UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD510128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>unclassified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>confidential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIMITATION CHANGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 10 Jul 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, [Army] Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AUTHORITY

| OAG, D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980; OAG, D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980 |

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

Best Available Copy

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG John M. Wright, Jr., subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Inc1

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command
Commandants
US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Aviation School

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

Best Available Copy
AVHCC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG John M. Wright, Jr.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG John M. Wright, Jr. The report covers the period 25 May 1969 - 25 May 1970, during which time MG Wright served as Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

2. MG Wright is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

1 Incl as (trip)
2 cy wd HQ, DA

Regarded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Chemical School
US Army Combat Surveillance School
US Army Electronic Warfare School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
Chief of Military History
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commanding Generals
US Army Electronics Command
US Army Weapons Command
III Corps, ATTN: Director, Project MASSTER
Chief of Staff, USAF
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commandant
Armed Forces Staff College
Defense Intelligence School
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
The National War College
Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command
The Air University Library
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
Office of the Commanding General
APO 96383

AVDG-CG

11 May 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer's Debriefing Report

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375


2. (C) General:

   a. Throughout the period of my tour as Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) all of the resources of the division have been focused on achieving the objectives of the accelerated pacification campaign. Operations have been aimed at destroying and neutralizing VC, VCI, guerrillas, and local forces in the populated areas; locating and destroying NVA units which operate in the piedmont, make intrusions into the populated areas, and support VC, VCI, guerrillas, and local forces; and locating and destroying NVA forces, supplies, and installations in the mountains and jungle before they can interfere with pacification.

   b. I have maintained the policy of conducting all combat operations in coordination with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), Thu Thien Province and district officials, and territorial forces. I have constantly emphasized to my staff, subordinate commanders and their staffs, and the individual soldier, the importance of considering every action in relation to its impact on pacification and development in the province. Throughout the past year, major portions of the division's assets, including not
only aircraft and fire support, but skills and abilities, have been used to support the Vietnamese leadership, both military and civilian, in attaining the goals of established programs. The progress made has been most encouraging.

c. The 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) is an outstanding combat division. It is led by competent, professional, energetic officers whose aggressive spirit permeates the organization. Released from static security missions and free to carry the battle to the enemy, the division does well on the battlefield.

d. Continued improvement in the effectiveness of territorial forces is required if the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) is to remain mobile, flexible, and free of the constraints imposed by static security missions in the lowlands. The 101st Airborne Division's program to train territorial forces has been closely coordinated with the USMC Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program and with the advisory effort in the province. Substantial progress has been made; however, further energizing of the program is required. The enemy's avowed goal of disrupting this effort reinforces my belief that close-in security provided by territorial forces will be a key factor in complete Vietnamization of the war.

3. (U) Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel, administration, and personnel support have immediate and direct effect upon the individual soldier. Efficient handling of these matters is essential to the maintenance of the high morale necessary to accomplish the difficult tasks required of the men in the division. Personnel services must be continuous from the day a soldier joins the organization until he leaves, and, in many cases, they must continue after he departs.

b. Assignment of officers has been of particular concern to me because of the critical impact their proper utilization has on the effectiveness of the division and because of the effect these assignments have on the individual's career development.

c. Two areas of particular concern throughout my tour have been reenlistment and safety. The skills required in today's Army, particularly in view of the constant personnel turbulence, demand an aggressive program.
to retain high quality soldiers. Significant strides have been made in this area. Safety, both on the ground and in the air, has received my close, personal attention. We can ill afford the reduction in combat power caused by thoughtless or careless acts. A vigorous program to reduce nonbattle casualties was implemented and emphasized at every opportunity. Results accomplished in aviation safety have been particularly noteworthy.

4. (U) Logistics: The internal management of supply and maintenance functions has been significantly improved. Customer and demand satisfaction rates, ASL zero balances, and the operational readiness rates of aircraft, armament, electronic, and automotive items have shown marked improvement. Effective resource utilization and a vigorous cost reduction program have played a major role in the division's ability to sustain operations at the required level with a minimum expenditure of resources.

5. (C) Civic Action and Psychological Operations:
   
a. The principal objectives of the division's civic action program have been to improve the image of the Government of Vietnam and the living conditions of the people. Through liaison and coordination with local officials, extensive repair and construction projects were initiated and completed, medical assistance and health training were conducted, and assistance in the resettlement of refugees was accomplished. Results are reflected in the improved attitude of the people to help themselves and counter the efforts of the Viet Cong.

   b. All available means of communication have been exploited and expanded to influence all groups — friendly, neutral, or hostile — to support both military and civilian organizations in achieving the Government of Vietnam's national objectives. Psychological operations have been fully integrated into all tactical and pacification operations conducted by the division. Evidence of deterioration in the enemy's morale and increased popular support for the Government reflect the success of these efforts.

6. (U) Combat Operations. The combined combat operations of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) have forced all major enemy elements out of the populated lowlands and kept them at bay while providing security for the training and building effort to prepare the Vietnamese people for their own defense. The territorial
forces training program has seen Regional Force units operate in the can-
opied jungle areas for the first time; Popular Force units are becoming
effective in providing local security to villages and hamlets; and the
development of the previously non-existent People's Self Defense Force
is encouraging. Success of the pacification program is evidenced by the
expansion of businesses, increased construction of new homes, initiation
and completion of self-help projects, resettlement of refugees, and
heightened interest of the people in the programs of the province. In
Thua Thien Province, operations conducted during the past year have
brought the division close to the goal of our national policy of "Vietnam-
izing" the war.

7. (U) It has been a unique privilege to command this great division in
combat. I am proud of its accomplishments in its current "Rendezvous
With Destiny."

5 Inc1
1. Intelligence and Combat
   Operations
2. Administration
3. Logistics
4. Civic Action
5. Psychological Operations

JOHN M. WRIGHT, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE AND COMBAT OPERATIONS

1. (C) Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER (concluded 14 Aug 69).

   a. On 25 May 1969 enemy forces were deployed in Base Area 611 in Laos and in the western portions of Thua Thien Province. Three NVA regiments, the 6th, 9th, and 29th were located in the A Shau Valley, while the 4th and 5th Regiments operated in the Phu Loc mountains and northern Quang Nam Province and southwest of Hue, respectively. Local force units continued operations on the periphery of the populated areas.

   b. Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER began on 1 March and was aimed at interdiction of enemy base areas, infiltration routes, and lines of communications and the location, identification, and destruction of NVA/VC forces and infrastructure. The scope of the operation changed on 15 May, when the 1st Brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, and supporting units moved to Tam Ky and initiated Operation LAMAR PLAIN under the operational control of the Americal Division. The remaining units were repositioned to compensate for this reduction in available forces. The 3d Brigade conducted operations in the A Shau Valley, and the 2d Brigade operated generally in the lowland areas of Thua Thien Province. This alignment of units remained in effect until the 1st Brigade returned to division control in mid-August. Operation KENTUCKY JUMPER marked the successful transition of the division from an airborne to an airmobile configuration and was characterized by multi-battalion airmobile assaults and continued close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). From this close relationship evolved techniques of coordination and personal and professional relationships which were refined in subsequent operations. Additionally, a noticeable improvement in the morale and fighting ability of the ARVN soldier and ARVN units became obvious. Enemy losses during this operation were 1675 NVA/VC KIA, 41 captured, and 5 Hoi Chanhs. During the period 25 May to 14 Aug, one brigade operation already in progress was terminated and two additional operations began.

   (1) APACHE SNOW (concluded 7 Jun 69). This operation by the 3d Brigade and the 1st Regiment (ARVN), conducted in coordination with the 9th Marine Regiment (US) and 3d Regiment (ARVN), was designed to defeat enemy forces in the northern A Shau Valley. Airmobile multi-battalion assaults along the Laotian border placed forces between enemy positions and their sanctuary areas, forcing them to stand and fight. APACHE SNOW was a classic campaign in which the enemy was found, fixed, and
destroyed in place. As a result of this operation, the 7th and 8th Battalions, 29th NVA Regiment were rendered combat ineffective and withdrew across the border into Laos, having suffered 691 killed and five PW. Additionally, 241 individual and 40 crew-served weapons, and large amounts of equipment were captured.

(2) MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS (8 Jun - 14 Aug 69). In the northern A Shau Valley, the 6th and 9th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment had been operating with little interference. Additionally, the 803d NVA Regiment's location was confirmed as being in the Rao Lao Valley area with the mission of attacking and harassing Allied fire support bases in the A Shau. Movement of the 675th Artillery Regiment into eastern Base Area 611 was also monitored. This operation was designed to deny the enemy the use of the A Shau Valley, an area that was vital to his logistical and tactical staging. Contact during the first week was sporadic. However, on 14 and 15 June, two sapper attacks against Fire Support Bases Derchtogaden and Currahee resulted in 84 NVA KIA. The 3d Brigade, with the 3d ARVN Regiment, maintained constant pressures on the enemy by a combination of airmobile assaults and armored reconnaissance operations. Taking maximum advantage of the flexibility inherent in airmobility and the firepower of the armored task force, every contact was rapidly reinforced and exploited. At the close of MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS, the enemy had suffered 451 killed, 8 PWs, and over 270 individual and crew-served weapons captured. The 9th Battalion, 29th Regiment was forced to withdraw into Laos, and heavy casualties had been inflicted on the sapper units of the 803d Regiment.

(3) CAMPBELL STREAMER (11 Jul - 15 Aug 69). Throughout the early summer months, Phu Loc District continued to experience a significant number of enemy initiated incidents. In June, attacks on US and GVN installations along QL1 culminated in a sapper attack against FSB Tomahawk. Additionally, the Phu Loc Armed Battalion, in conjunction with the 4th NVA Regiment continued to intensify the hue-Da Nang railroad and QL1. In conjunction with the 54th ARVN Regiment, the 2d Brigade initiated a two-phased operation to defeat the enemy and to force him deeper into the mountains away from the population centers and lines of communication. Systematic, detailed searches followed the initial air assaults into the area, and enemy contact was light throughout the initial phase of the operation. Phase II of the plan expanded operations into northern Quang Nam Province, but enemy contact remained light. To facilitate future airmobile operations in the Phu Loc mountain area,
all participating units executed an extensive LZ construction program. At the close of CAMPBELL STREAMER, the Phi Loc Armed Battalion had been forced to withdraw deeper into the mountains, enemy initiated incidents decreased significantly, and the enemy had lost 58 killed, six PW, and 57 individual and ten crew-served weapons captured.

