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1. Reference: AR 1-26, 4 November 1966, subject as above.

2. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing report of Major General George G. O'Connor, former Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, USARVA.

3. The contents of this report and the opinions expressed therein should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or view of the Department of the Army or any Army command, installation or agency.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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APO San Francisco 96370

AYDE-CG

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report (RCS-CSFOR-74)(U)

TO: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith in accordance with paragraph 5a, USARV Regulation 1-3, are five copies of the subject report.

2. (U) The report reflects my experiences while commanding the 9th Infantry Division in the Republic of Vietnam since 1 June 1967.

3. (U) This document regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure at TAB C.

G. G. O'CONNOR
Major General, USA
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CONFIDENTIAL
INTRODUCTION

1. Prior to the 9th Division's arrival in Vietnam on 1 February 1967, it had been designated to operate with at least one brigade in the Delta. The 2d Brigade was designated to become a part of the Mobile Riverine Force and key officers and NCO's received special orientation before leaving the United States.

2. Since arrival in Vietnam the 3d Brigade has operated almost exclusively in Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces, both of which are Delta areas in respect to terrain. The entire division is scheduled to move to the Delta by the summer of 1968.

3. The 1st Brigade has operated almost exclusively in the jungle type terrain. The lessons from jungle operations have been noted and are being recorded by other divisions. Therefore, I will focus this report on the Delta type operations. Since the division has had some jungle experience, I will also point out some of the differences and similarities of operations in these two types of environment. I will lead off with a discussion of the special problems in the Delta environment.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN DELTA ENVIRONMENT

A. Physical Aspects of Terrain.

1. Operating Advantages and Disadvantages.

a. The area is characterized by wide open rice paddies, numerous canals and tidal estuaries, mangrove and nipa palm thickets, and built-up areas surrounded by hedges and fruit trees. (FIG. 1) The enemy can mass only in the wooded areas around habitations or in the nipa thickets. All the approaches to and from his positions are exposed. (FIG. 2)

b. Once he is located, friendly forces have a better chance to isolate and annihilate him than they do in the jungle. On the negative side, however, the enemy can see our formations and hold his fire until friendly troops are within a few meters. The initial contact often results in numerous casualties. The open paddies make LZ's plentiful; but crossing them to the tree lines presents a real problem. During part of the year, the paddies are flooded with water, making progress slow and difficult. (FIG. 3) In the dry season the troops must move through bare fields with no concealment. The solution to this is greater dispersion; the lead squad must be 400 - 500 meters in front of the main body and the lead fire team beyond that some 200 - 300 meters. Scouts should be as far forward as possible.

c. Control of friendly forces from the air is easier. Supporting fire of artillery, air, and gunships can be controlled better than in the jungle. The use of smoke and CS have proven advantageous in closing with the enemy and forcing him out of his bunkers. Although the initial casualties in locating the enemy may sometimes be high, our superior firepower and control of the air gives
us greater advantages over the enemy in the Delta than these same assets do in the jungle.

d. Also on the negative side is the physical difficulty in traversing the muddy, swampy terrain. (FIG. 4) The deep mud retards movement. Progress is extremely fatiguing and dangerous due to the canals and estuaries that frequently rise above a man's head. (FIG. 5) The tidal action may permit an estuary to be forded at low tide, but a few hours later the depth changes and the swift currents generated by the normal current plus the tide may make it unfordable. Special training for troops preparing to operate in inundated areas is recommended in water survival, small boat operations, and field expedient methods of crossing waterways. (FIG. 6) Intensive practical work is required to develop the necessary skills. Unless men are adequately trained they expend time and energy fighting their environment and have little left to fight the enemy. Proper positioning of security elements prior to stream crossing must also be stressed as this affects the method of crossing.

2. Effect of Operating Conditions on the Troops

a. Perhaps the most serious physical effect is the result of constant immersion of the feet in water. (FIG. 7) Ninety-five percent of the troops deployed in the Delta areas have dermatophytosis of some degree in the feet. The primary effect was at first thought to be immersion foot, but further analysis has shown that fungal infections are more prevalent and normally set in before immersion foot. The seriousness is in direct proportion to the length of time the feet are wet. It was further discovered that once a man has had skin problems with his feet he is more susceptible to future recurrence and incapacitation in shorter exposure time. (1) It was found in the 9th Division that 48 hours in the field, then 24 hours out for drying purposes was the best cycle. (FIG. 7a) Three days in and two out was tried but was not as economical. Chart (INCL) shows the percent of incapacitation that can be expected per days of exposure; this chart is based on statistics kept over several months.

(2) The 1st Division in the Rung Sat Special Zone, the 25th Division in Long An, and the 199th Brigade in Gia Dinh have separately arrived at the two days in, one day out formula.

(3) The Division Surgeon inspected the feet of 127 VC prisoners from the area. The examination revealed no evidence of skin/disease of the feet or lower extremities. The question arose: Was the difference between the feet of the U.S. troops and the VC prisoners due to the inherent resistance on the part of the Vietnamese or to the difference in clothing? The answer came soon. Doctors noted that when Ho Chi Minh, serving as Kit Carson scouts, wore U.S. uniforms and boots, after two or three days exposure they began to break out with fungal lesion over the feet and lower extremities. (4) An experimental paddy boot has been devised and is now undergoing field tests. (FIG 8) It has the same sole as the jungle boot, but the upper is nylon mesh in lieu of canvas and the leather portions are reduced. It is believed that the greater air circulation will reduce the temperature of
the foot and at the same time facilitate drying. They won't be as good in this respect as Ho Chi Minh sandals, but they may extend our operating time in the paddies. (See INCL 2 for more detailed discussion.)

3. Other physical and health problems were anticipated from the physical environment, and the lack of sanitation in the heavily populated areas where troops were inserted. However, such problems have been minimal. There has been some gastroenteritis, but not an undue amount. The almost complete absence of malaria among the troops has been a surprise in view of the swarms of mosquitoes. There is something mentally depressing about living in the hot, humid, muddy, and unclean environment, but the physical effects of the terrain have proved less debilitating than expected—except for the fungal infections referred to above.

B. Basing Troops in the Delta.

1. Political Aspects.

a. The Delta area is the most populous in Vietnam. The IV Corps area of the Delta, for example, accounts for more than one-third of the South Vietnamese population; takes up half of South Vietnam's population if Saigon and Cholon are excluded. These statistics do not include Long An Province, also part of the Delta, but outside the IV Corps tactical zone. Including it in this comparison would, of course, raise the percentage of population even higher.

b. Political problems arise from the moment a decision is made to station troops in a Delta province or district. For example, the first requirement is for a place to billet the troops. Since all available dry ground is already occupied, somebody will have to be displaced. Even if it is decided to create new dry ground by pushing up paddy mud, such as at Tan Tru, or pumping sand out of a river into paddy land, such as at Dong Tam, someone has to be moved. Who? And to where? These questions must be solved by the Province and District officials, of course, but some group is going to be alienated to some degree. Even if attempts are made to give them better facilities, people dislike being forced to move.

c. Likewise, friendly forces operating in an area cause destruction of crops, dikes, and often make the roads impassable to civilian vehicles. The farmers and villagers have to be convinced that the presence of friendly forces providing security is worth the inconvenience, and the dangers, too, of having the additional forces in the area.

d. Since CGW is striving to win the support of the people, the introduction into a crowded environment of additional military forces from another nation is a mixed blessing from a political point of view. The added security must be worth the added burdens and the people must believe this.

2. Economic Aspects.

a. The Delta is the economic plum of South Vietnam. The IV Corps portion of the Delta alone produces about 63% of the rice harvested. Adding Long An to this would raise the percentage considerably.
b. The dangers of inflating local prices for goods and services by our added drain on the sources, plus our ability to pay more than the normal Vietnamese, must be foreseen. Advance planning and agreement with the province, district, and village chiefs can resolve such problems as price control, water supplies, laundry services, vehicle control, trash disposal, and real estate procurement before the introduction of troops.

c. Attitude surveys of the people in Long An and Dien Tuong Provinces tend to show that the added security of the presence of U.S. troops enables the farmers to till more land and to be more free of VC tax collection; they benefit financially despite crop and land damage. They are glad to have the U.S. troops on hand. The villagers, on the other hand, see only the increase in prices resulting from our presence and feel the U.S. presence attracts VC retaliation in the form of mortaring and ground attacks, thereby endangering the villagers. They require more attention through information programs.

d. Opening of the roads and waterways, of course, helps the economy. Running military convoys at night is one of the better ways and has several beneficial effects:

1. They keep our heavy traffic off the roads in the daytime, allowing civilian traffic to flow more freely.

2. They are visible evidence to the people that the night does not necessarily belong to the VC.

3. They inhibit or hinder the VC's freedom to mine or otherwise obstruct the road.

4. The degree of risk involved has been surprisingly small. For example in December the 9th Infantry Division ran 149 night convoys and had only 5 incidents involving enemy action.


a. There was considerable concern on the part of many Vietnamese and Americans that the presence of U.S. troops would have an upsetting effect on the social equilibrium in the Delta. The two cultures are different. The free and easy ways of Americans, particularly between the sexes, and our loud, forward, and breezy manners are alien to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese feared their children would take on American manners rather than following the old ones. The relationship between their women and U.S. troops was of particular concern. These are all significant concerns when troops must live so close to the people in the crowded conditions of the Delta.

b. Our solution was an indoctrination program for our soldiers, coupled with restricting visits in the villages and towns to official business and cultural tours. The indoctrination is a never-ending task. The men were taught to respect religious shrines, to show special respect for the old people, and to avoid actions considered rude or uncouth by the Vietnamese, such as bathing in the nude without screens. A concurrent information program for the Vietnamese, explaining why we were there and what we could be expected to do, was also necessary.
c. We are only partially successful in this indoctrination task. Attitude surveys reveal that school teachers see a difference in the manner of the children after Americans come to an area. We also get occasional complaints about soldiers laughing or whistling at school girls. The most common complaint is about our vehicles and our driving. We drive too fast, push pedestrians and Lambrettas off the roads, and stop or park our vehicles on the road so that other people cannot pass.

d. There have been only a few instances of violating shrines and surprisingly few incidents involving soldiers and the Vietnamese women. There is no question but that the 9th Division policy of making the villages off limits has helped minimize social problems. By and large, our soldiers have conducted themselves well.

a. The added security from the presence of U.S. troops appears almost everywhere to have offset the undesirable effects on Vietnamese social life.

