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HEADQUARTERS
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION

REDEPLOYMENT AFTER
ACTION REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96370

AVDE-GT

27 August 1969

SUBJECT: Redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Attached is the After Action Report of the 9th Infantry Division's redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam.

2. (U) The Old Reliables have just completed the first redeployment executed during the conduct of an active conflict. Some of the problems encountered will prove to be unique, while others will be common to each successive major unit redeployment.

3. (U) Recognizing that future troop relocations and redeployments may take various forms, we hope the attached report will assist other units in planning and executing future movements from RVN.

HARRIS W. WOLLIS
Major General, USA

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SUBJECT: Redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division (U)

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2 - CG 199th Inf Bde (Lt)
2 - CG 173d Inf Bde (Abn)
2 - CG 3d Bde, 82a Abn Div
2 - CG 1st Sig Bde
2 - CG 1st Abn Bde
2 - CG 44th Med Bde
2 - CG 18th Engt Bde
2 - CG 20th Engt Bde
2 - CTF 115
2 - CTF 116
2 - CO 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
2 - CO 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div
2 - CO 11th ACE
2 - CO 5th SPG (Abn)
2 - CO 18th MP Bde
SUMMARY

The redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division, completed on 27 August 1969, was the first movement of a major US Army unit from Vietnam. Many problems were encountered and solved, and many more were anticipated and, therefore, never encountered. This After Action Report contains a compilation of the problems encountered, observations made, and actions taken by the 9th Division during its redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam.

On 12 June 1969, the 9th Infantry Division received notification of its impending redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam. The mission given to the division was to reorganize the 3d Brigade as a separate brigade to remain in RVN, to disengage the remainder of the division from combat, to redeploy the 2d Brigade and elements of the division base to CONUS for inactivation, and to redeploy the 1st Brigade with the division (minus) at 85% authorized personnel strength to Hawaii as part of the PACOM Reserve. These tasks were to be accomplished prior to 1 September 1969.

Shortly following notification of its redeployment, the division formed a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG). The RPG was not conceived as an action agency but was formed to isolate and identify problems or obtain decisions, then turn them over to the appropriate staff section or action agency of the division for execution. The RPG prepared all redeployment plans, closely monitored all redeployment activities of the division in coordination with the general and special staff, and kept the Commanding General informed of the redeployment status through daily briefings.

Some of the division’s subordinate units formed similar, separate redeployment planning groups. These groups maintained liaison with the division RPG in order to obtain advance notice of pending actions and to keep their commanders informed. Units which had these RPGs performed markedly better during redeployment operations than those that did not.

All personnel, equipment, and customs processing was conducted at Dong Tam. On the date of departure, personnel were airlifted by CH-47 from Dong Tam to Bien Hoa where C-141 aircraft transported the troops to CONUS or Hawaii.

Since the first unit, the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, was scheduled to redeploy on 8 July, no time was lost in formulating plans with the 7th ARVN Division for filling the tactical void as 9th US Infantry Division elements disengaged from combat.

Redeploying from a hostile environment entailed continuation of combat operations and normal support operations until units were able to stand-down, return to Dong Tam base, and begin preparations for redeployment. Tactical coordination was facilitated by the fact that the 7th ARVN Division’s Tactical Area (DTA) coincided with the Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) of those units of the 9th US Infantry Division which were to be redeployed.
The order in which units redeployed was 2d Brigade, 1st Brigade, Division Troops, Support Command, and Division Headquarters. The stand-down and departure of the maneuver elements were phased to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy and to provide a gradual roll-up of forces into Dong Tam base where there was only a limited amount of space which could be used to accommodate forces withdrawn from the field.

Each infantry battalion initially stood down within its fire support base and conducted local security operations until turnover of the base to an ARVN or RF/PF unit. Following turnover of its fire support base, the unit moved to Dong Tam, where, due to space limitations, it was billeted aboard barracks ships provided by Task Force 117.

Artillery dispersed to Dong Tam with its supported unit. The artillery continued firing even after its supported unit began preparation for redeployment. Stand-down of artillery units was phased to permit the maximum number of tubes to remain in action as long as possible.

By 23 July 1969 all combat elements of the division slated for movement to either Hawaii or for inactivation in CONUS had stood down. Security of Dong Tam (TAOR KUDZU) was provided by Task Force Carlson, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry (Reinforced). On 26 July 1969, the division passed from operational control of the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) to operational control of USARV. During the period 12 June to 26 July 1969, direct liaison had been conducted with USARV. Official recognition of the division being under USARV operational control after 26 July facilitated coordination with that headquarters and Saigon Support Command.

Also on 26 July 1969, the division released operational control of the 3d Brigade to CG, II FFORCEV who in turn placed the 3d Brigade under the operational control of CG, 25th Infantry Division.

The division received notification on 9 August that those elements previously designated to move to Hawaii as part of the PACOM reserve would be inactivated by 30 September. This announcement ultimately had no effect on the division's redeployment. At the time the announcement was made, personnel, equipment, and supply aspects of the division's redeployment were tied to transactions that could not be unraveled any place other than Schofield Barracks, Hawaii without producing serious consequences. Therefore, the Department of the Army made the decision to permit the redeployment to proceed as scheduled and inactivate the division (minus) in Hawaii. Some of the vehicles which had been shipped to the surface port of embarkation were diverted to the depot at Long Binh with the division receiving turn-in credit. However, all CONEX containers, personnel, and most of the vehicles continued to Hawaii.

When the decision to inactivate the division was received, most of the effort required to redeploy the division had been completed. More than 90% of the division's equipment had departed Dong Tam, and most personnel had received movement orders to their new stations. The effect on families, many of which had already begun to move to Hawaii, was also significant. The mid-movement inactivation decision made it extremely difficult for the tactical leadership to give a credible rationale to the troops indicating that the
national leaders had a firm grasp of the situation. To the troops it appeared that much of their labor and tedious work to prepare their unit for a new mission had been accomplished to no avail.

Every effort should be made to avoid mid-movement changes. The total effect on troop morale cannot be assessed since the deployment was permitted to continue as scheduled. However, its ultimate effects can be expected to be detrimental.

On 18 August 1969 the division colors officially passed to Hawaii. The problems encountered pursuant to redeployment are discussed in detail in the main body of this report. The major problem that continued throughout redeployment was personnel administration. Personnel problems were reflected in most other areas, and in many cases personnel problems were the causative factors for other problems. Three immediate causes of personnel problems were as follows:

1. It took time to obtain approval of the 3d Brigade's new organization. It was the end of June before the organization was firm; this was only a week before the departure of the first unit for CONUS.

2. The criteria for personnel to accompany the 2d Brigade to CONUS for inactivation changed three times. The accounting for people became complex due to the number of reassignments and revocations of orders which were necessitated by changing criteria. To correct this situation a series of physical musters and a thorough strength reconciliation within all units were required.

3. The criteria for those going to Hawaii were not settled until early August. The primary cause was that fewer men volunteered to go to Hawaii than had been expected. The career officer and enlisted man preferred to finish his tour in Vietnam rather than risk a quick return to Vietnam due to not having received credit for a normal tour.

Notwithstanding the short time available for preliminary planning and the lack of initial guidance available in country, the division was able to accomplish its redeployment within the time allotted primarily due to two factors:

1. Separate Redeployment Planning Group. In order to continue normal combat operations and simultaneously prepare for redeployment, a separate Redeployment Planning Group is necessary. However, it is noted that this could lead to double-staffing and duplication of effort if not properly controlled.

2. Cooperation from Higher Headquarters. Throughout its redeployment the division received outstanding assistance and cooperation from the other headquarters in-country. In this regard, headquarters deserving special mention for their assistance are USARV and the Saigon Support Command.

Based on experience gained from the 9th Infantry Division's redeployment, it is apparent that future moves would be considerably simplified if personnel turbulence were attenuated by one of the following methods:

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(1) Unit Movement. Moving a unit with assigned personnel without regard to an individual's time in-country.

(2) Granting Completed Tours. Relaxing the criterion for a completed tour from ten months to, perhaps, six months.
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I - Public Information
J - Transportation
K - General Logistics
L - Management Techniques
M - Sample Documents
9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. (U) PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this report is:
   a. To outline the activities involved in the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division.
   b. To discuss problems encountered by the division during redeployment.
   c. To make recommendations which may assist in future redeployments.

II. (U) MISSION

2. On 12 June 1969, the 9th Infantry Division received notification of its selection as the first major US Army unit to redeploy from the Republic of Vietnam. The mission given to the division was to reorganize the 3d Brigade as a separate brigade to remain in the Republic of Vietnam, to disengage the remainder of the division from combat, to redeploy the 2d Brigade and elements of the division base to CONUS for inactivation, and to redeploy the remainder of the division at 85% of authorized personnel strength to Hawaii to form part of the PACOM reserve. These tasks were to be accomplished prior to 1 September 1969. On 9 August 1969, the division received notification that those elements previously designated to move to Hawaii would also be inactivated.

III. (U) FACTORS INFLUENCING THE REDEPLOYMENT

3. The division was alerted on 12 June to redeploy NLT 31 August 1969 (within 80 days), with the first battalion to redeploy on 8 July (within 26 days).
4. The division was engaged in continuous combat operations throughout its redeployment and until the last units departed Dong Tam.

5. The 7th ARVN Division’s tactical area (DTA) coincided with the tactical areas of interest (TAOI) of those 9th Infantry Division units which would redeploy.

6. A USARV Planning and Operations Group (UPOG) was constituted immediately after the redeployment was announced and was available to provide decisions and guidance for the division during the entire redeployment.

7. Dong Tam had the distinct advantage of being serviced by adequate land, water, and air lines of communication which provided direct routes to ports of embarkation.

8. All support requests from the division were fulfilled by the Saigon Support Command effectively and expeditiously.

9. There were significant shortages of many critical items of equipment throughout USARV which required the division to leave much critical equipment in-country to fill these needs.

10. There was no pre-positioned PSYOP material for use during redeployment. No effective PSYOP program was initiated above division level.

IV. (C) DISCUSSION

11. Organization (See Annex A). The redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division necessitated two reorganizations:

   a. Internal staff reorganization. A Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) was formed with division-wide representation to handle all redeployment activities. This permitted the division general and special staff to continue to focus on tactical plans and operations. The RPG was not a supra-staff but was conceived as a focal point for all redeployment matters. It prepared all redeployment plans; monitored all redeployment activities of the division;
identified redeployment problems or obtained decisions, then turned them over to the appropriate general or special staff or action agencies of the division for execution; and, kept the command group informed of the redeployment status through daily briefings.

b. Unit Reorganization.

(1) Reorganization was required for the brigade remaining in RVN, for that part of division returning to CONUS for inactivation, and for the division (-) redeploying to Hawaii.

(2) Initial planning guidance from USARV indicated that the brigade remaining in RVN would be patterned after a light infantry brigade with a space ceiling of 5854. Later guidance provided that the troop of air cavalry originally included would be transferred to DMAC and certain selected support elements would be provided from other USARV resources. Considerable staff effort was expended in tailoring the brigade organization to the austere Manning level of 5588 finally approved by USARV. Providing the division with detailed guidance or reorganization is required early in the planning period to facilitate redeployment action.

(3) That part of the division directed to return to CONUS for inactivation was composed of the 2d Brigade with three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and a brigade slice of the division base. The inactivation strength figures for this brigade slice were based on space requirements rather than unit TOE/MTOE structures. This required the division to select sub-elements and individual spaces for inactivation which would minimize the detrimental impact on the division's mission in Hawaii. Apparently in selecting these strength figures little consideration was given the impact of redeploying to CONUS these spaces for which there was no established command...
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structure. In future redeployments, the redeploying force structure should be based on authorized strengths of existing subordinate units. If space requirements do not coincide with standard unit TOE's, detailed guidance should be provided to the action headquarters.

(4) The division base redeploying to Hawaii also required reorganization. This was another case where strength figures did not relate to TOE organizations. If not resolved, this would have resulted in non-functional units within the division base in Hawaii. To rectify the situation, a division representative was sent to USARPAC to assist in drafting a viable organizational structure.

(5) The final organizational problem was encountered when USARPAC requested that division elements redeploying to Hawaii be reorganized from riverine to light infantry TOE's prior to departure from RVN. To accomplish a reorganization of this nature in a combat zone would have precluded the division's accomplishing the redeployment required to meet the President's deadline of 31 August. Therefore USARPAC revoked this request. Reorganization of major significance should be made after disengagement from combat and upon completion of redeployment.

12. Tactical Operations (See Annex B).

a. It was imperative that maximum pressure be maintained on the enemy to successfully extricate all elements of the division. To accomplish this it was necessary that each maneuver unit continue operations for as long as possible. Even after standing down in their fire support bases, battalions conducted local security operations until they were able to displace to Dong Tam. The 9th Infantry Division was able to turn over six of its fire support bases to the 7th ARVN Division and disengage from combat without incident because of vigorous

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offensive combat operations and close and continuous coordination with RVNAF.

b. There are several aspects of security which required continuous attention:

(1) It was necessary to provide security for troop movements from Dong Tam to the aerial port of embarkation. This security was provided by light fire teams from the 9th Aviation Battalion and Delta Military Assistance Command aviation resources.

(2) Throughout the period of redeployment operations, there were constant road convoys between the fire support bases and Dong Tam, and between Dong Tam and the Saigon-Long Binh complex. In the latter stages of the redeployment, as 9th Division ground tactical operations diminished, air cover was provided for all convoys to and from Dong Tam. The divisional engineer battalion provided daily mine sweeps of all roads. Following stand-down of the engineer battalion, this responsibility was assumed by the non-redeploying 3d Brigade’s organic engineer company.

(3) It was necessary to provide for the security of Dong Tam base throughout the redeployment. The Division Support Command and other support troops manned berms positions on the Dong Tam perimeter until these units were in their final phase of redeployment. Task Force Carlson (6th Battalion, 31st Infantry (Reinforced)) was formed to conduct operations in the area around Dong Tam (TAOR KUDZU). TF Carlson included one medium and one light artillery battery and air assets. As redeployment progressed, the number of tenant units at Dong Tam diminished until the base was unable to secure itself. This required TF Carlson to gradually decrease operations in TAOR KUDZU and commit a sizeable number of troops to berm security. Assistance was obtained from the 7th ARVN Division and from RF/PF forces in maintaining constant pressure.
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on the enemy in TAOR KUDZU. In addition, maximum use was made of tactical
air support and those US Naval forces of both TF 116 and TF 117 which were
in the vicinity. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was prepared to rein-
force Dong Tam, if required. The 6-31st Infantry reverted to the operational
control of the 3d Brigade on 31 August when the 7th ARVN Division assumed
responsibility for the security of Dong Tam.


a. Airlift Scheduling. The movement planning conference was held in
Hawaii on 19 June 1969, prior to the completion of detailed movement planning.
Because of limitations in staging areas at Dong Tam base and continuing security
requirements it was necessary that each divisional unit depart Dong Tam and
the APOE as an entity on a given day. Military Airlift Command planning was
initially predicated on the redeployment of units over a period of several
days. This conceptual difference was overcome. However difficulties which
were encountered may be avoided in the future by insuring that redeployment
conferences are held after detailed movement planning has been completed, and
should include representation of each major redeploying unit.

b. Advance Parties. Advance parties are necessary to coordinate both
redeployment and inactivation activities. The 9th Infantry Division dispatched
advance parties to both Hawaii and CONUS. The advance party to Hawaii concerned
itself with the details of coordinating the personnel and logistical support
for the incoming units. The advance party to CONUS insured the success of the
procedural and ceremonial aspects of the inactivation.

c. Combat Support. It is essential that continued combat support
be provided to a unit redeploying from a combat environment. The 9th Infantry
Division found it necessary to make detailed plans for the following:

(1) Tactical employment of organic and supporting artillery.

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(2) Coordination of all artillery support.

(3) Use of countermortar and ground surveillance radar.

(4) Tactical and administrative aviation support.

(5) Engineer and signal support.

Each of these is discussed in detail in Annex B.

d. Engineer Construction. Since the redeployment plans of the division included the concurrent restationing of battalion-sized units within RVN, there was an urgent requirement to build a battalion base camp at Can Giuoc and to enlarge the 3d Brigade headquarters complex at Tan An and Tan An Airfield. Engineer effort was released from projects elsewhere in the division TAOI and in the IV Corps Tactical Zone and was shifted to Long An Province to augment engineer troops constructing the facilities mentioned above. Two major problems were encountered in completing the required construction. Engineer construction materials were in short supply and required detailed justification and programming. Engineer troops in the vicinity were already committed and new priorities had to be established by USARV to obtain sufficient engineer troops to accomplish the tasks in a timely manner.


a. Upon receipt of redeployment orders the 9th Infantry Division found it necessary to cancel all civic action projects not actually in progress. A primary consideration in reaching this decision was the fact that there were neither the time nor the materials immediately available which would permit the division to complete the projects underway as well as initiate and complete additional projects. Proposed projects with a significant impact were coordinated with the civil affairs platoon supporting the recipient province with a view to encourage them to assume responsibility for these projects. Redeploying
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units which could not complete a project underway were able to provide adequate materiel and funds for completion of that project by local nationals.

b. Since local nationals within the division TA01 had become accustomed to MILCAP support, particularly MEDCAPs, it was important to coordinate with RVNAF elements and encourage them to assume those programs within their capability. It was also necessary to arrange for US supply support for RVNAF units to accomplish an adequate MILCAP effort.

c. The major item of significance in psychological operations was the lack of guidance concerning positive exploitation of the Presidential redeployment decision. The lack of high level guidance from principal PSYOP agencies delayed the start of the 9th Infantry Division's PSYOP effort and enabled the enemy to initiate his own PSYOP activities days before any friendly effort could be made. It is imperative that specific policy guidance be disseminated to the field immediately so that units which may be ordered to redeploy can develop appropriate themes for use in support of psychological operations during redeployment.

15. Personnel Administration (See Annex D).

a. Shortly after the 12 June notification, the 9th Infantry Division was given the following personnel redeployment criteria:

(1) Those personnel who had completed ten months of their tour would return to CONUS with an inactivating unit for release from active duty or reassignment.

(2) Those personnel who had completed between six and ten months of their tour could redeploy to Hawaii. Those with over ten months would have to initiate an intertheater transfer if they desired to go to Hawaii.

(3) Those personnel who had completed less than six months of their
tour would be reassigned to the 3d Brigade or another unit within RVN.

b. Each individual within the division was required to complete a preference statement indicating whether he wanted to remain in Vietnam or to redeploy to Hawaii (see Appendix I to Annex D). This survey, completed on 1 July 1969, showed that there were insufficient personnel who had six months or more in RVN and who desired assignment to Hawaii to fill redeploying units to the 85% strength figure required by USARPAC.

c. All USARV personnel who had completed ten months in-country were offered the opportunity to submit an intertheater transfer to Hawaii. The response fell far short of the requirement leaving the division still unable to muster the 85% strength. At this point USARV changed criteria to enable anyone who had been assigned to the 9th Infantry Division on 8 June 1969 and who had at least two months in RVN to volunteer for Hawaii. This provided a complete fill of enlisted personnel. However there was still a significant shortfall of officer and senior non-commissioned personnel. In order to eliminate the officer shortfall, Department of the Army approved the involuntary assignment of officers to units redeploying to Hawaii. The shortfall in the senior non-commissioned grades was resolved by allowing qualified lower grade enlisted personnel to occupy more senior positions.

d. The number of individual reassignment actions within the division was approximately 25,000 due to the changes in criteria. In order to accurately account for the location of each individual assigned to the division, it became necessary to hold daily musters and personnel strength reconciliations. Despite the fact that the first battalion completed its redeployment from RVN on 8 July 1969, the transfer of personnel to all units within the division was not completed until 12 August 1969.
16. **Personnel Processing (See Annex E).** All personnel processing for the division was centralized at Reliable Academy, the division's replacement and training center, and was completed prior to shipment of the troops to the aerial port of embarkation.

17. **Provost Marshal Activities (See Annex F).** In addition to normal internal security and law and order missions, the Provost Marshal was tasked to conduct all customs inspections at Dong Tam prior to the troops departing for the aerial port of embarkation.

18. **Finance (See Annex G).**

19. **Staff Judge Advocate (See Annex H).**

20. **Public Information (See Annex I).** Due to the politico-military implications of redeploying a major unit from RVN, there was an inordinately large number of correspondents visiting all phases of the division's disengagement and redeployment activities. Judicious handling was required to insure good press relations yet preclude delays in scheduled activities caused by such a large number of visitors.

21. **Transportation (See Annex J).** The most critical and all-encompassing facet of logistics in any redeployment is transportation. Fortunately the 9th Infantry Division was located with good access to highway, water, and air lines of communication. The optimum solution for meeting the transportation requirements of the redeployment was a combination of all three modes of transportation. Divisional and non-divisional truck convoys handled the bulk of the division's transportation requirements while water transportation (barge and LST) moved heavy or bulky items and air transportation lifted the fragile or high priority equipment and all personnel movements. In reviewing transportation operations, key considerations are discussed below.
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a. Equipment Status. Knowledge of the division's equipment assets is essential. Detailed knowledge of post, camp, and station property and TOE property is required so that lift data may be computed and rechecked. This is necessary so that accurate requests for land transportation (stake and platform trailers, Sea Land vans, and CONEX containers) can be made and for estimating supplementary water and air requirements.

b. Materials-handling Equipment (MHE). Forklifts are in relatively short supply and require detailed scheduling and close supervision to meet all commitments. Materials handling capability was considerably increased by augmenting the forklifts with organic cranes and wreckers and by centrally controlling all MHE assets at division level.

c. CONEX Control. Due to the magnitude of the requirement for handling CONEX containers, a central CONEX control agency was designated to supervise the positioning, packing, dusting, and inspecting of all CONEX containers.

d. Organic Transportation Augmentation. The division's organic vehicles were required to be shipped to the port or turned-in to depot. As a result, redeploying units lost the capability of providing their own administrative transportation. To fill this void, the 9th Infantry Division was supported by a light truck platoon from the Saigon Support Command. These trucks were dispatched daily on a priority basis to insure maximum utilization. It is recommended that transportation augmentation be provided to redeploying units when required.

