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IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

I. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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   US Army Limited War Laboratory
   US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96370

AVSC-WG
15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (UST), APO 96375
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.
   a. (C) Introduction

   (1) During this reporting period, 1 November 1968-31 January 1969, the 9th Infantry Division continued operations in support of missions and tasks either specified or implied by the following Plans and Operational Instructions:


      (c) IV CTZ Dry Weather Campaign Plan, dated 13 November 1968.

      (d) Operational Instructions for 4th Quarter CY 68.

   (2) The mission of the 9th Infantry Division is to conduct sustained, coordinated combined air and ground operations to destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (NVA) Main and Local Force units and their installations and infrastructure in the TAOI; in close cooperation and coordination with Task Force 117, execute ground and riverine operations to interdict enemy land and water LOC and deny the use of their base areas and to destroy targeted Main and Local Force units; conduct consolidation and pacification operations to identify and destroy VC guerrilla units and infrastructure and secure population centers and LOC in close coordination and cooperation with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces; conduct supporting operations to further assist the GVN pacification program by enhancing the capability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF); and, b. contributing to the health and welfare of the civilian population. The 9th Infantry Division has successfully accomplished this mission by conducting operations in Gia Dinh, Long An, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Kien Phong Provinces.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD 5200.10
CONVIDENTIAL

AVIA-45

SUBSCT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969

15 February 1969

(3) The 9th Infantry Division was involved in combat during every day (92 days) of this reporting period while conducting five major operations that commenced, terminated, or continued during the reporting period. Operation K.DU terminated on 17 December, 1st December, Operation 3d Bn 39th Inf commenced as part of Operation K.DU, which terminated on 31 December. 3d Bn 39th Inf continued as part of Operation 411, which commenced on 1 January. Operations 1st and 2nd Divisions 7Th and 3d Battalions are continuing.

(2) In addition to the above listed operations, an element of the 9th Infantry Division, the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, participated in combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The squadron conducted mounted and dismounted patrols in areas as designated. Troop D remained at Dong Tam and participated in missions as assigned by division headquarters.

(5) There was a major change in division operations during the reporting period. This involved the exchange of missions and locations of the 1st and 3d Brigades on 13 November 1968. 1st Brigade, with four infantry battalions, now operates in Dinh Dau Province. 3d Brigade, with two infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion, now operates in Long An Province.

b. (c) Organization

(1) Since November 1968, the following units have been reorganized under the new Aiverine Division. The Aiverine organization was designed to maximize an infantry battalion's effectiveness for operations in inundated areas by eliminating non-essential military occupational specialties (Mos) and equipment.

Strength authorizations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>AGG</th>
<th>90</th>
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<tr>
<td>3d Bn 39th Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>19 Nov 68</td>
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<td>5th Bn 60th Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn 31st Inf</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Additionally, two infantry battalions were reorganized under the Infantry Battalion, Light Infantry Division 1308 based on area of operations and mission assignments of the division.

Strength authorizations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>AGG</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>EFF DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn 60th Inf</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Bn 39th Inf</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AVDE-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(3) As part of the DA directed Standardization Plan, the following units of the division base were reorganized under the "G" Series TOE.

Strength authorizations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>ACC</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>EFF DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>9th Admin Co</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>545</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th MP Co</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHC and Band</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>775</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th S&amp;T Bn</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>775</td>
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<tr>
<td>709th Maint Bn</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th Engr Bn</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>775</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHC, DIV ARTY</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>775</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHC, 9th Div</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 1st Bde</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>97</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Med Bn</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Sig Bn</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>25 Nov 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The following unit was updated from the "E" Series to "G" Series MTOE.

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<td>3</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>19 Nov 68</td>
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</table>

(5) The following unit was reorganized as a riverine artillery battalion to provide required support for the second riverine brigade, the 5th Brigade.

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<th>ACC</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>EFF DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn 11th Arty</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>14 Nov 68</td>
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</table>

(6) The following unit was organized to provide support for the second riverine artillery battalion, the 1st Bn, 11th Arty.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969. RSN CSFOR-65 (HI) (U)

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<td>31st Trans Co</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>6 Nov 68</td>
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</table>

(7) Organizational Structure - Incl 1

(8) Roster of Key Personnel - Incl 2

(9) Division TAOI - Incl 3

c. (C) Personnel and Administration

(1) General Data: See Inclosure 4 for information and statistics concerning the following:

(a) Maintenance of unit strength.

(b) Personnel Management.

(c) Development and maintenance of morale.

(d) Maintenance of discipline, law and order.

(2) Significant Activities:

(a) Headquarters Commandant: During this quarter the mission of the Headquarters Commandant Section was reduced. All major construction activity was turned over to 9th Division engineering units. Only minor maintenance activities are accomplished by Headquarters Commandant Section. Headquarters Commandant Section continued to be responsible for billeting and messing of 9th Division headquarters officers and for the soil stabilization, landscaping, and drainage of the 9th Division Headquarters area.

(b) Tiger Scouts: The 9th Division Tiger Scout Program has made significant advances. At the end of this reporting period the Division was employing 322 Tiger Scouts. Prior to this quarter we were allocating our scouts two per platoon. Field experience has proven that greater continuity and more corps are attained when a Tiger Scout is assigned to a specific squad. The scout then works as a member of a team. To provide one scout per squad we received permission from USARV to hire 117 more scouts for a total of 447. A booby trap training program was started to instruct our scouts in detection and disarming of booby traps recently developed by the Viet Cong. The program was begun to aid in reducing the number of booby trap casualties suffered in the Division.

c. (C) Intelligence

Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

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(a) Discussion.

1. General. This reporting period was broken down into five main periods. The first period ran from 1 November to 4 December 1968. During this time the enemy was in the process of receiving replacement troops and supplies, and, in general, preparing himself and the population for the "Dong Xuan" or Winter-Spring Offensive. The second period ran from 5 December to 24 December 1968. During this time frame, enemy initiated activity, mainly in the form of attacks by fire, increased throughout the Tactical Area of Interest (TA01). There were coordinated attacks on friendly installations on the nights of 5-6 December and 12-13 December. Agent reports indicated that another peak of activity was to occur on the night of 20-21 December, but these attacks failed to materialize, probably due to enemy fears that their plans had been compromised. The third period, encompassing the Christmas and New Year truces and running until 10 January 1969, was another period of rest, regrouping, and resupply. There were eleven enemy violations of the Allied Christmas Truce period reported in the TA01; but, in general, the enemy honored the truce. During the fourth period, from 10 January to 21 January, the enemy completed a second phase of the Winter-Spring Offensive. This phase consisted of an increase of attacks by fire on friendly installations and district and provincial capitals. The fifth phase, running to the end of the reporting period, seemed to be another breathing spell for the enemy, perhaps to plan for another peak of activity during the Tet holiday period. Throughout the reporting period the enemy was keeping his forces as widely dispersed as possible and was attempting to avoid contact with Allied Forces. On 25 January, however, a 9th Infantry Division LRP team, operating in Kien Hoa Province, approximately six kilometers southwest of VC Island, made contact with an estimated 25 VC. Four companies of the 3d Brigade "piled on" and the contact resulted in 85 enemy killed. Captured FVs identified the enemy force as an element of the K6 Battalion of a 320th Regiment. A Hoi Chanh from the same unit confirmed their identification. The substance of their statements was that the 320th Regiment is moving into the U.S. 9th Infantry Division TAC with instructions to attack an unknown city. The subordination of the 320th Regiment has not been determined.

2. Long An Province: Captured enemy documents confirmed the enemy's intent to remain dispersed and avoid contact. Due to FV reports it is believed that the headquarters of SR-3 has moved from Binh Phuc District to Can Duoc District in the vicinity of My Le Village. The battalions of SR-2 (1st, 2nd, Dong Phu, 265th, and 520th battalions) remain scattered throughout the subregion in platoon and squad sized elements. The 520th battalion appears to have dropped out of sight entirely in Long An Province. The last contact with this battalion occurred on 17 October and the last report of the battalion came from a Hoi Chanh on 3 November. Since 1 January 1969, a number of reports of a 520th battalion in Kien Hoa Province were received. It is not known whether this is a new 520th battalion or whether the old 520th moved back to Kien Hoa, where it was originally formed and was operating until June 1968. The enemy continued to use the Van Co Tay and the Van Co Dong as major infiltration routes, but also began to use the Bo Bo Canal as an alternate LOC.
Slowly and with redoubled caution, the battalions in Long An were reinforced and resupplied during the first part of the reporting period. On 15 December, a member of the MI cadre of Can Duoc District, Nguyen Van Be, was captured. He was responsible for making maps of VC comms-liasion routes in Long An Province. Information gained from this POW was exploited resulting in interdiction of known routes. VC resupply activity into Long An and Go Cong has become more difficult because of improved Allied intelligence concerning enemy LOCs and the US interdiction of these LOCs through the Navy's Operation "Giant Slingshot". The enemy has also lost some key personnel, especially members of his rocket units. On 12 November the CO, XO, and a SGT of the 7th H-12 Rocket Company were captured in Can Gioc District. On 13 December, an estimated company size force engaged the US 2-60 Infantry Base Camp in Tan Tru with 60mm and 82mm mortars, 107mm rockets, RPGs, automatic weapons and small arms. This enemy initiated ground action resulted in two US killed and 45 US wounded. Some of the enemy's smaller scale actions were almost as deadly. On 6 January, a B/2-60 listening post was attacked by an estimated VC platoon in what was described as a very thoroughly reconed effort. Attacking from two directions, the enemy killed three US soldiers and three Popular Forces soldiers. After the thirty minute fire-fight, the enemy force withdrew to the north. Toward the end of the reporting period, however, even friendly initiated incidents had decreased significantly. On the other hand, reconnaissance continued to show signs of enemy activity.

Dinh Tuong Province: The enemy continued to feel the pressure of Allied operations throughout the province. Base Area 470 was no longer a relatively safe area for the seven battalions (261A, 261B, 263, 267B, Kien Phuong 502, 514A and 514C) which use it as a refuge. Examples of this pressure are plentiful. On 23 December, elements of the lst Brigade rendered combat ineffective two local guerilla units in a contact near Cai Nua. Forty-six VC lost their lives and eight POWs were captured. On the night of 6-7 January, nine kilometers southwest of Long Hiep, the lst Brigade killed 52 VC. Documents captured in the area identified the unit as the Kien Phuong 502 VC battalion. On 14 January, CIDG elements killed 96 VC and captured two POWs in southwestern Base Area 470; one of the POWs identified the unit contacted as the 261B Main Force Battalion. That same day elements of the 3-39 Infantry killed 19 VC of an unidentified unit three kilometers northwest of Cai Lay. There was excellent coordination between the 2-39 Infantry and Giao Duc District forces in combined operations in southwestern Base Area 470. On 24 December, a Ho Chi Minh agreed to lead US troops to a VC POW camp in Cai Be District, which allegedly contained a US prisoner. Troops were inserted and the VC reportedly decoyed them to the west, while they moved the prisoner to the east. The operation was terminated because of the Christmas Truce. On 12 January, a mine exploded under the Long Dinh Bridge, destroying 15% of the bridge. On 13 January, 44th Special Tactical Zone elements captured 45 107mm rocket rounds and one twelve-tube 107mm rocket launcher. A POW captured during the operation conducted in Kien Phuong Province stated that the rockets and launcher were bound for Dinh Tuong Province.
There have been no indications of 107mm rockets used in that province. Three PWs were captured in western Dinh Tuong on 25 December, 28 December, and 17 January. They have stated that they were from the 273rd battalion. One of the PWs stated that the 273rd battalion was supposedly formed in December 1968. Since January, the enemy has stepped up his attacks by fire, with the My Tho-Dong Van-Vinh Kim area being the primary target. On 25 January, an estimated two VC companies attacked the 174th RE Company compound, vic XS 5054, with 60-70 RPG rounds, 100 82mm mortar rounds, small arms and automatic weapons. The VC force closed to within 100 meters of the perimeter before they were killed. This attack was the largest and most intense attack on a military installation during the past four months and may have been staged in an effort to relieve the pressure being applied by Allied forces in western Dinh Tuong.

Go Cong Province: Enemy activity in Go Cong Province decreased further from the low level of the previous reporting period. The 514B battalion remains in western Go Cong, but has not been active. Enemy-initiated activity has been limited to two or three attacks by fire and one or two terrorist incidents. It appears that an aggressive Revolutionary Development Program has severely disrupted the local infrastructure. Provincial forces in Go Cong have coordinated with Long An Provincial officials to hunt the VC in areas near Go Cong. On 20 December 1968, the inhabitants of Dong An Village led the members of a 9th Division Support Command Nitecap to a VC monument, which had been standing since 1962.

Kien Hoa Province: The 2d Brigade's Mobile Riverine Operations in Kien Hoa Province have disrupted the enemy's forces. Denied security in their formerly safe base area, the enemy's only safe recourse was to mix with the local population when Allied forces entered areas in which they were operating. This tactic could cost them the support of the local populace, who have become the innocent victims of contacts between Allied and VC forces. Occasional reports of enemy activity in former Base Area 473 in eastern Binh Dinh District and former Base Area 475 in eastern Thanh Phu District were received during the reporting period. A new battalion, the 560th, was formed in Don Nhon District in November 1968. There were also reports that a Battle Group, called the First Battle Group, had been formed in Kien Hoa. This Battle Group is comparable to the Dong Thap I and Dong Thap II Regiments and has operational control over the 516th, the 550th, and the 560th Battalions. The heaviest loss to the enemy came as a result of two B-52 strikes in Central Giong Tien District on 29 December which resulted in 25 secondary explosions. Agent reports submitted after these strikes indicated that between 50 and 100 enemy were killed. The KIAs were probably members of the 516th Battalion. At the end of December reports of the 520th Battalion in Kien Hoa were received. It is not known whether this is a new 520 Battalion or whether the old 520 Battalion had returned to Kien Hoa. It is believed that Tu Ket, the political officer of the old 520 Battalion, is in Kien Hoa Province. As of 26
January Base Area 474 was no longer an official base area, but a new base area, 490, has been established in central Giong Tron District and the panhandle portion of Truc Giang District.

(b) Recapitulation.

<table>
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<th>EFFECTIVENESS</th>
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</tr>
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<td>CE</td>
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<td>S of Tay Minh City</td>
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<td>CE</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Regt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>261 A</td>
<td>Eastern Base Area 470</td>
<td>300</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>261 B</td>
<td>Central Base Area 470</td>
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<td>MCE</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>24 Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>514 A Bn</td>
<td>North Central Cai Lay (D)</td>
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<td>514 C Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>273 Bn</td>
<td>Southwestern Long Dinh (D)</td>
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<td>MCE</td>
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## Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR (R1) (U)

### Combat Unit Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Location</th>
<th>Strenght</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Go Cong Tri-border Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giong Trong (D)</td>
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<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co sized element in E Kien Hoa</td>
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<td>CE</td>
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<td>S of Ben Tre</td>
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<td>NW of Tra Vinh City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southeastern Kien Phong, W of Base Area 479</td>
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<td>MCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Central Kien Tuong</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** CE - Combat Effective; MCE - Marginal Combat Effective; NCE - Non-Combat Effective.

### Enemy Tactics and Techniques

The enemy has continued to remain dispersed in small groups to avoid contact. With this dispersal, there has been a further increase of booby trap and mining incidents. However, this tactic has worked to the enemy’s disadvantage on at least two occasions during the reporting period. In attempts to evade US forces, the VC have run into their own booby traps. There have been various reports of sapper units being trained in bridge demolition. These reports have been substantiated by the destruction of minor bridges in the TAOI, presumably as practice runs. On 21 December, at the Tan An Bridge, members of the 64th BP Company killed two VC in the Van Go Tay River and captured a third. A raft was found with 24 cans, each containing 60-70 lbs of Chicom block TNT. The initiating charge was 10 lbs of US C4 sensitized with 24 non-electrical blasting caps. The primary detonators were four Soviet chemical delay devices with approximately 18 minute delay capability. The enemy destroyed 1% of the Long Dinh Bridge on 12 January. On two separate occasions there have been attempts to use 107mm rockets in a direct fire mode. On 4 December, the 2-60th Infantry sweeping the perimeter of their Base Camp at Tan Tru after a contact the previous evening, discovered six 107mm rockets affixed to bamboo poles and pointed directly into the camp. Two of the rocket motors were turned out. On 28 December, 5-60th Infantry elements at Can Gluoc found five 107mm
rockets on bamboo launching stakes aimed at the 5-60 Infantry Base Camp, and a sixth rocket was ped in matting and with launching stakes nearby. These are the first known attempts to use the 107mm rocket in direct fire mode. The enemy has also become more sophisticated in his use of mortars. He consistently emplaces his mortars so that mortar flashes are difficult to detect from the air and the noise difficult to pinpoint on the ground. Also there are reports of boat hunter teams operating in Kien Hoa Province. These teams are presumably armed with 70mm, 6-40 and 5-41 rockets. Their mission is to attack US patrol boats operating on waterways in the province.