C. Operations in Densely Populated Areas.

1. Rules of Engagement.

a. The fact that almost every foot of high ground in the Delta is occupied by people poses problems in control of supporting fires. When the enemy blends in with the people, it is difficult to decide when and how to use our firepower. Some areas have a special set of Rules of Engagement such as in Long An Province. These are arrived at in consultation between the Province Chief, Province Senior Advisor, and the Senior Tactical Commanders on the ground in conformity with directives passed down from MACV through channels. The 9th Division Field SOP has been written to cover most Delta situations. (See MCC 3)

b. Interpreting the rules must be done by the ground commander, usually the company commander. For example, reconning by artillery fire is usually denied in built-up areas and can only be authorized at Province level. Reconning by small arms fire is usually left to the discretion of the ground commander. But how to decide whether or not to take a chance of killing some women or children, who may or may not be VC dependents, in order to reduce the sniping on your own troops when you are receiving occasional rounds from a group of booches?

c. The people all have strong bunkers in or near their houses, where they take cover when a VC-VCN battle begins in their area. The existence of a bunker without firing ports is universal. But how about those same bunkers with firing ports? Does that mean it's a VC house? Normally such bunkers are destroyed; this often means destroying the house, too.

d. Since the VC forcibly take over houses of otherwise friendly Vietnamese, the destruction of a house is a very sensitive proposition. For this reason the destruction or burning of houses is forbidden unless the VC are actually in them firing from them. In Long An Province the VC have been known to run from one house to another, firing one or two shots from each, hoping to draw retaliation by U.S. forces.
There are many ramifications of the Rules of Engagement. What looks good on paper is sometimes hard to apply in the heat of battle. Commanders must spend considerable time with their subordinate leaders, discussing what to do under certain circumstances. Then the rationale must be explained to the men. One of the most trying times is just after a unit has taken a number of casualties, such as from a claymore fired from or between houses. The instant reaction of the troops is to burn the whole hamlet down. Once started, this is difficult to stop. Even the term "Search and Destroy Mission" is sometimes used as the reason for burning a house.

2. Importance of Civic Action on Psychological Warfare

a. Operations in the Delta invariably involve habitations, rice crops, vegetable gardens, fruit trees, with the attendant ditches and dams to control the water, as well as the people living on the land and in the hamlets. Civic action and a careful and repeated explanation to the people through psychological warfare techniques is a must. No special gimmicks are needed. It's just that the need for these things is greater and so in turn are the results when used properly. Every soldier, just by his appearance and attitude as he drives or walks through a village, takes part in this facet of the war. Every move we make either adds to or detracts from winning the support of the people.

Our civic action program is quite extensive. At INCL 4 is a monthly civic action report, for the month of January, to illustrate the massive effort involved.

b. By the same token, commanders must be well indoctrinated on the amends to be made when civilians are killed, injured, or have their property damaged as a result of operations. The procedures for making a claim payments, instructing the people how to submit claims for damaged property, the need for personal visits to show concern — all these have double importance in the Delta where winning the support of the people is so important — because there are so many of them and the VC are mixed with them.

II

ANALYSIS OF 9TH DIVISION OPERATIONS IN THE DELTA

The remainder of my report will describe the types of operations which the 9th Infantry Division has conducted in the Delta environment. This analysis will attempt to show how some of the special problems outlined in Section I above were resolved. The analysis will attempt to provide an insight into the overall value of the presence of U.S. Forces in the Delta region.

A. The 9th Division mission is considered to be three-fold. First, we conduct strike operations against enemy concentrations, especially Main Force units, their bases, and their LOC's. Secondly, we conduct consolidation operations in areas of high priority for pacification. In the consolidation operations, we spread our units throughout a given area to provide security to governmental activities and the people as a whole. Our third mission is to provide support to ARVN military units and Regional Forces/Popular Forces with the objective of improving the effectiveness of the Vietnamese military forces. This mission is accomplished concurrently with both strike and consolidation operations.
B. Strike Operations.

Since this report deals primarily with our experience in the Delta, I will devote this section to the strike operations of the 9th Division Mobile Riverine Force.

1. On 1 July 1967 the 2d Brigade of the 9th Division became the Army component of the Mobile Riverine Force. The Navy component is Navy Task Force 117. These two elements have operated in "close coordination and cooperation." Harmony prevails as neither element controls, and no joint headquarters has been superimposed. They have functioned well together because they wanted to.

2. Two battalions of the 2d Brigade, the brigade headquarters, and supporting Army elements are quartered afloat with the Mobile Riverine Force. The sleeping quarters of these Army elements are on two APB's (FIG. 9) (barracks ships - converted LST) and one APL (non-propelled barracks barge). These ships are part of the Navy Mobile Riverine Base. The tactical lift for the 2d Brigade is provided by two River Assault Squadrons. These squadrons are equipped with Armored Troop Carriers (ATC) (FIG. 10 & 10a), Command and Control Boats (CCB), and fire support ships called "Monitors," (FIG. 11) after the U.S. Civil War boats.

3. The MRF operates far and wide throughout the Delta along the network of rivers. It is relatively independent of any land base in the Delta and is re-supplied primarily via a water line of communication from Vung Tau.

4. In its relatively short existence, the MRF has operated over a broad spread of this part of Vietnam. It has conducted operations as far north as Bien Hoa and as far east as Phuoc Thuy Province. It also has operated frequently in Long An Province. Other areas of operations have been the Rung Sat Special Zone, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Phong, Kien Hoa and Vinh Long Provinces. Today it concentrates on Dinh Tuong Province with frequent forays into Kien Hoa.

5. Since the present Army component of the MRF consists of only two battalions afloat, it has been found expedient to place other battalions under operational control of the 2d Brigade during combat missions. Additional forces of some type are necessary for blocking purposes to take full advantage of the MRF's striking power. It also has teamed with other brigades of the division, and with ARVN units. In recent months it has enjoyed a mutually beneficial association with the Vietnamese Marine Corps, one battalion of which has operated in close cooperation with the MRF on eight operations in two months.

6. The MRF has penetrated into areas that have long been VC strongholds, or, at best, enemy controlled or contested areas. We have carried the war to the enemy in the Delta and forced him to fight at a time and place of our choosing. The massive firepower in the way of artillery and air that U.S. troops employ is a new experience for the VC. The fact that we can isolate him makes our firepower more effective. This aggressive action on our part has disrupted numerous VC main and local force units, severely impaired their combat effectiveness, denied them access to food and other essential supplies, and
finally has forced them further away from the more productive areas of the Delta and away from the populace they had planned to intimidate. Major enemy losses were inflicted on the enemy in areas formerly inaccessible to friendly forces.

7. Examining the MRF and its strike operations in light of the special problems facing U.S. Forces in the Delta, we find a different situation in the strike forces from that described in the next section on consolidation operations. First, the MRF makes less impact upon the Vietnamese social structure, for it does not camp with the Vietnamese in their villages. It lives aboard Navy ships and moves throughout the provinces (principally Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa in recent months). The MRF is not in competition with the civilians for the limited dry land available. The mobile floating base removes the requirement for dry land bases. The MRF has little inflationary influence upon the local economy in the Delta, since its troops are isolated from the civilian population and supplied from Vung Tau.

8. Living conditions of the troops are excellent aboard the barracks ships. The major foot problems incurred in Delta terrain have been discussed previously.

9. Being supported by a water LOC, the MRF creates little impact upon the meager road network in the Delta. It contributes materially to opening the canals and waterways to commercial traffic. On the other hand, this dependence on water LOC reduces the need for land LOC's. The ground highways are not upgraded as a direct result of the MRF strike operations. However, MRF strike operations have pushed the Main Force VC elements west and north in Dinh Tuong Province, thus enhancing ARVN and RF/PF capability to secure Route 4.

10. The results of the MRF's successes have not been, and will not be, fully capitalized upon, however, until the Vietnamese military and governmental organizations are ready to step into the areas from which the Main Force units have been driven or dispersed. The 9th Division has made a strategic study which provides the basis of an overall plan to secure the contested areas of the Delta. Such a plan needs to be developed and agreed on at the HAGV level.

C. Consolidation Operations.

The 9th Division's largest consolidation operation has been Operation Enterprise, conducted by the 3d Brigade in Long An Province since April 1967. A list of essential factors inherent in this type of operation is attached at INCL 5.

1. When the 3d Brigade first entered Long An, most of the province was dominated by the Viet Cong. Each of the brigade's three battalions was placed in a separate district. Its mission was to operate over every foot of that district, becoming thoroughly familiar with the terrain, the enemy, and the friendly Vietnamese. The battalion targeted on the enemy units. The mission was to destroy them and their bases and cut off their LOC's. The ultimate objective was to reduce the enemy threat to units of platoon size or less, forces which the Vietnamese military could then be expected to contain, thereby freeing the U.S. battalions to move on to other areas. Operations included search and destroy, sweeps, eagle flights, cordon and searches, water and land
checkpoints, road runners, and many ambushes particularly at night.

