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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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SUBJECT: Operational Report 4 Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 13th Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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13th Aviation Battalion
AVBARN-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPG-55 (R1)'(U).

SECl DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section I Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Unit Mission: There has been no change to the unit mission during this period.

   b. Organization: At the close of the reporting period the organization of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) was as follows: (See Inc1 1)

      (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company
      (2) The 114th Aviation Company (Combat)
      (3) The 121st Aviation Company (Combat)
      (4) The 175th Aviation Company (Combat)
      (5) The 336th Aviation Company (Combat)
      (6) The 221st Aviation Company (Utility Airplane)

   c. Changes in Command and Staff:

      (1) LTC VELVA F. PARKER, 239-32-6648, FA, was assigned as the Battalion Commander on 15 July 1969, LTC Thomas E. Anderson, 516-28-2802, INF, was assigned to G-1 1st Aviation Brigade.

      (2) MAJ JOSEPH V. LENOCI, 137-28-5322, INF, was assigned as the Executive Officer on 20 July 1969, MAJ Ralph E. Nauman 116-26-2958, INF, was reassigned to CONUS.

FOR OT UT
693174
Inclosure
SUTJKT - Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, NCC 07-55 (II) (1).
Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS GFQ1-65 (RI) (0).

d. Unit Strength as of 31 July 1969: See Incl 2

e. Aircraft Status as of 31 July 1969: See Incl 3

f. Operational Results as of 31 July 1969: See Incl 4

g. Operations:

(1) The 13th Aviation Battalion, during the last quarter of FY 69, continued to provide aviation assets for preplanned air-mobile assaults, troop insertions and extractions, tactical and administrative resupply, command supervision, medical evacuation, direct fire support, artillery adjustment, and detailed reconnaissance, in direct support of the Vietnamese IV Corps in the Republic of Vietnam. The 13th Aviation Battalion was mainly in support of 21st ARVN Division and the IAF Tactical Zone. Support was also given to Military Advisor Groups, IV Corps Headquarters, 5th Special Forces, and CORDS. Support is still given to the US Navy Seals, however with lesser intensity than occurred in the previous quarter.

The 13th Battalion has increased it's air-mobile operations while decreasing the number of primary - ten (10) ship operations. This has been due to the recent activation of the 217th VNAF Squadron which is now operational with UH-1D models. When VNAF aviation assets are employed, the 13th Battalion supplies a CSC aircraft with crew and gun-ships from one of the attached units.

A mission recently acquired by the 13th Aviation Battalion is the night Hunter Killer mission. This mission employs five (5) UH-1D aircraft and either three (3) or two (2) AH-1G or AH-1C gunships. Of the five (5) UH-1D's one (1) is a CSC aircraft and one (1) is a flare ship. It is used strictly in the 44th Special Zone along the border and is employed to impede enemy infiltration during periods of darkness by using the immediate reaction of ground troops to places of known enemy activity which have been uncovered by the flare and armed aircraft.

The basis for these operations are the airfields located at Noc Hoa and Chi Lang. Its effectiveness is not known at this time.

(2) Air-mobile Operations: The Battalion supported four hundred and twenty five (425) air-mobile operations during the last quarter. The Battalion participated in combat assaults in every day of the last quarter. Some of the more significant operations are listed below.

(a) Combat Assault Operations, 3 June 1969: The 175th Aviation Company supported the 21XX in an AM K-BAR and the 9XX in a P K-BAR. The AM operation was staged out of Can Tho. The task organization

* K-BAR: Term used to describe an air-mobile package consisting of 5 UH-1D's, a heavy fire team of gun-ships, and one (1) command and control aircraft.
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AVN-N-09
14 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, CSS CSN0-45 (II) (U).

consisted of 5 UH-1D (175th) and 3 UH-1C (175th). All assets arrived Can Th 0700 hours. From this stagefield 40 troops were inserted at 0745 hours with negative contact into VS 012-397. From PZ 995 982, fifty troops were inserted at 0903 hours into VS 132-973. Claims for this operation were weapons cache consisting of 20 D-40 rounds, 1 handgrenade, 12 D-400m, -79 rounds, and 1 VC POW with grenade.

The PM K-21 was staged out of Sa Dec with the task organization arriving at 1225 hours and the task force commander at 1305. From these first PZ fifty troops were lifted at 1223 hours from PZ 895 202. In this AO claims were 5 structures, 2 sampans and 6 A1s at VS 209. Two LFT (235) were employed in VS 2721 at 1645 hours as the VC were running in the area. All assets were released at 1655 hours.

