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AGDA (M) (10 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 69R050 19 December 1969

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Donn R. Pepke, CG, 4th Infantry Division, Period 30 Nov 68 to 14-Nov 69 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Donn R. Pepke, subject as above.

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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ATTACHMENTS

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - MG Donn R. Pepke

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division for the period 30 November 1968 through 14 November 1969.

2. MG Pepke is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. H. Wilson
3rd Army
Assistant Adjutant General

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SENIOR OFFICER DEBRIEFING PROGRAM
(MG Donn R. Pepke, 4th Infantry Division)
(RCS - CSFOR - 74) (U)
COUNTRY: Republic of Vietnam
DEBRIEF REPORT BY: Major General Donn R. Pepke
DUTY ASSIGNED: Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division
INCLUSIVE DATES: 30 November 1968 - 14 November 1969
DATE OF REPORT: 10 November 1969
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During the year November 1968 to November 1969, the 4th Infantry Division was responsible for an area as large as the entire area of any other CTZ, and was supported with minimum resources. The Famous Fighting Fourth was employed in an economy of force role; a sound strategic policy given the division's limited assets and extensive area of responsibility. That the division never lost a major battle or campaign fought against NVA/VC forces and was able to hold every area for which it was responsible, defeating a formidable adversary in some of the most rugged terrain on earth, demonstrates the validity of the tactics employed and is a testimonial to the professionalism and competence of the officers and men who fought under the 4th Division colors.

While the complexity of its mission created hardships and difficulties, it produced a situation in which initiative and tactical ingenuity could flourish, and unique solutions to problems were more than desirable; they were mandatory. A summary of operations and lessons learned is included later in this paper, and the reader's attention is directed especially to those inclusions that describe the use of CBU Barriers, Screen Operations, Pattern Analysis, Long Range Patrols, Home Flow Operations for extensive land clearing and bunker busting, and the concept developed for employment of Short Range Patrols. All of these measures were designed as substitutes for high troop density. Utilization and perfection of these techniques enabled the 4th Division to concurrently meet all of its requirements, i.e., pacification, screening, security of lines of communication, protection of population centers, training PFC/PF, CIDG and PSDG, and interdiction and joint and combined operations with ARVN and PWF against enemy LOC's and base areas.

Enemy activity in the Highlands has always followed a pattern of peaks and valleys; periods of intensive combat actions are followed by periods of recuperation and regrouping in their sanctuaries. The 4th Division deploys its tactical forces to provide a protective screen of barriers and patrols between the population and the enemy, concentrating on a pacification program that is interrupted only by pre-emptive combat forces into enemy base areas. When the NVA is prepared for offensive action and begins to move, our combat units are assaulted by air and overland into fire bases astride the enemy routes of approach. Thus, by coupling blocking forces and air and artillery support, our counter offensive actions defeat the enemy and concomitantly protect GVN population and installations. The early warning provided by the full utilization of the entire spectrum of electronic and mechanical surveillance means coupled with our screening forces has always permitted us to meet the enemy and fight him in remote areas of...
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the Highlands, with minimal impact on negotiation and pacification. During periods of relative inactivity our tactical screen has permitted commanders to devote their full attention to civic action and the elimination of the VC infrastructure, confident that ample reaction time is available to blunt any major enemy offensives.

During 1969, the VIETNAMESE have improved their posture and their territorial forces have made great strides. Local officials, as well as non-military units, have demonstrated a continuous improvement. HVNAF units, also in an economy of force role in the Highlands, have been slightly hampered as a result of casualties among junior leaders suffered during the CH1 squadron and VC infiltration campaigns. However, the senior VIETNAMESE leadership is outstanding. LTC Lu-Lan, CC, 11 Corps, and Colonel Lien, CO, 24th STZ, have worked closely with the 4th Division and have demonstrated a professional grasp of tactics and management of resources that compares favorably with that of US commanders. The VIETNAMESE regular forces in the Highlands are responding favorably to the leadership of General Lu-Lan and Colonel Lien and casualties among small unit leaders are being minimized.

The Famous Fighting Fourth Infantry Division spent 1969 repeatedly defeating the enemy while continually improving the fighting ability of our VIETNAMESE allies. Our outstanding results are self-evident and our efforts are well documented. The Central Highlands remain vulnerable to attack from the IACTIAI and CAMBODIAN sanctuaries by the NVA, and progress toward complete GVN control is subject to small set backs and delays until such time as the Armed Forces of the Republic of VIETNAM have developed a genuine capability to provide complete security for the people they serve.

Accomplishment of its multiple missions required astute management of the limited resources available to the division. Combat units and their support echelons were in an almost constant state of motion, shifting from one area to another to meet threats, exploit opportunities, or simply to respond to changes in priorities as the division met all its responsibilities inherent in its mission in addition to higher headquarters directives. The extensive area and limited resources of the division had an impact on combat support and combat service support. DISCOM found itself responsible for supplying and maintaining division units all the way from Bu Prang to the An Lao Valley, a distance of over 200 miles. The An Lao Valley is 75 air miles northeast of Camp Enari, and Bu Prang is 175 air miles southwest. Signal communication between these widely separated units was maintained only with a great expenditure of resources and effort, and command and liaison functions further eroded the aviation assets available for combat missions. Additionally our engineer battalion was forced to distribute its forces so that engineer effort in mass was difficult to achieve. Thus, within this difficult and challenging environment, a responsive and professional staff was an absolute necessity, and the results testify to the competence of the officers and men who implemented and communicated the desires of the division commander.

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As responsibilities and requirements increased, the capability of the staff kept pace. It was in the area of General Staff accomplishments and exercises that the 4th Infantry Division made its greatest improvements during 1944. It was through mutual cooperation and mutual growth that the division was able to surmount every challenge and accomplish every mission.

In reviewing the accomplishments and problems of the past year's operations, there are several areas of particular interest from a commander's viewpoint which deserve to be highlighted. Worthy of reiteration is the fact that the 4th Infantry Division never lost a battle or a piece of ground it was expected to defend. This is the single most significant accomplishment of the Famous Fighting Fourth. Closely allied is the fact that the enemy's combat forces were never permitted to interfere with the orderly process of government and commerce in the Highlands, because the enemy was intercepted and halted fought in remote areas away from the population centers.

The burden of the war and the success of the 4th Infantry Division rests, in the final analysis, with the individual soldiers who must carry out the plans and orders of the commanding general. This fact is accepted as a basic truth in the Famous Fighting Fourth, and the accomplishments of the division stem from the understanding that our soldiers are individuals and are due the loyal concern of those who command. The men have responded to the obvious efforts of all officers and non-commissioned officers to secure and improve all aspects of their existence and to enhance their physical, mental, and spiritual welfare. This in itself is an extraordinary feat accomplished without the benefit of a battalion stand down or rest during the entire year.

My relations with my staff and commanders were based upon the assumption that everyone wanted to do that which I wanted done, and if there was a failure in response, it was because I failed in my instructions. The burden of disproving this assumption rests with the individual, and he is considered to be at fault only when he himself has demonstrated that he lacks the ability to carry out my desires or is unwilling to accept and implement the instructions he receives. Very few failed to respond, which reinforces my belief that professional soldiers come equipped with a sense of duty and motivation to get the job done rapidly and efficiently.

Finally, this division has been a unit in fact as well as in name, with all parts, large and small, working together as one entity in a unique demonstration of togetherness, the epitome of all for one and one for all. The result has been a unit that is proud of its country, its colors, and its uniform; a unit that has taken justifiable pride in its accomplishments and has adhered to its motto, "Steadfast and Loyal."
The Famous Fighting Fourth Infantry Division changed command on 30 November 1968. At that time there was a lull in the fighting because the enemy was withdrawing into sanctuaries in or near CAMBODIA and LAOS. Taking advantage of the lull in enemy activity during November and December, the 4th Infantry Division concentrated its efforts on destroying the VIET CONG infrastructure and disrupting VIET CONG base areas. The primary purpose of this campaign against the VIET CONG was to assist the Government of VIETNAM in securing and pacifying its territory; with peace talks imminent, accelerated pacification became the chief goal of the Government of VIETNAM and all Free World Military Assistance Forces in order to enhance the South VIETNAMESE Government's bargaining position. A second objective of the campaign against the VIET CONG was to hamper future operations of the regular North VIETNAMESE forces, which depend on local VIET CONG to guide their operations in unfamiliar territory and to stockpile food stuffs and munitions.

To produce an environment in which the Government of VIETNAM's pacification activities could flourish, maneuver battalions of the 4th Infantry Division, situated from DAK TO to BAN ME THUOT, conducted five types of operations: reconnaissance in force into base areas, screening operations, interdiction of routes of communication, cordon and search of selected populated areas, and civic action.

Reconnaissance in force operations detected and destroyed enemy base camps, eliminated caches, and whenever possible, detected and destroyed enemy units. These operations inhibited movement of large enemy units, and consequently reduced the enemy's influence upon the civilian populace.

Screening operations were conducted extensively in the western portion of the Division area of operations along the CAMBODIAN Border. The screening force, composed of the armored cavalry squadron and long and short range patrols, was deployed across enemy infiltration routes to the east. This permitted early warning of enemy forces moving into the area of operations while freeing the Division's other maneuver elements to pursue other operations. The screening forces would engage and delay the enemy forces to permit the commitment of other combat elements to destroy the enemy. Screening missions are essential to the economy of force role of the Division.

Interdiction was the mission of short range patrols and long range patrols. Composed of four men, these patrols remained in position from 48 to 72 hours, reporting enemy activity and adjusting indirect fire upon the enemy both day and night, without disclosing their own positions. Saturating the avenue of approach to villages with ambushes and short range patrols, the battalions of the 4th Infantry Division restricted the enemy's
movement and reduced his ability to make contact with the VIET CONG infrastructure to acquire food and labor from the civilian population. Free from the VIET CONG's influence, the people were able to respond to the government's pacification programs.

Cordon and Search operations were designed to detect and eliminate the VIET CONG Infrastructure. For these operations to be effective, close liaison with District and Province Intelligence and Operations Control Centers (DIOCC) (DIOCC) was necessary. The Static Census Grievance (SCG) representative was one of the key personnel in the DIOCC. He maintained a hamlet book which contained such information as: census of families and hamlets, maps and diagrams of villages and category cataloging of all of the residents in his area. When this information was combined with the photographs of suspected VCI and detainees, many times positive identification could be made. Cordon and Search operations provided additional information, which the battalions shared with the VIETNAMESE agencies. Repeated cordons and search of the same village proved fruitful, even though the initial catch might have been only one or two members of the VCI. Detainees would frequently identify other VCI through the screening of photographs of suspects, enemy dead, and villagers.

MEDCAP's were the heart of the battalions' efforts to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation with the Government of VIETNAM. While in the villages, the battalions took note of the relative impact of various civic action projects and gathered intelligence. After repeated visits to the villages, the US personnel, along with interpreters and National Police, were able to detect strangers among the regular inhabitants. Many of these strangers were detained for interrogation. The central function of the MEDCAP was to provide the people with needed medical personnel to recognize and treat the afflictions common among the MONTAGNARD. Medical personnel assigned to battalion civic action teams also trained MONTAGNARD personnel to recognize and treat these common afflictions so that they might help themselves in the absence of US MEDCAP's. The battalions found that repeated face to face contact generated interest in MEDCAP, gave us a better insight into problem areas and cultivated an attitude among the people that permitted the Volunteer Informant Program to flourish. As the MONTAGNARDS gained confidence in the US forces, the US forces gained confidence in their own efforts. Our soldiers responded as enthusiastically to the MEDCAP program as did the MONTAGNARDS.

While seven maneuver battalions supported pacification in their respective areas of operation, TASK FORCE WINNER was formed under the command of the Assistant Division Commander. It was composed of three of the Division's infantry battalions, its cavalry squadron, plus four ARVN battalions and a Special Forces Mobile Strike Force Battalion. This force began a massive sweep of two of the enemy's oldest sanctuaries: the DAK DOA Valley, home of the 408th Sapper Battalion; and the DAK PAYOU Valley, commonly known as VC Valley.
Since the French Indochina War, these two regions have harbored insurgent forces. Operating from the DAK PAYOU Valley, the VIET MINH harassed Highway 19 and eventually destroyed the elite French Mobile Group 100 in the MANG YANG Pass. In recent years, the DAK PAYOU Valley has been the refuge of the 95B NVA Regiment. The 95B Regiment has become virtually a permanent resident of the DAK PAYOU Valley, indistinguishable from the local VIET CONG, who also inhabit the valley in considerable numbers.

Rugged mountains rising 700 meters above the valley floor, dense jungle, and an abundance of caves make the DAK PAYOU Valley a formidable sanctuary. Because the enemy is so familiar with the region, he is able to extricate himself when threatened by invading allied forces. He employs squads and three-man cells in blocking positions, allowing larger units to escape. The DAK DOA Valley is a perennial base area for units harassing the installations and airfields near PLEIKU City. The mountains of the region provide good cover and concealment for enemy forces. The 408th Sapper Battalion and a rocket artillery company both operate from the DAK DOA Valley. In addition, the VIET CONG's shadow government of PLEIKU Province, the GIA LAI, often makes its headquarters in the DAK DOA Valley.

At the first sign that allied forces were intruding into their base area, the enemy fled southward out the lower end of the valley and then east into BINH DINH Province, finally stopping in the region south of AN KHE. The battalions of the 1st Brigade made sporadic contacts with rear guard elements. Although the Task Force failed to trap any large enemy force, it uncovered large caches of rice and munitions that the enemy had been forced to leave unprotected.

In its effort to track down an especially elusive foe, TASK FORCE WINNER had the assistance of Company E, 20th Infantry (Long Range Patrol), from I Field Force, VIETNAM. Saturating known enemy infiltration routes leading into the DAK PAYOU Valley from the southwest, the LRP's monitored and interdicted enemy infiltration and resupply efforts. Their operations accounted for a number of enemy confirmed killed, tons of foodstuffs, and numerous enemy weapons, munitions, and documents captured or destroyed. Weighing the forces involved against the results, the operations of the LRP's were the most successful of TASK FORCE WINNER.

The disappearance of the enemy from the DAK DOA Valley prompted the NVA to withdraw their ranger battalions from the valley for operations in an area that promised more substantial results, the CHU PA Mountain region northwest of PLEIKU City near the YA KRONG BOLAH River. The CHU PA is another seldom penetrated enemy base area. Intelligence indicated that the North VIETNAMESE had been accumulating caches there, possibly in preparation for an offensive during TET, 1969.
The end of operations in the DAK DOA Valley brought TASK FORCE WINNER to a close. Although the Task Force lasted only ten days and claimed only 29 enemy kills, it captured 22 tons of rice, 400 pounds of medical supplies, 30 pounds of documents, and considerable quantities of weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

Gradually, the Division's pacification effort expanded. On 20 January, the 1st Brigade terminated the last of its operations in the DAK TO region, transferring responsibility for that area to the 2d Brigade. From its base on Highway 19 East, the 1st Brigade extended the pacification program into eastern PLEIKU and western BINH DINH Provinces. Operations in the vicinity of the DAK FAYOU Valley and the MANG YANG Pass, initiated after the arrival of the 1st Brigade in December, promised to continue on a regular basis.

The possibility of a renewed enemy offensive, however, was not overlooked. The 1st Brigade was placed on alert for deployment either inside or outside the 4th Infantry Division's area of operations.

In the CHU PA Mountain region, troops of the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone, in coordination with the 4th Infantry Division, began operations on 5 January 1969. The 24th NVA Regiment began infiltrating into the CHU PA area from across the CAMBODIAN Border with the intention of protecting the caches which had been laboriously built up over the preceding months. Their mission was to attack PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities, attack villages and hamlets to disrupt the GVN Pacification Program, and interdict Highway 14N between PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities. The ARVN battalions made contact with elements of this unit almost daily as they moved through the area.

Seizing the opportunity to trap this newly arrived enemy force, the 4th Infantry Division, after coordination with the ARVN 24th Special Tactical Zone, combat assaulted into the CHU PA region. While the ARVN blocked to the west, 4th Infantry Division troops attempted to drive the enemy from their strongholds and trap them against the blocking forces.

While the CHU PA battle was in full swing, reliable intelligence reports indicated that a large enemy force had entered the area 15 kilometers north of the CHU PA. While its present objective was unknown, it appeared to be targeted against either POLEI KLENG, PLEI MRONG, or KONTUM City. The 4th Infantry Division was now simultaneously faced with a determined entrenched enemy and a moving threat. It became necessary to immediately deploy a US battalion sized force to seize the high ground to the southwest of POLEI KLENG, as seizure of this critical terrain by the enemy would give him an excellent springboard from which to launch any further attack to the east. Within hours, sightings and small contacts indicated that the enemy was attempting to slide northward around the blocking force. It then became necessary to move another battalion on the high ground to the north. The
1st Brigade’s operation against the 95th Regiment south of the MANG YANG Pass had reduced the threat in that area, thus making an additional battalion available for deployment to meet the new threat.

Elements of the 4th and 6th Battalions, 24th NVA Regiment, and the 31st NVA Artillery Battalion remained in fortified positions on the CHU PA; nevertheless, the two remaining US battalions proceeded deliberately through the mountain area, working downward from the heights and relying on artillery and air support to soften the enemy positions. After seven days of constant pressure, the shattered enemy divided into small groups and exfiltrated across the river under the cover of darkness. The 1st Brigade, with its one remaining battalion, terminated operations against the 95th Regiment and joined the remainder of the 4th Infantry Division in KONTUM Province to meet the enemy threat.

With the enemy forces effectively blocked, the 4th Infantry Division elected to use three days to realign its forces for the purpose of effecting a more responsive reserve. The realignment proved to have been an effective move with the beginning of the NVA Spring Offensive on 23 February, since it freed the entire 1st Brigade for operations anywhere in the Division Area. The Division was now aligned with the 2d Brigade having three battalions west of the YA KRONG BOLAH River blocking the enemy's advance and the 1st Brigade east of the YA KRONG BOLAH River, guarding the approaches to KONTUM City and being prepared to combat assault to smash the enemy or cut him off from his sanctuaries. As part of their Spring Offensive, the NVA attempted to interdict Highway 14 North, between PLEIKU and KONTUM Cities.

The 3d ARVN Cavalry smashed two attempted ambushes along the highway, killing 63 NVA and capturing four prisoners. While these actions were in progress, a new threat developed in the BENG HST area with heavy attacks by fire against the CIDG Camp. These attacks by fire on BENG HST, coupled with other intelligence, strongly indicated that the enemy was preparing a ground assault. It now became apparent that the major enemy thrust was to be made in KONTUM Province. Accordingly, the 4th Infantry Division redeployed the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, from BAN ME THUOT, terminating seven months of operations in that area.

The 4th Infantry Division was now faced with multiple threats: a possible ground attack on BENG HST from an unknown sized enemy force, the 66th NVA Regiment attempting to bypass US forces to the west of POLEI KLENG, attacks by fire on populated areas, and interdiction of Highway 14 North by elements of the 24th NVA Regiment, which had slowly infiltrated eastward to positions astride the highway south of KONTUM after being driven out of the CHU PA region.

The 4th Infantry Division, to better counter these enemy threats, now moved to the CHU PRONG mountain area to destroy the elements of the 24th NVA
Regiment to the east of Highway 14 North. As a precautionary measure, the Division also deployed elements of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to BEN HET and DAO TO. Documents and equipment captured on 23 and 24 February positively identified the enemy regiment west of POLEI KLENG as the 66th NVA Regiment, and revealed that elements of the K-25A Engineer Battalion in support of the 66th NVA Regiment were constructing roads and fortifications leading from the border into the 66th NVA Regiment’s area of operations. An analysis of the situation at that time indicated that the 66th NVA Regiment was the chief threat in the 4th Infantry Division’s area of operations. The Division carefully monitored intelligence indicators until it became apparent that the bulk of the 66th NVA Regiment was deployed just west of POLEI KLENG.

On 1 March, with lightning swiftness, the 1st Brigade, composed of three infantry battalions, conducted combat assaults behind the 66th NVA Regiment to effect a vertical envelopment and cut off the 66th NVA Regiment from its lines of communications. With the enemy now entrapped between the brigades, the Division began to close the noose to fix and destroy the enemy.

On the night of 3–4 March, the enemy attempted a tank-infantry attack on BEN HET, supported by artillery. It was the enemy's first tank attack in the Central Highlands, and the first in VIETNAM since the siege of KHE SANH. The enemy attack, even though using artillery support, failed. Two SOVIET PT-76 light amphibious tanks were knocked out and captured, and the enemy infantry failed to reach the BEN HET perimeter.

By 11 March, intelligence reports indicated that the 66th NVA Regiment was attempting to move south towards the CHU PA region. The 4th Infantry Division reacted by conducting saturation reconnaissance in force operations just north of the YA KRONG BOLAH River to detect any enemy activity.

The 1st Brigade's envelopment operations in the PLEI TRAP severely punished the 66th NVA Regiment; the ratio of NVA to US casualties was ten to one. When enemy armor moved toward BEN HET, it found US armor waiting for it. When the 66th NVA Regiment prepared to attack POLEI KLENG, it found its way blocked by forces which had been moved to the high ground in front of it, and subsequently discovered that a brigade had been airlifted behind it, was disrupting its supply routes, and was attacking its rear elements. When the enemy shifted southward, as if to attack PLEI MRONG, he found still another infantry battalion deployed in front of him. Furthermore, he still had not escaped the threat of envelopment. On 14 March, the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, combat assaulted south from the vicinity of LZ SWINGER to establish a new firebase, LZ CIDER, 27 kilometers southwest of POLEI KLENG. The enemy continued harassing attacks to cover his withdrawal. While his already decimated artillery shelled BEN HET and US firebases, his infantry and sappers attacked US patrol bases, and in so doing, he lost even more of
his guns, mortars, and soldiers. The result of the enemy's diversionary campaign was the virtual destruction of his 31st Artillery Battalion.

To cover its withdrawal, the 66th NVA Regiment continued to conduct harassing attacks into early April. Allied forces responded with B-52 strikes on suspected enemy headquarters and assembly areas. By mid-April, the 66th NVA Regiment was no longer a threat to KONTUM Province. Similarly, the 24th NVA Regiment ceased to be a threat to Highway 14 and northern PLEIKU Province.

During the period 28 February to 31 March, the 24th NVA Regiment was operating in the CHU PRONG Mountain area east of Highway 14 North. This area has been designated by MACV and the Joint General Staff as Base Area #229. The CHU PRONG Mountain area has long been a sanctuary from which NVA/VC forces have conducted interdiction operations against Highway 14, as well as offensive operations and standoff attacks against PLEIKU City. The 24th NVA Regiment has operated for some time from Base Area #229 in the CHU PRONG Mountain complex. In July 1968, just prior to the commencement of the second offensive, the 24th Special Tactical Zone, under the command of Colonel Lien, engaged in heavy combat with the 24th NVA Regiment in this same mountain area. At that time two scout companies were cut off and surrounded by NVA forces. Two ARVN infantry battalions and the 3d ARVN Cavalry Squadron attempted to relieve these forces. The resulting battles produced heavy losses on both sides, and ultimately resulted in the decimation of two battalions of the 24th NVA Regiment. In April 1969, one 4th Infantry Division battalion was deployed to engage the 24th NVA Regiment in the CHU PRONG Mountain area. Large amounts of ammunition, medical supplies, communications equipment, and documents were captured. While contact was relatively light, the neutralization of the enemy base area was highly significant. In addition to the destruction of many bunkers and fighting positions, infantry units conducted detailed denial operations of a major hospital complex, a regimental command post, and an extensive underground cave network. These major installations were denied by clearing all jungle growth surrounding their entrances, by painting their entrances for easy identification from the air, and by contamination with crystalline CS detonated within these facilities. It is felt that this denial effort is perhaps the most significant portion of the battle of the CHU PRONG. Having been thus denied these major facilities, it will be extremely difficult for enemy units to obtain security in the CHU PRONG Mountain sanctuary. Also, during the operation, numerous landing zones were established, which will contribute greatly to the denial of the enemy sanctuary, in that friendly forces will now be able to exploit an airmobile capability in any future engagements in the CHU PRONG Mountain area.

With the offensive of first line enemy forces defeated, the 4th Infantry Division returned to large scale support of the Republic of VIETNAM's pacification program. The 1st Brigade, having sent the 66th Regiment reeling...
back into CAMBODIA, airlifted out of the Plei Trap Valley and then travelled by convoy and C-130 aircraft to a new area of operations far to the east of the 4th Infantry Division's usual sphere of influence. Establishing its base area at AN KHE, the former home of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile), the 1st Brigade began operations in support of pacification efforts in BINH DINH Province.

In the months that followed, the 4th Infantry Division's maneuver battalions provided an outer shell of security around hamlets and villages in order that the Government of VIETNAM's influence would become firmly established.

The 4th Infantry Division expected that VIET CONG local forces and sappers would attempt to disrupt the pacification effort. Accordingly, intelligence gathering agencies and maneuver battalions maintained continuous surveillance of enemy base areas and avenues of approach. Night ambushes and short range patrols, employing starlight scopes to the maximum, interdicted enemy movement. Division units reacted rapidly and with overwhelming force to attacks on villages and hamlets.

In August, reconnaissance activity indicated that enemy units opposite BU PRANG, southwest of BAN ME THUOT, were to initiate a high point in their activities. To counter what appeared to be an imminent enemy threat to the BU PRANG area, the Division organized and deployed TASK FORCE FIGHTER to the BAN ME THUOT East airfield. This Task Force consisted of one air cavalry troop, one ground cavalry troop, one infantry company, and the necessary command and control and logistical support to operate it. TASK FORCE FIGHTER was to be the command and control headquarters for two Divisional infantry battalions that would have been deployed, if required, to BAN ME THUOT to relieve two battalions of the 23d ARVN Division that would react to this threat.

To date, no additional Division assets have been committed to this Task Force. However, on 28 October, Firebase KATE and ANNIE received intensive artillery and recoilless rifle fire. The tempo of fire and attacks increased against Firebase KATE, until the base was evacuated on the evening of 1 November. The threat continues to exist at this time.

To assist the 173d Airborne Brigade in their successful pacification efforts in eastern BINH DINH Province, the Division deployed one infantry battalion into the AN IAO Valley in the latter part of September to act as a screen to stop enemy infiltration into the northeastern part of BINH DINH Province, and to prevent the enemy from disrupting the pacification effort. This battalion remained under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade until the end of October. At the end of October, intelligence reports indicated that there might be a threat developing in the AN IAO...
Valley that was greater than one battalion could counter, as a regiment of the 3d NVA Division appeared to be moving into the area. When this threat was considered against the extended pacification disposition of the 173d forces, it was evident that the 173d Brigade could not both counter the enemy threat and continue its pacification operations. Therefore, the CG, IFFV, directed the Division to deploy its swing brigade, the 2d, into the northern AN LAO Valley to conduct screening and spoiling operations to prevent disruption of the pacification effort. On 28 October, an additional infantry battalion entered the area, and the 2d Brigade Headquarters resumed control of both 4th Infantry Division battalions on 1 November. This operation continues and initial contacts have been successful.

As the year drew to a close, the 4th Infantry Division's perennial antagonist, the 24th NVA Regiment, reappeared in the CHU PA - PLEI MRONG area. Having rested and resupplied itself in its CAMBODIAN sanctuaries over the summer months, the 24th NVA Regiment moved east expecting to meet only ARVN forces, but found itself once again confronted by an aggressive and coordinated allied force comprised of ARVN, Camp Strike, and 4th Infantry Division forces.

The 631st Composite Battalion had planned to terrorize the PLEIKU area with attacks by fire. This combined infantry-artillery NVA unit conducted extensive reconnaissance during the late fall in preparation for standoff attacks. Two attacks were carried out near the end of October using 122mm rockets. However, the 631st was forced to suspend activity and defend its well camouflaged supply base in the JHU FA against air-landed 4th Division troops.

While thwarting the enemy's renewed offensive, the Division remained dispersed over a vast area, assisting the local VIETNAMESE administration and the local self-defense forces to gain the strength that will eventually enable them to control their own destiny.