2. Concurrent with military operations was the mission to upgrade the capabilities of the ARVN and RP/PF units to the point where they could be expected to take over completely the security mission in the district. This mission contained many parts, to be discussed in the following section. Most important, however, were the combined operations, comprising over 30% of all operations.

a. This was a two-way street: We learn from them and they learn from us. The Vietnamese know the VC better—where they are apt to be, and where the bases and LOC's are. From us they, in turn, learned to improve their use of firepower, particularly artillery, and of airborne assets. They grew more confident and in many instances seemed to find that they underestimate their abilities.

b. In preparing my commanders for this portion of the mission I attempted to inculcate in them the following attitudes and assumptions (based on my experience under LG Fred Weyand in the U.S. 25th Division):

(1) The Vietnamese are as courageous as anyone else, given the same odds for success or survival.

(2) Their leadership is adequate except where proven otherwise on an individual basis.

(3) If they are expected to fight as well as U.S. units, they should be supported as well as U.S. units.

(4) They possess invaluable know-how concerning the enemy and the environment. They need moral support as well as physical support.

(5) They must be treated as equals and at times with the deference due any man who is at the mercy of circumstances beyond his control.

(6) The objectives assigned Vietnamese units must be commensurate with the unit's actual capabilities.

(7) Example is the best teacher.

(8) Patience is required.

c. We found that the smaller the units paired off, the more successful the operation; i.e. A U.S. squad with an ARVN squad made a better team than a U.S. battalion and an ARVN battalion. In these operations the ARVN performed better than when alone and our people did also; each was on his mettle to show what he could do. Of course, combined operations at all levels were required both to teach leadership at each level and to handle the enemy threat.

3. The third aspect of consolidation operations was winning the support of the people. This was important not only from a long range viewpoint of gaining the people's support for the GVN, but also from a short range view of getting information of military value from the people.
a. The most important mechanism for this was the Area Coordination Center (ACC). The ACC, of course, provides a means for coordinating the overall tactical effort as well as the effort to win the support of the people. (See INCL 6 for details.) Our civic action and psychological warfare programs also were coordinated through the ACC's. Here many of the problems referred to in Section I of this report were discussed and solutions worked out.

b. Getting agreement to establish an ACC and then to obtain regular attendance was not easy. It required patience, persuasiveness, and a demonstration by the commander concerned that he would put up resources and conduct operations as per agreements reached in the ACC meetings. The commander personally had to attend the meetings or else the district chief would not show up next time. If the chiefs were not present, the meetings accomplished little. Regular meetings with the implied guarantee that the chief would be there were essential to a viable ACC.

c. When the District Operations and Intelligence Control Center (DOICC) concept was instigated by CORDS in the fall of 1967, there appeared to be a danger of overlap with the ACC's and competition for resources. The same people from the District Staff, both Vietnamese and U.S., were involved in both organizations. Through discussion with Mr. John Vann, Deputy for CORDS IJ/77, we decided to weld the two organizations together. In practice, the DOICC has become the Operations and Intelligence center portion of the ACC in those districts where both exist. This relationship has never been formalized, principally, I believe, because the CORDS people at MACV level have refused to recognize the ACC as a practical working vehicle. At the working level there are few if any problems.

4. There are, of course, many other facets of consolidation operations. The points above might not be revealed in normal after-action reports. It should be re-emphasized that until Vietnamese military and governmental authorities are prepared to step in and take over once security is attained, U.S. units cannot be released. If U.S. units are withdrawn before ARVN and GVN political officials are ready to take over the security, the situation will quickly revert to near previous levels.

D. Improvement of Vietnamese Military Forces.

1. General. Of all the Division missions, I consider this to be the most important. Our contribution in this area may well be the most lasting of all the things we do. And if we are not successful in developing the ARVN and RP/PP proficiency wherein they can provide the required security, all else we do will be lost should the U.S. forces be withdrawn. We have a number of programs which contribute to this mission. I have already discussed our emphasis on combined operations. Other programs are ARVN Battalion Refresher Training, Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RP/RF) Upgrading, Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS), Logistics and Administration Advisory Teams (LATS). Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoons (CRIP) and Improvement Action Teams (IDPACT). A description of each is inclosed at INCL 7.

2. ARVN Battalion Refresher Training.
a. Two approaches were tried. One was the sister battalion system where a U.S. and an ARVN battalion trained together. They usually broke down into sister companies. Since there are a number of ways the ARVN can help us improve, it was felt there would be mutual benefit. It soon became evident that the quality of training varied widely depending on the commanders, but the lack of sufficient interpreters was the crowning blow. There simply weren't enough to make this system practical. This method was dropped and a committee system was adopted. A training team at brigade level was organized to train each ARVN battalion. This worked much better and required less overall effort, although the need for interpreters was always acute.

b. Every opportunity was taken to let the ARVN officers and NCO's do the instructing. For example, the U.S. instructors would deliver a short lecture and demonstrate something such as a compass course or night firing, and then the ARVN officers and NCO's would take-over the practical work. All range firing was controlled by the ARVN. The critiques were conducted by ARVN company and battalion commanders with occasional comment by the U.S. instructors.

c. A three day Concluding Evaluation Exercise (CEX) was conducted by the next higher ARVN headquarters assisted by its U.S. advisors at the end of the training period. Real operations were conducted, some resulting in VC killed and POW's captured. Only "Combat ready" or "Not combat ready" ratings were given; the critiques by the ARVN testing teams were almost always outstanding.

d. The advent of the dry season campaigns such as Santa Fe and the VC Tet offensive have caused delays in the completion of this program. The enthusiasm and avid interest expressed by the ARVN soldiers never failed to impress our men. I am sure that they, at least, look forward to resumption of training.

e. The armor, artillery, and engineer programs were going even better than the infantry training. The ARVN seemed particularly eager and adept at picking up technical subjects.

3. Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/FF). Upgrading.

a. The first step in this line was taken in late May 1967 when each brigade of the Division was charged with surveying the RF/FF outposts in its Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). The surveys required continual refinement to reach a meeting of the minds between the Province and District Chiefs, their advisors, and our people as to what should be done to improve which outposts, in what priority, and by whom. Eventually dossiers of each outpost were made up to include photographs and sketches of before and after. The Division supplied some material in the way of sandbags, timbers, and barbed wire to "prime the pump" until the Vietnamese supply system could be made to function.

b. Numerous improvements were made in the coordination of artillery support and reaction plans. The very fact that the U.S. units expressed a desire to help improve their positions and to react in case of attack did much for the morale of the RF/FF.
This program was expanded to include MATS, IMPACT, and LAATS, each of which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.


a. The MATS program has been enthusiastically received by both the Vietnamese and U.S. The U.S. members of these teams were all volunteers and a large percentage of them have extended to continue this work. They derive a real sense of satisfaction from the results obtained.

b. The teams are placed under the operational control of the U.S. Province advisor. A great variation exists between the guidance provided by these advisors. Some standardization in the way of goals and objectives should be established. More important, U.S. and Vietnamese goals for a particular RF/PF post must be agreed upon or else the MATS is at a great disadvantage.

c. These teams are headed by young lieutenants so they cannot be expected to carry out effectively all the facets of their mission without proper guidance. The parent unit is responsible for the logistical support of the team but operational guidance should come from the Province Advisor.

5. Improvement Action Teams (IMACTs).

a. The IMACT teams serve as roving MATS. These teams do not spend much time at any one outpost but provide a constant follow-up on the upgrading surveys (referred to in paragraph 3 above.) They are the means by which the U.S. brigade commander keeps track of progress in upgrading RF/PF in his area so that he can apply his resources to best advantage. IMACTs work in close coordination with the District Chiefs and their advisors although they remain under control of the U.S. brigade commanders.

b. IMACTs spur the RF/PF to get on with the job, and provide relief when the lack of one item, for example cement, prevents further progress on upgrading. These teams serve a very useful purpose and are in reality an augmentation of the MACV advisory effort.


Attempts to obtain barrier and construction materials through RF/PF channels met with little success and the aforementioned "pump priming" bid fair to become the sole source of supply. LAAT teams were formed and put under the operational control of the Province Senior Advisor to assist in getting the RF/PF supply system functioning. They have only been deployed in the past month so the results of their efforts haven't been noticed yet.

7. Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP).

a. The CRIPs provide a ready reaction force for the District Chief to call upon in exploiting intelligence obtained by the DOICC. They were designed to target on the VC infrastructure. Since infrastructure targets are not plentiful, the platoons are used for reconnaissance, for checking out agent reports, for ambushes, and even for reinforcing RF/PF outposts when intelligence indicates a particular post may be attacked. They constitute a rather elite military force immediately responsive to the District Chief.
b. The results obtained in terms of body count and weapons captured compared with friendly effort expended and friendly casualties have been impressive. As better dossiers on infrastructure are developed, it is hoped that these CRIPs will be more successful in their primary missions.

c. The CRIPs are another example of the mutual benefit of combining U.S. and ARVN military at a low level. Each develops a respect for the other; each attempts to look good in front of the other; the result is a fine and mutual admiration.

III

SUMMARY

Although the preceding discussion is not intended to be a complete study of problems inherent in inserting US troops into Delta operations, there are certain conclusions that can be drawn.

