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AGAM-P (M) (3 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684246

10 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Platoon, Airborne Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968, (U)

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101st Airborne Division Artillery

Best Available Copy
1. (U) Reference: 1. 301st AB Div Reg 1-1.

2. (U) In accordance with references the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 101st Airborne Division Artillery is submitted for the reporting period 1 August 1968 to 31 October 1968.

3. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. Narrative of significant unit activities.

      (i) On 1 August the 101st Airborne Division Artillery was disposed as follows:

          (a) Hq & Hq Btry. Division Artillery was collocated with Division Headquarters at Camp Eagle. Division Artillery continued to be responsible for coordinating the Camp Eagle perimeter defense.

          (b) The 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery was attached to the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division which was OPCON to the 25th Division and located in the vicinity of Cu Chi in the III Corps area. The firing batteries were located as follows:

              1. AB Batteries: PNR Laha (77473166).


          (c) The 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery was direct support to the 1st Brigade and was operating for Operation Somerset Plain. Its Headquarters Battery was located at Camp Eagle while the firing batteries were located as follows:  

              DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;   DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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1. Battery A: FSB Son (YD472031).
2. Battery B: Camp Eagle (YD5215).
3. Battery C: FSB Panther II (YD800329).

(a) The 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery was direct support to the 2nd Brigade and was engaged in preparing for Operation Somersot Plain and Nevada Eagle. Its Headquarters was located at FSB Son (YD632721) while the firing batteries were located at:

2. Battery B: FSB T-Bone (YD653203).
3. Battery C: FSB Georgia (YD418032).

(b) The 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery remained organic to the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division which was still under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division. Its Headquarters Battery was located at Camp Eagle while the firing batteries were located as follows:

1. Battery A: FSB Vegal (YD52135).
2. Battery B: FSB Boy (YD79132).
3. Battery C: FSB Georgia (YD418032).

(c) The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) provided general support to the Division. It was minus its organic battery which was attached to the 23rd Artillery Group, but in lieu of this unit had C Battery, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery attached. Its Headquarters Battery and Service Battery were located at Camp Eagle with its firing batteries located at:

1. Battery B (-): FSB Vegal (YD55035).
2. Platoon, Battery C: FSB Birmingham (YD705107).
3. Battery C: FSB Son (YD483011).
4. Battery C/6/16 Arty (-): FSB Eagle's Nest (YD407035).
5. Platoon, Battery C/6/16 Arty: FSB Mongoose (YD787268).

(2) On 1 August 1968, the following units were supporting the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

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(a) 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery (8"/175mm) was general support, reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(b) Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 40th Artillery (105mm) was reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(c) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery (.30) (40mm) provided general support to the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(d) Section C, 7th Artillery (40mm) (.50 Cal) was general support to the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(e) Section C, 29th Artillery (30-cal) was general support to the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(3) In addition, Battery D (Prov), 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery remained attached to the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry located at Than Tai in II Corps.

(4) During the period 1-3 August 1968 the Division Artillery was repositioning firing batteries to support Operation Superost Plain in the A Shau Valley while continuing to support Operation Nevada Eagle.

(5) On 4 August 1968 Operation Superost Plain began with an artillery proportion controlled by 2-11th Artillery, 320th Artillery in support of the combat assaults of the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry. A total of 2215-105mm, 713-155mm, and 49-175mm rounds were fired in support of the preparation.

(6) On 5 August 1968, two battalions of the 1st ARVN Division were inserted into the A Shau Valley. They were supported by Battery A, 11th ARVN Artillery (105) and two 155mm Howitzers from Battery A, 34th ARVN Artillery located at FSB Son. In addition, they were reinforced by C Battery, 2/11th Artillery.

(7) On 8 August 1968, Batteries NC, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery; Battery C (-), 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery; batteries A (-) and C, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery; and the ARVN Artillery fired extensively at an estimated NVA Battalion and were credited with 34 enemy KIA.

(8) On 10 August 1968, Company D, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry received hostile artillery fire. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery at FSB Georgia fired counter battery fire at enemy 130mm and 152mm gun positions.

(9) On 9-10 August 1968, a cordon was established around the village of Thon An Truyen and Thon Truyen Nam (TD815265) by 1st Battalion,
501st Infantry. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery fired into the cordon to force the enemy into the waiting infantry. Results were 42 VC KIA and 104 VC/NVA detainees.