22. General Logistics (See Annex K). Redeployment activities also impose complex requirements in the other areas of logistic support. The three most critical areas in the general logistics field are discussed below:

   a. Transfer of Logistic Responsibilities. As the Division Support
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Command stands down, non-divisional agencies must be prepared to assume the combat service support responsibilities for the division. This responsibility extends to many areas not commonly considered within the purview of normal activities. For the 9th Infantry Division these included not only the takeover of normal divisional responsibilities such as the operation of Class I, III, and V supply points, water treatment plants, and the provision of direct support maintenance but also repair/refuel/crash rescue services and installation coordinator functions.

b. Supply Accountability and Transfer. In many cases supply records did not accurately reflect the actual on-hand status of equipment. Inactivating a unit requires the property books to be zeroed. Therefore, it is essential that complete physical inventories be made immediately upon notification. In many commodities, particularly post, camp, and station property, excesses are inevitable. Unless exact information is obtained as to quantities of items on hand, transportation and storage of these items becomes an insurmountable problem. Additionally, there are many accountable personnel who are not familiar with the procedures involved in clearing a property book or accounting for all property. The division found it mandatory to conduct classes covering the procedures involved in closing out property books and to constitute traveling teams of supply experts to insure that proper procedures were followed.

c. Baggage. The definition, segregation, and appropriate handling of hold baggage, accompanied baggage, and to accompany troop (TAT) cargo requires particular attention. Procedures for handling these three types of items are not readily available, yet require a complete understanding by all concerned to insure that they are properly packed, inspected, and shipped so as to arrive at their proper destination as required.
23. Management Techniques (See Annex L). Due to the many facets and complex nature of disengaging from combat and redeploying a major unit, management techniques are required to maintain control and to monitor the progress of all important redeployment functions. Management tools were developed which assisted in determining potential problem areas which needed special attention or additional resources in order to maintain the required momentum. Annex L contains the charts and other methods used by the 9th Infantry Division for this purpose.

24. Sample Documents (See Annex M). Samples of all documents used in the processing of personnel and equipment for redeployment are contained in Annex M.

V. (U) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

25. Every effort should be made to provide initial decisions, guidance, and criteria at an early date and to avoid changes.

26. Any required reorganization should be accomplished subsequent to redeployment.

27. Redeploying units should be represented at all planning conferences which affect their redeployment or reorganization.

28. PSYOP guidance should be disseminated early.

29. A major unit should redeploy as constituted with minimum personnel turbulence.

30. Public Information coverage should be planned, controlled, and oriented toward the positive and favorable aspects of the redeployment.

31. Any critical items list should be as small as possible and remain firm.

32. Personnel and equipment management tools and controls should be implemented immediately and used continuously.

33. T-Day plans should include a check-list of unit responsibilities (e.g.,
customs inspections, personnel clearance, preparation and documentation of equipment).

ANNEXES:
A - Organization
B - Operations
C - Civic Action and PSYOP
D - Personnel Administration
E - Personnel Processing
F - Provost Marshal
G - Finance
H - Staff Judge Advocate
I - Public Information
J - Transportation
K - General Logistics
L - Management Techniques
M - Sample Documents
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Annex A (Organization) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. GENERAL

1. The decision to redeploy the 9th Infantry Division caused two reorganization problems as follows:

   a. **Internal Staff Reorganization.** An internal reorganization of the division staff was necessary so that tactical planning and operations could continue concurrently with redeployment planning and operations.

   b. **Unit Reorganization.** Reorganization was required for the brigade remaining in RVN, for the brigade redeploying to CONUS for inactivation, and for the division (-) redeploying to Hawaii.

II. **INTERNAL STAFF REORGANIZATION**

2. **Redeployment Planning Group.** Upon receiving notification of its redeployment, the division formed a Redeployment Planning Group (RPG) as shown at Appendix I. The RPG was not conceived as an action agency but was formed to isolate and identify problems or obtain decisions, then turn them over to the appropriate staff section or action agency of the division for execution. The RPG prepared all redeployment plans, closely monitored all redeployment activities of the division in coordination with the general and special staff, and kept the Commanding General informed of the redeployment status through daily briefings.

3. **USARV Planning and Operations Group.**

   a. The USARV Planning and Operations Group (see Appendix I) physically moved to Dong Tam and was invaluable during the planning phase as well as during the actual redeployment. The team chief was given authority to make certain on-the-spot decisions and had direct access to the USARV Chief of Staff for the
resolution of those problems beyond his charter. As a result of this close working relationship many potential problems were eliminated as soon as they were identified and there was little or no lost time waiting for decisions which could not be made locally.

b. The requirement for a USARV Planning and Operations Group to work with each major redeploying unit increases in importance as the time permitted that unit to redeploy is shortened.

III. UNIT REORGANIZATION

4. With the announcement of the 9th Infantry Division's impending redeployment, the division was required to split in three directions and reorganize as follows:

a. The 3d Brigade with three infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion would be reorganized as a separate light infantry brigade and remain in Long An Province.

b. The 2d Brigade with three infantry battalions and the brigade slice of the division base would return to CONUS for inactivation.

c. The 1st Brigade with three infantry battalions and the division (-) would redeploy to Hawaii as part of the PACOM reserve.

5. Reorganization of the Brigade Remaining in RVN.

a. The space ceiling for the 3d Brigade which was to remain in Vietnam fluctuated and was not approved until late June. This delayed critical planning for certain redeploying units which was contingent upon receiving the approved brigade organization.

b. The initial planning guidance from USARV indicated a space ceiling of 5854 but allowed flexibility to accommodate organizational requirements due to peculiarities of operations in the delta. Before reaching the approved
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space ceiling of 5588, changing guidance required five separate proposals to be prepared and submitted by the division with a resultant time loss associated with each proposal.

c. To preclude inordinate delays in the future, planning guidance should specifically state a space ceiling for any subordinate element being reorganized by a redeploying unit.

6. Reorganization of Units Redeploying to CONUS.

a. In addition to the 2d Brigade Headquarters, three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion and a brigade slice of the division base were directed to return to CONUS for inactivation. The strength figures for the brigade slice were based on space requirements rather than the TOE/MTOE organizational structure of the units. This required the division to select for inactivation those companies, platoons, sections, and individuals which would minimize the detrimental impact on the new mission of the division (-) in Hawaii.

b. It was apparent that the planners who selected the space levels for the division base returning to CONUS for inactivation did not fully consider the impact of redeploying and inactivating spaces for which there was no established chain of command. In those cases where spaces were not comparable to an organizational structure, provisional units had to be organized with adequate command and control prior to redeployment.

c. It is recommended that in the future, the force structure for redeployment be based on authorized strengths of subordinate organizations rather than arbitrary numbers. In addition, detailed guidance should be provided to the headquarters responsible for the redeployment when space requirements do not coincide with standard TOE/MTOE organizational structures.

A-3
7. Reorganization of Units Redeploying to Hawaii.

a. As a result of the two aforementioned reorganizations, certain spaces were eliminated from the division base redeploying to Hawaii. This was another case where figures did not relate to TOE/MTOE organizations and would have resulted in non-functional units in the division base after redeployment to Hawaii. To correct this deficiency, a division representative was sent to USARPAC to determine operational requirements and to assist in drafting a viable organizational structure. Delays were incurred due to a lack of secure voice communications between Hawaii and the 9th Infantry Division. These communications were required to obtain the division commander's views and concurrence. USARV was used as an intermediary to accomplish this.

b. Another reorganizational problem was encountered when USARPAC requested that the division elements redeploying to Hawaii be reorganized from riverine to a light infantry TOE prior to leaving Vietnam. This would have required an unacceptable delay in redeploying the division. In view of the time limit of 31 August established by the Presidential announcement, this requirement was revoked.

8. Recommendation. Once alerted for movement the major unit headquarters responsible for any reorganization should be represented at all conferences and consulted as early as practicable on plans which affect its reorganization.

APPENDIX:

1 - Redeployment Planning Group
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REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING GROUP (RPG)

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I. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

1. When notified of its redeployment, the 9th Infantry Division was engaged in operations against the enemy in Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, and Long An Provinces (see Appendix 1). Units were dispersed over an area of approximately 5000 square kilometers and were based in widely scattered fire support bases. The division concentrated on conducting numerous small unit operations in order to achieve a large area coverage and to prevent the enemy from gaining the initiative. An average day's operations for the division included approximately ninety platoon-sized day operations and forty-five platoon-sized night operations. Several factors requiring careful planning during the disengagement and redeployment are discussed below.


(1) The division was faced with the problem of maintaining maximum pressure on the enemy within its tactical area of interest (TAOI) at the same time it was required to prepare for redeployment. It was imperative that each maneuver unit continue operations as long as possible for the following reasons:

(a) The enemy continued to pose a threat throughout the Division's redeployment.

(b) The division progressively became more vulnerable as units disengaged and redeployed.

(2) The normal area of operations of the 9th Infantry Division units which redeployed coincided with the 7th ARVN Division Tactical Area (DTA). Special emphasis was placed on combined operations with the 7th ARVN Division.
This provided them increased use of the 9th Infantry Division's airmobile assets. In this manner, a gradual phaseout of US troops was accomplished as the 7th ARVN Division units intensified operations throughout their DTA. Each redeploying unit continued normal tactical operations until it stood down.

(3) Each redeploying unit continued normal tactical operations until it stood down. After standing down, each US unit conducted local security operations in the vicinity of its fire support base until it was able to displace to Dong Tam.

b. Turnover of Fire Support Bases to RVNAF.

(1) Prior to vacating a fire support base, coordination was necessary to provide for a smooth turnover to RVNAF.

(2) The 9th Infantry Division turned over six fire support bases to RVNAF. These ranged in size from the smallest which contained a battalion headquarters, one artillery battery, and one infantry company to the largest which accommodated a brigade headquarters, an infantry battalion, three artillery batteries, and supporting units. Close coordination was made with the 7th ARVN Division and the territorial forces (RF/PF) to determine who would occupy the base and when they would assume responsibility for it.

(3) Each fire support base was turned over with permanent installations intact. A small ceremony was conducted to recognize the official transfer of responsibility to RVNAF.


(1) Throughout the redeployment, it was necessary to provide security for the numerous road convoys moving to and from Dong Tam and for the air movement of troops to the aerial port of embarkation.

(2) Road convoys included: troops and equipment to Dong Tam as
each fire support base was turned over to RVNAF; redeploying equipment enroute to Newport, the surface port of embarkation; and, retrograde equipment enroute to depots for disposition. Troops were airlifted by CH-47 helicopters from Dong Tam to Bien Hoa, the aerial port of embarkation. Each helicopter mission consisted of the 94 unarmed troops which composed a C-141 load. CH-47 missions continued until all personnel to be redeployed that day had moved to Bien Hoa.

(3) The divisional engineer battalion provided daily mine sweeps of roads. Following stand-down of the engineer battalion, this responsibility was assumed by the non-redeploying 3d Brigade's organic engineer company. ARVN forces intensified operations along major roads and accepted the responsibility for ground security. Air cover was provided by the divisional aviation battalion until it stood down, at which time required air assets were provided by the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC).

(4) Prior arrangements for augmentation of both ground forces and air assets from non-organic sources were made to permit organic elements of the division to prepare for redeployment.

d. Base Camp Security.

(1) It was necessary to provide for the security of Dong Tam throughout redeployment. The Division Support Command and other support troops manned berm positions on the Dong Tam perimeter until these units were in the final phases of redeployment. Task Force Carlson (6th Battalion, 31st Infantry (Reinforced)) was formed to conduct operations in the area around Dong Tam (TAOR KUDZU). This task force included one infantry battalion, one assault helicopter company, an air cavalry troop, one medium artillery battery, one light artillery battery, and two ranger teams.

(2) As redeployment progressed, the number of tenant units at Dong Tam diminished until the base was unable to secure itself.
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TF Carlson to gradually decrease operations in TAOR KUDZU and commit a sizeable number of troops to berms security. Assistance was obtained from FF/FP forces in the vicinity and the 7th ARVN Division who maintained pressure on the enemy in the area around Dong Tam. In addition, maximum use was made of tactical air support and those US Naval forces of both TF 116 and TF 117 which were in the vicinity. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was prepared to reinforce Dong Tam, if required. The 6-Jlst Infantry reverted to the operational control of the 3d Brigade on 31 August when the 7th ARVN Division assumed responsibility for the security of Dong Tam.

e. Phaseout of Division Tactical Operations Center. With the stand-down of the maneuver battalions and the accompanying phase down of tactical operations, activities in the Division's tactical operations center (DTOC) were reduced proportionately. As units stood down, the work load on DTOC personnel decreased. Key personnel were retained for required tasks to include those involved in the daily briefings for the Commanding General and the staff. Personnel who were to be reassigned in RVN were released individually as they were no longer required. DTOC operations ceased on 15 August. However, essential communications were retained until the division headquarters departed so that the command group could keep abreast of the tactical situation.

II. (C) REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS

2. Sequential Planning.

a. As in any operation, planning for redeployment should proceed in a logical sequence. In the case of the 9th Division's redeployment, however, many decisions and actions were necessary prior to having complete and critical information. For example, a movement schedule was required prior to receiving information as to which units would redeploy and to which destination the units
would move.

b. Every attempt should be made to provide complete information in a timely manner to a unit ordered to redeploy.

3. Processing Schedule.

   a. Close scheduling is required to accomplish redeployment within the limited amount of time available. Initially, PERT-type diagrams were prepared for each redeploying unit (see Appendix 2 for an example of the diagrams used). Time estimates which were applied to each function for each divisional unit are shown at Appendix 3. From the information obtained from the PERT diagrams, a flow chart (Gantt Chart) was prepared for the division's redeployment. Proceeding in this manner, critical functions and facilities were identified. This permitted further analyses and detailed scheduling. See Appendix 4 for the personnel processing schedule developed in this manner.

b. It is recommended that extensive analytical scheduling take place immediately after a unit is selected to redeploy.


   a. It was anticipated that the division would undergo an extensive learning process during its redeployment. Therefore, in addition to considering the planning factors discussed in paragraph 3 above, unit movement dates were scheduled so that the initial redeployment dates had a several day buffer between them (see Appendix 5). After the fourth unit was redeployed, a long period was scheduled during which no unit redeployed. These buffers provided time to re-analyze procedures, reevaluate requirements, and resolve problems which had arisen. They also provided the time needed to refine procedures which enabled the division to complete its redeployment within the time allotted.

b. Transportation scheduling was required to be accomplished prior to
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completing most of the remaining redeployment planning. The inclusion of buffer periods into redeployment schedules permitted judgments to be made based on lessons learned.

5. Airlift Scheduling.

a. The 9th Infantry Division was not represented at the airlift planning conference held in Hawaii on 19 June 1969, at which time the movement schedule was initially planned. A misunderstanding arose between the Army and the Air Force representatives concerning redeployment of units. Because of the staging limitation at Dong Tam base and continuing security requirements it was necessary that each divisional unit depart from Dong Tam and the aerial port of embarkation (APOE) as a unit on a given day. Military Airlift Command planning was initially based on redeploying individual units over a period of several days. This misunderstanding was subsequently corrected; however, the presence of a 9th Infantry Division representative at the deployment planning conferences may have prevented the misunderstanding.

b. It is essential that major redeploying units be represented at planning conferences where decisions will be made which impact on their redeployment. The representative should be familiar with the resources and facilities available to his unit as well as its tactical situation.

6. Advance Parties.

a. Advance parties are necessary for continuity of operations. The 9th Infantry Division planned two advance parties to Hawaii; one to depart on 15 July, and the second on 1 August 1969. Due to the changing criteria for personnel to be redeployed, it was not known who would be going to Hawaii until after the first advance party had departed. Additionally some staff sections were without officers who would be going to Hawaii and some officer replacements
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were not received until after the second advance party had departed on 1 August. For these reasons, it was necessary to constitute a third advance party which moved to Hawaii on 12 August 1969.

b. Firm personnel redeployment criteria should be promulgated at an early date. In addition, officer filler personnel should be identified and assigned to a redeploying unit early.

7. Space Limitations.

a. Space at Dong Tam was critically limited. The 9th Infantry Division's tactical area of interest was located in the upper Mekong River Delta. High ground was at a premium and the only suitable staging area was Dong Tam base itself. Dong Tam's population density, already high, was increased by the influx of non-divisional personnel necessary to support the division's redeployment. Space for these units as well as equipment processing was obtained by relocating tenant units. Therefore, the bulk of maneuver units could not be accommodated at Dong Tam as they vacated their fire support bases.

b. Direct coordination was made with TF 117 to obtain the use of barracks ships to billet the maneuver units as they stood down and prepared for redeployment. Since TF 117's capacity was only two battalions, it was necessary to carefully schedule unit stand-down and redeployment dates.

c. Units should conduct space analyses to determine locations for their units and the facilities necessary for redeployment. These studies should be accomplished now and kept current as part of the unit's T-Day planning.

III. (C) ARTILLERY SUPPORT

8. The fire support plan for the 9th Infantry Division's redeployment had to provide for three separate activities: the direct and reinforcing field artillery required by the brigades until withdrawal into Dong Tam; the field artillery support provided the infantry battalion operating in the area surrounding B-7.
Don Tam (TAOR KUDZU); and, the control headquarters and fire units required to plan and execute the artillery's portion of defense against rocket and mortar attack (DARMA) operations for Dong Tam base as division artillery units stood down and redeployed. Each of the aforementioned items is discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

9. Artillery Situation Prior to Redeployment. The 1st Brigade was required to conduct operations in TAOR KUDZU with one infantry battalion even prior to redeployment. Close artillery support for this battalion was provided by one battery from the artillery battalion in direct support of the 1st Brigade. The fires of this battery, located on Dong Tam base, were controlled by the Dong Tam Artillery, the 9th Infantry Division Artillery general support (GS) battalion. The GS battalion also operated the Dong Tam Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) and executed the field artillery's portion of DARMA operations. Dong Tam base DARMA operations were normally supported by fires from several field artillery and heavy mortar units positioned at Dong Tam or in the vicinity.

10. Direct and Reinforcing Field Artillery Support. This aspect of artillery support during redeployment presented few problems since the normal artillery tactical missions applied during this phase of the operation. DS and GSR field artillery units remained in their normal areas of operation providing continuous support. As infantry elements were withdrawn, field artillery units were displaced back to Dong Tam. When the field artillery units arrived in Dong Tam, they occupied firing positions and were placed under the control of the Dong Tam Artillery fire support coordination center (FSCC).

11. Field Artillery Support for the KUDZU Infantry Battalion.

a. One 105mm howitzer battery of the 1st Brigade's DS field artillery battalion was always positioned in Dong Tam to provide close support for the KUDZU infantry battalion. As field artillery batteries displaced to Dong Tam,
they began firing in support of the base. The available field artillery support reached a high point on 26 July when three 105mm howitzer batteries, three 155mm howitzer batteries, and one 8-inch howitzer battery were located in firing positions on Dong Tam. This situation lasted until 6 August, when one 105mm howitzer battery went out of action to prepare for redeployment. The remaining Division Artillery units were taken out of action during the period 6-9 August 1969. The 105mm howitzer battery supporting the KUDZU battalion was organic to the field artillery battalion of the 3d Brigade and, therefore, was not scheduled for redeployment. It remained in support of the KUDZU battalion throughout the redeployment.

b. It was recognized that medium artillery would be required to engage bunkers and provide long-range support after division artillery stood down. Division requested and received a 155mm howitzer battery from II FFORCEV. This battery (-) of four 155mm howitzers became operational on Dong Tam base one day before the last division artillery medium battery went out of action.


a. At some point in time the GS battalion responsible for Dong Tam Artillery DARMA had to stand-down to prepare for redeployment. The problem was to provide an element to control the fire units, operate the AWCC, and plan the DARMA operations. This was considered too complex a mission to be assumed by a battery. Therefore, a separate element was necessary. Two solutions were considered:

(1) Form a provisional field artillery element with personnel and equipment authorized on a temporary basis.

(2) Task an adjacent field artillery battalion and augment that unit with additional personnel and equipment.
The latter solution was selected since it presented the added advantages of having the resources of a field artillery battalion available to satisfy unforeseen needs of the control element and a senior field artillery officer to supervise the fire support activities after the departure of division artillery.

b. The 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, which is organic to the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, was tasked with the mission of operating the Dong Tam FSCC when the GS battalion terminated operations to prepare for redeployment. Necessary personnel and equipment were identified and transferred to the 2-4th Artillery from the Dong Tam Artillery prior to the date designated for mission assumption.