2. (C) Operation RICHLAND SQUARE (15 Aug - 28 Sep 69).

a. This operation began as the 1st Brigade returned to division control after three months under OPCON of the Americal Division. Brigade missions and AOs were assigned, and coordination/liaison responsibility with ARVN units fixed. The concept underlying the operation and the close working relationships established during its course were to have significant impact on all future operations. The basic concept of RICHLAND SQUARE was to provide the degree of security for the population required for accelerated pacification while continuing to interdict enemy lines of communication and base areas in the A Shau Valley. The disposition of forces under this concept was instrumental in segregating NVA and local force units from the VC infrastructure, thus denying them access to the people.

b. Three brigade operations were conducted as part of RICHLAND SQUARE.

(1) CUMBERLAND THUNDER. The 1st Brigade, in cooperation with the 3d ARVN Regiment, initiated this operation against the 5th NVA Regiment and local force units operating in the Phu Loc mountains. Contact throughout the operation was light, with the enemy avoiding decisive engagement. Sporadic contact with trail watchers, snipers, and rice collecting parties accounted for the majority of enemy contacts. Enemy losses were 83 KIA, one PW, and 35 individual and three crew-served weapons captured.

(2) CLAIBORNE CHUTE. The fall rice harvest, which was to begin on 20 August in Thua Thien Province, was anticipated to be a major target of enemy activity. Elements of the 7th Front and the 5th and 6th NVA Regiments were believed to be moving into positions to disrupt the harvest. The 2d Brigade, in cooperation with the 1st ARVN Regiment, conducted intensive security operations along QL1 and reconnaissance-in-force operations in the rocket belt area. Saturation patrolling successfully interrupted enemy efforts to infiltrate rice collecting parties into the
populated areas. The rice harvest was accomplished without interruption, and the enemy suffered 34 KIA, two PW, and over 75 individual and crew-served weapons captured.

(3) LOUISIANA LEE. Airmobile assaults and armored reconnaissance operations of the 3d Brigade and 3d ARVN Regiment maintained Allied dominance in the A Shau Valley. After having sustained heavy casualties for the preceding five months, the enemy avoided contact and employed indirect fire attacks against firebase supporting the operation. In order to conduct surveillance over the maximum area, units were deployed in small reconnaissance teams and patrolled toward and along the Laotian border. Relying on airmobility to react to enemy contacts, this tactic was successful in maintaining pressure on the enemy and forced him to continue his westward movement into Laos. As a result of this operation, the enemy was effectively denied the use of the A Shau Valley and, in addition to the loss of large cache sites, he suffered 67 KIA, three PW, and over 30 individual and crew-served weapons captured.

3. (C) Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE (29 Sep - 6 Dec 69).

a. In August, the division staff began detailed studies on the expected effect of the pending monsoon season on the division's ability to sustain operations in the mountainous regions of the AO, particularly in the A Shau Valley. Although weather would be a major factor influencing the division's ability to keep open the air and ground lines of communication into the A Shau Valley, the decision was made in early September to maintain forces in the A Shau Valley. This decision was altered shortly thereafter, when the division was assigned the mission to screen the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division from Quang Tri Province. A study of the mission, requiring a brigade of two infantry battalions, dictated a revision of the earlier estimate and decision. To maintain forces in Quang Tri Province and in the A Shau Valley would have major impacts on the division's ability to support pacification in the populated lowlands. Therefore the decision was made to relocate forces out of the A Shau Valley and to increase security in the lowlands. The brigade operation conducted to screen the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division was designated Operation NOON FALLS and is discussed in paragraph 3b below. The operations of the 1st and 2d Brigades in the lowland and piedmont areas were characterized by small unit patrols and ambushes. These operations, designed to prevent NVA/VC units from using the population as a source of supplies and recruits, effectively stopped the flow of rice from the lowlands into the mountains. Total enemy casualties for
CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC SQUARE were 254 KIA, sixteen PW, three Hoi Chanhs, and 182 individual and crew-served weapons captured.

b. Operation NORTON FALLS (29 Sep - 3 Nov 69). This operation was conducted by the 3d Brigade to screen the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division from Quang Tri Province. Operating from a command post at the Mai Loc CIDG camp, the 3d Brigade deployed two battalions west of Vandergrift Combat Base in small reconnaissance teams. The ability rapidly to insert and extract forces in critical areas permitted maintaining pressure on the enemy while insuring the uninterrupted movement of the 3d Marine Division. During this period, elements of the division accounted for 65 enemy killed and over 30 weapons captured.

c. Operation SATURATE (5 Oct - 4 Dec 69). This operation was conducted by the 1st Bn (Ambi), 327th Inf in coordination with elements of the 54th ARVN Regiment and Thua Thien Sector forces. Not planned as part of REPUBLIC SQUARE, this operation was entirely conceived, executed, and controlled by the sector headquarters. Operational techniques for the coordination of US, ARVN, and territorial forces were further refined. In addition to the combat operations conducted, a training program for territorial forces was initiated by the battalion. The experience gained in the training of territorial forces was to assist in the development of a division training program aimed at upgrading the effectiveness of these forces. Although only eight enemy KIA were attributed to the US unit participating in the operation, the overall result of the operation was the virtual elimination of the VC infrastructure from Phu Thu District. At the start of the operation, the strength of the VCI was estimated at 50 to 70. By the conclusion of the operation this estimate was reduced to 18.

4. (C) Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (7 Dec 69 - 31 Mar 70).

a. With the relocation of division units into the lowland and piedmont areas, the enemy began a general eastward movement toward the population centers. No major offensive activity was noted as the enemy appeared to concentrate on the movement of supplies, the establishment of forward base areas, and the infiltration of some units toward the edge of the mountainous region. This eastward movement continued throughout the period of this operation with the enemy taking advantage of the northeast monsoon.

b. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN was developed in coordination with
CONFIDENTIAL

the lst Inf Div (ARVN) and Thua Thien Province/Sector officials to provide a single concept reflecting a fully integrated effort to accelerate the attainment of all the objectives of the Province Pacification and Development Plan. The operation epitomized the "one war concept," with emphasis on training of local forces and combined operations with Regional and Popular Force units. The disposition of forces within the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) area of operations was designed to provide the maximum flexibility possible in order to respond to any situation in NICTZ and to establish a shield of security behind which pacification and development in the populated lowlands could progress. Extensive offensive operations were conducted on the periphery of the populated lowlands to locate, interdict, and destroy enemy forces. Quick reaction, limited objective operations were conducted west of the piedmont region in response to hard intelligence, and periodic interdiction of the A Shau Valley was conducted on a continuous basis. Dedicated forces were assigned to train and upgrade the territorial forces and eliminate the VCLF/VCI operating in Phong Dien and Phu Loc Districts. Mobile training teams were formed to train territorial forces in those districts in which divisional units did not habitually operate. All operations conducted by the division were considered in relation to their direct contribution to achieving the objectives set forth in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan. Improvement in the combat effectiveness of territorial forces was encouraging. By upgrading the capability of PSDF units to secure their hamlets and villages, PF units would be released to provide security for key installations and lines of communication. This capability would, in turn, permit RF companies to become more mobile and assume responsibility for security operations on the fringe areas of the populated lowlands, releasing ARVN units for operations deeper into the mountains. The first tangible evidence of the success of this concept appeared in March, when territorial forces relieved the lst Inf Div (ARVN) of the responsibility for the security of the Hue Citadel.

c. Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, through the combined efforts of US/GVN forces, significantly furthered the mutual goals and objectives of the governments of Vietnam and the United States and better prepared GVN forces to assume the responsibility for combat, pacification, and psychological operations in Thua Thien Province. Enemy losses were 668 KIA, 19 PWS, and 323 individual and 35 crew-served weapons captured.

5. (C) Operation TEXAS STAR (1 Apr - continuing). Throughout the conduct of RANDOLPH GLEN, enemy forces continued eastward movement. By March, they posed a significant threat to the success of the pacification
effort in the lowlands. Enemy forces opposing the division at this time had increased to the highest level since the Tet offensive of 1968. TEXAS STAR was designed as a continuation of the concepts evolved during RANDOLPH GLEN. The major differences were changes in brigade AOs and responsibilities and the extension of brigade operations deeper into the mountain regions. A major planning consideration for this operation was the knowledge that in time, all or part of the division would leave Thua Thien Province. Brigade AOs were adjusted in order to preclude a major change in the close working relationships previously established at the district level and to minimize the impact on operations of the departure of any division elements from the area. The 2d Brigade was assigned the mission to support pacification in the lowland areas, while the 1st and 3d Brigades focused their attention on operations deeper into the canopy. The adjustment of ARVN regimental AOs coincided with the changing brigade AOs, and the close working relationship established between 101st and ARVN units continued uninterrupted. This disposition of forces will cause the least turbulence and have the least impact on attainment of complete pacification in Thua Thien Province when elements of the division are required in other areas of Vietnam.

6. (C) Intelligence Collection Effort.

a. Air Cavalry. Every major operation conducted by the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) made maximum use of the assigned air cavalry squadron. The progressive expansion of the division reconnaissance and surveillance zone caused an increase in requirements for air cavalry coverage. This need was filled in December 1969 with the conversion of Company A, 101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) to Troop F (Prov), 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. This provisional air cavalry troop was employed to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the piedmont regions of the division area of operation until it was deactivated and reconfigured as an assault helicopter company in March 1970.

b. Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance.

(1) Visual reconnaissance assets increased from two OID sorties per day to 12 sorties per day in February 1970. This increase permitted daily VR of the western DMZ, Loatian border, and major infiltration routes.

(2) The Imagery Interpretation Section, 101st MI Co (Div) was moved from Camp Eagle and collocated with the signal photo laboratory at Phu
Bai Combat Base in July 1969, thereby reducing the time required to deliver results of photographic missions to the requesting unit.

(3) Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) missions were conducted to provide information on areas of interest, to assist in locating enemy base areas and cache sites, and to detect enemy movement. The brigades conducted Sniffer missions in their respective areas of operation, while the 2d Sqdn (Ambt), 17th Cav conducted missions in the reconnaissance zone and special missions requested by the brigades. The division chemical section provided technical assistance.

c. Ground Surveillance.

