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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG R. Wetherill, CG, Delta
Military Assistance Command, Period 1 June 1969 through 16 January 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG R. Wetherill, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
STANO Systems Manager, OCofSA
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
MS R. Wetherill

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MS R. Wetherill. The report covers the period 1 June 1969 through 16 January 1970 during which time MS Wetherill served as Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command.

2. MS Wetherill is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. Murray
CPT. ACG
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
Delta Military Assistance Command
USAAG, IV CTZ, APO 96213

MACCZ-IV-CG 14 January 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO 96222

References:

a. Army Regulation 1-26
b. USARV Regulation 1-3

1. To preclude needless repetition of historical fact and discussion, I have limited my attached report to an up-dating of reference "C" based on developments since my assumption of command on 1 June 1969. I will discuss what I consider to be the major areas for improvement toward Vietnamisation in the remainder of this letter. The major problem areas will be treated in the four classic categories: Personnel; Operations; Training; and Logistics.

a. Personnel

Leadership has been properly singled out time and again as the keystone to success or failure of all Vietnamisation programs. Yet the major obstacle to the natural development of leadership in the country has yet to be forcefully attacked. That obstacle is the archaic, outmoded personnel management system inherited from the French. Insofar as personnel management pertains to leadership, I am speaking of the vital FOR OT UT 70B006

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MACCZ-IV-CG

14 January 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

role that promotion based on merit, and demotion/elimination based on incompetence play in making best use of natural leaders and in fostering the development of the leadership potential in promising candidates. A few specific incidents to emphasize the problem are:

1. An RF Company I recently visited was commanded by a PFC. Two aspirants had been assigned to "legalize" the orders of the company commander; this situation has prevailed for over a year. The man can not be commissioned since he is not "qualified" in the bureaucratic sense.

2. At least one ARVN company is commanded in battle by a non-commissioned officer; the commissioned officer re-assumes command in garrison.

3. In one province there is a highly qualified executive officer who has been recommended several times to be given his own province. However he is "too young".

4. On at least one occasion, a province chief has acquiesced to the demand to remove a company commander --- by reassigning him to command another company! After eighteen months in country, I have yet to hear of an officer being either reduced in grade, or eliminated from the service. The basic problem stems from old-world, bureaucratic standards for commissioning and promotion. This is aggravated by holding to peace time procedures under war time conditions. It is compounded by a counter-productive national attitude that "even a poor officer is better than none".

RECOMMENDATION: That MACV propose a flexible, dynamic promotion and elimination system similar to the United States Army system in time of war. Since this would require legislation for adoption, it is probable that the President, RVN, himself must be convinced of the necessity for its adoption. While there has been some small progress through a form of osmosis, leadership in the required depth will not be generated until a dynamic program is adopted.

b. TRAINING

Although the training conducted at national centers appears satisfactory, unit training is given only lip service at best. This stems from
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

the mistaken yet sincere concept that there is no need or time to train
since there are almost daily unit operations. Further, the overly cen-
tralized supervision of training per se, psychologically relieves the
Corps Commander of specific responsibility for this vital facet of all
military operations. The central training agency at JGS level operates
all ARVN and Territorial Forces Training Centers. It also publishes
very detailed training directives to units, thus further excusing the
Corps Commander from any requirement to participate.

RECOMMENDATION: That CTC become an inspecting and policy mak-
ing agency, turning over its operational functions including the develop-
ment of detailed directives to the four CTZ's.

c. OPERATIONS

(1) There is still overcentralization in the development and is-
suance of operational plans and orders. Some progress has been made,
but all echelons continue to instruct subordinate units too much as to
the "How" of an operation. This relieves the subordinate of full res-
ponsibility for the success of the operation. Concurrently it deprives
him of the opportunity for growth and development through making his
own estimates, plans and mistakes.

RECOMMENDATION: That MACV develop and propose to JGS a direc-
tive requiring the use of mission type orders, as opposed to the prac-
tice of dictating specific, detailed, restrictive operations orders. This
doctrine should be emphasized throughout the chain of command and at
appropriate schools and training establishments.

(2) There is still far too much operating by ARVN units with
little or no coordination with the province and districts in which the
operations are conducted. This not only fails to take advantage of the
freshest available intelligence, but also fails to get the maximum re-
results from all available resources in the geographic area concerned.
Here again, progress is greatest where mission type orders are issued.
This tends to force the ARVN regimental and battalion commanders to
establish liaison with provinces and districts to obtain best results in
their assigned TAOR's. They can no longer merely carry out detailed
division orders and thus be freed of any requirement to cooperate for
best results.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

At higher levels, the Corps Commander must insure that the division commander works closely with the province chief in respective DTA's. There has been very good progress in two divisions. The third unit has made no progress along these lines and has the worst record for contacts made and losses inflicted on the enemy.

RECOMMENDATION: That future MACV/JGS campaign plans and other appropriate documents strongly emphasize the requirement for mutual support and liaison between ARVN divisions and the provinces within DTA's. Further, that this vital aspect of operations become a key feature to be checked by senior staff officers and commanders on all field trips.

d. LOGISTICS

By and large, the ARVN logistics system is adequate. However the relationship between the ALC's and the province A&DSL companies is still vague and permits responsibility for conditions in the latter to be side-stepped by province chiefs.

RECOMMENDATION: That the administrative functions be separated from the current A&DSL companies and placed squarely under the province chief's control. Concurrently, that the logistics functions be placed squarely under the ALC commander in the nature of a "forward support depot" of the basic ALC. This should provide a clear cut chain of responsibility from wholesaler to retailer. It should also provide more flexibility in the lateral shifting and stockage of supplies by ALC at forward "forward support depots", to include support of divisions in mobile operations as may be dictated by the situation.

2. SITUATION IN IV CTZ

On balance, I believe IV Corps is capable of containing and reducing the current enemy threat posed by two additional regiments now within the Delta, and three poised north of the Cambodian border. The flexibility obtained by twice moving the 9th ARVN Division since October 1969, provides the Corps Commander with powerful reserves to deploy quickly to any major trouble spot. Should the enemy surface his main forces in an overt attempt to occupy meaningful real estate, there is no reason that he can not be soundly defeated. Should he elect to fragment his forces into company and battalion size units to operate throughout the Delta, the process of destruction will be longer, but again, with the present initiative, the IV CTZ should be able to handle the situation with current assets.
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

3. In summary of my eighteen month tour, I feel the RVN can be brought along from its current posture to become the viable independent nation envisaged as our ultimate objective. I urge that action be taken in consonance with paragraph two supra to expedite maximum development during the relatively short time we can continue to provide support.

R. WETHERILL
Senior Officer Debriefing Report, MG R. Wetherill

Major General, USA
Commanding
# DEBRIEFING REPORT, Major General R. WETHERILL

1 June 1969 - 16 January 1970

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I. THE ENEMY, IV CTZ

Directed by the North Vietnamese Government, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) controls military and political operations in IV CTZ. Within this zone, the enemy has divided his military structure into two commands: Headquarters, Military Region 2, which controls the upper part of the Delta; and Military Region 3, which controls the lower part. Each military region (MR) has regimental headquarters which control main force (MF) battalions. In addition, the military regions have direct control over separate MF battalions, companies, and platoons. Since May 1969, there has been a strategic change in organization underway. The eventual posture is not yet clear; elements of one NVA Division Headquarters, plus two main line regiments have infiltrated the Delta with three more regiments near the Cambodian border possibly attempting to enter.

As in the past, command and control of main force VC units is exercised through regimental or Military Region Headquarters. It is still cumbersome and slow but relatively secure. The increase in use of Chinese and captured U.S. equipment is slowly improving the situation; however, there have been no significant changes in the last 6 months in the enemy's command-and-control capability.

During the 1969 Summer-Fall campaign and thus far in the 1969-1970 Winter-Spring campaign, the VC/NVA have continued to employ economy of force tactics. A severe blow was dealt to the VC/NVA offensive capability during the last quarter of 1969 by ARVN operations in enemy base areas in MR2 and MR3. Enemy losses in MR3 totaled about 1200, including killed, captured, and Hoi Chanh. The operation in MR2 was less successful, resulting in 203 confirmed KIA and captured 36. ARVN losses were about 500, including 53 KIA and 456 wounded. Most of the friendly casualties were caused by booby-traps.

It is probable that the enemy will continue indirect fire attacks and harassments as the primary means of inflicting maximum casualties and damage to pacification efforts with minimum risk to himself. He will also continue logistical build-up and political proselytizing to strengthen the VC position in the event of the establishment of a coalition government. The infiltration of NVA personnel and units can also be expected to continue.

The VC have continued to standardize their weapon systems within the combat maneuver elements (MF/PKF). However, many guerrilla units still use a wide variety of weapons manufactured in both communist and non-communist countries. The basic infantry weapon is the AK-47 rifle with a basic load of approximately 50 rounds. Other individual weapons include the B-40 and B-41 AT4L and the RPD light machinegun. Officers carry the K54 Chicom pistol. The primary crew served weapons are the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. Indirect fire weapons include 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars. Antiaircraft weapons consist of the 12.7mm and 14.5mm YWMI. Introduced in the Delta beginning in April 1969 were the 107mm and
122mm rockets, which can be used for direct or indirect fire missions. The bulk of the VC armament and ammunition is still manufactured in Communist China and is of good quality. The VC continue to use captured and dud allied munitions to construct booby traps, mines, and launch bombs, although the reliability of these reworked munitions is extremely low. Individual training on the weapons systems lasts from one to two weeks, consisting primarily of verbal instruction and dry fire exercises. Standardization of the weapons system is the most significant armament gain made by the VC in the Delta.

Because of the nature of the terrain and weather in the Delta, VC units have always been relatively easy to resupply from Cambodia. In early 1969 during the dry season the VC/NVA logistical system was unable to adequately resupply all the units in the Delta. Shortages were felt in medical supplies, arms and ammunition, and other equipment. The difficulty was not the lack of supplies but the lack of manpower to transport them and a scarcity of command-liaison routes that were not interdicted by friendly operations. The situation improved during the rainy season when supplies could be transported by sampan over many routes which were impassable during the dry season. The large number of available routes made friendly interdiction very difficult. As a result, the VC/NVA seem to be well supplied with weapons and ammunition, as demonstrated by their free use of ammunition during several shelling and ground contacts in late 1969. A major shortage of medical supplies, especially of blood plasma and antibiotics, remains a significant problem. One problem resulting from a loss of popular support is difficulty in storing supplies where they will not be found by ARVN troops or reported by pro-GVN civilians. Shortages in all areas will probably become noticeable again during the dry season in early 1970.

The enemy continues to use the Delta's extensive canal and waterway system as their primary transportation system. All sizes and types of watercraft are employed to move men and supplies throughout the zone. Movements to contact, routine resupply, rapid dispersal and the massive logistical flow are all accomplished in this manner. The road systems, using purchased, commandeered, or hired vehicles of all descriptions supplement the waterways, particularly in rapid movement of supplies from Cambodian ports to border staging areas. During the rainy season, the inundation of large areas increases the ease of waterborne across the Cambodian-RVN border and also within the Delta. Wet season infiltration tonnage is reportedly twice that of the dry season. Hampered friendly ground movement during this period also allows the VC more freedom of movement. In addition, sampans can be modified to provide mobile firing positions for both small arms and indirect fire attacks, increasing the enemy's combat power and effectiveness during the period.

Since May 1969 NVA strength has increased significantly in the Delta. In January 1968 small groups of NVA personnel were reported in the Delta as Cadre, in support elements, and as fillers to VC units. In May 1969 the first sizeable group of NVA, the 273 VC Regiment of the 9th VC Division,
which was 80% NVA, was identified in IV CTZ. The unit was located first in the Seven Mountains, then moving south into the U Minh Forest. In August 1969 the 188 NVA Regiment of the 1st NVA Division arrived in the Seven Mountains with a strength estimated at 1600 personnel. At present, the 101D NVA Regiment is located just across the border in Cambodia, opposite the Chau Doc-Seven Mountains area, and the 88th Regiment is in the Crow's Nest area north of Moc Hoa. NVA strength in the Delta is now approximately 3500 men, but the total available for operations against GVN units and outposts is about 6400 to 6800 men. Infiltration groups of NVA troops for fillers in Main Force and NVA units are frequently detected moving into the Delta from Cambodia, especially in the MR2 sector. NVA infiltration can be expected to continue as more units require reinforcing and more VC/NVA filler units are infiltrated from Cambodia.

The setback suffered by the VC in their strategic counteroffensive has been reflected by the high Chieu Hoi and defection rate over the past year. The degradation of training and accelerated demands for replacements have lowered the morale and esprit of many VC units. Continued allied offensive operations and interdictions of commo-liaison routes have adversely affected their living conditions, eliminated their sanctuaries and former base areas, and forced the VC into a troubled, erratic existence. Shortages of medical supplies and the resultant fear of death from wounds has weakened the enemy's will to fight. The arrival of substantial numbers of NVA troops however, has somewhat increased enemy combat effectiveness and lowered his vulnerability to psychological operations. Though the natural animosity between the North and South Vietnamese tends to polarize the two groups, to reduce cooperation, and create dissention within mixed units, the enemy maintains a significant overall fighting capability, slightly reduced from previous levels. There was a definite downward trend in the enemy's combat effectiveness from Tet 68 to late 1969, but a swing upward began in mid-1969 following the COSVN decision (revealed in Resolution 9) to emphasize the strategic importance of the Delta. The arrival of at least 850 NVA filler personnel in Dinh Tuong Province, plus the arrival of 2 VC/NVA regiments (273, 188) in the Delta accompanied by the recent appearance of three more regiments (88, 101D, and 95) along the Cambodian border are ample indication that the enemy intends not only to shore up the flagging VC efforts and capabilities, but also to regain somewhere near parity with ARVN forces in the Delta.
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<td>Main Force Companies (16)</td>
<td>630</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Mobile Force (Local Force) Bns (17)</td>
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<td>Administrative Services</td>
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<td>VCI</td>
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*Main Force Battalions include four (4) from the 273 VC Regiment that infiltrated in May 1969 and four (4) from the 18B NVA Regiment. Not included in the number of Main Force Battalions are four (4) from the 88 NVA Regiment; four (4) from the 101D NVA Regiment; and possibly four (4) from the 95 NVA Regiment.*
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Reference para C of cover letter, MG Eckhardt's Debriefing Report, significant changes and up-to-date statistics concerning Local Government for the period 2 June 1969-16 January 1970 follow. Only those areas which show significant change are included.