13. Countermortar Radar (AN/MPQ-4A) Support. During the redeployment, the division base camp population increased significantly and became a lucrative target for indirect attacks by fire. This, coupled with a reduction in tactical operations outside TAOR KUDZU, increased the possibility of mortar and rocket attacks. Even before the redeployment announcement, Dong Tam base was recognized as the most vulnerable military target in the division's TAQI. Therefore, three AN/MPQ-4A's were in position around Dong Tam. Countermortar radar coverage for Dong Tam base was continuous throughout the redeployment under the operational control of the Dong Tam Artillery.


a. The 9th Infantry Division had used ground surveillance radars (AN/PPS-5, AN/TPS-33 and AN/TPS-25) offensively for intelligence and target acquisition, with each radar tied into an artillery FDC. Prior to the announcement of the division's redeployment, one AN/TPS-33 and one AN/PPS-5 were positioned in TAOR KUDZU. As the 1st and 2d Brigades withdrew and the intensity of operations decreased, it was recognized that additional radars were required to provide adequate coverage of the area around Dong Tam.
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b. Experience had shown that an artillery battalion fire direction center (FDC) was capable of handling a maximum of five radars. By positioning two large (AN/TPS-25 and AN/TPS-33) radars at Dong Tam and three small AN/PPS-5 radars in locations throughout TAOR KUDZU, all sectors could be covered continuously and dead spaces eliminated. These radars with crews were made available to TF Carlson as the 1st and 2d Brigades and Division Artillery closed into Dong Tam.

IV. (C) AVIATION SUPPORT

15. Tactical Aviation Support.
   
a. At the time redeployment operations began, the division was supported by the 191st and 162d Assault Helicopter Companies (AHC) in addition to its organic 9th Aviation Battalion. These two companies, assigned to the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion (CAB) at Dong Tam, were in direct support of the 1st and 2d Brigades respectively.

   b. Upon stand-down of the 2d Brigade, the support received from the 162d AHC terminated. Upon stand-down of the 1st Brigade, the 191st AHC was placed in direct support of TF Carlson. D Troop, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry (D/3-5th), the division's organic air cavalry troop (ACT), was not scheduled to redeploy. It was also placed in direct support of TF Carlson. With both an AHC and an ACT on a daily basis TF Carlson had the mobility and combat power to maintain a sufficient intensity of operations in the area surrounding Dong Tam to keep enemy initiated incidents to a minimum.

   
a. With the stand-down of the 9th Aviation Battalion on 23 July 1969, arrangements were made to continue the administrative missions formerly accomplished by the divisional battalion. Nine-UH-1H aircraft were laterally transferred to the 214th CAB from the 9th Aviation Battalion. In addition, two OH-6A
aircraft were laterally transferred to D/3-5 Cavalry. Using these newly
acquired aircraft, the 214th CAB and D/3-5th Cavalry assumed the administrative
aviation support missions for divisional elements until redeployment.

b. It is recommended:

(1) That redeploying units review all aviation support missions with
a view toward consolidating or cancelling as many missions as possible.

(2) That procedures for requesting and approving missions be reviewed.

V. (U) SIGNAL SUPPORT

17. The disengagement of combat elements prior to the cessation of hostil-
ities necessitated the continuation of adequate and responsive command and control
communications throughout all phases of redeployment. Sufficient communica-
tions were required so that units had the capability of immediately resuming an
effective defensive or offensive posture as the tactical situation dictated.


a. Non-organic signal support, both personnel and equipment, was
necessary to permit the release of redeploying unit assets for processing and
shipment.

b. Special communications circuits were requested through USARV C-E
to provide a sole user capability for the division's Redeployment Planning Group
directly to the USARV Army Operations Center and to the air and sea ports of
embarkation. In addition, a point-to-point teletype circuit was installed from
division headquarters to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. These circuits were inval-
uable in providing instant coordination that would have taken excessive periods
of time using common user channels.

c. Communications systems were operated and maintained by divisional
personnel until stand-down, rather than requiring non-organic personnel support.
A definite advantage was gained from having a 1st Signal Brigade installation,
B/52d-39th Signal, already at Dong Tam. This permitted continuous operation of the base telephone system throughout the redeployment. In addition, existing Corps Area VHF systems were available for priority tactical circuits which permitted the timely stand-down of divisional equipment.

d. USARV C-E provided a liaison officer who remained with the division throughout redeployment. He coordinated all C-E activities and assisted in the disposition of non-deploying signal equipment.

19. VHF Communications. Existing VHF communications should be maintained as long as possible. The increase in administrative traffic during redeployment cannot effectively be handled by FM radio alone. Phase out of communications systems should be programmed to permit operation by organic personnel as long as possible and to limit requirements for outside support.

20. Other Signal Support. Early consideration should be given to photographic coverage and public address equipment support. Ceremonial and historical activities are extensive throughout redeployment, and these activities may hinder redeployment processing of organic signal elements unless outside support is available.

VI. (C) ENGINEER OPERATIONS

21. Engineer activities affecting redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division were initially directed toward completing projects in progress. In addition, the 3d Brigade's facilities had to be enlarged due to their reorganization as a separate brigade, and a battalion-sized base camp had to be constructed for the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, which was added to the 3d Brigade as part of the reorganization.

22. Phaseout of Engineer Projects. As military operations in three provinces in the Division's TAOI were phased out, division engineer support in
these areas was also phased out. Projects in progress related to pacification or civic action were continued until completion, and coordination was made with each province so that they would assume responsibility for those projects which were programmed but not started (also see Annex C).

23. Initiation of Base Camp Construction.
   a. Concurrently with the phase out of combat support, work was started on the battalion-sized base camp at Can Giuoc (XS 8373) and enlargement of the facilities at Tan An and Tan An Airfield (XS 5565) was initiated to accommodate the increased troop levels at these locations resulting from the reorganization of the 3d Brigade. As engineer effort was released from projects in IV Corps Tactical Zone, it was immediately shifted to Long An Province to augment the forces constructing the 3d Brigade facilities. The principle constraints on this construction were a shortage of construction material and the limited time allowed for construction due to the programmed stand-down and redeployment of the division's organic 15th Engineer Battalion and the 86th Engineer Battalion (C) from the 34th Engineer Group.
   b. To obtain construction materials, bunkers were removed from two fire support bases that had been closed out. In addition, materials held as a contingency reserve for bridge construction in case of road interdiction were used. All unused lumber at Dong Tam and the fire support bases was collected and moved to the 3d Brigade area.
   c. To replace the redeploying engineer units, elements of the 93d Engineer Battalion (Const) were given the mission of assisting in the construction at Can Giuoc.

VII. (C) INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

   a. The agreements signed between agent handlers and indigenous personnel

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(sources) did not consider termination at the time the contracts were established. Therefore, it was necessary to negotiate final pay at the time the contract was terminated.

b. It is recommended that agreements be made which will permit either party to terminate at his discretion. Termination pay should be clearly defined and the required amount of money should be set aside to permit a rapid cancellation of the contract. Additionally, since little notice will probably be given, attempts should be made to find new employment for agents whose employment is terminated as a direct result of a unit's redeployment.

25. Intelligence Channels.

a. As battalions and brigade headquarters stand-down and prepare for redeployment, the usual liaison between these units and sector and subsector intelligence agencies ceases. Therefore, the intelligence collection capability rapidly decreases at a time when the unit's vulnerability increases.

b. The division G2 Section increased its liaison with intelligence agencies within the division TAOI in order to continue receiving intelligence throughout the redeployment period.

c. It is recommended that in the future a division which redeploy from a hostile environment be prepared to assume responsibility at division level for liaison with sectors and subsectors upon stand-down of maneuver elements.

APPENDIXES:
1 - 9th Infantry Division TAOI
2 - Redeployment PERT Diagram
3 - Planning Factors
4 - Personnel Processing Schedule
5 - Redeployment Schedule

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UNIT REDEPLOYMENT

1. UNIT MOVES TO STANDDOWN AREA
2. CLEAN, INSPECT, CLASSIFY EQUIPMENT
3. TURN-IN OR PREPARE, PROCESS, PACKAGE AND LOAD EQUIPMENT
4. MOVE EQUIPMENT TO STAGING AREA
5. PERSONNEL REASSIGNMENTS
6. HOLD BAGGAGE PROCESSING
7. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
8. PERSONAL PREPARATIONS
9. FINAL OUT-PROCESSING
10. MOVE TO APOE

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Tab A (Time Estimates) to Appendix 3 (Planning Factors) to Annex B (Operations) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

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<td>9</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Administration Co*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP Co*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Medium Boat Co (Inactivating)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
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*Unit was not required to relocate to stand-down area since it was already located at Dong Tam.
Appendix 4 (Personnel Processing Schedule) to Annex B (Operations) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)
Appendix 5 (Redeployment Schedule) to Annex B (Operations) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

1. UNIT WILL DEPART THE APOE IN TWO ELEMENTS
I. CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS

1. A large number of civic action construction projects were in progress at the time the division was notified of its redeployment. Other projects were in various planning stages. Those projects which had been started could not be abandoned without having an adverse psychological effect on the people targeted for 1969 Pacification and Development support. New projects could not be started due to insufficient time and materials available.

2. Upon receipt of redeployment orders, all projects not already under construction were cancelled with the exception of those which were unusually valuable or those which could be completed prior to the sponsoring unit's departure. Coordination was initiated with the civil affairs platoon of the province concerned with a view to having them assume responsibility for those projects which could not be completed by the division. Where feasible, sufficient materials and funds were provided to complete the projects. In exceptional cases requests for special grants from available funds were initiated to permit timely purchase of materials from the local economy.

II. MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS (MEDCAPS)

3. The people within the division's TAOI had become accustomed to visits from MEDCAP and other MILCAP teams. The MEDCAP schedule ceased when units stood down and prepared for redeployment. The 7th ARVN Division indicated a willingness to assume responsibility for the program within its DTA upon redeployment of 9th Infantry Division elements. However, the 7th ARVN Division did not have the capability to assume the complete MEDCAP schedule of the 9th Infantry Division. With more advanced notice, some system may have been established to provide the supplies and personnel to increase the 7th ARVN
Division's MEDCAP capability.

4. It is recommended that redeploying units provide all MEDCAP schedules and techniques of operation to those units who are to carry on in their place. Despite their limited capability to conduct such operations, ARVN units should be strongly encouraged to conduct MILCAPs within their tactical areas. Where feasible, a system should be established to provide ARVN units with sufficient supplies and personnel to increase their MEDCAP capabilities.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

5. Throughout the redeployment, the 9th Infantry Division received guidance concerning PSYOP exploitation of the redeployment. This guidance, obtained from principal US PSYOP agencies such as JUSPAO and MACJ-3-11, delayed the start of a redeployment PSYOP campaign by the 9th Infantry Division. By the time the first PSYOP material covering redeployment was disseminated to the division TAOI, the enemy had already initiated their own PSYOP activities. The Vietnamese agencies, Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and the Political Warfare Department (GPWD), did not issue any guidance to their subordinate agencies. This made a US/GVN coordinated effort impossible. Even a month after redeployment was announced, no guidance had been published by JUSPAO, VIS, or GPWD. MACJ-3-11 did disseminate exploitation guidance at the Midway Conference but no specific guidance for redeploying units was ever promulgated.

6. It is imperative that PSYOP guidance be disseminated to the field immediately after a unit is selected for redeployment. General policies should be developed with specific themes indicated for exploitation. Developing a media product in the field to retain the PSYOP initiative during redeployment should be the goal of all PSYOP agencies, both US and GVN.
I. PERSONNEL TURBULENCE

1. Personnel turbulence within the division was primarily attributed to redeployment criteria which were changed several times during the division's redeployment.

2. Lack of Firm Redeployment Criteria. Lack of firm redeployment criteria delayed initial reassignment of personnel and caused excessive revocations of orders with subsequent erroneous strength accounting at unit level.
   a. The basic criteria for personnel going to Hawaii were changed three times in order to reach required unit strengths for redeployment. As a result of these changes, firm rosters were not available until several days before the final unit processing. The result was crisis management which required handling each unit as a series of individual movements. Movement by unit would have relieved most of the problems encountered.
   b. It is strongly recommended that redeployment criteria be firmly established before any individual reassignments are made.

3. Personnel Movements While Division Tactically Engaged.
   a. Personnel shifts had to be accomplished while the division was tactically and logistically committed.
   b. All divisional units contained all categories of redeploying personnel (i.e., personnel redeploying to CONUS, to Hawaii, and those remaining in RVN), most of whom had to be reassigned prior to their current unit's redeployment. Certain individuals who were considered critical to the operation of their old unit had to be retained either until their new unit began final processing or their old unit redeployed. In the latter case, many of these men who had over
10 months in-country were rotated individually to CONUS through the 90th Replacement Battalion.

c. Where tactically feasible, redeploying units should be relieved of operational requirements as soon as criteria and redeployment plans are confirmed. Personnel assignments should be completed as soon as possible to stabilize units in their redeploying configuration. Only after assignments were stabilized could transportation and other support requirements be accomplished.


a. Lack of a valid Administrative Machine Branch personnel data file required the division's personnel section to manually screen officer and enlisted records in order to make assignments based on accurate grade, MOS, and DEROS criteria.

b. The division's personnel data file was destroyed by fire on 26 February 1969. Even though a team of personnel was sent to USARV to reconstruct a new data file, it was not purified and ready for machine manipulation at the time redeployment was announced. Consequently, the officer and enlisted assignments for Hawaii and for 3d Brigade units had to be manually screened and matched against new TOE/MTOE positions. Had the division's personnel data file been fully reconstituted, personnel rosters based on MOS, grade, and other criteria could have been used to expedite assignments. Statistical data also had to be compiled manually which was time consuming and unresponsive to the commander. Eventually, each unit roster was completed manually and sent to machine branch for key punching and verification. Only after the unit was recorded on IBM cards could a computerized program be written and statistical data extracted.

c. An accurate personnel data file is mandatory. A separate statistical section is also required if data are to be provided to the commander and higher headquarters in a timely manner.
5. Intertheater Transfer Shortfall.

a. When the 9th Infantry Division was ordered to redeploy to Hawaii, USARV invited all personnel in RVN with 10 months and over to apply for intertheater transfers (ITT). The number of intertheater transfers fell short of expectations. In addition, 12 of the 62 officer requests for ITT were denied branch clearance by Department of the Army. There were only 132 enlisted requests for ITT. Of these, forty were cancelled by USARV and nine others never materialized. This reduced the total number of enlisted ITT to 83.

b. In order to be effective, the intertheater transfer program should have the complete cooperation and support of Department of the Army. In future division-sized redeployments, emphasis should be placed on all personnel deploying with their units and less reliance on outside assistance for filler personnel.

6. Command and Control of Redeploying Personnel. Due to the redeployment criteria established, a large number of personnel transfers were required. As a result, commanders and NCOs of some units were not familiar with their troops. This created command and control problems. Daily musters (see Appendix 1) and rigid strength accounting procedures were initiated to improve control of personnel.

7. Individual preference statements (see Appendix 2) were initiated by each member of the division in compliance with orders that personnel would not be reassigned from RVN involuntarily. When redeployment is directed on short notice, the desires of the individual should not be given primary importance since this contributes to personnel turbulence. This problem was exacerbated by the number of changes made in personnel criteria. If individual preferences are to be considered, they should be solicited only after firm criteria have been established.

II. RECORDS MANAGEMENT

8. To insure that records are shipped or disposed of in accordance with D-3
applicable regulations, early records management guidance is necessary.

9. It is recommended that records management briefings be given to all adjutants and company commanders early in the redeployment cycle.

III. PERSONNEL SERVICES

10. Surgeon Activities. It was necessary to develop an effective program to prevent the possible introduction of various biological entities into the United States during the retrograde of cargo from RVN. A suitable program was devised through assistance from the US Department of Agriculture, the US Public Health Service, the USARV Surgeon’s Office and the USARV Preventive Medicine Detachment. The 61st Preventive Medicine Detachment located at Dong Tam was given the responsibility for carrying out the agricultural inspections of all CONEX containers and other equipment being redeployed from RVN. Department of Agriculture certification was not conducted in RVN but was accomplished at final destination. A trained crew from the installation engineer treated CONEX containers with a fungicide and a rodenticide (see Annexes K and M).

11. Red Cross Services. Redeployment activities of the division brought no noticeable change in Red Cross operations. The number of inquiries by relatives concerning the status of their service member increased slightly during the initial redeployment phase. This, however, decreased as the units redeployed.

The Red Cross office moved two of its six staff members to the 3d Brigade headquarters at Tan An to establish a field office which would provide coverage for that brigade. The office at Dong Tam was maintained until the last divisional unit redeployed.

12. Chaplain Services. Religious coverage for the division during the redeployment presented a minor problem because the division did not receive replacements for five chaplains who had completed their tours of duty and departed.
Religious coverage for the division was maintained with the assistance of the Navy chaplains of Task Force 117 and, in the latter stages, with help from three Chaplains who were assigned to the division as intertheater transfers to Hawaii.

13. **Inspector General.** The Inspector General Office received an increased number of congressional inquiries shortly after the redeployment of the first battalion to CONUS. These inquiries were initiated by families who had service members assigned to that unit prior to its redeployment. These personnel had been transferred to other units because their length of service in Vietnam did not qualify them for rotation to CONUS at that time. The inquiries and individual complaints gradually diminished as units redeployed.

IV. **FUNDS**

14. **Terminal Audit.**

   a. Inactivation of a unit necessitates the close out the unit fund. A terminal audit is required to verify the cash balance. Results of the audit are forwarded to USARV prior to the transfer of assets and closing out of the fund. In some cases the personnel responsible for the audit were transferred prior to the completion of the audit and new personnel had to be assigned this task.

   b. It is recommended that personnel charged with the responsibility for conducting the audit be identified early enough in the redeployment phase to complete the audit prior to redeployment of the unit or individual concerned. Command emphasis at all levels is necessary to insure that the unit fund is ready for the terminal audit.
V. VIETNAMESE AUGMENTATION WITH THE DIVISION

15. Kit Carson Scouts.

a. The Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) assigned to the 1st and 2d Brigade had to be transferred to other US divisions or discharged and returned to Chieu Hoï Centers.

(1) Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (II FFORCEV) established priorities for transferring Kit Carson Scouts to other divisions within II FFORCEV. On 24 July 1969, all Kit Carson Scouts from the 1st and 2d Brigades met with representatives from the 1st Cavalry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, and the 1st Infantry Division at Dong Tam. Representatives from these divisions gave a short briefing on their unit and the scouts were given the choice of either being transferred or being discharged. Those desiring to transfer were out-processed and sent with their new unit representative. Those requesting discharge were outprocessed, paid, and given a bi-lingual discharge certificate.

(2) Claims for death and injury of KCS were accomplished in advance of battalion stand-down dates. Scouts with permanent injuries were admitted to the National Rehabilitation Institute in Saigon.

b. In phasing out the division's Kit Carson Scout Program, scouts who had served faithfully with the division were insured continued employment with another US division or were discharged with full pay and other entitlements.

16. Interpreters. The ARVN interpreters assigned to the division, except for those with the 3d Brigade, had to be reassigned within the IV Corps Tactical Zone (IV CTZ). There were no problems encountered in identifying and reassigning interpreters as the units redeployed.
VII. CONCLUSION

17. One of the major tasks during the redeployment was the movement of personnel into deploying units and stabilizing these personnel at the earliest possible date. Unforeseen problems generated by the number of criteria changes as the redeployment progressed required intensive personnel management to control.

APPENDIXES:

1 - Daily Muster Report
2 - Individual Preference Statement
MORNING REPORT UNIT MUSTER RECAP

As of _____ hours Aug 69

_______ OFFICER
(Check One)
_______ ENLISTED

1. Assigned Strength
2. Attached Strength
3. Other (Explain)
4. Total Assigned & Attached Strength
5. Present for Duty Strength
6. Not Present for Duty Strength
   a. Hospital
   b. Special Leave
   c. Emergency Leave
   d. Compassionate Leave
   e. Ordinary Leave
   f. R & R
   g. AWOL
   h. TDY
   i. Confinement
   j. Intransit In
   k. Intransit Out
   l. Other (Explain)

NOTE: 1 & 2 & 3 must equal 4
5 & 6 must equal 4
6a through 6.1 must equal 6
### DISPOSITION FORM

**TO**

CG
9th Inf Div
ATTN: AVDE-AGP
APO SF 96370

1. ______ I desire to complete a normal tour in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. ______ I have completed 10 months of my tour in RVN as of the redeployment date of my unit and desire to intertheater transfer with the 9th Infantry Division to Hawaii.

3. ______ I have completed 6 to 10 months of my tour in RVN and desire to redeploy with the 9th Infantry Division to Hawaii.

4. ______ Although I have only completed 2 to 6 months of my tour in RVN, I desire to redeploy with the 9th Infantry Division to Hawaii.

---

**NAME**

(Insert Name)

**UNIT**

(Insert Unit)
Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. GENERAL

1. During redeployment each person must undergo a number of out-processing actions which include: shipping hold baggage; verifying supply, medical finance and AG records; certifying war trophies; manifesting; processing accompanying baggage; exchanging currency; and making the final customs check of individual and personal baggage prior to departure. In order to insure that each inspection was made and each action was taken in a timely and efficient manner, the 9th Infantry Division centralized all out-processing in one location. The use of an out-processing center greatly enhanced the efficiency of the division's redeployment. The facility established by the 9th Infantry Division is described below and is offered as a working model upon which to base redeployment planning in other units.

II. RELIABLE ACADEMY

2. Prior to redeployment, the division already had a small processing facility at Reliable Academy. This organization performed the functions of in-processing replacement personnel and out-processing R&R and PCS personnel, in addition to training those replacements who were new arrivals in-country. Augmented with appropriate personnel and equipment, Reliable Academy accomplished the task of redeployment out-processing for the entire division.

3. Out-processing was divided into three phases with each phase divided into distinct stages. The individual was required to complete each stage within a phase sequentially so that control could be maintained.
a. Phase I. This phase consisted of six stages (or stations) and an out-processing control headquarters (see Appendix 1 for a diagram of Reliable Academy). The control headquarters was staffed with a minimum of five personnel with necessary records and files. They monitored the entire out-processing program and conducted the initial orientation. All stations in the Phase I processing were designed to accommodate 350 men per day. Units were scheduled so that approximately that number would report for processing on any one day.