(d) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses

KIA 3221
DET.Inf.S 1507
FW 313
CHIEN HOI 58
CROSS-SEAMED WEAPONS (C/S) 22
SMALL ARMS (SA) 1,936
AMMO (rds) 5787
MINES 1920
GRAIN (tons) 8,925
SAPANS 535
STRUCTURES 1829
BUNKERS 6074

(e) Intelligence Sources and Agencies

Progress continued during the reporting period in the identification of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VC) operating within the Division T.CI. The Computer print-out black list previously compiled and published by the Counterintelligence Section was discontinued in favor of the village study black list. Under the new system, the CI Section maintains a card file containing VCI names and related information for each village in Dinh Tuong Province. From these files, VCI data can be collected and published as a village study.
These studies can be more easily utilized than the former computer blacklist. During November and December studies for each village in Dinh Tuong Province were compiled and published. These studies contained information on the structure and security status of the village, a list of VCI held by the CI Section to operate in the village, and information concerning shelter locations used by the village VCI. Several of these studies have already been updated and all will be updated as soon as more information becomes available. In Long An Province and Kien Hoa Province, the village files which the CI Section had begun have been combined with files maintained by the respective province PHOENIX Advisor. The CI Section has a representative who is responsible for helping to develop village files, working with the PHOENIX Committee in these provinces. The files maintained by Long An Province PHOENIX Committee are quite extensive and village studies and other information are available when required for specific operations. The files maintained by the Kien Hoa Province PHOENIX Committee have only recently been initiated and are not yet complete.

2 The CI Section, through its contact with the Province PHOENIX Committee, is able to provide VCI targets for the Division. Targets normally take two forms: targets developed by the PHOENIX Committee through the Vietnamese agencies; and targets developed by the CI Section. The PHOENIX targets are usually of a perishable or immediate nature, whereas the CI Section targets are long-range and the result of detailed analysis of available information. In either case, when the potential target information becomes available, the CI Section will immediately begin compilation of a target folder. These folders contain all intelligence information available on the target which the CI Section maintains in its files, such as VCI personalities and suspected shelter locations. When the target folder is fully developed, the CI Section will pass it to G2 or to the Brigade S2 for reaction. By the use of these folders, both the quality and success of VCI elimination operation should improve.

3 The Division Interrogation Section processed 1507 detainees. Of this total, 503 were classified Innocent Civilians, 833 were classified Civil Defendants, 513 were classified PW, and 58 were classified Ho Chi. In addition, the section processed 294 batches of captured documents, 273 of which were of tactical value. The section also processed approximately 1142 pounds of captured material, consisting primarily of medical supplies and Viet Cong clothing and equipment.

4 Long Range Patrol Activities

During the reporting period, Company E, 50th Infantry (LRP) continued to perform its mission of harassing and interdicting the Viet Cong deep within the Mekong Delta Base Areas to provide a more extensive coverage within the TAOD. Division LRP's were deployed from forward locations: two eight-man patrols were deployed from 1st Brigade Base Camp at Fire Support Base Loore in Dinh Tuong Province; two eight-man patrols were aboard the MRF in Kien Hoa Province; and two eight-man patrols were based at the 3d Brigade Forward CP at Tan An in Long An Province. One eight-man
Patrols, based at Nha Be, continued its mission of waterway reconnaissance along the Song Nha Be. The Company (-) remained at Division Main at Dong Tam. 217 patrols were conducted during the reporting period with contact developed 102 times. There was a marked increase in reactions to LRP sightings during the period. Of the 101 sightings during the reporting period, Division reacted with artillery, air, and ground forces on 84 occasions. One of the largest single contacts within the Division during the period came as a direct result of a reaction to a LRP sighting. On the evening of 29 November, a Long Range Patrol inserted west of Cam Son (V), Cal Be (D) Dinh Tuong Province and sighted an enemy force. The team immediately reported the sighting. Troop insertions were made at first light and contact broke four hours later. Results were 84 Viet Cong killed and 7 NW taken. Long Range Patrols were credited with 67 VC KIA (2C) and 11 NW/LF FW captured during the period. LRP's and a Division Tracker Team were credited with uncovering a cache of 14 AK-47's, 34 82mm rds, 30 RPG rds, 35 AK-47 magazines, 36 sets of web gear, 6 cans of MG links and one case 7.62 ammunition.

Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance

During the reporting period, infra-red and SLAR sensors continued to detect approximately 20 targets each night. More effective use of aerial photography for intelligence targeting was achieved during the period. Aerial photography was proven useful in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign for confirming locations of structures used by VC infrastructure. The major innovation during this period was creation of a division targeting section comprised of G2 Air personnel. One additional EM was required for the project, bringing the strength of the G2 Air section to two officers and three EM. The targeting section has the responsibility, previously assigned to G2 Plans, G3 Air, and G2 Air, for recommending targets for TAC Air, artillery, and B-52 strikes and providing intelligence as desired by G2, G3 and subordinate units. Target recommendations are made utilizing a "target booklet" consisting of 21 1:50,000 scale maps of the TA01 with 6 drops for each map. The booklet is assembled as follows, using clear acetate and the most transparent tracing paper available:

Base Map - Installations from Imagery Interpretation Reports.

Tracing Paper, 1 drop - Red Haze (infra-red) readouts for 12 month period. For CY 1968, only eight months were available.

Tracing Paper, 1 drop - SLAR readouts for 12 months. For CY 1968, only eight months were available.

Acetate, 4 drops - The 9th Inf Div INTSUMs are plotted weekly, thus providing a one month coverage of enemy contacts, agent reports, PW and detainee readouts, ground surveillance radar readouts, and aircraft receiving fire reports. By "piling on" the information from the above sources for any area of interest intelligence is derived for targeting purposes.
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6 Significant Activities and New Techniques in the Area of Aerial Reconnaissance.

a The Imagery Interpretation Section, consistent with its basic mission, received and processed 204 aerial photographic missions during the reporting period. From these missions a total of 111 Imagery Interpretation Reports were prepared and distributed. In response to specific requests this section prepared 16 photo mosaics, 6 defense overlays, 6 target folders, 18 special targeting readouts, and two hand held missions.

b 184 photographic missions were cut and packaged with field plots for dissemination to 9th Infantry Division units.

c New Techniques. Targeting folders for Base Areas in the Division's TAOI were assembled to facilitate fast, comprehensive briefing of commanders. The targeting folders are composed of annotated photography with accompanying installation overlays. During November, December, and January the 9th Infantry Division Chemical Section continued personnel detection operations, application of Riot Control Agents, and defoliation missions in support of 9th Infantry Division operations.

(f) Weather and Terrain

During the reporting period the weather continued to have little adverse effect on either friendly or enemy operations in the TAOI. The most adverse effects on friendly operations were the result of "buffeting" of aircraft and air-cushioned vehicles, by winds of up to 30 knots. Some limitations were also imposed by early morning fog. However, these were generally negligible, the fog normally lifted by mid-morning. Waterborne operations in smaller canals and rivers must take the tides into account, especially if larger craft are being used.

(g) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action

1 The enemy has the capability to:

a Conduct multi-battalion attacks on province and district seats, other major cities, and military installations.

b Conduct attacks by fire and harass towns, village, hamlets, outposts, and other installations.

c Conduct sniper and other terrorist attacks on key bridges, roads, RD projects, and population centers.

d Defend base areas and positions with local security forces and reinforce with forces within four km radius.
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Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSOR-65 (HF) (U)

a. Move multi-battalion forces to attack positions at a maximum rate of 14 km per night.

f. Disperse major units into company and platoon sized elements.

g. Withdraw and disperse his units at any time.

h. Wage political and psychological warfare, tax the populace, and hold control of any area where there is no friendly security at night.

i. Position forces in forward base areas throughout the TACI in order to enhance his ability to control the population of such areas. By so doing, he can claim nominal control of these areas in the event of a cease-fire.

2. The enemy is vulnerable to:

a. Loss of control/support of the population.

b. Friendly superior artillery and air power.

c. Interdiction of the LOCs and loss of cached supplies.

d. Disclosure or capture of attack plans.

e. Detection by friendly surveillance devices.

f. A breakdown of his infrastructure by aggressive Allied actions.

3. Probable Enemy Courses of Action:

a. Intensify population control efforts by the use of terrorism.

b. Continue interdiction efforts on the LOCs with emphasis on Hwy #4.

c. Continue to attempt offensive action against the Saigon Complex.

d. Attempt to evade decisive engagement with US forces.

e. Conduct multi-battalion and smaller attacks on minor targets for propaganda purposes.

f. Harass and attack primary targets by fire.

g. Continue efforts to secure base areas and LOCs.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(1) There was a total of five major operations either initiated, terminated, or in progress by the 9th Infantry Division during the period 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969. The enemy continued his resupply and reorganization missions with emphasis on recruiting and winning the support of the local population in contested areas. He further intensified his efforts to retain control of those areas which are under his domination. The enemy has been extremely reluctant to enter into decisive engagement with FWMF and has remained in a fragmented configuration. Airmobile assault, Eagle Flight, Checkerboard, Bushmaster, and Cordon and Search operations continued to keep the enemy on the defensive. Target acquisition by radar during the hours of darkness continues to provide targets for Artillery and Night Hunter operations. The enemy's offensive activity was characterized by harassment of outposts, mining of roads, and extensive use of sapper units.

(2) The following new techniques were implemented during the reporting period:

(a) The "Night Hunter Operation" was initiated. This is a concept developed to obtain maximum, immediate results from night target acquisition devices such as radar, SLAR and Red Haze. Once a target is located, an artillery TOT is planned to cover the target area. An Air Cav Troop is scrambled and flies to the suspected enemy location. The artillery TOT and Cav element are coordinated to arrive over the target area at the same time. If the Cav sights a valid target, they engage, and should the situation develop favorably, ground forces are inserted.

(b) Night Search Operation: This concept provides night interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and LOC over a large area not supported by artillery fire. The operation centers about an air cavalry troop. A spotter aircraft carrying riflemen (Spotters) with starlight scopes is followed by a flareship and light fire team. When the spotters detect a target, they mark it with a full-tracer burst of rifle fire, the flareship provides illumination, and the LFT engages the target. The aerorifle platoon, following the LFT, may be inserted to exploit the target more fully or to assess damage. Ready-reaction forces, to include artillery and TAC air, are on alert to exploit a large contact.

(c) Sniper Program: An active sniper training program was initiated. Snipers are equipped with match grade M-14 rifles with starlight scope or adjustable ranging telescope (ART). As of 31 January, the sniper teams in the division have killed a total of 91 VC in 65 separate contacts.
(3) Combat Operations:

(a) TOAN THANG II. The 1st Brigade continued Operation TOAN THANG II in Long An Province with three infantry battalions (2-39, 3-39, 2-60) and one mechanized battalion (2-47). The 2-47 Inf (Mech) performed the mission of road, bridge, and convoy security along Highway 4. From 31 October to 3 November, elements of the 3-39th Inf, gunships and scout ships of A Troop 3-17th Cav, and batteries of the 2-4th Artillery conducted Night Hunter operations east of Can Giooc. Reacting to radar sightings and engaging targets under illumination, the maneuver elements of the 3-39th and 3-17th Cav accounted for 47 VC (BC) and 11 Sampans. On 13 November, the 3d Brigade assumed responsibility for Operation TOAN THANG II with 2-47 Inf (Mech), 2-60 Inf, and 5-60 Inf. 3-39 Inf became OPCON to 1st Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province on 24 November 1968. Sporadic contact continued throughout the remainder of November with the following results: 226 VC (BC) and 37 FW. Contact by elements of the 3d Brigade with small groups of enemy resulted in 26 killed on 6 December and 33 killed on the 7th of December, at a cost of 1 US KIA. On 130000 December, the Viet Cong launched an attack by fire against the base camp of the 2-60 Inf at Tan Tru, vic X5 669631, which lasted approximately three hours. Results were 33 NVA killed (BC) and 2 US KIA with 45 WIA. The enemy remained fragmented in small groups during the month of December, resulting in sporadic contact. On 25 January Companies C and D, 5-60 Inf, made contact vic MX 439680 with an estimated enemy company. Companies A, B, and D, 2-60 Inf were inserted to seal the area with artillery, air strikes, and Air Cav supporting. Contact continued on 26 January as the area was swept. Final results were 78 VC (BC), 2 HO and 2 FW. The 1st and 3d Brigades conducted operations from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969 in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The following operations were conducted to upgrade the 41 target hamlets in Long An Province: 403 combat operations, 450 ICAP, 232 MECAP, and 195 PSIC operations. The following are the cumulative results of TOAN THANG II.

FRIENDLY LOSSES: 204 US KIA, 1198 US WIA.
ENEMY LOSSES: 2671 VC KIA, 182 FW, 30 HOI CHANH.

(b) QUyet CHien. The 9th Infantry Division continued Operation QUyet CHien with the 2d and 3d Brigades in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Province. Task Organization consisted of the 3-47 Inf and 4-47 Inf in the 2d Brigade and 1-16 Inf (Redesignated 5-60 Inf) and 6-31 Inf in the 3d Brigade. On 13 November, the 1st Brigade replaced 3d Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province. On 14 November, Co's D and E, 4-37 Inf initiated Checkerboard Operations northwest of My Phuoc Tay. During the night of 14 November, 27 enemy were killed attempting to infiltrate by sampan attack. 

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On 23 November, Co's A, C, and D of 6-31 Inf, supported by A Troop, 3-17 Cav, made contact with an estimated VC Company west of Cai Lay (XS1249). Co A made the initial contact and was supported by artillery, airstrikes, and Air Cav while Co's C and D were rapidly inserted into the contact area. Two air-strikes and supporting artillery were directed into the area while the companies moved into the contact area supported by the Air Cav. The results for the operation were 51 VC (BC), 16 PW, 1 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured with 30 motorized sampans, and 70 structures destroyed. On 30 November A Trp, 3-17 Cav, supporting 2-39 Inf airmobile operations, made a contact with an estimated VC company north of Cai Be (XS 1945). A Trp engaged a number of VC in the open while Co's A and D were rapidly inserted into the contact area. Co D was inserted to the north of the contact and Co A to the south. Supported by Air Cav, Co's A and D closed into the area of contact, trapping approximately 30 VC in the open. At the completion of a sweep of the area, the two rifle companies and A Trp accounted for 86 VC (BC), and 7 PW. Thirty-three weapons were captured.

On 1 December, the 9th Infantry Division initiated Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS as a part of Operation QUYET CHIEN with the four maneuver battalions (2-39, 3-39, 6-31, 4-39) of the 1st Brigade and the three maneuver battalions (3-60, 4-47, 3-47) of the 2d Brigade. During December no major contacts were established. Most contacts remained on a small unit level with company size units locating and pursuing squad and platoon size enemy elements. Night operations were successful along enemy lines of communication. On 17 December, Operation KUDZU was terminated and the mission of providing security for Dong Tam was incorporated into SPEEDY EXPRESS. Elements of the 9th Infantry Division conducted operations in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign from 1 November 1968 to 31 December 1968. The following operations were conducted to upgrade the 201 target hamlets in Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Dinh Tuong Provinces: 244 combat operations, 372 ICAF, 138 MEDCAP, and 363 PSYOP operations. Operation QUYET CHIEN terminated on 31 December 1968. The following are the cumulative results of Operation QUYET CHIEN/SPEEDY EXPRESS: US LOSSES 131 (40) KIA, 997 (312) WIA; ENEMY LOSSES: 2246 (703) KIA, 191 (65) PW, 36 (19) BOI CHANE. Figures in parentheses are inclusive totals for operation SPEEDY EXPRESS.

