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COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN
JAPAN, 1945-1960

A. Rodger Swearingen

PREPARED FOR:
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

The RAND Corporation
SAN MONICA, CALIFORNIA
MEMORANDUM
RM-4348 PR
APRIL 1960

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PREFACE

The study is by a RAND Corporation consultant who is Acting Director of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Strategy and Propaganda at the same university. The study was commenced in the late 1950's as part of RAND's program of research on the political context of Japanese rearmament. It builds on work done by the author in collaboration with Paul Langer, now on RAND's staff, published in 1952 under the title *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919-51*. The author has studied his subject on the spot not only during the Occupation, but during four subsequent trips to Japan. He has combed the available documentation published by the Japanese and United States governments and by Japanese, Soviet, and Chinese Communist sources, as well as the work of private scholars relating to the period 1945-1950. The author has conducted numerous interviews with Japanese and U.S. government specialists on Communism, Japanese labor leaders, and other qualified informants.

The objective of this Memorandum is to provide a case study of the policies, platforms, and techniques employed and problems encountered by a major Communist party in a highly critical area during the decade and a half from 1945 to 1960. It does not attempt to assess the current prospects for Communism in Japan, nor does it attempt to evaluate current Communist policies or practices in themselves, since much has happened since 1960 that bears heavily on such judgments. It is intended to provide
historical perspective and background for such assessments. Because of the importance Communists everywhere attach to the labor movement and because the postwar labor scene in Japan has been as turbulent as it has been significant, special attention has been devoted to Communist efforts to use labor as a political weapon.

The Memorandum falls into two parts. Part I is an analysis of the main lines of Communist theory, organization and action in Japan through the important Seventh Congress of the Japanese Communist Party in the summer of 1958. It is supplemented by a brief summary of developments during the next two years based largely on a White Paper published by the Japanese government in 1960, and on the author's on-the-spot discussions and observations.

Part II is a translation of the Japanese government 1960 White Paper on Communism in Japan. This provides detail and data in depth on the strategy, tactics, organization, and operations of the JCP in the critical period immediately preceding the anti-Haggerty riots of the summer of 1960.

The translation from the Japanese was done by the author with the help of several assistants and associates.

Author's Acknowledgments

The Memorandum has had the benefit of critical comment and advice from Paul F. Langer, Hans Ries, and Robert Scalapino.
The principal agent in Japan devoted to changing Japan's pre-Western orientation is the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Traditionally linked to Moscow, but now building closer ties with Peking, that Party, like Communist parties elsewhere, is constrained both by its historical development and by its habitual practices. An analysis of these developments, policies, and practices during the period 1945-60 throws important light on current assessments of the probable course of future strategy, and on the alternatives from which that Party can choose in its efforts to refashion Japan's institutions and sway her policies. Among the conclusions that emerge from an examination of this period are these:

-- The JCP has proved most effective and dangerous in the past during periods free from political, military and foreign policy crises while asserting and striving for a moderate Communist strategy for Japan.

-- Though concentrating on political rather than on economic issues, the JCP has demonstrated greatest appeal during periods of economic difficulty in Japan. This suggests that any important downturn in the Japanese economy may be expected to increase markedly the influence of the JCP.

-- As part of its concern with economic matters, the JCP has stressed anti-American issues in a variety of forms rather than demands for increased real wages. However, there have been systematic attempts to link the
the JCP has pointed to the United States as the root cause of many of Japan's socio-economic ills, including too-low wages.

-- Socialists in Japan, notably those of the left wing, are usually more numerous but less sophisticated and critical than their European counterparts. Thus some Communist political appeals, those that European socialists and labor leaders would easily see through, have had marked and continued success among socialists in Japan.

-- The history of Japan's relations with the West lends itself to exploitation by the Communists according to a special pattern scarcely possible elsewhere in the world. The racial issue, the U.S. use of the Bomb, the Allied Occupation of Japan, and issues arising from naval and air bases are combined and exploited in a strong case for anti-Americanism and the neutralization of Japan -- providing themes with conspicuously more appeal to the Japanese than similar themes would have in Western Germany or almost anywhere else in the world.

-- Japan's huge labor movement, controlled largely by the socialists but infiltrated and at times greatly influenced by the Communists, is a natural target for Communist activity. To date, the JCP has been only sporadically successful in dominating Japan's labor unions. In early 1947, even though Communist infiltration of unions had been successful and the demands and expectations of the workers were high, strong SCAP and Japanese government control measures frustrated a general strike. Although the JCP reached peak numbers in 1949, its divisive activities in the unions set off anti-Communist activity, as public opinion and government
Competition stiffened against the Party. Communist activities in support of the North Korean and Chinese Communist efforts in the Korean war further weakened the Party's influence, and its control of labor broke down as Japan passed from occupation to independence. Although the Communists had supported Japan's General Conference of Trade Unions (SOHYO) since 1952, and despite the close congruence between SOHYO policies and Communist demands, the Communists were never able to dominate the leadership of this organization. The JCP was similarly unsuccessful in securing top-level and official cooperation from the Socialist Party. Nevertheless, SOHYO proved to be useful to the JCP in many ways. But in the case of both SOHYO and the Socialist Party, cooperation at the working level was better.

The JCP has demonstrated considerable ability to encourage joint activities with a wide range of representation, including SOHYO. And at its 7th Congress, the Party reaffirmed its concern with labor -- its support of SOHYO, its criticism as well as support of other unions, its drive to strengthen labor's "international solidarity," and its attempts to assert ideological and organizational influence over all the workers and their unions.
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PART I

THE USE OF LABOR AS A POLITICAL WEAPON
LABOR'S ROLE IN COMMUNIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

To the Marxist it is axiomatic that the industrial worker forms "the vanguard of the socialist revolution." If the realities of the Russian Revolution dictated some adjustment in Lenin's thinking on the question of the role of labor and of the peasantry in the revolution, Communist experience in China brought with it the necessity, or opportunity, for a further modification of the theory. Whether this "change in emphasis" was accomplished without doing fundamental harm to certain sacred assumptions of Marxism-Leninism is a controversy which still rages among both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars. The appearance in the Communist arsenal of the unconventional weapon, Maoism, and its early adoption by the international Communist general staff as a standard weapon for the "underdeveloped" and "colonial" areas adds a new facet to the problem. Differences between Moscow and Peking only highlight the issue. It is equally apparent, however, that for the "advanced" industrial areas the Communists continue to regard labor as a vulnerable and highly significant force.

The Cominform's characterization of Japan in November 1951 as a "semi-colonial" or "dependent" area as well as earlier and subsequent JCP policy and practice suggest that elements of the Maoist strategy may have been approved by Moscow for use by the Japanese Communists. On the other hand, there is little evidence that Japan's Communists have abandoned either the Marxian theory or the Leninist tactical formula regarding the role of the
Indeed, the Japanese Communist leaders pride themselves on their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, treat the events of the Russian Revolution with reverence, and talk at the same time of "learning important political lessons from the great Mao Tse-tung and from the other Chinese Communist leaders." It seems evident, therefore, that any account of postwar Japanese Communist strategy in the use of labor as a political weapon should include: (1) Lenin's views on the role of organized labor and the Bolshevik experience, (2) Chinese Communist practice and theory, and (3) the JCP's own conception of labor's place in "the coming revolution in Japan."

1. LENIN'S VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF LABOR AND THE BOLSHEVIK EXPERIENCE

Lenin regarded the trade union as (1) a primary school in which the workers gain a "class consciousness" (general indoctrination and education function). The sporadic struggles against exploitation and spontaneous manifestations of hatred for the capitalist, Lenin insisted, must be intensified, focused, organized, and guided. Lenin then proceeded logically to a second role of the trade union, namely, as (2) a reservoir of potential Communist Party members (revolutionary training center). From here, it was but a short step to characterizing the trade union as (3) a link between the Communist Party and the masses (organizational, agitation and propaganda medium). Since the economic struggles of the trade unions are, in reality, Lenin argued, forms of the class struggle, and since class struggles are
essentially struggles for political power, the economic and political struggles cannot be separated one from the other. Accordingly, any limitation of trade union activity to the economic realm, political neutrality or a stand independent from the Party were all regarded by Lenin as obstructing the liberation of the proletariat by, in fact, serving the interests of the capitalist. Finally, at least until 1905, Lenin regarded the trade union as an indispensable force, united with the Party (i.e., controlled by the Party), for the final, decisive revolutionary struggle to sweep away the "reactionary, capitalist, anti-labor leadership" everywhere.

In summing up his view of the role of organized labor, Lenin cautioned against "syndicalism" and against over-emphasizing the spontaneous character of the labor movement. He warned equally against underestimating the role of organized labor. If the Party, fearing the difficulty of winning over the trade unions, forms something more convenient for its own purposes, the Party, he said, will have abdicated its role as the vanguard of the laboring class.

The failure of the revolution of 1905 forced Lenin to modify his views on the relative significance of labor to the revolution, though perhaps not on the role of the labor unions. Lenin now began to argue that without an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry there would be no revolution. This represents a clear modification of a fundamental theoretical postulate. However, Lenin, who prided himself on his "flexibility," seemed
uncertain over this inconsistency. Subsequent events proved the wisdom of Lenin's policy: the October revolution of 1917 was the child of peasant and soldier. It probably could not have succeeded without the alliance between proletariat and peasantry.

Nevertheless, the Russian Revolution saw enough workers seizing power and forming workers-soviets to give color to the fiction that revolution was essentially a proletarian movement. As a consequence, while concentrating their decisive activity after 1927 in the countryside and relying largely on the peasantry, the Chinese Communists continued to talk in the orthodox way about the industrial proletariat, at least until the appearance of Mao's "China's New Democracy" in 1940.

2. CHINESE COMMUNIST PRACTICE AND THEORY

While recognizing from the outset the limitations of China's small urban proletariat, the early Chinese Communist leaders with Russian guidance nevertheless followed the orthodox Comintern line on the "importance of the labor movement" so long as that seemed possible and promising. When, by 1927, the "workers" had proved "difficult" and ineffective in the face of the unexpectedly strong "counter-revolutionary enemy," the Chinese Party revamped its strategy. The resulting line stressed almost exclusively the peasant component of Lenin's worker-peasant formula. The new emphasis, later to become identified as Maoism, was, in fact, about as far from Leninism as Lenin's post-1905 formulation had been from the original Marxian position. It did, however, meet the ultimate Soviet test of orthodoxy: it worked.
Developments in Communist China during the first years of the Peking regime support the assumption that the Chinese Communists had no quarrel with Lenin on the ultimate importance of the urban proletariat. Indeed, in 1960, after more than 20 years of focusing on the peasantry, the Chinese Communists began to talk again of the "hegemony of the proletariat," and there were other signs of a return to near Moscow orthodoxy. The fact that this reversal went hand in hand with acquisition of control of China's major cities and with the development of a larger Chinese industrial proletariat suggests that the Chinese Communist strategy for "advanced" industrialized Japan may be expected to allow an appropriate place to the role of organized labor -- despite the Communists' dogmatic but mistaken classification of Japan as a "semi-colonial" or "dependent" area. Given Japan's astonishing recovery and relative prosperity under "capitalism," Communist China's evident failure to meet the most elementary economic needs of the nation can scarcely be overlooked by political, business and labor leaders in Japan.

3. JCP CONCEPTION OF LABOR'S PLACE IN THE "COMING REVOLUTION IN JAPAN"

The Japanese Communists have directed their main organizational and propaganda efforts towards Japan's large urban proletariat. Even when the Party was implementing the policy of its strategist, Sanzo Nosaka, by creating a popular front broad enough to include farmers, white-collar workers and even the "petty bourgeois" (essentially the "New Democracy" formula), there could be
no question as to the prime objective of Party work. A 1948 Japanese Communist handbook on labor unions stated without qualification:

> The worker is the real builder of socialism. The other classes of society can under no circumstances fulfill this role. Only when fighting together with the worker and under the worker's direction can they participate in the task of establishing socialism. By their own strength they can never achieve this objective.\(^1\)

In a nearly pure Marxist-Leninist formulation, another official Japanese Communist handbook on trade unions sets forth the paramount role of the worker in the following terms: "Revolution cannot be achieved by reliance on the Party's strength alone. It must be carried out by the people grouped around the workers. The labor unions thus perform the function of a belt linking the Communist Party to the masses."\(^2\)

A simple explanation is provided in the same work as to why the farmers, fishermen, and small businessmen of Japan (who even in industrialized Japan compose more than 50 per cent of the population) must be assigned a secondary role. Communist reasoning runs as follows: Farmers and small businessmen attend to their own little plot of land or their small store. They are used to thinking in terms of individual effort. For this reason they generally fail to realize the need for solidarity among the working

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people and find it difficult to comprehend the tenets of socialism. "Numerous as they are," the Japanese Communist handbook comments, "these groups are unable to recognize a clear objective in their struggle and hence vacillate somewhere between the worker and the capitalist." This limited political consciousness and relative impotence of the farmer and the petty bourgeois are contrasted with the outlook and revolutionary potential of the industrial worker. A "direct victim of capitalist exploitation" -- who, moreover, has experienced community life and collective action to a degree unknown to other social groups -- the Japanese worker, in the Communist view, possesses the combination of strength, cohesiveness and purposefulness necessary for the overthrow of the capitalist system. It is pointed out further that even the starving Japanese tenant farmer thinks that his economic problems can be solved only by a redistribution of large landholdings, whereas the worker -- owning neither property nor tools of production -- seeks and by necessity must seek a solution to his problems in the establishment of some sort of cooperative management. Thus, as a direct result of their function in capitalist society, the workers are believed more apt than any other social class to comprehend the principles of Marxist theory and practice.

As a logical outcome of this analysis, the Japanese Communist Party regards successful mobilization of the workers as a prerequisite for any movement aimed at the

\[3\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 126-127.}\]
establishment of a socialist state. The key to such mobilization is, of course, the labor union. In the Communist view, however, unions are not an effective revolutionary weapon until they have been combined under a single authority. From the outset, Japanese Communist policy has worked for a total mobilization of labor, to be accomplished through the welding together of all unions into a single organization. Further, the Communist Party clearly favors the "one union per industry" principle. The priority assigned to creating national unions in the transportation, communications and power industries underlines the role of labor unions as a political weapon. Alluding to this point, party leader Yoshio Shiga, in a report to the Communist Party's National Consultative Conference in November 1945, pointed out that communications and transportation industries were "the nerves of the nation." Practically all of the other points that Lenin made regarding labor unions are faithfully restated in the Japanese Communist labor union manual: Labor unions are "schools in which the worker learns class struggle and Communism." They prepare the worker for his "historical role" as one of the "vanguard of the revolution."

There is little reason to conclude that Japanese Communist thinking on this question has undergone a fundamental change, despite Japan's reclassification in

4Akahata, November 22, 1945.
5Ibid.
6Kikumani, op. cit., p. 30.
as a "semi-colonial" or "dependent" area, and despite increasing evidence of attempts to mobilize the "petty bourgeoisie" in support of an anti-American, pro-Chinese foreign policy. The paramount role assigned by the Japanese Communists to labor as a political weapon was officially confirmed in Zenei towards the end of 1954 in the following unequivocal terms: "The exploited working class, which has nothing to lose but its iron chains, is the only class capable of fighting indomitably and completely against the ruling classes; only the workers who have no need to exploit others possess proletarian democracy, class solidarity, and discipline obtained through group activities. The solidarity and iron discipline of our Party," the article concludes, "are reflected in the working class and have heightened the working class as the leading class for racial liberation."\(^7\)

The Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Japan held in the summer of 1958 reaffirmed in two ways the critical role assigned to labor in the Communist struggle for power: first, by the large number of labor specialists and labor union strategists placed in key executive posts in the Party; secondly, by the attention given to organizational and labor union questions in the documents issuing from the Congress.

In short, the urban proletariat appears to remain the focus of both JCP theory and practice, especially in matters of domestic politics -- perhaps because this is one of the few areas where Communist strategy has achieved any degree of success. The Japanese Communists, of course,

\(^7\)Fujita Tsugio, Zenei, October-December, 1954 (italics supplied).
devote considerable propaganda effort to the "agrarian struggle," which they continue to treat in terms of the desirability of an alliance between worker and peasant, but their main organizational and propaganda activity is aimed at the labor movement -- and with some success.

8 An article entitled "The Present Agrarian Struggle" (Tomen no Nomin Toso), for example, in the November, 1954 issue of Zenrei, attempts to show the basis for stressing the value of an alliance between the worker and the peasant against MSA, American military bases in Japan, and the "reactionary, pro-American, Yoshida government."
COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN JAPAN, 1945-1960

The difficulties and dangers of attempting to lay down a precise or rigid structure of analysis for this topic are in part due to the fact that in actual practice Japanese Communist policy lines have not always been clearly drawn nor has Communist strategy in Japan appeared entirely consistent. Postwar Japanese Communist policy has been guided and influenced both by international and domestic considerations and further complicated by factional disputes within the Party. As will be evident from the following documentation, Party strategy in Japan has been unique in its failure to respond in the standard pattern to identifiable shifts in the international Communist line. Consequently, consideration of the origin and basis of a particular strategy as well as the tactical objectives of the Communists in Japan during a given period must be regarded as prerequisite to understanding the Japanese Communist Party's use of labor as a political weapon.