A. Government Organization

1. Inter-Provincial Inspectors

The Inter-Provincial Inspectors, though not yet officially sworn in and installed, have been operational since June 1969. During this six-month period of their operation, the Inter-Provincial Inspectors have each inspected all eight provinces in their respective territories of responsibility. In addition, the Inspectors have made 86 inspection trips to the districts and 90 villages.

The duties of these Inter-Provincial Inspectorate are briefly as follows: (1) To inspect the province Chiefs in General Administration and the administrative offices in his area; (2) To supervise the Technical Ministries Inspectors; (3) To advise the Province Chief on implementation of regulations, the nation's policy and provincial development program; (4) To report to the Central Inspector General and the Prime Minister and to make recommendations for corrections and improvements in government; (5) To visit all public agencies, inspect accounts, records, documents, classified dossiers, and require explanations from concerned individuals. The rank of these Chief Inspectors is of "Director General Level," which is one grade higher than that of the previous Deputy Government Delegate Position.

In addition to their officially delegated management and post-auditing responsibilities the Inspectors serve: to provide a field review for the Prime Minister of the implementations of the national policies and programs; to represent in the villages the concern and interest of the executive branch of the government; to provide assistance to village officials in solving administrative problems; to provide encouragement to the people and officials in the villages to assume the responsibility for their own self-development; to provide a direct channel of communication between the people and the Prime Minister regarding public opinion socio-political activities, economic conditions, and the government's policies and programs.

During their six months of operation and after their initial ceremonial visitations to each province these Inter-Provincial Inspectors have developed into "on the spot" problem solving agents in the field. As this is being written, it appears that while the Inter-Provincial Inspectorates have been fulfilling a vital need concerning civil authority and responsibility at region level, their continuance in this capacity is
In doubt. The National Assembly in November 1969 deleted the requested appropriation for the Inspectors from the 1970 Appropriation Legislation. At this time, it does not appear that the Executive Branch of the government wishes to request the National Assembly to reconsider its action.

On the district level one important change occurred in mid-1969. After observing the slow progress the Villages Self-Development Program was making, the Deputy District Chiefs for Administration were given direct authority over the Ministry representatives in the districts to assist the villages in their Village Self Development planning and projects. This speeded up the program markedly.

On the village/hamlet level 687 villages out of the total of 727 villages in IV Corps are engaged in carrying out 8,500 self-development projects involving a total of 644,748,230$VN. These projects continue throughout the year, and although no break out can be made for the last 6 months, the trend is toward an increase in numbers and sophistication of projects on the village/hamlet level.

2. Status of Elected Government

Decree No. 68SNV of 9 April 1965, provided for elected Province Councils with power to decide, "within the frame-work of policy and course of action of the government," certain stipulated matters. The primary purpose of the council is to advise the province chief on the desires and needs of the people. Fifteen of the sixteen provinces in IV Corps have elected councils. Sa Dec province was created subsequent to the province council election of 30 May 1965, and consequently has no council. In actual practice, those bodies, where operative, are consultative only. In some provinces, notably An Giang, the council meets regularly and is effective as an advisory body. In some other cases, the province councils have not met in recent months.

3. Village/Hamlet Elections

a. Villages

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<td>Jan 1968</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1969</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1969</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
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b. Hamlets

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Appointed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1968</td>
<td>5,274</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1969</td>
<td>4,752</td>
<td>2,832</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1,308</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 1969</td>
<td>4,238</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Comments

The increase in elected government is largely due to the GVN elections held throughout 1969 and the US advisory effort constantly recommending that elections be held wherever possible. Village/hamlets with operating, viable governments serve to deny VC recruitment, resupply, and political advantage.

The reduction in the total number of villages and hamlets is the result, largely the product of US effort and advice, of consolidations jointly planned. In the "No government" category areas, there are few people. Over 90% of the population of the Corps live in areas with operating governments.

4. Effectiveness

a. Province and District

An analysis of progress in IV Corps indicates the provincial governmental functions are more effective today than they were in January of 1968. This is due to a number of factors:

(1) The quality of province chiefs appointed has improved.

(2) Sustained advisory effort has resulted in increased effectiveness of the province chiefs. For instance, in the area of strengthening local government, the province chiefs are now thinking in terms of holding elections wherever possible; they are, with a few exceptions, expediting the implementation of the Village Self Development Program.

(3) Some technical service reorganisation at the province level has served to streamline provincial organization and reduce the province chief span of control. This has increased the efficiency of the organization. For instance, each of the Directorates: Agricultural Service, Fisheries, Animal Husbandry, etc... of the Ministry of Agriculture had separate, independent offices at province with a common point of command only at the Saigon level. Now, these separate offices have been brought together with a single provincial chief of agriculture.

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with the representatives of the separate directorates responsible to that office. More of this type of reorganization could be accomplished within the fields of Public Works and Education.

(4) The administration at the province level of the Basic Administrative Management course to provincial and technical service supervisory personnel has had a lasting effect.

(5) On the negative side, it must be pointed out that national mobilization has left many key offices at the provincial level shorthanded and understaffed.

(6) One very big plus at the district level has taken place, the appointment of young, trained, inspired graduates of the National Institute for Administration as Deputy District Chiefs for Administration. After graduation from the NIA, these men were drafted, given short basic officer's training, then assigned to the districts with the military rank of Aspirant as the Deputy Chiefs for Administration.

b. Villages and Hamlets

(1) The administration of the in-province Village/Hamlet Administration training courses was badly delayed by the 1968 Tet offensive. Yet, after having lost almost half a year, the province training directors accomplished approximately 85% of their 1968 training goals by the end of the year. In 1969, much of the same sort of delay was caused by the need for training in election procedures for the March elections and training for the Village Self Development Program. This training is particularly important for the new village staff members created by Decree 045-QL/ND. The cumulative effect of the training has increased the effectiveness of Village/Hamlet Government. A total of 15,810 Village/Hamlet Officials received training during the latter half of 1969. The initial delay in the 1969 training program resulted in the training being greatly accelerated during October, November, and December to meet the 1969 goals. During this acceleration period classes were crowded and the quality of training was sacrificed for quantity.

(2) During late 1968, as it became apparent that the need for training additional RD teams lessen, the GVN decided to use the facilities of the National Training Center at Vung Tau for the training of Village/Hamlet Officials during 1969. The first cycle of training began on 24 March 1969 and covered a four week training period. Eight such cycles have been held during 1969. In Delta Military Assistance Command (DMA), a program was established for interviewing a representative sample of the returnees from each province. Although there were minor gripes about the length of the daily sessions and the food, nonetheless, the returnees have come back, inspired and with a national viewpoint. It must be pointed out that for many of these officials, it was the first time in their lives that they had traveled outside their
native provinces. The effect of meeting with and talking to their counterparts from the villages of the entire nation was enormous. By the end of 1969, village officials and all hamlet chiefs from the DMAC villages and hamlets having governments will have had an opportunity to go to Vung Tau. A total of 5,145 Village/Hamlet Officials from DMAC are scheduled for Vung Tau training during 1969.

3. The importance of training Village/Hamlet Officials to operate efficiently and responsively cannot be overemphasized. Viable GVN presence in the villages and hamlets serves to deny these areas to the insurgents—to deny them moral, financial, logistical and manpower support.

4. Major Problem Areas remain in the areas of taxation, government structure, and philosophy and culture. They are essentially the same as enumerated in Reference C. There have been no significant changes in these areas although the trend is toward flexibility, integrity, and a "can-do" attitude in all of these areas.

5. Rural Survey Teams

The Vietnamese Evaluation Branch was activated in July 1969 and authorized nine Rural Survey Teams of three members each. These teams conduct inquiries to determine popular opinion on the pacification program and to pinpoint accomplishments and shortcomings of local officials. Five major surveys of public opinion were made, in five to seven provinces. Material covered included three monthly general surveys on pacification (Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey), a survey of opinion on the death of Ho Chi Minh, and a survey of opinion on the Khien cabinet. Eleven surveys and inquiries on specific problems have been completed or are in progress; nine of these inquiries were in response to PSA requests. The most significant finding of these inquiries as far as that the Village Self-Development Program is benefiting only a limited number of families and no meaningful effort is being made to correct these local problems.

B. Political Development

Politically speaking, the enemy's most important move since June 1969 has been the formation of the "People's Revolutionary Government" (PRG), to which the NLF and the "People's Revolutionary Committees" are now subordinate. The VC, in the Delta as elsewhere, state they are in the "General offensive and spontaneous uprising phase" of their protracted war, this phase having begun in Spring of 1968. The next development is to be a provisional coalition government, which the PRG is designed to participate in. After this there will be a permanent coalition government, and, finally, a complete takeover by the PRG.

In preparation for these events, the VC have, during the past seven months, given highest priority to strengthening their village
level administrations. They have elected People's Revolutionary Committees in a number of villages and hamlets, though in many cases these elections are no more than appointments. The VC hope that, if they can solidify their control in the areas where they are already strong, and maintain at least a shadow presence in other areas, they will be in a good position to lay claim to sizeable portions of the Delta if there is an agreement to withdraw into spheres of influence, and, later, in a good position to defeat GVN candidates in national elections.

In line with these aims, the VC are also emphasizing recruitment of legal cadre. These are the people who will be able to stay in GVN controlled areas even after other cadre have been forced to go to VC controlled territory. The VC are insisting that all their non-legal cadre repair to VC-controlled areas just before a ceasefire, since they fear GVN reprisals.

The Phung Hoang program, which aims at eliminating legal cadre (VCI), has been notably unsuccessful—in the Delta as elsewhere—in neutralizing the top ones, who, once caught, are generally able to obtain their release by payoffs to GVN officials. If the government is to make any headway in frustrating VC plans for continued influence in the Delta, it must take steps to remove these legal cadre from positions of power.

1. Changes in Political Parties

In May 1969, President Thieu formed his National Social Democratic Front, consisting of the six parties that agreed to support him and his policies. By December 1969, the NSDF was moribund; the six parties had never been able to cooperate to any visible end; President Thieu had never seemed active in supporting them, and one component party had withdrawn, as well as an important faction of another party. Nowhere was the front more moribund than in the Delta, though the parties, listed below, continued on their own separate ways.

a. Hoa Hao Social Democratic party (Dan Xa) (Trinh Quoc Khanh faction). This is the party that withdrew from the NSDF, its withdrawal meaning Thieu’s Front had lost its only member with real Delta strength. The Dan Xa has offices in many cases down to hamlet level, a sign of health no other Delta party can match. In the past seven months the Dan Xa has expanded somewhat (i.e. built new offices), but not to any great extent.

b. Nhan Xa (Social Humanist) Party. This is a Catholic party with many former Can Lao members. As of December 1969, some Delta residents feared that Thieu was engaged in replacing all the important positions in the government and in the bureaucracy with Can Lao people,
many of whom belong to the Khon Xa. This development, added to the reportedly substantial number of new members the party has picked up recently in the Delta, makes the party an important one in southern Vietnam.

c. Greater Solidarity Force This is another Catholic party, but one with little support in IV Corps.

d. Dai Viet This party, likewise, is not strong in the Delta.

e. Lien Minh Founded in July 1968, this front was supposed to provide the backing for the GVN that the NSDF was formed to provide later. Initially, headquarters were established in capital towns all over the Delta, and some enthusiasm was evinced for the new grouping, but by December 1969, the Lien Minh was a dead letter.

f. VNQDD. When the NSDF was formed, the two main VNQDD factions (Khanh and Hicip) reunited in order to join. They have since split again, the HiP people leaving the Front. In the fall, both factions engaged in spurts of activity, but by December they were not being heard from. The VNQDD boasts a great deal of grass roots support, a claim that is very hard to check.

There are two opposition parties that have been active in IV Corps during the second half of 1969:

g. Progressive Nationalist Movement This party was formed in May 1969 and by December had established provincial executive committees in seven of the 16 Delta provinces. (This means the PNM had at least 500 members in each of those provinces). Thus, during this period the PNM was the most active party in IV Corps in terms of recruiting new members.

h. National Salvation Front This is the party of Senator Tran Van Don, and is strongest in Phong Dinh, Ba Xuyen, and Kien Giang provinces.

Political parties in Vietnam have never been really effective, and this is even more true of the Delta than elsewhere. It can be stated flatly that no political party in IV Corps is genuinely strong; none has jobs to offer its members, and none can influence governmental policy, either at the national or local levels. In the Delta, as elsewhere to a lesser degree, it is religion that exorcises real influence in public life, not the parties.

2. Situation of the Cambodian Buddhists

On 13 November 1969 Saigon Cambodians staged a five-day sitdown demonstration in front of Independence Palace, demanding that the
President reinstalled them as an official minority group. Subsequently, demonstrations occurred in Vinh Binh, Bac Lieu, Ba Kuyen, Phoeng Dinh, and again in Saigon, lasting into late December. The monks say they fear loss of their language and customs, and they probably are also afraid that, once no longer a minority, they will have lost the basis upon which to appeal to the GVN for aid. Underlying the Cambodians’ actions are the frustrations they have long felt against the GVN; they charge that the government neither provides them help nor makes available to them the means to improve themselves so they can compete with Vietnamese and make their own way.