(1) In September 1969, the G2 ground surveillance section was formed and assumed responsibility for all ground surveillance activities, to include radars, anti-intrusion devices, and unattended ground sensors. At that time, 17 sensor strings were being read out by seven monitor sites. By March 1970, the number of sensor strings increased to 47, with 24 additional strings in the division reconnaissance and surveillance zone monitored by Air Force EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft.

(2) In August 1969, the 101st Abn Div (Ambt) initiated a program for assisting 1st Inf Div (ARVN) units in training and procurement of sensor equipment. This program quickly expanded to include implant missions as well as opening new monitor sites.

(3) Ground surveillance radars were redistributed within the division, providing two AN/PPS 5 radars per infantry battalion and two AN/PPS 4 radars in each brigade headquarters. Three additional AN/PPS 4 radars were retained in the 801st Main Bn as maintenance floats.

(4) In October 1969, the division developed the radar raid. Conducted by moving frequently AN/PPS 4 or 5 radars with a security force to dominant terrain features outside firebases, these raids provided surveillance along routes of infiltration previously masked by terrain. By conducting raids within existing artillery fans and providing coordinated quick-fire channels, targets discovered were rapidly engaged.

d. Counter-Intelligence.

(1) The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) continued to provide reliable intelligence information and led to the capture of large quantities of enemy equipment and more than 50 NVA/VC KIA since June 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL

(2) In February 1970, the mission of the counter-intelligence section, 101st MI Co (Div) changed from direct support of the brigades to area support of the division. This change in mission allowed the most efficient employment of available counter-intelligence assets when the section was reduced in strength from 24 to 16 personnel and was required to assume the counter-intelligence security responsibilities of Phu Bai Combat Base upon departure of the XXIV Corps security section.

e. Liaison. The ACoS, G2 requires daily contact with numerous US and GVN military, paramilitary, and civilian organizations operating in Thua Thien Province. Agencies with which intelligence and counter-intelligence information is exchanged include:

G2 Security Section, XXIV Corps, Da Nang.
525th Combat Evaluation Group, Saigon.
Det A, 1st Bn, 525th MI Gp, Quang Tri City.
Det B, 1st Bn, 525th MI Gp, Thua Thien Province.
Pacification, Security and Coordination (PSC) (Static Census Grievance, Special Police, and PIC) Hue.
Phoenix/Phuong Hoang Committee, Hue.
1 PIOCC, 13 DIOCC, Thua Thien Province.
1 PIOCC, 5 DIOCC, Quang Tri Province.
Thua Thien Sector headquarters.
Strategic Research and Analysis (SRA), J2, MACV.
517th MI Detachment, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech).
National Police Advisor, Hue.
Plans and Development, G2 (CI), USARV.
Combined Action Team (CAT), Huong Tra.
3d Combined Action Group (CAG), Phu Bai.
Phoenix Training Program, Vung Tau.
524th MI Group, Da Nang.
Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer (NILO), Hue.
Korean Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), Hue.

7. (C) Lessons Learned.

a. Surveillance and Target Acquisition Program. Essential to the interdiction of enemy activity and lines of communication is a fully integrated surveillance system that incorporates aerial observation, radar detection, and artillery fire support.

(1) Aerial surveillance. Target acquisition and surveillance teams
reconnoitered throughout the AO in search of enemy emplacements and activity. Employing an OH6A and an AH1G (ARA) aircraft, acquired targets were engaged with aerial rockets, cannon artillery, and air strikes. The lowlands and piedmont areas were reconnoitered on a daily basis, using fixed-wing aircraft from XXIV Corps resources. With an experienced observer from division artillery, this program accomplished daily surveillance in specific areas and revealed any change in enemy activity. The program was designed to have an aircraft airborne at all times during daylight hours to provide maneuver units with aerial observation and adjustment of artillery fire.

(2) Radar surveillance.

(a) The AN/TPS 25 ground surveillance radar has been used extensively throughout the AO for long range surveillance. Operating at night and in all weather conditions, the radar has detected personnel and vehicles, which were then engaged by fire. The total integration of radars and other surveillance devices into a coordinated program has increased the division's ability to identify and attack enemy activity.

(b) The increasing number of enemy attacks by fire has dictated greater utilization of the AN/MPQ 4A counter-mortar radar. Frequent relocation of these radars into areas of probable attack has resulted in a significant increase in the number of suspected firing positions engaged by counter-mortar fire.

b. Combined Operations and Training with ARVN Artillery.

(1) Operations. Combined artillery operations with the 1st Inf Div Arty (ARVN) were continuous. US and ARVN artillery units were collocated on fire support bases with adjacent or combined fire direction centers to provide artillery support for combined operations of ground units. Fire requests from US and/or ARVN maneuver forces were processed and supported by the uncommitted artillery battery in range regardless of nationality. These operations not only assisted in improving the effectiveness of ARVN artillery units, but increased the responsiveness and availability of artillery support throughout the AO.

(2) Training. Programs were established with the 1st Inf Div Arty (ARVN) for training in meteorological survey, AN/MPQ 4 radar operations, chronographic equipment operation, artillery survey, airmobile artillery
techniques, fire direction, and firing battery operations. The instruction was presented in the form of practical exercises to ARVN officers and noncommissioned officers, who then conducted classes and practical exercises for their own units.

c. Artillery Quick Fire Channel with ARVN Units. The range capability of ARVN and US artillery units within a brigade or regimental area of operations often enabled units from both divisions to fire in support of combined operations. To make full use of this reinforcing capability and insure responsive fire support, the language barrier was overcome by establishing direct artillery liaison with each ARVN regimental command post. Coordination of fires, establishment of priorities, and translation of fire requests were effected rapidly through a quick-fire channel. The mission originated with the maneuver unit and was passed through the direct support artillery battalion to the regimental CP. Here it was processed by the fire support coordination elements and transmitted to a firing battery. The mission could originate from either a US or an ARVN unit.

d. Calibration of ARVN Artillery. A program was initiated to train ARVN artillery units in the use of the M-36 radar chronograph for calibration of artillery weapons in order to determine velocity error which is necessary to insure accurate delivery of fire. Extensive on-the-job training was conducted and resulted in the ability of the Vietnamese to operate and maintain chronograph equipment.

e. Artillery Raids.

(1) As the size of the division area of operations increased, the division perfected the artillery raid, a technique designed to extend available combat power into remote areas and to mass fires on enemy units, base areas, and cache sites beyond the range of artillery at fixed firebases. These raids are normally eight to 72 hours in duration and take maximum advantage of the airmobility and the aerial observation and target acquisition capabilities of the division. The majority of the raids has been conducted with 105mm and 155mm howitzer units of division artillery. However, nondondivisional units, to include XXIV Corps Artillery self-propelled howitzer/gun batteries, have been employed in support of 101st Abn Div (Amb) raids. These raids have served to deny the enemy the unrestricted freedom of movement he previously enjoyed in known base and storage areas.
(2) Experience has demonstrated that artillery raids are best conducted and controlled by a brigade headquarters. The decision to conduct a raid is normally made at division level. The target area is selected based on all available intelligence, and a specific area of operation for the raid is assigned to the brigade headquarters. Division artillery or nondivisional artillery elements support the raid with the requested or available number of firing batteries. The controlling brigade headquarters tasks an OPCON battalion to provide security, and division makes the required aviation lift available. A typical package would include one 105mm howitzer battery, one 155mm howitzer battery (—) (three howitzers), one rifle company for security, and air cavalry assets for target acquisition, bomb damage assessments and, when required, aerial observation and adjustment of fire. The division artillery normally provides aerial observers.

(3) In order to conduct artillery raids on short notice, the division developed and published standing operating procedures in the form of an operations plan. Contingency loads, assembled to support all quick reaction operations, are immediately available to support artillery raids. Particularly during the monsoon period these raids served the important secondary purpose of maintaining airmobility expertise in artillery units that would otherwise remain in a static position for extended periods.

f. Operation LIFESAVIII. The ability of an airmobile division to react rapidly in mountainous and jungle regions depends upon the availability of suitable landing zones. Maneuver elements in the division were tasked to construct expedient one-ship LZs at the rate of one per company-sized unit per day. Landing zone clearing teams, composed of pathfinder, engineer, and infantry personnel, were then formed to enter, expand, and improve expedient LZs to deliberate two-ship landing zones. Each brigade furnished a priority list of existing expedient landing zones requiring improvement. Utilizing demolition, hand tools and chainsaws, the LZ was enlarged and cleared of obstacles to provide level touchdown points for two UH-1 aircraft. Approach and departure routes were established based on prevailing winds and were cleared to provide the optimum angle of approach for aircraft. The location and characteristics of each LZ were then programmed into the 1005 computer for recall as required.

g. Employment of Bulk Flame Drops in Mine and Booby Trap Clearing Operations. The enemy's extensive use of mines and booby traps required an effective method of both detecting and neutralizing these devices and reducing the number of accidental detonations during clearing operations. A thickened fuel/flame mixture consisting of either mogas or JP-4 and
three to six percent M-4 thickener provided excellent results in burning wet vegetated areas. During clearing operations in a large mined and booby trapped area in Phong Dien District, the employment of flame drops resulted in 13 secondary explosions and the exposure or neutralization of 27 booby traps of various types. The accidental detonation rate in the area was reduced from 40 to 15 percent.

h. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations. An effective method of employing the XM3 system, with rapid interpretation of readings and engagement of enemy targets, was necessary to realize the full potential of the system in interdiction operations. An APD team, composed of a UH1H helicopter, carrying the XM3 device and a AH1G gunship providing cover, was employed. The AH1G served as a command and control ship to guide the APD through designated areas and plot "hot spots" as they were detected. The intelligence gathered was passed on to the G2/S2 or mission requesting agency for action. In areas cleared for engagement, the gunship fired on targets as they were confirmed. A third aircraft may be added to the team for command and control, freeing the AH1G gunship to engage freely targets of opportunity.

i. Defoliation Operations. Extensive defoliation has been conducted to deny the enemy the concealment provided by the jungle canopy. Additional defoliation was conducted around firebases to clear fields of fire. Large scale defoliation in the uninhabited areas of the AO was accomplished by the Air Force Ranchhand program, while firebase defoliation and missions in or near populated areas were conducted using helicopter-mounted sprayers.

j. Employment of CS. Riot control agent CS proved to be an effective means of neutralizing hard enemy targets and restricting the use of base areas without the excessive expenditure of firepower. CS is most appropriately used against bunkers, caves and tunnels, and to restrict the enemy's use of roads, lines of communications, and base camps. It can be effectively employed in areas where the enemy is intermingled with the civilian population, making the normal application of firepower impossible without causing casualties to civilians or material damage to the villages and hamlets. The use of powdered CS crystals to restrict the enemy's use of lines of communications, base areas, and certain key terrain has caused him to relocate and establish new routes and base areas. This impedes infiltration and makes him vulnerable to a directed intelligence collection effort.
Powdered CS crystals have also been successfully used for seeding caves, bunkers, and tunnel complexes by placing the agent throughout and sealing the entrance with explosives. Captured documents indicate that when used in this role, the CS has remained effective for periods of three months to one year.

k. Coordination with Vietnamese Forces. Objectives of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) have been projected toward the time when division responsibilities will extend beyond the boundaries of Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces. At that time, the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) will be heavily committed to provide protection for the populated lowlands until territorial forces are technically and tactically capable of assuming greater responsibility for security. The division has directed a major effort toward reducing the time required before territorial forces can assume this responsibility.