(10) On 15 August 1968, Hue was attacked by six 122mm rockets. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery and the ARVN 105mm Battery at FSB Corinoro (YD690203) placed counter rocket fire on the suspect launch sites. During the period 15-17 August 1968 Division Artillery assisted in emplacing and surveying sites for 34 sensing devices which were emplaced in the L Shau Valley. A monitoring station was established at FSB Eagle's Nest. A quick fire channel was established with Battery 4, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery and Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery at FSB Son. Over 2000 105mm and 155mm rounds were fired on sensations during the period 18 August thru 10 September 1968.

(11) On 16 August 1968, a Division Artillery Air Observor detected hostile mortars firing at FSB Birmingham (YD706102). He promptly adjusted artillery on the mortar positions and obtained one secondary explosion. On 16 August, Camp Eagle again came under a rocket attack receiving approximately 16 rockets. The counter rocket program was fired immediately and the attack ceased.

(12) On 18 August 1968, forces on Operation Somerset Plain commenced a withdrawal from the L Shau Valley. The ARVN Task Force was extracted from the L Shau Valley and the ARVN Artillery redeployed to Hue. The next day the US maneuver elements were extracted, Battery C (-), 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery redeployed from FSB Eagle's Nest to FSB Birmingham and Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery redeployed by air from FSB Georgia to FSB Birmingham. Also on 19 August 1968, Lieutenant Colonel George T. Peters Jr, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery was wounded by hostile artillery fire, the enemy round scored a direct hit on the 2nd Brigade Tactical Center at FSB Georgia.

(13) On 20 August 1968, Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery redeployed from FSB Portecheasallen to FSB Panther II and Vogel respectively. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery deployed from FSB Georgia to FSB Omaha. Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery redeployed from FSB Georgia and positioned one platoon at FSB Sally and one platoon at FSB Nangooso. Operation Somerset Plain was completed with a total of 5267 missions fired and a total expenditure of 66,827 rounds, mixed caliber.

(14) On 21 August 1968, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, which was reinforcing the fires of the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery, deployed from FSB Sally to its parent unit. This unit was replaced by Battery B, 6th Battalion, 33rd Artillery at FSB Sally with the mission of reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.
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(15) On 22 August 1968, Battery C (-), 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery moved by air from FSB Birmingham to Panther VII (YD600078) to support operations in the southern portion of the 2nd Brigade, 32nd Airborne Division A0. The remaining three turrets of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery were brought to Panther VII on 25 August 1968. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 33rd Artillery also moved by road from FSB Bastogne to FSB Boyd. Its mission remained general support reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery.

(16) On 23 August, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33rd Artillery moved by air from FSB Sally to FSB Bastogne (YD625096) to provide support for the 2nd Brigade Task Force which was conducting a series of combat assaults vicinity YD6515, 6214, 5314. Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Boyd to FSB Drick (YD834997).

(17) On 25 August 1968, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery provided a forward observer party for the 54th Armored Battalion which was operating in the Division A0. In addition, the Battalion assumed operational control of one 4.2" mortar which provided illumination for the Camp Eagle defense. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery moved by air from FSB Birmingham to Panther VII. Its mission was general support reinforcing the 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery.

(18) On 29 August 1968, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery came under a coordinated support and mortar attack at Panther VII. The results were 2 US KIA, 14 US WIA, and one 155mm howitzer slightly damaged. Enemy losses were 10 KIA.

(19) On 3 September 1968, Battery C (-), 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery moved by air from Panther VII to FSB Angio (YD929071). Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Drick to FSB Greer (YD889041) and was replaced at Drick by Battery C, 2/321st Artillery.

(20) During the period 4-8 September typhoon Dess struck the Division A0. Continuous high winds and heavy rains caused extensive damage to all fire support bases. The positions of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery, and Battery B (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery were flooded and the units were moved to FSB Shirley (YD835324). Battery C, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery remained at FSB Omaha but had to move to higher ground. Ground action diminished considerably during this period; however, an extensive firing program was initiated against all known or suspect enemy locations. In addition, the hostile rocket and mortar program was fired several times each day.

