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AGDA (N) (7 Jan 70) FOR OT UT 69B055 16 January 1970

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL James H. Leach, CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period 6 April 1969 to 7 December 1969 (U)

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1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of COL James H. Leach, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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2
AVHC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
COL James H. Leach

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by COL James H. Leach. The report covers the period 6 April 1969 to 7 December 1969 during which time COL Leach served as Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. COL Leach is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

CPT, AGO
Assistant Adjutant General
AVIC-CO

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Country: Republic of Vietnam
Debriefing Report by: Colonel James H. Leach
Duty Assignment: Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
Inclusive Dates: 6 April to 7 December 1969
Date of Report: 3 December 1969
1. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Terrain: The first major operation during my period of command was Operation MONTANA RAIDER. This thirty-two day operation was conducted in War Zone C, in the northern part of the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). The area of operations (AO) straddled the Saigon River and was bounded by the Cambodian border on the north, the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation on the south, QL 13 on the east, and the BÁ DEN (mountain) on the west. Phase I was conducted in the area northwest of DAU TIENG, Phase II north of the Rockback (a prominent hill), and Phase III in the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation area. All three areas presented similar terrain challenges. A substantial portion of each area was covered with double and triple canopy jungle and was traversed by numerous streams flowing into the Saigon River. Though the relief was not particularly rugged, the dense jungle cover forced armor-infantry teams to break jungle during the entire operation. All these conditions combined to slow the pace of the operation and pose significant challenges to the Regiment’s armored engineers.

Following MONTANA RAIDER, the Regiment moved more than 150 miles for operations in the XI AN LOC - BIEN HOA area. There the terrain was generally more open with a dense population, whereas War Zone C was totally devoid of inhabited areas. The 3d Squadron, under operational-control (OPCON) of the 1st Infantry Division, remained in the Catcher’s Mit - Nam Son area, making occasional forays as far north as the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation during all but the last few days of MONTANA RAIDER.

The last month of the dry season found the Regiment in BINH LONG Province. While the ground remained dry, the Regiment pushed out nearly to the Cambodian border on numerous occasions. However, as the ground grew soft and streams became swollen, the Regiment’s maneuvers were predominately restricted to the immense expanses of rubber tree forests surrounding each population center. Since the population centers (AN LOC, LOC MINH, and MINH THANH) were in the rubber or along the roads in the province, the limited trafficability in the outer jungle did not prevent the Regiment from protecting the population and aiding pacification. The Regiment simply changed its reconnaissance techniques from jungle to rubber forest operations.

The presence of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in the AO and the frequent attachment of Skytroopers from the 1st Cavalry Division (ACM) enabled the 11th ACR to continue to probe the jungle approaches and check for the presence of the enemy. By November, the ground was beginning to dry and our armored units were again busting the jungle to reach enemy base camps.

b. Enemy: During MONTANA RAIDER the 11th ACR entered a long established rear service and transportation zone for men and equipment entering South Vietnam from Cambodia. Unknown and unlocated elements of two North Vietnamese divisions were believed to be operating in the area. When the Regiment arrived in this area, we believed that the three regiments of the 1st NVA Division were dispersed west of the Saigon River in War Zones C with
the 95C Regiment in the Crescent area, the 103 Regiment north of FSB Grant, and the 101D Regiment north of Mui Ba Den. Subsequent intelligence findings during Phase I proved this suspected configuration to be erroneous. East of the Saigon River, the 7th NVA Division was believed to be dispersed along the MICHELIN - FISHHOOK supply/infiltration corridor. The 165th Regiment was believed to be located just north of the MICHELIN Plantation, the 16th Regiment in the FISHHOOK area, while the 209th Regiment was thought to be operating along the corridor from a base in the MINH THANH area.

Prior to the redeployment of Regimental forces for Phase I, several pre-operational intelligence activities were conducted. A cover and deception plan was formulated which led the enemy to believe that the Regiment was moving north of Mui Ba Den. The plan included the "loss" of fabricated overlays and the careful use of "security slips" in radio transmissions. The most important facet of the cover and deception plan was the Regiment's movement past the area of operations to larger positions near Mui Ba Den on 12 April. On 13 April, following extensive B-52 bombardment of bunker areas north of DAU TINH, the Regiment attacked from the northwest to the southeast (the movement was actually a reverse along the route used the previous day). Secondly, an extensive visual reconnaissance program was conducted in adjacent areas as well as the area of operations in an effort to further deceive the enemy.

Intelligence gathered during phase I accurately located the 188 Regiment and a transportation element of the 82nd Rear Service Group. This phase of the operation had the effect of deterring future 1st NVA Division attacks in the DAU TINH area, while forcing the forward elements of the 188 NVA Regiment to relocate away from DAU TINH and north of the Suoi Ba Hoa. Heavy enemy rocket fire on DAU TINH was reduced to an occasional harassing round.

Significant intelligence during Phase II came from documents captured on 27 April originating from the Headquarters of the 96th Artillery Regiment. These included hand-traced maps showing enemy firing positions used to rocket LAI KHE and DAU TINH. Other documents captured throughout the area of operations provided useful intelligence on the operations and missions of the 82nd Rear Service Group. However, the best intelligence during Phase III came from nine prisoners, six of whom were from the 96th Artillery Regiment and were carrying eight 107mm rockets to the LAI KHE area when captured. Identification of transportation personnel from the 82nd Rear Service Group came from two prisoners captured on 22 May. However, our most significant intelligence came with the capture of Ly Thai Hien on 12 May. Hien had been with the Viet Cong for twenty years, held the rank of Captain, and was serving as the Political Security Chief for VC Sub-Region One.

In early May, enemy forces in III CTZ initiated a series of intensive action periods—the Summer Offensive. Utilising their jungle sanctuaries as bases of operations, all Main Force Divisions concentrated their attention on peripheral areas of III CTZ.
During the first phase of the Summer Offensive (12 May - 7 June), XUAN LOC and AN LOC were the focal points. During this phase, the 5th VC Division threw its sapper forces at military installations in XUAN LOC on 18 May; the 7th Division made a feint towards AN LOC; the 1st NVA Division attacked Allied installations in War Zone C; and the 9th VC Division was concentrated in the TAX NINH area.

The second phase of the Summer Offensive began on the evening of 12 June, when the 275th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division attacked and suffered heavy casualties at FSB JOY near the LONG KHANH - BINH TUY Provincial boundary. The 7th Division attempted to seize and hold AN LOC, but this attack was preempted by elements of the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the 11th ACR operating in the rubber to the west of AN LOC. The enemy directed his heaviest rocket and mortar fires primarily against the city of AN LOC and its civic leaders and population during this period. The 189 and 95C Regiments of the 1st NVA Division continued to attack fire support bases in War Zone C, while the 101D Regiment periodically ambushed convoys along QL 13 in BINH LONG Province. The 9th VC Division focussed its operations in the TAX NINH area.

The third phase of the Summer Offensive, according to captured documents and prisoners, was to begin on 5 July and last until 20 July. This phase never materialized, probably because of the heavy losses suffered by the enemy during the first two phases of the Summer Offensive in and around AN LOC.

On 1 August, enemy forces in III CTZ initiated the Summer - Autumn Campaign. This offensive was directed against Allied military installations with some localized harassment of Vietnamese villages and hamlets. The AN LOC and LOC NINH areas were the focal points of enemy activity in the III CTZ during this offensive.

Enemy initiated activity in western Military Region 10 during late July and the first half of August can be divided into three distinct phases: 26 July - 6 August, 6-11 August, and 12-16 August. The first phase was characterized by sporadic mortar/rocket attacks, scattered small-scale ground probes, isolated mining incidents, and increased reconnaissance activity.

During the first phase three ralliers revealed the enemy's intentions in BINH LONG Province. On 29 July, Nguyen Van An, platoon leader of the 211 Sapper/Reconnaissance Company, 272nd VC Regiment, rallied to the 211th RF Company at BINH NINH (X721058), three kilometers southwest of AN LOC. On 3 August, An stated that the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments, along with the 938 Local Force Battalion, would attack AN LOC, while elements of the 7th NVA Division attacked XUAN LOC, LOC NINH and BO IIC. According to An, the attacks would be initiated between 5 and 15 August.

On 2 August, Nguyen Van Sen rallied to the 399th RF Company at TAN NUNG (X7653076), eight kilometers east of AN LOC. Sen, a member of the Propaganda Section of the HUNG PHAT - HUNG TEN Local Force, stated that on 15 July two companies from the 9th VC Division visited his base camp and reconnoitered
the surrounding area. The day before he rallied, Sen reported that 40-50
men from the D368 Local Force Battalion passed through his base camp asking
for directions to SOC TRANH (XT643822), an abandoned hamlet southeast of
AN LOC.

On 3 August, Nguyen Van Thien rallied to the 11th PF Platoon at XT16050, 4½
kilometers south of LOC MINH. Thien, a member of the C31 Sapper/Reconnaissance
Company, had been wounded on 27 July in a contact with F/2/11 ACR but
managed to avoid capture. Thien reported that the K7 and K8 Battalions of the
209th NVA Regiment would attack the hamlet of THIEN PHAT (XT710102) and
a road junction along QL 13 between AN LOC and LOC MINH on or about 7 August.

The second phase began on 6 August and was characterized by the movement of
enemy troops from secure base areas in or near Cambodia to forward positions
throughout BINH LONG Province. During this phase there were several signi-
ficant engagements involving members of the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments,
the 101D NVA Regiment, and the 58th Artillery Battalion.

The third phase (attack phase) began during the night of 11-12 August and
was characterized by light attacks by fire followed by moderate to heavy
ground probes, primarily in the AN LOC area. QUAN LOI (XT615905), 6 kilo-
meters southeast of AN LOC, was attacked by the K2 Sapper Battalion, 16th
Armor Office, COSVN, and the K3 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment. The
headquarters of the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) and elements of the 9th
Infantry Regiment (ARVN) at FSB SIDEMINDER (XT739821), 4½ kilometers south
of AN LOC, received and were penetrated by a heavy ground probe from the K3
Battalion, 271st VC Regiment. The K2 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment
attacked the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, Headquarters at FSB ASPEN (XT717801),
6 kilometers south of AN LOC. During the day and night of 11-12 August, E
and H/2/11 ACR were heavily engaged with elements of the 271st VC Regiment
at XT712824, near MINH DUC.