(c) KUDZU: The Division Support Command with one maneuver battalion, 4-47 Inf, was assigned the mission of securing the Division Base Camp at Dong Tam. This mission was accomplished through the establishment of platoon-size bases and the conduct of extensive patrolling. Countermortar radar sets continued to be used to locate active mortar locations. The 4-47 Inf was replaced on 1 December by 4-39 Inf. The 4-39 Inf continued Operation KUDZU until 17 December when the operation was terminated and the mission was integrated into Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS. The cumulative results of operation KUDZU are: US LOSSES 28 KIA and 336 WIA; ENEMY LOSSES 187 KIA, 41 PW, 4 BOI CHANE.

(d) On 1 January 1969, the 9th Infantry Division initiated Operation QUYET THANG. OPERATION SPEEDY EXPRESS continued as part of QUYET THANG. The 1st Brigade with four maneuver battalions (2-39, 3-39, 4-39, 6-31) and 2d Brigade:with
three maneuver battalions (3-60, 4-47, 3-47) continued operations in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong Provinces.

During January, contact was sporadic as the enemy remained fragmented. On 22 and 23 January, contacts with small groups of enemy by elements of the 2d Brigade resulted in a total of 50 VC (BC), at a cost of 1 US KIA. During the night of 30-31 January, a Night Hunter Operation conducted by elements of the 1st Brigade resulted in 18 VC (BC) and 3 sampans destroyed. Elements of the 9th Infantry Division conducted operations in support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign from 1 January 1969 to 31 January 1969. The following operations were conducted to upgrade the 201 target hamlets in Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Dinh Tuong Provinces: 199 Combat operations, 213 ICAP, 107 MEICAP, and 90 PSYOP operations. At the termination of the reporting period, Operation QUYET THANG continues with 1st and 2d Brigades. The following are the cumulative results of Operation QUYET THANG/SPEEDY EXPRESS: US LOSSES 121 (81) KIA, 813 (501) WHA; ENEMY LOSSES: 1794 (1091) KIA, 143 (78) PW, 34 (15) HOI CERAM. Figures in parentheses are inclusive totals for Operation QUYET THANG.

(4) The 9th Infantry Division continued support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969. The goal of this campaign was to improve the security of 1000 carefully selected hamlets throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Of this total, 243 target hamlets were within the Division TAOI. Specifically, this entailed the upgrading of hamlets with a Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) security rating of D, E, or V to a security rating of C or higher. Support provided by the division is as shown under Operations TOAN THANG II and QUYET CHIEN, and QUYET THANG/SPEEDY EXPRESS. Hamlet status as of 30 September 1968 and 31 December 1968 is as shown.

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<th>PROVINCE</th>
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<th>31 DEC 68</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
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</table>
(5) Combat Support Activities.

(a) Artillery Support:

1. The Division Artillery firing elements continue to support the Division operations in Long An, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, and Dinh Tuong Provinces. Timely and continuous fire support was also provided for the Army of Republic of Vietnam units, Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and Regional Forces/Popular Forces. A barge battery from the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery was placed OPCON to Senior Advisor, IV Corps, and operated in the southern Delta for a period of two weeks, supporting 21st ARVN Division operations. The AN/TPS-25 radar was employed as an integral part of the overall division plan to search and detect enemy movement along the major infiltration routes to Saigon and deep in enemy base areas. The AN/TPS-25 was also used as part of a coordinated team designed to seek out and destroy VC at night. The Night Hunter operations consisted of the coordinated use of the radar to locate targets, artillery to illuminate the target, and gunships to engage the sighted personnel. Paddy platforms were used by the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery in Kien Hoa Province to provide a suitable firing platform for a 105mm howitzer battery supporting 2d Brigade operations in the Giong Trom District.
Two firing batteries from II Field Forces Vietnamese Artillery, operating in the Long An Province, were used to supplement the fires of the 9th Infantry Division Artillery. A detailed report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery operations and lessons learned for the period is outlined in a separate report.

Artillery with the 9th Infantry Division fired a total of 216,614 rounds of 105mm howitzer, 32,983 rounds of 155mm and 7,574 rounds of 8 inch howitzer ammunition. A chart reflecting a breakdown of rounds fired by artillery is attached as Inclosure 6.

Helicopter Gunship Support:

The 9th Aviation Battalion flew 3,481 gunship sorties. Missions included escort for VIP flights, aerial displacement of supplies, personnel and equipment by cargo helicopters, medical evacuation, people sniffer, convoys, insertions and extractions, and Firefly missions. The gunships provided support for units in contact and defense against rocket/mortar attack at Tan An and Dong Tam. The gunships accounted for 54 VC KBA (BC). They destroyed 58 structures and 21 sampans. Gunships damaged 27 structures and three sampans.

5 Troop, 3-5th Cavalry supported all division elements during this period, providing an average of seven armed helicopters daily. Missions included reconnaissance, screening, and blocking operations. The Troop accounted for 256 VC KBA, 317 structures and 266 sampans destroyed, and three structures damaged.

Tactical Air Support: The number of air sorties increased slightly during this reporting period. A chart reflecting ordnance expended and results obtained is attached as Inclosure 7.

Strategic Air Support: There were a total of 13 B-52 strikes conducted within the 9th Infantry Division AOI during the reporting period.

Naval Fire Support: Naval gunfire was effectively integrated with artillery fire in support of 2d Brigade operations.

Statistical Operations Summary (Inclosure 8).

Training:

During the reporting period, the following training was conducted in the division.
(a) Replacement training.
(b) NCO Leadership training.
(c) Battalion refresher training.
(d) Sniper School training.

(2) Replacement training consists of five days of intensive orientation in many of the skills necessary to prepare an individual for combat duty in Vietnam. The Reliable Academy, a provisional organization formed within the 9th Infantry Division, conducted all replacement training during the period. The Academy completed a move from Bearcat to Dong Tam during the month of November 1968, and new classroom facilities and barracks were constructed to house the cadre and incoming replacements. In addition, new range facilities were completed and are presently in use by the Academy for instruction in weapon zeroing, grenade throwing, and demolition training. The following table shows the number of replacement personnel trained during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>EM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>166</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1823</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(3) Company grade officers and non-commissioned officers receive a six day orientation keyed specifically to the situation in Vietnam. The latest equipment being used in Vietnam is demonstrated, when practicable, and the capabilities and limitations of support elements are discussed.

(4) The 14 day NCO Leadership Course is designed to raise the proficiency level of small unit leaders within the division by presenting instruction in the principles of leadership as well as practical exercises in the skills required of junior leaders. The course is aimed at the specialists and junior NCOs who have not had the benefit of prior leadership positions in combat. During the past three months, a total of 278 personnel have completed the NCO Leadership Course.

(5) Individual and small unit training is conducted by maneuver battalions on a systematic basis in order to increase the effectiveness of their units. Refresher training in new tactics and techniques enables the commander to overcome any known operational weakness. Lessons learned and other tactical information are incorporated into refresher training in order to derive maximum benefit from experience gained by other units in the field in RVN.
(6) The 9th Infantry Division Sniper School, comprised of a cadre of personnel from the US Army Marksmanship Training Unit, conducted a total of four classes during the reporting period. All of those classes were held at the Sniper School at Bearcat, RVN. In January, the school relocated at Dong Tam and range facilities are presently under construction north of the Dong Tam Base perimeter. Completion date for the range is estimated to be the first week in February 1969.

g. (c) Logistics: Logistical planning, guidance, and support was provided for all organic and attached units and units under operational control of 9th Infantry Division during the reporting period. This support was rendered to one riverine brigade and two land based brigades. The lack of adequate road nets connecting the division base with outlying fire support bases has caused the division to rely in part on the use of CH47 and CH54 helicopters for support.

(1) Supply:

(a) There has been a noticeable increase in the flow of goods and services during this period. Worthy of special note is the flow of lumber for bunker and barrier construction. A six month forecast for this material was forwarded to 53rd General Group in early October of 1968 so that it could be ordered on a timely basis. This method proved to be effective. For example, 5,211 short tons of Class IV construction material were received during the quarter which ended on 31 October 1968. 9,183 tons were received during the quarter which ended on 31 January 1969. Of particular significance is the fact that 978 tons were shipped from Vung Tau during the period which ended on 31 October 1968; and 4,233 tons were shipped from Vung Tau during the quarter which ended on 31 January 1969.

(b) Electrical supplies such as power cords, light fixtures, wall plugs, and other outlets have not been available for issue during this three month period. These items are essential to units at outlying fire support bases which must have operational and sleeping area in bunkers as protection against enemy ground and mortar attacks. Valid "due outs" have been given for these items by supply agencies, but the items have not been made available for issue.

(c) In addition to supplies for organic, attached, and OPCON units of 9th Infantry Division, sizeable amounts of materials have been provided to Regional Forces and Popular Forces units. Civic action programs have been supported with materials for repair of schools and other worthy projects as determined by civic action personnel.
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(2) Services:

(a) The post exchange facility at Dong Tam has experienced difficulty in providing some relatively routine items such as soft drinks and shoe polish.

(b) Generators - Units occupying a semi-permanent location have a continuing need for electrical power. The TO&E authorized generators are inadequate to provide power for mess halls, refrigerators, living areas and limited recreational facilities at battalion base areas. There is also insufficient electrical wiring in the standard lighting set to provide adequate power distribution to battalion sized units.

(3) Support:

(a) At present units of the division are being supported by supply point distribution. Very recently a study was conducted on the feasibility of supporting all units of the division by unit distribution. This would assist materially in the delivery of heavy bulky items as most of the light infantry units have a small amount of wheel vehicles. Riverine units are allocated fewer vehicles as in concept their resupply is by water means. Tactical situations have dictated the relocation of some sub-elements of the riverine force to land based areas. This has caused a readjustment in the concept of resupply for those elements.

(b) Forward Area Refuel Equipment (FARE) was used in support of several brigade size operations. Except for some difficulties with the pump engine, the system worked well. It has a built-in system for determining if the filter element is clogged. This feature along with frequent fuel sampling assists tremendously in determining if fuel is contaminated.

(4) Transportations:

(a) Contract vehicles operated by Philco/Ford have moved large quantities of materials into and out of the division area.

(b) The majority of lumber for barrier construction was transported to the division area by water.

(c) Removal of supplies from the basin area caused difficulty for the division’s Supply and Transportation Battalion prior to the arrival of eleven tractor trailers and operators in December of 1968. Prior to the arrival of the men and equipment, the SAT Bn was required to haul cargo from the basin area to the Class IV yard with organic vehicles.
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(5) See Inclosure 15 for additional comments in depth on most areas mentioned.

b. (C) Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations.

(a) During the reporting period, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) generated the majority of PSYOP support requirements. The targets involved were local and main force VC units and their families living in the area. Secondly, the NVA cadre were a target group during this period. The third target remains the populace friendly to the GVN.

(b) The themes used during the period varied for each target, but fell generally within these categories: Chieu Hoi, Dai Dearth Ket, Special Rewards Campaign, VIP and GWN/FWA Image. The theme found to be most effective in generating Hoi Chanh was the Special Rewards Campaign (Third Party Inducement).

(c) OBJECTIVES:

1. To inform the VC/NVA/Communist soldier that the Chieu Hoi Program is for him and what it offers.
2. To encourage NVA soldiers to become prisoners.
3. To bolster the confidence of the apathetic civilian populace in the ability of the GVN.
4. To inform the populace of rewards for inducing friends and relatives to rally to the government.

(d) Again, during the reporting period, the need for thorough coordination of effort in PSYOP was noted. The Area Coordinating Center is an excellent place to start this coordination, since it is here that all functioning staffs in a province have weekly contact. Additionally, contact was established with the APA/PSYOP in each province as the focal point for coordination of efforts with VIS, RD and APTs.

(e) During the reporting period the total of confirmed Hoi Chanhs was 1,997 for the Division TACI. Of this total 71 rallied to divisional units. The continual tactical pressure, accompanied by a good "sales" program in regard to Chieu Hoi Campaigns, continues to account for extremely high returns rates. Of particular note during the period was the result of the "Special Rewards Program" on the Third Party Inducement Program. This program reportedly accounted for approximately 75% of all Hoi Chanhs during December and January.

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(f) PSYOP Activity Statistics (1 Nov 68 through 31 Jan 69)

1 Leaflet Missions (total): 1269
   Air: 533
   Ground: 736

2 Loudspeaker Missions (total): 1296
   Air: 566
   Ground: 730

3 Loudspeaker Hours (total): 568

4 Rapid Reaction Leaflets produced by 9th Inf Div: 4

5 Rapid Reaction Leaflets produced by other agencies: 9

(2) Civil Affairs

(a) The 9th Infantry Division Civic Action program during the reporting period continued to show marked success. The people are realizing that long needed economic and social improvement can be accomplished through the self-help attitude which is manifesting itself in this area. A project initiated by An Thai Dong Hamlet in Dinh Tuong Province supports this idea. Having a need for electrification, each family contributed money towards a 15 KW generator, and erected the poles. Concurrently, they requested wire and technical assistance from the District Chief. As the district's funds were already allocated, the District Chief requested assistance from the 9th Division. The 1st Brigade, working in coordination with the 9th Signal Bn, made the arrangements and the project was completed in late December. The percentage of Vietnamese self-help in this reporting period has risen in other areas. It has added immeasurably to the people's self-confidence and pride of accomplishment and has reduced friction among them. Concentrating the division's efforts in self-help projects has served to strengthen the overall effectiveness of our Civic Action Program, as the people are increasingly receptive to our presence and are more willing to work with Americans.

(b) Repair and construction projects are vital to a successful Civil Affairs program. They demonstrate to the Vietnamese people that the GVN and her allies are genuinely interested in their welfare and in the future of South Vietnam. Since the Viet Cong employ guerrilla tactics, the logistical support necessary for repair and construction is not available to them. As a consequence, the Vietnamese peasant sees only the Viet Cong's will to destroy. Our efforts in construction and repair demonstrate to the peasants our desire to help the people help themselves.
A fine example of the importance of the construction and rebuilding program took place in the western districts of Dinh Tuong. The 9th Infantry Division repaired schools, installed a drainage system, renovated several market places, and dug wells. The total impact of this program was realized when members of the Hoa Hao religious sect turned over control of the district’s only high school to the government as a means of expressing their appreciation and trust.

(c) Distribution of foodstuffs, building materials, tools, and health items have increased during this reporting period. Commodity distributions are now recognized as a tremendous force in Civil Affairs projects. The people, in using the materials given them, develop a greater sense of self-determination, resulting in a stronger feeling of kinship with the GVN.

Materials distributed:

1. Building materials
   - Cement: 39,600 lbs
   - Tin Sheets: 640 lbs
   - Lumber: 5,319 bd ft
   - Paint: 82 gal
   - Other: 1,279,566 lbs

2. Kits (includes health, school, and refuge): 823 kits

3. Food: 51,362 lbs

4. Clothing: 5,050 lbs

2. Health items (soap, toothpaste, etc.): 6,335 lbs

(d) Medical Civic Action Program. The number of MEDCAPs held by the 9th Infantry Division is steadily increasing. One of the most promising recent programs is the MEDCAP conducted by DISCOM at the Dong Tam Base CA Center. MEDCAPs are held six days a week and the people are responding favorably to the increased medical attention. Recently, the building had to be doubled in size to accommodate the number of daily patients.
Intelligence Civic Action Projects (ICAP). ICAPs currently being used as an outgrowth of MEDCAPs. ICAPs are designed to increase the effectiveness of security and intelligence efforts. The ICAP personnel are accompanied by a security element, so they can operate in insecure or contested areas. Aside from humanitarian interests, an ICAP is designed to generate information and intelligence, particularly that which pertains to the VC Infrastructure. Another objective is to evaluate the degree of security in an area and how much pacification effort should be used in a given area. The frequency of ICAPs has increased tremendously, as has the amount of useful information gained from them.

Some of the most successful CA projects recently undertaken were overnight ICAPs (NITCAPs). One reason NITCAPs are producing a large quantity of intelligence is that they can reach the segment of the population that works during the day and is not present for daytime MEDCAPs and ICAPs.

MEDCAPs this quarter (includes ICAPs and NITCAPs): 1,443 patients treated: 111,963.