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(22) On 9 September, Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery moved by air from FSB Son to FSB Boyd and Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Back to FSB Boyd. Battery C, 6th Artillery was redesignated Battery F, 16th Artillery by P.O. 423, HQ, USARV, dated 21 August 1968.

(23) On 10 September, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery moved by air from FSB Son to FSB Shirley. Battery F, 16th Artillery moved by air from Panther III and FSB anecho to FSB Koy (24566530) with the mission of general support reinforcing the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery. Battery C, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery moved from FSB Omaha to FSB Sally. Additionally Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved from FSB Panther III to FSB Birmingham. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery moved from FSB Boyd to FSB anecho with the mission of general support reinforcing the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(24) On 11 September, Battery C (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery moved by air from FSB Son to FSB Birmingham. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Shirley to FSB Vinh Loc (2003 15) in support of a combined US/Vietnamese operation. Additional support was provided by Battery F, 16th Artillery and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines who were supporting the fires of the Division from FSB anecho.

(25) On 12 September 1968, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Birmingham to Camp Eagle in preparation for deployment with the 3rd Brigade, 62nd Airborne Division to III Corps.

(26) On 13 September 1968, Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Son to FSB Birmingham with the mission of general support reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery in the Vinh Loc Operation.

(27) On 14 September 1968, Battery A, 4th Battalion, 83rd Artillery and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 13th Marines moved by road from FSB anecho to FSB Quick (9052) to support operations in the extreme southern portion of the first brigade. Two 175mm howitzers from Battery D, 1st Battalion, 444th Artillery supported this move. These units returned to FSB anecho on 17 September and 25 September respectively.

(28) On 15 September 1968, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery moved by air from FSB Shirley to FSB goose (10545568).

(29) On 18 September 1968, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery closed Camp Eagle. This was the first unit of that battalion returning to Division artillery control. It was given the mission of reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery and provided fires for the 2/17 Cavalry from FSB Panther II.

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On 17 September 1968, Battery B (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery moved by air from FSB Shirley to Camp Eagle (1006L257).

On 21 September 1968, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery was given a direct support mission to the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and later 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 33rd Artillery; Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery; and Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery were controlled by the 1/11th in support of operations in the vicinity of FSB Trick.

On 24 September 1968, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Vinh Loc to FSB Shirley as the combined B1/BNF operation at Vinh Loc terminated. A company of the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry remained at Vinh Loc. This unit was provided quick fire channel with Battery F, 16th Artillery on FSB Loy.

On 29 September 1968, Battery C (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery moved by air from FSB Vaghol to FSB Birmingham. Its mission was general support, reinforcing the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery.

On 1 October 1968, Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery deployed from Camp Eagle to the III Corps.

Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery continued to arrive with Battery B closing at Camp Eagle on 2 October 1968.

On 3 October 1968, Camp Eagle came under a rocket attack. Seven to ten 122mm rockets were fired causing negligible damage. Personnel from Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery at Panther II observed the launch flashes and immediately brought fire upon the area. The counter rocket program was fired and a sweep of the area disclosed one launcher destroyed.

On 4 October 1968, Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery moved by air from FSB Anzio to FSB Loy.

On 7 October 1968 the advance party of the 4th Battalion, 77th Artillery (APA) including the Battalion Commander, LTC Roger Bartholomew, arrived from CONUS.

On 12 October 1968, Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery moved by air from FSB Vaghol to FSB Anzio; and Battery G, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery moved by air from FSB Anzio to FSB Birmingham. Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Creer to FSB Anzio. The battery then moved to Phu Bai on 14 October for deployment to III Corps. This was the last Artillery Battery of the 2nd Battalion, 321st Artillery, 82nd Airborne Division to leave the 101st Divisionador.
On 12 October 1968, Battery C (-), 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery moved by air from FSB Birmingham to FSB Bastogne to support an assault by elements of the Second Brigade. The Battery (-) returned to FSB Birmingham on 15 October 1968.

On 14 October 1968, the remaining H. elements of 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery closed Camp Eagle.

On 15 October 1968, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery conducted an air assault from FSB I-Bone to FSB Tomahawk (2D14015). Battery A (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery moved by air from FSB Scandy to FSB Denise (X3002017). Battery H, 6th Battalion, 33rd Artillery moved by road from FSB Joe (YN733150) to FSB Los Banos (AR1832999).