On 12 August, two significant contacts along QL 13 were initiated by elements
of the 101D NVA Regiment. On 13 August, attention shifted to the LOC MINH
area where several engagements identified the K6 Battalion of the 209th NVA
Regiment and elements of the 1st NVA Regiment. Several significant engage-
ments during the remainder of August identified members of the K6 Battalion,
165th NVA Regiment at XT776445; the C31 Sapper/Reconnaissance Company, 272nd
VC Regiment at XT670505; members of the 101D NVA Regiment at XT76729; and
the 226 Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion at XT684995.

Friendly reconnaissance operations in western Military Region 10 during the
first half of September produced only light and scattered contacts. The most
active enemy units in the enemy were: the K7 Battalion, 16th Armor Office,
COSVN, which conducted mortar attacks and ground probes against the 9th
Infantry Regiment (ARVN) CP at CHOM THANH (XT770619) and FSB THUNDER II;
the K9 Battalion of the 273rd VC Regiment, which ambushed one platoon of
A/1-16 Infantry (HECH) at XT738863; and K7, K8, and K9 Battalions of the 101D
NVA Regiment all suffered heavy losses in these contacts.
During the last half of September, enemy units withdrew to positions in or near Cambodia. Only eight significant engagements were reported from mid-September through the end of October. Other enemy activity consisted of logistical operations, ground to air firings, and mining incidents.

Enemy initiated activity throughout the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's AOR was obviously limited due to the extensive casualties suffered by them during the August highpoint. The absence of adequate logistical support, coupled with the destruction of numerous supply caches, diminished the enemy's offensive potential and contributed to the further weakening of morale. At the present time, enemy units have withdrawn to positions in or near Cambodia.

c. Sources: In the course of the Regiment's operations, the following sources have been utilized: human sources, captured enemy documents, visual reconnaissance, aerial photography, and technical detectors.

(1) Human Sources: Human sources consist of prisoners of war, ralliers, and agents. Prisoners and ralliers are used most frequently, often on a daily basis. Information concerning enemy unit locations, capabilities, and probable courses of action was derived from extensive interrogation of these individuals by highly trained intelligence personnel. If the information proved reliable and of immediate tactical significance, the rallier was returned to the field, where he was used to locate enemy positions or caches. As in the past, information provided by prisoners and ralliers was exchanged between the 11th ACR and other US and ARVN units adjacent to our area of operations. Agent reports, even though they are provided daily, have often proved unreliable and of little value in the Regiment's intelligence collection effort.

(2) Captured Enemy Documents: Captured enemy documents are of primary value in establishing enemy unit identification. These documents were also useful in compiling blacklists (enemy infrastructure) and gaining information relating to enemy morale and intentions.

(3) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance missions are flown daily by the Regiment's Thunderhorse, Air Cavalry Troop, and provide the Regiment with the bulk of the immediate tactical intelligence. Trail activity, base camps, bunker complexes, and fighting positions are the most common sightings. Visual reconnaissance provides the targeting and planning data for B-52 air strikes, armored reconnaissance operations, Aero Rifle Platoon insertions, artillery missions, night hawk, and TAC Air Strikes.

(4) Aerial Photography: Aerial photography is less useful as a tactical tool than the visual-reconnaissance capability of the Air Cavalry Troop. It is used to align B-52 strikes, to select landing zones for combat assaults, provide route and engineer reconnaissance, and to provide augmentation to map data for seal and search operations.
(5) Technical Detectors: Technical detectors that are used by the Regiment include SLAR, Red Haze, Personnel Detector (Sniffer), ground sensors and ground radar. The data provided by SLAR, Sniffer, and Red Haze are incorporated in all Regimental Operations. Ground sensors and ground radar have proven useful in perimeter defense and along avenues of approach and LOC.

2. (c) Combat Operations:

   a. General: The employment of the 11th Armored Cavalry during the past eight months has further demonstrated the Regiment’s organizational flexibility and the inherent ability of cavalry to adapt its equipment and tactics to meet the requirements of any form of warfare and to conquer any type of terrain. The Blackhorse Regiment and its Squadrons have successfully operated independently, as part of combined arms teams, and in combined operations with our allies. The Regiment also has been deployed successfully in areas previously considered unsuitable for armored vehicles. On two occasions when the NVA threatened the district capital of BO LOC in PHUOC LONG Province, a troop of the Regiment was airlifted from LOC NINH to the BU ZOP Special Forces airfield to relieve the enemy pressure and demonstrate the feasibility of air transporting armored cavalry. Operations in BINH LONG Province again demonstrated the Regiment’s capacity for controlling as many as five maneuver battalions while simultaneously coordinating the operations of a similar number of ARVN infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons operating in the Regiment’s area of operations. During the operations with ARVN, CIDG, and RF/FF units, the Blackhorse troopers not only defeated the enemy, they served as tutors and advisors in the development of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). In summary, the past eight months have proven the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to be the versatile, tenacious fighting machine that all cavalry men knew it to be.

   The sections that follow cover the major operations of the Regiment (or of its squadrons when operating independently), the important combat lessons we learned, the training provided for RVNAF, and our progress in support of pacification. When appropriate, inclosures and maps have been included to clarify or expand as required.

   b. Operations: The most significant Regimental operations of the period were MONTANA RAIDER and KENTUCKY COUGAR, both while under tactical operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AR). Squadron and Regimental operations were also conducted in the TRAPEZOID - IRON TRIANGLE, the LAN SON - CATCHERS MIT, BINH HDA Province, and the XUAN LOC - BLACKHORSE TAOR. Each of these is described in detail below.

   (1) MONTANA RAIDER: Operation MONTANA RAIDER (Regiment less 3rd Squadron), initiated on 12 April 1969, was directed at elements of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions, which were believed to be using the supply routes south of the FISHHOOK and establishing rear areas from which to operate. The area of operations was bounded by the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation on the south,
Cambodia on the north, Highway 13 on the east, and Nui Ba Den on the west.

The area is a traditional sanctuary for enemy forces because the heavy jungle, the Saigon River and its many tributarries, and the proximity to Cambodia make it an ideal guerilla base. Furthermore, armor had not operated in the area for about two years and infantry - sky trooper operations had been rather limited. Hence, a well-fortified, well-supplied enemy that had no fear of armored vehicles lay innocently in wait for our sudden move into their "safe" area.

The goal of the operation was to find and destroy elements of the two enemy divisions located in the rear service areas and along the infiltration corridors of the enemy sanctuary. The operation was executed (in three phases) by two armor heavy task forces formed around the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and one infantry heavy task force formed around the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

The operation was conducted in three phases. The first phase began on 13 April to the west of the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation with TF 1/11 entering the AO from the southwest, TF 2/11 entering from the northwest, and TF 1/8 sweeping from the northeast. This would drive the retreating NVA/VC against the Saigon River. During the early stages of Phase I, there were contacts and small arms and supply caches found. As the forces swept toward the Saigon River, it became more apparent that the majority of the enemy forces were based near the Saigon River in the middle of the AO. As the Task Forces closed on this area, on the 18th of April, a large, tenacious enemy contact was made. At the end of the day the enemy had lost 32 killed.

The Regiment moved to QIAN LOI on 24 April to begin Phase II. The reaction of the Regimental Headquarters and Squadron Trains was necessary if the operation was to be adequately supported. This time the Regiment entered the AO from the north. This phase was characterized by many small contacts, usually producing 5-10 NVA/VC killed for a total of 97 NVA/VC dead for the entire phase. A considerable quantity of rice and ammunition was captured along with many weapons. Hence, the Regiment did locate the 62nd Rear Service Group and the caches that were believed to be in the area.

Phase III was initially centered around the MINH THANH Rubber Plantation. The US forces swept towards the Saigon River where extensive searches for enemy caches were conducted. They found nothing and there was little contact. The operations then moved south to the northeast edge of the MICHELIN Plantation where light contact continued until the end of the operation on 11 May. We lost one man, thirty-seven were wounded; the enemy lost seventeen killed and nine captured. The three phases cost us 43 killed and 237 wounded as compared to the enemy losses of 213 killed and 15 captured.

All three phases of this operation were characterized by the efficiency of the combined arms teams— consisting of armored cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers and air cavalry. Each component of the team made a vital contri-
bution to the success of the operation. The mobility of the trackd vehicles, even in heavy jungle, was demonstrated by the fact that of the 1000 miles traveled by the vehicles, better than 800 miles were in jungle areas. The armor also provided the fire power and protection to enter and destroy enemy bunker complexes at a cost of fewer casualties. The infantry sky troopers provided necessary security for the armor and proved invaluable in searching the base camps after they had been overrun by armored cavalry. The combat engineer platoons maintained the momentum of the attack as they bridged the rivers and gaps so common in the AO. The Air Cavalry Troop (Thunderhorse) of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was used extensively to locate the enemy, take him under fire, and guide the ground troops into the contact. MONTANA RAIDER was truly combined arms warfare.

Engineer equipment and vehicles were used extensively throughout the operation. For instance, the AVLB section was used to span gaps no fewer than 17 times. The combat engineer vehicles (CEVs) and bulldozers were used to improve landing zones, clear fields of fire, build firing positions, and improve roads. The engineer mine sweep teams and ACAVs were also used to clear and secure the heavily mined roads. Without the engineers the scope of MONTANA RAIDER would have been severely limited.

The most important lesson learned from Operation MONTANA RAIDER is that tracked vehicles can be employed effectively in almost any terrain. Tracks were employed throughout the AO, most of which was covered with multi-canopy jungle. However, we also learned that a maintenance stand down of 3-5 days is necessary after 7-10 days of continuous jungle operations. Debris needs to be removed, filters changed, radiators cleaned and trash removed from engine compartments, in addition to much needed troop rest.

