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INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

URBAN INSURGENCY CASES

by

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Background and Prospect for Urban Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Why is Urban Insurgency Frequent Today?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. The Meaning of Urban Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>CASES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Tentative Hypotheses and Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. The Next Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** 135
I. INTRODUCTION

As a part of Defense Research Corporation's 1964 studies for the Advanced Research Projects Agency's Remote Area Conflict Office, under OSD Contract No. SD-231, a conference on urban insurgency was held in Santa Barbara from August 31 to September 4. In preparation for that conference, more than a score of attendees received a copy of a preliminary workbook on urban insurgency (DRC IM-154, Workbook for Participants, Urban Insurgency Conference). It contained narrative accounts of ten instances of insurgency having an important urban aspect, along with preliminary observations toward definition and analysis of the topic.

The present paper is a major revision of that workbook. The individual accounts have been expanded and corrected. The analytical portions have been entirely rewritten and a section has been added suggesting some preliminary empirical generalizations and hypotheses derived from a comparison of the cases. As the original workbook had the purpose of introducing the concept and data of urban insurgency, so this paper is an introduction.

No previous published work constitutes an introduction to the field as it is viewed here. There is, of course, an extensive literature on the use of terror, anarchy, revolution, strikes, and so on throughout the last half of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th. These writings, of Marx, Blanqui, Bakunin, Lenin, and others are propagandistic, programmatic, and idealistic. With their secular millennialism dominating what analysis they involve, none of such works can be considered objective or comprehensive in the sense that scholarship requires.

Valuable studies have been made of some topics which overlap significantly with urban insurgency--terrorism, revolution, communism, coup d'état, limited war--but not even the sum of all these constitute the desired introduction to the field we are treating. Urban insurgency is seen here as a behavioral phenomenon involving not only tactical and
UNCLASSIFIED

A detailed history of urban political disorder has yet to be written. Nevertheless in order to appreciate the status today of studies relating to urban insurgency (UI) it is necessary to sketch some major lines of that history.

It is sufficient to recall some of the Roman mobs to realize the antiquity of the problem. The nature of such disorders seems not to have changed much even with the French Revolution. Only in the middle of the nineteenth century did urban insurgency take on a new tone and fresh methods, with the advent of Blanqui, Marx, and other intellectual revolutionaries. Instead of merely constituting a means of communicating social and economic dissatisfaction from the masses to the elites about the health of the received order, insurgency now sometimes aimed at a fundamental, self-conscious remodeling of the whole structure. Socialists wanted a new kind of sociopolitical order, while anarchists desired total dismantling of the institutionalized forms of power. So street violence took on new direction and purpose, becoming a tool of conspirators as much as an expression of naive public desires.

The tactics of insurgency had a history of their own. For example, the general strike was especially popular during the last quarter of the

* E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels, Praeger, New York, 1959, chap. VII.
19th and first quarter of the 20th century, then largely died out.* Examples of successful techniques influenced other situations; the sharing of experiences among the world's revolutionaries became common as a revolutionary literature grew over the years.

The 1920's and 1930's seem to have been crucial in UI development, marking a downturn in the use of mass tactics due to a number of failures with that approach. Improving technology and police methods, such as use of tear gas, probably accounted in part for these failures. Certainly in those two decades one looks in vain for striking positive attainments for urban insurgency to place alongside prominent failures such as the 1926 general strike in England, the communist defeats in the Chinese cities in 1927, and the ineffectiveness of mass activities in the United States during the depression years. The example of the Spanish Civil War may have served as an added deterrent, for there it was made clear that in a real civil war modern heavy armament at length becomes decisive over urban mobs or cells.

The Soviets chose in the 1920's to emphasize political action instead of armed subversive force. Their influence set the tone for the times, except in China.

One looks in vain in recent decades for new thinking or a newly expressed doctrine of urban revolt. In the communist literature of these two decades nothing has been added to Trotsky's and Lenin's ideas. As the most significant statements of a communist urban paramilitary doctrine, they have not been updated. In the last twenty-five years communist forces have depended either on guerrilla operations or political maneuvering (or, as a result of World War II, direct military conquest) to gain control of governments. Nationalist movements not dominated by communism were no more imaginative in developing the urban way. No

decisive new use of urban insurgency tactics appears until the Jews turned to selective terrorism in Palestine in the early 1940's.

In the last half dozen years attention of military researchers in the United States has turned wholesale to "counterinsurgency". So far this term has applied almost exclusively to military, paramilitary, or politico-military activities in rural areas. Events of the last two or three years have made clear that such an exclusive concern cannot be maintained any longer. What has happened in the streets of Saigon has all of a sudden come to be at least as significant as the shooting out in the rice paddies. Khartoum, Zanzibar, Caracas, Georgetown and Panama City have succeeded each other with startling rapidity to underline some of the possibilities for violent political action on the urban scene. A non-systematic survey of events reported in newspapers since 1963 shows that at least fifty-seven nations have experienced political violence and most of these have had manifestations on the urban scene.* These nations range all the way from highly-developed, well-policed states to those at a very low level of development.

Many contemporary targets for UI are of strategic importance to the United States. Our national interests are clearly involved in the political status of places like Okinawa, Libya, Bolivia, or Turkey. Should urban violence become threatening in these or many other countries we might be required to cancel agreements, pull out of bases, lose international prestige, commit more aid funds, send advisors, or involve our fighting forces. U.S. responsibilities in the world have been touched by UI difficulties already and will be again. It is essential that we be prepared to take appropriate action to meet the challenges posed for us by this type of threat.

* These include bombings, shootings, assassinations and other terrorist actions against persons; sabotage; and strikes, riots and mass demonstrations; or the presence of an organized movement with the intention of carrying out such activities. The list of countries and documentation of the incidents will appear in a DRC internal memorandum.
Investigations by DRC of the state of the field in 1964 indicate that the United States is inadequately prepared to counter urban insurgency. The preventive or responsive measures available to national and local policy makers are few. Many control measures taken in the past have been too late or are of a kind which turn out to provoke more difficulty than they are worth. While basic tactics are available to handle routine riots and occasional terrorism, the broader concept of a whole program of counterinsurgency is hardly even discussed among police here or abroad. The military often is called in to control a situation which has exceeded the capacity of the regular police, but they too lack a doctrine, training, or materials to do more than simply quell mass action. An alarming operational and doctrinal vacuum pervades our own and other democratic countries in the face of the UI threat.

Turning to the research communities we find that urban insurgency and counterinsurgency have been neglected here too. Fortunately, much research has gone on, both in academic circles and in military R and D, which is relevant to UI, but it has not been phrased and coordinated to focus on that problem.

Lack of understanding of the nature of the city insurgency problem is serious enough among operational personnel, but a greater problem lies in the failure at policy-making levels to see a relation between responding operationally to insurgency which has broken out and the broader problem of influencing social change so as to anticipate and prevent outbreaks of violence. What is missing is an understanding of the phenomenon of urban insurgency as a whole. Efforts of the several U.S. research communities are nearing answers to basic questions about rural guerrilla operations; the questions about urban problems and their solution are only now being raised.

B. WHY IS URBAN INSURGENCY FREQUENT TODAY?

One reason is that it is an easy route to the seizure of power. Requiring only a limited number of personnel, little materiel, and, if
planning has been careful, but short duration, UI is an attractive gamble. And government responses have often been unimaginative if not inept. Especially for impulsive, romantic personalities, UI offers a route to power without the drudgery of the long, difficult Mao route.

Demography in today's world makes urban insurgency more frequent. There are far more cities today than a hundred years ago, and a larger number of potential rebels live in them. Sites which once were villages or were even unsettled, in one or two generations have become towns and cities: Leopoldville, Aden, Lagunillas, Nha Trang, Limassol. And today's village could become tomorrow's town with the population explosion progressing as it is.

The psychology of urban life seems to contribute to the likelihood of a politics of violence. Characterizations of the city as a way of life emphasize receptivity to new ideas, increased knowledge about the outside world, aggressiveness, and the loss of traditional social controls. The density and intensity of dissatisfaction with things as they are is markedly higher in this milieu also.

Since cities, particularly capitals, are centers of communication, administration, wealth, and power, they tend to control whole nations. Political control of one major city may be sufficient to establish a convincing claim to control of the country (cf. Khartoum, Leopoldville, Asuncion, or even Budapest). Conversely, a government still holding the capital or other major cities may still be viable. Their criticality as targets makes urban areas worth considerable expenditure of effort to seize.

The city is geographically complex and physically intricate as a fighting terrain. For those who know how to take advantage of it, the urban milieu can be as protective as the jungle. The mass of people makes the insurgent difficult to identify. Alliance with ethnic or criminal
groups who normally refuse cooperation with the police may allow an insurgent to enjoy a segment of a town virtually as a sanctuary (e.g. the Casbah). Physical cover is multi-dimensional due to walls, roofs, basements, and utility passages. Fighting is likely to be in confined areas where small numbers of men may be able to stand against forces far superior in number. And surprise is a weapon at least as frequently available to the urban insurgent as to the rural guerrilla.

Means to carry on conflict in the city are close at hand. Urban leaders are likely to be educated and highly skilled. The technological capability among the rebels will be superior to what one finds in the country. Supplies—food, money, clothing, medicines, arms, communications equipment—are more readily available in the city, and obtaining them may be simpler (impersonal buying and routine stealing can be safer than looting by guerrillas). Obtaining recruits may not be much of a problem either, with frustrated, ambitious, rootless persons available in large numbers in many cities.

These features, which help explain the high frequency of UI, should not obscure the fact that the obstacles to insurgent success are also numerous. For example, urban police may have some advantages in intelligence capability over a rural constabulary; and a tight record-keeping system can control population movement quite well. Each situation has its own combination of factors pro and con. Perhaps the current UI-rate of occurrence is attributable in part to the failure of urban counter-insurgency agencies to take full advantage of the factors in their favor.

No mention has yet been made of what surely is another highly-important reason for the present number of urban insurgencies. That is that there is a great deal of urban agitation and conspiracy, much (but by no means all) of it of communist origin. We should ask ourselves the question, therefore, what if those whose political aims are greatly at variance with those of the United States at this time should set out to
UNCLASSIFIED

construct a doctrine and perfect techniques for urban conflict? Research can work both ways. It seems reasonable that by more careful target selection, improved intelligence, faster communications, and better armament, the chances for success in UI could be raised. A concerted attempt by those who aim to injure our country's interests, whether they be communist, nationalist, racist, or rightist, could have most serious consequences for the U.S.

Possible insurgency in the United States constantly haunts discussions of this subject. Events last year in Harlem, Rochester, and Elizabeth, and indications of potentially insurgent aims held by various groups throughout our country, show the possibility that operational situations much like what we have seen in Saigon, Caracas, and Tel-Aviv are not impossible. Progress in understanding the problem as it occurs in cities in remote areas likely will shed light on the domestic problem too.

At an initial level of discourse the commonsense meanings of the terms "urban" and "insurgency" have allowed us to reach this point in the discussion without careful definition; however, before serious research on the topic can even be planned a clearer delineation of the phenomena encompassed is essential.

C. THE MEANING OF URBAN INSURGENCY

Insurgency is one type of human behavior which is intended to produce social change. Every society, however stable it may appear, is undergoing change constantly. Each has culturally-standardized mechanisms through which its participants change its structure. The control of goods and services, the distribution of authority, and the allotment of affect are among the most pressing organizational problems facing a human group.

Political behavior aims to institutionalize and codify changes in social relations. In this broad sense it is going on constantly in and
between all groups and roles. Politics is the more formal portion of
political behavior which is carried on publicly, at the community level
of organization or higher.

Maximum advantage generally accrues to society when competitors uti-
lize mainly peaceful mechanisms for change. However, peaceful channels
may appear to some social elements to place them at too great a disadvan-
tage. They may then utilize force to increase their political leverage.
Approved ways to bring about social change—election, marriage, inheri-
tance, corporation, charity—from that point on are supplemented by
mechanisms based on force.

The degree of force at play in political action is often obscured
by conceptual subtleties unique to a given culture. A participant in
the culture may be so used to leaving threat at an implicit level that
he does not realize its presence or at least would never verbalize it.
Nieburg has noted that even an election involves "the threat of violence
implicit in the counting of heads."* More clearly involving threat are
such patterns as taxation, tribute-taking, intimidation, imprisonment,
enslavement, and extortion. At an even higher point on the force scale are
the explicitly violent patterns: mugging, rioting, torture, war. Insurgency,
with which we are especially concerned here, always involves an element
of force, but it is not invariably manifest as overt violence.

Use in the statements above of terms like "culturally-standardized"
and "patterns" denotes that the behavior we are dealing with is more or
less regular. The regularity derives from the fact that the individual
—soldier, assassin, rioter, or politician—learns how to carry out his
political behavior in terms which others teach him (not necessarily con-
sciously) and which they will respond to appropriately. Only if he knows
the cultural rules of the game for demonstrating, conspiring, terrorizing,

* H. L. Nieburg, "Uses of Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
or propagandizing will he be able to get the results he desires. Those with whom he interacts must be able to predict his behavior and he theirs. That is, the form of the behavior may be predicted, but this does not imply an ability to anticipate precisely when a particular form will occur. (That would be prophecy.) Insurgent behavior is predictable, but only in the same sense as a missile attack: if..., then ...

The proportion of patterned to unpatterned behavior in humans appears to be so high that for many important purposes the latter can be ignored. This systematic, predictable nature of most behavior permits it to be studied scientifically. Once we rule out consideration of the idiosyncratic, individually-specific element of violence, it should be possible to make genuinely scientific analyses of urban insurgency with the potential of establishing general principles governing its occurrence.

Our topic does not encompass all violent social behavior. A crucial characteristic distinguishing insurgency from related phenomena is motive. The word insurgency connotes a primary concern with overthrowing the arrangements for power and authority prevailing in the society. The threat of force involved in a work stoppage which is aimed chiefly at obtaining higher pay is not insurgent, but a general strike which is accompanied by a demand for resignation of the prime minister is. Of course, not all participants in violent behavior necessarily have the same motivations. However, should a conspiratorial organization promote a strike, ostensibly for economic gain but secretly for political disruption, we should consider this an insurgent act.

Degree and scope of violence have also to enter into a definition. In the absence of accurate information on the motives of the violent person(s), the amount of disruption they cause may have to be the chief clue to their intentions. For example, the slaying of President John F. Kennedy by a lone assassin could hardly be interpreted as insurgent.
Only when the number of victims becomes notable, or incidents frequent or geographically widespread, is insurgency said to be in progress.

Clearly it is environment which distinguishes urban insurgency from other phenomena of its genus. Insurgency can take place anywhere, and any serious rebel movement is not likely to miss the opportunity to strike in a number of ways and places. The struggle will rarely be limited to one milieu like the city but will be carried on more or less as an integral, coordinated, national whole. Urban insurgency is not, therefore, to be thought of as a set of operations concretely distinct from other insurgent actions. It is only analytically separable. Setting is significant in so many ways--tactically, psychologically, sociologically--that it appears desirable to pay special attention to political conflict carried on within this one environment, in order to dramatize its special nature.

An urban environment involves a substantial built-up area, an industrial or commercial base for the economy, and such social and psychological features as social scientists connote by use of the term urban. These include substantial personal anonymity, marked class or rank differences, a complex occupational structure, and dependence on indirect forms of social control. Since actual communities are never wholly urbanized, it is impossible to specify any absolute boundary, say of population density, beyond which the setting is necessarily to be considered urban. Nevertheless the forms which urban political violence takes do not normally flourish in rural areas, and vice versa, so real cases tend to cluster at one or the other pole of the environmental continuum.

A definition of urban insurgency can now be offered:

Urban insurgency consists of that patterned human behavior motivated primarily by a desire to overthrow the existing political structure or to replace the leaders occupying it, through the use of violence or its threat within the setting of urban life.
It would be conceptually and methodologically unfortunate to allow the delineation of a field such as UI to separate it unduly from related topics. The purpose of conceiving insurgency in the city as a separable set of phenomena is to permit more detailed examination of its characteristics than would be the case were the peculiarities of the setting not brought to the fore. Nevertheless, this behavior has obvious connections in data, method, and theory to other topics, many of which have been widely researched. Various sorts of criminal behavior display organizational, operational, and perhaps psychological and ideological similarities to UI. Studies of guerrilla counterinsurgency and of war in its more conventional forms relate to the field also. In disciplinary terms we can say that any scientific study touching on the nature of violent behavior or on life in cities has potential relevance for understanding and coping with urban insurgency, whether the conceptual framework springs from anthropology, psychology, sociology, history, political science, jurisprudence, or some other field. The various applied studies are likewise of value—engineering, administration, police science, systems analysis, operations research, etc. This marking out of urban insurgency as a research topic is to clarify problems and facilitate the mustering of existing knowledge for their solution—to build bridges, not to construct a fence.

While the discussion has been only of insurgency, by implication counterinsurgency as a topic is also to be studied. However, it is misleading to think of the prefix "counter-" as a mere synonym for "anti-" and then to suppose that the whole thing is simply the opposite side of the insurgency coin. Efforts of the authorities to avoid, contain, or repress insurgency may themselves be an independent variable which may be as much a stimulus as a response. So-called counterinsurgency may actually produce insurgency. Hence the study of UI must include research explicitly on counterinsurgency as well.
II. CASES

The most urgent procedural requirement in research on UI is the accumulation of a body of reliable information of sufficient scope so that preliminary empirical generalizations can be sought.

The case accounts below are written to present a reasonably full picture of the factors contributing to the outbreak of violence, together with an account of the major events which followed. Some attention has gone to following the thread of political violence through later outbreaks even after supposed settlement of the initial trouble.

The expert on any of the nations will be able to say that more attention should have been paid to such and such. It must be emphasized that limitations on time, resources, and convenience of presentation have restricted each account to its present size. This paper, it will be recalled, is offered as an introduction only.

Much more, and better, data-collecting will be needed if we are to analyze historical cases in satisfying detail. Amidst all the words which people write down about any one conflict, it would seem that everything had been described, but that is not so. Serious gaps appear in the literature on each of the nine cases we deal with. It is possible, but not likely, that further bibliographical searching might produce records with the desired information. We have tried to examine sources written from a variety of viewpoints and what seemed the most important sources, but we could not hope to exhaust the materials on any one case. To obtain more details, particularly of an operational nature, interviews with participants probably must be resorted to. Caulfield’s excellent book on the Dublin rising* shows what careful searching of this type can turn up long after the event.

The format has been kept as free from a theoretical stance as possible. It seemed preferable at this stage of research to present the cases as somewhat systematized but not fully digested pieces of data, so that the reader would be stimulated to seek his own version of order in the data and give serendipity fairly free run.

Nor did a firm pattern dictate the selection of the cases. Most of those dealt with suggested themselves by the frequency with which they came up in any discussions having to do with urban conflicts. Some attention has gone to assuring that different scales and durations of insurgency are represented. Older insurgencies, dating before the arming of counterinsurgent forces with modern weapons, have been avoided; not that they tell us nothing of value, but that they are not as immediately relevant in an introduction as those we have chosen.

A. ALGERIA

One of the most influential battles for independence in the post-war period has been that of Algeria. Between 1945 and 1962 as high as four hundred thousand armed Frenchmen and over 100,000 Algerians struggled for control of a country about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. Nearly all of the combat went on in the 80,000 square mile coastal band (about 9% of the total colony) where most of Algeria's nine million people lived. While the guerrilla operations assumed classic proportions and form, urban insurgency also was a significant element in the battle.

Up to the time of the outbreak of World War I, French control over this North African area, which dated from the mid-1800's, had not been seriously challenged by the native Arab-Berber population. The natives, by this time, seemed to have become accustomed to the near century of French colonial domination and bore relatively little resentment toward either the French colon or the French army. However, several streams of influence were playing on the land to produce revolt. One result of
French policies and actions was to keep the Arab population's standard of living depressed while the European population visibly prospered. The French dominants in Algeria resisted most social and economic change in the colony, except that which appeared to their advantage. Exploiting the area economically through large-scale commercial agriculture, they discouraged industrial development since it was a threat to Algeria's dependence upon France and to the low wage system the colonists maintained in the countryside.

The political conditions of French rule included tight French control of the whole administrative apparatus from the office of governor-general down to village policemen. Only in local tribal and religious matters did the Arabs have significant native leadership. All European males, but only a select few Arabs, were allowed to vote for Algerian representatives to the French General Assembly. Placatory moves to extend suffrage more widely were made, but never threatened colon dominance in all important political and economic matters. Any moves by Moslem aspirants toward greater political recognition were met by suppression and persecution from the economic dominants and the French army and bureaucracy. What is more, the Arab population bore the brunt of the tax burden, were denied educational opportunities (80% had no facilities by World War II), and were held in check by the Native Code which was employed in a manner to deny civil rights to the Moslems. In sum, a colonialist mentality prevailed. The French Algerians had scorn for the Arabs' cultural ways which they did not fail to express; they decried what they saw as native filthiness, villainy, and laziness. They did not perceive any connection between Arab fatalism and the colonial system itself.

This is not to say that the French did not provide valuable services for the Arabs. There were some educational facilities, and reclamation and public health programs were also instituted. The reclamation and health programs were far from selfless, of course.
France failed to realize, until it was too late, that its public health program in Algeria, which increased the birth rate and brought greater longevity, was producing a most serious problem of population pressure upon limited land and natural resources. By the late 1930's Arab hunger was a serious problem in many rural and urban areas, and by 1950 one in three rural natives, and one in five of those in Algerian cities, was unemployed.

Education also had an unexpected consequence. Limited though the opportunities for Arab schooling were, tens of thousands did have access to the idea of social advancement and political liberty. Ironically, the Algerian revolution was in large measure driven by the discontent of educated Arabs who had learned well from French history to say "vive la Revolution." The great mass of small landowners and workers on the great French landholdings, as well as urban laborers, harbored few ideas other than apathetic acceptance of their fate.

The class structure in the colony was dominated at the top by the wealthy French landowners. While many of them had been born in Algeria, even the second and third generations retained the colonial point of view. A maximum of 10% of the colony's population controlled at least 90% of what industry there was and 40% of the best farm land, grouped into sizeable estates worked by hired laborers.

Despite her long period of rule, France's policies produced a minimum of contact and exchange between European and Arab civilizations. The literate and professional Arabs were schooled, ate, dressed, and spoke in the European manner, but this was only the veneer of their real culture. For they clung to Arab religion, folkways, and mores. The "Frenchified" Arabs almost never identified with the real French, who always made them feel they were different and never really accepted them. Only a handful of Frenchmen knew Arabic.
Class differences in the ethnic gap were compounded by the urban-rural dichotomy. The cities on the plain had been built up with many of the amenities of urban life of metropolitan France available, in strong contrast to that which prevailed for the great majority of nearby rural dwellers. And in a land so vast and broken by desert and abrupt mountains, regional differences also were significant, especially due to the lack of a really modern communications system.

The incipience of Algerian nationalism can be traced to World War I in which 100,000 Algerian conscripts fought for France and were promised political rights for doing so. After the war, full political rights were not forthcoming. The French settler minority still continued to name most of the Algerian representation to the French Assembly, but the non-Europeans were far too weak to take serious action, either politically or economically.

It was between the two world wars that indigenous Algerian leaders first began to build political organizations. There was little charisma, and leadership was not very vigorous. Instead formal party organizations and programs were largely a response to popular pressures and anti-French sentiments already in existence.

The first popular nationalist political party on the scene was the Algerian People's Party (PPA). Its leader, Messali Hadji, had served in the French Army in World War I, joined the Communist party in 1927, was arrested and jailed in 1933 until 1935, and the next year organized the National Union of North African Moslems (which was dissolved by the French authorities in 1937). Three months afterwards Messali broke with the Communists and organized the Algerian People's Party. Messali was soon in jail again, but by the outbreak of World War II the party had enrolled 14,000 members (of which 4000 were in France) from amongst Algerian students, workers, and soldiers. Like the Communist Party, the PPA was organized with a central committee at the top, under which were
regional units, then sections, and finally local cells of eight to ten people. Its program called for "national independence," "confiscation of huge land holdings," repeal of the Native Code, and the right to organize trade unions.