On 17 October 1968 a UH-1D from the Division Artillery Aviation Section crashed while taking off from the USS SUMERALL after completing a Naval Gunfire mission. WO1 Daugherty (USA) and Lance Corporal Moore (USMC) were killed in the crash.

On 19 October 1968, Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery closed into Camp Eagle and was positioned at FSB Bastogne on 21 October 1968. This completed the move of the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery from III CTZ. On this date the remainder of Headquarters Battery, 4th Battalion, 77th Artillery (ARA) arrived from CONUS.

On 22 October 1968, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery moved by air from FSB Boise to FSB Anzio and subsequently to FSB Tomahawk on 24 October. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 33rd Artillery moved from FSB Bastogne to FSB Boyd.


To support operations in the extreme southeastern portion of the Division AO, the Control Fire Direction Centers of the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery were established at FSB Roy and FSB Tomahawk on 27 October. The 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery controlled 4 105mm batteries and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery controlled 1 155mm battery and one 81mm battery in support of this operation. Additionally, four M42 (dusters) from Battery D, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery and one searchlight were employed in support of 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry.

On 25 October 1968 the Division was ordered to assume control of that portion of the 1st Air Cavalry Division AO which included a major portion of Thua Thien Province. The 3rd Brigade assumed operational responsibility.
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for this AO and the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery moved its headquarters to Camp Evans with the 3rd Brigade.

(49) On 28 October 1968, Battery C, 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery (175mm) moved by road from FSB Bastogne to FSB Boyd. Preparations to close FSB Bastogne by 2 November continued.

(50) On 29 October 1968 the repositioning of artillery resulting from the greatly expanded AO began. Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery moved by air from Panther II to Camp Evans and Battery B, 6th Battalion, 33rd Artillery moved by air from FSB Boyd to Panther II. Its mission changed to general support reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery with priority of fires to the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

(51) On 31 October 1968, Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery moved from FSB Tobahawk to FSB Beach (L375988). Battery B (-), 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery moved to FSB Jack (L493282) with the mission of general support reinforcing the 2nd Battalion, 319th Artillery.

b. Organizational Structure: See enclosure 1.

c. The following number of unit days were engaged in:

(1) Training 35*
(2) Troop Movement 47
(3) Operations 92

*Conducted concurrently with combat operations. See para 4b(2).

d. The situation regarding Delta Battery (Provisional), 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery remained essentially the same since the last reporting period. Confidential USARV message 72224 from WHQ-OA, DTG 020000Z Oct 68 indicated that this unit would become an authorized fourth battery and that personnel and equipment fillers would be available by 15 October 1968. By the end of the reporting period the authorized number of howitzers were received; however, the additional personnel and other equipment were not available and the personnel and equipment status therefore remained critical.

e. Combined operations with elements of the 1st ARVN Division have increased and ARVN Artillery has been employed to a greater extent in these operations. US liaison officers with the various ARVN Task Force Headquarters assist in the formulation of coordinated, integrated fire plans. In addition, as the 101st Airborne Division assumed of operations increased, ARVN artillery units were called on to fire defensive targets, preparations, and illumination missions in support of US forces. The Hue/Phu Bai/Camp Eagle counter
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The mortar and counter rocket program was jointly planned and is generated by US and ARVN artillery units. An example of the close coordination between the 101st Airborne Division Artillery and the 1st ARVN Division Artillery occurred during Operation Somerset Plain when an ARVN 105mm howitzer battery and a platoon of 155mm howitzers were airlifted to a forward fire base with the assistance of personnel and equipment from the 101st Airborne Division Artillery. A joint resupply point was established for this operation and ARVN personnel rigged their own Class I and V supplies.

4. (C) Section 2 Lessons Learned, Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Administrative and financial actions

(a) Observation: Administrative and financial actions are difficult to process in an expedited manner. The distance between the administrative rear (Bien Hoa) and Camp Eagle results in an extremely slow method of processing administrative action.