First, there certainly are unique problems involved in US troops being based in and operating in the Delta. The problems derive principally from the terrain and the dense population. There are political, economic and social problems, in addition to those military ones resulting from restrictions imposed to protect the people. Many of the restrictions are self-imposed but nevertheless they inhibit full use of our military power. Almost all the problems can be mitigated to some degree as long as one recognizes them and takes the proper precautions.

Secondly, strike operations can pay off in VC killed and VC units dispersed even better in the Delta than in jungle terrain. If mounted from a mobile riverine configuration the problems inherent in basing troops in the Delta are fewer than from land bases. Jungle trained troops do need special indoctrination and training, however, before beginning operations in the Delta.

Thirdly, consolidation operations are also possible although they present more difficulties because the troops must live in the area for an extended period of time. The problems referred above become real ones. There are tried and tested mechanisms by which to tackle these difficulties, such as the Area Coordination Centers and the use of civic action and psychological operations. Whether this type of consolidation or pacification operation can better be done by Vietnamese Army forces is a moot question.

And fourthly, there are a number of things which the resources and power of a US infantry division can do to improve the capabilities of the Vietnamese military forces - ARVN and RV/PF. These benefits are not peculiar to the Delta environment, but they are not now in existence there because the US presence is only a token one at this time. The MACV advisor system does not currently have the resources in either personnel or material to provide the same degree of assistance. The main point is, however, that a US division can do these things in addition to its more normal mission of searching out and killing VC. The spark and encouragement given the Vietnamese military forces by the presence of a US unit is remarkable; this alone might justify the presence of a US division in the area.
The 9th Division arrived in-country in December 1966, with the final units arriving by the end of January. Upon arrival of the last brigade, deployment was made into the Rung Sat Zone. The purpose of the exercise was to search for VC units in the area, and also to gain experience in riverine type operations. ARVN troop carriers were used during this period, pending arrival of the USN boats.

Experience in this area was during the time frame of February through May 1967. During this time, two battalions of the 2d Brigade operated in this area, which is an inundated area. At all times the troops were subject to immersion of at least their feet in water, at times they were in water above their waist during high tide. Occasionally, some men were able to dry out for a few hours when sleeping tied in a tree or on their air mattresses.

During this time, deployment was varied between two to four days. Experience showed that when troops were left in continuous water more than 48 hours there was approximately 75% morbidity. That is, the feet became red, slightly swollen and tender, and there did not appear to be any lesions on the feet of troops deployed in the Rung Sat area until May 1967, when the temperature and humidity in the area had risen.

During this time, from March until mid May, experimentation was carried out with a silicone preparation in a cream form which had been developed to protect the feet against immersion foot. The cream was not at all well accepted by the troops deployed because it was heavy, fouled up their stockings, could not be washed out, and required application at least every 12 hours.

Comparisons done between those using and those not using the cream revealed no significant difference. Skin lesions appeared in May in the troops of the 2d brigade deployed in the Rung Sat Zone. The lesions were elevated, macular, papular, erythematous, and were circular. They began on the dorsum of the feet, over the malleoli, and up the entire leg to the groin. The lesions became confluent and gave the appearance of general
erythema to the feet and ankles. This condition did not begin until May 1967, when the humidity and heat increased. At first, it was thought that these lesions were examples of immersion foot, which had presented itself earlier as generalized erythema.

Previous reports that troops should be deployed only 48 hours at a time were verified during the period March through May 1967. When a schedule of 48 hours in and 24 hours out was carried out, foot problems, as described above, were minimal. When this time in water was exceeded, more cases of erythema and red lesions were noted on the feet and lower extremities.

In June, two battalions of the 2d Brigade were embarked on the Riverine Force and moved up the Northern Branch of the Mekong River. The program of deployment began generally two days in the field and one day drying out, then two days in the field and two days drying out. During the dry-out period shorts and sandals (zorries) were encouraged. It was found that the air and sunshine were the best and fastest cures for the observed foot conditions.

In mid July 1967, after the Southwest Monsoon had begun, a battle raged for five days in an inundated area South of Saigon. Some of the troops were in the field for four days and others for five days. In the units who had been in the field five days, over 50% of their troops were non-deployable on the sixth day. One company had 66% of its present for duty strength non-deployable. Those units who had been in the field for four days had 40% of its troops non-deployable the next day. Out of those that were non-deployable, a considerable number were unable to go to the field from three to seven days and several as long as fourteen days. Several were required to be hospitalized because of immersion foot, which required from about four to ten days to recover. Those were some in this group who had already had some skin problems with their feet who developed secondary infections and this delayed their recovery somewhat longer than the majority.

At the same time of the occurrence of these large numbers of foot problems in the US troops deployed, examination was made of the feet of 127 Viet Cong prisoners taken from the same area. Examination revealed no evidence of skin disease of the feet or lower extremities. There was also no indication of immersion foot. These VC prisoners were wearing short pants and nothing on their feet. In comparing the two groups, it becomes apparent that a great deal of the problem found in US troops was due to the type of clothing and footwear that they were wearing. The jungle combat boot and long trousers of the jungle fatigues had several undesirable effects. They kept the skin of the troops at a higher temperature than if exposed directly to the air. Also, they kept the skin constantly moist, without any opportunity to dry out. The question arose then, was the difference between the US troops and VC prisoners feet and
legs due to an inherent resistance on the part of the Vietnamese or due to the difference in clothing.

This question was quickly answered. Several units in the Delta had had the use of some Cho Hanvas as guides in inundated areas during the monsoon season. It has been noted by the doctors and the men of the units that when these Cho Hanvas were put in the US uniforms and boots that after two or three days exposure, they began to break out with erythematous lesions over the feet and lower extremities.

By the end of July the Southwest Monsoon had inundated the Delta area. We were seeing greater and greater numbers of skin eruptions and conditions. For some time we had been unable to differentiate immersion foot problems from fungal infections. As all physicians observing the troops had never seen a case of tropical immersion foot, nor had they any great experience with fungal infections of the foot.

In early August, the consensus of opinion was that we were seeing fungus on the feet in the form of ringworm that had become confluent and did not appear in the classical nature of ring or erythema and central clearing. The lesions of the legs, thighs, groin, and lower torso were of the classical ringworm structure. The fact that the lesions on the feet were confluent, forming a generalized erythematous eruption, may be the reason for the delay in making a diagnosis of dermatophytosis of the feet. By mid-August the problem of skin conditions was becoming increasingly more serious. More and more men were not able to go to the field because of skin conditions. This naturally detracted from the combat effectiveness of the units deployed.

A request was made to the Surgeon, USAWR, for a dermatological team to come to the Division to evaluate the skin conditions and make recommendations about the therapy that was being used. The following is a list of the medications that were being employed in attempts to control the skin lesions:

Griseofulvin
Mycobutanin
Desenex
Mycolog
Kenalog

Undecylente acid
Puracine ointment
Hydrocortisone
Tinactin
Vioform and Hydrocortisone

Burrow's solution
Triamcinolone

By mid-September, certain conclusions were able to be drawn from the experiences gained during the previous two months in the inundated areas of the Mekong Delta. They are listed as follows:

1. That most of the foot and lower extremity skin conditions were due to dermatophytosis of types undetermined.

2. That the increase in the temperature and humidity, plus the increase in immersion in the water, because of the Southwest Monsoon.
season, caused a rapid increase in generalized dermatophytosis in the troops.

3. That the jungle combat boot and jungle fatigues aggravated the skin conditions and provided an excellent milieu for the growth of dermatophytes.

4. That once a soldier had had skin problems on his feet, he was more susceptible to future recurrences, with less exposure time being required before he would be incapacitated for duty.

5. That the ideal rotation under the circumstances of the Southwest Monsoon was 48 hours in the field, 24 hours out, 48 hours in and 48 hours out.

6. That exposure to sunshine and air were the best adjuncts to treatment of the skin conditions.

7. That immersion foot was very rarely seen because the dermatophytosis was of such a severe nature that troops could not be left in the field long enough to get immersion foot.

8. That many of the dermatological preparations and drugs were not effective as would be expected.

9. That those with moderate to marked lesions of the feet if not allowed to dry out and regress sufficiently would become secondarily infected and develop ulceration, thus increasing the time to cure the lesions.

10. That no cures were able to be affected in any of the troops with dermatophytosis, because of the necessity of keeping the maximum number of troops in the field, thus recreating the conditions that were the cause for the growth of the fungus.

11. That over 95% of troops deployed in the Delta areas had dermatophytosis of some degree of the feet.

In early October, Dr. Harvey Blank, leading a dermatological team of the Commission on Cutaneous Diseases of the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, visited the 2d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division aboard the Riverine Force. Examinations, cultures, direct preparations, and biopsies were performed on 200 troops from this force. It was their opinion that the problems seen represented dermatophytosis of unusual and atypical types. They noted the most severely affected areas were the dorsa of the foot and leg, under the boot, and the groins and buttocks. The lesions were intensely inflammatory, often starting as a
mycotic folliculitis, and spreading to produce bright and ringed lesions which became confluent. It was the dermatological team's opinion that the infections were of the zoophilic, or soil inhabiting, fungi rather than the common anthropophilic Trichophyton rubrum. The fact that the lesions were confluent and intensely red, plus the inexperience of the Medical Officers seeing the lesions, was the reason for the delay in diagnosis of approximately three months from the time the lesions were first observed.