Communist strategy in Japan during the postwar decade and a half -- 1945 to 1960 -- may be divided into three main periods joined by two significant transitional periods: Phase One: Peaceful Revolution, 1945-1949, which in turn may be subdivided into (a) Democratic People's Front (1945-1947) and (b) Democratic National Front (1947-1949); Cominform Criticism and Transition, 1950-1951; Phase Two: National Liberation Democratic Revolution -- The Colonial and Dependent Area Formula, 1951-1955, which can be further divided into (a) Radical
Interlude (1951-1952), (b) Popular Front -- Underground (1953-1954), and (c) Popular Front -- New Look (1954-1955); Transitional Period; Sixth National Council Meeting to Seventh Party Congress, 1955-1958; and Phase Three: National Liberation Democratic Revolution -- the Puppet Capitalist Economy, Peace and Independence Formula, 1958-1960. This period has been treated under the rubrics (a) Ideological Guidelines Laid Down by the Seventh Party Congress, and (b) Strategy and Tactics Projected by the Seventh Party Congress.

Among the criteria for distinguishing Communist strategy and emphasis of one period from another, the following may serve as useful points of reference:

Peaceful Revolution vs. Violent Revolution -- By an analysis of Party documents and Plenum discussions and by observation of Communist activities, one can identify the Communist view of "the revolution" or approach to revolution at any given time. This, of course, is spelled out and defended in terms of what the Marxist-Leninist would characterize as the "stage of the revolution." It is further related to what the Communists call "objective" and "subjective" conditions. What appears to happen in practice, however, is that the "theory" arrived at by "scientific analysis" of the "objective" and "subjective" conditions (that is the situation in Japan and the readiness of the Firty) must depend for continued sanction or validity on its effectiveness in serving Soviet or Chinese Communist policies and objectives. Thus, a theory or strategy which is successful in accomplishing an objective
at one period may become "anti-social, anti-Marxist, anti-patriotic, and anti-Japanese" as immediate changes occur in Soviet and Chinese Communist needs.

The precise nature of a given policy may be identified further in terms of legal as opposed to underground activity, mass party vs. the "hard core" emphasis, and the broad popular front tactic and "peaceful coexistence" line rather than militant obstructionist tactics.

National vs. International Orientation -- The pattern of the temporary "domestication" of a Communist party is familiar to the student of international Communism. In order to remove the stigma of Soviet direction and international Communist orientation, several of the parties (for example the American and Indo-Chinese) went so far as to change their name for a period at the end of World War II. Again, the degree of acknowledged relationship with the International Communist movement appears to be dictated by the international atmosphere as the Soviet and more recently Chinese Communist parties think it bears on their foreign policy needs and strategy.

A related concept involves the focus of the Communist program in a country. For example, it may be oriented nationally, against domestic monopoly capital, etc., or (as has been more recently the case in Japan) "foreign supported monopoly capital, which is turning Japan into an American colony," may be designated as the target.

In general, Communist strategy in Japan up to 1950 may be said to have followed a "peaceful," "national," "legal," and "mass party" approach. The years 1950-1951 brought a shift to a more "radical," "international" and
"illegal" (underground) orientation or emphasis, but one can detect a return to something like the earlier approach in 1953 and 1954. The resulting strategy, while within the framework of the "National Liberation Front" laid down in November of 1951, may more properly be regarded as a hybrid strategy with several variants. By 1958, this strategy had taken the form of the "National Liberation Democratic Movement," i.e., the puppet capitalist economy, peace and independence formula.

Phase One: Peaceful Revolution, 1945-1950

Except for a brief, confused, transitional period immediately following the end of the war, the period from Japan's surrender to the Cominform criticism in January 1950 may be characterized as that of "Peaceful Revolution." A tactical shift from the democratic people's front to the democratic national front, which occurred in 1947, did not significantly alter the two principal policy considerations of the period, both deliberate reversals of prewar Japanese Communist strategy. The first was moderation, expressed in terms of the concept "peaceful revolution" and the slogan "the lovable Communist Party" and designed to develop a broad, popular, mass party. The second was autonomy or national orientation, that is, the concerted attempt to stress the Party's independent character, to play down or deny any international orientation or foreign ties, especially those with the Soviet Union, and to concentrate on domestic issues.

In contrast to the prewar Party, which had failed in its mission largely because both the Japanese government and the people of Japan regarded it -- correctly -- as a
secret, foreign-directed, radical organization, disrespectful of the Emperor and devoted to the cause of violent revolution, the postwar "lovable Party" made substantial progress. Led by a moderate strategy in an atmosphere conducive to total reform, if not to revolution, the revitalized legal Party by the spring of 1949 dominated the strong postwar labor movement. Boasting a registered membership of approximately 100,000, it sent 35 members to the Japanese Diet. Further, a large percentage of all university students in Japan supported the Communist Party's program, or parts of it, and there were some 3,000,000 sympathizers, including an indeterminable number of secret Party members throughout Japan.

To what extent did the policy of "peaceful revolution," which produced such striking results, represent a fundamental reorientation of the Party and to what extent must it be regarded simply as a tactical maneuver? A closer examination of the Party leadership, organization, and domestic and foreign policies and tactics suggests the answer to this complicated question.

The first postwar convention of the Japan Communist Party, in December 1945, was officially designated the Fourth Party Congress, indicating that the legal postwar Party regarded itself as the legitimate successor to the illegal prewar organization. The leaders of the Party during the period under review were veterans of the prewar Japanese Communist movement with extensive training and experience in the Soviet Union and China. Until 1950, the Japanese Party guided itself by means of a policy memorandum drafted in Moscow in 1932. Thus, the
Communist Party in Japan, from its inception to the postwar years, has had a certain continuity in its organization, leadership, and basic policy. An examination of the main policy lines and specific tactics of the democratic people's front and the democratic national front serves further to clarify this point.

(a) Democratic People's Front, 1945-1947

Defeat, confusion, economic chaos and an Allied occupation policy aimed at the "revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the people of Japan" all tended to produce an environment in post-surrender Japan which for the first time permitted the uninhibited growth of both the Japanese Communist Party and the labor movement.

The Japanese Communist leaders who, along with other political prisoners, were released from prison on October 10, 1945, had been "out of politics" throughout the United Front and Wartime Alliance periods, 1935-1945. By neither training nor experience were they equipped to meet the situation they encountered in post-surrender Japan. Further, there is no evidence that Moscow had by this time settled on a firm line for Japan. Consequently, until Party strategist Sanzo Nosaka returned to Japan in January 1946, after nine years in Moscow and five years in Yenan, Communist policy in Japan continued to reflect in a general way aspects of the pre-1935 leftist Comintern strategy for Japan.

Announced Communist policy for Japan in 1945-1946 may be summarized as follows:
(1) Cooperation with the Allies (which, of course, included the Soviet Union) as a force "liberating the world from Fascism and militarism" and "opening the way for the democratic revolution in Japan."

(2) Elimination of the Emperor system, that is: "The Emperor and his court, the military and administrative bureaucracy, the aristocracy, parasitic landlordism and monopoly capitalism."

(3) Mobilization of "all groups and organizations with democratic aims into a united front against the anti-democratic forces."

At the same time Japanese Communist policy during this initial period was dominated by a leftist orientation that failed to gain popular support:

(1) The Party remained an elitist party; rigid requirements for Party membership were maintained.

(2) Neither the call for total abolition of the imperial institution nor the expropriation of land for distribution to peasants seemed geared to a policy of general appeal.

(3) Aggressive labor tactics did little to enhance the Party's reputation among moderate elements.

(4) Attacks on the Socialist leadership further weakened any chances of a united front which the Communists claimed they wanted.9

With the return of Nosaka to Japan early in 1946, JCP policy began to take on a "new look," no doubt influenced by Nosaka's years with the Chinese Communists

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9A fuller treatment of this period is included in T. G. Tsukahira, *The Postwar Evolution of Communist Strategy in Japan*, which has been drawn on for the above.
and designed to exploit the opportunities afforded by the American occupation. The shift was in the direction of broadening the basis of party membership and attempting to strengthen public support for the Communist program. Accordingly, the leftist orientation was abandoned in favor of a more moderate line, suggested by the slogans "peaceful revolution" and a "lovable Communist Party." By flatly denying that the JCP maintained or would in the future seek any ties with the Soviet Union, Nosaka sought to create the image of a patriotic party of the common man, which throughout the war had alone stood for peace and now was the logical instrument for the promised democratization of Japan. It is not clear how far the JCP leaders thought such a program would carry them. If Nosaka and certain other JCP leaders were not really convinced that the Party could attain political power in Japan through the parliamentary process alone, they were at least certain about the desirability of employing some less peaceful tactic should this become necessary.

The keynote to tactics for the period was Nosaka's call for "unity with all political parties and political forces going in our direction," a "democratic front." Such unity, Nosaka reported to the Fifth Party Congress (March 1946), had already been achieved on the local level, notably in the Kyoto area where the Communist, Nosaka's approach is set forth in two works by him, Nihon Minshuka no tame ni (Towards the Democratization of Japan), 1948, and Senryaku, Seijutsu No Shomondai (Strategy and Tactics), 1949. Detailed descriptions of the contents of both may be found in Langer-Swearingen, Japanese Communism: An Annotated Bibliography of Works in the Japanese Language, New York, University of Southern California, IPR, 1953.
Socialist, Liberal and Republican parties had joined forces. There was less success, Nosaka admitted, at the national level. Socialist leadership had rejected a common front with the Communists, but within the Socialist Party and other groups, Nosaka insisted, there was active sentiment for cooperation with the JCP. This sympathy on the part of the rank and file, Nosaka stressed, must be exploited at the working level. But, Nosaka cautioned, while working on the lower echelons, the top must not be neglected, for if negotiations at the top were successful, the whole would fall into line.11

The "lovable, peaceful" strategy served to increase public interest and confidence in the Communist Party. As a consequence, in the first postwar general elections of April 1946, the JCP gained five seats in the House of Representatives and a total of 2,130,000 votes. On the labor front the Party made perhaps even more striking progress. The National Congress of Industrial Unions, which claimed 1,600,000 members, was organized in August 1946 under the leadership of six regular JCP members and four secret Party members and sympathizers.12

(b) Democratic National Front, 1947-1950

With the deterioration of relations between East and West during 1947, the Kremlin launched a more militant

11 Formulation from Tsukahira, op. cit., p. 22. See also Nosaka's report to the Fifth Congress in Zenei, No. 4, April 1946, pp. 21-22.

policy. In Europe, abandonment of the rightist strategy of the immediate postwar period (that is, cooperation "from above" with other "democratic" parties and groups) became evident when the French and Italian Communist Parties withdrew from the coalition governments in which they had participated. In various countries Communists began to attack the leadership of non-Communist parties as "traitors" to the democratic cause. This policy crystallized as a worldwide Communist strategy with the formation of the Cominform in September 1947. Zhdanov's "Two Hostile Camps" keynote speech was accompanied by a publication of a "Declaration of the Conference on the International Situation," which named Japan as an "instrument of United States imperialist policy" and characterized Socialist parties everywhere as "tactical weapons of the imperialist camp."  

Japanese Communist response to the new line was immediate abandonment of attempts to form a "top alliance" with the Socialist Party, some de-emphasis of the peaceful revolutionary theme, and adoption of a more anti-U.S. posture. The policy that emerged from the Party's Sixth Congress (December 21-23, 1947) defined a new strategy for the JCP -- a strategy which differed from the rightist strategy of the 1945-1947 period and from the leftist strategies of the Party's prewar history, though it combined features of both.

In the Communist view, Japan had become a semi-colonial country; hence, "foreign imperialism" was added

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to such traditional enemies as "monopoly capital, feudal landlords, and reactionary bureaucrats." Both the earlier rightist strategy of alliances "at the top" and the leftist anticapitalist single-stage revolution approach were ruled out. Instead a two-stage revolution was conceived, the first stage ("bourgeois democratic") being directed against foreign imperialism and domestic Fascism and feudalism. The new united front ("from below") of all classes and groups (including the bourgeoisie) willing to fight foreign "imperialism" was essentially the Maoist formula which two years later Peking, with Moscow's approval, was to acclaim "the path that should be taken by peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy."

In February 1948 the JCP officially launched its "democratic national front" offensive. Communists concentrated their effort on establishing a united front "from below" by wooing dissident groups and individuals in the Socialist camp and by attempting to mobilize "all democratic forces": workers, peasants, "working townpeople," intelligentsia, small and medium businessmen and "sincere" or "progressive" industrial capitalists. Their announced goals were the thorough democratization of Japan, the stabilization and improvement of living standards, complete independence of Japan, and world peace. Although they attacked American influence in Japan, usually

Indirectly, they aimed chiefly at increasing political strength in order to seize power within the existing constitutional framework -- or at least to move as far in that direction as the situation would permit.

The general election of January 1949 demonstrated the striking progress that the JCP had made with its moderate, united-front policy during a period when there was, in any case, general, if temporary, loss of confidence by the electorate in other left-wing parties. Thirty-five Communist candidates were elected. The total Communist vote was 2,980,000, almost 10 per cent of the total votes cast. 15

Encouraged by such success at home and stimulated by Chinese Communist victories on the Continent, Japanese Communist leaders apparently became genuinely convinced that final victory was at hand. This attitude soon developed into an aggressive overconfidence which, coupled with increased pressure from SCAP and the Japanese government, perhaps accounts for the JCP's subsequent general decline in popular support and reduced effectiveness on the labor front and in other critical areas. 16

An analysis of the two policies, "peaceful revolution" and "autonomy," may serve further to clarify the strategy.

15 Registered Party membership at this time was about 100,000.

16 A series of Communist-inspired acts of violence occurred about this time, including the unauthorized operation of electric cars, the unlawful occupation of the Taira Police Station, the Mitaka electric car wreck, and the Matsukawa train wreck. (The defendants in the Natsukawa case were acquitted in 1963.)
Party strategist Sanzo Nosaka wrote in 1948: "There are some people who hold the view that a peaceful revolution represents a new type of revolution that neither Lenin nor Stalin had ever envisaged. This constitutes a social democratic view fraught with grave dangers for the cause of revolution. Although at times the possibility of a peaceful development of revolution may exist, peaceful revolution is no more than a type of tactics. With changing conditions, the approach must also change." A year later, Nosaka spoke more candidly: "If pursued skillfully, this policy will facilitate the development of conditions for direct revolution and make possible the seizure of power." On the question of autonomy, the Secretary-General of the JCP, Kyuichi Tokuda, told a Party Congress in 1946: "We have no ties whatsoever with the Soviet Union. I should like to state here that in the future as well our Party will never have relations with the Soviet Union." Although in line with the new postwar policy, the Japanese Party may have deliberately attempted to play down its visible ties with the Soviet Union, evidence suggests that the basic relationship remained unchanged. The

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17 Sanzo Nosaka, Senryaku, Senjutsu no Shomondai (Strategy and Tactics), Tokyo, 1949, p. 99.
19 Kyuichi Tokuda, Naigai josei to Nippon Kyosanto no nimmu (The Domestic and Foreign Situation and the Mission of the Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, 1949, p. 236.
principal areas of Soviet influence and liaison -- though not necessarily total control -- which can be documented and illustrated are:

1. The Soviet indoctrination of Japanese prisoners of war, effected in close cooperation with the Japanese Communists; (2) Soviet propaganda broadcasts from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Moscow, coordinated with Communist activities in Japan; (3) Direct Japanese Communist liaison with the Russian mission in Tokyo; (4) Substantial Japanese Communist exchanges of information and personnel with Communist China and the Soviet-controlled North Korea; (5) Japanese Communist acceptance of the Cominform criticism in January 1950 and the complete switch in policy and program along the lines "suggested" in Moscow.

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21 By 1950, registered Party membership is thought to have reached its peak. Japanese authorities reported 100,000 registered members and 3,629 Communist cells throughout Japan. See Special Investigation Bureau, Attorney General's Office, Two Political Extremities in Japan, February 15, 1950. The subsequent decline is recorded in another Japanese government publication which states: "According to official registration figures, Party membership reached a peak of 100,000 in March 1950, but it dwindled gradually to 65,000 in January 1951, 59,000 in May, 56,000 in August, and 48,000 in June 1952. Its actual strength, including non-registered Communists, which was once thought to be 300,000, was recently estimated at 60,000 to 70,000. Niizeki, "Postwar Activities of the Japan Communist Party," loc. cit. To these figures must be added some 460,000 or 80 per cent of the Korean residents in Japan, who at least up to 1952 were regarded by the Japanese authorities as being under varying degrees of Communist influence and control. Of these, 1,500 were registered JCP members; about 100,000 were regarded as active sympathizers."
Cominform Criticism and Transition, 1950-1951

In January 1950 Moscow "suggested" a shift to a more positive policy in an anonymous editorial in the official Cominform organ "For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy." Nosaka's approach was branded, among other things, "antidemocratic, anti-Socialist, antipatriotic, and anti-Japanese." The precise reasons for Moscow's proposal are still not clear. It seems probable, however, that Communist strategy in Occupied Japan (which, when the International Communist line shifted to the left in 1947 and 1948, had apparently been given a special tactical dispensation because of the country's occupied status) had by 1950 outlived its usefulness. With China in the Soviet orbit and with hopes for an overall peace treaty and for the withdrawal of American troops from Japan steadily growing dimmer, the world situation as the Kremlin viewed it toward the end of 1949 might well have called for more dynamic action from the Japanese Party. The impending move in Korea must have also figured in the decision.  