(b) Combat Assault Operation, 10 July 1969: The 121st Aviation Company supported the 7th XX in an operation staged out of Ben Tre with the center of mass XI 5090 utilizing a task organization consisting of 5 UH-1D's, a heavy fire team and one C&C aircraft. Assets arrived at Ben Tre at 0700 hours and began the operation at 0350 hours with an insertion of 50 troops from PZ Ben Tre into landing zone XI 793 923 and 20 troops into XI 795 986. The lifts were completed at 1025 hours. At 1100 hours fifty troops were extracted from XI 792 923 and returned to Ben Tre. This extraction drew heavy fire with one UH-1B returning to Soc Trang with bullet damage. This aircraft returned to the AO in time for the afternoon portion of the operation. The claims of the air assets were 7 XIA; 15 sampans; and 10 structures at XI 793 916. In the vicinity of the first Z the ground troops had 2 VCI XIA, 14 VC POW and 1 weapon captured. In the morning operation the Command and Control aircraft claimed two XIA's and five sampans at XI 926 937. The afternoon operation began at PZ Ben Tre with the insertion of 20 troops into XI 927 945 at 1240 hours. Extractions were initiated from PZ XI 959 918 with 50 troops returned to Ben Tre at 1630 hours. Ground troops claimed 4 XIA, 4 POW's and several captured documents in the vicinity of XI 923 949. All assets were released at 1700 hours. The air mission commander commented that there was an excellent element of surprise for the day and that in almost every landing zone the enemy were found running around as the slicks touched down. He said the operation was well planned and executed.

(c) Combat Assault Operation, 17 July 1969: The 356th Aviation Company supported the 21st ARVN Division in an operation staged out of Rach Glo with a center of mass 13 440 020. The task organization consisting of 1 C&C aircraft, 5 UH-1D's, and a heavy fire team which arrived at Rach Glo at 0730 hours. The first lift of 50 troops was from PZ Kien Phinh in 12 460 070 at 0950 hours. The second lift at 1010 hours, from the same PZ was 50 troops into 450 035. Ground elements had heavy contact in the AO claiming 10 VC XIA, while losing 3 XIA and 6 A1.
Gunsips in support of the ground elements claimed 20 IEEE at 3 S 502 060, 10 structures and 2 sampans. Ground troops destroyed 2000 lbs. of rice and captured 2 AK-47's, 1 M-40 round, and 1 kil of documents.

Air assets received a cancellation of the afternoon 1-USA at Vl Than and stood by to give support at Rach Gia. At 1510 hours, the first of two extractions began from PZ 050 035 to LZ Kien Binh. A total of 100 troops were lifted with the last lift completed at 1525 hours.

Assists had negative contact and negative claims for the extractions and were released at 1530 hours.

(d) Combat Assault Operations, 2 June 1969: The 121st Aviation Company supported the IV Corps in a combined VN/VF and US operation staging out of Bac Lieu with a center of mass of W 92 h 2. The task organization consisted of nine VMF UH-1H’s, one platoon of gunsips, and one CAC aircraft. One slick was lost at approximately 0915 hours when one of it's crew was wounded. The aircraft then returned to Minh Thuy. The operation began at 0800 hours with the first lift from Bac Lieu into 992 436. It consisted of eighty troops and landed at 0820. Following that were seven lifts including a total of 590 troops inserted from 3 864 452 into five LZ's XI 020 430 (2), XI 946 429, XI 915 417, W 947 436 (2), and W 937 449. The seven insertions began at 0839 and terminated at 1157. There were both ground and air contact with the ground elements claiming 20 VC IEEE, one K-16 captured, one K-79 captured, and two Russian made weapons captured. The elements claimed 67 structures, 25 sampans and seven KBA’s all within an area with center of mass at W 260 990. The extractions started at 1615 hours and consisted of four lifts, one from W 975 365, and three from IX 994 375, all landing at W 896 329. A total of 280 troops were extracted between 1615 hours and 1642 hours. One lift of 60 troops was made by a CH-47. All assists were released at 1705 to terminate the operations.

H. Training - The 13th Aviation Battalion continued in their mission of providing US transition training to VN/VF aviators.

(1) VN/VF class number 5, consisting of seven students, graduated five (5) of these on 25 May 1969. The other two (2) attended the staff officer course and graduated seven weeks prior. Of the five (5) students on 25 May 1969 that graduated, all had an excess of 130 hours transition time.