An example of the severity of the lesions and their effect on the effective combat strength of the two battalions surveyed during the week of 16 September 1967 are as follows:

1. 4th Bn, 47th Inf, 9th Inf Div
   a. Number of men - 450
   b. Foot problems seen - 219
   c. Severity of foot problems in terms of days lost from the field.
      (1) Mild (less than three days) - 10
      (2) Moderate (three to seven days) - 65
      (3) Severe (more than seven days) - 31
      (4) Number of men not available for field duty - 106

2. 3d Bn, 60th Inf, 9th Inf Div - There were 20 - 40 men, out of 300 men, out of duty at all times because of the lesions.

3. The frequency of the typical athlete's foot type of condition was relatively rarely seen in those examined.

Of interest to note was the fact that the physicians had observed that the lesions were not responding as well as they should have to the various fungicidal medications being used. Also, there was a question of possible resistance of the dermatophytosis to griseofulvin 1000 mg a day of the microcrystalline, or fine particle type; although large quantities of the drug were being used in the troops afflicted with the dermatophytosis, there were no cures. Dr. Blank suggested that the reason for failure on the part of the drug may be due to a leaching of the medication out of the skin by the continual immersion in the water. Also, there might be a drug resistance in the soil fungi affecting the troops. Material was taken back to the University of Miami laboratories for further isolation and sensitivity studies on the specimens obtained.
During the Southwest Monsoon season the Delta area of RVN becomes essentially one large lake. Dry land is at a premium and almost nonexistent. Because of this the troops, when on operations, are immersed in water twenty-four hours a day. The water depth ranges from ankle to waist high. The continual moisture, high humidity, and high temperatures provide excellent conditions for the growth of fungi. The present combat boot, jungle boot, keeps the temperature of the foot elevated above the outside temperature and also continually moist. The long trousers of the jungle fatigues act in a manner similar to the boots. This, of course, gives an explanation for the reason that the US troops are plagued by dermatophytosis and the VC and local populations have no significant problems with these conditions.

As a result of the dermatological conditions occurring in the Delta area, operations of a necessity have had to be tailored so as to not allow the skin conditions to become so severe that long periods of convalescence would be required. Because of this requirement of drying out periods, many man combat days have been lost. During a period of 214 days, 80 days were required for drying out and 134 days were available for combat. This represents a reduction to 63% effectiveness of the troops deployed in this type of terrain.

Below is a tabulation of three months experience with Riverine Force's deployed in the Delta region, RVN during the Southwest Monsoon season.

FACTORS:

Noneffectiveness because of foot problems, average of two Battalions reporting per day, average number of days reported is 29 days per month, three month reporting fairly accurately, interpolation for three months reporting on basis of 30 day month. Average number of riflemen actually put in the field is 300 per day.

In September 1967 there were 1683 man combat days lost; an average of 56 men per day not able to go to the field, an average of 28 men per battalion per day lost. Average loss was 7.3% of Battalion per day.

In October 1967 there were 2013 man combat days lost; an average of 54 men per day not able to go to the field, an average of 47 men per Battalion per day lost. Average loss was 17.3% of Battalion per day.

In November 1967 there were 977 man combat days lost; an average of 32 men per day not able to go to the field, an average of 16 men per Battalion per day lost. Average loss was 4.7% of Battalion per day.

Average loss of Battalion strength over the three month period was 7.9% per day.
In late August 1967, one of the battalions, 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry, rotating from the Riverine Force to Dong Tam for a six week period. The primary purpose of this rotation was so that the troops could dry out. During this period, the troops were either out on guard or patrolling in the TAOR. When they returned from patrolling they filled sand bags until late in the evening. The base area at the time was wet and sloppy. Because of the conditions that existed, the men had very little, if any, opportunity to dry out and for the skin lesions on their feet to heal. They returned to the Riverine Force in early October.

From September through mid December this battalion had an average of 58 men not able to go to the field per day. In October alone this battalion had an average of 66 men per day not able to go to the field. For the month, there were 2000 man days lost because of dermatophytosis of the feet in this battalion.

Although our statistics are incomplete, we are able to estimate that the average number of men not able to go to the field per battalion per day during the Southwest Monsoon in the Delta, RVN, is 33 per day per battalion deployed. This loss of manpower from dermatophytosis is that which results when a program of 48 hours in the field, 24 hours out, 48 hours in and 48 hours out is employed.

In order to overcome these problems, the following steps have been taken:

A new paddy boot has been designed to reduce the temperature of the foot and also to let it dry rapidly. It allows the free circulation of air and water about the foot and ankle. A new low quarter acrylic stocking of a net design has been developed to compliment the boot. Additionally, the trial use of shorts will be carried out in order to reduce the fungus infections of the lower extremities and groin.

These items have been specifically designed to overcome the problems inherent in the use of our present clothing when fighting in the inundated areas of the Mekong Delta. It is anticipated that the reduction in loss of manpower due to dermatophytosis will be somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 to 40%. It is also anticipated that troops will be able to be deployed for increasing periods of time without any increase in morbidity. Additionally, the onset of tropical immersion foot should be delayed because this condition is accelerated by high temperatures. In view of the fact that the temperature should be no greater than the surrounding air or water in the new boot, the condition should not be enhanced. In fact, the time of onset of tropical immersion foot probably will not be observed for 96 to 120 hours of exposure, as opposed to the present 56 to 72 hours of exposure which has been observed.

In conclusion, during the Monsoon season it appears that our total
manoeffectiveness due to dermatophytosis is about 7.9% per day per battalion. The total force effectiveness during the Southwest Monsoon was 63%, less 7.9% or 55.1%. This is even when dry out periods are provided.

FOSTER H. TAPT, JR
LTC, MC
Division Surgeon
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

SUBJECT: Change 26 to 9th Infantry Division Field SOP

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Attached as Inclosure 1 is Appendix 10 (Coordination with GWN/ARVN and Rules of Engagement) to Annex A (Operations) to the 9th Infantry Division Field SOP.

2. (U) The enclosed appendix is Classified CONFIDENTIAL. This document will be protected and downgraded as prescribed in AR 380-5 and should not be inserted into the Division SOP.

3. (U) This change letter should be filed in front of the field SOP for reference purposes.

4. (U) This letter regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ R. H. Phelps

/s/ R. H. Phelps

CPT, AG
Agst AG

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as 9th Inf Div Field SOP
Plus 10 cy’s – 199th Inf Bde (Lt) (Sep)

INCLOSURE 3

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Appendix 10 (Coordination with GVN/AVN and Rules of Engagement) to Annex A (Operations) to 9th Infantry Division Field ROP.

1. (U) References:


b. MACV Dir 525-3, Minimizing Noncombatant Battle Casualties, 14 October 66.

c. MACV Dir 525-18, Conduct of Artillery/Mortar and Naval Cannonfire, 19 October 66.


2. (U) Purpose:

a. To establish policies, procedures, and responsibilities which insure coordination of division operations with the RVN military and civilian agencies.

b. To prescribe Rules of Engagement.

3. (C) Minimizing Noncombatant Battle Casualties.

a. General. Because of the VC propaganda exploitation of any noncombatant casualties and incidents caused by US/FN/VN and the resultant resentment and alienation of the people, these casualties and incidents must be prevented at all levels. To assist the tactical commander in preventing noncombatant injuries and deaths, the following safety requirements and rules of engagement have been developed.

b. Ground Operations: Commanders at every level will plan and conduct their operations as follows:

(1) Commanders will consider both the military and psychological objective of each operation. Prestrikes in populated areas, reconnaissances by fire into civilian occupied hamlets, and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which are detrimental to the overall war effort.

(2) Commanders will maintain and conduct a thorough and continuing program to emphasize the short and long range importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held prior to each operation. They will include as a minimum, the location...
of noncombatants and other friendly forces, measures to prevent mutual interference, safety precautions for fire support, rules of engagement, fire clearance procedure, identification and recognition signals and emergency procedures.

(3) To insure that US artillery and mortar fires are delivered only after proper coordination and clearances have been obtained, it is incumbent upon each person involved in fire direction and approval channels to fully understand and to comply with current clearance procedures. The GVN/ARVN coordination procedures and rules of engagement found in this appendix are applicable in each GVN province/district. It is essential that the utmost caution be exercised by all concerned to insure that these clearance procedures are followed prior to firing artillery and/or mortars. This is particularly true in heavily populated areas such as Long An, Dinh Tuong, and Gia Dinh Provinces.

(4) A civic action plan should be developed to support each operation. (Annex J)

(5) Operations should be planned in coordination with province/district chiefs with due regard for security of plans. A liaison officer should coordinate operations with the province/district headquarters.

(6) Assignment of RVN military liaison officers should be arranged for each significant operation. When assigned to US combat forces they might greatly enhance coordination with RVN forces and assist in friend/foe identification. RVF/FF participation at US battalion and company level operations should be sought.

(7) Established rules of good military conduct and discipline must be enforced.

(8) The following will govern the destruction of dwellings by ground forces:

(a) Destruction of houses simply because items found therein indicate use by VC, or VC sympathizers, is not warranted and will not be condoned. The majority of houses have some type cellar, bunker or foxhole to provide protection to its inhabitants. Discovery of these items is not in itself cause for destruction.

(b) Identification of a house as "VC" by ARVN or RVF/FF is not sufficient to permit destruction without further justification. Local authorities will, if practicable, be consulted concerning destruction of houses. If the local authorities state that the house should be destroyed, they should be the ones to perform the destruction.

(c) If US personnel are receiving fire from the houses
the fire will be returned even though destruction of the house results. Destruction of structures in areas used as VC base camps, or those obviously built by the VC to fight from, is authorized.

4. (C) Restrictions and Rules of Engagement.

a. General. The following procedures will be observed during conduct of combat operations.

(1) Aircraft delivery systems.

