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11 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
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A. COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION

1. (U) On 26 June 1969, LTG Kelvin Zais assumed command of XXIV Corps from LTG Richard G. Stilwell, who was presented the Distinguished Service Medal (2d OLC) by GEN Creighton Abrams at a change of command ceremony. LTG Stilwell had been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross by LTG Frank T. Mildren and the Vietnamese Army Distinguished Service Order 1st Class and Chumong My Awards by MG Ngo Quang Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Division at separate ceremonies.

2. (U) On 12 June 1969, an award ceremony was held for MG Clifford B. Drake, USMC, Deputy Commanding General, XXIV Corps, upon his departure for further assignment as directed by the Commandant, USMC. Prior to departure, MG Drake was presented the Navy Distinguished Service Medal (1st Award) by LTG Stilwell and the Vietnamese Navy Distinguished Service Order 1st Class and the Reconstruction and Development Medal presented by MG Ngo Quang Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Division.


4. (U) On 26 July 1969, BG Allen G. Pixton, XXIV Corps Artillery Commander, departed for a special 30 day leave to Hawaii. COL John M. Jennings assumed command of XXIV Corps Artillery for the remainder of the report period during General Pixton’s absence.

5. (U) On 28 July 1969, an award ceremony was held for BG Alexander R. Bolling, Jr, Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps, departing for assignment with OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. BG Bolling was presented the Distinguished Service Medal (1st Award) by LTG Frank T. Mildren and the Vietnamese National Distinguished Service Order 2d Class by MG Ngo Quang Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Division.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) General Enemy Situation:

   a. General. During the reporting period, enemy activity was generally light with short flurries of heightened activity or “upsurge” as the enemy conducted his much heralded, but relatively mild, “Summer Offensive”. Upsurges of enemy initiated activity generally occurred each month during the five to ten days of lowest lunar illumination. During “high points”, the enemy concentrated primarily on stand-off attacks and committed significant ground troops on only a few occasions.

   b. QUANG TRI (P).

      (1) In early May, enemy activity was generally light and scattered with
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the exception of several sharp contacts with elements of the 36th NVA Regt
in the Central DMZ area. Between 21 April and 5 May, the 36th NVA Regt suffered
423 confirmed KIA which significantly reduced the unit's combat effectiveness.
The May "high point" offensive occurred in two phases: The first on 11-13 May
and the second on 18-19 May in celebration of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The
11-13 May increase consisted of one ground action (a probe by a 20-man force,
probably elements of 36th Regt) and a widespread increase in attacks by fire
with Dong Ha Combat Base, Quang Tri Combat Base, Task Force Clearwater, C-1
Base, A-1 Base, FSB Russell, LZ Sparrow, and FSB Thunder receiving either
rocket or mortar fire. On 16 May, 1/11 ARVN Cav made two separate contacts
with enemy companies northeast of A-3 Base. A FM from one contact identified
his unit as the 4th BN/270th Regt. On 19 May, VANDERGRIFT Combat Base received
six 107mm rockets from an unidentified enemy force. Attacks by fire in the
eastern DMZ Area and Quang Tri lowlands increased sharply on 18-19 May. Some
attacks were probably conducted by elements of the 84th Rocket/Artillery Regt
and the K34 Rocket/Artillery Bn/7th Front. There was an increase in enemy
attacks by fire during the four days prior to the 30 May truce on Buddha's
birthday. On 29 May, Operation CAMERON FALLS was initiated to counteract
the threat against VANDERGRIFT Combat Base by the 24th Regt/304th Div which
had infiltrated in the area just south of that installation.

(2) On 5 June, in the eastern DMZ, forty 122mm rockets were destroyed by
an air strike and eighteen 140mm rockets were captured by ARVN elements northeast
of A-1 Base. During the first week of June, the enemy unsuccessfully tried
the new tactic of employing mortar fire against patrol craft operating on the
CUA VIET River. On 6 June, VANDERGRIFT Combat Base received seventeen 107mm
rockets. Captured documents later indicated elements of the 84th Rocket/Artillery
Regt were responsible for the attack. Also on 6 June, elements of the 24th
Regt attacked FSB TICONDEROGA. Friendly losses were 16 USMC personnel killed
and 65 wounded. Enemy losses were 34 killed. On 12 June, Operation UTAH MESA
was initiated to sweep west from VANDERGRIFT Combat Base and further disrupt
the 24th Regt.

(3) The enemy's June "high point" of offensive activity occurred between
17 and 19 June. On 17 June, the 33d Sapper Bn and elements of the 6th BN/270th
Regt attempted to attack C-1 Base. Only one company of the 33d Sappers reached
C-1 Base without being interdicted by air and artillery bombardment or Allied
ground forces. They launched an unsuccessful attack through a mine field which
resulted in 59 enemy KIA and 6 enemy captured. In UTAH MESA, on 18 June, B/666
Mech Inf, operating east of LANG VEI, was attacked by elements of the 20th Sapper
BN/304th Div. The enemy utilised the relatively new tactic of employing RPFs
to obtain air bursts over friendly troops. On 19 June, 2 km east of LANG VEI,a
contact by C/1/9 Marines resulted in 35 NVA KIA. On 20 June, the 20th
Sapper Bn again attacked B/1/66 Mech Inf in the same area. Confirmed losses
of the 20th Sapper Bn for both contacts were 66 KIA. Enemy attacks by fire
increased during the June "high point" as Dong Ha Combat Base, Quang Tri Combat
Base and Allied units conducting sweep operations in the eastern and central
DMZ areas received rocket or mortar fire.

(4) Following the June "high point", enemy activity decreased significantly;
however, the enemy continued to assert his presence in the eastern and central

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DMZ areas through sporadic rocket and mortar attacks. Enemy activity was
heaviest in the UTAH MESA AO with significant ground contacts occurring almost
daily. Between 24 June and 1 July, Allied elements inflicted 169 casualties on
elements of the 24th NVA Regt. On 9 July, ARVN elements in night defensive
positions in the eastern DMZ area received two separate company-size attacks
resulting in a total of 42 enemy KIA. The attacking unit was unidentified,
but was probably an element of either the 31st Regt or 270th Regt. Operation
UTAH MESA terminated on 10 July with a total of 309 enemy KIA. The July
"high point" of activity in QUANG TRI (P) occurred between 14 and 16 July.
On 14 July, a PBR operating on the CUA VIET River was sunk by a pressure
influence mine, probably replaced by elements of the 126th Naval Sapper Regt.
Attacks by fire on 14 July increased sharply as Camp KISTLER, C-2 Base, A-2
Base, A-1 and DONG HA Combat Base received rocket or mortar fire. There were
no significant ground contacts during the July "high point". On 20 July, the
915th RF Co was attacked by the 5th Co/27th Bn/31st Regt reinforced with sapper
elements from the 31st Regt 3 km west of DONG HA. The Regional Force defenders
counterattacked and decisively defeated the enemy killing 17 and capturing 5
while suffering only 9 friendly casualties.

(5) Between 20-24 July, elements of the 1st ARVN Regt conducting reconnois-
sance-in-force operations west and southwest of former Base Area 101 initiated
contacts with one platoon-size and three company-size enemy units. Results
of the engagements were 84 confirmed enemy KIA, 7 FVs and numerous items of
ordnance, equipment and supplies captured. ARVN losses were very light. Initial
readout indicates the FVs were members of the K34 Rkt/Arty Bn and K10 Sapper
Bn/7th Front. Additionally, 118 enemy bodies, three days to three months old,
were found in the area of the contacts.

c. THUA THIEN (P).

(1) For the first 6 weeks of the reporting period, enemy activity was light
to moderate. The Summer Offensive was launched on 11 and 12 May when enemy
attacks by fire throughout SVN reached the highest level in over a year. In
THUA THIEN (P) during this period, HUE City, the AN LO Bridge, Camp EVANS, and
HUONG TRA (D) HQ were struck with 122mm rockets. Several bridges in PHU LOC (D)
also came under mortar and ground attack. PHU BAI Combat Base was struck twice
with 122mm rockets while Camp EAGLE was struck once during the first 6 weeks of
reporting period. In the A SHAU Valley, FSB's CURRAHEE, TURNAGE and TIGER
received 122mm rocket attacks. Two sapper-type attacks were launched in THUA
THIEN (P). On 13 May, elements of the 306th Inf Bn and K12 Sapper Bn/6th Regt
struck FSB AIRBORNE resulting in 22 friendly KIA and 61 WIA with 32 enemy KIA
and 1 FM captured. On 28 May, 2/1 ARVN at FSB BRADLEY, repulsed a sapper-type
attack from an unidentified company-size force. Results were 13 ARVN KIA, 24
ARVN WIA, 4 US WIA and 22 NVA KIA.

(2) On 8 May, Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER, which began in mid-March,
was terminated. During this operation, 218 enemy were killed and two major
supply caches were discovered. Of greater importance, Operation MASSACHUSETTS
STRIKER rendered the 816th Bn/9th Regt combat ineffective and denied the enemy
the use of the southern A SHAU Valley. This interdicted the enemy's vital
supply line serving the 4th and 5th Regts in southern THUA THIEN (P) and possibly units in northern and central QUANG NAM (P).