In any case, after some considerable confusion and debate, the Japanese Party issued a statement which at once praised Nosaka, admitted that mistakes had been made, and accepted the Cominform criticism. Nosaka concluded on what became the keynote of future policy: "We must... fulfill," he said, "the important mission assigned to the

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Communist Party of Japan as a link in the international revolutionary movement."

The two-year period from the Cominform criticism in January 1950 to the publication of a New Party Program in November 1951 was confused and transitional. In the course of adjusting a major, and often violent, factional dispute within the Central Committee and of threshing out differences over theory, the orientation of the whole Party moved steadily to the left. This shift to a more radical and internationally oriented policy can be discerned by a study of the Japanese Communist press and by the increasing number and scope of Communist incidents in Japan and of sabotage and other acts of violence.

Two Party documents -- the "1950 Thesis" and the "1951 Party Rules and Regulations" -- form the principal link between the old policy of "peaceful revolution" and a new post-treaty approach designated as a "national liberation democratic revolution." In terminology, emphasis and specific content, these two documents reveal the direction of the reorientation in progress: from a moderate to a more radical approach, from peaceful to militant tactics, from an ostensible position of autonomy to a frankly international orientation, from a vague position of neutrality to outspoken alignment with the Soviet bloc.

During the same transitional period, most of the Party leaders disappeared underground. The Japanese

\[Cf. \ Rodger \ Swearingen, \ "Japan's \ Red \ Underground," \ The \ Christian \ Science \ Monitor, \ November \ 9, \ 1953.\]
government and private industry initiated a number of measures (including purges of suspected Communists from both government and industry) designed to control the now openly radical and frankly foreign-oriented organization. At the same time the Party's popularity with the Japanese populace dwindled markedly as it moved underground and to the left. Serving to mark the Party's new emphasis were the creation of a whole new underground military apparatus as well as the appearance of military reports and secret publications on military affairs and guerrilla warfare. In February 1951 the JCP adopted a "military policy" at its Seventh National Consultative Conference. This policy stipulated in part:

The Japanese people are being controlled by American imperialism and its reactionary Japanese agents such as bankers, landowners and bureaucrats. This control is being maintained through the combined efforts of all terror groups such as domestic mercenary troops, the police, and bands of believers in club-law, with the American Army as the main force. Revolution therefore requires a people's armed struggle forceful enough to drive off the American Army and smash all pressure machinery which has recourse to force. Under such conditions, the war for emancipation of the people shall be carried out by armed uprisings and general strikes of the working classes as soon as certain subjective and objective conditions are fulfilled.24

By the summer of 1951 factional strife had been significantly reduced and the reorientation seemed

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24 Quoted in Niizeki, op. cit., p. 72.
virtually complete. Shortly after the San Francisco Peace Conference, the JCP announced a new policy.

Before discussing the new policy, we must consider the Party's re-evaluation and criticism of the 1950 transitional period as it was detailed, for the first time, by the Seventh Party Congress in the summer of 1958. The Political Report presented to the Congress devotes a great many pages to what is termed "the Problem of 1950." The gist of the Party's official reflection on this matter deserves special comment. As the Party saw it in retrospect, the problem resulted from the fact that:

1. The Party did not clearly recognize the new situation confronting Japan after the war and made the mistake of regarding American imperialism in occupied Japan as a liberating force.

2. The Party pursued an "unprincipled policy" of raising new Party leaders to key positions simply because of their apparent "abilities, despite the suspicion entertained about them from the outset because of defects in their Party records."

3. Comrade Tokuda [Party Secretary General until his death in Peking in 1953] gradually intensified the tendency to develop the "patriarchal cult of personality."

4. In response to the Cominform criticism and "under the oppression of American imperialism," which was preparing for the Korean war, there was a need for measures based on "the unity and solidarity of the will of the people," but the manner in which this was done was arbitrary, incorrect and illegal in terms of the Party rules and regulations.
5. Factional prejudices and the cult of the personality, which regard all critics as enemies, jeopardized Central Committee unity and authority and prevented the Control Commission from discharging its mission.

6. The manner in which a separate underground Party structure was created in the spring of 1950 resulted, in fact, in the virtual destruction of the duly constituted Central Committee. "Objectively speaking, the Party leaders concerned committed the mistake of Party dissolutionism."

7. "We must understand," the document concludes, "that to make decisions elsewhere [i.e., by self-appointed Party headquarters] on matters which should be decided at the national party congress not only is against Party regulations but also gives rise to serious mistakes and confusions." 25

Phase Two: National Liberation Democratic Revolution -- the Colonial and Dependent Area Formula, 1951-1958

The basis and nature of the new post-treaty policy, that of the National Liberation Front, are combined in three documents published anonymously by the Cominform: "Immediate Demands of the Japanese Communist Party -- New Program" (November 23, 1951); "Basis of the New Program of the Communist Party of Japan" (February 15, 1952); and "Thirty-Eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan" (July 4, 1952). 25

25 Akahata, November 6, 1957.
The theoretical justification for the new approach, as given in the three documents, may be summarized as follows: Owing to the exploitation by U.S. monopoly capital and military imperialism, Japan has been transformed -- economically, politically, and militarily -- into a country completely under the control of and dependent on the United States. And how does the Marxist-Leninist approach the problems of the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent areas? In answering this, the "Basis of the New Program" invokes Stalin's authority for underlining the difference between a revolution in an imperialist country and a revolution in a colonial or dependent area. The principal point, of course, is that only in colonial or dependent areas is it possible to utilize the national bourgeoisie "at a certain stage and for a certain period..." (to quote Stalin) in support of the revolutionary movement "against imperialism and for emancipation."

Relating this theory directly to post-treaty Japan, the same document goes on to define the future revolution in Japan as a "national-liberation democratic revolution" and to call for a coalition government to represent all "progressive and liberation forces" in the country. This is to be based on an alliance of workers and peasants who, we are told, will support the struggle for a free and independent Japan or will at least maintain a friendly neutrality.

The slogan "peaceful revolution" is abandoned. "It would be a serious mistake to think," the document cautions, "that a new national liberation democratic
government will arise of its own volition, without difficulties, in a peaceful way...." The earlier line on autonomy also disappears. Instead the "Basis of the New Program" develops the theme that neutrality is impossible, that American imperialism is a paper tiger (a favorite phrase of the Chinese Communists) as shown by its weakness in Europe and by the Korean War. Any attempt, therefore, to rely on American imperialism would be as disastrous for Japan as was her ill-fated alliance with the imperialists, Hitler and Mussolini. "The international situation shows most clearly," the document asserts, "that the international peace camp is a powerful ally in our national liberation democratic front...." 
"Most harmful for us at present," it concludes, "are fear of the threats of the occupation troops, the illusions about the 'Free World,' and the attempt to maintain a position of neutrality."

(a) Radical Interlude, 1951-1952

Three initial manifestations of the new line may be identified: (1) emphasis on militant activity, (2) increased use of the anti-American theme, and (3) the characterization of Japan as a semi-colonial country. Of these three, the first was the shortest lived, while the other two continued with some modification to be characteristic of Party tactics in the succeeding popular-front phase.

1. The abandonment of the tactic of "peaceful revolution" and its replacement by "liberation revolution," which specifically rejected the "peaceful way of liberation," would seem to suggest that Communist policy in
Japan in the winter of 1951 and spring of 1952 moved one step closer to the final objective of seizing political power by militant activity. Indeed, the Party's ability and intention to employ violence in line with the new post-treaty policy were amply demonstrated, notably in February 1952, when Communists in Tokyo and other cities staged the biggest series of riots and anti-American demonstrations since the outset of the Occupation and again during the alarming 1952 May Day riots. Subsequent incidents involving the use of acid bombs, Molotov cocktails, and armed action squads were numerous enough to suggest a definite plan. Further, the Party's "military policy" and guerrilla activity were discussed regularly in the Japanese Communist's principal covert publications. Consequently, the violence and underground military activity during 1951 and much of 1952 must be regarded as Party policy and not simply a series of isolated incidents.

One important qualification should be added. By the summer of 1952, Party leaders apparently had come to recognize in the new policy a point of diminishing returns. Irresponsible action by left-wing elements within the Party, young Japanese Communists, and Korean youth groups threatened to turn the Japanese people against the Communist Party and promised little in return. Cautioning against overzealous and premature action, Secretary

26 Volume IV of the Nikkan Rodo Tsushin-sha documentary series on Japanese Communism includes the texts of several "military affairs notes" (Gunji Noto) purported to have been circulated covertly by the Party during this period. Nikkan Rodo Tsushin-sha, Nihon Kyosanto Bunken-shu (Documents on Japanese Communism), Tokyo, 1953, pp. 394-423.
Tokuda wrote from the underground in July 1952: "Our task is to master the art of combining legal with underground work." 27

2. A second manifestation of the new line was the increased use of the anti-American theme for rallying all progressive forces against "United States imperialism."

Why were the workers' conditions no better? Because of the exploitation by U.S. monopoly capital and its agents, the Yoshida government, which have turned Japan into a colony. What accounts for the worsening plight of the Japanese farmer? The American-inspired land reform program, which was "a fraud from beginning to end, designed only to preserve the domination of the reactionary forces," as well as the "vast amount of land in Japan commandeered by the U.S. imperialists and converted from productive agricultural land to destructive military bases and airfields." Similar appeals were tailored to the needs, demands, and fears of intellectuals, white collar workers and even businessmen, whose desire to trade with Communist China went unfulfilled because, they were told, of United States control over Japan. In almost any Japanese newspaper or periodical of the time, one was likely to find a story on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, the McCarran Immigration Act, or the so-called "book burning" controversy, as well as a great many unsavory accounts

of how United States security forces comported themselves in Japan.\textsuperscript{28}

1. A third manifestation of the new line, and perhaps most intriguing, was the use made of the semi-colonial area formula: Japan's official classification by the Soviets as a semi-colonial, dependent area placed that country, at least for propaganda purposes, in the same category to which China had been assigned until 1949. This suggests that at least some of the theory, strategy and tactics employed successfully by the Communists in China may have become officially valid for Japan.

In his July 4, 1952 document, "Thirtieth Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan," Tokuda, after speaking of the need both to arm the Party with the theory of Marxism and to follow unswervingly the ideas of Stalin, concluded: "The ideas of Mao Tse-tung, who applied Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese Revolution and blazed a new pathway for China, must also be our constant guide."

It is to be recalled that early in 1949 Nosaka, who spent nine years in Moscow and then five years in Yenan, had said: "We are learning valuable theoretical and political lessons from the great Mao Tse-tung and from other Chinese Communist leaders."\textsuperscript{29} Of further


\textsuperscript{29} Akahata, March 25, 1949. The first issue of Zenei, February 1946, carried the program of the Chinese Communist Party. In subsequent issues Mao's New Democracy was discussed in detail. "We can learn from the spirit of the Chinese Communist Party," the title of an article which appeared in Zenei of June 1, 1947, characterizes the relations between the two parties.
significance is that during 1950, 1951, and 1952 the Chinese Communists exhibited an increasingly active interest in Japan. Articles bearing such titles as "To Our Japanese Comrades" began to appear regularly in the Peking Jent-min jih-pao, and were (significantly) reprinted in Pravda. These were apparently designed to guide the Japanese Party through the difficult transitional period. The nature of the Japanese Party's reaction to this guidance from the mainland and the increasing volume of publications in Japan about and from Communist China suggest strongly that the Japanese Party may have been prepared to accept Peking as its new source of inspiration and authority. The sheer size and proximity of the new power center in Asia might alone be regarded as decisive, but the ideological factor appears at least as important as geopolitical considerations. The Japanese Party's initial assessment of the significance of the Chinese Communist success is nowhere expressed more clearly than

A survey of the Party publication Akahata for the period June 1952 through December 1953 shows 85 articles on the U.S.S.R. (many of them devoted in part to relations with China) as against 168 articles on Communist China. While many qualifications are implicit in such quantitative analysis, on-the-spot sampling of left-wing attitudes and interests in Japan during the summer of 1953 and 1954 would tend to corroborate this kind of interest and emphasis ratio. It is significant that a second similar survey covering the period 1952-1960 produced an entirely different picture, one clearly emphasizing Soviet rather than Chinese affairs.
In Kubota's widely read book, *Aragashii Chinogoku to Nihon* (The New China and Japan), in which he writes:

The victory of the Chinese Communists has had a deep spiritual and ideological influence upon the Japanese working classes.

The working people have by their own strength gained a great victory in China -- a country which was more reactionary, more feudalistic, and more of a colony than Japan. This has given unbounded encouragement to our workers and has inspired them with confidence in victory. Our workers had looked on people's democracy and on socialism as something in far-away Europe, but now it has happened in China, only an ocean away, in the country with which we have had the closest relations and for the longest time. If such was possible in China, why should it not now be possible in Japan?31

(b) Popular Front -- Underground, 1953-1954

The period which followed Stalin's death witnessed two more shifts in the Communist line in Japan. It is difficult to judge how directly these changes may have been related to events in the Soviet Union.

The chief modifications in policy concerned violence, which was temporarily abandoned, and broadening the base of popular support in order to capitalize on growing anti-American and pro-Chinese Communist sentiment in Japan. While the semi-colonial formula laid down in November 1951 continued to provide the strategic framework, significant tactical modifications began to appear during 1953. The

31 Tokyo, 1949, p. 121.
Popular Front coexistence formula may be said to have crystallized at the 24th Central Committee Meeting, reported to have been held secretly in November 1953, but the swing away from the direct, radical approach -- probably related to a general softening in the Soviet line and to the gradual termination of hostilities in Korea as well as to domestic considerations -- is identifiable considerably earlier than that. Relevant to this point are the following trends and events of the critical year 1953:

1. Continued self-criticism and "standing up" of the reasons for the resounding defeat of the Party in the October 1952 and April 1953 elections in Japan -- a defeat generally interpreted as public disapproval of the Party's 1951-1952 violent tactics.

2. The conspicuous absence (apart from minor and isolated incidents) of violence such as characterized the February and May riots of the previous year.

3. The development by the Party of an extensive "peace movement" coincident with the close of the Korean War.

4. Increased activity in the legal-political realm; concentration with renewed vigor on the labor movement, especially on the influential 3,000,000 member Sohyo trade union confederation.

5. An increase in the number and circulation of legal JCP publications and the emergence of several organs from covert to overt status.

6. A de-emphasis of military activities (i.e., military action squads, "shock troops," etc.).
The new "interim program," adopted in November 1953, frankly admitted that the balance of power between the East and the West was unfavorable to the Communists and called upon the Party to "increase Communist strength by strengthening the Communist Party, the National Liberation Front, and the Democratic United Front." But it also characterized as "nonsense" any attempt to schedule a revolution at what it called "the present stage." Instead, it placed emphasis on strengthening a united front for bringing about an anti-American, anti-Yoshida, and anti-rearmament movement. The Party also listed nine items as tactical objectives for attaining the larger goal:

1. Opposition to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the MSA agreement and U.S. interference in domestic affairs.
2. Opposition to foreign military bases; withdrawal of foreign troops.
3. Restoration of just and fair relations with all countries, including the Soviet Union and Communist China; revival of free trade on a basis of equality and reciprocity; opposition to international trade under unilateral U.S. control.
4. Freedom of travel to foreign countries.
5. Opposition to militarization of industry; guarantee of peaceful development of industry.
6. Freedom of speech, assembly and association; complete guarantee of people's democratic rights.
7. Opposition to the revival of militarism and to the mercenary armed forces of the U.S.
8. Opposition to the Pacific military alliance and all other aggressive military alliances under any name.

The principal focus of subsequent JCP tactics appears to have been the Socialist Parties and the Sohyo labor organization. During the first half of 1954, although the "peace movement" dominated overt propaganda, there were continued indications of JCP underground military activity. In February, for example, the Japanese police were reported to have seized JCP documents calling for the intensification of efforts to arm and train a military underground.

Public Security Investigation Board Chairman Goichiro Fujii told a Japanese Cabinet meeting early in August 1954 that Party members and fellow travelers were steadily increasing in numbers, that the JCP registered membership had again reached the 100,000 mark, and that there were some 500 units of the underground Communist Nuclear Self Defense Force ready for revolutionary action.