(1) Station 1 (Hold Baggage).

(a) This was the initial out-processing station and served to rid the individual of his personal belongings which were to be shipped. This facility was able to accommodate 300 men per day and was flexible enough to handle more as the need arose. Experience showed that only about 41% of the redeploying personnel processed hold baggage. While this may be a valid figure for combat divisions it can be expected to increase for units which have different missions or which are stationed in more permanent locations.

(b) At Station 1 all hold baggage was received, inspected for unauthorized items, and crated for shipment. Required documentation was also prepared at this location. Ten military personnel were able to easily handle the normal load. See Appendix 2 for a diagram of Station 1.

(2) Station 2 (CTA 50-901 Turn-in Point). At this station all TA 50 equipment was turned in for units inactivating and each individual's clothing record was screened. Ten supply personnel and two drivers with vehicles were able to handle the programmed work load. An additional requirement was a storage area for equipment that was required to be packaged for turn-in through supply channels. A schematic of Station 2 is at Appendix 3.

(3) Station 3 (Supply Issue Point). Station 3 was responsible for
providing all items authorized for issue to out-processing personnel (e.g. fatigues, boots, and caps). In addition, unit citations were issued to the first battalion to redeploy. All fatigues were issued with US Army tapes and division patches. Arrangements were made with a Vietnam Regional Exchange tailor in the Reliable Academy area to embroider name tags for those requiring this service. See Appendix 4 for a diagram of this station.

(4) Station 4 (Medical Detachment). This station required four medical aidmen. Their function was to screen all shot, health, and dental records, and to administer innoculations to those out-processing personnel requiring them. In addition, the required eight malaria pills were issued here. A diagram of this station is at Appendix 5.

(5) Station 5 (Finance Detachment). This station was responsible for locating, receiving, and screening individual finance records. Authorized partial payments were made to personnel desiring them. All finance records were updated, and locator cards (DD Form 141) prepared for all individuals. A schematic of Station 5 is at Appendix 6.

(6) Station 6 (AG Detachment). Station 6 was responsible for thoroughly screening DA Forms 20 and 66 and updating these forms with appropriate entries. Emergency data forms and postal locator cards were completed at this station. In addition, identification tags and cards were checked, and action taken to obtain these items when missing. All records to include 201 File, Form 20 or 66, and medical and clothing records were then collected for shipment with the unit. Station 6 is diagrammed at Appendix 7.

b. Phase II. Phase II processing consisted of two stations; flight manifesting and the war trophy and baggage check. The capacity of these stations was adjusted to handle all personnel to be redeployed on a given day. Units
reported for Phase II processing by manifest element (a manifest element was the 94 personnel who would depart on one C-141).

1) **Station 7 (Flight Manifest Check).** This station manifested each individual to include seat and sortie number for the CH-47 flight to Bien Hoa and the mission and seat number for the C-141 flight to final destination. This process required three typists for efficient operation. The manifest element of 94 personnel was divided into three CH-47 groups of 32, 32, and 30 personnel respectively. A manifest for each group was typed and then all three combined to form one flight manifest for the C-141 manifest element. It was desirable that the 94 personnel be pre-assigned to each manifest element by the unit concerned and that a roster of the manifest elements be furnished the Division Transportation Officer. When this practice was followed, manifests could be pre-typed and only one man was needed at Station 7 to check the manifest and account for all personnel.

2) **Station 8 (War Trophy and Baggage Inspection).** This station was responsible for the initial customs inspection of all accompanied baggage and the inspection and proper labeling of all war trophies. Required forms (i.e., baggage tags and personnel data cards) were filled out prior to the group’s arrival at this station. Three substations were established as follows:

   (a) **War Trophy Inspection.** This point was responsible for inspecting all individual war trophies and ensuring that no unauthorized item was allowed to accompany the individual to the aircraft. The individual was required to have the necessary war trophy registration papers and war trophy export authorization. One copy of each of these documents was then taped to the war trophy with the individual retaining the remaining copies as his receipt.
The inspector also insured that the war trophy was identified with a properly completed baggage tag.

(b) Baggage Inspection. The actual inspection area consisted of a long counter with seven to ten stalls. After completing the baggage inspection, an individual proceeded to a designated holding area to await further instructions while his baggage moved to the final sub-station.

(c) Baggage Loading. This sub-station was responsible for the loading of all personal baggage into Sea Land vans. Only one manifest element was loaded per van to insure that each individual's baggage would be placed on the proper aircraft at Bien Hoa. The Sea Land vans were sealed and convoyed to the APOE where the baggage was palletized and prepared for loading into the C-141 aircraft by US Air Force personnel. A diagram of stations 7 and 8 is at Appendix 8.

c. Phase III. Phase III processing consisted of three stations, numbered 9 through 11. This phase of out-processing was accomplished on the actual day of departure. All personnel departing on a given day reported for Phase III processing by manifest element for ease of control in meeting the published departure schedule (see Appendix 9).

(1) Station 9 (Currency Conversion Point).

(a) This station, a building equipped with four secure finance cages and one large counter, accommodated up to 200 men per hour. All forms that were required for currency conversion were filled out prior to arrival at this station. The large counter was used for a final check of these forms. The troops were then directed to one of the cages for actual money conversion. A minimum of four finance clerks and one finance officer were required for efficient operation. Prior to converting his WPC to US currency, each man was given the
opportunity to convert Vietnamese currency to MPC.

(b) When Phase III processing was conducted within one or two days of pay-day, the men were also paid in US dollars by the finance personnel at the time of their Phase III processing thereby eliminating excessive finance transactions. A diagram of station 9 is at Appendix 10.

(2) Station 10 (Final Customs Inspection). This station was organized with ten separate inspection tables, one entrance, and one exit. The building was well lighted with separate areas set aside for the collection of any prohibited items so that the personnel being inspected could not recover any items taken from them. An "amnesty box" was provided where unauthorized items could be surrendered without question prior to the inspection. A schematic of Station 10 is at Appendix 11.

(3) Station 11 (Staging for Shipment). To accommodate 94 men per hour. this station required a building equipped with either chairs or benches and at least one desk (see Appendix 12 for a diagram of Station 11). This station’s staff exercised overall supervision of the group movements through the Phase III stations. It was composed of one OIC and six senior NCO’s. Individual responsibilities were as follows:

(a) One NCO organized the personnel according to flight manifest and started the group into Station 9. This NCO was responsible for keeping all manifest elements together throughout Stations 9, 10, and 11.

(b) Once a group arrived at Station 11, two NCO’s took charge and put the group in a separate area within the building and made a complete manifest check. They also insured that each man had completed a DD Form 40R (Customs Declaration Certificate) and that these certificates were given to the flight commander.
(c) A fourth NCO arranged and controlled the transportation from Station 11 to the CH-47's which transported the troops to Bien Hoa, the aerial port of embarkation.

(d) The fifth NCO was responsible for issuing, stamping, and collecting the Phase III out-processing control sheets.

(e) The sixth NCO was the NCOIC and provided overall supervision of Station 11 operations.

(f) Red Cross girls also participated in this last phase by providing refreshments and cheerful conversation.

(g) It should be noted that no one was allowed to leave Station 11 (since customs inspections had been completed) and the group was essentially quarantined until reaching the port of debarkation.

III. COORDINATION

4. A key to the success of the operation described in the preceding paragraphs was coordination between the unit being out-processed and Reliable Academy. Each out-processing unit provided a liaison representative to Reliable Academy during the period that the unit was actually processing. In addition, final coordination meetings were held one day prior to a unit's entering Phase II processing. Each unit departing on a given day was required to attend the coordination meeting and each interested staff agency was also represented. Unit representatives were thoroughly briefed on necessary prior arrangements and events which would occur during Phase II and III processing. In this manner most problems were avoided and positive controls were established to preclude disruptions.
APPENDIXES:

1 - Reliable Academy
2 - Station 1
3 - Station 2
4 - Station 3
5 - Station 4
6 - Station 5
7 - Station 6
8 - Station 7 and 8
9 - Phase III Processing Schedule
10 - Station 9
11 - Station 10
12 - Station 11

E-8
Appendix 1 (Reliable Academy) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

LEGEND

- PROCESSING STATION NUMBER
- LATRINE
- BUNKER

E-1-1
Appendix 2 (Station 1) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

Hold Baggage

Packing and Storage

Administrative Area

Inspection Counters

Entrance and Exit

Typists

E-2-1
Appendix 3 (Station 2) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

CTA 50-901 Turn-in Point

- Bins for Serviceable Equipment
- Entrance
- Weapon Turn-in
- Weapon Racks
- Exit
- TA50 Turn-in

E-3-1
Appendix 4 (Station 3) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

Supply Issue Point

Entrance

Exit

Counter

Clothing Bins

Access to Storage
Appendix 5 (Station 4) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

Medical Detachment

Malaria Pill Distribution

Shot Teams

Entrance

Shot Record Check

E-5-1
Appendix 6 (Station 5) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

Finance Detachment

Entrance and Exit

Records Table

Money Cage

Pay Vouchers

Pay and Promotion Orders Check

Allotments Check

Supervisor's Office

E-6-1
Appendix 7 (Station 6) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

AG Detachment

Control Sheet
Collection Point

Records Turn-in

Records Screening

Supervisor's Office

Officer's Records

EM Records

Entrance

Exit
Appendix 8 (Stations 7 and 8) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)
### PHASE III - PROCESSING SCHEDULE

**30 JULY 1969**

| RUN | MISSION NUMBER | DEPART DEST | ARRIVAL UNIT OFF FOB | TOTAL REL ACCT GDS | C-PAD | B-PAD | B-2 | B-H | B-RA | B-HOA | B-RA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA | B-HOA |
|-----|----------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------|-------|-----|-----|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1   | R042           | 1           | 7/39                 | 7/87                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 2   | R043           | 2           | 7/39                 | 7/31                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 3   | R044           | 3           | 7/39                 | 2/32                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 4   | R045           | 4           | 7/39                 | 5/35                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 5   | R046           | 5           | 7/39                 | 2/31                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 6   | R047           | 6           | 7/39                 | 4/39                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 7   | R048           | 7           | 7/39                 | 6/39                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 8   | R049           | 8           | 7/39                 | 8/39                | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 9   | R050           | 9           | 7/39                 | 10/39               | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |
| 10  | R052           | 10          | 7/39                 | 12/39               | 94    | 0650  | 0650 | 0705 | 0720 | 0800  | 1000  | 1100  | 1200  | 1300  | 1400  | 1500  | 1600  | 1700  | 1800  | 1900  | 2000  | 2100  | 2200  | 2300  | 2400  |

**B-9-1**

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**SORTIES SPACED AT 5 MIN INTERVALS**

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**ROX LUNCH**
Appendix 10 (Station 9) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

Currency Conversion

E-10-1
Final Customs Inspection

E-11-1
Appendix 1.2 (Station 11) to Annex E (Personnel Processing) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)
Annex F (Provost Marshal) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. GENERAL

1. The division Provost Marshal was responsible for the following activities during the redeployment: conducting the division's customs processing; maintaining effective discipline, law and order at Dong Tam to cope with the anticipated population increase; and, phasing out the division Collection Point.

II. CUSTOMS PROCESSING

2. The Provost Marshal's office was given the mission of conducting customs inspections of all personnel and equipment. Equipment and CENEX containers were inspected prior to being transported to Saigon. The hold baggage was inspected by the Saigon Support Command representative in charge of the hold baggage facility as each unit processed through Phase II. Individual and accompanied baggage inspections were made during the Phase III out-processing at Reliable Academy.

3. An effective customs inspection program requires the following:
   a. Highly motivated and thoroughly trained personnel to perform the customs inspections.
   b. Amnesty boxes whose use is clearly understood by all personnel.
   c. An officer or senior NCO from the processing unit being processed to act as liaison officer with the customs inspectors.
   d. Inspection of vehicles used to transport personnel from the holding area to the aircraft to insure items hidden prior to the customs inspection are not later recovered.
   e. Marijuana detection dogs, if available. They were of great assistance in locating marijuana that was not discovered during the normal customs inspections.

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increased military police enforcement. A high degree of command interest led to accurate and timely accident reporting and increased accident prevention. Initially the number of vehicles in the Dong Tam area increased. As each unit redeployed, the number of vehicles decreased rapidly but the traffic density remained constant until the bulk of the division had redeployed. Traffic safety measures remained in effect throughout the entire redeployment period.
Annex G (Finance) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

1. The 9th Infantry Division's redeployment required that the Finance Office reorganize to manage the finance records of three categories of personnel; those deploying to CONUS and Hawaii, and those remaining in-country. The problem areas encountered in accomplishing this task are discussed below:

   a. Unit Processing. In most cases, personnel did not redeploy with their original unit but were assigned to a new unit. As a result, the individual's Financial Data Records Folder (FDRF) often was not available when his new unit began processing. Initially machine-produced rosters were used for identifying the pay records of personnel who were to process on a given day. However, because of the number of last minute changes, these rosters were not accurate. Therefore, direct coordination was necessary between deploying units and the supporting finance office in order to obtain an accurate rosters of assigned personnel. Coordination was also required with the Division Transportation Office to obtain aircraft manifests so that the FDRF could be boxed in manifest order and accompany each deploying unit.

   b. Exchange of MPC to US Dollars. The exchange of MPC to US dollars had to be accomplished at the last possible moment. To prevent US dollars from falling into the hands of unauthorized personnel, the exchange of currency was conducted during the final phase of processing on the morning of departure. Personnel were assembled and processed in manifest order. Controls were established to insure that all redeploying personnel were afforded the opportunity to convert MPC and to preclude the possibility of unauthorized personnel obtaining US dollars.

   c. Continuous Pay Service. Continuous pay service for units deploying to Hawaii and CONUS, and for those remaining in-country had to be maintained.
throughout the division's redeployment. In the latter part of July the Division Finance Office began to separate its functions. One group managed the records of the 3d Brigade which remained in-country and the other group managed the records of the units redeploying to Hawaii. To facilitate continued finance functions in Hawaii and at Dong Tam, the Deputy Finance Officer and approximately 30 personnel were designated to establish a Class B finance office in Hawaii.

2. The finance officer was able to provide the necessary records management and out-processing functions only after direct coordination with each deploying unit. In future moves, records management can be improved if personnel reassignments are accomplished and accurate rosters produced in sufficient time to have financial records reorganized in redeploying unit order prior to out-processing.
Annex H (Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

1. When the announcement was made that redeployment would divide the division three ways, several legal problems became apparent.
   a. The availability of witnesses for courts martial.
   b. Disposition of confinement cases.
   c. Rise in case loads.
   d. Continuation of SJA support until redeployment.

2. These four problems are discussed below:
   a. Non-availability of Witnesses. Due to the rapid departure of units and the many personnel transfers, it was difficult to insure the presence of witnesses for courts martial. In order to preclude the loss of witnesses, commanders were advised to indicate the estimated departure date of all witnesses when forwarding a charge sheet. Further, if a prospective witness was transferred to another unit, the losing unit was required to notify the SJA office so that his whereabouts would remain known.
   b. Confinement Cases.
      (1) USARV directed that special courts martial convening authorities suspend the unexecuted portion of sentences of confinement for individuals eligible for rotation. Individuals not eligible for rotation were to be transferred to units remaining in Vietnam.
      (2) From experience, it is recommended that:
         (a) An increase in assignments to the correctional holding facility be authorized.
         (b) USARV permit the reassignment of confined personnel outside the division to prevent an unreasonable burden on divisional elements remaining.
c. **Increase in Courts Martial.** Announcement of redeployment caused a number of AWOL personnel to return to military control in the belief that they would be allowed to redeploy with their units. To cope with this development, the SJA created an additional trial team to dispose of these cases as quickly as possible. Units with the earliest redeployment dates received priority in obtaining the service of the trial team. It was apparent that all personnel were not aware that time spent in confinement or AWOL does not count toward completion of their Vietnam tour and many were not eligible to redeploy.

d. **Legal Service Support.** Due to the requirement for packing and shipping of equipment, the SJA office could not provide total legal service up to the moment of actual redeployment. It was able to provide legal services until approximately 10 days prior to departure. After stand-down of the SJA office, provisions were made for assumption of jurisdiction by Headquarters, II FFORCEV.
Press coverage increased dramatically from the time the announcement was made that the 9th Infantry Division would redeploy until 8 July 1969 when the first unit departed the Republic of Vietnam. During this period, civilian news correspondents from nearly every continent visited Dong Tam to cover the redeployment of the division.

a. Increase in Press Coverage. During the period of the increased press coverage the Information Office (10) was tasked with two additional aspects of press relations; transportation of the press and their billeting while in the division area. When the Information Office learned of a correspondent's intention to come to Dong Tam, the IO made the necessary arrangements for helicopter transportation with the 9th Aviation Battalion and for billets through the Headquarters Commandant. Transportation while in the division tactical area of interest (TAOI) came from the aviation battalion or host brigade. Billeting outside Dong Tam was coordinated through the host brigade.

b. Requirements for Statistical and Biographical Data. The Office of the Chief of Information, and other information offices in RN, Hawaii, and at Fort Lewis, Washington, required historical and biographical data on the redeploying units and their commanders. Brigade IO Sections assisted in supplying the necessary data to include unit histories, action photographs, and biographical sketches and photographs of the commanders. Once the material was compiled, it was forwarded to the requesting agency by courier or when feasible with the redeploying unit's advance party.

c. Termination of Publications. Redeployment marked the end of publication of the "Old Reliable", the division's weekly newspaper, and the Octofoil, its quarterly magazine.
I. COMPARISON OF TRANSPORTATION MODES

1. Highway transportation was determined to be the best means available to meet the tight time schedule for redeploying the 9th Infantry Division for the following reasons:

   a. The excellent road to the surface port of embarkation (POE) and the proximity of the POE to Dong Tam (2½ hours).

   b. Throughout the period of the redeployment, there was generally a high availability of non-divisional transportation.

2. Although water transportation is capable of moving heavy and bulky cargo and is quite flexible in the delta with its many navigable waterways, there are serious drawbacks. Water transportation is slow and difficult to schedule because of the scarcity of floating assets.

3. Air transportation is restricted by its high cost, low availability, and limited capability to move bulky cargo. It is fast and almost completely safe from ambush.

4. Fortunately, the 9th Infantry Division was located with good access to highway, water, and air lines of communication. The optimum solution for meeting the transportation requirements of redeployment was a combination of all three modes of transportation. Divisional and non-divisional truck convoys fulfilled a preponderance of the division's transportation requirements while water transportation (barge and LST) handled heavy or bulky items and air transportation handled the fragile or high priority equipment and all personnel movements.
II. LIFT REQUIREMENTS

5. Initial estimates for lift requirements must be accurate to insure that the proper type and number of vehicles and CONEX containers are provided. In the 9th Infantry Division, the original estimate for CONEX containers required was over 1400 while the final requirement was approximately half that number. This was principally due to the large number of critical items which were required to remain in-country.

6. The Forces and Materiel Report (FAMREP) can be of assistance in estimating lift requirements. However, it is only as accurate as the input data and must be continually updated and verified to be of value.

III. SCHEDULING

7. Close scheduling of transportation assets was necessary to meet time schedules.

   a. Stake and Platform Trailers. Stake and platform (S6P) trailers had to be spotted in unit areas for loading CONEX containers but could not be scheduled too early as any unused time was a waste of this critical transportation resource. Tractors were also critical and were scheduled to pull S6P trailers only after they were loaded, banded, and ready for movement.

   b. Sea Land Vans. Sea Land Vans were spotted in unit areas for loading of post, camp, and station property (including cantonment mess equipment) just before a unit cleared its area and redeployed.

   c. Light Truck Platoon. A light truck platoon from the Saigon Support Command was centrally dispatched on a priority basis to meet normal divisional requirements after stand-down of the 9th S&T Battalion.

   d. Water Assets. Barges, LSTs, and LCM-8s were requested and scheduled as needed to supplement road convoys for the heavy, bulky loads and equipment which were retrograded to the depot or to property disposal yards.

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e. **Air Assets.** CH-47's were requested and scheduled to move troops to Bien Hoa to meet departure times of C-141 aircraft. Army and Air Force air assets were also used to move fragile and critical equipment such as ground surveillance radars which were reallocated to new units.

f. **Materials-Handling Equipment (MHE).** Forklifts were in short supply and required close scheduling to meet commitments. The 9th S&T Battalion had furnished forklift service for the majority of the division's requirements until its stand-down. At this time it became necessary to centrally control all organic and non-organic forklifts, wreckers, and cranes which were available at Dong, Tam so that maximum use could be made of all MHE to meet requirements.

IV. **CONVOYS**

8. **Control.** Most of the division's vehicles were moved to the port by unit convoys. It was necessary to hold convoy coordination meetings each evening to coordinate the clearance, security, communications, and other details required for the next day's convoy. Convoys consisted of 15 to 50 vehicles from a number of divisional units. This made it highly desirable to have convoy commanders who were familiar with the convoy overwatch system and the methods of coordinating air cover and artillery fires. Qualified officers from line units were habitually used to perform this function.

9. **Drivers.** Many units used drivers not normally assigned to the vehicles they drove in convoy. Therefore, it was necessary to have a supervised motor stables to insure a satisfactory condition of the vehicles before departure.

10. **Documentation.** Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) for vehicles moving to the port of embarkation by unit convoy were first given to the Division Transportation Officer (DTO). He assigned a control number and
returned one copy to the unit. The TCMD retained by the DTO was logged and used to organize the convoy. Each unit represented in the convoy provided two copies of the TCMD to the convoy commander who obtained a signed receipt for the vehicle from port personnel. This receipt was returned to the shipping unit as proof of shipment.