Two other nationalist protest groups arose during the 1930's. The most extreme of these was the Ulemas (literally "teachers") led by Sheikh Abd-el-Hamid Ben Badis. This was a nativist religious protest movement which arose in reaction to French efforts to set up a state-controlled official religious structure run by Imams, paid out of the Algerian budget and carefully selected for their political reliability. Playing upon the powerful popular sentiment for Moslem control of their own religion and education, Ben Badis, through his paper, El Shihab, called for free religious teaching and a free press. It was in response to such appeals, nationalist in undertone, that Ulema free schools began forming in the early 1930's. In response to French repression and persecution the Ulemas made common cause with the PPA in 1937. Their schools became breeding grounds for young nationalists and future terrorist leaders.

The third important nationalist pressure organization was the Young Algeria Movement headed by Ferhat Abbas. This was a secular, predominantly middle-class, movement whose aims in the 1920's were limited to a drive for the full rights of French citizenship for all Algerians rather than for an independent Algeria. It had neither social aims like the PPA nor religious ones like the Ulema. Basically it was accommodative rather than revolutionist. Abbas during this time maintained his moderate political position from a post inside the colonial bureaucracy.

One can hardly overestimate the catalytic effect World War II had upon the growth of Algerian nationalism. The military collapse of France in 1940 produced a power vacuum which Arab nationalists were quick to exploit, despite the fact that Vichy agents in Algeria repressed all the
nationalist movements. The Allied North African invasion of late 1942
gave the nationalists encouragement. General Eisenhower's November 1942
statement about political rights, self-government, and religious freedom
for the area was designed to get the political and military cooperation
of the Moslems for De Gaulle's Free French force, but the nationalists
turned these statements to their own ends.

The Algerian Manifesto of 1943 was the first formal cooperative
protest of the three main nationalist groups (PPA, Ulema, and the Young
Algeria Movement). A call for social reform, political equality, and
French recognition of an autonomous Islamic religion and culture, the
Manifesto was an unequivocal move away from the "assimilation within
France" idea of the older nationalists and towards outright independence.
The French response to the Manifesto was not completely negative.
General Catroux and the French army would brook no discussion of Algerian
political problems, for their concern was purely military, and their
thoughts and policies were in behalf of metropolitan France only. Yet
the De Gaulle committee offered some hope.

Despairing of the willingness of French authorities to make a satis-
factory compromise, Abbas in March of 1944 announced the creation in
Setif of an organization called the Friends of the Algerian Manifesto
(AMA or UDMA). Soon included in this organization were all the nation-
alist forces, including a growing number of elements advocating terrorist
and strike action, who saw the movement as a convenient front. By the
fall of 1944, Abbas claimed the AMA had over 500,000 Moslem supporters.

The De Gaulle French "government" decided on December 11, 1943, to
grant French citizenship to the Moslem "élites" forthwith, a significant
step forward, but this roused serious resentment on the part of the
colonels, who feared they would lose their political control. Their resis-
tance robbed the decision of much of its significance. In any case this
concession was totally inadequate in nationalist eyes. Abbas' frustration
over the failure of his evolutionary policy led him toward agreement with those leaders who had previously decided on revolution.

From this time onward, there was a rapid build-up of tensions between the French authorities and French residents on the one hand and the Arab nationalist forces on the other. Handbills appeared inciting the Arabs to "Kill the Frenchmen and the Jews" and urging that "Moslems unite" in resistance efforts. Local Arab combat groups began to form, and there were some attacks on property, sabotage (mainly water mains), and street demonstrations. As the threat increased, apprehensive colons formed vigilante groups, and the police became more repressive. The efforts of Governor-General Chataigneau to work out a compromise seemed only to increase the activities of the extremists on both sides.

The Arab masses, meanwhile, were being pushed toward a violent outburst not only by the urging of nationalist leaders but by a genuine loss of all hope for a better future under continued French rule. Food shortages during the war years, when starvation threatened the Moslem population in some rural areas (particularly around Setif), while the colons appeared to live opulently, had aggravated feelings. Food was not as short by 1945 at Setif as in other areas, but this was a locale where large French corporations owned farms which held the Berber natives in virtual peonage.

On May 8, 1945, rioting in Setif merely brought to a head the antagonism that had been brewing between the French and Arab populations in the region for several years. There is considerable evidence that prior to the riot, various Arab revolutionary plots had been underway for some time, masked by open AMA activity. The spark that ignited the riot itself was the unfurling of nationalist banners during the course of a Moslem V-E Day parade in Setif celebrating the German surrender. For some reason, demonstrators here, but not in some other towns, had been told by police not to display provocative signs. Upon their appearance
police were ordered to seize the independence signs and flags, whereupon clashes began. The rioting was greatly aggravated by the presence of thousands of discontented peasants (it was market day in Setif) who were soon running amok in an anti-European orgy of killing and destruction.

The Setif disturbances had repercussions within the hour in the small towns in the region. A wave of rape, murder, and pillage spread outward from the initial outbreak. Violence and atrocities moved to the Kerrata and Guelma areas as fast as rumor could travel. Colonos were despoiled without warning, sometimes by Berbers who had grown up on their farms; however, some Moslems defended the Europeans. One hundred three Europeans in all were slain.

There is some evidence that more serious insurrection had been planned for the near future, which the Setif incident set off prematurely. Without doubt the violence in some areas constituted a "real uprising", though it could not be coordinated much under the surprising circumstances.

Immediate savage French repression extended in geographical extent and severity beyond anything the Moslems had done. Bombing and strafing were resorted to, entire villages were destroyed, and widespread imprisonment and, allegedly, torture were employed. Senegalese, Spahi, and Foreign Legion troops joined regular forces in wreaking vengeance. Censorship prevented even Algerians from knowing the full extent of the action, but a later sifting of eye-witness reports indicates that damage was immense. The French reported later that 1200 natives were killed, but Halpern, who appears to have done the only objective study on the affair, judged that the number was more likely to be in the range of 17,000 to 40,000 dead.

French statements at first spoke of the Setif-Kerrata-Guelma violence only as "food riots", but there is no good evidence that this was true in a direct sense. Later an official attempt was made to throw
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blame on Hitler, for a Nazi emblem was reported found, and significance was read into the absence of attacks by the natives on Axis prisoners in the areas. Another French comment comes closer to the fact, apparently, in crediting the unrest to "inexact interpretation of the Atlantic Charter" concerning freedom!

Although the French authorities and settlers demonstrated a brutally efficient capacity for dealing with the Setif rioters, the long-range significance of the Setif uprising was a decisive stroke in behalf of Algerian independence. Following the Amnesty Law of 1946, Nationalist leaders and groups promptly went back into business again, and the French aided their cause by the ineffectual electoral compromise of 1947 and the obvious rigging of the elections of 1948. When the 1954 Algerian independence movement erupted, nearly every one of its leaders could trace his rise to political prominence to the persecution suffered during the French repression resulting from the May 8, 1945, Setif riots.

In 1947 some of the more militant young members of the MTLD, organized in the previous year to replace the outlawed PPA, created a paramilitary force called the "Special Organization," OS. They aimed to prepare an armed revolution, but the discovery of the OS by French authorities in 1950 split the nationalists badly. By mid-1954, nine former OS men had created CRUA, "Revolutionary Committee for Unity in Action." By the time violence broke out on a sizeable scale at the end of October of that year, the Committee had organized well and had gained substantial support from Algerians in France and also from other Arab nations.

On the night of October 31st, French military and police posts throughout much of coastal Algeria, and particularly in the department of Constantine, were attacked by bombs and armed bands. Simultaneously, Radio Cairo announced that the Algerian War of Independence had been launched. At that same time, the CRUA became the FLN, "National
Liberation Front." It counted between 2,000 and 3,000 ex-members of the MTLD and the OS. There was no mass support for the newborn revolution. The struggle of the FLN was on such a scale and so thoroughly publicized that no attempt will be made here to recapitulate its entire course until it came to a conclusion in 1962 through negotiation. We shall look only at some urban aspects of the conflict.

By 1956 the National Liberation Army had divided the country into a number of operational theaters. The city of Algiers (800,000) was made an autonomous zone. It was in that city that the most dramatic conflicts between insurgents and counterinsurgents occurred; however, all the major cities of Algeria (Oran, 390,000, Constantine, 220,000, and nine other cities with over 50,000, 40% of this number being European) had essentially the same experience, differing only in scale from the capital. France itself was also designated a theater of operations by the ALN, and terrorist acts were carried out there, primarily against Algerians in order to gain their support of the revolution. (There were hundreds of thousands of Algerians in France as a result of an earlier official policy of encouraging emigration to relieve population pressure in the colony.)

In Algiers at least 1,500 armed terrorists with several times that many unarmed auxiliaries were available at first and were able to build up an extensive network of activity and support before the outmanned French police could do much to stop them. It was only in 1957 when the French Army took over control of the city that genuine progress was made. Firm population controls were instituted, and the normal guarantees of legality were choked off. The urban violence was chiefly terrorist bombings and shootings directed at two targets. The first was Europeans, in order to discourage and dismay them. In addition, Algerians were attacked if they hesitated to give their support to the FLN. Still other random violence was done simply to train and test ALN recruits.
There seems never to have been a serious FLN plan to seize control of Algiers. Rather, there was the intention to so intimidate the French that they would desire to leave or negotiate a political settlement. Also the city insurgents provided funds through collections and robbery for the use of the ALN. Another purpose of the city activity was to take pressure off the rural areas by detaining sizeable French forces which were required to pacify the cities. Finally, serious propaganda efforts were also carried out to ensure the unified support of the Algerian population for the movement. This included not only printed and verbal communication but also occasional strikes and demonstrations.

Had the French not acted decisively with their army, the Algiers situation might have deteriorated rapidly to the extent that they would have lost the entire capital. Their firm action in policing Algiers, in fact, made life extremely difficult for the urban terrorists. So urban insurgency can be said to have been only partially successful. However, the political repercussions throughout the world from the vigor of the repressive measures the army was using proved influential in speeding France's decision to withdraw. In a technical sense the army was effective; in a strategic sense the quality of their "success" made it increasingly difficult for France to stay in Algeria under any circumstances.

A footnote to the Algerian insurgency, although the subject deserves separate full consideration on its own, has to do with the formation of the OAS, the French Secret Army Organization for counterterror. The OAS did in fact prove effective to a considerable degree in neutralizing some of the effects of ALN urban tactics. Again, however, the political consequences throughout the world and especially in France itself of the OAS operations meant that this private counterterrorist organization also won some battles but lost the war.

In retrospect it appears that the Algerian insurgency actually did begin, in the sense of violence, in 1945 in Setif. From then on there
was little likelihood that the Algerian question would be settled without systematic violence, and there were those who planned it so from that time on.

Probably in no other place in the world has urban terror been used so effectively as in Algiers. On the other hand, the French became masters in controlling that terror. The outcome—operational stalemate—may be prophetic of the urban insurgency to come.

B. CYPRUS

Terrain on Cyprus is highly varied, and so have been the forms which insurgency has taken over nearly 35 years. Mountains up to 6,400 feet suggest how broken much of the 3,500-square mile island is. During the time of the most violent struggle the population was around 550,000. Nicosia with around 80,000 people, Limassol with 40,000, Famagusta with 30,000, Larnaca 20,000, and some other towns, were scenes of systematic urban insurgency for a number of years. Greek Cypriots countrywide outnumber those of Turkish descent (Sunni Moslems) about four to one, but roughly one-third of Nicosia's population is Turkish.

The enosis (union with Greece) movement began in the mid-nineteenth century, facing the British even as they took control of the island from Turkey in 1878. The modern regeneration of Cypriot nationalism can be traced to World War I. In 1915 Cyprus had been offered to Greece to entice her into war on the Allied side, and during the course of the war British Prime Minister Lloyd George had made several statements which seemed encouraging to the Cypriot nationalists. But the latter's hopes were repeatedly dampened in the aftermath of the war. Britain formally made Cyprus a Crown Colony in 1925.

The enosis movement was entirely pacific until 1931. Common people were wholly apathetic on the matter, which was of concern chiefly to intellectuals and the priests. The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus was
the major vehicle for the expression and promotion of enosis. (It had been the bishops, under the Turks, who had been the effective ethnic representative and leaders, although they had used that position to their personal advantage at times.) Schools featured Greek rather than English books and heroes, especially at the secondary level where many of the teachers were strong enosists.

Several forces led to the outbreak of violence in 1931. One was the completely laissez faire attitude of the British Colonial Office in response to Cypriot memorials of protest. In 1929 an education law was passed shifting control of schools from Greek and Turkish bodies to the British authorities. More important was an economic problem which took on political tones. A trade deficit, due primarily to the great depression, arose when the British refused to go along with the elected members of the Legislative Council to raise customs duties to balance the budget instead of imposing new taxes on the island. The bishops at that point exploited the situation with anti-British propaganda. On October 18th the Metropolitan of Kition resigned from the Council and two days later made an inflammatory speech at Limassol. On the evening of the 21st, after other Council members had resigned, a crowd shouting for enosis, singing the Greek national anthem, and led by a priest with a Greek flag, marched on Government House, a decrepit wooden building. They succeeded in burning it but were scattered by volleys from troops. The British government sent more troops and warships to the island. Disturbances in various parts of the island led to the deaths of 6 civilians and the injury of 30 civilians and 38 Greek and Turkish policemen. About 400 arrests were made and many deportations, including the bishops, followed.

Severe punitive measures were imposed. A palatial new Government House, costing 70,000 pounds, was built and charged to the Cypriots. The weak Constitution was abolished and all elective bodies eliminated, clubs and other organizations suspended, meetings of more than five people prohibited except by permit, and censorship established.
With agitation eliminated, little talk of enosis was heard through the rest of the decade, although a Committee for Cyprus Autonomy was formed in London in 1937. Prosperity increased somewhat, some modest development measures were taken, and trade unions were legalized in 1936. A Debt Settlement Law of 1940 greatly improved the condition of the agricultural sector.

The invasion of Greece in 1940 by Italy increased Cypriot support for Britain. Some 19,000 of the island's inhabitants were under arms by late 1941.

Municipal elections in March 1943 saw partial success for a new party, leftist AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People). (The Communist Party had been outlawed in 1933.) During 1943-44 AKEL supported a number of strikes and refused cooperation with the government as a protest against the lack of popularly-elected bodies on the island. Meanwhile the right-wing, middle-class National Party, supported by the Church, was also seeking enosis. When the permanent Under-Secretary for Colonies visited Cyprus in 1944 and refused to discuss separation of Cyprus from the Commonwealth, AKEL together with trade and shopkeeper unions called a general strike.

The rivalry of right and left forces in Greece in 1944-45 was reflected in Cyprus. During celebration of Greek Independence Day, March 25, 1945, groups from the two Cypriot parties clashed at one village, and police opened fire and produced casualties. Actually the conflict was over leadership of the enosis movement, not about its virtue.

The new British Labor government in 1946 modified the harsh control laws applied in 1931 and allowed political exiles to return to the island. Britain appeared willing to grant some kind of self-government, but the Greek Cypriot leaders, particularly the priests, rejected categorically any solution but enosis. The Greek government resolved mild
support for discussions on the subject with London. A Cypriot mission to London in 1947 sought concrete action toward enosis but was treated coldly by the Colonial Office.

In 1948 Britain did offer the island's people a new constitution, but it seemed to them to offer no hope for ultimate independent political assertion, let alone union with Greece. At that time, as Britain was forced to leave Palestine by the action of terrorists, and with Suez an open question, Cyprus appeared to those in Britain who still thought in terms of empire as an absolutely essential military base for protection of the country's interests in Africa and the Middle East.

After the 1948 British offer of a constitution, it seemed clear to the Greek Cypriots that there was little chance for a peaceful, evolutionary development toward independence as things stood. Two key personalities enter the picture at this point, who prove to be crucial for all later Cypriot developments and particularly for the April 1955 and subsequent violence.

Colonel George Grivas had had academic, administrative, and operational training in the army of Greece by World War II. He was made chief of staff of a division until the collapse of Greek resistance to the Germans. Grivas next appeared in Athens as organizer of a minuscule right-wing terrorist group (Chi), at the very end of the German occupation. His aim seems to have been building a "greater Greece"—to include parts of Albania, European Turkey, and Cyprus—and restoration of the Greek monarchy under a government of the extreme right. The group had a small part to play against the Communists in the Greek civil war of 1944 and again in 1946, but it was never highly influential, although exhibiting a high degree of ruthlessness in assassination of "communists". But in all these activities Grivas' ambitions were frustrated; even the restored monarchy paid only the slightest attention to him, and he was not put back on active military service.
The other personality was His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios III, originally Michael Mouskos. Makarios' career moved rapidly after training in law and theology, first in war-time, hungry Athens, then in 1946 at Boston University. He was there in 1948 when news came that he had been elected Bishop of Kitium at the age of 34. Until then not showing an interest in politics, young Makarios was influenced by the last days of aged Makarios II who aroused a fervor of popular feeling in Cyprus which carried through to a futile "plebiscite" under Church auspices which, it was claimed, returned 95.7% for enosis.

Soon Makarios III was both Archbishop and Ethnarch—national leader of the Greek Cypriots. As such he enjoyed substantial power, though more informal than formal. The idea of the Church's domination of secular political matters was very old and very much ingrained. Furthermore, the Church had not always dealt with even its own members with kid gloves. As probably the richest (6-1/2 million pounds worth of property, 1955) interest group, the bishops and priests took themselves very seriously. Furthermore, old traditions of ethnic and religious bitterness, conspiracy and violence in the Byzantine tradition lay just below the surface of Cypriot feelings and action in 1950. That was the year in which Makarios III formally took office. He and Grivas were already acquainted.

Meanwhile the mass of the population remained apathetic toward enosis. Most lived fairly simple, unaware lives—Cyprus was not a center of world travel—even though literacy was high and education to a modest level was not uncommon. Their attitude fits Mayes' description of "Cypriot character": tending to be mild; stubborn under calamity yet hanging on with toughness through adversity; rare outbursts of anger and violence rather than cold, calculated vengeance.

Class differences as such, though present, were obscured by the imperial-colonial and ethnic cleavages. British civil servants, many of them brought back from now-disappeared assignments in Africa and Asia,
held aloof from the "natives," and with more than a thousand trained Cypriot professional people on the island, the British took none into top civil service posts.

The communists, deeply involved in the AKEL party, were threatening at this time to take leadership of the nationalist movement. This Makarios felt he had to fight actively, to protect the traditional dominance of the Church in Cyprus. (Vacillation by the Greek ELAS on support of enosis, in 1945, partly occasioned by Greek Communist's tortuous attempts to follow the Russian line, lost the left its best chance to take control of the rebel movement. They were now making another try.) From his key position as Ethnarcb the Archbishop made preparation for the coming struggle by forming political ties with Greece (at first extra-official, but highly influential). He kept up agitation, and also organized a number of interlocking groups such as PEON (Pancyprian National Youth Organization), OHEN (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth), and PEK (Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus). The so-called Free Trade Unions were also tied in, and of course the right-wing National Party provided the overt political structure.

In 1951 Grivas was summoned to confer with Makarios. Funds were collected through a committee headed by the Archbishop of Athens while the organizational pattern on Cyprus was developed. Arms were sought throughout the Mediterranean, but they were difficult to come by at this time and particularly difficult to smuggle in (the coastline is small).

It is worth noting that this carefully planned preparation for violence did not have anything particularly to do with economic distress. Cyprus was enjoying relative prosperity. Its trade was tied firmly to England, not to Greece. Emigrants in substantial numbers went to England to live and work. British, not Greek, capital was behind most of the island's vigorous economic growth.
Success in the coming struggle depended heavily on the attitude of Greece herself. By 1954 U.S. aid had substantially reduced Greece's old dependence on Britain, permitting Athens to take a more active course on the Cyprus matter than it had theretofore thought prudent. On March 1, 1954, Greece announced that it would raise the Cyprus issue at the UN. Thereafter, Greek sponsorship of enosis was firm.

The actual coordinating organization which was planning the violent campaign against the British was EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants). As the chief paramilitary group, it coordinated its efforts with the other nationalist forces by means of a National Front for the Liberation of Cyprus (EMAK). EOKA's basic structure consisted of local groups in contact with both local and regional commanders; most groups had fewer than ten members. Crozier may have exaggerated in speaking of EOKA as consisting of "a few dozen trained gunmen and saboteurs, with the backing of a few thousand exalted school-children," yet EOKA never became an army. It remained a small well-knit terrorist group consisting of two kinds of elements: a hard core of trained saboteurs and, in the towns, murder squads. Activities of both were supplemented by cells in the secondary schools.

EOKA was cast in the form of a secret society, such as Greece had long known. Members were obliged to swear an oath replete with Orthodox ritual formulae. The organization was strictly religious (Turks could not belong, obviously). Breaking the oath or refusal to carry out an order was punishable by death. Grivas had also studied such underground movements as the Irish Republican Army and the Jewish Irgun.

Grivas' tight control was reinforced by systematic myth--and charisma--building: Grivas was a great hero of the resistance against the Germans; Grivas was "Dighenis", an almost mystically protected figure

* The name of a semi-mythical leader of Byzantine forces against Moslems in the 12th century.
who could not be captured; EOKA would be ruthless to "traitors". (As many as three Cypriot "traitors" were in fact executed for each two of the "enemy".) The organization expounded no political philosophy aside from national freedom; the oath declared for liberation of Cyprus from the British control.

During the second half of 1954 there was little actual violence on the island, although the threat was clear, at least in retrospect. Makarios himself said to the National Assembly in Nicosia on July 23, "It is only through the exercise of violence that the British can be made to understand." The words of others were more forceful, and the three years of planning for violence which had already been invested spoke still louder. However, from a police point of view there was little direct confirmation of persistent rumors that a concrete organization for revolt existed.

On July 24, 1954, the worst nationalist fears regarding Britain's unbending attitude toward their island's future were confirmed, when in a debate on the Cyprus problem in the House of Commons, Hopkinson, the Minister of State for the Colonies, declared that Cyprus "can never be fully independent." August, 1954, saw a secret meeting which made the final organizational preparation for the violence. By January, 1955, the British had much concrete information on the people and groups involved but were not in a legal position to do much about it.

On the morning of April 1, 1955, simultaneous explosions rocked the cities of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol. The Nicosia radio station, the Colonial Secretary's office, the Department of Education, Wolseley Barracks, and courts and police headquarters were hit. Smaller police installations and some military facilities were also struck.

The careful coordination of the first attacks showed that careful planning and unified direction were involved. In reaction the police
rounded up leaders of the EOKA, conducted a massive search, and seized an impressive number of arms caches. They seem then to have assumed that the problem had been pretty much taken care of, as in 1931.

How greatly they had underestimated the strength and determination of the insurgents became more and more apparent with each succeeding month. The April 1 explosions were but the initiation of the all-out drive for enosis, led now publicly by a charismatic military figure of experience and inspired by the religious-ethnic leader of the Greek Cypriots.

The scrupulous care shown by the bomb-throwers and dynamiters of April, so that lives would not be lost on either side, was interpreted by officials as a reluctance on EOKA's part to shed blood for fear of consequences. In fact, it was due to a definite plan which aimed at creating as much noise as possible and causing as much damage to government property and as much difficulty to the administration as possible, in the hope that the British Government would, as it had in Palestine, reverse its previous policy and begin discussions with the Cypriots on a real political settlement. When this result was not produced, the campaign went on.

In addition to bombs "there were almost daily parades and demonstrations of students, distribution of leaflets, painting of slogans on walls and road-surfaces, flying flags from church-steeples and schools, stone-throwing incidents, couriers' carrying explosives, meetings and speeches, strikes, sermons, threatening letters to would-be informers, and the constant threat of sudden attack on government installations and buildings."

The British arrests and massive searches and jailings of April, 1955, precipitated student strikes the following month in all the major towns in behalf of enosis. There were also EOKA-sponsored protest
demonstrations in front of the government buildings in Nicosia. When
the police attempted to break the city strikes, these spread into the
secondary village schools. In June attempted police repression of
nationalist demonstrations resulted in a coordinated urban-rural attack
upon the police, involving bombings of police stations, arms seizures,
and assassinations. By fall the police and local authorities were so
cowed by EOKA and the Greek Cypriot populace that they rarely dared
venture out into the open. When Britain then temporarily softened its
repressive tactics, not only did the guerrillas become more bold, but
the apprehensive Turkish population became restive and began to make
the fighting triangular. (Surprisingly, the Greek Cypriots seem never
to have anticipated the Turks' taking any active part in the action.)