On 10 November, as General Pepke's tour neared its end, the Division was tasked to deploy a two battalion force to Da LAC Province. This was accomplished the following day and no operation or mission already in progress was terminated.
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1. (C) Introduction (Summary of Events Immediately Preceding Assumption of Command)

a. Operation HUMITAN MACARTHUR was in progress at the assumption of command. It had been progressing since 12 October 1967, and was to terminate on 31 January 1969. The Division's mission at that time was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program and the Revolutionary Development Program. Specifically, the Division was to:

1. Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border area and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.
2. Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAO/N to the highlands into the coastal provinces.
3. Conduct ambush attacks and ambush operations.
4. Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.
5. Destroy and eliminate VIET CONG infrastructure.
6. Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.
7. Support the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP-ENANG Resettlement Program.
8. Open, secure and maintain land lines of communications.
9. Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites and sector/subsector headquarters within the II Corps Tactical Zone.
10. Provide a battalion size reserve to 1 Field Force, VIETNAM, on order. The Division's mission has not changed appreciably during the past year; the priorities, however, have been changed as the enemy situation and threat dictated.

b. The tactical situation, immediately prior to the change of command, was one of relative quiet. The enemy had suffered severe casualties in the DUC LAP-ME THUOT area and the mainline NVA units had withdrawn from VIETNAM for a major refitting and reorganization. Unable to afford further confrontation, the enemy's major offensive efforts were standoff attacks against firebases. No major offensive action developed because the enemy lacked sufficient strength for any all-out attacks.

c. In November, a threat developed across the CAMBODIAN Border from the DUC CO Special Forces Camp when three NVA regiments concentrated for an offensive. However, a brigade from the 4th Infantry Division was placed on key terrain features around the camp astride enemy avenues of approach. This action forestalled any possible offensive threat in this area.

d. Also during November, Operations TOLL ROAD and DEADEND were conducted in response to intelligence that revealed that enemy forces were using the

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PIEL TRAP Road in western KONTUM Province to move troops and supplies. Further air reconnaissance and long range patrols discovered the enemy was making improvements on the road to accommodate medium vehicular traffic. Joint operations with CSF forces made the road impassable for heavy enemy movement; artillery and air strikes interdicted the remainder of the road.

e. At the end of November, the Division was actively pursuing the offensive to find and destroy the enemy, to keep him moving with no chance of respite, and to invade his base areas to destroy his safe havens and supply installations.

f. To accomplish the mission stated previously, the Division had eight infantry battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, one armored cavalry squadron and one tank battalion. The Division had a normal base with three brigades, Division Artillery, Division Support Command, signal, engineer, and medical aviation elements.

2. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION

a. The concept of operation of the 4th Infantry Division over the past year was designed to establish certain operating principles, methods, and techniques by which the Division would accomplish its assigned mission. During all aspects of Division operations, emphasis was placed upon the interaction between Division forces, Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Provincial and Special Forces forces.

b. The basic concept was one of employing screening and reconnaissance resources to saturate likely enemy areas of activity and avenues of approach, coupled with the rapid, aggressive, and overwhelming commitment of immediately available reaction forces to fix and destroy the enemy.

(1) Screening Forces: Special Forces, Camp Strike and Mike Strike forces along with the Provincial forces of various types were relied upon to accomplish an equitable portion of the screening and local-defense tasks. Integrated with these forces, certain Division and ARVN forces were assigned to the screening task. The mission of these screening and local defense forces was to detect the enemy's presence, size, and direction of movement. To the extent feasible, these forces were also to engage and fix the enemy forces. Rapid and accurate reporting was essential. In addition to these screening forces, all available intelligence resources were devoted to the detection of enemy forces and their activities.

(2) Reaction Forces: The key to the success of this concept was the rapid, aggressive, and overwhelming employment of reaction forces. Reaction forces available included air cavalry, with their organic aero-rifle elements; armored and mechanized units utilizing their speed, armored protection, firepower, and shock action; and infantry battalions lightened and specially trained to exploit contacts by conducting rapid air mobile operations to block and destroy enemy forces. Artillery was pre-positioned to cover areas of likely contact. In addition, selected direct support artillery batteries moved firing platoons forward on extremely short notice to cover contacts. Certain cardinal principles regarding reaction forces were: (a) commitment of reaction forces to any contact situation, no matter how small they
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appeared; (b) immediate reaction — waiting to obtain exhaustive details was waiting too long; (c) the initial decision to react was taken by the lowest-level commander having resources available; (d) progressively, control passed up the chain of command as the situation clarified and additional resources were required and committed; (e) reaction was overwhelming — over-commitment was preferred to undercommitment; (f) higher commanders were immediately, continuously, and accurately apprised of the situation and actions taken; (g) maximum use was made of standing operating procedures, prior preparations, and contingency plans to shorten reaction time; (h) warning orders were issued to units of possible use in exploiting the contact, and advisories on assets required upon the unit's commitment were passed as early as possible; (i) day or night reaction was constantly contemplated.

(3) Destruction of Enemy Forces: Through skillful use of these screening and rapid reaction forces, the I Division was able to bring appropriate combat power to bear rapidly in any foreseeable set of circumstances. No target was considered too small, nor was immediate reaction withheld simply because the target appeared to be beyond the capability of the reaction force immediately available. The purpose was to engage and to fix the enemy while overwhelming forces were brought to bear on him. This concept also permitted maximum flexibility for massed employment of Division resources without regard to "traditional" brigade allocations, as the tactical situation dictated.

(4) Simultaneous Contacts: The possibility existed that simultaneous contacts might develop in two or more brigade areas, thus tending to set up a condition of overcommitment of the Division as a whole. In such a case the decision had to be made as to which contacts were to be exploited fully and, if necessary, which were to be contained and terminated. This possibility emphasized the absolute requirement for timely, accurate reporting both of the situation and of the subordinate commander's intentions.

c. Concept of Operations.

(1) Employment of Tank, Cavalry, and Mechanized Battalions.

(a) Where terrain permitted, maximum use was made of tank, cavalry, and mechanized battalions to conduct mobile operations designed to harass, detect and destroy the enemy. The principal role for these battalions, however, was reaction to contacts developed by other means.

(b) Unit operations were decentralized with maximum emphasis on continuous movement, and forces moved freely throughout the assigned areas of operations. Contacts were reinforced rapidly by concentrating other elements of the battalion and by rapid-reaction air mobile forces. Under this concept, the mechanized, cavalry, and tank battalions worked in extremely close cooperation with the Special Forces camps, Regional and Popular Forces units, and Provincial elements in their area of operation for the purpose of reacting at any time to contacts made by these forces and to attacks made against villages, hamlets, units, convoys, and fire support bases.

(2) Employment of Infantry Battalions.

(a) Infantry was used primarily in an airmobile role to react to contacts made by long range patrols, short range patrols, Civilian Irregular
Defense Group forces, Regional and Popular Forces units, and elements conducting ambushes or reconnaissance-in-force missions. Infantry reacted where appropriate to intelligence obtained by Airborne Personnel Detectors, Infra-red Detectors, air cavalry, head hunters and to other appropriate intelligence reports.

(b) The only firebases occupied were those on which it was necessary to position artillery to obtain area coverage and those which constituted key terrain that had to be held to protect a vital area or that acted as part of a screen to detect and initially fix the enemy.

(c) Each brigade had one infantry battalion which was lightened to essential equipment for employment as an air mobile force. These infantry battalions were so positioned that they could assemble one platoon in fifteen minutes, one company in thirty minutes, a second company in one hour, and the battalion minus in three hours.

(d) The concept of employment of the air mobile battalion envisioned a rapid marshalling of assets followed by an equally rapid deployment of forces. When a significant contact was made, brigades possessed the capability of immediate reaction by diverting all UH-1 aircraft under their control from normal missions to that of air lifting a platoon on fifteen minute alert. The platoon could then be inserted into the contact area with the mission of exploiting the contact. To enhance the brigade's ability to react with effective combat power, the Division Tactical Operations Center, upon request from the brigade, would divert available aircraft to the brigade. As additional aircraft became available, the contact would continue to be exploited. Maximum emphasis was placed on fixing the enemy until such time as forces sufficient to destroy the enemy force had been inserted. Forces inserted would be prepared to stay at least three days in the area. When an air cavalry troop was in support of the brigade, the air cavalry would be diverted to the contact area, where the first element to be inserted was usually the aero-rifle platoon. Following this insertion, the lift section of the troop was released to the commander concerned to aid in the insertion of additional elements.

(e) When infantry was employed in the air mobile role, maximum use was made of stay-behind elements to establish ambushes and to destroy enemy forces attempting to re-enter the area.

(f) When intelligence indicated that infiltration routes were being used, the air mobile battalion was also used to conduct extensive ambush operations of company to squad size along these infiltration routes. Elements would be airlifted into a landing zone from which they would move overland to ambush sites. Contacts were reinforced rapidly as outlined previously. Ambush forces would remain in the area for a minimum of three days.

(g) Infantry elements were prepared to react immediately to exploit attacks on villages, hamlets, convoys, brigades and other fixed installations in their areas of operations.

(3) Employment of Artillery.
(a) Artillery was positioned so that it could provide maximum area coverage without having to displace to provide support for infantry and armor elements operating under the concept previously stated.

(b) The direct support artillery battery of the battalion designated as the Division's airmobile battalion was lightened to minimum essential equipment. It was prepared to displace one platoon within twenty minutes, to provide artillery support for forces operating beyond the range of light or medium artillery.

(c) Normally, a self-propelled artillery battery was placed in support of each mechanized and tank unit. This unit maintained the immediate reaction capability required for it to deploy rapidly with armor elements as they exploited a contact.

(4) Employment of Air Cavalry

(a) The air cavalry troop of the organic cavalry squadron normally operated with the squadron. The air cavalry troop of the cavalry squadron over which the Division exercised operational control normally was allocated to brigades on a daily basis dictated by the tactical situation. On occasions, for the conduct of a specific mission, all air cavalry would be centralized under the squadron over which the Division exercised operational control.

(b) When a contact developed in his area of operation, the brigade commander normally diverted the air cavalry to that area. When the contact so justified, the aero-rifle platoon was inserted. As stated, the lift section would then operate under brigade control to assist in lifting elements of the airmobile battalion into the area. It should be noted that the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry had the organic capability of deploying its cavalry troop (a company-size infantry unit) in addition to its aero-rifle Platoons.

(c) Where feasible, the squadron commander made the cavalry troop available for reinforcing an aero-rifle platoon previously inserted.

(5) Employment of Long and Short Range Patrols

(a) A maximum number of long range patrols were operational at all times. Long range patrols were normally inserted into a landing zone some distance away from their assigned areas of operation; they then moved to the assigned area of operation. Long range patrols were not extracted routinely when a contact developed or when they detected enemy in the vicinity of their location. As indicated in the concept for employment of infantry, long range patrol sightings and contacts normally were exploited by the aero-rifle platoon followed by elements of the airmobile battalion or the cavalry troop.

(b) Infantry elements occupying firebases positioned short range patrols around the area for surveillance and to direct air, artillery and gunships when they made sightings. In addition, short range patrol sightings or contacts were exploited by the unit dispatching the patrol. A reaction company was designated by each battalion. If required, elements of the airmobile battalion were also used to react.
(c) Additional emphasis was placed on local patrolling. Reconnaissance patrols were dispatched on a daily basis. The reconnaissance platoon was habitually used in its reconnaissance role.

(6) Employment of Lift Aviation.

(a) To the extent possible, the Division retained a general reserve of UH-1 aircraft for lift purposes. These aircraft were on call to the brigade commander when he made the decision to exploit a contact.

(b) When the decision was made to exploit, the brigade could react immediately by assembling all of its allocated aircraft to lift the platoon on fifteen minute alert. Additional aircraft, as required, were furnished by Division on request of the brigade. Use was also made of the lift section of the air cavalry troop if one was in support of the brigade.

(c) All brigades were impressed with the concept of surrendering their lift ships immediately when it became necessary to divert them to another brigade to exploit a contact.

(7) Command and Control.

As a rule, additional resources were initially placed under the operational control of the US commander initiating or first reacting to the contact. Thus, if the contact was initiated by an air cavalry troop, forces reacting to the contact would come under the troop commander's operational control to insure coordination of air, fire support, and ground maneuver. Once a contact had been developed to a point where two or more ground elements of company size had been committed, operational control of all troops in the area, including air cavalry, came under an appropriate battalion-level commander. Close and continuous liaison and coordination was required when Division forces were committed in support of or in proximity to Republic of Vietnam, Provincial or Special Forces elements.
3. (C) OPERATIONS

a. Single War Concept

The 4th Infantry Division has fully recognized the necessity for attacking the enemy simultaneously on all fronts — military, political, psychological, and economic — by a vigorous, well-coordinated, and closely integrated effort. It has pursued this goal as it must be pursued: in close cooperation and coordination with ARVN, Provincial and District authorities, and CIDG elements within the area of operations.

b. Vietnamizing the War

To the fullest extent possible, the 4th Infantry Division has integrated its operational efforts with those of ARVN, RF/PF, and CIDG forces. It envisions participation in combined operations as the norm, to include the habitual coordination of supporting fires and the sharing of responsibility for specific operations. This emphasis has increased the operational effectiveness of all concerned and, just as importantly, has provided invaluable training for RVNAF and allowed US Commanders to more accurately evaluate the state of readiness of units which may in the future be required to go it alone in the present 4th Infantry Division area of operations.

c. Summary of Combined Operations

(1) During the latter part of 1968 and early 1969, the Division participated in TF WINNER and BINH TAY/SLEDSHAMMER Operations in Pleiku Province. TF WINNER's area of operations, the DAK PAYOU Valley, is a region of dense canopy jungle and large natural caves. Enemy forces have traditionally sought refuge in the area and prior to TF WINNER an NVA Regiment and a local force battalion utilized the valley as a base of operations.

(2) On 25 December 1968, TASK FORCE WINNER, controlling two brigade CP's (four U.S. infantry, one ARVN infantry and one MSF battalion) and a cavalry squadron, began search and clear operations in this valley to destroy the enemy's base areas and supply caches and interdict his infiltration routes. The enemy appeared to vacate the valley and move to the eastern slope as friendly troops made the initial thrust into the valley from the south. Here, east of the DAK PAYOU Valley, the majority of the contacts and the significant finds took place. Though the Task Force killed only 29 NVA/VC, it dealt the enemy its most crippling blow by capturing twenty-two tons of rice, 400 pounds of medical supplies and considerable quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

(3) To guard against the enemy resupplying himself during the operation, LRF teams were deployed along the routes of infiltration and resupply into the area. Captured documents indicated that these teams made a significant contribution towards denying the enemy the ability to resupply and rearm their forces. In addition to stopping enemy resupply efforts, the LRF teams also uncovered large rice caches and training complexes in the area approximately 10 km southwest of the valley.

(4) TASK FORCE WINNER terminated on 3 January 1969. Its operation had created a substantial void in the enemy's supply system which hampered his future plans.
(5) Close coordination was effected between US and ARVN commanders down to company level, and remarkable performances were noted on the parts of the 42d ARVN Regiment and 2d ARVN Ranger Group. These operations resulted in the virtual destruction of the 24th NVA Regiment and continued in the CHU PA Mountains until 7 February.

(6) During April 1969, the Division reduced its independent missions against NVA main force units and, under provisions of OPORD 10-69 (WASHINGTON GREEN), initiated support of the CVN Pacification and Development Plan. The area of operation was extended when the 1st Brigade was deployed into two western districts of Binh Dinh Province. When the 1st Brigade left the DAK TO area a Letter of Agreement between CG, IFFORCEV and CG, II Corps gave responsibility for security of QL-LAN north of Kontum to CO, 24th STZ. Implementation of the agreement was effected in an orderly and professional manner. Colonel Lien, CO, 24th STZ, complied with every facet of the agreement and displayed an aggressive spirit for meeting any threat in his new area of operation. Concurrently a combined search and destroy operation was initiated in the area west of BUON BLECH with elements of the 3d Brigade and the 2d ARVN Ranger Group. Coordination between the two units throughout the entire operation was excellent.

(7) The landmark operation in the "Vietnamization Program" occurred in May 1969 when the 24th STZ responded to an NVA threat against BEN HET/DAK TO. The 4th Infantry Division deployed one battalion (3-12 Inf) and one task force (1-14 Inf (-)) to relieve ARVN units in the Pleiku Defense Complex so that they could be employed at BEN HET/DAK TO, and the Division stood ready to reinforce the 24th STZ if necessary. Subsequently, during the period 1-23 July, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was sent to BAN ME THUOT where it conducted combined operations with the 8th ARVN Armored Cavalry Regiment. These operations were successful and permitted the 53d ARVN Regiment to displace from BAN ME THUOT to BEN HET/DAK TO to reinforce the 24th STZ. One air cavalry troop (A/7-17) was deployed by the 4th Infantry Division to support the operation, but no ground reinforcement was requested. The defense of BEN HET/DAK TO, therefore, was essentially an ARVN operation; and the 24th STZ demonstrated its ability to respond aggressively and offensively against a substantial NVA main force threat.

(8) 4th Infantry Division commanders continue to develop closer relationships with CIDG forces in their areas and are habitually integrating CIDG operations into their own; thus significantly adding to the combat effectiveness of each. As an example, there were 32 such operations conducted during the month of August 1969. In addition, CIDG artillery personnel were trained by Division Artillery at the Duc CO, Plei Krong, Pouei Kien, and Tieu Atar CIDG Camps during the first eight months of 1969.

(9) Relations with Province and District authorities continue to be excellent, and combined operations with Regional and Popular Force units are regular events throughout the Division area of operation. There were 55 such operations during August 1969. The 4th Infantry Division trains RF/PP units during these operations and, in addition, conduct an RF/PP Leadership School at Camp Enari. Facilities for this school, in terms of classroom/billet facilities and instructional methods, have improved greatly

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during 1969 and receive continued emphasis from the Commanding General. In
the first eight months of this year 208 personnel have received instruction
and graduated from the school. Also, during the month of June, 12 ARVN
personnel completed two weeks of instruction at Camp Enari in Civic Action
and are now pioneers in the joint CA effort. This latter program is of
great importance in that it marks the first step in transferring CA
responsibility from US to VIETNAMESE resources.

d. Prognosis

4th Infantry Division operations in support of the Single War and
Vietnamization Programs increased in number and in scope during the past
year. As a result of repeated success, the VIETNAMESE have shown steadily
increasing acceptance and enthusiasm for the programs. Two aspects of these
programs of particular significance are the training in hard skills of
VIETNAMESE personnel, and the increasing willingness of VIETNAMESE headquarters
to initiate, plan, and control operations with VIETNAMESE forces in the primary
role while US forces support.
4. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS

The 4th Infantry Division has developed a highly successful Civil Affairs Program. The Division effectively combines Civic Action and Psychological Operations to accomplish our primary goal which is to create an environment in which the Government of South VIETNAM can flourish and meet the needs of the people. To this end, the 4th Infantry Division Civil Affairs activities are based on the following objectives: win the confidence of the people; strengthen and support the Government of South VIETNAM; provide security to the civil population; deny the enemy the support of the civil population and its resources; and improve the general economy, health, and education of the population. The Division Civil Affairs Program emphasized the "self-help" approach to each of these stated objectives. It is essential that the people be personally involved and wholeheartedly committed to each project. They must be convinced that they can favorably influence the future through their own efforts. All Division civil affairs activities are pursued in a manner that will bring the civilian population closer to the government. Demonstrated willingness and ability by the Government of VIETNAM to assist the people in improving their way of life inevitably increases public commitment to the Government.

a. Village Consolidation

(1) In July 1967, a program to consolidate hamlets in the TAOR into large villages was started. The first of these consolidations appeared at the base of CHI TEH Mountain, at AR 844375. The Division provided security and transportation to the villagers and entire hamlets were relocated. These relocations were voluntary with the joint approval of the hamlet chiefs, who selected the location for the consolidation. In November 1968, four consolidations were established composed of 18 hamlets, and four additional consolidations were in progress. Currently, there are 12 consolidations and 19 hamlets within the TAOR. By April 1, 1969, over 14,000 MONTAGNARDS had been relocated in consolidated villages.

(2) Results of the hamlet consolidation program were twofold: first, considerable area was cleared for defensive artillery fire; and second, the villagers were able to enjoy freedom from enemy intimidation. Additionally, Division civic action personnel moved into the consolidation to aid in the upgrading of the social and economic levels of these people. GVN district and province officials began to introduce programs into the villages designed to bring the villagers into contact with the various agencies of the GVN. Village elections were held and a chief was elected and placed on the district payroll.

(3) Village defense forces were established in 11 consolidations. These personnel, all volunteers, have been armed and trained by GVN and have proven themselves able to defend their villages on several occasions.

(4) To augment the Division's efforts to upgrade the educational level of the people within the consolidated villages, the aid of the GVN was solicited and received. Schools were built by the people in each
consolidation and teachers were provided by GVN. Currently classroom instruction is being carried on in all 12 consolidations, thus reducing illiteracy among the residents of these villages.

(5) In July 1969, a group of ARVN NCO's completed a three week civic action training program at II Corps Headquarters in PLZIKU. These NCO's were assigned to all levels of the Division's Civic Action Program. It is anticipated that on the departure of the Division from the Highlands, these NCO's will form the nucleus of the ARVN Civic Action Program. The NCO's have adapted well to their new environments and have actively participated in the work of the units to which assigned.

(6) GVN involvement in the consolidated villages in the TACR has been further evidenced by the introduction of Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre into the villages. These cadre instruct the villagers on methods of sanitation, hygiene, and other subjects which are beneficial to the development of a higher standard of living and assist in winning the people over to the GVN.

(7) Advantages of the Village Consolidation Program. The advantages of the village consolidation program were many. First and foremost, the residents of the hamlets could start a new life free from enemy intimidation. However, there were several additional benefits derived from this program.

(a) Prior to the consolidation program, there were in excess of 80 detached hamlets within the boundary of the TACR. These hamlets were remote, and often difficult to reach. Consequently, the people were separated from the GVN, and often the CA teams were spread thin, each team covering in excess of three hamlets, and often as many as five. Civic action projects were, of necessity, limited to high impact projects that could be completed in a relatively short period of time. The consolidated village brought a stabilized and effective civic action program to the people.

(b) After the consolidation program was initiated the Division's civic action teams were able to spend a majority of their time aiding the villagers in projects of long-term significance. Health, education, construction, and economic development projects were initiated and continuing medical care was able to be provided.

(c) Perhaps the most significant benefit of the consolidation program was the introduction of GVN officials and programs into the development of the villages. No longer located in remote areas, villages soon attained the necessary recognition to qualify for GVN support in areas such as education, health, political development, and security.

(i) Disadvantages of Village Consolidation. The disadvantages of the consolidation program were few. Possibly the most significant problem was shortage of available rice. The increased population density placed a greater demand on available land. The shortage of rice caused some discontent among the Montagnards and additional food had to be obtained through GVN agencies. It is anticipated, though, that the introduction of two new high yield species of rice, fruit trees, and improved agricultural techniques will resolve this problem in the very near future.
(9) Pre-consolidation Planning. At the onset of the consolidation program, a means to achieve the cooperation of the people in this program was sought. Studies of various alternatives revealed that the people should select a location for the new consolidation, and that the site selected should be near enough to their original home that they would be able to continue to cultivate their ancestral lands. The hamlet chiefs agreed on village layout and a plan for the move was agreed upon.

(10) Division Support Rendered. Division support to the villages moving into consolidations was security and transportation. Houses were entirely dismantled, and the sides, floors, and roofs along with personal belongings were trucked to the new location. Security forces were placed in the area to protect the people from enemy harassment. After the consolidations were established and secured, Division support consisted of the resident civic action team, usually a force of about 12 men, who established a small compound in the village and provided for security of the villagers.

(11) Post-consolidation Activities. Naturally, the greatest strides in the Division's civic action program were made subsequent to the consolidation of the hamlets. A chain of events, well programmed, and closely monitored led to vast improvements in the standards of living of these people.

(a) The first consideration was to provide the residents of these villages with security from enemy recruiting and terrorism. Initially, a perimeter was established and fencing was raised around the village. Although this initial effort was minimal, it was the first step in denying the enemy the resources to which they had been accustomed — the people and their food.

1 After the village was fortified, a civic action team moved into the village to provide initial security to the people. Artillery Defensive Targets were plotted and confirmed around the villages.

2 Personnel were recruited to form a voluntary Peoples' Self Defense Force within the village. The PSDF was trained and weapons were provided by the district. As allocations were received, village PSDF members were recruited into the Popular Forces and were given formal training and upgraded weapons.

3 To date, 11 of the consolidated villages have PSDF armed and employed on the village perimeters, and six of the villages have PF elements in residence or on duty during hours of darkness. On several occasions, these security elements have proven themselves capable of repelling enemy attempts to breach the perimeter.

(\:) Along with village security requirements the establishment of a resident civic action team was considered of primary importance. This team, composed of approximately 12 men, took up residence in the village, becoming an integral, but inconspicuous part of the village society. This concept has proven extremely successful in gaining the support of the people because the team endures many of the same hardships as the people.
One of the primary advantages of this concept is the presence of the team regardless of weather or enemy activity. Projects of long-range scope could be accomplished and participation by the people was encouraged.

(12) Village elections were considered an integral part of the establishment of the democratic process in the newly consolidated villages. A village chief was elected by popular vote under the supervision of the GVN and once elected, became a governmental representative paid by the district government. He further represented the village when soliciting materials from GVN, and supervised the administration of the village council of which he is the chairman.

(13) As soon as the hamlets were moved, long-range projects were started in the consolidation. These projects may be subdivided into the following general categories: construction, agriculture, health, animal husbandry, and educational development.

(a) Initially, construction projects were oriented towards improvement of village security and providing for the immediate needs of the people. The perimeter was built, using the materials available from GVN and Division resources. A village labor force was assembled to do the actual work under the close supervision of US personnel. Bunkers were built on the perimeter and access gates to the village were built as directed by the chief. As the perimeter was being established, other members of the CA team were supervising the construction of a MEDCAP shelter, a waterpoint (spillway), or one of several other projects needed by the people.

(b) After the initial needs of the people were met, construction projects were initiated which were geared to the improvement of existing facilities to improve the health, sanitation, and education of the people. Usually one of the first projects was the establishment of a full size dispensary. Once again, the people were enjoined to provide the labor under the supervision of the CA team. By utilizing local labor, emphasis was placed on the "self-help" concept and the villagers learned to work with tools and materials with which they were not familiar. Pride in the completion of these many construction projects was evident and village ceremonies were held to mark the completion of these projects.

(c) One other significant construction project was the establishment of a council house in the village. The council house was constructed of native materials and is the seat of the village government. Here the chief and elders gather to discuss village projects and problems.

(d) Additional projects included the construction of a school, roads and bridges, fences around the houses, and cattle and pig pens. As with other projects, these were based on the "self-help" principle and the use of new materials and tools was taught to the villagers by the CA team. Chiefs were encouraged to evaluate village needs and determine which projects they desired to implement.

(e) The Division has also conducted an extensive program to improve the agricultural techniques and diet of the people.
In July and August 1969, 10,000 fruit trees of six varieties were provided by the GVN for gratis distribution to the inhabitants of the consolidated villages of the TACR. The people were given instruction in the planting and care of the trees. When these bear fruit, they will provide a supplement to the diet, and a means of further developing economic independence.

In several villages of the TACR, experimental gardens have been established. Seeds have been obtained from GVN and distributed to the villages. Gardening techniques have been introduced and the people have been encouraged to maintain individual plots. As well as providing vegetables to complement the diet of the people, this project is the wherewithall to determine which vegetables will flourish in the Highlands.

In order to provide protein to the diet of the MONTAGNARD, fishponds have been constructed in the villages of the TACR. Those ponds were constructed adjacent to the village waterpoint, and fertilization techniques were taught to the MONTAGNARD. GVN has provided fingerlings to stock the ponds, and its anticipated that the fish will also prove to be an additional means to develop the economy of the people.

(f) Health and sanitation projects have also been initiated by the CA teams residing in the villages. These projects included the building of latrines, clean-up programs in the villages, sanitation, inoculations against disease, and hygiene training. These projects were closely monitored by Division medical personnel to ensure that programs were complete and high standards were maintained.

(g) Animal husbandry projects were carried out in the villages to improve the health of cattle and livestock. Inoculations were administered and livestock was sprayed for ticks and lice. Cattle pens were built to keep the cattle from roaming freely through the villages. Although villagers regarded some projects with skepticism, they soon realized the need for and benefits of the projects and cooperated wholeheartedly.

(h) Educational programs were developed in the consolidations. As the villages were deemed secure, schools were built and members of the CA teams functioned as part-time teachers. Although there was a language problem, interpreters were able to provide the necessary translations of the lessons. In several villages, a teacher was sought within the village, was hired, and was paid by the Division Chaplain’s Fund. In August 1969, teachers were licensed by the GVN and assigned to teach at these schools. These teachers were placed on the GVN payroll. Currently, each consolidation has a school, and a certified teacher furnished by GVN.