V. PREPARATION OF VEHICLES

11. Vehicle preparation requirements and standards were provided through MACV Transportation Movement Agency (TMA) prior to the movement of vehicles to the port. All vehicles were required to meet Department of Agriculture standards of cleanliness. To assist units in preparing their vehicles for movement, a static demonstration of properly prepared and correctly documented equipment and vehicles was held at the Dong Tam convoy staging area on 19 July 1969. Items displayed were: "piggy-backed" trailers; 1/2, 3/4, 2 1/2, and 5-ton trucks; banded bows; wooden containers; and CONEX containers. Units were required to achieve the demonstrated standards in the packing and documentation of their own equipment and vehicles.

VI. TRANSPORTATION AUGMENTATION

13. The division's organic vehicles were required to be shipped to the port or turned-in to depot. As a result, redeploying units lost the capability of providing their own administrative transportation. To fill this void the 9th Infantry Division was supported by a light truck platoon from the Saigon Support Command with the necessary command, maintenance, and dispatch personnel. One and one-half drivers per vehicle were also furnished. These trucks were dispatched daily on a priority basis to insure maximum utilization. It is recommended that transportation augmentation be provided to redeploying units when required.

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VII. DIVISION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

13. The Division Transportation Office required reorganization along functional lines of order to fulfill its role in redeployment operations (see Appendix 1). It was augmented with additional personnel and equipment:

a. Division Movement Control Officer. The Division Movement Control Officer was placed in charge of the requisitioning, positioning, loading on trailers, and movement to port of CONEX containers. This was a normal extension of his duties as Division CONEX Control Officer. He was familiar with existing CONEX locations, serviceability criteria, handling, and movement procedures. He required the assistance of banding teams and forklift operators for the redeployment.

b. Banding Teams. Two banding teams were formed consisting of one NCO and three EM each. They were provided with transportation and banding materials and operated directly under the supervision of the CONEX Control Officer. They were responsible to insure that CONEX containers and similar loads were securely banded to semi-trailers for movement to the port. The banding team concept was necessary because of the limited amount of banding materials and tools, and the general lack of loading and banding experience within the division.

c. Convoy Control Officer. An additional officer was assigned to the Division Transportation Office as Convoy Control Officer. His responsibilities included planning, organizing, clearing, and checking all redeployment convoys. He also assembled and checked documentation and assigned control numbers to the TCMDs prior to movement. A direct telephone link to Newport facilitated communication and was used to collect and verify shipment and movement data.

d. Helicopter Loading NCO. An additional NCO was used to supervise
the loading of CH-47's at the division helipad. He was responsible to insure that CH-47 loads were formed in accordance with manifests and that all personnel were accounted for prior to take-off. After loading, he dispatched the CH-47's in accordance with established schedules and made reports to the Movements Control Center on the status of the aircraft, their departure times, and the loads carried.

18. Clerk Typists. Two additional clerk typists were required as manifest clerks. They assembled and typed manifests; prepared and distributed personnel movement forms; and, checked, adjusted and distributed manifests as required. They also maintained files on personnel movement data.

APPENDIX:

1 - Division Transportation Office
Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. GENERAL

1. Complex logistic requirements were placed on the division support elements by the three separate actions required within the division; inactivation, redeployment, and reorganization. In addition, division elements continued combat operations until stand-down, thereby placing a dual requirement on the logistic support elements, that of retrograding and redeploying equipment while still providing combat service support.

II. LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES

2. Division Support Command.
   a. As the Division Support Command stands down, non-divisional agencies are required to assume responsibility for the combat service support of the division:
      (1) The Saigon Support Command assumed the mission of the 9th S&T Battalion. For the most part, assumption of the Class I, III, and V activities by Saigon Support Command was accomplished without difficulty.
      (2) The mission of the 709th Maintenance Battalion was assumed by the 238th Light Equipment Maintenance (LEM) Company on 20 July 1969. A problem developed when the 238th LEM Company did not have trained personnel to support all artillery equipment in the division. By reorganizing and obtaining the expertise necessary from the 709th Maintenance Battalion, the 238th LEM Company was able to give all needed maintenance support.
   b. In general, the support and cooperation of all Saigon Support Command personnel to the 9th Infantry Division was outstanding. Appendix 1 outlines Saigon Support Command personnel at Dong Tam, and Appendix 2
shows the organization of the Logistics Operations Group.

3. **Dong Tam Rearm/Refuel.** The Dong Tam helicopter rearm/refuel facility was taken over by the 164th Combat Aviation Group (CAG). The 164th CAG was assisted by Saigon Support Command in hauling JP4 from the basin storage area to the helicopter refueling site. On 25 August 1969, the responsibility for hauling JP4 shifted to the 164th CAG, with the actual work being performed by the RVN 4th Area Logistical Command (ALC). The 164th CAG furnished the personnel and equipment required to permit Dong Tam to continue as a rearm/refuel point. The equipment for the facility was signed over in place by the 164th CAG from the 9th Infantry Division.

4. **Installation Coordinator.** The Commanding Officer, Division Support Command, remained as the installation coordinator until the final stages of the redeployment when the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) appointed the Commanding Officer, 93d Engineer Battalion (Const) to this responsibility.

5. **Allocation and Control of Real Estate.** With the permission and concurrence of MACV, real estate at Dong Tam was allocated to 7th ARVN Division, US Navv, and remaining US Army units. Coordination meetings of all parties concerned were held at Dong Tam before receipt of the property.

6. **Morale, Welfare, and Recreation.** The division post exchange was transferred to the 93d Engineer Battalion (Const) and was kept open during the entire redeployment. The special service club, the swimming pool, the library, and the miniature golf course were kept open until the middle of August.

7. **G5 Projects.** When the order to redeploy the 9th Infantry Division was received, all requisitions for construction material required to complete several G5 projects (e.g., three schools and two market places) were cancelled. Since it
was believed that the failure to complete these projects would have a detrimental
effect on the morale of the local people, efforts were made to obtain all materials
required. 450,000$ VN of a required 675,000$ VN was obtained from G5 resources to
finish the projects. The remainder of the required materials was obtained from
salvage.

8. OJT for ARVN. ARVN was allowed to come on post to train for various
logistical functions which they would have to assume once the 9th Infantry
Division departed Dong Tam. For example, 20 ARVN EM, one ARVN officer, and
an interpreter were billeted on Dong Tam from 9 August while they were learning
to operate the water and ice plants. ARVN operators for the 5000 gallon POL
tankers assisted Saigon Support Command operators on JP4 runs for several days
before taking over these responsibilities.


III. AMMUNITION

12. Turn-in.

a. Turn-in of ammunition was accomplished with little difficulty.
As soon as redeployment was announced, all units were advised to report all
unserviceable ammunition so that the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit
could destroy items not suitable for retrograde.

b. The Division Ammunition Office (DAO) coordinated with the supporting
Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) and division units to insure that turn-in criteria
had been received and were understood. Turn-in procedures were simple so that
it was easy for units to turn-in ammunition to the supporting ASP. This prevented
ammunition from being abandoned.

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c. Turnover of ammunition to ARVN units proved to be a satisfactory method for units to dispose of ammunition. Prior approval from USARV was necessary before transferring ASR items to RVNAF. When transfer of ammunition to RVNAF was effected, an RVNAF official was required to sign a Transportation Order, DA Form 581, in three copies. One copy was forwarded to MACV J-42-AM and one to USARV G4 Ammunition.

13. Packing Materials. Packing materials for much of the ammunition in the hands of troops had been thrown away. As soon as redeployment was announced, all units were advised to save all packing materials. A few units had enough packing materials on hand to meet their needs and the excess was turned in to the supporting ASP. Sufficient wooden boxes were turned in by artillery units (105mm boxes) and aviation units (2.75-inch rocket boxes) to pack all retrograde received from units that did not have boxes.

IV. CAPTURED MATERIEL

14. Processing. Within the 9th Infantry Division, captured materiel could be processed in one of three ways:

a. It could be given to the division historian for proper storage and shipment to Hawaii as part of the William B. Cronin Museum. Given to the museum, materiel became the property of the Army Museum System and was properly accounted for, documented, and secured by a custodian or curator.

b. Certain items can be kept as individual war trophies if properly licensed, documented, and shipped. Automatic weapons can not be legally evacuated as individual war trophies. Individual war trophies were licensed by the Interrogation Prisoner of War (IPW) Section of the 9th Military Intelligence Detachment. After validation by the military police, an authorization certificate to ship the war trophy to a destination chosen by the soldier was
issued. The trophy could then be shipped as hold or accompanied baggage. If the trophy were a fire arm, it could only be shipped as accompanied baggage.

c. The trophy also could be turned in to the 1st Logistical Command for use in Department of the Army training programs.

15. Inspection. War trophies were inspected during out-processing at Reliable Academy (see Annex E). One copy of the war trophy registration and one copy of the war trophy export authorization were required to be taped to the trophy. The remaining copies of these papers were retained by the individual as his receipt.

16. The only problem encountered was that many war trophies were not registered at the time of inspection. To facilitate the out-processing, it is recommended that a military intelligence clerk and an MP be located at the processing point to register and authorize any war trophies not already registered. This procedure eliminated the need to send an individual back to MI and the MP's.

V. PROCESSING FACILITIES

17. An adequate processing, packaging and preservation area should be established to insure expeditious processing of supplies and equipment (see Appendix 6). Hard surfaced roads, hardstands, overhead rain cover, and wash-racks are desirable. It is necessary that timely expert advice be available concerning organization of the processing, packaging and preservation (PPF) area. PPF technicians did not arrive at Dong Tam from CONUS until 17 July 1969, over a month after the announcement was made to redeploy. An earlier arrival would have been of great benefit to the division in its organization of the processing area.

18. Construction of PPF facilities will be necessary if they are not available or if other arrangements to accomplish the necessary tasks cannot
be made. Several facilities which had been constructed for other purposes were suitable for use as processing facilities:

a. At Dong Tam, wash racks had been built in the basin area several months before the redeployment was announced and were used to advantage to clean vehicles and equipment.

b. Hangars at the heliport at the north end of the post provided storage areas for boxes and packing materials and a processing point for banding and inspecting the division’s vehicles and equipment prior to movement to the port.

c. Overhead rain cover was provided by the shop buildings of Company E, 709th Maintenance Battalion where small arms and signal equipment were turned in, processed, and packaged.

VI. CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

19. At the time redeployment was announced there were several projects under construction at Dong Tam by RKM, PA&E, and the 93d Engineer Battalion (Const). Each was reviewed to determine the feasibility of terminating the project. Projects terminated were: paving an extension of the fixed wing strip at Dong Tam; construction of revetments for the POL tank farm; a new PX building; and, several chapel buildings. All projects which had not been started were cancelled. Due to the nature of the facilities involved, several projects were continued to completion, either as planned or modified to minimize the effort required. These included: a fire crash rescue building; medical dust-off helicopter pads; an ammunition storage point; paving of interior roads; and, the construction of a new gate and access road on the east berm.

VII. PACKING MATERIALS

20. Boxes. Contracts to manufacture boxes for packing were awarded to PA&E. In addition to these boxes, unserviceable foot lockers were available
to pack equipment and supplies.

21. **Soft Packing.** Soft pack materials which dispense a liquid substance that fills the voids around equipment in a box, then hardens into a cork-like material to provide a resilient package for shipment of sensitive equipment were provided by Saigon Support Command. Radios and optical gear are especially suited for this type of packing.

22. **Control of Packing Materials.** Control of packing materials initially was a problem due to the failure of units to properly plan for their special packing requirements. Packaging materials were expended rapidly necessitating a control system. To facilitate control of packing materials it is recommended that the staff section controlling CONEX containers also control the issue of packaging materials to insure that appropriate quantities of each are available. This section should insure that additional packaging materials are requisitioned on a timely basis.

**VIII. AGRICULTURAL**

23. **Problem Areas.**

a. The lack of guidance on procedures and standards for the cleaning and sealing of CONEX containers initially hindered operations. Many units used improper techniques in their haste to begin packing. The requirements to meet Department of Agriculture standards were not known. These problems were later controlled through the use of Inspecting and Dusting Requests and a CONEX Inspection Certificate (see Annex M). Department of Agriculture certification was not conducted in RVN but was accomplished at final destination.

b. Maintaining standards of CONEX cleanliness and adhering to packing schedules in inclement weather also presented a problem. Although the Department of Agriculture required that all soil be removed from CONEX containers,
prior to shipment, the muddy conditions and heavy rains of the delta hampered operations. Many CONEX containers had to be unpacked, cleaned and repacked due to the large amounts of mud being tracked into the CONEX containers.

24. **Recommendations.**

a. All CONEX containers and vehicles should be cleaned thoroughly prior to departure from the packing site. Upon reaching the POE most CONEX containers and vehicles will again require cleaning because of road distance and muddy conditions encountered enroute.

b. A specific staff section should be assigned the mission of CONEX control immediately upon notification of redeployment. This section should obtain guidelines and standards for all procedures involving CONEX containers.

c. Special attention should be given to Department of Agriculture entomological requirements and to customs requirements.

d. Covered hardstands should be provided for packing, dusting, and sealing CONEX containers. Units should be prepared for limited packing during inclement weather.

IX. **REAL PROPERTY CLEARANCE**

25. **Pre-inventory.**

a. A pre-inventory of all real property was conducted by the occupant and personnel from PA&E to establish ownership of such items as ceiling fans and air conditioners. This pre-inventory normally took one day to complete a battalion-sized unit and usually several more days to resolve ownership problems. The pre-inventory facilitated the actual turnover of the real property to PA&E when the unit cleared the area and redeployed.

b. Building clearances were completed at least one day in advance of a unit's departure. Covered vans were positioned in unit areas for loading.
post, camp, and station property, at least two days prior to departure.

On the last night before departure, the only items remaining in the barracks were beds and mattresses. These were outloaded the morning of actual departure. Final police of buildings and grounds was then conducted and buildings turned over to PA&E.

26. Mess Halls. Clearing of mess halls was critical. The phasing-out of units near the end of the redeployment period was rapid and required a close scheduling of messing facilities to permit removal of cantonment or TOE mess equipment. It was necessary to close unit messes from two to four days prior to actual departure of the unit. This required satelliting on other units with later departure dates and with a sufficient mess capacity to accommodate them. Detailed schedules were prepared at division level to satisfy all messing requirements. Two messes were taken over by Saigon Support Command personnel eight days before the final units' departure date, thus relieving these units of any further responsibility in this area.

APPENDIXES:
1 - Saigon Support Command Personnel
2 - Non-Divisional Support Organization
3 - Maintenance
4 - Supply Accountability and Transfers
5 - Baggage
6 - Equipment Processing

K-9
Appendix 1 (Saigon Support Command Personnel) to Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFF</th>
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<tr>
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LOGISTICS OPERATIONS GROUP

OIC

SUPPLY
- DISPOSITION
- DIRECT SUPPORT

TRANSPORTATION

MAINTENANCE
- CLASSIFICATION AND INSPECTION
- DIRECT SUPPORT

48TH GP

MOVEMENTS CONTROL CENTER
I. PLL/ASL

1. Since those elements of the division redeploying to Hawaii were to be reorganized under new MTOE's, their PLL and ASL authorizations would differ from those currently in effect. The division supplied an entire listing of ASLs (less marine items) to USARHAW. Upon receipt of the ASL listings, USARHAW requisitioned 50% of each line item. Priority for disposition of 9th Infantry Division ASL items in-country was given to completely filling the ASL of the 3d Brigade. All PLL's for Hawaii were recomputed based on a full fill of MTOE items. PLL on-hand within redeploying units was packed and sent to Hawaii, and the shortfall requisitioned through the Supply and Maintenance Center in Hawaii.

2. Upon announcement of the redeployment, all outstanding requisitions other than Red Ball requisitions and requisitions for equipment deadlined for parts were cancelled. From then on, the division was authorized to requisition parts for deadlined items only. Individual units submitted requisitions to divisional DS elements which were processed on a fill-or-kill basis. This served both to provide needed parts for units and to draw-down the parts on-hand within divisional DS elements.

II. TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS

3. Prior to equipment turn-in, technical inspections were performed at Dong Tam by Saigon Support Command personnel. The following percentages of items were found unserviceable, not repairable on station: 100% of 155mm towed howitzers; 40% of automotive vehicles; 10% of all classes of small arms; and, 5% of signal items. Of the total automotive and signal items found not
repairable in RVN, 75% met retrograde standards for the Closed Loop Program. Only one-third of all unserviceable items were salvaged while two-thirds were candidates for rebuild. In summary, the quantity of items declared salvage or "unserviceable, not repairable" was quite small. Statistics on M16 rifles will illustrate this point:

a. Total M16s technically inspected: 10,593.
b. Serviceable: 7,177.
c. Repairable in RVN: 3,352.
d. Unserviceable, not repairable: 64.

4. Divisional elements redeploying to Hawaii reported that additional vehicles have been determined unserviceable in Hawaii as a result of normal technical inspections performed by USARHAW depot maintenance personnel. Therefore, it is recommended that the command to which a redeploying unit will be assigned provide qualified personnel to augment the in-country technical inspection teams. Rigorous technical inspection procedures prior to shipment will preclude excessive cost incurred by shipping unserviceable vehicles and equipment.

III. MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR NEW STATION

6. The 9th Infantry Division developed an extensive maintenance program for implementation in Hawaii to insure that all units would attain a satisfactory maintenance posture as rapidly as possible. The program was planned to be of four months duration and to have three phases:

a. Phase I was to last thirty days and was to consist of a series of maintenance inspections. The areas to be inspected in each unit were personnel and training; publications and reports; deadline reporting procedures; shop operations; tools and test equipment; facilities; and safety SOP's, programs,
and practices. In addition, extensive use was to be made of a roadside spot check system.

b. Phase II, also to last thirty days, was to emphasize maintenance administration. Inspections by division teams would investigate unit proficiency in TAERS, would validate ESC's, and would review PLL and Maintenance Request (DA Form 2407) procedures.

c. Phase III, lasting two months, would consist of a division-conducted CMMI program in which two units per week would be inspected. Re-inspections would be conducted as necessary to insure attainment of high maintenance standards.
Appendix 4 (Supply Accountability and Transfers) to Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

1. PROPERTY BOOKS AND SUPPLY ACCOUNTABILITY

1. General. In many cases supply records did not accurately reflect the actual authorized and on-hand status. Inactivating a unit requires property books to be zeroed. Therefore, it was essential that complete physical inventories be made. Hand receipt reviews were not adequate in fixing property accountability. The process of zeroing a TOE property book for a standard light infantry battalion was found to require a minimum of 15 days.

2. Combat Losses and Reports of Survey.

   a. Used in a proper and timely manner, the DA Form 2408-7 (Combat Loss) is an effective tool in property accountability.

   b. During redeployment it was essential that the 9th Infantry Division receive special handling on Reports of Survey. USARV indicated that they would forward approval within 24 hours of receipt of a survey. This expedited processing was rarely needed; however. The agreement did accelerate the approval process and made it easier to clear property books within the limited time available.

3. PCS Property. Some Post, Camp, and Station property was required to be shipped to Hawaii for use by the division at Schofield Barracks. The remainder was used to fill the 3d Brigade requirements or turned-in to the Saigon Support Command representatives at Dong Tam. To facilitate redeployment, all equipment less beds and mattresses was turned-in several days before a unit departed Dong Tam. This required close monitoring to insure that the units cleared their areas promptly and that required storage and transportation assets were provided. Experience indicated that most units did not have an accurate
count of PC&S property on hand. It is recommended that a complete inventory of PC&S property be conducted and that all equipment not vitally needed to sustain a unit be turned-in as soon as possible.

II. *UNAUTHORIZED DISPOSAL*

4. In spite of Project STRIP which was completed in early 1969, excesses were found especially in post, camp, and station property. Action was required to insure that these excesses were turned-in to the division supply office rather than be disposed of in some other manner.

5. Isolated instances were observed of units discarding equipment in the sanitary fill and other areas. To alleviate this, a "no questions asked" turn-in of excesses was instituted by the division supply office/Saigon Support Command personnel. Additionally, a guard was placed at the sanitary fill entrances and all vehicles were checked for supplies and equipment prior to entry into the sanitary fill area. Vehicles with supplies were returned to their unit area.

6. To preclude scavenging and other illegal transfers of property, the military police at the main gate inspected all vehicles leaving Dong Tam. Unless a driver had a lateral transfer document, an issue slip, or an authorization from one of six persons on Dong Tam, he was not allowed to take property off-post. This action significantly curtailed losses.

7. The following actions are recommended:
   
a. That the turn-in of excess supplies and equipment be made as convenient as possible. This was done by having a free turn-in area where units disposed of their excess government property without question.

   b. That guards be posted to prevent unauthorized disposal of equipment (e.g., at sanitary fills and bodies of water).
c. That gate control be established to eliminate unauthorized equipment leaving the base.

III. LATERAL TRANSFERS

8. It is general practice when laterally transferring equipment from one unit to another, to have the property book officers from both the losing and receiving units perform a joint inspection. When agreement is reached on the quantity and condition of equipment, the lateral transfer is completed. In view of the limited time normally available for redeployment, it is recommended that the equipment not being taken with a unit be turned-in through supply channels with no requirement for lateral transfer to other agencies. Redistribution of assets can then be effected after turn-in.

IV. TEMPORARY LOANS

9. An effective method of filling temporary unit requirements for equipment during redeployment was to hand receipt equipment from the Saigon Support Command representative at Dong Tam using assets turned in by redeploying units. For example, ninety AN/PRC-25 radios were required on the Dong Tam perimeter for communication. These were not available from within the organic resources of the infantry battalion charged with the defense of Dong Tam. Saigon Support Command identified serviceable AN/PRC-25 radios that had been turned in and hand receipted the radios back to the battalion for use on a temporary basis.

