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AGO d/a ltr, 2 May 1975; AGO d/a ltr, 2 May 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

8 NOV 1969

SCH: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report submitted by Col James H. Gunn. The report covers the period October 1968 to October 1969, during which time Col Gunn served as Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Da Nang.

2. Col Gunn is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
Chief, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

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lic of Vietnam

... by Brigadier General James W. Gunn

DUTY ASSIGNMENT: Commanding General, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang

INCLUSIVE DATES: October 1968 to October 1969

DATE OF REPORT: 7 October 1969
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I am completing a 16 month tour in the Republic of Vietnam. Initially, I served as the Chief of Staff, 1st Logistical Command from 10 June 1968 to 12 August 1968. Subsequently, I was assigned as acting deputy of the 1st Logistical Command until 18 October 1968. I assumed command of the United States Army Support Command, Da Nang on 19 October 1968 and have held that position until the present time.

The debriefing report submitted by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command on 20 August 1969 was an outstanding report on the overall logistical support situation in the Republic of Vietnam. Accordingly, I shall endeavor to avoid duplication where possible and address the logistical support situation as it exists in the I Corps Tactical Zone.
Prior to January 1968, the only major Army units in the I Corps Tactical Zone were the Americal Division at Chu Lai and the 108th Artillery Group spread to the south of the Demilitarized Zone. Logistical support was provided by the 80th General Support Group which had personnel located at Dong Ha, Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Duc Pho. Total Army strength in the Corps was about 28,000 and logistical support was the responsibility of the Qui Nhon Support Command.

In January and February 1963, during the Tet offensive, Army strength in I Corps jumped to almost 100,000 as additional tactical units were deployed into the zone. As support requirements grew, the number of logistical troops was increased to over 8,000 personnel. Due to the large number of logistical troops required and the wide geographical area over which they would be required to operate, it was deemed necessary to establish another support command.

The Da Nang Support Command—youngest of the four support commands—was formally established on 25 February 1968. The headquarters Table of Distribution and Allowances was approved by Department of the Army on 1 February 1968 and in September of this year a Modified Table of Distribution and Allowances was approved by Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam. Our present headquarters organization is reflected at inclosure 1.

In addition to our headquarters, the Da Nang Support Command has four major subordinate units, plus some smaller units, as shown on inclosure 2.
We have depicted in inclosure 3, the rather unique position in which the Commanding General of the Da Nang Support Command finds himself. Because of the large number of major tactical and support headquarters of different services in the I Corps Tactical Zone, there must be continuous coordination and cooperation between these headquarters in order to provide effective logistical support throughout the entire zone of the corps.

On the right side of the chart, we see the Da Nang Support Command portrayed relative to its superior headquarters.

On the left side of the chart, we see that the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which is commanded by a USMC Lieutenant General, is the major United States tactical headquarters in the ICTZ.

Subordinate to III MAF is the XXIV Corps, which is commanded by an Army Lieutenant General. Under the XXIV Corps we have the 101st Airmobile Division, the 3d Marine Division, and the 108th Artillery Group. The 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry is under operational control of the 101st Airmobile Division while the 1st Brigade 5th Mechanized Division is under operational control of the 3d Marine Division.

Other major tactical commands directly under Headquarters, III MAF, include the Americal Division (23d Infantry Division) and the First Marine Division (Reinforced).

Covering logistical support aspects of III MAF, we have two commands which are counterparts to the Da Nang Support Command. These are the Naval Support Activity (NSA) and the Force Logistics Command (FLC), a USMC organization.
While the Do Dang Support Command does not appear in the chain of command under Headquarters, III MAF, a sense of mutual concern and cooperation must exist in order to assure the finest support possible to all United States forces in the ICTZ. In this respect, the Commanding General and his primary staff officers must continually strive to maintain a rapport with their sister-service-counterparts that contributes to the maintenance of harmonious working relationships. Without the existence of this trust and understanding, the mission of supporting combat operations in the ICTZ would be extremely difficult.
The mission of the Da Nang Support Command is shown at inclosure 4, and as can be seen we provide the usual logistical services. However, a couple of items bear special mention.

First, the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, provides to each service wholesale support for all commodities including Class I, common items of Class II, III, and IV.

Second, we provide mortuary services for all United States forces in I Corps Tactical Zone. In fact, there is only one other mortuary in the Republic of Vietnam and it is located in Saigon at the Tan San Nhut Air Base.

In connection with our mortuary operations we are faced with the problem of obtaining and retaining qualified personnel. For example, few military personnel are trained as morticians. As a result, the use of civil service personnel is heavily relied upon. However, the problems encountered with the civil service employee is that our grade level (GS-9 to 11) is too low to attract the highly skilled individual we would hope to employ. Additionally, the civil service employee is hired for a one year tour. Hence, we have the perpetual problem of personnel turnover.