(2) 3rd Squadron Operations, 12 April to 10 June: During operation MONTANA RAIDER, the 3rd Squadron was OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division with a mission to consolidate the Regiment's pacification gains made in the CATCHERS - LAM SON area. The operational concept was to conduct extensive ambush patrols in the vicinity of each village. A significant ambush technique developed during this period was for the ambush patrol (AP) leader to pop the AP using nothing but Claymores, opening up with small arms and grenades only when the enemy tried to retrieve their dead.

The 3rd Squadron also participated in Operation MADISON THUMB (10-16 May). The area of operations was generally in the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation and from there to the western TRAPEZOID. This operation was coordinated to compliment Operation MONTANA RAIDER to the north and east of the MICHELIN Plantation. The 3rd Squadron found the area uneventful since the area contained few enemy troops. Following MADISON THUMB, the Squadron returned to the LAM SON area.

(3) BLACKHORSE TAOR: After the completion of MONTANA RAIDER, the Regiment moved to Blackhorse Base Camp where it commenced Operation TOAN THANH, Phase III. This operation started on 11 May in response to intelligence.
reports that the 33rd NVA Regiment and the Dului Local Force Battalion were operating in the area. The 2nd Squadron, and later the 1st, in combined operations with elements of the 10th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Brigade, conducted ground reconnaissance operations in the TAOR. Additionally, the Regiment had a road security mission between Blackhorse Base Camp and XUAN LOC. While there were no significant engagements, there were numerous contacts with the 33rd NVA Regiment, a unit which had complete freedom of movement in the area prior to our arrival. F Troop made a night counterattack from Blackhorse Base Camp in response to an NVA attack against the 15th Field Artillery Battalion in XUAN LOC. The combined operations conducted with units of the 13th Division (ARVN) also proved to be an excellent combat operational training vehicle. This enhanced the combat effectiveness of the 18th Division and permitted the 11th ACR to develop coordination techniques it would later use extensively in BINH LONG Province under the LONG TIN Program.

(4) 1st Squadron Operations, 14 May to 28 July: On 14 May, the 1st Squadron was placed OPCON to the BINH HOA Tactical Area Command (THAC). This was an uneventful assignment. Hence, on 22 May, it was released and moved into the BLACKHORSE TAOR and operated with the Regiment until 7 June when the Squadron moved 130 miles to join the Big Red One. During the period 7 June to 28 July, the 1st Squadron was OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and operated in the TRAPEZOID-IRON TRANGLE area. The Squadron continued to emphasize the cross reinforcement of armored cavalry troops with tanks and infantry. The Squadron also made maximum use of aerial reconnaissance. However, no major NVA/VC tactical units were identified or contacted with the exception of elements of the 96B Artillery Regiment (NVA). Frequent contact was made with security elements and rear service personnel of SR-1. On 28 July, the 1st Squadron rejoined the Regiment to replace the 3rd Squadron which was moved to Blackhorse Base Camp for retraining, maintenance, and receipt of the Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne, Assault Vehicle, M551 (Sheridan).

(5) Operations in BINH LONG Province, 26 May to Present:

(a) Operations in BINH LONG Province began on 26 May, when the 2nd Squadron moved rapidly over 130 miles without halting, except for refueling, to the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area to participate in what the Regiment considered to be the second phase of TOAN THANG III, 26 May to 10 June. The Squadron commenced the operation under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division and was targeted against the three regiments of the 7th NVA Division, believed to be in the AN LOC/QUAN LOI area. To accomplish the mission, the Squadron initiated extensive ground and air reconnaissance in conjunction with night ambush patrols where immediate contacts were made against NVA regular troops—the 15th and 101D NVA Regiments of the 1st NVA Division, which were sent to replace the 209th NVA Regiment.

Three significant contacts occurred to the west of AN LOC. The first began on 3 June when contact was made with the C9 Company of the K9 Battalion,
101D Regiment. The area was cordoned and a swoop after artillery and air strikes produced 20 NVA killed and 10 PWs.

The second significant engagement was early the morning of 6 June when elements of the 165th Regiment attacked FSB HOWARD. The initial contact was broken by the enemy after 30 minutes. However, the 165th Regiment continued with harassing and sniper fires throughout the night. A sweep around the fire support base at first light yielded 18 NVA killed.

On 7 June, the Squadron, reacting to recent intelligence information, made contact with elements of the 165th Regiment located in the rubber north of FSB HOWARD. The contact had lasted seven hours before it was broken. The results of the day were extremely lucrative with a body count of 95 NVA killed.

(b) On 8 June, in response to enemy build up in the BINH LONG Province, the 3rd Squadron (less two troops) and Regimental Headquarters moved to QUAN LOI. On 10 June, the Blackhorse Regiment with two of its organic squadrons and one mechanized infantry Battalion (2nd Battalion, 2nd Mechanized Infantry) assumed the mission of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. This operation, code-named Operation SHORTSTOP, was targeted against the regiments of the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions. Constant pressure on the enemy pre-empted a major ground attack against AN LOC by the 155th and 209th NVA Regiments on 17-18 June. Following this period, the defeated enemy retreated to rear areas near the Cambodian border to rest and resupply. Operation SHORTSTOP resulted in 155 NVA killed with only 7 US soldiers killed in action.

(c) The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) initiated Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR on 22 June 1969. At this time operational control of the 11th ACR switched from the 1st Infantry Division to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the latter unit taking over much of the 1st Infantry's AO. The operation had not only the usual combat objectives but also sought to improve the RWF through combined operations and training. A further objective was to consolidate GVN controlled areas and pacify marginal areas. The ultimate goal was to enable the GVN to assume more of the responsibility for pacification and combat operations within BINH LONG Province. In this new role, the Regiment has proved to be particularly-adapt at supporting pacification. Nevertheless, during the highpoints in mid-August and early September, the Regiment once again demonstrated that it remains a tenacious, adaptable fighting organization.

The period from the beginning of the operation until the first week in August was fairly quiet with only scattered contacts. The only significant incidents during this period were two ambushes on QL 13 in early July. After these engagements, the NVA/VC again retreated to their rear areas near the Cambodian border. To accomplish the mission during this time, ground reconnaissance operations in conjunction with night ambush patrols were employed around the population centers of LOC BINH and AN LOC. Many of these were
combined operations, which were not only beneficial to the ARVN but later paid dividends during the battle of mid-August.

Early in August, a Hoi Chanh disclosed NVA plans for large scale attacks in northern BINH LONG Province between 6 and 15 August. During the period 5-11 August, the size of the expected attacks became apparent. To counter this threat, the Flackhorse was reinforced and soon had operational control of five maneuver battalions and coordinated the operations of five ARVN infantry and cavalry battalions in its AO.

During this reinforcement the movement of NVA/VC forces from their rear areas to the vicinity of AN LOC and LOC NINH was first picked up by the Air Cavalry (Thunderhorse) Troop. This discovery cost the enemy dearly. Between 8 and 10 August, the NVA/VC lost over 70 soldiers from repeated Cobra, artillery and TAC Air strikes.

The expected attacks came early in the morning of 12 August. Initially, rocket and mortar attacks followed by heavy ground probes were received at QUAN LOI and FSB SIDEWINDER. At QUAN LOI the Blackhorse Regiment berm defense force was credited with 50 NVA kills. The CP of the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN), located at FSB SIDEWINDER, was overrun. However, a reinforcing column from 2/11 ACR accounted for 78 dead as it forced the enemy back from the base. The 2nd Squadron at FSB ASPEN was also attacked that same morning. That attack cost the enemy 32 killed.

To the north in the LOC NINH area, elements of Task Force WRIGHT, 1/11 ACR and 3rd ARVN Ranger Battalion (Regiment Executive Officer, LTC Wright), had two significant contacts. The first was an ambush that left 19 NVA killed. In the second, elements of 1/11 ACR received 15 rounds of mixed ordnance followed by a light ground probe. The enemy withdrew leaving 12 NVA killed.

Thus the offensive was marked by heavy enemy losses. Not only was the enemy defeated when attacking, but the counterattack launched against his retreating forces further disabled him. The counterattack plan was designed to seal the avenues of retreat west and south of AN LOC. The detailed planning prior to 10 August and the rapid deployment of forces after the attacks produced another 217 NVA killed. On 13 August, elements of Task Force WRIGHT, in combined operations with the 3rd Rangers (ARVN) in the LOC NINH area, added an additional 110 NVA killed.

Operations on 18 August merit special mention. In response to a possible enemy armor threat, one armored cavalry troop (A/1/11 ACR) was airlifted from LOC NINH to the BO DOP Special Forces Camp in PHUOC LONG Province. This operation was initiated to augment the forces of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AAN) then defending the BO IBC District Headquarters. It was the first time an armored cavalry troop of the Regiment had been airlifted. The operation was a complete success and once again demonstrated the versatility of armored cavalry.
Although renewed enemy attacks were expected in the latter part of August, no significant contacts were made until 5 September. Between 5 and 7 September, in four separate contacts the enemy lost 192 killed while the Regiment and its OPCON units lost only 4 killed and 98 wounded. The Regiment lost the Aero Weapons Platoon leader to 51 caliber fire at LOC NHN; a LOH pilot was seriously wounded; a Chinook was damaged; and the Regimental Commander's helicopter was hit, seriously wounding the crew chief and injuring the CSM of the 1st Squadron.

Since mid-September there has been a lull in the fighting with only scattered, minor contacts. Hence, pacification was once again given full emphasis and a DONG TIEN (Forward Together) Program of combined operations, RNNAF training, and civic action in villages was initiated.

c. Significant Training Programs:

(1) Conversion to the AR/AAV M551 (Sheridan): The introduction of the AR/AAV M551 into the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons completed the conversion of the Regiment's armored cavalry platoons to the General Sheridan Vehicle. Each Squadron received three weeks of training and maintenance orientation on the new vehicles. (A complete evaluation of the Sheridan is made in paragraph 6.a., below.)

After a week of maintenance at Blackhorse Base Camp beginning on the 28th of July, the 3rd Squadron received its new Sheridans and began training while OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. As an additional duty, the Squadron planned and initiated a program for the training of the 5th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). The 2nd Squadron received training on its new tracks at DI AN beginning 7 September. At this time it was placed OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. While not in actual training, its armored cavalry troops performed limited operations near DI AN to become familiar with their vehicles and to enhance the security of the area.