V. REQUISITION POLICY

10. Determining the status of requisitions is required as early as possible. This was complicated by the fact that different policies were applied to units depending on their status: inactivating, redeploying, or remaining in RVN. These are discussed below:

    a. Requisitions for 2d Brigade units were cancelled immediately except
for priority repair parts needed to remove critical equipment from deadline.

b. The 1st Brigade and the division ( ) were authorized to submit requisitions in Hawaii once activity address codes and unit identification codes (UIC) had been confirmed. For PEM (Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army) items, the division G4 sent shortage lists to USARV, USARHAW, and to the division advance party in Hawaii for requisition action. The advance party confirmed that USARHAW had requisitioned these PEM items in bulk using the shortage lists as a basis. Requisitions for non-PEM items were prepared on DA Form 2765-1 (MILSTRIP Requisition, Manual) and forwarded to the division advance party in Hawaii. They were submitted as soon as unit document registers were opened. This same procedure was followed for FFL items.

c. Requisitions for the 3d Brigade continued uninterrupted. One problem experienced was that newly organized units did not have UIC's and could not initially submit requisitions.
I. DEFINITIONS

1. Hold Baggage. Hold Baggage consists of an individual's possessions which are shipped ahead to meet him at his destination. This baggage may be packed and shipped by a commercial firm or mailed by the owner.

2. Accompanied Baggage. Accompanied baggage is that impedimenta which accompanies an individual on the aircraft but not necessarily in the passenger compartment. This baggage was limited to 66 pounds per individual for the 9th Infantry Division's redeployment.

3. To Accompany Troops (TAT) Cargo. TAT Cargo comprises those items which are essential for proper unit administration at both ends of the move. Examples are unit records and typewriters.

II. HOLD BAGGAGE

4. Procedures. A customs inspection was conducted at the hold baggage facility to locate any unauthorized items (pyrotechnics, weapons, narcotics, etc) (see Tab A for complete baggage flow chart). Shipping orders were prepared and the baggage was then crated to protect it against possible damage during shipment.

5. Hold Baggage for Intertheater Transfers. Personnel with intertheater transfers who were assigned to the 9th Infantry Division from another unit in Vietnam were permitted to ship hold baggage from their original station. This preshipment of hold baggage eliminated the personal inconvenience of having the individual transport his hold baggage to Dong Tam for shipment to Hawaii. An individual's local hold baggage facility would ship his baggage to Hawaii upon presentation of orders assigning him to the 9th Infantry Division.
6. **Tariff Rates.** At the time of the announcement of the division's redeployment to Hawaii, tariff rates for hold baggage had been established only to CONUS. This required an amendment to the shipper's contract to permit shipments of hold baggage directly to Hawaii. It is recommended that tariff rates be established for shipment of hold baggage to any area of the world to which US units may be redeployed; e.g., Europe, the Middle East, and South America.

### III. ACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE PROCEDURES

7. **Procedure.**

   a. Accompanied baggage was loaded into covered vans and sealed after a customs inspection was made for unauthorized items. The actual inspection took place at Reliable Academy (see Annex E).

   b. On the day prior to departure of the personnel, the covered vans were driven to Bien Hoa where the baggage was palletized by USAF personnel and loaded aboard the proper aircraft.

8. **TA 50.** Some units required individuals to carry their TA 50 to Hawaii as accompanied baggage. This procedure created an unnecessary hardship for the individual who was only authorized 66 -unds for his own personal belongings. TA 50 should either be shipped as TAT cargo if it is required soon after the unit arrival at final destination or be packed in CONEX containers and shipped as part of unit impedimenta.

### IV. TAT CARGO

9. **Packing and Movement.** TAT cargo was packed by the unit prior to its departure. Standard sized packing crates and boxes were used. To facilitate load planning, units were furnished aircraft pallet spaces, pallet dimensions, and weight restrictions. Type loads using standard packing materials were also
furnished (see Appendix 6 to Annex M). TAT cargo was inspected by unit customs officers, marked with DD Form 1387 (Air Shipment Label) (see Tab B), and loaded into vans spotted in unit areas. Vans arrived at the APOE approximately 18 hours prior to scheduled aircraft departure where loads were palletized for air movement. Entomological inspection of TAT cargo was accomplished by aerial port personnel during palletization.

10. Vehicles. TAT vehicle shipments were limited by size and weight. The 9th Infantry Division shipped only 1-ton trucks and trailers which occupied one pallet space each. Vehicles were prepared for air shipment and labelled as dangerous cargo with a DD Form 1387-2. (see Tab C) in accordance with Air Force Manual 71-4. They were shipped in operational configuration with a half tank of fuel and with batteries connected. Vehicles were driven to the APOE by unit personnel in convoy. Unit personnel were also required to assist in final cleaning and preparation prior to loading on aircraft.

11. Recommendations. To permit more efficient movement of accompanied baggage and TAT cargo to the APOE, it is recommended that planning guidance for air shipment of these items be obtained from Air Force personnel as soon as possible.

Tabs:
A - Baggage Processing
B - DD Form 1387
C - DD Form 1387-2
Tab A (Baggage Processing) to Appendix 5 (Baggage) to Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

BAGGAGE PROCESSING

UNIT

RELIABLE ACADEMY

PROCESS POINT

SHIPMENT

HOLD BAGGAGE

BAGGAGE SEPARATION
CUSTOMS INSPECTION

ACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE
CUSTOMS INSPECTION
OUTLOAD AT DONG TAM
CONVOYED TO APOE
AF PALLETIZES

CARRY ON BAG
CUSTOMS AT DONG TAM
GUARANTINED

K-5-A-1
Tab B (DD Form 1387) to Appendix 5 (Baggage) to Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

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<tr>
<td>TO: (POE when applicable)</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD (When applicable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE OR MARK FOR</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIECE NO.</td>
<td>TOTAL PIECES</td>
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K-5-B-1
**SPECIAL HANDLING DATA/CERTIFICATION**

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</tr>
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</table>

**DESTINATION**

**HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS**

**SHIPPER CERTIFICATION:**

The person certify that the contents of the packages in this shipment are properly seasoned, packed, marked, and in proper condition for transportation in accordance with:

- [ ] AFM 71-4
- [ ] TM 38-250
- [ ] 12-03-100 and MACD 740229
- [ ] "SPECIAL AIR TRANSPORT RESTRICTED ARTICLES "TARIFF 6, C & B"
- [ ] "OTHER (Spec)"
- [ ] "SHIPMENT WITHIN PASSENGER/CARGO AIRCRAFT "UNITATION"

**SIGNATURE**

**DATE**

---

K-5-C-1
Appendix 6 (Equipment Processing) to Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. GENERAL

1. Equipment to Remain in RVN. Equipment that was to remain in RVN was processed in much the same manner as equipment to be shipped out of country. However, different documentation was required. DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-in, was prepared on equipment that was turned-in to remain in-country. DA Form 1384-2, Transportation Control and Movement Document, was prepared on those items being shipped out of RVN.

2. Equipment Shipped to CONUS and Hawaii.
   a. No equipment was shipped to CONUS except unit colors.
   b. All TOE/MTOE equipment less items on the Critical Items Lists was shipped to Hawaii. Even after it was announced that the division would inactivate, all equipment scheduled for shipment was shipped except for a few selected items which were diverted to other locations by USARV.
   c. Discretionary items on the MTOE and in the possession of the unit were shipped to Hawaii. It was USARV policy that no discretionary item shortages would be requisitioned.

II. CRITICAL ITEMS

3. An important factor affecting redeployment shipments and turn-ins was the USARV-generated Critical Items List (CIL). This list contained items that were in short supply in Vietnam and which were to remain in-country to fill these shortages. The CIL had two groups:
   a. The 100% CIL (see Tab A) contained items none of which were permitted to leave Vietnam.
   b. The Limited Critical Items List (see Tab B) contained those items...
which could be taken by the division to Hawaii in specified numbers.

4. Problems associated with the Critical Items List are as follows:
   a. The composition of the Critical Items List constantly changed during the first month after the announcement of the redeployment. This caused additional repacking and resulted in unnecessary delays.
   b. The Critical Items List was quite large. This made it difficult for Saigon Support Command representatives at Dong Tam to store and handle these items as they were turned-in pending redistribution.
   c. As a result of the large CIL, the unit readiness posture in Hawaii would have suffered significantly since many of the TOE/MTOE items necessary for mission accomplishment were on the Critical Items List.

5. It is recommended:
   a. That the Critical Items List be screened and contain as few items as possible.
   b. That the Critical Items List be published early and remain firm.

III. EQUIPMENT REDISTRIBUTION

6. All equipment of the 2d Brigade, which inactivated in CONUS, was turned-in at Dong Tam. This equipment was used first to fill the shortages existing in the 3d Brigade, then to fill shortages in the lst Brigade and the division base, and finally the remainder was turned-in to the Saigon Support Command for redistribution to other units as directed by USARV. The amount of equipment generated by this inactivation was not as great as might have been expected since the 2d Brigade was generally organized under a riverine TOE and had significantly less equipment than a standard light infantry unit. However, the amount of equipment was still extensive and created storage problems initially for the 9th S&T Battalion and later for the Saigon Support Command when they assumed the support responsibility.
for the division on 23 July 1969. Equipment was redistributed or turned-in
by the 9th S&T Battalion/Saigon Support Command as fast as possible (see Tab
C), but at times this was not rapid enough to avoid filling all available
storage areas at Dong Tam.

7. It is recommended:
   a. That maximum storage space and transportation assets for retro-
      grade be provided a division during inactivation of its units.
   b. That equipment redistribution/retrograde instructions be furnished
      a division as soon as possible.

IV. PREPARATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR TURN-IN

8. Equipment turn-in was accomplished by unit supply personnel in conjunction
with unit maintenance personnel. Flow of equipment is shown in Tab D. The
average time lapse for turning in a piece of equipment was two days. The
normal turn-in procedure began with an inspection by the Saigon Support Command
team followed by corrective action within the maintenance capability of the
unit. As the equipment was processed, it was classified as serviceable or unser-
viceable. After the equipment had returned to the unit and corrective action
was completed, the unit prepared the necessary documents and turned in the
equipment.

9. Documentation had to be constantly checked to insure proper account-
ability and accuracy of shipping instructions.

10. It is recommended that the condition of the vehicle and the documen-
tation be checked at a final inspection station just prior to turn-in.

V. PREPARATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT

11. High standards of maintenance were required for those vehicles returning
to Hawaii with the division (-). Unit maintenance officers were charged with
the responsibility to see that vehicles were in as high a state of maintenance as possible. Vehicles which were within the repair capability of maintenance facilities in Hawaii were taken with the division to preclude the long delay anticipated in obtaining new items. As soon as an item was ready for shipment, the unit customs officer conducted the necessary inspections and insured that stenciling, customs certificates, and transportation documentation were accomplished properly.

12. Documentation for equipment shipped was accomplished by the individual units. Instruction on documentation procedure was provided at Dong Tam by a team from 1st Logistical Command. This team conducted classes which included the correct preparation of DA Form 1384, Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD), and distributed a "mini-ILSTAMP" manual which described in detail the preparation of the TCMD, and the proper marking, labeling, and preparation of cargo for shipment (see Appendix 5 to Annex M).

13. Two representatives of 4th Transportation Command were assigned as liaison representatives to check and advise units on documentation matters. They worked at the vehicle processing point and with the CONEX dusting and entomology teams. This enabled them to check documentation of vehicles or CONEX containers at the time of final preparation and inspection. They made on-the-spot corrections and insured that documentation, labeling, and cargo to be shipped were all in agreement with each other.

14. It is recommended:

   a. That all equipment be carefully prepared for shipment.

   b. That the cleanliness, state of general maintenance, and documentation be checked by a unit officer before the equipment is offered for shipment to insure compliance with all requirements and that it arrives at its final
destination in condition to fulfill its new mission.

VI. CONEX CONTAINERS

15. Preparation and Sealing.

a. The preparation of CONEX containers was best controlled by one officer with a well-trained detail. Their function was to insure that all CONEX containers which were to be shipped by the unit were thoroughly cleaned and properly stenciled.

b. Each unit or section was responsible for packing its own equipment into CONEX containers. This was closely supervised by the unit customs officer who insured that no contraband was placed inside the containers.

c. After a CONEX was packed, the division dusting team was scheduled through the DISCOM S3. This team made the final inspection, dusted and sealed the CONEX with a railroad car seal. The CONEX was then reported to the DTO for movement to the port. Department of Agriculture certification was not conducted in RVN but was accomplished at final destination.


a. In order to standardize the shipping data entered on documentation, the DTO used Technical Bulletin 55-46, dated January 1967, as a standard reference for all shipping data, dimensions, and weight of vehicles.

b. After the CONEX containers were sealed, TCMD's were prepared and given to the DTO who was responsible for loading the CONEX containers on stake and platform trailers for shipment to Newport with the next day's convoy.

c. The DTO took the TCMD to the Movement Control Center (MCC) at Dong Tam where a Transportation Movement Request (TMR) number was assigned to the CONEX being shipped. One copy of the TCMD with the TMR number was returned to the unit as a receipt. A record of the TMR number was made in the DTO log.

d. The remaining copies of the TCMD were used by the MCC as shipping documents. One was retained by the MCC as proof of shipment and the remaining copies
went forward to the port for shipping purposes.

17. **Recommendations.** Packing and shipping of CONEX containers was critical to the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division. CONEX control was essential. Therefore, it is recommended:

   a. That all CONEX containers be centrally controlled by one staff agency with daily status carefully recorded and cross-checked.

   b. That each divisional unit appoint a CONEX control officer who is responsible for all preparation and movement of that unit's CONEX containers.

   c. That daily meetings of all unit CONEX control officers be held at a division level to determine CONEX problem areas and revise container requirements for redeployment.

**VII. SECURITY GUARDS**

19. Two security guards were provided by the division to travel aboard each ship carrying the division's equipment. These personnel were levied from divisional units having equipment loaded aboard the ships. They were scheduled aboard ship by means of a letter addressed to MSIS Vietnam and delivered through port operations personnel. Security guards should carry the following papers:

   a. A copy of unit movement orders and a copy of orders assigning the individual to the moving unit.

   b. A letter of instructions assigning duties, responsibilities and actions to be taken, and listing names and telephone numbers of contact personnel at the ports of embarkation and debarkation.

20. Security guards should be identified early so that requests for travel space can be made to MSIS to insure space aboard ship. A letter of instructions, covering situations which could normally be expected to occur,
should be furnished the security guards.

IX. COORDINATION WITH PORTS

21. Coordination was established with the surface and aerial ports of embarkation to determine requirements and criteria for all shipments. Direct telephone circuits were established from the division’s Redeployment Planning Group headquarters to both ports to facilitate coordination. Reciprocal liaison visits were made by division personnel and port representatives. Continuous coordination permitted early resolution of problem areas.

22. It is recommended that early coordination be established and maintained between the redeploying unit and the aerial and surface ports of embarkation to permit resolution of problem areas at an early date.

TABS:
A - 100% Critical Item List
B - 25% Critical Item List
C - Flow of Equipment and Supplies (2d Brigade and Critical Items)
D - Flow of Equipment and Supplies (Redeploying Units)
100% CRITICAL ITEM LIST

NCR 500 WITH ACCESSORIES
AIRCRAFT WITH TOOL AND PARTS
SNIPER RIFLES
ENSURE ITEMS
1005 COMPUTER WITH ACCESSORIES
POL EQUIPMENT (PUMPS, CONTAINERS, HOSES)
DENTAL OPERATING AND INSTRUMENT UNIT, FIELD
COMPRESSOR, AIR, PORTABLE
X-RAY SET, MOBILE, 50 MA
X-RAY SET, FIELD, 50 MA
STERILIZER, SURGICAL INSTRUMENT
STERILIZER, INSTRUMENT, ELEC HEATED
DISTRIBUTOR, WATER, TANK
BULLDOZER, D7E
RADAR, CHRONOGRAPH
DISTRIBUTOR, BITUMINOUS
GENERAL MECHANICS TOOL KITS
RADIO, PRC 77
TRAILER, WATER
RADIO, AN/GRC 163
TEL CEN, AN/MTC-1
RADIO, AN/GRC 122
ANTENNA, RC 292
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<td>RADAR, CM</td>
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<td>WRECKERS</td>
<td>RECOVERY VEHICLE, M578</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROADGRADERS</td>
<td>TRUCK, DUMP (ALL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOOPLOADERS</td>
<td>GENERATORS (3,10KW 400CPS)</td>
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<td>TRUCK, MSTD, CRANE 20TON</td>
<td>(30,60, 100KW 60CPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAN, Reefer, 7 1/2 TON</td>
<td>M16 AND ACCESSORIES</td>
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<td>TPS 25 RADAR</td>
<td>FORKLIFTS</td>
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<td>AIRMOBILE ENGINEER EQUIPMENT</td>
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Tab B (25% Critical Item List) to Appendix 6 (Equipment Processing) to Annex K (General Logistics) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

25% CRITICAL ITEM LIST

RADIO (VRC 12, 46, 47, 49, PRC 25, GRA 39)

* RADIO, AN/MRC 69

TRUCK 1/4 TON

* RADIO, AN/GRC 142

** FADAC

* EIGHT TAKEN TO HAWAII

** TEN TAKEN TO HAWAII
FLOW OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
(2D BRIGADE AND CRITICAL ITEMS)
FLOW OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
(REDEPLOYING UNITS)

UNIT

INSPECTION & CLASSIFICATION

LIMITED D/S

PROCESSING

STAGING

MCC

NEWPORT

PDO

K-6-D-1
Annex L (Management Techniques) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. ORGANIZATION

1. Notification of redeployment did not terminate any of the division's current mission requirements. It was therefore necessary to reorganize several agencies due to the added responsibilities attendant to redeploying the division.
   a. Redeployment Planning Group (RPG). The creation of the RPG, described in Annex A, did not entail a reorganization in itself. However, some of the key members of the RPG were committed to redeployment activities on a full-time basis and reorganization was required in the losing staff sections as a result.
   b. S3, DISCON. The S3 Section of Division Support Command received the added responsibility for CONEX container control. Thus, this section was reorganized to include a small element which monitored the CONEX status of the Division, controlled the issue of the containers, and coordinated the spraying, dusting, and sealing of CONEX containers. Once a container was sealed it became the responsibility of the Division Transportation Officer.
   c. Division Transportation Office. The Division Transportation Office was reorganized to accomplish a greatly increased scope of operations. The reorganization of this office is described in detail in Section VII of Annex J.
   d. Company E, 709th Maintenance Battalion. This unit became the turn-in point for the division's wheeled and tracked vehicles, small arms, and marine equipment. The company's maintenance mission was assumed by the other forward support companies of the battalion, and its area was cleared and prepared for its new mission. Additional personnel to conduct technical inspections were provided to Company E by the Saigon Support Command.
II. BRIEFING CHARTS

2. An effective method of monitoring progress and status of the redeployment is through graphically-portrayed statistics. The 9th Infantry Division used five briefing charts as management tools throughout its redeployment.

a. Redeployment Progress Chart. This chart is shown at Appendix 1. Progress in five areas was received from units as a daily report and was depicted in the five percentage columns on the chart using colored tape.

   (1) Prepare Equipment. This column displayed the cumulative percentage of a unit's equipment which was being prepared for turn-in or being processed for shipment.

   (2) Turn-in/Process Equipment. This showed the cumulative percentage of a unit's equipment which had been turned-in or processed for shipment.

   (3) Out/In Process Personnel. Each unit initially had many personnel assigned who would not be redeploying with the unit. These people had to be transferred out, and enough people had to be transferred into the unit to bring it up to its required redeployment strength. The cumulative percentage of these personnel transfers which had been completed was displayed in this column.

   (4) Hold Baggage. The cumulative percentage of the unit's personnel who had shipped their hold baggage was displayed in this column.

   (5) Admin Processing. The cumulative percentage of a unit's personnel who had completed Phase I out-processing (see Annex E) was shown in this column.

b. Redeployment Status Chart. The cumulative percentage of a unit's vehicles and CONEX containers which had been shipped to the surface port of embarkation was shown on this chart (see Appendix 2). Black progress indexes were used to depict the progress that the unit should have achieved by the current date.
c. Cumulative Movement Charts. Three charts of this type were used; vehicle, trailer, and CONEX movement (see Appendix 3, 4, and 5). On each the planned cumulative curve was plotted; and the achieved movement status was plotted in a different color on a daily basis. In this way it was readily apparent how the division stood with respect to where it should be.

III. BRIEFINGS

3. Briefings and meetings were used as vehicles to keep the command informed from the outset of redeployment.

a. Morning Briefing. Redeployment was incorporated into the daily morning tactical briefing in order to keep the Commanding General informed. Each of the charts described above was briefed as well as any new developments.

b. Redeployment Planning Group Meeting. The RPG met each evening. Each member of the RPG informed the other members of progress made and problems encountered in his area of interest. Representatives from subordinate units often attended these meetings in order to obtain advance information for their commanders.

c. Convoy Meeting. Each evening at 2000 hours a meeting was held at which each unit was required to be represented. The purposes of the meeting were for CONEX control, coordination for the following day's convoys, and dissemination of information on other phases of redeployment.