(3) On 10 May, Operation APACHE SNOW was launched with combat assaults along the Laocon border in the northern A SHAU Valley. In the initial stages of the operation, a large enemy supply complex (possibly the enemy's Warehouse 54, supplying most units in THUA THIEN (P)) was found. The discovery of this large depot denied enemy units in the Military Region. Tri Thien Hue (MRTTH) area vast stores of weapons and equipment. The enemy's sensitivity to allied encroachment into this area was shown by the above mentioned attack on FSB AIRBORNE which was located within the depot. Most significant during Operation APACHE SNOW was the stand by two battalions of the 29th Regt on Hill 937 (DONG AP Bia). For ten days, the allies pounded the hill with tactical air and artillery fire to weaken the well dug-in enemy. On 20 May, the hill was taken. During the action, over 600 NVA were killed rendering the 7th and 8th Bns/29th Regt combat ineffective. Remaining elements of the 29th Regt withdrew into LAOS to avoid complete destruction. On 29 May, an unidentified reinforced company struck FSB BRADLXT with a sapper-type attack. The attack may have been in retaliation for the resounding defeat suffered by the 29th Regt on Hill 937. Little other significant ground contact was made in Operation APACHE SNOW; however, the enemy did attack friendly fire bases with 122mm artillery and rockets. Attacks from eastern Base Area 611 on FSB CURRAHEE were probably the work of the 833 Rkt/Arty BN/MRTTH. Mixed rocket and artillery attacks on FSB ERSKINE can probably be attributed to the 675B Artillery Regt located in west-central BA 611. Activity in the THUA THIEN (P) lowlands was generally light until mid-June with both the 4th and 5th Regts continuing to avoid contact. Activity in PHU LOC (D), to include assassinations, kidnappings, mining of the railroad, small ground and mortar attacks, and enemy rice procurement, was conducted by small parties of the PHU LOC Armed Bn and the 4th NVA Regt. Rocket attacks on HUE, Camp EAGLE, and PHU BAI Combat Base were the only offensive activity attributable to the 5th Regt during June. North of HUE, activity continued to be light as the 6th Regt remained in the western reaches of the province near supply lines and allied Operation APACHE SNOW. On 7 June, Operation APACHE SNOW terminated and enemy casualties were set at 1021 KIA in this combined operation by elements of the 3d Mar Div, the 101st Abn Div (AM), and the 1st ARVN Div. On 8 June, allied troops continued interdiction of the northern A SHAU Valley in Operation MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOS. Through 21 July, the casualty total for that operation was 266 enemy KIA. During the operation, the enemy retaliated with attacks by rocket and mortar fire, particularly against FSB BERCHEHSGARDEN and FSB CURRAHEE. On 14 June, FSB BERCHEHSGARDEN received a fiercely conducted sapper attack by the 13 Sapper Bn/MRTTH and FSB CURRAHEE sustained an abortive sapper attack by elements of the 12th Sapper Bn and the 806th Bn/6th Regt on 15 June. In heavy and continuing contacts west of FSB CURRAHEE after 9 July, 101st Abn Div (AM) elements identified at least 2 battalions of the apparently recently reinfiltreated 803d Regt. The regiment may have been called upon to fill the void left by the badly defeated 29th Regt. As with the 29th Regt, the 803d has been aggressive in its offensive activities. Since early July there has been significant increase in activity by the 5th Regt in central THUA THIEN (P). In the first three weeks of July, all subordinate units of the regiment, with the exception
of the 810th Bn, were identified in contact. Of particular importance was
the activity by the CHI THUA I and II Sapper Bns in attacks on FSB GERONIMO
and PHU THU (D) HQ. In the case of the attack at PHU THU, it appears that
the CHI THUA I Bn was performing in an advisory capacity for local force
elements. The increased offensive action by the 5th Regt may be an attempt
to create enough activity in the lowlands to force the allies to divert their
attention and forces from the A SHAH Valley, as continued interdiction of the
A SHAH suppresses the bulk of logistical activity for the 4th and 5th Regiments.
In leading up to the July “high points” there was a significant increase in
activity in the lowlands. The activity may, in many cases, be attributable
to local force units. Activity took the form of terrorism, assassinations,
attacks by fire and sapper attacks. Significant targets have been FSB TOMAHAWK,
NBC elements at ROCKCRUSHER, DONG DA Training Center, PHU BAI Combat Base,
PHU THU (D) HQ, FSB GERONIMO and PHONG DIEN (D) HQ. These activities may be
interpreted as a show of force by NVA and VC units attempting to intimidate
the lowland populace into supporting the VC. Part of the increase may also
be attributed to intensified attempts to gain rice and other supplies from
the lowlands area. In eastern THUA THIEN (F), the 4th Regt maintained its
pattern of little offensive activity with the exception of the 19 June attacks
in PHU LOC (D). The most significant of these attacks was on FSB TOMAHAWK.
However, a FW from the K4C Bn/4th Regt captured on 17 July indicated elements
of the K4C Bn and the PHU LOC Armed Bn were planning joint operations in the
lowlands area of PHU LOC (D) to free the area for VC/NVA rice collection
efforts. As in the past, the HUE-DA NANG Railroad continued to be the target
of mining and sabotage attempts in the “bowling alley” area.

d. Enemy Capabilities. The enemy retains the capability to attack-by-fire,
interdict LOCs, conduct limited ground and sapper-type attacks, and engage in
limited harassment of the lowlands populace and territorial forces. Enemy
forces will probably continue to avoid decisive contact. They will conduct
harassing attacks by mortar/rocket/RPG fire and concentrate on problems of
food supply while attempting to position NVA forces for offensive activities
as the northeast monsoon approaches.

2. (C) B-52 Bombing Program: There was a total of 76 B-52 strikes in the
Corps AO during the quarter; 18 in May, 34 in June and 24 in July. Broken
down into general areas, 48 strikes were employed in the vicinity of BA 611,
12 immediately south of the DMZ, 6 in the vicinity of the Vietnamese Salient,
8 in the vicinity of the A SHAH Valley and 2 in the vicinity of LEECH ISLAND.
Of these strikes, 25 were flown in support of MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS, 19 for
APACHE SNOW, 9 for VIRGINIA RIDGE, 6 for KENTUCKY JUMPER, 3 for IDAHO CANTON
and 14 (of which 4 were secondaries) not in support of a specific ground oper-
ation.

(C) Intelligence Collection:

a. Significant Activities: The significant activities of the Collection
Division including the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Branch (IPWB), the
Ground Reconnaissance Branch (GRB) and the Technical Intelligence Branch (TIB)
for the period 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969 are indicated below.

5
(1) Although there was a decrease in the number of PWs captured during this reporting period, compared with the previous reporting period, the information obtained provided a wealth of information of intelligence value. Perfection of interrogation procedures, a more intense follow-up on knowledgeable PWs, and the maintenance of a close working relationship with all IPW elements in the Corps AO have accounted for this continued production of timely, accurate information. Close coordination with ARVN elements has also contributed to the flow of information obtained through interrogation.

(2) Captured enemy documents continue to be a prime source of confirming collateral and GB information. An increase in the number of significant documents was noted during the period and close liaison with the 1st ARVN Div has resulted in an increased number of document readouts being forwarded to this headquarters. These documents have been translated by the interpreters attached to the XXIV Corps IPW Branch. In addition, a copy camera was loaned to the G2 Advisor, 1st ARVN Div in order to expedite the acquisition of ARVN captured documents into US channels.

e. Ground Reconnaissance Branch: Aggressive ground reconnaissance in the XXIV Corps AO continued to produce positive results as 248 ground reconnaissance patrols were inserted in the XXIV Corps AO on intelligence collection missions. These patrols produced over 94 contacts, resulting in over 148 enemy KIA. In addition over 165 sightings without contacts were made which provided intelligence data on numerous personnel movements and the location of enemy bunker complexes and base camps.

d. Technical Intelligence Branch: During the period, numerous technical intelligence items were monitored by this branch. The most significant of these items were as follows:

(1) Hand Grenades: In early June, three grenades similar to the Hungarian Model 42 concussion grenade were discovered on a dead NVA. It was the first time these grenades had been reported in the XXIV Corps AO.

(2) Claymore Mine Assembly: On 4 July, an improvised anti-personnel claymore mine assembly was discovered for the first time in the Corps AO. The assembly consisted of 2 VC DH-10 claymore mines with a sack of dirt in between. One claymore mine was positioned to blow the other into the air. The top claymore mine had a delay fuse which would explode at approximately 75 feet in the air providing an airburst. It is assumed these mines were to be used against LZ's. A detailed description of this mine was published in the XXIV Corps IOTSUM Number 195, dated 5 July 1969. The Combined Material Exploitation Center team attached to this headquarters continued to provide invaluable assistance to units in the field. Additionally, the Technical Intelligence Branch registered numerous war trophies to include a total of 58 pistols and 175 rifles.
4. (C) Counterintelligence:

   a. Attack on VC Infrastructure: The G2 Security Division, XXIV Corps, is tasked with the mission of monitoring VCI information and maintaining a VCI database. This is being accomplished by screening reports from all intelligence agencies and by frequent liaison visits to province and district GVN agencies, as well as US tactical units. Liaison has improved considerably and emphasis is being placed on low-level intelligence sources. The Early Warning Network and the Volunteer Informant Program also produce valuable intelligence concerning the VCI.

   b. Liaison: Increased emphasis is being placed on frequent visits to various DIOCC, PIOCC and other GVN agencies to gain timely information regarding VCI cadres and their activity. Previously, liaison was conducted weekly, but plans are being put into effect to permit more frequent visits to the various agencies.

C. OPERATIONS

1. (C) The XXIV Corps Area of Operations remained generally the same during this report period, however, the AO was enlarged slightly to the south to allow the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in conjunction with 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) units to conduct Operation Campbell Streamer.

2. (C) The following operations terminated during the report period:

   a. Operation PURPLE MARTIN: Task Force Hotel deployed the 4th Marine Regiment in the northwest portion of the 3d Marine Division AO. This clear and search operation extended to the Laotian border on the west and the DMZ in the north. Ground contacts and attacks by fire occurred frequently. The operation commenced 27 February 1969 and terminated 8 May 1969 with the following results:

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<td>269</td>
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   b. Operation MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER: This operation initiated the Spring Offensive in the southern portion of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) AO. It opened route 547 into the A SHU Valley and continued south on the YELLOW BRICK ROAD, Route 611, into northwestern QUANG NAM Province. The highlight of this operation was the discovery of large caches of weapons and medical supplies. The operation commenced 1 March 1969 and terminated 8 May 1969 with the following results:

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<td>KIA</td>
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c. Operation MAINE CRAIG: This operation by elements of the 3d Marine Division exploited intelligence information concerning the KHE SANH area and the area southeast of KHE SANH. Several large caches, including 356 tons of rice and many individual weapons, were captured. The operation commenced 15 March 1969 and terminated 2 May 1969 with the following results:

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d. Operation BRISTOL BOOTS: Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) reinforced by the 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry, conducted RIF into the RUONG RUONG Valley to exploit intelligence reports of enemy activity. The operation commenced 25 April 1969 and terminated 15 May 1969 with the following results:

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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


e. Operation VIRGINIA RIDGE: This clear and search operation was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry and 1st Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment along with elements of the 3d Marine Division in the area between Route 9 and the DMZ. The operation commenced 1 May 1969 and terminated 16 July 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>FW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>RET</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>G/SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>560</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Operation MASSACHUSETTS BAY: A clear and search operation was conducted between HUE and QUANG TRI in the coastal lowlands by the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). The operation commenced 7 May 1969 and terminated 18 June 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>FW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>RET</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>G/SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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g. Operation HERKIMER MOUNTAIN: This clear and search operation by the 4th Marine Regiment took place in the same AO previously used during Operation Purple Martin. Frequent ground contacts continued throughout the operation. The operation commenced 9 May 1969 and terminated 16 July 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>FW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>RET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>DET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>219</td>
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<td>167</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. Operation APACHE SHOW: A XXIV Corps operation with elements of 101st Airborne Division (AM), 3d Marine Division and 1st ARVN Division participating. The operation exploited intelligence indicating the presence of two NVA Regiments in the northern portion of the A SHAU Valley and souther DA KRONG Valley. Extensive air and artillery preparation preceded combat assaults into the AO where the enemy was found, fixed and destroyed in the battle for control of DONG AP HIA MOUNTAIN. The operation commenced on 10 May 1969 and terminated on 7 June 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>FW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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<td>DET</td>
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<td>719</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>667</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Ordnance captured:
- 3000 lb TNT
- 2000 ft det cord
- 10,000 anti-aircraft rds
- 437,640 3A rds
- 3120 60mm mortar rds
- 4361 82mm mortar rds
- 45 60mm mortars
- 40 AK47's
- 1 Bast German MG
- 1 East German MG
- 4 143 rifles