In November 1954 the JCP announced a new 13-point platform which pledged "to support any government in Japan, even a reactionary government," that would "adjust" Japan's relations with Soviet Russia and Red China. The new platform called for a total peace settlement with former enemies, opposed any revision of the present

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33 The Mainichi, August 4, 1954. Thirty thousand of these members were reported by Tokyo Metropolitan Police authorities (who placed JCP registered strength at 100,000) to be paid full-time Party workers. *Nippon Times*, December 1, 1954.
constitution, and demanded a prohibition against the use of atom and hydrogen bombs. Conspicuous by their absence were past demands for abrogation of the U.S.-Japan treaties and agreements, and the usual opposition to rearmament. 34

(c) Popular Front -- New Look, 1954-1955

After the Geneva Conference of 1954, the JCP began to display aspects of the Soviet "New Look." This was in line with worldwide Communist policy and was therefore not an unexpected development. Certain other related foreign and domestic developments appear to have influenced the transformation in JCP policy which took place during the summer of 1955. The most significant factors leading JCP strategy back in the direction of the Nosaka peaceful revolution formula appear to have been:

1. The general reorientation of the Soviet line in the direction of calculated cordiality.
2. The end of the fighting in Korea.
3. The evident failure of the Party's militant underground policy, notably among the Socialists and key labor leaders.
4. Developments in domestic politics, especially replacement of the Yoshida Government by the Hatoyama Government, and the increased strength of the Socialist

parties (Party), which, in turn, tended to create what the JCP apparently regarded as a more fluid political situation.

5. The death of long-time Party Secretary General Tokuda and Nosaka's assumption of the "collective leadership."


The details of the new, modified JCP policy were discussed at a Sixth National Council Meeting and were subsequently published as a resolution in Akahata on July 30, 1955.

After commenting on "favorable" international developments (such as the Geneva and Bandung Conferences) and noting that "the American imperialists are still supervising and controlling our industry, agriculture, finances, and trade and exploiting and plundering our people," the resolution turns to several "fundamental problems and errors." These are identified as: failure to overcome factionalism and to unify the Party, the tactical error of extreme leftist adventurism, and the inability to strengthen ties between the Party and the people.

"The Central Committee of the Party," we are told, "made clear its determination last January to abandon the tactics and struggling methods of ultra-leftist adventurism. The Party recognizes that Japan is not yet ripe for revolution, and stresses the need to carry on an indefatigable fight so as to bring more and more people
into the ambit of the Communist Party and to build a
democratic united front for national liberation."

Before examining the policy and tactics suggested by
the Party in the several areas regarded as critical or
important, it may be useful to summarize the lessons which,
in the same document, the Party says, must be learned if
the Democratic United Front for National Liberation is to
materialize.

1. The Democratic United Front for National Liber-
ation (DUFNL) will not arise by itself nor can it be formed
easily in a short time. It can come into existence only
through the Party's undaunted political and organizational
activities over a long period among the broad masses of the
people.

2. This Democratic United Front for National Libera-
tion can be formed only by uniting the masses of people,
centered on the workers and farmers, under the new
program.

3. To establish closer ties between the Party and
the masses, Party activities must be systematically improved
by critically examining the Party's political and organiza-
tional results and shortcomings of the past.

4. The DUFNL is a means to unify all forces and
individuals for the cause of independence and democracy,
irrespective of ideological leanings, political views, or
religious beliefs. The Party should set aside temporarily
conflicting interests and emphasize common problems and
objectives.

5. The Party must not lose itself in the movement
for liberation, but must carry on systematically correct
activities of its own. It must continue to argue un-
tiringly for the construction of an independent, peaceful
and democratic Japan in accordance with the new program.

The resolution concludes by pinpointing eleven target
areas, and suggests the relative importance and tactical
line for each. These are -- perhaps in order of signifi-
cance: (1) laborers, (2) farm workers, (3) intellectuals,
(4) youth, (5) women, (6) political parties, (7) small
and medium business, (8) the Japanese government or
administration, (9) monopoly capital, (10) rightist
groups, (11) the peace movement (especially neutralists).

"Without the support of a large number of labor
unions, the Party cannot lead the millions of the working
masses." And farmers cannot be ignored because, together
with urban workers, they form "the mainstay of the
democratic revolution for national liberation." In both
areas the Party is cautioned to "correct the error of
leftist sectionalism," to "achieve unity," not to "force
the Party's program" on groups, to pay more attention to
the daily interests of the union members, and to con-
centrate on winning the masses of workers and farmers
ideologically, even though this may be a slow process.

Intellectuals, young people and women are assigned a
clearly secondary role, although the Party implores
members to "eradicate existing prejudice in the Party
against intellectuals" and to channel the political
consciousness of intellectuals, youth and women toward
the correct cause.

With respect to its policy toward other political
bodies, the Party is not to make such mistakes as
supporting a Shigenobu Cabinet and attacking the Socialist Party. Errors of this sort were made, the
resolution says, because the Party had lost sight of its basic objective -- to draw the masses to its side and to
fight for the unity of all democratic forces.

The Party is further advised to be aware of, and to be ready to exploit, dissatisfaction with the Japanese
government and with the economic situation of small and medium business. At the same time the Party must realize
that various types of governments, though reactionary and pro-U.S., can contribute to the revolution. It should do
what it can to frustrate the formation of a cabinet more reactionary than the Hatoyama Cabinet, and try to form a
cabinet that "supports people's demands, even in part," and temporarily, "along lines of opposition to American
occupation and Japanese rearmament."

While the Party must not ally itself with monopoly
capital, which supports traitorous, reactionary govern-
ments, it may encourage certain "dissatisfied big
bourgeois" to take a neutralist position.

The Party must expose and block the revival of anti-
Communist, Fascist, terrorist, rightist groups.

Further, a broad peace movement must be organized
among people of all walks of life who are against atomic
war. The Party must, in effect, stand publicly for
neutralism while not being, itself, neutral.

Finally, the Party must improve itself on the
ideological level. "By mastering the world view of
Marxism-Leninism and being led by it, all Party members
in their Party life must...be loyal to proletarian
internationalism, the working class, and the Party; must
be imbued with a genuine humanism; must live for the
people. Illegal activities must be toned down, lawful
political activities emphasized, propaganda and agitation
made less intellectual and more meaningful to the masses.
In short, the Party must make further efforts to expand
its system and to become a popular vanguard party of the
people."

"In the not too distant future," the document con-
cludes, "the Party can become a real mass party of the
working class if it untiringly arms itself with the
theory of Marxism-Leninism, conducts proper mutual criti-
cism and self-criticism, corrects its errors, removes
its shortcomings, observes strictly the principle of
collective leadership, and promotes the positiveness of
Party members. The Party, thus, can muster all sound,
progressive, patriotic forces in Japan for a democratic
united front for national liberation."

(d) Transitional Period: Sixth National Council Meeting
to Seventh Party Congress, 1955-1958

The transitional period began with the Sixth National
Council Meeting in the summer of 1955, included the
important Moscow Declaration of November 1957, and closed
on a new strategic note with the Seventh JCP Congress in
July of 1958.

The era was marked by a continuing trend toward moder-
ation at times reminiscent of Nosaka's policy of "peaceful
revolution." At the same time the Party held to a pro-
Soviet, pro-Chinese Communist foreign policy skillfully
subsumed under the slogans "peace," "independence" and "keeping on friendly terms with all countries."

As for strategy as it relates to ideology, the most important development of the period was the Party's decision to stop characterizing Japan as a semi-colonial country and to return to the image of Japan as an advanced if dependent capitalist nation -- still under U.S. guidance and control.

Within the Party things were far from quiet. The Party's endemic factionalism, always just below the surface, broke into the open with two occurrences that threatened to split the Party wide open: the opposition raised by the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee and the Zengakuren revolution.

In domestic policy, the predominant trend toward moderation and parliamentarianism is reflected in the official documents, in statements by Party leaders, and in the official Party press. Early in 1957, Japanese law enforcement agencies came into possession of a 40-page document on Communist policy believed to have been drafted by a twelve-man special committee formed at the Ninth Central Committee meeting of the Party. The committee was said to have been headed by Kenji Miyamoto, later to become Secretary General of the JCP. This document

Apart from primary JCP sources, the most accurate and substantial treatment of the early part of the period may be found in a white paper on the JCP issued by the Japanese authorities in November of 1957 and subsequently published (January 24, 1958) by the Nikkan Rodo Tsushinsha organization.
I, further, the tenor of official articles and editorials in Zenei and Akahata after 1956 reflected moderation and the broad, popular-front approach. The switch is evident in the Party’s more conciliatory, more “friendly” approach to labor, to the Socialist Party and to the question of elections.

Writing in Zenei of June 1958, Shigeo Kamiyama characterized the period since 1955 in these words: “The Communist Party made a major switch at its Sixth National Council meeting. After commenting on the Party’s mistake of attacking the Socialists, of branding them as “tools of U.S. imperialism,” he went on to argue:

“The Socialist Party is strongly supported by a majority of the laborers and it also has strong influence among the farmers and other strata of the people. Therefore, an important and decisive task of the Communist Party is to propose and to work for the realization of Socialist-Communist joint action and united front.” It was the Soviet 20th Party Congress, he said, that underlined “the need for joint action of the Social Democratic and Communist parties."

With respect to foreign policy, Party policy was officially purported to “keep on friendly terms with

36 Japan Times, July 20, 1957.
37 See particularly Yamabe Kentaro, “Nihonshakai-to ronzu” (On the Japan Socialist Party), Zenei, April 1958; and Kasuga Shōichi, “To to rodokumiai” (The Party and Labor Unions), Zenei, April 1957.
...all countries." The Party strongly backed the "peaceful unification of Vietnam and Korea." It was also "necessary" to reopen "equal diplomatic relations" with East Germany. The Party called further for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, restoration of Japan's diplomatic relations with Communist China, increased trade with the continent and the return of Okinawa to Japan. The delicate question of the "northern territories" was handled gingerly by pointing out that the Socialist Party, victim of Liberal-Democratic Party propaganda, was demanding return of Southern Sakhalin and the entire Kuriles, which the Party insisted, "will rather confuse the people." Finally, the JCP asked for revision of the "unequal Peace Treaty" and abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Administrative and ASA agreements. 39

On the leadership and personnel side, three indications of increasing moderation and renewed emphasis on legal activity may be cited: (1) the emergence of the principal moderate leaders from the underground to assume positions of leadership within the Party, (2) the expulsion of the extremist left faction from Party leadership, and (3) the reinstatement of such moderate leaders as Shigeo Kamiyama, whose thesis of the two-stage revolution had been repeatedly criticized by left-extremists within the Party. The moderate complexion of the Compromise Central Committee elected by the Seventh Party Congress in July 1958 was a further confirmation of this trend.

39 Akahata, April 29 and 30, 1958.
In terms of propaganda, tactics and action at the working level, particularly in "peace campaigns," etc., closer relationships with Socialist organizations and with labor unions set the pattern.

Leadership -- Factionalism and the New Alignment

The Political Report prepared for the Seventh Party Congress attributes the Party's failures in the transitional period between the Sixth National Council Meeting and the Seventh Party Congress in large part to "leftist opportunism," "sectionalism," neglect of ideological training of new cadres, and especially to "a patriarchal cult of personality, with comrade Kyuichi Tokuda as the central figure."\(^4^0\)

The Seventh Party Congress elected Kenji Miyamoto Secretary General of the JCP. After the death of Tokuda and on the eve of the Congress, other prominent leaders who had been associated with the "patriarchal cult" and had opposed Miyamoto were dropped. These included such men as Ritsu Ito, Shida, Shiino, Mita and Yoshida. And at the Seventh Congress itself, the remaining members of the "cult," such as Konno and Nishizawa (Tokuda's son-in-law), retired from central-executive posts. The "old man," Nosaka, though losing the title of first secretary, retained the honorary post of chairman (Ccho).

The context in which these factional struggles went on relates to opposing theories of revolution: the one-stage revolution as against the two-stage. This

\(^{40}\)"Gist of the Political Report," Akahata, November 6, 1957.
continuing struggle between the two theories, that is to say, between the left extremists and the moderates within the Party, appear to have been behind the expulsions just mentioned.

With respect to realignment of the Party leadership, the Seventh Congress increased the Central Committee to 31 members, and it appeared that the moderate character of the new orientation might be expected to prevail for a time. Shojiro Kasuga replaced the sometimes difficult and bureaucratic Shoichii Kasuga as Chairman of the important Control Commission.

A point of special significance to the present study is the fact that Party leaders with substantial labor union backgrounds were added to the Presidium and to the Secretariat. These included Yahiro II (leader of the February 1 general strike), Katsumi Kikunami (ex-chairman of the National Federation of Industrial Organizations) and Ichizo Suzuki (ex-chairman of the National Railway Workers Union). The point is reinforced by the intensity and amount of attention given labor and labor union strategy in the Political Report of the Seventh Congress.

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Members of the Central Committee Presidium following the Seventh Congress: Sanzo Nosaka, Chairman of the Central Committee and of its Presidium, Shoichi Kasuga, Katsumi Kikunami, Koreto Kurahara, Yoshio Shiga, Ichizo Suzuki, Satomi Hakamada, Harushige Metsushima and Kenji Miyamoto; Secretariat: Kenji Miyamoto, Secretary General and concurrently member of the Presidium, Kuraji Anzai, Yoshiro II, Shoichi Kasuga, concurrently member of the Presidium, Hikoyoshi Nishikawa, Satomi Hakamada, concurrently member of the Presidium, and Itaru Yonehara.

(a) Ideological Guidelines Laid Down by the Seventh Party Congress

The Seventh Congress of the JCP in the summer of 1958 represented another milestone in the long and complicated development of a Communist theory and strategy for Japan. Not all the issues are yet clear to us. As has been suggested, dissension and inner-Party disunity over fundamental theoretical questions still persisted. Yet a better understanding of Communist revolutionary strategy for Japan is possible as a consequence of the documents, attendant comments, and observations on the Seventh Congress.

The theoretical, ideological or strategic problem -- which has a specific relationship to the character of Communist policy in Japan -- centers on the changing view and treatment of three related issues: (1) the character and stage of development of Japan as a nation, (2) identification of the "principal enemy" and (3) the proper revolutionary strategy (i.e., one-stage vs. two-stage, peaceful vs. violent revolution, etc.).

The Character or Stage of Development of Japan as a Nation.

The stereotyped Comintern division of the world into three categories of nations: socialist (the U.S.S.R.), capitalist, and colonial (or semi-colonial) became obsolete with the end of World War II. (Many would suggest that it has always been obsolete.) The postwar
period produced several anticipated and a few unexpected changes in the status of nations which Marxist-Leninist theoreticians at some point would be obliged to face. How should Moscow characterize an occupied Germany or Japan? Into what Marxist-Leninist pigeonhole should one force the new nations of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East? What should the Soviet theoretician do with Eastern Europe? And, after 1948, with Yugoslavia? An anti-Soviet, socialist country? Impossible! With the emergence of a Communist China in 1949, Maoism became competitive. And as Peking-oriented regimes came into being, probably in North Korea as a consequence of the Korean war, certainly in Southern Indochina after the Geneva agreements of 1954 -- the simple ideological world of Comintern days had been replaced by a confusing complex of which Japan is a classic example.

Though Communists talked about "feudal remnants," up to the end of World War II, Japan was a fairly clear-cut case of an advanced capitalist, imperialist country. The character and "stage of development" of Japanese industrial organization as well as the record of Japanese militarism seemed to sustain Lenin's views. Certainly, the case was convincing enough to all of the faithful and to a great many non-Communist intellectuals.

With the defeat of Japan and its control and occupation by the Allied forces, the picture began to change radically. During the early postwar years, Soviet policy makers for a variety of reasons chose not to make an issue of the ideological question. The JCP leadership, in the person of Sanzo Nosaka, it will be recalled, responded to
certain implications of the changed "objective conditions" in Japan and attempted to "adapt Marxism-Leninism" to these new conditions. For this, Nosaka was severely taken to task by the Cominform early in 1950. Yet up to this time Moscow had apparently been content to leave the JCP largely on its own ideological resources. The essential point is that while Nosaka was saying that the U.S. Occupation forces, "far from hindering the aims of the JCP," would, on the contrary, "facilitate the democratization of Japan," Soviet policy makers in Moscow and Tokyo were saying nothing. Nor did they, at least up to 1950, have anything significant to say directly on the question of the character of Japan, its changed "stage of development." Presumably, then, up to this time, Japan was an occupied, advanced capitalist country.

The Cominform criticism of 1950 signaled the 180 degree turn which was, in effect, to put Japan for the first time in its history among the "dependent, semi-colonial and colonial areas." Nosaka's theory was criticized for "embellishing the imperialist occupation of Japan." Still the issue was far from clear. The ensuing months saw Nosaka's self-criticism and the reorientation of the JCP policy among more military and international lines, though the "fundamental theoretical question" had not been resolved. A hint of things to come appeared in the form of a statement by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party shortly before the beginning of the Korean War: "American imperialist policy toward
Japan, it said, "is one directed to turning Japan into an American colony and a base for a new war of aggression." 

By the fall of 1951, the New Program and other official JCP documents, without actually using the term "colony," began to characterize Japan as "a country completely dependent upon America." This, with minor variations, is the category to which Japan was assigned during the ensuing years, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the end of the occupation notwithstanding.

The JCP Sixth National Council Meeting held in the summer of 1955 attempted to distinguish between Japan's economic development and its political status: "Japan is an advanced capitalist country," the Council Resolution stated, "but it is a subservient country which is solely under American occupation and which has lost its independence."