(1) Operations and training. In an effort to speed the development of territorial forces, division units were committed to train Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and People's Self Defense Forces. The objective was to set into motion a series of improvements, ultimately resulting in the total assumption of population security responsibilities by territorial forces. The first step in this program was to prepare the PSDF and PF for security missions in areas near villages and hamlets. The accomplishment of this task will release Regional Forces from static security posts and allow them to conduct combat operations along the periphery of the populated areas. This employment of RF will, in turn, free ARVN units to conduct combat operations in the canopied jungle areas to defeat the NVA/VC forces. Extensive training of GVN forces was conducted through combined combat operations with ARVN and paramilitary forces; through employment of two US infantry battalions dedicated to operations within specified districts; and formation of mobile training teams.

(2) Collocation of battalion CPs with VN district headquarters. In Phong Dien and Phu Loc Districts, two "dedicated" battalions, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, collocated their battalion headquarters with the respective district headquarters. This measure greatly facilitated the cooperation and coordination necessary to conduct extensive combined operations and training. RF units located in other districts rotated into Phong Dien or Phu Loc Districts to conduct combined operations and on-the-job training tailored to their specific requirements. By utilizing this rotation system, a maximum number of companies benefitted from the training provided by the two "dedicated" battalions.
8. (C) Training.

a. Combat Commanders' Course. On 5 August 1969, a Combat Commanders' Course was established for newly assigned company grade officers. The course is presented upon completion of replacement training and is designed to review airmobile tactics and techniques prior to the individual's arrival in his unit. The POI is based in part on instruction that newly assigned officers most frequently request. It is designed to provide a thorough understanding of tactical operations conducted by the division and to increase self-confidence among junior officers. Subjects consist of ambush and patrolling, company and platoon tactics, combat demolitions, airmobile operations, and fire support. The course includes informal discussion periods that familiarize the students with division policies and procedures and answer questions concerning the current tactical situation.

b. Combat Leaders' Course. Selected enlisted personnel in the grades of E4 and E5 demonstrating leadership potential receive a one week course on leadership and small unit tactics. Aimed at the leader and potential leader at squad level, this course has been instrumental in providing improved leadership within infantry platoons.

c. Sniper School. A sniper training program was instituted in September 1969 using a cadre formed from within the division. In January 1970, a sniper instructor team, trained at Fort Benning, was assigned to the division and is now responsible for all sniper training. Snipers are currently employed in all infantry battalions, brigade security platoons, and the cavalry squadron. In order to improve sniper employment throughout the division, the sniper school cadre makes three day liaison visits to battalions to assist commanders in more efficient planning and employment of trained snipers.

d. Airmobile Operations. An introduction to airmobile operations is presented to newly assigned officers through the division's airmobile operations school. The purpose of the school is to familiarize commanders and staff officers with policies, procedures, and techniques for the employment and utilization of aircraft and the conduct of airmobile operations. Presented every six weeks, the school has attracted students from the 1st Inf Div (ARVN); the 1st Aviation Brigade; the 173d Airborne Brigade; and the 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div (Mech). Attached at Tab 1 is a typical program of instruction.
**e. Aviation Training.** In order to maintain the highest possible proficiency within aviation units, an extensive aviation training program was initiated. The primary areas of concern were OH6A transition and UH1H instructor pilot training. Both programs were conducted by the division flight standardization section, under the supervision of the division aviation officer, and provided the pilots and instructor pilots required for sustained, safe operations.

9. (C) Problems: The following problems beyond the capability of the division to solve completely were encountered. They have been identified previously in other correspondence or presented as problem areas to representatives of interested agencies/staffs during visits to the division. They are reiterated in this report because of their impact on the division's operations.

a. Inadequate Airmobile Engineer Training in Army Training Centers.

(1) Discussion. Engineer enlisted personnel attending Army training centers or CONUS schools receive no training on airmobile engineer techniques or equipment. For officers, airmobile training consists primarily of a general orientation on operations, with little or no specific instruction in airmobile engineer techniques. As a result, all newly assigned engineers, regardless of grade or position, must be given on-the-job training upon assignment to the airmobile engineer battalion. This training places a significant burden on the unit. The unique employment of airmobile engineer equipment necessitates a complete training program in operations and maintenance, equipment breakdown and re-assembly, and in preparation of equipment for transportation by helicopter.

(2) Recommendations.

(a) That the Department of the Army/Office of the Chief of Engineers jointly review CONUS engineer training programs to incorporate specific airmobile engineer training in AIT centers and in CONUS schools, as applicable. This training should be provided to engineer enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and officers who are designated for assignment to airmobile engineer units.

(b) That an MOS suffix/prefix be established to identify qualified/trained airmobile engineer personnel.

b. Inadequate Engineer Repair Parts, Supply, and New Development of Airmobile Engineer Equipment.

(1) Discussion:

(a) Inadequate repair parts. The airmobile engineer battalion equipment authorization was established in 1964-65. All equipment was classified at that time as nonstandard or limited standard. Repair parts were
acquired based on limited operational experience and through bulk procurement, and issued on a one time basis. Repair parts were provided to the airmobile unit as "push packages" rather than through normal supply channels. In 1969, airmobile engineer equipment was reclassified to standard and limited standard. This classification will result in the supply system's eventually carrying airmobile engineer equipment repair parts. However, difficulties and shortages are expected to continue due to a lack of established demand data and the insufficient density of these items in the Army inventory. It is therefore recommended that the standard stockage criteria not be applied to airmobile engineer equipment repair parts.

(b) Airmobile engineer equipment end item supply. The division has never been issued its full TOE authorization of airmobile engineer equipment. Although a valid requirement undoubtedly exists for airmobile engineer equipment in other units, it is required to supplement normal combat engineer equipment. In the airmobile division it is the only engineer equipment available, and any shortage has detrimental effects on operational support provided. It is recommended that airmobile engineer battalions be brought to authorized equipment levels on a priority basis, and that additional airmobile engineer equipment be procured to satisfy non-airmobile engineer requirements and to provide replacements for combat or maintenance losses.

(c) Airmobile engineer equipment development. The current airmobile engineer equipment was procured/developed in 1963-65 based on the lift capability of aircraft at that time. Engineer equipment presently available has failed to keep pace with the increased lift capability of the division's organic helicopters. It is recommended that appropriate Army agencies be tasked to review and expedite airmobile engineer equipment development in consonance with aircraft development and increased lift capabilities. Specific examples of equipment that should be reviewed/developed are:

1. 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton dump trucks rather than 3/4 ton dump trucks.
3. Tracked backhoe/loader rather than the TD 3414 wheeled vehicle.
4. 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton wrecker rather than the 3/4 ton wrecker.
(2) Recommendations.

(a) That special consideration be given to the establishment of separate stockage criteria for airmobile engineer equipment repair parts.

(b) That airmobile engineer equipment end items be procured in sufficient quantity to fully equip airmobile engineer battalions and other users, as appropriate, to include a "float" for combat/maintenance losses.

c. Engineer Support.

(1) Discussion. The airmobile engineer battalion organization was developed under the concept that an organic general support capability would not be required due to the nature of airmobile operations and that, if necessary, this support would be provided by a general support Army engineer unit. Although the concept proved valid during the early phases of airmobile operations in RVN, present requirements exceed the degree of support envisioned in the developmental phases of airmobility. In addition to direct combat support to committed units, the division engineer battalion is committed to tactical road projects, civic action support, and fire support maintenance support. These general support type missions are currently performed by diverting assets from the direct support companies.

(2) Recommendation. That a general support unit be added to the organization of the airmobile engineer battalion. Consideration should be given to providing this support by augmentation in stability operations.

d. Training of communications personnel in MOS 31M, 05B, and 05C.

(1) Discussion. Communications personnel being assigned to the division in these MOS are inadequately trained on the equipment employed in the division, specifically the AN/MEC68 and AN/GRC163 four channel terminals, and the AN/VSC2 and AN/GRC162 SSB/RATT radios and associated VRECTOR equipment. An extensive OJT program has been required and has degraded operational capabilities, especially in the AM/SSB nets.

(2) Recommendation. That personnel being assigned to division signal units be trained on the equipment used by those units.
e. FM Frequency Interference.

(1) Discussion. The airmobile division is susceptible to unique FM radio frequency interference problems caused by frequent movement of aircraft and units throughout the AO. Frequency engineering procedures are utilized in assigning sole user and common user frequencies in order to minimize interference. This, however, has been only partially effective. Requiring radios to be operated on low power whenever possible also has alleviated part of the difficulty, but mutual interference remains a significant problem.

(2) Recommendation. That the airmobile division be assigned sufficient frequencies to provide sole user channels on command and operations/intelligence nets down to maneuver and aviation battalion level.

f. Lack of Ranger Trained Personnel for Company L, 75th Infantry (Ranger).

(1) Discussion.

(a) Under TOE 7-157G the ranger company is authorized three officers and 84 enlisted men, organized into two patrol platoons of five ranger patrols of six men each. Experience gained over the past year in employing these small teams in remote areas has clearly shown that every man assigned to the company should be a graduate of the Army Infantry School's Ranger Course. The tasks assigned to these teams require the skills, leadership ability, and endurance developed by the ranger course. In my view, there is no substitute for this training.

(b) It is recognized that all personnel who successfully complete the ranger course at Fort Benning are promoted to sergeant if not already in that grade or higher. This will require a slight modification of the existing program to receive and train replacement packets for units in Vietnam.