(2) Vehicles captured:
- 20 trucks
- 50 bicycles
- 6 bulldozers
- 1 jeep
- 500 truck headlamps

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1. Operation CAMERON FALLS: Elements of the 3rd Marine Division conducted search and destroy operations in the mountainous terrain south and southwest of CA LU. The operation was characterised by numerous sightings and contacts made by aggressive platoon size patrols. The operation was successful in interdicting enemy LOC's and thwarted build up of enemy forces in the area. Operation Cameron Falls commenced on 29 May 1969 and terminated 23 June 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVAC</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Operation UTAH MESA: Elements of the 3rd Marine Division and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), in conjunction with elements of the 2d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, conducted offensive operations from VANDERGRIFT Combat Base west to the KHE SANH plain and surrounding area to secure the west flank of the 3rd Marine Division AO and to spoil significant enemy build up in that area. Operation Utah Mesa, which commenced on 12 June 1969, terminated on 9 July 1969. Cumulative totals are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVAC</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Operation TENNESSEE PRIDE: Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducted RIF operations into Base Area 114. Contact with the enemy was negligible throughout the operation. Operation Tennessee Pride commenced on 24 June 1969 and terminated on 2 July 1969 with the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVAC</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Operation WILLIAMS GLADE: Elements of 3rd Marine Division and 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), conducted sweep operations in the area southwest of QUANG TRI Combat Base. Enemy contact was negligible throughout the operation. Operation Williams Glade commenced 12 July 1969 and terminated 26 July 1969 with the following results:
3. (c) The following operations are still in progress. Results to date are shown in paragraph 3h.

a. KENTUCKY JUMPER: 101st Airborne Division (AM) spring-summer offensive continued in the southern and western portion of THUA THIEN Province. The operation commenced on 1 March 1969.

b. MONTGOMERY RENDEZVOUS: This operation is being conducted by elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in the area previously occupied during Operation Apache Snow. It is designated to keep Route 547 open and to block the enemy use of the A SHAU Valley. The operation commenced on 8 June 1969.

c. IROQUOIS GROVE: The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), is deployed in the coastal lowlands south of QUANG TRI. The clear and search operation is in the area previously occupied during Operation Massachusetts Bay. The operation commenced on 19 June 1969.

d. ARLINGTON CANYON: A quick reaction operation by elements of the 3d Marine Division designed to thwart enemy use of the area for rocket attacks on VANDERGRIFT Combat Base. The operation commenced on 3 July 1969.

e. CAMPBELL STREAMER: This operation is designed to exploit intelligence information concerning the area west of the HAI VAN Pass and the ELEPHANT VALLEY area. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) in conjunction with GVN forces are conducting search and clear/RIF operation in the area. Light, sporadic contact has been reported. The operation commenced on 13 July 1969.

f. IDAHO CANYON: Elements of the 3d Marine Regiment conduct RIF in the area previously occupied during Operation Virginia Ridge. This operation commenced 16 July 1969.

g. GEORGIA TAR: Elements of the 4th Marine Regiment conducted clear and search operations northeast of KHE SANH. The operation commenced on 16 July 1969.

h. Statistical data of current operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Starting Date</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>EVAC</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky Jumper</td>
<td>1 Mar 69</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1578</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery Rendezvous</td>
<td>8 Jun 69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CONFIDENTIAL

Operation  Starting Date  KIA  KIA  KIA  KIA
Iroquois Grove  19 Jun 69  3  51  39  1
Arlington Canyon  3 Jul 69  2  1  1  0
Campbell Streamer  13 Jul 69  2  4  4  0
Idaho Canyon  16 Jul 69  18  72  57  0
Georgia Tar  16 Jul 69  0  2  1  0

EVENT

Operation  Starting Date  KIA  KIA  KIA  KIA  IV  G/SW
Kentucky Jumper  1 Mar 69  1571  37  5  462  1540  172
Montgomery Rendezvous  8 Jun 69  302  6  0  0  0  132  37
Iroquois Grove  19 Jun 69  39  0  0  17  18  4
Arlington Canyon  3 Jul 69  5  0  0  0  1  0
Campbell Streamer  13 Jul 69  16  1  0  0  16  1
Idaho Canyon  16 Jul 69  125  1  0  0  33  15
Georgia Tar  16 Jul 69  9  0  0  1  12  0

1. Rice captured:
   (1) Thua Thien Province  52 tons
   (2) Quang Tri Province  5 tons

4. (C) Task Force Clearwater:

   a. Forces of Task Force Clearwater detected 63,744 vessels on the inland
      waterways of Northern IOTs during the reporting period. They boarded and searched
      26,115 and inspected 26,925 vessels without boarding. 219,450 persons were
      checked for proper identification and 799 were detained. The largest number of
      violators were breaking curfew or did not have proper identification.

   b. The enemy has maintained his pressure on the One Viet LOC during this
      reporting period. Mining attempts have occurred throughout the quarter, with
      activity increasing during the dark of the moon. However, no logistics craft
      have been sunk and no cargo has been lost. On 17 June, one empty cargo roll-
      on/roll-off barge was holed by a swimmer placed mine at a marking buoy in the
      GUA VIET River mouth. A PBR was holed and sunk by a suspected pressure
influence mine with 7 US WIA and 1 US KIA on 14 July. Four (4) mines detonated in the river, 2 damaging US craft and 2 detonated by mine sweeps. Three (3) mines were discovered prior to deployment. One was destroyed in place and two were rendered safe by EOD and sent to Saigon for exploitation. No attempts were detected to interdict the PERFUME River LOC this quarter. Both LOCs are swept daily by assigned mine sweep craft prior to opening the river to logistic craft traffic. Patrol boats have engaged enemy units along the river banks in excess of 50 times this quarter to secure the LOCs or support friendly ground forces in the area.

c. On 24 May, the Navy PACVs assigned to Hue River Security Group were deactivated, leaving a large area to be covered by existing Patrol Boats. Much of the area of CUA HAI Bay is inaccessible to the PBR because of shallow water and can not be patrolled.

d. The British one pound "SCARE" charge has been evaluated as superior to the MK-342 concussion grenade as an anti-swimmer weapon and is presently used for both anti-swimmer operations and as a sweep for pressure actuated mines in the CUA VIET River.

e. Increased emphasis is being placed on Civic Action programs and MEDCAP/ DENTCAP are conducted regularly throughout the Clearwater AO. Three test villages along the Cua Viet River are being used to evaluate a weekly "MINI-MEDCAP" program, using regular crews of the PBRs to take care of soap, band aid and aspirin type medical needs. The VIP program on the CUA VIET continues to produce good results. Children on the river banks were paid 34,400 $VN for munitions turned in, including 2 water mines.

D. LOGISTICS

1. (U) General. During the period covered by this report, the plan and procedure for logistics support in the XXIV Corps area of operations (AO) remained unchanged.

2. (C) Significant Activities.

a. Operation Apache Snow.

(1) During the period 10 May to 7 June, the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 3d Marine Division, in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Division, conducted Operation Apache. Resupply was accomplished entirely by aircraft with an averaged daily resupply of 346 S/Tons for the combined 1st ARVN Division - 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 64 S/Tons for the 3d Marine Division.

(2) Interservice logistical support of the Army and Marine Corps was a significant factor in the success of Operation Apache Snow. Indicative of this was an interservice supply agreement whereby the Army issued Class I & V to Marine Corps units. Marine Corps shore parties received and handled the supplies from Army issue points, then rig and the supplies which were, in turn, transported to Marine FSB’s by Army helicopters. This is a typical example of interservice cooperation.
b. During the period 15 May 1969 to 18 May 1969, the 1st Brigade (-), 101st Airborne Division (AM) was deployed principally by air from PHU BAI to TAM KY, located in the southern portion of I Corps. The air movement consisted of 69 C-130 sorties which transported 1459 passengers, 520 S/Tons of cargo, 12 105mm howitzers, and 81 vehicles. Additionally, 1 LST and 1 YFU, which embarked from TAM KY, were employed to move 111 passengers, 302 S/Tons of cargo and 31 vehicles. Of note is that the infantry battalions were in the field at the time of notification and one rifle company was extracted while still in contact with the enemy.

e. During the reporting period the 9th Marine Regimental Landing Team began redeployment to Okinawa. The regiment and attachments stood down to embark in three increments. Each increment consists of 1 Marine battalion, supporting artillery, and combat service support. The first increment, designated Embarkation Unit Alpha-1, stood down 23 June 1969. It embarked from CUA VIET and DA NANG 13-15 July 1969. A total of 2529 passengers and 86,917.75 S/Tons were embarked. These figures include the 1st AMTRAC Br which began redeployment in June. The majority of personnel were flown from QUANG TRI to DA NANG. Heavy equipment units, e.g. tanks, artillery and anti-tank companies were staged through CUA VIET. The second unit, Embarkation Unit Alpha-2, stood down on 7 July and began embarkation on 30 July with completion scheduled 2 August. The third unit, Embarkation Unit Alpha-3, stood down 23 July and will embark in August. An advance liaison team departed by air on 2 July. Each embarkation unit has an advance party which departs by air; Alpha-1, 10 July, Alpha-2, 24 July, and Alpha-3, in August. No significant problems have developed.

d. During this period, post hostilities planning gained momentum with the receipt on 10 June 1969 of the USARV OPLAN 69-69, and the receipt of the III MAF OPLAN 69-69 on 18 June 1969. XXIV Corps is in the process of producing a supporting plan for the III MAF OPLAN 69-69. No significant problems have been encountered in the planning for support of the post hostilities plans.

e. QL-1 through the HAI VAN Pass was opened to free flow traffic on 7 May 1969. The HAI VAN is trafficable between the hours of 0800 and 1630 hours daily.

2. Personnel Administration.

1. (U) Civilian Personnel Management. The number of direct hire Vietnamese Nationals in the command decreased from 59 to 47. Because of funding limitations the number of daily hire Vietnamese Nationals was also reduced.