In Moscow during the summer of 1957, the author questioned E. M. Zhukov, specialist on Japan and Dean of the Far Eastern International Relations field in the Soviet Union, on this point. Asked if he regarded Japan as a "colonial area," he replied that he would regard Japan not as a "colonial area," but as an area "dependent upon the United States." He then added that he was really

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42 China Information Bureau, Press Administration, No. 404, Peking, June 14, 1950.
43 Akahata, July 30, 1955.
not up to date on "what the Japanese Communists had been saying recently on this point." 44

By way of explaining the Party's mistakes and "incorrect" theories of the past, the Political Report presented at the 1958 Seventh Congress relates: "In spite of the fact that Japan was an advanced capitalist country in which the semifeudal landowners fundamentally had been disbanded, the Party erroneously defined Japan simply as a colonial dependency, although it was right in calling attention to the state of 'colonial dependency' in which Japan was placed by the imperialistic American Occupation." Then in a significant passage, the Report concludes: "In connection with these mistakes, the Party adopted the international theories concerning the struggles for liberation in colonial and dependent countries, as well as the theory on proletarian internationalism without adapting them to the actual conditions in Japan." 45

After considerable apparent confusion and disagreement, the Seventh Congress finally settled on a compromise: Japan was a dependency of the United States, controlled by American imperialism despite the fact that it was a highly developed capitalist country. According to the final version of the Political Report adopted by the Congress:

44 Interview with E. M. Zhukov, Moscow, August 1957. Also present at the interview, in addition to the official Intourist interpreter, was A. A. Guber, Soviet "authority" on colonialism and on Southeast Asia.

45 Akahata, July 30, 1955.
Japan today has already become part of America's aggressive scheme in Asia and a base for atomic war. The central purpose of present American policy is to lead Japan along the armament road...[in the interests of] America's aggressive world policy.

At the same time, Japanese capitalism is in the process of preparing the economic basis for the revival of imperialism.46

Identification of the Principal Enemy

The identification of the principal enemy turns out to be a question very closely related to the matter of the Party's domestic vs. international orientation. Up to 1950, as has been shown, the Party played down its ties with the Soviet Union and asserted that American forces in Japan were helping rather than hindering the revolution. The enemies during this period were presumably largely domestic. Major targets were the monopoly capitalists and the Japanese militarists. The broader the united front, the fewer the acknowledged enemies.

The Cominform Criticism of 1950 and the Party's re-orientation changed all this. First, as Party policy moved from the moderate two-stage approach to a more extreme, one-stage pattern, former "friends" (the Socialists, for example) tended to be regarded as enemies. Secondly, the United States became the target of a direct attack.

The corollary of the 1951 New Program's emphasis on Japan's dependent status, was, of course, the emergence of the new and principal enemy, now specifically identified as the United States along with the totally dependent

Japanese government. The character and stage of development of Japan's economy remained to be changed.

The 1955 JCP Resolution adopted at the Sixth National Council Meeting still focused on "American and Japanese reactionary forces which are enslaving the Japanese," but it was a distinctly more moderate and sophisticated document calling for a broader, united-front approach.

The central issue of the Seventh Party Congress -- an issue never completely resolved -- was the identification of the principal enemy. The argument was whether "American imperialism" or "Japanese monopolies" should be regarded as the chief enemy. As summarized in Akahata, the opposition to the draft program and Political Report took the following line:

Our view that the Japanese monopolies are controlling Japan does not imply that the Party should reject the objective of national independence, but that the Party should promote a fundamental class struggle against the monopolies in order to win independence for the Japanese nation....

American power in Japan is exerted through the Japanese monopolies. Therefore, the first blow of our Party must be struck against the Japanese monopolies.47

Miyamoto summarized the prevailing opinion in support of the draft program and Report as follows:

Some comrades have asserted that we underestimate the power of monopolies in Japan. As is obvious from the draft program, which

differs from the 1951 program, we placed
the monopolies at the center of the power
structure of Japan and the principle of
the draft program was derived from this
newly recognized structure of Japan. In
the draft program, we also recognized the
growth of contradictions between Japan and
the United States. It is important to see
the growing contradictions in all aspects
of Japanese-American relations. But we
believe the common interests of the Japanese
and American monopolies remain greater than
the contradictions between them.48

Thus, while the Party had formerly branded Japan as
a semi-colonial or dependent nation under the control of
American imperialism and had listed as the "people's
enemies" monopolistic capital, the Emperor, the defunct
military clique, the bureaucracy, the landlord, in the
new 1958 formulation Japan became a puppet capitalist
economy, and the "enemies of the people" were now lumped
essentially into two categories: monopolistic capital
and its associate -- American imperialism.

In two separate statements of May 1958, the political
implications of the new strategic formula are set forth:
In an interview with the editor of the magazine Sekai,
Nosaka said: "...I believe that the major objective of
the democratic government that we wish to establish is to
sever Japan from the United States."49 During the same
month Akahata editorialized: "The peace, independence and
prosperity of Japan are impossible without friendly ties
with China as well as with the U.S.S.R."50

48 Akahata, July 30, 1958.
49 Sekai (The World), May 1958.
50 May 19, 1958.
(b) Strategy and Tactics Projected by the Seventh Party Congress

What were the specific objectives projected for the Party during the 1958-1960 period and how do they relate to tactical considerations for the several strata of Japanese society? The Political Report has something to say on this question. The Party was to display more zeal, attain better discipline, eradicate extreme leftist opportunism and sectionalism, defend itself against international and external enemies, and improve its ideology and organization at the working level. But more specific "Present Missions of the Party" are also contained in the Political Report. These may be summarized briefly:

1. The primary mission of the Party is to step up the struggle for "peace and independence." To achieve these desirable goals, the Party must struggle against rearmament and nuclear testing. It must fight relentlessly against the plans of reactionary forces in the U.S. and Japan to convert Japan into a base for Atomic war. It must seek the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japan. Most of the well-known Soviet and Chinese Communist positions on international issues are also listed as important missions of the Party: liberation of Taiwan, unification of Korea, Communist China's representation in the U.N., etc.

2. The defense of "democratic rights." This category includes all of the well known goals: the struggle to protect democracy, to oppose attacks on labor unions, to fight police oppression, to reduce social discrimination
(the Outcasts), and to fight against the reactionary educational policies of monopoly capital and the Kishi Cabinet, etc.

To win over a wide stratum of the people to the side of democratic forces by exposing the truth about the reactionaries' offensive through the newspapers, radio and other media of mass communications, the Party must utilize every available propaganda opportunity and strengthen the propaganda activities of the party and other democratic forces. We must attract the peoples' masses to the Party and the united front through constant propaganda for peace, independence, democracy and socialism. 3

3. The economic struggle against the "concentration of capital." "Monopoly capital and its government are driving all of the people into poverty by oppressing their livelihood," the Political Report asserts. "In the process," the document concludes, "a handful of monopolistic corporations accumulate huge profits at the cost of the masses in order to strengthen reactionary control through the concentration of capital." The Party's answer: rally with the workers and fight for livelihood and welfare improvements of all kinds at the working level.

4. Struggle for a "national democratic united front" centered on the working class. The aim here is to "develop a united mass movement to overthrow the Kishi Cabinet by linking the various people's struggles with the Diet struggle." Cooperative ties with the Socialist Party are also seen as important:

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51 Akahata, November 6, 1957. Subsequent references to and quotations from the Political Report are from the same source unless otherwise specified.
The Socialist Party is planning an increasingly large role in the struggle to protect the peace, independence, democracy and livelihood of the Japanese people. Moreover it has taken a step toward peaceful coexistence by issuing a joint statement with the Soviet Communist Party, and it is coming to agree with our Party on an increasing number of points...despite differences in our basic political stands. These facts are propitious for the formation of a coalition government by the two parties under a united front based on a common platform.

5. Intensify Diet Activities. "The Party must correctly evaluate the role of the Diet and utilize it to establish a united front. It must endeavor to step up its Diet activities and send more representatives to the Diet." Party activity in local government is also to be strengthened.

6. Unify workers and farmers. "The worker-farmer alliance should be the nucleus of a national democratic united front to which all other people would repair."

7. Strengthen "proletarian internationalism." The "missions" of the Party end on this note:

Our Party must strengthen mutual confidence based on the principle of proletarian internationalism and support the struggle of all fraternal parties. It must support all struggles of the peoples of the world for peace, democracy and social progress which are being waged under the leadership of the working class. The workers, farmers, women, youth, and intellectuals of Japan have deepened their international intercourse with their foreign counterparts. Our Party must give further support to the development of such movements as will strengthen international solidarity in the future.
How these tactical objectives are to be accomplished by mobilizing critical elements and groups in the society is spelled out in a separate section of the Political Report entitled "Struggle Missions for Various Elements of the People." If these sectors are arranged in terms of importance, as appears to be the case, the labor union area rates top priority.

Labor Union activities. The Party asked members to assist labor unions in correcting four fundamental weaknesses: (1) the ineffectiveness of labor unions at the lower echelons, (2) their poor organizational structure, i.e., on an enterprise basis, (3) their weakness in the struggle against "the disruptive tactics of monopoly capital and against separationist elements," and (4) their division into national blocs.

The Agrarian area. The Party suggests that all elements of the agrarian community (poor, middle-class and rich farmers) were being ruthlessly exploited by the government and monopoly capital. The agrarian aspect of the united front was, accordingly, reflected in the Party's advice to the rich farmers to make common cause with the middle class and the impoverished farmers.

Fisheries and Fishermen. The Party sees three major problems "now threatening the Japanese fishing industry and the livelihood of our fishermen: (1) Japan has been deprived of high-seas fishing grounds under the Japan-U.S.-Canada Fisheries Agreement, (2) large areas of these fishing grounds have been taken over as military reservations by U.S. forces, and (3) indiscriminate fishing practices of monopoly fisheries continue unabated." These
items are neatly related in terms of "struggle tactics" to the farmers' need for a guaranteed wage system, new fisheries legislation, stronger fisheries unions, etc. The Party is at obvious pains here to underline U.S. responsibility for the problem, since it is widely known in Japan that the Soviets often interfere with Japanese fishing operations.

The Community People (Outcasts). "The struggle for emancipation by the outcast communities (whose population the Party numbers at 3,000,000) will succeed by relying upon the wage earning people of the 'communities' and through a widespread common front with various other groups."

Lower-strata Urban Citizens. "The demands and struggles of the wage earning citizens (small merchants, manual workers, craftsmen and many other self-employed people) form an important part of the struggle of all the working people, centering on the working class, for peace, independence, democracy and the betterment of their standard of living." "...the Party must be in close contact with the aggressive individuals of this group who have become mature and must strengthen further the independent, democratic organization of the wage earning citizens. The Party must further strengthen Party organs created within this group of people."

Women. "The Party must realize that women's struggles play a great role in spreading democracy and opening the way for socialism in Japan. The Party must correct the erroneous ideas that exist on these points (that women are inferior, etc.)."
Youth. "Serious attention must be given the appeal to youth made in the administrative policy speech of Prime Minister Kishi.... The U.S. and Japanese reactionary forces obviously intend to employ youth again in their designs to militarize the country." After calling for a united front of all young people seeking peace, democracy, and social progress, the Party singles out as a prime target the Japanese Democratic Youth League (Minsei Domai), which, it says, is a "sectionalist organization containing few progressive elements."

Intellectuals. "There are," the Party suggests, "among the intellectuals not a few who either are under the ideological influence of the Japanese and U.S. reactionary forces or remain noncommitted. Due consideration must be given, the Party advises, "to the fact that even these persons are undergoing ideological changes along with the changes in the international and domestic situations."

Small Entrepreneurs. Special emphasis is placed on the point that it is the small entrepreneur who can be especially useful in the struggle to promote trade with China and the U.S.S.R. Apart from encouraging this group to participate in various trade-promotion organizations, the Party concludes that the workers in small enterprises must be organized into labor unions. In effect, then, the Party intends to fight both with and against the small entrepreneur.

The revolutionary pattern of Communist strategy and tactics which thus emerges is one constructed of three essential links. First, the Party seeks to show that
Monopoly capital and the Japanese government are subservient to and controlled by U.S. interests. Secondly, the Party asserts that the nature and seriousness of Japan's present problems are a direct consequence of this unholy alliance. Thirdly, the Party aims to unite a variety of local, united-front struggles (centering on the worker-farmer alliance) into mass movements or national campaigns which will soon serve to neutralize the unholy alliance. Ultimately, these national movements will converge to bring about the downfall of the present Japanese government, thereby paving the way for a "coalition government" (lead by Socialists and Communists), the first stage on the road to political power.

This essentially two-stage revolutionary formula, with a strong Maoist flavor, lays emphasis on, but is not restricted to, parliamentarianism and open, legal methods. It is dedicated to the "coexistence" line, and appears to bank heavily upon the growing attraction of Communist China and the increasing power and prestige of the Soviet Union -- probably in that order.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Details of implementation of this policy during the 1958-1960 period may be found in the *Japanese Government White Paper on Communism in Japan*, a full translation of which is included as Part II of this study.
Since JCP organization and operations in the labor area are an integral part of Party organization and administration, it is useful first to outline briefly the basic structure of the Party organization. Certain modifications in this structure will be noted from time to time. These occur mainly in response to changes in tactical emphasis related to shifts in the international Communist line as well as to changing conditions in Japan. Thus, when the principal Party leadership was removed from further participation in Japanese political life by order of General MacArthur in the summer of 1950, the Central Committee was formally replaced by the Central Directorate, though there can be little doubt that the Central Committee, or at least the Tokuda group, continued to run the Party from underground. Other structural modifications accompanied the Party's policy shift toward placing a greater emphasis on underground, military activity during 1950 and 1951, while subsequent increasing interest in the labor union as a political weapon occasioned further reorganization. Finally, with the subsequent Soviet policy shift to a more moderate approach, at the time referred to as a "New Look," the JCP appears to have modified its policy and organizational structure to facilitate the return to an emphasis on "legal activities."

The relationship of the Party's organizational structure to the situation faced by the JCP in Japan is clearly implied in a section of a resolution adopted
by the JCP's 6th National Council Meeting in July 1955. The text reads:

Illegal activities are activities to be undertaken when the Party is forced to resort to them because of the relative strength among the classes. During the period 1950 and 1951, when suppression became intensified, lawful activities were not the Party's main activities. In May 1952 the occupation system ended in a formal sense and the situation changed. The possibility for developing lawful activities increased. We made a slow start in taking advantage of this possibility. The Party must now make full use of all conditions for the development of lawful political activities.5

This statement leaves out such important factors as the Korean War, Moscow and Peking policy needs, factionalism within the JCP, etc. Nevertheless, a review of the Party's changing organizational structure from 1945 to 1960 does seem to substantiate what in any case might reasonably be expected to have happened: Party organization underwent at least two basic overhauls, each in response to a change in direction (for a combination of reasons) of Party policy or tactics. As the Party suggests, the critical factor appears to have been emphasis on illegal vs. lawful political activities, modified perhaps by changing target emphasis. Party organization consequently, remained fairly constant during the period of peaceful revolution, 1945-1949. During the transition period, 1950 to 1951, it was altered to conform to the changing "international and domestic picture." And

5 Akahata, July 30, 1955.
during 1954 and 1955 -- in response, again, to the international developments and the changing domestic climate -- it was revamped and geared to the new United Front policy with its renewed emphasis on lawful political activity.

1. BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1945-1950

The basic organization, nomenclature, and administration of the JCP remains constant enough to permit a meaningful overall analysis, despite structural alterations geared to the changing situation in the world and in Japan.

Structurally, the JCP resembles the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Like Communist parties throughout the world, it embraces every aspect of the political, economic and social life of the nation by means of an interlocking network of cells, guided and controlled by a hierarchy of Party agencies (see Fig. 1).

For the labor area -- as for other areas -- decisions on policy and tactics are, of course, made at the Central Committee or Presidium (Politburo) level. Policy is implemented by a Labor Union Directorate (at one time operated as a staff section of the Party Secretariat, later expanded and organized as a separate administrative unit, directly attached to the Politburo). At the operating level -- in factories, mines, and other working places -- are the Party cells. The role these cells play

Fig. 1—Organization of the JCP—January 1950
in the JCP's use of labor is suggested in an official Party handbook entitled "Cell Activities Made Easy":

The basic unit of the Party is called a cell. Cells are created in shops, agrarian communities, schools, and residential areas. These cells, each of which has a definite, independent character, serve as the nuclei of Party activity. The situation is exactly the same as in the case of the human body, where each cell functions as an independent organism, contributing at the same time to the function of the body as a whole.

These cells are combined to form district committees, regional committees, and a central committee. By means of the cell, the higher echelons activate the masses. Union of the Party and the masses is effected through the cell....

The cell is the stronghold of the revolutionary movement.55

2. THE LABOR UNION CONTROL MECHANISM: FRACTIONS

The standard instrument employed by the Communist Party to penetrate, influence and control the labor unions is called a "fraction" or "Party member group."56 The Rules and Regulations, adopted in December 1947 by the Sixth Congress of the JCP, detailed the nature and function

55Tsunesaburo Takenaka and Shoichi Kasuga, Saibo Katsudo hayawakari (Cell Activities Made Easy), Tokyo, 1949, pp. 8-9.