There are among the Vietnamese-Cambodians two organizations that compete for their support. One is the Saigon-based Theravada Buddhist Association, which often sponsors demonstrations. The other is the United Vietnamese Buddhists of Cambodian Origin, led by the Venerable Danh Bao, who has refused to support the demonstrators. Danh Bao’s non-militant stand seems to have resulted in a number of defections. Formerly, his group was thought to be almost completely dominant everywhere except in Saigon and Vinh Binh. However, an impressive number of monks have demonstrated in other locales, and Danh Bao’s opponents have charged in him with having been bribed by the government. This is probably not true, but Danh Bao has found himself in a difficult position vis-a-vis many of his own followers, and whether he can extricate himself remains to be seen.

The only recent attempt by the GVN to satisfy the Cambodians was the establishment on October 18, of a General Directorate for the Development of the Lives of Vietnamese-Cambodians, long petitioned for by the Cambodians themselves. The organization’s purpose was to give the Cambodians a voice at the highest levels of government, chiefly in order to see that they got what aid was coming to them. President Thieu, however, in large part dissipated the goodwill that should have been the result of the Directorate’s formation by appointing as Director General a weak and ineffective man in whom most Cambodian leaders have little or no faith. The man is COL Kim Khanh, whom Danh Bao is trying to have replaced. If he succeeds in this, Danh Bao might regain some of his lost prestige.

The future of the Vietnamese-Cambodians is difficult to predict. The GVN seems adamant in its determination not to yield to their one demand, and the Cambodians seem equally determined to get their minority status. The demonstrations will probably continue into 1970, and only tact and patience on both sides will prevent ugly and perhaps seriously damaging incidents from arising.
C. Economic and Social

1. Historically, economic factors have not been considered the immediate cause of the insurgency in the Delta but rather were irritants that could be exploited politically by the NLF. I personally believe the peasant-landlord gap and other feudal practices were at the root of the insurgency. Throughout the past several years, and particularly in the interval 1 June 1969-16 January 1970, considerable progress has been made in removing the economic inequities of maldistribution of wealth, poor communication and transportation to market areas, and the uncertainty due to fear of currency devaluation. This latter is always a possibility which might have serious consequences throughout the country. In brief, unless the GVN can continue to carry through its attempts to satisfy the economic aspirations of the people and provide the peasant "greater expectations" for a better life, the insurgency will increase to some degree regardless of Hanoi's actions.

2. Among factors tending to further the insurgency in the interval 1 June 1969-16 January 1970 (that is, factors that were politically exploitable), the manpower and race issues have some importance. For instance, the second half of CY 69 saw increased recruitment of ARVN troops as well as RF/PF, thus furthering the strain on the Delta's already scarce manpower. The draft age males have been effectively removed from the job market and placed in a generally economically non-productive enterprise. Moreover, as cursory observation in the Delta reveals, the effective denial of these men to the job of producing rice and other agricultural staples has placed a much greater strain on the children and the older females than they traditionally bear in the cultivation and harvest season. This is a real burden to the elderly, and therefore a politically exploitable grievance. Furthermore, the ARVN and other military groups are notorious for supplementing their low wages by stealing goods (such as chickens and other commodities), undoubtedly a source of resentment among the local peasant population. Hence, the occupational distortion due to the war is a continuing factor helping to further the insurgency.

3. Another similar factor of some importance in the Delta is the social aspect of the rice trade. Among the more politically sophisticated there is a resentment of the fact that the principal rice merchants and millers of Phong Dinh, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu and Kien Giang Provinces are ethnic Chinese. They are part of a wider oligopolistic network of individuals who have combined by ethnic homogeneity and better business methods to control the trade. This, too, is an economic fact exploitable by the enemy.

4. One other factor helping to further the insurgency is the nuisance caused by lack of adequate rural loan capital. There are two main sources of loans for the Delta farmer. One is the family or extended family loan usually at rates approaching the market rate of
interest, and the other is GVN financial institutions such as the Agricultural Development Bank (with a much more favorable rate of interest). In borrowing funds from the first source the farmer is burdened by a high rate of interest as well as limited loanable funds, and in approaching the second source he is frequently excluded because of arbitrary factors such as age, social background or lack of a credit rating. This situation has aroused anger on the part of some poor farmers who now have the opportunity to expand operations, using improved seed, mechanization, and modern cultivation techniques, but who are circumscribed by an entrenched system which appears unfriendly to them.

5. The interval 1 June 1969 to 16 January 1970, on the other hand, has shown continuing progress in the reduction or elimination of many factors tending to further the insurgency. Progress in the form of increasing absolute levels of wealth as well as the reduction of social inequities tends to take the political advantage away from the NLF and thus hinder the insurgency. In terms of absolute wealth the Delta farmer as well as the city dweller is beginning to fare better. Real incomes are at a level such that the imported necessities and even luxuries of life are available on an increasingly greater scale. This is demonstrated by the profusion of ownership of agricultural machinery, Hondas, and sampan boat motors both in the provincial towns and the rural countryside. On the negative side, the October 1969 GVN austerity tax increase raised the price of most imported items to the consumer and caused a speculative twenty percent rise in prices across the board, thus effectively decreasing the purchasing power of the piaster. The speculative price effects of the tax are only temporary, however, and represent a compromise between a little inflation now against the risk of a great deal next year.

6. In terms of the redistribution of wealth in the direction of the rural peasant, the second half of CY 69 also saw progress. For the farmer who was rich enough and fortunate enough to plant early maturing rice varieties, the price of paddy in October and November 1969 was two to three times the prevailing price in February or March. This helped a small group of farmers achieve large profits from a relatively small planted area. The majority of the farmers who plant rice for the main harvest in December 1969 should also reap profits about fifty percent higher per unit of paddy than they did a year ago. In general, the prices of goods the farmer produces have been increasing approximately sixty-five percent faster than the goods he buys since the beginning of 1967.

7. Finally, the interval 1 June 1969 to 16 January 1970 has shown substantial expansion of the market area in the Delta and increasingly freer trade. This is a result of the opening and repair of 340 kilometers of district, provincial and interprovincial roads by ARVN engineers as well as the implementation of the Prime Minister's directive abolishing Police Resource Control checkpoints along National Route 4. The latter measure, designed to facilitate the movement of foodstuffs to Saigon, has already taken effect in many Delta provinces.
D. New Life Development

1. Community Development - Village Self Development

a. Goals

(1) To assist in the development of a viable local government at the village and hamlet levels by organizing and uniting the rural people to help them advance toward self-governance, self-sufficiency, and self-defense through democratic processes.

(2) To help undertake developmental projects, planned and implemented by the people with local government support.

(3) To recruit and train Vietnamese Community Development Assistants who will assist in the implementation of the Village Self Development Program.

(4) To assist GVN officials in the training of elected local government officials in the VSD Program and in the dissemination of information in the rural and urban areas.

b. Achievements

(1) A total of 4,821 VSD projects were completed while 4,325 are still underway as of 20 December 1969.

(2) Hired and trained 110 Community Development Assistants.

(3) Conducted the first formal training of Vietnamese Community Development Assistants with 110 trainees for a period of 10 days.

(4) Conducted in-service training in some provinces for CDAs and VSD training for elected and appointed village and hamlet officials.

c. Discussion

(1) The VSD Program in 1969 was not fully implemented until the late part of June because of the delay in the election and training of village and hamlet officials. Further delay was caused by the extension of the 1958 Accelerated Pacification Campaign where-in additional funds and projects had to be carried out during the first quarter of the year in order to provide program continuity from the old program to the new.

(2) During the second half of the year, VSD funds have been released to the villages, with the additional 600,000$VN disbursed to villages having elected officials. It was at this same time that
the concept of Area Development was organized and implemented in districts where a full complement of Assistant Area Development Officer, Community Development Officer, Community Development Assistants and GVN personnel was employed as a "mobile team" to support program implementation in some provinces. Sometime in October, the plan to train CDAs in Can Tho was initiated by this office which was approved late in November. As a result, the 1st Delta Regional CDA Training Course for Vietnamese was held for 10 days in Can Tho. One hundred ten (110) CDAs from all the provinces attended the training.

d. Problem areas

(1) The 3-day training for elected village and hamlet officials in the VSD and P & D Program in each province was not sufficient to acquire complete understanding of the program.

(2) Reporting requirements were far beyond the capability of GVN officials due to lack of personnel, project forms, and office equipment.

(3) Lack of vehicles and interpreters for CDOs and CDAs.

e. Recommended solutions

Problem number 1 can be solved by a well-prepared program of instruction with adequate staff and preparation; problem number 2 through the use of foresight and advance planning, better logistical support to village, district and provincial Pacification and Development offices. Problem number 3 is a recurrent one, but could easily be solved if higher priority and increased support would be accorded the VSD Program.

2. Agriculture: The 1969-70 rice crop will total 4 million metric tons (MT), compared to 3.1 million MT in 1968-69. As a result, the imports of rice for 1970 will be decreased to 150,000 MT as compared to 350,000 MT in 1969 and a record high of 800,000 MT in 1968. Land planted to fruits and vegetables has increased because of an upward trend in demand for human food. Sorghum is being planted on an experimental basis to supply livestock feeds. Hogs and chickens have increased in numbers, with new strains rapidly supplanting the traditional breeds. In excess of 70,000 hectares of land have been distributed through the land reform program, the best record in the history of the program although substantially short of plans for the year.

3. Logistics

a. Commodity Support. In August 1969, a significant achievement was accomplished in authorizing villages and hamlets to purchase cement on the local market when available or purchase from MORD when not available. This has resulted in reduced cement shipments
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to CIA and provincial warehouses. A further accomplishment was made in getting provinces to agree to transfer laterally excesses of cement between provinces. Effective 1 Sep 69, CIA Can Tho received instructions to implement plans to requisition and maintain stock control cards on clothing and equipment required by RDC. There are approximately 16,500 RDC personnel. Initial issues have been completed. Replacement and stockage requisitions have been forwarded to CIA Saigon. During the period June 69 to 1 Jan 70, 259,183,167 metric tons of commodities were delivered to provinces.

b. Central Logistics Agency Regional Warehouse Complexes and Provincial Warehouses. The warehouse program was started in 1963 to provide warehouse space at province level. In 1965, this was amended to include district level. In 1968, it was desired to build two regional warehouses located in Can Tho and Sa Dec. The Can Tho complex would support six (6) provinces while Sa Dec would support seven (7) provinces. At this time, Sa Dec is under construction with target date of completion in March 1970. All required land for Can Tho complex has not been obtained yet but is expected to be acquired by mid-January 1970. Status of province and district warehouses as of January 1970 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Started</th>
<th>Less than 50%</th>
<th>More than 50%</th>
<th>Basic structures completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province 16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province 18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexes 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Can Tho is currently operating out of a leased building which is inadequate.

c. Province Logistics Advisors

The program of having a PIA assigned to each province proved so successful that it was extended for another year. This program is due to expire in 1970.

d. Province Maintenance Shops

The project to construct Province Maintenance Shops in each of the 16 provinces is nearing completion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Started</th>
<th>Less than 50%</th>
<th>More than 50%</th>
<th>Basic structure completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23
Final completion of three shops has been delayed due to incomplete basic structures. No target date for completion is available at this writing. The following shops are completely operational by GVN personnel: Go Cong, An Giang, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Kien Phong, Ba Xuyen. The following six (6) shops have training teams: Chau Doc, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thion, Vinh Long, Kien Giang, and An Xuyen. Twelve (12) shops are partially equipped with tools and spare parts. Maintenance and assistance training has, and will continue, to be furnished by Philco-Ford until March 1970, at which time their contract will expire. Difficulty in hiring trainees is due to low pay scale offered by GVN.

4. Engineering. The Engineering goals for the period June 1969-January 1970 were to repair and renovate delta electrical systems, improve dredging operations, improve the fresh water supply in the Delta, and provide technical engineering advice to both GVN and US programs.

The following accomplishments were noted during the period:

a. The installation of additional generating capacity in seven Province Capitals and the beginning of construction of improved distribution systems in three Province Capitals.

b. The RSEA dredges completed land fill and sand stockpile projects in An Giang, Vinh Long, Phong Dinh, and Sa Dec Provinces (500,000M3). Also during the period, a new canal in Chau Doc Province has been under construction to open up access to the Nui San Quarry for rock deliveries and the cattle market for movement of stock by barge. This job is approximately 85% complete.

c. Complemented new water wells in Vi Thanh (Chuong Thion Province) and Vinh Quoi (Ba Xuyen Province) and continued deep exploratory drilling in the salt water salient which protrudes into Vinh Binh, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong provinces and the southern part of Dinh Tuong Province; finished the installation of a surface water supply systems in Cal Rang and Vi Thanh, and Binh Thuy.

d. Accepted two of three impact hospitals from OICC; completed Can Tho University projects; accepted Vinh Long Normal School. In addition, roads and highway funds were transferred to MAC-DC-LOC, electrical programs increased in scope and pace. Unfortunately, the exploratory drilling for fresh water in the Vinh Binh, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong salt water salient has proved unsuccessful.

Difficulty has been experienced especially in the last 6 months in hiring skilled labor. It is becoming both scarcer and more expensive. Prices continue to rise, even more rapidly lately because of the recent increase in taxes. Spare parts continue to be available more on the opportunistic basis rather than on a planned requirement basis.
5. Youth Affairs. In May 1969 the NLD/Youth Affairs division of CORDS was phased out. Action in this area continues but is a result of individual support given by highly motivated CORDS field personnel or as an outgrowth of other programs.