British intelligence was hampered by EOKA vengeance on its own
people. Insurgent executions invariably took place in public and by
methods aimed at the maximum fear effect. Masked men would enter a cafe,
or even a church, point their guns at the patrons, order them to stand
facing the wall, then shoot the victim, and depart. Step by step the
police organization, hampered by its own regulations from responding in
kind, was forced to retire to safe stations behind barbed-wire fences.
As a result the countryside passed to EOKA control for lack of police
patrolling. Few Cypriots dared raise a voice against EOKA because of
the mounting number of its victims among their own—"traitors."

Attacks intended to terrorize the British forces hit policemen and
police stations, military camps and installations, military patrols,
utility systems for the security forces, homes of army and police
officers, government buildings, British institutes, planes, ships, boats,
etc. Army stores were raided for supplies.

The severity of EOKA reprisals would probably have backfired
than in fact they did if the members of the movement had not been so
carefully disciplined. They were, for example, required to be scrupulous
about paying for goods taken or used (the Church footed the bills and was the channel for payment). Nor was any kind of criminal harassment of the population permitted within EOKA.

In November of 1955, Britain attempted to wrest control of the countryside back from EOKA. Twenty thousand troops and 4,500 policemen went into anti-guerrilla action with specific orders to "get" Dighenis, but this campaign, with its massive arrests, searches, and inconveniences, only seems to have swelled the popular support for EOKA. The harassment, the demonstrations, the assassinations, and the bombings in the cities and towns seemed to increase in proportion to the attempts to prevent them. Meanwhile the "General" successfully organized a mass campaign of passive resistance in the villages. Guerrilla tactics improved too.

By early 1956, insurgency incidents were averaging 300 per month. The British capabilities for dealing with the situation began to improve during 1957 as they improved in intelligence capability, concentrated on specific targets, killed many leaders, and captured various guerrilla bands and much ammunition. In part the greater success sprang from the reduced British sensitivity to protocol. As they became more angry about wanton attacks on them and replied with more vigor and less legality, the situation improved somewhat. After a bomb had blown up in Gov. Harding's bedroom, the Archbishop was deported to exile in the Seychelles Islands (by which he became a greater hero than ever).

Conducted as it was while the Suez expedition was at hand, the British counter-effort was never as vigorous as it might have been. At home, political dispute about the significance of Cyprus as a base and public apprehension about the terror campaign sapped the determination to hang on. Costs were high (30 million pounds just by 1956) to the government. The vigorous methods used by British intelligence to combat EOKA secrecy led to outcries at home. After the Suez affair had been argued at length, the value of Cyprus as a military base seemed,
after all, less than it had at one time. Finally the government moved definitively for a political settlement of the Cypriot problem. After complicated negotiations in late 1958 an agreement was initialled in February 1959. Independence became a fact in 1960 with Markarios as President.

While the terrorism was not decisive in Britain's decision to give up government of the island, it unquestionably hastened it. EOKA was certainly not defeated. In Cyprus itself, the terror proved effective as a tactic producing apparently complete conformity; EOKA was unquestionably obeyed, though not happily.

As with so many other insurgencies, departure of the colonial power from the scene did not end violence. Cypriot skills in violence had been too carefully nurtured for years to be given up overnight. When inter-ethnic friction came to a head in 1962, serious violence broke out again, now between Greeks and Turks. (The Turks had stayed pretty much out of the EOKA affair until 1958 when a sizable number of Turkish policemen, and progressively civilians, were killed, and struck back in turn.) Today a UN force occupies a tenuous position between the two communities who threaten to renew fighting should the international force depart.

Meanwhile internal divisions have sprung up among the Greek Cypriots themselves with Grivas, back from Greece, as armed forces head, and other rightists angered at increasing Communist influence on the wake of international maneuvering over the question of the Turkish minority. Several rightist secret societies have been organized and armed, threatening future revival of open conflict on the island between Greek factions.

If Britain had considered Cyprus important enough, could she have hung on by staying in the cities while ignoring the countryside? It is highly doubtful, at least without acting in highly un-British ways.
EOKA control of the population had become virtually complete in city as well as rural areas. Civilized life even in Nicosia was at a standstill. The terror could have been broken only by ruthlessness, but the homeland, and world opinion, would not stand for that.

C. HUNGARY

Probably no other insurgency ever had the tremendous emotional impact on the whole civilized world that the Hungarian uprising of 1956 did. Thousands of stories of individual heroism and horror came from it, yet it was also a key event in the Cold War and the evolution of the Communist portion of the world. For study of the how and why of urban insurgency it is the prime example of "the unexpected revolution."

The rising is most clearly associated with Budapest, although it was not by any means confined there. But in that key capital city (one and three quarters million population) were focused most of the reporting facilities. Our information is almost exclusively on what happened there between October 23 and the second week of November.

The 1945 elections in Hungary, authorized by the Allied Control Commission in the immediate aftermath of World War II, gave a fair indication of the political sentiments of the Hungarian people. In the new parliament the Independent Peasants emerged with 245 seats (57.5\% of the votes), the Communists with 70, the Social Democrats with 69, and the National Peasants with 23. These results were progressively nullified by aggressive Soviet influence exerted on behalf of Moscow-trained emigrés. By 1948 the non-communist parties had all been crushed. The following year Hungary was declared a "People's Democracy." This meant, in effect, that the real political power was in the hands of Moscow, which ruled through its Hungarian agent, Matyas Rakosi, a firm Stalinist. Under the latter's regime, the AVH (State Security Police) used terrorist methods and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment to purge tens of thousands of "nationalist" and "liberal" persons both inside
and outside the Hungarian Communist Party, making Hungary a full-fledged satellite, and destroying individual liberties. There is no question, however, that some of the basic reforms along socialist lines instituted in the postwar period, like nationalization of some industries and land reform, were widely welcomed.

Imre Nagy formed a new government in mid-1953 when patent economic failures led the new Russian leaders after Stalin's death to become displeased with Rakosi. Nagy had been a consistent critic of the unrealistic program of heavy industry and farm collectivization. Now he announced amnesty, the abolition of internment camps, and other measures intended to ease the pressure of the police tactics for which Rakosi's regime had become hated by a majority of Hungarians. Nagy's policies were intended to improve the food shortages and otherwise make Hungary more livable. In January 1954 the Premier indicated that he considered it desirable to establish economic relations with capitalist countries. His hope was only to move toward modest independence of Moscow, like Tito and Gomulka, for the Hungarian leader was ideologically a communist, not a "counter-revolutionary."

Early in 1955 Rakosi returned to challenge Nagy and by March had won dominance in higher Party circles. On the 9th Nagy was charged by the Central Committee with "rightist deviationism and anti-Marxist opportunism." A Rakosi man was installed as Premier, and Nagy was expelled from the Party.

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, held in Moscow in early 1956, softened Rakosi's hard line and encouraged a measure of democratization, national independence, and relaxation of police rule. In July of 1956, however, Rakosi was dismissed and succeeded by Erno Gero, but in the wake of visible indications of the Soviets' relaxation of controls, the Hungarian people were hopeful that former leader Nagy would be returned to power.
Hungarian intellectuals, mainly writers within the Party, had become restless under rigid Communist discipline. Both in December 1955 and again the next June they had spoken out demanding freedom of expression—again on September 11 and October 20 the Writers' Union demanded "complete freedom." Following the 1953 fall of Rakosi, Nagy-minded intellectuals had founded the private Petofi Circle, which now became a public forum for frank criticism of the leadership and policies of the government. The "right" or anti-Rakosi wing of the party, many of whom had been purged in the 1947-53 period, tended to welcome this ferment of apparently healthy criticism.

The Rakosi-Gero wing was unhappy about the un-Stalin turn of events, but realized vaguely that accommodation was in order. On October 19, in response to student pressures for far-reaching educational policy changes, including abolition of compulsory teaching of Russian in the schools, Education Minister Konya proclaimed a program of very limited conciliation. That same day the students reacted with protest demonstrations in Szeged and other towns. They were encouraged in their resistance by the October 19 news of Poland's success in moving towards greater independence of the USSR. Apprehensive Soviet authorities, however, took a dim view of these intellectual rumblings in Hungary. On October 20, their military began assembling floating bridges at Zahony on the Soviet-Hungarian frontier; on October 21 Hungarian-speaking reserve officers and those on leave were called to duty; on October 22 Soviet forces in Western Hungary began shifting towards Budapest.

Also on October 22, student meetings took place in Budapest where various lists of demands were drawn up to present to the government. The most important session was at the Building Industry Technological University, where sixteen demands were drawn up including (1) immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, (2) reconstitution of the Hungarian government under the leadership of Nagy, (3) free elections, and (4) immediate improvement in worker and peasant living conditions. The following morning
the meetings were repeated. At noon a delegation went to the Minister of the Interior to inform him that a demonstration was planned in support of Poland and various national reforms. He refused permission, but students issued an appeal to the workers for support. Lists of student demands were soon being prepared throughout Budapest. They caused great excitement and were eagerly duplicated and distributed despite Party efforts to halt their diffusion. That afternoon thousands of students, workers, and Hungarian soldiers assembled at Petofi statue in Pest then moved across the river to another statue in Buda. The 2-kilometer march, with their numbers swelling and crowd excitement growing, led to increasingly daring nationalist slogans and cries of "Russians, go home!" By 5 p.m. a quarter of a million people had gathered in front of the Parliament Building demanding Nagy as Premier. Nagy was brought but made a noncommittal, short speech. (His indecision was to prove crucial throughout the entire uprising.)

Meanwhile a delegation of students had gone to the Radio Building demanding to have their list of points read over the air. They got no satisfaction; in fact they became infuriated by a trick which tried to persuade them that a broadcast had been made.

At 8 o'clock Gero spoke on the radio, but in terms so incomprehending of what was happening that it acted as a fuse. Youths now began to assault the Radio Building. Soon they had also overturned an 80-foot statue of Stalin in City Park.

Truckloads of the AVH Security Police arrived and used tear gas to try to disperse the Radio Building crowd. Then use of bayonets was threatened, volleys were fired in the air, and finally the AVH opened fire on the crowd, killing and wounding a number of people. This attack by the hated secret police definitively turned the excited but largely peaceful demonstration into a violent uprising. Hungarian troops were called, but on arriving some of them joined the crowd and others were relieved of their weapons. Two tanks and many guns were obtained in

*Petofi was the poet-hero of the 1848 rebellion.
this manner. Workers seized trucks and arms from military barracks and drove into central Budapest. More people continued to pour in. Announcements on the radio from the Central Committee were confused and inconsistent. The Communist leaders seemed near panic.

When it became known that other official buildings were also under attack, the Stalinists in the leadership demanded ruthless suppression, calling the revolt "fascist" and "counter-revolutionary." More moderate elements prevailed, however, and agreed that Nagy must become Premier and concessions be made. As more information came in to the leaders, they perceived the spread of the fighting to other sections of the city. With battling continuing, they decided to declare martial law. Soviet troops were called on to restore order. Throughout the early morning hours Soviet tanks fought, and sometimes lost, against young street partisans, who had learned well in school the stories of the glorious Soviet partisans who had fought German tanks with such imagination and cunning. The news that Russian tanks had been destroyed by the irregulars swept through the insurgent ranks, boosting their confidence. They had seized the Radio Building and others by noon of the 24th.

Although the unprepared fighters lacked central coordination (they generally broke into units of 5 to 10 persons), a general strike was called and soon was being widely observed. It spread during the day throughout the country. It was clear by mid-afternoon that the Party had become ineffectual and was merely scrambling for some way to regain control. The desperation of the situation was underlined by the arrival at Party headquarters, in Soviet tanks, of A. I. Mikoyan and M.A. Suslov. They stayed in Budapest for at least 3 days (according to some reports; others say they arrived on the 28th).

To this time the hostility of the people had been mainly against the AVH. Soviet tanks now held key bridges and intersections but were not very active. In some places the Russian soldiers were openly.
sympathetic. Government statements containing progressively more liberal appeals and concessions were broadcast and printed in an attempt to quiet the situation, but concessions could not keep pace with increasing demands by student and worker councils which had been set up. The people were savoring the new freedom feeling.

On the 25th, Soviet tanks came into the Parliament Square where a large mass of people were demonstrating and singing the national anthem. The tank crews seemed sympathetic and cordial. When AVH began firing into the crowd, the Soviets, thinking the people were attacking them, opened fire. A bloody massacre followed which set off a full-scale battle that raged for the next four days.

The government had been forced to its knees by the 26th. It broadcast a renewed amnesty decree along with a plea for the people to lay down their arms. As Rakosi supporters fled or were relieved from their posts, the radio and press came out on the side of the rebels and even escalated their demands. Meanwhile the street fighting became more bitter. The AVH was disintegrating, and Russian forces showed increasing brutality. Damage to buildings mounted rapidly under the fire of their tanks and artillery.

Nagy announced the composition of a compromise government of Communist and non-Communist Ministers on the 27th, but it contained too many of the old guard to pacify the combatants. Hard fighting went on, especially at Kilian Barracks where, under the leadership of ex-Colonel Maleter, the insurgents destroyed tank after Russian tank. On the 28th Nagy ordered a cease-fire and announced that negotiations had been made for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The fighting briefly came to a halt, largely on the insurgents' terms. Their tactics in the narrow streets of Budapest had shocked and surprised the Soviet forces, although these were by no means defeated. All the Hungarian Army had disintegrated or revolted. Only the remnants of the AVH, to whom the insurgents gave absolutely no mercy, stood in the way.
Meanwhile the events of the 23rd had inflamed the whole country. Revolutionary workers' councils and a whole melange of other insurgent elements sprang up and fell into ad hoc integration with each other. Fighters in the country's east reported some Russian forces were coming across the border, but Mikoyan was promising that no Soviet reinforcements would enter Hungary.

On the 29th, Nagy decreed abolition of the AVH, and the following day it was announced that free elections would be held. What was left of the Communist Party leadership in Hungary could only agree, and the Soviet forces began to withdraw from Budapest. Violence in the streets subsided.

For the next five days, up to November 4, the people of Budapest, believing their objectives had been attained, began to clear away the rubble, to restore order, and to bring life back to somewhat normal conditions despite the threatening reports of new Soviet forces. On November 1, the freedom fighters agreed to become part of a new national guard (many had joined and been armed as early as the 29th). On November 2, political prisoners, the most famous of whom was Cardinal Mindszenty, were released, and many surviving AVH members were jailed. On November 3, a coalition government was constituted with the Communist Party influence in it no longer clearly dominant.

It is impossible to speak realistically of there really being a government during the late October days. "Revolutionary councils" from the areas outside Budapest, fully participating in the revolution in their zones, pressed Nagy with demands for this or that point in a cacophony of counsel. Nagy's own early indecision in taking control of the explosive situation had partly compromised him with the most active partisans. He and many of the other remaining leaders in the nominal government, such as Janos Kadar, remained communists, and as such were viewed with a show-me-by-your-deeds attitude on the part of many among
the rebels. In any case the policies or demands which the Nagy government finally communicated to the Soviets and the world represented a position to which grassroots demands pushed them; on their own they would have been much more cautious.

International influences became increasingly significant as the days passed. The Western world watched the affair, ably reported by a handful of daring journalists, with a mixture of wonder, glee, and horror. The revolt was exploited by the Western countries as a tremendous propaganda victory in the Cold War—the unmasking of seething discontent among the workers against "the workers' state." The Hungarians themselves listened avidly to sources like Radio Free Europe, reveling in the glorification of their struggle. They also asked specifically for help against the Soviets in the last bitter days when Soviet power had become invincible on the scene. Promises and semi-promises came back to them, but obviously the West was as surprised and unprepared to exploit the revolt as the Hungarians themselves were; no significant assistance could realistically be expected from outside. The line taken by the Communist Bloc varied greatly from country to country and time to time. At first the uprising was merely labeled reactionary and counter-revolutionary, but as the ferocity of Hungarian feelings and the scope of the revolution became patent, contradictory, and even pacifying reports were put out.

What finally led the Russians to turn to overwhelming armed might to control Hungary is not clear to history yet. There are indications that they were toying with the revolutionaries from the first; that they were preparing all the time for a massive onslaught. This seems unlikely, considering the serious losses in prestige they suffered in the interval. What seems most likely is that Mikoyan and Suslov first assessed the situation as one to be given kid-glove treatment but unlikely to give permanent problems to the Soviet stance. That some elements of the Russian forces had themselves sympathized with, and even gone to the aid of, the Hungarian revolutionists might have given them additional reason
to be cautious. Somewhere along the line, however, the narrowly-balanced policy scales were tipped to the side of using full force. The fact that the West was reaping a great propaganda benefit must have been significant. Other factors seem to have been: the threat of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and adoption of a policy of neutrality (Nagy finally, reluctantly, accepted this position when public opinion forced him to, but Russian forces were already pouring in before he made the decision public); Nagy's inclusion of so many non-Communist political figures in his government and the intention to hold free elections; the daily-increasing hostility of the fighters to the presence of any Russian forces in the country; the flood of nationalism which led to incidents touching Russian pride (such as desecration of a monument to the Russian liberating soldiers); opportunity, from the fact that the upcoming U.S. elections and the Suez affair had effectively tied the hands of both the West and the UN; fears that the example of Hungary would set off troubles in other Bloc countries, punctuated by shrill warnings from the Red leaders of those countries that precisely that would happen; and the disintegration of the Hungarian Army leaving only irregulars to oppose the Russian advance.

Heavy replacements for the tired Soviet forces actually began moving into the country on the 31st. By November 2 a ring of Soviet armor had been drawn around Budapest. The Nagy government had been kept completely in the dark about the intentions of the Russians since Mikoyan's deceptive promises of five days before. When the government sent a series of protest notes to the Russian embassy, they were assured that negotiations would be opened about the withdrawal of troops. The next morning the pledge was given that no further troop trains would cross the frontier.

Nagy felt uneasy about the situation but proceeded with announcement of his new multi-party government, feeling some optimism. It seemed to the Hungarians that with the eyes of the world riveted on their
country the Soviets were not likely to take brazen armed action against them.

The next morning they learned the truth. They awakened to bursts of gunfire, and the second battle of Budapest began. Infantry and a thousand tanks entered the city. The Soviet commander installed Kadar (who had mysteriously disappeared from the city and Nagy's government some days before) as puppet Prime Minister, although he was powerless at the moment.

The next week was the end. By the 9th only tiny pockets of resistance continued in remote areas. Large-scale deportations were set in motion; collective farms were reestablished. Pathetic radio calls to the West for help slowly died out.

Nagy and his chief collaborators took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. (The story of his subsequent treacherous betrayal and execution by the Russians is well known.) Kadar's cynical government of the "workers revolution" eventually regained a measure of control, backed by Russian guns.

The entire episode was called by Heray "thirteen days that shook the Kremlin." Such an encapsulation of history is more dramatic than accurate. From October 23 to around November 9 was indeed the operational phase of the insurgency, but to understand it requires looking at earlier, and subsequent, events. The ground was prepared and the seeds planted well previous to October 23, years before, in fact. The aftermath showed that the revolt did not have as negative a result as at first appeared. In subsequent years some, but by no means all, of the revolutionary demands have been implemented by Kadar, in response to quieter demands than those of 1956.
Rarely has such an apparently unequal battle been launched. On the insurgent side there was no serious preparation. No one realistically thought that serious violence would erupt. Troubles had recently occurred in Poland, and cries for change were being heard among intellectuals, but what happened was still shocking. If the psychological and political lessons in this case remain to be fully drawn out, the operational ones do so even more. Exactly who did what—tactics, communications, logistics, command—seems almost totally unanalyzed, at least in the open literature.

Budapest's events determined the course of the revolt. Other cities and towns fought, and guerrilla action went on on a small scale, but all was indecisive. The fighting there determined the domestic and international political repercussions, and they in turn shaped the fighting. Still the West's admiration for the courage of the fighters and interest in instructive details of the operations it involved ought not to divert attention from the fact that the Hungarians did lose. The strategic military lesson is clear enough.

D. IRELAND

The Irish revolt is distinguished by several features. Its present-day remnant, the IRA (Irish Republican Army), represents a movement which has gone on for over fifty years, undoubtedly the longest active insurgency involving urban action that modern times have seen. Neither has any revolt been so romanticized as this one. Further, the 1916 Easter rising, the operational beginning of it all, has a good claim to being the first big insurgency fought with essentially modern equipment. Finally, Dublin, 1916, illustrates beautifully the phenomenon of the uprising that succeeded by getting beaten.

Irish resentment over British rule can be traced at least as far back as the early 19th century. The Catholic Irish felt duped over the clauses in the Union Act providing for religious emancipation, for these
were implemented only very tardily. Maladministration by the British, their failure to understand the Irish character and demands, their neglect in not considering Irish grievances serious, economic exploitation, and their refusal to face up to the fact that substantial segments of the Irish community never really were willing to accept British rule—all these factors were compounded in their seriousness by the extraordinary hardships and economic difficulties that plagued the Irish people over much of the nineteenth century. There were the potato crop failures and resulting starvation and emigration in the 1840's and 1850's. The 70's and 80's were a time of horror for the peasantry from widespread famine, merciless eviction of tenants by the English landholders, and jailing without trial of protesters and suspected saboteurs. The safety valve for this explosive rural situation was mass emigration to the United States, Canada, and Australia.

The chief political vehicle of nationalist Irish protest was the Sinn Fein society. The Fenians seem to have been organized almost simultaneously in both Ireland and the United States early in the latter half of the 19th century. They wished complete independence from hated England. After a flurry of activity, the Sinn Fein idea declined in influence and did not begin to rise again till the turn of the century. For this resurrection the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a conspiratorial, fraternal, anti-British association, was largely responsible.* The IRB was led by men like Thomas J. Clarke, an old Fenian dynamiter who finished a 15-year jail term in 1898, Arthur Griffith, who founded the nationalist Sinn Fein propaganda organ in 1905, and ardent and uncompromising Irish nationalists Pearse, MacDermott, Ceannt, and O'Rahilly. These men began as a tiny cell, then converted Sinn Fein's older, non-violent aims into plans and programs of direct action in behalf of Irish

* The relation of IRB to the revived Sinn Fein movement is of inner circle to front. Organizationally IRB controlled Sinn Fein as much as the Communist Party ran the Viet Minh.
independence. Though the Catholic Church hierarchy prohibited absolution for IRB members, the parish priests generally disregarded the Church's official stand and accepted IRB membership and Catholic religious beliefs as compatible. Young recruits for the IRB were provided from 1909 onward by the Fianna Eireann, a rabidly nationalist and militant Irish "Boy Scout" organization founded and managed by Countess Constance Markievicz.

Some kind of "Home Rule," with a separate parliament, had been bruited about for years without action by both English rulers and Irish subjects as a possible solution to the tender question of sovereignty. When the Liberal Party found itself in power in 1911, its majority in Commons was so small it required the support of the Irish MP's. As the price of his support, John Redmond, leader of the Irish Party, demanded that the government introduce another Home Rule bill. In the subsequent jousting (which involved a contest over the power of the House of Lords) the Tories roused the Protestant Orangemen of the northern provinces (Ulster) to organize the Ulster Volunteers, who pledged to resist Home Rule by force. (Home Rule would have made an almost irrevocable division between Protestant North and Catholic South which strong nationalists of both faiths wished to avoid.) British authorities tacitly accepted the Volunteers as a quasi-military body by allowing them to drill.

Events of 1913 and 1914 gave the revolutionaries some unusual opportunities which they were not slow to exploit. One was the six-months Dublin transport strike of 1913, which the employers crushed with violence. From the ranks of the 20,000 miserable, starving workers, Larkin and Connolly, socialist union leaders, recruited a so-called Irish Citizens Army (ICA), a volunteer labor militia which the IRB came later to control. The strike also left behind it a strong dislike of repressive police measures. Perhaps more important in the long run was the IRB's exploitation of romantic intellectual nationalism. A nativistic movement took shape from the early years of the century in the form of the Gaelic League, which campaigned for revival of the old language and
literature. IRB's opportunity to exploit this hitherto peaceful movement came in October 1913 when Professor Eoin MacNeill published an article in the League's journal urging southern Ireland to follow (or to counter) Ulster's example and organize an Irish volunteer army, ostensibly for "maintaining the constitution of the United Kingdom." IRB agents promptly persuaded MacNeill to organize such a force and then supplied him with organizers and a staff to do the job. Unaware that he was being used, MacNeill became the front man for the clandestine Brotherhood, whose members in strategic posts controlled the burgeoning Irish Volunteer Army. Four thousand were enrolled in a month, 10,000 by the end of 1913.