IV. NEWS MEDIA

4. All organic methods of disseminating information were used. The Division Newspaper, "Old Reliable", and radio program, "Delta 9", were especially effective as methods of informing the troops and dispelling rumors concerning redeployment.
Appendixes:
1 - Redeployment Progress Chart
2 - Redeployment Status Chart
3 - Cumulative Vehicle Movement Chart
4 - Cumulative Trailer Movement Chart
5 - Cumulative CONEX Movement Chart
### Re-Deployment Progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Out/In Process Personnel</th>
<th>Turn-In Equipment</th>
<th>Hold Baggage</th>
<th>Admin Processing</th>
<th>Prepare Equipment</th>
<th>% Complete</th>
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<td>4-39th Inf</td>
<td>40% 75%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
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<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2-39th Inf</td>
<td>30% July</td>
<td>30% 50%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
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<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-39th Inf</td>
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<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 1st Bde</td>
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<td>30% 50%</td>
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<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-39th Arty</td>
<td>30% July</td>
<td>30% 50%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-84th Arty</td>
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<td>30% 50%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Med</td>
<td>30% July</td>
<td>30% 50%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705th Maint</td>
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<td>30% 50%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Avn</td>
<td>30% July</td>
<td>30% 50%</td>
<td>25% 50%</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>30% 50%</td>
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**L-1-1**
## Redeployment Status

**Posted 10 Aug 89**

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Conex Containers</th>
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<td>1-64 ARTY</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>9TH SIG BN</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>9TH AV BN</td>
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**Percent at Newport**

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Appendix 3 (Cumulative Vehicle Movement Chart) to Annex L (Management Techniques) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (II)
Appendix 4 (Cumulative Trailer Movement Chart) to Annex L (Management Techniques) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)
Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

I. GENERAL

1. This annex contains samples of all documents used in the processing of personnel and equipment for redeployment.

II. EQUIPMENT

2. At Appendix 1 are the request forms for CONEX Loading and Inspection and for Spraying and Rodenticide Block Treatments. These forms were submitted by units to the central CONEX Control Agency (DISCOM S3) in order to have CONEX containers positioned and partially treated.

3. At Appendix 2 is the CONEX Certificate which was prepared as the container was dusted with Diazinon, inspected for narcotics and contraband, and received the rodenticide block. At Appendix 3 are the procedural guidelines for CONEX container processing.

4. Appendix 4 is the Packing Materials Request Sheet which lists the items needed to accomplish the various methods of packing and packaging. This sheet was used by units and by Support Command personnel to control the issue and use of critical packing materials.

5. Additionally, many standard forms were used in the course of outprocessing. The most complex of these, the Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD), required the dissemination of detailed instructions in order to insure proper preparation (see Appendix 5). The definition and handling of TAT cargo were not widely understood by members of the division. It was necessary to publish a letter to explain unit responsibilities and list sample loads (Appendix 6).

6. The form at Appendix 7 was turned in daily to the RPG by each redeploying
battalion or separate company. It served to show progress and to highlight potential problem areas.

III. PERSONNEL

7. In personnel processing, the division used the MACV Form 40-R, Declaration Certificate, (Appendix 8); 834AD Form 12, Emergency Data, (Appendix 9); and, standard MAC baggage tags along with explanation sheets (Appendix 10).

8. Each C-141 manifest form was completed as the sample at Appendix 11. The manifest form was prepared by the DISCOM staff and was designed to expedite final processing by complete plane load.

APPENDIXES:

1 - CONEX Processing Request Forms
2 - CONEX Certificate
3 - Procedural Guidelines for CONEX Container Processing
4 - Packing Materials Request
5 - Preparation of TCMD
6 - Air TAT Cargo
7 - Equipment Status Report
8 - MACV Form 40-R
9 - 834AD Form 12
10 - Forms Completion Instructions
11 - Sample Manifest
Appendix I (CONEX Processing Request Forms) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

LOADING AND UNLOADING REQUEST

DATE: ____________________________  TIME: ____________________________

UNIT: ____________________________  NO OF CONEX: ______________________

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: ________________  TEL NO: _______________________

BLDG NO: __________________________  REQUEST TAKEN BY: ________________

SPRAYING AND INCINERATOR BLOCK REQUEST

DATE: ____________________________  TIME: ____________________________

UNIT: ____________________________  NO OF CONEX: ______________________

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: ________________  TEL NO: _______________________

BLDG NO: __________________________  REQUEST TAKEN BY: ________________
CERTIFICATE

CONTAINER SERIAL NUMBER ___________________________ UIC ___________________________

CONTAINER SEAL SERIAL NUMBER ___________________________

1. I CERTIFY THAT ON ___________________________ 1969 THIS CONTAINER WAS DUSTED WITH DIAZIMOX.

NAME (PRINT) ___________________________ SIGNATURE ___________________________

RANK ___________________________ SSAN ___________________________

ORGANIZATION ___________________________

2. I CERTIFY THAT ON ___________________________ 1969 THIS CONTAINER WAS INSPECTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED AND IT CONTAINED NO NARCOTICS OR CONTRABAND MATERIAL.

NAME (PRINT) ___________________________ SIGNATURE ___________________________

RANK ___________________________ SSAN ___________________________

ORGANIZATION ___________________________

3. I CERTIFY THAT A RODENTICIDE BLOCK WAS PROPERLY PLACED IN THIS CONTAINER ON ___________________________ 1969.

NAME (PRINT) ___________________________ SIGNATURE ___________________________

ORGANIZATION ___________________________

DISTRIBUTION:

1-IN CONTAINER
1-SHIPPING UNIT
1-DIVISION TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

M-2-1
I. GENERAL

1. This appendix will include the following:
   a. Composition of dusting teams.
   b. The procedure used for scheduling CONEX containers to be dusted.
   c. Cleaning.
   d. Packing.
   e. Bracing.
   f. Dusting.
   g. Customs Inspection.

II. COMPOSITION OF DUSTING TEAM

2. The two dusting teams consisted of the following personnel:
   a. One representative of the DISCOM S3 office (NCOIC) who was responsible for the overall operation of the team, for the physical sealing of the CONEX as well as adding the serial number of the seal to the TCMD and certification form.

   b. One representative of the Provost Marshal's Office spot-checked CONEX containers for contraband on the initial date the unit commenced packing CONEX containers. In addition, when the team reported to a unit to seal the CONEX he again checked for contraband. With the addition of marijuana dogs, the dusting team was augmented with one dog handler and dog.

   c. A representative from the 61st Preventive Medicine Detachment certified that CONEX containers were dusted and that the rodenticide block was placed within the CONEX prior to sealing.
d. A representative from the Division Transportation Office was added to the team to make on-the-spot correction of TCMD's and markings on the CONEX containers. This individual was additionally responsible for hand carrying the completed TCMD back to the DTO to prevent a delay in processing the CONEX for shipment. Initially, a unit would attempt to consolidate TCMD's thus causing a delay in shipment of CONEX containers.

e. The final member of the dusting team was a civilian from PAGE who did the actual dusting.

III. SCHEDULING

3. In an effort to maximize utilization of the dusting team a scheduling program was established. All scheduling was controlled by the S3 DISCOM. Units were required to notify this office at least six hours in advance of the start of any packing of CONEX containers. This allowed the MP representative to be on-hand at the unit to make his initial check for contraband. Twelve hours prior to the sealing of any CONEX containers, units requested the dusting team. 12 hours advance notice gave sufficient time to schedule the team for an entire day. On the mornings that units were scheduled to have CONEX containers sealed, they were called to verify the location and number of CONEX containers to be sealed and to insure that a Customs Control Officer was on hand. In addition, a radio was placed with each team to aid in control as well as to inform the team of any possible change in their schedule.

IV. FORMS

4. To add to the control of the treating of CONEX containers three locally produced forms were found to be essential. The first was a material request form to control the issue of all packing and packaging materials. S3 DISCOM verified all requests for materials and then forwarded the forms to Scigov

M-3-2
Support Command personnel who in turn issued the materials to the unit. The second form was an inner office form to record unit requests for loading and inspection as well as dusting and sealing of CONEX containers. The third and final form was the certificate which was signed by the unit Customs Control Officer and the 61st FM Detachment representative. Distribution of the form was one copy in the CONEX, one copy to the shipping unit, and one to the Division Transportation Office which was attached to the TCMD.

V. HANDLING

5. Cleaning. Specific guidance was given to units as to the preparation of CONEX containers. It was a unit responsibility to clean the CONEX and to check serviceability of the CONEX prior to packing. Specifically, CONEX containers had to be free of holes and all dirt, mud, and vegetation had to be removed from inside the CONEX as well as from the runners and door frames. In addition the doors of the CONEX had to be checked to insure they closed properly. To avoid delay in processing during this step, units placed all stenciling on the CONEX as well as the prescribed unit symbol which assisted the unit in easy identification of their CONEX containers once they had arrived in Hawaii.

6. Packing. Packing was a unit responsibility. If technical assistance was required, the unit requested it from S3 DISCOM, and Saigon Support Command personnel were sent to the unit to assist them in packing CONEX containers. If additional special or oversized boxes were required, these were also requested from S3 DISCOM. Unit requests were turned over to Saigon Support Command who had contracted P&G to build any required special containers. Units were required to complete a packing list identifying all items packed in a CONEX container. One copy was required by the PMO, and the unit retained the second copy to assist them in identifying packed items. From all reports,
this procedure saved units many man hours in Hawaii when they started unpacking.

7. Bracing. If a unit required special bracing of material assistance was requested from S3 DISCOM. Teams from PA&E and the 15th Engineer Battalion were made available and scheduled for units upon request.

8. Dusting. As mentioned, dusting was accomplished by a civilian representative from PA&E under the guidance of the 61st PM Detachment representative. In addition, he placed a rodenticide block in each CONEX container.

9. Customs Inspection. Unit customs control officers certified that CONEX containers contained no contraband and the 61st Detachment representative certified that the CONEX was properly treated. This was the final step of the procedure developed to process CONEX containers, signal vans, and shop vans. Finally, the CONEX was sealed by the NCOIC of the team and the responsibility for movement was assumed by DTO.
Appendix 4 (Packing Materials Request) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 X 6 X 20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SOLVENT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAPER Coated on 1 side (200 yds)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barrier Material Coated on 2 sides</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Craft Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAPE 6&quot; Wide Green</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FOOT LOCKER (unserviceable)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONEX INSERTS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WOOD BOXES 40&quot; X 24&quot; X 20&quot;</td>
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<td>27&quot; X 19&quot; X 14&quot;</td>
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PICK UP DATE________________________
PICK UP TIME________________________

NCO/OIC PICKING UP MATERIAL ________________________
AUTHORIZED BY ________________________

H-4-1
Appendix 5 (Preparation of TCMD) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redevelopment After Action Report (U)

1. PURPOSE: This SOP provides guidance for the preparation of a Transportation Control and Movement Document (TCMD) for a unit deploying from or within YW4. Use of this guide permits preparation of the TCMD without reference to any other document. Appropriate MILSTAMP references are provided in the event additional information or clarification is required.

2. OCCURRENCE. a. Each vehicle, tank towed or tracked weapon, trailer, 'EX' container or group of containers, SEAVAN or MILVAN is a separate shipment unit.

b. A TCMD, with a unique non-repetitive TCN is required for each shipment unit. While it is permitted to put multiple shipment units on a single TCMD, this is not recommended.

c. The TCMD requires three basic types of entries:

1) Shipment unit prime entry (See 3a below)

2) Omit size dimension data (See 3b below)

3) Miscellaneous Information (i.e., Nomenclature) (See 3c below)

d. The TCMD will be coded with those codes prescribed herein. If desired, data may also be shown "in the clear", however, this does not void the requirement for coded data.

3. DOCUMENT PREPARATION. Using the DA Form 1801-2 (TCMD), the following entries will be made in the blocks indicated.

a. Shipment Unit Prime Entry:

1) Document Identifier Code (DIC), Block 32: A three position code identifying the type of entry and general type of shipment or document. (MILSTAMP Appendix F-1)

(a) For general cargo, enter TX1.

(b) For vehicles, trailers or wheeled gun, enter TX1.

(c) For 'EX' containers, enter TX1.

(d) For Seavan containers, enter TX2. This entry is a control entry for the van only and does not pertain to the cargo.

(e) For single shipment units consolidated into a Seavan container, enter TX1.
(2) Trailer/Container Number Code, Block 33: A five position code used to identify controlled containers, taken from the serial number of the containers.

(a) For general cargo leave blank.
(b) For vehicles, leave blank.
(c) For GONEX containers, enter the last 5 digits of the container serial number.
(d) For SEAVAL containers, enter the last 5 digits of the container serial number.
(e) For single shipment units consolidated into a container, leave blank.

(3) Consignor/Commodity Abbreviation Code, Block 34: An entry that identifies the consignor or unit which offers the shipment in all cases except the SEAVAL container.

(a) For all shipments except the SEAVAL, enter the activity address code or Unit Identification Code of the shipper.
(b) For the SEAVAL, enter SL-ED 35 which designates a 35 foot container owned by the SEA-LASH company.

(4) Commodity/Special Handling Code, Block 35: A five-position code which specifically identifies the cargo and special handling requirements.

(a) First three positions are as follows (See MILSTUFF Appendix B-1).

(1) For general cargo, enter 700.
(2) For vehicles or trailers with more than 2 1/2 ton capacity or less, enter 367.
(3) For vehicles or trailers with more than 2 1/2 ton capacity, enter 382.
(4) For vehicles, tracked, enter 876.
(5) For tank, combat, enter 864.
(6) For all type jeeps, enter 870.

(b) Second two positions are as follows (See MILSTUFF Appendix B-1)

(1) For heavy lifts (10,000 pounds or more) enter 77.
For outsize dimensions (over 6 feet in any direction), enter 25.

For heavy lift with outsize dimensions, enter 27.

For no exceptional handling, enter 22.

(c) Example of a completed code: 700ZZ.

(5) Air commodity/Special handling code, block 35: A two position code which identifies air shipments and special handling requirements. (See Inclosure 6)

(a) First position: (See MILSTAMP Appendix E-3)

(1) For construction materials, enter B.

(2) For Signal Corps equipment and radios, enter H.

(3) For medical supplies, enter M.

(4) For vehicles and vehicle parts, enter V.

(5) For weapons, enter W.

(b) Second position: (See MILSTAMP Appendix B-3)

(1) For cargo requiring protection from freezing, enter P.

(2) For extremely fragile items, including delicate instruments, enter Q.

(3) For sets or systems that must move together, enter S.

(4) For cargo requiring no special handling, enter Z.

(c) Example of completed code for radio equipment which must move as a set: FS.

(6) Air dimension code, block 36A: A one position code identifying the minimum size aircraft into which the cargo will fit.

(1) For a C123, enter C.

(2) For a C130, enter Q.

(3) For a C114, enter R.

(4) For a C12H, enter U.

(7) Port of Embarkation, block 36B: A three position code which identifies the air or water port at which the cargo is to be loaded. (See MILSTAMP Appendix E-13A and B-13B)

M-5-3
(8) "Port of Debarkation", Block 37: A three position code which identifies the air or water port at which the cargo transportation will end. (See MTSAMP Appendix B-13A and B-13B.)

(9) "Code of Shipment Code", Block 33: A one position code which identifies the mode of shipment within segments of the transportation pipeline.

(a) for Military Airlift Command (MAC), enter F.

(b) for Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) vessel, enter 7. Vessel may be MSTS owned, space chartered, or time chartered.

(c) for VESL service, enter V.

(10) "Type of Pack Code", Block 39: A two position code identifying the type of shipping container used. (See MTSAMP Appendix B-7)

(a) for bundle, enter B.

(b) for box, enter BX.

(c) for crate, enter X.

(d) for loose items enter L.

(e) for more than one type container in the same shipment unit, enter "X.

(f) for vehicle, enter V6

(g) for vehicle, operational, enter VO

(h) for palletized unit load, enter PT

(i) for CONEX container, enter X and one digit, based on the serial number of the container. If the serial number is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial Number</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Serial Number</th>
<th>Code</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>000,000 - 999,999</td>
<td>X0</td>
<td>100,000 - 599,999</td>
<td>X5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 - 299,999</td>
<td>X1</td>
<td>200,000 - 699,999</td>
<td>X6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000 - 399,999</td>
<td>X2</td>
<td>300,000 - 799,999</td>
<td>X7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000 - 499,999</td>
<td>X3</td>
<td>400,000 - 899,999</td>
<td>X8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400,000 - 599,999</td>
<td>X4</td>
<td>500,000 - 999,999</td>
<td>X9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(j) for "NAVY" containers, enter 2 and one digit based on the loading of the container.

(1) If loaded to capacity by Military Shipping Activity, enter 7.

(2) If loaded to less than capacity by Military Shipping Activity, enter 23.

(k) for a single movement unit consolidated into a CONEX container, enter type pack code in Block 37 of the TM entry. (See Disclosure 4.)
Transport: a control unit (CTU), block 50. A 17 position non-repetitive code which identifies each separate shipping unit.

(a) Non-VSC STR 5P TCN (Used for Unit Move)

(1) Position 1 thru 6: activity address code of activity assigning the CTU. For unit moves, enter unit identification code of the unit.

(2) Position 7: last digit of calendar year.

(3) Position 8 thru 10: Julian date.


(a) X - Red disc (Unit Move): items of equipment and supplies which will accompany a unit during movement but do not necessarily have to move on the same transportation conveyance as unit personnel.

(b) Y - Yellow disc (Unit Move): these items which must be accessible to the unit personnel during the movement and must therefore be loaded aboard the same transportation conveyance on which the unit personnel must move.

(c) Z - Other Organizational equipment (Unit Move): items of unit equipment and supplies, other than Red disc or Yellow disc, which are required subsequent to arrival of the unit at destination. (Does not include follow-on requisitioned material)

(5) Position 12-14: Shipment serial number

(6) Position 15: enter X

(7) Position 16: partial shipment code

(a) This code is applied only by shipping activities to indicate the release of a single shipment unit in more than one increment because of its size or other consideration.

(b) The first partial shipment will be identified by a and each consecutive shipment thereafter will be identified by b thru z. The last shipment will always be identified by z.

(c) If more than 25 partial shipments are made, non-VSC STR 5P TCN's will be used. The last shipment will be made under the original TCN with code Z as a partial indicator.

(8) Position 17: split shipment code.

(a) This code is applied only by transshipping activities to identify further splitting of shipment units.
(b) Not to be used by shipper. Always enter X.

(b) For a SFAVA; TC: Assigned by WMCA. Enter UIC only in Block 40 and enter the TSN of the shipment unit in the TSN entry. (See Inclosure 1.)

(12) Consignee, Block 41: A six position code identifying the ultimate consignee of the cargo. Enter the unit identification code of the receiving unit.

(13) Priority, Block 42: This is a one position code relating to "TSTAMP" priorities 1 thru 20. There are only four "TSTAMP" transportation priorities. If the "TSTAMP" priority is:

1 - 3 then enter 1
4 - 8 2
9 - 15 3
16 - 20 4

(a) Transportation priority 1 and 2: The preferred mode of shipment for transportation priorities 1 and 2 is airlift. Transportation by other high speed modes should be used when airlift is limited or inappropriate because of cargo size, classification, RDD or other traffic management consideration.

(b) Transportation priority 3: Will usually move by ordinary or expedited surface modes of transportation. Airlift will only be used when surface is not available or when the only access to the consignee is by air.

(14) Required Delivery Date (RDD) Code, Block 43A: A three position code determined by the shipper specifying the Julian date that the cargo is needed at its destination. The last three digits of the Julian date are used.

(a) For a SFAVA; container, leave block 43 blank except for 43E. Enter the inside cubic capacity of the container in this block. (See Inclosure 1)

(b) Enter the TAC code for the shipment consolidated in the SFAVA in block 43E of the TSN entry.

(15) Project Code, Block 43B: A code used to identify the project, if assigned, under which the shipment is made.

(16) Blocks 43C and 43D not used.

(17) Transportation Account Code (TAC), Block 43E: A four position code used to identify the DOD agency and transportation account chargeable for movement of material. For Army troop support movements, enter A205.

M-5-6
(18) Pieces, Block 44A: Total number of pieces in a shipment unit. (A 1-digit number preceded by zeros if necessary.)

(a) For COLEX container, enter 1.
(b) For SEAVAN, enter net weight of cargo.
(c) For general cargo, enter total pieces.
(d) For single shipment units consolidated into a container, enter total number of pieces.

(19) Weight, Block 44B: Total weight of the shipment unit. (A 5-digit number preceded by zeros if necessary.)

(a) For COLEX container, enter gross weight of container and cargo.
(b) For SEAVAN, enter net weight of cargo.
(c) For general cargo, enter total weight of shipment unit.
(d) For a vehicle with cargo, enter the total weight of vehicle and cargo.
(e) For a single shipment unit consolidated into a SEAVAN container, enter total weight of the cargo.

(20) Cube, Block 44C: Total cube, expressed in whole cubic feet, of the shipment unit. (A 7-digit number preceded by zeros if necessary.)

(a) For COLEX Type II (Standard Size) container, enter 365.
(b) For COLEX Type I (Half Size) container, enter 185.
(c) For SEAVAN container, enter total cube of cargo.
(d) For general cargo, enter total cube of cargo.
(e) For a single shipment unit consolidated into a SEAVAN container, enter total cube of the cargo.

b. OUTSIDE DIMENSIONS DATA ENTRY:

(1) OUTSIDE IDENTIFIER CODE (DIC), Block 32:

(a) For a vehicle, enter TV5.
(b) For other outside cargo, enter TX5.
(c) CONEX containers or SEAVAN containers do not require outside dimension entries.

(2) Block 33 leave blank.

(3) Commodity abbreviation Code, Block 34:
   (a) For a vehicle, enter model number. (See Inclosure 2)
   (b) For all other cargo, enter a commodity abbreviation. (See USSTAN Appendix B-4)

(4) Blocks 35 thru 42 leave blank.