(2) Sniper Training: This program is still new in the 11th ACR; however, snipers have proven to be valuable assets in other units. When the Blackhorse Regiment receives more trained snipers, it is hoped that more significant results will be obtained. To date, one enemy soldier has been killed by a sniper from the 1st Squadron.

(3) DONG TIEN (Forward Together) Program: The DONG TIEN Program was initiated on 11 October 1969 to speed and aid in the Vietnamization of the war effort. The Regimental motto ALONS or "Let's Go" was added to represent "Let's Go Forward Together". The program established two basic missions: to up-grade the RNNAF through combined operations and training, and, secondly, to assist and broaden the pacification program. Although the 11th ACR had previously participated in combined operations, trained RNNAF units, and assisted the pacification effort, the DONG TIEN Program has further coordinated the US and Vietnamese effort and re-emphasized its importance towards combat readiness.
The upgrading of the ARVN forces is particularly important to the Allied effort in Vietnam. It includes the training of individuals on their weapons and equipment, small unit training, and the advice given commanders during combined operations. Troops from the 11th ACR have given formal classes on such diverse subjects as combat helicopter assault techniques, first aid, demolitions, mine detection, track crew proficiency courses, and employment of the flame thrower. Additionally, on-the-job training has been given to Vietnamese medics, mechanics, and other specialists. Often the training included field experience as well as classroom instruction. In the month of October, 25 classes on such subjects were taught by different troops of the Regiment.

Combined operations have also increased in number and scope. The increased activities have included village seal and search missions, mine sweeps, road security, and ground reconnaissance operations. In October, the 11th ACR participated in 57 combined operations with the ARVN, 55 operations with the BINH LONG RF/PF, and 6 operations with the local CEDM companies. These combined efforts not only increased the combat proficiency of the units concerned, but also improved their morale and confidence.

To aid in the pacification program, the 11th ACR has also identified villages only marginally under government control. Greater emphasis was placed on these villages. Village searches, an increased number of night ambushes near the village, and an active civil affairs program were initiated to weaken the Viet Cong control.

The ultimate goal of the Regimental LONG TIEH Program has been to produce Vietnamese forces capable of protecting the country, and a population willing to support its army and government.

d. Organization and Equipment:

(1) Introduction: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has altered its basic TOE to adapt to the special requirements of combat in Vietnam. New or improved equipment is constantly being tested and introduced. During the last three years, the Regiment’s organization has also been modified to trim away unnecessary sections and to add personnel to meet new requirements or man new equipment. Some of the more significant changes and modifications are discussed below.

Before leaving for Vietnam the M113A1 was modified with additional armament and gunshields, converting it into the ACAV. Currently belly armor is being added to the basic M113A1 to give additional protection to the crew. A second change was the conspicuous replacement of many wheeled vehicles by tracked vehicles and aircraft to better cope with the problems of resupply in a jungle environment. Another change was the deletion of the Regiment’s air defense section, not required in a counterinsurgency war. The unsuccessful command/reconnaissance vehicle (M114) was replaced by the better armed, more mobile ACAV.
This process of change continues to the present day. During the past eight months noteworthy changes have been made. As mentioned earlier, the Regiment has converted to the M551 AR/AVV. Two ACAV's per platoon were exchanged for three of the Sheridans. Fortunately, no M48 tanks were given up. Currently underway is a conversion from 6.2 inch to 81mm mortars, which will provide close in defensive fire for the troops. Finally, the Regiment has submitted a request for more mine sweepers and improved mine detection equipment.

There are also several changes currently being discussed. One is the formal consolidation of the platoon's mortar crews at either troop or company level with the addition of necessary FDC personnel and FO's. A second would increase the quantity of mine detection equipment available to the Regiment.

(2) AR/AVV: The addition of the M551 Sheridan has increased the versatility and fire power of each armored cavalry platoon. Although deficiencies exist in the Sheridan, especially in the turret and gun control system, it is proving itself to be a valuable asset. (See paragraph 6.d. below.)

(3) Mine Detection: During the past eight months enemy mining increased nearly 100%. Though the Regiment has sharpened its mine detecting skills and now finds, rather than hits, over 60% of the mines, the threat remains serious. Presently each platoon has one hand held mine sweeper; the tank company and HHT have one each for a squadron total of eleven. A recent request would double this authorization. Our search for a good tank-mounted mine roller or flail continues. Something must be done. Mines have considerably slowed the movement of our troops and platoons. In the last four months mines have caused the loss of 4 armored vehicles. These same mines have wounded 84 Blackhorse troopers; fortunately, none have been killed. This is probably due to our policy of leading with tanks or vehicles equipped with belly armor kits. An experimental tank-mounted mine roller has been issued in an attempt to omit vehicle damage and casualties in our mine sweep missions.

(4) Mortars: Changes in the mortar squads include exchanging the 6.2 inch mortar for the 81mm mortar. To date the 2nd Squadron has completed this conversion and the 1st Squadron is planning to make the change. The exchange is made at the sacrifice of range and damage radius for more accuracy and ability to fire close in targets. Additionally, more ammunition can be carried in a comparable area. The squadrons habitually consolidate their mortars and crews at troop or squadron level. The consolidation has several advantages: The direct fires from the entire troop can be massed in support of the platoon in contact. The consolidated FDC gives accurate, coordinated fires from the troop or squadron. However, this does not limit the platoon. If sent on a separate mission, one or even two mortars can be attached to support it.

(5) Radar: Presently, thought is being given to the possibility of consolidating the ground surveillance section at squadron level. The radars would then be given to the troops on a mission basis. This would
insure that units with a good area for radar employment would never have too few radars due to maintenance problems or other shortages. In addition, the radar sections have a great deal of trouble with maintenance of their AN-PPS-4 radar sets. It has been recommended that they be replaced with a sturdier set or that modifications be made to the present set to improve durability.

(6) Conclusion: The war in the Republic of Vietnam has brought many changes to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Changes will continue to be made as equipment and organizations are refined, and as the nature of the war changes. The armored cavalry regiment has a versatile organization and excellent equipment that can meet many requirements. The process of change is continuous and only time will tell what configurations the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment will have in the future.

d. Summary: The 11th ACR has made a considerable contribution to peace in Vietnam. The effort has been two-fold. The Blackhorse Regiment has ably assisted provincial officials in the pacification of the marginal villages and hamlets. Secondly, the Regiment has encouraged RVNAF to assume more responsibility for the safety of their country, giving training and advice as required.

In the past eight months the Regiment has proven not only that it is a peacemaker, but that it continues to be a versatile, tenacious instrument of war. The 11th ACR has tested new concepts for employment of armored cavalry and has refined the "textbook" answers to older tactical problems. It has used its mobility to participate in operations throughout the III CTZ. In short, when the NVA/VC threatened an area, the Blackhorse moved to the attack and reinforced the defenses. When the NVA withdrew to Cambodia, the Blackhorse became advisor and teacher to our Vietnamese Allies.

3. (c) ARMY AVIATION:

a. Air Cavalry Troop:

(1) General: During the period April to December 1969, Air Cavalry Troop has continued to demonstrate its importance as an integral part of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Troop is the primary intelligence gathering element of the Regiment, employing aerial research reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, bomb damage assessments, sensor (Sniffer) missions, night observation and firefly missions. Air Cavalry Troop consists of a Troop Headquarters with two OH-1C aircraft, two Scout Troop with nine OH-6A aircraft, an Aero Scout Platoon with eight OH-6A aircraft, an Aero "Fire" Platoon with eight UH-1H aircraft, and an Aero Weapons Platoon with nine AH-1G aircraft. Employment of Air Cavalry Troop is based on intelligence or enemy contact, and over the past eight months the Troop has been effectively used to fight and destroy the enemy as well as to develop a situation or gather intelligence information.

(2) The Pink Team: The workhorse of the Air Cavalry Troop is the "pink team", consisting of one OH-6A and one AH-1G Cobra (one white and
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one red element. The team was devised to stretch the limited OH-6A assets as far as possible. The white element visually reconnoiters its targeted area at tree-top level, while the red element is normally posted at a higher altitude to maintain communications, plot coordinates, insure accurate reports are given and provide immediate protection. A white team (two OH-6A's) is less effective, because the two scouts spend most of their time looking out for one another and must continually climb up to orient themselves when they need a map fix location.

(3) Aero Rifle Platoon: The Aero Rifle Platoon in its authorized configuration is unwieldly. The 11th ACR has split this one platoon into two platoons. The aircraft were put under a Captain (aviator) platoon commander and the riflemen were put under the command of an infantry Lieutenant (non-rated). This has allowed for much smoother operations in maintenance, command and control.

(4) Problem Areas:

(a) The primary problem faced by the Air Cavalry Troop is the training of both scout pilots and scout observers. The severe personnel turbulence in the Aero Scout Platoon is caused primarily by casualties. In twelve months only four aviators completed six months as scout pilots uninjured— one pilot was shot down four times in seven days, another was shot down seven times in eight months. Few scout observers have survived a complete tour. The training of replacements for scout observers and pilots is both time consuming and costly in badly needed aircraft hours.

(b) The AH-1G Cobra helicopter of the Aero Weapons Platoon provides adequate firepower in the Air Cavalry Troop. However, the maintenance of the weapons system has severely taxed the troop. Under field conditions far more problems occur than should. The Troop has neither enough trained personnel nor test equipment authorized to meet its needs. With present capabilities trouble-shooting is a hit or miss proposition.

b. Aviation Platoon:

(1) General: The Aviation Platoon is employed by Regimental Headquarters, and each squadron employs an aviation section. Aviation Platoon consists of a command and control section with two OH-6A and two UH-1H aircraft, and a transportation section with six UH-1H aircraft. Both Aviation Platoon and the squadron aviation sections perform command and control, liaison, resupply, courier and limited troop transport.

(2) The primary development in the Aviation Platoon was the establishment of a platoon operations in the confines of the Regimental TOC. This allowed quicker response, more thorough planning, and better aircraft utilization. The establishment of the Regimental Aviation Office/Aviation Safety Office gave Army Aviation representation on the Regimental Staff and made advice on aviation matters readily available to the Regimental Commander.