(2) VN/VF class number 6, graduated five (5) officers on 22 June 1969. Again, two (2) students had graduated previously in the staff officer course. The staff officers accrued close to fifty (50) hours transition time while the others accrued in excess of 150 hours during their transition.
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AVAFW-62
14 August 1969

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, VCS 05F00-65 (II) (II).

(3) VNAF class number 7 graduated four (4) students on 27 July 1969. Again, two (2) staff officers had graduated previously. The students in this class were from the 215th Squadron at Nha Trang and did exceptionally well in their transition. All had in excess of 170 hours of transition time and were extremely receptive during the entire training program.

(4) As of 31 July 1969, class 8 had graduated three staff officers while four (4) transition students were still in training. As of 31 July they completed the minimums as required in the Letter of Instruction concerning the VNAF Transition Course. These students, from the 213th Squadron based at Da Nang, were very receptive and cooperative to all instructions.

(5) The above mentioned graduates bring the total number of VNAF personnel that have graduated from the UH-1 transition course to forty-five (45) with nine (9) of these staff officers.

(6) The 13th Aviation Battalion supplied twenty-seven (27) personnel to the Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) at Vung Tau during the period 1 May - 31 July 1969.

(7) The 13th Battalion sent one (1) person to the Jungle Environmental Survival Training School (JESTS) in the Philippines. During this time period six (6) personnel attended the 1st Aviation Brigade Instructor Pilot School located at Long Binh.

I. Morale and Discipline:

(1) The number of approved recommendations for awards received during this period are shown by type and totals awarded:
   Distinguished Flying Cross - 4, Bronze Star - 8, Air Medals - 190, Army Commendation Medals - 11, Air Medal with V Device - 4.

2. During this reporting period the number of approved disciplinary actions taken under UCM were:

   Officers  WO  EN
   GENERAL  0  0  0
   SPECIAL  0  0  0
   SUMMARY  0  0  0
   ARTICLES 15's  0  3  51

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AVBASN-GC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPQI-65 (RI) (U).

(4) The number of personnel that took R&R or leave to various countries is denoted below:

J. Safety:

(1) During the reporting period, the Battalion experienced four (4) reportable accidents, approximately one accident per 9,700 flying hours. Two of the accidents were a result of material failure, one was the result of pilot error, and one cause is unknown at this time. The accident rate reflects a marked decrease over the previous reporting period which was one accident per 3,400 flying hours. The Battalion at the close of FY 69 had logged 162,218 flying hours. This is greater than any other Combat Aviation Battalion in RVN.

(2) The Battalion experienced eight (8) hydraulic failures, an increase from the previous reporting period. Six (6) of the hydraulic failures were attributed to the improper securing of lines allowing chafing and weakening of the hydraulic lines to occur. This problem was primarily due to improper maintenance and inspection. As a result of the above indications, an extensive study is underway in an attempt to increase the quality of aircraft maintenance.

(3) Since the previous reporting period, three (3) aviation companies within the Battalion have had a zero (0) accident rate. Two of the companies are assault helicopter, and the third is an utility airplane company. This is attributed to an increased safety conscious attitude by all commanders within the Battalion and the attached units.

(4) Accident/Incident statistics and flying hours for 1 May 69-31 July 69 are as follows:

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<th>RECAUTIONARY FLYING RATE</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121st AHC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175th AHC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>221st RAC</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136th AHC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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2. Section 2. Lessons Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluation, Recommendations and Command Action.

   (A) Personnel: NONE

   (B) Operations:

   (C) Navigation Aids:

   (a) Observation: There are very few electronic aircraft navigation aids in the IV Corps area.

   (b) Evaluation: The IV Corps area is quite large, and, at present, operational Army aircraft navigational aids are limited to Soc Trang, Vinh Long Binh Thuy, Ca Mau and Dong Tan. During the dry season, when the rice paddies are burning, visibility frequently is reduced to less than a mile for extended areas. During all seasons there are heavy winds which hamper dead-reckoning and, unless really familiar with local canals and rivers, contact flying with anything smaller than a 1:250,000 is difficult with anything larger is cumbersome.

   (c) Recommendations: That additional low frequency beacons be installed and maintained at secure locations in the vicinity of Tra Vinh, VI Thanh, Rach Gia, Chi Lang and Moc Hoa.