6. Civic Action. Civic Action programs and activities have shown a slow but steady increase from June 1969 through January 1970. In the Delta, Regional and Popular Forces have provided the main source of energy for civic action projects, leading the nation consistently in man-day contributions to projects month after month. Paramilitary and ARVN forces have contributed less, rating only third in the nation in their contributions. U.S. forces, consisting mainly of the 9th US Division (minus one brigade), provided a sizeable input into the overall program in the early part of this period, consistently putting in 5,000 man-days or more on various projects. This contribution was withdrawn by the 9th Division's departure from RVN. Projects that were incomplete or outstanding were continued through the Civil Affairs teams of the 2d Civic Affairs Company. Also, US Navy Seabee Teams conducting a people-to-people program in pacification and training have had a high impact in their ten areas in IV CTZ.

Engineering Construction Advisory Detachment (ECAD) Teams have completed four major projects during this period of time. These consist of the Binh Thuy Village water plant, the Ca Lai Rang City water plant and system, repairs to the Vi Thanh City water plant, and the Phu Hiep water plant and system. On the whole these projects are providing clean potable water for approximately 20,000 people.

The Military Support of Pacification Fund (AIX) had been expended at the rate of 27 million piasters per month as of June 1969. During June the fund received a 42% reduction so as not to exceed the CY 69 budget. In December an additional 48% reduction was placed on the fund due to a smaller budget for CY 70. The major AIX Fund expenditures for this period were in support of the Chieu Hoi Third Party Award program, the repair and construction of LOCs through Public Works, and hamlet primary school construction. Approximately 300 million piasters were expended during CY 69 in support of the Pacification program in IV CTZ. During this period of time the RVNAF Civic Action Program, while showing no startling leaps forward, had undergone steady expansion and improvement. All US/FWF assets available within IV CTZ and participating in Civic Action have enhanced the pacification program in their areas of operation.

7. Education

Significant developments in the Delta's education program were:

a. Elementary Education
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(1) Construction of 977 additional school classrooms, 313 of which were wholly from the efforts of parents in newly pacified hamlets. These classrooms will accommodate 59,620 additional pupils and make a significant impact on pacification in the Delta.

(2) MOE decree to make all primary schools community schools.

(3) Training 1,294 additional hamlet school teachers to staff classrooms built through the Village Self Development Program.

(4) In-service training for 4,000 school teachers and education officials.

(5) Construction of two new dormitories at the Vinh Long Normal School to double teacher candidate enrollment.

(6) Opening of new teacher training normal schools at My Tho and Long Xuyen.

(7) Meeting GVN/MOE goals for CY 70 dependent upon a supply of 2,600 additional teachers for recruitment and training in CY 70.

b. Secondary Schools

(1) Construction of 456 or 94 percent of the 486 additional high school classrooms programmed for CY 69 assured by 15 January 1970.

(2) The approval from CPDC funding to construct and equip 83 new high school classrooms ASAP.

(3) Inception of an accelerated high school teacher training program by the University of Can Tho for 170 first-cycle teacher candidates to staff new classrooms built in CY 69.

(4) Pilot school development through Ohio University Contract in Business Education in four selected high schools has been successful beyond expectations with 2,600 students currently enrolled in typing-curriculum-enrichment course.

(5) Contracts let to construct new vocational agriculture high schools at Long Xuyen and Phu Vinh.

(6) Contracts let to complete the Junior Technical High Schools at Long Xuyen and Vinh Long to provide for greatly increased enrollments.
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c. University of Can Tho

(1) Completion of construction through U.S. Aid of 14 classroom buildings housing demonstration high school and accelerated high school teacher training program.

(2) Completion of construction through U.S. Aid of science classroom and laboratory building that was completely destroyed in February 1968 Tet Offensive.

(3) Increase in enrollment for 1969-1970 school year from 2,000 to 3,000 students or 52 percent.

E. Revolutionary Development Cadre Program

1. General. The methods of operation by the RD Cadre have not changed from the previous period. Approximately 400 teams are currently employed in targeted hamlets, spending approximately 3 months establishing the minimum foundations for viable hamlet governments. In addition, approximately 125 teams (25%) are currently employed in secure villages, improving and upgrading already established governments. The training of village and hamlet officials at Vinh Tau has greatly improved their understanding and employment of RD Cadre, although there are still occasional problems.

2. Conversion and Phased Out

a. The conversion of US support from OSA to normal MACV/USAID/GVN channels is still in progress. GVN MORD supply channels are now used for general supplies. HT-1 radios are supplied through the Central Telecommunications Directorate and weapons and ammunition through Sector A&DSL companies. Medical supplies are provided through the Ministry of Health. In the near future GVN will assume responsibility for payrolls. All of these changes have been or are being made without serious difficulty; only HT-1’s remain a problem. In addition, the transfer of 37 vehicles from OSA to MORD province property officers is expected in the near future. DOD civilians will begin arriving in January to take over RD Cadre advisor jobs at DMAC level.

b. On 1 June 1969 there were 514 RD Cadre teams in the sixteen provinces of IV Corps. This number increased to 560 teams by 16 January 1970. Of these all are armed 30-man teams except for 38 teams in An Gian province - those are unarmed 20-man teams in a village support role. The 38 teams in An Gian will be reduced to eight men each by 15 April. As pacification proceeds in other provinces, more teams are being assigned to village support missions. Many of those teams will also be reduced to eight men during 1970. As requirements for RD Cadre decline in more secure provinces, additional teams will
be recruited in other provinces. It is anticipated that as many as 1950 cadre (equivalent to 65 teams) can be released in eight provinces during 1970. These spaces will be needed to recruit 65 new teams in provinces not yet fully pacified. As team assignments are shifted more and more to village support, we will be in a posture by the end of 1970 to begin reducing overall strength requirements in IV Corps.

3. Problem Areas

a. Major problem areas are poor support by security forces and lack of HT-1 radios and radio repair. The HT-1 radio problem is receiving attention now. We are short 1272 for RD Cadre. Security problems are attacked as they arise; in general, support is uneven. The rate of VC-initiated incidents has fallen from a second quarter high of 402 per month to about 100 per month. The desertion rate, which soared after reorganization and increased VC attacks, has also fallen but is still much higher (about 230 per month) than before reorganization. This is due mainly to the removal of organic security forces when teams were reorganized from 59 men to 30 men in February 1969.

b. The delay in National Assembly approval of a pay raise for RD Cadre has had some effect on morale. The severity of the morale problem varies from team to team.

c. Cadre leadership was weakened by reorganization, and province span of control problems were increased. Considerable improvement has been made although we have not reached the former level of efficiency. The benefits of reorganization, on the other hand, far outweigh those disadvantages.

F. Chieu Hoi Program

1. Inducement

The momentum generated by the Provincial Pacification Campaigns resulted in record numbers of ralliers during the latter part of 1969. During the period 1 June 1969 to 16 January 1970 more than 17,000 rallied in IV CTZ, the largest number in the history of the program and slightly more than the year's total for all the rest of Vietnam combined. Throughout this period shifts in various provinces' efforts between the consolidation of pacified areas and movement into new areas did produce monthly fluctuations, but the rate remained consistently high until the second week of December when it dropped to its lowest level since the pre-Tet period of February 1969.

No single reason can be assigned for this decrease, but one of the more salient possible causes should be mentioned. Increased security control of cadres by the Viet Cong before an offensive, or before the Tet holiday, has been apparent in earlier drops in the Chieu
Hoi rate. This has been verified by extensive interviews conducted with Hoi Chanh. Last year, a large drop in the Chieu Hoi rate occurred during the week of Tet; yet, the following week produced one of the highest peaks of returns to come in during any seven-day period in 1969. Though continuing Psyops support will attempt to keep the inducement rate high during the coming Tet period, the number of Hoi Chanh rallying will probably remain low until the holiday season has passed.

The more than 17,000 Hoi Chanh who rallied during the period represented a total which surpassed by more than 7,000 the entire number of Hoi Chanh who rallied in the Corps during 1968.

The third and fourth quarter of 1969 showed a definite southward movement in the geographical rallying pattern within the provinces of the Delta. In June, Vinh Long, Kien Hoa, and Dinh Tuong were the provinces which were producing large numbers. However, as the year progressed, less and less Hoi Chanh came out of those areas, and provinces in the southern and western portions which previously had been on the lower end of the scale in terms of numbers of Hoi Chanh suddenly became the focal point of the Chieu Hoi Program. As aggressive ARVN operations and movement into new areas by RP/PP took place, the number of Hoi Chanh which came out of areas in An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, and Kien Giang reached a high point in late November and early December. During this period these provinces alone were responsible for half of the Hoi Chanh in the Delta.

APT authorized strength increased from 1499 to 2120 and, as of 16 January 1970, actual strength stood at 2102 or 99% of the total authorization. The addition of APT advisors in some provinces coupled with well-recruited and trained teams provided the provinces of Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long with aggressive and competent operational teams that all played a significant part in the successful inducement program of those provinces.

Throughout the period sudden influxes into many of the Chieu Hoi Centers caused temporary overcrowding, which in at least one province, Chuong Thien, was of serious magnitude. Relief of the situation was provided by DOD commodity support, Food for Freedom commodities, and voluntary agency assistance. Improved training of cadre by the Chieu Hoi Ministry and the removal of three corrupt, inefficient, and inept Provincial Chieu Hoi Chiefs during the last quarter of 1969 brought to a close a long advisory struggle to eliminate the poorest from the ranks of the Service Chiefs and replace them with men who are seriously interested in continuing improvement in training, reintegration, resettlement, and efficient administration of their provincial programs.
2. Training

Continuous political and vocational training in all Centers in the Delta was not possible during the past seven and one-half months. Overcrowding in some Centers like An Xuyen and Chuong Thien temporarily forestalled training efforts. Elsewhere, lack of qualified instructors and/or equipment hindered training programs. Of the more than 17,000 Hoi Chanh who were present in the Centers during the period and where adequate facilities existed to conduct meaningful training, only one out of every ten Hoi Chanh chose to avail themselves of the vocational training offered. However, a number of provinces had good vocational training. Provincial programs in carpentry, masonry, tailoring, hollow-block making, and agricultural training were particularly successful in An Giang, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Kien Tuong and Vinh Long. The total number of Hoi Chanh who received vocational training at the Provincial level in all provinces was approximately 3250.

The Regional Center had a highly successful advanced vocational instruction program in operation throughout the period. Courses were offered in furniture making, auto mechanics, driving, and tailoring at the Center to Hoi Chanh from all the Provincial Centers in the Corps. Two hundred Hoi Chanh took advantage of the opportunity to receive advanced training.

APT training in political indoctrination, psychological warfare, and small unit tactics progressed at a rapid pace at the Regional Center. Over 430 APT members received this advanced training; of the total authorized 2120 APT in the Corps, over half have now been provided with advanced training at the Regional Center. It is expected that all of the present authorized APT will have received Regional training by 1 May 1970.

3. Reintegration/Resettlement

Construction of additional Chieu Hoi hamlets during the period took place in Ba Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Phong Dinh. These additions bring the total number of provinces which now have hamlets to eleven. No new hamlet construction is planned for 1970.

During the last two quarters of 1969 a concerted advisory effort was undertaken to make the GVN aware of the manpower resource represented by the Hoi Chanh, who were readily available in large numbers in almost all provinces of the Delta as a potential source of recruits for RF/FF and RDC. The effort proved successful in some provinces, notably Bac Lieu, An Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Kien Hoa, and Phong Dinh. By the end of 1969 over 3800 Hoi Chanh had found employment immediately upon their release from the Centers in RF/FF, RDC, APT, and ARVN. The majority of these recruits went into RF and FF.
Those Hoi Chanh who did not immediately join a GVN military or paramilitary unit upon their release from the Center usually returned home to await the draft. While private employment for the Hoi Chanh remained difficult to find, procedural requirements in obtaining ID cards (a former bar to immediate employment) were significantly improved during the latter part of 1969.

4. Hoi Chanh other than Viet Cong

Some 9% of the total Hoi Chanh who rallied during the period 1 June-16 January were defectors from anti-GVN but non-Communist groups, including an extremist faction of the Hoa Hao sect and members of the "KKK" (Khmer Kampuchea Krom, "Cambodians of Lower Cambodia," a racial separatist group). About 1350 of these dissidents came in July and August of 1969. Their appearance caused temporary overcrowding in Chau Doc and Sa Dec. To relieve some of this congestion, 350 were transferred to the Regional Center at Can Tho. As a condition of allowing these dissidents to rally, the Ministry of Chieu Hoi required the surrender of at least one individual weapon for every two ralliers accepted into the program. This produced a total of over 500 individual or crew served weapons.

G. Psychological Warfare and Information

1. Information Effort. The information effort continued, with 50-150 million leaflets and 100-150 thousand posters distributed each month. Hand distribution of newspapers exceeded 500,000 per month during the period, and the aerial distribution of the newspaper FREE SOUTH rose to 1,850,000 monthly. Five national magazines are distributed in the Delta, in the total amount of 230,000 copies each month.

   Ground and waterborne speaker broadcasts exceed 10,000 hours on a monthly average. Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, which are targeted more specifically, range from 300 to 500 hours per month.

   Local television coverage from the Can Tho station is now 3½ hours, broadcasting daily from 1800 to at least 2100. There are conservatively estimated to be over 30,000 television sets in the Delta. In addition, the Upper Delta is able to receive broadcasts from Saigon TV. Local Can Tho radio broadcasting amounts to 3 hours daily and is received by an estimated 1,300,000 persons. Radio Saigon may be tuned in also, as well as Radio Hanoi and the Viet Cong clandestine broadcasts. Throughout the Delta, motion picture viewings range from 1,000 to 1,500 per month, and Culture Drama team performances number from 300 to 400 monthly.