(5) Remarks, Block 43:
   (a) Enter a 5 digit length followed by L, preceded by zeros if necessary. Example: 00185L.
   (b) Enter a 4 digit width, followed by W, preceded by zeros if necessary. Example: 0074W.
   (c) Enter a 4 digit height followed by H, preceded by zeros if necessary. Example: 0085H. (See Inclosure 2)

(6) Block 44 leave blank.

c. Miscellaneous Data Entry:

(1) DTC, Block 32:
   (a) For a vehicle, enter TV9.
   (b) For other cargo, enter TV9.

(2) Block 33 leave blank.

(3) Commodity abbreviation, Block 34:
   (a) If commodity code (USSTAN Appendix B-4) has been entered in 34 entry, leave blank.
   (b) If there is a 34 entry, enter commodity code as shown by USSTAN.

(4) Blocks 35 thru 42 leave blank.

(5) Remarks, Block 43:
   (a) For vehicles, make an individual TV9 entry for the following information:

   (1) Amount of cargo or CVN (in terms of boxes, etc.) loaded on the vehicle. (See Inclosure 2)

   M-5-8
(2) Nomenclature of the vehicle, i.e., T26 2½ Ton Cargo.

(3) AR 70-20 requires that all vehicles, weapons and containers be inspected and declared free of all dangerous or explosive material. (See Inclosure 2, 3, and 5)

(a) Inspection of vehicles, weapons (except small arms) and containers must be accomplished and shown on DA Form 9-1 or suitable substitute attached to the vehicle, weapon or container and signed by a commissioned officer. (See Inclosure 7)

(b) This is not to be confused with DA Form 1387-2, Special Handling/Data Certification, which is used for air shipments.

(h) For COREX containers, make an individual TIX entry for the following information.

1. A brief description, not more than 27 characters, of the shipment unit specified by the TCH consolidated inside the container.

2. The seal number of the container.

3. The certification.

(c) For a SEAEX container, make an individual TIX entry for the following information. (See Inclosure 4)

1. The seal number of the container.

2. The certification.

3. Enter a brief description of the shipment unit inside the container.

(d) For general cargo, make one TIX entry with a brief description of the cargo.

d. Address Marking:

1. Data elements for stencil address marking. (See Inclosure 11)

(a) TCH: Shown with a space between each of the data elements, e.g., WARSZA 9239 H203 XXX.

(b) ORD.

(c) Project code, if specified.

(d) Consignor: Coded and in the clear.

(e) Transportation Priority.

M-5-9
(f) Port of embarkation: (Port/APOE) Coded and in the clear.

(g) Port of debarcation: Coded and in the clear.

(h) Consignee: Coded and in the clear.

(i) Piece number: Not required for shipments or a single commodity in standard packs.

(j) Total pieces.

(k) Weight: Each piece.

(l) Tube: Each piece.

(?) Format requirements:

(a) Stencil markings:

(1) Line 1: _______

(2) Line 2: ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________

(3) Line 3: Consignor

(4) Line 4: POE

(5) Line 5: POD

(6) Line 6: Ultimate Consignee

(7) Line 7: __1__ of __12__ WT __________

(?) Label requirements: 'Military Shipment Label (DD Form 1387)' or 'Military Shipment Tag (DD Form 1387-1)' will be used for address marking under the following conditions: (See Inclosures 8 and 9)

(1) Air shipments.

(2) Transportation Priority 1 and 2 shipments.

(a) Priority 1: DD Form 1387

(b) Priority 2: DD Form 1387-1

(3) For marking unpacked items and containers with a surface too small to stencil.

(?) Color identification of Priorities 1 and 2:

M-5-10
(a) Transportation priority 1 or 2 will be identified by colored border and colored 1 and 2 on DD Forms 1387 and 1387-2. No color is authorized for priorities 3 and 4.

(1) Priority 1 - RFO (DD Form 1387)

(2) Priority 2 - RFO (DD Form 1387-1)

(b) Each shipping container, as identified by the type pack code, will be marked with the data elements mentioned in para 4 (1) by stencil, label or tag as appropriate.

(5) Then one or more shipment units are packed in multiple shipping containers for a single ultimate consignee and are consolidated into a 40/80, 20/40, 40/40 trailer, C-IV, palletized unit load or another consolidation container by the shipping activity for delivery as a unit to the ultimate consignee. Complete address marking is required only for the external consolidation container. The shipment unit containers consolidated therein will be marked only with the shipment unit TC, piece number, total pieces and consignee.

(6) Special Handling Data Certification. The special handling data certification (DD Form 1387-2) will be applied to each piece of cargo to be shipped via military air or commercial augmentation when it is necessary to identify the characteristics, precautionary measures and special handling instructions for the safe and proper handling of dangerous, hazardous, classified or other shipments requiring special handling. (See Enclosure 10).

(1) The shipping activity will enter the following: (See DD Form 1387-2):

(2) Receipt: In the clear geographic location of the ultimate consignee

(3) Inclement of Item: Specific nomenclature as shown in AR 71-1, *Handling of Dangerous Materials for Transportation by Military Aircraft* (Do not indicate nomenclature of classified shipments)

(4) Packaging: Indicate shipment characteristics, precautionary measures, loading or stowing instructions and all other details necessary for safe and proper handling prescribed by regulation as determined by the shipping activity.

(5) Net Explosive Weight (NEW): Indicate net explosive weight for classes 1 and 4 explosives only.

(6) Gross Weight: Indicate total weight of piece
(7) Certification: The shipper certification for dangerous material as prescribed by AP 71-4 will be indicated by reference to the packaging sub-paragraph number in the space provided on the DD Form 1387-2.

(b) Classified shipments will not be identified as Security Cargo or Classified Cargo on the outer container of the shipment. Classified shipments will be identified as Signature Service Required in the handling instructions block. Shipments that are both classified and dangerous will require the notation Signature Service Required and will specify special handling instructions and shipper certification as prescribed by AP 71-4.

(c) Distribution of DD Form 1387-2

(1) One copy of the completed form will be securely affixed to each container of the shipment unit and located adjacent to the military Shipment Label or Military Shipping Tag. Three additional copies will be forwarded to the terminal with the shipment.

(2) If the form contains a shipper certification, four of the copies will be signed. One signed copy will be placed on the number one piece of the shipment unit. The other three copies will be forwarded to the originating terminal operator along with the shipment as prescribed by AP 71-4. A copy of the completed form will be affixed to each additional container of the shipment unit but need not be signed.

III. STANDARDS OF CLEANLINESS


(1) All items of retrograde cargo will be cleaned to remove caked dirt or mud, trash and accumulations of excess grease and oil prior to departure RV:

(2) Vehicles, artillery, weapons and other similar equipment will be cleaned to include the removal of extraneous material from interior locations. Such material includes but is not limited to, ammunition, spent brass, ammunition components, explosives, toxic and/or flammable materials, human remains and trash.

(3) CONEX containers, overseas shipping crates and other reusable containers, closed wheeled and tracked vehicles, aircraft and tracked vehicles, aircraft and similar items of retrograde cargo will be processed for flea and rodent control after they are cleaned and prior to being closed and sealed for outloading.
(a) Rodent control treatment will consist of a thorough uniform dusting of the interior using 2 percent Diazinon dust (FSN 63H0-4S)-5033 at the rate of 4 pounds per 1000 square feet of floor space.

(b) Rodent control treatment will consist of placing at least one Paraffin-Diphacin rodenticide block (FSN 63H0-089-4664) in each CONEX or other container and in each closed vehicle. In RO/RO service vans or similar units and aircraft, the rodenticide blocks will be placed at the rate of 1 block per 5 linear feet. At least 1" feet of the red tape on one of the rodenticide blocks will be left projecting outside the closed container, vehicle, aircraft, or van to indicate that the above treatment has been performed.

1. Use of this guide should be sufficient to prepare accurate TCDs for the types of cargo mentioned herein. For any additional assistance consult "TSTA/P", your local Movement Control Center (MCC), or ACofS, Transportation, Documentation Officer (Phone LBN 3973/3974). Accurate documentation is the key to all successful cargo movements.

I. Enclosures
1. Sample TCD for General Cargo.
2. Sample TCD for Vehicle w/OUT.
3. Sample TCD for CONEX container.
4. Sample TCD for SEA-LAND container.
5. Sample TCD for Vehicle w/Cargo.
6. Sample TCD for Air Shipments.
7. TD Form 7-1.
8. TD Form 1377.
9. TD Form 1377-1.
10. TD Form 1377-2.
11. Illustration of STI: NTL YANKING.

M-5-13
## TRANSPORTATION CONTROL AND MOVEMENT DOCUMENT

### Table:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Cubic</th>
<th>Remarks and OR</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>WARVAA</td>
<td>96727</td>
<td>RG1</td>
<td>XE6</td>
<td>ZVE</td>
<td>WARVAA9239R164XXX</td>
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<td>TV9</td>
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<td>w/ Bx EQUIPMENT</td>
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<td>TV9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRK 2½ CARGO</td>
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<td>TV9</td>
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<td>CERT IAW AR 740-20</td>
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**Sample TCMH for Vehicle W/O VM**

**OD Form 1384-2, 1 Dec 66**

**Tag Case No. 3648**
## TRANSPORTATION CONTROL AND MOVEMENT DOCUMENT

### Column Headers:
- Date
- Time
- Consignor
- Consignee
- Car or Unit
- Control 

### Rows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Consignor</th>
<th>Consignee</th>
<th>Car or Unit</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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### Details:

- **TV1**
  - WARVAA
  - 9672Z
  - RG1
  - XR6
  - ZVE
  - WARVAA92398025XXX
  - WARVAA
  - 3
  - A205
  - 001 06700 0600
  - 00185L0074W0185H
  - TRK, CARGO, 3/4 TON
  - w/ BOXES CARGO
  - CERT IAW AR 740-20

**SAMPLE TCMD FOR VEHICLE W/CARGO LOADED**

---

**DD FORM 1384-2, 1 DEC 68**

**TAG CASE NO. 3648**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doc #</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Consignee</th>
<th>Commodity-Spec-Hauly</th>
<th>Adm</th>
<th>POI</th>
<th>TOL</th>
<th>Date Due</th>
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**NOTES:***

- **RADIO EQUIP**

**SAMPLE FOD FOR AIR SHIPMENT**
I certify that I have inspected (enter vehicle type and USA No. or container number) and that all weapons (except those considered an integral part of the vehicle), explosives, ammunition, ammunition components, packing materials, and trash have been removed.

(Signature)

James A. Mount
144 Ordnance
2D COS COMPANY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSPORTATION CONTROL NUMBER</th>
<th>RDD</th>
<th>PROJECT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT8149 6345 0010XXX</td>
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<td>ABC</td>
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<th>TRANS PRIORITY</th>
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<td>A2563H TOBYHANNA ARMY DEPOT</td>
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<tr>
<th>TO: (POE when applicable)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUU TRAVIS AFB</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FAIRFIELD, CALIF.</td>
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<td>SAIGON, VIETNAM</td>
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<tr>
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DD FORM 1387, 1 APR 65 EDITION OF 1 APR 63 MAY BE USED.
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<td>ABC</td>
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<tr>
<th>FROM:</th>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>TRANS PRIORITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>SUU TRAVIS AFB FAIRFIELD, CALIF.</td>
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<tr>
<th>POD (When applicable)</th>
<th>CONSIGNEE OR MARK FOR</th>
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<tr>
<td>SGN TAN SON NHUT AIR FIELD</td>
<td>AT8149 1st LOG COMMAND LOG AREA</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>total piece</th>
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**SPECIAL HANDLING DATA/CERTIFICATION**

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**DESTINATION**

FT. SHAFTER HAWAII

**HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS**

CONTAINS FLAMMABLE SOLVENTS

STORE IN A COOL, WELL-VENTILATED AREA AWAY FROM FIRE HAZARDS AND OXIDIZING MATERIALS, KEEP CONTAINER TIGHTLY CLOSED.

**ICC CLASS FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS--**

**RED LABEL**

**SHIPPER CERTIFICATIONS**

This is to CERTIFY that the contents of the packages in this shipment are properly described by name and are packed, marked, and in proper condition for transportation in accordance with:

- **SUBPARAGRAPH 6-12C(1)** for F1-4, TM 38-250, NAVMAMPS 13-02-990 AND MCO 4610-19
- **OFFICIAL AIR TRANSPORT RESTRICTED ARTICLES** for ICC 6, CAB NO. 62
- **OTHER (Specify)**
- **SHIPMENT WITHIN PASSENGER/CARGO AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS**

**SIGNATURE**

/s/ Joe Doaks, Capt.

**ATLANTA ARMY DEPOT**

**DATE**

USA

1-10-66
ILLUSTRATION OF STENCIL MARKING

TCN FB5644 9090 7800 XXX
RDD 126 PROJ 555 TP3
RD2030 TINKER AFB, OKLA
1GC T.O. MOTB RAYDNE, N.J.
HA4 SOUTHAMPTON, ENGLAND
FB5644 BENTWATERS RAF STA
SUFFOLK, ENGLAND

1 of 12 WT 1200 CU 110

Incl 11
M-5-24
Appendix 6 (Air TAT Cargo) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96370

AVD: CL

SUBJECT: Air TAT Cargo

See DISTRIBUTION

1. General. TAT ("To accompany troops") cargo will be moved to Hawaii by air concurrently with unit personnel moves to Hawaii. Cargo designated for air shipment will be prepared for shipment by the unit prior to departure from Dong Tam.

2. Unit responsibilities. a. Select items to be moved as air cargo.

   Maximum weight and cube allowances for each unit are specified in Appendix 2 (Air Movement Cargo Allowance) to Annex C (Movement) to OPORD 1-69 (U).

   b. Pack, process and prepare all cargo for air shipment. Unit customs and entomology officials will insure that customs and entomological standards are met and that proper certification of these actions is accomplished.

   c. Mark TAT cargo in accordance with current U.S.T.A.P directives, to include Transportation Control Number, Unit Identification Code, Port of Embarkation Code, Port of Debarkation Code and weight and dimension data.

   d. Load TAT cargo into vans positioned in the unit area. Boxed or crated cargo will be loaded into these vans for shipment to APOs.

   e. Prepare vehicles to be moved as TAT cargo in accordance with guidelines in F. 38-750 a. 74: 38-236. DD Form 1347-2 will be used to certify the condition of vehicles prepared for shipment. A unit driver will accompany the vehicle to the APOs, and he will rejoin his unit for redeployment at the APOs.

   f. Prepare TC.D's on all cargo to be shipped by air. One TC.D may be used for all boxed or crated cargo, showing total weight, cube and number of pieces shipped. Each vehicle to be shipped will be listed on a separate TC.D. Completed TC.D's will be turned over to DTO for disposition.

M-6-1
AVDE-GL
SUBJECT: Air TAT Cargo

3. Division Transportation Office responsibilities,
   a. Arrange for positioning of semitrailer vans in the unit area in sufficient time to permit loading of air TAT cargo.

   b. Arrange for movement of TAT cargo by van to the APOE in convoy the afternoon prior to unit personnel redeployment day.

   c. Provide staff guidance on loading procedures and coordinate movement of air cargo to the APOE.

4. Aircraft loading. C141 aircraft can transport ten (10) cargo pallets when configured solely for cargo hauling. Pallets are 108 inches by 88 inches. Nine (9) pallets can be loaded to a height of 96 inches, and the tenth to a height of 72 inches. Maximum cargo weight allowable is 2,642 pounds per pallet. However, maximum aircraft load is 60,000 pounds.

   a. In order to facilitate handling and palletizing, air TAT cargo should be packed in footlockers or standard sized boxes when possible.

   b. Sample type pallet loads using the standard boxes and crates provided to the division include the following:

   (1) 63 footlockers (32" x 16" x 13") and 39 cardboard boxes (18" x 12" x 7").

   (2) 32 crates (40" x 24" x 20") and 39 cardboard boxes (18" x 12" x 20").

   (3) 8 crates (60" x 40" x 20") and 16 crates (40" x 24" x 20").

   (4) 6 crates (60" x 40" x 30") and 16 crates (40" x 24" x 30").

   (5) 60 cardboard boxes (24" x 24" x 14") and 52 cardboard boxes (18" x 12" x 7").

   (6) 90 cardboard boxes (27" x 19" x 14") and 52 cardboard boxes (18" x 12" x 7").

   (7) 6 crates (60" x 40" x 30") and 48 crates (24" x 24" x 14").

   (8) 8 crates (60" x 40" x 20") and 48 crates (24" x 24" x 14").

   (9) One ½-ton truck.

   (10) Two ½-ton trailers.
SUBJECT: Air TAT Cargo

The above listed sample loads are not exclusive. Units may substitute field safes, field desks, records boxes and other items of similar size, weight and packaging within the size and weight restrictions of the aircraft. Units can insure that cube restrictions are met by marking off an area of proper dimensions (108" x 86" x 96") and using this as a guide.

5. Additional Information. Contact Division Transportation Office.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DISTRIBUTION:
A Plus
10 ZC
10 DTO

M-6-3
Appendix 7 (CONEX Status) to Annex M (Documentation) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

1. Status of Packing & Shipping

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<th>VEHICLES</th>
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2. Status of Turn-In

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<td>c. Total number of items turned-in</td>
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<td>Total shipped or turned-in</td>
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M-7-1
**Declaration Certificate**

(MACV Directive 63-1)

This form must be completed and signed by the certifying individual. All entries must be in ink.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last Name</td>
<td>First Name</td>
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</tbody>
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Organizational Assignment:

- [ ] Passenger
- [ ] Crew Member on Flight

To (place of entry) in (date) I do certify that I am personally aware of the contents of all my packages and baggage carried on this flight, that I did not and will not introduce any article or thing intended for resale or for financial gain, or any article of value of more than $10.00 for any person not enjoying duty-free privileges, or any of the following prohibited items on board this aircraft, on my person, in my hand or stowed baggage, or otherwise:

- Narcotics
- Marriages
- Explosives, Ammunition, or Fireworks
- Alcoholic beverages (in excess of one wine gallon)
- Privately owned Weapons (must be immediately declared for control purposes)
- Vietnamese currency in excess of $20.00
- Items in excess of demonstrable personal needs
- Gold or Silver Bullion
- Articles manufactured or produced in Communist China, North Vietnam, or North Korea
- Obscene or Pornographic Articles or Literature
- Printed Matter Advocating Treason or Insurrection Against the United States or Against Any Country With Which the United States Has Entered into a Mutual Defense or Assistance Agreement

Prohibited Items Will Be Listed Here. (If NONE, so state)

I do further certify that I have in my possession no currency or negotiable instruments other than the following in the amounts stated:

- [ ] United States Currency
- [ ] Military Payment Certificates
- [ ] Vietnamese Piasters
- [ ] Checks, Money Orders, etc.
- [ ] Other Currency

The following items are carried on this flight for the accommodation of the named United States national who are accorded duty-free importation privileges in Vietnam: (Do not list your own personal items).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Name, Rank, Organization of Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Due to incoming personnel only

APPLIES TO INCOMING PERSONNEL ONLY

The following items are carried on this flight for the accommodation of the named United States national who are accorded duty-free importation privileges in Vietnam: (Do not list your own personal items).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Name, Rank, Organization of Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Date

Signature of Person Accomplishing Form

Date

Signature of Customs Inspector Where an Actual Inspection of apparel has been made

**Caution**

1. All portions of your Declaration Certificate must be completed prior to departing.
2. Incomplete forms or forms not made out in ink will cause you delay at Customs Inspection.
3. The possession of any prohibited items in the Republic of Vietnam is a violation of Article 107, Uniform Code of Military Justice.
4. If you are in possession of any prohibited items, report directly to the base guard

MACV Form 40-R

Edition of 3 Feb 67 Edition of 3 Feb 60 may be used until supplies are exhausted
Appendix 9 (834AD Form 12) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

EMERGENCY DATA FORM

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LAST</th>
<th>FIRST</th>
<th>MI</th>
<th>RANK/RATE</th>
<th>SSAN</th>
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PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

ADDRESS OF PERSON TO NOTIFY

FLIGHT NO.

REMARKS

834AD FORM 12 Mar 67

M-9-1
Appendix 10 (Forms Completion Instructions) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

1. MACV Form 40-R.
   a. One copy per individual.
   b. Filled out in ink.
   c. "Flight Number" is Mission Number.
   d. "Place of Departure" is Bien Hoa.
   e. "Place of Entry" is __________.
   f. "Date" is __________.
   g. All items must be checked. Yes or No.
   h. Form must be signed by individual.
   i. Currency section should be completed after completion of currency exchange on the morning of departure.
   j. Completed forms will be collected by the Aircraft Troop Commander and placed in his manifest forms packet for presentation to the MAC representative at the APOE.

2. Emergency Data Form.
   a. Two copies per individual.
   b. Filled out in ink.
   c. Two copies to be brought to accompanied baggage turn-in. Both will be turned over to the manifest clerk at processing Station 8.
   d. One copy to be retained by MAC. One copy will be placed in the manifest forms packet and given to the Aircraft Troop Commander for delivery to the MAC representative at the APOE.

   a. One for each item of baggage to be checked, one for each war trophy firearm.
   b. Completion:
      Side 1.
      (1) "To" is __________.
      (2) "Mission Number" from manifest.
      (3) "Date" is date of departure.
      (4) "From" is Hoa.
      Side 2.
      (1) Name.
      (2) Rank.
      (3) SSAN.
      (4) Unit address (redemption) or home address (inactivation).
   c. Attach tag to baggage
   d. Individual retains claim as proof of shipment.

M-10-1
Appendix 11 (Sample Manifest) to Annex M (Sample Documents) to 9th Infantry Division Redeployment After Action Report (U)

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