World War I provided the insurgents the opportunity to put into action against British, the paramilitary ICA and Irish Volunteer forces they were building up. Brotherhood leaders believed that the war had produced psychological conditioning conducive to the promotion of a mass uprising against British rule in Ireland. For one thing war delayed passage of the Home Rule Bill. The IRB exploited popular disappointment on this matter as much as they could, but actually most Irishmen, if they cared about politics at all, seemed willing to settle for some form of Home Rule as the only feasible alternative to independence they could see. The war cut off the emigration safety valve also, and the IRB saw in the disappointed surplus manpower that began to accumulate (100,000 by 1916) a source of recruits for the coming independence fight. The IRB also played upon the threat of British conscription to alarm Irish youth. At the same time the Germans were in a position to offer the nationalists material assistance and were approached for this purpose.

The British government, during the first two years of World War I, was in an extremely delicate position with respect to the growing problem of Irish nationalism. If repression were too harsh, open revolt might be the result, and yet too lenient a policy was equally unwise lest the nationalists get completely out of hand. The moderate, ad hoc approach to the problem seemed to them to be working. Three of the four nationalist newspapers were suppressed for repeatedly publishing seditious
articles—they promptly appeared again under new names. Some 500 members of the ICA and Irish Volunteers were prosecuted under the Defense of the Realm Act, and a number of speakers and writers were arrested and temporarily jailed for seditious propaganda. But all such actions were taken sparingly and only after good cause had been given for taking them. As a result, by 1916, Britain apparently had little to fear from the Irish people. Most of them understood why Home Rule had to be delayed, and most were reconciled to accept the bill. Any tendency the Irish farmers might have had toward violent nationalism was dampened by their wartime prosperity, although statements by some of them to the effect that they hoped the war would never end hardly endeared them to the British. Probably the best indicator of popular opinion was the fact that 168,000 Irishmen joined and served alongside the British in France despite sedition by a few and grumbling on the part of others of their countrymen.

But all this evidence made little impression upon the fanatically-determined IRB of early 1916. Socialist labor boss Connally continued to drill his Dublin ICA in street-fighting sniper fire and tactics, and the Irish Volunteers, now 12,000 strong, went on preparing for possible future action against the British. In January the Supreme Council of the IRB had set Easter Sunday as the date for their uprising. As psychological preparation, one of the leaders, Joseph Plunkett, circulated a document which he had forged purporting to show how the British authorities were on the point of carrying out a grand plan of arresting and incarcerating all the prominent nationalist supporters in Ireland. It gave a basis for arguing that an uprising was necessary to beat the British to the punch.

Meanwhile union leader Connally, a Marxist revolutionary, had studied literature on the Paris and Moscow revolutions and planned to proceed along similar lines. (As a dogmatic Marxist, he believed the British capitalists would never permit the use of artillery in the city because of the property loss entailed!) By 1915 he had turned part of
union headquarters into an amateur munitions factory. When the IRB learned of his plans, they immediately drew him into their circle, so he would not set things off prematurely. Connally was only partly with them, however. He warned his socialist followers to keep their rifles in case they won, because the Volunteers might have a different goal than they, as in fact was the case.

All through the preparatory period, the revolutionists built up a strong body of support in America among Irish emigrants, who sent back a flow of funds for subversion and arms acquisition. A continual stream of propaganda was also put out via the American Irish which painted the British as tyrants and the revolutionaries as patriots. The eventual effect of this tactic on world opinion, with that opinion then constraining the British response to the insurgency, was not insignificant.

Sir Roger Casement made contact with German General Staff officers early in 1916 to ask help for the rebellion. They scornfully refused the grandiose Irish scheme for massive support, but decided that it was worth the gamble to them of sending a few thousand obsolete rifles and ammunition. A trawler was dispatched with the guns and Casement was returned in a submarine. Chiefly as a result of chance, but partly due to inadequate communication, the trawler ended up scuttled to prevent seizure of the guns and Casement was taken prisoner just two days before the scheduled beginning of the revolt. The harried IRB leaders delayed the plan for one day, until Monday, but felt that they had no choice but to proceed.

The IRB strategy was for the 3,000 Irish Volunteer and ICA men in Dublin to seize that city, whereupon the other 10,000 Irish Volunteers throughout the country would spread the uprising all over southern Ireland. (Together they called themselves the Irish Republican Army.) The vague hope was that, somehow, if they could keep the fight going, Germany would give them direct help to turn the tide against the British
forces. Actually the planning was inept from a strategic point of view, and the plot astonishingly uncoordinated.

Other potential insurgents failed to show up due to a variety of factors, behind many of which lay either lack of conviction or fear. Professor MacNeill was persuaded at the last moment to back out and his order to the Volunteers not to fall out on Easter as had been planned was a most serious further blow to the rebel hopes.

At 10 AM Easter morning, April 24, 1916, insurgent forces "proclaimed" a republic and began occupying principal public buildings (except Dublin Castle, the seat of British power, where they were unsuccessful). They blocked some roads leading into the city, and sat back to defend against British counterforces and await the hoped-for risings in the countryside. The insurgents actually were doomed from the first. Only 700 of them turned out, though far more had been expected to muster. The British's barracks strength right in Dublin was 3-1/2 times their number. (Within 48 hours the ratio was 20 to 1.) Their arms were limited to rifles and grenades. There were insufficient forces to attempt fully to isolate the city. Telegraph lines were cut, but telephone communications were unaccountably left almost untouched for the British military to use. Finally, there was little reason to think that the populace was sympathetic to the uprising.

The action at first had comic opera touches. At 10 AM the Volunteers and about 100 Citizens Army men had answered roll call and paraded, fully armed. (Drills were normal on holidays; few noted their presence.) At noon the General Post Office was occupied with no opposition from the sergeant and six men on guard duty—with unloaded rifles—on the second floor. Clerks and customers were sent home. Windows were knocked out and sandbags and improvised barricades of furniture set up. The green, white, and orange tricolor of the Republic was run up, and a Proclamation was proudly posted on the wall. All day Monday Dubliners stood about
quietly in little groups and watched without enthusiasm while the Volunteers, some in their dark green parade uniforms and slouch hats, commandeered cars for barricades or dug trenches in the parks. There were a few women and girls along with the men, many of whom were old men or quite young boys.

The British military response was unsophisticated. Bloody but useless infantry and even cavalry attacks were made at first on the Post Office building. The British officers hadn't the slightest idea how to adapt their tactical routines to the environment. The slaughter of infantrymen was pitiful at some points.

The rebels held a number of strategic buildings in downtown Dublin, but they lacked area control of any kind. Intercommunication was by courier, scuttling through back ways. Most streets were no-man's-land.

One of the striking facts about the operation was the way in which noncombatants stood about watching proceedings--and sometimes getting shot. The situation was fluid for so long that rebel women could come and go among the buildings without detention by the government forces; they furnished food and medical aid for several days before the situation became tight.

Not much really happened on Monday. The government was trying to assess the confused situation and was ordering in many more forces. Rumors about German submarines, zeppelins, and armies were rife on both sides. With the attention of the forces of law diverted momentarily, looting by slum dwellers broke out in the afternoon. Liquor and toy shops were particularly popular.

On Tuesday and Wednesday artillery went into action as British reinforcements arrived in the city. They were not required elsewhere, for planned uprisings in other locations than Dublin amounted to little.
Condemnation of the rash action by the Volunteers was commonly heard among Irishmen around the country.

Use of the artillery together with the looting caused serious fires. Since the firefighting forces were unable to move freely in the streets, major sections of the city were burned out during the next three days. Eventually fires forced knots of rebels from various buildings, weakening their total position considerably.

Once the British forces realized the futility of standard tactics, they did improvise with some success. A kind of home-made armored car was devised on an automobile which allowed much freer movement in the streets. Both sides made extensive use of passage through holes dug in interior walls, passing from house to house without showing in the street.

While in the long run the systematic British use of artillery (despite Connally) proved decisive, nevertheless the intimate knowledge which the rebels had of almost every building and alley enabled them to prolong the struggle. Since only British troops, not local policemen of any kind, were employed on the counterinsurgent side, lack of such knowledge was a serious obstacle for them.

On Wednesday word got around about the vengeance some British military authorities were taking on prisoners. (This was wartime and the rebels were openly sympathetic to Germany.) Some Dubliners began to express pride in the tough fight the insurgents were putting up, but shortages of food and the great fires were causing general concern. In the last hours of the rebellion on the 29th, remnants of the IRA trying to find cover were both praised and jeered in the streets.

The British military began on May 2 a series of courts-martial, executing insurgent leaders immediately whenever sentences of death were passed and confirmed. The trials were always private; no records were
ever published. Announced briefly a few at a time, these executions, added to reports of brutality to those being held, slowly aroused sympathy and support for the Rising on the part of many Irishmen. The continued detention of nearly 2,000 men, most of whom had no trial, further exacerbated popular feelings. Furthermore, the troops, exhausted and frustrated by a kind of fighting they had never been taught, treated some civilians viciously in the last close infighting, and reports of this spread.

Yet the Easter uprising was fraught with long-range significance, for the British government's reaction to this episode seems to have been unnecessarily brutal. The hard-core nationalists in the imprisoned group (ultimately totaling 3,500) used the opportunity to indoctrinate all their cellmates. Thus the repression had the ultimate effect of turning away not only the Dubliners, but a good deal of public opinion all over Ireland, from the British. By December 1916 the executed leaders had acquired a kind of mystical Gaelic sainthood. Old Sinn Fein literature was unobtainable because of the demand. As soon as an amnesty became effective in 1917 the nationalists were back in business again rather openly. All attempts by Dublin Castle to keep down the nationalist virus by the old moderate coercive tactics now failed. Nationalist newspapers prospered, demands for more than mere Home Rule increased, the Irish Volunteers began drilling again, and in 1917 the political and military wings of the independence movement were joined in the person of Eamon de Valera. Possible British conscription became such a burning issue that the Catholic Church hierarchy even came out against it. British decrees, prohibitions, bans, and arrests seemed only to provide added stimulus and public support for the nationalists.

In December 1918, the Sinn Fein-backed candidates mostly triumphed in the elections. March of 1919 saw new uprisings now keyed to guerrilla war. English institutions such as the courts were boycotted in favor of local competitors set up by the Sinn Fein, in part because of the
inability of government forces to guarantee enforcement or protection any longer. By late 1919 British law was unknown throughout most of the southern counties; Sinn Fein reprisals and threats had effectively cowed even those Irish who were outraged at their violence. Murders, particularly of detectives and policemen, were commonplace on city streets.

As Sinn Fein terror controlled the country at the local level, only military force gave the government any power at all. Raiding for arms was general. On the border with Ulster, sectarian assassinations and house-burnings added to the carnage.

To get around the problem of the lack of witnesses willing to testify against Sinn Feiners, the British authorities decided to strike back directly. Recruits to the force called the Auxiliaries were rapidly hired, mostly from among unemployed war veterans. (Because recruiting was so rapid, the uniforms furnished them were mixed, hence the name Black and Tans.) From August 1920 reprisals became a matter of policy. One reprisal act burned as much of Cork as the Easter Rebellion had of Dublin. In the first three months of 1921 there were 500 deaths, about one-third of them crown forces.

Home Rule and Partition became actuality in April 1921. Virtual impasse preventing the organization of a viable Irish government finally was broken following lengthy negotiations, but only after the King had appealed for reconciliation and peace. The resultant "republic" actually had virtual dominion status. Most nationalists were willing to try to live with this partial victory, but a diehard faction of the IRA refused. Civil war threatened for a time, but the new government under M. Collins moved slowly, unsure of its strength. An election was held in 1922, and the vote reflected a desire for an end to fighting. The dissidents refused to listen and set off new fighting, both between troop units and on a guerrilla basis, Irish against Irish. When the new Republican parliament passed a land reform act at the end of the year, nearly all
active support for the belated insurgents ended. 1923 saw the total end of violence.

Since that time small units of the old IRA have kept organized. Their aim has been and still is chiefly to unite Ulster with the Republic. They undertook a serious campaign of terrorist bombing in England early in World War II, with German financing, and again in 1956 they did serious damage along the Ulster border. Early in 1965 they were continuing their romantic crusade, despite lack of widespread support. (The Dublin government officially bans them.)

In viewing the place of urban violence in the entire range of Irish insurgency, one is struck by the fact that a heavy urban component has always been present. While the 1916 fighting was certainly the high point of violence, the use of terrorism in the city context has clearly been characteristic all along. The police and other representatives of government have been the prime target; ideological education of "the people" has never been an objective as in communist insurgency. A fundamental reason for the urban orientation seems to be that the nationalist movement has been mainly middle-class, intellectual, and highly-romanticized. Rural Irishmen have been apathetic about the whole matter. While there has been some guerrilla-type action, as between 1918 and 1923 and from 1956 to the present, the personnel engaged in it seem to have been almost wholly urban types who continued living in the cities.

In the entire Irish movement for independence from 1916 on, the Easter Rising, at first a hopeless affair, may have been the most important single action, for it provided martyrs and meaning for what had appeared impossible of realization.

E. JAPAN

Insurgency in the Far East usually calls to mind Malaya, the Huks, and Vietnam. The case of Japan in 1960 offers a drastically different
type of political disorder which deserves close study. While some commentators on the Security Treaty riots of that May and June concluded at the time that the events did not constitute insurgency, in retrospect there seems little doubt that at least some political elements taking part in the troubles definitely aimed at the overthrow of the government.

The heavy proportion of Japan's 93 million population which lives in urban circumstances is striking, being at least 63%. Seven cities have over a million inhabitants; Tokyo is the largest of the world's metropolises. Together with its size the capital city's unique importance as political and economic center of the country inevitably made it the site for the 1960 political disorders. In fact other Japanese areas were not directly involved in the violence at all.

The crucial psychological, partisan, and international factors in the 1960 crisis stem chiefly from World War II and the occupation of Japan. As an aftermath of the frustrated military adventures of 1941-45 and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people took on strong anti-war attitudes. They also wanted very much to be accepted in the world community as a modern, respectable, independent nation. At the same time the remarkable rebuilding of the physical and economic structure of the country with American financial and technical help had drawn the country, now buoyantly prosperous, into intimate connection with the U.S.

The pacifist mood of Japan was rudely disturbed in 1950 when the nation was confronted with the conflict in nearby Korea. Suddenly Japan was catapulted into the uncomfortable position of becoming the Western powers' key bastion against Communist expansion in the Far East. Both the United States and the United Nations needed strategically located Japan as a base of operations. In these new international circumstances, the United States and Japanese governments negotiated a ten-year security
treaty under which Japan promised never to grant military bases to a third power without prior U.S. approval. It also gave the United States the free right to operate bases, maintain troops, and store arms and equipment.

When the Korean fighting ended in 1953, there no longer seemed the same justification for the Security Treaty. Some elements of the populace began to resent more and more the presence of large numbers of United States troops on the islands, not only because they were a constant reminder of the occupation but also because it was feared that their continued presence might involve Japan in a future war. The Security Treaty by the mid-1950's had already become an active political issue. Ambitious political factions, particularly of the left, played on popular pacifist and nationalist sentiments, arguing that it was not in Japan's best interest to be tied too closely to a foreign power, especially one as military-minded as the U.S. The government's adjustment to these pressures was a move in behalf of treaty revision to remove a number of the more objectionable features, but the leftists would be satisfied with nothing less than complete abrogation. Their opposition was supported by a vigorous propaganda campaign by Communist China from 1958 on which subtly led anti-war elements in Japan into an increasingly vocal anti-American and anti-Kishi position.

In building their post-war parliamentary system, the Japanese had tended to eschew the political extremes of both right and left and to opt for moderate government. One of the best indicators of the broad, pacifist, democratic appeal is the numerical weakness of the far right political organizations. Far more numerous and powerful was the rising left, but this sector, in which the Socialist Party was by far the strongest, was seriously weakened by ideological factionalism ranging from Trotskyism through Stalinism to supporters of a program like that of the British Labor Party. Dominating the postwar governments had been the Liberal-Democratic Party, which represented the elements of the
society most central to the postwar prosperity—the Japanese Establishment, so to speak. But the party system in Japan is weak. Factions, constituting exclusive interest groups loyal to a single leader, are the basic political units. The two major parties, the Liberal-Democratic and the Socialist, are in reality fairly brittle coalitions of factions, each of which is constantly jockeying for position. None of the factions or parties is genuinely a mass political organization.

By 1959 Prime Minister Kishi's administration was already weakened. For one thing the other Liberal-Democratic factions felt his term had been long enough and that someone else should have a turn. Some inevitable social and economic problems added weight to the desire for change. One near-disastrous legislative move nearly toppled the government in the fall of 1959. Concerned over the growing threat to law and order, the Kishi government attempted to frame a more realistic Police Duties Execution Law. Popular opposition to any move toward the wartime police state, as this measure was interpreted to be, nearly brought down the government.

The first pressure other than propaganda against renewal of the Security Treaty with the U.S. was in November 1959. On the 27th a few thousand leftist union and student demonstrators came to the Diet grounds where they were allowed to hold a demonstration without police interference.

Meanwhile the small but vocal rightists (their organizations included 65,000; they held 5,000 demonstrations in 1959 alone) had invoked violence against opponents of the treaty renewal. In August members of three organizations violently demonstrated in Hiroshima on the eve of the atom-bombing anniversary against delegates attending a World Conference Against Nuclear Weapons. Jumping out of trucks and jeeps, they attacked the delegates with fists and curses while a chartered plane scattered propaganda leaflets over the city. Violence from the right was to prove critical as a precipitant the next year.
Two keys to the violence of 1960 were Zengakuren (National Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations) and Sohyō (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan). The former comprised about 20% of the university students in the country. Its doctrine was militantly Marxist, but its official position and leaders were substantially more radical than the rank and file. Internally, however, Zengakuren faced the same problem of factionalism that plagues most Japanese political organizations. One group had followed de-Stalinization with a declaration of independence from the (Russian) international communist line. Some of the elements involved in this wing have been called Trotskyite, and they came to control Zengakuren as the Main Current. The anti-Main Current (or Yoyogi) wing stayed with the Japanese Communist Party line. The two wings were in resolute opposition to each other during most of the period of the 1960 riots.

Sohyō is the chief labor union organization in Japan. It is strongly Marxist and militant but continues to reflect its origin from intellectual rather than worker sources. Over the last decade the federation has come to dominate the Socialist Party. While other factions exist within the party, it is essentially true that a Sohyō position is a Socialist position. The Sohyō-Socialist program calls for a disarmed, neutralist stand for Japan under guarantees by the U.S., USSR, and Peking.

Lengthy negotiation (22 sessions) between Kishi and Ambassador MacArthur worked out the substance of the proposed new treaty. The Prime Minister departed from Tokyo on January 20 to go to Washington for the signing ceremony. At his departure 700 (Main Current) Zengakuren followers rioted at the airport.

Through February, March, and April the Diet had the treaty text before it for debate, for Diet approval of the signing was required. Opponents used every parliamentary tactic to delay passage. Going into May the Kishi government was getting impatient. For one thing there was the pressure within the party for the Prime Minister's early routine
replacement. Also President Eisenhower had been invited to visit Japan in June. Kishl desired passage by mid-May so that a required 30-day waiting period before the treaty became effective would make the date of implementation fall during Eisenhower's visit. May 19 was the last possible day on which Diet passage of the treaty could come if the American president was to be given that present. Besides, the Diet was scheduled for only a week past the 19th. Intertwined with the whole treaty question was a tangle of inter-factional political considerations connected with Kishi's success or failure in this effort. Non-Kishi factions were especially anxious that Kishi not make personal political hay under the sun of Ike's visit.

Meanwhile the U-2 incident and Khrushchev's withdrawal of the invitation to Eisenhower to visit the USSR cast a tense pall over Japan. Reports had circulated for some time about U-2 planes being based in Japan; were treaty bases being used for provocative spying too? Furthermore, Japanese intellectuals and pacifists had been enthralled by "the spirit of Camp David" and had anticipated a dramatic détente in the Cold War. Now renewed war danger seemed to threaten instead.

On the night of May 19 the Diet virtually ignored parliamentary procedure as the evening wore on. Various opposition maneuvers to delay a vote—which would, of course, be for approval because of the government's substantial majority—were finally exhausted. More immediate was a motion to extend the session, which would heighten the ultimate chance for treaty approval. Only physical opposition action remained open, it appeared. After a recess Socialist members and their supporters seated themselves on the floor of a lobby area, blocking the Speaker in his office from the assembly hall. It appeared that no vote could be called for in time, even for an extension of the Diet session, if they could keep him imprisoned until midnight.* In desperation and after repeated

* Parliamentary rules would have prevented any meeting on the next day because notice had not been given. That would have given opponents another day for political maneuvering at least.
warnings, the Speaker called in police (armed only with white gloves) to clear the corridor. (All considered this a very touchy move, considering Japan's earlier police-state experience.) The Speaker finally did succeed in gaining entry to the chamber where, with the Socialists absent, he immediately called for a vote on a motion to extend the Diet for 50 days. As soon as that had passed, he suddenly called the treaty to the floor for a vote, and passage followed at 12:05 A.M.

Zengakure, Sohyo and other partisans had been in place outside the Diet all day. Busses had hauled union men into the city early. The demonstration was ostensibly under control of the People's Council Against the Security Pact, a 140-organization leftist front (the Communist Party was not a member, but was attached as an "observer.") Zengakuren formed ten abreast into a giant column to snake dance around the building. Leaders used a two-beat blast of whistles to set the stomping pace. Over and over trance-like, they chanted four-syllable slogans against the treaty. Rain did not dampen the shouts. By 5 P.M. the crowd had swelled to 150,000. When the police arrived, union sound trucks incited the crowds the more, but the action outside did not prove decisive for what transpired inside the Diet.

The newspapers the next day reflected widespread disapproval of the government's last-minute tactic. Newspapers in Japan, the prime medium of information—37 million a day are printed—are traditionally very critical of the government. In this case they seemed genuinely to express popular displeasure, although at the same time they were stimulating protest. The chief complaint was that in voting the measure through with the opposition absent the Kishi forces had acted "unilaterally," a "bad" procedure in a country where behind-the-scenes "adjustment" of differences is the ideal rather than humiliating an opponent. Little was said in the papers in condemnation of the Socialists' sit-in.
Almost every day for the next month the mobs formed outside both the legislature and Kishi's residence to march, snake-dance, shout, and advertise their opposition. Zengakuren and union money mobilized transport facilities, banners, and lunches every day.

The demonstrators included non-leftists too. Christian student groups joined Zengakuren to show solidarity with the pacifist principle. Even some Liberal-Democrats of the Prime Minister's own party were there. Especially noteworthy was the activism, for the first time on any scale in Japan, of professional and intellectual groups with no special leftist tendencies.

If the government could be made to fall within 30 days, the opposition knew, the Diet's passage of the treaty would be negated, hence the demonstrations were keyed to a June 19th deadline.

The masses in the streets were so great the police were helpless to manage them. At first a kind of carnival atmosphere prevailed, but day after day tempers became more strained. Pushing and shoving between police and crowds increased, and threats shouted at the Diet mounted. Western observers were struck by the utter discipline of the masses of humanity. Captains with whistles and megaphones seemed to have absolute control. Fear that this discipline could be unwisely used and the staggering scale of the crowds, far beyond any real police control, impressed neutral onlookers. The government meanwhile claimed that it lacked adequate legal powers to take strong police action. Police tried only to contain the demonstrations, not to stop them, and gave ground if attacked.

On June 4 the communications workers led a protest strike which took five and one-half million off their jobs, the largest work stoppage in Japan's history.

U.S. White House Press Secretary James Hagerty arrived June 10 at Haneda Airport to make final preparations for Eisenhower's arrival.
Anti-Main Current (Communist Party) adherents of Zengakuren together with union demonstrators had clogged the two main roads from the airport to the city. Deciding to proceed by automobile anyway the Hagerty party had not even left the airport when they were engulfed by a mob which rocked the car, cracked the windows, slashed the tires, shouted "Go home, Hagerty!", and sang the Internationale. The police had expected only a peaceful demonstration. It took them 80 minutes to clear the area long enough for the party to leave the automobile to board a helicopter for the trip to downtown Tokyo.