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(3) Due to the long number of hours flown by the squadron sections, their pilot manning level was increased from four to six aviators. This increase eliminated the necessity of squadron aviators flying in excess of 150 hours per month and brought them back within the accepted safety limits.

c. Maintenance:

(1) The biggest changes in aviation operation took place in the maintenance field. In essence, all maintenance platoons and sections were removed from Air Cavalry Troop and Aviation Platoon and attached to the 398th Transportation Maintenance Detachment. Subsequently, the commanding officer of the 398th assumed all responsibility for aircraft maintenance. Normally, the 398th operates a forward contact team, which supports all Regimental units in the forward area, and a rear facility that accomplishes all heavy maintenance. This plan has been outstanding and the Regiment has enjoyed aircraft availability in excess of the USARV averages.

(2) A major problem exists in the parts technical supply element to the 398th Transportation Maintenance Detachment. To maintain adequate and authorized amounts of parts on hand requires a large storage facility that is not organic to the Regiment. As long as the Regimental maintenance facilities remain fixed, such storage facilities can be found. However, if and when the Regiment is required to live on its organic wheels and tracks, aircraft technical supply will not be able to maintain the necessary stockage level required.

4. (c) ARTILLERY:

a. General: During the period April through November 1969, the 155mm Howitzer Batteries, organic to each of the three squadrons, performed the mission of Direct Support to their respective squadrons. Additionally, they provided General Support throughout the area of operations. Tactical operations were characterized by frequent displacements over adverse terrain during inclimate weather. The batteries established numerous fire support bases in remote jungle areas where supply by any means except helicopter was virtually impossible. Preventive maintenance, especially on the M-109 Howitzer, was a constant concern. Requests for Howitzer repair parts were given high priority by support ordnance and, although operating under demanding tactical conditions, the downtime was held to a minimum.

The adjustment of artillery fires follows established procedures. Upon verification that the initial target location is correct, battery fires are adjusted throughout the target area to provide a saturation coverage which will require the enemy to pay a heavy toll for the use of that area.

The MTOE, which has been approved and funded by USARV, will give the Regimental Artillery Section the capability to clear fires and to better coordinate the fires of the Howitzer batteries. This change will provide the personnel and equipment to perform all operational functions normally handled by a Direct Support artillery battalion.
b. Problems Encountered: Fire support coordination and artillery liaison fire support coordination elements (FSCE) are particularly necessary in Vietnam due to problems peculiar to fire coordination in this theater. For instance, batteries must frequently provide 6100 mil fire support against targets in areas congested with friendly inhabitants and US and Allied troops, which magnifies the problem of fire clearance. FSCE must also maintain contact with Air Warning Controlling Centers (AWCC), post air data, and announce check fires if aircraft are in the area of operations. In artillery battalions the FSCE is formed from personnel in Fire Direction Center (FDC). HHT, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, does not have an FDC or qualified personnel to create a FSCE. Hence, the Regiment presently lacks the men and resources to effectively perform this necessary function.

The 11th ACR has three organic Howitzer batteries designed to operate independently in support of their respective squadrons. However, in the Republic of Vietnam, the tactical employment of three batteries has been more like that of a Direct Support battalion than of separate batteries. Although the tactical employment has changed, the assets normally found in a Direct Support battalion are not available. The present organization of the armored cavalry squadron and its organic Howitzer battery does not adequately provide for artillery liaison between the squadron and its supporting artillery. The establishment of three artillery liaison sections would fill the existing void and greatly improve artillery fire support for the Regiment.

The problems of providing the FSCE and the artillery liaison teams were partially solved by II Field Force Artillery, Vietnam, by providing from its own resources one LTC, Deputy for Artillery, one Major, Fire Support Coordinator, and three artillery liaison teams, one for each squadron.

c. Recommendation: The 11th ACR TOE be changed to authorize the following:

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GRADE | MOS | BRANCH | STRENGTH | JOB TITLE
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
SGT | 13E20 | AT | 1 | Intelligence Sergeant
SGT | 13E20 | AT | 2 | Operations Assistants
SPh | 13A10 | AT | 4 | RTO's
CPh | 1193 | AT | 3 | Artillery Liaison Officers
SGT | 13E20 | AT | 3 | Reconnaissance Sergeants
SPh | 13E10 | AT | 3 | RTO's for RTO's

Lessons Learned: When reacting to an enemy ambush or other type contact, it was common practice to check fire artillery on target area because: (1) of command and control aircraft flying over the area; (2) to allow helicopter gunships to expend; and (3) to conduct airstrikes with high performance-aircraft. The artillery check fire created an unnecessary delay in re-establishing effective and timely artillery fire, giving the enemy additional time to reorganize or evade. Therefore, the following SOP for employing artillery was initiated and found to be most effective:

**STEP 1:** Adjust available artillery fire on the target until helicopter gunships or TAC Air is available.

**STEP 2:** Shift the artillery fire from the target and continue to use it as blocking fires while the gunships and TAC Air are engaging the target.

**STEP 3:** Utilize the artillery as blocking fire during the attack and subsequent sweep by the ground maneuver unit.

**STEP 4:** When the contact has broken and friendly units have departed, employ zone and shifting artillery to completely saturate the area.

e. General Information:

(1) Targets engaged during the period April through October 1969 were in the following categories: Sniper, SIAR, SPAR, Red Haze, intelligence, contact, Sensors, preparations, air strike follow-up, registrations and blocking.

(2) Ammunition Expended, April through October 1969:

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TOTAL 39,043

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5. (C) CHEMICAL:

a. General: On 10 February 1969, the 33rd Chemical Detachment was reassigned from the XXIV CORPS to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. During the period 6 April to the present, the 33rd Chemical Detachment has provided airborne personnel detection, CS drops, defoliation and chemical staff support to the Regiment.

b. Personnel Detection:

(1) During most of this eight month period, the 33rd Chemical Detachment had the XM3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD). From 6 April to 31 October 1969, 233 missions were flown. The results of those missions added greatly to the intelligence posture of the Regiment.

A number of problems, however, have been encountered. The new XM3 APD with its dual detection system practically eliminates the possibility of machine generated errors, but two possible errors are from helicopter exhaust and downwind drift of smoke particles from nearby villages during neutral or inversion atmospheric conditions. These readings can be eliminated during the evaluation of recorded tapes by an experienced operator. Another problem encountered is that individuals expect the APD to get all the people on the ground 100% of the time, rather than considering it a significant intelligence indicator because, like any other intelligence tool, the APD gives the desired information on a number of occasions. This problem could be partly caused by the rather misleading nomenclature of "Personnel Detector" instead of a name like "Base Camp Locator" which describes its use and value more correctly.

(2) The Sniffer is used for obtaining information which will be integrated with other information in determining the overall intelligence picture. APD readings, along with other intelligence, are used in planning HI fires, B-52 strikes, and, most important, ground reconnaissance. The low altitude and relatively slow speed of the aircraft makes the aircraft vulnerable to ground fire. However, because of the low altitude and proximity of the enemy, the enemy location is sighted and the resultant "pile on" has given a significant body count.

c. Leaflet Drops: To conserve blade time, the Air Cavalry Troop was given the mission of dropping PSYOP leaflets during other missions. The low flying of Sniffer missions permits pinpoint leaflet drops on trails, bunker complexes and other areas which indicate recent NVA/VC activity. This procedure makes the PSYOP leaflets more effective as well as helping disguise the type of mission.

d. Defoliation:

(1) Few C123 defoliation missions were flown due to the danger of destroying crops and rubber trees which are so necessary for the economic welfare of the people within our area of operations.
The 33rd Chemical Detachment provided ground base defoliation around fire support base enclaves and areas inside these base camps, i.e., around ammunition dumps. When approval for ground base defoliation was not responsive, diesel fuel was used instead of defoliant, thus bypassing the approval problem. After the grass dies, it can easily be burned. This procedure does a satisfactory job but has the disadvantage of requiring large quantities of diesel fuel. As an indication of the amount of fuel required for a job, THUNDER IV, a small fire support base, required 4,800 gallons of diesel fuel for defoliation.

e. CS Employment:

(1) E-158 CS Clusters:

(a) Numerous CS Clusters were dropped during the period. The clusters were used mainly in a reconnaissance role, i.e., clusters were dropped on suspected enemy positions in inaccessible areas, then followed by gunships and/or artillery.

(b) The availability of E-158 CS Clusters from the ASP has been a major problem. During most of this period the clusters were on the ASP. After they were removed, the ASP could not keep enough on hand to meet the requirements of the Regiment, even though the requested stockage level for the Regiment was only 60 CS Clusters.

(2) CS Drum Drops: Five drops of 55-gallon drums of persistent CS were made during the period. The drops were made to restrict the enemy's use of likely avenues of approach, abandoned villages and extensive bunker complexes. The support for these drops had to come from the division to which the Regiment was OPCON.

(3) EURB's: Bunker Use Restriction Bombs were produced for squadron use in contaminating bunkers with persistent CS. These improvised bombs are easy to use and make, and stand up under field conditions. One of these bombs will effectively contaminate a lift by 6ft dry bunker for longer than six months. The Detachment has produced over 1,800 EURB's since September 1969.

f. Flame: An improved "Flame Bath" consisting of three 55-gallon drums containing diesel fuel and JP-4 (two contained diesel fuel and one contained JP-4) was developed and tested. This "Flame Bath" is good for the burning of vegetation during the dry season, destroying hedges and other structures as well as covering area targets. The bombing accuracy is such that point targets should not be engaged. This sling-loader munition should not be employed where there is large-caliber fire, since a round in one of these drums could seriously endanger the ship.

g. (c) LOGISTICS:

a. General: Logistical operations in the 11th ACR underwent
troublesome changes during the eight month period from April to December 1969.
On 6 April, the Regiment was OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division, the Regimental
CP was located at BIEN HOA, the Regimental Rear was at Blackhorse Base Camp,
and the tactical area of operations was in the LAM SON where 80% of resupply
was done by road. By November, the Regiment was OPCON to the 1st Cavalry
Division (AN), the Regimental CP was located at QUAN LOI, having marched 370
miles during four tactical moves, Blackhorse Base Camp had been turned over
to ARVN and the Regimental Rear had moved to BIEN HOA and DI AN, two troops
had been airlifted to BO DUP (5 miles from the Cambodian border), and all
three of the squadrons were conducting tactical operations in BINH LONG
Province and War Zone C where 80% of the resupply was done by air. Tactical
operations shifted from a static situation close to the LONG BINH logistical
center to an extremely fluid situation over 70 miles from LONG BINH. Logis-
tical operations had to change to meet these changing tactical requirements.