(i) Due to the prevalent attitudes concerning the MONTAGNARD, his remoteness from the VIETNAMESE population centers, and his self-sufficiency, there were few attempts made to increase his economic standards. To overcome this, several of the Division’s projects have been geared to have a secondary result, the ability to market commodities in excess of their needs. In two villages, small VIETNAMESE-operated stores have been established to introduce monetary trade into the village. Although marketable items at present consist mostly of artifacts, the increase in the rice
harvest from the introduction of IR-5 and IR-8, two newly developed high
yield varieties, and the fish from the village ponds should prove marketable
in the next 6 to 12 months. Negotiations are currently underway to acquire
stall space in the FLX XU market for the sale of commodities and artifacts
by the MONTAGNARDS.

(a) As in many parts of the Republic of VIETNAM, the "Miracle Rices"
IR-5 and IR-8, were introduced into the BAHNE and JARAI villages in the
vicinity of Camp Dhari during 1969. What is unique in the 4th Division's
program is the meticulous collection of data on each individual plot as
well as the project as a whole, and the gradual, step by step approach
to introducing improved agricultural techniques to the two MONTAGNARD
tribes involved. The pilot plots now under cultivation are being used as
a training vehicle to show the tribesmen the advantages of both the new
techniques as well as the IR-5/IR-8 seed varieties. Those pilot plots are
located among fields under cultivation using traditional techniques and
seed varieties. Since the IR-5/IR-8 plots will be ready to harvest three
or four weeks prior to the surrounding fields, the problem of collecting
the villagers to demonstrate the advantages of improved seed and methods
will be greatly eased. This year's crop will be entrusted to the village
and hamlet chiefs as seed rice for next year's planting. Thus, the program
will extend over an eighteen month period before any significant increase in
total production is realized. However, the long term benefits, both economic
and educational, should this program succeed, are tremendous, and well worth
the expenditure of time and effort made to plan, organize, and monitor the
progress. Initial planning and organizing was begun in February 1969, and
the program has enjoyed the active support of the command since that time.
Through this program we hope to deny the enemy one of his most fertile
areas of exploitation — hunger — and the resulting estrangement from the
Government of the Republic of VIETNAM.

(b) Primitive agricultural techniques and tools have historically
limited the agricultural activity of the Highland tribes. Even under the
most favorable conditions the output of food staples has been at mere
subsistence levels. When the Hamlet Consolidation Program in the 4th
Infantry Division's TACR was executed, it increased the per capita demand
on the available rice fields. Traditional rice varieties and agricultural
methods offered the MONTAGNARDS nothing except near starvation and the
dispai, resentment, and eventual turmoil that follows. The so-called
"Miracle" species of rice have a yield per acre potential at least three
times that of those varieties currently under cultivation in the PLEIKU
area. Since rice is the dietary staple of the local population, the
economic potential of widespread cultivation of IR-5 and/or IR-8 is
tremendous.

(c) Initially coordination was effected with CORDS, the Ministry of
Ethnic Minorities, and Ministry of Agriculture, USAID, and the International
Rice Research Institute in HANOI. From these sources came the necessary
technical information and resources to initiate a pilot program. Agencies
of the Government of the Republic of VIETNAM supplied the seed rice and
fertilizers. Valuable background and technical advice arrived from the
Rice Institute, and USAID furnished detailed, sequential guidance in the
raising of Miracle Rice. The program for CY 1969 purposely involved a

27
limited amount of land. Ten of twelve consolidated villages in the 4th Division's TAOR established small IR-5/IR-8 plots. The total area put under cultivation is approximately one hectare, the majority of it being planted in IR-5. By keeping the plots small two important benefits were accrued. First, the individual plots could be closely and continuously monitored. Trouble spots could be quickly analyzed and treated. Also, in the case of failure, the economic effects on the village would be minimal. Through meetings and discussion with village leaders and inhabitants, the program was made known to the people, and those individuals willing to innovate were found and brought voluntarily into the program. The real success of the program is dependent on the yields of the pilot fields. Should these fields succeed the more innovative of the MONTAGNARDS will hopefully devote a significant portion of the village fields to IR-5 and IR-8 next year. If this happens, the program should sell itself.

(d) There was a moderate amount of initial resistance and numerous "Doubting Toms" among the MONTAGNARD villagers to some of the techniques being introduced including use of seed beds, transplanting, row planting, use of insecticides -- in short a whole new methodology of cultivation. However, this resistance was less than anticipated and proved to be only a minor problem with the pilot plots under cultivation.

(e) Given some luck -- particularly in terms of favorable weather and few insects -- the yield may well be four times that of surrounding fields.

(15) GVN involvement in the villages of the TAOR has increased rapidly. Province and district officials have taken great care and interest since the population is now centralized. Due to the size of the villages, they now qualify for GVN RD programs and village self development funds. Frequent visits to villages by GVN representatives are common occurrences. In addition RD Cadre have been assigned in four villages and PF elements have been recruited and trained for six villages. As funds are available, these programs will be enlarged to encompass the entire TAOR.

b. Civic Action.

Division Civic Action teams have participated in aggressive programs in both the forward areas and the TAOR.

(1) Forward Area Civic Action.

In the forward area, CA teams are employed daily in support of tactical operations. Due to the constant shifting of units, activities must be limited to MEDCAP's; short term, high impact projects; and face-to-face psychological operations.

(a) The largest forward area program is centered in the AN KHE area, in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff. The 1st Brigade has in excess of 10 teams participating in civic action on a daily basis. Since this is a well defined, semipermanent installation, and involves a large population center, projects are more permanent in nature. On a daily basis, the
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1st Brigade treats approximately 2,000 patients under the Medical Civic Action Program. In addition, they provide support to the AN TUC Dispensary, a large, well equipped district health center in AN KHE.

1) Until mid-September, the 2d Brigade's Civic Action Program was centered in KONTUM Province. In this area of operations there were no major population centers. The hamlets were remotely located and the majority of the population was MONTAGNARD. 2d Brigade activities included the Medical Civic Action Program and projects of high impact and relatively short duration. They further engaged in PSYOP during the conduct of civic action activities.

(c) The 3d Brigade is centered in the area with the least population. Civic action activities are more permanent, and projects in the villages are of long term nature. Due to the proximity of the THANH AN District Headquarters, GVN support is sought and received on a relatively large scale.

(d) The purpose of the forward area CA program is to win the confidence of the people, encourage their support of the GVN, and discourage their support of enemy activities by providing information on changes in enemy situation, caches, and movement of enemy units.

(e) Statistical Summary of Civic Action Activities. The following data provides information on the Division's Civic Action Program during the period 1 December 1968 through 31 August 1969:

3) The civic action teams of the Division have spent 57,993 man-days (10 hour days) engaged in civic action activities.

4) Commodities distributed have had a plaster value of 18,071,127$VN.

5) The Division has expended 801,656$VN from the US/MAF Civic Action/PSYWAR Imprest Fund in support of civic action projects.

6) The Division has conducted 2% of all civic action activities in conjunction with other FMAF, 5.8% in conjunction with RVNMAF, and 1.3% with US civilian voluntary agencies. 83.68% of all projects were conducted with the people under the "self-help" program.

7) The breakout of the Civic Action Program shows Division participation in the following areas:

a) Economic Development. Includes agriculture, fisheries, markets, cottage industries, and other activities involving production and distribution of products. 6,320 man-days 2,045,886

b) Education. Includes all activities involving the increase and improvement of school facilities and classroom or other group instruction. 4,284 1,383,788

c) Social Welfare. Includes all assistance to hospitals, refugees, exchanges, religious organizations and other institutions, groups, or individuals. 19,710 6,441,968

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Transportation. Includes all activities that improve or increase modes of transportation, e.g., roads, bridges, and waterways.

- The Division assisted an average of 14 schools, 8 hospitals/ dispensaries, 2 orphanages, and 1 leper colony on a monthly basis.

- While participating in Civic Action activities, Division personnel distributed the following quantities of commodities listed:

  - Food: 76,603 lbs.
  - Clothing: 24,830 lbs.
  - Health items (soap, etc): 18,474 lbs.

- Division medical personnel treated 565,069 persons with excess medical supplies under the Medical Civic Action Programs.

Psychological Operation.

The Division's Psychological Operations Program has been conducted in an aggressive manner. Division assets were combined with assets of Company B, 8th PSYOP Battalion; 9th Special Operations Squadron (USAF); GVN agencies; and JUSPAO.

1. TACR Psychological Operations. In the TACR, PSYOP was used to instruct the people and gain solidarity for GVN. Cultural Drama Teams from Pleiku Province and Audio/Visual Teams from Company B, 8th PSYOP Battalion and the 4th Infantry Division supported these programs. Posters and leaflets were handed out to the villagers during the visits. VIS had constructed an "office" in each of the consolidated villages and visits each village an average of once each week. PSYOP assets have also been used to support elections in the villages, providing information on the election, and inducing the villagers to cast their votes. These programs have proved effective and were well received by the villagers.

2. Forward Area Psychological Operations. The majority of the Division's PSYOP Program was conducted in support of tactical operations in the forward areas. Each brigade has a PSYOP Officer and an organic loudspeaker team furnished by Company B, 8th PSYOP Battalion. Brigades request their own leaflet drops, airborne loudspeaker broadcasts and utilizes its loudspeaker assets on the ground as determined by the commander.

3. Psychological Operations Assets. PSYOP assets available to or attached to the Division are:

- One Audio/Visual Team composed of a team leader from the 4th Infantry Division, a team member from Company B, 8th PSYOP Battalion and
a Kit Carson Scout. This team is organic to the G5 Office and is moved as required within the Division's area of operations. The team is used to show movies and make appeals to the inhabitants of villages and hamlets in forward areas to support the cause of the GVN and report enemy activities to US or ARVN forces. While on a mission, the hamlet and team are provided security by the unit being supported and the villagers have the freedom to attend these presentations without fear of enemy harassment or intimidation.

(b) Two additional Audio/Visual Teams are available to the Division from Company B, 8th PSTOP Battalion. One team is attached to the PLEIKU Province Headquarters and one is attached to the KONTUM Province Headquarters. These teams, although in direct support of the Province Chiefs, may be used by the Division on an on-call basis.

(c) Three ground Loudspeaker Teams are attached to the Division from Company B, 8th PSTOP Battalion. These teams are attached to the Brigade PSTOP Officer where they are used in support of tactical operations. Their effectiveness to provide PSTOP support during contacts, has induced several enemy soldiers to return to the GVN under the auspices of the CHIEU HOI Program. A particularly effective method of employment is during cordon and search operations where they can appeal to the calmness of the people, instruct them on the required conduct, and explain to them the programs of the GVN.

(d) Leaflets and tapes for PSTOP missions are provided by Company B, 8th PSTOP Battalion and JUSPAO. Company B has an extensive printing capability and produces the bulk of the Division's leaflets. They also stock national leaflets which are provided on request. Propaganda development personnel from Company B and the 20th POLMAR Battalion evaluate Division leaflets and insure that GVN policy with regard to propaganda is followed.

(e) Leaflet drops and airborne tape/speaker missions are flown by the 9th Special Operations Squadron using O-2B and C-47 aircraft. Preplans are provided by the Division on a daily basis and quick reaction missions may be called in any time.

(f) Cultural Drama Teams from PLEIKU Province are programed to support the Division. These teams are used mostly within the TAOR, but have also been used in support of operations in the forward areas. These teams present music, comedy, skits, and short plays which promulgate the GVN cause as well as entertain the people.

(g) Armed Propaganda Teams from the Province CHIEU HOI Center have been used to support the Division PSTOP Program. These people, former enemy who rallied to the GVN, contact families of enemy soldiers and explain the benefits of the CHIEU HOI Program by relating their personal experiences as enemy soldiers and as HOI CHANN. They have also been used in support of elections. These teams are highly mobile and well armed which allows them to go into areas normally inaccessible to small units. They have proven to be extremely effective in the conduct of the CHIEU HOI Program.
(4) The "Early Word" airborne radio/loudspeaker system has been employed successfully by Division units. This unique system is employed by units for quick reaction appeals to enemy soldiers. The most effective use of this system is the exploitation of HOI CHANH's voice. Also, because of the rapid response, the Political Officer is denied the time to cast doubt about the fate of the rallier.

(4) Psychological Operations Campaigns

(a) Two PSYOP campaigns have been conducted during the months of August and September 1969 in the areas along Highway QL 103E and QL 14. These intensive face-to-face PSYOP campaigns were targeted at contested and enemy controlled villages and hamlets and were programmed to reduce enemy mining incidents and interdiction of these vital lines of communication. Audio/Visual Teams, leaflets and posters, and civic action activities were combined to accomplish these missions. VIS participation was solicited and received. People were encouraged to support the GVN, deny the enemy access to their food and living of their people, and induce them to report enemy activity to GVN or US/PWMAF units. Results of these programs are already starting to filter in. The village of KON CHARA (1) (BR 182529) was the first of the targeted hamlets to provide concrete results.

(b) On 12 September 1969, a VC District Chief and five members of his staff visited KON CHARA (1) demanding food for his troops. He instructed the villagers to have the food ready in two hours and depart the village. On his return, the villagers of KON CHARA (1) overwhelmed the VC force, killing the VC leader and capturing his people and their weapons. The village was presented a 4th Infantry Division Certificate of Achievement for their heroism. Other targeted villages have also started to take definite action to curb enemy activity and enemy mining incidents and interdiction of these routes have been sharply curtailed.

(5) Statistical Summary of Psychological Operations Activities

A summary of PSYOP activities for the period 1 December 1968 through 1 September 1969 follows:

(a) Leaflet Drops (Monthly Totals):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number Dropped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>79,004,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>75,239,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>66,640,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>70,832,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>65,230,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### (b) Airborne Speaker Time (Monthly Totals):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>NVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>64:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>47:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>57:39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>97:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>67:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>108:15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (c) Ground Speaker Time (Monthly Totals):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>NVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>NVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>NVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>44:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>38:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>50:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>90:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>104:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>240:13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Movie Time and Attendance (Monthly Totals):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Hours</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>35:00</td>
<td>10,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>51:00</td>
<td>16,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>25:00</td>
<td>6,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>33:35</td>
<td>5,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>48:40</td>
<td>14,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>61:36</td>
<td>15,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>54:12</td>
<td>15,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>74:10</td>
<td>17,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>64:45</td>
<td>18,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) A direct result of the Division's Psychological Operations is reflected in the following figures of HOI CHANH's:

HOI CHANH
7 Jan 69 - 15 Oct 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pleiku</th>
<th>Binh Dinh</th>
<th>Kontum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan - 16 Aug</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 - 23 Aug</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 - 30 Aug</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug - 6 Sep</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 13 Sep</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 20 Sep</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 27 Sep</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sep - 4 Oct</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 11 Oct</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 - 20 Oct</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\frac{231 = 1,383}{231 = 1,383}
\]

(d) Kit Carson Scout Program.

The 4th Infantry Division is also a participant in the Kit Carson Scout Program. The purpose of this program is to hire a former VC/NVA

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to perform as scouts and guides for maneuver units of the 4th Infantry Division. The Scout's experiences as a former VC/NVA enables him to detect mines, booby-traps, and enemy positions far ahead of his American comrades. This fact alone has saved many American lives. In addition, individual bravery on the field of battle by Kit Carson Scouts has brought great credit upon themselves and their compatriots. The 4th Infantry Division has recommended two Scouts for the highest valor award they may receive — the Silver Star. Both of these awards were approved by USA RV.

Statistical Summary, December 1968 — August 1969

- Number of KCS employed on 1 December 1968: 77
- Number of KCS recruited during period: 149
- Number of KCS WIA: 5
- Number of KCS KIA: 4
- Number of KCS MIA: 0
- Number of KCS AWOL during period: 32
- Number of KCS terminated during period: 60
- Number of KCS employed on 31 August 1969: 162

- ARVN Dependent Housing

(1) On 6 December 1968, a meeting was called by the CG, I FFV, and a plan was discussed which tasked all major US units to provide materials and technical support for an ARVN dependent housing program. ARVN units were to furnish all labor and perform all construction for the project. Materials issued were to be salvage or excess materials. The 4th Infantry Division was tasked to support the 42d ARVN Regiment, the 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron, and the 2d Ranger Group.

(2) On 25 January 1969, a meeting was called again by the CG, I FFV, and housing requirements were established. The total requirement for "self-help" housing for Division supported units was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Family Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42d Regiment</td>
<td>1,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Ranger Group</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Armored Cavalry</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 42d ARVN Regiment. The 42d Regiment had by far the largest requirement for dependent housing. In January 1969, sites were selected at PLEIKU, KONTUM, and TANH CANH for the construction of the houses. The sites were inspected by Division representatives to insure that
adequate drainage existed. A standard JGS hollow-block building was selected, each building containing 10 family units. During the month of January, a 10 unit building was started. On 14 April 1969, the first building in PLEIKU was occupied. By 2 July 1969, two 10 unit buildings had been completed by the 1st Battalion. When the unit was moved, the buildings were allocated to a FF unit in PLEIKU. In August the first building was started in KONTUM.

(b) 2d Ranger Group. The dependent housing area is located adjacent to BIEN HO Lake, northeast of PLEIKU City. A total of 194 units are required under the "self-help" program. The goal for CY 1969 was to provide materials for 50 family units. By the end of March, two buildings were under construction. As construction progressed, materials were made available so that construction could continue uninterrupted. During April 1969, two additional buildings were started. These were all five family buildings, however, they were modified and converted to the standard 10 unit buildings in April. In June a third 10 unit building was started and the first building was complete in July. Currently there are 22 completed units and work is progressing on additional units.

(c) 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron. The 3d Armored Cavalry Squadron, located in PLEIKU City, started construction of housing in April 1969, with one five unit building. This building was completed and occupied in July. To date, additional sites are being prepared for future construction.

(3) Use of PW Labor.

During the month of March 1969, liaison was established with II Corps to ascertain the feasibility of using PW labor for the production of cement blocks. As a result of this liaison, an agreement was made to allow PWs to work making blocks, providing the Division furnished the machines and cement. A representative of CORDS, IPPV provided training and block production was started on 15 April 1969. Units which were supported by the Division were allocated blocks commensurate with their own production. This action, in part, relieved the units of providing large work forces which were invariably discontinued when tactical operations or other commitments so dictated.
5. (C) Organisation and Training.

a. Test and evaluation of New Equipment.

(1) The R&D program was a continuing project that varied from 4 to 5 items to as high as 30 to be evaluated at any one time. The period used to evaluate an item normally ran from 30 to 60 days. In most cases HQ3 USARV furnished New Equipment Training Teams (NETT) to conduct the required training on the new equipment. In the absence of such an item it was necessary for the R&D Officer to conduct necessary training from whatever literature was available.

(2) Processing ENSURE Requests. A great deal of emphasis was placed on this program and the field was actively encouraged to suggest improvements and new items of equipment. Input from the units in the field with appropriate justification was prepared by the R&D Officer. Some items obtained through the ENSURE program were:

(a) Carbide Tipped Chain Saws.

(b) Mine Rollers.

(c) Discreet Hamlet Signaling Device.

b. Projects Recently Completed or Under Evaluation:

(1) M72A1E1 LAW: Completed 31 July 1969. This weapon has proven to be a vast improvement over the former M72 in the area of durability and ease with which it can be recocked. Four battalions tested this weapon for 90 days.

(2) XM203 Grenade Launcher: Completed 31 July 1969. This weapon was used for sixty days against area and point targets at a normal range of 100 meters. It was more versatile than the M79, and was extremely accurate. A few disadvantages encountered were that it was heavier and more bulky than the M79, the plastic hand guard and the battlesight broke easily, and it required the grenadiers to carry a heavier basic load.

(3) Uniform, Improved Mosquito Protection: The test on this item was completed on 1 August 1969. Due to combat conditions the uniform did not receive a fair test and should be tested in a more controlled area such as the Canal Zone. Some of the comments from the 1-35 Inf were as follows: The close weave of the uniform reduced ventilation and caused heat problems during hot weather. The uniforms were heavy when wet, and required many hours to dry even in hot weather. The unit's malaria rate was reduced during the last 30 days period of the test, but the Battalion Commander stated that he felt it was due to command emphasis and not to the uniform.
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(4) Mine Roller for M-48 Tank. The Division has two of these at the present time and has found them to be highly successful. They have detonated two mines of approximately 20 pounds with no damage or casualties to the tank or crew. There were maintenance problems but these have been overcome. Six more have been requested and delivery should be completed in December 1969.

(5) Marginal Terrain Assault Bridge: The evaluation on this item began 14 July to 14 September 1969. Our 2-8 Inf (Mech) was very pleased with this item of equipment and made the following comments:

(a) During the dry season the assault bridge can go anywhere the M134A1 can.

(b) During the wet season the mobility is limited because of its weight.

(c) It was determined that during the monsoon season when the bridge was in the down position, because of its weight, it would shift position in extremely muddy areas when track vehicles attempted to cross over the bridge.

(d) The assault bridge cannot bridge gaps in excess of 30 feet.

(e) Both wheeled and track vehicles crossed the bridge.

(f) During the test period maintenance was effectively accomplished by the battalion maintenance section.

(g) Operators were easily and effectively trained at company level.

(6) Anti-Oscillation Sighting System: This item was a set of binoculars mounted in OH6A and UH1 aircraft with a motion compensation gyro device to eliminate all shaking so the observer can adjust artillery fire or just observe clearly at what he is looking. There are now six in the Division and the evaluation has just been completed. Acceptance is recommended.

(7) M-79 Ammo Vest: This proved to be a very useful item of equipment. Troops like it; ammo is readily available to the individual wearing it; and the arrangement of pouches is not blocked by TA-50, and the vest has good ventilation.

(8) XM191 Multi Shot Flame Weapon: Some problems were encountered with this weapon initially. During the initial test firing by the NETT and our Chemical Section a misfire occurred. While trying to unload the weapon a round fired, slightly injuring two men. It was determined that the problem lay in the firing mechanism. The launchers were returned to Edgewood Arsenal.
along with the damaged launcher. The weapon arrived back in country on 18 October 1969. A successful test firing and training period was conducted. The weapon is now out to battalions for field testing.

(9) Frag Ma Cord X:37: A limited test was performed in 1967, but due to lack of enemy activity at that time, it did not receive a thorough evaluation. Fragmacord is a linear anti-personnel munition. Fragmacord mines consist of 30 foot lengths of flexible explosive cord ½ inch in diameter with 1 inch rings spaced ½ inch apart. In laboratory tests the lethal area was determined to be 100 feet in all directions, but the danger zone extends well beyond this. The following are some suggested uses:

(a) Placed in a ditch where the enemy is expected to take cover, prior to an attack, and detonated remotely.

(b) Attaching several cords together and emplaced around the entire perimeter either on the ground or in the trees. Primed to detonate all at once or in sections.

(c) Booby trap trails by cutting into smaller sections and wrap around tree trunks waist high. Rig with a trip wire.

(d) Use as an improvised hand grenade. Coil or ball the strips and attach blasting cap with short piece of safety fuse.

(10) M48A3 Tank M1 Commanders Cupola: Due in October. We will receive 12 of these items.

(11) V100 Commando Car (ENSURE): This vehicle has proven to be of great value to the 4th Infantry Division Military Police in convoy security. Five have been received and five more are due in on 1 November.

(12) Arpa Big Screen Night Viewer (ENSURE 276): A 22# pair of binoculars that will allow the naked eye to see as well as on a bright moonlit night. Since the mechanism is very delicate, it will be used on the bunker line at base camp. The Division will receive four viewers.

(13) Variable Body Armor. This is a vest type individual armor that utilizes ceramic plates for protection; scheduled issue is 30 November 1969. Its primary use will be for convoy personnel due to the extreme weight: approximately 52 pounds.

(14) Discreet Hamlet Signaling Device. This is a device which enables indigenous personnel to alert the 4th Infantry Division (ICC) that they require some sort of assistance due to enemy activity. The device itself is a small transmitter, which, when activated, sends a signal to a command board in ICC. It is given (two per village) to individuals selected by G2.
There have been difficulties in several areas: battery life is short and it is subject to dampness. Testing began on 8 July 1969, and will continue until 15 November 1969.

b. Training.

(1) Although the 4th Infantry Division has been engaged in combat for the past three years, it became quickly apparent that there was a need for a continuing training program. The 4th Training Detachment was organized from the Division's assets to meet the training requirements. Training programs were instituted to teach special skills required for operations in the Central Highlands.

(2) Replacement training is designed to bridge the gap between CONUS training and the requirements of the 4th Infantry Division in VIETNAM. Two cycles are completed each week. Division replacements average in excess of 2,000 each month. The emphasis in training is on map reading, patrolling, marksmanship, artillery adjustment, enemy tactics and lessons learned. The course is not designed to give the replacement specific training such as received in basic training but to reinforce his previous training and ease his transition into a combat environment. Field grade officers review the program of instruction, and select subjects in which they desire refresher training.

(3) The Noncommissioned Officer Combat Leadership course is designed to prepare selected enlisted men for leadership positions in combat at the fire team, squad and platoon level. The course is not an NCO Academy as such but is designed to meet the leadership requirements for combat units. Each cycle is two weeks in duration and has an average input of 30 students. Emphasis is placed upon leadership and tactics.

(4) The Pre-Recondo course is designed to prepare personnel as Rangers and secondly for the MACV Recondo School. Most students are trained to become Rangers with the Long Range Patrol Company; however, it is not limited to these personnel only. All units within the Division have a patrolling responsibility, and the skills taught in the course are readily used by all combat personnel. In addition, a special course was designed for base camp personnel to teach the skills necessary to conduct patrols in the TAOR. Emphasis is placed upon map reading, patrolling, artillery adjustment, and physical training.

(5) In order to enhance sniper operations in the Division, a two week course was designed to train marksmen from each maneuver unit. Each student is armed with an accurized M-14 rifle with a sniper scope mounted. This weapon is retained by the individual when he completes the course and returns to his unit.
(6) The Regional Force/Popular Force Leadership course was designed to train RF/PF officers and noncommissioned officers for leadership positions. One cycle of twelve days duration is conducted each month with an input of up to 50 lieutenants, warrant officers and aspirants or 50 NCO's. Emphasis is placed upon leadership, tactics, weapons, fire support, map reading and new US equipment to be issued to the RF/PF units.

(7) The Kit Carson training program was designed to prepare VIET CONG and North VIETNAMESE Army ralliers for integration into the US combat units. The twelve day course is normally conducted alternately with one RF/PF course. Emphasis is placed upon English, US tactics, and use and care of US weapons and equipment.

(8) In addition, the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery conducts a mortar school to train proficient mortarmen for the maneuver units of the Division. The course, ten days in duration, normally trains 25 mortarmen per class.

(9) A twelve day reconnaissance platoon course was established in April. This course is designed to provide refresher training for TOE reconnaissance platoons. Patrolling techniques, map reading, artillery adjustment and communications are emphasized. To date, six platoons have completed the course.
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6. (C) AIR CAVALRY

a. Method of Employment: Troops were employed as an organic part of the squadron and as a separate troop in direct support of the Three brigades of the Division. To accomplish its mission the troop was employed in air cavalry operations, limited airmobile operations, cordon and search, and downed aircraft and rescue operations.

b. Results: Air cavalry has been credited with over 24% of the confirmed enemy dead of the Division and an unknown amount of enemy wounded. Bunker complexes, rest stations, and one NVA training area have been located and destroyed. These were inaccessible to ground elements. Both individual and crew served weapons have been captured by the troops.

c. New Tactics:

(1) Employment of an UH-1H as a "chase" aircraft, equipped with a McGuire Recovery Rig. This aircraft was responsible for map reading, radio relay, situation reports and primarily for immediate rescue for downed scout crews.

(2) Employing Snoopy with the air cavalry enables it to cover a much larger area. Snoopy covers the area and then the air cavalry makes a detailed search of specific points of interest.

(3) A daily check was made to determine if any agents, POW's, or Ho Chi Chams were willing to identify known or suspected enemy locations. The Air Cavalry would fly these volunteers to confirm these areas of enemy activity, as part of their daily missions.

(4) Cordon and search operations were conducted by inserting the Aero-Rifle Platoon the evening prior to the cordon, at least two kilometers from the intended target. A fake extraction is made and the platoon moves under the cover of darkness to cut off all exits from the target prior to daylight. At daylight, the area scouts and a fire team arrive over the target. The rifle platoon is already in blocking positions to capture, if possible, or to kill any enemy flushed from the target village.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) Aero Scouts should fly in pairs, or three's and when arriving over a suspected enemy location, should keep their air speed up until it is determined if the hidden enemy wants to fight immediately or if they have to be routed out. This eliminates unnecessary exposing of aircraft and the crews.