The demonstrations continued, reaching their peak on June 15, only four days before Eisenhower was due to arrive. By nightfall a downpour had sent away from the Diet area all but 10,000 to 15,000 hard-core Zengakuren students. When right-wing extremist provocateurs drove a truck into a line of demonstrators, violence broke out. The students stormed a line of police trucks which had been rolled up to form a barrier to the main entrance to the Diet grounds, pulling them out into the street with ropes, one at a time, where they burned 20 of them. They fought the police for hours, charging them with staves from their signs and torn up paving blocks. Student taunts to the police about their usually rural backgrounds ("dogs") increased the tension, yet the latter fought back only when attacked. In one charge a girl fell in the mud and was trampled to death by her companions. Word was spread that she had been strangled by the police. Finally, while the students massed

* Until June 10 the Communist Party (or Yoyogi or anti-Main Current) wing of Zengakuren had not been seriously involved in the demonstrations. Yet they were the only Zengakuren involved against Hagerty that day. From then on, while the Main Current element continued to direct its wrath against Kishi, not the Americans, the Communist-tied group turned with a vengeance to whipping up both violence and anti-American feeling. It has been suggested as significant that Soviet correspondents, who rarely covered public events in Tokyo, were at the airport well in advance to watch the happenings when Hagerty arrived.
for another attack, the police used tear gas for the first time and were sent charging out to the attack with clubs. The formations of students collapsed, and hundreds of injured studded the area. In all 1,000 were injured during the night. The government arranged the next day to cancel the Eisenhower trip.

The first doubts about the demonstrations which had followed the Hagerty incident were now multiplied. Voices came forward noting the increasing Communist-directed shape the protests were taking. The demand for "adjustment" and pacific measures grew. Concern was expressed for Japan's international image as a peaceful land. Fifty-five leading newspapers published a joint statement condemning violence.

Although demonstrations continued right up to the crucial 19th, when 300,000 persons surrounded the Diet, there was no further violence. The treaty became effective.

The Kishi government's resignation was now inevitable. This took place immediately after the ratification documents were exchanged--in secret--between the two countries on the 23rd. After some heavy internal politicking the Liberal Democrats picked Ikeda Hayato to form the new government, which would continue most of the policies of his predecessor.

Peaceful elections were held in the fall of 1960 which reflected the views of the nation as a whole on the May-June dispute. The Liberal-Democrats won an even larger majority in the Diet. The apparent meaning was that Japanese voters outside Tokyo had been far less anti-Kishi than the scale of the demonstrations in the capital had led many to believe. The urban student-intellectual-labor elements had clearly been the driving force in the June affair.

The western observer is struck by one pervading feature of the 1960 "insurgency." The same feature reappears in subsequent Japanese political
action. Both conservatives and leftists made it plain enough that neither fully trusts democratic-parliamentarian mechanisms. The extreme rightists had made that clear long before; in fact violence, especially assassination, was their standard resort. But the Kishi forces showed in the Diet on the night of May 19 that they too considered ends more important than means. The leftists transmitted basically the same message in the June rioting. The subtle threat of violence is not gone from Tokyo yet.

F. LEBANON

Few cases of urban insurgent violence have involved such a complicated skein of causes as that which troubled Lebanon in mid-1958. The ethnic variety of the population was unparalleled, the international factors deeply involved, the internal politics of the matter almost incomprehensible to a non-Lebanese, the action of the U.S.A. intelligent, and the outcome surprisingly satisfactory to all concerned.

Lebanon is another of the tiny stages for insurgency, only 120 miles long and 35 miles in width. Of the population of around 1,600,000, some 450,000 are in Beirut. Tripoli, the second city, has only 80,000. Much of the population and most of the wealth are on the coastal strip, from which the Lebanese range rises abruptly to nearly 10,000 feet in less than 25 miles. The clefts and valleys of the range have kept its varied inhabitants independent of each other and of any central government. Guerrilla war is old stuff here. Eastward is the Bîqa' valley and then the Anti-Lebanon range.

The country has always had an economy and interests which emphasized its role as an international crossroads. Its own production has to be heavily supplemented by imports. Syria and the industrialized countries of Europe and America supply most of those imports. They are paid for by funds taken from trade and tourism. As the most stable country in the Near East, Lebanon long since became the financial center of her part of the world. Many Europeans live there, and substantial
earnings come from services connected with the Middle East oil trade. Lebanese residents scattered around the world, often as traders, also remit large sums to the homeland. The inland and mountain areas, however, are relatively poor and backward.

Lebanon advanced and prospered as a result of her privileged position under the French Mandate. From 1920 to 1943 she became perhaps the most culturally and economically advanced region in the Near East. Independent Lebanon continued to prosper. Economic development was extraordinarily rapid in the first half of the 1950's.

When Lebanon's present boundaries were established in 1920 under French mandate, a political entity was formed which was anachronistic in the Near East. Lebanon's strong middle class, its important urban population, and its numerous Christians set it apart. Political and social accommodation were essential if the mosaic of peoples was to exist as a nation. Compromise had to be a way of life.

The Sunni Muslims (19% of the population of Lebanon in 1956), concentrated in the urbanized areas, were tied by sentiment to Syria and the wider Arab world. As large as the group was, it had not produced political leaders of much vigor. Shi'ite (heterodox) Muslims (18%), of the northern Biqa', were more accommodative to their varied neighbors but were even less politically significant because they were heavily rural. The Maronite Christians constituted fully 29% of the population and included much of the economic, political, and intellectual leadership. Of the remaining religious and ethnic groups the most significant was the Druzes (6%). Others include Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Gregorian, Armenian, Protestant, and Jewish communities.

The Sunni viewed Lebanon as an artificial Christian-dominated state set up to protect Christian interests. They refused to participate seriously in it. This basic internal rift underlay the apparent stability.
and economic soundness which had come to distinguish the country after World War I. The key elements of the rift were supposedly stabilized in 1943 when complete independence was gained. At that time leading politicians formed a "National Covenant," an unwritten agreement to the effect that Lebanon was recognized as an Arab state, which was never to seek assistance from a European power to the detriment of sister Arab states, while in turn Arabs were never to seek dissolution of Lebanon in a larger Arab unit.

During this period, the Christian-Muslim duality in political affairs shaped a tradition to the effect that the powerful Presidency was to be occupied by a Christian, the Prime Minister was to be a Muslim, and such proportioned sharing of posts in government by religious and ethnic groups went all down the line. Thus by electoral law Parliament was required to contain precisely 23 Maronites, 16 Sunni Moslems, 14 Shi'ite Moslems, 8 Greek Orthodox, 5 Druzes, and so on. A mature political party system failed to develop because of the religious fragmentation of the country, and also because the Lebanese voters, like those in neighboring Arab states, focused their attention upon personalities rather than institutions. In rural areas political power rested with individuals or families in a semi-feudal manner. The delicate balance could work well, however, so long as a balancing of factions was maintained and the spirit of compromise prevailed.

Independence was the watchword in 1943 and Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri, an experienced leader, was chosen President in a compromise between candidates preferred by the French and British (Edde and Chamoun) respectively. The new Parliament on November 8 cut out or amended every article which recognized any tie whatever to France. The (Free) French authorities in Beirut then rounded up the President and all the ministers they could find and imprisoned them, suspending the constitution and installing Edde as head of the government. An air-tight business strike followed, and under heavy international protests France gave in after 10 days. Bisharah became the leading national hero.

72
President Bisharah's unique popularity was enhanced in 1946 when the French forces finally evacuated Lebanon completely. The 1947 elections led to such a sweep of the President's candidates that outraged charges of fraud were heard. In May, 1948, after another triumph it was suddenly proposed that, even a year before the presidential election, the constitutional ban on a second term be lifted and Bisharah be reelected immediately. Opposition then began crystallizing around Camille Chamoun, whose succession to the presidency had been tacitly agreed upon when Bisharah was first elected.

Bisharah al-Khuri was too firmly in power to be challenged immediately, but as the years passed the nepotistic corruption in his government became so great, and economic conditions (after the record wartime prosperity) worsened so, that virtual anarchy prevailed by the summer of 1952. A signed newspaper attack on the President by Deputy Jumblat spurred the opposition in May. Late in the summer a mass protest meeting of 10,000 persons was held. The deposing of King Farouk of Egypt in July had a clear effect on public opinion. Finally at the opening of Parliament, September 9, the Prime Minister resigned, as the opposition guessed he would have to, and in his farewell speech he openly accused the President of causing most of the troubles of the country. The climax came after a complete business strike in Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon on September 15 and 16. The issue was still only reform, not abdication. There were rumors that the Communists were preparing riots, but aside from the overturning of a few tramcars no violence occurred. Although the strike leaders, well satisfied, called off the demonstration on the 17th, few stores reopened. Amid the tension General Shihab spoke for the army to the effect that, while it would maintain order, it would remain politically neutral. The President then resigned, on September 18, 1953. Amid a swirl of realigning forces Chamoun was elected President by Parliament five days later, but the basic questions of economic and political reforms remained.
With the rise of Nasser to prominence in Egypt and the formation of the "United Arab Republic," Lebanese Arabs came under this influence. Their chief spokesman was Saeb Salam who had briefly served as Prime Minister twice before. In 1957 Salam and others organized a National Front in opposition to the Chamoun government, including Druze, Shi'ite, and even some Christian politicians. (It did not include the communists, although it had their support.) Significantly, this was the first time in Lebanon's history when a front had had Muslim leadership. Some smaller groups and amateur politicians soon formed a less-influential "Third Force" as a hopeful but ineffectual mediator. The rallying cry was the "corruption" of the Chamoun government and claimed election frauds which had returned a Chamoun-supporting parliament in the 1957 elections.

As political stability and orderly democratic government based on compromise weakened, Lebanon's traditional international policy of strict neutrality also began to disintegrate and became the overt center of the dispute. In November 1956 Lebanon refused to follow the lead of a meeting of Arab heads of state in acting against Britain and France in sympathy with Egypt in the Suez matter. By the end of 1956, President Chamoun had begun attributing his political troubles, with some justification, to the intrigues of Syria and Egypt. There was some truth in the countercharge that Chamoun's government was becoming increasingly personalistic and that a substantial segment of the Christian population also wanted a change. Following several cases of sabotage and the discovery of arms caches of apparent Egyptian origin, the government declared a state of emergency. In March of 1957, at the urging of Foreign Minister Charles Malik, the President associated Lebanon with the Eisenhower Doctrine as a prop for his threatened regime. This meant, in effect, the forsaking of Lebanon's traditional neutralist foreign policy and its association with the West, indirectly aligning the country with the unpopular Baghdad Pact and against the "positive neutrality" of Egypt and Syria.
Following this abrupt foreign policy shift, Lebanese politics progressively felt more forcefully the effects of outside nations vying for influence there. The Egyptian press and radio launched a campaign against the government of Lebanon in April 1957 which continued until the end of the crisis the next year.

On May 30 the opposition precipitated disturbances in Beirut which resulted in the killing of 6, the wounding of 16, and the arrest of over 200. They had been set up when on the 27th the United National Front warned Chamoun that unless he dismissed the government within 24 hours, in favor of a neutral cabinet as a caretaker until the impending elections were over, they would call for a general strike and "peaceful demonstrations". How the violence began on the 30th is in dispute, but eventually the army replaced the police, after firearms and tear gas had been used against the demonstrators. The Prime Minister claimed that a coup d'etat had been intended. Salam, the Front leader, became a hero; the civilian dead were considered martyrs; and stories of police brutality spread.

From that day on violence increased. Salam went on a hunger strike, and the general strike was supposed to continue, but neither move was effective. The elections were held on four successive Sundays beginning June 9. Government supporters won two-thirds of the seats in what can hardly be considered an honest election (however, there seems never to have been one in the country up to that time). The United Front refused to accept the result and apparently set out from that time on to prepare rebellion.

A measure of normalcy was restored temporarily after the elections, but soon bombings, clan feuds, sabotage, gun-running, and clashes between armed bands and the gendarmes began in mountain areas. This increased in frequency and severity until the climatic 1958 events. As terrorism increased, the government accused the Syrian intelligence service of
intervention, and Syrian residents of Lebanon were deported with increasing frequency. On February 1, 1958, Nasser and President Quwwatli of Syria formed the United Arab Republic by merging their two countries. On February 5, many schools closed down throughout Lebanon, and despite government bans demonstrations were carried out in the major cities. Egyptian and Syrian flags appeared everywhere. On Nasser's visit to Damascus on the 24th and 25th a delegation from the United National Front went to pay its respects to him. As many as 350,000 other Lebanese were said to have visited Damascus to honor Nasser at that time. The effect on Lebanese Christians can be imagined; most were persuaded that their independence was in danger.

The Nasser-occasioned excitement continued and violence increased. Five persons were arrested in Tripoli on March 16 for leading demonstrators in favor of the UAR. On the 19th school children stayed away from school because authorities had ordered pictures of Nasser taken down from walls and other public places (portraits of Chamoun were also forbidden). There were more demonstrators in Tripoli on the 21st and the 23rd. Disturbances in Tyre were serious. Late in the month three men were given prison terms for allegedly tearing the Lebanese flag and trampling on it, but some shopkeepers struck and children again left school in protest at the sentences. At the succeeding demonstration gendarmes wounded six persons. Continuation of strikes and demonstrations on the 1st of April and then another shooting by gendarmes on the 2nd, killed four and wounded 11. In less than a week 150 persons were arrested in Tyre, and the army was called in to take control of the city.

In response to indications that a legal move was being prepared to permit Chamoun to run again for President, 82 pro-Nasser leaders issued a manifesto on March 28th warning him against such a plan. On April 15th in a riotous session in Parliament, Ma'ruf Sa'd charged the government with arming its supporters. On the 20th explosives were
thrown near the house of the Prime Minister, Sami al-Sulh. Sabotage was continual. Thus by the end of April the country was ready for insurrection.

Armed conflict was set off by the slaying on May 8 of Nasib al-Matni, editor of Beirut's pro-Nasser al-Talaghraf (al-Matni was a Maronite Christian). Chamoun was blamed, of course. Found in the victim's pocket were four letters threatening his life if he did not give up his anti-government position. He had already been attacked once on November 9.

The United Front joined with other political groups to call a general strike, demanding Chamoun's resignation. The strike was only partially successful, however, especially in Beirut. In Tripoli the strike led immediately to armed rebellion when a mob of 1,000 worshipers at a mosque demonstrated after prayers. As security forces clashed with them 40 persons were injured. The next day harder fighting started, and 10 were slain. The U.S. Information Service was set afire. By the 11th "people's guards" had been formed to enforce the strike. Shops ignoring the strike call were burned. Mob fighting was renewed. An after-dark curfew was imposed, but already 13 had been killed.

The 12th saw violence erupt also in Beirut. Already on the 9th after news of the disorders in Tripoli had arrived, opposition leaders in Beirut had met and decided on armed rebellion (they had, of course, been preparing for well over a year for this likely turn of events). Early in the morning rebel forces barricaded many of the roads in and out of the city and effectively sealed off the older, Moslem section. The Christian section was under government control with soldiers employing armored cars. The army imposed firm censorship on every reference to military activity.
Within a few days the country became divided into a number of sectors virtually independent of each other. Jumblat held most of the Shûf area of south-central Lebanon, although Maronite villages in the mountains there fought fiercely when he attacked. In Tripoli as in Beirut the opposition controlled the older quarter containing a population of some 40,000. Sidon was almost wholly held by the rebels. The entire area bordering Syria, with small exceptions, went into opposition hands, serving as a route for arms imports.

Government forces were of three kinds. The regular army (9,000 men) was used with restraint by General Shihab. Trying to stay above it all, he tried to keep from showing a commitment to either political side. If either government or opposition forces threatened decisive moves, they were restrained by the army. The government then came to rely on the police, the ill-equipped gendarmerie, and politically-based private armies. One of these was the PPS (Progressive Socialist Party), which had important support from Iraq. Its ideal was a single Arab Fertile Crescent country. PPS probably furnished a minimum of 3,000 armed men on the government side, deploying them in the cities particularly. Another major private army came from the paramilitary Phalanges. Started as a youth movement in 1936 on the model of Germany's, the rightist organization feared the submersion of independent Christian Lebanon in a "Muslim sea." They helped police, patrolled streets, and fought some battles on their own, mostly in Beirut. Additional government support came from Maronite Christians who were incited by Chamoun supporters to concern about their Christian status in the light of the Moslem dominance among the opposition.

Opposition forces too were highly heterogeneous. Loyalties to particular leaders characterized many of the elements. On a number of occasions rivalry and bickering among the Front leaders lost them chances to make important military gains.
The initial rebel plan in Beirut called for attacking the presidential palace, capturing Chamoun, and taking the international airport. None of these was accomplished. The army's restraining presence was a prime reason. The heaviest fighting was on June 14-15 when army tanks were in action against the opposition in intense but indecisive street fighting. Eventually the action settled down to maintaining sectors, with the rebels infiltrating the government area to set off bombs with the intent to enforce the general strike on shopkeepers. Casualties from the bombs were slight, apparently by design.

On the other hand Tripoli suffered massive damage. There the army was particularly active against upwards of 1,000 opponents. A minimum of 168 opposition dead were chalked up. In this city, as in most of the rebel sectors, a court system and other quasi-governmental instruments were implemented. Newspapers and radio station operated on behalf of the side in whose area their facilities lay. Food and supplies got through to rebel enclaves in most places, but only with the greatest difficulty at Tripoli owing to a systematic blockade by the army.

As the revolt continued it became increasingly apparent that the UAR was deeply involved, though Nasser denied it. Government deportation of Syrians reached 25,000 by the end of June, but this only increased the UAR gunrunning, training of terrorists, and radio propaganda. When the United States indicated its willingness to engage in military action to preserve the independence of Lebanon, the UAR threatened to send volunteers to help the rebels, and the Russians charged the U.S. and other Western powers with armed interference in the affairs of Lebanon. Actually Britain and France wished to avoid any intervention, in the wake of Suez. Meanwhile the Baghdad Pact countries pledged their support to Chamoun's government.

The Lebanese government brought a charge of intervention against Syria before the United Nations Security Council. That body voted on
June 11, Russia abstaining, to send an unarmed observer corps to the Lebanese border with Syria. (Since only about a 16-mile section of the border was then under control of the Lebanese forces, only that portion was accessible to the UN group. The remainder was under rebel control and was not examined.) The observers' report played down the intervention factor and termed the conflict a "civil war" without recommending any action.

As the stalemated fighting continued in Beirut and Tripoli and the guerrilla warfare simmered in the north and east, the U.S. continued to reaffirm its determination to support the Lebanese government, with arms if necessary. On July 15 the Eisenhower Doctrine was invoked. Five-thousand U.S. Marines were landed following an appeal from President Chamoun. He declared he had exhausted all other resources before asking for armed support and pointed out that his repeated requests to the UN and the Arab League had fallen on deaf ears. NATO and the Baghdad Pact members endorsed the U.S. dispatch of troops, while the UAR, the Sino-Soviet bloc, India, and Japan condemned the action.

Once on the scene, U.S. military action was extremely discreet, although over 15,000 troops were landed. Chamoun would have liked firm personal support by the Americans, but it became apparent that this country would insist on a political compromise.

On July 31 General Shihab was chosen as President-elect by Parliament. Both sides acclaimed him, but there were indications that neither fully trusted him nor was satisfied that this solved the basic problems.

Construction of a government of conciliation under Shihab was a delicate problem which threatened to end in stalemate over the question of the composition of the Cabinet. Finally Maronite Patriarch Meouchi, although later criticized for intervening in politics, used his influence to arrange a cabinet in which only four men divided up all the portfolios,
two from the old government faction and the other two from the opposition. The traditional balance had been restored.

Although there were over 2,000 casualties in the disorders, and the abundance of arms remaining in the hands of both sides made the situation risky for some time after, no lasting bitterness resulted. One reason is that the political quarrelling did not polarize along clearly religious or ethnic lines. Economic losses were severe, however, especially from losses in mercantile and tourist revenues.

The United States military intervention, which lasted for three months, did much to restore internal peace to Lebanon. Key functions of the July-October 1958 U.S. "occupation" were, aside from helping to curb insurgent violence, mediating in the selection of the new president and providing emergency, as well as long-range, economic assistance. While U.S. troops were there, Syrian and Egyptian border infiltration came to a virtual halt and rebels in the countryside began returning to their homes in Tripoli and other Muslim towns. By mid-October, the general situation had become sufficiently normalized for the U.S. military intervention to end.

Despite periodic flareups of tension since 1958, Lebanon's delicate political balance has been maintained. Here is one case where the term "settlement" may fairly be applied to the outcome of insurgency.

Conclusions about insurgency are difficult to draw in the Lebanese case, for the American intervention prevented the drawn-out conflict which seemed to threaten. Sizeable forces were engaged in both rural and urban areas. Neither had a chance to become decisive. Neither side seemed either well-equipped or desirous of committing their forces firmly to battle. Both the hesitation to fight and the rather predictable, wholly political nature of the settlement made clear that the military action was seen by both sides more as an extension of politics than as a civil war.
G. PALESTINE

Palestine provides one of the clearest demonstrations of the effects of territorial constriction on the course of a campaign of urban violence. The degree of education of the insurgents, the psychological setting in which they worked, and the marked success they enjoyed all contain valuable lessons for an understanding of the urban form of paramilitary activity.

The crucial action went on from 1944 to 1947, but long before this the elements of the conflict were being shaped. Increasing numbers of Jewish immigrants gave concern to Palestinian Arabs as early as 1920, when pogroms were started in some communities. Britain, holding the League of Nations mandate for the territory, held up Jewish immigration for a time in 1921 in response to the Arab violence. Again in 1929 immigration was restricted for the same reason. By 1936 much more serious violence developed. It had become clear both to Arabs and to Jews that Britain's indecision could be exploited by either side by refusing to cooperate in implementing the mandate, appealing to international sentiment, or resorting to open violence.

By the mid-1930's the old argument over whether there should be a Jewish national home in Palestine was no longer relevant. So many Jews were there by that time that the only question remaining concerned the political arrangements under which Jews and Arabs could get along together.

Cooperation between the two groups was made difficult by the great differences in their traditions. The Jewish immigrants were dominantly of western civilizational background; the Arabs shared the Near Eastern tradition of neighboring Arab countries. Economically the Jews were rapidly developing a sophisticated system of agriculture and land settlement, as well as some industry and commerce along thoroughly modern technological lines. Most of the Arab population, on the other hand,
consisted of a peasantry which was educationally handicapped and technologically backward, and dominated by nobles and landlords holding a heavy proportion of the wealth. The poor fallahin labored under heavy debt and miserable living conditions. Class differences were profound. But among the Jews there had not developed any significant industrial or financial aristocracy. It was clear that the two communities were moving forward at different rates and in different directions.

The 1936 conflict stemmed from a number of causes. One of these was the economic distress brought on by a run on the Palestine banks and a consequent economic recession, both associated with the threat of a European war over Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. Moreover, the Fascist radio station at Bari, Italy, put out a steady stream of anti-British propaganda for Near Eastern consumption. A tentative British proposal for partition of Palestine between the Arabs and Jews was also crucial; the Arabs were adamant against it, as were some of the Jews. On April 15, two Jews were killed by Arabs, and in the next few days there were reprisals and counterreprisals on both sides. A Higher Committee was organized to direct an Arab strike. Their announced purpose was to obtain prohibition of Jewish immigration and other concessions which they saw as a protection of their traditional position. An Arab economic boycott of the Jews was instituted. Gradually the strike developed from sporadic violence and sabotage into open rebellion. Bands of armed guerrillas were organized throughout Arab Palestine, especially in the rural hill districts. Trains were derailed, telephone wires cut, and the oil pipeline from Iraq blocked. There was sniping at interurban traffic, including the movements of British soldiers and police, and Jewish outlying villages were assaulted. Britain immediately brought in added forces to keep highways open and the railroads in operation. Reluctantly the British took offensive action against the guerrillas and brought them under control temporarily. Systematic or sporadic violence of this same kind recurred in 1937 and 1938. Our only concern here with these events is to see the influence which they had in the preparations for an eventual Jewish insurgency against the British.
One of the most significant outcomes was that Jewish military units were given an opportunity to expand and train. The Haganah (Irgun ha-Hagana), an illegal self-defense corps, had been founded in 1920. It already provided the Zionist quasi-government, the Jewish Agency, with upwards of 10,000 armed and trained men. Throughout the 1936 - 1938 Arab troubles the Jewish Agency prevailed upon Britain to permit them to defend their own villages against Arab attacks. In addition to Haganah, Jewish constables were recruited and armed for this purpose.