(b) Evaluation: The ability to speed up personnel actions would reduce the time lost in written correspondence with the rear and almost eliminate sending personnel to the rear to complete some administrative actions.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel contact teams be periodically provided to units located in the Division AO to process necessary administrative actions on the spot.

b. Operations:

(1) Firing during periods of the reduced visibility.

(a) Observation: During Typhoon Bess, ground and air operations were considerably reduced. As a result, Division Artillery increased its interdiction program on known and recent intelligence targets provided by the Division FSCE targeting section, in order to continue to exert pressure on the enemy.

(b) Evaluation: Although positive surveillance could not be made due to the weather, reports from prisoners of war indicated that the increased interdiction program affected the enemy's morale and his already seriously limited operations.

(c) Recommendations: During inclement weather when flying is restrictive, that the artillery interdiction program be stepped up in order to deny the enemy free movement.
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(2) Concurrent Training.

(a) Observation: Due to the large number of replacements on the job and specialist training must be conducted at every opportunity. During periodic "stand downs" maneuver elements are able to concentrate on refresher training; however, artillery batteries always have a tactical mission.

(b) Evaluation: A vigorous training program at all levels was initiated in September 1968. It included:

1. A battery executive officer's course of five days duration conducted by Division Artillery.

2. Two battery fire direction officer's courses of five days duration conducted by Division Artillery.

3. A battery testing program conducted by Division Artillery.

4. Continuation and evaluation of the Infantry 81mm and 4.2" mortar sections by Direct Support Artillery Battalions.

5. A five day FADAC operator's training school conducted by a USARV Training team.

6. FDC chart operator's and computer's, firing battery gunners, and liaison sergeant's courses conducted by the battalions. The results of the battery tests and training courses indicate that standard procedures are understood and utilized, responses to fire requests are improving and that artillery incidents have been drastically reduced.

(c) Recommendation: That the conduct of an intensive training program is a definite means of reducing artillery incidents.

(3) Artillery Preparation for Combat Assaults.

(a) Observation: The rapid changing tactical situation frequently does not allow the formal publication of an artillery fire plan for combat assaults even though the requirement to coordinate fires remains. To meet this requirement, the 101st Airborne Division artillery has developed and put into use a brief format for a fire plan that can be transmitted via radio or wire with minimum coding required. This fire plan, called a SAVE (Short, Accurate, Violent, Effective) message, is sufficiently flexible to be used for combat assaults on the coastal plains and in the mountainous jungle. As indicated in the SAVE message notes (see Inclosure 2) the length of the preparation, number of fire units, control of fires, and communications discipline are considered.

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(b) Evaluation: Units assigned, attached, supporting, or reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division Artillery have employed this procedure for the past two months and it has proved to be a most effective means of disseminating the information needed for controlling and firing preparations for combat assaults.

(c) Recommendation: That this procedure be examined by XXIV Corps Artillery with a view to making it an SOP for all artillery units in the Corps.

(4) Setting the M513AI series fuze for point-detonating (PD) action.

(a) Observation:

1. There has been considerable discussion on the proper method to set the M513AI series variable time fuze (VT) for point detonating (PD) action. Applicable publications which address this subject (FM 6-40, TM 9-1300-203, and Notes for the Battery Executive, Cannon Artillery, twelfth edition, US Army Artillery and Missile School) do not agree on the method of setting the M513AI fuze for PD action. Paragraph 5-16, FM 6-40 states the individual setting the fuze should look down on the nose of the fuze and rotate the cap in a clockwise direction. It adds that the cap should not be backed up to the setting because this introduces backlash and reduces timing accuracy. Paragraph 5-14, TM 9-1300-203, states that the fuzes can be set or changed one or more times by rotating the index mark in either direction. Paragraph 5-75e adds that the proximity element will never become armed and that an airburst will not occur when the fuze is set at the PD line. Page 90, Notes for the Battery Executive, states that this fuze will be set in a clockwise direction to the 90 second mark for PD action and that an airburst may occur if the fuze is set on PD.

2. The 101st Airborne Division Artillery has experienced a high percentage of air burst when this fuze was set on 90 seconds for PD action and a test was therefore conducted to determine the validity of setting the fuze on PD by turning the cap in a counterclockwise direction.

(b) Evaluation: The limited tests indicated that setting the fuze by turning the cap in a counterclockwise direction to the PD mark might be the correct procedure as no airbursts or duds were observed.

