior officer/WCO level within the battalions and companies. This is due primarily to combat losses and the large expansion of ARVN forces in 1969.

e. Awards and Decorations: During the first five months of 1970, II Corps awarded 1667 ARVN awards while 3390 Certificates of Achievement and Commendation were presented. This compares with 3950 awards and 4530 Certificates of Achievement and Commendation for the last six months of 1969. Advisors at all levels are continuously emphasizing the need for an effective ARVN awards program as a means to build and maintain high morale. Under study at JGS is a recommendation for a special medal to be given to individuals who serve in the Highlands. Final action on this proposal is pending.

f. Military Police: ARVN Military Police have continued to expand and improve their activities throughout II CTZ during the past year. The 11th QC Battalion, which was organized at Nha Trang in December, 1968, has become fully operational and is now rated as one of the most aggressive QC Battalions.
in Vietnam. Prior to the organization of this unit, the 2d QC Battalion had police responsibility for the entire II Corps. During the past three months, particular emphasis has been on AWOL apprehension in conjunction with the National Police at the Sector level. Results in this area have been gratifying. The major advisory effort has been directed toward operational improvements and supply activities. In conjunction with this, a major building program was initiated to rebuild and remodel billeting and office facilities. This program is now about 75 per cent complete. Additionally, ten sets of dependent quarters were constructed for the 2d QC Battalion at Pleiku and it is anticipated that ten more sets will be completed this year. Continued emphasis is being placed on combined patrol activities in all sectors in II Corps, and it is expected that this should result in a substantial increase in AWOL apprehensions and curbing of illicit blackmarket activities. A comprehensive refresher training course was conducted by U.S. Military Police for the 2d QC Battalion during March and was repeated again in May.

g. Prisoner of War Activities: Two PW facilities are maintained and operated in II CTZ. A male PW facility is located at Pleiku while the female facility is at Qui Nhon. Each of these had a daily prisoner population of about 1050 during the past year. The major emphasis has been placed on insuring that the PW camps comply with the Geneva Convention and on improving the cleanliness and livability of the quarters. There has been a marked improvement in each of these areas in the past six months. Additional work programs which were initiated have been quite successful at the Pleiku camp. About 90 per cent of the employable prisoner population at Pleiku is now gainfully employed; however, the employment rate at the Qui Nhon PW camp continues to remain low at 22 per cent. Every effort is being made to raise this rate during the next three months. However, the female prisoners continue to be less cooperative than their male counterparts. Each camp conducts a vigorous rehabilitation program oriented towards outright release or transfer to a Chieu Hoi Camp. There were 67 prisoners released in 1969 under these programs, whereas this figure almost doubled during the first three months of 1970. Continued emphasis is still required in this area.

15. (C) Redesignation of the 24th STZ

a. On 23 March 1970, a meeting was held at JGS to discuss the reorganization of ARVN forces in Northern II Corps. It was decided at this meeting that the 24th Special Tactical Zone would be disbanded, effective 1 May 1970. The territory previously contained in the 24th STZ (Pleiku and Kontum Provinces) would become part of the 22d Division, under the control of a Forward Command Post to be established at Kontum.

b. The following units were disbanded with an effective date of 30 April 1970:

(1) 24th STZ Headquarters.
24th STZ Headquarters Company.

620th Signal Company.

MID Detachment, 24th STZ.

c. The 42d Regiment became an organic unit of the 22d Division on 1 May 1970. The 721st Medical Company of the 72d Medical Group, in support of the 42d Regiment, was placed as an organic element of the 22d Medical Battalion and was redesignated as the 224th Medical Company. This company continues to support the 42d Regiment.

d. After the inactivation of the 24th STZ, the 403d, 404th, 406th Scout Companies and the 12th, 13th, 15th and 18th Highland Intelligence Platoons were placed under the control of the 22d Division and are under the Headquarters Company, 22d Infantry Division for administration and logistics.

e. The 24th STZ Military Security Area was disbanded on 30 April 1970. The functions previously performed by this unit will be assumed by the Military Security Area of the 22d Division. However, this arrangement has proved undesirable.

f. The personnel spaces no longer needed by the 22d Division Forward CP were used to bolster 22d Division units and the remainder were transferred to JGS for disposition.

g. The total strength presently authorized for the 22d Division Forward Command Post is 133. The 22d Infantry Division Signal Battalion was augmented by 24 personnel from the 24th STZ. The 22d Division Logistical Battalion received 98 additional spaces as a result of the reorganization.

h. One unfavorable outgrowth of this reorganization has been the virtual elimination of the communications capability at the 22d DTA Fwd. With the disbandment of the 620th Signal Company, ARVN headquarters in Kontum has become more and more dependent on the U.S. advisory communications system.