Another military force shaped by the Arab revolt was the Irgun Tzvai Leumi (National Military Organization) which had its origin in April 1937 out of elements of the Revisionist Party. Their aim was not defense against Arabs but simply to drive out the British. The beginning of their attacks constituted the opening violence of the eleven-year campaign which culminated in the British withdrawal in 1948. Prominent leader David Ben-Gurion condemned them unequivocally, terming them "murdering gangs". To the Irgun, however, their attacks on the British police stations were pure patriotism, which they hoped would lead to peace and independence.

Other results of the 1936 conflict included recognition by the British, the Jews, and the Arabs that the mandate was unworkable; that no scheme of partition was acceptable to either Arabs or Jews; that Arab-Jewish enmity was profound; that anti-British feeling, spurred by Axis propaganda, was on the rise in the Near East; and that concessions could be wrung from Britain by either side's maneuvering through armed action, international propaganda, and economic damage. As far as the

* The British apparently made a serious mistake in permitting not only Haganah but other non-official and illegal military groups to form and operate over the years, just as they did in Ireland. As late as May, 1939, the British Army permitted the Nashashibi Arab faction to set up its own anti-terrorist units in order to combat rebel forces which it itself could not contain.
Arabs were concerned, internal feuds occasioned by the rebellion destroyed whatever political unity they had had, making them ineffective right up until the war with Israel, in 1948.

Into 1939 the Irgun continued its attacks on a small scale, damaging government buildings in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. Occasional acts of sabotage and even murder followed, even though David Raziel, the head of Irgun, was put in prison at the end of May. The organization was stepping up its external propaganda and sending fund-raising representatives to the United States at this time. More significant was the fact that despite the expressed opposition of the quasi-government to such violence, the Jewish public refused to cooperate with British security authorities in rounding up the terrorists; the Jews as a whole resented the firm measures sometimes employed by the army and police. Meanwhile mandatory authorities agreed to an expansion in the size of the legal Jewish constabulary up to almost 19,000, even though they knew that nearly all members at the same time belonged to Haganah. Lewis guns and grenade rifles were included for the first time among the arms issued to the Jews. Although there was a quick reversal in this British position, the force itself remained in being.

The threat of the German advance across the North African desert toward Egypt helped bring greater Jewish support to Britain in the war effort. When it appeared doubtful in 1941 and 1942 that British troops could contain the Axis desert forces at El Alamein, 1500 young men drawn from the Jewish collective villages were secretly trained as guerrillas by the British army and charged to engage in sabotage and partisan warfare in the event of a German occupation of Palestine. The group was officially named "The Jewish Rural Special Police." Unofficially it was known as Palmach, an abbreviation for Plugot ha-Mahaz or "Striking Unit". Later this unit formed the nucleus of a commando force within Haganah. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the 43,000 British-trained Palestinian Jews who were under arms at the end of 1942 had been screened by the Jewish Agency and either actually or potentially belonged to Haganah.
The tensions of German successes, economic readjustments in Palestine, the wartime labor shortage, and other factors combined to heighten concern about the immigration rate. Jewish refugees wanted desperately to come to Palestine; Jews already there desired intensely that they come. The cautious British policy refused to speed up the movement. One of the upshots of this situation was the formation of a new insurgent group, aiming to further attack the British until they were driven from Palestine. This was the Stern Gang, formed of Irgunists unhappy at that body's wartime cessation of violence against the British. They recruited old colleagues from the Irgun, young delinquents from the oriental Jewish slums, and Jewish members of the Polish troops who had begun to arrive in Palestine. The Sternists distributed printed propaganda, made clandestine broadcasts, committed robberies, and set off some bombs, but generally remained at a low level of violence. In 1942 they accused the Palestine police of torturing captured Stern Gang men for information, so they "retaliated" by killing the Jewish Deputy Superintendent of Police and two detectives in Tel-Aviv. The subsequent small war between the Gang and police ended with the Gang's being immobilized for two years by arrests. There seems to have been little active support for the desperate point of view of the Stern Gang, particularly since wartime security was heavily emphasized at this time.

In all the violence both before and after this time, communists had no significant part. Communists there were in small numbers among both Jews and Arabs, but the violence stemmed not from ideologists but from nationalists--desperate persons who could see no alternative course. Neither Irgun, the Stern Gang, or Haganah as groups fit comfortably at any one position on a right-left spectrum of political belief.

1943 was a time of crystallization of sentiment and preparation for the definitive outbreak of violence in the year to follow. Large numbers of arms were imported through illegal channels, mostly salvaged from the desert battlefields of North Africa. The Zionists, with more
money at hand than other bidders, stockpiled many of these, anticipating a showdown with the British and Arabs. Jewish sentiment toward the British immigration policy was further strained by their extreme concern over the fate of the Jewish refugees of Europe. The Stern Gang, inactive since the death of its founder and the arrest of its leader two years previously, was revived at this time under the name FFI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel or "Lehi"). Their numbers included mostly young people, particularly oriental Jews and recently arrived illegal immigrants. Even a few Arabs were enlisted with them.

The FFI logic was that since effective sabotage required large numbers of men, munitions, and skill, they could not use such a weapon. Being only a handful, all they could hope to carry out was individual terrorism—to strike at important personalities at the head of the administration, in order to convince the British that they could not afford to keep enough force in the land to maintain law and order. Like the Irgun before, the FFI organizers carefully studied the literature of insurrectionary terror—of the IRA, Russian Narodnaya Volya, and others. The FFI was, however, non-ideological and had no political line except to drive out the British.

By the beginning of 1944, there were three potential insurgent groups. The FFI numbered between 250 and 300. The still inactive, but preparing, Irgun probably had over a thousand members at this time. Irgun's previous ties to the Revisionist Party had by now terminated, and they took the same non-ideological position as the FFI. The Irgun's political background in pre-war Poland gave them access to help from the Polish military units in exile, brought to Palestine in 1942 and 1943, which were increasingly anti-British. Polish commanders reportedly allowed Jewish deserters from their ranks to join the Irgunists. They also trained the Irgun in terrorism and sabotage, allowed the use of their military vehicles for the transporting of munitions, and gave refuges in Polish army camps to those from the Irgun sought by the Palestine police.
Of the three anti-British forces only the Haganah had the support of the entire Jewish community of Palestine and abroad, yet the Irgun and the FFI had some power to direct the course of Jewish "foreign policy" simply by taking independent action. However, since all three groups were extralegal, internecine conflict could destroy them.

1946 was a year full of terror. Beginning in February, the Irgun and the FFI launched systematic campaigns. Irgun specialized in the bombing of government offices, with precautions to avoid bloodshed. The FFI, on the other hand, went in for assassination, besides renewing their old vendetta with the police. Hardly a week passed without blood flowing in the streets of the cities in Israel. Police retaliation contributed to the violence. On the 24th of February, the Assistant Police Superintendent, the man who had killed the founder of the Stern Gang, escaped with wounds when a mine exploded under his car. That afternoon a second mine blew up as a police car passed, injuring four inspectors. Two days later government tax offices in three major cities were blown up. On March 19th a policeman was shot dead by a Stern Gang member whom he had cornered on a stairway. On the 23rd, the Irgun set off simultaneous bombs at police headquarters in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa, and three police were killed in Tel-Aviv. Irgun men dressed in police uniforms subsequently raided police headquarters. Suddenly photographs of the FFI leaders, each with a price on his head, were published in the Hebrew newspapers; the organization had killed two Jewish merchants as informers and had announced that it would "execute" anyone else who informed on its members. On April 1st, a Jewish policeman was blown up by a grenade while firing at fleeing FFI men. Five days later two young FFI activists killed themselves rather than be captured near Tiberias. Thus, all through April and May, terror and counterterror grew.

The British, impatient and uninformed, raided settlements having no connection with the terrorists, interning inhabitants and beating
some of them. Hundreds were thrown into prison without charge or trial. On June 22nd, Sir Harold MacMichael announced that possession of a gun was now a crime punishable by death. The insurgents responded with propaganda asserting the torture of prisoners. In mid-October, some 250 suspected terrorists who had been interned were flown to a prison camp in the Sudan without trial or notification of their families. Also a new order became effective—the moment a terrorist outrage was reported, air raid sirens sounded, whereupon all persons on the streets had to freeze in their tracks until the sirens again sounded. One of the most shocking events to the British was the murder of Lord Moyne, the British Minister Resident in the Middle East and a member of the war cabinet, in Cairo by two FFI agents. The threat of an extension of the terrorism overseas was seen as exceedingly serious. Emergency regulations, virtually martial law, were now invoked in Palestine.

At the end of 1944 the arrests of terrorists had seriously hurt the Irgun but apparently not the FFI. Actually few arms had been captured by the British and there was adequate leadership still at large to plan diehard actions. The relationship of the British to the Jewish public was characterized by increasing mutual distrust. Jews lacked confidence in the ability of the police who had allowed key leaders of the Stern group to escape in November, 1943, after they had been turned in by informers the previous year. Particularly irritating was the British practice of imposing collective fines on a community. Meanwhile the Jewish Agency quasi-government, the press, and most public leaders at least verbally condemned the terrorism as harming the cause of the Zionists. The leftist press was terming the terrorists "Jewish Fascists".

British complaints about the fact that the Jewish community was not assisting the police to curb terrorism combined with implicit threats in London that the violence was hurting Jewish chances for political support in the post-war settlement period. Between December 1944 and March 1945 the quasi-government furnished British authorities with
information about terrorist hide-outs, printing presses, and arms caches, and units of Haganah even kidnapped individual terrorists to procure additional information. As a result, some 200 suspects were taken into custody in December alone. Wealthy businessmen were urged to notify Haganah if terrorists demanded funds from them, whereupon the terrorists turned to thefts and bogus soliciting to replenish their treasury. Attacks dropped off.

The advent of the Labor Government in Britain gave only temporary optimism among Palestinian Jews. Soon they were disappointed again, and increasingly embittered. Agency cooperation disappeared before long, and Irgunists and the FFI renewed terrorist activities in the summer of 1945, bombing police installations and the oil pipeline from Iraq. The Palestinian Arabs were still in a state of disarray as a result of the pre-war political debacle, so all the Jewish antipathy could be directed at the British colonial masters, as they were now viewed.

The British response was to increase security measures greatly along strictly military lines. The proposed Anglo-American inquiry in November postponed any armed showdown but the—-to the Jews—pressing matter of bringing displaced fellows from Europe led them to begin to transport large numbers of the refugees by ship. When British coastal patrols, enforcing the immigration restrictions, interfered, full scale armed clashes seemed ever nearer (by now the Haganah consisted of over 60,000 well-trained, well-armed soldiers). At the end of the next February Irgun, the FFI, and Palmach (Haganah's commando force) cooperated in a common plan to assault British installations used for surveillance of the illegal immigration. Popular Jewish approval of these moves was plainly manifest. The influence of moderates among the Jews was clearly waning, yet the activists and the extreme terrorists were still far from united.
In April Irgunists killed several British soldiers in an arms raid at Tel-Aviv. A group of British soldiers, in retaliation for the death of their comrades, took unusually violent action in two communities, destroying property and mauling innocent people. Feelings on both sides became more tense, and propaganda more shrill.

There followed a complex series of international moves which further complicated the situation. Poorly phrased "policy statements" by the British government followed by threats to Britain's military position in adjacent countries together with an apparent buildup at British bases in Palestine all led to increasing distrust by the Jews of the motives and aims of the English. The tension, and in some cases misunderstanding became so great that the British suddenly put Jewish Palestine under virtual military siege at the end of June. Some 2700 persons, almost all of them supporters of the Agency, were arrested. No sooner had this harsh action been taken, however, than repercussions in American political circles forced the British to relent. It was apparent from the Jewish point of view that no satisfactory outcome to their demands for increased immigration and eventual free immigration could be expected by negotiation.

The difficulties of Britain's international position have to be appreciated to evaluate her moves in meeting this challenge. Not only was there the touchy matter of British-Arab relations in general, but the American intervention, formal and informal, was significant. Particularly irritating to the British was that no action was taken against American organizations financing illegal immigration. The pro-terrorist advertisements in the American press provoked bitter reaction in Britain also.

The July bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing about 80 persons, had immediate effect. British public opinion now demanded severe punitive measures against the entire Jewish community.
Tel-Aviv was put under a twenty-two hour curfew for four days; 20,000 troops and 600 police conducted house-to-house searches and screened more than half the city's population. The hotel bombing had triggered such a wave of international revulsion that responsible Jewish forces had little alternative but to withdraw support from the Irgun and FFI. In September the Jewish Agency in effect declared war on the terrorists, but to little effect. Popular Jewish opposition, if any, to their terrorism was too weak to lead to their betrayal, and they knew it.

By December 1947 the Haganah was again cooperating in terror after further British failures to take decisive action to break the political impasse.

From November 29, 1947, when the United Nations resolved to partition Palestine, until the last British troops were withdrawn on May 15, 1948, attacks continued, in order to guarantee and speed the move. But the terrorist movements were already shifting their attention by then to the Arabs, for full scale war was approaching.

There is not the slightest doubt that the objectives of the terrorists were reached. The British withdrawal might have taken place anyway, but its timing was surely advanced by the bitter and expensive measures that the mandating power had to take to try to contain the action. By the end of 1946 there were more than 80,000 British troops—nearly one-tenth of the whole British Army—in Palestine. That was one soldier or constable for every eighteen persons in the country. For the upkeep of the forces the British taxpayers spent an estimated two hundred million dollars during the Labor Government's year and one-half in office. British responses were certainly not timid; they actually proved quite effective tactically. The measures taken, however, had to be restricted because of the moral position which the British Government tried to maintain on the question of Palestine.
H. SPAIN

Rarely has a modern nation seen its own citizens, unprovoked from the outside, engage in so much violence as plagued Spain in the decade from 1928 to 1938. Much of this was explicitly insurgent, and much of it took place on the urban scene. (In 1930 there were ten cities with over 100,000 population; Barcelona had over a million and Madrid nearly as many.) The complexity of the motives, beliefs, and activities of that period is too great for detailed consideration in this short compass. Our concern here will be chiefly with the beginning of the Civil War, in 1936, and with happenings in only the two major cities. Events in Madrid contrasted with those in Barcelona in a way which particularly demonstrates the methodological possibilities for the study of UI in controlled comparisons.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Spain still suffered from the isolation she had undergone while much of the rest of Europe had been intellectually, religiously, and economically recast in the preceding three centuries. The new twentieth century forces entering the country met continual opposition from conservatives who preferred no change. Proletarian workers, influenced strongly by revolutionary Socialism, undertook serious urban violence and general strikes as early as 1917. By the end of 1928 civil discontent with the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (under the monarchy of course) had become widespread, combined with unrest in elements of the army. When the world financial crisis made its effect felt in 1930, the dictator fled. Revolutionary strikes aiming at a republic continued, however. The election results in the spring of 1931 led the Republican coalition to demand that King Alphonso abdicate, whereupon he left Spain, but without formal abdication.

Grievous factional rivalries and great ideological differences tore at the fabric of the succeeding Second Republic. Anarcho-Syndicalists numbered one and a quarter million and the Socialists (Communists were
then but a tiny element) had large followings on the left. Regional separatists were exercised about independence or autonomy for Catalonia, the Basque area, Galicia, and Valencia. Extreme right elements, though few in number, were troublesome because committed to violence. Several varieties of Traditionalists and Communists added to the political mosaic effect. Hovering over all governmental considerations was the army, poorly-equipped and disciplined and frustrated by having too much top brass (from colonial wars) to allow new promotions. (In 1939 there was one general for every 150 men.)

The advent of the Republic saw power placed in the hands of "progressive" intellectuals who intended to modernize and reform Spanish society by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means. They were politically inexperienced, however. Their drastic legislative reforms undermined the political support they might have built among "moderate rightists" and "moderate socialists." Doctrinaire anti-Catholic legislation, including a disastrous attempt suddenly to eliminate religious schools, eroded away badly-needed good-will. On the other hand, maintenance of the capitalistic economy left the Socialists dissatisfied. Furthermore, Premier Azanza's invocation of the notorious Law for the Defense of the Republic, which allowed arbitrary suspensions of civil rights, made the government as harsh in some ways as the last military dictatorship had been.

The Republican government, which moved toward the left in its first two years, shifted to a center-right position when the 1933 elections (the first with woman suffrage) gave impressive conservative majorities. Cabinets were highly unstable for the next two years, while regionalist and extremist violence provoked reprisals from the authorities over much of the country. During this period (1934), the Falange (Spanish Fascist) Party was formed.
By the end of 1935 the center-right government knew it could hold power no longer and called for elections in February 1936. Azahá emerged from the pre-election maneuvering as leader of a Popular Front consisting of Republicans, Socialists, Communists, Trotskyists, Syndicalists, and Anarchists. The Front easily swept the elections.

This new signal of popular support set off a wave of leftist violence aimed at capitalists, the church, and personal enemies. During the first months, February to June, official figures showed 113 general strikes, 269 persons killed and 1,287 wounded in street encounters or assassinations, 146 bombings, and 170 churches burned (with 251 more attempted). In that vicious atmosphere Fascism grew rapidly as a protest and protection against excesses on the left.

On July 17, 1936, army mutiny broke out in Spanish Morocco, led by General Francisco Franco Bahamonde. As that revolt spread throughout the mainland in the next two days, the entire country was plunged into a civil war which eventually claimed one million lives.

The forces lined up for the conflict were varied but fell out clearly enough into two wings. A solid majority of the people were conservative or moderate liberals, especially the small land-holders in the North, East, and Center of the land. The right was small but well-organized. The Falange had only about 6,000 members, of which 1,000 were in Madrid. They had been continuously involved in the build-up of terrorist and counter-terrorist acts in opposition to the revolutionary left. The Carlistas were a paramilitary organization, ideologically traditionalist, ultra-reactionary, and monarchist. They were not terrorists, but their 15,000 men were to prove an important factor in the military uprising. The Catholic Church too was clearly aligned on the same side, bringing to bear the influence and wealth that organization could still bring to bear. Finally, the right counted with most of the 115,000-man army.
As a proportion of the total of 22 million people, the extreme left was also a small minority, but they had two strong advantages. They were quite well-organized and highly motivated, and they were experienced in violence by a long succession of street battles, riots, and terrorist activities. The Anarchists were most numerous—about one million members composed the CNT (Anarcho-Syndicalist Trade Union) and FAI (Anarchist secret society). They were made up mostly of landless peasants from the South and Southwest and proletarian workers from Barcelona.

The other major revolutionary grouping consisted of the Socialist Party and the UGT (Socialist Trade Union). The Socialists were especially strong among the industrial workers of Bilbao, miners in Asturias and the South, white collar and railroad workers, intellectuals, and the great majority of Madrid's workers. By 1934 the UGT had 1,250,000 members led by experienced people of intellectual bourgeois and working class derivation. Minor parties on the left added to the violence all out of proportion to their numbers. The Stalinist Communists (organized as the Spanish Communist Party, a Catalanian Communist Party, and a youth group) numbered no more than 30,000, but they were disciplined and took an active part in the street fighting with the Fascists in the months preceding the army revolt. POUM (Marxist Workers Party) was composed of Communists dissident from the regular party, led by labor-connected, highly-experienced Leninists.

As these party alignments show, the civil war tended to become a conflict between the urban intellectuals and workers on the one hand and the military, the church, and the rural population on the other. This dichotomy reflected the strong tensions between modern forces of the outside Western world and the inertia of tradition which had plagued Spain for over a hundred years without a definitive solution being arrived at.
On the 18th the government made an attempt to appease the military leaders who were outside Madrid. It resigned and the President formed a more conservative government. But both the military and the revolutionary left rejected the move, since both felt confident of victory. The army in Madrid did not take action at this time. They stayed in their barracks, and the streets came under control of the leftists whose pressure on the politically-isolated, fumbling government led to approval early on the 19th to arm the workers. This act largely sealed the fate of the government. Moderate Martinez Barrio, chosen to succeed the premier who resigned in the face of the revolt, was vetoed by leaders of the extremist groups. When the new government was formed, it had been chosen in contravention of the constitution, and became in effect illegal. From then on the constitution was no longer taken seriously. (Later the leftists more or less took control of the government, but it remained quite ineffectual right up until defeat in 1938.)

In Madrid the workers did not wait for the troops to come out of the barracks. The CNT, being already in the middle of a strike, was armed and ready to begin action immediately. On the 18th CNT leaders decided to open by force their headquarters which the government had closed down during the strike. They also began to requisition arms and automobiles. On the 19th a threat to the Minister of Interior to assault the prisons led to his releasing the Anarchists kept there.

Both the UGT and CNT ordered a general strike. With the aid of the railroad workers and postal clerks, UGT set up a system of communications and codes to keep in touch with other areas of the country. The Socialists meanwhile uncovered the weapons they had hidden upon suppression of an abortive uprising in 1934. Barricades were erected in the streets, which were being patrolled by the armed workers. Government buildings had been barricaded and were guarded by police and militia.
Firing from rooftops and, allegedly, churches on the night of the 19th aroused mobs which stormed the headquarters of the rightist parties. Many churches and convents were burned at the same time.

The army's failure to go into action in Madrid had a strong psychological action also. The fact that the army revolt was against legal governmental authority, together with the obvious enthusiasm of the masses in the city, created an atmosphere which drew even conservative liberals into active participation on the anti-army side. Some of the Asalto Guards (armed police) and Civil Guards too were swept up by this bandwagon effect to side with the leftist revolutionaries.

Army troops in the metropolitan area of Madrid were approximately as follows: one infantry division, half a cavalry division, and one regiment of heavy artillery. The infantry division included a regiment of light artillery and one mortar regiment. Their actual strength in men is uncertain because many of the units were undermanned. Some rightist civilians also joined the troops. The Franco government's later history of the civil war said there were about 6,000 troops, 4,000 Asalto Guards, and 2,400 Civil Guards in the capital.

The soldiers were draftees and not very reliable for taking part in a rightist uprising. No doubt this consideration added to the hesitation of the army officers in sallying from the barracks. In fact one of the regiments near Madrid, at El Pardo, joined the revolt but being afraid to venture into Madrid went north to join other units there.

At the airport of Getafe, 10 miles south of the city, there was fighting between revolting army elements and air force troops loyal to the government who were aided by some Civil Guards and militia. After a few hours of fighting, the army units surrendered; the few airplanes and pilots at the airport remained with the militia force.
An artillery depot, Pacifico, in the city fell into militia hands in the early hours of the 19th after a short fight had been precipitated by a split between Loyalist and Nationalist factions in the garrison. As a result, the militia obtained 5,000 rifles (plus 60,000 others which lacked bolts, which were in the Montaña barracks, main redoubt of the army insurgents).

Montaña barracks had been chosen headquarters by the rebels because of its location near the center of the city and its defensive situation. The large, thick-walled building was on a hill and surrounded by a small park and a ravine. By midday of the 19th the regimental garrison, reinforced by civilian rightists, was ready to move. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, light artillery, and mortars. The local leader of the revolt, General Fanjul, wasted time with harangues and political declarations, and it was late afternoon before the attempt was made to move into the streets. By then all the other barracks in Madrid had fallen into militia hands, so that a huge crowd had congregated outside Montaña. Well-protected by barricades, trees in the park, and nearby buildings, they made it impossible for the troops to maneuver outside the barracks, into which they were forced to retreat again.

The next morning two 75 mm and one 155 mm gun bombarded the garrison, while an airplane came in to drop a couple of small bombs. Loudspeakers were used to incite the soldiers to desertion. Announcements were broadcast about the victory of the militia over the army in Barcelona. General Fanjul asked for help from the Carabanchel barracks southwest of Madrid, but the crowd was so massive by then that relief troops could never have advanced the eight miles, part of it through city streets.