   (d) Command Action: No command action has been taken at this time.

   (2) Friendly Fire.

   (a) Observation: Aircraft have been taking hits from friendly ARVN troops who recon by fire as soon as they depart the aircraft in the LZ.

   (b) Evaluation: Most formation used with the exception of trail, which is seldom used, have aircraft generally landing abreast of each other. When troops depart both doors and recon by fire, they endanger not only other aircraft but also other friendly troops. Also, while they fire, it is extremely difficult to determine if enemy fire is being received in the LZ. If troops are traveling light, and, if they expend a lot of ammunition reconning by fire, then there might not be sufficient ammunition when needed. Once in the LZ, door gunners do not fire unless fired upon for fear of hitting friendly troops or other aircraft.

   (c) Recommendation: That troops departing aircraft in an LZ do not recon by fire or fire at all unless fired upon.

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14 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Cobra) for the period ending 31 July 1969, NSCC CSFBD-65 (R1) (U).

(d) Command Action: All air mission commanders have been briefed to inform the task force commanders to keep friendly fire to a minimum until the troop transports are clear of the immediate area. Unsatisfactory mission reports are submitted after each incident of this type.

(3) Refueling:

(a) Observation: The hoses at many refueling areas are too short.

(b) Evaluation: When the gas hose is too short, aircraft are required to set down with the gas entrance nearest the hose. Many times this requires hovering with a strong tail wind and is a potentially dangerous situation.

(c) Recommendation: Lengthen refueling hoses so that as a minimum the hose is long enough to go under the tail boom to the gas tank. Establish a policy whenever the wind is in excess of 20 knots so that the aircraft will not have to turn their tails into the wind if refueling hoses are too short.

(d) Command Action: No command action has been taken at this time.

(4) Mixed Fire Teams:

(a) Observation: There is a necessity when using a fixed fire team of AH-1G's and UH-1C's for an altitude difference between the UH-1C lead and the AH-1G wingman.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the steep angle of attack necessary for the AH-1G to place effective fire on a target, as compared to the UH-1C, there is a need for altitude separation.

(c) Recommendation: When using mixed fire teams, the altitude separation be at least 100 feet or more. Altitude separation being based on type of terrain and target location.

(d) Command Action: All mixed fire teams of this unit use a minimum of 100 feet altitude separation to assure maximum fire power.

(5) Aircraft Hits:

(a) Observation: Door gunners and crewchiefs on UH-1C aircraft take a great deal of hostile fire in their area of the aircraft.
AVRAIN-69


(b) Evaluation: Due to the low level tactics used in UH-1C gunships and relative slow speed, most hits are taken in the cargo area.

(c) Recommendation: That armor plating should be used under all crewchiefs and door gunners' seats on the UH-1C gunships. The armor plates can consist of steel plate, scrap seat armor from pilot seats, or back plates from the crew body armor. The protective plating to be placed on such an angle so that any projectiles penetrating the bottom of the aircraft would be deflected toward the open door. These armor plates must be properly secured to the aircraft.

(d) Command Action: All crewchiefs and gunners are required to place protective plates beneath their seats on an angle so that any projectiles penetrating the bottom of the ship will be deflected out the open door.

(6) Crew Seating:

(a) Observation: It has become apparent that crewchiefs and gunners are riding in the cargo compartment and not in their assigned locations.

(b) Evaluation: This practice defeats the purpose of having people in those positions. The purpose is to detect any unusual noises or fuel odors from the transmission and engine areas as well as to man their M-60 machine guns should the need arise.

(c) Recommendation: Command emphasis should be placed on the importance of these people being in their proper positions within the craft. The Aircraft Commander should be made constantly aware of this situation and take steps to correct any deficiencies.

(d) Command Action: All commanders have been notified to insure that command emphasis is given to aircraft commanders to insure that all crew members ride in their proper places.

(7) Uncontrolled Airfields:

(a) Observation: All too frequently, fixed wing aircraft, and helicopters in particular, are landing at uncontrolled airfields throughout the Delta without giving any prior warning as to their location or intentions.
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14 August 1969


(c) Evaluation: This practice has caused many near mishaps and further points out the unsafe and unprofessional attitudes which some aviators have.

(a) Recommendation: Strict emphasis on the use of Delta ground frequencies should be made at all company meetings and safety classes.

(d) Command Action: During the quarterly Aviation Safety Council meeting held on 24 June 1969, this subject was discussed, and the correct procedures involved were disseminated to the Battalion's subordinate units.