The 9th Infantry Division undertook the repair of the road between Binh Chanh and Can Giuoc in Long An Province. The road had been in such bad condition for six months that travel by wheeled vehicle was impossible. Crushed rock had to be shipped by barge from Vung Tau to Tan An, from which it was trucked to the site. In all, 15,000 tons of material were needed to complete the road. The project is significant because until its completion the villages had to back-pack everything they took to market. This road will play an important role in future CA operations, as we can now reach areas with ICAPs, MEDCAPs, and pacification efforts which were inaccessible before the road was reopened.

Over the Christmas season, the 9th Infantry Division was responsible for numerous children's Christmas parties. For example, parties were held at Binh Phuoc Chapel. Hundreds of children were entertained by these programs and presented with small gifts, clothing, and refreshments.

Innocent Civilian Center. Knowlton Center, the 9th Infantry Division's Friendship House, processed 307 innocent civilians during this reporting period. The primary purpose of the center is to receive Vietnamese Nationals detained by operations and subsequently determined to be innocent civilians by IFD. Upon arrival at the center, the people are briefed in Vietnamese by an interpreter to explain the reason for their initial detention. The center, they are told, is our guest house where they may rest or amuse themselves with the many recreational facilities until transportation to their homes can be arranged. Sometimes, because of late arrival at the center, it is necessary for the people to stay overnight. When this occurs, transportation is arranged for the following morning. The center has sleeping quarters which will accommodate 75 people comfortably. There is a day room with television, a ping-pong table, and a variety of Vietnamese reading materials.
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A plentiful assortment of nourishing Vietnamese and American food is available for the guests. The Center has separate shower facilities for men and women. A health kit for soup, towel, toothbrush, and toothpaste is given to each guest. Transportation is furnished by the 9th Infantry Division to either return the people to their homes or to take them to commercial facilities where they are given sufficient money to defray travel expenses.

i. (C) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and ARVN Training

(1) The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Re-training Program continued during this period. During the period 18 December to 29 December the 3rd Brigade conducted 105mm and 90mm training for cadre and crews of the 46th and 50th Regiments. On 5 February the 3rd Brigade will initiate ARVN Infantry refresher training for the 46th and 50th Regiments in Long An Province.

(2) During the reporting period the Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) was phased out due to lack of available ARVN Battalions. The last Battalion to receive training was the 2-11th Infantry in October.

(3) Arrival of ARVN RMTT, scheduled to arrive at the Reliable Academy in December, was postponed until 15 February 1969.

(4) Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) Upgrading Program continued to be supported throughout the Division TAOI. Specific teams employed were the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) and the Improvement Action Team (IMPACT). Their mission was to build new outposts primarily in the APC areas. During the reporting period the IMPACT Teams in Long An, Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces were phased out due to the productive results in upgrading selected outposts. Presently the IMPACT Teams in Kien Hoa Province are located in Thanh Phu, Binh Dai and Rung My Districts. The amount of RF/PF IMPACT support provided is shown in Inclosure 9.

j. (C) Engineer Support

(1) During the reporting period the 15th Engineer Battalion has provided direct combat support required to sustain the division in its combat missions in the Mekong Delta. In addition to numerous combat support missions involving minesweeps, clearing operations, and demolitions, the battalion has participated in several major combat operations. Support rendered to the brigade included demolition and booby trap clearing on several battalion and company size operations; numerous minesweep and road clearing operations; construction and maintenance of protective systems (pier
protection, mine booms, lighting, protective minefields) for important bridges on QL 4; establishment and improvement of major and minor fire support bases in Long An, Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces; opening and upgrading of tactically and strategically significant roads; repair and removal of various bridges and rafts; and several other relatively minor engineering tasks. At several times during the reporting period, as many as nine Platoons at a time were involved solely with combat support.

(2) Foremost in the planning for the reporting period were the plans generated for the Dry Season Campaign (Op SPEEDY EXPRESS). Considerable emphasis was placed on preparing for a maximum effort in improving drainage and hardstand at fire support bases, at tactical operating bases, and on roads.

(3) One policy set forth by the division commander is of considerable interest to the road program. Following combat operations in an area to clear out the Viet Cong, the road network is opened up by the engineers so that Vietnamese civilians can begin to traffic the area. Experience has shown that this technique does help pacify such areas.

(4) Noteworthy also is the success the companies have had in locating caches and booby traps through the use of mine detectors. All three direct support companies have had considerable success in this respect.

(5) The Battalion Security Platoon, in addition to providing security for the mine sweeps, convoys, and engineer work parties, was committed to an operation at Tri Ton near the Cambodian border under the direction of IV Corps Tactical Zone. The operation served to emphasize the need for applying certain principles of armor tactics when employing one or two flame tracks (M113 carriers and flame throwers) by themselves, namely, always employ more than one track at a time and employ the tracks in conjunction with ground troops.

(6) Construction has diminished somewhat since the last report. With more combat support requirements, the direct support companies have decreased construction activities, although there are still construction requirements at Dong Tam and at the various tactical operating and fire support bases to keep the general support company and at least one platoon from each of the direct support companies busy with vertical construction.

(7) As was anticipated in the last report, the requirement for engineer assistance and technical advice to units conducting self-help construction programs has been reduced because the end of Dong Tam construction draws near. We continue, however, to furnish plans, advice, technical assistance, personnel, and equipment to all units as needed.
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k. (C) Signal Support

(1) During this reporting period the areas served by the Division Communication System were as follows: Nho Duc, Ben Dau, Binh Phuc, Ben Tre, Can Giooc, Dong Tam, Giang Truc, Hoc Hoa, FSB Moore, Nha Be, Rach Kien, Tan An, Tan Tru, FSB Tiger II, Tuyen Nhon, Vinh Long, and the Mobile Riverine Brigade.

(2) In November planning was initiated for communication support for extended 9th Infantry Division operations in the IV CTZ, in conjunction with the Dry Weather Campaign. Since saturation of the limited army area multi-channel communication systems within the Delta was anticipated, additional systems were programmed. A 24 channel tropospheric scatter system was established by the 1st Signal Brigade in November, utilizing AN/TRC-97B equipment between Dong Tam, Can Tho, and Vung Tau. Another AN/TRC-97B system was installed from Dong Tam to Long Binh by II FFORCEV. This system was established as a back-up to the AN/TRC-29 system (MV-1) which provides the 9th Infantry Division its primary multi-channel link to II FFORCEV. On 11 November the CG directed that unauthorized, non-NSA approved MAC codes, such as the "Point of Origin" System, would not be authorized for use within the 9th Infantry Division. This brought about a 98 percent reduction in transmission security violations within the division. 1st Brigade and 3d Brigade exchanged TACIB on 13 November, resulting in removal of the flag of 1st Brigade to FSB Moore and relocation of 3d Brigade to Tan An. The exchange of TAOIs was accomplished without significant loss of communication support. PM retransmission facilities were installed at Tuyen Nhon for Op CACTUS FIRE I on 14 November for use by the 9th Infantry Division Riverine and Navy force when it conducted an extended water-borne operation from Dong Tam to Moc Hoa. In addition, a sole user voice circuit was established from the 9th Infantry Division's DTDC to IV Corps' TOC at Can Tho, with the activation of a point to point HDX teletype circuit on 15 November. The VHF system to Bearcat was deactivated during the middle of November with the elimination of Division Rear. On 20 November the division's MARS station at Bearcat was deactivated and a new station commenced operations at Dong Tam on the same date. An AM/GRC-26D radio teletype station, operating in the Division Admin Log Net at Vung Tau, was closed 23 November due to the withdrawal of the DISCOM Liaison at Vung Tau. Additionally, the twelve channel AM/MC-69 system to Can Giooc was deactivated when the 4-39th Infantry became OPCON to the 1st Brigade on 24 November.

(3) In December each Brigade was issued one AN/MC-34 Teletype to augment its existing teletype assets. The AN/MC-34 lends itself ideally to brigade operations, being installed in an easily transportable 4-ton trailer which can be moved by road or by HH-1D helicopter anywhere in a brigade's TA0I for forward CP operation. Initial difficulties were experienced with the AN/MC-34 when used in the secure teletype mode. It was discovered by the Division's COMSEC Logistic Support Section that two wire strips in the control box were omitted by the manufacturer. Action
was taken and the equipment has since been operating properly. On 5 December
Op CACTUS FIRE II was initiated requiring the activation of the division's FM
retransmission facilities at Tuyen Nhon. As with CACTUS FIRE I the sole user tele-
phone circuit to Moc Hoa was established through Army Area Systems from the DNOC.
The third CACTUS FIRE operation was initiated on 20 December with identical sup-
port provided. A 200 pair cable was laid between the frame at Reliable Switchboard
and the 9th Infantry Division Communications Center. This cable amounted to
approximately 3000 feet and was enclosed by the 267th Cable Construction Detach-
ment. An additional cable for critical command and control circuits will be in-
stalled between the Division Communications Center and the DNOC. This cable will
be used should the primary cable be cut by enemy rocket or mortar fire and will
allow for uninterrupted communications on critical circuits. An AUTOSEVOCOM
Narrow Band Secure Voice terminal was installed in the DNOC on 21 December, providing
a secure telephone, cleared up to Top Secret, for the Division Headquarters. Public
address systems and photo coverage, along with FM radio support, were provided for
the Bob Hope Christmas Show which performed on 27 December.

(4) Issue of pre-printed keylists for the Division's secure voice network
began on 1 January 1969. Prior to this date keylist extracts were made by the
Division on stencils. The new keylists are easier to control and use. On 7 Jan-
uary a 78 foot AB-216 tower was erected by the Division at FSPB Moore for the lat-
Brigade. This tower is used for FM and VHF antennas and gives the lat Brigade
a considerable increase in FM radio range. Frequency interference continues to
be a problem within the 9th Infantry Division and is compounded by the lack of
sufficient discrete frequencies in III and IV CTZ. On 7 January a letter was dis-
seminated throughout the division emphasizing the need for more efficient use and
stricter control of existing frequencies. Radio transmissions must be kept to a
minimum and should be short and concise in conjunction with lowest possible oper-
ating power, thereby reducing transmissions range. Maneuver battalions of the
Division experienced considerable difficulty obtaining MEDEVAC (Dust Off) assist-
ance while operating in the field during the reporting period. This was because
their distance from the Division's Base Camp at Dong Tam exceeded normal FM radio
range. The problem was solved on 14 January by placing the Dust Off antenna on
top of the 204 foot AB-216 communication tower at Dong Tam and remoting the RT-
524, located at the base of the tower, with a GRA-59 to Dust Off control approx-
imately 400 meters away. After remoting, FM communications have been established
at distances ranging up to 90 KMs from Dong Tam. During the month of January six
AN/GRC-122s were received by the division as replacements for the AN/GRC-46. It
is expected that this new equipment will improve significantly the radio teletype
service provided the Division. There are still 25 AN/GRC-46s remaining in the
Division, all of which have qualified for retrograde.

1. (C) Army Aviation.
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(1) General: During the reporting period, Army Aviation supported division operations daily. Operations SPEEDY EXPRESS, TOAM THANG (Phase II), QUIET GREEN, FAIRWAY WOODS, CLEAN SWEET, and KUDZU were characterized by the employment of multiple assault helicopter companies and air cavalry troops. Medium and heavy cargo helicopters provided lift for artillery, supplies, equipment, and troop movement. The 9th Aviation Battalion provided general support to the division. IFFORCEV supported the division by providing a daily average of two assault helicopter companies, two air cavalry troops, and three cargo helicopters.

(2) Employment of Army Aviation in support of operations: The 9th Aviation Battalion continued to provide general aviation support to the division by furnishing daily 19 UH-1D/H's, two UH-1C armed helicopters, and four AH-1G 'OOh'. During the quarter, the battalion flew 26,686 sorties, lifted 297 tons of cargo, and transported 34,591 passengers and troops. In addition, eight troops were MEVAC'd by battalion aircraft. The unit averaged 7,918 flying hours per month. 1234 night hours were flown and 1,715 hours of combat assault were logged.

a. (C) Chemical Support.

(1) Personnel Detection: During the reporting period there were 942 missions flown for a total flying time of 962 hours. All missions were flown utilizing the UH-1 helicopter. Results of these missions were reported to G2 and to brigade and/or air cavalry units for strike reaction and intelligence purposes. Total missions and flying time during the previous quarter were 518 and 664 respectively. This represents an increase of 81% in missions and 29% in flying time. An intelligence report by the 9th Infantry Division states the enemy is currently baiting the people sniffer through the use of pots of urine and fecal material placed in preselected areas to deter sniffer operations. The 9th Infantry Division "Operation Honeybucket" is currently underway to evaluate the effectiveness of this countermeasure. Maintenance continues to be a problem with both APD and MFD. Sand picked up during operations staged from the Dong Tam Heliport becomes lodged in vulnerable locations, such as between the rotary disk and valve surface, causing a pressure drop in the vacuum system with a resultant loss in detection sensitivity. This situation is being alleviated by continued spraying of the Dong Tam Heliport and constant inspection of vulnerable locations/parts during operations from Dong Tam.

(2) Riot Control Agent Operations: During the reporting period there were four missions flown utilizing bulk CS. Over 6,650 pounds were dropped covering over 100 hectares. On 28 December, a CS-1 barrel drop was completed at grid XS 090620. A total of 1,460 pounds of bulk CS were used for the purpose of terrain denial. On 31 December 1968, a CS-2 barrel drop was completed at grid XS 099635. A total of 2,320 pounds of bulk CS were used for the
purpose of terrain denial. On 17 January 1969, a CS-2 barrel drop was completed at grid XS 510770. A total of 1,440 pounds of bulk CS-2 was used for the purpose of terrain denial. 82 E158 Tactical CS Clusters were expended. These munitions were used only in conjunction with sniffer operations and the drops were made in response to high sniffer readings in areas with a noticeable amount of bunkers. Use of the E158 clusters has been very effective in routing VC from bunkers. A close check was kept by lot number on all E158 clusters dropped by Division Chemical personnel. Of the dud munitions registered, the majority were determined to be from lot Number CME-3-32.

(3) Defoliation: Six defoliation requests were forwarded through channels for approval during this quarter. These requests involved 20 different areas. Most of these requests, if approved, will be sprayed next quarter. On 26 and 27 December 1968, the defoliation mission at Tan Tru was completed by utilizing both ground and helicopter spray methods. A total of 750 gallons of agent Blue was expended. The results were clear zones of fire around the base camp perimeter. Due to the unusual request for defoliation in the vicinity of Ben Luc Bridge and the denial of helicopter spray by the Province Chief for this project, the Division Chemical Section developed a waterborne method of defoliant delivery. This method, which utilized a decontamination truck mounted on an LCM, will be evaluated during the next quarter. Recommended dilutions of defoliants have proven to be ineffective in terms of overall derived defoliation results. Fifty-fifty mixtures of defoliant and diluent have proven to be more successful. In addition, agent Orange is the only agent totally effective against Nippa Fals; other agents merely burn the uppermost leafy portion of the target.

(4) ENSURE Items - Three ENSURE items were used this reporting quarter.

(a) The XM-26 CS "Brown Bag" system has not been used extensively enough for any conclusive results. Further evaluation should be available by next quarter.

(b) The XM-920 Fuze Burster system was utilized on two CS bulk drops. The fuse, with a pre-set time delay, was designed for air bursting of CS drums for maximum effectiveness. Approximately 33% of these fuses failed to operate.

(c) The XM925 Fuze Burster system was employed on one CS bulk drop. This fuse, designed for explosion on impact, proved ineffective, having a 50% dud rate.
2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (C) Personnel

(1) (C) Selection of Prisoner of War Custodial Personnel

OBSERVATION: The necessary control procedures over Prisoners of War are best achieved with carefully selected and trained personnel. The specialized nature of their duties at the collecting points requires mature individuals who can be depended upon to cope successfully with problems or incidents. This calls for calm and judicious-but-immediate action. The duty roster approach of selecting duty personnel has been avoided.

EVALUATION: The 9th Infantry Division Prisoner of War custodial personnel must possess the highest qualities of leadership, discipline, and judgement. They are personally interviewed and selected for this highly specialized duty by the Division Provost Marshal.