Before the day ended the issue was decided throughout the city. After five hours of attack Montaña surrendered. Most of the defenders were killed on the spot. Carabanchel barracks was soon captured by officers of the loyalist side, aided by militia. Its General was killed.
by his own men. The final victory was the easy capture of Alcala de Henares, 17 miles away.

Two elements were most crucial in the victory of the government (actually the leftist "ungovernment" which at this time pursued a course essentially independent of the ineffectual Republican authority) over the military revolt. First was the fact that the disciplined union and party elements, prepared in advance with some arms, immediately took action to control the streets. Second was the hesitancy of the army, compounded by uncertainty about the loyalty of the troops.

Events in the first days of the civil war progressed somewhat differently in Barcelona. That city, and region (Catalonia), had a distinctive background. Maintenance of the status of the Catalan language was a tender point (Barcelona was the cultural center for its nearly 6 million speakers). Catalan separatism had been a continual thorn in Spain's side, particularly since the Versailles settlement after World War I had emphasized self-determination. In 1926 exiled Colonel Macià, leader of the rightist separatist party, launched a futile attempt to invade Catalonia from France to set up an independent state. In the maneuvering leading to the fall of King Alphonso in 1931, a Republican revolutionary committee made a pact with Catalan autonomists whereby the latter supported the Republican movement in exchange for a promise of regional autonomy when the Republic was set up. As a result, Barcelona gave a three-to-one majority for Republican candidates in the crucial April 1931 elections.

As soon as the monarchy fell, separatists in Barcelona proclaimed a "Catalan state". Appeals from the new Republican government in Madrid led to an agreement to substitute for "state" the term generalitat, and the Catalans resigned themselves to the status of an autonomous region.
The army was scheduled to move at dawn on the 19th of July to seize the offices of the generalitat, a radio station, the telephone exchange, and various other crucial points in Barcelona. In addition to the general unrest then prevailing throughout the country, the mutiny reported from Spanish Morocco on the 17th had given the local government some warning about the intentions of the army. On the 18th the militant left organized and armed its people as a militia. Some of their arms came from caches laid down two years before.

At that time (1934) hard-core Anarchists (who were especially numerous in Barcelona), Socialists, and Communists had taken part in an uprising that had involved leftist groups throughout the nation. Repression of it took a week all told, but in Barcelona one day sufficed. The army was absolutely ruthless with the Catalanian insurgents. Casualties of the ill-fated attempt were 3,000 dead, 7,000 wounded, and 40,000 imprisoned. Although the try failed, the local revolutionaires were well-provided with martyrs by the experience, and they became more impassioned enemies of the military than ever. It was the arms hidden then which were brought out on July 19, 1936.

On that Saturday too approximately 3,000 of the Asalto Guards or constabulary declared loyalty to the government. In anticipation of army action, they gave advice and help to the militia which was forming. They furnished some arms too.

The government in Catalonia was in a better political position to meet trouble than had been the case in Madrid. Here the creation of the autonomous generalitat in 1931 had mobilized support for the local authorities. They remained in control of the fighting all the next day without that drift of the leftists toward independent action which characterized the situation in the capital.
Five barracks around the outer parts of the city were occupied by one division of the army with around 12,000 men. There were a brigade of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery. Some Falangists and other rightists also joined them. Their plan of operations was probably sound (it was much like what they had carried out in quelling the 1934 rising), but coordination was poor. For instance, the general who was to command the revolt did not fly in from the Balearics until six and one-half hours after the operation began, by which time its outcome was decided.

Weaponry available to the army included artillery, machine guns, and rifles, but no tanks. Trucks were available to move some of the men, but the artillery was mule-drawn.

Through the night of the 18th the workers commanded the streets, assisted by the Asalto forces. They had use of the telephone system to coordinate their activities. Emotional excitement was at a peak level; large crowds thronged the streets by morning.

At dawn the military moved. Generally, they were able to move through the streets, for their artillery could clear the barricades, but when they arrived at crucial squares, where the militia had emplaced itself in buildings, the firing was so intense that the soldiers' further advance was out of the question. After three to five hours of futile fighting, some elements returned to their barracks without attaining their objectives. Division headquarters, one of the targets of the insurrection, was seized, but this proved inconclusive anyway.

The strongest army unit, with 12 artillery pieces and machine guns, was attacked immediately by militia when only half the force had emerged from its barracks. Without space to maneuver or emplace near the entrance, they had to retire in a few hours after exhausting their ammunition.
It is clear that had the troops had clear movement in the streets, their leaders' plan would have given them strategic control of Barcelona. The fact that movement was denied them sprang from the simple but intelligent defense tactics which the militia prepared in advance. Probably the presence of the Asalto Guards, who were trained in basic tactics, was crucial to the success of the defense.

Two companies which set out from another barracks were intercepted by workers who mingled with them and informed them of the nature of the situation. Not having been told accurately by their officers of the nature of the operation, many of the draftees now wavered. One entire company turned on their officers, killed them, and joined the militia force. The other company could not, or would not, move on when then pinned down by fire from buildings around the square.

The Civil Guard, which was loyal to the military in most parts of Spain, here came over to the government's side early Sunday afternoon. While the alignment of this 1000-man force did not take place until the action had begun, had the Guard gone the other way it would have made control of the streets by the government-worker forces much more difficult.

By mid-afternoon it had become clear even to the generals (who had some communication among the units by using their few armored cars strictly as message carriers) that the government had the situation in hand. Most of the fighting units gave up then, and General Goded made his surrender at 4:30 PM. Large numbers of the military men were slain on the spot by the Anarchists and other revolutionary leftists who pretty much constituted the militia.

In the aftermath the government and leftist forces (Loyalists) gained control of nearly all the cities within days, while the military-rightists (Nationalists) took possession of substantial portions of the
countryside. The rest of the history of the Civil War is well known. Extensive intervention by Russia and the Axis complicated the situation, but after terrible destruction and suffering, the issue was resolved for the Fascists. Franco's regime has controlled the country since the 1938 denouement.

The fundamental Spanish problems were never resolved. Iron-fisted Falangist control kept any revival of opposition down for many years. The last five years have seen unavoidable, though slight, liberalization of government policies with results that have caused renewed concern among traditionalists. Within the past year terrorist bombings in the capital have been combined with indications of renewed Basque nationalist plotting, an attempt to revive the anarchist CNT, strikes, peasant unrest, and student demonstrations on behalf of greater freedom. An anarchist group, the FELN (Spanish Forces of National Liberation), based in North Africa, has been credited by Spanish authorities with the Madrid bombings for which an 18-year-old Scottish student was imprisoned.

Comparison of the 1936 events in the two Spanish cities is instructive. While the end results turned out much the same, the means for arriving at them were not. In Barcelona, action on the Republican side was much more effective and coordinated than in Madrid. There the troops actually came out to fight, but failed to take the city. Madrid, on the other hand, was lost through inaction, although we cannot know what might have happened had action been undertaken.

One important differentiating factor was in the guidance which the Guradia Asalto provided for the Barcelona militia. As anarchists--mainly the latter were not well-organized. (They did not even have officers designated.) The tactical knowledge of, and example set by, the formally-trained personnel made possible a defense which proved a nightmare to the army.
Two other differences stand out. One was the degree of control which the government maintained over the situation in Barcelona, thanks in part to the politics of Catalonian separatism, as well as to the emotions which the military's actions aroused in this, the Republican stronghold of Spain. The other factor was that the army lost the element of surprise. Had the troops seized the key squares of the city on the morning of the 18th, the government forces would have been unable to mobilize for defense.

Later in the war much fighting went on in the cities of Spain, but it tended by then to be of a fully military nature. The urban aspects of the beginning of the Spanish Civil War were significant features of a complex situation. Had both the major cities immediately gone to the Nationalists, the two-year war would surely have taken a different course than it did.

I. VENEZUELA

The insurgent violence in Caracas has come to be a kind of symbol of the possibilities this kind of disorder has in Latin America. The measure of success which the democratic Venezuelan government has had in combatting the terrorists may be a counter-prophecy about control. From either point of view the case is a fascinating one.

Venezuela's nearly 7 million people (1960) were concentrated in the northern one-fifth of the republic, the area comprising the Andes and adjacent coastal lowlands. Three out of five Venezuelans live in communities of 1,000 or more. Besides Caracas (1,300,000), major cities are Maracaibo (425,000), Lagunillas (200,000), Barquisimeto (200,000), Valencia (150,000), and Maracay (130,000). Much of this heavy urban population derives from a marked exodus from the countryside over the last 25 years.
Throughout most of the country's history political dominance has been exercised by local or national caudillos ("bosses"). Often tyranny has prevailed; at no time until 1945 was there a genuinely democratic government. From the 1920's students, and from the 1930's organized workers, pressed for modifications in the traditional social structure. In 1945 Medina, who had been trying to maintain control while balanced between strong forces both on the right and left, was overthrown by a major revolutionary movement. The revolutionary drive came from the labor-leftist Acción Democrática (AD) party in cooperation with a group of dissatisfied junior army officers.

The AD government, which took full control after subsequent elections, instituted major economic and social reforms such as land redistribution, government planning of the economy, tax increases on foreign industry and the wealthy, and welfare measures. By moving too far and too fast the leaders alienated crucial elements of the society, so that in November, 1948, the military seized control.

A decade of dictatorship began, during which Col. Marcos Pérez Jiménez was dominant. The period was marked by arbitrary rule, economic mismanagement, and continued exploitation of the economy by the upper class - military alliance. Finally a coalition of all the opposition--most of whose leaders were in exile--united to overthrow the government in early 1958. After a year under an interim junta, the people elected a new AD-headed government which took over in February 1959.

Starting in 1960, communist and other leftist elements began a campaign of violence aimed at overthrowing the legitimate govern until that time they had participated in the revolutionary government, but by now had become disillusioned with the moderation of President Romulo Betancourt and AD in pressing for the radical structural reforms which they favored. At the same time efforts were also underway by followers of Pérez Jiménez and agents of vengeful Dominican dictator Trujillo to wreck the administration.
What was the social setting within which the impatient opposition launched their movement? What were the nation's problems and what grievances did the insurgents lay stress on in order to promote their cause?

The country has had a tradition of violence in both personal and political affairs going back at least to the Spanish conquest. Revolution (actually coup d'etat) and the dominance of the military have been traditional in the political arena. The Acción Democrática government of 1945, the first really democratic regime, as well as the new government of 1958-9, came to power through urban violence (although in each case large election majorities subsequently validated the takeover.)

Loyalty to country is not a strongly-emphasized principle. Advantage to self, kin, and friends is a far more powerful motivation than patriotism or nationalism. The power of personal ties shows up in political activity, where factional leaders depend on allegiance to them personally rather than to a principle. Formerly it was aristocratic landlords who commanded worker loyalty.

In the last two generations social relationships have been revolutionized by the growth of the petroleum industry, along with the broader commercial and industrial development which it stimulated. A distinguishable middle class has appeared in urbanized areas. Today's upper class includes the traditional aristocracy plus the new wealthy-from-industry. The lower mass is not truly a class because of a lack of genuine class consciousness. Composed of peasants only partly aware of national problems, manual workers, small shopkeepers, and the unemployed or semi-employed proletariat, this social segment includes nearly all those who have migrated to the cities from rural areas.

Both in fact and in myth there is a good deal of status mobility. A great increase in educational opportunity under the AD government since 1959 has combined with rapid expansion in bureaucratic employment and
in manufacturing and services to develop a sense of opportunity. As late as 1959 or 1960, however, there was still somewhat greater uncertainty about mobility than today.

Like most Latin-Americans, Venezuelans of the higher socioeconomic ranks have long valued education and literacy, but only recently has a mass system developed. The number of educated people playing a vital part in the country's development has never been large. Education and literacy took important leaps forward, however, during the first five years of the new Betancourt regime. The share for education in the national budget, from which most schools are supported, was nearly doubled. Demand for educated persons was on the increase in industry and the bureaucracy. But even an infusion of funds was insufficient to meet accumulated problems. Facilities are still inadequate and the quality of teaching is poor, though improving. (In 1960 only one-quarter of those starting the first grade were completing the sixth.) University-level problems were equally difficult, both in providing facilities for the increased number of students (234% in the five years ending 1962-3) and in developing a curriculum which is realistic for the nation's needs.

The mass media have attained great significance in shaping the views of a wide public. Urbanization and industrialization have provided growing middle and upper classes with more time, money, and desire to be informed and entertained. Several Caracas newspapers have grown to national importance. Not only is circulation relatively high, but the papers themselves are of good journalistic quality. But radio is probably the most influential single medium, since it reaches the lower masses as well as outlying villages and ranches. (There are around 100 radio stations, with receivers in 750,000 homes.) Television has had strong impact in the last decade. At present as high as 70% of the homes in some cities have sets.
Communists strongly infiltrated journalism and the teaching profession during the 1950's when they were tolerated by the dictator while the democratic opposition was crushed. Pressures from several directions have eliminated some of the Reds' influence during the last few years, but by 1960 it was still substantial. At the same time they were well-established in universities, both on the faculties and among students.

The fall of the military dictatorship in 1958 did not eliminate the power of the armed forces within the country. Their control of overwhelming physical force continued to give them potential veto power over the decisions which any Venezuelan government might take. They learned from what happened in 1958, however, that caution and diplomacy were becoming necessary for Latin American armed forces, a lesson which the destruction of the Cuban army by Castro underlined. In the last half-dozen years, as a practical expedient, the services have kept away from their traditional alliance of interests with the conservatives. Instead they have supported the moderate social reform program of Betancourt and AD. Many of the younger officers had in any case been educated sufficiently to have imbued a measure of liberalism; they actually support reform in principle.

Especially since World War II the military forces have been technologically modernized. Close financial and operational links with the United States have been forged to match civilian ties of the two nations in commerce and industry. With an increasing level of technical skill involved, the military establishment has tended to become more professional and at the same time more politically neutral.

Latent public hostility to the services remains high, a legacy of the decades of dictatorship of the past. Distrust of the police has the same grounds.
Venezuela's growth in population, wealth, and problems has been based almost completely on exploitation of her petroleum resources. Mainly since 1935 American and European firms have invested billions of dollars to develop oil fields, pipelines, a refinery, and other facilities. Employment in the industry (3% of the labor force) has stayed small, but the tax and royalty revenue accruing to the government from oil has paid for the country's modernization. The boom in petroleum production, which more than doubled between 1949 and 1957, joined with high world oil prices to produce a geometric increase in revenues during the Pérez Jiménez regime. He was spending 70% of the annual budget in the Federal District in spectacular public works, housing developments, military frills, and communications developments. This vast pork barrel speeded up enormously the rural emigration which peasant poverty and the pull of oil fields had already begun. Hundreds of thousands of persons flocked to Caracas where the money was to be had. There many settled in ranchos, shack settlements on the hillsides at the edge of the city.

Another by-product of the petroleum development has been the forging of tight connections between the U.S. and the Caribbean country. Over half the oil produced there is sold to the U.S.; capital from here is heavily invested there; more U.S. citizens live in Venezuela than in any other foreign country except Canada, nearly 50,000; U.S. products and ideas are imported massively; and our government's political bonds with the Caracas government have been taken, by us, as something of a model for the hemisphere. At the same time this heavy U.S. involvement has stimulated strong anti-Yankee, anti-imperialist feelings in some quarters.

With the overthrow of the dictatorship in early 1958, the revolutionary junta vowed to restore some balance in the pattern of federal spending. However when the artificial construction boom collapsed with the old regime, and the ranks of the unemployed swelled dangerously, Junta President Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal decreed a "Plan de Emergencia" to take up the economic (and political) slack. It provided unemployed
workers with liberal per diem payments under few administrative restraints. (When Larrazabal ran for permanent President that December, Caracas supported him by a 5 to 1 margin.) The demographic result was to speed up the drain of population from the countryside.

Abrupt termination of the emergency plan in Caracas combined with an economic recession to produce a crisis in the capital city. A mob of 70,000 unemployed demonstrated before the President's palace in August, 1959. Police and National Guard troops broke it up. Constant government vigilance was required against further moves of this kind until the economic situation picked up again in 1961.

With the election of peasant-backed Romulo Betancourt, the government adopted a broad national policy of development. Now only 30% of the revenue was to be spent in Caracas. Developing programs of agrarian reform, rural roads, electrification, and welfare services to outlying areas helped AD build a strong party organization which has dominated rural politics since that time.

The lumpenproletariat of transplanted, unskilled, ex-rural people remains a potentially dangerous body within the social and political structure. We must look elsewhere, however, to find the sources of the insurgent violence which shook Caracas and other Venezuelan cities from 1961 to 1965. The campaign of insurgency came from the political left. *

* Any one violent incident may be difficult to attribute to a given group or motive. Yet insurgency has unquestionably been important. The MIR party (see page 113) was the one most fully committed to violence. Part of the Communist Party (FCV) agreed, but other elements wanted to go more slowly, concentrating on the popular front tactic instead of active insurrection. Some of the more excitable portions of the Democratic Republican Union (URD) joined in the shooting for a time, too.

Other forces were also at work, however, Rightists, generally supporters of exiled (to the U.S.) Pérez Jiménez, actually began terrorist tactics before the left did. Some are still involved in the anti-government "armed forces". At the most primitive level were professional (Reference continued next page)
The communists had been included in the 1958 revolutionary front against Pérez Jiménez (chiefly because of their control over many labor and student organizations) along with AD, COPEI* and URD. The 1958 election campaign began to tear apart this coalition. AD's moderate reform program further alienated the communists and Fidelists. Disaffection grew over AD's dominance of patronage which it used to cement its party organization at the expense of its rivals.

Worsening Venezuelan relations with Cuba helped crystallize leftist attitudes. Betancourt had once been very favorable to Castro and had even extended him aid. As Fidel took on an increasingly communist orientation and turned against the United States, his opposition to democratic regimes such as those of Costa Rica and Venezuela increased. The Inter-American Conference in San Jose in August, 1960, raised the question of a resolution mildly criticizing Cuba. Foreign Minister Ignacio Luis Arcaya (of URD) refused to accept President Betancourt's decision to approve the measure, leading to this replacement at the Conference. Not only did this bring demonstrators into the streets in Caracas, it clearly turned URD's support away from the regime.

Earlier a rightist army insurrection had failed in April. Then in June an attempt was made on Betancourt's life under Trujillo's provocation. Thus the government was under pressure from both right and left.

In October and November disorders originating on the left tried to bring about the fall of Betancourt's government. A strike of telephone workers and the threat of a bank-clerk walkout provided the occasion.

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...criminal elements without political motivation. These men wished to make a living from violence, and were enemies of the police in any case. They abound in Caracas. Then there are young delinquents, some of them of middle- and upper-class origin, who take part in criminal or merely insurgent acts to escape boredom, to prove their manhood, or to find new and exhilarating experiences.

There is no question, however, that the PCV has pretty much had central direction of the politically-motivated violence.

* The Christian Socialist Party.
The Communists and MIR* took advantage of the excitement to call for a "popular revolution" through a general strike. Students turned out to burn buses and cars and attack stores. Some Central University students barricaded themselves within the campus, protected by the autonomy of the university, and began to shoot at police and National Guardsmen outside. The strikes fizzled quickly, but the students, assisted by other elements, kept the rioting up for four days. Finally President Betancourt ordered regular army units into the streets, and the situation was quickly controlled. At the same time the cabinet proclaimed a state of emergency and authorized suspension of selected constitutional guarantees.

To the surprise of some, the military leaders did not decide to intervene, as the Communists seem to have wanted them to. (Military action would have provided a target against which much more widespread opposition could have been organized than against the progressive AD government.) The President's kid-glove treatment of the generals since taking office had no doubt helped.

As a result of a subsequent investigation of the November rioting, charges were filed against a leader of the MIR and a PCV member of the Chamber of Deputies. After lengthy litigation and then referral to the Chamber, congressional immunity was lifted from the Communist, Teodoro Petkoff, who was subsequently jailed. The government began using both official and unofficial ways to limit severely the PCV and MIR propaganda media.

During 1961 the violent opposition laid plans for a larger, better-organized insurgency. A "National Liberation Movement" was formed, involving primarily PCV and MIR, and later FALN (Armed Forces of National

* Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a radical, non-communist party formed earlier in the year by a schism within AD which led the hot-headed, younger men to oppose Betancourt and the older leadership.
Liberation) became the military arm. Cuban support for the revolutionaries, which first became clear in Havana propaganda at the time of the November disorders, was stepped up, and training was given in Cuba to guerrilla and terrorist cadres. Evidently money and printed propaganda was also brought in, in part by some Deputies who could do so because of their immunity from customs search when returning from trips to Cuba.

The initial guerrilla action was first detected in January, 1962. Most of the personnel involved were city people--students chiefly. They had a very difficult time. Peasants turned in some guerrillas, and army operations discovered many of their training camps in the mountains. However, late in the year either they or their urban collaborators were able successfully to attack some oil installations, causing heavy damage. The guerrilla operations never did find fertile ideological soil among the campesinos. Government programs and political organizing had built up substantial support there. The bands exist still today, but they must be considered largely a failure.

Scores of bombings took place in Caracas during summer and autumn of 1961, but much of it was credited by the authorities to a rightist plot supported by the Dominican Republic dictator, a bitter enemy of Betancourt. The increasingly anti-American slant of the attacks, many on American businesses, made it clear by October that the leftists were at work.

In May and June 1962 bloody Marine Corps uprisings at Carúpano and Puerto Cabello yielded unmistakable evidence of the involvement of PCV and MIR leaders. This evidence the President used to begin legal actions which led eventually to suspension of the MIR and PCV from legal political activity and the ballot.

The government had a very narrow line to walk through 1962. The military was still not without qualms about Betancourt. They might
decide to step in at any time. At the same time all the opposition parties, in the highly politicized Venezuelan tradition, attacked the government at every opportunity whether justified or not. Economic policies were hit; the break in relations with Cuba at the end of 1961 was deplored by some; and demands for restoration of full civil liberties were debated at length. A major legislative program had to be carried out at the same time. Too harsh a line on the leftists would weaken the government's political support for domestic reforms. Too easy a policy, on the other hand, not only gave the insurgents opportunity to grow, but also brought danger from the military, worried about the "growth of communism."

The city attacks were carried out by bands of half a dozen terrorists, more or less, coordinated in a cell-network as in the Algerian FLN and many similar movements. Sniping from roofs and windows, often without much plan and perhaps just "for kicks", was a regular occurrence. Policemen and police vehicles were often the targets. Homemade bombs were thrown from automobiles, chiefly for noise effect. Charges left in buildings in satchels were timed for later explosion. On a few raids, arson was tried. Robberies of banks and other businesses were frequent. Usually FALN slogans were scrawled on walls at the scene, or the participants gave that movement verbal credit for the incident. A good deal of the action had little more than a publicity aim.

The poorly-trained police (many of Pérez Jiménez' men had fled or been kicked out in 1958) had to work out countermeasures in the midst of the violence. Their organization was inefficient and morale low. In 1962 alone more than 80 policemen had been killed. Digepol (General Direction of Police) was in a key position in investigation; its forte is investigation of subversion, and, some say, of all the opposition. Municipal police and the PTJ (Judicial-Technical Police) also had roles to play. The FAC (Armed Forces of Cooperation, or National Guard) was probably most effective operationally, when called upon, since it employed
military discipline and organization, and utilized career personnel. Army elements were also used. Coordination was, and has remained, a serious problem in the battle.

In 1963 attacks continued on an increasing scale. U.S. businesses, the embassy, and the military mission were targets. Oil installations were hit. By September the leftists had become so virulent that previous support started turning away. The URD came out against their violent tactics. When five National Guardsmen on a train were shot and killed by a FALN gang, widespread condemnation was heard. Meanwhile Betancourt was making the continuity of constitutional government the major issue of the campaign, with good effect. (Venezuela had not had a properly-elected president complete his term in this century.) The arrest of many suspected insurgent leaders, including MIR and PCV congressmen, had a dampening effect on the trouble even though it produced new cries about political persecution. The legitimate parties were not obstructed in their election campaigns, however.

As the December 1963 presidential election approached, FALN activities rose toward a climax. In November came the lucky find of a large arms cache on the Caribbean coast. Later investigation established that it had been brought in from Cuba. The heavy arms were shown, by documents seized in Caracas raids, to have been intended for an uprising in the capital. The precise aim of this plan is unclear, but it seems to have been more to provoke a postponement of the election than to attempt a full insurrection.