(c) Utilization of 0-1 Aircraft:

(a) Observation: 0-1 aircraft continues to be used for administrative tasks by those advisory personnel to whom they are assigned for operational control.

(b) Evaluation: Reference IV Corps Directive, 95-1, dtd 29 October 1963, para G, "...the 0-1 is a valuable tactical tool in the counterinsurgency environment, and as such should not be used for administrative tasks for which alternate means are provided, and available. Only in cases of an administrative or tactical urgency should 0-1 aircraft be utilized for other than, visual reconnaissance, artillery and naval gunfire adjustment, column cover, radio relay, airstrlce marking, and message drops."

(c) Recommendations: That proper utilization of 0-1 aircraft be stressed via aviation representatives, at command level.

(d) Command Action: Aviators continue to educate ground commanders as to the proper utilization of 0-1 aircraft.

(C) Training: NONE.

(D) Intelligence: NONE

(E) Logistics: Survival Radios

(1) Observation: The availability of RT-10 survival radios is all but nonexistent.
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SUJET: Operational Report - Lessons learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RES CSFG-65 (HI) (U).

14 August 1969

(2) Evaluation: Each aircraft is required to carry one of these radios in the survival kit. However, replacement radios are not available nor are the spare parts to fix unserviceable ones. There does not appear to be a clear and distinct channel through which these radios can be repaired or exchanged.

(3) Recommendations: That a study be initiated on this problem and a priority system be established if regular distribution of these radios is unfeasable.

(4) Command Action: The survival radios have been requisitioned through supply channels. A message has come to this Headquarters concerning these requisitions which states that no survival radios are presently in supply channels at this time nor will any be until October and November of 1969.

(F) Organization: NONE

(G) Maintenance: Aircraft Maintenance

(1) Observation: It has been found that a company effort on aircraft maintenance has eliminated many minor deficiencies. This effort is conducted every evening at 1930 hours, when most of the aircraft have returned to home station. At this time all crew chiefs, gunners and assigned aviators report to their respective aircraft. Under the supervision of the maintenance officer, the technical inspectors and line maintenance personnel are made available to find and correct minor discrepancies.

(2) Evaluation: Through aircraft stables, the company is able to find and correct many deficiencies that may otherwise go unnoticed. This process also serves as a question and answer period which is very beneficial to all new aviators and crew chiefs.

(3) Recommendations: That aircraft stables be entered into the SOP of all aviation units.
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AVNDC-63

14 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, SOS CSGOR-65 (RI) (0).

(4) Command Action: This Headquarters concurs with this program of aircraft stables and urges other subordinate units to undertake these same procedures if missions warrant.

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1-CO, 15th Avn Co
1-CO, 121st Avn Co
1-CO, 336th Avn Co
1-CO, 221st Avn Co

VITA F. PARKER
LTC
Commanding

13
SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion for the Period ending 31 July 1969, HCS, CSM-65

Da, Hq, 164th Aviation Group (OB), ABU 96215, 29 August 1969

To: SES DISTIBUTION

1. The attached 13th CAB OULL for the period ending 31 July 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters.

2. The following comments are made on the report:

a. Para. 2B (1), (c), page 8: Concur.

b. Para. 2B (2), page 8: The 13th CAB submitted an unsatisfactory mission report on 27 July 1969 and 7 August 1969. These reports have been forwarded to IV Corps. Liaison officers have been notified of these occurrences and have been directed to inform the advisors of this problem area.

c. Para. 2B (3), (c), page 9: Non-concur. Miniport hoses from connecting pipelines are a standard length - 25 ft. This length allows the pilot to position the aircraft so that the 25 ft hose can be brought under the tailboom irrespective of wind direction. If specific exceptions are brought to the attention of this headquarters, corrections can be made.

d. Para 2B (4) (c), page 9: Concur.

e. Para 2B (5) (c), page 10: Concur.

f. Para 2B (6) (c), page 10: Concur.

h. Para 2B (8) (c), page 11: It is the policy of this command that 0-1 aircraft will not be used for administrative missions. This headquarters does not schedule such missions and constantly advises liaison officers to inform supported units of this policy.