2. (U) Special Services. During the period, tennis courts, a mobile library and photo lab were completed and placed into operation. The extremely long waiting period for out-of-country EMR is expected to be significantly reduced due to receipt of increased quotas.
3. (U) Religious Activities.

a. Religious coverage continued to be adequate throughout the Corps AO. Although a Jewish chaplain was not available during the period 7 March to 4 June, effective Jewish services were scheduled by local congregations, under the leadership of lay leaders. Visits by the Jewish chaplain, HQ, IFFV further enhanced Jewish religious activities. Full Jewish religious coverage can be expected in view of the assignment to XXIV Corps of a Jewish chaplain.

b. Three monthly training conferences were conducted during the reporting period. Primary speakers were COL Thomas A. Bowen, Senior Advisor, Tinh Thien Province who discussed CORDS and how chaplains can assist the program; LTC Janck M. Narden, SJA, XXIV Corps and Mr. Rich Edwards, ARE Assistant Field Director.

4. (U) Medical.

a. During the reporting period excellent medical support continued to be provided in the Corps AO. A new system of forward medical regulating was initiated and improvements in existing hospital facilities, to include internal ward construction, sanitary features, mess hall and electrical power, were completed. Coordination of the construction effort for the new hospital for PHU BAI continues. An analysis of various contingencies in medical support resources has been completed and the Corps position on hospital requirements for PHU BAI has been prepared.

b. Coordination was completed and plans for construction, equipping, training of personnel and consultant service were made concerning the establishment of a physio therapy clinic at Nguyen Tri Phuong Hospital in Hue.

5. (U) Discipline, Law and Order. Normal activities were conducted in the area of discipline, law and order during the reporting period, with no significant trends. Highlight of the period was the receipt of the V-100, Commando Armored Car, in the 504th MP Battalion which provides direct support for the Corps.

F. INSPECTION GENERAL.

NONE

0. INFORMATION.

1. (U) Coverage was furnished for the following major events:

a. Visit of Secretary of State Rogers.

b. Visit of Republic of Vietnam President Thieu.

c. XXIV Corps Change of Command Ceremony.
2. (U) Four interviews were coordinated with the Command Group and one interview/briefing with a staff section for members of the press.

3. (U) Thirteen feature/news stories on Corps activities were released.

4. (U) There were 147 press representatives visiting the Press Camp - 76 were billeted.

H. COMMAND HISTORIAN.

(U) The following activities were carried out by the XXIV Corps Command Historian for the period May - July 1969:


I. ARMY AVIATION.

NONE

J. SIGNAL.

1. (U) The NICTZ Communication Coordination Committee.

a. The formerly established NICTZ Communications Coordination Committee held its first meeting on 5 May 1969. The basic objective of this committee is to examine the overall NICTZ communications systems with a view toward identifying areas of duplication and facilities no longer mission essential. These include switchboards, teletype facilities, data terminals, technical controls, radio and cable systems, courier service, circuits, secure voice and special purpose communications. Instructions contained in COMUSMACV Speed Letter, MACV J63, dated 28 Feb 69 and III MAF ICCI 2303.1 are used by the committee as guidelines. Subsequent meetings were held in June and July.

b. Progress is being made in the expansion of the AN/HTC-9 at Camp Eagle, thereby eliminating a number of small tactical switchboards; acceptance of the Quang Tri Cable Distribution and Tie Cable Project; deactivation of two AN/TRC-97 (Navy) Systems, Cua Viet to Da Nang and Tan My to Da Nang; installation of one AN/TRC-97 system from Phu Bai to Tan My to provide Tan My with telephone service and allow for future deactivation of a 101st Abn Div AM/GRC-163 system from Camp Eagle to Tan My; and elimination of non-essential circuits and trunks.

2. (U) Deactivation of Microwave Systems. During this reporting period two microwave systems were deactivated. On 9 May 1969, a 45 channel AM/TRC-29 system,
770M1 from Quang Tri Army to Dong Ha, and on 18 May 1969 a channel TRC-129 system, 770UT 5F from Phu Bai to Dong Ha, was deactivated. These deactivations were made possible by the completion of Phase II Southeast Asia Wideland System-Integrated Communications System overbuild program during the previous month.

3. (C) VHF Support for Apache Snow. On 10 May 1969, a 12 channel VHF system, FFB-58, was installed between Headquarters, 3d Brigade (FWD), FSB Berchtesgarden and Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (AM), Camp Eagle. Necessary assets for this system were made available under the provisions of XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69, Division Support Communications Contingency Plan. Personnel and equipment of the 63d Signal Battalion, 12th Signal Group (formerly ICTZ Signal Group) were helicopterized to FSB Berchtesgarden and used to install the system. This 12 channel system provided the required command and control and fire direction communications between Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (AM), Camp Eagle, 3d Brigade (FWD), and 3d Brigade (REAR) at Camp Evans via existing systems. This system used in conjunction with the organic 4 channel system installed by the 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division, and 1st ARVN Division provided the required trunking needs in the AO for Apache Snow.

4. (C) VHF Support of FSB Birmingham. On 29 May 1969 and under the provisions of XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69, the 63d Signal Battalion, 12th Signal Group, established a 12 channel VHF System FFB-78 from Camp Eagle to FSB Birmingham. The system was in support of 101st Airborne Division operations and provided a more reliable and expanded means of communication to FSB Birmingham. Activation of this system permitted the 101st Airborne Division to deactivate two organic four channel systems from Camp Eagle to FSB Birmingham.

5. (U) Deactivation of VHF Systems. On 3 June 1969, a 12 channel VHF System, FFB-73, installed between FSB Whip and LZ Sally was deactivated. This system was in support of Operation Massachusetts Striker which was implemented on 23 April 1969 under provisions of XXIV Corps OPLAN 10-69. Service was provided between 2d Bde, 101st Airborne Division (AM) (FWD) at FSB Whip and 2d Bde, 101st Airborne Division (AM) (MAIN) at LZ Sally. On 3 June 1969, a twelve channel VHF system, FFB-69, between the 108th Artillery Group at Dong Ha and the Dong Ha TMT was deactivated. This system was no longer required as a result of an expansion and improvement in the Cable Distribution System at Dong Ha Combat Base.

6. (C) Quang Tri Cable Distribution System. On 5 June 1969, formal tests and acceptance were made by the 12th Signal Group on the cable distribution system in Quang Tri Combat Base. The project which provides support to the major elements of Quang Tri Combat Base, Camp Red Devil and Quang Tri City was completed by a detachment of the 40th Signal Battalion. In the new Cable Distribution System, two tie cables, the 04 (400 pr) and 05 (50 pr), now provide service to Quang Tri City. Camp Red Devil is supported by 100 pairs of the new 600 pair 02 cable and an existing 50 pair cable. The remaining 01 cable (600 pr), 03 cable (400 pr), and 500 pair of the 02 cable will support the major units in the Quang Tri Combat Base area. The 588th Signal Company is maintaining and utilizing the new CDS providing telephone service in Quang Tri and adjacent units in Quang Tri City and Camp Red Devil.
7. (U) **Camp Red Devil Telephone and Cable Distribution System.** During June, installation of a 400 pair distribution cable was completed at Camp Red Devil. This new cable plant will support the major elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). One AN/MTC-10 presently provides telephone service for the compound and allows access to main switchboard AN/MTG-9 at Quang Tri Army. Completion of the cable distribution system in Red Devil and tie cables in Quang Tri from Red Devil are major improvements necessary to support present and future communications requirements in the Quang Tri Combat Base - Camp Red Devil area. The project was a joint effort of the 12th Signal Group and the 298th Signal Company of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech).

8. (C) **Joint Sea Ground Tactical Keylist ICTZ.** On 1 July 1969, utilization of a common Nestor Keylist, AKAK-8159 throughout I Corps was implemented with CG III MAF as the controlling and evaluating headquarters. This keylist is used to key the code changes for the KY-8/KY-38 tactical secure voice equipments. These secure voice equipments are used on all ground to ground and supporting arms tactical radio operations in ICTZ. The use of a common keylist throughout the Corps AO separates secure radio nets only by frequency thus allowing ease of operation and adding flexibility into the system. The MACV Advisors and Special Forces will not be integrated into the Corps keylist until evaluation can be made on an individual basis. The Master Program is subject to further evaluation, user education and command emphasis to insure full implementation of the program.

9. (C) **Relocation of 9th Regimental Landing Team, 3d Marine Division.** On 7 July 1969, communications support in accordance with Annex F to III MAF OPLAN 182-69 was implemented. This OPLAN is for the redeployment of selected III MAF units and primarily the 9th Regimental Landing Team, 3d Marine Division, with concurrence of CG, USAV and CG, 1st Signal Brigade, the 12th Signal Group established a secure Command at Tam My Port which was housed on the Phu Bai ACC to support the redeployment. The 12th Signal Group also established two HF SSB voice radio stations (located at Cua Viet and Tam My) in the Port Facilities Administrative Net. Organic communications within 3d Marine Division provides for one HF SSB voice station located at Dong Ha in the Port Facilities Net. Organic communications within 101st Airborne Division (AM) provides for monitoring of convoys passing through their AO as required. It is anticipated that this communications support will be terminated upon completion of the redeployment phase.

K. **ENGINEER.**

1. (U) During the report period, the following construction projects were completed:

    a. Cam Lo Bridge (ID 149604).
    b. 3d Medical Surgical Facility at Quang Tri.
    c. Two CH-47 hangars (in XXIV Corps AO).
    d. Eight UH-1 hangars (in XXIV Corps AO).
2. (U) Major construction projects started during period:
   
   a. Lang Co Bridge (ZC 886957)
   
   b. Song Bo Railroad Bridge (YD 614278)
   
   c. Dong Da Bridge (YD 242611)
   
   d. 85th Evacuation Hospital

3. (C) Major bridge construction/repair scheduled to begin during the next report period:
   
   a. Restoration of Hue vehicle bridge to 2 lane CL 18.
   
   b. Construction of Quang Tri Bridge.

4. (U) Land Clearing: The 59th Land Clearing Company under OPCON of the 45th Engineer Group continued to clear areas adjacent to Route 547 and open tank trails in the A Shau Valley. Approximately 5,000 acres have been cleared on Route 547/547A and in the A Shua Valley.

5. (U) Primary Lines of Communication: There were 62 miles of 1st lift paving accomplished during the period and 12 miles of 2d lift.