(a) Forward air controllers (FAC) and armed helicopter commanders will be briefed on locations of friendly and potentially friendly populated areas. Strikes will not be executed where identification of friendly elements is in doubt. FAC's and helicopter commanders will recon the strike area for friendly personnel and noncombatants prior to strike execution.

(b) All close air support missions that involve air strikes not controlled by radar will be controlled by a FAC. As a portion of the FAC's target briefing to the strike pilots he will include the location of the nearest friendly elements.

(c) Specified strike zones (free fire areas will be configured to avoid populated areas except in known VC base areas.

(d) All air strikes will have GVN/ARVN approval prior to execution.

(e) Close air support measures that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must be controlled by a FAC. If the attack on a hamlet or village is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US/GVN/ARVN approval is required. If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker system prior to the strike execution and must be given adequate time to evacuate the area.

(f) If an armed helicopter target involves noncombatants,
such as in a hamlet or village, wherever possible an HMAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and US/GVN/ARVN approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.

(a) All aircraft receiving ground fire from friendly or potentially friendly populated areas will return fire only when:

1. The sources of fire can be visually identified.
2. The strike or fire can be positively oriented against the source.
3. The fire is of such intensity that counter action is necessary.

(2) Indirect fire support weapons (artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire)

(a) Specified Strike Zones ("Free Fire Areas"):

1. Specified strike zones (free fire areas) are established in writing and authenticated by GVN/ARVN authorities. When a specified strike zone (free fire area) has been established, no GVN/ARVN clearance to fire is necessary.

2. Unobserved fire may be directed against all target areas located within specified strike zones (free fire areas).

(b) Uninhabited areas outside specified strike zones (free fire areas):

1. When IN CONTACT, fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces at the request of any US/ARVN unit. This situation is considered observed fire even though an artillery air/forward observer is not the requester.

2. When not IN CONTACT, observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without GVN/ARVN approval.

3. When there is no contact with VC/NVA forces, unobserved fires may be directed on hostile targets and target areas, only after GVN/ARVN approval.

4. GVN/ARVN approval is required before directing either observed or unobserved fire on targets not clearly identified as hostile.
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(c) Villages and Hamlets (Inhabited areas): Fires directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in villages and hamlets occupied by noncombatants will be conducted as follows:

1. All such fires will be controlled by an observer and executed only after GVN/ARVN approval.

2. Villages and hamlets not associated with maneuver of ground forces will not be fired upon without proper warning by leaflets and/or speaker systems or by other appropriate means, even though fire is received from them.

3. Villages and hamlets may be attacked without warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving maneuver of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such a warning.

4. Unobserved fires will not be planned closer than 1000 meters from friendly villages or hamlets unless specifically requested by GVN/ARVN authorities. Observed fires may be delivered closer than 1000 meters of inhabited areas providing the targets are clearly identified as hostile.

5. The use of incendiary type ammunition will be on a very restricted basis.

6. Village and hamlet defensive fires will be executed when requested by GVN/ARVN authority.

7. Artillery air observers will be briefed on areas to be avoided because of friendly or potentially friendly population.

D. RVN/Cambodian Border Area.

(1) General. All units responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5KM of the border will have posted in operations centers a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked on the RVN side to a depth of 5KM.

(2) Aircraft.

(a) Aircraft will not cross the Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by CINCPAC.

(b) Pilots operating within 5KM of the border will have a 1:50,000 map of the area of operations.

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(c) Complete prestrike briefings and poststrike debriefings will be conducted for strikes within 5KM of the border.

(d) Strike aircraft within 5KM of the border will be under control of a FAC unless radar controlled.

(e) Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, recon, transport and supply) are allowed to operate as necessary in the outpost area, but will neither cross or fire across the border.

3. Artillery, mortars and naval gunfire.

(a) All fire missions with intended target areas within 2KM of the RVN/Cambodian border will be observed.

(b) Fire missions with intended target areas greater than 2KM from the border may be unobserved subject to applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in this SOP.

(e) Fire will not be conducted where dispersion could result in fire being placed on or over the border.

4. Prevention of mutual interference in rivers and coastal waters.

(1) General: The control of water craft is primarily the responsibility of the VVN and is normally exercised by boarding and search rather than the use of destructive fires. The increase of FWMF in the Market Time (Coastal waters of SVN) and Game Warden (Bassac and Mekong Rivers) areas require that the following measures be implemented to prevent incidents in which friendly water craft are attacked by small arms, aircraft, mortars and/or artillery.

(2) Commanders may attack or place fire on watercraft if:

(a) The water craft is firing on friendly forces. The responsible Coastal Surveillance Center/Game Warden TOC will be notified immediately.

(b) The water craft is conducting hostile maneuvers or other actions and coordination has been affected with the responsible Coastal Surveillance Center/Game Warden TOC.

(3) River ambushes established along rivers in the Game Warden area must be coordinated with the appropriate Game Warden TOC.

5. Indirect fire support weapons clearance procedures:

(1) In addition to the other restrictions and rules of engagement the following clearance procedures are established for all artillery, mortar and naval gunfire.
(2) Prior to firing the following data and clearances must be obtained by the firing unit or its headquarters.

(a) US/FMAF ground clearance: Obtained from the US/FMAF maneuver force commander having responsibility for the AO/TAOR. Areas that are not designated US/FMAF AO/TAOR need no US/FMAF ground clearance.

(b) GVN/ARVN clearance.
   
   1 In specified strike zones (free fire areas) no GVN/ARVN clearance to fire is needed.
   
   2 In all other areas GVN/ARVN clearance must be obtained from the appropriate Province/District Chief, his authorized representative, or higher GVN/ARVN authority except when a US/FMAF unit is IN CONTACT with VC/NVA forces.

(c) AWCC: Firing data must be provided to the appropriate Artillery Warning Control Center (AWCC) for friendly aircraft warning.

(d) Paris Control: All 8" and 175mm fires must be sent to Paris Control for high performance aircraft warning.

(e) None of the above abridge the right of self-defense. Artillery if fired without GVN/ARVN clearance at the request of any unit IN CONTACT. A unit is considered IN CONTACT when it is engaged with an enemy force. Sniper fire or mortar rounds are not considered IN CONTACT. The supported unit commander is responsible for making the "IN CONTACT" determination.

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MG

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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/s/ Walsh

/s/ RICHARDSON
G3

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E. W. EVERTT
CPT, AAC
Asst AG

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A-10-7
TO Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCA
APO 96375

1. Total number of non-days personnel of units engaged in civic action activities. 1045

2. Cost of supplies contributed from military resources for civic action projects (do not include cost of commodities obtained from USAID, CARE, CHS and like organizations). VN$ 2,343,660

3. Voluntary contributions. VN$ 90,000

4. Percent of US military civic action activities conducted jointly with:
   a. Other FMNAP 4.9%
   b. RVNAF 39.6%
   c. US civilian voluntary agencies 0.0%

5. Average percent of self-help contributed by the people. 56.0%

6. For each of the major civic action programs listed below, enter the number of non-days (8 hr days) and cost of supplies provided from resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMS</th>
<th>MAN-DAYS</th>
<th>VN$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development: Includes all agriculture, fisheries, markets and cottage industries and other activities involving production and distribution of products.</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>116,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCLOSURE 4
b. Education: Includes all activities, involving the increase and improvement of school facilities and classroom or other group instruction. Excludes all technical training reported in programs a, c and d.

   c. Social Welfare: Includes all assistance to hospitals, refugees, orphanages, religious organizations and other institutions, groups and individuals. Excludes items reported in a, b and d.

   d. Transportation: Includes all activities that improve or increase methods of transportation, e.g., roads, bridges and waterways.

   e. Refugee Assistance Support: All assistance to refugees including activities reported in programs a, b, c and d.

7. GVN Program Support: None

8. Number of separate institutions assisted during the reporting period.

   a. Schools 26

   b. Hospitals 4

   c. Orphanages 7

   d. Others - see paragraph 13

9. The 3d Bn, 47th Infantry, MEF, noted the presence of the following attitude which acts to hinder their operation in Dinh Tuong Province. "Fear is one of the major drawbacks to any form of civic action that could be undertaken. The fear is that Viet Cong forces may initiate reprisals against those who cooperate with GVN and/or MACV advisers in civic action projects. This fear has been allayed to some extent by the close coordination of such programs with tactical operations to take maximum advantage of the security afforded.

10. The following beneficial results have been realized as a result of 9th Infantry Division Civic Action Programs:

   a. Reports from 3d Brigade units in Long An Province reflect a willingness on the part of the Vietnamese people to undertake a second and third civic-action project upon successful completion of the first. The "self-help" construction of Sampan Dock and Market Place at Tan Tru (XS 6763) is an excellent example of this attitude.
b. Timely warning by the Kim Son (KS 3641) village chief, enabled a 4th Brn, 47th Infantry MEDCAP Team to successfully evade Viet Cong forces entering the village.

c. The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, MRF, on two occasions received lists of Viet Cong personnel operating in areas frequented by MEDCAP Teams. The lists were compiled and given to US Forces by GWN village officials. Due to the increase in US and RVNAP military activity, those officials felt secure enough to divulge such information.