   The impact of PSYOP activities on friendly targets is extremely difficult to determine. A study was made in III and IV Corps in 101 hamlets by interviewing 1500 inhabitants on their source of information of both local and national affairs. The findings of this
survey are that the primary source of information is radio (47.8% of the people receive information on national affairs, 29.8 local affairs). Hamlet officials were next (11.4 national and 12.6 local), followed by friends and neighbors (11.4 national and 21.1 local), followed by VIS (5.0 national and 12.1 local), followed by TV (14.1 national and 0% local).

2. Specific Techniques

GWN/US PSYOP Programs supported the goals of the Combined Campaign Operations Plan AB-144. The techniques which are discussed below are representative of PSYOP activities rather than being a comprehensive discussion of all actions taken during the period under consideration.

a. 9th Infantry Division Redeployment

Redeployment of 25,000 men of the US 9th Infantry Division was announced on 9 June 1969. Specific PSYOP guidance concerning this redeployment was not announced until 15 June. Special leaflets and tapes were then prepared indicating the strength and readiness of ARVN to assume their new mission. As a result of this experience it was concluded that when significant events occur, field Psyoperators should respond positively within existing guidelines pending receipt of specific guidance, in order to preclude a propaganda advantage by the enemy.

b. "Operation Nui Co To II"

During the period 1-31 July both US and ARVN provided PSYOP support for the intensified bombing and shelling of the Seven Mountains area under "Operation Nui Co To II." Day and night aerial loudspeaker operations and leaflet drops were conducted by the 5th Special Operations Squadron, USAF. ARVN POLWAR conducted parallel operations plus ground night loudspeaker broadcasts. Both standard and specially prepared tapes and leaflets were used. The main target was the NVA troops in the area.

c. Exploitation of Hoi Chanh

On 18 August 1969, eight North Vietnamese soldiers rallied in Tinh Bien District, Chau Doc province. Among those rallying was the platoon leader. After these Hoi Chanh were interrogated by intelligence, they were turned over to PSYOP for exploitation. It was suggested that the soldiers participate in radio and TV broadcasts, to which they agreed, and subsequently a 32 minute radio tape and a TV tape were prepared describing their life and experience as NVA.

Five individual 3x6 Chieu Hoi leaflets and one aerial tape were developed for dissemination. A 5x8 leaflet containing a group photo and a Chieu Hoi appeal by the platoon leader was developed, and dissemination of this leaflet and the aerial tape was completed on selected target areas.
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d. Death of Ho Chi Minh

On 3 September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died, and on 4 Sep 69, leaflets were dropped announcing his death. Because of the complexity of the problem of how to best exploit this event, it was decided that in the absence of specific guidance, the best approach was to simply announce Ho's death. All air assets in the Delta covered base camps, transfer points, contested areas, and infiltration routes with this announcement for a four day period.

e. Mang Thit Nicollai Canal

PSYOP support was provided to Commander River Patrol Force in support of the opening of the Mang Thit Nicollai Canal as part of the 1969 pacification program. Special material was produced to show the progress made along the canal and air loudspeaker broadcasts were made to villages and hamlets in the area.

f. Leaflet Bundle Method

The "Leaflet Bundle Method" of aerial leaflet delivery was developed by the 10th PSYOP Battalion in September 1969. This method consists of wrapping 4000 6x3 leaflets in paper and releasing this bundle over each target. This method enables the aircraft to cover 480 targets 9,500 meters long by 500 meters wide. Previous missions had engaged only 60 targets of the same area. The only change is in the density of leaflets per square kilometer not the size of the area covered. The result is that target capability has been increased eightfold.

g. Earlyword

On 8 October a quick reaction aerial loudspeaker mission was conducted in support of an RF operation in Phong Din province. The time lapse from the initial request for support to the time the USAF aircraft was over the target was twenty minutes. The pilot used the Earlyword system to broadcast a message from the Province Chief flying in a C & C helicopter.

f. Phung Hoang Program

Beginning in October the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) program received renewed PSYOP emphasis. Provinces were encouraged to collect biographical data on known VC and to obtain photographs wherever possible. Pictures and biographical data were then published in poster form in much the same manner as FBI wanted posters. In addition, photos were shown on television and announcements made on radio in order to provide maximum coverage and to publicize the campaign. Eventually a standardized poster was developed and by the end of the year most provinces had published posters.
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Some of the VCI who have been targeted are considered to be low level VCI and efforts have been undertaken to target higher levels of the VC infrastructure. The impact of the Phung Hoan program is not fully known since it is difficult to determine how many persons have elected to Chieu Hoi for fear of being identified. Several subjects were captured because of posters, and many others are known to have chosen to Chieu Hoi because they were specifically targeted.

1. PSDF Victory

On 13 November it was reported at the Vietnamese daily briefing at IV CTZ that the hamlet of Nam Qui, Chau Doc province, had been attacked by the VC. The PSDF has sustained 6 KIA but killed 18 VC and captured 3 weapons in their successful defense. To exploit this successful operation, the following actions were accomplished or initiated within 48 hours: The Vietnamese Press representative prepared a story and forwarded it to MOI, Saigon, for National dissemination. Can Tho ran 4 minutes of film on the evening news broadcast 14 November. Can Tho Radio broadcast a 2 minute report in the evening news on 14 Nov, and prepared a 15 minute special program that was broadcast on 17 November. The Combined PSYOP Center prepared 2 posters and a leaflet for dissemination in the Tri Tcn area and through RF/PF channels where desired.

j. Downed U.S. Flyers

On 17 November the 10th PSYOP battalion received a request to support the attempted rescue of two American pilots downed in Vinh Binh Province (the VNAF had already flown loudspeaker and leaflet missions). An O-2B speaker plane flew over the area during the afternoon of the day of the request. A live broadcast was made by an interpreter of the Vinh Binh TOC, and 60,000 leaflets pertaining to the rescue of allied personnel were dropped. In the evening, a C-47 aircraft flew over the area broadcasting a quick reaction tape and dropped 2,500,000 leaflets. These leaflets consisted of a quick reaction leaflet, printed by the battalion in less than eight hours from the initial notification, and standard leaflets of the theme "Rescue of Allied Personnel." Aerial broadcasts and leaflet drops were made for the next five days.

k. Tuyen Binh Incident

In Tuyen Binh district of Kien Tuong province the 88th NVA Regiment and the 50th Local Force Battalion attempted to overrun Long Khot district town on 3 Dec 69. The enemy was repulsed by RF, IF and PSDF forces and lost 130 men KIA. Special loudspeaker tapes were broadcast by VNAF aircraft and standardized leaflets were dropped with NVA and Chieu Hoi appeals. To publicize the accomplishments of the RF and PF a special poster was prepared to emphasize what can be accomplished through carefully prepared ambushes and a determination to fight. The
NVA elements retreated into the "crew's nest" inside Cambodia. Chieu Ho leaflets were drifted into the "crew's nest" by dissemination from a C-47 aircraft flying at an altitude of 8,000 feet (normal attitude is 3,000 feet for leaflet missions) and releasing the leaflets in Tay Ninh province, III Corps.

1. RF/FF Promotion

As a further means of promoting esprit de corps and unit identification a poster has been developed, printed, and distributed showing RF and FF unit pictures with an accompanying slogan illustrating their resolve to sacrifice, to defend villages and hamlets, and to defeat "the enemy of the people."

2. Delayed Opening Leaflet

Emphasis was placed on the use of Delayed Opening Leaflet (DOL) method of leaflet dissemination in IV Corps. This method consists of tying a bundle of 1000 6x3 leaflets with nylon string. An attached fuse is ignited and the DOL bundle is ejected from the aircraft. When the fuse burns down to the string, it is severed and the leaflets are released. By changing the length of the fuse, the leaflets may be released at any altitude. This method allows for pinpoint accuracy and is most suitable when used by light aircraft.

3. Major Problem Areas

Recruitment of VIS-Cadre continues to be a problem. Competition for a dwindling supply of manpower as well as low salaries has resulted in many vacancies. Training and supervision of cadre also is problematic since face-to-face communication requires personnel to be self-starting and outgoing, qualities not often found. Information cadre all too frequently regard their responsibilities as limited to passing out printed materials, whereas the Vietnamese have traditionally used the spoken word as a primary means of communication. When dealing with an illiterate population the significance of face-to-face communication is obvious.

Repair of equipment such as electrical generators and television sets through VIS Channels remains an unresolved area. Lack of skilled personnel, replacement parts, and inadequate transportation all contribute to equipment deterioration and malfunction. Until the Ministry of Information vitalizes its repair and logistics system or finds a means of repairing equipment at the user level, this will be a continuing problem.

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4. Vietnamization

c. Termination of US Advisory Effort

The PSYOP Advisory effort in An Giang Province was turned over to the Vietnamese VIS Chief and Sector S-5 on 23 October 1969. Continued support will be received through the distribution of national publications by JUSPAO and US Military sources. The PSYOP Advisory function was turned over to the Vietnamese Information Chief in Kien Tuong Province as of 28 November 1969. National publications will continue to be distributed and both provinces will be monitored by the IV Corps VIS Chief.

c. Cultural Drama Teams

Because of the loss of Assistance in Kind (AIK) funds to the APA/PSYOPS on 31 December 1969 support of Cultural Drama Teams cannot be continued, all provinces were advised to seek support of these teams through Ministry of Information channels. Continued support of Cultural Drama groups by US advisors is questionable because of the lack of evidence to indicate their degree of effectiveness and because it has only served to delay MOI's assuming responsibility for the Van Tac Vu program.

c. Combined Air Operations Center

In early October 1969 the 5th Special Operations Squadron executed a stand-down in preparation for redeployment. After determining what aerial assets were available and how to employ them, on 21 October 1969, a combined POLWAR - US IV Corps Air mission targeting section became operational. This section coordinates the employment of all USAF/VNAF PSYOP aircraft to include USAF loudspeaker aircraft (O-2B) and a leaflet and night loudspeaker C-47 based at Bien Hoa, and VNAF loudspeaker aircraft (V-17A) based at Binh Thuy, and a leaflet and loudspeaker U-6A aircraft based at Saigon.

Scheduling of air missions on a weekly basis through joint efforts of the Vietnamese and US is progressing well and will be continued in the future with little, if any, modification. US PSYOP Air Assets available to VNAC from the 9th SOS appear adequate to satisfy current and projected needs, and these are teamed with VNAF assets by the Combined Operations Center.

c. Earlyword System

On 25 November 1969, the first in-flight test of the Earlyword System in VNAF aircraft supporting the IV Corps was conducted. Two 116th Squadron (VNAF) aircraft flew in the general vicinity of Headquarters 40th POLWAR Bn, Binh Thuy, from which a prepared message was
broadcast over an AN/PRC-25 radio. The message was clearly audible and convinced the Vietnamese representatives that they had acquired an effective PSYOP capability.

e. Combined Psychological Operations Center

In November 1969 planning was completed for a Combined US-POLWAR Psychological Operations Center and steps taken to train POLWAR personnel to take over media production, dissemination, and evaluation responsibilities of the 10th PSYOP Battalion. A detailed study outlining transfer of function from the 10th PSYOP to POLWAR BLOC, including a new TOE, has been prepared and is being staffed. Training of POLRAR personnel is progressing satisfactorily, and the prognosis for a successful operation is favorable. US advisory personnel can eventually be reduced to a team of five (5) officers and seven (7) enlisted personnel to provide training and logistical support until POLWAR develops their own capability to function independently.

f. Radio

Emphasis was placed on beginning Cambodian language programming to appeal to the significant minority population of Cambodians in the Delta. One VN field reporter was assigned from ARVN to Radio Can Tho on direct appeal of the PSYOP Director to the Minister of Information.

5. Can Tho Television

Can Tho Television completed one year of operation on 11 November 1969. Continued emphasis has been placed on covering items of local interest such as successful military operations, land title ceremonies, openings of schools, and public works projects. Three cultural drama team performances were video taped in the studio and rebroadcast in the latter part of November. Regular programming has been supported by video tapes from Saigon.

H. Public Health Program

1. Third Country Support

During the period covered by this report, five countries continued to provide medical teams to Vietnamese hospitals to assist in the upgrading of definitive medical care and to provide surgical capability augmentation.

Sponsor countries and team locations were as follows:

Switzerland - Ha Tien, Kien Giang province
Australia - Long Xuyen, An Giang province

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The number of surgical procedures performed by these teams, coupled with the advisory effort, made a significant contribution to the local government health program. Logistical support for these teams continued to be provided from U.S. resources.

2. Nursing Advisory Program

Vietnamese hospitals in the Delta are still hampered by a shortage of nursing personnel. Two one-year program assistant nurse schools are conducted (at Can Tho and Long Xuyen), and as of 1 July 1969 both schools initiated a program of two classes per year. Neither school was ready for this expansion in that facilities were still inexperienced, program revisions were necessary, and dormitory as well as classroom facilities were inadequate. The new school at Long Xuyen was completed and dedicated on 20 Nov 69. At the Can Tho school, although plans for a second story dormitory were approved in 1968, as yet no construction had been initiated. Completion of the construction requirements along with a continuing gain in experience by the two faculties concerned should result in a very effective program. Based on beneficial trends in the conduct of these schools, the single Nurse Education Advisor assigned should not be required at the conclusion of her tour.

Since 1967, two hundred thirty assistant nurses have been graduated from these two schools and assigned to hospitals within this Region. In addition, assistant nurses have also been assigned from graduates of the Saigon conducted school. With this amount of input, increased nurse staffing would be expected but has not materialized as indicated by the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nurse Technicians</th>
<th>Nat'l Nurses</th>
<th>Last Nurses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This decrease is explained by the fact that nurses are permitted after a period of assignment to transfer to other Regions without any control by the Bureau of Nursing. The Bureau of Personnel provides replacements but these are new graduates who should be additions to the staff rather than replacements. As a result there is no improvement in staffing in IV CTZ hospitals despite the number of graduates from the nursing schools.
The general duty nurse advisory program is gradually being phased out with only two advisors remaining who will have departed by February 1970.