(2) Prior coordination with the main ground element to facilitate immediate reaction in contacts is a must.
(3) Weather and cloud ceiling are the biggest limiting factors due to the aerodynamic characteristics of the AH-1G which is used to support the scouts. Low ceiling will not allow the AH-1G time to place effective fire on a point target.

(4) When a reaction force is designated to reinforce the Aero-Rifle Platoon, direct coordination must be effected with that unit to prevent any misunderstanding and facilitate immediate availability of that unit in the event of a contact larger than the platoon can handle.

(5) Mixed loads of ordnance to be carried on the AH-1G should vary with the terrain in which they are operating.

(6) When units, not exceeding one company, are inserted to reinforce the ARF, they should be placed under the command of the Air Cavalry Commanding Officer since he is familiar with the activity on the ground and the immediate friendly/enemy situation.

(7) Maximum prior planning of Air Cavalry operations should be made at brigade and higher to prevent loss of valuable daylight time on maximum dates.

(8) The NVA in the area of observation in the past have been reluctant to initiate fire on the Air Cavalry. When they do, the areas adjacent to the contact should not be avoided or neglected. On numerous occasions it is felt that 3 or 4 NVA kept us in contact while a larger force escaped undetected.

(9) The Aero-Rifle Platoon and jump CP from the Air Cavalry should be staged at the closest secure area available to the area of observation to facilitate immediate response to a sighting or contact made by the scouts.

e. Recommendations and Comments:

(1) The Air Cavalry Troop is most effective when employed as a combined arms team with a ground element.

(2) Commanders should not fragment the troop, i.e. borrow the UH-1H's for another mission while the troop is conducting an operation. The time required to regain control of the lift capability to insert the Aero-Rifle Platoon allows the enemy too much time to escape.

(3) The troop mission should not be changed from one brigade to another in a day unless there is a contact. Too much time loss occurs due to moving from one area to another and briefings upon arrival at a new brigade headquarters.
(4) During times when inclement weather prevents air operations, the troop should be given a maintenance stand down for that day to increase the combat effectiveness and materiel readiness of the unit. In the past the troop has spent an entire day on standby, unable to replace parts or dismantle any equipment, waiting for the weather to break.

(5) A contact maintenance team from the Direct Support Company is made available to the Air Cavalry Troop at night. Once this is done, their aircraft receive 80% of their maintenance in preparation for the next day's operations.
7. (C) Fire Support.

a. Artillery Fire Support.

(1) Harassing and Interdiction Fire. The vast area of operations assigned to this Division requires discrimination in the use of harassing and/or interdiction fires. Harassing fires have not been used. Interdiction fires have been used but they encompass less than 10% of the total artillery munitions expenditures. The greater portion of unobserved fires have been fired on targets acquired by one or more intelligence means. One successful area in the interdiction fire program is in conjunction with the road security mission of the Division. A road firing program has been developed which covers likely routes of approach to areas in which repeated mining incidents have occurred and to key bridge or culvert crossings along highways 11N and 19E. These programs were fired periodically throughout the night and during the early morning hours. This road fire program resulted in the reduction of mining and bridge incidents along these major highways.

(2) Other Unobserved Fires.

(a) Preemptive Mortar Program. During periods when intelligence indicated the possibility of increased enemy activity around US firebases, the Division attempted to preempt the enemy's initiative by firing a heavy unobserved fire program on known mortar/rocket locations from which attacks had previously been launched as well as on up-to-date intelligence information concerning enemy locations and movement as determined by Special Intelligence gathering means, Snoopy, radar and other devices.

(b) Artillery Follow-up of B-52 Strikes. Usually reliable intelligence sources indicated that the enemy will often move back into a B-52 box after the area has been struck. To preclude offering a sanctuary for reassembly, the Division adopted a policy of firing an artillery follow-up when possible on all B-52 targets at various times after the strike. The same intelligence sources have indicated that this has been successful in producing casualties.

(3) Employment of Artillery by Platoon (Hipshoots).

(a) The size of the Division area of operation often required that artillery batteries be split in order to provide fire support to elements of a maneuver battalion operating beyond the range of the direct support battery which was normally located with the battalion CP.

(b) When a hipshoot was necessary, a security force, normally an infantry platoon, and two tubes of artillery with a basic load of ammunition would move by air or road to a location from which the remainder of the operation could be supported. These elements would normally be positioned...
in sufficient time to enable the artillery platoon to fire any LZ prepara-
tions required for the assaulting force.

(c) Multiple hipshoots for periods of longer than 1-3 days posed cer-
tain problems for both the maneuver elements and the artillery units
involved. At times, as many as six to eight batteries were operating in
a split configuration with the attendant loss of maneuver elements tied
down to static security missions. Each split battery required that the
artillery duplicate many functions such as fire direction centers, resupply
convoys or lifts, and communications systems with the personnel and equip-
ment designed for a single operation.

(d) The problems encountered by using hipshoots to provide additional
artillery coverage were overcome to some extent by the use of CIDG forces to
provide security, thus freeing maneuver elements; the positioning of the
artillery hipshoot in location already secured by US or indigenous forces;
and the computation of firing data from a central fire direction center
for both the hipshoot location and the battery position. The use of the
latter was not feasible most of the time because of the impact of terrain
and distance on communications. The use of the hipshoot to provide artil-
lery coverage was expensive in terms of assets consumed (personnel and
equipment) but necessary from an operational point of view.

(4) Reconnaissance by Fire. Artillery fires were used extensively
in situations when infantry units were moving to contact or conducting
reconnaissance in force. Such fires were controlled and adjusted ahead of
the moving elements by artillery forward observers, and served a number of
simultaneous useful purposes

(a) As an assistance in land navigation and orientation when moving
in dense vegetation.

(b) To protect exposed or threatened flanks.

(c) To instill confidence in the accuracy and immediate responsiveness
of the artillery.

(d) Artillery fires "walked" in front of the infantry as it advanced, and
insured that, in the event of contact, the initial volley could be adjusted
onto the enemy rapidly and without the necessity of smoke marking rounds.

(5) Special Ammunition.

(a) Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM). ICM has been used against
several types of targets throughout the area of operations with optimum
results obtained against targets in the open or in sparsely vegetated areas.
On 5 March 1969, a heavy enemy force launched an attack on LZ ROBERTS. ICM
was fired on top of friendly positions and the enemy attack was stopped.
The benefits of using ICM over friendly positions have been recognized for
some time and all firebases include the use of ICM in their final protective
fires.

(b) Shell, XM 546 (BEEHIVE). BEEHIVE munition has been used for
defense of Division firebases on several occasions. On 9 May 1969,
BEEHIVE was used in conjunction with ICM during an attack on LZ PENNY
resulting in 54 enemy KIA. Artillery weapons are positioned within the
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firebase in order to insure the most effective use of BEEHIVE munitions in
final protective fires.

(d) Fuzes.

(a) Concrete Piercing (CP). 155mm howitzers firing HE with CP fuze
continue to be used effectively against bunkers and bunker complexes.

(b) Variable Time (VT). VT has been used sparingly because of the
amount of dense vegetation in the Division area of operations.

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amount of dense vegetation in the Division area of operations.

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amount of dense vegetation in the Division area of operations.
(d) Exacting coordination between Fire Support Coordination Centers (FSCC) and aviation units was required when both artillery and gunships were used in supporting roles. FSCC's recommend aerial routes away from their gun target line to let supporting artillery fire for the maximum possible time until the gunships arrived on station.

(2) Results. Gunships were directly responsible for producing approximately 24% of the total enemy confirmed killed in action.
8. (C) AIR SUPPORT

a. The 4th Infantry Division has very effectively used tactical air to supplement its organic firepower. More significant, however, the Division has maximized available air support by the selected use of certain special munitions and fuzing options, combined with detailed integrated fire planning at all levels. By careful statistical analysis of winds, weather patterns, and trends peculiar to the Central Highlands, and through the use of varied delivery and control procedures, improved methods of providing continual fire were developed. These methods resulted in a reduced enemy capability to initiate attacks as well as an enhanced divisional ability to defend against them.

b. Method of Employment:

(1) Because of the diverse and peculiar weather and terrain conditions encountered in the Central Highlands, it is necessary to continually consider various aircraft-weapon-fuze compatibility, so that either FAC or Combat Sky Spot control procedures could be used in the air attack of known or suspected targets. In order to maintain constant, around-the-clock pressure on the enemy, it is mandatory to plan the tactical air program so that delivered ordnance is compatible to both intra-AO diversions or alternate delivery control procedures. By careful preplanning of ordnance-fuze combinations and timely decisions to convert from FAC to CSS control, or vice versa, the 4th Division has been able to maximize the number of available sorties, and reduce significantly the loss of sorties due to localized weather conditions or an overly restrictive choice in weapon-fuze combinations.

(2) Although the FAC control of tactical fighters has proved highly effective in the support of ground operations, the 4th Infantry Division has found that under the varied terrain and weather conditions peculiar to the Central Highlands, close air support to troops in contact has been provided most effectively by FAC controlled A-1 "SPAD" aircraft. Their loiter capability, slower delivery speeds, and minimum reaction times in the 4th Division AO consistently provided the most accurate and effective air support under adverse weather and hostile fire conditions. A secondary factor in the successful employment of A-1 aircraft resulted from their capability to monitor VHF and FM frequencies while being controlled on UHF. This enabled the pilots to gain fuller understanding of the position and scheme of maneuver of friendly forces and the locations of the opposing forces.

(3) The 4th Infantry Division has found that a completely integrated fire support system, incorporating organic artillery, tactical air, and organic air cavalry has been of great value, especially in providing preparatory fires for a combat assault. The close control and coordination
of all available fire support means allows maximum continuing pressure to be placed upon the enemy, greatly increasing the effectiveness of the preparatory and follow-on fires, while decreasing friendly losses. The coordinated use of FAC's, air cavalry, and tactical air achieved the most rewarding and responsive tactical air strikes. When the air cavalry is employed to work the target areas following, or even during, a tactical strike, constant heavy pressure is kept upon the enemy. If additional strikes are needed or target relocation is required, additional air delivered ordnance by both the air cavalry and the tactical fighters can be delivered in minimum time with excellent results.

c. Aerial Bombardment:

(1) The Division has made extensive use of delayed action aerial delivered anti-personnel mines which have proven to be very effective in blocking known enemy infiltration routes. They have also been employed as barriers against exfiltration, especially when concurrent offensive ground operations have been designed to box-in enemy forces to provide concentrated and lucrative targets. When enemy concentrations did develop from the use of the weapons systems, strikes against them were integrated into the overall fire support plan. A special innovation has been the coordinated employment of the aerial-delivered mines and B-52 strikes.

(2) The 4th Infantry Division has employed an integrated compression system to increase the effectiveness of B-52 strikes. When a proposed strike is submitted, the Division, with consideration for both present and future tactical planning, has employed an air-delivered mine barrier to bracket or encircle the B-52 target area, and restrict enemy movement to the area of interest. Prior to the B-52 strike, the target area outside the B-52 box, but within the trace of the barrier, has been further seeded with delay-fuzed bombs to increase the enemy's confusion, and continue to compress his movements into the proposed target areas. This concept has been used to good advantage in the 4th Division area of operations. (See Inclosure 2)

(3) Results: Because of the extremely large area for which it is responsible the 4th Infantry Division has found it necessary to rely heavily on tactical air support. Identified targets beyond the range of artillery can be attacked only by air and the responsiveness of the Air Force has made a major contribution to the Division's success. Perhaps more than any other unit in Vietnam, the 4th Infantry Division must plan the integrated use of all fire support in order to insure that all requirements are met with the limited resources available, and tactical air represents a principal ingredient in the Division's firepower mix. The Air Force response to the Division's requests has been outstanding from every point of view; timeliness, accuracy, coordination, selection of ordnance, and effectiveness of delivery. The combination of B-52 strikes, tactical air, and organic artillery,
each directed against targets most appropriate to its own characteristics, has been a major factor in the 4th Infantry Division's accomplishments.
a. General:

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Aviation Battalion (Combat) and elements of the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat) supported the 4th Infantry Division in Operations MACARTHUR and HINFS.

(2) Throughout the reporting period the 4th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was intact with no attachments or detachments. The 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat) provided 14 UH-1H's, 8 UH-10's, 4 CH-47's and 1 CH-54 on a daily basis to the 4th Infantry Division.

b. Tactical Operations:

(1) Elements affecting the action:

(a) Terrain - the 4th and 52d Aviation Battalions operate throughout the 4th Infantry Division AO which encompasses three provinces: KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, and part of BINH DINH Province in the AN KHE area. The area is predominantly high plateau with a number of mountain ranges. There is a high mountainous area to the east of Highway 14 running north from DAK TO to DAK PEK with some peaks as high as 7,000 feet. To the east of Highway 14 between KONTUM and PLEIKU Cities another mountainous area ranges up to 5,700 feet. South of Highway 19 between PLEIKU and AN KHE are two north-south ridgelines on either side of the valley known as VC Valley. Another difficult area, with high steep mountains and heavy vegetation, lies between the PLEIKU-KONTUM area on the east and the PLEI TRAP River and CAMBODIAN Border on the west.

(b) Weather - The weather for the period 1 December 1968 through April 1969 was generally dry with essentially no precipitation. Temperatures increased from highs in the mid-80's and lows in the 60's in December to highs in the mid-90's and lows near 70 by the end of April. Density altitudes often exceeded 5,000 feet at ground level during the afternoons. Winds were variable at 5 - 10 knots and shifted direction frequently. Cloud decks varied from 3,000 feet and higher, but were usually scattered, with ceilings not lower than 5,000 feet after 1000 hours. Visibility was usually good, 6NM or better, except in the mountains in Northwestern PLEIKU and southwestern KONTUM Provinces where haze caused by smoke and temperature inversions at 6,000 feet to 7,000 feet caused decreased visibility, sometimes as low as two miles in the late afternoon. The months of May through September saw a significant increase in cloudiness and precipitation. Early morning fog occurred frequently, and thunderstorm activity occurred almost every afternoon. Low clouds, accompanied by fog and light drizzle, formed on most mornings but normally dissipated by mid-morning. Flying hours were best from mid-morning to mid-afternoon. Ceilings were below 500 feet until late morning,
lifting to 1,000 - 1,500 feet by mid-afternoon, and again were below 1,000 feet by midnight. Visibility was below one mile until mid-morning, and then increased to better than 6 miles, except in rain showers.  

(2) Operations:  

(a) Traditionally the 4th Aviation Battalion has supported one of the brigades of the 4th Infantry Division, and the 52d Aviation Battalion from Camp Holloway has supported the other two brigades. The bulk of the combat operations conducted by the 4th Aviation Battalion have been in support of the 3d Brigade, while the 1st and 2d Brigades were supported by the 52d Aviation Battalion. On several occasions the 4th Aviation and 52d Aviation Battalions reinforced each other to accomplish larger lifts.  

(b) The standard ROAD Infantry Division TOE provides eighty-eight (88) helicopters to the organic elements of the Division. Additional non-divisional support is provided from assets of the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat), a subordinate unit of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat). Unfortunately, the size of the area of operations assigned to I Field Force, Vietnam and II ARVN Corps precludes the use of the entire 52d ABC to support the 4th Infantry Division. Therefore, assets are made available to the Division on a daily "mission" basis, as determined by the Army Aviation Element, HQ, IFFV. The contributions of Army Aviation have played a most significant role in the battlefield successes of the 4th Infantry Division. From DAK TO to DUC LAP, from DUC CO to AN KHE, the crews and helicopters supporting the Famous Fighting Fourth have assisted in carrying the fight to the enemy despite limited assets.  

(c) To properly assess the capabilities of a standard infantry division, it is necessary to be familiar with the organic aviation assets and where they are located. Figure 1 shows a breakout of aviation assets in accordance with the ROAD TOE.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>UH-1H</th>
<th>AH-1G</th>
<th>UH-1C</th>
<th>OH-6A</th>
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<td>Avn Bn</td>
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<td>Div Arty</td>
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<td>Maint Bn</td>
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(Figure 1)
The first obvious limitation is the lack of sufficient gunship support. Secondly, the use of the UH-1C as a lift ship for the Aero Rifle Platoon of the Cav Troop is severely limited in high density altitudes of the Central Highlands. A simple trade-off allowed for a partial solution to both problems. The two slicks in B Company were exchanged with D 1/10 for the 2 UH-1C's, which were subsequently armed. Additional approval was obtained to withdraw the two UH-1C's from Div Arty. These aircraft were also armed and placed in B Company, thereby providing a total of ten gunships for Division Support. This shift of Division assets allowed for centralization of maintenance responsibility in B Company and D 1/10 by reducing the types of helicopters assigned.

Figure 2 shows the new Division Structure.

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>UH-1C</th>
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<td>Maint Bn</td>
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(FIGURE 2)

(d) As previously stated, the additional aviation assets required to provide mobility to the Division come from the 52d Aviation Battalion (Combat). The normal daily allocation provides the following aircraft:

UH-1H = 14
UH-1C = 6
CH-47 = 4
CH-54 = 1 (Provided from 355th Avn Co, 268th Avn Bn)

From the total assets available, the Division G-3 established priorities to lift combat elements of the brigades, move required supplies, provide command and control aircraft, and to provide transportation for members of the Division Staff.
(e) The combined assets of the 52d and 4th Aviation Battalions can provide an average of 18 slick helicopters (exclusive of special missions, and General Officer and Brigade Commander Command and Control ships), for approximately 7 flying hours per helicopter daily. This fixes our capability at (as an average) 126 helicopter hours daily. When it becomes necessary to exceed the programmed flying hours on any given day, we must face the fact that we are borrowing time from future operational days. Based on experience factors, it requires approximately 24 slick sorties to move a rifle company, computed on an ACL of 6, with the high density altitude in the Division AO. To illustrate what this means in flying hours, consider a ten kilometer move. Twenty kilometers (roundtrip) at a speed of 80 knots requires 15 minutes of flying time; an additional minute is required to land at the PZ, and a minute to off-load at the LZ, for a total of 17 minutes per sortie. 24 sorties at 17 minutes each means that 408 minutes (6 hours and 48 minutes) are required to move one rifle company ten kilometers. Considering that a brigade has three slicks, one per BN; the move, properly planned, managed and executed, can be accomplished in approximately 2 hours 20 minutes of actual blade time per helicopter. Assembly, refueling and return time would also have to be included, but have been disregarded to this example. The remaining blade time available for the day would then be used for necessary administrative/logistical missions. While some success has been obtained in requesting and receiving additional lift assets for battalion operations, the primary means available to move, the maneuver elements is the pooling of available resources, execution of the move and then the subsequent redistribution of the assets, and then dispersal of assets to normal administrative/logistical missions. The helicopter requirement for a LRP insertion/extraction is two slicks helicopters and a gun team. First, a VR must be flown to familiarize the LRP team leader with his AO and his LZ. By planning the daily activities for LRP operations, the VR may be accomplished enroute to a forward fire base. For example, we will assume that two team insertions and one team extraction are planned for a given day. Upon completion of the VR by both teams, team number two will disembark at the forward fire base, while team number one is inserted. The aircraft are then used to make the extraction and return to the forward fire base. The extracted team is dropped off and team two picked up for insertion. The return flight to base camp will go by the forward fire base to pick up the extracted team and return to base camp. Obviously this can only be done when the LRP AOs are within a reasonable proximity to each other (20 - 30 KM). It can be seen that even as basic a tactical maneuver as insertion/extraction of six LRP teams can use twelve hours or more of limited helicopter time in one day.

(f) Helicopter gunships were employed in an aerial fire support role. This support was provided for troops in contact, combat assaults, LRP insertions and extractions, and highway security. In addition to this normal employment, gunships were provided for Snoopy and Scorpion missions. Snoopy and Scorpion missions consist of two gunships, one UH-1H or OH-6A equipped with an airborne personnel detector, and one UH-1H or OH-6A utilized as the navigation and recovery ship in the event that one of the team's aircraft is forced down. In the Snoopy role, the gunships
provide security for the team, and fire only in defense of the team. In the Scorpion role, the gunships are given prior clearance to fire on any targets detected by the team's airborne personnel detector equipment in the assigned area of operation.

(g) The employment of helicopter gunships in the above described roles resulted in rapid and responsive aerial fire support for troops in contact, LRP extractions and insertions, combat assaults, highway operations and Snoopy missions. The results of helicopter gunships employed on Scorpion missions are impossible to measure by statistics alone. Most of the targets detected by the airborne personnel detector were located in triple canopy jungle, which precluded visual observance of the enemy position. It is, however, a known fact that artillery employed on an unsuspecting enemy has devastating casualty producing and morale effects. These same effects can be applied to the employment of gunships in the Scorpion role.

(3) Training:

(a) Aviation training is one of the most improved areas in the Aviation Battalion. The establishment of a standardization program was the first big step in causing this improvement. The emphasis was rightfully shifted to the concept that the aircraft commanders serve as primary instructors of new aviators. The instructor pilot (IP) is the authority, but the aircraft commanders now realize and readily accept their newly assigned responsibilities.

(b) To complement the standardization efforts, a commander's briefing was prepared and presented to the brigade and battalion commanders and staffs in an attempt to solve some of the problems faced while operating aircraft in a tactical environment. This briefing presented information concerning aviation and its proper utilization. Areas discussed were: selection and preparation of LZ's and helipads, (airmobile operations) and the efficient utilization of aircraft. A detailed explanation of the load capabilities of the aircraft used by the Division, and the effects of altitude and fuel loads upon these capabilities were included. In addition, troop safety requirements were covered.
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20. (c) CHEMICAL SUPPORT

a. General. The Division Chemical Section performed as a staff section and as an operating section. It operated extensively in the employment of Riot Control Agents (RCA), herbicides, and Airborne personnel detectors (AID). In addition, training was conducted in the preparation of flame field expedients, and the operation of the M32 mechanized flamethrower, the XM15E1 flame service unit, and the XM191 multishot portable flame weapon system.

b. Riot Control Agents (RCA). RCA munitions were employed extensively in direct support of combat operations, increasing the effectiveness of fire support. Bulk RCA was also used in the contamination of specific areas to deny them to the enemy. In employment of RCA munitions and bulk RCA, agent CS was used.

(1) CS and Artillery. A total of 3728 XM15 CS Canister Clusters were employed in conjunction with artillery, tactical airstrikes, B-52 strikes, and ground operations from 1 November 1968 to 31 October 1969.

(a) CS and artillery targets were processed by the Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) using current intelligence concerning enemy locations. When known and suspected enemy locations were recognized, tactical and political clearance for employment was obtained, and the missions were conducted by the Division Chemical Section.

(b) CS was employed on extremely hard targets to drive enemy personnel from protective cover prior to their being engaged by artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes. Intelligence sources indicated that these operations were very effective in increasing the vulnerability of the enemy to artillery and aerial delivered ordnance.

(c) The XM15 CS Canister Cluster was used in the preparation of targets. It is an aerial delivered munition equipped with a variable time fuse. Area coverage when properly employed is a circular pattern approximately 100 meters in diameter. Normally missions were flown in UH-1D helicopters carrying 16 such munitions. Expenditure of XM15 Clusters was from 1 to 4 per target, depending on vegetation and the "hardness" of the target. Normally one sortie resulted in the preparation of 4 to 5 targets for artillery fires. Frequently, the employing aircraft remained on station to adjust fires.

(d) When preparing targets for tactical air and B-52 strikes, the targets were saturated with CS 10-20 minutes prior to TOT. This insured that enemy personnel were driven from protective cover prior to TOT. The normal XM15 expenditure for preparation of a B-52 strike was 20 per strike.
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(a) The XM19 Cluster proved valuable in the suppressing of enemy fires during operations and extractions of hilltops troops on hot landing zones. In most cases, the employment of CS at locations from which enemy fire was being received resulted in the immediate cessation of hostile fire.

(b) An additional use of the XM19 was in conjunction with the hunter-killer SCORPION team, consisting of two OH-6 and two AH-1G helicopters. One OH-6 carries an XM 3 Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) and the other carries 4 XM19 Clusters in a locally designed and fabricated dispenser. When lucrative targets were located, the XM19 Clusters were employed prior to gunship expenditures. This technique greatly increased the effectiveness of the SCORPION team. Refer to subparagraph d below, and to Inclosure 4 for more details on the SCORPION concept.

(2) Bulk RCA Employment. Micro-pulverized CS powder was extensively employed to contaminate infiltration routes, way stations, bunkers, tunnels, and living areas to deny their use to the enemy. While bulk CS was employed by ground troops to contaminate certain tunnel and cave complexes, the usual method of employing bulk CS was by air drop. During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 October 1969, 3132 55-gallon CS drums were air dropped. The duration of the effectiveness of the CS was dependent upon weather conditions. During the dry season persistency ranged from two to three months; during the wet season persistency was cut to a maximum of four days.

(a) Targets to be contaminated were located by APD, Red Haze, Duffle Bag, and other intelligence sources. Processing political and tactical clearance of targets was accomplished by FSCEn, and the missions were conducted by the Division Chemical Section.

(b) Missions were conducted using a CH-47 helicopter carrying 24 drums. Using a set of locally fabricated racks and rollers, the drums were dropped from altitudes ranging from 1500 to 2500 feet AGL. The XM925 drum and burster system is an impact detonating system which bursts the drum spreading powdered CS in a circular pattern with a 20-25 meter radius. One CH-47 sortie effectively covers an area 40 meters wide and 800 meters long.

(c) Intelligence sources indicated major enemy movement away from locations in which bulk CS had been employed. In this respect, CS proved to be very effective in restricting extensive enemy use of valuable terrain and in producing increased enemy casualties when it was integrated with gunship and artillery support.

(d) A recent ENSURE request was initiated to improve the quantity and precision of air-delivered persistent CS. The Division Chemical Section with the USAF Tactical Air Liaison section requested the use of a
Herbicide Support

Large scale TRAILDUST and helicopter herbicide operations (A1AVENCO) were conducted. Herbicides were employed in the control of vegetation on base camp perimeters and along lines of communication used in this manner. Friendly fields of fire were improved on perimeters, and potential ambush sites were reduced along lines of communication. Aerial herbicide employment also assisted in improving aerial observation of known enemy infiltration routes and base areas. In additional consideration is the employment of herbicides against enemy crops. Both TRAILDUST and helicopter spray were employed to effectively limit the growth of enemy crops.

1. TRAILDUST. During the period 1 November 1968 to 31 October 1969, 112 TRAILDUST missions were conducted in support of the Division. These missions were flown by UH-1B helicopters, each of which carried 1000 gallons of herbicide. Normally each mission employed three such aircraft. Targets against which TRAILDUST was employed included enemy base areas, infiltration routes, and enemy crops.

2. The Division area of operations contains numerous areas with lucrative targets against which herbicides can be employed. Herbicides were difficult to obtain beginning 1 July 1969, and at that time, the area approved for defoliation in Pleiku, Kontum, and Binh Dinh Provinces were drastically reduced in size. The Division Chemical Section recommended a new plan for strip destruction and defoliation which would result in increased coverage of enemy controlled areas within Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. The extended strip destruction plan for Kontum Province was approved in September 1969.

3. Herbicides were not available through ARVN supply channels in sufficient quantity to support extensive helicopter employment of herbicide.

d. Aireborne Personnel Detector (APD) Operations. The APD was employed extensively as a device to gain, confirm, or deny intelligence information. From 1 November 1968 to 31 October 1969, over 1,160 APD missions were conducted.

1. In January 1969, the SCORPION hunter killer concept was employed with the establishment of the SCORPION team. This team consists of two OH-6 (LOH) helicopters and two AH-13 (Cobra) helicopters from the 4th Aviation Battalion. In addition to its APD mission, the SCORPION team can react rapidly to neutralize lucrative targets located with APD. One LOH flying at treetop level carries the APD. It is followed by the two Cobras at high altitude which furnish armed cover. The higher Cobra also
maps the missions. Overall control of the mission is established by the high LOI, which flies at sufficient altitude to observe all SCORPION aircraft. The 'high LOI' also carries XM15 CS Canister Clusters for employment against suitable targets.

(2) APU missions are flown daily from Division resources, and additional APU operations are conducted by the 1st Brigade. Support is also given to the 24th Special Tactical Zone by furnishing one APU and one operator to the MACV advisory element.

e. Flame Operations. The Division Chemical Section supported flame operations through training and technical assistance with standard and experimental flame weapons and flame field expedients.

(1) Training and assistance in preparation of flame field expedients were conducted throughout the period of this report. Formal training was conducted at periodic chemical refresher classes, and informal training and assistance continued on an "as required" basis. Flame fougasses, flame mines, and flame illumination devices are emplaced on base camp/fire base perimeters throughout the area of operations.