6. (U) Secondary lines of Communication:
   
   a. Work continued to increase on the secondary LOC program. Effort was concentrated on Route 560 by the 101st ARVN Engineer Battalion with assistance from the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat). The 1st and 101st ARVN Engineer Battalions assisted by the 326th Engineer Battalion and the 27th Engineer Battalion continued to progress on Route 552. The Phu Bai Bridge was completed 18 June 1969 by D Company, 87th Engineer Battalion. The 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) commenced construction of a bridge at YD 465405. The 101st Engineer Battalion commenced upgrading of Route 8B.

   b. Route 547, to the junction of Route 547 and 548 in the A Shau Valley, was opened to small tracked and wheeled vehicles on 18 June 1969 and passed tanks on 18 July 1969. Basic pioneer road improvement was accomplished on Route 548 within the confines of the A Shau Valley.

L. CIVIL ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Civic Action Activities:
   
   a. During this reporting period, all phases of pacification progressed rapidly due, mainly, to the secure atmosphere that was prevalent in the Corps AO and a continuing emphasis on military civic action. Self-help projects constituted the bulk of the civic action work with more than 70% of the projects being accomplished by indigenous self-help labor. During the reporting period, XXIV Corps units spent over 11,706 man days (10 hour work day) in...
civic action projects. Corps units made available to the people over 768 tons of commodities including such items as soap, food, medical supplies, and CARE kits as well as various construction materials such as sand, gravel, tiles, bricks and lumber, both salvage and quality. The divisions supported 269 projects (schools, orphanages, hospitals, dispensaries, etc) through donations of money and by providing technical advice and direct assistance.

b. Major projects undertaken by units in XXIV Corps AO are delineated in the following paragraphs.

(1) 3d Marine Division:

(a) The Cam Vu refugee resettlement was completed with the assistance of the 3d Marine Division. The project included completion of an irrigation system. This operation is covered in detail in inclosure 3 of this report.

(b) The 11th Engineer Battalion plowed approximately 1000 hectares of land in the Cam Lo resettlement area. This was land that had lain fallow for several years and in many cases was too hard for the local farmers to plow. Initially there was some resistance by indigenous personnel because the plow tore down their dikes. Realizing, however, that their plows and water buffalo had an extremely difficult task because of the hardened soil and the fact that they could get the land tilled deeply, the initial resistance faded and the farmers were very receptive to the project.

(c) Construction on the 3d Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital at Quang Tri got into full swing during the reporting period. In order to raise money for the project, the 3d Marine Division conducted a raffle in which they gave away two automobiles and other valuable prizes. The division netted $54,040.00 (AM) from the raffle which will be utilized to buy material for constructing the hospital. Workers on the project have completed, except for the roofs, the medical services building, the receiving and emergency building, and the domestic services building. Half of the first ward and the foundation for the nurses’ quarters/isolation building have been completed.

(2) 101st Airborne Division (AM):

(a) A survey of orphanages in Thua Thien Province was completed by the division G5 section. The results of this survey were used to realign orphanage support and for more equitable distribution of assistance.

(b) A fire, on 9 July 1969, destroyed 261 homes in the Quang Phong refugee area in Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Province. The men of the 3d Brigade did a heroic job of fighting the fire, thereby saving lives and property. The division G5 delivered 8,600 lbs of food to the stricken village the same day. The next day, 40 general purpose medium tents were delivered to Thua Thien Province by the division G5 to provide housing for the homeless people. The actions of the 3d Brigade and timely action of the G5 were significant in aiding the fire victims.

(c) Project "Screaming Eagles" continued with 1200 baby chickens delivered to the people of Thua Thien Province during the reporting period.
The division donated to the Long Tho Lime Factory, in Thua Thien Province, three Russian trucks that were captured during military operations in the A Shau Valley. An additional eight Russian trucks were presented to the Province Chief to be used for spare parts.

Miscellaneous accomplishments:

(a) The fishing industry has continued to expand in both provinces during the reporting period. The lack of large scale enemy activity in the populated areas and along the coast has made it possible to relax waterway restrictions, allowing a significant increase in fishing activity. Larger quantities of fish are being sold on the markets, thereby increasing the individual fisherman's income. The average daily income for a fisherman in Gia Dang, Quang Tri Province now amounts to 400-600 $VN per day.

(b) The railroad between Hue and Da Nang has continued to operate on a daily basis despite several mining incidents and mortar attacks. This has provided a significant boost to the economy in that a trip from Hue to Da Nang on the railroad costs approximately 40$VN whereas the same trip by bus costs about 400$VN.

(c) The monthly G5 conferences were continued during the report period.

c. Civic Action Effectiveness:

(i) The following are results of successful civic action programs throughout XXIV Corps:

(a) The local populace continues to display a responsive attitude toward GVN representatives and US soldiers. Their will to progress is evident in the amount of self-help projects that are going on. This is also indicative of their faith in the Government of Vietnam.

(b) The farmers in the area are forming cooperatives and pooling their money to buy tractors, water pumps, and other agricultural equipment. Some farmers in Quang Tri Province, for example, are presently negotiating to buy six to eight tractors in an effort to mechanize farming and increase production. The point is that the Vietnamese farmers are organizing themselves and using their own funds to progress. This is significant in that the thinking and attitude of the farmer is becoming more progressive in nature.

2. (C) Psychological Operations (all figures are as of 31 July 1969)

a. XXIV Corps, G5 PSIOP Division continued to monitor and supervise PSIOP programs/campaigns being conducted by units OP-10 to XXIV Corps and to coordinate PSIOP activities with the 1st ARVN Division and both provinces.

b. The number of Hoi Chanhs rallying to the Allies continued to decrease, from 149 last quarter to 66 during the current reporting period. This decline is a continuation of the downward trend which began in November 1968. The Chieu Hoi program established by this headquarters is being reviewed for
changes in approach in hopes of reversing the current downward trend.

c. During this quarter, the XXIV Corps PSTOP Division processed 3,163 requests for leaflets and 2,410 requests for aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. In response to these requests approximately 168,863,000 leaflets were disseminated and approximately 274 hours of messages were broadcast over aerial and ground loudspeakers.

d. During the period 10 May through 7 June 1969, the 3d Marine Division, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and 1st ARVN Division participated in Operation Apache Snow. The objective of this operation was to reopen the A Shau Valley and destroy the enemy logistical routes and supply depots located there. In support of this operation, more than 7,352,000 leaflets were disseminated and a total aerial broadcasting time of 50 hours and 35 minutes was directed against the NVA units encountered.

e. The newly developed "Early Word" system was utilized for the first time during the reporting period. This system has increased PSTOP versatility. It enables immediate exploitation of Boi Chang by having him deliver surrender or rally appeals to his former comrades via the FM radio linked to the aircraft's loudspeaker system. This system has also been utilized by the 3d Marine Division in locating and giving instruction to lost US personnel.

3. (C) Pacification.

a. During the reporting period, statistics indicating the pacification progress made in the XXIV Corps AO became available for the period 1 April 1969 to 30 June 1969 as follows:

(1) The number of hamlets covered by GVN security increased from 582 to 692 while the number of contested hamlets increased from 112 to 126 and the number of VC controlled hamlets dropped from 21 to 9.

(2) The percentage of population within the Corps AO under GVN security rose from 87.1% to 93.2% and although the number of contested hamlets actually rose, the percentage of population in contested areas dropped from 11.5% to 8.0%. The percentage of population under VC control dropped from 2.1% to a miniscule 0.3%.

(3) A number of hamlets being carried as abandoned or not evaluated were rehhabited or reestablished in a new location during the reporting period. This was done by the resettlement of refugees into some hamlets. In those instances where refugees from a specific hamlet chose to remain where they were, their refugee hamlet was named for their old hamlet and the old hamlet dropped from the records. The increase in the number of contested hamlets shown in para 3a(2) above resulted from these resettlement and reestablishment activities. This is due mainly to the fact that during this initial period of change, the villages are rated low in development, which is a major factor in the HES rating. The next reporting period should see a decrease in the number of contested hamlets as the development activities gain momentum.
b. Several other indicators show the effectiveness of the pacification support efforts of XXIV Corps.

(1) Approximately 15,700 refugees returned to their homes or were resettled in place during the reporting period. This reduced the total XXIV Corps AO refugee population to approximately 119,000 people at the end of July 1969.

(2) Elections were held in 778 hamlets and 150 villages within the XXIV Corps AO. These account for 91% of the hamlet and 96% of the village elections programmed for 1969.

(3) Village self development funds have been made available to 69 village chiefs, representing 46% of the villages programmed for receipt of these funds in 1969.

(4) The secondary lines of communication project has continued to progress. As of 31 July, a total of 194 kilometers of secondary LOC had been upgraded, built, or were under construction. This constitutes 55% of the 352 kilometers programmed.
SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COMMAND

None

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) ITEM: IMPROVED B-52 TARGETING

a. OBSERVATION: Continuing use of previously reported procedures (HQ, XXIV Corps G-31, 4 Jun 69) resulted in further improvements to simplify operations, provide a faster reaction capability, and conserve man-hours. The basic 10x10 kilometer grid square data base system is retained, but in a different format. All intelligence data of both a transitory and nontransitory nature are recorded and maintained in a manila folder for each 10x10 kilometer grid square. Data is plotted on a sheet of graph paper and recorded on a data sheet contained within each folder. The folders are cross-referenced to each other by use of a code number. Transitory data is recorded in red and non-transitory data in black. The graph sheets are filed in such a manner that adjoining grid squares can be easily aligned without removal from their respective files. A further improvement to the target selection and priority determination system is the evaluation of target nominations under the numerical rating system employed by MACV. In addition to providing a relative value and standing of targets nominated by this headquarters, this also provides a more accurate forecast of the target's acceptability for selection to be struck.

b. EVALUATION: In addition to considering all aspects of targeting in a systematic manner, these refinements have provided an almost instantaneous reflection of existing intelligence data in any area and an immediate response capability to targeting requirements. Since these revisions have been implemented, the processing time of target nomination has been reduced to one sixth of that previously required; the percentage of targets selected for strikes from those nominated has increased by over 100%.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the system of recording intelligence data described above be implemented whenever accurate, detailed, and quickly retrieved targeting data is required.

2. (C) ITEM: PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION

a. OBSERVATION: PWS continue to be a prime source of current and confirming information concerning enemy location, identification, and strength. The capability of the IPW branch must include the ability to exploit each source expertly and rapidly.

b. EVALUATION: The IPW personnel of XXIV Corps are adequate and experienced at the present time. During the next quarter, experienced interrogator losses will exceed 50%, placing a large part of the IPW effort in inexperienced hands.
c. **RECOMMENDATIONS:** Newly assigned interrogator personnel require considerably more time than most school-trained individuals before they can perform in an optimum manner. A period of 2 weeks is the minimum amount of time recommended for orientation of new interrogators. Subjects which should be covered fully during this two (2) week training period are listed below:

1. Geographical Orientation - to include administrative units, boundaries, and GVN agencies.
2. Order of Battle - to include VC/NLF organization.
3. Interrogation Techniques.
5. Vietnamese Psychology.