Nurse advisors are still required in the fields of Chief Nurse, Nurse Advisors, Operating Room, Central Service, Public Health and Nurse Education.

Although the Vietnamese Regional Chief Nurse is competent and desires improvement in nursing standards, lack of any authority in Provincial Hospitals hampers any attempt in making necessary changes.

3. Impact Hospitals

Three impact hospitals had been programmed and completed. Impact Hospital, Vi Thanh, Chuong Thien Province, was formally dedicated during 1969 and is in operation and functioning with a limited staff augmented by USAID contracted Korean Provincial Health Assistance Program (PHAP) team.

The Impact Hospital, Chau Doc Province, became fully operational in 1969 with some minor construction discrepancies being corrected by the contractor. This hospital is augmented by a U.S. Military PHAP team.

The final impact hospital at Cao Lanh, Kien Phong Province, was not completed until December 1969. Minor construction deficiencies are being corrected by the contractor. This hospital is also augmented by another USAID contracted Korean PHAP team.

4. Joint Utilization of Facilities

The implementation order for Joint Utilization of Medical Facilities was signed by the Ministers of Defense and Health on September 1969 to be completed in three phases. Phase I was to be implemented immediately and consisted of four provincial hospitals located in Kien Hoa, Kien Tuong, Chau Doc and Kien Giang. Integration has been initiated with MOH designation of Hospital Directors and Deputy Directors and the transfer of military medical personnel and equipment to the MOH facility. Joint utilization in these facilities is progressing satisfactorily.

Where local problem areas have developed, an executive committee comprised of MOH and MOD personnel have visited the facilities for on-site appraisal and recommendations for solution.

Phase II was implemented on 15 December and initial action includes the transfer of military personnel and equipment to the MOH facility. This phase includes seven provincial hospitals located in Kien Phong, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Chuong Thien, Bac Lieu, An Xuyen and Sa Dec.
Although joint utilization is to extend into the District area, implementation has not been effected to any significant degree as of this time.

5. U.S. Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP)

Nine U.S. military medical teams continue to provide advisory and augmentation support to as many provinces. In view of the progress made by the Vietnamese in many areas plus the implementation of joint utilization which is resulting in combining the professional and ancillary personnel resources of the Ministry of Defense with available facilities and equipment of the Ministry of Health, a survey was completed and recommendations submitted for revising the Joint Table of Distribution under which the teams were originally organized. These recommendations reflect the team composition required to support current requirements in both advisory and augmentation areas to provide for a realistic authorization.

6. Medical Logistics

Very significant progress has been made during this period in the area of medical logistics.

During the first part of 1969, approximately 80% of medical supplies issued from MOH Can Tho Depot were airlifted to provinces. By December, this ratio was completely reversed with 80% now being delivered by trucks, a significant monetary saving.

Resupply of the MOH Can Tho Medical Depot from the Logistics Center, Phu Tho is now being accomplished by contractor trucks hauling supplies in sealed CONEX containers which has completely eliminated pilferage and theft onroute. Exception to this contractor hauling is the resupply of "controlled items" which are hauled by branch depot trucks.

Other significant trends in the medical logistics area - comparing Jan-May and June-December 1969 periods included a reduction in zero balance items at the Medical Depot from a monthly average of 171 items to 98.7 items for the latter period. Depot stock availability for the two periods were 59.9% to 69.5% monthly average; however, the significance of this increase in availability is the 76% for October with 80% for both November and December from a previous low of 51% in June. This can be attributed to more accurate accounting records, realistic requisitioning objectives, and the development of and recording supply and consumption data.

Although significant gains have been made in depot operations, a serious shortage of personnel exists with only 29 of the authorized 54 personnel assigned. Extreme difficulty is encountered in recruiting due to existing low pay scale and the lack of other applicants due to military requirements. Increased effectiveness of this depot will continue to be hampered until personnel are made available.
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In the area of vehicle maintenance for the 280 vehicles, major problems are developing due to the variety of manufacture (American, German, British, Italian and Japanese) which makes the availability of spare parts a very difficult task. Another area is the wear-out period of vehicles where one model of vehicle is mass assigned to Provinces. An example is twenty five (25) International Harvester Ambulances assigned in provinces of the same and year of production; they are now being deadlined due to lack of vital repair parts such as clutch disc assemblies.

These problems will only be overcome when the variety of manufacture is reduced so that spare parts stockage can be managed, and model and year distribution staggered in order to eliminate simultaneous mass wear-out of vehicle major components.

I. Phung Hoan

1. General. In the past 6 months, the Phoenix program was still hampered at the working level by a lack of cooperation and coordination. Long standing rivalries and distrust still exist between the GVN agencies involved in the program. In many areas, Phoenix operations are consistently awarded a low priority for assets, probably indicating a lack of coordination between the PIOCC and TOC or a lack of GVN command emphasis on the program. This situation has improved as a result of emphasis being placed on cooperation and coordination among the agencies involved. In addition to the emphasis from advisory channels, guidance has been disseminated in the 1970 Pacification Plan. To improve relationships between Americans involved in the program, quarterly conferences for province level coordinators have been established. These meetings, introduced in the latter part of 1969, have proved a useful forum for both the development of imaginative ideas and for the airing of problem areas. The conferences were first held in Can Tho in August and November; these two conferences alone have stimulated interdistrict and interprovince liaison in many areas of the Delta.

2. Blacklists. In the past 6 months, DIOOC's and Province Centers began producing blacklists regularly and disseminating them to village level for operational use. The blacklists are being used on operations by Vietnamese Police, military units, and Provincial Reconnaissance Units.

3. Provincial Reconnaissance Units. During the period 1 June 1969-16 January 1970, PMU's in IV Corps Tactical Zone killed 991 and captured 1029 VC/VCI.

4. Phung Hoan School. The IV CTZ Phung Hoan School opened on 6 October 1969. By 7 January 1970, the school will have graduated a total of 285 students from its two week course in the intelligence and administrative techniques pertinent to the Phung Hoan program. This school
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is headed by an exceptionally competent Vietnamese police veteran, who is ambitious, energetic, and resourceful. He is actively participating with the American advisors in the program to improve the training at the school. Reports received from American advisors indicate that the school has generated much enthusiasm in the field for the Phung Hoang program. Current estimates are that all personnel currently assigned to Phung Hoang duties at district and province level can be trained in eighteen months.

5. With the appreciable increase in National Police assets and force structure, a major move should be made to place the Phoenix program squarely on the National Police as a major primary mission. The sharing of responsibility at province and district level between the military and police confuses the focus of effort and allows for a "sharing of failure." It is felt strongly that the Police should be designated officially at all levels as the "Phung Hoang Agency" in order to attain maximum thrust in this vital program.

J. Resettlement and Refugee Support

The refugee program in the Delta made great progress in the last half of 1969. During the early months virtually nothing was accomplished save for occasional small benefits payments. The Return-to-Village (RTV) movement was only beginning to surface. It was not until June that GVN officials at all levels began showing interest in the number of refugee returnees and appreciating their value to the pacification effort in the countryside.

A major factor in the stepped up activity during the second half of 1969 has been the focusing of Vietnamese and American efforts through the IV Corps Regional Pacification and Development Council (RPDC). The RPDC has proved an excellent management tool for bringing problems to attention and focusing high-level pressure for their solution. The most effective single event in the Refugee Program was a meeting, called by the RPDC in late July, which assembled the Deputy Province Chiefs for Administration and Social Welfare Service Chiefs to review provincial refugee programs. This review of the general situation in IV Corps led directly to a major decentralization of decision-making from the Ministry of Social Welfare to Province Pacification and Development Councils.

This decentralization, and a realization of other rigid MSW policies, made possible giant strides in the RTV movement. As of 1 June only 2,239 refugees had been recognized as RTV. By 20 November, 193,071 had been listed, and it is estimated that some 50,000 more had actually returned to their former homes, but without being properly certified under MSW regulations. Substantial additional funds were made available by MSW for refugee benefits, amounting to 619 million piasters of which approximately 90% was paid out by 31 December. The credibility rating of the
GVN, which suffered from promised but long-delayed payments, improved markedly, especially in the last quarter of the year. Prospects for early 1970 are for continued excellent RTV progress.

Considerable progress has also been made in resettling those refugees who are unable to return to their home villages. As of 1 June 20,874 had received their resettlement benefits, but this number rose to 64,675 by 20 November 1969. War victims in general have also benefitted from the new outlook, with much greater attention being shown toward caring for newly affected victims and virtually all pending benefits, some dating back to 1967, being paid. Vocational training, held up during the first half of the year, improved with the mid-year release of funds, but with only 1,256 refugees and war victims receiving trades training by year's end this activity is far below its potential.

A perceptible change of attitude toward the refugee problem has taken place among senior province officials, civilian and military, stemming from the monthly meetings of the RPDC. Greater concern is being given to avoiding unnecessary generation of refugees, to care of refugees once generated, and to the well-being of those who have returned to their original villages where they are in an exposed position.

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III. PACIFICATION PROGRAM

In June of 1969 recovery from the Communist "Tet Offensive" had long since been completed and the Pacification counteroffensive which commenced with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (November-December 1968/January 1969) had made continuous progress for the previous eight months. From a low point, in March 1968, which saw only 50% of the population and 33% of the hamlets in the Delta relatively secure conditions had improved until 75% of the population and 62% of the hamlets were relatively secure.

Vietnamese forces, supported in two provinces by elements of the US Ninth Division, made every effort to hold the initiative. Their progressive liberation of areas previously hold by the Viet Cong had noticeable effects on the fighting power of the enemy. Apparently as a consequence, in May the VC in the Delta were reinforced by North Vietnamese regulars for the first time in the war when the 273rd Regiment moved into the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc. In July the 273rd displaced southward into the U Minh forest, and a second NVA regiment, the 18B, moved into the Seven Mountains. In addition, substantial numbers of NVA "filler" personnel were fed into Viet Cong Main Force battalions.

Despite this increase in the quality of enemy forces and the withdrawal of the Ninth US Division at the end of July, pacification progress was continuous from June to January. Conditions of relative security (HER categories A, B, and C) were expanded to cover 87% of the population and 78% of the hamlets in the Delta by 30 November.

As pacification expanded, the reaction of the Vietnamese people to the arrival of friendly forces was consistently favorable. A significant fact is that one of the principal restraints on even more rapid friendly gains was neither enemy resistance nor popular opposition, but lack of immediately available Territorial Security forces to provide coverage for newly entered areas. Only at the end of this period did enemy resistance increase so substantially as to inflict local checks on pacification. The principal problem area was in Chau Doc province, where the 18B NVA showed increased activity after friendly forces in the area were cut back.

In addition to the considerable gains in relatively secure population (up 12%, from 75% on 1 June to 87% on 30 November), strong efforts were made to improve conditions in areas already pacified. In fact, even greater gains were made in the most secure (AB) category than in the relatively secure (21% up from 40% to 61% over the same period of time). Economic trends were favorable throughout this period as well. Surface and water lines of communication were consistently open, with deterioration because of weather and fair-wear-and-tear.
representing a greater problem than enemy action. The rice harvest, the Delta's most important product, surpassed all predictions thanks to unusually favorable weather, producing over 4,000,000 metric tons. Despite this large crop, rice prices have held up in the market. Prosperity has also brought inflation, which continued to rise throughout the year. This trend was countrywide rather than local and, since it shifted the price structure in favor of agricultural products, hurt the Delta much less than other areas.

The low level of enemy activity furthered the economy by opening many new areas to cultivation and commerce. Reopening of these areas, in turn, allowed many displaced refugees to go back to their home villages. Beginning in June, increased attention was given to this possibility by the GVN's Refugee Ministry. The Return to Village (RTV) program increased in both numbers and rate beginning in July, and government support was appropriately increased the following month. By the end of the year IV CTZ had the most successful RTV programs in the country, and resettlement of refugees outside their former home villages was also making good progress.

Defections from the Communist side under the Chieu Hoi program remained high throughout the entire period, with over 2,000 returnees in every month except September which had a "low" of 1,961 Ho Chi Minh. By the end of the year the Delta had rallied substantially more Ho Chi Minh than the other three regions of Viet Nam combined. However, these ralliers were predominantly low-level VC with few officers, important infrastructure, or NVA troops. The Phung Hoing program, aimed selectively at VC infrastructure, also found it relatively easy to neutralize low-level sympathizers but scored only modest successes against upper-level Viet Cong agents. The problem of rallying or capturing the highly indoctrinated hard-core members of the Viet Cong has always been one of the most difficult challenges to the Pacification program, and there is no reason to believe a solution will soon be found.

The substantial successes of pacification in the last half of 1969 have not only increased the prestige and credibility of the Republic of Viet Nam, but have increased friendly resources in the Delta at the expense of locally recruited enemy strength. The goal of relative security for the whole population of the Delta in the coming year seems within reach. However, this will depend a great deal on the ARVN's ability to meet and defeat the increasing threat of disruption presented by the two main force regiments poised across the Cambodian border.
IV. GOVERNMENT FORCES

A. Intelligence

Combat intelligence in the Delta deals mainly with variables in the enemy order of battle, capabilities, and probable courses of action as influenced by the relative constants of geography and a two season, monsoonal climate. During the period 1 June 1969 to 16 January 1970, the intelligence assets became aggressively engaged in a cohesive effort necessary to the unique requirements of the IV CTZ. With a primary mission as advisors and a requirement to supply CG, DMAC and COMUSMACV with timely intelligence, an organizational concept was formed that effectively combined US advisory assets with the various independent US intelligence collection agencies in the Delta. This total effort simultaneously served as a model and provided catalytic assistance and guidance to the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

The Special Security Office continued to enhance the intelligence capability of CG, DMAC by providing special intelligence for tactical coverage of the Delta. This detachment proved invaluable in the reliability of its early warning and supplemented the assessments on current enemy capabilities and intentions, the primary mission of the IV Corps Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The JIC provided the centralization for the coordination and liaison among collectors and integrated all available intelligence reports from Delta agencies. It has been successful in all areas and has continually improved the exchange of information and the quality of current intelligence produced.