11. The following civic action projects are considered to be particularly effective:

a. Eq and A Company, 9th Medical En, has established a program offering special obstetrical treatment to Vietnamese civilians. Liaison has been established with village medical personnel to identify difficult delivery problems. Upon identification, the subject is brought to the medical clearing station with the local physician for delivery. In so doing, village medical personnel receive advanced surgical instruction while patient and child enjoy the benefits of treatment by specialists.

b. The 3d Brn, 47th Infantry, MRF, has developed an interesting technique for integration of the MEDCAP program with tactical operations. Following sweep operations in an ATC (Assault Troop Carrier) boat, the MEDCAP team beaches at a pre-designated village or hamlet. Following loudspeaker announcement, all patients are treated on the ATC. This method provides maximum security for the MEDCAP Team, expands MEDCAP coverage and does much to lessen the adverse effect of military operations in the area. Additionally, should medical treatment be required for US casualties, evacuation to the ATC can be easily accomplished.

12. Selected civic action projects having particular human interest appeal making them suitable for publication. The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, Queen’s Cobra, conducted a hamlet festival in Phuoc Lai. The festival was highlighted by an exhibition of Thai boxing and soccer competition between RTAVR and Vietnamese teams. In addition to the conduct of MEDCAP and commodity distributions, area school children received special Tet gifts and presents.

13. Summary of civic action projects.

a. Construction projects completed during reporting period.

(1) Dwellings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Built</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Roads (ka)

| Roads (ka) | 4.0 | 17.5 |

(3) Churches

| Churches | 0   | 2    |

(4) Hospitals 0 2
(5) Dispensaries 0 2
(6) Market Places 1 0
(7) Schools 0 5
(8) Latrines 1 0
(9) Bridges 8 5
(10) Other 20 15

b. Educational efforts.

(1) Classes
   (a) English'186 total students 1626
   (b) Other 48 total students 190

(2) Training
   (a) Nurses/aides 2
   (b) Machine operators 0
   (c) Mechanics 0
   (d) Other 5

c. Commodities distributed (include commodities from USAID and voluntary agencies).

(1) Building materials
   (a) Cement- 54,900 lbs.
   (b) Tin sheets- 394 number
   (c) Lumber- 117,965 bd ft.
   (d) Paint- 65.5 gals
   (e) Other- 40,800 lbs.

(2) Kits (number)
   (a) Health- 320

(b) School - 2068
(c) Midwife - 2
(d) Phys Ed - 10
(e) Woodworking - 2
(f) Masonry - 4
(g) Barber - 0
(h) Other - 138

(3) Food - 50,676 lbs.
(4) Clothing - 500 lbs
(5) Health items (soap, toothpaste, etc) - 4,796 lbs.
(6) Agricultural tools - 505 number

d. MEDCAPS 26,111 (number of patients).

14. Expenditures from US/FEAP Military Civic Action and PSTWA Fund $100,687 WJ.

15. Normal psychological operations utilizing standard themes were conducted in support of MEDCAPs and civic action projects.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. W. EVERETT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
ESSENTIAL FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The 25th U.S. Infantry Division's experience in Hau Nghia Province revealed that several factors or conditions should exist if there is to be a program that effectively supports and fortifies the government's Revolutionary Development program. The experience in the 9th U.S. Infantry Division substantiated the validity of these factors. These factors, premised on the overall objective of protecting the people and re-establishing government authority, include the following:

1. Integrated US-ARVN operational planning. This should be conducted at the Division level, the Brigade-Provience level, and the Battalion-District level. The planning should be continuous and at the Provience and lower level should be brought into focus at meetings attended by the U.S. & ARVN military unit commanders, the Provience or District Chief and his key staff members, and U.S. military and civilian Provience advisors.

2. Integrated U.S.-ARVN intelligence collection and evaluation. There should be a joint intelligence center at the Provience and/or District level where field intelligence is seen while it is still fresh and therefore valid as a basis for immediate reaction operations. This center can be rather informal involving U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence representatives who exchange and discuss intelligence and who insure that spot intelligence of value is gotten to the operations side for rapid exploitation.

3. Resource control at Brigade-Provience and District-Battalion level. We must take full advantage of the native know-how of our Vietnamese counterparts and we must key our operations to field intelligence which is unusually fragile because of the frequency with which VC formations move. Therefore, it is necessary that some resources in terms of combat units and lift be immediately available at the lower levels. This is also a most effective morale-booster and confidence-builder for the Provience and District Chief and his subordinates.

4. Integrated U.S.-ARVN operations. All field operations should involve both U.S. and Vietnamese forces: ARVN troops in Search and Destroy and similar operations; government teams in hamlet-oriented operations; national police in all population control actions and so forth. These integrated operations are necessary to keep U.S. forces in their proper role vis-à-vis the Vietnamese and to increase the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces by enabling them to learn by example and by observing the results of U.S. tactics and techniques.

INCLUSION 5
5. Maintain visible military presence. U.S. units and ARVN units on revolutionary development missions must be prepared to live in the operational area until the people have been made to feel secure and their cooperation has been won. This usually requires a period of approximately one month. After the withdrawal of the unit, provisions must be made for some form of permanent military security such as Regional and Popular Force outposts or ARVN units. This begins a critical phase during which U.S. presence must be kept in the area daily by helicopter or other rapid reaction operations. Night operations must be included to continue the restriction of VC movement. During this phase, which continues indefinitely if the first phase was completely effective, U.S. operations largely take the form of reaction operations based on spot field intelligence.

6. Population control. This is critical to the objective of separating the people from the Viet Cong. Census taking, inspection and issuance of ID papers, traffic checks on all heavily travelled routes and at random checks of lightly travelled roads and frequent seal and search operations must be conducted. Again, these are to be joint operations, with government representatives having the physical contact with the people.

7. Disruption of VC liaison routes. This is also critical to our objective. In lightly populated areas the routes are cut by conventional military methods, ie, sweeps, ambushes, increased day and night surveillance, harassing and interdiction fires, etc. In heavily populated areas it may be necessary to institute rationing coupled with house by house searches and bolstered by an active intelligence net.

8. Locally focused information campaign. The basis for much of the anti-VC psywar campaign should be of local origin such as telling of the road cuts by the VC, the story of a local chieu hoi, the assistance rendered by pro-government agencies, etc.

9. Road use. The road net, once opened for use, must be travelled frequently by military vehicles. Vehicles will be hit by mines and the danger of ambush must be taken into account but we must be prepared to take casualties if need be to assert our capability of using the road.

10. Isolation of hard-core units. Hard-core units, particularly of battalion size and larger, must be isolated and kept on the run by appropriate military operations.

11. Government follow-on force. Provisions must be made for appropriate governmental administrative agencies to locate in the area.
REDACTED
b. There also exists a requirement to maintain close coordination with those regular Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) elements operating within the division TACI which are not under the operational control of the province chiefs. Coordination with these units will normally be concerned only with tactical operations. The planning and conduct of combined tactical operations with RVNAF units in support of combined contingency plans within a given province or district makes it highly desirable that senior representatives of the RVNAF within the area participate in the ACC on a permanent basis.

c. The ACC is composed of those forces and agencies participating in the security and development effort within the province or district concerned. A steering committee consisting of the Senior GVN/RVNAF officials, both military and civilian within the province is the focal point and provides direction and guidance to the subcommittees which constitute the center. The ACC is further divided into two groups: The Combined Operation Center (COC), and the Civil Military Action Committee (CMAC).

5. Organization: Both GVN and RVNAF membership of the ACC should include the following:

a. Combined Operation Center:

(1) Senior military commanders (RVNAF/RVNAF).

(2) Representatives of local intelligence organizations (police, military, civilian) function as a combined intelligence center to develop information on the enemy forces, infrastructure and organization.

(3) Psychological operations agencies.

(4) Public information agencies.

(5) Paramilitary organization (CIDG).

(6) Representatives of military elements located within the TACI.

(7) Other GVN representatives to include economic, social, political and civic action agencies as required.

b. The CMAC participation is accomplished by providing the COC with advice to assist in the planning and execution of operations. The organization of the CMAC will depend on local requirements and conditions and may include:

(1) Senior GVN official.

(2) Sector S5.

(3) RVNAF Tactical Unit S5.
AVVIE-CC
SUBJECT: LOI, Area Coordinating Center
11 November 1967

(4) Local police.
(5) FWAF Provost Marshal representative.
(6) Legal representatives.
(7) Religious leaders.
(8) Key business representatives.
(9) Press or news representatives.
(10) Other influential persons.

c. Inclosures 1 and 2 are representative type ACC organizations and may be tailored to meet the specific requirements of a local or political subdivision.

6. Operations:

a. A committee chairman is selected to preside over the steering committee. It is mandatory that the chairman be the Vietnamese representative. A FWAF vice chairman is desirable.

b. The key staff of the ACC will meet as frequently as the situation requires. This may vary from a continuous day to day operation to once a week. However, daily meetings are considered optimum at the provincial level. Minutes are maintained of formal meetings and are considered to be formal documents pertaining to operational effectiveness of the ACC.

c. As a minimum, intelligence and civil affairs personnel of the COC/CMAC will meet with their ARVN/Advisory counterparts on a daily basis to review the events of the day and to confirm events for the following day. The entire center should meet weekly to plan activities for the future. This planning should be geared to the 3 week planning cycle currently practiced in the division and normally will provide a basis for the brigade commander's recommendations. This planning must be integrated to the maximum extent possible; otherwise diffusion of the combined effort is inevitable. This task will demand the maximum of tact and understanding on the part of FWAF commanders.

d. The location for meetings may vary between the GVN and FWAF sites, however, the GVN Command Post or Operation Center is the preferred meeting place.

e. Commanders will insure that all combined actions are in accordance with existing MACV, USARV and 9th Infantry Division Directives especially those concerning prisoners of war.