3. (C) **ITEM: DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION**

   a. **OBSERVATION:** Exploitation of information obtained from captured enemy documents continues to provide valuable intelligence.

   b. **EVALUATION:** The most obvious deficiency in exploitation is the nature of the source. The information is likely to be dated, contain quantities of propaganda, personal memoirs, and other material of non-tactical interest which must be screened to get to the tactically significant information contained therein.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** Careful attention must be given to proofing the rough readouts to prevent distortion or loss of meaning due to awkward translation. Coordination is currently underway with III MAF to effect a special courier service, with a terminal in DA NANG, to speed the flow of documents to and information from CDEC. Command emphasis should be placed on getting documents out of the field and into division level intelligence channels for initial exploitation and subsequent evacuation.

4. (C) **ITEM: REDUCTION OF FALSE SENSOR ACTIVATION**

   a. **OBSERVATION:** Various detection modes are built into the Mini Sid, and when utilized properly, false activations are reduced or eliminated. The primary sensor, the Mini Sid, may be set in four modes. Mode A is used when it is emplaced alone. When it is emplaced with ancillary sensors (e.g. Pirid or Magid) Modes B, C and D may be utilized. Mode B causes an activation to be reported only when the ancillary device is activated. Mode C causes a report when either the Mini Sid or the ancillary device is activated. Mode D causes a report only when the Mini Sid and the ancillary device are both activated within twenty seconds of each other, thus, virtually eliminating false or misleading activations. Activation of sensors set in Mode D indicates high probability of a target. Further, Mode D allows new or untrained personnel to make highly valid target assessments.
In March 1969, a hand-placed string of sensors containing Mini Side, set in the C Mode, and ancillary sensors were activated north of Con Thien. This string was almost continuously active for over a month. Although artillery was fired in response to the various activations, the indicated movement generally failed to cease. A patrol was inserted to investigate and concluded that most of the activations were false. In May, new batteries were installed in the Mini Side and they were switched to the D Mode. Activations decreased drastically as many of the false activations ceased. A similar experience took place with another string of sensors.

In areas where sensors are often liable to false activation or when there is a lack of well trained sensor readout personnel, sensors should be set in the D Mode. This tends to insure a valid target before sensor activations are transmitted to the readout site.

In a recent operation, a Recon Platoon was inserted into an LZ to make contact with an enemy element which had been sighted and reported by an AO. The LZ was prepared by two AHA gunships prior to troop insertion. Immediately after being inserted, the point man and the first squad moved off the LZ toward the reported enemy position. The squad had moved about 50 meters when the point man detected gas and gave a voice alarm to the remainder of the squad. The second and third men in the squad file immediately experienced severe respiratory distress, burning and copious tearing of the eyes. All squad members were affected by the agent. The platoon immediately moved back to the LZ. Two men could not open their eyes, were experiencing severe respiratory distress and were vomiting. A dust-off was called and the two men were evacuated to a medical facility. A search of the LZ was conducted to determine the type munitions or dissemination means employed. The search revealed three (3) US 55 gallon drums of chemical agent CS 1 in and near the LZ. These drums had been dropped during a previous operation and were fused with the XM-921 time fuse which was purged from the inventory approximately 14 months ago. Three drums had been pierced allowing the agent to disseminate.

Based on the observation, it is realistic to assume that during the LZ preparation phase, prior to the Recon Platoon insertion, the AHA gunships hit the previously employed US 55 gallon CS 1 drums, thereby venting the agent just prior to the insertion.

That Recon units, which are lightly equipped, carry the light weight XM-28 RCA mask and that all CS 1 and CS 2 chemical agent drops be plotted and recorded for future operations evaluation.

The 1st Brigade was deployed to Tam Ky, but not with the infantry battalions which had been normally operating with the 1st Brigade.
headquarters. The battalions deployed were from the 2d Brigade. Additionally, the deployment was announced 18 hours prior to the scheduled departure.

b. EVALUATION: In as much as future tactical situations may dictate rapid moves with a minimum of notification to units in the field and, further, the deployed task force may be comprised of units not organic to the headquarters of the task force, greater stress must be placed on unit movement plans.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: That all units, to include small detachments, periodically review their movement plans and maintain a current list of the unit strength and a detailed schedule indicating the cubic, weight and square footage of the unit's equipment and impediment administration.

E. PERSONNEL

1. (U) ITEM: REPRODUCTION EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE

a. OBSERVATION: A serious problem exists pertaining to Multilith Offset Press maintenance support for this headquarters. Detailed maintenance is required each 2-3 month period. The technical representative is located in Saigon and is contacted through Da Nang Support Command who relays the request to 1st Log Command. Past experience reveals a time lag of 2-3 weeks from the date an initial request is made to date of actual arrival of factory representative.

b. EVALUATION: The Corps Headquarters' Reproduction Unit serves not only the staff but assigned units and numerous other support elements located on Phu Bai Combat Base. Presently, there are 2 Model 1250 Offset Presses on hand. Should a complete outage occur and one or both machines become inoperable, the administrative support to this headquarters and assigned units would be seriously jeopardized.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS: Action should be taken through higher headquarters to implement scheduled, preferably quarterly, maintenance visits by a manufacturer representative. Telephonic contact prior to departing Saigon for Phu Bai is strongly recommended. In so doing, the representative could ascertain if any major problems exist that would require parts which he may not normally carry with him. The quantity of Offset Presses located in I Corps support a further recommendation that a factory representative be located in Da Nang.

2. (U) ITEM: CAREER COUNSELOR

a. OBSERVATION: The Corps TOE authorizes an E-6 as the Corps Career Counselor Supervisor. A trend in current regulations is to make E-8 the authorized grade for the Corps and Army level Career Counselor Supervisor.

b. EVALUATION: In a combat situation, the Corps Career Counselor is required to supervise the tactical aspects of the reenlistment program for all Corps assigned units. Further, in the present situation, nondivisional units which are OCPON to the XXIV Corps are monitored.
c. **RECOMMENDATION:** The Corps Career Counselor slot be upgraded from E-6 to E-8 under AR 671-201 and paragraph 1-12, Table 1-1, AR 600-280. As a principle realistment MOS serving from 3,000 to 10,000 personnel, MOS 00E50, E-6, is required. Upgrading of the Career Counselor position will be requested in the next XXIV Corps MTOE submission.

3. (U) **ITEM:** USE OF COMMANDO ARMORED CAR, V-100.

   a. **OBSERVATION:** The initial Commando Armored Cars were received by the MP Battalion in direct support to XXIV Corps. They were observed in operation while providing convoy escort and security on Route 547 RW. The distance covered by each round trip was in excess of 60 miles and took approximately 12 hours to complete. The weather conditions under which these vehicles were observed were hot with clear skies; road conditions were dry and extremely dusty. Two Commando Armored Cars were normally used per convoy and the crews appeared to be adequately cross trained in the performance of their duties and the operation of the vehicle.

   b. **EVALUATION:** Overall, this vehicle is capable of providing security and escort services for convoys. The armament is considered adequate and the armor plating of the vehicle will provide protection against small arms fire and a measure of protection against larger caliber fire. The radio system and power plant are also considered adequate. One weakness noted in this vehicle is in the drive train. One vehicle, on the day of the observation, suffered a rear differential failure and had to be operated in four-wheel-drive. The vehicle completed the trip; however, if the terrain had been less than favorable, it would not have completed the trip. Another V-100 had to be trucked back to the unit as a clutch failed while it was escorting a convoy on the previous day. The interior heat of the vehicle is almost unbearable when the hatches are closed and as a result the vehicle is operated with the top hatches open. In the event of enemy action this could be the cause of unnecessary casualties and might delay the reaction of the crew in returning enemy fire.

   c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That each military police company engaged in convoy escort duties have 10 of these vehicles authorized by TOE with an augmentation of maintenance personnel in the appropriate MOS. That a repair parts list be established and required parts be stocked for these vehicles. At the present time, there is no stockpile of parts for these vehicles in the XXIV Corps AO and, as a result, vehicles can not be repaired and returned to service in an expeditious manner.

4. (U) **ITEM:** REQUIREMENT FOR AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FOR MILITARY POLICE UNITS.

   a. **OBSERVATION:** Those MP units which provide area support for XXIV Corps do not have either organic or assigned direct air support available to them. The MP mission requires the battalion be positioned over 86.4 miles of main supply routes and lines of communications. This wide dispersion of personnel increases the control problems of the company and battalion commander.
b. **EVALUATION**: Due to the nature of this war, rapidity of movement is essential. It is desirable that night travel through unpatified areas and day travel at any great distance from pacified areas be conducted by aircraft. Further, it is felt that a MP Battalion Commander cannot possibly exercise the desired degree of command and control over the entire length of the MSR without air transportation. Also, the capability provided by helicopter in conducting road and route reconnaissance and convoy surveillance is of extreme value to the MP mission.

c. **RECOMMENDATION**: That MP units be provided with either organic or direct support aircraft.

F. **INSPECTOR GENERAL**

None

G. **INFORMATION**

(U) **ITEM: PERSONNEL STAFFING**

a. **OBSERVATION**: The Information Office is unable to adequately perform the Public Information mission. In particular, there is an almost total lack of Corps generated feature and hometown news stories publicising activities of the Army in the civilian media. Present staffing is occupied with escorting correspondents in the Corps area of operation, publication of a daily news summary, and routine office actions.

b. **EVALUATION**: An active Information Program is vitally needed to inform the civilian community in the United States of the activities of the Army and individuals. This can lead to better understanding by the civilian community of the mission of the military establishment and national goals. It is also important to troop morale that the civilian community be aware of and understand the personal hardships and sacrifices of Corps troops in the Republic of Vietnam, and that Corps troop activities are given recognition in military news media on the same scale as other commands authorized larger and more complete information staffs.

c. **RECOMMENDATION**: That XXIV Corps MTOK be changed to authorize the Information Office the following personnel:

1. One EM, Grade E-6, MOS 71Q40, Information Supervisor (Editor/Writer).
2. One EM, Grade E-5, MOS 71Q20, Information Specialist (Writer/Photographer).
3. Two EM, Grade E-4, MOS 71Q20, Information Specialist (Writer/Photographer).

(4) These changes will be requested in the next MTOK submission.
H. COMMAND HISTORY
  None
I. AVIATION
  None
J. SIGNAL
  None
K. ENGINEER
  None
L. G5 ACTIVITIES
  None
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375  1 OCT 1969

TO:  Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, XXIV Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow.