Our workload for calendar year 1968 and 1969, to date is as follows:

- CY 1968 - 8,770 remains processed
- CY 1969 - 4,600 plus remains processed

NOTE: The highlight of this activity is the effectiveness of its operation. Of the total remains handled in CY 68 and thus far in CY 69, there has been only one instance of mistaken identity.
Third, the Da Nang Support Command provides property disposal service for all United States forces in the 1 Corps Tactical Zone to include Air Force, Navy, and Marines.

Fourth, our mission does not include responsibility for medical supplies, missile peculiar equipment, cryptographic equipment, aircraft avionics or aircraft armament.

Finally, we provide logistical support to other Free World Military Armed Forces, as directed. For example, we provide support for the Republic of Korea Marine Brigade which operates south of Da Nang.
The chart at inclosure 5 portrays the concept under which logistical support is provided in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

On the left side of the chart we have shown the support rendered by the Naval Support Activity (NSA), which is subordinate to the III Marine Amphibious Force, the senior tactical command in the I Corps Tactical Zone. In its wholesale capacity, the NSA provides:

a. Common service items, except Class V, to all US forces in the ICTZ.

b. Port operation and terminal services throughout the ICTZ. The Korean Express is under contract to provide port clearance operations at the deep water piers, Da Nang.

c. Common User Land Transportation in the Da Nang and Phu Bai areas.

d. SERVHART (self-service store) service in Da Nang and Phu Bai. We do, however, provide some military personnel to assist in operation of the SERVHART at Phu Bai.

Retail Class I support for all US forces north of Camp Evans is provided by the Marines. The reason for this arrangement is that the preponderance of troops in that area are Marines. Conversely, in the area south of Camp Evans and extending to the Hai Van Pass, the USA Support Command provides Class I support for all US forces in that portion of ICTZ. Within Da Nang, NSA provides Class I support. South of Da Nang, retail Class I support for all US Army forces is provided by the Da Nang Support Command.

On the right side of the chart at inclosure 5, we show those services which are provided by the USA Support Command. In this connection I should point out that Army peculiar items are requisitioned through the Army Field Depot.
at Da Nang. Requisitions that cannot be filled are passed to the USA Depot, Qui Nhon and then if not filled, to the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (ICCV).

By virtue of an agreement worked out at the Department of Defense level, Army provided the USAC a total of twenty-six (26) 175mm guns (21, plus 5 for float). The Army trained the initial gun crews and we now furnish spare and repair parts for the 175mm guns used in the ICTZ.

Another item which is not shown on the enclosure, but demonstrates how closely the services must coordinate, is the fact that the Sea Bee Construction Battalions frequently cannot meet all of their line-haul requirements. We, therefore, provide motor transport assistance to both the Sea Bees and various USAC units in the northern part of the ICTZ upon request.
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PART VI - TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS, TROOP AND EQUIPMENT DENSITIES

Shown on inclosure 6 is the tactical disposition of the major combat forces in the ICTZ. The strength for which logistical support is provided is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXIV CORPS</td>
<td>2,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101ST ABN DIV (AM)</td>
<td>18,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICAL DIV</td>
<td>24,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/5TH MECH BDE</td>
<td>5,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108TH ARNY GP</td>
<td>3,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5TH ARMD CAV SQDN</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>22,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>77,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These include all non-divisional units such as engineer and signal groups and separate Artillery Batteries.

OPERATION LIBERTY CANYON - The movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from ICTZ to III CTZ was a very successful move and the first such movement of an entire division with all equipment within the Republic of Vietnam. I say successful because no major setbacks occurred; however, close coordination was required in order to assemble the necessary assets to effect the move and to get all equipment and personnel ready. Minor problems, brought about by lack of a movement plan, were corrected or ratified during the operation. The lack of Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) and storage/staging areas at port facilities created a minor bottleneck but did not hold up the operation. The shortage of MHE is and will probably continue to be a problem; therefore, careful utilization of these assets will be necessary.

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during future moves of this nature. Total passengers and tonnage moved were: passengers, 15,596 (mostly by aircraft); tonnage, 25,402 Short Tons (mostly surface vessel).

Ammunition peculiar to the division was left behind on site creating a disposal problem for Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and ammunition personnel.