3
1. The maintenance of 24 hour representation with province and district officials is essential to the accomplishment of this effort. In addition, at province level communications between tactical operations centers is required. At those districts where FNSF and GVN forces are colocated, similar arrangements must exist. In those districts where frequent operations are conducted by FNSF, but no colocation exists, 24 hour representation must be maintained between the FNSF and advisory personnel. Due to the limited resources available to advisory personnel it may be necessary to furnish communication equipment on a loan basis to satisfy the required communications link. Advisory personnel in-turn must be impressed with the importance of reporting events within their area on a timely basis so that, where warranted, appropriate action can be initiated to provide support or reinforce indigenous forces.

7. Execution:

a. ACCs will be established at the following locations within their TAOI by the commanders indicated:

(1) Bien Hoa Province: CO, 1st Bde.
(2) Dinh Tiuong Province: CO, TF Unston.
(4) Long Xuyen: CO, 11th CIP.
(5) Phan Rang District: CO, MAV.

b. Responsibility for establishing ACC at the district level will be determined by the commander responsible for the TAOI.

(1) The ACC will include the COC as a minimum. The organization and formation of a CMAC is the responsibility of the commander to develop as the situation requires.

(2) Commanders of elements operating on short duration combined operations will form as a minimum a COC.

8. Mission: The ACC can expect to concern itself with a variety of missions which will include, but not be limited to:

a. Tactical operations against VC forces.

b. Intelligence operations including integrating unit capabilities with and extending the GVN and division intelligence program.

c. Psychological operations including the GVN and FNSF information program.
AVIZ-GC

SUBJECT: LOI, Area Coordinating Center

11 November 1967

d. Military civic action supporting economic, psychological and sociological activities.

e. Population and resources control operations.

f. Advisory assistance in training and operations with RVNAF including Regional and Popular Forces.

9. Assistance and support of the GVN Revolutionary Development Program.

9. Reports: Brigade, regiment and task force commanders will forward ACC minutes to 60, 9th Infantry Division, ATTN: ACOFS, 65 not later than 72 hours after each meeting.

10. References:

a. LOI 65-67 (Tactical Area of Interest) Nov 67

b. FM 33-5, Oct 66

c. Chap 6, RH 41-10 Aug 67

d. Annex J, (Civil Affairs), 9th Div SOP

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN S. KOELL, Jr.
CFT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

A
Plus
20 - 65

2 Incl
TO: C/S
FROM: G7
DATE: 12 Feb 68
CM:

1. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Battalion Refresher Program was initiated on 31 July 1967 and was expanded on 18 September 1967 to include training of Artillery, Cavalry and Engineer units. The program of instruction included basic subjects, weapons training and tactical training for the combat units and construction type training for the Engineers. At the conclusion of training, each unit participated in a three day concluding evaluating exercise (C3E) which evaluated the effectiveness of training and the combat effectiveness of the unit. In some instances scheduled training has been interrupted or rescheduled due to the operational commitment of ARVN units. Every effort has been made to continue training while ARVN units were in the field as the mission and tactical situation permitted. This refresher program has provided an opportunity for a mutual understanding of ARVN and US methods of operation and has resulted in an increase in the combat effectiveness of ARVN units. The current status of the ARVN refresher training is indicated at enclosure 1.

2. Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) upgrading. The RF/PF upgrading program was initiated by the 9th Infantry Division in late May 1967 when the Brigades, Regiments and other separate headquarters effected a survey of all RF/PF outposts within their respective Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI). These surveys included the classification by category, surveying or firing DEFCONs, Contingency plans for reinforcing an outpost. The current status of RF/PF outpost upgrading is reflected at enclosure 2. This program has been expanded to include Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS), Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), Improvement Action Teams (IAAT), and the Logistics Administration Advisory Teams (LAATS).

a. On 10 July 1967 the 9th Infantry Division was directed to organize MAT teams for deployment within the Division's Tactical area of interest (TAOI). The MAT team has the mission of conducting training, improving outposts, and encouraging RF/PF units to participate in offensive operations. The team consists of a US Lieutenant, one heavy weapons and one light weapons Infantry, a medic and a radio telephone operator driver. The District headquarters provides an ARVN officer as an assistant team leader and one interpreter. The teams lives and operates with the unit to which it is assigned for upgrading. MATS are generally employed in Revolutionary development areas in order to assist, through training, in the security of these areas. The MATS program has enjoyed considerable success in their operations as has been evidenced by the performance of RF/PF units which have been trained. The 9th Infantry Division and 11th ACR currently have seven MAT teams deployed within the Division's TAOI as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>VILLAGE</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th ACR</td>
<td>125 (TT 655163)</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanh Linh (TT 933250)</td>
<td>Binh Tuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>TT 278101</td>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT 067877</td>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCLUSION 7
b. In November of 1967 the 11th ACR, 1st & 3d Brigades and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) were directed to organize and deploy Improvement Action Teams (IAPT) to assist in RF/PF upgrading. The IAPT consists of one officer and one Noncommissioned Officer and an ARVN Officer and interpreter provided by the district, headquarters in which the team operates. The team provides training, upgrading outposts, and encourages offensive operations. The length of time spent with the RF/PF unit is of short duration with emphasis on critical items. IAPT teams are generally employed on the periphery of RF areas to insure that these areas are not neglected. On 11 February 1968 2d Brigade formed three IAPT teams for deployment in the Dinh Tuong Province. The 9th Infantry Division and 11th ACR currently have 13 IAPT teams deployed in their TA0I, specifically the Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Long An and Dinh Tuong Provinces.

c. The IATS and IAPT teams in their attempts to obtain barrier and construction materials through the RF/PF supply channels met with little success and had to rely extensively on US supply channels. In order to ameliorate this situation II FORC.en directed that subordinate commands would organize and deploy, within their TA0Is, Logistics Administration Advisory teams (LAATS) which have the mission of examining the RF/PF supply system and getting the supply response required by the supported units. The LAATS consists of a team leader, a Major with a logistics background, an AG Lieutenant and an NCO/Specialist, each in wheel vehicle repair, radio repair, small arms repair, medical and general supply fields. The LAATS are an augmentation to the Province Senior Advisor's staff and works closely with the Administration and direct support logistics company which supports all RF/PF units in a province. The LAATS were deployed on 10 January 1968 to the Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa and Long An Province Headquarters.

d. On 26 October 1967 the 9th Infantry Division directed the 1st and 3d Brigades to organize Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) for employment in Bien Hoa and Long An Provinces respectively. The CRIP consists of 22 US and 22 RF intelligence personnel organized into a platoon headquarters and four squads. The US provides the firepower and mobility for the platoon and the RF provides the knowledge of the language, terrain and infrastructure. The CRIP has the mission of exploiting and generating intelligence, conducting ambush patrols, targeting on VC infrastructure and acts as a ready reaction force as needed. The RF element has been issued M16 rifles by the brigades responsible for the formation of the unit. The CRIP program has been very successful in the performance of their mission and has done much to increase the capacity and potential of the RF intelligence element.
AVDE-GG

SUBJECT: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Support

12 February 1963

2 Incl

1. (Status ARVN Refresher Tng)

2. (RF/FP Outpost classification)

/s/ Ronald D. Kamakahi
/t/ RONALD D. KAHAKAHT
LTC, GS
AGofS, G7

"A TRUE COPY"

R. W. EVERETT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
### Status of ARVN Refresher Training

**Training Completed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
<th>COMPLETION DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2/46TH INF EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>31 JUL 67</td>
<td>27 SEP 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 3/46TH INF EN 25TH DIV</td>
<td>20 AUG 67</td>
<td>16 OCT 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. 5TH ACR 18TH DIV</td>
<td>4 OCT 67</td>
<td>26 OCT 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. B HTRY 35TH FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>16 OCT 67</td>
<td>11 NOV 67</td>
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<td>5. 18TH ENGR EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>2 OCT 67</td>
<td>29 NOV 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. A HTRY 38TH FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>24 OCT 67</td>
<td>3 DEC 67</td>
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<td>8. 4/46TH INF EN 18TH DIV</td>
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**Training in Progress**

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<td>2. C HTRY 38TH FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>6 NOV 67</td>
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<td>3. 1/50TH INF EN 18TH DIV</td>
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**Units to be Trained**

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<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>Completion Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1/43D INF EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>11 MAR 68</td>
<td>5 APR 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. B HTRY 181ST FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td>8 APR 68</td>
<td>3 MAY 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. A HTRY 181ST FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. C HTRY 182D FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. B HTRY 182D FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. A HTRY 182D FA EN 18TH DIV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inclosure: *Training suspended or deferred due to operational commitments.*
RF/FF OUTPOST CLASSIFICATION

CATEGORY "A" INSTALLATION HAS:
1. Fighting Bunkers.
2. All Bunkers have overhead cover.
3. Automatic Weapons.
4. Barriers consisting of at least three strands of Barbed wire—100 Meters in Depth.
5. Excellent fields of fire—500 Meters.
7. AP Mines.
8. Artillery Support.

CATEGORY "B" INSTALLATION HAS:
1. Overhead Cover.
2. Bunkers.
3. Adequate Barrier wire (150 meters to 200 meters wide).
4. AP Mines.
5. Artillery Support.
6. Adequate Fields of fire—300 Meters.
7. Communication with other outpost.

CATEGORY "C" INSTALLATION HAS:
1. Overhead Cover.
2. Barrier wire (100 meters to 50 meters wide).
3. Artillery Support.
5. Communications with other outpost.

CATEGORY "D" INSTALLATION HAS:
1. Has no Bunkers.
2. Less than 50 Meters of Barrier wire.
3. Poor fields of fire—100 Meters.
4. Excellent Enemy Approaches.
5. No Artillery Support and few Mines.