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "IMPROVED B-52 TARGETING", section II, page 24, paragraph B1; concur. This method of B-52 targeting will be included in USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons report which is disseminated to all subordinate commands. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION", section II, page 24, paragraph B2; concur. The XXIV Corps is advised to establish orientation training for newly assigned IPW personnel. Several items listed, i.e., OB and geographical orientation are peculiar to the XXIV Corps TAOR. The lack of knowledge in report writing interrogation techniques and Vietnamese psychology is the result of inadequate training of IPWs at the United States Army Intelligence School. Emphasis on these basic items is required to provide the combat commanders with qualified personnel. Recommend USARPAC and DA call this matter to the attention of Continental Army Command and the United States Army Intelligence School.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning "DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION", section II, page 25, paragraph B3; concur. The requirement to expeditiously evacuate captured enemy documents is contained in MACV Directive 381-11. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   d. (U) Reference item concerning "DEPLOYMENT OF 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV (AM)", section II, page 26, paragraph D; concur. USARV letter, dated 18 August 1969, subject: Force and Material Reporting, (FAMREP) (CINCPACINST 5230.9) directed all USARV units to prepare accurate, up to date movement plans. These plans will be available for any future deployments.

   e. (U) Reference item concerning "REPRODUCTION EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE", section II, page 27, paragraph E1; concur. The 1st Logistical Command is presently sending personnel to Japan to attend maintenance classes on the multi-lith presses. The Da Nang Support Command has sent an individual to this class. The emphasis in the class is on preventive maintenance and quarterly services. Maintenance and services are presently being performed by a contractor. There are no "factory representatives" per se located in-country.

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Because of the low density and wide dispersion of the reproduction equipment, it was necessary to establish a central location from which contract maintenance personnel could operate on an on-call basis.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "CAREER COUNSELOR", section II, page 27, paragraph E2; concur. In December 1969, this headquarters formally requested authority to upgrade senior career counselor spaces as provided for by standards of grade authorization outlined in AR 611-201. CINCSARPAC recommended approval and in January 1969, sent a message to the Chief, Office of Personnel Operations, requesting a decision be made concerning this matter. To date, no information has been received from DA although follow-up queries were sent in February and March 1969.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "USE OF COMMANDO ARMORED CAR, V-100", section II, page 28, paragraph E3; concur.

(1) USARV has received 85 of the 166 XM706 Armored Cars authorized. When shipments under ENSURE are complete, the vehicle density in USARV will be sufficient to provide adequate convoy security. MTOE action by subordinate commands will be required when shipments of the XM706 are complete.

(2) No special MOS is required for maintenance personnel.

(3) It is the responsibility of the owning unit to establish a PLL from appropriate manuals IAW AR 735-35. This PLL is then submitted to the supporting DSU which in turn adds the required repair parts to its ASL IAW AR 711-16. By taking these actions and by requisitioning repair parts, the unit insures their availability in the supply system. Initial provisioning for the XM706 has been delayed; however every effort is being made to expedite delivery of repair parts.

(4) The unit is advised to submit an EIR concerning the unbearably hot crew compartment.

h. (U) Reference item concerning "REQUIREMENT FOR AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FOR MILITARY POLICE UNITS", section II, page 28, paragraph E4; nonconcur. If adequate justification exists for organic aircraft, MTOE action should be initiated. Direct support aircraft should be requested through the 16th Military Police Group to Headquarters III MAF.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "PERSONNEL STAFFING", section II, page 29, paragraph G. The XXIV Corps has submitted an MTOE that is being reviewed at this time. The MTOE includes the personnel changes as proposed in the ORLL.

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Because the USARV personnel space ceiling has been significantly reduced, the additional personnel spaces needed to satisfy the proposed increase are not now available and are not expected to become available in the near future. This headquarters has notified the unit of the current status of the MTOE and has recommended that it finance the increased personnel requirement by identifying spaces for trade-off. In the event the unit cannot finance these spaces, the request will be considered for possible inclusion in the USARV Force Requirements Priority List.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps
GPOP-DT (20 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. I. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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CAM VU AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. a. Background:

In late February and early March 1968, approximately 6,000 people from 13 hamlets were evacuated from the fertile Cam Lo Valley. At that time, just after Tet 1968, the lack of allied military units for the area made necessary the subsequent relocation of these people. At the request of the 3d Marine Division, in order to facilitate the allied operations in the area, the people were moved to four principal refugee camps. The vacated area, consisting of approximately 15 square kilometers, was turned into a free fire zone.

b. By May 1968, with the gradual return of security in the area, the return of the people and the utilization of the economic potential of the fertile valley, complemented by the large Colombo Plan Irrigation System, could once again be contemplated. By returning the people, in accordance with the National Program of "Return to Hamlet" during the months of March and April 1969, the people had adequate time to repair the irrigation dikes and ready their rice paddies for use in May, and the largest irrigation system in the province could again be used. This huge irrigation complex, coupled with the introduction of IR-8 rice, could eventually approach self-sufficiency in rice production. At present, nearly 50% of the rice consumed in province must be imported. Also, in addition to the potentially vast economic gains, there was the opportunity to return people to their homes thereby relieving four (4) overcrowded refugee camps and demonstrating the government's desire to foster resettlement whenever the situation permits.

2. Mission and Objectives:

a. The objectives of this operation were as follows: To return some 6000 people to their native hamlets in an orderly manner; to secure for them the benefits to which they are legally entitled; to remove VC elements from the hamlets; to secure the area and the people from VC infiltration after their return home and to restore the people to a level of economic stability where their sympathies for the GVN would be stimulated and their resistance to communist incursions fortified.

b. Due to the complex and subtle nature of these missions, close coordination was required of nearly all the province agencies, both military and civilian.

c. This operation was viewed as having four phases:
(1) A preliminary phase involving an engineering and survey effort during which the participating agencies would prepare for their respective roles.

(2) A series of operations were to be conducted in the area prior to the relocation of the people.

(3) A phase wherein the physical resettlement of the people and their final screening would occur.

(4) A phase consisting of operations following the resettlement to prevent regression and to foster continued improvements.

3. Command and Control:

a. The management and staffing of Operation "Kangaroo" (as the plan was designated) was designed to meet a specific set of circumstances:

(1) The bisection of the area of operation by the Dong Ha-Cam Lo District boundary and the subsequent need to coordinate the activities of two district governents throughout the operation.

(2) The unusually heavy demands on resources, both in terms of personnel and material, required to achieve the objectives outlined.

b. In order to meet the challenges posed by these circumstances, it was decided that the operation would be controlled and fully executed by Sector and Province rather than the districts involved. To this end, a "Province-Sector Forward Command Post" was established in the Cam Vu area and the Sector Chief of Staff was eventually named as commanding officer of the operation. All elements operating in conjunction with the operation, either on a short or long term basis, came under the operational control of this headquarters for the duration of their involvement. Resources and personnel, in terms of staff and troops were drawn from either district involved or from Sector or Province, whichever was more appropriate. The headquarters itself consisted of a conventional S-staff plus designated civil agencies, including police, refugee service, and public health.

c. The advisory effort displayed in conjunction with Operation "Kangaroo" followed lines similar to the Sector Plan of organisation in that it was a Sector-Province Advisory Staff. The Senior Advisor for the operation was the Chief of New Life Development and the military deputy was the Sector S-4 Advisor. To this administrative advisory team, a five-man Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) and a platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company were attached.

4. Execution:

It should be understood that the four phases were not mutually exclusive—that is, activities undertaken as part of Phase I were still going on after activities included under Phase II, III, and IV commenced.
a. Phase I - Preliminary and Planning Activities:

Phase I was comprised of four major activities: engineering efforts, survey projects, planning and preliminary sweeps.

(1) The engineering efforts were directed toward the following areas:

(a) The repair of Road 8B and its bridges was undertaken by the 14th US Engineer Battalion. This project has been completed.

(b) It is necessary to repair the public building in the 13 hamlets and 3 villages comprising the resettlement area. MCB 62 has agreed to repair these buildings starting in June 1969.

(c) The repair of the pumping station which consists of six (6) Harland pumps has been completed. The task was originally undertaken by MCB 7 and was completed by MCB 62 which replaced it. The repair of a large breach in the irrigation system was undertaken by the 11th Engineer Battalion, 3d Marine Division, and has been completed.

(2) The second aspect of Phase I was a survey of the people to be moved. This survey was conducted on two levels: first, the Refugee Service, with assistance from the 29th CA Company, brought its family-name lists up to date; second, the provincial intelligence services prepared detailed blacklists and activated or upgraded existing informant-agent network in the 13 hamlets which were to be relocated.

(3) The third aspect of Phase I involved the preparation of detailed plans by each of the civilian and military staffs named by the Province Chief as participants in the operation. Each section included in its plan a statement of their objectives, the number of personnel they planned to assign to the operations and the support arrangements they contemplated for these personnel.

(4) The fourth aspect was the conducting of military sweeps in the area of resettlement to ascertain the absence of main force enemy units. These sweeps were conducted by Sector and sub-sector forces. Portions of these forces remained in the area to provide security during the following phases of the operation.

b. Phase II - Operation Prior to Resettlement:

(1) The primary objective of this phase was the removal of the VC infrastructure and to insure that there were no main force units in the resettlement area. Battalion-size forces conducted sweeps both to the north and south of the resettlement area. The northern area was swept by the 2nd Regt, 1st ARVN Division, and the southern area was swept by the 3d Marine Division. These sweeps were all of a one-day duration since they all resulted in a negative contact.
(2) The RF/PF Forces were responsible for sweeping the immediate resettlement area. They mounted operations through the entire resettlement area. The two districts involved, Dong Ha and Cam Lo, were responsible for sweeping the resettlement hamlets in their districts.

(3) In addition to regular military operations, psychological operations were launched against the refugees. These operations had the following objectives:

(a) To plant false information intended to confuse the enemy.
(b) To induce potential Hoi Chanh to rally to the GVN.
(c) To inform the refugees about the mechanics of the move.
(d) To inform the refugees about the benefits they would accrue as a result of the move.
(e) To inform the refugees about the responsibilities that they must fulfill as resettled, economically bettered citizens of the GVH and the unfortunate consequences that would follow if these responsibilities were not fulfilled.

c. Phase III—Resettlement of the People:

(1) After the entire area to be resettled was examined as a result of the operations described above, the physical relocation of the people was undertaken. Since the objectives involved the resettlement of refugees from both Dong Ha and Cam Lo Districts, it was necessary to have two processing centers.