(2) Refresher training in the operation and maintenance of the M132 Mechanized Flamethrower was conducted in units having organic M132 assets. Concurrently training was conducted in the operation and maintenance of the XM45EI Mechanized Flame Service Unit.

(3) The Division became the first unit in RVN to receive the XM191 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon. The system is a four shot, rocket-propelled, shoulder-fired weapon. It is capable of firing four incendiary rockets at the rate of one per second and being reloaded with new rocket clips. In October 1969, a New Equipment Training Team assisted by the Division Chemical Section conducted training in the operation and maintenance of the weapon system. The weapon has been distributed to field units and is presently under evaluation.
11. (C) SIGNAL SUPPORT


(1) The vast extent of the 4th Infantry Division AO, coupled with the rugged terrain, makes the provision of communication to all elements a challenge of considerable magnitude. By careful reorganization of the Division Signal Battalion, exploitation of every capability of Divisional communications equipment, and taking advantage of the available Defense Communications System (DCS), Corps Area Communication System (CACS), and IFFV (54th Signal Battalion) communications system, communications have been maintained with Divisional, lateral, and supporting units.

(2) The multichannel (AN/TRC-24) radio equipment on hand is old and has the further disadvantages of large size, excessive weight, high power consumption, and low reliability. It is difficult to transport, supply, and maintain. However, its technical characteristics make it especially useful for the rough mountainous terrain and dense vegetation of the Central Highlands where "line of sight" signal paths are practically non-existent. As of the writing time of this paper, all 124th Signal Battalion 12-channel VHF systems are non-line of sight and range from 36 kilometers to 70 kilometers, well beyond the planning range of the equipment; yet they work.

(3) The radioteletype equipment in the Division is of the new AN/GRC-106 derived family and has proven superior to the older AN/GRC-26 and AN/GRC-46 type equipment. Radioteletype is the primary means of record operational communications between the Division Headquarters and organic, attached, and OPCON units and has been totally reliable.

(4) At brigade and lower levels, FM Secure Voice is the backbone of communications and has proven to be extremely effective. The Division has vigorously implemented the FM Secure Voice program, and all combat and combat support units employ secure voice communications down to the company level.

(5) The Division has maintained four distinct tactical telephone systems to allow rapid, responsive tailored communications to four categories of users. This concept has proven extremely successful.

   a) The TOC system provides telephone communications between the Division TOC and the TOCs of brigades, DIVARTY, separate battalions, Division OPCON units and Task Forces, and lateral and higher headquarters such as II Corps, Co B, 5th SFGA, IFFV, and USARV.

   b) The Fire Support System provides "hot line" communications from the FSCE to all headquarters involved in the clearance of fires. This includes, in addition to divisional elements, all neighboring US and VIETNAMESE headquarters.
(c) The Division Common User System provides access to the SEA Dial Telephone System and general purpose telephone service to the brigades and separate battalions, Task Forces, and lateral and supporting headquarters through the SEA Dial Telephone System.

(d) The Division Artillery Telephone System provides a tailored system connecting DIVARTY elements and IFFV artillery units. This system is used for both operational and administrative/logistical traffic.

(6) Teletype communications are also tailored to best serve the users. Three systems are employed, and all are operated entirely by Division personnel.

(a) The TOC to TOC system provides secure teletype service between the Division TOC, brigades, DIVARTY, separate battalions, OPCON units, and Task Forces as well as to the IFFV TOC. Messages transmitted via this system are not processed through the AG message center, but are accepted in handwritten form for immediate transmission. Rapid service direct to the recipient with a minimum of handling is the watchword in this net. Both radio and "landline" teletype is used in this system as appropriate.

(b) The common user teletype system is used for all logistical and administrative messages, plus "routine" operational traffic such as SITREPS, INTSUMS, etc, which are too long to be effectively passed in the TOC to TOC network. Service is provided to all brigades, and access to the world-wide autodin system is provided by a 1st Signal Brigade autodin mode V terminal at Camp Enari. Over 600 messages a day are processed through the Division common user teletype system.

(c) The DIVARTY net includes all DIVARTY elements and is used for all record traffic within DIVARTY.

(7) The critical communications problem in the Division is the AN/PRC-25 radio and its ancillary equipment.

(a) The TOE authorization for AN/PRC-25 radios is not sufficient to support the aggressive long and short range patrol program pursued by the Division. A minimum of 10 additional man pack radios per maneuver battalion is necessary. At present this problem is further compounded by a shortage of 150 man-pack radios below the current authorization. These two shortages necessitate limiting small unit operations to those which can be supported by available radios.

(b) All equipment suffers from the alternating cycle of monsoon rains followed by a period of heat and dust. The handset H-189 used with the man-pack radio is particularly sensitive to these conditions. All attempts to protect this handset and prevent a high failure rate have been only partially
successful at best. It is simply not sufficiently rugged to withstand the climate of the Central Highlands. The same comment is true of all switchboard, telephone, and teletype equipment.

b. New Equipment.

(1) The receipt of sufficient AN/GRC-142 radio teletype sets has provided reliable, high quality radio teletype service throughout the Division.

(2) The pending receipt of the new Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) series of UHF multichannel radio relay equipment will improve the supportability and maintainability of the Division telephone and teletype systems. However, the inherent shorter range and stricter line of sight parameters of this equipment are a definite drawback for this AO. At least half the present VHF equipment should be retained for those long haul systems where the new equipment is not useable.

(3) The pending receipt of the HYL-3 automatic retransmission units for secure FM will enhance the Division FM nets immeasurably and eliminate the manpower now needed to operate manual secure relays. At the same time it will eliminate the delays and possibility of garbled messages associated with manual relay operations.

c. Developmental Requirements. All signal equipment should be light, airmobile, require low input power, and be dependable. It should provide secure, extended range communications. Some specific requirements are:

(1) A four to six channel secure radio relay system for use in lieu of certain FM nets between brigades and battalions. Such a four channel system would provide, from a battalion CP, one channel to brigade for command and control, one channel to brigade for intelligence, one channel extended to the battalion trains for logistics and administration, and one channel connected to the brigade switchboard for general purpose use. Sufficient relay stations should be provided.

(2) A single unit replacement for the AN/PRC-77/KY-38 combination. Development of such an item, say of the size of an AN/PRC-25, would facilitate the extension of secure FM down to the platoon, SRP, LRP, and FO level, would allow all nets to be secure, and would eliminate the threat of intercept and imitative communication deception.

(3) Directional Antennas for FM radios. In the 4th Infantry Division AO, two problems plague FM radio communication: marginal signal strength and friendly interference. A directional antenna would help solve both problems. For example, in the Division Command Net, the NCS would continue to use an omnidirectional antenna, but the brigade stations could each use a directional antenna, improving the effective strength of their received
and transmitted signals, and at the same time, directing radiated energy toward the intended receiver and away from stations with which it might interfere.

(4) Divisional Level Light Tropo. In an AO such as the one assigned to this Division, the terrain is such that many points are inaccessible by VHF multichannel radio without multiple relay points. Since each relay point requires a security force, such installations are inappropriate. A light Troposcatter system with 24 voice channels and a planning range of 100 miles would be capable of providing all required communications to a brigade or Task Force headquarters.
Landing Zone and Fire Support Base Development.

Normal engineer support played an important role in the development of landing zones and fire support bases. Basic skills with explosives and demolitions, field fortification construction techniques, and terrain reconnaissance were all inherent to this successful development. Whether in rear or forward areas, the engineers have provided the support that has enabled LZs and FSBs to be constructed in a minimum of time. In the forward areas, where lines of communication were nonexistent, engineer rappelling teams were often among the first troops to secure and level a suitable LZ. After the hasty LZs were developed, the airmobile dozer, Case 450, was brought into the firebase by CH-54s, and clearing operations were rapidly completed. Continued engineer support was rendered in developing tactical operations centers, medical bunkers, overhead cover, and in providing continual advice. It was a continual effort to maintain high standards of construction, due to the paucity of materials and time for construction. The engineers were invariably the last to depart the fire bases, after first assuring that no material that could be gainfully used by the enemy was left behind. From the LZ/FSB's construction to its eventual destruction, the engineers assisted in the total combat effort, by providing construction equipment, plans, manhours and technical advice.

While the LZ or FSB was in being, engineer support in the form of land clearing for fields of fire and water production was constantly being supplied. In many cases the engineers not only produced the water but defended the water points as they were separated from the secure base area.

b. Lines of Communication. The monsoon season in the Central Highlands, coupled with the enemy's ability to interdict important LOGs, provided many opportunities for the engineers to prove their value. Approximately 80 kilometers of road are searched for mines each day utilizing engineer resources. Continual improvement in searching techniques and the employment of the Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) with a mine roller attached has made it possible to carry out other normal operations with little delay. The rapid employment of the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) has reduced the tactical impact upon the Division due to loss of bridges or sections of road. Mining incidents were of such importance that a mine warfare center was developed to monitor the daily situation and provide guidance to the tactical units as to the changes in employment. To assure the competency of unit mine sweep personnel, schools were conducted to increase the division's overall
effectiveness in mine sweeping. Even though the engineers maintained
the roads, there was still the threat of ambush along many miles of
heavily wooded roads. The problem was alleviated by the creation of a
land clearing team within Headquarters Company. This team was composed
of six D-9 dozers equipped with Home Plow blades, and supported by an
infantry platoon (\Underline{5}, Home Plow Operations.) The team cleared
roadside favorable to ambushes, suspected enemy positions, and was
utilized very effectively in destroying enemy bunkers and tunnel complexes.
This had the ancillary effect of denying ground to the enemy through the
development of observation lanes and expedient LZ areas.

c. Engineers in an Infantry Role.

(1) The engineers were called upon to provide the command, and
staff section for the Provisional Battalion. The Provisional Battalion
consisted of three provisional rifle companies, one from each brigade rear
element, with the responsibility of providing infantry support while
conserving combat strength in limited areas of operation. On the four
occasions that the Provisional Battalion was formed, the engineer command
and staff sections provided the direction that led to the successful
completion of the operations.

(2) The Provisional Battalion is normally employed within the
4th Infantry Division's TAOR; however, employment outside the TAOR is
possible. The Provisional Battalion has artillery, TAC Air, and gunship
support upon request. The battalion’s mission may be to perform search
and destroy, ambush, search and clear, cordon and search, and reconnaissance
in force. The most recent mission was to conduct search operations and
night ambushes, to prevent NVA/VC stand-off rocket attacks on Camp Enari.
13. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. Estimate of Enemy Forces.

(1) Enemy forces in the Division area of operations possessed a variety of weapons that ranged from homemade explosives and antiquated weapons left from previous wars, to modern CHICOM and RUSSIAN Weapons systems. During the year, enemy attacks have run the gamut from light ground probes, to attacks by fire employing 107-mm, 122-mm, and 140-mm rockets, to an abortive armor attack by a tank platoon. The TOE of an NVA battalion authorizes heavy weapons platoons which possess 82-mm mortars, RPG-2 and RPG-7 rocket launchers are authorized at company level. Artillery support in the Division area of operations has been supplied by the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment which has a number of specialized battalions: the K-30 Battalion provides light anti-aircraft support; the K-32 and K-33 Battalions possess both 122-mm rockets and 120-mm mortars; the K-41 and K-42 Battalions can employ 105-mm howitzers; the K-74 Battalion has 85-mm guns; and an unidentified battalion possesses 37-mm anti-aircraft capability. In addition, the Regiment also controls the K-16 Tank Battalion which has 20-25 PT-76 RUSSIAN amphibious tanks.

(2) The enemy capability was greatly enhanced in mid-May when a composite battalion of infantry, artillery, and sappers was formed to attack LZ OASIS. The limited success of this task force may have led to the formation of the 631st Composite NVA Battalion. In addition, NVA and VC Sapper Battalions operate throughout the Division area of operations. Most enemy regiments in the Division's area also have supporting companies of combined sapper-engineers. Sappers are expertly trained fighters who specialize in stealth, reconnaissance, and the use of a variety of demolitions to attack and destroy allied positions.

(3) Vulnerabilities: Enemy supply areas are generally insecure, rendering supply caches vulnerable to friendly search and destroy operations. The enemy also has limited logistical support and cannot conduct sustained offensive operations, unless he is near his sanctuary areas. He continues to be vulnerable to superior allied firepower when massing near an objective and during his withdrawal. Due to the low morale existing in many of his units as a result of food shortages, sickness, heavy losses and continuing defeats, the enemy was susceptible to friendly psychological operations. Also, enemy reliance on local civilians as a labor source makes large operations vulnerable to friendly intelligence efforts.


(1) Morale. The enemy's morale, both NVA and VC, declined steadily as US operations continued to inflict heavy casualties and to deny the use of infiltration routes to the enemy. Food became especially scarce during the latter months of 1969 in BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces. The mission of an increasing number of combat units was diverted to food.
production in an effort to expand the quantities available. Heavy casualties during operations in the CHU, PA, PLU Trap, and BEN HIE - DAK TO regions contributed significantly to the enemy's low morale. Prisoner interrogations revealed that a great amount of time was spent by unit political officers in a concerted effort to raise morale and convince the individuals of the importance of their mission in SVN. Many NVA soldiers expressed confusion over the attitude of the South Vietnamese people to their presence in this country. In SVN they were told they would be received as a liberating force; however, the reaction of the SVN people was usually just the opposite. Malaria also played an important role in lowering of enemy morale. Many infiltration groups had as high as 50% casualties from the disease even before entering SVN. Without adequate medical facilities the physical status and the will to fight of many enemy soldiers was seriously impaired. As a result of heavy casualties, conscription in SVN is now affecting the older, married male population, many of whom have no desire to leave their wives and children and come to SVN. The combination of all the above factors has contributed to the lowering of the enemy's morale and has seriously hampered his war effort.

(2) Mines, demolitions, and booby traps. Lines of communication throughout the Division area of operations experienced a slow upsurge of mining incidents as enemy forces placed increasing emphasis on highway interdiction. Once again the enemy displayed his ingenuity in utilizing materiel on hand for his war effort. The basket-type mine was encountered in BINH DINH Province by the 1st Brigade. This mine consists of a bamboo woven basket which contains explosives, a detonating device, and a pressure device, normally a mortar fuze. Enemy forces have also shown a penchant for utilizing dud mortar and artillery rounds. These mines proved extremely effective and usually resulted in extensive damage to or destruction of vehicles. The enemy, however, was not limited to the use of these crude devices, and employed SOVIET plastic and metallic anti-tank mines. Most mines were usually found in pot holes in the road, off the road near vehicle turn-around points, and intermingled with debris both on and off the highway. Experience has shown that mines are rarely employed singly; the normal employment is in pairs or greater multiples. Booby traps were not used extensively by the enemy throughout the area of operations. Of the various forms of booby traps, punji stakes have been the most prevalent, although not consistently employed enough to constitute any major threat. As for the demolitions utilized by enemy sapper elements, the year has seen a steady decline in the quality of sapper type explosives, such as satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes. The majority of explosives found recently have been crude homemade devices utilizing poor grades of TNT and other compositions. Following recent sapper attacks, sweeps have frequently turned up defective unexploded satchel charges, and bangalore torpedoes that failed to detonate due to faulty fuzes, ignitors, or composition.
c. The following enemy forces were identified during the period of this report:

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<td>vic BEN HET³</td>
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¹The strength and location of the 18th NVA Regt are as of mid-April 1969 when the 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for western Binh Dinh Province.

²Captured Pk's and documents confirmed the redesignation of the 5th Bn, 24th Bn to the 94th Group. This unit was further re-subordinated to the Kontum Province Committee.

³The strength and location of the 28th NVA Regt are as of mid-May 1969 when the Recon Battalions were first identified in II Corps by Division intelligence.

⁴The strength and location of the K-41, K-42, and K-46 Bn's are as of March 1969 when the units were first identified in II Corps through document analysis.

⁵The disposition of the K-46 Bn is as of May 1969 when the unit was first identified in II Corps through document analysis.
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<td>E-301 LF Bn</td>
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1. The unidentified Antiaircraft Battalion was picked up by Division order of battle in May because of the significant increase of 37-mm antiaircraft ground-to-air fire in the Tri Border Area. The unidentified Artillery Battalion was also added to Division order of battle in May when the DUC CO area experienced a significant increase in 105-mm Howitzer fire.

2. The strength and location of the K-41, K-42, and K-16 Bn's are as of March 1969 when the units were first identified in II Corps through document analysis.

3. In December 1968, the 101D Regt moved from II Corps into the III Corps area.

4. The strength and disposition of the K-20 Sapper Battalion are as of March 1969 when the Battalion was first identified through prisoner interrogation.

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d. Narrative Summary of Enemy Activity.

(1) At the beginning of December 1968, enemy forces in the provinces of PLEIKU, KONTUM, and DARLAC were recovering from their losses of the DUC LAP campaign and the abortive attempt to attack the DUC CO and OASIS areas. At this time the 66th NVA Regiment was in Base Area 702; the 18B Regiment was thought to be in the same area, along with the 95B Regiment. It was apparent that the 101st NVA Regiment had already gone south into the III Corps area. The 24th NVA Regiment was still active in the mountains to the east of Highway 14, between PLEIKU and KONTUM. The 24th had suffered

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1. The 306th LF Battalion was first identified through documents captured on 1 July 1969 north of KONTUM City.
2. The K-394 NVA Bn was formed by the amalgamation of the K-34 Arty Bn and the K-39 Inf Bn.
3. The 631 NVA Bn was formed by the amalgamation of the K-31 Arty Bn and the 966th NVA Bn.
extremely heavy casualties during the previous months and was largely
ineffective. It was determined later that the bulk of the survivors
of the 24th NVA Regiment were in the process of working their way into
sanctuaries in CAMBODIA.

(2) The events of interest concerning major forces took place during
the December period. The first involved the 95B Regiment in the VC Valley
area, and the second involved the build up of the large base in the CHU
FA, west of PLEIKU. After sorting out intelligence concerning the 95B
Regiment, Task Force WINNER was formed with the objective of destroying
the two battalions of the 95B Regiment. Intelligence showed that VC
Valley itself, also used as an extensive egress route, was not the
principal location of major elements of the 95B. The responsibility of Task
Force WINNER was also enlarged to include the base area of the 408th
Sapper Battalion to the north. While substantial amounts of food and sup-
plies were moved from the VC Valley area, there never was a decisive
contact with elements of the 95B Regiment.

(3) Enemy elements belonging to the 408th Sapper Battalion to
the north were also successful in avoiding decisive contact. Again
this was primarily due to the enemy's total familiarity with his area and
the extremely rough terrain in which we had to operate. Stay-behind patrols
and a stay-behind platoon, however, enjoyed occasional successes in the
408th's area by ambushing small enemy elements as they filtered back into
the base. The 408th has not subsequently engaged in anything but the most
minor of harassments and appears to have avoided contact to the northeast
of PLEIKU. Several elements of this battalion, however, have been detached
to other areas and have been moderately active while working with local
forces.

(4) Also at this time, the Division conducted a saturation long range
patrol program within the PHU NHON District between Highway 14 and the VC
Valley to deny enemy infiltration from CAMBODIA. These patrols were placed
along known infiltration trails and in suspected cache areas. Employment
of this long range patrol effort, which consisted primarily of the IFFV
Long Range Patrol Company, stretched from the CAMBODIAN Border south to
DUC CO, east to the PLEI ME area, and then to the southern edge of the VC
Valley itself. Over 70,000 lbs of rice were removed from enemy caches during
the month of December. Approximately 500,000 lbs of rice had been removed
or destroyed in the area through August 1969. The removal of this vital
commodity, the removal of many small arms caches, and the disruption of the
infiltration route has greatly hampered the capability of the 95B Regiment,
and as late as mid-September, regimental elements were still busily
engaged in trying to reconstitute these losses. A series of small patrols
placed in the area throughout a great portion of the year have continued
to deplete this regiment both in supplies and in manpower.

(5) It became increasingly apparent during the first part of December
that enemy units working in Base Areas 701 and 702 were bringing a myriad
of supplies from these base areas into the CHU FA Mountains, west of PLEIKU.
It was also known that the PLEI TRAP Valley road leading out of the Tri Border
Area into VIETNAM was being extensively used for the southern movement of
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intfiltration groups and logistics as well as for the build up of forces in the CHU PA Mountain area. As a result of a study made by the Division G-2 section, based on valuable input received from a Hoi Chan, a combined operation using ARVN and 4th Division battalions was begun in the CHU PA area during the first week in January 1969. Despite the triple canopy jungle and the extremely rugged terrain, this allied operation was eminently successful. Not only were enemy transportation and logistical groups in the area surprised and scattered, but over 100 tons of war materiel were destroyed. Fires and explosions continued for days in enemy ammunition and arms dumps. This effort in effect pre-empted the Spring Offensive by almost two months and was instrumental in destroying much of the enemy’s capability to inflict heavy damage on population centers to the east. The 24th NVA Regiment was in the southern portion of the CHU PA and suffered such heavy casualties that it was forced to withdraw to the west to regroup. Over 500 enemy bodies were found in the CHU PA area alone. Allied incursions into the CHU PA also caught the 8th Battalion of the 66th Regiment forcing it to withdraw into its rear base to the northwest of the CHU PA. This battalion was never able to reconstitute itself sufficiently to take part in subsequent battles near the population center of KONTUM.

(6) In the meantime during January and February, it became evident that the 66th Regiment was in the rugged terrain to the north of the CHU PA attempting to work its way east toward PLEI MRONG. The 66th was blocked by 4th Division troops northeast of POLEI KLENG. The 7th and 9th Battalions of the 66th, harassed at every turn and suffering heavy casualties, worked their way to the POLEI KLENG area and in conjunction with elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment made an abortive attempt against the fire bases protecting the approaches to POLEI KLENG and against POLEI KLENG itself. Attacks were also made in the BEN HET area with the heavy attacks by fire against BEN HET climaxing in a tank attack on the 3d and 4th of March. These tanks operating out of Base Area 609 were under control of 40th Artillery elements in the Tri-Border Area. Extensive road building had taken place to the west of BEN HET in order to bring these tanks forward. On 2 March Division intelligence detected heavy SLAR readings in the border area and dispatched a platoon of tanks to BEN HET to counter a possible tank attack. Two SOVIET-made PT-76’s were destroyed during this attack. Also during this period, the Division captured two 105-mm howitzers to the northwest of POLEI KLENG near the border and destroyed or captured several trucks.

(7) Attacks during March were heavy until the middle of the month with attacks occurring in the DUC CO area to the south, against the villages on Highway 14 between KONTUM and THANH AN, and on THANH AN itself. Enemy forces in northern KONTUM consisted of the 66th and 40th Regiments supported by the K-25A and K-25B Sapper Battalions, the 28th Sapper Battalion, the K-20 Sapper Battalion, the K-15 Tank Battalion, and the 304th Local Force Battalion. Also found to the east of Highway 14 in the THANH CAN - KON HORIZING area, was the 5th Battalion of the 24th NVA Regiment. Further south, the 24th Regiment came back into the CHU PA and moved to the vicinity of Highway 14 where it continued operations in an attempt to interdict Highway 14 and disrupt pacification efforts in the PLEI MRONG area.

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Once again the 24th Regiment was unable to make any headway, and a large portion of it, probably one battalion, was destroyed in the CHU PRONG Mountain area east of the highway.

(8) By the last of March the Spring Campaign was definitely coming to a close, and by the 14th of April, enemy elements had withdrawn back to sanctuaries. It is significant to note that a good portion of the enemy's defeat was due to the pre-emptive reaction by Division elements to timely intelligence in the CHU PA area. The movement of 1st Brigade elements into western KONTUM near the PLEI TRAP to interdict enemy routes of supply also contributed to the pre-emptive action. This movement completely disrupted the enemy supply system, added considerably to the confusion of enemy commanders and troops, and succeeded in making a major base area completely useless to the enemy. We know from subsequent reports that the 66th Regiment suffered over two thirds casualties during this period.

(9) In April, enemy forces concluded their unsuccessful Spring Offensive and withdrew into sanctuaries to refit and resupply. At this time CSF elements from TIEU ATAR made contact with NVA forces infiltrating through northern DARNLAC Province. Elements of the Division were called upon to rapidly deploy into the area to attempt to block the infiltrating units. Although enemy forces were never decisively engaged, Division elements inflicted 151 casualties on the enemy in moderate contacts. Although intelligence gleaned from captured documents and PWs mentioned three infiltration groups, the 1062, 1063, and 1064, Division forces encountered only two companies from the 1063 Infiltration Group. Elsewhere, in mid-April 1st Brigade forces were deployed into BINH DINH Province to negate the efforts of the 95B Regiment and the 18th NVA Regiment to disrupt the GVN Pacification Program.

(10) In mid-April NVA forces which had been dormant since the culmination of their Spring Offensive completed resupply and refitting activities in the lower PLEI TRAP and commenced redeployment into the BEN HET - DAK TO area. Enemy forces in the Tri-Border area increased to near division strength. Following the division size build-up, the enemy launched their long-awaited Summer Offensive, and DAK TO and BEN HET began to receive heavy stand off attacks, while fire support bases in the surrounding area received light ground probes and harassing attacks. The enemy forces responsible for these attacks were the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments, supported by rocket, antiaircraft, and field artillery battalions of the 40th Artillery Regiment, as well as by Engineer/Sapper units. During May, the intensity of attacks on BEN HET and DAK TO increased, and by the end of the month both camps had received a combined total of 1,647 rounds of mortar, rocket, and artillery fire.
(11) At the same time, enemy elements in PLEIKU Province became active as the 24th NVA Regiment conducted their first major ground attack in over a year and attacked LZ PENNY in battalion strength. Two days later, a combined arms team, using elements of the K-37 Sapper Battalion as a nucleus, conducted an attack on LZ OASIS using mortar, rocket, and infantry support. Both attacks were successfully repulsed and the enemy resumed his normal pace of activity.

(12) During June NVA forces continued their attacks by fire on BEN HET and DAK TO and interdicted Highway 412. The 28th Regiment attempted to isolate and surround the Special Forces Camp and cut off resupply at the BEN HET Camp. During June BEN HET and DAK TO received a total of 2,709 rounds of mixed mortar, rocket, and artillery fire. ARVN forces were never able to mount sustained operations against the superior NVA forces. However, US artillery and Tactical Air, provided with lucrative targets by US intelligence, poured tons of munitions into enemy locations, and successfully prevented enemy forces from launching a major ground attack against BEN HET. Suffering heavy losses from the continuous bombardment, the enemy was finally forced to withdraw his troops into sanctuaries across the CAMBODIAN Border. The withdrawal of enemy units from the BEN HET - DAK TO area during the last week of June marked the culmination of the enemy's Summer Offensive.

(13) By the first week of July, all NVA forces throughout the Division area of operations were in sanctuaries conducting refitting and resupply operations. The remainder of July saw an increase in guerrilla type activities perpetrated by small local force VC units. Activity remained light until mid-July when operations began against the extensive base area of the 18th NVA Regiment to the north-northeast of AN KHE. Intelligence indicated the presence of the Regimental Headquarters and supporting companies, the 8th Battalion of the 18th Regiment, elements of the H-208 LF Company, and local force guerrillas conducting training within the area.

(14) 1st Brigade LRP teams were inserted into the area to pinpoint enemy locations and were immediately engaged. In addition, aircraft flying support for the LRP teams received heavy ground-to-air fire, and LZs were subjected to attacks by fire and harassing type fire. The main body of the 18th NVA Regiment moved north to avoid contact leaving behind rear security elements to cover their retreat. In August, one battalion of the 1st Brigade was lifted to an area north of the Regiment's location in an attempt to push the evading enemy forces back into elements sweeping from the south. Following sporadic contact in the northern area, the 18th NVA Regiment fled northeast across the SONG BA River into Base Area 226 again leaving behind rear security elements to slow down friendly forces in pursuit. Sporadic contact with small size units continued through the month of August. The numerous bunker complexes found, contacts with enemy forces, heavy ground-to-air fire, the uncovering of a hospital complex, and the discovery of three rice caches attested to the Regiment's extensive use of this base area. Although friendly forces were unable to decisively engage elements of the 18th Regiment, sporadic contacts during the two-month period accounted for over 300 NVA killed and over 5,000 pounds of rice captured. At the close of the northern operation, CBU bomblets were dropped along routes of egress to make the area inaccessible to enemy use in the immediate future.
(15) The majority of the NVA elements which had participated in the Summer Offensive withdrew into their CAMBODIAN sanctuaries in July and were inactive during August. Following this withdrawal, the Division focused its attention on DARLAC and QUANG DUC Provinces where major NVA forces had deployed for the battle at DUC LAP following the previous Summer Offensive. By mid-August reliable intelligence confirmed the movement of enemy forces into the II Corps - III Corps border area; however, no contact was made.