56The term "fraction" was replaced in 1947 by the phrase "Party member group." This rectification of names was decided upon at the Sixth Party Congress, apparently in an attempt to mitigate the violent criticism being directed against the Party by non-Communists because of Communist "fractional" activity.
of such groups within labor organizations or similar "mass organizations":

Article 49. When there are more than three Party members within a mass organization, such as a labor union, a farmers' organization, a youth association, a cooperative or a cultural organization, these members shall form a Party member group. Party member groups within a mass organization, while acting within the limits set by the rules and regulations of the particular organization, must strengthen the Party's influence by gaining the confidence of the organization's members through positive and exemplary conduct. The Party member group elects a directorate to attend to daily activities.

Article 50. Party member groups belonging to the same organization may have central, regional, metropolitan, and prefectural or district group directorates, in accordance with the territorial breakdown of the particular organization. These directorates form a chain of command running from top to bottom; but they are all subordinate to the Party's Central, Regional, Metropolitan, Prefectural and District Committees, respectively, and they are bound by the decisions of these Party Committees.

Article 51. Party member group directorates shall be composed of:

1. Party members in executive positions on the various levels within a mass organization;

2. Representatives of Party member group directorates or of cells within the lower executive echelons of the said organization; and

3. Representatives from Party organs which direct the Party member groups at each level.
Article 52. Joint meetings of the group directorates and of the Party organs at the central, regional, metropolitan, prefectural and district levels shall be held for the purpose of (a) coordinating activities of the groups within each of the various mass organizations; (b) coordinating the activities of these groups with the activities of the Party itself; and (c) coordinating all group activities with Party policy.

The importance the Party attaches to the organization of labor as a political weapon may be judged by the statements of two high-ranking JCP leaders, both of them specialists in organizational activity. When attacked for his connection with Communist fractions, labor leader Katsumi Kikunami replied: "The activity of Party members within the labor unions strengthens the class character of these organizations. This, in turn, stimulates their development. Such activity, therefore, must be considered absolutely indispensable (for a healthy development of Japanese unions).... There are those who proclaim that they have no objection to our being members of the Communist Party but that they object only to our fractional activity. This is like telling a man that he may continue to live as a human being but that he must absolutely refrain from walking." A book edited by Kentaro Yamabe, recommended by the Communist Party and composed in the main of articles taken from Akahata, contains the

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57 Nippon kyosanto kettei hokoku-shu (Resolutions and Reports of the Japanese Communist Party), Fukuoka, 1949, pp. 80-81.
58 Kikunami, Rodo kumiso-ron, p. 110.
following pertinent comment: "The Italian and the French Communist parties are able to direct very large mass movements because they possess vigorous factory cells everywhere." 59

Although Communists have at no time constituted more than a small minority even in the so-called "Communist unions" of the NCIU, they have nevertheless been able to exert, through skillful organizational and fractional activity, a degree of influence out of proportion to their numerical strength. Representing usually less than 10 percent of the total membership of an organization, they have often succeeded in gaining complete control. 60 The gradual process of Communist penetration, although never quite uniform because of varying local conditions, has generally followed a distinct and discernible pattern. Communist workers -- few in number but always in the forefront of the unions' struggle with the employer -- would organize Communist fractions as prescribed by a resolution of the Central Committee adopted in May 1946, at a time when it had become clear that the Communist unification drive had failed. Once the fraction had been formed with the active assistance and under the supervision of the appropriate Party agency, a suitable individual would be selected among the Communist union members for a position of

59 Kentaro Yamabe, To-seikatsu (Party Life), Tokyo, 1950, p. 18.

60 According to SCAP, this fact was openly admitted by Communist leaders. Satomi Hakamada, a veteran of the pre-war Communist movement and in the postwar period a member of the Central Committee, commenting on the question, reportedly boasted in 1946: "A handful of Communist members hold the actual leadership." Summation of Non-military Activities in Japan, February, 1957, p. 36.
leadership. Thereupon, the fraction could initiate an organized campaign to send its leader into the policy-making body of the union. Backed by a well-disciplined team of supporters, trained in organizational techniques, and armed with a clear-cut answer to any and all political and economic questions, the candidate -- who during the early period seldom admitted his membership in the Communist Party -- from the outset would command an advantage over his generally inexperienced opponents. Even when he faced a Socialist candidate, the Communist union leader was apt to find himself in the more favorable position, for his competitor's camp was likely to be split into left-wing, centrist, and right-wing factions, engaged in a permanent feud with one another. Thus, although outnumbered many times by the non-Communists, the Communist fraction very often succeeded in placing its candidate on the union's policy-making board. Once elected -- and this constitutes the beginning of the next phase -- the Party representative would attempt to strengthen Communist influence through the judicious use of a variety of techniques, especially by bringing in his supporters as permanent officials to staff the union's secretariat. In the Japanese context, where it is so difficult to fire anyone, these Party members are difficult to dislodge in their positions. They write the draft action policies, speeches, etc. of the leaders. They are one of the chief problems inside Sohyo today. In this manner, a single seat on a union's directorate was frequently parlayed into a Communist majority. The same technique applied on a larger scale, in turn, brought whole national unions under Communist control.
PARTY STRUCTURE, 1950-1954

The following factors appear to have been principally responsible for changes in the JCP organizational structure after 1950: (1) The removal by SCAP Directive of the top JCP leaders from further participation in public life and their disappearance into the underground; (2) developments in the international scene, especially the Korean War; (3) the failure of the Party to win increasing mass support or to maintain control of the labor movement; (4) the influence of certain doctrinaire elements within the Party who had all along fought for a more militant policy and whose hand appears to have been temporarily strengthened by the Cominform criticism of Nosaka's "legal" line.

The organization which emerged is shown on the accompanying chart (Fig. 2). Early in 1954, a Central Directorate officially replaced the Central Committee, while an expanded underground structure took over the principal operations of the Party, especially the development of military guerrilla "self-defense corps," the penetration of mass organizations and political parties, and the re-establishment of control over the Japanese labor movement.

4. REORGANIZATION FOR INTENSIFIED LABOR ACTIVITY: UNIFICATION COMMITTEES

In September 1949, the JCP Central Committee first suggested the creation of unification committees in all unions. These committees were to serve as the spearhead
of Communist influence within the unions. The January 1, 1950 issue of Zen'ei set forth the new organizational pattern in an article entitled "Turning Point in the Trade Union Movement -- For a United Front," which frankly admitted that the Party had "lost the leadership of the labor unions" and recommended unification committees as the "effective organizational form" to regain the lost ground.

After the shift to a more radical and international posture following the Cominform criticism of Nosaka (January 1950) and the outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950), the Party sought to strengthen the organization of management cells through the unification committee movement. Attempts were also made to convert the factory struggle committees into resistance and self-defense units and nucleus self-defense units (chukaku jiei-kai).

Labor in general, and Sohyo in particular, now became the main target. By the end of 1951 the Party had apparently made considerable progress in its program of cell reconstruction in the principal industries. Meanwhile, Party rules and regulations were tightened and the organizational structure revamped to conform with the new situation.

A Party directive entitled "Labor Union Directive" issued on August 13, 1952, stated that the Labor Union Central Group Guidance Directorate was to be strengthened and attached to the Central Committee through the Orgburo. (See organizational chart attached.) This directive established the fact that the Group Guidance Directorate had become an important action unit for organizational activity. Further, it emphasized that there was no more
vital problem than the strengthening of the leadership of
the working class, the main body of the revolution. 61

A meeting of the National Labor Unions Central Group
Directorate was reportedly convened in January 1953 to
formulate policy for the coming year. Organizationally,
it was determined that in order to "firmly control the
unions and to grasp the leadership of the working class,"
the establishment of an intra-Party organization was
necessary. The decision was reached to expand and to
strengthen the network of labor union group directorates
and unification committees on every level. 62 The
February issue of the Party organ Soahikisha called for
improved and expanded organizational activity and for a
political newspaper for the labor unions. The Japan
Worker (Nihon Rodosha) was issued immediately thereafter.

In May 1953 the National Labor Unions Central Group
Directorate (Chuo Sakki) again convened a conference of
national representatives. Here the conclusion was reached
that the labor movement was approaching a "turning point,"
that the mission of the Party was now to "develop the
advanced labor class in the direction of conscious
revolution." For the first time the unification committees
were directed to adopt a platform and rules and to come
out in the open and demonstrate their leadership before
the public.

61 Nikkan Rodo Tsushinsha, op. cit.
62 Ibid.
Following the Fourth Sohyo Convention, the Party continued still another meeting of the National Labor Unions Group Directorate in July (1953). The Party openly stated that the laboring class had become the center of all struggles and that victory was unthinkable without labor's support. 63

5. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES AND TRENDS, 1954-1955

Though the JCP structure by 1955 had still not returned to the basic organization of the 1945-1950 period, a trend in that direction became evident during 1954 and 1955. That this process was underway was first suggested by the transfer during 1954 of several JCP publications from covert to overt status by the surfacing of a number of underground JCP members, by the apparent dismantling of portions of the underground military apparatus, and by a general de-emphasis on underground activity. 64

All indications further point to the fact that the Central Directorate was gradually strengthened during this period, and its functions enlarged after Kasuga Shoichi became its chairman in March 1954, and particularly after the Party's open activities have been re-emphasized. Until 1954, the jurisdiction of the Central Directorate was clearly nominal, the real authority resting with the

63 Nihon Rodosha, August 3, 1953.
64 The Public Security Agency has estimated the number of JCP underground members at 1,200, of whom perhaps one-half are believed to have surfaced during 1955.
Central Committee Headquarters, i.e., the Central Committee (as shown on Fig. 2).

Further significant changes in organizational structure and emphasis are reflected in the July 1955 Draft Revised Party Regulations. The two most striking points are (1) the detail with which central, regional and local, even cell, organization is discussed (in contrast to the disappearance of such sections from the 1951 Revised Party Regulations), and (2) the appearance of the concept of collective leadership, and the not unexpected replacement of the Politburo by a Presidium.

6. REVISED JCP ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT VIS-A-VIS LABOR

The section on labor unions in the resolution adopted at the Sixth National Council Meeting of the JCP in July 1955 explains how these changes might have been expected to affect JCP organization in labor. The text reads as follows:

Without the support of a large number of labor unions, the Party cannot lead the millions of the working masses. In order to gain the support of labor unions, Party members must work day after day so as to gain the confidence of union members. The Party must decisively correct the error of leftist sectionalism committed in the labor movement, the formation of unification committees consisting of Party members and sympathizers, for example. It must establish correct relations between the Party and labor unions -- the mass organizations. A labor union is a mass organization uniting all workers, irrespective of political views, party affiliations, nationality and religious beliefs, whose
aim is to serve the daily demands and interests of the working masses. The major task of labor unions at present is to organize worker actions and to unify all labor unions in order to win pressing economic and social demands, that is, to oppose the stoppage of wage increases, layoffs, additional work loads, and other aspects of deteriorated working conditions, to win higher wages and a minimum wage scale, and to expand social security, and to defend the rights of labor unions and their members.

Therefore, the Party must always seek the unity of all labor unions, and must fight against the factionalists' scheme to split labor unions.... Our Party members must not arbitrarily force the Party's platform and policy on labor unions. Our Party members in the unions must untiringly and enthusiastically work for the daily interests of union members, and at the same time carry on the task of political persuasion...and win the working masses ideologically. Without this basic activity no attempt should be made to achieve organizational unity. One cannot conjure up "unity" by Party fiat. Such is not real unity.

The Party members, therefore, must conduct systematic activities patiently and devotedly in all kinds of worker unions, even those under reactionary leaders, and must fulfill their duty as Party members. The Party, too, must organize temporary workers, who are growing in numbers, unorganized workers of small and medium enterprises, and the unemployed. The Party is to some extent restoring confidence in worker union movements. To secure more support from many worker unions, the Party must continue its strenuous activities....
by so doing, the party can gain ideological support from the majority of the working class and can open up the way toward creating a united labor front.65

Thus, modifications in JCP policy and an approach in the direction of the "peaceful revolution" formula of 1946-1950 suggest that the organizational structure of the JCP following the Sixth National Council Meeting in the summer of 1955 was essentially a hybrid, the offspring of the pre-Korean Japanese Party and the post-Stalin Soviet Party, in which aspects of the Chinese Communist organizational pattern may be identified. The new organization took the form of a Presidium, "collective leadership," and an emphasis on open, popular-front tactics.

7. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 1958-1960 DEVELOPMENTS

Japanese security agencies report that during 1956 and 1957, the JCP did, indeed, revise its organizational structure. The central aim of this reorganization appears to have been a greater degree of centralization to assure more direct and effective control by central Party organs. With respect to the labor unions, this development included the abolition of JCP unification committees within labor unions and the discontinuance of publication of such specialized JCP items on labor tactics as Nihon Rodo-sha (The Japanese Worker).66

65 Akahata, July 1955.
While the new JCP regulations adopted by the Seventh Congress have relatively little to say about labor and labor organization, a single article seems highly significant. Article 16 reads: "With regard to the class composition of Party membership, the number of workers must be increased constantly with a view toward effecting a proportionate increase of workers. This applies also to the composition of the executive (guidance) organs."

All of these developments appear to be part of a more general return to the organizational structure of the Occupation period.

By 1960, the JCP organization had been overhauled in order to gear it more closely to the tasks set forth at the Seventh Party Congress. The resulting structure in many ways resembled more closely the organizational pattern of a decade earlier than it did some of the ad hoc underground arrangements of the intervening period.

The accompanying chart reflects the JCP organization as of February 1960. Characteristic of Communist Parties the world over, the Presidium has, of course, replaced the Politburo. The Jûgburo has disappeared as a separate entity. A comparison with the 1950 structure (p. 69) shows more similarities than differences. This suggests that the streamlined party may be expected to function in a manner more closely akin to the Nosaka "lovable" Party of the 1945-1950 period than to the belligerent, underground Party of the early 1950's.

67 Akahata, August 19, 1958.
At the same time, certainly, violence had not been ruled out, nor had the Party abandoned all underground activities. The question, as always the case with Communist Parties, was a matter to be resolved in terms of the needs and potential of a given period.
Fig. 3—Organization of the JCP—February 1960
IV. THE JCP AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN OCCUPIED JAPAN, 1945-1951

1. RESURGENCE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT TO THE FEBRUARY 1ST GENERAL STRIKE (August 1945 to January 1947)

(ii) The General Scene

Disillusionment with war and militarism, economic chaos, unemployment, and an American occupation policy dedicated to the "revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the people of Japan" combined to produce an atmosphere in post-surrender Japan which, for the first time in history, permitted the growth of a large, legal Communist Party and a strong labor movement.

Labor received direct support from the Supreme Commander himself. On October 11, 1945, General MacArthur told the newly-appointed Prime Minister, Baron Kijuro Shidehara: "I expect you to institute the following reforms in the social order in Japan, as rapidly as they can be assimilated: ...the encouragement of the unionization of labor -- that it may be clothed with such dignity as will permit it an influential voice in safeguarding the working man from exploitation and abuse and raising his living standard to a higher level."

In line with this policy, later confirmed by the Far Eastern Commission in a sixteen-point statement, "Principles for Japanese Trade Unions," and in the Commission's

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"The Post-surrender Policy for Japan," the Japanese Diet passed two laws upon the recommendation of SCAP. These were the Trade Union Law (Rodo Kumiai-ho) and the Labor Relations Adjustment Law (Rodo Kankai Chosei-ho) of 1945 and 1946 respectively. The former, similar to the U.S. National Labor Relations Act, guaranteed labor's right to organize and to strike in support of its demands, recognizing also for the first time collective bargaining in Japanese industry. The latter established a comprehensive system of conciliation, mediation and arbitration for the settlement of labor-management disputes.

By the end of 1945 the prewar labor organizational level had already been surpassed with the formation of 855 labor unions listing a membership of 700,000. By June 1946 there were 12,000 unions with 3,680,000 members, and by the end of 1947 the figure had risen to 28,000 unions and a membership of 6,270,000. One-half of all Japanese labor was organized.

(b) JCP Labor Policy and Organizational Activity

The principal trade union organization in prewar Japan was the Federation of Labor (Sodomei), which had been formed by Japan's Socialists. By the mid-1920's the Japanese Communists had sufficiently infiltrated the organization to achieve a measure of influence. When in 1925 a Communist bid for control of Sodomei failed, the organized Communist group within the Federation, called Kyogikai, was expelled. Kyogikai continued to operate

\[\text{Ibid., pp. 49-58.}\]
Encouraged by the relative freedom of Occupied Japan, the Social Democratic labor leaders (including such well-known figures as Komakichi Matsuoka, Kanju Kato, and Suehiro Nishio) once more set about recreating Sodomei. Again the Communist Party sought to infiltrate, but failing to "capture" the Federation, the Party decided to split the group and to form the Communist controlled Sambetsu (NCIU). It has been alleged by several observers of Japanese labor that SCAP indirectly assisted the process by at times showing or appearing to show preference for the NCIU-oriented elements.\textsuperscript{71}

By November 1945, the JCP had formulated its postwar labor policy. Late that month Akehata carried several significant articles and policy guides which called upon the Party to: (1) criticize the past policy of the Industrial Patriotic Association (the Government sponsored successor to Sodomei), (2) intensify organizational activity aimed at the establishment of one union per factory and the unification of trade unions, and (3) defend the "basic tenets of democracy."\textsuperscript{72} On December 25, 1945, the Communists organized a conference of Party-controlled unions in Yokohama at which they denounced Sodomei and the Social Democratic Party. The same month, Satomi Hakamada, Communist Party labor specialist, told a conference in Tokyo: "We are determined to organize the National


\textsuperscript{72} November 22, 1945.
Council of Trade Unions, which will comprise the unions under our leadership. We will call a conference (for that purpose)...at the end of March."73 Concurrently, Secretary General of the JCP Tokuda wrote in Zerei:

"Sodomei is an egocentric union which serves the boss... The Communist Party of Japan must establish as soon as possible its Party Fractions, which will lead their affiliated unions into Communist unions. Further, it must establish industrial unions under the pattern of revolutionary trade unionism and unify the labor front through a national congress based on such industrial unions."74

Shortly thereafter, a meeting of the Kanagawa Prefectural Factory Representative's Council was convened in Kawasaki and around this nucleus, the Kanto Regional Labor Union Council (Kanto Chiho Rodo Kumiai Kyogikai) was organized in the latter part of January 1946. The movement gathered momentum and at the "National Meeting to Welcome the Return of Sanzo Nosaka," held on January 26, the Preparatory Council of the All Japan Industrial Trade Unions Congress (Zen Nihon Sangyo-betsu Rodo Kumiai Keigi Kessei Jumbikai) was formed.75 This organization was in due course to become the Communist-run Sambetsu.