(c) The MOS identifier code "G" is used to identify ranger qualified enlisted personnel, "P" to denote parachutists. Only one MOS identifier code is used in personnel rosters. The suffix "P" is more commonly recorded than the "G" when an individual holds both. This is due primarily to the significance of the suffix in the pay system. TOE 7-157G does not list the MOS identifier suffix "G" as a requirement. This system makes
more difficult the identification of ranger qualified personnel. In addition, the TOE does not constitute a basis for placing a specific requirement for enlisted ranger personnel on the replacement system.

(2) Recommendations:

(a) That TOE 7-157G be annotated to reflect a specific requirement for ranger qualified personnel in the company, particularly in the two patrol platoons.

(b) That all replacements for the ranger companies in Vietnam be ranger qualified personnel.
# Program of Instruction
## 1st Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>0900-0925</td>
<td>Organization and Employment of Acft in the Airmobile Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>0925-1000</td>
<td>Air Cavalry Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000-1010</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1010-1035</td>
<td>Introduction to Support Fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1035-1105</td>
<td>Aerial Rocket Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1105-1115</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>1115-1130</td>
<td>TAC Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>1130-1145</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1145-1210</td>
<td>Chemical Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1210-1315</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>1315-1345</td>
<td>Checklist for the Air Mission Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>1345-1405</td>
<td>Pickup and Landing Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1405-1415</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1415-1435</td>
<td>Pathfinder Operation of PZ and LZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>1435-1505</td>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1505-1515</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>1515-1545</td>
<td>Communications for Airmobile Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>1545-1615</td>
<td>Aeromedical Evacuation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Program of Instruction

2d Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>0900-0940</td>
<td>Combat Assaults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>0940-1010</td>
<td>Airmobile Infantry Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1010-1025</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>1025-1045</td>
<td>CH47 Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1045-1055</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>1055-1110</td>
<td>CH54 Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>1110-1145</td>
<td>Planning a Fire Support Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>1145-1215</td>
<td>Panel: Opening and Closing a Firebase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1215-1315</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>1315-1345</td>
<td>Aircraft Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1345-1355</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>1355-1455</td>
<td>Utilization of Aircraft in Division Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1455-1505</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>1505-1535</td>
<td>Discussion Period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26
ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel and Administration. During the past year, personnel policies, administration, and personnel support activities have received close attention and continuing emphasis. These areas have the most direct effect upon the individual soldier and indirectly, through his attitudes, on everything the division does. The goal of an efficient, responsive, smoothly operating personnel system has been largely achieved.


      (1) In May 1969 the division rear was located at Bien Hoa Army Base, 450 miles south of the division headquarters and the divisional units being supported. The adjutant general and finance sections, other elements of the administration company, and the division's Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS) were the major components of the division rear. The majority of the personnel assigned to the division came from the 90th Replacement Battalion, near Long Binh. After inprocessing and completion of a five to eight day training program, replacements were shipped north to join their unit of assignment.

      (2) In June 1969 a detailed study was initiated to determine the advisability of moving the 101st elements from Bien Hoa to a location more suitable for supporting the division. This study culminated in the complete relocation of the division rear to Phu Bai in November 1969. From this location, agencies providing personnel services are more sensitive and responsive to the needs of the individual soldier. SERTS was relocated to Camp Evans, collocated with the 3d Brigade, where adequate training areas and billeting space are available.

   b. Inprocessing. The treatment the soldier receives during his first contact with the division is of crucial importance to his attitude for the remainder of his tour. Initial processing includes a records check, completion of all pending finance action, to include travel pay due, allotments, and an opportunity to participate in the savings program. By carefully explaining all pay options available and insuring that each individual's finance record is correct during this phase of processing, subsequent pay problems have been significantly reduced. During the personnel records check, each individual is questioned not only to insure that record entries are correct but also to elicit additional information of value in determining the most appropriate assignment.
c. Replacement Training. After completion of inprocessing, replacement enlisted personnel in the grades of E8 and below and all company grade and warrant officers are transported to SERTS for a five day replacement training course. This program emphasizes the individual skills required to enable the replacement to assume his duties upon joining a unit. This training also provides an orientation on the new environment in which the soldier finds himself, with emphasis on personal health habits, rules of engagement, and US - Vietnamese relations. Upon completion of the replacement training phase, company grade officers of the combat arms remain for an additional three days of training in the Combat Commanders' Course. This course is discussed in greater detail in paragraph 5a, enclosure 1.

d. Outprocessing. Personnel returning to CONUS are processed as carefully as incoming replacements. Particular attention is placed on insuring that each soldier receives all approved awards and decorations and that his records are correctly posted. The relocation of the personnel center to Phu Bai has reduced the amount of time required for outprocessing and travel and has made the personnel support facilities more responsive to the requirements of the division.

e. Officer Assignments. The assignment of officers within the division is closely monitored. Lieutenant colonels are not accepted for assignment unless commanded recommended by their branch. The assignment of majors is also closely controlled. A policy of six months command and six months staff for lieutenant colonels, and reassignment between units and staff for majors after six months has been followed. This policy has benefited the division by providing experienced commanders and staff officers at all levels while also broadening the experience of the individual concerned. Assignment of company grade officers is based on a careful analysis of individual qualifications, such as a second tour in PVN, ranger or airborne qualifications, level of military schooling, and troop unit experience. Normally, captains are not assigned to a staff position until after commanding a company/battery.

2. Morale.

a. Eagle Beach. In May 1969 the division opened Eagle Beach, an in-country R&R center. Originally designed to provide a standdown facility for rifle companies, facilities have been progressively expanded and improved and now serve over 6,000 troops each month. Infantry companies still are the largest users of the facility, with other units allocated quotas by the adjutant general.
b. Awards. Recognition of acts of achievement and valor through an aggressive awards program has provided the impetus to the maintenance of a high level of performance. Impact awards constitute a particularly significant contribution to high morale.

c. Division Band. The division band has supported both division and non-divisional units throughout northern I Corps. In addition to playing at official functions, it has provided troop entertainment on firebases, in base camps, and at Eagle Beach. As its reputation became well established, the band has been invited to play for patients in the Cam Ranh Bay and Danang hospitals. It has also responded to invitations from Vietnamese agencies to bring the music of the "Screaming Eagles" to Vietnamese soldiers and civilians.

3. Reenlistment. A hard, critical look was taken at the division reenlistment program. A study was made to determine what could be offered the first term soldier to induce him to stay in the Army for another term and to extend his tour in the division. From this study a comprehensive program was developed that provided the reenlistee with some positive incentives primarily geared to retention in the division. Training programs in general maintenance, aircraft maintenance, computer programming, administrative and personnel specialties, and for aircraft door gunners were established in units of the division. This training not only prepared the individual soldier for further advancement, but also provided to the division highly motivated and trained personnel in critical skills. The success of the program was readily apparent as the reenlistment figures approached the 500 mark during the first quarter of calendar year 1970.

4. Safety. In a war zone as well as under peace time conditions, safety is an important factor. In a combat area, however, the number of unsafe acts and potential hazards tend to increase rapidly. To reduce the accident rate, a comprehensive and aggressive safety program must be pursued. All the safety regulations and SOPs are virtually useless unless command emphasis is added to enforce compliance. To implement an effective program, a cooperative effort among ground and aviation safety officers, the provost marshal, and the division CMMI team was inaugurated. Battalion refresher training includes lectures on safety by the division safety officer. Information and guidance for unit safety officers is made available on a continuing basis. A joint MP-CMMI team program of roadside spot inspections has helped reduce the vehicle accidents caused by malfunctions and unserviceable equipment. Strict enforcement of traffic regulations has been highly successful in the reduction of accident rates.
5. Information. The information office produces several publications for information and edification of the troops. The daily "Airborne Date-line" and bi-weekly Screaming Eagle provide members of the division with current information concerning events throughout the world and unit operations in the division AO. The quarterly magazine, Rendezvous with Destiny provides feature stories about the division's activities and important events such as the Bob Hope Christmas Show. The most valuable publication produced by the information office is the History of the Screaming Eagles. This publication is distributed to all newly assigned personnel as they are processed into the division. In this manner the new "Screaming Eagle" gains an insight into what it means to be a member of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and a sense of belonging to the finest combat division in the Army. This identification with the division has a decided positive effect on the actions of each individual soldier. The other periodicals reinforce his pride and sense of unit and individual identity through the feature stories they contain.
LOGISTICS

1. General. Logistical support of the division, nondivisional, and GVN units continued to maximize the flexibility inherent in the division's air-mobility. Refinement of support concepts continued, with only minor changes from normal procedures, and those based primarily on the uniqueness of the airmobile division. The most significant modifications have been in the area of logistics management.

2. Logistical Operations.

   a. The division followed the principle of distributing all classes of supply as far forward as possible by ground transportation, thus allowing for most efficient use of aircraft.

   b. Continued command emphasis was placed on emergency resupply capability for units inaccessible by normal methods. Two instrument controlled resupply drop training missions have been flown in the last four months, confirming the division's ability to resupply and sustain operations under adverse weather conditions.

   c. During the past eleven months, a marked improvement has been registered in closing division firebases. The implementation of the following standards throughout the division has resulted in monetary savings as well as leaving a position free of equipment which could be used by the enemy:

      (1) All Class IV materials not emplaced are retrograded. Sandbags which are reusable are emptied and backhauled. Engineer stakes, barbed wire and concertina already emplaced are left to facilitate reopening of the firebase at a later date.

      (2) Class V supplies are retrograded or fired at a suitable target.

      (3) All trash is policed, burned, and buried in one location.

   d. In August 1969, the division instituted a policy of prestocking firebase construction materials. Using the experience gained from previous construction, firebase "packages" consisting of the required construction materials were prepared on pallets so as to be immediately available when needed. Typical packages are listed below.

Inc13

31
(1) Tactical operation center.
(2) Net control station.
(3) Fire direction center.
(4) Fighting and sleeping positions.

As the packages contain only those materials necessary to construct positions in a specified manner, there is assurance that firebases will have adequate positions with minimal waste of materials.

e. Camp Sally was turned over to the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) on 29 March 1970 for use as a regimental base camp. This action was accomplished in conjunction with the repositioning of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Amb) to Phu Bai Combat Base and was the first step in the transitional alignment of division elements.

3. From June 1969 through April 1970 logistical improvements in the division were achieved through refinement of management procedures. The following paragraphs summarize salient features of DISCOM operations during this period.

a. 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Airmobile).