Once the Regiment had moved out in April, it stayed on the move the full
eight months. The combat vehicles traveled an average of over 2,500 miles,
two thirds of this distance in jungle or plantation terrain. The intensity
of the combat faced by the 11th ACR troops can be measured by the vehicle
losses sustained. From 1 April to 15 November 1969, 198 vehicles were dam-
aged or destroyed due to enemy action, 160 of them by mines. The biggest
losses occurred in April during Operation MONTANA RAIDER (35), in June during
Operation SHORTSTOP (30), and in August during Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR (33).

Even while the Regiment was engaged in combat operations in BINH LONG Prov-
ince during the August highpoint, it was growing larger and increasing its
firepower by the addition of the M551 Sheridan. In August, the 3rd Squadron
returned 160 miles to Blackhorse Base Camp, turned in 18 M113A1 ACAV's and
picked up 27 M551 Sheridans. In September, the 3rd Squadron returned to QUAN
LOI and the 2nd Squadron moved 60 miles to DI AN to establish a rear area
and to draw M551's. By October, the Regiment was completely equipped with
the M551, and each squadron had added 1,150 lines of repair parts to their
PLL and the 152mm ammunition to their basic load.

b. Communication: The single largest logistical problem faced by
the 11th ACR in the Republic of Vietnam during the period April through
November 1969, was communication with support elements. There are no author-
nized RTT or radio nets to link the Regiment with its support maintenance
company or supply and services company, so telephones became the primary
means of communication. The Regimental Headquarters is authorized 15 TA/312
telephones and by scrounging double that number, the Headquarters could barely
take care of its inter-office, tactical and logistical needs in three sep-
ate locations.

The S-4 shop normally operated with two field phones on the tactical switch-
board and one on the local post or camp switchboard. This was adequate when
the Headquarters was within 30-40 miles of the support units in LONG BINH.
But, as the Regiment moved away from LONG BINH to DAO TIENG and QUAN LOI,
telephone communications became extremely difficult. The Regimental S-4 once made the point in a meeting with 1st Logistical Command personnel, that we were operating a million dollar a day support business on two \$18 field phones, dependent on four 15¢ flashlight batteries. The point was lost, for no action was taken by the logistical elements to improve either the quality or quantity of communication equipment until October 1969.

By direct coordination with the 185th Maintenance Battalion, radio communication was established in July through the Regimental relay station. In October, the 185th Maintenance Battalion was able to net the Regimental RTT. This vastly improved communications to the maintenance support unit, but telephone remained the single point to point source of communication with the 3rd Ordnance Battalion (ammunition) and 266th Supply and Service Battalion (general supplies).

c. Blackhorse Base Camp: One of the most significant logistical accomplishments of the 11th ACR in 1969 was the turnover of Blackhorse Base Camp to the ARVN. When the Regiment arrived in Vietnam in 1966, a base camp was essential to provide a logistical control point for the Regiment. Blackhorse was constructed near XUAN LOC to support the Regiment in its original mission of clearing and securing QL 1. As the war progressed, the Regiment moved farther and farther away from Blackhorse until, by mid-1969, the Regimental CP was located in BINH HOA, the Regimental area of operations was the LAM SON, and 80% of its logistical support was coming directly out of the LONG BINH complex. In April of 1969, the Regiment (-) moved even further west into War Zone C during Operation MONTANA RAIDER, and the Regimental CP located first at DAU TIENG, then subsequently elements moved to QUAN LOI and back into War Zone C, then on to LOC BINH, SONG BE, BU DOI and MINH THANH.

It became obvious that Blackhorse was a luxury that the Regiment could no longer afford. The 43 road miles from LONG BINH added to the logistical line of supply, the 50 minutes of blade time added to the daily courier run, the 450 people required to administer, maintain and secure the post, all added up to logistical dead weight. Command emphasis was directed towards the closing of the base camp. The main point of argument was that the full operational mobility of an armored cavalry regiment could never be realized as long as it was committed to maintaining a piece of real estate which had neither tactical nor logistical value. In August, USARV, II FFORCIV, and ARVN commanders accepted this reasoning and, on 24 October 1969, Blackhorse Base Camp was turned over to the ARVN 18th Infantry Division in a colorful ceremony headed by Generals Hildren and Minh.

The logistical dividends were immediate. Supplies were no longer shipped from LONG BINH Depot to the 506th SSS Detachment at Blackhorse, then shipped back past LONG BINH on the way to a forward location. All maintenance support came from the 185th Maintenance Battalion in LONG BINH, rather than being split between the 185th and 591st Light Maintenance Company. The line of communication and supply was thus shortened considerably.
d. M551 "Sheridan": In January 1969, the 1st Squadron drew 27 M551 vehicles, the first Sheridans assigned to a combat theater. The first three weeks in February were spent training the crews and mechanics. By the end of February they were engaged in their first combat mission in the LONG BINH/BINH HOA area. In April, the 1st Squadron moved with the Regiment (-) into War Zone C, and the M551 was given its first combat test in the jungle environment. Its performance was extensively evaluated by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), and despite maintenance "bugs" and desired modifications, its increased firepower and mobility were determined to be valuable enough to warrant shipping additional vehicles to the Vietnam battlefields. Consequently, in August and September 1969, the 3rd and 2nd Squadrons each drew 27 M551's to give the Regiment a full complement of Sheridans.

Because of the controversy and adverse publicity surrounding this vehicle, the 11th ACR's experience with it in combat will be covered in some detail. Interviews with the crews have indicated that they like the vehicle— "when it works." This new piece of equipment has a sophisticated turret electrical system, uses a new combustible, and not fully reliable, cartridge main gun ammunition, has numerous target bugs, but it has proven to be a rugged vehicle in combat, with excellent mobility, and its 152mm gun has a devastating punch when it works.

The cavalryman looks at an armored vehicle from a practical point of view: Will it move? Will it shoot? Will it protect him? He is not concerned with cost, effectiveness and abstract engineering data. He only wants to know that he can perform his mission with his vehicle. Using these "performance" indicators, the following conclusions were reached in the 11th ACR:

1) Move: The M551 proved to have an extremely dependable and rugged track and suspension system. It had good cross-country capability and the track was hard to throw. The sprocket required special self-locking nuts, torqued to specifications, which added an unnecessary maintenance headache, but overall the running gear was rated highly— in fact it is considered the best we have ever had. The engine is a turbocharged Detroit diesel and little problem was experienced with it beyond the operator and crew maintenance of draining the fuel filters and cleaning the air filters. There was a problem with the wear on the fan tower and generator pulleys made of aluminum, but when the pulleys were changed to steel, this problem became negligible. The engine mounting bolts and the engine/transmission mating bolts require specified torque, and incomplete or insufficient torque on these bolts caused a significant number of the M551 engine and transmission failures when the case was ruptured. Automotively, the M551 compared favorably with the M68A3, as shown by the number of automotive failures per vehicle in the 1st Squadron for the period from 1 June to 30 September 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENG</th>
<th>TRANS</th>
<th>ENG ELEC</th>
<th>SUSPENSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M551</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M68A3</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It should be noted that in jungle operations, the tank "busts" the jungle, breaking trail for the other vehicles to follow, and its suspension and powertrain take a tremendous beating in such operations. Still, the automotive maintenance effort for the two vehicles was very similar.

(2) Shoot: The M551 carries a 152mm gun, which makes it the most heavily armed reconnaissance vehicle ever sent into combat. From its first battles near Long Binh, through the MICHELIN plantation to the jungles of War Zone C, the M551 became a weapon feared and respected by the enemy. However, it was this same weapons system which caused the most problems with the M551.

(a) First, there was the combustible cartridge case which broke easily when mishandled or jolted (such as by a mine). It tended to absorb moisture and swell inside of the gun tube when left chambered overnight in the rainy season. It had both an asbestos cover and a neoprene sleeve which had to be removed prior to firing and thus slowed the rate of fire. Because it was a combustible case, there was always the danger of fire in the turret due to mishap, carelessness, or enemy action. Six crewmen were seriously burned, two dying as a result of the burns.

(b) Second, there was the electrical turret power, which was a new departure from the proven reliability of the hydraulic/mechanical system found on the M48/M60 tanks. The problems normally associated with electrical circuits were compounded by daily usage in the poorest of weather conditions. Add to this the inexperience of maintenance personnel and technical representatives in troubleshooting all electrical systems and you have a large maintenance problem.

(c) The third problem associated with the turret was its closed breech scavenging system, a compressed air device designed to blow any cartridge residue out of the gun chamber before the next round was loaded. The compressors were the weak link in the CBSS system, being highly vulnerable to damage, dirt and moisture. When the compressor failed, in theory, the gun was unsafe to fire. In actual practice, the crew would often flush out the chamber with a hand-held fire extinguisher or rag to keep the weapon in action. Two serious accidents were allegedly caused by the failure of the CBSS.

(d) The fourth and probably biggest problem was in the unreliable seals of the recoil system. They leaked, and when they leaked the gun failed to function properly. Several modifications have been suggested and tried, but the problem still exists. The recoil seals have probably caused more harsh comments on the M551 than any other single problem. For the period 1 June to 30 September 1969, comparative figures show that the M551 had 0.52 turret electrical failures and 1.1 main gun failures per vehicle, whereas the M48A3 had only 0.22 turret electrical failures and 0 main gun failures per vehicle.
(3) Protection: The M551 participated in every major battle which the 1st Squadron fought since February. Because of its firepower, it was often in the lead, and being in the lead, it was often the first to strike a mine or take an RPG round. The M551 battle loss statistics show the increasing intensity of combat activity and mining incidents. (See Annex E, below.)