(c) Recommendation: That the results of this test be forwarded to the US Army Artillery Board, Fort Sill, Oklahoma for further evaluation.

(5) The Distance Measuring Instrument (DMI).

(a) Observation: The DMI is used to bring common survey control to US and ARVN artillery units over a large area of operations. Triangulation stations are often set up in areas not controlled by friendly forces.
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(b) Evaluation: This equipment provides reliable and accurate survey control in a minimum time when compared with other means of survey. However, waterproofing appears to be inadequate as condensation in the equipment renders it inoperable. This is a continual problem in the climate of Viet Nam.

(c) Recommendation: That the problem of waterproofing in the DI be further examined by USARV personnel with a view to determining what can be done to eliminate it.

(6) Intelligence: None.

(7) Logistics: Consolidated ammunition supply for specific operations.

(a) Observation:

1. During Operation Somerset Plain, the Division established a consolidated Forward Supply Point (FSP) at FSB Birmingham (YD702103) to reduce the time required to airlift supplies and to have a controlled, effective resupply system. As Class V supplies for artillery units employed the majority of the available airlift, Division artillery also set up a consolidated Class V point using the resources of all attached, organic, and ARVN artillery units participating in the operation.

2. Daily stockage of the FSP enabled most requests to be immediately filled and wrecker and forklift support contributed to an effective operation. Many of the fire support bases were at high altitudes and the density-altitude factor decreased the lift capability of CH-47 helicopters to 8,500 pounds. Loads were rigged throughout the day and night according to priorities established by Division artillery.

3. The Division artillery Class V holipad was divided into an upper and lower level for light and medium ammunition respectively. Aircraft were controlled by one individual on one frequency. As the helicopter arrived at the designated pick-up point, the hook-up man handed a data card to the crewman through the cargo hook hatch prior to hooking up the load. This card listed the destination of the cargo, the type of cargo, and the receiving unit's callsign and frequency. Alternate destinations with the required information were also listed in case the primary base was not able to receive the cargo.

(b) Evaluation: During Operation Somerset Plain, 1,970 tons of ammunition were delivered in 475 sorties over a sixteen (16) day period without a single accident. During a peak period over 600 tons of Class V were moved in a single day utilizing 160 CH-47 sorties.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1 August 1968-31 October 1968

(c) Recommendation: This system is recommended for similar large scale operations requiring strict supervision of ammunition distribution.

5. (U) Section III. Evasion, Escape, Survival: None.

EDWARD B. VOGEL
LTC, Artillery
Artillery Officer
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDG-GC (Dec 68) 1st Ind

CIT Olson/dvd/Engle 103

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 101st Abn Div Artillery

DA, 771, 101st Abn Div, APO San Francisco 96383 2 Dec 68

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96383


2. (G) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned, Commanders Observations, and Evaluations and Recommendations.

Page 12 4b (4) - Setting the 151311 series fuse for point-detonating (PD) action

a. Evaluation:

The test conducted was with charge A and 100 rounds were fired with no duds and no air bursts observed. Arrows on the base of the fuse indicate the fuse can be set in either direction; the shortest distance for a PD setting is counter clockwise.

b. Recommendations: That further testing be conducted.

FOR XX COMANDER:

[Signature]

M. H. WOMACK
COL, IIF
Acting Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT (1 Nov 68) 2d Ind MAJ Sanderson/wab/2506
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1 August 1968 - 31 October 1968 (U)
Da, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96308 2 DEC 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The OI1LL of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery (AM) has been reviewed at Ht, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 2: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Concur with commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations noted at paras 4a, 4b(1), 4b(5) and 4b(7) without further comment.

   b. Item: Concurrent training, page 11, para 4b(2). Concur. The majority of artillery activities tends to fit a repetitious pattern of common situations. Experience indicates the only practical method of maintaining a satisfactory level of proficiency in less common artillery procedures is through constant, concurrent training and testing. XXIV Corps Artillery conducts regular training schools and inspections to supplement those of the divisions and subordinate units. XXIV Corps Artillery attributes a significant part of the decrease in friendly fire incidents to the concurrent training/inspection effort.

   c. Item: Artillery preparation for combat assaults, page 11, 4b(3). Concur, with the following additional comments: The solution presented by the 101st Airborne Division Artillery (AM) is an excellent and workable plan. Recommended changes are designed to enhance security without decreasing the utility of the message. Several of these points have been discussed with the unit and are listed below. The system will be studied further with a view toward developing a standard procedure for artillery within the Corps.

