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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL W. H. Brandenburg, USARV Provost Marshal and CO, 18th Military Police Brigade, Period 30 Aug 68 through 22 Dec 69 (U)


2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL W. H. Brandenburg, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
COL W. H. Brandenburg

1. (U) Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by COL W. H. Brandenburg. The report covers the period 30 August 1968 through 22 December 1969 during which time COL Brandenburg served as USARV Provost Marshal and Commanding Officer, 18th Military Police Brigade.

2. (C) This headquarters does not agree with that part of paragraph 4, subject report, concerning OPCON of the 716th Military Police Battalion. The 716th MP Battalion is employed in the USAHAC AOR under the OPCON of CO, USAHAC. The battalion is used to provide physical security of installations and to maintain law and order in the Saigon area. The merits of the area provost marshal concept are outweighed by the continuing requirement for the CO, USAHAC to have control of security forces which are immediately responsive to USAHAC.

3. (U) COL Brandenburg is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. D. MURRAY
CPT, AGG
Assistant Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (JCS-3320)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (U) In accordance with USAV Regulation 1-3, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, the following report is submitted.

2. (C) Combined Police Operations: Combined police operations have been expanded throughout all four Corps Tactical Zones, and continue to prove highly beneficial to both US and Vietnamese forces in the accomplishment of mutual endeavors. A primary Brigade objective is to increase the number and improve the quality of combined police activities through close liaison, personal example, and on-the-job training. National-level control is provided by the Central Combined Police Operating Council, which is composed of the Director General, National Police, the AAVN Provost Marshal General, and myself. In December 1968, the Council drafted and approved the Combined Police SOP, which is the basic documentary implementation of combined police operations and of the Combined Police Agreement. The Agreement, which established the Council, was ratified in June 1968. The SOP establishes policies and procedures for the conduct of combined police operations, and provides detailed guidance pertaining to jurisdiction, missions, and responsibilities applicable to all three agencies. The SOP, written in English and Vietnamese, received widest distribution, has been implemented at all echelons, and has significantly enhanced the conduct of combined police operations and the spirit of close cooperation and rapport which exists between US and Vietnamese law enforcement agencies. Recommend that continuing emphasis be exerted in the area of combined police activities with the ultimate goal of successful stability operations and Vietnamization of the overall police effort.

3. (C) Brigade HA Maintenance: At the present time, there is no maintenance unit in the Republic of Vietnam which is capable of providing direct support to Brigade watercraft. Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (MMAV), a US Army contracting agency, provides support through four detachments.
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AVBGC-0

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (ACS-CSFOR-74)

located at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Vung Tau, and Saigon. Repair contracts
are arranged with local firms on the basis of individual work orders. Conse-
quently, maintenance support to Army watercraft, specifically Brigade
patrol boats (PBR’s) and Boston Whalers, is widely dispersed, the system
lacks continuity, and completed repairs are often substandard. Additionally,
organizational maintenance repair parts requests are often delayed or can-
celled by HQ. As a result, the 458th Transportation Company, a subordinate
Brigade element, is often forced to perform higher echelon maintenance than
authorized, thereby placing an additional burden upon an already fully
committed unit and negating the established system of maintenance levels.
Recommend the establishment of a US Army direct support watercraft main-
tenance unit with detachments deployed at major port areas throughout RVN.

4. (G) Brigade Concept: Grouping of subordinate elements into a brigade
has been a key factor in the success of the non-divisional military police
effort. Two-hatting the Brigade Commanding Officer and the USAAV Provost
Marshal also tremendously enhanced military police provost marshal operations.
The area provost marshal concept, in which group and battalion commanders are
also provost marshals in their respective areas, is a tremendous advancement
in military police operations. With the exception of the 716th Military
Police Battalion in Saigon, which is, and should not be, under the operational
control of Headquarters Area Command, all Brigade elements are operationally
controlled by Brigade. This allows complete flexibility to shift forces and
assets to where they are needed the most and enhances the effectiveness of
military police support, overall.

5. (C) Sentry Dogs:

a. The Brigade has two sentry dog companies with a third one in process
of activation. Dogs are stationed at ammunition supply points, air fields,
tank farms, outports and other similar areas. The efficiency of sentry dogs
is difficult to determine. Sappers have successfully attacked installations
guarded by dogs, e.g., Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot, and they have been detected
by dogs at others, e.g., Tay Ninh, Ban Lie Thuot. Although doctrine prohibits
the use of dogs as deterrents, it is possible that dogs do deter attacks.
Dogs are deployed in a number of locations that have never been attacked.
While cause and effect cannot be established, the possibility is not unre-
asonable. Nevertheless, dogs are expensive.

b. Veterinary care must be available. Training must be continuous.
Care and grooming are extremely important, especially in the Vietnam climate.
With all this attention, dogs can work only six hours out of 24. Thus his
handler remains on post only six hours also, whereas the average security
guard and military policeman works a 12 hour shift.
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AVBC-0

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (RCS-CSFOR-74)

c. A number of dog posts in RVN were established simply to humor senior commanders. It is a fact that good dog posts are difficult to find in AVN. Continuous activity at most key installations and activities creates a cacophony of sights and sounds which virtually negate a sentry dog's effectiveness.

d. In conclusion, although protection by sentry dogs is highly favored by many commanders in RVN, this preference is based more on emotion than on fact. We do not know how effective sentry dogs have been in AVN. An effectiveness study, if possible, might remove some of the existing conceptions and misconceptions.

c. (C) XM-706 Commando Car: The XM-706 wheeled armored vehicle has proved its worth in convoy escort missions. It provides protection from small arms and mining, and has much more fire power than the gun jeep. Maintenance has been a problem because repair parts have not been available in sufficient quantity. Some interchangeability with other standard parts, e.g., tires, has been possible. An ENSURE item, the XM-706 or a similar vehicle should become a part of the Military Police Tactical T&E.

W. H. BRANDENBURG
Colonel, APC
Commanding
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