(16) Enemy activity decreased throughout the AO during September as the enemy activity was characterized by attacks by fire, and light ground probes against villages and hamlets in an attempt to disrupt the GVN pacification effort. Activity was strongest in BINH DINH Province where the 2d Brigade deployed to the VINH THANH Valley to mount a combined multi-battalion operation with ROKA forces against the 18th NVA Regiment and the BINH DINH Provincial Unit. Only sporadic contact was made as the enemy forces evaded to avoid decisive combat. US and ROKA forces were successful, however, in killing over 260 NVA/VC. The enemy's reluctance to stand and fight cost him heavy supply losses as friendly forces captured or destroyed 245 small arms, 44 machine guns, 15 mortar tubes, 500,000 rounds of small arms, 2,000 rounds of crew-served ammunition, 56 rockets, and 47,450 pounds of rice.

(17) Increased enemy reconnaissance during early October indicated that enemy forces were preparing for their Autumn Offensive in PLEIKU Province. The 6th Battalion and the remainder of the 24th Regiment moved back into the CHU PA from their CAMBODIAN sanctuary. Increased contacts with enemy forces around PLEI MRONG in mid-October indicated that the 24th Regiment had completed resupply and staging operations and was prepared to initiate attacks on villages and friendly installations and to commence interdiction of Highway 14 between PLEIKU and KONTUM. Documents captured by the 2-8 Mechanized Infantry in contact with platoon and company size NVA forces identified both the 4th and 6th Battalions of the 24th Regiment. The 631st Composite Battalion re-established its offensive and attacked LZ OASIS for the first time in more than five months with rockets and mortar fire. The 631st Composite Battalion continued its offensive and rocketed allied installations in PLEIKU and finally CAMP ENARI in late October.

(18) In the II Corps - III Corps border area during October, the 7-17 Air Cavalry obtained initial indications of enemy movement in the BU PRANG area. In late October, reliable intelligence indicated enemy movement northeast toward the camp. The BU PRANG and DUC LAP Special Forces camps and fire support bases ANNIE and KATE received heavy rocket and artillery fire from across the CAMBODIAN border which caused the MSF and CSF forces to withdraw to the BU PRANG camp. To date the 28th NVA Regiment and the 394 Composite Battalion have been identified in contact in the BU PRANG - DUC LAP area.
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14. (C) PERSONNEL

a. Strengths. In order to accomplish the mission of defense of the base camp, conduct operations against the enemy, and provide an adequate supply/support function, each unit was assigned an authorized number of personnel that it could maintain in its base camp and trains area. The base camp and trains strength authorizations for standard infantry battalions were 130 and 90 respectively. The mechanized infantry battalion was authorized 145 and 130 respectively because of its additional logistical requirements. As of 8 September, the authorized strengths for base camp and trains were reduced to 120 and 80 for infantry battalions and 126 and 105 for the mechanized infantry battalion in order to further increase unit forward strengths. These authorized strengths reflected the mission of the unit, tactical considerations, and geographic location and could be altered temporarily in keeping with the tactical and logistical situation.

b. Replacements. USARV has maintained the Division overstrength in the 11 series MOS. Although specific shortages existed in 11C series personnel, excesses existing in 11B MOS covered this shortage. The shortage was not unique to the Division as USARV fills vacancies based on total strength rather than specific MOS shortages. To solve the problem of a shortage of mortarmen, the Division operated a mortar school, and each unit had its own training program which was assisted by a Division mobile training team. These two programs working together resulted in a number of 11B personnel completing either unit training or the mortar school and subsequently being assigned as mortarmen and awarded an 11C secondary MOS. This program has significantly reduced the shortage of 11C personnel. Requisitions for personnel that are unfilled are primarily in the senior NCO grades. Approximately 99% of the personnel arriving in the Division are MOS qualified.

c. Discipline. In order to meet the requirements outlined by the Military Justice Act of 1968 and facilitate the administration of Military Justice within the Division, a Judicial Support Activity was formed which consolidated the administration of Military Justice Activities of 19 battalions and other Special Court-Martial authorities. Formerly each Court-Martial authority performed Military Justice functions for its own personnel to include two trial counsels, two defense counsels, and five court members and prepared the record of trial and published Court-Martial orders. Under the present system, the Judicial Support Activity provides the personnel and performs these functions for the various Special Court-Martial authorities. This affords the unit a considerable man-power saving and enables the savings to be devoted to the accomplishment of the immediate combat mission. The Judicial Support Activity also monitors potential Courts-Martial cases and assists and advises the company and battalion commanders on appropriate Courts-Martial charges to insure that trial delays are held to the minimum. The centralization under the operation of the Staff Judge Advocate has eliminated any backlog of Special Courts-Martial
cases to the point that an individual can now be tried by a Special Court-Martial within one week after the offense has been committed. A considerable decrease in the number of Courts-Martial offenses has also been noted as a result of expeditious trial action.

d. Prisoners of War. During the period November 1968 through September 1969, the Division detained 842 prisoners of which 520 were released as innocent civilians. The prisoners of war collection point at Camp Enari has grown during this period and now has the capacity to accommodate over 200 detainees.

e. Military Police Activities.

(1) In the general category of law enforcement, five points stand out: the size of the 4th Infantry Division Military Police Company, the success of combining sound law enforcement with continuing command effort to reduce traffic accidents and traffic fatalities, the need for rigid control of indigenous personnel on US installations, the importance of having a comprehensive program to combat the omnipresent narcotics/drug/marijuana problem, and the successful employment of V-100 Commando Armored Cars in convoy operations.

(2) Size of the Division MP Company. Like other infantry and armor divisions, the 4th Division has an organic MP Company organized under the TOE 19-27G. Its authorized strength of 189 has proven inadequate to support sustained combat operations when three brigades are habitually committed. In addition to performing all of the functions outlined in the TOE, Division MPs use one platoon daily for controlling convoy operations and three squads for controlling/searching indigenous personnel who arrive at Division and brigade base camps at the daily rate of 3,600. Recognizing the need to reinforce the Division MP Company, an augmentation was requested from and approved by the Commanding General, USARV. This authorized overstrength of 39 enlisted men permits execution of all essential MP missions.

(3) Reducing Motor Vehicle Accidents and Traffic Fatalities. It is axiomatic that one of the most unpalatable experiences for a commander whose command is engaged in combat operations is the useless loss of American lives. The division introduced a program which has proven extremely effective in reducing both motor vehicle accidents and traffic fatalities. The program is thrust in three directions: first, the promulgation of a traffic code applicable throughout the Division area of operation; second, the initiation of uniformly rigid traffic law enforcement; and third, continued command interest in all administrative and disciplinary actions taken against traffic violators. The traffic code includes two unique features which contribute vitally to low accident rates. The maximum speed authorized is 25 MPH (exclusive of direct enemy contact situations.) The rapid accident/fatality reduction has since shown the advantages of lowered speed limits. The other unique part of the traffic code is the provision for impoundment of vehicles for
any of the following offenses: vehicle left unsecured or unattended (the Division rate for larceny is 0.0%), speed in excess of 11 MPH above the posted maximum, drunk/reckless driving, and unauthorized dispatch.

(4) Control of Indigenous Personnel. While indigenous civilians provide many services for the Division, they also pose threats to internal security as well as to private and US property. To reduce the risks the PHO has been charged with the responsibility for issuing passes. Working closely with the G2 and the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS), appropriate clearance is verified and expedited thus minimizing the issuance of temporary passes. All employees and their vehicles are required to pass through labor control gates where a complete search by MPs and hired indigenous female searchers is accomplished. This system has significantly retarded larceny, black market activities, unauthorized entry, and introduction of contraband items on installations. Periodically, ARVN MSS participates in these daily operations to verify security clearances. All employees exchange their VN identification cards for US passes. A nightly check insures that all indigenous personnel depart the Division Base Camp. This system has proven extremely successful.

(5) The Narcotics/Drug/Marijuana Problem. The problem of narcotics, dangerous drugs, and marijuana is commonplace in today's society and is aggravated in VIETNAM by the mental and physical stresses of combat coupled with easy and cheap acquisition of these illegal items (hereafter referred to as illicit drugs.) A three-pronged program initiated by the Provost Marshal to combat the problem has been established. The three parts of the program consist of education, investigation, and "salvation." The education process for an individual assigned to the Division begins while he is in the 4th Replacement Detachment. A CID investigator presents a 30 minute straight-forward discussion of the problem, stressing the physiological, financial, sociological, economical, physical, and psychological difficulties which may accrue to an individual who uses or "pushes" illicit drugs. On a continual basis, CID personnel conduct scheduled presentations at firebases and base camps. Usually two one-hour presentations are made. The first hour is presented to officers and NCOs, grade E6 and above. In this class the emphasis is placed on how personnel obtain and use illicit drugs, where they usually hide them, actions to be taken if illicit drug possession or use is suspected, and how military police personnel can assist. Portions of marijuana and opium are burned for the class and all types of cigarettes, containers, pipes, and materials are displayed. Lower grade enlisted men receive a one-hour presentation, the purpose of which is to discourage the use of illicit drugs. Most of the features of the Replacement Detachment presentation are reiterated. Men are also informed of the "Salvation" program. The "Salvation" part of the program is possibly unique to the Division. Under the provisions of this program, a person who uses or is a user of illicit drugs is allowed to turn himself in without prejudice for the purpose of obtaining assistance in overcoming his problem. One requirement cannot be waived: the person turning
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himself if must not be suspected of, under investigation for, or pending administrative or disciplinary action for illicit drug use or possession. Usually self turn-in is to military police or CID, but sometimes it is to medical or chaplain personnel. In any case, all three agencies - the Provost Marshal, Surgeon, and Chaplain work closely together to help the man help himself. Experienced, mature individuals gain his confidence, reassure him regarding amnesty, and devote as many hours as possible to preventing the man from becoming an illicit drug statistic. The man remains relatively anonymous, and his case is disclosed to his unit only when he so authorizes although every attempt is made to establish rapport between the man and an officer or senior NCO of his unit. The program is somewhat similar to the Alcoholics Anonymous program in that the Division Chief of CID, an especially interested and mature individual, has made himself available 24 hours a day to assist or merely talk with those desiring help. Although the program is too embryonic to assess statistically, it is considered to have had a great deal of merit. None of the personnel who have turned themselves in to date have subsequently become subjects of MP reports of investigation for drug abuse.

(b) Use of V-100 Commando Armored Cars in Convoy Operations. The Division has had from 16 to 30 V-100 Commando armored vehicles on loan from ARVN authorities for approximately 16 months. These vehicles are primarily used in protecting and exercising command and control of convoys. The following concept is used: a Military Police Officer is designated as commander of each resupply convoy. Each march serial has three V-100's; one leads, one trails, and one is located in the convoy's approximate center. Gun-jeeps and gun-trucks are also dispersed throughout as needed. All three vehicles enter the Division Transportation Officer's (DTO) radio net. The DTO regulates traffic and advises the MP convoy commander when the highway is cleared of mines and safe for traffic. MP check-point personnel at SPs space vehicles at 100 meter intervals and advise the convoy commander when all vehicles have crossed the SF. The convoy commander, normally situated in the middle V-100, controls the rate of march by making frequent speed checks with other V-100s. V-100s have proven highly useful, because of their ability to maneuver and lay down a violent volume of automatic fire. Further, the convoy commander is capable of calling for artillery and air support. Since the initiation of the V-100 vehicle in Division convoys, no personnel have ever been left in enemy kill zones. However, certain problems have been experienced. Because of the loan status of V-100s, the Division has had no authorization to stock parts. Further, daily use of the vehicles caused a severe maintenance problem. The vehicles, while impervious to small arms fire and fragmentation missiles, are highly vulnerable to land mines and B-40 fire.


(1) Morale. Because the basic needs of each soldier are adequately provided for, morale within the Division is extremely high. Such items as mail, hot meals, clean clothing, and other comforts that can be pro-
vided under field conditions are never neglected in the 4th Infantry Division. The Service Club and the Craft Shop, opened in July 1969; the postal facility; and several officer, NCO, and enlisted men's clubs all work together to enhance the morale. They are used to maximum extent when units are in Camp Enari on maintenance stand down.

(2) Personnel Services. A significant amount of time was being lost by personnel returning to the Division base camp to correct their records, get new 10 cards and tags, make allotment changes, etc. To counter this drain, a mobile composite personnel team was formed under the control of the Adjutant General. This team, made up of members of the Adjutant General's Office, Finance Office, and Judge Advocate Section, was instrumental in saving thousands of man-days each quarter by taking all desired services to the troops in the field rather than having the individual soldier return to the Division base camp. The team was particularly effective during company and battalion level stand downs. The success of this effort was due primarily to the fact that all records pertaining to all individuals in the unit visited were taken to them. The individual could start/stop an allotment, get a new 10 card, verify or update his emergency data card, and ask for legal advice on a personal problem on the firebase at which he worked. A total of more than 50,000 man-hours was saved each quarter by the utilization of this team.

(a) Awards and Decorations. In furtherance of the command awards program to immediately recognize acts of valor, an "impact awards" system was established which made it possible to process and present valor awards up to and including the Bronze Star within 24 hours of the act. This program did much to enhance the value and meaning of the awards program.

(b) Special Services Activities. The individual soldier must occasionally have a break, and during such a break, it is necessary to keep him occupied and out of trouble. The opportunities available through the special services program, if properly utilized, are ideal for this purpose. A request for an increase in the number of USO shows was granted, and Division policy established that these shows would go as far forward as security would permit. A library and craft shop were completed in the base camp to provide constructive recreational facilities to occupy the time of the soldier and both were an immediate success.

(c) Scholarship Fund and Division Association. Voluntary contributions to the 4th Infantry Division Scholarship Fund up to the end of October 1969 have exceeded $260,000.00. At present there are 224 known eligible dependents. During the year, arrangements were finalized with the National Chapter of the 4th Infantry Division Association for the establishment of the final arrangements are complete a sum of $250,000.00 will be forwarded to the bank for deposit. The certificates will be issued by the National Association to the eligible recipients at that time.
(d) MPC Conversion and Savings. On 11 August 1969 a Conversion Day was announced for all American troops in RVN. The Division converted $4,476,809.70 in old MPC for new MIXC in the first 48 hours of the conversion period. There were 3,962 people during the period who converted more than the $150 demonstrating the need for stronger emphasis on the use of savings programs available for Division personnel.

g. Medical Support.

(1) Infectious Disease. By far the most severe medical problem facing soldiers in the Central Highlands is malaria. Nearly one-third of the cases are Vivax Malaria, and the remainder are primarily Falciparum. Through vigorous command emphasis, the Vivax rate is one half that registered for corresponding months the previous year. Since the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet will prevent all Vivax Malaria, a program of testing urine for the presence of the Chloroquine tablet was instituted by the Division Surgeon. By requiring one fourth of each unit to be tested every week, the surgeon was able to pinpoint the units with inadequate malaria prophylaxis programs.

(2) Diarrheal disease has almost always been food or water borne. The constant attention to safe water by engineer elements, unit surgeons, and the individual is constantly warranted. Water supply points are kept clean and the soldier is shown how to treat his water with iodine tablets in case of an emergency. Food must be meticulously prepared, and frequent inspections of mess halls by medical personnel, food service technicians, and field sanitation teams are conducted. Perhaps the single most important factor that allows organisms to grow in food is temperature. Food must be cooked and kept at temperatures over 140°F. Refrigerated foods must be kept at temperatures below 45°F. Food left between these two temperatures for an hour or more is dangerous and unsafe to consume. Local indigenous food and water is unsafe and troops are constantly reminded of this fact.

(3) Skin disease is quite common among combat troops. The foot is particularly susceptible to fungal infection and immersion foot syndrome. Frequent clothing resupply and particular attention to the feet have been invaluable in minimizing these ailments.

(4) Dental Service. Dental care and treatment for the entire Division area of operation was provided by the 39th Medical Detachment (MS). Camp Enari had a thirteen chair clinic which supplemented the 71st Evacuation Hospital Clinic. Although incoming personnel are screened and those requiring immediate care are treated, dental care is a continuous requirement. To provide this care to the forward fire bases, two air mobile dental vans are lifted into forward areas so none of the men are deprived of this vital service by virtue of their inaccessibility to base camp facilities. When in base camp, men assigned to forward firebases receive first priority treatment.
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h. Chaplain Activities. Chaplains are an essential part of the
Division. Their role in providing religious services and their concern
with morals and morale have assisted soldiers in maintaining their sense
of human dignity. A particular effort has been made to ensure that the
soldier has the opportunity to receive the ministrations of his faith
no matter where he is. This has been made possible by chaplains utilizing
the concept of area coverage. Instead of a chaplain seeing only one unit
that may be spread throughout the area of operations, he works within a
prescribed area and covers the many units within that area saving the
chaplain much time. The Division Chaplain's Office has provided teams
to fly twice weekly to provide services for units that were inaccessible
to unit chaplains. These teams were available upon request by the brigade
chaplains. The teams were made up of the DISCOM Chaplain, DIVARTY Chaplain,
the Engineer Battalion Chaplain, and those in the Division Chaplain's
Office. Chaplains who work in the forward areas become well acquainted
with their men by sharing the hardships and hazards of fire base life and
are an effective source of information. The men often seek counsel with
the Chaplain and confide in him. Problem areas can be resolved before
they grow out of proportion.
15. (C) LOGISTICS

a. General.

(1) Logistical support to forward combat elements has been accomplished through forward support elements (FSE), 1st Logistical Command: forward support activities (FSA) and 1st Logistical Command logistical support activities (LSA). Additionally, one direct support maintenance company and one medical company has habitually been in support of each brigade and collocated with the brigade trains. Land lines of communication have been the primary means of resupply, although airlift resupply has been necessary on occasion. Ammunition resupply has been provided by the 1st Logistical Command through ammunition supply points (ASP) located at PLEIKU, AN KHE, and MARY LOU (phased out).

(a) At FSE augmented by bath and laundry support from 45th Group (GS) has been capable of supporting a normal brigade task force of two, three or four maneuver battalions. An FSE operation provided by 45th Group (GS) was necessary to support elements of the Division operating in the DAK TO area during the early months of 1969. In April, the 1st Brigade moved to AN KHE and since that time that brigade has been supported by a logistical support activity (LSA) of the 593d Group (GS).

(b) FSE's, FSA's, and LSA's have habitually been collocated with C-130 capable airfields. This has given the Division the capability of resupply by air if land lines of communication are threatened or closed.

(c) With an extremely large Division AO, it was necessary to preposition certain supplies at brigade bases in order to further insure that these supplies would be forward should land lines of communication be interdicted. Stockage Objectives (SO) were established on selected supplies and these SO's were monitored on a daily basis.

(2) Maintenance support to forward combat elements is provided by forward direct support maintenance companies of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. These companies are collocated with brigade combat trains, and emphasis is placed on repairing vehicles and equipment as far forward as possible. Headquarters and Co A, 704th Maintenance Battalion provides back up support to the direct support companies, and operates the technical supply activity for the Division. Back up direct support maintenance for the Division is provided by the 62d Maintenance Battalion, 45th Group (GS). Due to a stabilized tactical situation during the early and summer of 1969, the Division was able to place a great deal of emphasis on maintenance. As vehicles and equipment received close technical inspections, the deadline rate in the Division increased. However, by late summer, the upward trend leveled off and is now declining. This emphasis on maintenance should result in improved tactical operations in the future. (The maintenance status of
tactical vehicles, combat vehicles, and aircraft is briefed and monitored on a daily basis. The maintenance status of other selected items of equipment is briefed on a weekly basis. The Division has a CMHT Team and during the past nine months each unit of this Division has received at least one CMHT. A PML Assistance Team has also been formed and this team makes frequent visits to Division units, providing assistance in records keeping and maintenance of repair parts.

(3) As has been stated, transportation support within the Division has generally been accomplished over land lines of communication. C-130 support is available on request and several of the Division's contingency plans call for relocation by air. Through a constant emphasis on highway security, the land lines of communication in the Division AO have remained open. Convoy have been able to move with only a minimum of harassment. The greatest adversity faced in overland movement was the extremely poor road conditions that existed in some areas during the heavy monsoon rains during the month of July and in early August. Often an all day effort was required in order to push supplies forward from brigade to battalion firebases. This problem was minimized in July, however, when 1st Logistical Command agreed to provide GSO support to the Division throughout the monsoon season. The GSO's went forward to the brigades and resupply problems were greatly reduced on receipt of this support.

(4) Ammunition resupply was accomplished with little or no difficulty during the year. The Available Supply Rate (ASR) of ammunition imposed no undue hardships. On occasion the Division did request extension of certain ASR controlled ammunition and these requests were habitually granted, though not always in the quantities asked for. The Division, on no occasion, over-drew its ASR of ammunition. The 88th Ordnance Battalion, 1st Logistical Command, operated the ammunition supply points in the Division's Area of Operations. Presently the Division is supported by two ASP's; PLEIKU and AN KHE. Additionally, a consolidated ammunition supply activity was in operation with the 3d Brigade at the OASIS, until that brigade base closed in October. Stockage Objectives have been established for selected munitions and these SO's are monitored on a daily basis.

b. Maintenance Support.

(1) The 704th Maintenance Battalion provides direct support maintenance for TOE and TDA equipment, including aircraft; except medical, electrical accounting machines (EAM), airdrop and cryptographic equipment belonging to assigned and attached units of the 4th Infantry Division. It also provides direct support and organizational level repair parts and maintenance supplies. Support is provided on an area basis to Division units and attached units.
(2) Support to brigades is provided by a forward support company at each of the brigade fire bases. The main support company and aircraft maintenance company are located at Camp Enari. When drastic shifts in equipment densities occur due to the tactical situation, the support company is augmented with teams from the other forward support companies. Special contact teams are assembled on a mission basis.

(a) Specific services provided by all maintenance units are:

1. Equipment repair.
2. DX of selected unserviceable, recoverable components and assemblies.
3. Collection and evaluation of unserviceables.
4. Recovery and evacuation support.

(b) Backup and general support maintenance is provided by:

1. 62d Maintenance Battalion (DS), PLEIKU.
2. 86th Maintenance Battalion (GS), QUI NHON.
3. 604th Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company (DS), PLEIKU.
4. 540th Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company (DS), QUI NHON.
5. USS Corpus Christi Bay (FAMP) (Depot).

(3) Each forward support company stocks repair parts using a sixty (60) day requisitioning objective (15 days operating level, 15 days safety level and 30 days order and shipping time). All requisitions from the forward support companies pass through the main support company and the supplies return through the same channels. This system has proven better for this Division than using the through-put concept.

(4) The main support company operates consolidated Tech Supply records at Camp Enari for Headquarters and Company A and Company E using an NCR 500 mechanized accounting system. Forward support companies use manual stock records procedures. The NCR 500 configuration does not have a high speed printer capability, an auxiliary card punch or an auxiliary card reader. To compensate for this, the Technical Supply Office has obtained machine time on the AG 1005 system for special supply procedures. These programs enable the Technical Supply Office to better manage the ASL and provide more accurate requisition status to the customers.

(5) The establishment and operation of brigade and Division Maintenance Collection Points has helped to provide an orderly evacuation of unservice-
able equipment to the rear areas. Minimum use of controlled substitution of assemblies on equipment in the maintenance collection point has been a factor in maintaining the equipment of this Division in a high state of combat effectiveness.

(6) Logistical Problem Areas.

(a) Closed Loop Supply Support.

1. The period 1 January - 31 August was characterized by additional items being taken under the Closed Loop System of Control. This was particularly true of the signal commodity. As a result of apparent lack of signal assets in the Closed Loop Program, both down time and deadline rate have increased within the Division. Coupled with the lack of assets for signal equipment is the lack of repair parts for FM series radios (AN/PRC-25 & AN/VRC-12 series) which provide the bulk of tactical unit communications.

2. A policy of repair and return to the supply system exists for the modules in these radios. The modules are mailed to Sacramento Army Depot for repair. After repair the modules are placed into the supply pipeline to satisfy worldwide requirements. Since 1 January 1969, the 704th Maintenance Battalion has returned over 5,000 modules for repair. The number of modules received within the Division has been less than 25%. A continuous zero balance condition exists for certain critical modules (AN/PRC-25-A2, A9, A10; AN/VRC-12 series, A1500, A5300 and A8500). The lack of these modules has contributed to an average of 15 - 20% deadline rate for FM radios within the Division over a six month period. Some of the steps taken to alleviate the problem were:

a. Controlled substitution of modules between radios.

b. Washout of older radios in order to allow units to requisition newer models.

c. Depot searches for modules.

d. Investigation of unit maintenance operations and treatment of the equipment.

2. All the above have allowed us to hold the deadline rate to a minimum. However, until more assets either in the form of repair parts or new equipment are made available there does not appear to be an immediate solution to the high deadline rate.

4. Power train components for the M113A1 series of vehicles have been consumed at an extremely high rate since 1 January. Asset availability has been sporadic due to the large requirements. Aggressive supervision of
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daily organizational maintenance and quarterly services has assisted in lowering the rate during the year. In some cases engines being rebuilt at the Sagami Plant in JAPAN were unsatisfactory. The combination of these factors has been the primary cause of the high deadline and replacement rate for these components.

(b) Maintenance of Ground Equipment.

1. The general maintenance of ground related equipment was characterized by significant reductions in wheel vehicle backlogs, new equipment problems, and attempts to reduce the communications deadline.

2. Combat vehicle deadline rates remained fairly constant over the period. Recurring supply problems on M48A3 Tanks were primarily for suspension assemblies and power train components. Recent conferences and discussions with QUI NHON Support Command has promised some relief in this area. QUI NHON Support Command agreed to pre-position certain combat vehicles major assemblies in the 704th Maintenance Battalion. This will allow a more rapid response to forward commitments.

3. Significant reductions in direct support wheel vehicle backlogs have been accomplished since 1 January. Depot searches, requisition follow-up and aggressive expediting are the main reasons for the reduction.

4. The artillery deadline rate has remained at an acceptable level throughout the period. The introduction of the M102 light howitzer temporarily increased the deadline rate until unit PLL's and 704th Maintenance Battalion ASL's were filled. M102 howitzer sights and sight mounts were problem areas until the receipt of adequate maintenance float stockages. A quarterly repair and return program for the M109 155mm SP howitzers was initiated in late July and has improved the organizational maintenance of this equipment. The repair and return program is an excellent crew training vehicle.

5. Communications equipment has been the most pressing maintenance problem throughout the period. The lack of replacement modules has hampered the reduction of the FM radio's deadline rate. In addition, it was found that the failure rate of FM radios mounted in combat vehicles was due primarily to poor ventilation and overheating of components and power surges through the equipment due to starting the vehicles with the radios on. Electronics command is reviewing the installation requirements for the radios in combat vehicles to reduce the overheating condition. Voltage suppressors are now in use to prevent the power surge problem. The repair of AN/PRC-9 and AN/PRT-4 squad radios has recently become critical, due to a change in DA policy removing the General Support Maintenance capability for repair of these items and centralizing repair at LEXINGTON-BLUE GRASS Army Depot. As a result, all radios requiring printed circuit repairs must
be evacuated to CONUS. To offset the extended repair time, additional maintenance float items are being obtained and a direct exchange program initiated.

6. The AN/PPS-5 Radar was introduced in country early this year and presented new equipment problems. Airborne Instruments Laboratory, Inc. (the contractor for this item) provided contract representatives to assist in resolving the problem areas and have been most cooperative and responsive in this area.

7. Starlight Scopes AN/PVS-1, 2, 3, and TVS 2 and 4's have also had a high deadline rate due to lack of repair parts. A repair and return program was initiated with Sacramento Army Depot and has proven to be extremely responsive with the average turnaround time being 21 days.

(c) Aircraft Maintenance.

1. Aircraft availability has steadily increased throughout the period due primarily to the establishment of closer working relationships between organizational and direct support maintenance units, more efficient and effective maintenance management and properly applied command emphasis. One of the most effective tools has been a weekly maintenance conference with representatives from all aviation units, Division Aviation Office and Company E, 704th Maintenance Battalion. These meetings proved to be most effective in solving existing maintenance problems and have held new problems to a minimum.

2. During this period the most significant maintenance problems have been with the Hughes Light Observation Helicopter (OH-6A). The normal transition problems were experienced with phase out of the OH-23 and replacement by the OH-6A. At this time most of the OH-23 repair parts have been purged from the 704th Maintenance Battalion ASL.

3. The major maintenance problem contributing to low availability for LOH aircraft was the strut fairings, which were cutting scratches in excess of 1/10,000th of an inch into the cross tube landing struts. A survey was made of all LOH aircraft, and ten (10) were grounded until the decision was made to remove the fairings and fly the aircraft without them.