RECOMMENDATION: Use permanently assigned military police personnel for detainee custodial duty on a full time basis. Interpreters should not only be assigned to MI-IPW teams but also to the military police personnel. Utilize only those personnel in custodial operations who are mature and exhibit an interest in the job.

(2) (C) Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate Course

OBSERVATION: Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate Course graduates have demonstrated the ability to meet the demands placed on junior leaders during actual combat. However, their performance of duty in a garrison environment, especially at a base camp or aboard ship, reflects a lack of experience and/or training.

EVALUATION: Primary combat skills such as map reading, fire and maneuver, fire adjustment, leadership responsibility, and mission performance while under fire are adequately stressed in NOOCC and NCO Academies. Graduates are fully prepared mentally and physically to meet the demands of a combat environment. However, morale and discipline in garrison can directly affect the brigade's combat performance. A high disciplinary rate reduces the strength available to a field unit; poor morale reduces an individual's standard of performance. Successful prevention of these problems should begin at the NCO level.
RECOMMENDATION: That NCOCC and NCO Academies place additional emphasis on garrison leadership without reducing the training given in combat related skills. Areas of attention should include: proper relationship to subordinates, garrison leadership responsibilities, development of skills in counseling and guidance, career counseling, and inspection procedures and techniques.

(3) (U) Staffing of Supply and Service Unit

OBSERVATION: Staffing of supply and service units is inadequate to perform aerial delivery operations.

EVALUATION: The supply and service unit experienced a continued drastic change in the conventional support procedures previously followed by logistical units. Operations supported by aerial delivery involved locations such as Ben Tre, Cay Be, My Phouc Tay, and FSB Tiper Lair. This unit was able to support the various operations but only at the expense of drawing men and equipment from other sections within the company, thus reducing the capability to accomplish effectively their assigned missions. The current MOD for a Supply and Service Company in a Supply and Transport Battalion calls for only one aerial delivery specialist (MOS 43E3P). Many of the 9th Infantry Division's operations are conducted in areas accessible only by a helicopter. It is therefore necessary to support these units with Class III and V supplies via aerial delivery.

RECOMMENDATION: To provide adequate aerial delivery support without hindering the operations of other sections, it is recommended that the present air delivery section (one man) be increased to one section chief (SGT E5) and two specialists (E4).

b. (C) Operations

1. (C) Employment of Snipers

OBSERVATION: The use of school trained sniper teams has proven successful in engaging targets at extended ranges and in increasing killing areas of ambushes.

EVALUATION: Sniper teams can be effectively employed during daylight hours to engage targets at extended ranges. The use of sniper teams in cordon and search, reconnaissance in force, and airmobile operations has given infantry elements the unique capability of hitting the enemy at long range without disclosure of their positions. The sniper marks the target for other elements who can take the enemy under effective fire. The employment of snipers with the pink filter searchlight along roads, streams, and bridges has provided a deterrent to sappers attempting to interdict friendly lines of communications.

RECOMMENDATION: Development of new techniques and innovations together with refinements of current techniques should be continued.
OBSERVATION: A change of the mission of the Mobile Riverine Force has resulted in new requirements being placed upon the 1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat).

EVALUATION: The pacification of Kien Hoa Province has placed the Infantry elements of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, in a more static role. To support the Brigade's operations throughout the province, the boats must be dispersed to various locations. The 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery must frequently move artillery batteries to locations many miles from the CP complex, causing a strain on the maintenance and command facilities of the transportation company providing mobility to the artillery battalion.

Any thing less than major electrical or overhaul repairs are accomplished on the mission site by the mechanics on the Damage Control Vessel, which normally remains with the CP complex. Major overhauls and repair of electrical malfunctions are performed at Base Camp. Boats frequently have malfunctions at very distant locations, requiring that the Damage Control Boat make frequent long and hard runs. Vessel engineers often have neither the experience nor the tools and parts to repair malfunctions in a mobile situation.

Command suffers in a separated operation. Each section which supports an artillery battery is staffed with an NCOIC E6. However, no adequate control over boat operations has resulted from this arrangement. Since the company commander cannot visit all locations with any degree of regularity and the platoon leader remains at the CP complex, proper control cannot be exercised.

RECOMMENDATION: To resolve the two problem areas in separate battery operations, a Command and Control/Damage boat was established. The basic mission of the vessel is to provide a mobile control vehicle. The vessel has an empty well deck to facilitate any type of cargo and has a three net radio system and increased firepower. The vessel is under command of the Executive Officer. The vessel can accompany a boat section through insecure canals and remain to escort it out again. In addition to the command aspect of the boat, a Senior Engine Mechanic will be aboard with tools and spare parts to accomplish repairs beyond the scope of the organic vessel mechanic on any malfunctioning vessel.

(3) (C) Waterborne Security Procedures

OBSERVATION: Conventional waterborne security procedures did not provide adequate protection from divers.

EVALUATION: Defense of the boats and barges of a waterborne Fire Support Base is a joint water-land venture. Ground security of the area is normally provided by an attached Infantry platoon. Water security is conducted by Naval elements. However, Navy elements have not always been in the position to conduct adequate security and the boats and barges have had to conduct their own defense.
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Water security is provided by a Navy "Tango" or "Alpha" boat patrolling across the stems of the moored boats in the complex. At irregular intervals concussion grenades (fragmentation when concussion grenades were unavailable) are dropped into the water to prevent divers from infiltrating the complex. However, the effectiveness of an underwater explosion caused by a grenade against a swimmer was unknown. To compound the problem, artillery personnel were continually in the water adjusting the position of the barge. The goal was to provide an adequate deterrent to swimmer infiltration, yet not injure friendly personnel who were in the water.

To establish the danger radius to friendly personnel, the Company Commander went into the water and had grenades detonated underwater as he swam toward the point of detonation. Twenty yards from the explosion, pain in the chest developed, but was not disabling. The eardrums of a swimmer would have been punctured at this distance. Both concussion and fragmentation grenades were tested, the concussion grenades having only slightly greater effect.

RECOMMENDATION: Injury to barge personnel by an underwater explosion of a grenade can be discounted beyond 20 meters. Barge personnel in the water should ensure they do not put their heads underwater when the swimmer defense is being conducted. Grenades should be thrown no further than 15 yards from the boats to effect maximum injury to any swimmer infiltration. Grenades from the barges should be thrown the same distance. Because of the proximity to the people re-adjusting barge positions, all personnel should be out of water when a grenade is thrown from a barge. A trained and disciplined diver can function with damaged eardrums, therefore, the defense should be conducted to insure chest injury to any one underwater nearer than 15 yards from the boats. The underwater explosion should be of such severity and proximity to collapse the lungs and chest cavity of a diver. However, care must be taken to explode the grenades far enough from the boats to insure that the packing gland around the propeller shafts is not damaged. No such restrictions exist for the barge.

(4) (C) Protection for the Crew of an LCM VIII Against Ambush

OBSERVATION: The protection afforded a crew of an LCM VIII against an ambush is inadequate. Armor plating is not on hand and predetonation shields are not compatible with the mission.

EVALUATION: Prior to tactical dispatch, all vessels are equipped with armor plate or steel plate on the quarterdeck. This plate varies from 1/4 to 5/8 thickness dependent upon availability. The Command and Control boat has the thickest plating at 5/8 of an inch thick, however, this plating has been penetrated by small arms fire. No vessel has a predetonation defense against point detonating weapons. The space available is not sufficient to allow predetonation rods to be constructed and still allow the freedom of movement necessary when maneuvering.

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Protection for the coxswain is 1" armor plate. The total space available for armor plating is limited between the edge of the quarterdeck and the engine access plate over the engine room. The access plate must be able to be moved whenever engine maintenance requires.

RECOMMENDATION: Construction of an armor plate-concrete "sandwich" has been undertaken to reduce the danger to personnel from small arms and heavy automatic weapons. The entire "sandwich" will be removable for vessel turn-in. The "sandwich" will be fitted with U-bolts to facilitate lifting by crane. The structure will be secured to the deck by angle-iron brackets which will facilitate easy removal. Each "sandwich" will have a handrail to aid personnel in using the catwalk. When the vessel is turned-in, the armor will be lifted onto a new vessel. The plate should be at least 1/4" and have at least eight inches of concrete between the plates. It will be reinforced by internal bracing before the concrete is poured. This will insure that possible damage during transfer is held to a minimum.

(5) (C) Transportation of Prisoners of War to ARVN PW Facilities, Combined Military Intelligence Centers, and Medical Facilities.

OBSERVATION: Whenever detainees are to be evacuated to an ARVN Corps PW facility, to Combined Military Intelligence Centers in the case of Prisoners of War of special intelligence value, or to an appropriate hospital for treatment, the next higher command (II FV PMO) arranges with the 18th MP Brigade for escort guards and for evacuation of the PW to his respective destination. Escort guards from the 18th MP Brigade are required to obtain custody of the detainee from the Division Central PW Collecting Point and escort him to his final destination. Transportation to ARVN PW cages proceeds quite smoothly. Personnel of the 720th MP Battalion come to Dong Tam approximately once a week by Caribou aircraft and pick up PWs and transport them to Can Tho. Problems arise in the areas of transporting PWs to the Combined Intelligence Center and in providing escort guards for medical evacuation flights from the 3d Surgical Hospital at Dong Tam. It is generally impossible for the 18th MP Brigade to respond rapidly to these specialized escort requirements. As a result, the 9th Infantry Division MPs must frequently act as escorts.

EVALUATION: The inability of the 720th MP Battalion to provide escorts for detainees requiring medical evacuation or to arrange transportation and escorts for PWs of significant intelligence interest and the subsequent imposition of this responsibility upon limited 9th Division MP resources creates a hardship.

RECOMMENDATION: It was recommended to USARV on 17 January 1969 that this problem be brought to the attention of the 18th MP Brigade and that steps be taken to resolve the escort and transportation difficulties.

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OBSERVATION: The 9th Military Police Company has played a significant role in effective combined police efforts with the Vietnamese National Police. When Civil Defendants are detained by maneuver elements, they are interrogated, classified, and maintained at the Central or Forward Collecting Points until release to the National Police. Through constant liaison, the release time to Vietnamese authorities has become minimal. Speedy evacuation has aided immensely in clearing the facility for receipt of additional prisoners. Innocent Civilians present a unique problem. Innocent Civilians are detained during field operations and are later determined to be innocent of any VC affiliation. Military policemen work closely with the "L-I-W" personnel and SS to expedite the rapid return of Innocent Civilians to their homes or points of capture. In an effort to lessen the effect of incarceration by a foreign force, the Military Police have cooperated fully with the 75/35 Innocent Civilian Center. Immediately after being determined the Innocent Civilian is released to a separate facility operated under the auspices of the 75 or 35. In an atmosphere of cordiality, the Innocent Civilian receives food, lodging, clothing, and toilet articles. He also receives an indoctrination on the role of the 9th Infantry Division in support of the government of Vietnam.

EVALUATION: None.

RECOMMENDATION: Military Police personnel must insure rapid repatriation of Innocent Civilians to the points of their capture or to their homes and must endeavor to create favorable images in the minds of the people.

PROTECTION OF DETAINED FROM HOSTILE ATTACKS

OBSERVATION: At Division Central Collecting Points and at all Forward Collecting Points there is a constant danger that hostile attacks on the base camps will result in casualties among detained persons. In order to lessen this danger military police confinement personnel have constructed PW personnel bunkers in each segregation cage and instructed detainees as to their use.

EVALUATION: The foresight and initiative taken by the military police confinement personnel in constructing PW personnel bunkers has greatly reduced the possibility of PW casualties resulting from hostile attack. In instances where mortar attacks occurred and mortar rounds landed in adjacent areas, no detainees have been wounded.

RECOMMENDATION: PW personnel bunkers should be constructed at PW holding areas.

DAILY MINESWEEP

OBSERVATION: When a minesweep of an essential roadway such as that of the TL22 is conducted daily, the unit tends to fall into a pattern of operation.
EVALUATION: If a minesweep is always conducted during the same time frame and in a set pattern, it is an open invitation to the VC to establish an ambush.

RECOMMENDATION: A minesweep should originate from a different location each day and the method of the sweep should be varied to preclude establishment of a set pattern.

(10) (C) Overhead Cover:

OBSERVATION: Infantry units have sustained a large number of casualties because minimal overhead cover was not available during mortar attacks.

EVALUATION: Any type of overhead cover could have reduced casualties. With primary emphasis on operations, sufficient time was not taken to establish overhead cover.

RECOMMENDATION: The immediate construction of overhead cover should be a prime consideration in the establishment of any base position.

(11) (C) Clearing Minefields.

OBSERVATION: Minefields placed in marshy areas constitute great hazards to clearing operations.

EVALUATION: There are some minefields in the Delta which are located in rice paddies and in marshy areas. Mine detectors cannot effectively detect the location of mines underwater and clearing charges are not always effective in the water.

RECOMMENDATION: Pumps should be used to drain the area of a suspected minefield so that mine detectors and clearing charges can be effectively used to clear the minefield.

(12) (C) Claymore Mines.

OBSERVATION: The rubber coated wires leading to claymore mines tend to rot when left in water for over four days.

EVALUATION: In static positions it is often necessary to lay the command wire through water. If the original wires are replaced with commo wire and the new wires are kept out of the water, the life of the wire can be greatly increased.
RECOMMENDATION: Replace the original claymore wires with commo wire (WD-1) and keep the wires out of the water as much as possible.

(13) (C) Bridge Protection Against Floating Mines

OBSERVATION: Floating mine booms currently in use are inadequate.

EVALUATION: The attempt to destroy the Ten An Bridge with a floating mine proved the inadequacy of the present mine boom. The mine which was used (1680 lbs of explosive) floated with approximately 1⁄4" protruding above the surface of the water. Although there was no mine boom present at the time of the attempt, a swimmer accompanying the raft would have had no trouble easing the raft under the conventional surface mine booms which are currently in use.

RECOMMENDATION: A chain link fence, barbed tape, or some similar device should be attached to the mine boom and extended six or seven feet below the surface of the water. Adequate lighting should also be employed to provide surveillance of the mine boom during the hours of darkness.

(14) (C) Airboat Transportation.

OBSERVATION: Some airboats have been overturned while being towed behind "Tango" boats.

EVALUATION: Because of the waves created by the Tango boats and the inherent instability of the airboats, the latter are easily upset while in transit from home base to an area of operations.

RECOMMENDATION: Airboats should not be towed more than a short distance at slow speeds, but should be transported on a barge or similar vehicle to preclude damages caused by towing.

(15) (U) Sampan Pumps

OBSERVATION: Captured sampan motors used as pumps have been a very efficient and economical means of draining the low marshy terrain found in the Mekong Delta.

EVALUATION: When conventional centrifugal or diaphragm pumps are used to pump the silty water found in the Mekong Delta, they rapidly wear out and become inoperable. This is particularly true when they are used to...
pump the water out of rice paddies. However, the simple sampan pump, commonly used by the Vietnamese, does not wear out as rapidly since the water does not come in contact with the internal workings of the pump. Also, a sampan pump is capable of pumping at a faster rate than other types of pumps of equal horsepower. The sampan pump is nothing more than a sampan motor with the long shaft and propeller drawing water through a pipe.

RECOMMENDATION: Attempts should be made to procure sampan pumps (motors) and appropriate repair parts through regular supply channels. Also, all captured sampan motors should be evacuated through engineer channels so that they may be used in draining projects.

(16) (U) Soil Conditions at Construction Sites

OBSERVATION: Soil conditions in the Mekong Delta are not stable enough to provide good bearing capacity for building foundations with normal footers.

EVALUATION: When possible, stabilized fill should be added to sites being used for building construction. This is not always possible, however, and an alternate solution must be used. Fifty-five gallon drums provide good floating footers on which to build foundations. Although there is some uneven settlement, experience has shown that, if the floor joists are strong enough, the settlement does not get out of control and the building itself remains fairly level. In the absence of 55-gallon drums, 40mm ammunition cans provide the same benefits.

RECOMMENDATION: When it is not practical to provide stabilized fill for hardstand on which to construct a building, footers made of 55-gallon drums or 40mm ammunition cans may be used with good results.

(17) (U) Construction Deficiencies

OBSERVATION: Non-engineer units, in their haste to construct facilities at most fire support bases, have been building structures that are unsafe and have been wasting material in the process.