There were many modifications to the M551 suggested by the 1st Squadron during their evaluation period. Many of these modifications, such as the side armor mine protective plate, grease lubrication for roadwheels, and a removable commander's control, were incorporated into the Phase II vehicles which were issued to the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons. These same modifications kits were shipped to 1st Squadron during the period June through September and were applied as the vehicles came in from combat operations. Other modifications, such as the commander's protective shield, were received later and were applied to vehicles in all squadrons as they became available.

e. Maintenance Support: The direct support maintenance operation changed significantly during the period from April to November 1969. In April, the Regiment was supported by a single 25-30 man contact team from the 110th Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company. When the Regiment (-) moved out on Operation MONTANA RAIDER, the contact team went with them, while the stay-behind unit received maintenance support directly from the 110th HEM Company at LONG BINH. In June, however, when two squadrons were at QUAN LOI, one squadron was at PHUOC VINH, one troop was at Blackhorse, and a tank company was at DAU TIENG, it became obvious that a single contact team did not have the capability to provide support at all of these locations. As a result, in July the 110th HEM Company reorganized their assets and formed three contact teams of fifteen men each, one to support each squadron. This reorganization provided direct support maintenance which could move with the squadron and thus provide maintenance continuity at all times.

In October, all squadrons came under the tactical control of the 11th ACR for the first time in over a year. With all the squadron trains on the QUAN LOI post, it became obvious that the three support maintenance contact teams would have to have a central control to avoid duplication of effort and squadron rivalries. As a result, the 185th Maintenance Battalion formed a forward support element under the direction of a captain, which maintained control of the three contact teams, operated a service stock supply and a vehicle float yard, and controlled the 11th ACR vehicle retrograde and evacuation.

The FSE paid immediate dividends over and above the single point of contact for maintenance support operations. The service stock located at QUAN LOI acted as a forward branch office of the 185th Maintenance Battalion Consolidated Tech Supply. All 11th ACR units at QUAN LOI, including Air Cavalry Troop and the 919th Engineer Company, could turn requisitions in to the service stock supply the same day that they were prepared, thus eliminating the automatic one day delay of the system when all requisitions were flown.
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to the 105th Tech Supply in LONG BINH on the following day's courier. The establishment of a retrograde turn-in point at QUAN LOI accomplished two things: (1) It eliminated the often considerable delay in waiting for transportation for the 76 mile haul from QUAN LOI to LONG BINH, and (2) it relieved the unit from maintaining a second maintenance team at BIQJ HOA or LONG BINH to prepare, transport and turn-in vehicles there. By operating a float yard at QUAN LOI, the FSE provided float vehicles forward where they were needed and avoided transportation delays.

In late October, the 1st Logistical Command evaluated the 11th ACR support at QUAN LOI and decided that their investment in supply and maintenance support required some high level coordination and direction. As a result, MAJ D. H. Ward of Saigon Support Command was assigned to QUAN LOI as the senior man of this group, and he became the chief coordinator of all 11th ACR support activities at QUAN LOI, to include ammunition, laundry, rations, transportation and maintenance. For the first time since it had moved away from Blackhorse Base Camp, the 11th ACR had established a Regimental Logistical Control Point as outlined in FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment. A combat service support operations center was located forward with the Regiment and could react to the needs of the Regiment.

7. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: During the past eight months, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's psychological operations (PSYOP's) were directed at both local civilians as well as the NVA/VC. The success with the Chieu Hoi and Volunteer Informant Programs, and the improvement of popular attitude within the areas of operations, exemplifies the effectiveness of the Blackhorse Regiment in the pacification effort.

b. Chieu Hoi Program: The major portion of PSYOP aerial activity has been in support of the Chieu Hoi Program. PSYOP tactical missions, both loudspeaker and loudspeaker, have been flown during or immediately after almost every contact. Several ground tactical missions were conducted, the most recent being on the morning of 12 August in a successful effort to talk surviving sappers out of the bunkers, culverts, and tall grass around QUAN LOI. Chieu Hoi missions were also flown on numerous intelligence missions, i.e., SPAR's, SLAR's, base camp areas, trails, etcetera.

c. Volunteer Informant Program: The Volunteer Informant Program was heavily stressed in an effort to reduce the number of incidents which have caused considerable damage to Regimental vehicles. The program stresses rewards for information concerning mines, booby traps, caches, etcetera. The rewards are in the form of monetary payment or the equivalent in rice. Recently, more stress has been placed on the SVN citizen's patriotic obligation to give this information, rather than monetary inducement. It remains to be seen how effective this new approach will be. In July and August the people openly cooperated with ARW and US forces by informing them of the NVA/VC presence. Reliable agent reports are now common.
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d. New Techniques: The Regiment has been successful in making loudspeaker tapes and leaflets using relatives of the VC Local Force in the LOC NINH area. The relatives addressed their messages directly to their husbands, fathers, sons, daughters, etc., who were working with the VC.

e. Popular Attitude: Although the attitude of the populace in the Regimental areas of operations cannot be described as overwhelming enthusiasm for the GVN, the situation has shown remarkable improvement over the past eight months. A number of villagers have indicated that local villagers now refuse to cooperate in assisting the VC, and no longer provide them with food. Also, the intense civil action work done by the 11th ACR, ARVN, and local RF/PF units contrasts strongly with VC terrorism. Encouraging is the fact that the people are beginning to fly the national flag more openly.

6. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has had a continuing and forceful impact on civic action within its area of operations. The Blackhorse Regiment has conducted extensive MEDCAP, DENTCAP, and ICAP programs, provided the necessary materials for the construction of a school at TAN BINH and a market at BINH MY, has assisted in the construction and improvement of numerous RF/PF compounds.

b. Significant Projects:

(1) Of significance during the past eight months was the completion of the school in TAN BINH, BINH DUONG Province. Seven years ago the original school was destroyed by the VC. The village provided 100% of the labor necessary for construction, each family sharing in the work. Materials were provided by the 11th ACR and the Government of South Vietnam. Also, a house for the two new teachers was constructed within the US compound. Over 400 students were enrolled upon the school's completion. The entire project was an excellent example of cooperation between Vietnamese civilians, the GVN, and US Forces.

(2) The 11th ACR assisted in the construction of a market in BINH MY, also in BINH DUONG Province. It was built 100% by the villagers, with the materials provided by the Regiment. The purpose of the market is to stimulate the local economy and to minimize travel over the mine infested roads to PHUOC VINH and TAN UXEN. The market has met an excellent reception.

(3) An unusual project undertaken by the Regiment was extensive and intensive mine sweep operations in and around the rubber near AN LOC and LOC NINH. While this project cannot be described as totally civic action, it did have a significant impact on the civilian economy. US and ARVN forces cleared the roads of mines, many of which were identified by the rubber workers. Since 60% of the population depends on rubber for a living, it is imperative that roads through the plantation be kept open to allow access to all areas of the plantation.
c. MEDCAP, DENTCAP, and ICAP Program: In the area around Blackhorse Base Camp (XUAN LOC) during April, May, and June, an intensive schedule of MEDCAP's serviced the nearby villages of TOI GIAD, DAN RINH, CAM TAN, and CAN MY. During the same period in the LAM SON area, the villages of BINH MY, BINH CO, and TAN BINH received a full-scale MEDCAP program daily. During Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR in BINH LONG Province, the Regiment has continued to provide complete MEDCAP programs for the civilian population. Over 150 MEDCAP's, DENTCAP's, and ICAP's have been conducted in the AO with every village being visited regularly. To date, over 10,000 persons have been treated. Every ICAP includes a MEDCAP.

Also undertaken was the use of ARVN and RF/PF medics on MEDCAP's and DENTCAP's. This program is designed to ultimately have the Vietnamese forces conduct their own MEDCAP and DENTCAP programs.

8. SUMMARY:

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has continued to modify techniques, organization, and equipment levels to respond to the many varied tasks assigned. During my command, our missions have changed from primarily offensive to primarily defensive. Civic action, pacification, training, support to the ARVN forces, and protection of the populated areas of BINH LONG Province have become primary missions supplanting the extensive reconnaissance missions of the mid-year.

Civic action in the LAM SON area last April was targeted against three villages which had no RF/PF local force protection. Medical assistance to these villages was easy; the people simply walked to our aid stations. This austere beginning has grown steadily and today the Blackhorse Regiment now routinely provides assistance and protection to 103 hamlets in BINH LONG Province. While all are exposed to the hazards of war because of their proximity to Cambodia, the Regiment's aggressive pursuit of its health program, civic action projects in coordination with provincial forces, road improvement and rice clearing, as well as assistance in building numerous RF/PF compounds has produced significant results. This has been verified many times over by the cooperative and willing response of the people and the improved viable economy of the province. The people are confident of their protection for they know that an attack by the enemy against a village is an attack against the 11th Cavalry.