(1) Class I - The total tonnage of Class I issued for the period was 36,586 S/T (Tab 1). The downward trend in October 1969 from 3,739 S/T to 2,392 S/T in January 1970 was due primarily to the change in weather and reduction of ice consumption. Improved accountability, depletion of excess stocks and more stringent control of ration issues also contributed to the decline. The trend is currently moving upward as demands for ice, which is the most prominent single item in considering Class I tonnage, are increasing due to the onset of the warm weather.

(2) Class II.

(a) Average demand accommodation for the period was 64% (Tab 2). The current six hundred item authorized stockage list allows for intensive management of a small number of items but does not permit a high demand accommodation rate. The favorable trend which has been occurring since September relates to the selection of high demand items for addition to the authorized stockage list and deletion of those items which, by demand experience, do not warrant retention.

(b) The demand satisfaction average for the period was 81.2%. The decline in March and April 1970 occurred because of a reduction in supply response by supporting depots in the form of extended order ship time.
increased emphasis is now being placed on expeditious shipment of critical high demand items and is expected to relieve this situation.

(c) Average authorized stockage list zero balance for the period was 37.1%. Recent increases in demands and the failure of supporting depots to meet required delivery dates account for the upward trend in March 1970.

(3) Class III - The total tonnage issued for the period was 113,683 S/T (Tab 3). The August 1969 peak of 13,031 S/T was related to increased flying hours in support of operations in the A Shau Valley. The decline starting in September 1969 and continuing through February 1970 to a low point of 8,710 S/T was attributable to the tactical employment of the division and reduced flying hours due to weather. An upward trend in March and April 1970 was experienced and is expected to continue throughout the summer. The amount of fuel consumed remains directly proportional to the flying hour program, as JP4 is the major commodity in the Class III area.

(4) Class IV - Issues peaked in August at 986 S/T as a result of the construction for Fire Support Base Rendezvous and the upgrading of Fire Support Base Blaze (Tab 4). The period 1 September 1969 to November 1969 saw a fairly steady decline; however, in December 1969 significant quantities of PSP, previously back ordered, were received and issued to upgrade parking and work areas adjacent to aircraft maintenance facilities. Significant issues of tactical wire were made during December 1969 and January 1970 to improve base camp security under the division's "Get Set For Tet" program.

(5) Class V - Total issues for the period were 47,486 S/T (Tab 5). Class V issues are directly related to major offensive and defensive actions which have occurred during the year. The high of 5,690 S/T in July 1969 represents division requirements as a result of operations in the A Shau Valley and in the Tam Ky area. The October 1969 peak of 4,765 S/T showed increased consumption in support of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambt), which was employed as a covering force for the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division. January and February 1970 issues reflected the increased fires concentrated in the "rocket belt" prior to and during the Tet period. April 1970 showed another high and reflected issues in support of Spring operations.

(6) NOMEX Central Issue Facility - The majority of aviator peculiar clothing and equipment has been in short supply during this period (Tab 6). However, as a result of the establishment of a division level NOMEX central issue facility, the demand satisfaction trend has steadily increased and reached 90% in April 1970. This facility has proven to be an effective and efficient method of operation in managing these items and has permitted an overall reduction in the quantity of stockage.
b. 801st Maintenance Battalion (Airmobile).

(1) Automotive operational readiness (OR) - The OR trend during the period 20 June 1969 through 30 April 1970 showed steady improvement (Tab 7). The OR at the beginning of the period was 92.2% and reached a high of 95.5% at the end of the period. The OR during the entire period exceeded the USARV goal of 90%. The favorable trend was achieved through continual command emphasis, impressive improvement in prescribed load list performance, roadside spot check inspections, technical assistance visits, and revitalization of the division automotive fleet.

(2) Equipment "washout" - In mid-December 1969 it became apparent that division vehicles and electrical generating equipment were in need of revitalization (Tab 8). Further, it was recognized that there were a number of vehicles and generators in excess of authorized quantities within the division. Positive steps were taken to identify that equipment which exceeded repair expenditure limits or repair and return time frames. Equipment so identified was either "washed out" of the system or retrograded. Whenever possible, major assemblies and components were reclaimed and used to remove other equipment from deadline status. A total of 427 vehicles and 192 generators were removed from the division inventory during the period 1 January through 2 May 1970. New or rebuilt equipment is being obtained to bring the on-hand quantities to authorized levels.

(3) Armament operational readiness - The OR trend remained above 99.6% throughout the period (Tab 9). Significant improvement was achieved in the repair and return time intervals for armament-related equipment such as starlight scopes from CONUS rebuild facilities. Although difficulties were experienced with the recoil system of the M102 howitzer, judicious use of maintenance floats and management by exception prevented the deadlining of artillery weapons.

(4) Electronics operational readiness - The OR trend was 95.8% at the beginning of the period and improved to the extent that it exceeded 97% at the end of the period (Tab 10). Improvement in the OR was primarily a reflection of reduced repair times in support maintenance and CONUS facilities. Further, high priority treatment of ground surveillance radars from the operator back to the maintenance unit resulted in an increased OR for PPS-4 and PPS-5 radars.

(5) Supply performance - The supply of repair parts contributed significantly to the increased materiel readiness of the 101st Abn Div (Airm).
During the period, positive action was taken to improve the supply of Class IX repair parts to divisional units. The authorized stockage list of the 801st Maint Bn (Ambl) was reduced from 7,415 lines to a more manageable level of 6,125 lines. The ASLs of forward support units were reduced from approximately 1,000 lines to about 425 lines consisting of hard core deadline parts. Zero balances were managed by exception and removed from the ASL when status warranted such deletion. A "country store" of over 100 lines was established to provide customers with low cost, fast-moving items with a minimum of paperwork. A viable direct exchange program of minor assemblies and components was initiated. More efficient internal and external supply procedures, to include monthly reconciliations with customer units, were also initiated. One significant development, the operation of electronic accounting machinery (NCR 500 system) on a daily cycle, greatly improved supply response to using units' requests and permitted more timely demands to be placed on the backup depot system. During the early part of the period, the supply performance is somewhat suspect due to the turmoil of tactical operations and poor statistical analysis. However, toward the end of the period, valid analysis indicated favorable trends in demand accommodation, demand satisfaction, and zero balances (Tab 11).

(6) Supply transactions - An appreciation of the volume of supply requests placed upon the 801st Maint Bn (Ambl) technical supply activity may be obtained by considering the month of January 1970 (Tab 12). Total requests for the month exceeded 25,000. Combining issues and requests, supply transactions totaled 39,192 for the month of January. The improvements realized in technical supply performance, as measured by demand accommodation, demand satisfaction, and zero balances, are particularly noteworthy in view of the large volume of technical supply transactions occurring during the period.

c. 326th Medical Battalion (Airmobile).

(1) The patient work load of the four organic medical companies consisted of the following major categories:

(a) Disease and injury cases admitted and treated.

(b) Disease and injury cases accorded initial stabilization and treatment and then evacuated to USARV Medical Command hospitals.

(c) Routine sick call on an area support basis for units which lack organic medical support.
(d) Special examinations, such as audiometer and electrocardiogram, for flight physicals.

(e) Psychiatric evaluations.

(2) The heaviest work load for any month of the reporting period occurred during June 1969 (Tab 13). The 1st Brigade was operating under the control of the Americal Division in the Tam Ky area, and division level medical support was provided by Company A, 326th Medical Battalion (Airmobile). The remaining division maneuver units were primarily engaged in operations in the mountainous areas of Thua Thien Province.

(3) Approximately 4,000 patients each month were seen during the period July through September 1969. A significant drop to 3,200 patients was noted in October 1969. This was attributed to the abnormally heavy rainfall during the month which tended to reduce the overall activity of the division.

(4) An increase in the work load occurred during November and December 1969, with a downward trend thereafter to the low point in February 1970. A total of 3,180 patients was seen that month.

(5) A similar increase of patients was noted in March 1970, when 3,520 individuals were treated. The April 1970 work load was characterized by a decrease of 160 individuals to a level similar to that of January 1970.

(6) The exact cause of the fluctuations in work load cannot be readily isolated or identified. Major factors appear to have been the effects of the weather and the environment on the health of the individual soldier, and the duration, scope, and intensity of engagement with the enemy.

(7) Two recent modifications in the policy for handling minor injuries and individuals with temporary medical profiles will have a significant effect on the work load of the medical companies. Both modifications are directed toward improving fox hole strengths.

(a) Individuals with injuries, disease or sickness which will preclude return to full duty within five days are evacuated to USARV Medical Command hospitals, enabling the division to receive replacements for these noneffective personnel. Individuals in this category will not be returned to the division until they are fully fit for duty. This change in policy will tend to decrease the work load of the clearing companies.

(b) All personnel retained in base camp areas for medical reasons of a
temporary nature are evaluated by a physician at least every three days. This policy assures that individuals are returned to duty at the earliest feasible time, or, if appropriate, receive a permanent profile with a minimum of delay.

(8) Missions flown by the air ambulance platoon included:

(a) Evacuation of patients from the field to treatment facilities.

(b) Transportation of patients between medical treatment facilities.

(c) Administrative missions, e.g., visits to treatment facilities and firebases.

(d) Training missions.

(9) Missions flown by the air ambulance platoon included:

(a) Evacuation of patients from the field to treatment facilities.

(b) Transportation of patients between medical treatment facilities.

(c) Administrative missions, e.g., visits to treatment facilities and firebases.

(d) Training missions.

(9) Total missions per month ranged from a low of 498 in September 1969 to a high of 829 in December 1969 (Tab 14). The number of patients evacuated in December was not as high as during some months in which a lesser number of missions was flown, indicating that during December fewer patients were carried per mission and that there was an increase in administrative missions. With the exception of the unusually high number of missions flown in December, the peak occurred during the months of good weather, as might be expected. This trend is again evident in April 1970, when an increase of 228 occurred over the preceding month, for a total of nearly 800 missions.

(10) The number of night missions varied between 7.8% and 14.7% of the monthly total. The average percentage of night missions for the reporting period was 11.2%. Night missions were at the lowest percentage levels during the months of December 1969 and January and February 1970.

(11) The number of hoist missions varied between 3.4% and 15.4% of the monthly total. The average percentage of hoist missions for the reporting period was 7.8%. This compares with a figure of approximately 1% hoist missions in the air ambulance units under control of USARV Medical Command. A similar relationship was noted between hoist missions and the winter months, in that the lowest percentage figures occurred during the winter.