16. (c) CIDG Conversion to Ranger Border Defense Forces.

a. General

The conversion of the CIDG Camps to Ranger Border Defense Camps has been directed by JGS, in coordination with COMUSMACV, to take place in the 36 CIDG Border Camps stretched along the western border of South Vietnam. In II CTZ, 12 camps are slated to be converted, along with 2 battalions of Mobile Strike Forces. The CIDG personnel in the camps will remain largely unchanged. The primary change is that these forces will no longer be under LLDB and US Special Forces but will be converted to Ranger Border Defense Forces under the Corps commander. Basic responsibility
for directing and monitoring this conversion lies with the Central Joint Committee comprised of representatives from JGS and appropriate MACV counterparts. At Corps level, a Joint Committee has been established as required by JGS and MACV with the mission of coordinating and implementing the conversion process within II Corps.

d. General Plan

The conversion began on 1 June 1970 and is to be completed by 31 December 1970 for all the camps in South Vietnam. There will be 5 phases or conversion cycles, each of which lasts for 90 days. The phases begin on the first of each month starting in June and lasting through October. Each border camp will be reorganized as a Ranger Battalion with 3 Combat Companies and a Battalion Headquarters. The Battalion Headquarters will be staffed by 2 officers, 4 NCO's and 2 EM. On the advisory side, MACV will provide a 4 man team comprised of 1 Maj, 1 LT, and 2 E-7 NCO's. Any further advisory personnel would have to be authorized from within the Corps. The combat companies in the Ranger Border Defense Battalion will be equipped under the TOE of the RF Company. As of June 1st, C-2 LLDB has been redesignated as "II CTZ Ranger Headquarters". The 12 Ranger Border Defense Battalions fall directly under the command of II CTZ Ranger Headquarters. The Ranger Support Company and Signal Company are also under this Headquarters. The 2nd Ranger Group remains directly under II Corps during the entire conversion period but will also be placed under the Ranger Headquarters as of 1 January 1971.

c. Reserve

In addition to their regular missions, 2nd Ranger Group will assume a supporting role for the Border Defense System. This support will consist largely of 2nd Ranger Group acting as a Reaction Force to maneuver as the tactical situation dictates, much as the Mobile Strike Forces have been doing in the past. The mission and TACR's of the Ranger Border Camps will remain the same as present, with border surveillance as their basic responsibility. While the CCP calls for these camps to be OPCON to the Division Commanders, in reality the system will remain much as it has been in the past. All coordination for operations or utilization of Border Defense Forces will be made through II CTZ Ranger Headquarters.

d. Forecast

Unless there is a drastic change in motivation, aggressiveness and close supervision, it is anticipated that the new Border Defense System will not be anymore effective than at present. All that is being done is converting the same CIDG soldiers into Rangers. The problem in II CTZ will continue with inadequate border security in the traditional sense. It's going to take hard work - training and a new approach to inculcate
an offensive spirit into the newly formed Rangers.

17. (C) Advisor Organization and Training.

a. Organization

(1) During the reporting period a re-evaluation of the composition of the II Corps Advisory Group was conducted with the objective of reducing non-essential positions, balancing advisory manning levels of the subordinate detachments to take into consideration area peculiarities and house keeping functions, and conversion of administrative spaces to advisory functions. Although the overall strength of the Group increased from 617 to 629 spaces the Advisory effort is strengthened by the addition of twelve new advisory positions, conversion of eight administrative spaces to full time advisory functions, and achievement of personnel economies by conversion of security guard spaces to indigenous personnel spaces. In summary, the impact of the new Joint Table of Distribution is seen in a streamlining of non-advisory functions and an increase in advisory assistance to ARVN.

(2) With the JOS conversion of the 24th Special Tactical Zone to a forward headquarters of the 22d Division on 1 May, it was necessary to re-evaluate the organization of the 24th STZ advisory detachment to assure that it interfaced with the new 22d Division (Forward) TOE. It was determined from the evaluation that five additional spaces were required, three in the G-3 operations branch, one in the G-2 section, and one in the detachment headquarters. The request for a change to the JTD to incorporate the five additional spaces was still under consideration by Headquarters MACV on 30 June 1970.

b. Advisor Training.