An ever increasing amount of effort and talent of the Regiment has been directed toward training ARVN and RF/PF forces. Formal training programs, joint and combined operations, and complete cooperation are the norm rather than the exception. As a result of this close association, the ability and self-confidence of the provincial forces, the ARVN 9th Infantry, and the ARVN 15th Cavalry Regiment have manifested themselves by the ever increasing responsiveness and expanded responsibilities of ARVN forces toward the protection of the people of BINH LONG Province.
Since the ever changing environment in which we operate demands a flexible, resourceful, military organization and in recognition that we are now entering a phase of war where fewer US forces will be available to assist the ARVN, I firmly believe the armored cavalry regiment, with its agility and responsive heavy fire power, is uniquely suited to the task of assisting the Government of South Vietnam in the pursuit of its national objectives.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1. Annex A Intelligence Statistics
3. Annex C Logistical Statistics
### INTELLIGENCE STATISTICS

Enemy Losses for the Period 6 April to 20 November 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (Killed in Action)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pw's</td>
<td>201</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hoi Chanh</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Captured/Destroyed (tons)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Served Weapons Captured/Destroyed</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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# COMBAT OPERATIONS STATISTICS

1. The following is the task organization for significant dates by operation during the period April to November 1969:

## MONTANA RAIDER

### Phase I, 13 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Reconnaissance Battalion</th>
<th>2-3 Cav (-)</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Con</th>
<th>Air Cav Transport</th>
<th>1-21 Arty (-)</th>
<th>1-22 Arty (-)</th>
<th>1-23 Arty (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 1/11 ACR</td>
<td>A/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>H/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>E/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>D/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>HQ, 8-6 Arty (DC)</td>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>819 Engr (-)</td>
<td>Plt/919 Engr (--)</td>
<td>Plt/919 Engr (--)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 1/11 ACR</td>
<td>A/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>H/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>E/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>D/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>HQ, 8-6 Arty (DC)</td>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>819 Engr (-)</td>
<td>Plt/919 Engr (--)</td>
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### Phase II, 25 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Reconnaissance Battalion</th>
<th>2-3 Cav (-)</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Con</th>
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<th>1-21 Arty (-)</th>
<th>1-22 Arty (-)</th>
<th>1-23 Arty (-)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 1/11 ACR</td>
<td>A/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>H/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>E/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>D/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>HQ, 8-6 Arty (DC)</td>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>819 Engr (-)</td>
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<td>E/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>D/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>HQ, 8-6 Arty (DC)</td>
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### Phase III, 25 April

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
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<th>Regiment</th>
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<th>1-22 Arty (-)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
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<td>E/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>D/1-8 Cav</td>
<td>HQ, 8-6 Arty (DC)</td>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>819 Engr (-)</td>
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### Phase III, 11 May

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<th>1-21 Arty (-)</th>
<th>1-22 Arty (-)</th>
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<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Annex B
### CONFIDENTIAL

**BLACKHORSE TAOR, 14 May 1969**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TF 2/11 ACR (-)</th>
<th>Air Cavalry Trp</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pit/919 Engr</td>
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</table>

**22 May 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/11 ACR (-)</th>
<th>TF 2/11 ACR -</th>
<th>Regt Con</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>2/11 ACR (-)</td>
<td>0/2/11 ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/1/11 ACR</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How/1/11 ACR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>919 Engr</td>
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**26 May 1969**

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<tr>
<th>TF 1/11 ACR</th>
<th>TF 1-12 Inf</th>
<th>TF L/52 Inf (ARVN)</th>
<th>Regt Con</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/11 ACR</td>
<td>1/1-12 Inf</td>
<td>L/52 Inf (ARVN)</td>
<td>C/1/11 ACR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>E/1-12 Inf</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>How/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>E/4-12 Inf</td>
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<td>Pit/B/2/11 ACR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plt/C/1/11 ACR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pit/E/2/11 ACR</td>
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<td>Plt/D/1/11 ACR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C/2-40 Arty</td>
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**Operation SHORTSTOP, 10 June 1969**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>TF 3/11 ACR</th>
<th>TF 2-2 Inf (MECH)</th>
<th>TF WRIGHT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trp/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>3/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>A/2-2 Inf (MECH)</td>
<td>D/1-2 Inf</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>B/2-2 Inf (MECH)</td>
<td>2 Plt/31 Engr (RRF)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>C/11 IDG</td>
<td>C/2-2 Inf (MECH)</td>
<td>Pit/HQ/11 ACR</td>
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<td>Co/2-9 Inf (ARV)</td>
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<td>Trp/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>Perimeter Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ, 8-6 Arty (DS)</td>
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<td>Inf Co --</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plt/B/2-34 Arm</td>
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</tr>
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<td>C/2-13 Arty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/1-5 Arty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pit/C/1-7 Arty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/6-27 Arty (GS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F/16 Arty (GS)</td>
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**CONFIDENTIAL**
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KENTUCKY COUGAR, 26 June 1969

TF 2/11 ACR
B/2/11 ACR
G/2/11 ACR
H/2/11 ACR (-)
C/1-7 Cav
Plt/9/2/11 ACR
Plt/919 Engr

TF 3/11 ACR
K/3/11 ACR
H/3/11 ACR
C/1-7 Cav
Plt/919 Engr

TF WREIGHT
A/1-1 Cav
2 Plt/31 Engr (HRF)
Blt/HQ/11 ACR (HRF)
Perimeter Defense Personnel
Loger Units
Mort Plt/7/2/11 ACR (DS)

Regt Con
Air Cav Trp
919 Engr (-)
HQ, 6-27 Arty (DS)
How/2/11 ACR
How/3/11 ACR
C/2/13 Arty (GS)
Plt/A/3-197 Arty (GS)
A/6-27 Arty (GS)
F/16 Arty (GS)

29 July 1969

TF 1/11 ACR
A/1/11 ACR
B/1/11 ACR
C/1/11 ACR
Plt/919 Engr

TF 2/11 ACR
C/1/11 ACR
E/2/11 ACR
F/2/11 ACR
Plt/919 Engr

Regt Con
Air Cav Trp
919 Engr (-)
HQ, 6/27 Arty
How/1/11 ACR
How/2/11 ACR
C/2/13 Arty (GS)
A/3-197 Arty (GS)
A/6-27 Arty (GS)
F/16 Arty (GS)

15 August 1969

TF WREIGHT
1/11 ACR
36 Rangers (ARVN)
B/1/9 (DS)
Plt/919 Engr

TF 1/16 Inf
1/16 Inf (-)
2 Lt AVLB

TF 2/11 ACR
2/11 ACR
D Co, 1-7 Cav
Plt/919 Engr

Regt Con
Air Cav Trp
919 Engr (-)
HQ, 6/27 Arty
How/1/11 ACR
How/2/11 ACR
C/2/13 Arty
A/1/21 Arty
C/2/13 Arty
A/3-197 Arty (GS)
A/6-27 Arty (GS)
F/16 Arty (GS)

CONFIDENTIAL
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<th>TF 2/11 ACR</th>
<th>TF 3/11 ACR</th>
<th>Regt Con</th>
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<td>L/3/11 ACR</td>
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<td>G/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>M/3/11 ACR</td>
<td>HQ, 6/27 Arty (OS)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>H/2/11 ACR</td>
<td>How/3/11 ACR</td>
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<tr>
<td>How/1/11 ACR</td>
<td>How/2/11 ACR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>H/919 Engr</td>
<td>3/919 Engr</td>
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The following statistics represent the combined operations of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment with the RVN, since 1 July 1969. Records of combined operations were not maintained prior to this date.

1st Squadron Combined Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/FF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>140</td>
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2nd Squadron Combined Operations

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<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/FF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>87</td>
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3rd Squadron Combined Operations

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
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<td>148</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/FF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>88</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total Combined Operations by Squadrons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1ST SQN</th>
<th>2ND SQN</th>
<th>3RD SQN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/FF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1. 1st Squadron was OPLAN to 1st Infantry Division 1-23 July.
2. 2nd Squadron was OPLAN to 1st Infantry Division 7 Sep - 10 Oct.
3. 3rd Squadron was OPLAN to 199th Light Infantry Brigade 26 Jul - 6 Sep. Operations with the 5th Cav Regt (ARVN) during this period are not recorded.
3. The following statistics represent 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment activities in support of the DONG TIEN Program during the period 11 October through 31 October 1969:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1ST SQIN</th>
<th>2ND SQIN</th>
<th>3RD SQIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>ARVN</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
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</table>

Number of Joint ICAPS

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<th>2ND SQIN</th>
<th>3RD SQIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>ICAPS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
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</table>

Number of Combined Operations

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<tr>
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<th>1ST SQIN</th>
<th>2ND SQIN</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
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<td>95</td>
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Total Number of Activities in Support of DONG TIEN

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<th>3RD SQIN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL ICAPS</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>148</td>
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</table>
AREAS OF OPERATIONS—6 APR - 7 DEC 1969

MONTANA RAIDER
CATCHERS MIT - LAM SON
BLACKHORSE TAOR
BINH LONG PROVINCE
STATISTICAL SUMMARY GRAPHS

43
STATISTICAL SUMMARY

- Montana Raider
- Catchers Mit Lamson
- Bi Ackhorse
- Toan Thang III A
- Shortstop
- Kentucky Cougar
- Total

Bar chart showing:
- Weapons captured: 264, 758
- Combat vehicles captured: 26, 12, 22, 59, 129
- POW captured: 15, 2, 2, 4, 47, 80

Legend:
- MONTANA RAIDER
- CATCHERS MIT LAMSON
- BI ACKHORSE
- TOAN THANG III A
- SHORTSTOP
- KENTUCKY COUGAR
- TOTAL
# LOGISTICAL STATISTICS

## Battle Loss (Mine)

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<tr>
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<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>3(2)</td>
<td>4(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M1L8</td>
<td>11(8)</td>
<td>6(4)</td>
<td>10(9)</td>
<td>5(3)</td>
<td>7(6)</td>
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<td>8(4)</td>
<td>16(11)</td>
<td>12(12)</td>
<td>6(6)</td>
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<td>2(1)</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
<td>6(3)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>35(29)</td>
<td>24(18)</td>
<td>30(28)</td>
<td>20(13)</td>
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## Average Mileage

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<th>AUG</th>
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<th>OCT</th>
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<td>414</td>
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<tr>
<td>M113</td>
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## Aerial Resupply

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<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
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<tr>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>26.5</td>
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<td>HRS FLOOM</td>
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<td>143.2</td>
<td>143.2</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>416.9</td>
<td>400.2</td>
<td>354.9</td>
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CIVIC ACTION - COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTED

The following are commodities distributed during the period 1 April through 30 October 1969:

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<td>301 ea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>4,520 bd ft</td>
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<td>Paint</td>
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<td>Clothing</td>
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<td>Scrap Lumber</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13,400 ea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engr Stakes</td>
<td>700 ea</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>GVN Flags</td>
<td>1,200 ea</td>
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### Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL James H. Leach

#### 2. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)
Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 6 April 1969 to 7 December 1969.

#### 3. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)
COL James H. Leach

#### 5. REPORT DATE
3 December 1969

#### 6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.
N/A

#### 7. PROJECT NO.
N/A

#### 8. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
69B055

#### 9. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

#### 10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
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#### 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

#### 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

#### 13. ABSTRACT

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

Security Classification

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**

Security Classification

**CONFIDENTIAL**