i. Para 2B (1), (a), page 12: On 20 Jun 69, the communications section of the 164th CAB submitted a compiled report of Status of Survival Radios to 1st AVN Bue, listing the equipment on hand; operative; inoperative; and equipment on requisition. VhC 68 radios are arriving in this unit. The 244th AVN Co. (Surveillance Airplane) has received 12 radios. Priority is for the 244th AVN Co., the two 0-1 companies and then helicopter units.
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JVbGc-U (14 Aug 69) 1st Ind 29 August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational report – Lessons Learned of the 13th Cab for the
Period ending 31 July 1969, HQs, CABon-05 (al)

j. Para 26 (1), page 12: The basic concept of this type aircraft
maintenance is good. Further investigation reveals that the aircraft
stables consists of the maintenance officer, maintenance supervisors and
line personnel plus the armament and gunner perform immediate maintenance
on the aircraft. This procedure is followed in the majority of the units
in this command.

JACK M. THALLINSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:
2-Da, ATTN: AGSPOR
1-GG, 1st AVN Bde, ATTN: JVbGc-U
AVBAGC-0 (14 Aug 69) 2d Inf

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 15th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96584 9 SEP 1969

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBAGC-DSST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the contents as indorsed except as noted below.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2(B)(1), page 8, addresses insufficient electronic navigational aids in the Delta region of South Vietnam. The feasibility of placing navigational aids at Tra Vinh, Vi Thanh, Bach Giia and Hoc Hoa has been referred to the 15th Aviation Group (Combat) for evaluation and recommendations.

b. Paragraph 2(E)(1), page 11, addresses the shortage of aircrewman AK-10 survival radios in the supply system. The AK-10 radio is being replaced by the AN/URC-68 as the standard survival radio. 3600 AN/URC-68 radios are expected to arrive in Vietnam by the end of calendar year 1969. Those radios are USAF command controlled items. Priority of issue has been established as follows: Aviation Company (Surveillance Airplane), Aviation Company (Observation), Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter), and Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)/(Heavy Helicopter). Units have been advised to requisition radios through AHMC channels and repair parts through 1st Logistical Command supply channels. Responsibility for repair has been delegated to the aviation electronics support companies of the 34th General Support Group. 120 AN/URC-68 radios have arrived to date and been distributed in accordance with the above priority.

c. Paragraph 2(G)(1), page 12, proposes that a daily supervised aircraft maintenance period be conducted at company level. Concur in principle. Although a supervised maintenance period for all assigned aircraft and crews at a specific time each day can be a workable solution for some units, it is not possible for all aviation units because of varying missions.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969, RVN CSFOR-69 (RI) (U)

The recommending unit was notified of approval on daily supervised maintenance periods for their unit but not as a command policy.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

ARTHUR W. LITTLE
CPT AGG
Asst AG

CF:
13th Avn Bn (Cbt)
CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (14 Aug 69) 3d Ind

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 5 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOD-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat).

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (C) Reference item concerning "Navigational Aids", section II, page 8, paragraph 2B(1); concur. The 165th Combat Aviation Group has coordinated with the 13th Combat Aviation Battalion for the establishment of the navigational aids. Personnel provided by the using unit will be trained by the 165th Combat Aviation Group as navigational aid operators. Using units will provide for site security. USARV has approved a request from the 165th Combat Aviation Group to laterally transfer six beacons to using units for their use at Ví Thanh, Tra Vinh and Rach Gia.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning "Uncontrolled Airfields", section II, page 10, paragraph 2B(7); nonconcur. The Tactical Aerodrome Directory provides the correct procedures to be followed. In addition, the Directorate of Civil Aviation has established the VHF frequency of 118.1 as a common frequency at uncontrolled airfields.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. C. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
13th Avn Bn
1st Avn Bde

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT (14 Aug 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 13th Aviation Battalion (Cbt) for
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Army AG
CONFIDENTIAL

ANT:MN-CC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - lessons learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 3 July 1969, SEC

(FFD-65 (II) (9)). Organization and Statiomg.

CONFIDENTIAL
S U B J E C T: Operational Report - Lessons learned of the 13th Aviation
Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1969. RG
GFG1-65 (II) (U). 13th Battalion Aircraft Status

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<th>UH-1D N</th>
<th>UH-1H N</th>
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3 of these aircraft are replacement AH-1G aircraft

32nd August 1969

CONFIDENTIAL
**AVBA-33**

**18 August 1949**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 13th Aviation Battalion (Combat) for the period ending 31 July 1949, OOS CSFOR-65 (LL) (D). 13th Battalion Operational Statistics

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 13th Aviation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 13th Aviation Battalion

14 August 1969

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

N/A