(2) The resettlement was undertaken on a systematic hamlet-by-hamlet basis. As each hamlet was moved from its refugee location to its assigned homesite, all the adult inhabitants of the hamlet were required to pass through the final screening center. There were two screening centers established for this operation. The screening center for the refugees from Dong Ha was located at Ngia Tu So Refugee Camp and for Cam Lo, it was at the Vinh Dai Refugee Camp. As the personnel passed through the screening center, they were given a final check by the intelligence personnel, temporary ID cards were issued, agricultural information was made available, immunisation shots were given and finally, commodities were issued. The following commodities were issued to each family: 10 sheets of roofing tin, 1 gallon salad oil, 1 50-lb bag of grain, 1 roll of tar paper, and 2 bars of soap. In addition, one "C" ration meal was given to each person.

(3) The logistical requirements to physically move the people varied between the two districts involved:
(a) There were a total of 8 hamlets containing approximately 850 families and 4000 people to be moved within Dong Ha. Five of the hamlets comprising Dong Hoa Village were adjacent to Route 8B. The other three, comprising Dong Thanh Village along the Cam Lo River, but had a road access. In order to assist these people in the movement of their household goods, it was necessary to have trucking support. The 111th ARVN Transportation Battalion, located in Danang, provided five trucks for the duration of the operation. These trucks moved all personnel and their household goods to their new homesites.

(b) There were a total of 5 hamlets containing approximately 450 families and 2000 people to be moved within Cam Lo District. These hamlets comprised the village of Cam Hieu. It was necessary to move these refugees from two camps located on the south side of the Cam Lo River directly across to the north side. In order to facilitate the movement of these people, the 11th Engineer Battalion, 3d Marine Division, constructed a ferry to take the people and their household goods across the river. The trucks hauled the goods to the riverbank and the ferry took them across.

(4) The time phasing for the processing and movement of the people went as follows:

- 21 March - 8 April   Processed all personnel from Dong Ha
- 23 March - 16 April  Completed movement of all personnel from Dong Ha
- 11 April - 16 April  Processed all personnel from Cam Lo
- 12 April - 22 April  Completed the movement of all personnel from Cam Lo

(5) A synopsis of families and people processed and moved during this operation is as follows: (The first 8 hamlets are from Dong Ha and the last 5, from Cam Lo).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hamlet</th>
<th>Estimated Families</th>
<th>Actual Families</th>
<th>Estimated People</th>
<th>Actual People</th>
<th>Families Moved</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. An Binh</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>637</td>
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<td>2. Cam Lo Ha</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Phu Ngan</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>220</td>
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<td>4. Cam Vu</td>
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<td>217</td>
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<td>1029</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>293</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMLET</td>
<td>Estimated Families</td>
<td>Actual Families</td>
<td>Estimated People</td>
<td>Actual People</td>
<td>Moved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Nghia An Trung</td>
<td>201</td>
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<td>880</td>
<td>647</td>
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<td>8. Thanh Laoog</td>
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<td>159</td>
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<td>9. Truong Xa</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>294</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Dinh Xa</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Lam Lang</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Van Bich Giang</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1379</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>6191</td>
<td>5904</td>
<td>1297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**d. Phase IV - Operation Following Resettlement:**

1. The fourth and final phase of Operation Kangaroo will be conducted during the coming weeks and months.

2. The fourth phase of the operation is a long term and continuing effort. The two tasks involved in this final phase are the most difficult to perform. These tasks are: first, the economic development of the area; and second, continued military operations against VC elements in the area. What must be accomplished during the final phase is the development of the area into an economically stable, self-supporting community. It is hoped they will be capable of and willing to participate in the defense of their hamlets through the Popular Self Defense Force. Two important keys which will lead to ultimate success of the area are IR-8 rice and the Colombo Plan Irrigation System. Added together, the two elements should be able to transform this area into one of the richest rice producing areas in Northern I Corps.

3. During this period of economic development, military forces are being left in the area to insure that the VC do not sweep in and destroy the developing hamlets. To accomplish this, Sector Headquarters is keeping one company group in the area. This will also help to insure that the VC infrastructure does not penetrate the village and hamlet governments thereby securing for themselves a new source of rice and other foodstuffs. It is considered necessary to have a continuing series of cordon-search operations in the area to insure that VC do not infiltrate into the area once again.
5. **Enemy Initiated Activities:**

During the period of resettlement, the enemy made various attempts to discourage the operation.

a. During the night of 29 March 1969, an estimated VC company attacked the pumping station in the vicinity of ID 178608. The pumping station was defended by PF platoon 75 with a CAP. As the enemy attempted to infiltrate the area, they were detected. A violent firefight ensued with the enemy being driven from the area. The results of the attack were 3 VC KIA (probable) and 1 AK-47 captured and 4 US Marines WIA and 3 PF WIA. The aggressive performance by the defenders prevented serious damage from being inflicted upon the pumping station.

b. During the evening hours on 15 April, an estimated VC platoon attacked PF Platoon 82 with a CAP in the vicinity of ID 226618. Once again, the PF and CAPs beat back the enemy inflicting losses upon him. The results of the attack were 2 VC KIA (probable), 1 AK-47 captured. The friendly losses were 1 PF KIA, 5 USMC WIA, and 4 PF WIA.

c. Also during the evening of 15 April, the enemy fired 29 rounds of 82mm mortar into the CP location of the 1/26 Company Group, vicinity ID 195613. The results of this attack by fire were negative.

d. The third attempt by the VC to discourage the operation was his attempt to interdict Route 8B, the LOG going through the resettlement area. On 25 March, a 29th CA 3/4 ton truck struck a mine in the vicinity ID 185615. One occupant was wounded and was medevaced and the truck was totally destroyed. On 27 March, a recovery vehicle from the 63d Maintenance Battalion was sent to retrieve the wrecked vehicle. At the vicinity of coordinate ID 172613, this vehicle also struck a mine disabling it. There were no injuries to the occupants. A second recovery vehicle was then called in and it proceeded to hit another mine in the vicinity of ID 193618. This vehicle was also disabled but no casualties were incurred. On 28 March, a mine sweep team from the 11th Engineer Battalion, 3d Marine Division, attempted to clear Route 8B so that the disabled vehicles could be recovered. By the time the 3/4 ton truck was reached, a total of five anti-tank mines (M-46) were discovered. The mines were detected at the following coordinates: 196619, 194617, 190616, 184615 and 175615. These mines were all destroyed in place. At this time, the three vehicles that were wrecked were extracted. The mine sweep team then continued to clear 8B. A 1 1/2 ton truck from MCB 7 was following the sweep team in order to reach the pumping station to continue repair on the pumping station. In the vicinity of ID 170613, the MCB 7 truck hit a mine. The truck was totally destroyed and a member of the mine sweep team who was riding in the back was KIA. The driver of the truck was seriously burned and was medevaced. There were no further attempts to interdict Route 8B.

6. **Results of Friendly Initiated Actions:**

a. On 24 March, RF Company 145, while on patrol discovered a bunker containing 4 60mm mortar rounds.
b. On 28 March, RF Company K5, on Operation Cam Vu 2, reacted to information received from an informant and uncovered a cache of 85 80mm mortar rounds.

c. On 11 April, while on patrol, RF Company K5 discovered a bunker containing 10 anti-tank mines and some documents. The documents led to the apprehension of 4 VCI and 8 VCS.

7. Units which Supported Operation Kangaroo:

This operation could not have been brought to a successful conclusion without the enthusiastic support rendered by various units in the area.

a. 63d Maintenance Battalion: The 63d Maintenance Battalion provided 2000 rolls of tar paper. It was distributed on the basis of one roll for each family. The remaining rolls were given to the hamlet chiefs for use in repairing public buildings. The battalion also provided trucking support which was needed to move USAID commodities from Quang Tri City to the resettlement areas. The battalion is to be commended for the outstanding support rendered to this resettlement operation.

b. 3d Marine Division: The 3d Marine Division provided 6000 "C" ration meals for the operation. Each person that was resettled received a "C" ration meal on the day of the actual move. The 11th Engineer Battalion was tasked with the job of repairing a large breach in the irrigation system in the vicinity of XD 187612. During the time this area was a free fire zone, a 750-pound bomb created a breach 50 ft by 30 ft in the main canal. The battalion responded with outstanding support and on 29 April, the repair of the breach was completed. The 11th Engineer Battalion also constructed a ferry which was utilised to move the refugees from the south side of the Cam Lo River to the north side. The ferry was made of four sections from a floating bridge. By utilizing this ferry, the movement of the refugees across the river was extremely smooth and efficient. The ferry was capable of moving the household goods of approximately ten families at one time. This helped to make that portion of the operation highly efficient. The 11th Engineer Battalion is to be commended for the zealous cooperation they rendered to this operation.

c. MCB 7 and MCB 62: One of the main economic attractions of the resettlement area was the Colombo Irrigation System. In order to utilize this system, it was necessary to repair the pumping station which consists of 6 Harland pumps. MCB 7, with a great deal of enthusiasm, undertook this project. Upon their rotation to the United States, the job was finished by MCB 62. Due to their enthusiastic support, five of the six Harland pumps have been completely repaired. Each pump is capable of pumping 60,000 gallons of water per hour. The system has been tested and is now operational. The true benefits of this system will be evident as the rice production of the area increases.
d. 111th ARVN Transportation Battalion: In order to facilitate the movement of the refugees, it was necessary to have additional trucking for the duration of the operation. The trucks assisted in the movement of the refugees and their household goods to their native hamlets. Each family was provided the maximum of two truckloads.

8. Problem Areas:

a. Only one significant problem was encountered during the conduct of the operation. The Vietnamese were reluctant to specifically appoint one individual to be in charge of the operation. The Sector Chief of Staff who was in charge of Operation Fisher, would have been an ideal choice. However, the Deputy Sector Commander insisted he should be in charge. This officer failed to coordinate many important issues and had the CP and Processing Center in a high degree of disorder. After five days, the Chief of Staff was placed in charge but he was forced to assume a secondary role, still receiving all guidance from the Deputy Sector Commander.

b. One area which is still awaiting resolution is the payment of resettlement monies to the refugees. Under Vietnamese law, all refugees are entitled to the following payments:

1. 5000$VN to compensate for the move.
2. Payment of the monthly rice allowance. This amounts to about 2500$VN to purchase rice for six months for one family.
3. All refugees are supposed to receive either 10 bags of cement or 2500$VN to purchase same.

As of this time, the Vietnamese Government has made none of these payments to the refugees. We have constantly been told that the monies are available and on the way, but thus far, no monies have arrived. Since retaining the loyalty of these people is most important to the success of the program, it is considered absolutely necessary that the refugees receive all their legal entitlements.
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, XXIV Corps**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CG, XXIV Corps

20 August 1969

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**Abstract**

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