While the number of troops affects our logistical support plan, we must also consider the densities of major items of equipment. Reflected below is a general breakout of the major items of equipment we support in the ICTZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHEELED VEHICLES</td>
<td>6,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANKS</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTILLERY</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERATORS</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC's (M113 FAMILY)</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS</td>
<td>13,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the ICTZ we support a somewhat higher density of artillery pieces, tanks and APC's than the other support commands. This is brought about by virtue of the concentration of artillery south of the DMZ. Also, the presence of the 1/5th Mechanized Brigade and the 3/5th Armored Cavalry contributes to the relatively large numbers of tanks and APC's in the ICTZ. In November 1969, the Americal Division is scheduled to receive their first consignment of Sheridan tanks. The introduction of this item has required that we initiate a training program for mechanics and other maintenance personnel well in advance of the receipt of the Sheridan.
Inclosures 1 and 2 showed our headquarters staff organization for the Da Nang Support Command and the major units which are assigned thereto. I should like now to explain how these major subordinate units are organized and stationed to support the entire ICTZ.

The 528th Battalion (Prov) which is stationed at Camp Love on the outskirts of Da Nang provides command and control over Army Class V activities throughout the entire ICTZ. This battalion functions under the operational control of my ADC, ammunition (see inclosure 2).

Since my ADCS, ammunition has a corps wide responsibility for Army Class V support, the subordinate units of the battalion are not further assigned nor attached to geographical control headquarters.

At Da Nang the 34th Supply and Service Battalion operates our Field Depot (see inclosure 7). In a later portion of this overall statement, the Field Depot operation will be covered in more detail, so it should suffice now to look at only the battalion organization.

Stationed in Da Nang we have the 80th General Support Group which is responsible for support for that portion of the ICTZ from the Hai Van Pass southward to the II Corps Tactical Zone boundary. Its activities and units extend from Da Nang to Chu Lai and Duc Pho (see inclosure 8).

In the northern part of the ICTZ, from the Hai Van Pass northward to the DMZ, we have the 26th General Support Group (see inclosure 9).

Headquartered in Phu Bai, the 26th Group has activities and units in Phu Bai, Dong Ha, and Quang Tri.

Inclosure 10 summarizes the organization for Army logistics support in I Corps.
Prior to going into the functional aspects of the Command's activities, I would like to discuss our experience with the Reserve/National Guard units which were deployed to Vietnam during the summer and fall of 1968.

As shown by inclosure 11, we had 16 Reserve/National Guard units which were assigned to the Da Nang Support Command during 1968. We found these units to be outstanding in every respect. They were composed of mature officers and men; they arrived in-country with 100 per cent of their TOE strength and equipment; their members were well educated for the most part; and they were highly motivated and skilled.

In order to offset the adverse effects of losing these units all at one time, we started an infusion program which has paid handsome dividends. For example, we transferred from these units 25 per cent of their assigned numbers to other units and infused a like number of Regular Army Troops into the Reserve/National Guard units. This transfer proved a valuable move, because as we redeployed the Reserve/National Guard units, their missions had to be continued. The infusion program provided a means of retaining some personnel familiar with operations of the redeploying units which could be integrated into the newly activated units or those units relocated from in-country assets to the I Corps Tactical Zone.

The units received as replacement for the Reserve/National Guard units have not been as highly skilled nor as highly motivated as the Reserve/National Guard units. In addition, some units lost were not replaced by like units. For example, the 842d Quartermaster Company (POL Operation) was redeployed and we received the 848th Quartermaster Platoon (POL Operation)
in its place. Understandably, the Platoon does not have the line haul tanker capability which was lost when the 642d Quartermaster Company departed.

It is evident that although the use of Reserve/National Guard units was a big asset, their loss created many problems which is requiring a great deal of ingenuity to solve.

Another event that impacts upon the Da Nang Support Command is the most recent 6.5 per cent personnel space reduction. We were levied an across-the-board reduction of more than 450 spaces, excluding spaces lost through redeployment of the Reserve/National Guard units. Major realignment of Support Command troop units has been accomplished in order that we may maintain our mission capability despite the loss of these spaces.

Impacting still more on our capability has been the restriction on the hire of local national civilians. This limitation, which went into effect during March 1969 and was not lifted until September, had a very adverse effect on our depot operations in as much as they were unable to hire against 96 authorized vacancies.

Now that the restriction on local hire has been removed, the Da Nang Support Command is authorized to hire up to its authorized ceiling of 1,037. As of 4 October 1969, we had 803 local nationals on our payroll. Throughout the command we are in the process of hiring additional local national civilians and concurrently are determining training requirements for the
newly hired personnel in order to bring them up to an acceptable level of competence.
The commander of a logistical unit in the RVN can expect his mission capability to be seriously degraded due to the fact that he will have to provide, from his TOE/TD assets, personnel for perimeter/security forces, convoy security, and liaison functions. Shown on inclosure is a breakout of personnel committed to other than normal mission requirements. These totals do not include personnel lost through normal details, i.e. charge of quarters, interior guard, etc.