As public concern mounted and political support for control action firmed, the government took decisive measures. The climax came on November 19 when the FALN tried to call a general strike, which got nowhere. Snipers were active, and 21 were killed, but soldiers and police, armed with improved intelligence, were able to prevent any escalation.
In the next few days hundreds of arrests were made, including many of the FALN core. The worst was over, and despite a "curfew" threatened by the insurgents on election day, most voters did cast ballots.

The large total vote and the solid plurality for AD's Leoni was taken by all observers as a firm repudiation of the insurgents. As a matter of fact the FALN itself seemed to view the election in the same light, for very little new violence occurred for a number of months. Instead political pressure was stepped up to obtain amnesty for the hundreds still held in prison on political charges.

Shortly after the 1963 election the fact that constitutional government had been maintained in Venezuela led to considerable optimism. The election results had shifted party strengths considerably, and a new coalition clearly had to be forged if AD President Leoni was to govern. At the same time the insurgents seemed to have been cut down to size.

Today a measure of political stability indeed appears to have been attained. The economy is flourishing. Police capabilities have clearly improved. Legislation has been passed to allow conditional release or exile of some of the political prisoners. Party realignments have seen the founder of MIR, and other leftists, moving into a new (legal) party, VPN. Thus at least some insurgents seem ready now to operate at a political rather than a paramilitary level.

Nevertheless, disturbing questions remain. The basic problem of the discontent of the intellectuals remains. Social problems within Caracas are not being solved. The current administration has turned out to be more expert at political juggling than at moving the country ahead fundamentally. And the guerrilla bands are still in the mountains, now better organized and more active than ever. There still is little indication of popular support for them, but they hang on like a latent

* Popular Nationalist Vanguard.
Infection. In the cities too some terroristic acts still occur, and student rioting recurs regularly, although the urban FALN has taken hard blows too. Cuba continues its active support.

Venezuelan insurgency is perhaps unique in the degree to which it has been centered on the city. The guerrilla bands would not have begun nor could they have continued without funds, supplies, and personnel from urban zones, yet the country operations have had but slight political effect. On the contrary the city terrorism has come close, a couple of times at least, to producing a complicated situation which might have brought a change in government, whether to the insurgents' advantage or not. Only an astute political sense has saved the government from a worse situation. It remains to be seen if astuteness is enough.
III. CONCLUSIONS

The systematic study of urban insurgency is only beginning. It is hardly time for firm conclusions yet. Nevertheless tentative generalizations have emerged as our attention has moved from case to case. As a basis for, and stimulus to, further investigation, such general statements can serve a useful function even though they are tentative.

Nine cases, on which the data are uneven, cannot establish firm empirical regularities. Defects in the quality of information make it impossible to produce a significant list of descriptive features, such as how many men usually constitute a cell, or what were the dollar costs per month for counterinsurgent forces. Given the type of information at hand, the generalizations which can be derived have to be at a higher level of abstraction. They take the form of hypotheses: "when . . . is the case, urban insurgency will be more likely (or more successful, or impossible, etc.)." Eighty-six such propositions are presented below.

As hypotheses the propositions are seen as probing tools, not God's truth. They are thought of as illustrative, not definitive. Many of them we never expected to be confirmed, for they were purposely phrased in negative language to be provocative. Some of the statements might, of course, be made of insurgency in general, or even of social violence in general. We propose to rephrase and test them more critically some time in the future, using a far wider sample than has been permitted us at this point. It needs emphasis that the list is intended as a means to open doors to further research.

The hypotheses are tested by making a judgment of the correctness of the assertion for each of nine cases of urban insurgency. A simple yes or no answer is not sufficient, or even possible in many cases. To answer a query about the relationship between variables in a given case may require lengthy qualification instead of a simplistic yes or no. Eventually such tools as numerical scaling and jury techniques among
area experts may improve the quality of the judgments. For the present the hypotheses, at the very least, constitute a tentative paradigm to guide a researcher (e.g., one interviewing an ex-combatant) as to what to find out.

One of the tool needs in a new field such as UI is a classification into which data may be sorted. At the same time the scheme should be as theoretically noncommittal as possible, like the Dewey decimal system. The list of hypotheses has been placed in one suggested cataloging system. Critics and users will find its omissions and distortions soon enough. But, like the hypotheses, the classification is offered as an interim, expandable tool to facilitate further work.
A. TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES AND CLASSIFICATION

1.0 BASIC HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

A. Holidays and other recreational occasions provide especially likely circumstances for acts of insurgent violence.

Comments: True for at least three cases, untrue for at least two others, and indeterminate for the remainder.

2.0 CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND SUBVERSION

A. The strength of tradition of law and order is a cultural determinant of great significance in the success, or lack of it, of urban insurgency.

Comments: The hypothesis is illustrative of a large number under this heading, none of which can be tested because there seems no simple way at the moment to operationalize the problem.

3.0 ECONOMY

A. Only where political or economic colonialism or imperialism is strong enough to be plainly apparent can there be successful urban insurgency.

B. An unemployment rate higher than normal for the country increases the likelihood of the rise of insurgency.

3.1 SOCIAL STRUCTURE (GENERAL)

A. When several major cleavages fall along similar lines in a society (racial, ethnic, economic, religious, etc.) the non-political cleavages play a major part in insurgency.

5.0 HEALTH AND WELFARE

A. The worse the public health level the less the chance for insurgent action.

Comments: Lack of suitable data preclude a test.

5.1 CLASS STRUCTURE

A. Urban insurgency occurs generally in countries with a history of influential secret societies.

B. Urban insurgency only takes place where there is a clear class structure.

Comments: "Influential" is the problem term. Information available at this time does not permit operationalizing the test. True only if colonial masters are included as a separate class, as with Palestine.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Working-class solidarity is less significant for the rise of insurgency than frustration among an elite (especially the intellectuals).</td>
<td>Quite clearly true in six cases, and indeterminate in the others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 EDUCATION, LITERACY, THE MEDIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Urban insurgency flourishes where schools of higher education emphasize humanities and law.</td>
<td>So related to level of technology, income, and so on that education cannot be considered apart. In any case the statement is true in four cases at least, but does not hold in others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 MILITARY STRUCTURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Insurgency flourishes where military officers have very high status in the society.</td>
<td>Not necessarily correct, evidently, for four cases disagree with the stated relationship while only three clearly agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Religious organizations are not very important in either the growth or repression of urban insurgency.</td>
<td>Four cases agree, two disagree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 URBAN-RURAL AND REGIONAL STRUCTURES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Urban insurgency is most successful in countries where the capital city is clearly the major urban area.</td>
<td>The proposition is untrue for each of the three successes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 POLITICAL STRUCTURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Urban insurgency arises most frequently where there is a single dominant party (which may consist of the colonial rulers) which effectively excludes other groups from political power.</td>
<td>In four cases the answer is yes, but it is chiefly the colonial situations where this is true. In five cases political monopoly did not prevail, at least not clearly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7 INSURGENT MOVEMENT(S) BEFORE SERIOUS VIOLENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Before violence, an urban insurgent tendency will be expressed in multiple, competing movements.</td>
<td>Our information may be defective, for the organizations would have been small. True for three cases and probably untrue in three.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8 PRE-VIOLENCE COUNTERMEASURES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Reforms which are not basic or structural ones are not very successful as deterrents.</td>
<td>The statement may be true, but &quot;basic&quot; makes the problem impossible to resolve because of its ambiguity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypotheses

B. The arrest and/or deportation of key leaders is effective in delaying or ending an incipient insurgency.

6.0 PRECIPITATORS OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE

A. Precipitants of violence take six forms:

(1) an incident which confirms existing generalized fears or hatreds
(2) a new deprivation amid generally difficult conditions
(3) suddenly closing off an opportunity for peaceful protest
(4) a failure (e.g., a defeat) demands a scapegoat.
(5) one precipitant may produce another (perhaps elsewhere geographically)
(6) a rumor of any of the first five may suffice to precipitate

7.0 OPERATIONAL HISTORY

A. The appearance of vigilante groups or other private repressive forces against insurgents presages complete failure of the nominal government's power.

B. There are historical thresholds before which certain tactics (e.g., concessions, arrests) are effective, but beyond which those same tactics only compound the conflict.

C. An outbreak of mass violence is necessarily preceded by mobilization over a period of time sufficient to give warning to authorities.

D. Avenues for expressing insurgent violence (riot, assassination, etc.) will shift in popularity as controls on any one are implemented with increasing success, the insurgents always moving toward "new" fashions in tactics.

Comments

Information sometimes is probably lacking, but rarely does it appear that key leaders were arrested or deported before violence.

All the detectible precipitators seem to fit under one or more of these categories, but usually more than one applies. Numbers (1) and (5) seem particularly frequent.

The private repressive forces referred to are difficult to detect and may be so private and so small that the records of the insurges do not take notice of them. Some type of force like these appeared in five cases, but the statement as phrased is not supported by the data.

The statement remains a logical possibility, but some kind of methodological control has to be found before the thresholds can be isolated. A number of the cases (Algeria, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Palestine) seem to support the proposition tentatively.

In Ireland and Hungary there seems to be a warning of impending troubles, but in most cases the sources imply that no warning signs were given. Better data seem required.

Detailed evidence will be required to test the statement, but it is not unlikely to be confirmed, judging by the present cases, such as Venezuela.
Hypotheses

E. Urban insurgency violence will rise rapidly to a peak (in number of participants) after it is first precipitated, whereupon, if it fails to overthrow the government quickly, it will decrease at a much slower rate than it began.

Details on numbers involved are not available. Only Hungary seems to agree while perhaps five other cases cast doubt on the hypothesis.

F. There is a threshold where, upon the insurgents gaining (losing) support (notoriety) among a certain proportion of the population, there is a rapid, bandwagon type shift to (from) their support.

At least five cases (Japan, Venezuela, Spain, Palestine, Ireland) tend to support the proposition. No case clearly opposes it.

8.0 PHYSICAL SETTING AND INSURGENT ECOTOLOGY

A. Violence begins in the most densely populated section.

Almost every case (Lebanon may be the exception) disagrees with the statement.

B. Mass action will not take place most readily when public squares or other freely-accessible assembly places are available for the insurgents.

The terminology "most readily" and "freely-accessible" need further specification before a reasonable judgment can be made here.

C. Inclement weather always abates insurgent activity in the city.

Information is sparse on this point. It certainly is not flatter true.

D. Insurgent mass activity always increases when hot weather turns people out of doors, makes them irritable, and discourages them from normal activities.

As with the last statement, data are insufficient to establish this.

8.1 INSURGENT TARGETS AND AIMS

A. Political conspirators always try to refocus violence, or its threat, which originally had mainly economic, racial, ethnic or religious motivations.

This is true to some extent in nearly all cases; however, not all possible tensions are refocused in this way.

B. Once the insurgent movement has got firm corporate existence, its chief task is to prove the inability of the government to solve the problems the movement is exploiting, including its violence.

The terms of the hypothesis are too general for testing, although it seems justifiable from what is known of some insurgencies.

8.2 INSURGENT TACTICS (INCLUDING FINANCE)

A. Terroristic acts will concentrate at night and during holiday or vacation periods.

This question could be answered easily if suitable information were at hand.
### Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Terrorism as a policy in revolution is not usually linked to mass insurrection.</td>
<td>Yes. With the possible exception of Lebanon, every case shows a separation of urban mass action and terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Early in the insurgency, propaganda value of an action counts for more than damage to counterforces.</td>
<td>Some cases suggest the statement's validity, but how does one measure these elements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Urban terrorists always try to take advantage of dissimulation and protection by legal devices rather than standing to fight.</td>
<td>This is true nearly everywhere. The Stern Gang in Palestine fought back until 1944 when they too gave up personal arms to emphasize the &quot;legality of their acts.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Leaders of mass actions always choose locations of maximum disruption of communications.</td>
<td>Information is lacking on this point.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 8.3 Insurgent Material and Logistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Sufficient explosives and weapons are available in any modern city (by thievery, manufacture, or purchase) that insurgent terrorism can operate indefinitely without external aid.</td>
<td>The present sample gives little evidence to refute the point, but information on whether the insurgents considered what they had &quot;sufficient&quot; is hard to find.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Finances are never a serious limiting factor for urban insurgents.</td>
<td>Little indication in the sources, but apparently the insurgents could always use more money.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 8.4 Insurgent Personnel, Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Charismatic leadership is essential in successful insurgent action.</td>
<td>Probably the statement is untrue. Better data are essential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Key leaders of the insurgency are motivated by opportunistic desire for power than by idealism.</td>
<td>Little or no evidence is available, but what there is tends to disprove the proposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Key insurgent leaders will have been trained abroad, or at least will be dependent on foreign ideology.</td>
<td>The statement is too strong; &quot;dependent&quot; seems inaccurate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Key insurgent leaders have been socially deviant from childhood.</td>
<td>Information is insufficient to determine this point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>The age of the dependable body of insurgents is between 16 and 30.</td>
<td>The hypothesis has some support, but quantified information is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>The &quot;expert&quot; (e.g., engineer) stays aloof from insurgency.</td>
<td>Unknown, however it is not totally correct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Industrial workers are not widely involved in urban insurgency.</td>
<td>There is some support, but the composition of insurgent forces needs closer study to be sure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Intellectuals take a strong stand on the one side or the other in urban insurgency.</td>
<td>At least some intellectuals do so in some cases. Quantification is required before one can have confidence in an answer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Insurgent violence, once launched, attracts deviant and destructive persons who, at least temporarily, make insurgent action more random and vicious and less disciplined.</td>
<td>At least two cases confirm the point, while lack of information in other cases suggests that it may be so.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**8.5 INSURGENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE**

| A. Communication being essential in the formation of an insurgent movement, differing languages or cultural traditions which break a city into small ecological or social units make insurgency difficult or impossible. | Not confirmed. Apparently a single group can carry on alone, as the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. Probably a shared language and culture would make insurgency easier, however. |
| B. A terrorist campaign can be carried out with as few as half a dozen insurgents. | Data on movements as small as this are generally lacking, but it remains a possibility. Bombings in Spain in 1964 and in urban Colombia the same year may have been on this scale. |
| C. Support from student organizations or unions or both, is essential to insurgency success. | The support is there in every case, whether it is "essential" or not. |
| D. Always one marginal or dissident group spearheads the insurgency, but if there is only one marginal group, the insurgency will not succeed. | More detailed analysis of the politics of insurgent movements is required to answer this question. |
| E. Small-cell insurgent organizations are less vulnerable to exposure, but at the cost of efficiency of communication and speed of mobilization. | Information on this topic is deficient. |

**8.6 INSURGENT IDEOLOGY AND "CULTURE"**

| A. Personal scapegoats (leading public figures, usually political-governmental) are always found and labeled by both insurgents and counterinsurgents. | Generally, if not universally, true in these cases. (Scapegoating may be subtle, remaining at the rumor level, making it difficult to establish the point more firmly.) |
| B. Developed doctrines of violent insurgent operation are dominant among insurgents over common-sense experimentation and adaptation to local situations. (The more doctrinaire a movement, the more vulnerable it is to counteraction.) | Information required to settle the issue would have to be obtained from participants, in most cases. That in the literature is too limited. |
C. Martyrs are essential to the "culture" of a full-fledged insurgency.

D. Insurgents have few positive beliefs on which to cooperate; they are a congeries of anti-elements.

8.7 INSURGENT FOREIGN AND NON-URBAN CONNECTIONS

A. No successful insurgency ever occurs without being linked either with an armed forces uprising or an active guerrilla campaign in the country.

B. Every urban insurgency specifically models itself on one or more foreign example of insurgency either through literature or direct cadre training.

C. Foreign support, even if only in propaganda, is essential in maintaining insurgent morale.

8.8 INSURGENT INTELLIGENCE

A. Insurgent intelligence is always more quickly responsive and effective because of smaller numbers involved and fewer restraints in methods.

8.9 INSURGENT PROPAGANDA

A. When insurgent movements are small, publicity stunts and propaganda stunts are vital to their further growth.

9.1 LEGAL ASPECTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A. Most changes in legal powers to deal with increasing insurgency are ineffective since police practices will be too inefficient to implement the new laws quickly.
### Hypotheses

#### 9.2 COUNTERINSURGENCY TACTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Reforms in social and economic conditions are never sufficient to end violence once insurgents have seriously set on that course.</td>
<td>Impossible to confirm or deny. Where these changes have been effected after violence has begun, they have been accompanied by more direct measures. A controlled situation would be required to resolve the point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Government agreement to partial reform to accommodate criticism encourages further pressing of claims by extremists.</td>
<td>Two cases agree, but others are at least doubtful. Much more detailed data are needed, here and on nearly all other questions in the 9.2 category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Counterinsurgency measures are more effective when strong controls are quickly put into effect and then relaxed step by step as an apparent reward for obedience.</td>
<td>This tactic seems never to have been tried in our cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Increased fear of government repressive powers invariably produces more support for the insurgents among the public.</td>
<td>There is some support for the statement, but in other cases the reverse seems to hold. &quot;Government repressive powers&quot; is clearly a complex variable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Vacillation on the part of police decision-makers in determining that they will utilize force encourages the spread of violence.</td>
<td>Palestine, Ireland, and possibly Japan suggest support for the idea, but usually one cannot determine this point. Detailed information is needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. The authority (decision-maker) who uses too much force too soon to control disorder weakens his position of authority and political support.</td>
<td>Some cases, such as Algeria (Setif) and Dublin, seem to agree with the hypothesis. Isolation of this one factor is, however, difficult.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Regular military riot control tactics (&quot;divide and keep moving&quot;) produce maximum hostility among the public.</td>
<td>Again there is need for a pair of situations differing only by this one factor, before an answer can be given. The present cases do not involve many such tactical operations in any case and the description of them is inadequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Single guards at fixed posts lose maximum effect unless they are in fortified positions, and there is insurgent uncertainty about their strength and support.</td>
<td>Data are almost completely absent on this point.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9.3 COUNTERINSURGENT MATERIAL AND LOGISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Improved firepower alone does not increase ability to quell urban violence.</td>
<td>In the hands of determined police, and for a mass action, improved firepower probably helps (cf. Ireland, Hungary). Against a terrorist movement there is no evidence that it makes much difference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hypotheses

#### 9.4 COUNTERINSURGENT PERSONNEL, LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. A non-professionalized control force (e.g. militia) is useless</td>
<td>Defection of conscripts in Spain and Hungary, plus sympathizing with the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. militia) is useless in serious, continuing insurgency because of</td>
<td>insurgents on the part of some of the French in Algeria and the British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>failure of the individual control agent's conflict of loyalties.</td>
<td>in Palestine, suggest that the proposition has some validity but whether</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>it holds generally will require study of many more applicable cases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9.5 COUNTERINSURGENT INTERNAL STRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. In urban situations, counterinsurgent forces must outnumber insurgents</td>
<td>We lack figures on both sides in most cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by at least 10 to 1 to repress them.</td>
<td>Information on the officers is almost completely lacking; the question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cannot be answered at this time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9.6 COUNTERINSURGENT IDEOLOGY, "CULTURE"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Loyalty of police, or soldiers on police duty, cannot be</td>
<td>Some situations suggest that authorities had suspicions as to the loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adequately determined in advance of mass action.</td>
<td>of their men, but more data are needed to know whether a rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prediction of loyalty is possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9.7 COUNTERINSURGENT FOREIGN AND RURAL CONNECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Counterinsurgent advisors (in lieu of actual forces) have never really</td>
<td>No advisors were systematically utilized in these cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>made any difference in the outcome of UI.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 9.8 COUNTERINSURGENT INTELLIGENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Counterinsurgency intelligence is most effective utilizing a single,</td>
<td>We know too little about the intelligence systems in these cases to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrated system of data-sharing and rapid communication.</td>
<td>make any judgment. If centralized intelligence is needed only if</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>insurgent command is highly centralized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Counterinsurgency intelligence is always infiltrated by insurgents.</td>
<td>Insurgents sometimes claim that they have infiltrated, but the facts are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not possible to know, from these sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Counterinsurgency intelligence cannot be effective without the use of</td>
<td>The use of violence is not usually reported, but the hypothesis remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence to extract information.</td>
<td>a possibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u. Paid informers do not provide crucial information to counterinsurgents.</td>
<td>Palestine, Cyprus, and probably some other cases show that paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>informers can be extremely valuable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>9.9 COUNTERINSURGENT PROPAGANDA</strong></td>
<td>Special study of propaganda effectiveness is required, involving operationalizing &quot;successful.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Counterinsurgent propaganda is only successful when it tells of demonstrable facts, not just promises or programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.0 THE UNCOMMITTED PUBLIC</strong></td>
<td>This problem requires data not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Members of the public forced by terror to support insurgents welcome forced conformity to government regulations which gives them an excuse to deny the insurgents what they demand.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11.0 PACIFICATION</strong></td>
<td>True for at least seven of the nine cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. International fears of escalation or other political intervention are significant or determinative factors in concluding the violence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>12.0 SOCIAL, CULTURAL AFTERMATHS</strong></td>
<td>Measurement of levels of violence has not been made satisfactorily in any of our cases to permit testing the validity of this statement. Some impressionistic evidence supports the idea for several cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Personal and social violence of a non-insurgent nature will continue at a heightened level for some time after the end of the political struggle.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13.0 THE STRATEGY OR PHILOSOPHY OF VIOLENCE AND COUNTERVIOLENCE</strong></td>
<td>None of these hypotheses can be evaluated intelligently without much further thought and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Since violence usually begets violence, on a wider scale, it is likely to be self-defeating for a society to try to solve problems of growth and development by insurgency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Violence serves &quot;good&quot; functional ends in many cases by making issues and grievances overt and immediate, so that they must be dealt with.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Permitting some unopposed violence may be strategically good from government's point of view as a means of discrediting a movement in public eyes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. THE NEXT RESEARCH

A somewhat detailed program of research in urban insurgency has already been described (in DRC IMR-175, Urban Disorders Research - Tentative Program Formulation). Here only a general indication will be given of the direction we feel such work ought to take.

Five types of research seem called for. Not all are of equal priority, nor are the methods or personnel they require at all the same. The length of time required to yield satisfying results will probably vary as much among them as the methods they call for.

First applied research is needed to improve the actual capabilities of police, military, and other operational forces used to control urban insurgent outbursts. These range from systems analyses of police forces to development of better chemicals for riot management. Social and psychological factors should be thoroughly considered at every turn, in recognition of the fundamentally political nature of insurgency.

Another type of research should be directed to determining the causes of urban political disorders. It would attack fundamental questions about relations between insurgency and poverty, aspirations, development, etc. Prediction and prevention would be the ultimate goal. The time range required to obtain satisfying results in this area may be long.

The strategy of insurgency and counterefforts should also be examined. What, for example, would be the long-range implication for a nation of having a counterinsurgent organization so capable and powerful that all possibility of revolt (except by that organization, of course) were eliminated?

The other two types of research are routine but basic. One would improve our access to detailed data, while the other would strive to perfect the analytical tools for manipulating it more effectively.
The elements mentioned can be rationalized as a complete program—a broad, holistic effort chiefly along systems lines—which might well take care of the most urgent needs which the United States has in urban counterinsurgency research. But this may not be enough. It also seems desirable in facing such a research topic to hedge on the possible failure of the main program by carrying on novel lines of investigations at the same time as the more routine ones. It may turn out that truly crucial discoveries will be made through such secondary efforts. Suppose a qualified expert (or a team) was permitted to approach the subject of urban insurgency strictly from the point of view of his specialty. He would bring to bear on the data a set of concepts, certain analytical methods, and a theoretical tradition distinct from what the mainstream of military R&D would be doing. Each expert would face the question, "How does my special field shed light on the problem of urban insurgency?"

Presumably scores of approaches could make some contribution, even though many dead ends might result. Some of the possibilities (obviously concentrated in the social sciences because it is best known to the author) are:

- Small group research
- International relations
- Geopolitics
- Urban geography (and city planning)
- Social ecology
- Structural-functional analysis
- Communications theory
- Social movements
- Collective behavior
- National character
- Psychiatry
- Criminology
- History of ideas ("cell," "insurgency," etc.)
- History of technology (weaponry)
Operations research
Legal controls
Military tactics

Regardless of what methodological or theoretical tack is taken in the study of UI, suitably detailed data are a must. The present paper has provided a foundation for that task.
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