During the period of 1 June 1969 to 16 January 1970, the IV Corps Interrogation Center (CIC), created in April 1969, has greatly expanded its operations. A total of 287 VC/NVA have been interrogated at this installation; of those 160 were Hoi Chanh and the remaining 127 were PV's. This detailed interrogation of middle-ranking VC/NVA has contributed to a marked increase in the OB holdings of the IV CTZ, and has provided tactical commanders significant information on the strength, level of effectivness, and operational practices of the VC and, more recently, NVA units within the zone.

During the same period, the Plans and Operations Section continued its mission of strengthening the production, planning, and targeting capability required by DMAC's dual role in the IV CTZ. This section has provided the headquarters with a capability for contributing to contingency and operational planning -- joint and unilateral -- and handling special tasks, such as targeting and source control, without depriving the other G2 elements of needed manpower.
In August 1969, DI-C's target acquisition capability was improved with the organization of the Plans and Operations Targeting Committee. This organization exploited all target acquisition assets toward a dedicated mission of timely intelligence for the aggressive attack of targets. This effort, undertaken in coordination with G-3, required and obtained the maximum in coordination and became the main channel through which target data could be rapidly processed.

Perhaps one of the fastest growing programs in the IV CTZ has been the DUFFEL BAG/TIGHT JAW development within the last few months. Initially, this sensor program was established as a US border interdiction effort. By mid-January 1970, all three ARVN Divisions (7th, 9th, 21st) and the 444th STZ will have trained sensor personnel. Two of these divisions (7th and 21st) will be operational. Since June 1969 this program has grown from 94 active sensors to over 367 as of 1 January 1970. The expansion of this effort has developed a spirit of coordination and teamwork between ARVN units and US personnel and combined the reaction assets of the Army, Air Force, and Naval Riverine Forces.

The G2 Air Section, in coordination with the 444th SAC, continued to improve on the hunter-killer team concept of combining an IR/SLAR sensor aircraft (OV-1 Mohawk) with assorted types of armed aircraft. The areas where the hunter-killer teams enjoyed the maximum results were in the Tram and U-dinh Forests. During December 1969, a new innovation to the hunter-killer concept was employed. A US Navy Rocket Ship is used to fire on coastal targets located by the IR sensor aircraft.

The monthly IR and Aerial Photographic Reconnaissance Plan submitted by the Divisions and Special Zone has been prepared entirely by the ARVN G2 Air since mid-1969. Further, ARVN Participation in the hand-held camera program has increased considerably. Currently ten of the sixteen provinces in the IV CTZ have an active ARVN hand-held camera program.

In early January 1970, an ARVN Imagery Interpreter (II) Officer and NCO were introduced into Detachment C, 1st Military Battalion (AM) for the purpose of training the ARVN II's on current MIBARs operations. These efforts will prove to be of immeasurable value for the Vietnamization Program in IV CTZ.

B. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

ARVN military intelligence and counterintelligence efforts have continued much the same as in the first half of 1969 and are fully described in Reference "C" of the cover letter, "MG Eckhardt's Debriefing Report." It should be noted that during the latter half of 1969, ARVN and US advisor efforts were successful improving procedures and refining
techniques in both of these areas. As the enemy was forced into an economy of force tactic, emphasis swung toward the rooting out of VC/VCI by paramilitary, police and security organizations. The increased participation of military unit S-2's and G-2's in regional intelligence and operations coordination centers resulted in better coordination of all intelligence down to district level.

C. ARVN Forces

1. General. The ARVN forces were relatively unchanged in IV CTZ. One significant development occurred when the 9th Division operated outside of its normal division tactical area. Finally convinced of the necessity of mobility for success in the Delta, the 9th Division executed extended operations in both the U Minh Forest and in Dinh Tuong Province. Even more significantly, the Commanding General, IV CTZ, now "thinks mobility" and feels that the 9th Division is his "fire brigade."

2. Combat Tactics. Tactics employed in this period were unchanged; however, one innovation in the use of aerial assets was introduced. A package of one command and control helicopter, 2 gunships, and 5 slicks were assigned to province senior advisors on a scheduled half-day basis. With this package the province was now able to initiate offensive operations and react to intelligence generated at their level. This has proved very successful and is only limited by the province's ability to select targets and control the assets.

D. US Military Forces and Vietnemization

1. Degree of Involvement. The two Infantry Brigades of the 9th US Infantry departed the IV CTZ in the 1 July to 31 August 1969 time frame. This left the 164th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) as the only forces under operational control of DMAC and directly involved in combat operations. The three combat aviation battalions of this unit comprise ninety percent of the combat aviation assets in the IV CTZ. The Air Cavalry Squadron assigned to the 164th CAG is the only unit of its type in the IV CTZ. The infantry troops used for insertion into combat during the Air Cavalry Squadron's operations are provided by the ARVN. Two other units, Sealords and the IV Direct Air Support Center (DASC), are located in the IV CTZ but are not under operational control of DMAC. These units are also involved directly in combat and combat support missions. Sealords has turned over fifty percent of its boat assets to the Vietnamese Navy. The remaining fifty percent are programmed for turn over by July 1970. Sealords is primarily involved in the interdiction program along the Cambodian IV CTZ border. The DASC is also deeply involved in turning over the operation to the Vietnamese. In June sixty-five percent of the tactical
air sorties were flown by the USAF. As of 1 January 1970 this percentage has been reduced to forty-two percent. In addition to the above, IV CTZ has a large advisory element as well as technical service units. These elements are involved in both combat and non-combat support of Vietnamese units.

2. Command Structure and Relationships with Government Forces: All US combat support elements within the IV CTZ are under the command of US commanders, all ARVN units with the exception of a few Special Forces elements are under the command of ARVN Commanders. The relationship between forces is based on a cooperation and coordination basis. In the employment of US combat support assets, a US Commander/Senior Advisor must approve the use of these assets. Before these assets may engage the enemy by fire, an ARVN Commander/Province Chief must approve the request.

Combined plans are developed, and combined operations are conducted; however, the relationship is still based on the understanding and cooperation of the respective commanders. On 1 July 1969, the three US Army Advisory Groups at division level were converted to Division Combat Assistance Teams. Concurrently, their mission was changed from advising to assisting their counterparts. This change in mission has also been experienced within the CORDS organization by reducing the advisory teams within the more pacified provinces. US Commanders/Senior Advisors continue to influence their Vietnamese counterparts. The degree of influence is dependent on the rapport established between the two and the rank and experience of the US personnel.

3. Levels at which US personnel actually located. Within IV CTZ US personnel are located at hamlet/village (MATs), district, and province (Advisory Team) in relation to civil government and battalions, regiments and divisions (DCAT) and corps (IMAC) in relation to military units. In addition, advisory teams are located in Vietnamese Naval and Air Force units, RF/PF, National and Division training centers, and the National Police.

4. Functions actually performed at various levels. At all levels the primary mission is the same: to assist the Vietnamese in all aspects of nation building. The complexity of the effort and degree of involvement varies at each level. Province, district, village/hamlet, battalion, and regiment are predominantly involved in counseling and assisting their counterparts in relation to combat and pacification type operations rather than in establishing any broad major policies. The division and corps assistance elements are involved more in encouraging the development of major plans, policies, and programs designed to support the overall nation building objective. US personnel also advise in staff and logistical procedures at all levels, again the
complexity of the effort depends on the level of operations.

5. Effectiveness of the US Military Support from June 69 to January 70. US helicopter gunships account for twenty-five percent of the enemy killed in the Delta; US troop-carrying helicopters provide ninety percent of the Delta's troop air lift capability. Effectiveness of the helicopter assets is reflected by the total enemy killed in the Delta. The enemy-kill figure has risen steadily over the past three years and is directly correlated to the increased proficiency in utilization of helicopter assets. US Navy support has proven to be an effective means for controlling the many waterways and is a necessity in the border interdiction program. Any US Navy assets withdrawn from the Delta have been replaced by VN Navy assets. Navy operations have greatly complicated and denied the enemy of freedom of movement over any long distance in the Delta. USAF support is also an important asset in the overall effort. USAF effectiveness can be measured by the success of the Vietnameization of the air war in the Delta. As a result of this, the Vietnamese have taken over a greater portion of the tactical air sorties flown here. In June the Vietnamese Air Force flew approximately thirty-five percent of the Tactical Air missions. They are presently flying over fifty-eight percent of these missions.

6. Effectiveness of training and equipment. The effectiveness of training has improved over the last six months. Command interest and emphasis by both US advisors and Vietnamese are largely responsible for this improvement in training. However, due to the increased number of combat operations, many battalions have not received refresher training since 1966. Company level operations are still small in number for daylight and night operations due to the lack of leadership and small unit training. The overload in training centers is producing quantity but not quality. Mine and booby-trap training has improved but is still lacking sufficient emphasis to make it more effective. The tempo of combat operations and the overloading at the training centers have precluded any significant improvement in this area. Equipment is excellent; however, due to the increase of force structure, supply has not equalled personnel input. Living conditions at the training centers are adequate. Adequate training areas are also a major problem.

E. Regional Forces/Popular Forces.

There has been no change in the mission or organization of the Regional/Popular Forces during this period; however, there has been some change in their tactics. Night operations have increased. For example, in November, a typical month in the latter half of the year, the number of daylight RF/FF operations conducted was 2611. This is less than the
monthly average during the first six months of the year — even though there had been a significant increase in the number of operational RF/PF units. So, the increase in the number of RF/PF units and the added territory that had been pacified contributed to the weakening of the enemy's strength, in particular, the enemy's daylight combat effectiveness. In turn, this served to reduce the number of GVN daylight operations required to maintain security.

With the enemy forced to operate more and more by night, increased emphasis was placed on platoon and squad-size ambushes and night training. In March 1969, a typical earlier month of the year, the total of night operations with contact was 124. By November the monthly total had risen to 367, with a confirmed enemy kill of 560. Continued emphasis is being placed on night operations, particularly in the case of the PF's: President Thieu's guidance to them is "sleep by day and operate by night."

Although the use of RF/PF units as intelligence sources is limited, there has been a marked increase in the number of operations based on intelligence gathered and disseminated by the province level RF intelligence platoons and the district level RF intelligence squads. The tremendous growth of the intelligence system within IV CTZ during the period June 1969 - January 1970 has been particularly noticeable in the Civilian Volunteer Informant Program, which has often provided intelligence resulting in operations which gained contact with the enemy.

**Force Structure Increase.**

1. **RF.** The authorization of 532 RF rifle companies in June of 1969 was increased in January 1970 to 558 RF rifle companies. An additional 19 companies will be gained as a result of CIDG conversion presently under way, bring the IV Corps authorized total to 577 RF rifle companies.

2. **PF.** Popular Forces units consist entirely of separate platoons. IV CTZ's authorized total of 1999 platoons in June 1969 has been increased to 2867 PF platoons. Those units will become fully available for deployment upon completion of training in June 1970.

3. Upgrading of RF/PF capability has not been limited solely to the increase of tactical units. In December 1969 the Administrative and Direct Support Logistic Companies were augmented in personnel and equipment and reorganized as Sector Management and Direct Support Logistic Centers. Additionally, augmentation personnel are being assigned based on the situation of the individual province. Although some progress in decreasing the shortage of RF NCO's was made during
the period June 69 - January 70, the present shortage is still a serious problem. In June 69, IV CTZ was short 3161 NCO's or 19.2% of authorized strength. By the end of December, this shortage had been reduced to 1960 or 11.7% of the authorized NCO strength.

4. Improvement in the equipment of RF/PF units continued throughout the period June 1969 to January 1970. In June 1969, RF/PF units had received 77% of their authorized M-16 rifles; by January 1970 over 97% of the authorized weapons were on hand. The on-hand quantity of authorized M-79 grenade launchers had increased to over 84% by January 1970. In June 1969, RF units had on hand 85% of the authorized M-60 machine guns; by January 1970 this had increased to over 91%.

CIDG conversion

A necessary step in the overall cycle of pacification within the Republic of Vietnam is the conversion of selected CIDG camps which have completed their assigned missions to Regional Force Companies, which will generally be deployed in the area once controlled by the CIDG camp from which they were formed. The CIDG personnel will be recruited into the Regional Forces and formed into RF companies in a phased conversion process. Certain criteria must be met before this conversion process, desirable in that it releases US and VN Special Forces for redeployment to other areas, can be initiated. The most important of these criteria are:

An acceptable degree of security must exist in the area surrounding the camp.

Effective control of the converted companies must be within the capability of government officials at both province and district level.

Resources required to support the additional RF companies, to include personnel, transportation and equipment, must be available within the ARVN system.

The converted companies must be capable of performing Regional Force operational missions upon change-over. The criteria outlined above having been met, the decision was made to convert four CIDG camps to Regional Force Companies in IV CTZ as part of the Country-Wide Conversion Plan.