From the standpoint of not being isolated, our units are fortunate. That is, they are stationed within combat bases which are manned in large part by tactical units. As a result, our requirement to provide perimeter guards and security personnel for convoys is not as demanding as in some of the other support commands. Nevertheless, we still commit more than 600 people daily to activities not normally required of similar TOE/TD organizations.

I should point out that the personnel placed on perimeter, security, and convoy details are the very best soldiers most involved in mission accomplishment - the daily routine of providing supplies and services to the customer. Consequently, the impact is greatest at the working level.
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PART X - BULK PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND PIPELINE OPERATIONS

The Navy receives into Da Nang all bulk petroleum products destined for I Corps Tactical Zone. From Da Nang the product is shipped via intercoastal tanker to northern and southern I Corps. In the Northern I Corps Tactical Zone the fuel is received at COL Co Island, a Navy terminal at the mouth of the Perfume River, east of Hue. For resupply of the Phu Bai, Hue, and Camp Eagle areas, all products are line hauled by Army vehicles from the Tan My ramp to the users.

JP-4 supply for the Quang Tri area is accomplished with an Army operated pipeline from COL Co Island through Hue and Camp Evans pump stations to the Army's Quang Tri tank farm. An extension of this pipeline from Quang Tri to Dong Ha runs for supply of the US Marine base there (inclosure 13). AVGAS, MOGAS, and diesel fuel are supplied to Dong Ha and Quang Tri via Navy intercoastal tankers to Cua Viet and thence by bladder boats and barges up the river to the Dong Ha ramp. At the ramp, petroleum products (AVGAS, MOGAS, DF-2) are discharged via assault line to the Dong Ha Marine Petroleum Supply Point. Distribution and retail issues are also accomplished from this location.

In the Southern I Corps, petroleum is shipped via intercoastal tankers from Da Nang to Chu Lai and Sa Huynh. From the Navy's terminal at Chu Lai, all products are line and local hauled by Army vehicles to the various users in the Chu Lai area and to Hill 29. Supply to Logistics Support Area (LSA) Duc Pho is accomplished from Sa Huynh via Army line haul.

Packaged petroleum products for NICTZ are issued from NSA Depot, Da Nang to Army direct support units which in turn issue to using units.
Southern I Corps is supplied from Naval Support Activity Depot - Chu Lai to Army direct support units.

Our biggest challenge has been operation of the 66 mile pipeline system we have in the northern portion of the ICTZ. Problems associated with this operation are:

First, security is a real problem since the line was placed through portions of the countryside which cannot be adequately patrolled, particularly during the hours of darkness.

Second, fire fighting equipment and personnel are inadequate. This stems from the fact that troop lists for USARV do not include engineer detachments to perform the fire protection mission. Further, most CONUS trained fire fighters are civil service employees, thus depriving the military an adequately trained base.

Third, present TOE's do not make provisions for proper equipment for operation of a buried pipeline — backhoes, ditch diggers, front loaders, etc. As a result, we must rely upon Sea Bee and/or Army or Marine engineer units for assistance when equipment of this nature is required. Additionally, the locating of leaks presents a continuing problem which could be overcome by employing some type of leak detection device not presently available.

Fourth, use of the lightweight assault type pipeline with couplings, instead of a heavy duty welded pipe, presents maintenance problems. Damage is caused by local nationals who uncouple the sections to pilfer the product. In a number of cases the coupling is not unfastened. However, the gasket is damaged thereby allowing the product to leak out.
Despite the problems encountered, operation of the pipeline is cost effective when compared to the cost of line haul for like amounts of fuel.
The Da Nang Support Command operates four (4) Ammunition Supply Points (ASP) at Camp Evans, Phu Bai, Chu Lai and Duc Pho. Additionally, we are granted storage space in two USMC ASP's - one at Da Nang and one at Quang Tri (see inclosure 14).

The majority of our Class V support in the IGTZ is received via deep draft vessels at Da Nang. Distribution from Da Nang is by Navy controlled lighterage north and south to Hue, Dong Ha, Chu Lai and Sa Huynh.

Port clearance of ammunition is performed by the Navy at Da Nang and Chu Lai while at Dong Ha we share this responsibility with the Marines. At Hue/Tan My and Sa Huynh we have sole responsibility for the clearing of Class V from the ramps.