      (1) The SAVA message should not be disseminated by insecure radio more than four hours before the start of the preparation.

      (2) The blank form message, with explanatory notes, should be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

      (3) The messages should be sent by secure FH (KY-8) whenever possible, and this fact should be stated in the implementing instructions.

      (4) When the message is sent by insecure means, the firing units in line 3 should be denoted by designators set forth in the implementing instructions. FM call signs should not be used as designators.

      (5) Preparation H-hour, line 4c, should be encoded. Further, line 4d should be specified in terms of H-hour, e.g. H-hour minus 45 minutes.

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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT (1 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1 August 1968 - 31 October 1968 (U)

d. Item: Setting the M513A1 series fuse for point-detonating (PD) action, page 12, para 4b(4) and 1st Ind, para 2. Concur with recommendations of CRLL and 1st Indorsement. The procedure described also differs from instructions contained in USAMV letter, AVHAD-AM, dated 26 Mar 68, subj: "Artillery Fuze Information Letter 4-68" from which the following is extracted:

"2. Fuze VT, M513A1 (T22652) and M514A1 (T22752)

a. These fuzes are shipped with the fuze set on the shipping line's'. When fired as shipped (scale setting on the shipping line) the VT element will arm after about three seconds and the fuze will function in the VT mode at anytime after arming.

b. The ID line is located in the fuze wrench slot and will be completely disregarded. Do not under any circumstances set the fuze on the PD mark. When PD action is desired set the fuze for 90 seconds. The one exception to this is when firing the 175mm (gun) with charge 3, the fuze must be set for 100 seconds. Do not set the fuzes on the PD mark.

c. If VT action is desired, then the proper time setting should be set on the time ring to increase arming delay and decrease the possibility of a premature detonation."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

H.R. TAYLOR
CPT/AGC
ASST AG

Cy Furn:

CG, 101st Abn Div (AK)
CG, 101st Abn Div Army (AK)
AVH0G-DST (1 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 1 August 1968-31 October 1968 (U)  

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375  

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558  

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division Artillery.  

2. Comments follow:  
   a. Reference item concerning setting the M513A1 fuse for point-detonating (PD) action, page 12, paragraph 4b(4); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2d: Concur. Recommend the US Army Artillery Board, Fort Sill, Oklahoma review this item.  
   
   b. Reference item concerning the distance measuring instrument (DMI), page 12, paragraph 4b(5): Concur. The unit will be advised to submit an EIR.  

FOR THE COMMANDER:  

Cy furn:  
XXIV Corps  
101st Abn Div Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Abn Div Arty for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
NOTE 1. This is a SAVE message which is an electronic artillery fire plan in support of an arty preparation of an LZ. S - A - V - E stands for Short - Accurate - Violent - Effective. These words are the principles by which a successful preparation should be planned and executed.

NOTE 2. Each DS Bn will number their SAVE messages in sequence using the following prefix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREFIX</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>2/320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1/321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>2/319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE 3. The location of the LZ will be sent by KAC Code. This location then becomes the point of origin for target list locations. Each unit will acknowledge message by reading back LZ coordinates using a different KAC Code designator. The coordinates of the LZ will be announced in the clear by the controlling unit within five (5) minutes of H-Hour.

NOTE 4. The following three (3) standard length preps will be available. The desired prep will be indicated in para 2.

a. **Light**: Indicating a six (6) minute prep.

b. **Medium**: Indicating a twelve (12) minute prep.

c. **Heavy**: Indicating a sixteen (16) minute prep.

NOTE 5. This Organization for Combat lists the artillery batteries that will fire in support of the prep. The phonetic letter opposite each unit will be transmitted along with the radio call sign of the battery. This phonetic letter then represents that battery in the schedule of fires (para 6). The sequence of units in this paragraph also represents the order in which units will acknowledge all transmissions.

NOTE 6. The Dump Grid represents an area which has been cleared for expenditure of loaded ammo in the event of a check fire. Permission must be requested from the control FDO (para 4b) prior to firing in this area. The dump grid should be within on carriage traverse limits of medium and heavy artillery.