EVALUATION: In all cases encountered to date, the units involved have not coordinated with the brigade engineer for advice and assistance, have not used any plans in their construction, and are not bothering to determine a bill of materials from which to draw materials. This method of "designing" as you build and using any materials that might be available is unsafe, uneconomical, and could produce disastrous results.
RECOMMENDATION: All plans or construction at all fire support bases should by reviewed by the brigade engineer so that the design, bill of materials, and plans can be checked and a determination concerning the safety of the structure can be made.

(18) (U) MSA1 Matting in the Delta

OBSERVATION: In many cases in the Delta, the base below MSA1 matting will sink causing the matting to buckle downward.

EVALUATION: Sometimes, even when reasonable care has been taken to preclude failure of the base course, the sinking will still occur. If this happens near the edge of a parking area or airfield, the matting can be removed, the hole filled and the matting replaced. However, if it occurs in the middle of a large area of matting, a great work effort is needed to remove and repair it.

RECOMMENDATION: In cases where the sunken area is in the middle of a large area of matting, earth can be placed on top of the existing matting and a new section welded into place to obtain a level, satisfactory surface.

(19) (U) Expedient Picket Driver

OBSERVATION: Driving pickets by sledge hammer is a slow and tedious process, especially when the number of sledge hammers available is limited.

EVALUATION: When sledge hammers are either not available or are limited in number and a large number of pickets must be erected in a relatively short period of time, the task can be lightened by fabricating an "expedient picket driver" by welding a two-foot piece of 4" to 6" diameter pipe perpendicular to the end of another two-foot piece of 1½" to 2" diameter pipe. By grasping the ends of the smaller pipe and placing the larger pipe over the picket, the picket can be driven easily into the ground.

RECOMMENDATION: Expedient picket drivers may be used on those occasions when sufficient sledge hammers are not available for driving large numbers of pickets.

(20) (U) Erection of Tin PASCO Buildings

OBSERVATION: When placing the anchor bolts for the buildings in concrete, using the measurements for the plans, it was found that the measurements placed the bolts so that they did not line up with the holes in the base plates.
EVALUATION: If the base plates are uncrated first, they can be used as a template for placing the anchor bolts in the slab. The cloth measuring tape supplied with the kits is not adequate because it has a tendency to stretch.

RECOMMENDATION: The base plate should be used as a template until such time as the plans are corrected. The cloth tape should be replaced with a metal tape.

(21) (U) Erection of Porta-Kemp Building

OBSERVATION: The number of men required to erect the side walls of a Porta-Kemp building according to the instructions is inadequate.

EVALUATION: The erection instructions indicate that only four men are required to erect the side walls. However, after the roof of the building had been lifted into place, it was found necessary to have five men erect the walls and one NCO to supervise the fitting.

RECOMMENDATION: Five men together with one NCO should be used to erect the walls of the Porta-Kemp Building.

(22) (U) Securing Metal Edge to Concrete

OBSERVATION: Drilling holes near the edge of concrete in order to secure a metal edge results in the edge of the concrete chipping and breaking.

EVALUATION: Because of the low grade of concrete available in RVN, it was found to be almost impossible to drill holes into concrete edging in order to secure metal edges to it. The concrete chipped and broke if the holes were within two or three inches of the edge. Helicopter repair kits contain an epoxy glue which can be mixed at the job site and is very effective for fastening metal to concrete.

RECOMMENDATION: Epoxy glue should be used in securing metal edging to concrete.

(23) (U) Pouring Long Strips of Concrete

OBSERVATION: When pouring long strips of concrete with a limited amount of time to complete pouring and erratic concrete delivery, a means of blocking off the strips was needed.

EVALUATION: It was found that expansion joint locations could not be effectively preplanned because of erratic concrete delivery. Masonite wrapped with tar paper proved to be an adequate block which acted also as an ex-
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pension joint.

RECOMMENDATION: Use masonite wrapped with tarpaper as an expedient expansion joint when the conditions described exist.

(24) (U) Fraction of Exterior Bunker on Concrete Slab

OBSERVATION: Work is very slow constructing both inner and outer walls of a bunker on a concrete slab.

EVALUATION: When building a wooden bunker on a concrete slab, very little space is left between the inner and outer walls. The problem of driving nails into the outer wall in this confined space slowed down construction.

RECOMMENDATION: The exterior walls can be prefabricated on the site and then raised into position.

(25) (U) McCulloch Chain Saw Blades

OBSERVATION: McCulloch chain saw blades cannot be sharpened because of the carbide tip.

EVALUATION: When the carbide tips on the blades burn after continuous use, the saw becomes virtually useless. The blades cannot be sharpened and replacement blades are virtually non-existent.

RECOMMENDATION: Increase the supply of chain saw blades or improve the blades.

(26) (C) Launching of the Bailey Bridge

OBSERVATION: It is not possible to launch a Bailey bridge in the normal manner when one end of the bridge site is an existing portion of a narrow bridge.
EVALUATION: When replacing an end of a partially destroyed bridge which is too narrow to launch a Bailey bridge through the remaining span, the Bailey bridge can be launched backwards from the abutment to the pier. The bridge is constructed without the stringers, chases, and ribands in order to decrease the weight of the bridge since a launching nose is impossible. These parts are added after the bridge is in place. The bridge size is doubled to counterbalance the bridge and extra transoms and stringers are added as a safety factor. The bridge is then launched backwards with the end post already in place on the bridge. A 20-ton crane can also be used on the existing bridge to help set the Bailey bridge on the bearing plates.

RECOMMENDATION: That in a situation such as the one above, the Bailey bridge be launched backwards in the manner described.

(27) (C) Storage of Bailey Bridges

OBSERVATION: As a result of bad communications and the distance between the site of a blown bridge and the storage yard for a Bailey bridge, the bridge parts were dispatched to the job site at irregular intervals resulting in a shortage of materials.

EVALUATION: To prevent such a situation from occurring, a pattern should be developed for storing the bridge. The loading was irregular and some parts were not delivered without undue delay. Bad communications and a long haul distance contributed to the delays because trucks were dispatched in groups of two or three at irregular intervals. Hence, the people on the job site did not know until all the trucks had arrived and the bridge was well on its way to completion that they were short parts.

RECOMMENDATION: A standard storage pattern or system should be developed and should be used by all units. The recommended system is to store all the materials for each bay of the bridge so that all components may be loaded on one truck.
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(28) (U) Anchor Systems in the Delta

OBSERVATION: One hundred pound kedge anchors will not hold effectively in the Delta river bottom.

EVALUATION: Towing a kedge anchor on 150 feet of rope behind a bridge erection boat is not enough to ground the anchor. One man can easily dislodge the anchor.

RECOMMENDATION: Another system of anchoring should be used as a back-up when kedge anchors are employed. No suitable system has been developed as of this reporting period.

(29) (C) Expedient Anchorage System

OBSERVATION: Using the Class 60 towers and cross bracing arms, an expedient anchorage system for a float bridge can be devised.

EVALUATION: If a stationary object is within reach of the center of a float bridge, the towers and cross bracing provide a firm back-up anchorage.

RECOMMENDATION: The described anchorage system should be considered as an alternate solution for anchoring a float bridge.

(30) (C) Expedient Mine Boom Anchors

OBSERVATION: The current in two of the rivers in Vietnam is so swift (over ten feet per second) that most of the anchors contrived for holding mine booms in place were not adequate.

EVALUATION: After several possible solutions were attempted unsuccessfully, a combination of two Bailey bridge panels, four 55-gallon drums filled with concrete, and some U-shaped pickets was found to work with excellent results. The four drums were filled with concrete, allowed to harden, and were placed on their sides in between the two panels, one panel on top and the other on bottom. The pickets were welded onto the panels to hold the drums and were allowed to extend beyond the top panel. A cable was attached to the bottom of the anchor and a buoy or float was attached to the cable. The anchor and float were then picked up by a CH-47 and dropped into the river with the extended pickets facing down and the mine boom was attached to the float.

RECOMMENDATION: That the described system be considered for use as a mine boom anchor in the middle of a river.

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(31) (C) Communications Failure

OBSERVATION: Communications failure has occurred as a result of dust and/or moisture.

EVALUATION: Dust and/or moisture permeates radios, switchboards, and their connections causing malfunction of the equipment.

RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate maintenance of vulnerable areas of the equipment should be established to adequately protect the equipment from dust and moisture.

(32) (C) Communications Security

OBSERVATION: Vietnamese civilians have been observed looking at vehicle radios.

EVALUATION: Even though Vietnamese civilians do not have direct access to our radios, they often can get within several feet of a radio when a vehicle is stopped. By matching the bumper with the frequency in the window of the radio, and by listening to a transmission from the vehicle, pieces of the CECI can be "fit together."

RECOMMENDATION: A piece of tape should be placed across the frequency window when driving in populated areas. Transmissions made in areas where civilians are in a position to overhear should be avoided as much as possible.

(33) (C) Close Air Support at Night

OBSERVATION: While employing aerial fire support in defense of night locations, the most difficult aspect of fire control is adequately marking friendly positions.

EVALUATION: Units in contact during hours of darkness often neither properly mark their position nor establish communications with the element providing close air support. Prior to employing air support, the ground force commander must mark the limits of his position and verify the enemy force location. In addition, the air support element must establish communications with the ground commander. All friendly units in the immediate area of contact must monitor the radio net controlling/employing close air support.

RECOMMENDATION: Commanders should insure that small unit leaders are thoroughly familiar with the ordnance capabilities of available air support.
and with proper marking techniques. Aviators should be briefed on the overall tactical situation prior to establishing communications with the ground force commander. Adjustments of close air supporting fires must be made by the ground force commander.

(34) (C) Coordination of Artillery fire

OBSERVATION: Small unit commanders are presently not aware of the procedures and responsibilities in connection with a no fire box.

EVALUATION: A no fire box is a fire control measure used in conjunction with the establishment of night positions. It can be in the shape of a box, triangle, rectangle, or any other shape that suits the situation. It is drawn on operational maps and firing charts and is a continuous line which is 500 meters from friendly elements inside the box. Fire will not be delivered inside the box unless specifically requested by the unit concerned, e.g., DEFCONS and contact fire missions. Forward observers determine the size and shape of the box in conjunction with the infantry company commander.

RECOMMENDATION: The box should be encoded and sent to the battalion artillery LEO.

(35) (C) Naval gunfire

OBSERVATION: Observed direct Naval gunfire is an effective means of beach preparation to augment conventional artillery or to substitute for conventional artillery when it is not available.

EVALUATION: On 28 December 1968, the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry (used naval gunfire support from the USS Colleton) in support of multiple riverine assaults. Under this new concept, the USS Colleton moved its MHB anchorage along with the river division ASPBs and Armored Troop Carriers (ATC). Once the USS Colleton was positioned opposite the selected beaching sites, it commenced a beach preparation using its two 40mm quadmount guns and 3-inch/50 caliber rapid fire mounts. There was no time limit placed on fires provided by the USS Colleton. As the flotilla of Monitors, ATCs, and ASPBs approached the beaching site, they took up the beach preparation and the USS Colleton ceased fire. This insured a continuous volume of fire on the beaching site.

RECOMMENDATION: That the fires from the heavy guns of the APBs be planned as a part of beach preparation whenever possible.

(36) (C) Use of Snipers

OBSERVATION: Snipers are not always effectively employed on the most likely avenue of approach into a defensive position.
EVALUATION: Likely avenues of approach are generally those which offer the most cover and/or concealment. Either of these factors derive the sniper of his basic ability to engage point targets at long range.

RECOMMENDATION: That snipers be used as an economy of force measure by positioning them to cover large open areas in or near a defensive position. This allows a company commander to concentrate his forces in the vulnerable spots of his position.

c. (C) Training

(1) (U) Specialized Training for PW Guards and Supervisors

OBSERVATION: The Prisoner of War section is responsible for operating the PW collecting points at division and at each of the brigades and for safeguarding PW's during evacuation from brigade to division. All military policemen are trained in detainee processing procedures, emergency escape SOPs, and the Geneva Convention. Many Military Police learned sufficient elementary Vietnamese to assist them when dealing with detainees.

EVALUATION: Using permanently assigned personnel for PW work rather than the duty roster approach, the 9th Military Police Company has developed an outstanding group of specialists for handling detainees. They all know what is required for a secure detention facility and they know how to operate it with a minimum of personnel. They know what to do in case of hostile actions or during an escape attempt. They are trained to provide an environment conducive to the intelligence gathering process and yet protect the rights of the detainee.

RECOMMENDATION: That the procedure described above be continued.

(2) (U) Dermatology Training

OBSERVATION: That the most important factor in the reduction of combat man-days lost due to dermatologic disease of the feet and body is the recognition and treatment of the condition by the Battalion Surgeon.

EVALUATION: Most surgeons arriving from CONUS have had no experience in tropical dermatology. An initial training course by physicians who have had in-country experience is necessary if the new physician is to be able to contribute to the reduction of skin disease in his battalion. In addition, continued communication in the form of a refresher course is necessary to allow the physicians to keep abreast of new methods of diagnosis and treatment.

RECOMMENDATION: All surgeons arriving in the Division should receive a concentrated course in tropical dermatology given by an experienced representative.
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of the Division Surgeon Office. Once each quarter each battalion surgeon should be rotated into Division Headquarters Base Camp to receive a refresher course in diagnosis and treatment of the disease.

d. (C) Intelligence

(1) (C) Mines

OBSERVATION: Numerous vehicles have been damaged or destroyed by mines in the roadways. On more than one occasion it has been noted that mines had apparently been buried in old mine craters. An old stump in the ground or a fixed stick in the ground several yards off the road has been used as aiming stakes. Thin green wires leading from the road to the command site have been strung along the surface of the ground.

EVALUATION: Stumps, stakes or old wrecks provide a good means for the VC to determine when to detonate a mine he has planted in the road. Without some kind of aiming stake, he would have a lesser chance of detonating a mine at exactly the right moment to cause maximum damage. Since the filled craters are usually not compacted as well as the rest of the road, they provide the most logical place for the VC to place a mine. On one occasion a mine was detonated in the evening and the resulting crater was not filled until morning. The crater was filled without checking the loose dirt at the bottom and another mine was detonated in the same spot a few hours later in the morning. Since the road was fairly well-traveled, the VC could not have had time to place the mine in the crater that morning. This indicates that the mine must have been placed in the bottom of the crater the night before. The mine was either deep in the crater or was of plastic construction precluding detection by the minesweep team. After the minesweep was completed, an innocent looking civilian could have laid the thin green wire and hooked it to hidden wires leading from the mine to the side of the road. The mine could then be command-detonated at the precise moment to hit a vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION: A good visual reconnaissance for aiming devices or wire should be conducted in conjunction with minesweeping operations. A thorough inspection of the crater before filling should be conducted to discover any additional mines. In order to prevent the laying of command wires during the day, one or two lookout posts should be set up at strategic locations along the road.

(2) (C) Booby Traps

OBSERVATION: Booby trap incidents have increased markedly during the reporting period. Most booby traps still consist of some metallic substance.

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EVALUATION: The casualties incurred by the increase in booby trap incidents can be reduced during operations by the effective utilization of metallic mine detectors or ordnance locators such as the Mark 10 or Mark 15 Detectors.

RECOMMENDATION: In conjunction with operations, metallic mine detectors or locators should be used to locate booby traps.

(3) Infiltration of US Installations and Units

OBSERVATION: The VC have infiltrated many informants into Dong Tam Base and other military installations and units. The informants usually are civilian employees, house girls, camp hangers, prostitutes, Tiger Scouts, and "Mini-Scouts" (unauthorized use of children as Tiger Scouts).

EVALUATION: In January 1969, an element was compromised on numerous operations by a "Mini-Scout" (12 years old) and camp hangers. One compromise resulted in two US KHA and one US WHA.

RECOMMENDATION: A close inspection should be conducted of civilian personnel entering and leaving military installations. Camp hangers and "Mini-Scouts" should be eliminated. Eliminate discussions of planned tactical operations with Tiger Scouts until immediately prior to execution of the operation.

(4) VC Evasion Techniques

OBSERVATION: The VC do not move a great distance when evading US ground operations, but remain hidden in the general area. When a US unit has passed, the VC double back in the direction of the US landing.