The following major difficulties affect our Class V system:

1. The biggest drawback to our Class V system is that we do not have an ammunition depot like the other support commands. We must rely on shipments from other depots which are within the 1st Logistical Command. These depots must provide a rapid response to our requirements and must accomplish shipments within the required delivery dates established by my command.

2. The shortage of deep water piers slows ammunition receipts and requires it to be offloaded in the stream onto smaller craft for transshipment or transfer to the Da Nang ASP. This procedure often times necessitates double and triple handling.

3. Our limited storage capability reduces our ability to meet surge demands.
4. To meet established stockage objectives we must continually cross-level stocks in our ASP's throughout all of the IOTZ. This cross-leveling effort necessitates the commitment of a rather significant portion of our transportation assets in order to move the stocks from one location to another. Again, the lack of an ammunition depot is the major reason for our heavy cross-leveling requirement.

5. It is necessary to borrow certain stocks from the Marines when we are low on a particular item or a shipment fails to arrive. This borrowing creates an administrative problem that requires a significant amount of time to resolve.

6. Movement of Class V northward, through the Hai Van Pass, is extremely dangerous as has been pointed out previously. Furthermore, the use of motor transport for the line haul of ammunition from the Da Nang ASP to outlying ASP’s is not economical when compared to movement by water. During the monsoon season, however, lighterage movements are often precluded due to adverse sea conditions. In such instances we must resort to line haul when possible. During the 68 - 69 monsoon season which was less severe than normal, lighterage operations were suspended for eighteen (18) days from September to February.
The Army has no port operation responsibilities in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The Navy provides all terminal services at the only deep water port in I Corps, Da Nang. Other ports shown here are serviced by Navy controlled lighterage (LST's, LEU's, LEM's, inclosure 15).

In regards to lighterage, experience has indicated that the Naval Support Activity (NSA) has sufficient assets to meet Army requirements. During peak periods of movement, our backlog of cargo has not become excessive. As pointed out earlier, NSA has common user land transportation (CULT) responsibility in the Da Nang and Chu Lai area which provides port/beach clearance services only. Port clearance responsibility at Dong Ha has been assigned by the III Marine Amphibious Force to the Force Logistics Command with Ist Logistical Command clearing the shortfall - approximately 40 per cent - at this location. Port clearance at Tan My, Hue, and Sa Huynh is the responsibility of the US Army and is accomplished by organic transportation units.

We have learned that during the monsoon season, movement through ports other than Da Nang will be severely hampered, if not entirely halted, for varying periods of time. As a result, we strive to insure that stocks are maintained at rather high levels to preclude adverse effects when the boats cannot run. Additionally, we must plan for combat essential air deliveries in the event both the sea lanes and the road system are closed for an extended period.
PART XIII - HIGHWAY SYSTEMS

The Support Command’s transportation role centers primarily on our highway transport activities (inclosure 16).

Line haul and unit distribution of Army supplies are accomplished with Army assets. While the amount of line haul trucking north from Da Nang is limited, regularly scheduled convoys do run to the south.

The highway system in the ICTZ is subject to interdiction by the enemy since he can employ mines and ambushes almost at will. As a consequence, road clearing operations reduce the time a road will be operational.

Several stretches of QL-1 are particularly vulnerable. For example, to the south there are three major bridges between Chu Lai and Duc Pho. South of Duc Pho there are several low lying areas that are inundated in the event of high tides or heavy rains. To the north, the transport of ammunition and petroleum products through the Hai Van Pass is closely controlled because the loss of a single load in place could seal the pass to all other traffic.

The monsoon rains cause heavy damage to the roadbed and place land area, thus closing the roads.

The engineers are scheduled to have QL-1 paved entirely between Be Vor and Dong Ha by this November. If that schedule is met, road clearing times will be substantially reduced and we should be able to operate the highway more hours per day.

We find the V-100 Scout Car to be an excellent security vehicle. It is superior to tracked vehicles because it does not damage road surfaces, it operates at a higher rate of speed, and it requires less maintenance. Additionally, it has good fire power and high mobility.
The necessity for operating continuously over unimproved roads for extended periods of time, plus the shortage of replacement task vehicles has resulted in a gradual deterioration of a large part of the vehicle fleet, particularly 5 ton cargo trucks and 12 ton stake and platform (S&P) trailers. The recent receipt of a limited number of 2½ ton and 5 ton cargo trucks (drop sides) has improved the situation somewhat. However, a minimum of one hundred new 5 ton cargo trucks (drop sides) and seventy-five S&P trailers are needed to properly update the fleet and reduce maintenance downtime due to vehicle age and condition. The receipt of the above vehicles will bring the task transportation units to their full authorization and allow for the turn-in of those 5 ton cargo trucks and S&P trailers requiring overhaul.
On inclosure 17 we show how resupply movements occur in the ICTZ. The effectiveness of our resupply mission depends primarily on our ability to maintain control of our supply assets within the transportation system. Due to the geographical location of supply centers close to the South China Sea, approximately eighty-five percent (85%) of the local resupply tonnage is moved by the Navy over sea lines of communication originating here in Da Nang.