4. Another significant problem experienced with the LOH has been the tail rotor. It is extremely difficult to balance the tail rotor and eliminate a high frequency vibration. Another facet of the rotor problem has been the inward collapsing of the tail rotor after only a few hours of operation. Both of these problems caused a considerable drain on the supply system with a resultant zero balance in country for tail rotors. Production had to be initiated to satisfy the requirements. Considerable downtime was experienced as a result of the tail rotor problems.
c. Transportation Support.

(1) The transportation support available to the Division has been adequate to support all mission requirements. Highway has been the primary mode of support with air being a backup for high priority, short-fused requirements. Each brigade as a separate task force has, where possible, been located close to a C-130 capable airfield to insure continuous support should the land line of communications be interdicted or washed out during the monsoon season.

(2) Highway operations have been essential to insure sufficient resupply of forward brigade bases so as to permit a logistical posture which would permit continuous tactical operations.

(a) Highway 19E is the main supply route from QUI NHON on the coast to PLEIKU in the highlands. To coordinate use, security, maintenance and control of this road, a highway coordinator was established with headquarters at AN KHE. Monthly meetings are held by the highway coordinator between all units concerned, with operations, maintenance, control and security personnel attending.

(b) Highway 14N which runs north and south through PLEIKU was used to support a brigade in KONTUM and non-divisional units as far north as BEN HET. This road is a dispatch route and is controlled by the Division within the AO.

(c) Highway 19W is controlled by the 3d Brigade who is the primary user of the road. It is used from the intersection of Highway 14 and 19 westward to within a few miles of the CAMBODIAN Border.

(d) The monthly performance and road utilization statistics are as follows:

1. Average number of convoys controlled by the Division: 162.
2. Average number of vehicles per convoy: 40.

(3) Utilization of United States Air Force aircraft is infrequent in support of Divisional operations. During the past six months two battalions have relocated by air. Contingency plans are in existence which provide for air movement of units when necessary. Unit air movement plans and air loading tables are also prepared and kept current should air movement be required.

(a) IFFV C-7A aircraft are used to support courier and liaison missions within the Division AO where scheduled common user service is not available. Additionally, they are used to support separate brigade or battalion task forces on a mission basis.
(b) The C-130 and C-123 aircraft that make up the common user system are utilized within the Division. Special mission airlift requests (SMAR's) and routine cargo offerings are made through the local Traffic Management Agency (TMA) field office in Pleiku. Emergency requests, after receiving command approval are relayed to both TMA and IPPFV for approval and necessary action to effect required support.

(c) An average month's airlift performance for all aircraft follows:

1. Sorties - 164.
2. Passengers - 5334.
3. Cargo - 107,970 pounds.

(d) The above statistics do not reflect the movement of DEROS and R&R personnel or replacement personnel.

(4) GOER support was available to the Division during the monsoon season after a specific request for this service was initiated. Due to a relatively temperate monsoon season this year, the full capability of the GOER support was not utilized nor was it required, although when it was used, it was invaluable in supporting isolated units operating in western Pleiku Province.

d. Supply.

(1) Logistical support for classes of supply I, II, III and IIIA, IV and VII are provided to the 4th Infantry Division by the 4th Supply and Transport Battalion through the use of forward support elements (FSE) and base camp stock control and storage facilities. In addition to supply, the 4th S&T Battalion is responsible for providing the Division with selected combat service support, i.e., graves registration and bath. The battalion currently operates one FSE for the 2d Brigade and a Division supply office annex at Camp Radcliff in support of the 1st Brigade. This annex stocks approximately 600 lines of ASL, and has the capability of requisitioning directly from the supporting depot/ICC using its own activity address code. This arrangement takes maximum advantage of lst Logistical Command transportation, saving a 58 kilometer back haul and avoids double handling.

(2) The 4th S&T Battalion receives rations from the Class I section (88th S&S Battalion) at Camp Schmidt for the 3d Brigade and Base Camp. The rations are forwarded to the FSE's and base camp ration breakdown using four TOS reefer vans. Supply point distribution and the item pile method of ration breakdown are used at all Class I points. Class I support for the 1st Brigade - Camp Radcliff is provided by the logistical command ISA.
located at that installation. Class I rations are issued daily to the FSE's in order to insure freshness and to minimize the handicap imposed by insufficient refrigeration.

(3) Class III and IIL support for the 4th Infantry Division is provided by three Class III dispensing facilities serving the base camp, Firebase MEREDITH and Firebase BLACKHAWK. The 4th S&T Battalion frequently provides fuel to forward elements of the brigades by 5000 gallon tanker and 500 gallon pods carried by helicopter sling lifts. In addition, packaged POL products are distributed by the FSE's to unit trains for use in forward areas. Resupply of packaged products to the FSE's is normally accomplished by 4th S&T Battalion organic vehicles, while bulk product is supplied by the thru-put method making maximum use of 1st Logistical Command equipment and avoiding time consuming double handling. The 4th S&T Battalion provides supplemental bulk product transportation when 1st Logistical Command equipment is not available. Units at Camp Radcliff receive Class III support from the LSA 593-3 and the 2d Brigade at LZ ENGLISH receives its Class III support from LSA 593-1.

(4) Class II, IV and VII supply support and stock control is provided by the Division Supply Office at Camp Enari. This activity handles the majority of the Division's supply transactions, including all TOE equipment. Limited barrier materials and disposable eating utensils are pre-stocked at the FSE's for issue to forward combat elements. The barrier materials normally consist of concertina wire, barbed wire, pickets, sandbags and lumber used to construct defensive fortifications. Materials for Division use are normally transported by 1st Logistical Command transportation direct from the depot to Division base camp. The 4th S&T Battalion organic transportation is frequently used to supplement 1st Logistical Command transportation and to pick-up critically needed items from the depot when time is of the essence.

(5) Logistical Problem Areas.

(a) Typewriters have been a critical item to the 4th Infantry Division for more than a year. Since 1 January, the Division has requisitioned 339 typewriters. As of this date only 147 have been received. Although presentation of this problem to responsible logistical support elements has been made, the problem has not been alleviated.

(b) The "Project Rags" status listings received monthly from the three major depots and the ICC are not satisfactory in their present form. The DSU has considerable difficulty reconciling the stock records against the status listing because the listings are arranged by UIC. This necessitates each commodity section researching fifty separate sections of all four listings in order to ascertain the current status of requisitions. The
present format is functional for use by the consumer in reconciling his document register, but an additional listing by Federal Stock Number is required for use by the DSU.

(c) The quantity, variety and quality of fresh fruits and vegetables is a matter of continuing concern. The variety and quantity of fresh produce received has often been less than that required by the 28 Day Master Menu. The total useable amounts received, after deducting spoilage, are not adequate to the needs of the Division.

(d) A problem appears to be developing in resupply from the depot of some subcritical items of general supply. Health and welfare items such as steel cots, ponchos and wall lockers are not in stock at the depot. In addition, problems have been experienced in obtaining fire direction plotting boards and graphical scales.
16. (C) BASE CAMP ACTIVITIES

a. All major construction at Camp Enari has been terminated. The majority of all planned construction was completed prior to termination with the exception of open messes,hardstand, the water distribution system, and security lighting. Security lighting is proceeding on a self-help basis.

b. Since November 1968, several projects designed primarily for the welfare and morale of the 4th Infantry Division soldiers, have been completed.

c. The Post Exchange was destroyed by fire in November 1968. Immediate plans were made for a new building with improved facilities. The new Post Exchange opened on 29 April 1969. This new facility offers the soldier the opportunity for purchasing almost any item he desires. If a desired item is not immediately available, a mail order service is provided, enabling the individual to mail gifts or personal items home. The success of the Post Exchange is proven by the increase in gross monthly sales which have risen from $800,000 in November 1968, to over $1,000,000 in August 1969.

d. A snack bar was also opened as part of the Exchange system. This facility offers a variety of soft drinks, milk shakes, and sandwiches not available in the unit mess halls. This innovation to the daily routine of the soldier who is a permanent resident of the base camp, and to those who are standing down after the rigors of combat has been enthusiastically supported by the men of the 4th Infantry Division: 47,184 men used the snack bar during the month of September 1969.

e. Post Exchange facilities were made available to forward troops through the use of mobile PX vans and an air-mobile PX service utilizing UH-1H helicopters. When the 1st Brigade was deployed to Firebase MCNERNEY, a special van outfitted with sales counters and display shelves was obtained from QHI NHON and served the brigade and the battalion trains areas within the firebase.

f. The air-mobile PX, an innovation begun in February, brings a selection of the most popular PX items to forward troops on a regular schedule. The air-mobile PX operates twice a week, frequently landing at company or patrol LZ's for at least one hour. Watches, cameras, film, magazines, and canned goods are the most popular items made available to 4th Division troops. Special trips are made, when aircraft are available, upon request of commanders in the field.

g. Barber facilities are made available to forward troops at brigade firebases and battalion trains areas through contracted VIETNAMESE barbers. A five chair air-conditioned barber van with water and electrical facilities was made available to the 1st Brigade's Firebase MCNERNEY from the QHI NHON Regional Exchange, and is now rotated among units on Camp Enari to provide barber services. Barber facilities at trains areas and at Camp Enari are augmented when stand downs or troop concentrations occur.

h. The men of the 4th Infantry Division have available to them a variety of recreational and athletic activities. Division Special
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Services controls these programs with a well-trained and responsive staff. Recreational and leisure time facilities have been greatly expanded at Camp Enari. On 24 July 1969, Willett Hall, an 800 seat theater and recreation complex, was dedicated. The multi-use structure has a stage, cinema screen, theater lighting, and the capability of providing one of the following: a regulation-size basketball court, four half-size basketball courts, two full-size volleyball courts, or a regulation indoor tennis court. It also has a weight-lifting area, a boxing ring and training area, a full-size trampoline, and equipment check-out facilities offering baseball, football, basketball, boxing, handball, tennis, and badminton equipment. In addition, tennis shoes and athletic clothing are available.

i. An aggressive and highly popular athletic program designed by a trained recreation director has been made available for the support troops at Camp Enari and forward troops on their return to base camp. A volleyball tournament in September and October saw teams from all the battalions and separate companies in the Division participating. The winning team was sent to QUI NHON and placed fourth in a USASUPCOM tournament.

j. A basketball tournament began on 4 November 1969, and 16 teams participated in daily competition. With the acquisition of a regulation-size boxing ring and training facilities, a boxing program was initiated, the only one of its kind in VIETNAM. Clinics, exhibitions, and tournaments have been scheduled to provide training and experience in this popular sport.

k. Trampoline instruction was instituted upon the receipt of a trampoline in October. Training and tournaments in handball, outdoor basketball, tennis, and softball are planned as the wet monsoon abates.

Willett Hall has been exceptionally popular with the men of the 4th Infantry Division. Approximately 1,700 men a week checkout the 150 pieces of athletic equipment available. Movies are shown twice a week, and USO and special Soldier Shows are presented to standing-room-only audiences.

m. Swimming facilities are provided by a pool complex adjacent to the PX area. Swimming trunks are available for checkout, and outdoor lounges and chairs are provided for the average of 200 men a day who utilize the pool. Special time is set aside each day for competition swimming and instruction. A miniature golf course within the pool compound provides a further recreational outlet.

n. A second new recreation center, the Special Service's Craft Shop, opened on 26 July 1969. The building, centrally located next to the PX complex, is open 12 hours a day, six days a week, and offers Iyvmen tools, materials, and instruction in leatherwork, lapidary, silver-work, woodworking, photography processing, printing and drawing, and model building. An exceptional selection of tools and equipment is available for the soldier's use. A resale store offers hobby materials at wholesale or cost prices, and leather and photographic materials are
made available at cost or below cost prices. An average of 125 men a
day utilize the craft shop, and may request instruction in any of the
hobby programs from the Craft Shop Director or the Special Services
Staff. A lounge and television set enhance the Craft Shop, providing
a comfortable social center for men working on projects or processing
film.

o. Special Services opened a 1,500 volume circulating library at
Camp Enari, next to Willett Hall, and operates a large and well-stocked
library at Camp Radcliff. Popular and regional magazines and daily
newspapers are available for leisure-reading, and a well-stocked
reference section is provided. Popular best-sellers, important non-
fiction, and literary classics are available for circulation to anyone
in the Division.

p. Special Services also offers a variety of USO and Soldier
Shows. Special performances and hand-shake tours are scheduled for
forward firebases and bring show-business personalities to the combat
infantrymen. Current movies are provided to both rear and forward
locations on a daily basis. Twenty projectors have been provided to
Division units for this purpose.

q. The Service Club offers checkout table games, musical
instruments, cards, a recently refurbished pool room, a ping-pong room,
a magazine reading room, TV room, music room with a piano, and a tape
room with a large tape library and a complement of tape recorders
allowing men to tape with their own machines or the excellent machines
that are offered at the Club.

r. A full recreational program supervised by a trained USO staff
includes twice-weekly movies, weekly pool and ping-pong tournaments,
monthly unit and birthday parties, and USC and Soldier Shows. An
expanded schedule includes information lectures, and a theater workshop.

s. The Noncommissioned Officers' Open Mess administrative system
has undergone a complete revision to provide additional financial controls
and safeguards. These revisions are necessary to protect the interest
of NCO's and EM who support and are served by the Open Mess system. The
primary effort was the consolidation of all clubs at Camp Enari and
Camp Radcliff under one main club account. At this time all annexes
(38) are operating under this system.

t. The Main Officers' Open Mess also has absorbed as annexes 12
clubs within the Division area. As with the NCO mess, consolidation
has simplified accounting, facilitated supervision, and resulted in a
profit in both cases.

u. A unique innovation was introduced in the club system during
August 1969. All clubs were placed under the direct control of the
Deputy Post Commander, Camp Enari. In addition, two 4th Infantry
Division documents were published. One document established admin-
istrative and operational policies and procedures for the establishment,
operation, administration and inactivation of clubs within the command.
The other established the 4th Infantry Division Audit Team and the

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procedures necessary for a close examination and evaluation of the financial administration and fixed assets of the officers and NCO-EM clubs of the Division.

v. The audit team is completely independent of the officers and NCO-EM clubs and cannot be influenced by either system. Separate clubs are audited each day and the results forwarded to the Commanding General's Office. Since establishing these regulations, all clubs have been thoroughly audited. In addition, the USARV Audit Team has conducted an inspection of the mess system within the Division. No major discrepancies were discovered. The establishment of these controls have not caused a decline in entertainment or other activities in the club system. It has, however, created a setting for competent, accurate, and efficient club management throughout the Division.

w. Labor management is another important part of the Division base camp activities. A total of 425 permanent hire VIETNAMESE are employed at Camp Enari and Camp Radcliff. To provide a centralized point of contact and continuous supervision, the labor management office was placed under the direct control of the Deputy Post Commander. This has been particularly successful because of the DPC's close association with the PX, NCO and officers club, and other administrative activities of the Post where the majority of the indigenous personnel work.

x. In addition to the 425 permanent hire VIETNAMESE, there are approximately 471 MONTAGNARDS hired on a daily basis, 450 housemaids, and 204 Kit Carson Scouts controlled by the labor management office. The 471 MONTAGNARDS are utilized to improve fortifications, clear fields of fire, clean drainage ditches, and aid in erosion control projects. These personnel are paid on a daily basis from assistance-in-kind funds reserved from the VIETNAMESE Government. The housemaids provide services of a personal nature such as laundry, boot cleaning, and billet maintenance. These personnel are paid by funds collected from the personnel utilizing these services. The Kit Carson Scouts are paid from assistance-in-kind funds controlled by the labor management office. The 330 VIETNAMESE employed by PA & E and the 135 VIETNAMESE employed by the PX are not controlled by the labor management office, but by each respective organization.

y. The economy is affected by the employment of these personnel in that 5,000,000 - 6,000,000 piasters are expended each month for the permanent hire, 2,000,000 piaster for daily hire, 1,200,000 piaster for personal hire, and 900,000 piasters for the Kit Carson Scouts. This amount represents a total of 85,600 US dollars put into the local VIETNAMESE economy each month.
17. (C) INFORMATION

a. Command Information Activities

(1) Arrangements have been made with the AFVN station on nearby Dragon Mountain to present a five minute broadcast three times daily on AM radio and four times daily on FM radio. These brief broadcasts, prepared by the Information Office, disseminate actual combat news, as well as feature material throughout the Division. When it was felt that particular emphasis should be placed on specific command information topics such as safety, savings programs, and malaria prevention, tapes have been prepared by the Information Office and periodically broadcast throughout the day by the AFVN station. Because some of our units in the eastern part of our area of operation are almost beyond the effective range of the PLEIKU station, the Division also broadcasts through the QUI NHON AFVN outlet. The Division also employs the TV facilities of the AFVN station for a locally produced weekly show by the Division Chaplain, enabling him to communicate with men that he may not otherwise reach during his weekly and daily visits to forward areas. News feeds are also prepared for TV presentation.

(2) The principal media for in-depth command information remains the Division's weekly newspaper, The Steadfast and Loyal. Every issue contains specific subjects that warrant additional command emphasis. The Command Sergeant Major has a column by which he can communicate directly with the men. The paper has quite a secondary audience at home, according to letters received requesting additional copies. The paper is one of the best investments in time and effort made by the Division. Another publication was also produced to fill the need for a comprehensive orientation of new personnel. This booklet, The Faces of the Famous Fighting Fourth, outlines the composition of the Division and the mission of each unit. An innovation in military publications was also initiated this past year. A need was felt for a yearbook to serve as a memento of each soldier's tour of duty in VIETNAM. Authority was granted to publish a magazine format yearbook in four quarterly increments, the Esprit. When a man joins the Division, he will receive a current publication. When he leaves twelve months later, he will have received three other quarterly increments and, in effect, have a memento of his year with the Famous Fighting Fourth.

b. Public Information Activities.

(1) Public information has been based on the policy that our deeds will speak for themselves. Any effort to sell the Division to the public has been strictly prohibited.

(2) The primary outlet for public information releases on significant events in the lives of Iyvmen is the US Army Hometown News Center. An aggressive and most successful program in hometown news releases has enabled the Division to maintain a position of leadership in this vital program.

(3) Feature news stories and photos are also released to civilian news agencies maintaining bureaus in SAIGON. We have achieved a moderate degree of success in this area. It is extremely difficult to ascertain
the amount of copy utilized due to the lack of feedback. Feature material and photos have also been released directly to the Army Times.

c. Press Relations.

Due to our location and the nature of our operations, we have not been visited by large numbers of correspondents from civilian news media. When they do come to the Division, commanders and staff officers have been made available for interview when possible. Our relationship with the press is good, as evidenced by the number of correspondents who repeatedly visit our area of operations. The MACV Press Camp at Camp Schmidt, which is operated by the 11th Public Information Detachment, provides most of the logistical support for correspondents. On an individual basis, however, correspondents are housed at Camp Enari. The press has never placed unreasonable demands upon any element of this Division. News has never been withheld for any reason except for possible security considerations. On several occasions honorary Division membership has been extended to members of the press in recognition of the outstanding job done reporting the Division's story to the American public.
1. The pattern analysis technique was first developed for Operation Task Force WINNER in the VC Valley during November and December, 1968. This system of pattern analysis was developed by plotting intelligence reports (IR's) from the area of interest for a specified time period. The objective was to plot enemy IR's as derived through special intelligence, and then confirm the analysis by the systematic programming of additional intelligence sources into the area.

2. One of the classic examples of the employment of the technique occurred in the CHU PA Mountain area in PLEIKU Province. The analysis of this area was largely responsible for an operation in the CHU PA which lasted from January to mid March. This operation subsequently uncovered and captured over 100 tons of material, destroyed an additional 200 tons of supplies, resulted in the death of over 500 NVA (body count), forced the 24th NVA Infantry Regiment to withdraw for a time, pre-empted the enemy's Spring Offensive almost two months in advance, and greatly reduced the intensity of that offensive.

3. Our interest in the CHU PA began in October 1968 when it became apparent that the number of IR's in the area were increasing. Large numbers of IR's were also identifying known or suspected trail systems to the west and southeast of the CHU PA. Since the day by day following of IR's on a map was not conclusive, an attempt was made to make visual and photo observation of the PLEI TRAP Road and the trails off the PLEI TRAP which lead to the CHU PA, as well as in the CHU PA itself. Movement in the PLEI TRAP was evident, improvements on the road could be seen, and our APD continually confirmed its ever increasing use. The road was subsequently closed. Evidence of movement to the CHU PA, however, was inconclusive. The area was too vast for adequate visual observation and the triple canopy jungle too thick to monitor trail activity by photography. The same restrictions were evident when we attempted to "see through" the jungle area that comprises the CHU PA.

4. In early December, the initial pattern analysis was made by plotting all IR's on an overlay, regardless of unit identification. This analysis was displayed by a series of overlays on an accompanying map board. Subsequent plottings, which were made during the operation, disclosed the fact that enemy units were indeed being driven into the highest reaches of the CHU PA by the encircling friendly forces. These subsequent plottings aided greatly in day to day operational planning.

5. Once surfaced by the IR Pattern Analysis, other technical intelligence resources were employed to confirm enemy presence. Our APD was run along the clearly indicated trail complexes, and the areas of enemy concentration.

Incl 1
within the CHJ PA. Aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, confirmed the use of the river crossing points that had been indicated by the initial analysis. Long Range Patrols were employed both to prove enemy presence and as an economy of force measure.

6. In short, the "layers" of intelligence indicators and continuing analysis over a number of weeks were invaluable to the success of the operation. Troops were emplaced in a timely manner where they could do the most damage to the enemy. Valleys which were suspected cache areas were searched and the caches found. Despite the dense jungle and rugged terrain, units were able to move almost directly to the cache sites. There were no real surprises. The analysis also enabled us to search intelligently for enemy presence in the CHJ PA after the operation ended. In addition, it provided leads to adjacent areas which were successfully exploited using the same pattern analysis technique. The numerous fortified areas subsequently discovered were destroyed and their locations made a matter of record for future operations.

Incl 1

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One of the more difficult problems in the Central Highlands is the development of adequate landing zones. One technique that this Division is now employing is the use of Commando Vault, air delivered large mass high explosives to provide instant clearing of heavily forested areas.

The Commando Vault system employs the M-121 10,000 pound bomb delivered by a ground radar controlled C-130 aircraft using drogue parachute extracted bombs. This system has proven to be quite accurate and it provides an excellent landing zone in a short period of time.

Attached are before and after photographs of recent LZ cuts using the M-121 10,000 lb bomb.

These photographs were taken by the 4th Infantry Division Forward Air Controller who was airborne at the time of the drop to coordinate the Commando Vault mission. The 834th Air Division Mission Coordinator accompanied the FAC and was in direct contact with the delivery aircraft. All pictures were made by hand-held camera using 200-mm lens.

Set #1 shows the LZ at TA 912612. Only one bomb was used, producing a usable 1-2 aircraft LZ. The vertical view of this LZ shows the cleared area that was produced.

Set #2 shows the LZ at TA 940629. Only one bomb was used, producing a one aircraft LZ. The bomb was dropped through the ground cover which indicates the reliability of the radar system. Weather precluded additional photographs.

Set #3 shows the attempted LZ at TA 927596. The first weapon produced an air burst and an unacceptable LZ. A 25 meter correction was made to the northeast; the second weapon hit the top of the hill, producing a two aircraft LZ.

Set #4 shows the LZ at TA 948608. This was a two weapon LZ. The first weapon landed in a shallow ravine at TA 949607 and did not produce the desired results. A 50 meter correction was made to the northwest and the second weapon produced an excellent LZ.

It is our feeling in the Famous Fighting Fourth Infantry Division that the use of the Commando Vault has been quite successful, and has permitted the Division to employ its airmobile capability in terrain that was previously unusable because of the absence of adequate landing zones.
1. The Division has developed techniques to maximize the effectiveness of the CBU-42 type air delivered munitions. The CBU-42 is a special bomblet, which, upon impact, deploys eight trip-lines that detonate the bomblet upon activation. These munitions are compatible with many USAF fighter aircraft, are delivered under FAC control, and, if properly targeted, can be effectively used to harass and disrupt the enemy, or canalize his movement into areas that can be covered with a massive artillery and tactical air fire program.

2. At the termination of the Spring-Summer offensive that centered around the BEN NEK - DAK TO complex, all enemy elements, except the 4th Battalion, 24 Regiment withdrew into a sanctuary in CAMBODIA. This move was necessary to completely refit and retrain combat units that had been decimated in combat. Some intelligence sources indicated that replacements and supplies were being infiltrated south of the Tri-Border and then east into the CHU PA Mountain area. The normal operating area of the K-31 Artillery Battalion and the 966th Infantry Battalion is located south of the CHU PA mountains. In mid-summer, these elements combined to form the 631st Composite Battalion. By mid-July, there were two battalion size units west of Highway 14 with the mission of interdicting the highway and conducting stand-off attacks and attacks by fire against populated areas as well as US/GVN installations. In early August, a PI and a ROI CHAINH verified the infiltration supply route and T-stations used by NVA units. This information, coupled with a build up of intelligence reports, indicated the exact locations being used by the 631st Battalion as a base area, and a supply route. After the implanting of CBU-42 munitions across the supply route and completely around the 631st Base Area, there was a definite decrease in the traffic along the infiltration route. Activity within the mine box around the 631st increased, and intelligence sources indicated that 631st elements were trapped inside and were attempting to locate routes of escape. Further to the east in BINH DINH Province, intelligence sources indicated the 2d Battalion, 95 B Regiment was preparing to interdict Highway 19. To preclude this action, a mine belt was implanted south of Highway 19 and north of the suspected enemy location. This action along with aggressive pursuit by friendly forces, airlifted behind the NVA battalion, resulted in a complete disruption of the enemy plans. Presently, the 2d Battalion, 95 B Regiment is scattered throughout the southwestern corner of BINH DINH Province and cannot successfully perform its primary mission.

3. The munition has proven to be a highly successful means of denying the enemy his supply routes and restricting his movement. These munitions are used in two separate roles: the seeding of infiltration routes, and...
the compression of enemy movement into specified areas. In early August 1969, air intelligence activity in the tri-border area confirmed heavy enemy movement from CAMBODIA into SOUTH VIETNAM. An aerial delivered mine barrier was employed, and all intelligence indicators showed a definite disruption in the pattern of enemy activity and movement (Map 1). The second pattern of employment is the encircling of an enemy base area or supply area with CBU-42 munitions in conjunction with the submission of a B-52 strike. Following the B-52 strike request, a request is forwarded for a CBU 42 barrier around the strike area. The purpose of the barrier is to compress enemy movement into the designated target area and to deny the enemy freedom of exfiltration from the area. This concept was employed in the CHU PA Mountain complex. Intelligence reports showed confusion and disruption in the enemy's pattern of activity. Artillery, tactical air, and both persistent and non-persistent chemical agents are programmed into these clearly defined target areas to maximize the damage to the enemy. (MAP 2 & 3)

4. The planning for the selection of these target areas is a joint Air Force-Army responsibility. The ground commanders select barrier areas to complement their schemes of maneuver, the plan, with the Air Liaison Officer, the specific barrier trace and the most efficient methods of employment. The AJF and G-3/S-3 Air Officer, from either a map or air reconnaissance, select the precise trace for the barrier after considering the terrain and the capabilities of the probable delivery aircraft. As soon as political and tactical clearances are received from the appropriate agencies, the request for the barrier is forwarded to the next higher headquarters. Upon receipt of an approval for expenditure, the mission is programmed from daily air allocation resources. FAC delivery control procedures are similar to those used in any other mission, except that the FAC must mark each trace of the desired barrier. Once on station, the FAC may make minor adjustments to increase the effectiveness of the barrier.

5. The major problem connected with the CBU-42A mines is the same problem that applies to all barriers: the barrier restricts both enemy and friendly movement. Consequently, CBU-42 mines, because of their twenty-five (25) days life, are employed in areas where there is no planned friendly movement, or in border denial operations, where the barrier is designed to restrict and disrupt enemy movement.

6. It has been the experience of the 4th Infantry Division that aerial delivered mines, deployed in properly selected target areas, have been of great value in harassing and disrupting the enemy, by depriving him of his freedom of movement, and compressing his movement into areas where he can be decisively engaged by artillery along with strategic and tactical air strikes.

Incl 3

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1. Scorpion Operations involve the use of the Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) in conjunction with gun ships that have been given prior clearance to fire on any target. A minimum of four aircraft are required on these missions.

2. One OH-5A (LOH) helicopter (detector ship) carries the personnel detector and detector operator. For the best performance of the APD, the detector ship should fly 10 to 20 feet above the trees. The best aircraft speed is between 90 and 100 knots; flying slower than 90 knots makes the detector helicopter more vulnerable to hostile fire.