EVALUATION: A thorough knowledge of the area together with preplanned concealment are put to good use by the VC. In January a detainee leading a US ground element back to his base area escaped. After one US element had swept the area in which he was suspected to be hiding, the detainee removed himself from his hiding place and ran into another US element which was sweeping behind the first. On a "Stay Behind" operation in January, a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) reported that an area which had been swept with negative results by US ground elements, came alive with VC as soon as the last US ground element had been extracted.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that US elements on sweep operations check suspected VC locations more carefully.
(5) (U) Need for Complete Capture Data

OBSERVATION: As soon as a detainee is apprehended, complete capturing data should be obtained by the capturing unit. Complete capturing data includes the following information: identification of the detainee, unit identification, mission of the detainee, location of capture, and other remarks pertinent to the circumstances existing at the time of capture. Complete capturing data is necessary to insure thorough and rapid processing, interrogation, and classification of the detainee.

EVALUATION: The lack of complete capturing data materially hinders rapid processing of detainees. A lack of capturing data results in a sacrifice of vital intelligence information. Capturing units, in far too many instances, have failed to insure that pertinent capturing data is preserved for later use in the intelligence gathering process.

RECOMMENDATION: Commanders must insure that all personnel realize the necessity of complete capturing data on all detainees and that they know how to complete the capturing data tags which accompany the detainee from the field to the collecting point.

(6) (U) Military Police-Military Intelligence (IPW) Relationships

OBSERVATION: The mission of an MI-IPW team is to classify detainees and extract as much information as possible. Military Police custodial personnel and the MI team work together in achieving their missions. The atmosphere created by the presence of Military Police has proven to be effective in making the detainee more relaxed and receptive to the idea of furnishing valuable intelligence data.

EVALUATION: Cooperation between MP and MI (IPW) personnel has resulted in valuable intelligence returns which have materially aided combat effectiveness of the 9th Infantry Division. Along with obtaining that information which is invaluable toward the success of tactical operations, joint MP and MI (IPW) efforts have aided in recruiting numerous Viet Cong into the Chieu Hoi Program and in proving to them that Americans can be trusted to protect the integrity of the individual detainee.

RECOMMENDATION: That MP and MI (IPW) teams maintain good working relationships for cooperation in the processing of detainees.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(1) (U) Logistics

(1) (U) Fuel Contamination

OBSERVATION: The contamination of JP4 aviation fuel by water at forward area rearm-refuel sites resulted in a loss of facilities which was costly in time and effort.

EVALUATION: Condensation of water in fuel storage bladders, tanks, and fuel tankers occurs because of fluctuating temperature and the high relative humidity. Fuel dispensed at the refueling sites was transported from storage tanks by fuel tankers. 500-gallon collapsible drums for aerial delivery were filled at the air delivery zone and airlifted to the refueling site by CH-47 or CH-54 helicopters. At the refueling site, fuel remained in the bladders until dispensed to aircraft. Accumulation of water by condensation could have occurred during any or all of the storage or transit stages of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION: To eliminate the accumulation of water, a series of fuel filters was established at each point the fuel changed storage facilities. Frequent tests of all fuel containers were made to insure fuel was not contaminated by water. Collapsible bladders are not drained completely at the site. At least 6" of fuel is left in each container to protect against sediment and/or water that may be in the bottom of container. Fuel handling personnel must ensure that the refueling point and its equipment are inspected frequently to eliminate any possible source of contamination.

(2) (U) Prisoner of War Identification Kit

OBSERVATION: No rapid processing identification camera is authorized for use by military police custodial personnel, yet photographs must be attached to detainees forms. The one camera in use at the Dong Tam facility is on loan from another Division agency. Photographs which accompany intelligence documents pertaining to Civil Defendants, Chieu Hoi's, and Prisoners of War provide an excellent positive identification for later use. A number of Civil Defendants are captured repeatedly and correlation with prior records is often difficult without photographs. There is no camera equipment at Forward Collecting Points. Civil Defendants located at the Forward Collecting Points are released directly to the Vietnamese National Police and no photographic record is made. Fingerprinting of detainees also presents problems at the Division and Forward Collecting facilities. Presently, fingerprint plates, ink rollers, and tube ink are used to secure readable fingerprints from detainees. This process is extremely time consuming. The United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory has extensively tested and recommended adoption of a fingerprint stamp pad. The pad would allow rapid, uncomplicated fingerprinting. The Division has recently received an identification banding kit from USAVC for use on all pads. Sufficient kits were obtained to equip the Division Forward Collecting Points.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 January 1969, HCS CEFOR-65 (R) (U)

EVALUATION: The benefits obtained from the development and provision of an Identification Kit would be considerable. Each Collecting Point would have the immediate capability to photograph, fingerprint, and place identification bands on all detainees. Detainee records would be more complete, provide a permanent record, and assist in positive identification of detainees at later times.

RECOMMENDATION: A PW Identification Kit should be adopted and authorized for use by military police custodial personnel at Division Central and all Division Forward Collecting Points.

(3) (C) Convoy Security

OBSERVATION: Over convoy routes that are green (safe), but do have a certain amount of risk, it is necessary to provide security for convoys.

EVALUATION: It has been found that there is some loss of security when Military Police vehicles are used instead of armored personnel carriers (APC) for convoy escort. However, the loss of security is minimized by having the APCs positioned along the convoy route and all units operating on a common radio net. Use of MP vehicles results in a faster moving convoy, fewer APC maintenance problems and greater utilization of APCs on tactical operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That this means of convoy security for relatively safe routes be employed whenever possible.

(4) (U) Utilization of Aircraft

OBSERVATION: Improved utilization of available flying hours was attained through closer passenger control.

EVALUATION: Closer passenger control was obtained by placing liaison NCOs at each of the two major passenger terminals, Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut. At Tan Son Nhut, aircraft ground time has been reduced by having the liaison NCO manifest R&R returnees and escort them directly to the aircraft. The Air Traffic Control Office (ATCO) adds transient passengers to the manifest. A side benefit of better personnel control is a major reduction in the time required for personnel coming from R&R to return to their units.

RECOMMENDATION: That close attention to passenger control be continued.

(5) (C) Allocation of Helicopter Munitions Under Available Supply Rate (ASR)

OBSERVATION: Allocation of helicopter munition (2.75" rockets) under ASR control to specific aviation units is not economical means of controlling and limiting expenditures.
EVALUATION: The present tactical employment of helicopter gunships finds them frequently operating far from their unit bases. Rearing is done at the nearest established rear point. Specific host units are assigned responsibility for operating the rear points. They must supply Class VA to all aircraft operating in the area. Consumption is not related to the number of aircraft based at the rear point.

RECOMMENDATION: That Class VA be allocated to rear points based on demand history and operational planning data and that separate control charts be prepared on aviation units to restrict consumption at point of expenditure (aircraft) rather than point of issue (rearm point).

f. Organization: None.

g. (C) Other

(1) (C) Signal: Loss of Transmission Power

OBSERVATION: It has been determined that persons with wet clothing reduce the sending range of the AN/PRC-25 radio using the AT-292/PRC antenna, when they stand between the antenna and the receiving station.

EVALUATION: The wet clothing absorbs some of the transmitted signal.

RECOMMENDATION: That all radio operators and small unit leaders be made aware of this fact so they may insure that wet personnel do not interfere with field radio traffic.

(2) (C) Signal: Training of Radio Operators

OBSERVATION: The majority of communications security violations are of a routine nature which could be prevented by good commo procedure.

EVALUATION: Battalion and brigade radio operators are normally recruited from commo personnel in subordinate units. These individuals are generally intelligent and willing, but have little or no formal communications training.

RECOMMENDATION: That each battalion and brigade operate a short communications procedure refresher course for all radio-telephone operators and that all incoming radio-telephone operators be required to undergo this instruction prior to assuming their duties.

(3) (U) Reduction of Foot Disease

OBSERVATION: The occurrence of foot disease increases sharply after 48 hours
of continuous exposure to an inundated environment and the 9th Infantry Division TACI remains inundated even in the dry season.

EVALUATION: Skin disease of the feet can reduce "paddy strength" of a battalion by 35% after 72 hours of continuous exposure and by 50% after 96 hours. A drying out period of 24 hours after exposure of 48 hours permits the skin to heal and thus prevents breakdown of the skin and the ultimate condition which follows, infection. During the dry season most areas of operation continue to be inundated; thus, without the limit of 48 hours to paddy operations, the occurrence of foot disease would be as high as the occurrence in the wet season.

RECOMMENDATION: That the command policy of limiting operations in "paddy areas" to 48 hours followed by a 24 hour dry utilization period be used as an important method to prevent disease of the feet. That this policy should be continued throughout the dry season.

(4) (U) Clinical Research

OBSERVATION: Clinical research of dermatologic disease occurring among troops in the field is a valuable tool in discovering new methods of treatment for this disease.

EVALUATION: The combat environment which exists in an infantry division is normally thought to prohibit the use of clinical research. However, through the cooperation of the Commanding General, the organic medical personnel and the MDA Research Team, Vietnam, this division has been able to conduct this type of research in the field among combat battalions. The information gained from these clinical studies has contributed to improved treatment methods for several types of dermatologic disease.

RECOMMENDATION: That clinical research in a combat environment continue to be utilized as a method of discovering new methods of treatment for the dermatologic disease occurring among the troops in this division.

(5) (U) Construction of Crew Quarters and Wall Decks - LCM-6

OBSERVATION: Construction of crew quarters and wall decks on LCM-6 has been of used. This has proven inadequate for many reasons. A better solution was needed as an interim measure until receipt of metal modules.

EVALUATION: Construction of the structure in the wall decks, i.e., CPs, IPs, Mass Hall, IPW, DCV was sufficiently strong when made of wood, but insects became excessive. In the areas where food was prepared they were particularly bothersome. The insects were introduced onto the boats from cardboard cartons and
boxes. The mess boat was plagued with all kinds of vermin. Although spraying was helpful, it was not completely effective and provided only temporary relief.

RECOMMENDATION: Pending issue of all modules, all newly constructed boats will be made of metal whenever possible. Of particular importance is the new mess boat. It is being constructed entirely of metal. The supports are 4" OD pipe and the walls are discarded PSP. The vessel will have metal floors and walls. All metal construction will allow frequent washing with hot water and soap. This type of construction will have to be limited due to the scarcity of raw materials, but will definitely aid in control of vermin and rodents.
Section 3. Lessons Learned from Employment of Tactical Cover, Deception and Evasion.

a. (C) Insertions of Reconnaissance Elements

OBSERVATION: Insertion of Long Range Patrols without compromise is extremely difficult to effect after friendly units are withdrawn.

EVALUATION: The preferred method of covering the insertion of LRPs is the "stay behind technique." When making a late evening airmobile extraction of deployed units, insert a LRP element with one of the final sorties to arrive at the PZ. LRPs can operate with the deployed unit during the day, pick likely spots for night observation and intelligence gathering, and then remain behind when the conventional unit extracts. Cover for waterborne insertion is the most difficult to achieve. However, it can be accomplished by using several boats simultaneously, one of which will carry the LRP to be inserted. Each boat may make several landings, but all boats should withdraw and return to their base at approximately the same time.

RECOMMENDATION: That careful efforts be made to conceal the insertion of LRPs.

b. (C) Enemy Decoy and Deception Techniques

OBSERVATION: The VC have been successfully using decoys to draw US ground forces away from VC locations.

EVALUATION: Three to five VC are often seen running away from a location into which US troops are about to advance. This has the effect of pulling the entire US ground element away from the planned target area. On 24 December, during an attempt to recover a US IN, five VC were seen to run away from the area in which a prisoner was allegedly imprisoned. The main body of US troops gave chase to the five VC. It was later learned that the VC withdrew in another direction with the US IN. In January 1969 a US Cavalry element spotted three camouflaged buildings in an area toward which US troops were moving. Three VC ran away from this area. The US troops gave chase and consequently never entered the target area.

RECOMMENDATION: A part of the US ground element should always be designated to proceed to the planned target area.

[signature]

Colonel, CE
Acting Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

A-1R-M

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

Incl
1. 9th Inf Div Organization/
   Task Organization and Unit
   Locations
2. Roster of Key Personnel
3. Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI)
4. Personnel and Administration Data
5. Enemy Unit Locations
6. Artillery Support
7. G-3 Air Operational Support Chart
8. G-3 Tabulated Operations Data
9. IMINT Support to RP/TP
10. Base Operations
11. 1st Bde Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORR)
12. 2d Bde ORR
13. 3d Bde ORR
14. 3-5 Cav ORR
15. DISCOM ORR
16. 15th Eng Bn ORR
17. 9th Sig Bn ORR
18. 9th Avn Bn ORR
19. 9th MP Co ORR

Incl 2 9-19 wd, Hq, DA

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CONFIDENTIAL
AV:3C-RL-H (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HQ II FORCLV, APO San Francisco 96266 21 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVSGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GCP-IT, APO 96358

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division for the period ending 31
January 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

B. G. MACDONALD
LT, AG
Assl AG
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from the 9th Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. (U) Reference item concerning Staffing of Supply and Service Unit, page 35, paragraph 2a(3), which recommends increasing the air delivery section strength from one (E4) to three (one E5 and two E4); concur. The recommendation appears valid and upon receipt of this proposal in MTOE format, it will be evaluated and processed. However, in accordance with Air 611-2011, the grade authorization for a three man section would be one E4 and two E3's.

   b. (C) Reference item concerning Transportation of Prisoners of War to ARVN PW Facilities, Combined Military Intelligence Centers, and Medical Facilities, page 38, paragraph 2b(5). The recommendation, as stated, does not lend itself to a concurrence or nonconcurrence by this headquarters. A check of the files at this headquarters has failed to reveal any documentation pertaining to the recommendation noted to have been forwarded to USARV on 17 January 1969; however, operational matters of this type should be resolved at the PFCOCEV/Military Police Brigade level. If PFCOCEV has been advised of this action. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   c. (C) Reference item concerning Sampan Pumps, page 41, paragraph 2b(15); concur in evacuating captured sampan motors through engineer channels for potential usage in projects requiring drainage. Nonconcur in procuring pumps (motors) through supply channels as there are pumps presently in the inventory which will serve the same purpose. Unit will be advised.

   d. (C) Reference item concerning Securing Metal Edge to Concrete, page 44, paragraph 2b(22); nonconcur. Standard construction practice is to weld metal "stubs" to the inside of metal edging. The stubs are imbedded in the concrete and anchor the metal edge after the concrete has hardened.

   e. (C) Reference item concerning McCullogh Chain Saw Blades, page 45, paragraph 2b(25); nonconcur. Blades on the McCullogh Saw can be sharpened with a 9/32" round file. Burning of the blades is an indication of misuse of the saw.
f. (C) Reference item concerning Launching of the Bailey Bridge, page 45, paragraph 2b(2a); concur. This method of launching the Bailey Bridge may be found on page 2/0 of TM 5-277.

g. (C) Reference item concerning Anchor Systems in the Delta, page 47, paragraph 2b(2b); concur. The following is provided: Chapter 12 of TM 5-210 lists many standard and expedient anchorage systems for floating bridges, the majority of which have been used successfully in the Delta, including the method used in paragraph 2b(2d) on page 47 of the 9th Infantry Division ODL.

h. (C) Reference item concerning Expedition Mine Boom Anchors, page 47, paragraph 2b(2b); concur. In system deserving consideration for use in the mine boom, with suitable substitute for Bailey Bridge anchor, which are non-standard supply items.

i. (C) Reference item concerning Communications Security, page 4, paragraph 3a; concur. This is a simple but effective method of gathering frequency and unit identification. Item will be published in the next issue of U.S. Army Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend U.S. Army Combat Intelligence Lessons be republished item to other major subordinate commands.

j. (U) Reference item concerning Dermatology Training, page 50, paragraph 2c(2); concur. Additional assistance is available to Surgeon, 9th Infantry Division, in the assignment of two dermatologists to Dermatology Center, 2nd Evacuation Hospital. One of these individuals will be made continually available to units in III and IV CTZ for instruction and on site clinics with medical battalions.

k. (C) Reference item concerning mines, page 51, paragraph 2d(2); concur. These are important aids in daily mine-sweeping operations. Item will be published in the next issue of U.S. Army Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action by U.S. Army Combat Intelligence Lessons.

l. (C) Reference item concerning infiltration of US installations and units, page 54, paragraph 3b(2); concur. Observation provides good hints for insuring operational security. Item will be published in the next issue of U.S. Army Combat Intelligence Lessons. Recommend no action by U.S. Army Combat Intelligence Lessons.

m. (U) Reference item concerning Prisoner of War Identification Kit, page 54, paragraph 2e(2); concur. This headquarters is currently running a survey of the effectiveness of prisoner of war identification kits that were issued to the field in November 1968. The addition of a rapid processing identification camera and fingerprint stamp pad as
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AV.CC-G (15 Feb 67) 2d Inf

SUBJ:  Operational report of 9th Infantry Division for period ending 31 January 1967 (Avn Cptn-D) (Hi)

Components of, or in addition to, the prisoner of war name identification kit will be included as a portion of the survey results and forwarded to higher headquarters for evaluation by appropriate agencies.

n. (C) Reference item concerning Allocation of Helicopter Munitions under Available Supply Rate (ASR) Control, page 55, paragraph 2d(5); non-concur. USALV allocates munitions to major commanders who further sub-allocate to using units. Each commander is responsible for planning operations within the quantity of ammunition allocated. If USALV were to allocate helicopter munitions to rearming points, it would be, in effect, establishing ASR's which would deprive the commander of managing the munitions available to him.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. Wilson

C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:

9th Inf Div

Hq II FFV

64

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Inf Div for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 /R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JUN 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 21, 2d Indorsement. This recommendation concerning placing a piece of tape over the frequency window of vehicular mounted radios to prevent unauthorized personnel from observing the operating frequency will be incorporated into the next revision of Headquarters, U. S. Army, Pacific, Communications - Electronics Instructions (CED), item number 10-( ).