In order to more effectively manage all Army transportation assets and to maintain control of resupply movements in I Corps Tactical Zone, Movement Control Centers were established on 15 October 1968 at Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Quang Tri. On 1 May 69, a fourth Movement Control Center was established at Chu Lai. In addition to managing Army transportation assets, the MCC's have established a close working relationship with its offices of the 1st Traffic Region, Traffic Management Agency (TMA) for the movement of cargo to include retrograde or other than Army assets. The MCC's, through "Project Challenge" which requires an evaluation of the essentuality of the supplies to be moved, have increased the availability of priority transportation for combat essential cargo.

Considerable effort has been made to re-establish the Vietnamese railroad north of Da Nang. Regular scheduled rail service between Da Nang and Hue commenced on 15 January 1969. A trial shipment of 60 S/T of palletized Army lube oil was made on 30 January 1969. Since then occasional shipments of heavy Class IV materiel have been made, but in very small quantities. Future use of the Vietnamese railroad will be dependent upon the completion
of spur lines to the 26th General Support Group in Chu Bai, the Bridge
Ramp cargo facility in Da Nang and the Deepwater Pier in Da Nang.

Presently, the US Army loans 1st Logistics Command railroad assets to the
Vietnamese railway in Da Nang. This loan consists of two diesel switch
engines, three revenue cars and ten gondola cars. Future plans envision
the loan of additional US Army equipment to the Vietnamese railroad as
the US government increases its utilization of the railroad.

The railroad is particularly vulnerable to enemy action as evidenced by
the fact that there have been eleven (...) interdictions during the past
six months. Often the enemy uses command detonated mines, which are deployed
on bridges and in the roadbed. Another shortcoming is the difficulty of
enroute security of sensitive cargo which is subject to pilferage. Overall
experiences have dictated that only heavy construction material should be
shipped by railroad; we therefore consider the railroad to be only of limited
usefulness.

A joint US-VN project now under way in the ICTZ is the recovery of the
stock which has been abandoned along the right-of-way. Support Command per-
sonnel and equipment, protected by combat troops and assisted by Vietnamese
railroad technicians, have been successfully combined into recovery units
for these missions. Some difficulties have been experienced due to the fact
that many of these abandoned railroad cars have been used as housing by
refugees. The problem of resettling these people is being overcome and the
rolling stock is being recovered.
As pointed out earlier, the Da Nang Support Command has a Field Depot which is operated by the 34th Supply and Services Battalion (See Incl 7). We provide Army peculiar materiel for all Army units in the I Corps Tactical Zone from this depot. Our backup support is provided by the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon. In this connection, Army peculiar materiel is requisitioned by direct support or general support units from the Da Nang Depot. Those requisitions which cannot be filled are passed to the USA Depot, Qui Nhon and then if not filled, to the US Army Inventory Control Center Vietnam (ICCV). The timeliness of our operations are dependent, to a large degree, upon rapid response from the Qui Nhon Depot.

In the area of Class VII (major end items), the Closed Loop Support Program serves to improve our responsiveness to supported units. In this connection we preposition major end items and major components at Chu Lai in order to reduce replacement time during periods of intensified combat or inclement weather. We find that the combination of Closed Loop Support and prepositioning provides responsive support, however, shortages of some items precludes us from prepositioning as much equipment as desired. Presently, we stock about 48,000 combat essential/Army peculiar items.

Appearing below are some data which indicates the size of our depot operations over the past four months and its increasing effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
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<td>17,900</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>AUGUST</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Filled</td>
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<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,400</td>
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MATERIAL RELEASE DENIALS

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,100</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>23,200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>27,400</td>
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<td>27,700</td>
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STOCK LOCATION ACCURACY

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<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>3,065</td>
<td>98.4</td>
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We believe our Field Depot is a very fine operation; however, we are somewhat hampered by several factors:

First, the Depot Commander serves as both the Battalion Commander of the 34th S&S Bn and the Commanding Officer of the Depot. As a result of this dual command and technical responsibility, he is restricted in the amount of time that he can devote to depot operations.