(12) The factor most strongly influencing the number of missions flown and the percentage of these missions which were nighttime or hoist missions appeared to be the time of year. The months associated with good flying weather show higher values for all three of the parameters discussed above.
The patient work load of the air ambulance platoon during the reporting period included the following basic categories of patients:

(a) Disease and injury from field to treatment facilities.
(b) Disease and injury between treatment facilities.
(c) Outpatient evaluation on a hospital ship.

The highest number of patients transported in any month was 1,042 in June 1969 (Tab 15). Two other months have also been associated with the transportation of more than 1,000 patients, August 1969 and April 1970. The fewest number of patients transported was 623 in November 1969. A definite relationship was noted between the total number of patients transported and the percentage of such patients carried from the field to treatment facilities. The months, except for June 1969, during which the highest number of patients was transported also had the highest percentage of patients evacuated from the field and fell in the southwest monsoon season.

Of the total number of patients evacuated each month, the highest percentage evacuated from the field (66.2%) occurred in April 1970. The lowest percentage of field evacuations (35.7%) occurred in December 1969. For the entire period the number of individuals evacuated from the field averaged 47.2% of all patients transported by the air ambulance platoon.

The winter months reflected a pattern in which more patients were transported between medical facilities than from the field to medical facilities and were also the months in which the lowest total number of patients was transported.

Thus again was noted the relationship between the season and the work load of the air ambulance platoon. During the hot, dry season, more patients were evacuated each month, and a greater percentage was evacuated from the field to treatment facilities.

d. 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Airmobile)

The aircraft maintenance and supply posture of the division during the period has been one of growth and improvement. Aircraft availability has increased from 74% in May 1969 to the present range of 82-83% every
month (Tab 16). One of the reasons for this increase in availability has been the steadily decreasing "not operational ready, supply" (NORS) rate. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that this high availability rate has been maintained in spite of an increasing combat damage rate over the past three months (from 3% in January 1970 to 8% in April 1970). This accomplishment was made possible by an efficient supply system, the dedicated hard work of all aircraft maintenance personnel, and emphasis throughout the division.

(2) Aircraft OR percentage comparisons by type for May 1969 and April 1970 are indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>May 1969</th>
<th></th>
<th>April 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Acft</td>
<td>%OR</td>
<td>No Acft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U6A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH6A</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH1G</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH1H</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH54</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) To provide for qualification control over the 2,100 enlisted personnel engaged in aircraft maintenance in the division, a series of checklists was developed for UH1H, AH1G, OH6A, and CH47 mechanics. These checklists are based on the skills and knowledge requirements of the applicable MOS and enable the supervisor to evaluate the job proficiency of newly assigned mechanics, thus providing a basis for additional training emphasis. The vast majority of newly assigned mechanics is fresh out of stateside schools, and these checklists have proven to be invaluable in establishing high standards of maintenance.

4. Conservation of Resources.

a. In November 1969, the division initiated a conservation of resources program designed to stimulate thought and develop an attitude of cost consciousness. Tactical divisions are exempt from participation in the Cost Reduction Program; however, experience has proven that much can be done to conserve resources in tactical units while engaged in combat operations. This is particularly true where considerable materiel is expended in base camp operations. It has also been found that changes in techniques have resulted in saving of resources. This has been achieved with no loss of combat effectiveness.
b. During the period June 1969 - April 1970, three separate "no questions asked" turn-ins of excess equipment valued at approximately 12 million dollars were accomplished. Although no attempt has been made to estimate additional savings from these turn-ins, the elimination of operations, repair, and upkeep costs for these items is of great significance in terms of dollars saved annually.

c. Considerable savings have also been realized through the adoption of a policy designed to minimize the use of sandbags at base camps. Sandbags were used to hold down roofs of SEA huts in anticipation of strong winds. These had to be replaced four or five times a year due to deterioration. By the use of a few extra nails the requirement was eliminated. Additionally, by using nonrecoverable materials, such as peneprime drums and ammunition boxes, for building revetments and by preserving existing sandbag revetments with a thin cement shell, sandbag utilization was further reduced. It is estimated that the annual saving in expenditures for sandbags will amount to approximately 800,000 dollars.

d. In the conservation of resources program, subordinate commanders were directed to conduct "brainstorming" sessions for the purpose of identifying areas where cost reductions are possible. The results obtained were then analyzed at division level and, if valid, were publicized throughout the command. This provided an additional means of cross-fertilization of ideas among all units. Some of the areas in which savings were realized are shown at Tab 17.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE</th>
<th>TOTAL TO DATE</th>
<th>GENERATOR</th>
<th>TOTAL TO DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2 ton</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3. KW</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4 ton</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1.5 KW</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 ton</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>3 KW 60 CY</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2 ton</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3 KW 400 CY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ton</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5 KW</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special purpose</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 KW 60 CY</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehicles</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10 KW 400 CY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>15/30 KW</td>
<td>4/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45/60 KW</td>
<td>3/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Misc</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REALIZED SAVINGS AREAS

1. Relocation of SEA huts rather than new construction.
   Estimated Savings $32,400 this quarter

2. Initiation of shuttle truck service between base camps to reduce vehicle use
   Estimated Savings $28,000 per quarter

3. Movement of division rear from Bien Hoa to Phu Bai to reduce transportation and operating costs.
   Estimated Savings $78,000 per quarter

4. Establishment of a division central issue facility for NOMEX clothing to provide better control of issues and turn-ins.
   Estimated Savings $10,000 per quarter

5. Improvement of rotation of fatigues and clothing items to troops in the field. This reduces the number of unserviceable fatigues.
   Estimated Savings $200,000 per quarter

6. Establishment of a DX program for tires which has resulted in a 70% increase in tires returned for recapping.
   Estimated Savings $54,000 per quarter

7. Development of procedures for improving oil filter exchange for generators, which in turn, has reduced the number of engines replaced.
   Estimated Savings $8,000 per quarter

8. Improvement in handling procedures for radar, starlight scopes, and FADAC, which should reduce damage and maintenance costs.
   Estimated Savings undetermined

   Estimated Savings $2,000 per quarter

Tab 17 to Incl 3
10. Reduction in the number of artillery rounds fired on sensor activations to a one or two battery TOT with significant savings in artillery ammunition expenditure.

   Estimated Savings undetermined

11. Reduction, where appropriate, of the number of AH1G aircraft accomplishing secondary missions, e.g., CH54 escort, VIP patrol, etc. One aircraft conducts mission, and one aircraft is on standby status (The cost of one hour of flight time for AH1G aircraft is $400).

   Estimated Savings $300,000 per quarter

12. A SALT1 warehouse has been established by the 5th Transportation Battalion to stock low dollar value items. By ordering a year's requirements on one requisition, processing costs were reduced.

   Estimated Savings undetermined
CIVIC ACTION

1. General. During the past year, pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province expanded at an increased rate. Territorial security, achieved through combined US and GVN (ARVN, RF, PF, and PSDF) tactical operations and local security measures, provided a safe environment in which long-range, high impact projects were generated in all ten rural districts of Thua Thien Province as well as in the three urban districts of Hue City. As a part of the overall pacification and development effort, the division expanded and improved its civic action program. The monthly average number of active projects increased from 52 in May 1969 to 155 presently in progress. This represents an increase of 198%. A major contributing factor to the greater volume of civic action projects was the development and adoption in August 1969 of a province priority list. The initial lists of requested projects originated at the village/hamlet level. These lists were submitted through the respective district chiefs to the province chief. At province level, the project lists were consolidated, screened for GVN funding, assigned a priority, and forwarded to the division as a request for civic action assistance. The priority list served as an excellent management tool for civic action.

2. Conduct of Civic Action Program.

a. Objectives. The broad objective of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) civic action program was to contribute to the GVN national objective of "Prosperity for All", and to support the related goals as outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1969 and 1970. Specific objectives directly related to military civic action were twofold:

(1) Improving the living conditions of the people and thereby alleviating the underlying causes of insurgency.

(2) Improving the image of the Government of Vietnam in the eyes of the local populace.

b. The civic action effort included more than just assistance on construction projects. It involved the development of a good relationship between the division and the surrounding community and the channeling of all civic action endeavors through GVN officials.
c. The MEDCAP program was an integral part of civic action and contributed to medical self-sufficiency through a scheduled, organized teaching program conducted by US military medical personnel at Vietnamese facilities. The MEDCAP also provided medical care which exceeded the existing capabilities of GVN medical personnel and/or facilities.

d. Conduct of Civic Action Effort.

(1) Continual liaison and coordination with province and district officials and military units throughout the division area of operation contributed significantly to the organization of the civic action program. Improved liaison efforts, combined with increased interest and participation by the residents of Thua Thien Province and nondivisional units, resulted in rapid completion of civic action projects. Unit S5s were authorized and encouraged to coordinate civic action activity with the appropriate district chief and district senior advisor. The major civic action effort was repair and construction; therefore, items used in large quantities were lumber, tin, and cement. The majority of these commodities were salvaged items. Sources included the sanitary fill for scrap lumber, firebases for ammunition boxes, and construction units for salvaged building materials and hydrated cement. The CA/PSYWAR fund was used to purchase needed items on the local economy. Division support of the projects consisted of transportation assistance, technical advice, provision of materials, and supervisory assistance to insure the arrival of materials at the time they were required. While the majority of the commodities were delivered by vehicle, helicopters were used for deliveries to areas inaccessible by other means.

(2) Medical assistance and support were provided throughout the province by both divisional and nondivisional units. The ACofS G5 and the division surgeon worked closely together to support the MEDCAP program. After a survey of all districts for MEDCAP locations, facilities, and desired MEDCAP frequency, the province health chief furnished a list of 42 district facilities and 12 Hue City facilities to the division surgeon. Medical unit assignments were made to provide these facilities with MEDCAP. The surgeon also prepared a division circular outlining the objectives and procedures under which MEDCAPs were conducted. The MEDCAP program emphasized the training of Vietnamese in the health care role to create a sense of identification between the Vietnamese health care workers and the local populace.
e. Vietnamese participation in civic action programs. Vietnamese participation in all civic action projects was emphasized. Labor for the projects was organized and supervised by the appropriate district or village chief, and maximum contribution of materials by the Vietnamese was encouraged. Transportation support of the division civic action efforts was rendered by ARVN and RF/PF units to transport commodities throughout the province. Until recently, ARVN-sponsored civic action projects had been limited to upgrading dependent living conditions. Six projects were initiated early in 1970 by the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) for the benefit of Vietnamese other than military dependents. These projects included the construction of two dispensaries, two marketplaces, and two wells. Also, beginning in early 1970, Thua Thien Province and the division jointly sponsored the construction of 29 police stations in three districts. Province provided the labor, roofing, and cement, while the division furnished lumber, nails, and concrete reinforcing materials. Increased interest and participation by ARVN in civic action was encouraging. Expanded participation can be expected as the ARVN civic action program progresses.