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73 Zerei, April 1-15, 1946.
74 Quoted in Deverall, p. 129.
75 Nippon Rodo Tsushinsha, Rodo Kumiai no shidoken wo nerau Nihon Kyosanto (The JCP Aiming to Seize Control of the Labor Unions), Tokyo, 1954.
By the time of the Fifth Party Congress, held in Tokyo February 25 through February 26, 1946, Party labor union specialist Hakamada could report: (1) that a Kanto Regional Labor Union Conference with an aggregate membership of some 360,000 had been organized "under the predominant influence of the Communist Party"; (2) that in the Hokkaido Region "almost 99 per cent of the coal miners have been organized under the guidance of our Party"; (3) that in Kyushu some 60,000 workers, principally coal miners, had been organized under the guidance of the Party; and (4) that even in the Socialist-dominated area of Kyoto-Osada (Kansai) some progress was being made. Indeed, he asserted, "in every Prefecture throughout the nation the various prefectural labor union conferences are rapidly being organized at the initiative of our Party and under the leadership of its regional organizations." This, he said, "represents real progress." The situation today is in marked contrast with the evil laws and police pressure of prewar Japan. "If the more than 7,000 members in our Party," Hakamada concluded, "work with all their strength to capture the yet unorganized masses, they will surely succeed."76

In preparation for the April 1946 general elections, the Party took critical note of its first election struggle, that of 1928, where there was insufficient or no correlation of strike activity in Hokkaido, Osaka, Mie, Shizuoka and Tokyo with a militant election struggle. It then went on

to lay down the following policy vis-a-vis labor: (1) intensification and exploitation of labor's struggle for "increased wages," "opposition to dismissals," "equitable food distribution," and "purge of war criminals and others responsible for the war"; (2) efforts towards establishment of a national industrial union; and (3) organization of a far-reaching factory representatives council movement on a national basis. 77

After a period of intensive Communist Party organizational and propaganda activity, 78 the All Japan Congress of Industrial Unions (Sambetsu) or NCIU was formed in August 1946 with an announced membership of 1,570,000.

The degree of Communist influence in the organization may be judged from the fact that Communist Party labor leaders Yojiro Konno wrote the general platform, Matsuta Hosoya, Katsumi Kikunami and Kazuyuki Dobashi wrote the Regulations and Program of Action. Thirteen of the organization's 19 executives were Communist Party members, while at least 30 of its 43 member Central Committee were Party members. 79

(c) JCP Labor Tactics of the Period

The JCP sought to exploit the economic instability and political confusion of the immediate post-surrender

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77 Akahata, January 1, 1946.
78 In the lead article of the March 15, 1946 issue of Zenei (then still a bi-weekly publication), Tokuda stressed the importance of labor and unions to the Party program and urged Party members to improve their organization techniques.
79 Nihon Rodo Tsushin-sha, op. cit. Kikunami was elected President and Dobashi first vice-president of NCIU.
period indirectly by intensifying and channeling labor's anti-capitalist, pro-socialist views and directly by encouraging employer-worker control of industry and enterprise with worker-veto, production control and the general strike.

(1) Political Activity and Propaganda. Open political and propaganda activity in the labor area did not differ in an essential way from the general JCP line, which sought to discredit militarism and the "war criminals," destroy capitalism and Japan's capitalists, and to exploit for the Party's purposes the new "democratic atmosphere." By linking the problems of the workers, the economic chaos, and other difficulties directly to the war and to capitalism, the JCP attempted to discredit the capitalist and the "reactionary" prewar Japanese governments. Meanwhile it implied or stated directly that the only road to peace and prosperity was that traveled by the Communist Party.

The use of mass meetings and demonstrations in which Party organizers channeled grievances toward specific political objectives represented a characteristic supplementary tactic. It is one that has been used rather successfully throughout the postwar period. The range of issues runs from "give-us-rice" demonstrations of the early occupation period to "give-us-peace" meetings of the late occupation. The targets remain the same: the Japanese government, big business, and the United States.

It is possible that the JCP started with several advantages. For one thing it could point convincingly to the fact that it had constantly fought against war and
(2) Employer-Worker Control of Industry and Enterprise with Worker Veto. The prototype of this tactic was the Asahi Shimbun case. Kazumi Kikunami, an English-speaking, ardent Marxist, and a group of like-minded associates (at the time disclaiming any affiliation with the Communist Party), on October 21, 1945 called upon the publisher of Asahi "to begin collective bargaining talks." Because of SCAP labor policy and several earlier incidents of SCAP indignation over press censorship, the Asahi management apparently felt obliged to negotiate. Kikunami and his group demanded that the president of Asahi Shimbun resign and turn the newspaper over to "employee control." Three days later Asahi capitulated. It was agreed that President Nagataka Maruyama and Chairman of the Board Seiichi Ueno would resign. The owners would continue as owners, but the management agreed with Kikunami that the paper would in the future be operated by a management-labor conference, composed equally of workers and representatives of the employer. The latter device gave the workers not only a 50 per cent share in the planning and operation of the paper, but also a veto over the employer. Since no arbitration machinery was included in the arrangement, a workers' victory was

80In 1948, Kikunami wrote the JCP handbook on labor strategy entitled Rodo Kumiai-ron (On Labor Unions).
assured in all cases of management-labor disagreement. This was a standard Communist technique in Europe. It was to set the pattern for labor relations in Japan, where the labor contracts of the new unions invariably called for the so-called management conference. 81

Subsequently, using the same tactic, worker committees challenged the management of the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Mainichi Shimbun, Japan's two other largest dailies. The Mainichi capitulated on November 26. In rapid succession many other metropolitan and provincial newspapers came under varying and increasing degrees of worker control. The Communist Party appears to have been behind most of these cases. When the Yomiuri Shimbun proved unexpectedly difficult, the Party devised a different tactic called "production control."

(3) Production Control. Five self-appointed union leaders, headed by Communist Tomin Suzuki, approached the Yomiuri management with the usual demands. On October 27, the Yomiuri management replied in an unusual way by summarily firing all five. Indignant, the leaders staged a mass meeting, called a strike, and took over operation of the newspaper "in the name of the workers." This was the origin of the Communist tactic, production control, wherein the workers would seize a plant, oust the management, and then carry on business as usual until the management was forced to come to terms.

Production control of Yomiuri proved an unexpectedly great asset to the Communists. Not only did the Communists

81 Discusscd in detail in Deverall, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
increase circulation above the 1,500,000 mark without missing an issue, but the imprisonment of Yomiuri's publisher, Matsumoto Shori, by SCAP as a war criminal coincided with Communist demands. On December 11, the top officials of Yomiuri resigned from their positions. An agreement was signed on the same date giving the union the right to "advise on editorial policy, personnel problems and other matters of mutual interest." The Communist, Tomin Suzuki, and a number of assistants chosen by him, took over the editorial function, and Yomiuri thus came under the ideological control of the JCP. This incident set the pattern for production control tactics throughout the nation. 82 This strange succession of events culminating in Communist victory appears to have convinced many Japanese that SCAP backed the JCP and was perhaps encouraging such activity.

(4) The General Strike. The general strike is, of course, a standard Communist political weapon, but until the formation of the NCIU, the general condition of labor and the Party's own lack of power did not permit the Communists to employ this weapon. To be sure, during the first half of 1946 a number of smaller strikes occurred. They were usually ineffective and quickly settled. In connection with a rash of short-lived strikes in March and April, however, the JCP did launch a series of mass rallies and popular demonstrations in support of its

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82 This technique was emphasized by the Party on numerous occasions. See, for example, Akahata, April 8, 1946; April 12, 1946; April 18, 1946.
central political slogan, "immediate formation of a peoples government." 83

With the inauguration of the NCIU in the summer of 1946, the strikes suddenly assumed major proportions. Encouraged by an official NCIU resolution referring to the possibility of a general strike to prevent the dismissal of 130,000 railway workers as proposed by the government, 84 the first nation-wide work stoppages occurred. The movement gained rapid momentum. On October 13, the Communist newspaper proclaimed: "The capitalist camp, directed by the Yoshida Cabinet, frightened by the intensification of labor, has already begun to weaken." 85 Strikes now assumed an increasingly political character, and ominous articles began to appear in the Party press discussing the relation between "peaceful revolution and the general strike." 86

As the NCIU labor offensive advanced, virtually all labor groups agreed that a change in government was necessary to improve what was termed an "intolerable economic situation." The time for a merger appeared to be drawing near. On January 15, 1946, when a National Union Joint Struggle Committee came into being -- a merger had again been rejected by the JFL (Sodomei) -- more than 3,000,000 organized workers, having disagreed on a uniform set of demands, were arrayed against the Yoshida government. 87 All major unions, whether Communist, Socialist

83 Akahata, May 16, 1946.
84 Ibid., August 26, 1946.
85 Ibid., October 13, 1946.
86 Ibid., October 31, 1946.
87 Jiji Yearbook, Tokyo, 1948, p. 250.
or neutral, joined in the snowballing movement for the overthrow of the conservative government. Although there was much hesitation and confusion among the heterogeneous labor groups as to the tactics which should be employed, the Communist Party and all other radical elements within the NCU followed a clearly delineated course. On New Year's day, 1947, Nsaka stated: "The year 1947 will bring the high point in Japan's crisis.... Only a people's government can overcome it."[88] A few days later, the Party organ proclaimed: "The decisive battle is approaching! A general strike is now inevitable!"[89] A last-minute minor concession by the Japanese government failed to impress the government workers, who formed the main body of the Struggle Committee. The militant elements succeeded in carrying along the moderates on a wave of popular enthusiasm for a general strike. When on January 30 negotiations broke down completely, the general strike scheduled for February 1 seemed unavoidable. Economic pressures, the conservative government's reluctance to grant justified claims in time, and the strong desire of the left-wing parties to share more fully in the government -- these three factors had created an explosive situation which was skillfully exploited by the Communist Party. On January 31, on the eve of the projected general strike, the Japanese Communists seemed close to seizing a large share of political power. A few hours later the situation had entirely changed. A direct order from

[89] Ibid., January 5, 1947.
General MacArthur to the leaders of the strike movement made it clear that the occupation authorities would not permit what was called "the use of so deadly a social weapon." The head of the strike committee was forced to call off the strike by means of a nation-wide broadcast. Although discouraged, he hinted at future action, commenting, "one step back, two steps forward."

(d) Summary of the Period, 1946-1947

The focus of JCP labor strategy during this period was on domestic, political, and organizational activity. The objective of the Communist Party appears to have been the capture of a share of political power, the tactics of direct action -- production control, general strike, etc. -- being assigned an important role. The Party overestimated its potential and overplayed its hand. The critical factors which significantly influenced the successes and failure of the several tactics employed may be identified as follows:

1. Contributing to the successes scored by the Party
   (a) Economic chaos, disillusionment with the war, an atmosphere of change
   (b) Weakness of organized political opposition
   (c) The Party's superior organizational ability and intensive activity

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90 SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 762.
91 Akahata, February 4, 1947.
(d) Initial SCAP policy -- especially a labor policy which, in effect, favored the ultra-left wing in Japanese politics.

2. Factors which serve as a check on Communist power
   (a) Failure of the Socialists to cooperate fully in Communist labor strategy
   (b) Improving economic situation, at least with respect to basic necessities, food, etc. during 1946
   (c) SCAP anti-strike measures effected in 1947

Having decisively lost the first round -- the General Strike of February 1947 -- the Party shifted the emphasis of its labor strategy in the direction of a greater reliance on parliamentarianism -- a turning point from offensive to defensive as will be shown below.

2. FAILURE OF THE FEBRUARY GENERAL STRIKE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOHYO (FEBRUARY 1947 - JULY 1950)

(a) Basic JCP Policy

If the abortive general strike did not result in anything even approximating the conditions the JCP had hoped to create by paralyzing what little remained of the Japanese economy, it was at least a contributing factor in forcing the withdrawal of the government, which, by that time, was thoroughly unpopular. The subsequent elections of April 1947 offer a convenient yardstick for measuring the degree of Communist influence in Japanese labor unions. The JFL (Sodomei), true to its traditional policy, endorsed exclusively Socialist candidates. Its
rival, the NCJU (Sambetsu), then numbering about a million
and a half members, was about evenly split between left
Socialists and Communists. Of fifteen candidates endorsed
by the organization, eight ran on the Socialist and seven
on the Communist ticket. 

Communist influence in the
Railway Workers Union (approximately 550,000 members) was
perhaps still greater; among its six official candidates,
five claimed Communist affiliation.

The election results, however, showed no corresponding
 gains in general popular support. The Communist faction
in the Diet remained negligible, whereas the Socialist
Party, polling seven times as many votes as the Communists,
advanced to a leading position. The "people's government,"
for which the JCP had been agitating, did not materialize.
Instead a coalition cabinet was installed under the anti-
Communist Socialist leader, Tetsu Katayama, who was care-
ful to exclude Communists and Communist sympathizers from
his cabinet.

The new situation necessitated adjustment in JCP
labor policy and tactics. Articles in the Party press
and comments of observers close to the scene suggest that
the JCP drew the following lessons from the failure of
the general strike: (1) if leadership in a general strike
is over-centralized, the strike will fail in the event of
pressure on the central directorate; (2) lower echelons

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92 SCAP, Summation of Non-military Activities in

93 None of the JCP's nine candidates for prefectural
governors was elected; only eleven out of 170 candidates
for mayor were elected; 4 out of 40 candidates for House
of Councillors were elected; and 4 out of 120 candidates
for House of Representatives were elected.
only follow the lead of higher and appear incapable of independent strike activity; (3) public opinion, which was not behind the strike, is a desirable, if not essential, condition; (4) mobilization of a joint struggle encompassing a wide range of support was not attained.

A comparative lull in Communist-sponsored strikes marked the subsequent first months of the Katayama cabinet. There were virtually no nation-wide strikes from March through September. The Party shifted the focus of its labor tactics from the general strike to mass absenteeism, wildcat strikes, factory walkouts, rejection of overtime work, rainy-season tactics, "home with a cold," and localized and scattered strikes.

Though clearly on the defensive and despite growing opposition to their over-zealous policies, Communist labor leaders succeeded for the most part in retaining their positions in the left-wing unions. A proposal to exclude the Communists in order to remove the main obstacle to a merger with the JFL (Sodomei) was voted down by a NCIU (Sambetsu) convention.94 Attesting to the strength of Communist influence within its ranks, the NCIU also refused to follow the JFL in its unconditional support of the Katayama cabinet, preferring to "judge each issue on its individual merits."95

"Labor movement policy (a draft)," penned by Ken-ichi Ito and Hiroshi Hasegawa and promulgated after the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in June 1947, reflected

94 *Nippon Times*, July 11 and July 13, 1947.
95 *Jiji Nenkan*, 1949, p. 250.
developments of the preceding months and set the pattern for subsequent JCP labor tactics. It stressed the need for unifying the labor front and for gaining the support of the unorganized mass. Commenting on the failure of the general strike, the document pointed to the need for stronger leadership by the working class, a higher level of political education among a broad segment of the populace, and a more intensified struggle both inside and outside the Diet.

This policy along with the Nosaka policy of "peaceful revolution" was confirmed by the Sixth Party Congress in Tokyo during December 1947.

(b) Bipolarization: Zenroren vs. Democratization Leagues

A renewed attempt by the NCIU to prepare the ground for a gradual merger of all unions was finally successful in the spring of 1947. While on the surface this development may appear to suggest a closing of the ranks of labor behind the JCP, the process of bipolarization had, in fact, already begun.

An invitation was issued to all Japanese labor unions to join in establishing an informal liaison organ which would represent the interest of labor and would eventually participate in the work of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The latter at this time included practically all non-Communist and Communist trade unions from the United States to the Soviet Union. The JFL -- main obstacle to previous attempts at unification -- decided to accept the invitation, but only after assurance that the new organization -- to be called the National Liaison Council
of Japanese Trade Unions (Zenren) -- would be merely a consultative and not a policy-making body.