Second, hard skills and materials handling equipment adequate for depot operations are not authorized under present TOE’s. Due to administrative overhead requirements, the ratio of mission personnel to total personnel is

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far lower than would be experienced by a depot organization. Third, augmentation by the hire of local nationals is necessary to meet total workload requirements. Restrictions on hiring have prevented full development of augmentation required; however, this has now been lifted. Along with the hiring of local nationals we have the continuing problem of training them to an acceptable level of competence. Fourth, the Depot automatic data processing (ALP) capability is built around two (2) UNIVAC 1005 computers. These computers are not compatible with the Standard Supply System Vietnam (3SVN) and as a result the centralized programming and procedures provided for 3 SVN have limited application at Da Nang. Those procedures which are applicable must be reprogrammed to match the UNIVAC 1005 capability. Because of this incompatibility, overall service is restricted. Finally, until recently our operations have been hampered by a lack of adequate storage areas; however, we are overcoming that difficulty through the improvement of existing areas and the construction for a large covered warehouse.
Maintenance units of Da Nang Support Command provide both general and direct support to all Army non-divisional units, and back-up support to two Army divisions, the 101st and the Americal. In addition, back-up and repair parts support is provided for 7 AN/MPS-10 counter mortar radar sets, and 40 AN/PPS-5 ground surveillance radars operated by the US Marines.

One of the success stories at the Da Nang Support Command has been the effectiveness of our Command Maintenance Management Assistance Team. Organized as a non-TOE counterpart of the 1st Log Command's CAMA Team, the CAMA Team has made continuous assistance visits to all units throughout I Corps. The success of the program is attested to by the overwhelming percentage of satisfactory ratings awarded by lst Logistical CAMA Teams to Da Nang Support Command units. In practically every case, the units that achieved a satisfactory rating had received a prior visit from the Da Nang assistance team.

No doubt one of our most difficult assignments is the support of engineering equipment, especially the heavy construction equipment of the 45th Engineer Group. Extensive land clearing operations, such as the A Shau Valley road improvement have severely taxed the support structure at all levels of maintenance.

Cooperation between our maintenance personnel and maintenance counterparts within the US Navy and US Marine Corps has been practiced continuously by the Da Nang Support Command. Support for vital maintenance services such as electric motor rewinding and tire recapping have been successfully established in the Da Nang area by direct negotiations with the US Naval Support Activity. Conversely, support maintenance has been regularly performed for
certain USAG radar equipment and technical assistance has been provided frequently on various aspects of heavy weapons systems maintenance by US Army Support Command units. The overall maintenance posture of Da Nang Support Command "customer" units has improved steadily so that with very few exceptions the non-operational readiness rates have been maintained consistently below the 1st Logistical Command and MACV tolerance levels. The attainment of maximum operational readiness at all levels of combat service support remains the full time objective of our maintenance program. The road to a successful maintenance program is impeded by several factors: First, the shortage of experienced technical supply Warrant Officers deprives the maintenance units of special skills sorely needed at the USG/ASU level. Second, there is a continuing shortage of supervisory personnel for the ASU 500 system. Invariably the enlisted personnel, once trained, depart the military for much better paying positions in private business or industry. Third, we find we are deficient in specific skills such as electric/refrigerator mechanics and generator repairmen. The need for these type of personnel is brought about by the garrison-type duty that is found in this theater. Although air-conditioning, refrigeration and generators are authorized in this environment, the TOE's do not provide spaces for the necessary skills to maintain the equipment. Fourth, our composite battalions pose a problem from the standpoint of overall direction. For example, several of our maintenance battalions have been tailored to provide a variety of services for a given geographical area. They must provide such services as bakery, laundry, PUL, subsistence, and transportation in addition to maintenance support. This composite battalion
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arrangement detracts from the maintenance effort and necessitates a staffing pattern to accommodate the other assigned missions.

Fifth, we have no contractor effort in the ICTZ. All or our maintenance, with the exception of electric motor rewinding and tire recapping being done under Navy contracts, is accomplished by military personnel.

Finally, many of our maintenance units are handicapped by the lack of improved maintenance facilities and must utilize TO&E maintenance sheds or shelters.
The recent decision to withdraw the 3d Marine Division from the northern portion of the I Corps Tactical Zone, along with its supporting elements, has far reaching implications for the Da Nang Support Command. What the final effect will be is unknown at this time; however, there are several very obvious changes that will occur. These are:

1. We will assume the Class I mission for that portion of the zone north of Camp Evans. (I mentioned earlier that the USARV now has responsibility for all Class I north of Evans, while the US Army has this responsibility for Camp Evans and the area south to the Hai Van Pass.)

2. Assumption of responsibilities for Class III support to residual USARV and US Navy elements which do not redeploy and those US Army elements which may relocate as a result of the 3d Division's redeployment.