3. Integration with Tactical Operations.

a. Civic action was an integral part of tactical operations in the populated lowlands. For example, considerable effort was expended during cordon operations to insure that inconvenience to the Vietnamese was minimal. Medical personnel, as a part of each cordon, rendered medical assistance to the large gatherings. The unit S5 furnished materials, and the villagers provided the labor to complete short range high impact projects to benefit the cordoned village. The S5 furnished supplemental food for the villagers whenever the cordon was at least one full day in duration. Further, the division provided loudspeaker and communication facilities so that government officials could explain the reasons for the operations and any inconveniences caused by the cordon. Vietnamese cultural drama teams and armed propaganda teams were furnished through the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Audio-visual teams in support of the cordon showed movies when operations carried on into the evening. On occasion, the division band entertained during cordons. All efforts in support of the operations were closely coordinated with the appropriate district chief.

b. With the emphasis on pacification, the unit S5 became a central figure in the accomplishment of the pacification goals. The S5, with his capability to dispense food, shelter, and materials for projects which benefited the people, was the direct link between the Vietnamese people
and his unit. Because of this position, the 55 was able to furnish valuable information to the 52 concerning the attitude of the people, their problems, VC/VCI influence, the degree of cooperation of hamlet/village officials and their attitude toward the pacification program. The 52 was able rapidly to exploit information gathered by the 55.

4. Community Relations. The division hosted meetings with officials and leading citizens of Thua Thien Province to further US/Vietnamese relations and to become better acquainted with the local government. Each district chief in Thua Thien and his advisor were frequent guests of the division. Guided tours of Hue and surrounding sites of historical interest were sponsored for military personnel by the Hue tourist office. The tours provided a worthwhile recreational activity for those participating. A Vietnamese-American sports festival was held in Hue during July 1969. The festival consisted of track and sport events, with approximately 300 Vietnamese and American athletes participating. English language classes under the sponsorship of the Hue Culture Center were conducted in various high schools in Hue. Division personnel assisted in these classes as voluntary instructors during their off-duty hours. During the Mid-Autumn Festival (TET Trung Thu) and the Vietnamese New Year (TET), the division specifically sponsored the dependent children of soldiers in the 3d Regiment (ARVN) and 54th Regiment (ARVN). In addition, orphanages, schools, and the dependent children of the interpreters and Kit Carson Scouts were presented gifts of candy and toys.

5. Assessment of the Situation.

a. Local Government. Thua Thien Province has an effective local government with definite plans and goals. Those plans and goals were consolidated into a pacification and development plan adapted from the GVN Campaign Plan. Of the 415 hamlets recorded in the monthly Hamlet Evaluation System report, only 12 had appointed rather than elected officials. Elections are scheduled in a total of 16 hamlets in 1970. Eight of the 12 hamlets with appointed officials are to receive scheduled for elections.

b. Resettlement Progress. During this period, no new refugees were generated in Thua Thien Province. The registered refugee population of Thua Thien at the end of March 1970 was 9,068. The division assisted in resettlement by insuring security, clearing booby traps in resettlement areas, and by furnishing transportation for the movement of families, household goods, and building materials. As the refugee
problem decreased to manageable proportions, previously neglected social welfare activities expanded. CARITAS/CRS, Buddhist Social Welfare, and the World Relief Commission were involved in large scale food programs with surplus commodities, especially in the newly resettled pacification hamlets. UNICEF completed nine milk feeding stations that provided milk to approximately 6,000 children daily.

c. Road Building and Pacification. Improvements and repairs of roads and bridges throughout the province materially assisted in the refugee resettlement process and the resumption of trade and commerce. While the roads and bridges were built for tactical purposes, the effort enriched the pacification effort immeasurably. Formerly waterbound inhabitants used the completed secondary roads as farm to market routes, further strengthening the economy. The tactical value of the roads was demonstrated by the improved resupply of units by road and a reduction of enemy and terrorist incidents in the district.

d. Attitude of the People. The improved attitude of the people was reflected in the expansion of businesses, increased building and repair of homes, initiation and completion of more self-help projects, and increased interest by the people in programs of the province. Attitudes of complacency were not detectable. In fact, indications of definite determination to counter the efforts of the VC were seen, particularly in the training courses conducted with the RF/PF, PSDF, medical personnel, and village officials.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Objectives. Psychological operations were aimed at influencing the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of friendly, neutral, and hostile groups in such a way as to support both military and civilian organizations in the achievement of national objectives. Emphasis on the Chieu Hoi program was maintained to encourage VC/NVA ralliers at every opportunity.

2. Conduct of PSYOP.

   a. Development of the PSYOP Program.

      (1) The program was tailored to provide maximum support to both tactical operations conducted in the mountains and jungle canopy, as well as pacification and development activities in the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province. This required careful organization and efficient utilization of PSYOP resources from general support, direct support, and assigned units.

      (2) Resources of the 9th Special Operations Squadron, the general support delivery unit, were employed to provide high-volume, wide-area leaflet coverage and to support most preplanned aerial broadcast missions. Direct support elements, ground loudspeaker teams, and audio-visual vans were placed in support of each brigade and employed in conjunction with cordon operations, MEDCAPS, cultural drama team performances organized by the 1st Inf Div (ARVN), and RD cadre activities in the rural areas. Organic resources were employed to achieve low-volume, pinpoint leaflet drops, quick response to targets of opportunity, and the early word capability for rapid exploitation of Hoi Chanhs and PWs. To expand the organic loudspeaker capability of the division, a more efficient and powerful aerial loudspeaker system was designed and developed, providing each brigade with a 1,000 watt aerial loudspeaker system, with a fourth system held in general support of the division.

      (3) Various PSYOP themes were designed to destroy the NVA and VC soldiers' morale and will to fight; to entice individuals of local guerrilla units, VC infrastructure, and VC labor force to discontinue their support of the Communists and to take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program; and finally, to inform the people of government programs and to solicit their support of the GVN.

      (4) The Joint Propaganda Development Center (JPDC) of the 7th PSYOP Battalion added to the effectiveness of the division's PSYOP
program of developing special Vietnamese-oriented leaflets. The information upon which the leaflets were based was provided by the division in the form of order of battle intelligence, unit histories, and current intelligence summary data, which pointed out specific enemy vulnerabilities to PSYOP.

b. Coordination with other units and programs. Close coordination with PSYOP agencies throughout the province was effected in the form of a combined PSYOP advisory committee which met periodically. Attendees included representatives from XXIV Corps, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), 1st Inf Div (ARVN), the Province Chieu HoI Center, the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), Sector 55, and the Phoenix Committee. Emphasis was placed on improving liaison and coordination among the members and developing a cohesive information/PSYOP effort throughout the province. Examples of combined programs were the Tet 1970 Campaign, the NVA Campaign, the Chieu HoI Campaign, and the closely coordinated PSYOP effort demonstrated during combined operations.

c. Effectiveness of PSYOP Activities.

(1) Impact on NVA. Recent PW interrogation reports from this area corroborated reports from other sources that US/GVN PSYOP activities resulted in a very damaging impact on elements of the NVA. Although tangible evidence of this impact cannot be provided, sufficient evidence was secured which indicated that an effective PSYOP effort is in progress against the NVA.

(2) Impact on VC/VGI/VCS. Although the number of Ho! Chanhs fell short of the established goals for Thu Thien Province, it was significant that an increased percentage of ralliers attributed their decision to rally to messages received from both PSYOP broadcasts and leaflets.

(3) Local populace.

(a) Publication of the Voluntary Informant Program by all PSYOP agencies proved most effective. An increasing amount of weapons and munitions was turned in to friendly forces.

(b) The PSYOP audio-visual and ground loudspeaker teams expanded the effectiveness of the VIS program. By showing movies and slides of GVN completed self-help projects and other successful civic action programs, respect and support for the GVN was strengthened. VIS chiefs and cadre learned communication techniques and how to operate and maintain the audio-visual equipment in the process. A fringe benefit which further indicates the effectiveness of the teams was the frequent,
unsolicited information about local VC activities provided by the local inhabitants.

3. Integration of PSYOP with tactical operations. The division integrated combined psychological operations into the planning and execution phases of both tactical and pacification type operations.

a. During the planning phase, detailed coordination between G2/S2 and PSYOP personnel resulted in determination of enemy vulnerabilities to PSYOP. After appropriate themes were developed against the enemy, the employment of PSYOP was integrated into the OPLAN with G3/S3.

b. During the execution phase of an operation, the PSYOP representative monitored the employment of PSYOP assets, kept the commander informed and when necessary, made appropriate recommendations.

c. During cordon and search operations, the PSYOP mobile team was habitually employed. The PSYOP mobile team included a ground broadcast team, audio-visual team, cultural drama team, MEDCAP team, armed propaganda team, and a Hoi Chanh speaker. This PSYOP mobile team assisted the commander by precluding alienation of the people and contributing to the success of the operation.

4. Summary of PSYOP. Close surveillance and coordination of PSYOP activities with ARVN units and agencies of the GVN resulted in a cohesive PSYOP effort throughout the province. The integration of PSYOP assets during the planning and execution phases of tactical operations added immeasurably to the attainment of both military and political objectives. Psychological broadcasts and leaflet drops had a significant impact on lowering the enemy's morale, while the combined effort of all PSYOP agencies in the lowlands increased popular support of the GVN.
**REPORT TITLE**
Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG John M. Wright, Jr.

**DATE**
11 May 1970

**CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.**
N/A

**PROJECT NO.**
N/A

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**
N/A

**SUPPORTING MILITARY ACTIVITY**
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

---

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA**
R & D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATING ACTIVITY</th>
<th>REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310</td>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 25 May 1969 to 25 May 1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MG John M. Wright, Jr.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL NO OF PAGES</th>
<th>NO. OF REFS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DD FORM 1473**

---

UNCLASSIFIED

---

Security Classification
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.