3. Two AH-1G Cobra gunships act as cover ships for the low LOH. One Cobra flies 50-100 feet above and behind the low LOH. The second Cobra flies 100-500 feet above and behind the LOH providing direction to the LOH and plotting detections as they are announced by the detector operator.

4. The second LOH flies at 100-1500 feet and acts as radio relay to the supported unit. It also serves as a rescue aircraft if the detection ship is forced to land.

5. When searching an area comparatively free of mountains, the detector ship flies at tree top level to reduce the slant range to the target, thereby facilitating more accurate detection. The flight search pattern of the detector ship is flown in a crosswind S-shaped pattern, moving from the downwind side of the search area to the upwind side.

6. During the day in mountainous terrain, the air currents tend to flow up valleys. Therefore, the crosswind search pattern is not used. The detector ship flies at tree top level just below the crest of the ridges from the top of the hill down the draws and ravines. By flying downhill, the pilot reserves engine power to be used in emergencies.

7. When a reading between 40 and 60 is obtained on the personnel detector meter, the operator will radio "mark" to the plotting ship above. When a meter reading above 60 is obtained, the operator radios a "heavy mark" to the plotting ship. Each "mark" and "heavy mark" is corrected for plotting purposes to allow for instrument and commo delays. The APD has a 2 to 3 second delay and will have traveled 200 to 300 feet past the source before the detection is indicated to the plotter.

8. When heavy readings are received and a target developed, the escorting gunships may expend on the target, or the high LOH can call artillery fire in on the target. In either case, the SCORPION mission is an aggressive operation to seek out the enemy and bring immediate fire on him.

Incl 4
1. The Rome Plow bunker busting-land clearing operation was first undertaken by the Famous Fighting Fourth Infantry Division in June 1969. Operations in the CHU PA Mountain area revealed the existence of large complexes of bunkers that had to be destroyed. The 4th Division Engineer conceived an operation to strip the complex of its forest cover and eliminate the bunkers. Rather than attack the bunkers in the conventional manner with demolitions, tractors equipped with the special Rome Plow blade and others equipped with standard bulldozer blades would be employed.

2. With demolitions it is difficult to destroy bunkers completely; if the uprights are demolished, the hole remains, and the enemy can reconstruct the bunker with relative ease. If the roof is blasted in, the enemy can burrow still deeper and continue to use the bunker. The Rome Plow is more effective. It rips off the cover, fills in the hole, and clears away the trees and brush, depriving the enemy of his concealment, and making him more vulnerable to air and artillery fires should he attempt to reoccupy the area. The tangle of fallen trees makes the cleared area even more difficult to traverse than the natural forest growth. The Rome Plow method renders the area useless to the enemy on a prolonged basis.

3. The Rome Plow blade has a sharp cutting edge jutting out at the end. As the D-7 tractor smashes through the trees and undergrowth, the Rome Plow blade works both like a bulldozer blade and a giant axe. The tractor has a braced steel cab with heavy steel screen to protect the operator from falling trees and debris.

4. Normally two teams are employed in an area where extensive works must be done. The teams consist of one officer and twenty-five enlisted men. They are equipped with two D-7 tractors with Rome Plow blades, two D-7 tractors with standard bulldozer blades, one combat engineer vehicle with bulldozer blade, one M60A3 tank, two 2½-ton cargo trucks, two trailer-mounted 250 cubic-feet-per-minute air compressors, and one maintenance contact team. The contact team handles the heavy welding requirements that arise during land clearing operations. The compressor is used to blow out the dozer radiators three or four times a day, a necessary task because of the dirt and debris churned up while stripping the jungle. The 2½-ton trucks tow the compressor trailers and carry fuel. The combat engineer vehicle functions in conjunction with the tank to provide security.

5. The engineer teams, accompanied by infantry, enter the work area; it is essential that there be close coordination with the infantry. The standard practice is for one infantry element to sweep ahead of the team, watching for the enemy, reconnoitering the area, and locating the bunker sites. The engineer teams, accompanied by the remainder of the infantry and its head-
quarters element, move in to destroy the bunkers. Meanwhile, the reconnoitering infantry continues its sweep. The infantry-engineer teams do not seek contact as that would only disrupt their mission.

6. An ancillary benefit of the land clearing operation has been the creation of potential landing zones throughout the area of bunker complexes. The cleared strips, though cluttered with fallen trees and debris, can become landing zones if necessary. More suitable are the cleared baugier positions, established every night as the infantry-engineer teams move through the area.

7. Although tracked vehicles have performed with little difficulty, the monsoon season with its mud does hamper movement of the wheeled vehicles. However, there are always tracked vehicles to assist, and this was not an insurmountable problem.

8. Rome Plow operations have become increasingly more successful. It has become apparent that engineer land clearing has become one of the Division's most effective means of denying the enemy his sanctuaries and increasing the security of the Central Highlands.
1. In July, the Land Clearing priorities which had been established in May by the Division were reexamined to insure completeness, orderly progression of work, and support the current tactical situation.

2. One of the major tactical developments prompting this was the increase of enemy activity in the MANG YANG Pass and the area to the east. Tactical reports and intelligence established the area between the pass and Bridge 26 as the most active for both ambush and infiltration. Based on this, an examination of the feasibility of clearing this area was requested. An aerial reconnaissance of the entire highway was made to determine the need for machines to cut secondary growth. The secondary growth in the area of interest that had been cleared prior to this time was very thick, and offered good cover and concealment. Combined with the dense tree growth to the north and south of the originally cleared area, it offered a decided advantage to the enemy.

3. After these factors were considered, the decision was made to attempt to obtain the use of the 538th Land Clearing Company in August, rather than wait until October as originally planned. The first priority would be the bowl formed in the boundaries previously delineated, which covered an area of some 6,000 acres. Then, selected areas on Highway 19 to AN KHE would be done.

4. A message was sent to IFFV in late July requesting the immediate use of the 538th Land Clearing Company on this top priority mission. Approval was obtained, 26 August was established as the start date.

5. Prior to this, an on-site reconnaissance of the task was conducted by the active principals to be involved which convinced them of the merit of the project. Vegetation to the north of the highway was to be cut back to the foothills if possible; to the south, the cut was to be over the crest of the first hill line, but not to the base of the mountain, as there was no additional tactical advantage to be gained by that additional clearing.

6. A week prior to the actual movement of the 538th Land Clearing Company into the area, final plans for movement and support were firm. The finalized program for clearing was submitted to IFFV on 15 September 1969.

7. The weather prevented the 538th Land Clearing Company from completing the project in its entirety, but the work that was done was most beneficial to the highway security program. In addition, their movement to and work in the area of LZ SCHUELLER provided additional benefits to the overall program.

Incl 6
INFANTRY WEAPONS

1. Claymore Mines. The Claymore mine has proven itself to be an extremely effective weapon both offensively and defensively. Its use in the defense is evident, but its importance in the offense to initiate contact may not be fully realized. When ambushes are established by units or patrols, the claymore detonation creates a devastating casualty producing and psychological effect. The mine is lightweight; each individual may carry one if the situation dictates. It has long been recognized that enemy forces use hugging tactics against US forces to preclude the use of close in artillery support. Long Range Patrols habitually use claymore mines around their night locations and ambush positions. Using them to initiate contact has caused many enemy casualties, and detonating the mines in many situations, causes a sufficient lull to enable the patrols to extricate themselves.

2. M72 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW). The LAW is another weapon that is light for each man to carry, and that has sufficient firepower to effect the action. The number of ways to employ the LAW is only limited by individual ingenuity. As an offensive weapon, the LAW is effective against bunkers and caves which are a nemesis in the Division area of operation and it is an excellent fire suppressive weapon when engaging an entrenched enemy.

3. XM203 Over-Under. This weapon provides the dual capability of the M16 rifle and the 40mm grenade launcher, and provides flexibility and versatility of employment. It can be used to deliver a high volume of either type fire as the situation warrants. The individual soldier has expressed a desire for this weapon because it eliminates one or the other type individual weapon. Also, personnel like the ability to have a large caliber weapon to deliver heavy fire at the initiation of contact, or a "reserve" of a large caliber weapon that may be needed at a critical time.

Incl 7
SHORT RANGE PATROLS

1. Purpose: This enclosure sets forth basic concepts, principles and guidelines for the conduct of Short Range Patrol (SRP) operations within the 4th Infantry Division.

2. General: The extensive area of operations of the 4th Infantry Division has required the development of additional means to supplement conventional patrolling and reconnaissance operations. Terrain, vegetation, lack of landing zones, and the sheer size of the area of operation all hinder normal reconnaissance activity. In order to increase the effectiveness of limited assets, and provide for the prompt detection and destruction of enemy forces, a concept of Short Range Patrolling has been developed. Short Range Patrols are designed to saturate an area with a series of small stationary teams positioned along likely enemy avenues of approach.

3. Mission: The mission of the Short Range Patrol is:

   a. To detect and report the presence, size and direction of movement of enemy forces.

   b. To direct artillery, mortar, tactical air, armed helicopters and other fire support means on the enemy force and report the results observed.

4. Employment: Each rifle company will normally employ five to seven SRP's at distances up to three four kilometers from the company base. The SRP will remain in position from 48 to 72 hours. The position should afford the best observation possible and be concealed from enemy detection and should be far enough from other friendly elements to allow for the use of immediate and effective fire support.

   a. The ideal size for a SRP is four men; a greater number increases the risk of detection and compromise of the SRP position.

   b. Each SRP must be thoroughly briefed on its mission, the situation in the area, the location of friendly units, especially other SRP's in the area; available fire support, to include preplanned concentrations, and procedures to be used if the SRP becomes engaged with the enemy. The briefing will include information on the location and movement of 4th Infantry Division elements, and ARVN, RF/PF, and CIDG forces conducting operations in the area. Whenever possible, the briefing should be conducted by the company commander and artillery forward observer.

   c. Each SRP is inspected prior to leaving the fire base to insure that it is knowledgeable of SRP procedures, that it has the required equipment that this equipment is operable, and that no prohibited items (cigarettes, transistor radios, etc) are taken on the patrol.
d. As a general rule, SRP's do not move except when enroute to or evacuating their position. The SRP is most vulnerable during the movement to and from its position. Upon leaving the fire base, the SRP team will normally follow a route which offers the best cover and concealment. A different route with similar cover and concealment, will be used for returning. SRP's should not move directly into their primary position. Different techniques such as observing the position from a secondary position, or moving past the position and then circling back, can be used to insure that the SRP position is secure. The SRP Team must not be observed as they move into their position.

e. Adherence to good patrolling techniques is essential at all times. Talking, use of lights, smoking, careless handling of equipment and needless movement at any time, especially after the occupation of the position, can lead to the compromise of the patrol. When a SRP adheres strictly to light and noise discipline, practices sound patrolling techniques, preserves the vegetation in and around positions, and employs proper procedures for calling air and artillery, excellent results can be expected. When practices are not observed, casualties and mission failure will inevitably occur.

f. If a SRP has reason to believe that its position may have been compromised, it must move either to an alternate position or back to its patrol fire base. In this regard, particular caution must be exercised when a SRP is employed in a populated area to avoid accidental detection.

g. The mission, size, and isolated location of the SRP necessitates a high state of vigilance and alertness at all times. No more than one SRP Team member is asleep at any one time.

h. SRP's will not conduct sweeps after employment of artillery or air strikes. Aerial reconnaissance assets will be utilized to the maximum extent possible to assess results of artillery fires/air strikes. If circumstances dictate a sweep operation following a SRP sighting, commanders will insure that an adequate force is utilized to perform the mission.

i. SRP's will be debriefed immediately upon their return from a patrol, and the debriefing will cover all phases of the SRP's activity. When possible, it will be conducted by the supported battalion S-2, and all information will be forwarded immediately through intelligence channels.

5. Equipment: The amount of equipment carried by the SRP team is dependent on the terrain, the distance the team must travel, and the time it is scheduled to remain in position. The items listed below are considered the minimum essential and are standard combat equipment. Items designated for Long Range Patrol use may be substituted when available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN/PRC 25/77 w/sufficient batteries for</td>
<td>1 (with extra handset, if available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duration of patrol and long and short</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antenna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smoke grenades</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frag grenades</td>
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<td>CS grenades</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Halizone Tablets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poncho and Poncho Liner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insect Repellent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaria Tablets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map</td>
<td>1 per - as minimum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signal Mirror</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6. Training: Training for SRP operations must be continuous, and should include the following as a minimum:

   a. Land Navigation.
   b. Adjustment of artillery and mortar fire.
   c. TAC air and armed helicopter support.

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d. Communications (includes reporting procedures, radio, pyrotechnics, field expedience antennas, brevity codes).

e. Actions to break contact.

f. First Aid.

g. Combat Intelligence.

h. Patrolling (to include all phases of preparation, planning and execution).

i. Individual weapons training.

7. Reports: Spot reports will be submitted for all SRP sightings, incidents or contacts. The number and location of all SRP's will be reported in brigade daily plans summaries.
LONG RANGE PATROL ACTIVITIES

1. On 6 October 1969, LRP activities within the Division were reorganized to more efficiently use available LRP assets. Prior to this LRP activities were divided between the Division controlled Co K (Ranger), 75th Infantry and the brigade controlled LRP Platoons. This organization produced duplication of effort and increased requirements for assets, both men and materials. Neither the brigade nor the Division had the capability to monitor a large target area without considerable difficulty with command, communication and reporting.

2. After this reorganization was completed, the brigade LRP Platoons were absorbed into Co K, 75th Infantry under the operational control of the Division G3. The centralization of LRP assets is now being tested. Early indications are that the reorganization has resulted in a much improved 75th Infantry. To better understand the organization the SOP for Co K and LRP Operations are included in this inclosure.

3. The most effective employment of Rangers is one in which a large number of teams are deployed in a given area to screen an enemy route of approach or withdrawal. An example of this employment occurred in early October 1969, when the 2d Brigade was withdrawn from its AO northwest of PLEIKU. A twelve team LRP platoon, with a platoon leader and control team, was deployed to PLEI MRONG and staged out of the Special Forces camp there. An average of eight teams were operational at all times, screening the mountain range west of PLEI MRONG, with the other four teams used as a rotation base to provide for stand-down and further patrol preparation. When the 24th NVA Regiment began its move eastward toward Highway 19 on 12 October, its movement was reported by the screen, and for four days the enemy was subjected to directed artillery and air strikes, and lost twelve men to ground contact with Ranger teams. Given early warning, the 4th Division had moved a mechanized infantry battalion into the PLEI MRONG area by the time the 24th Regiment emerged from the mountains. In a series of contacts the enemy lost over 100 men KIA and his offensive was preempted.

4. Mission: The mission of Co K (Ranger), 75th Infantry is to provide a long range reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition capability to the 4th Infantry Division; provide personnel and equipment to train, administer, plan for, and employ LRP's as directed; and conduct limited harassing activities.

5. Command Relationship:
   a. ACofS, G3 will provide general staff supervision for operations conducted by Co K (Ranger).

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b. ACofS, G2 will recommend missions to ACofS, G3 according to weekly intelligence reports.

c. Brigade commanders will support from patrol platoons placed DS to them.

6. Coordination:

a. Brigades and the 1 10th Cavalry may request Division LRP employment on a mission basis.

b. Requests for DS teams will be submitted through G2/S2 channels to arrive at G2 no later than 2400 hours each Saturday; one information copy will be forwarded to G3. Requests will indicate the recommended areas of operation in order of priority.

c. G2 will notify the requesting unit of the status of the request as soon as possible.

d. Control teams are normally deployed once per week in accordance with approved priorities and LRP teams are attached on a mission basis.

7. Responsibilities: The following comments apply to brigades and the 1 10th Cav.

a. Units will assign missions to the DS patrol platoon leader. The patrol platoon leader is responsible for determining the number of teams to be employed to accomplish the assigned mission.

b. Units will provide reaction forces for both OPCON LRP teams and LRP teams employed in their AO.

c. Units will insure that DS LRP teams are provided with an overflight of the AO at least three hours prior to insertion to allow the team to adequately prepare for its mission.

d. Units will provide for the insertion and extraction of DS LRP teams and LRP teams employed in their AO using air assets provided for the purpose by G-3. Actual control of insertions is exercised by the K-75 control party supporting the Brigade.

e. Units will plan for and execute emergency extractions of both DS LRP teams and LRP teams employed in their AO.

f. K-75 will establish mission support sites when necessary to maintain communications and control of DS LRP teams.

g. Units will provide messing, quarters, and SOI extracts for DS patrol platoons.

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8. LRP Operations:
   a. Employment.

   (1) LRP teams are employed under the control of the assigned platoon headquarters. The number of teams operating under platoon control may vary due to the assigned mission. The platoon leader is responsible for planning assigned missions and preparing, employing, and debriefing his teams.

   (2) When a patrol platoon is placed DS to a unit, the patrol platoon headquarters and attached mission support section will normally locate with the tactical operations center of the supported unit. If the teams are to be deployed in the area of operations of a subordinate unit, the patrol headquarters and mission support section may be collocated with the headquarters of the subordinate unit for better control.

   (3) Teams may be deployed on Division missions in a subordinate unit's area of operations. When this occurs, a mission support section will be located with the tactical operations center of the concerned unit for liaison and communications support. The concerned unit may require the mission support section to locate with a subordinate unit for control purposes.

   b. Insertion.

   (1) Patrols are inserted by helicopter, ground vehicles, walk in or by the use of stay-behind. The terrain, weather and distance from the staging area to the insertion point generally dictate the means to be used. In all cases the insertion must be carefully planned to eliminate the possibility of the LRP teams being compromised upon entering the AO.

   (2) The most desirable AO for a LRP team is enemy territory away from friendly forces and civilian villages. In this way, an inserted team can safely determine that any movement or firing that they hear or observe is caused by enemy forces.

   (3) The following is applicable for helicopter insertions:

   (a) Two lift ships—one for insert, one C&C/chase ship—and two gunships are mandatory for the insertion of a LRP team by helicopter.

   (b) Personnel will be seated in such a manner that immediately upon exiting the helicopter, they are in their patrol formation.

   (c) No member of the patrol will leave the helicopter until he receives the exit signal from either the crew chief or the door gunner. The crew chief or door gunner will give the exit signal at the command of the aircraft commander.

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(d) After exiting from the aircraft, the patrol moves immediately to that portion of the LZ that provides the maximum cover and concealment, and immediately establishes radio communication with the insertion officer to verify its location and to determine the quality of communication. If communication difficulties exist, the patrol will move to a higher terrain feature and again attempt to establish communications. If communication is not possible after 30 minutes, the patrol will secure the LZ and await extraction.

c. Extractions:

(1) Selection and security of an extraction LZ is a very important phase of the LRP mission. Wind direction, obstacles, enemy locations, size, and terrain must always be considered prior to extraction. The aircraft commander approves the selection of LZ’s. Patrol leaders will assist the aircraft commanders in every way possible to insure a safe, quick extraction. After the aircraft has landed, the crew chief or door gunner will signal for the team to approach. The team leader will move the patrol to the helicopter as quickly as possible.

(2) Due to the hazard of night LRP extractions, requests to DTOC for aircraft for night LRP extractions will be made only after the supported unit commander or Company Commander of Co K (Ranger), 75th Infantry has personally determined that the extraction is necessary.

9. Communications procedures.

a. A system of communication checks will be instituted which will insure radio contact checks with LRP teams every two hours during daylight hours and every hour during the hours of darkness.

b. An SOP will be distributed within each unit using LRP teams for the immediate re-establishment of communications with LRP teams if the first communications check is missed. If communications fail, the following minimum procedures will take place:

(1) An immediate overflight of the area will be made in an effort to receive prearranged signals with radio, pyrotechnics, or signals by mirror when the aircraft is overhead.

(2) Aircraft will check out prearranged primary and alternate extraction points.

(3) Should these communication attempts fail, an appropriate rescue team will be introduced into the area to search for the team.

10. Debriefing.

a. When LRP’s are placed OPCON to separate units, the S2 of the supported
unit will debrief the team upon the completion of the mission in coordination with the patrol platoon leader.

b. When teams are employed in brigade and 10 Cavalry's AO's, coordination between the unit S2 and the CO, Co K (Ranger) 75th Infantry, will be made to establish the location and time of the debriefing. When possible the LRP team will be moved to the designated location by the S2 for debriefing. If the debriefing at brigade level is not possible due to time and transportation requirements, a debriefing report will be provided by Co K (Ranger) 75th Infantry.

c. An informal report of the debriefings will be forwarded to the ACofS G2 within 24 hours after extraction; an information copy will be forwarded to ACofS G3.


a. A reaction force will be designated by the supported unit CO to exploit LRP sightings or to reinforce LRP patrols in contact. The reaction force commander will be briefed thoroughly on the area of operation, and will formulate contingency plans for the commitment of the reaction force.

b. The size of the reaction force will be determined by the troops and air craft available and the estimated enemy threat. A desirable reaction force is considered to be the assault elements of one rifle company that can be employed within thirty minutes of notification.

c. The helicopter support necessary to employ the reaction force must be designated specifically for this mission. This includes both the lift ships and gunships.

d. The decision to commit the reaction force must be timely. If the size of the enemy contact indicates a larger force than the ready reaction force is capable of effectively engaging, additional forces should be alerted and committed. Fire support in the form of air, field artillery, and gunships should be employed in conjunction with the reaction force to destroy the enemy and assist in the extraction of the LRP team.

12. LRP Reports.

a. Spot Report. CO, Co K (Ranger), 75th Infantry and brigade S2's will submit telephonic spot reports immediately to G2 Operations (DTOC) as they are received. Spot reports will be submitted on all insertions, sightings, current locations, night locations, contacts, and extractions. Current locations will be reported to G3 Operation (DTOC) at 1600 hours daily. Night locations will be submitted by 2000 hours daily.

b. LRP After Action Report. A LRP after action report will be submitted
to G2, ATTN: G2 Air/Recon by Co K (Ranger) 75th Infantry and by brigade S2's for OPCON teams after each LRP mission. This report will be submitted in two copies each with an overlay, 1/50,000 scale, depicting the area of operations, insertion and extraction points, route of march, night halts, and any significant information. After Action Reports will be submitted NLT 24 hours after extraction of the team. This report will be classified CONFIDENTIAL upon completion. An information copy will be forwarded to ACofS, G3.

c. LRP Weekly Status Report. The LRP Weekly Status Report will be submitted to ACofS, G3, by 1500 hours each Monday.

d. LRP Monthly Status Report. The LRP Monthly Status Report will be submitted to ACofS, G3 by CC, Co I (Ranger), 75th Infantry as of 2400 hours on the last day of each month to reach this headquarters NLT 1200 hours on the second day of the new month. This report will be classified CONFIDENTIAL upon completion.

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List of abbreviations used in text (local, common usage standard Army)

AA 
AFB 
AFRS 
AGI 
ALOC 
AO 
APC 
APD 
ARP 
ARVN 
ASL 
ASP 
ASR 
A/V 
AVLB 
AW
BC
CA
CAS
CBU
C&C
CHICOM
CT
CIA
CMTT
CMIT
CORD
CP
CS
CSF
CSS
DISCOM
DS
DTOC
EFP
ERP

Anti Aircraft
Air Force Base
Armed Forces Radio Service
Annual General Inspection
Air Line of Communications
Area of Operations
Armored Personnel Carrier
Airborne Personnel Detector
Aero Rifle Platoon
Army Republic of Vietnam
Authorized Stockage List
Ammunition Supply Point
Ammunition Supply Rate
Audio/Visual
Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
Automatic Weapon
Body Count
Civic Action, Combat Assault
Close Air Support
Cluster Bomb Unit
Command and Control (Aircraft)
Chinese Communist
Counterintelligence
Captured in Action
Combined Mobile Training Team
Combined Mobile Instruction Team
Council on Revolutionary Development
Command Post
Tear Gas
Camp Strike Force
Combat Sky Spot
Division Support Command
Direct Support
Division Tactical Operations Center
Equipment Deadlined for parts
Engineer Rappelling Platoon

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FAC  Forward Air Controller
FDC  Fire Direction Center
FO  Forward Observer
FOB  Forward Operating Base
FRAGO  Fragmentary Order
FSA  Forward Support Area
FSB  Forward Support Base
FSE  Forward Supply Element
FWMAF  Free World Military Assistance Forces

GRREG  Graves Registration
GS  General Support
GSR  General Support Reinforcing
GUNSHIP  Armed UH-1 Helicopter
GVN  Government of Vietnam

HAWKEYE TEAM  Four Man Hunter - Killer Team
HE  High Explosive
HAI  Harassment and Interdiction
HEADHUNTER  OH-6 Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance
HOOK  CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter

ICC  Installation Coordination Center
IFFORCEV, IFFV  IX Field Force, Vietnam
JUSPAO  Joint US Public Affairs Office

KBA  Killed by Air
KIA  Killed in Action

LF  Local Force
LOH  Light Observation Helicopter
LP  Listening Post
LRP  Long Range Patrol
LLOC  Land Line of Communication
LZ  Landing Zone

MACV  Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MDCAP  Medical Civic Action Program
MF  Main Force
MI  Military Intelligence
MIA  Missing in Action
MSF  Mobile Strike Force
MSR  Main Supply Route
MTOR  Modification Table of Organization and Equipment

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>HCC</td>
<td>Nth Control Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnam Army</td>
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<td>NVA/C</td>
<td>North Vietnam Army Captive</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCH</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
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<td>OP</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<td>OCON</td>
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<td>Commanders' Conference</td>
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<td>Popular Force</td>
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<td>POLWAR</td>
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<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<td>Radio Teletype</td>
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<td>RDA</td>
<td>Revolutionary Development</td>
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<td>RD</td>
<td>Regional Development</td>
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<td>RED BALL</td>
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<td>RIF</td>
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<td>RL</td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
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<td>RRC</td>
<td>Radio Research Company</td>
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<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLICK</td>
<td>OH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift</td>
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<tr>
<td>STARR</td>
<td>Sided Looking Airborne Radar</td>
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<tr>
<td>STH</td>
<td>Sudden Appreciation of Suspect Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Self Propelled</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td>Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Fireship</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Short Range Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>Single Side Band (Radio Transmission Mode)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACO</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Time on Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>United States Army Vietnam</td>
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<td>Viet Montagnard Cong</td>
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<tr>
<td>VR</td>
<td>Visual Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT</td>
<td>Variable Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTR</td>
<td>Vehicle, Tank Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>White Phosphorous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LOCATIONS OF VILLAGES, LZ'S AND FSB'S

AN KHE
ARTILLERY HILL
BASE AREA 226
BASE AREA 238
BASE AREA 702
BASE AREA 740
BEN HAT
BLACKHAWK
BRIDGE #3 (FSB 3)
BUON HO
CAMP RADCLIFF
CATECCA
CHU PA MOUNTAINS
DAK AIYUNH
DAK SEANG
DAK TO
DIEN BINH
DOC CO
DOC LAP
FSB #5
FSB #6
FSB DENISE
HON KONG MOUNTAIN
Incl 11

BR 4744
ZA 2353
BR 7263
AQ 7874
YA 5146
YU 7579
YB 873257
BR 034535
YB 952239
BQ 0733
BR 465467
ZA 1834
YA 9568
AR 9528
YB 8940
ZB 003217
A 090180
YA 842252
YU 8576
YB 968153
YB 935188
BR 520512
BR 4546
CONFIDENTIAL

DON BRING
LAZ THIEN
LZ ACTION
LZ BULLET
LZ CATHY
LZ MARY LOU
LZ MILE HIGH
LZ NICOLE
LZ PENNY
LZ RUTH
LZ SCHUELLER
MANG BUK
MANG GIANG PASS
OASIS
PLATEAU GI
PLEI BRENG
PLEI DAMAU (DJERL)
PLEI DO LIM
PLEI DJERENG
PLEI MRONG
PLEI NHOA YUT
PLEI PANG
PLEI PHAM KLAH
PLEI TRAP VALLEY
Incl 11

BS 700113
AP 971732
BR 264470
BR 497564
YA 966703
ZA 228878
YA 936930
ZA 173784
ZA 118722
ZA 168530
BR 367458
AS 9842
BR 2251
ZA 114275
BS 0815
AR 8229
AR 899251
AR 906284
YA 900453
ZA 113673
AR 8828
AR 835615
AR 8929
TB 8815 - south to - YA 6347

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

POLEI KLENG
ROCKET RIDGE
TANH CANH
VC VALLEY
VINH THANH VALLEY

ZA 029933
YB 9715
ZB 0622
BR 13°9
BR 6251

Incl 11

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**Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Donn R. Pepke**

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