3. To provide laundry and bath services for the Quang Tri - Dong Ha areas.

4. Assumption of responsibility for operating the ASP at Quang Tri. (Presently the Army is provided space at this ASP. Upon withdrawal of the Marines we will have to operate the ASP.)

5. Additional requirements for perimeter security and internal security personnel. While the extent of these requirements are not known, they certainly will detract from mission capability.

The assumption of these additional missions will require personnel and equipment assets which are not available from within the Da Nang Support Command. Equipment such as laundry machines, fuel pumps, fuel dispensers, shower units, bakery equipment and refrigerator units are in short supply and will have to be provided from assets outside the command.
The support rendered by the US Army Support Command to the US and Free World Military Armed Forces has been responsive to all combat operations. No operation has been delayed or cancelled for lack of support.

The Reserve/National Guard units deployed to the I Corps Tactical Zone were composed of highly skilled, motivated individuals who performed outstandingly. The deployment of these units to the Republic of Vietnam during the summer-fall of 1968 proved a worthwhile decision. They strengthened existing weaknesses in our logistical structure at a time when assets were not available within the regular establishment at that time.

Within the Support Command we have progressed in many ways. Facilities have been upgraded; equipment maintenance has reached a very high plateau of customer satisfaction; outstanding rapport exists between ourselves and our customers; and relations with our sister services and III MAF are outstanding.

Probably the characteristic which has been most pronounced throughout the conduct of tactical and support operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone, has been the fine spirit of cooperation demonstrated by the various US and Free World Military Forces in their efforts to deter Communist aggression.
MISSION

- COMMAND 1ST LOG UNITS IN ICTZ
- PROVIDE TO ALL US ARMY FORCES
- RESUPPLY OF CLASSES I-IV
- DS/GS MAINTENANCE
- TRANSPORTATION
- SERVICES
- US ARMY FIELD DEPOT
- ESA/LSA AS REQUIRED
- PROVIDE MORTUARY SERVICE FOR ALL US FORCES
- PROVIDE PROPERTY DISPOSAL SERVICE FOR ALL US FORCES
- SUPPORT FWMAF AS DIRECTED

* WHOLESALE CLASS I-IV COMMON FURNISHED BY NSA
## LOGISTICAL CONCEPT ICTZ

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSA/II MAF PROVIDES:</th>
<th>I ST LOG REINFORCES III MAF</th>
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<tr>
<td>WHOLESALE SUPPLY LESS CL/V</td>
<td>PPL OPERATION + MAINT</td>
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<tr>
<td>TERMINAL SERVICES</td>
<td>RETAIL POL AT PHU BAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>CULT IN DNG + CHU LAI</td>
<td>+ QUANG TRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVMART IN DNG + PHU BAI</td>
<td>HIGHWAY TRANSPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLI NORTH OF CAMP EVANS TO DMZ</td>
<td>REPAIR PARTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**175 MM**

2D MAR BDE (ROK)

- CLI, BAKERY AT PHU BAI
- BAKERY AT CHU LAI
- RETAIL SUPPLY (ARMY)
- DS/GS AMMO (ARMY)
- MAINTENANCE (ARMY)
- SERVICES (ARMY)
- PDO (FWMAF)
- MORTUARY (FWMAF)
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<th>OPERATING SITE</th>
<th>DEP Date</th>
<th>RELOCATING SITE</th>
<th>OPERATING SITE</th>
<th>SPACES GAINED/LOST</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<td>167</td>
<td>1 Aug 69</td>
<td>652nd Cen Sup Co</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>- 7</td>
<td>38 marginal personnel (record of one Article 15) including one with 5 Article 15's and one with summary court martial.</td>
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<td>976th FM</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>40th AMU</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>805th Trans Co</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>- 28</td>
<td>36 marginal personnel including one with a summary court martial, one with a special and one with a general court martial.</td>
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<td>+ 53</td>
<td>41 marginal personnel including one with 5 Article 15's, 3 personnel NCO and 2 enlisted.</td>
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<td>+ 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>126th 5th Co</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>9 Aug 69</td>
<td>216th SSS Co</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>- 6</td>
<td>9 marginal personnel.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>HOGK</td>
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<tr>
<td>513th Nat Bn, NCOs</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>3 Oct 69</td>
<td>2nd CS BN, NCO</td>
<td>123</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NCOE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-117</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
<td>% REDUCED</td>
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*Includes T&F, Transient Billets, Special Services, etc.
**Report Title:** Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG James W. Gunn

**Date:** October 1968 to October 1969

**Project No.:** N/A

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