Because of the relative grade and combat experience level of newly assigned officers and non-commissioned officers, it became increasingly clear that action had to be taken to better prepare these personnel for the rigors and demands of combat operations in Vietnam. Since the Advisory Group lacked the capability to conduct comprehensive training for advisors, a request was made to the 4th US Infantry Division to authorize II Corps newly assigned company grade officers and non-commissioned officers to attend the excellent five day combat orientation course conducted by the division. Additionally, officers to be assigned as regimental advisors spent five days accompanying 4th Division Brigade commanders in the planning and conduct of brigade sized operations. Both of the above programs proved to be highly beneficial in preparing advisors for their duties.
c. **Senior Advisors Conference.**

Periodically, a formal conference was held at II Corps for the division senior advisors, the senior advisors to separate corps troop units, and the principal II Corps Advisory Staff. The purpose of the conferences was to discuss current topics of interest, problem areas, lessons learned, and new policies. The II Corps Senior Advisor required each division and unit senior advisor to report on the status of the unit he advised, following which he would issue guidance as to the direction he desired the advisory effort to proceed and the areas which required emphasis. These conferences with their rich exchange of ideas proved to be highly beneficial in orienting the advisory effort in II Corps.

18. (C) **Organization - Force Structure**

a. **22d Infantry Division**

- 22d Division Headquarters Company
- 22d Division Reconnaissance Company
- 40th Infantry Regiment
  - 1st Battalion, 40th Regiment
  - 2d Battalion, 40th Regiment
  - 3d Battalion, 40th Regiment
  - 4th Battalion, 40th Regiment
  - 40th Regimental Reconnaissance Company
- 41st Infantry Regiment
  - 1st Battalion, 41st Regiment
  - 2d Battalion, 41st Regiment
  - 3d Battalion, 41st Regiment
  - 4th Battalion, 41st Regiment
  - 41st Regimental Reconnaissance Company

**Artillery**

- 220th Artillery Battalion
- 221st Artillery Battalion
- 222d Artillery Battalion
- 223d Artillery Battalion

**Armored Cavalry**

- 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron
**Highland Scouts**

401st Highland Scout Company  
402d Highland Scout Company  
405th Highland Scout Company

22d Division Forward Command Post  
42d Infantry Regiment  
  1st Battalion, 42d Regiment  
  2d Battalion, 42d Regiment  
  3d Battalion, 42d Regiment  
  4th Battalion, 42d Regiment  
  42d Regimental Reconnaissance Company

47th Infantry Regiment (OPCON to 22d Division Forward CP)  
  1st Battalion, 47th Regiment  
  2d Battalion, 47th Regiment  
  3d Battalion, 47th Regiment  
  4th Battalion, 47th Regiment  
  47th Regimental Reconnaissance Company

**Highland Scouts**

404th Highland Scout Company  
406th Highland Scout Company

**Artillery**

63d Artillery Battalion

b. **23d Infantry Division**

23d Division Headquarters Company  
23d Division Reconnaissance Company  
44th Infantry Regiment  
  1st Battalion, 44th Regiment  
  2d Battalion, 44th Regiment  
  3d Battalion, 44th Regiment  
  4th Battalion, 44th Regiment  
  44th Regimental Reconnaissance Company

45th Infantry Regiment  
  1st Battalion, 45th Regiment  
  2d Battalion, 45th Regiment  
  3d Battalion, 45th Regiment  
  4th Battalion, 45th Regiment

53d Infantry Regiment
1st Battalion, 53d Regiment
2d Battalion, 53d Regiment
3d Battalion, 53d Regiment
4th Battalion, 53d Regiment

Artillery

230th Artillery Battalion
231st Artillery Battalion
232d Artillery Battalion
233d Artillery Battalion

Armored Cavalry

8th Armored Cavalry Squadron

Highland Scouts

407th Highland Scout Company
408th Highland Scout Company
409th Highland Scout Company
410th Highland Scout Company
411th Highland Scout Company
412th Highland Scout Company
413d Highland Scout Company

c. 2nd Ranger Group

2d Ranger Group Headquarters
11th Ranger Battalion
22d Ranger Battalion
23rd Ranger Battalion

d. 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron

e. 37th Artillery Battalion

f. 69th Artillery Battalion

g. Corps Support Units

(1) 20th Engineer Group

201st Engineer Battalion
202nd Engineer Battalion
203rd Engineer Battalion
214th Engineer Company (Dump Truck)
215th Engineer Company (Light Equipment)
216th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge)
217th Engineer Company (Float Bridge)
226th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge)

(2) 22d Division Logistical Battalion
(3) 23d Division Logistical Battalion
(4) 72d Medical Group (Under Command of Surgeon General)

a. 22d Medical Battalion.
b. 23d Medical Battalion.
### CONFIDENTIAL

**DESERTION RATES**

**NUMBER OF DESERTIONS PER 1000 ASSIGNED**

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Inclusion 1 to Annex B.
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