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The conversion order, specifying the conversion period and assigning administrative and logistical responsibilities, was issued by the Commanding General, IV Corps, on 5 October 1969. Although minor difficulties encountered at My Da and Kinh Quan II delayed completion of most actions within the established time frame, conversion has progressed satisfactorily other than in the development of a sustained motivation and indoctrination program and in administration processing (documentation of CIDG personnel and their dependents, physical examinations and the like). Psychological preparation has been intensified and administrative processing accelerated in order to ensure preparation of My Da and Kinh Quan II for conversion prior to 31 January 1970. For best utilization of manpower, all CIDG should be converted to conventional forces as soon as practicable, at least in the Delta.

**MAT Utilization**

116 Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) are currently deployed in 15 of the 16 provinces in IV CTZ. Regional Force Companies and Popular Force Platoons (RF/PF units) have been advised on the accomplishment of their assigned missions by the MAT throughout 1969. The MAT missions are unchanged.

Early in 1969 the MAT were recognized to be essential to the progress of Delta pacification, as the best advisory resource available for expansion of US advisory presence at the village level, where advisory effort can be the most successful.

An increase of 110 additional MAT teams was requested for DMAC. The concept of increasing the number of MAT team was approved, but it could not be supported logistically. The concept of augmenting existing teams with additional personnel was adopted as a compromise measure pending the availability of logistic support for additional independent teams. The augmentation, consisting of 3 NCOs in M03 11B40 or 11C40, gave the 5-man team an augmented strength of 8, allow-
ing dual deployment of an augmented team in two 4-man groups.

Problems arose in connection with the augmented teams, stemming from the fact that since 4men are the minimum number felt capable of meeting MAT objectives of upgrading an RF/PF unit, the loss of one man would make one group of the team ineffective. Additionally, the authorization of only one interpreter to serve both groups of an augmented team left one group facing a language barrier between themselves and the unit they were to advise. The augmentation program is now being phased out and the slots will be converted to the formation of 44 new 5-man MAT for DMAC. The majority of personnel for the new teams will come from personnel presently serving as augmentation in 73 of the present 116 MAT.

The employment concept of MAT has been expanded from the basic function of upgrading RF/PF units in place, to include the additional function of upgrading village and hamlet security, emphasis being placed on providing advice and assistance in the establishment of Village and Hamlet Security Plans.

During the period June 1969 to December 1969 the number of units deployed in village and hamlet security roles became fairly constant, caused in part by the need to firmly establish the gains realized during the main thrust of the 1969 Pacification and Development program. The 1970 Pacification and Development Program establishes the People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) as the mainstay of village and hamlet security, in coordination with National Police (NP) assets and backed by PF Platoons. A more vigorous PSDF training program has been developed, to be conducted largely by the supporting PF units. Freeing of RF companies now tied down to village/hamlet security roles for mobile reaction force deployment will result, as will the eventual release of PF Platoons from villages/hamlets with firmly established security to deployment in villages and hamlets requiring PF presence to develop and perfect their local security in turn.

An important contribution to the MAT effort was made by the 12 Australian advisors attached to the Delta Military Assistance Command. During the early months of the year, these advisors were attached to Mobile Advisory Teams; however, in the past 6 months they have been formed into two-man Village Defense Advisory Teams (VDAT'S) and deployed under the operational control of Province Senior Advisors in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Phong Dinh, Vinh Long, and Vinh Binh provinces. VDAT's operate exclusively at village and hamlet level, advising the village chief and his staff. Their mission is to achieve an integration of the various defense groups.
and facilities into a cohesive security plan for the village while encouraging maximum participation of Vietnamese. This pilot program has been very successful, contributing significantly to pacification and the security of the people at village level.

F. Paramilitary (People's Self Defense Force)

During the period 1 June to 22 December 1969, the number of PSDF members organized increased by 868,090 from 369,273 to a total of 1,237,363. The number trained increased by 362,530 from 281,615 to a total of 654,145. The number armed increased by 25,163 from 69,454 to a total of 104,617.

The effectiveness of the PSDF varies from fair to excellent, depending on training and local leadership. The Viet Cong recognize the political and military potential of the PSDF for withholding from the VC the support of the people and denying the VC access to the hamlet. This potential is daily demonstrated. Although problems are experienced in many areas: training, leadership, integration in coordinated plans, communication, and use of fixed positions, the PSDF withhold valuable aid and comfort from the VC simply by their existence and are rapidly becoming a fairly effective local defensive force.

G. Police

1. National Police. At midyear 1969, police deployment to villages and hamlets was minimal, with police strength concentrated at province headquarters levels. Two significant steps have been taken in the latter half of 1969 to move police into closer contact with outlying areas: over 50% of the total police strength in IV CTZ has been deployed to district level and below, and the 23 National Police Field Force companies have been deployed by platoons so that shortly each district will have an NPFF platoon under operational control of the District Chief. The main thrust of police tactics, after their presence has been established at village/hamlet level, has been directed toward counterinsurgency. As the area becomes increasingly pacified, the emphasis is shifted to security, law, and order -- the traditional police role. Village police have been extremely effective in projecting the SVN image, and being under the operational control of the village chiefs, they are more responsive to the needs of the community.

2. The Police Special Branch. The Police Special Branch (PSB), responsible for intelligence collection and some kinds of covert operations, has an informant network with informants at all levels of the VC structure. Most of them are at village level or below.
Some of them are not regular informants, and some, categorized by the PSB as "sympathizers", report for ideological reasons rather than for the small sum of money the PSB pays out for acceptable information. In some cases, where a regular informant is deep in VC Territory, a system of cut-outs is used between the informant and the PSB Intelligence Officer. The main problems in the PSB intelligence network, from the U.S. advisor’s standpoint, are the slow and uncertain communications between the PSB Intelligence Officers and their informants, and the difficulty in checking on the good faith of an informant. The PSB advisors assist the PSB across the board at all echelons but address themselves particularly to these two main problems. A day-to-day liaison is conducted on operations, and the training program of the PSB, which has a large input by the U.S. advisors, concentrates on reliable reporting techniques and checking of sources of information. A training course has been completed for secure communications between intelligence officers in Region and in the provinces, which will in time replace the present PSB pouch in urgent cases. The problem of slow communications between PSB intelligence officers and informants is being attacked by persuading the PSB to eliminate cut-outs where possible and to employ proven clandestine techniques to arrange face-to-face meetings between intelligence officers and informants. In general, the effectiveness of the PSB informant system is less than it should be given the assets available but is better than it was a year ago, and the training programs are having a measurable effect on the improvement of the system.

3. Identity and adequacy of Counterinsurgency training

Early in 1968, 13 U.S. Army combat-experienced Non-Commissioned officers were placed on 90-day temporary duty to establish an in-training program for National Police Field Forces. With deployment of NPF by platoons to district levels, there were attendant leadership problems which made it advisable to continue these NCO’s as field advisors. A strength augmentation to Public Safety was approved by COMUSMACV authorizing one NCO per province to continue this in-service training, but most of the slots remain unfilled. In those provinces fortunate enough to have these NCO’s assigned, the results have been consistently better.

The 'Hung Hoang school has been established at Can Tho for persons involved in the program to eliminate the VC infrastructure. The National Police provide approximately 60% of the student input. Initial class presentations have been improved based upon performance of graduates and recommendations from the field.
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4. Major Problem Areas

a. Leadership. Middle-level leadership is still poor. The promotion system is still not strictly based on merit, and this has had a two-fold effect: subordinates are not provided with sufficient incentive to do their best, and those promoted are not generally the most deserving.

b. National Identification Registration Program. There is a current backlog in Saigon of over 1,000,000 ID Card applications waiting to be returned for issue. Production of ID Card applications within IV CTZ is improving, however, with several additional teams organized or planned. Approximately 14% of the total IV CTZ goal has been met, with 25% of the time frame past. This shortfall of 11% was caused primarily by poor organization and administrative procedures, coupled with lack of a sufficient number of processing teams. Intensive advisory pressure was applied in this area during the past six months, and most teams are now exceeding their daily quotas.

5. Military conversion to police

During a five-month period ending January 1970, the goal for recruitment from ARVN sources was 4,375. Through command emphasis by the CG IV Corps and U.S. advisory interest, no shortfall will be experienced. Recently the CG IV Corps has directed that there be no further recruitment from regular units, only from sector assets with emphasis on popular forces. However, goals for this category are being increased from 10-25% in order to achieve the total goal within the time frame.

6. Training other than Counterinsurgency

The Regional National Police training facility at Can Tho has, since the middle of 1969, expanded and diversified its training program considerably. A course on duties of village police chiefs was inaugurated to complement the deployment of police to village/hamlet level. To strengthen National Police leadership, courses in mid-level management and National Police Field Forces leadership have been formulated. Also being presented are courses in administration, typing, weapons repair, Marine Police rural operation, and narcotics investigation. To continue the training effort at province level, a proposal is being staffed to instruct and assign training officers to each province.

A training aids facility has been set up at region level to support the training center, and a large library of Vietnamese
language training films has been obtained. Equipment to dub Vietnamese on additional films has been secured, and a man is presently undergoing training in its use.


The NPFF SOP of 19 March 1969 has changed the concept of NPFF operations to some degree, establishing a wide variety of duties to which the NPFF may now be assigned. Subsequent inspections disclosed a high degree of improper utilization; however, so the SOP was reproduced and wide distribution to VN officials at all levels made, with the IV Corps Commanding General's endorsement.

The deployment of platoons to district level imposed additional leadership and administrative problems on platoon leaders, and leadership shortcomings reduced the effectiveness of many platoons. To counteract this, Company Commanders and their platoons to upgrade platoon leadership and to ensure the establishment of proper working relationships between NPFF and other district level units.

An extensive construction program has been initiated to construct living quarters and secure storage facilities. Four company compounds have been completed in the last six months, and five others are under construction. A building prefabricating shop, established in November, prepared 10 complete platoon barracks during its first month of operation.

The NPFF, in the last six months of 1969, increased from 16 companies to 23. The number of NPFF platoons assigned at district level nearly doubled during the same period, with more than 60 platoons as of 31 December 1969.

8. Marine Police

Marine Police base expansion has reached a total 6 bases and 7 sub-bases, of which six are operational. One other base is still in the planning stage, and pressure is being applied to expedite this project. The Architect/Engineer work for the permanent repair base at Can Tho has been completed and bids for its construction will be offered in the near future.

The Marine Police still continue to have difficulties, but many of their problems are being solved due to the excellent advice and help given them by the PSD advisors to provinces in which bases are located. More province chiefs, district chiefs, and police chiefs have become aware of the Marine Police presence and mission, and
are relying on them to keep waterways secure. Marine Police are now being used also for water transport and blocking force for various elements of GVN forces on operations.

9. Elimination of Resources Control Checkpoints

The recent Prime Ministerial decree changing the concept of resources control has resulted in the elimination of most formal resources control checkpoints. This has permitted re-assignment of National Police to other duties, and provided additional manpower for deployment of police to sub-district level. The effectiveness of the original program was questionable, being little-understood by National Police and consequently given low priority. Very often the checkpoints were used to extort illegal payments, and any benefits accrued from a few correctly operated checkpoints were countered by a deterioration of the police image where illegal practices were widespread. Also, checkpoints were often undermanned, thus creating serious bottlenecks to the flow of traffic. Others, to avoid recrimination, were often operated in an indifferent manner, as a consequence seldom stopping traffic for inspection. With the elimination of resources control checkpoints as such, officials have substituted them with spot checks for contraband by mobile and static security checkpoints.

H. Logistical Support

The Vietnamese logistical system in IV CTZ is responsive to operational requirements. The concept of achieving area coverage through the SMDISC is valid. However, these centers cannot adequately support large tactical operations in their sectors. Recently, the divisions began deploying elements of the support battalions in support of regimental size operations which has reduced the requirement normally placed on the SMDSL Centers.

Emphasis has continued toward modernization of RVNAF equipment. The modernization program is well advanced. Presently there is an average of 90% to 100% fill of all essential equipment authorized except tactical vehicles and radios. The fill on tactical vehicles and radios average about 70%.

The dedication of US Engineer units to highway construction in IV CTZ will have a marked impact on the GVN effort in the Delta. The US 34th Engineer Group, in general support of DMAC, still has its four battalions engaged in upgrading National Highway QL-4 and other interprovincial roads in the LOC program.
Additional missions of US engineers include upgrading MACV advisor compounds, operational support missions, and airfield maintenance.

The logistical system in IV Corps could be improved by a change in the organizational structures. The 4th ALC should be placed under the command and control of the Corps Commander. Such a change would increase coordination between the Corps staff and the 4th ALC and ensure proper logistical planning for support of tactical and administrative operations. By TOE mission statement, the sector chief commands the SMDSL Center and the 4th ALC is responsible for technical supervision and operations. Both weaknesses in the system could be eliminated by assigning command and control of the entire area logistical support activities to the Corps Commander.

Areas in need of increased emphasis.

1. Emphasis should be placed on improving the management of the logistics systems. Top level management is adequate; however, below Corps, Division and 4th ALC, management is weak. Training and subsequent assignment of junior officers and NCO's to manage maintenance and supply activities at the user level must be emphasized in the future. The assignment of trained and qualified advisors throughout the ARVN logistics system should assist in overcoming the current weaknesses in the system.

2. A major weakness in the RVNAF Logistical system is the failure to initiate follow-up action on requisitions. The generally accepted practice appears to be that once the item is requisitioned, the supply section has done its job. This weakness can only be eliminated by establishing management practices that require periodic follow-up actions by the requisitioning agency with the wholesaler. The system will not be effective unless periodic reporting through the chain of command is made mandatory.

3. RVNAF still does not have a materiel readiness reporting system. Maintenance of equipment will suffer until systematic reporting on the operational status of equipment is established throughout the logistical system. Periodic reporting on the status of combat essential equipment within the chain of command is necessary to maintain the proper degree of command interest and supervision.
**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG R. Wetherill**

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