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. Shortt
CT, AGC
Ann AG

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
### Assigned Units

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<tr>
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<td>HHG 1st Bde</td>
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### Attached Units

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**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.**

**DOD DIR 5200.10**
Task Organization and Unit Locations as of 0600W

9th Inf Div

15th Engr (-) DONG TAM
D/3-5 Cav DONG TAM
B/3-17 Cav DONG TAM

DIVARTY

1-84 Arty (-) DONG TAM
A/1-84 Arty TAN TRU
B/1-84 Arty FSPB DIZZY
C/1-84 Arty FSPB KEY
D/1-84 Arty (2 Tubes) FSPB MOORE

6-77 Arty (-) CAN THO
A/6-77 Arty THOI LAI
B/5-77 Arty (4 Tubes) THON TRI DIEN (2 Tubes)

C/5-77 Arty CHIEN TRAEBANG
B/5-42 Arty GSR CAN GIUOC
C/5-42 Arty GSR THU THUA

OPERATION SPEEDY EXPRESS

1st Bde

4-39 Inf (-) FSPB MOORE
B/4-39 Inf FSPB DIZZY
C/4-39 Inf AP BINH LONG (2)
D/4-39 Inf AP BINH LONG
CONFIDENTIAL

3-39 Inf (-)
A/3-39 Inf
B/3-39 Inf
C/3-39 Inf
D/3-39 Inf
2-39 Inf (-)
A/2-39 Inf
B/2-39 Inf
C/2-39 Inf
6-31 Inf (-)
A/6-31 Inf
C/6-31 Inf
2/6-31 Inf
1-11 Arty (DS) (-)
A/1-11 Arty
B/1-11 Arty

2d Bde
2d Bde Fwd

3-47 Inf (-)
A/3-47 Inf
B/3-47 Inf
C/3-47 Inf
D/3-47 Inf
3-60 Inf (-)
B/3-60 Inf
D/3-60 Inf

DONG TAM
PB DEROS
PB DEPENDO
PB DALTON
PB DUNAVY
FSPB DIRK
FSPB DUSTY
DONG TAM
AP MY HOA
FSPB MORE
AP CAN LO
AP HOA HUNG (1)
DONG TAM
DONG TAM
FSPB DUSTY
FSPB MORE
MRB
FSPB KHAN
FSPB TIGER II
AP CHO (3)
TIGER II
CHAU HOA
AP QUI NHIA
MRB
AP NHUT (1)
AP PHU DINH

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31 January 1969

XS 4143
XS 3644
XS 4345
XS 4345
XS 3644
XS 1448
XS 1344
XS 4143
XS 1350
XS 2650
XS 2553
XS 2048
XS 4143
XS 4143
XS 1344
XS 2650
XS 3941
XS 4826
XS 6227
XS 5829
XS 6227
XS 6228
XS 6226
XS 3941
XS 5235
XS 3539

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OPERATION TOAN THANG (Phase II)

3d Bde

5-60 Inf (-)
B/5-60 Inf
2-60 Inf (-)
D/2-60 Inf
2-47 Inf (-) (M)
A/2-47 Inf (M)
B/2-47 Inf (M)

C/15th Engr

2-4 Arty (DS) (-)
A/2-4 Arty
B/2-4 Arty
C/2-4 Arty (2 Tubes)
(4 Tubes)

DETACHED UNITS:

3-5 Cav (-) OPCON TO 101ST ABN DIV (AML) TRANH LAM

CONFIDENTIAL
Personnel and Administrative Data (U)

1. (C) Maintenance of Unit Strength

A. Division Strength:
(Comparison as of 1 Nov 68-31 Jan 69)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
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(Strength by Month)

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b. Gains:

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Confidential

DOD DIR 5200.10

71
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(Location of Wound)

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(Situation)

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2. (U) Personnel Management:

PIR Reconciliation: Personnel Information Roster updating was the most significant management function to occur during the period of the report. It was discovered that incorrect morning report entries were being made by most of our division units and had resulted in erroneous posting of Personnel Information Rosters at Division level. Therefore, PIR's were not reflecting the true status of battalion strengths. To alleviate this problem, AG Personnel Management made arrangements to have each battalion send representation to AG with the battalion PIR's so that a hand posted reconciliation could be made. AG worked with one battalion per day. This method has resulted in much greater accuracy in strength accounting and further allows for correct management and reassignment of division personnel.

3. (U) Development and Management of Morale:

a. Morale continues to be high in all units.

b. Special Services Activities.

(1) Entertainment:

(a) USO Shows.  

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<tr>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major League All Star Spec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joey Bishop</td>
<td>22 Nov 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig Sacwicz</td>
<td>14 Dec 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Op HOLLY</td>
<td>27 Dec 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Stewart &amp; Wife</td>
<td>14 Jan 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Daniel &amp; Friends</td>
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(b) Soldier Shows:

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<td>The Common People</td>
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31 January 1969

(2) R&R

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<td>1707</td>
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c. Postal Activities.

(1) During the period 1 Nov 68 - 25 Jan 69, 879,136 pounds of mail were handled by the APC. This includes both incoming and outgoing items. The period 5 Dec 68 - 28 Dec 68 was the busiest in terms of volume of mail handled. During the period above, 37 CONEX containers of mail were received. All mail was delivered to the unit mail clerks on the day it was received. An augmentation of 22 personnel was utilized to accomplish operation.

(2) Hospital mail statistics for the period averaged 96% effectiveness, an exceptional degree of success.

d. Awards and Decorations: During this period a new Awards and Decorations policy was implemented for the 9th Division. Every unit has been directed to review the records of every man in its organization after he has been in country for five months to determine if the individual deserves an achievement award. The units are also to review the records of every man in their organization after he has been in country for 11 months to determine if he deserves an achievement award or service award or both. Each month commanders will submit a roster to G1 indicating that they have reviewed the records of those men with five and eleven months service with the actions taken concerning these personnel.

d. Awards and Decorations. Awards Issued (1 Nov 68-31 Jan 69)

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<th>BS</th>
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<th>SM</th>
<th>BST</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>ACM</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>AM</th>
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75
31 January 1969

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<td>3</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Sig</td>
<td></td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>119</td>
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<td>164</td>
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<tr>
<td>15th Engr</td>
<td></td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td>188</td>
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<td>274</td>
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<tr>
<td>709th Maint</td>
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<td>231</td>
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<td>286</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Adm</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>9th MP</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E/9th Div</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9th MI</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th PIO</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224 PIO</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th MHD</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>39th CMIL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>43rd Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>45th Inf</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/50th Inf</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Rel Acad</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1097th Trans</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Airboat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>335 RRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 13 9 142 42 35 496 28 652 1216 3959 3420 1396 11399

e. Religious Services:

(1) The following are statistics of the Religious Activities for the period 1 November 1968 - January 1969:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PROTESTANT</th>
<th>CATHOLIC</th>
<th>JEWISH</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Services</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td>34,578</td>
<td>23,029</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>57,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorial Services</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Visits</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Compared with the last reporting period we had increases in both the number of services and attendance.

76
January 1969

(3) The significant increase in services and attendance reflects the normal increase for the Thanksgiving and Christmas periods.

f. Red Cross:

(1) Red Cross support rendered during the reporting period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cases Handled</th>
<th>Loans/Grants (Amt)</th>
<th>Emergency Leave</th>
<th>Non-Emer Leave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>18 ($2520.00)</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>8 ($975.00)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1337</td>
<td>1 ($160.00)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The December dip in case totals is the annual holiday slowdown. Otherwise, the totals remain relatively static. The decline in loan activity is more a cyclic effect than a trend. The statistics are not considered high for a command of this size.

(3) As of 1 December 68, this office relinquished control of the Bearcat A/C substation to the Field Director, II Field Forces, due to the departure from Bearcat of the last 9th Division Troops.

(4) For Christmas, 25,281 ARC gift bags were distributed, one to each serviceman and woman in the Division AO.

(5) Attempting to reduce the Division drowning rate, ten line personnel completed a two-week Water Safety Instructors course. They will be utilized by the Brigade Commanders as instructors for two hour Combat Survival Swimming courses to line personnel. Also, an October graduate of the 431 course has been placed in the Reliable Academy as a Water Survival instructor.

g. Education Center:

(1) Introduction: The Army Education Center, which moved to Dong Tam from Bearcat early this fiscal year, has been in the process of obtaining sufficient floor space and instructional equipment to carry on its essential mission of offering both enlisted men and officers the opportunity to remedy, at least in part, any educational deficiencies they may have. In addition, the Army Education Center is charged with the mission of offering courses in foreign languages, MOS-related courses and assistance to those who plan to enroll full time in civilian schools, either through the Army's "Bootstraps" program or upon discharge from the service.

(2) Organization and Personnel: The Center is an integral unit which consists of an Education Director (DAC) and two enlisted men. In addition, two men are assigned to teach Tiger Scouts basic English and another to teach 9th Division clerks typing as well as remedial high school courses to enlisted men who lack a high school education.
Operations:

(a) The previous Education Director left Dong Tam on or about 22 October 1968. His replacement, Mr. Russell S. Johns, arrived 22 November 1968.

(b) New, portable-type classrooms arrived during the month of December. Facilities consist of one 10'x40' language laboratory (less tape recorders) and three 20'x30' classrooms complete with blackboards, instructor's desks, and student chairs and desks.

(c) In January, typewriters were requisitioned and delivered for a typing laboratory. On Monday, 27 January 1969, the first class was organized. It meets seven days per week, three hours per day, for three weeks to be followed by succeeding cycles of like duration.

(d) A new man was assigned to the Education Center within the past week to teach typing classes. In the afternoon, he will conduct the new USAPI programmed, core-curriculum course to enlisted personnel who cannot pass the high school GED battery of tests. This program, a mandatory requirement placed on the Center by the Department of the Army, is probably one of the most beneficial (both to the Army and to the men who participate) that the Center can offer.

(e) The University of Maryland was queried in January 1969 concerning college-level classes at Dong Tam for officer personnel who lack a bachelor's degree. The Director of the Far East Division, University of Maryland, has agreed to begin courses at Dong Tam during Term 4, 31 March 1969 through 24 May 1969, provided the Army Education Center can locate part time instructors who meet the University of Maryland's requirement of a Master's degree. It is hoped that at least four or five will be available at Dong Tam to conduct the courses for Maryland. Note: The University of Maryland pays their part time instructors directly.

(f) In December, publicity was given to the USAPI high school GED program. As a result, the number of men who have been able to complete their high school work is gradually growing. Each one of these men, as soon as he receives his high school certificate or diploma, is potentially a much better soldier and definitely will be better equipped as a civilian upon discharge.

Logistics: So far, the Army Education Center has been fortunate in obtaining most of the equipment and buildings it needs for the foreseeable future. It still lacks tape recorders for the language laboratory although everything else is on hand for the laboratory, including the tapes.

Education Center Activities for the Quarter Ending 31 Jan 1969 follows:

(a) Correspondence Course Registrations

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. College Level</td>
<td>271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. High School</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MOS Related (Lang, Technical)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Testing Services

1. HS GED 245
2. College Comprehensive (oct) 42
3. Subject Standardized 18
4. Achievement 76

301

4. (c) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) Crimes against Persons and Property. The Division has experienced a decrease in these types of crimes. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person and Property</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (Over $50)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny (Under $50)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrongful Appropriation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Miscellaneous and Military Offenses: The division has experienced a significant decrease in this category. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Miscellaneous Offenses</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>TOTAL (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narcotics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Narcotics</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1/38</td>
<td>1/16</td>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>3/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1/38</td>
<td>1/16</td>
<td>1/9</td>
<td>3/63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

**MILITARY OFFENSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off Limits</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violations of Regulations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Traffic Offenses: The division experienced a significant reduction in the number of traffic offenses for this quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traffic Offenses</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicular Homicide</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reckless Driving</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleeing Scene</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Sixty CID Reports of Investigation were received this quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CID Case</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opened</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Detainees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Total (3 mos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PW's</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendants</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilians</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Evacuees</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>269</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>1016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### FOOT PROBLEMS - QUARTERS OR LIGHT DUTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Patient Visits</td>
<td>Quarters or Light Duty</td>
<td>Total Patient Visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/39th Inf</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/39th Inf</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/39th Inf</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/47th Inf</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/47th Inf</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/47th Inf</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/60th Inf</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/60th Inf</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/60th Inf</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/31st Inf</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5th Cav</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL Patient Visits**: 7275  
**TOTAL Quarters or Light Duty**: 5073
### Artillery Support

**Summary of Rounds Fired**

#### Division Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm Howitzer</th>
<th>155mm Howitzer</th>
<th>8&quot; Howitzer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,468</td>
<td>153,988</td>
<td>3,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Non-Division Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm Howitzer</th>
<th>155mm Howitzer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,097</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>Rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>62,626</td>
<td>30,114</td>
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</table>

**Fired in Support of RVN-RP/PF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105mm Howitzer</th>
<th>155mm Howitzer</th>
<th>8&quot; Howitzer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,122</td>
<td>64,024</td>
<td>646</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- Missions and Rounds are the number of missions and rounds fired, respectively.
- Missions are the total number of missions conducted.
- Rounds are the total number of rounds fired during those missions.

---

**Confidential**

*31 January 1969*

**Declasified at 3 Year Intervals;**
**Declassify After 12 Years.**

**DOD Dir 5200.10**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
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<td>BLDGS DEST</td>
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<td>637</td>
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<td>BLDGS DAM</td>
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<td>1,634</td>
<td>4,561</td>
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<td>BUNKERS DAM</td>
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<td>297</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>995</td>
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<tr>
<td>KBA (BC)</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>174</td>
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<tr>
<td>KBA (POSS)</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>SAMFANS DEST</td>
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</tr>
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**DIVISION OPERATIONS DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>OPNS</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>EN LOSSES/CONTACTS</th>
<th>EN LOSSES/CONTACT</th>
<th>US KIA/CONTACT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
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<td>189</td>
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<td>25:1</td>
<td>5:9:1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
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<td>195</td>
<td>7:3:1</td>
<td>19:1</td>
<td>5:6:1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1285</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>3:9:1</td>
<td>13:1</td>
<td>4:2:1</td>
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**DIVISION COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
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<th>US WHA</th>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC FW</th>
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*Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years. DOD Dir 5200.10*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

31 January 1969
**UNIT OPERATIONS DATA**

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>#OPS</th>
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<th>OPS/CONTACT</th>
<th>VC LOSSES/US KHA</th>
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<td>6.4:1</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 9th Infantry Division

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.**

**CG, 9th Infantry Division**

**15 February 1969**

**691216**

N/A

**N/A**

**OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310**

**N/A**

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**Security Classification:** Confidential