NOTE 7. The two letter conc. prefix is the prefix assigned to each artillery battalion and its subordinate elements in the Div Arty SOP. The LNO involved, in conjunction with the control FDO, will number each concentration with the specific prefix, followed by the suffix 1 thru 30. In para 5, the prefix is
mentioned only once. Each target is then designated only by the appropriate number. The location of each target is given as a shift from the LZ coordinates which represents the Point of Origin, i.e., "Target 7", Right 1.2, Up 0.6."

NOTE 8.

a. The column on the left, listing the phonetic alphabet, represents each battery as designated in para 3.

b. The top line of the block indicates minutes, with the reminder of the "Type Prep" (para 2) being fired.

c. EOP (End of Prep) is the exact second that the last rounds will impact. The exact EOP time will be announced by the control FDO at least two minutes prior to the EOP time. Units scheduled to fire the last two minutes of the prep will consider the EOP time as a final TOT. Units will report "Tubes Clear" prior to EOP but after the last volley is fired.

d. With the exception of the last two minutes of the prep, all units will fire at a sustained rate of fire. The last two minutes will be fired at a maximum rate of fire. These rates per tube per two minute periods are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Sustained</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. One round of WP with a 200 meter height of burst will be fired by the unit designated as Alpha. This round will be fired to impact 20 seconds after EOP, unless directed otherwise by the control FDO.

d. Each unit (designated by a phonetic letter) will be given specific targets, from the target list at para 5, to be fired during each two minute block. The first target designated will be placed in the block corresponding to the length of the prep (16, 12, or 6 min). Each successive target for that unit will be placed in the order of sequence of decreasing time blocks until EOP is reached or "Clear Tubes" (CT) is indicated at an earlier time (i.e., 2 min.). Normally, all reinforcing artillery will be given a "Clear Tubes" at 2 minutes.

g. If the fire is to be adjusted by the LNO or AO, then only the initial target location for each battery will be given along with the termination
NOTES (cont)

directions, i.e., "Alpha, Target #2, will adjust, Terminate fire at EOP" or "...Terminate at EOP Minus Two."

NOTE 5.

a. Communications will be held to a minimum. Units will acknowledge messages in the sequence indicated in par. 3. (WAIT YOUR TURN)

b. Expenditures will be sent to the control FDO only upon request and only before the LZ has been declared "Green."

c. Units will report time of flight, degree of hazard and maximum ordinate at the initial communication check.
1. **Landing Zone** (Note 3) __________________________ (K&C Code)

2. **Type Prep** (Note 4) Light ___ Medium ___ Heavy ___

3. **Organization for Combat** (Note 5)
   - Alpha __________________________
   - Bravo __________________________
   - Charlie __________________________
   - Delta ____________________________
   - Echo ____________________________
   - Foxtrot __________________________

4. **Coordinating Instructions**
   a. **H0** _____________ ______ Freq. Designator ____________
   b. Control FDO _____________ ______ Freq. ________________
   c. H-Hour __________________________ (hrs)
   d. Commo Check __________________________ (hrs)
   e. Dump Grid (Note 6) ___________________________ (In Clear)
   f. Clearances (Initials) **BRN** ______________

5. **Target list** (Note 7) Conc. Prefix ______________
   1 _______________ 11 _______________ 21 _______________
   2 _______________ 12 _______________ 22 _______________
   3 _______________ 13 _______________ 23 _______________
   4 _______________ 14 _______________ 24 _______________
   5 _______________ 15 _______________ 25 _______________
   6 _______________ 16 _______________ 26 _______________
   7 _______________ 17 _______________ 27 _______________
   8 _______________ 18 _______________ 28 _______________
   9 _______________ 19 _______________ 29 _______________
   10 _______________ 20 _______________ 30 _______________

---

**Note 1:**

**Note 2:**

**Note 3:**

**Note 4:**

**Note 5:**

**Note 6:**

**Note 7:**
6. **Schedule of Fires** (Note 9)

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<tr>
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<td>Sustain Rate</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Charlie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Echo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foxtrot</td>
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7. Remarks: _______________________________________

8. SOP (See Note 9)
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq 101st Airborne Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CO, 101st Airborne Division Artillery

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

**ITEM 1**

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.