When the Katayama cabinet found that it could not control the progress of inflation, the pressure of unions for higher wages, and the contradictory desires and programs of the coalition parties, it resigned in the spring of 1948. The JCP, probably overestimating the effect of Katayama's failure upon the political alignment of labor, attempted unsuccessfully to split the Socialist Party and its peripheral organizations, to bring the NCIU under its complete control and to absorb the Left Socialists. But Communist fractional activity was beginning to produce an inevitable reaction. In August 1947 the JFL had withdrawn from participation in the pro-Communist Zenren. A few months later, the JFL followed this action by inviting other unions to join in an anti-Communist drive. At about the same time several local unions decided to secede from the All Japan Newspaper and Radio Workers Union, accusing it of being Communist dominated. Even within the NCIU and especially in those affiliated unions where Communist influence was strongest and militant tactics predominated, the long feud with non-Communist union activity led to the formation of "Democratization Leagues" (Minshuka Domei).

(c) Increased Anti-Communist Activity and the Creation of Sohyo

Despite the emergence during 1948 of a more positive anti-Communist policy on the part of SCAP and the Japanese

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96 Summations, August 1947, p. 203.
97 Ibid., January 1948, p. 209.
government and a similar trend within the labor movement, perhaps half of organized labor still remained under varying degrees of Communist control.

The Democratization Leagues scored their first real success during the spring of 1949. On April 26, newspapers reported that the leader of the Democratization League within the Government Railway Workers Union had been elected chairman of the central executive committee of the organization. Among 23 seats on the central executive committee, the Democratization League secured nine -- as against seven for the Communists and seven for the non-Communist left-wing Renovationists.98 A few weeks later one of the strongest left-wing unions, the All Japan Electrical Workers Union (Densan) adopted the League's policy statement by a vote of 290 to 281, but rejected by a margin of 36 votes a proposal to disaffiliate from the Communist-dominated NCIU.99

Apart from the growing anti-Communist feeling engendered by the international situation, the sudden emergence of vigorous anti-Communist forces, after more than a year of rather unsuccessful attempts to break the Communist hold over many of the key unions, may be attributed to the effects of the economic stabilization program in Japan, which was being implemented upon United States recommendations. This program, known as the Dodge Plan, which

98 The prospect of a major strike by government workers in the summer of 1948 was eliminated by a letter from General MacArthur to Prime Minister Ashida: "No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the public service of Japan...should resort to strike." On the basis of this letter, the Japanese government promulgated the antistrike ordinance.

99 Nippon Times, April 26, 1949.
embodied a deflationary policy and dismissal of surplus workers, coupled with already existing severe restrictions on strikes and other types of labor action, must necessarily have resulted in lessening the importance of labor unions. The program had the full backing of the occupation authorities. In April 1949, shortly after the first step to implement the plan had been taken, representatives of the NCTU were asked to visit general headquarters to familiarize themselves with the new program. The labor delegates were warned that "politically inspired strikes against revision of the labor-union laws would not be tolerated," and were informed that "Japan must implement the nine-point Economic Stabilization Program and that, therefore, no political strikes or activities by the Japanese workers will be tolerated."100

Labor generally deplored the implied wage freeze and the added restrictions, but was divided in its opinion as to how best to protect its interests. On one side were the Communist-controlled unions and their sympathizers mainly in the NCIU who advocated resistance and the overthrow of the Yoshida government through the exercise of concerted pressure. On the other side were the "moderates" of the JFL and all those who were beginning to reconcile themselves to the idea of a strategic retreat. The JCP spoke of the "road to Fascism," of "capital offensive" and "foreign monopolies," of the government's policy as a "sellout of the country," and of Japan's future under a

100 *Nippon Times*, March 27, 1949.
Throughout 1949 the Party strove to arouse workers, farmers, women, and young people under the slogan 'peace and independence' in an attempt to prevent implementation of the plan. The anti-Communists -- frequently as much opposed to the 'Dodge Plan' as the Communists -- accused the Party of being responsible for the situation and for the anti-labor measures recommended by the Supreme Commander and adopted by the government. The feeling was widespread that the militant and reckless action of the Communists, who obviously were more interested in perpetuating strikes than in settling them, was responsible for labor's being deprived of many of the privileges it had enjoyed in the early phase of the occupation.  

In September 1949, the JCP Central Committee issued a directive urging the unification of the labor front through the creation of unification-movement committees. A few months later an article in Zenei admitted the seriousness of the situation: "During the past year," it stated, "Party organs on every level have lost their leadership of the labor unions." In answering the question, "Is unification of the labor front possible?" the Party answered "Yes, through the unification committees."

By this time both Zenroren and Sambetsu had begun to disintegrate. Sodomai seceded from Sambetsu in 1948,

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In November 1949, at the suggestion of the National Federation of Private Railway Workers Unions (Shitetsu Soren), a number of neutral unions met in a labor unification conference. Out of this conference came the decision: "The unification of the democratic labor front of the nation will be with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions on an international level." This conference developed into the "National Trade Unions Unification Preparatory Committee (Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Toitsu Jumbikai)."

After holding more than ten meetings aimed at eliciting participation of as many of the non-Communist democratic trade unions as possible, the "Japanese General Council of Labor Unions Formation Preparatory Meeting" was held on March 11, 1950. Seventeen affiliated unions with a total of 3,977,000 members, and seven observer unions with a total of 150,000 members joined. Sohyo was formally inaugurated in July with the election of Takeo Muto (Tanro) as chairman, Takemado Hase (Zentel Jukumi) and
Seichi Marumara (Kalin) as vice-chairman and Zengoro Shimomura (Sodomei) as chief of the General Affairs Bureau.

(d) Controls

The controls imposed upon labor by government, business, and industry must be regarded as a significant factor in checking Communist influence and leadership within labor unions. A series of restrictive measures followed the halting of the general strike. These included denying government workers the right to strike (1948), revision of the postwar Trade Union Law to assure greater responsibility (1949), the removal of trade union leaders from positions of influence under the Dodge Plan retrenchment (1949), the "Red purge" -- the removal of more than ten thousand "Communists and sympathizers" from Japanese business firms and key industries (1950), and the dissolution of the Communist-run Zenroren and purge of its twelve executives (1950).

These specific measures, coupled as they were by the general purges of Communist Party leadership and a widespread ban on Communist publications, as well as an increase in police security and the crystallization of anti-Communist sentiment throughout Japan, greatly reduced the Party's effectiveness within the labor movement.

(e) Summary of the Period, 1947-1950

The JCP's labor policy during these years -- indeed, general JCP strategy -- was not entirely consistent with the International Communist line, even though the Party
strategists paid lip service to the radical shift in the international Communist line occasioned by the creation of the Cominform late in 1947.

In a somewhat incongruous development, the tactical objectives of the Party, which had assigned a high priority to "production control" and the general strike during the earlier period, were revised in the direction of more moderate direct action (slow-downs, pistol strikes, etc.) and a greater reliance on parliamentarianism. At the same time, the Party sought to align itself formally with the new Cominform-inspired International Communist approach by attacking the Socialist Party leadership and by a more intense, if cautious, anti-American position.

Two related domestic developments principally account for the JCP's parliamentarian emphasis at a time when Communist policy elsewhere in the world was moving in the opposite direction: (1) the loss of Party prestige and influence within a number of labor unions; (2) the establishment of a series of control measures by SCAP, the Japanese government, and private industry. These were in turn related to the effects of the Dodge Plan on the Japanese economy and the Cold War on Japanese politics.

2. INauguration of SOHYO TO THE JCP NATIONAL ORGANIZATION CONFERENCE (AUGUST 1950 -- END OF 1951)

(a) The Setting

The change in the international situation stemming from the Korean War had repercussions for Japan. Not only did an increasingly anti-Communist policy emerge, but a shift from a deflationary trend to an inflationary
one accompanied the change from extreme poverty to the
afluence of a wartime economy. This situation directly
affected the labor movement.

With the inauguration of Sohyo as the focal point of
the "democratic unions," Zenroren, which under Party
leadership had controlled the majority of the labor
unions, continued to decline. According to the statistics
of the Labor Ministry in April 1950, Zenroren's strength
had been reduced to 22 affiliated unions with a total of
700,000 members. At this point, Zenroren was ordered
dissolved by the Special Examination Bureau of the
Attorney General's Office under the Organizations Control
Ordinance. Simultaneously, the officials of Zenroren,
including Director Kenta Kaneko, Kazuyoshi Dobashi, and
eleven others, were purged from further participation in
public affairs. Zenroren was accused of anti-Occupation
activity and of inciting labor violence. The Party was
now forced to shift the focus of its labor organizational
activity to the NCIU (Sambetsu), which, though reduced in
stature, had not come under the dissolution order.

Two themes dominated Party strategy and tactics
during this period. One was a military policy, which was
confirmed at the 5th National Council Meeting in October
1951. The other was that a "separate peace" was the road
to war, that the struggle for an "overall peace treaty"
was central to the domestic and foreign struggle as well
as to the development of the democratic national (racial)
front. The labor movement was identified as the principal
weapon for the achievement of the Party's military and political policy. 103

(b) The National Organizational Conference

The Party convened the National Organizational Conference (Zenkoku Soshiki Kaigi) in December 1951 to discuss tactics. A so-called Organizational Program (The Problems of Present Tactics and Organization) was adopted as basic Party policy for the implementation of the New Program. The main points here were the recognition of Sohyo as the dominant force in the labor front and a complete change in the Party's unification tactics. The slogan "Traitorous Sohyo," used the previous May Day, now became "Strengthen Sohyo and concentrate on Sohyo." Sohyo was now the largest and most promising Japanese labor union. It thus became the JCP's chief target.

This Party document outlined the new unification tactics as follows:

1. Unification of action must be based on the demands of the workers regardless of trade union affiliation.

2. The independent action of the NCIU (Sambetsu)-line unions must be strengthened and efforts made to give positive aid and cooperation to Sohyo-line unions. The sectarian tendencies of the NCIU (Sambetsu)-line unions must be countered.

103 Rodo Tsushin, op. cit.
3. As for the actions of neutral unions, they must be persuaded that the internal strengthening of Sohyo is to the benefit of the working class; they must remain within Sohyo and give assistance to their affiliation with Sohyo.

4. All the workers must be made to realize that the democratization of the trade unions is a guarantee of the unification of the entire labor front.

5. Although the unification of the labor front must be accomplished around Sohyo, there must also be a development of the unification movement along industrial and regional lines. For this purpose it is necessary that the Sohyo-line unions establish systematic and constant liaison with the Sambetsu-line and neutral unions. This liaison must be established quickly under the aid and leadership of the Party on national and regional levels. Whenever there exists any possibility of unification within Sohyo, either on an industrial or regional basis, there must be no hesitation. The federated unions have been a big obstacle to the unification of the labor front. This is principally because the leaders of these federated unions have been brought up by the capitalists for the express purpose of carrying out disruptionist tactics.

6. The activities of the unification committees must be further systematized. The thing to be most guarded against is the illusion that these committees are akin to trade unions. The trouble is that the people who guide these activities are almost without exception trade union leaders, and therefore display a strong
tendency to place the unification movement committees under their own influence or under the influence of forces they control. In addition, these people have an insufficient understanding of the unification movement. That is the reason for further sectarianism. In extreme cases, they even tend to use the Party and its cells in the light of their own selfish estimates of the situation. Therefore, in order to correct this and to strengthen the movement, the Party must make the following alterations:

(a) the activities of the unification movement committees must be strengthened within factories; (b) the committees within the factories must organize various small groups that will effectively expand the movement; (c) they must increase their efforts toward organizing factory committees; and (d) they must work for the education of the workers, for the strengthening of the trade unions, and for the interests and rights of the workers. Party organs must not consider the unification committees as separate units. Groups within the committees must not consider themselves as union representatives or as union guidance departments. Committees outside a particular establishment (working place) must subordinate themselves to the Party activities of groups within that establishment. Group activities must be unified by Party organs.

7. WFTU-affiliated unions must strengthen their liaison with the executive bureau of the WFTU as well as with the executive bureaus of the respective trade internationals. They must also make positive efforts to introduce and propagate the activities of these bodies throughout the trade union membership of our nation. At
the same time, the leaders and the general membership of
the trade unions must report on our nation's labor move-
ment through the WFTU to the workers of the world and
act to strengthen their solidarity.

8. Party groups and guidance departments must be
established within the trade unions on the national and
regional levels. The important point here is that the
Party organs at various echelons must organize various
groups in order to integrate nationally the activities of
the trade unions of the various enterprises, regions and
industries.

9. Labor activity toward strengthening and democrat-
ization of union activities must be widened. The various
organization and resistance activities within enterprises
must be strengthened. Education within trade unions
must be fostered and propaganda activities intensified.
Effort must be made to organize the activities of workers
outside the enterprise. Housing must be organized in areas
with large concentrations of the labor force.\textsuperscript{104}

(c) Further Controls

The use of Japan as the United Nations base for
operations in Korea put the country on a near wartime
footing. This development plus the Communist Party's
emphasis on military activity and sabotage in 1950 and
1951 resulted, quite naturally, in a further tightening
of government security and control measures. General

\textsuperscript{104} Paraphrased at length from document quoted in
\textit{Rodo Tsushinsha}. 
surveillance over Communist Party activities was increased. An "emergency strike" law and anti-subversive legislature, both enacted in 1952, placed additional weapons in government hands.

(d) Summary of the Period, 1950-1952

This period saw JCP labor policy dominated by international considerations. Labor came to be viewed less as a weapon for achieving political power and more as a strategic weapon on the home front. With the Korean War in the offing, a loose, parliamentary organization was judged undependable and ineffective for the tasks it might be called upon to perform. Further, people who had been calling for a more positive, internationally oriented policy, even before the Cominform's attack on Nosaka's moderate approach, came more to be listened to when the Party lost much of its control over labor during 1949 even though it gained votes in the elections.

The Cominform criticism of the Japanese Party, supported as it was by Peking, produced a significant reorientation in policy along more radical, internationally oriented lines. In the labor field this resulted in a tightening of Party discipline, a concerted attempt to recapture control of the labor unions, the organization of a whole series of unification committees and military committees, and a program emphasizing labor's role in the support of Communist attempts to subvert the U.N. war effort with defense strikes and sabotage.

While this policy was successful in re-establishing Communist influence over segments of labor, it appears to
have largely failed in its military purpose for these reasons: (1) The confusion and disunity within the Party, (2) the revolt of the Socialists and the public at large at the radical measures adopted by the Communists, (3) strict control measures adopted by the Occupation authorities and the Japanese government, and (4) the relative economic stability of the period which reduced the number and intensity of economic grievances the Communist Party might exploit.

4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A study of the Occupation period provides several guides to the nature of the JCP's labor strategy and its use of labor as a political weapon. It must be admitted, however, that many generalizations that can be made are likely to be applicable only to an occupied country. Nonetheless, there are some constants or universals that may be useful.

Although the JCP's concept of labor as the ultimate political weapon remained constant throughout the Occupation period, the targets and expectations for the weapon changed with the changing foreign and domestic situation.

The decisive factors influencing the Communists' choice of a particular strategic weapon on the labor front in Occupied Japan, as well as the success of the campaign, comes down in the final analysis to: (1) the degree of JCP influence in the labor unions; (2) the nature of government and management's (SCAP in the case of Occupied Japan) attitudes and controls; (3) the JCP and labor unions' stated programs and their appeal to rank-and-file
members. (4) certain political and economic factors, both
domestic and foreign; and (5) the objectives and strength
of the JCP.

To speak of the General Strike as the Communist
Party's heavy weapon as opposed, let us say, to agitation
and propaganda, which may be regarded as lighter weapons,
may be stretching the military analogy too far. The
choice of the weapon or weapons, however, can be directly
related to the tactical situation. One may even go a
step further in the analogy and say that the particular
strategy relates essentially to the questions of mission
and capabilities. Thus, it might be possible to work out
an equation, using the five factors noted above, to show
that early 1947 was a time of strong Communist-dominated
labor unions, when the workers' demands and expectations
were high and when the Communist Party was confident
(over-confident as it turned out). If a combination of
such factors accounts for the Party's near victory in the
general strike of 1947, another factor proved decisive:
SCAP and Japanese government control measures were adequate
to the task and the general strike failed. This Democratic
People's Front (1945-1947) was also the period during which
the employer-worker control of industry and production con-
trol tactics were employed widely and successfully. There
were no adequate prohibitions or sanctions against such
Communist-inspired activity. While continuing to talk
about the general strike, production control, and employer-
worker control of industry, the Party shifted its emphasis
during 1948 and 1949 to political activity, propaganda,
mass meetings and demonstrations. These were regarded as
were appropriate weapons for the Democratic National Front phase of the "peaceful revolution" (1947-1949).

By the spring of 1949, despite -- or perhaps related to -- the JCP impressive successes in the elections (35 JCP members elected to the House of Representatives), the equation referred to above had changed. The JCP was at the peak numerical strength and the immediate objective seemed to be simply a matter of more members and more votes. The moderate strategy of peaceful revolution appeared to be paying off, but not without a price. An anti-Communist reaction within the labor unions was due in part to objections to Communist fractional activity. At the same time, SCAP and Japanese government attitudes and controls as well as elements of public opinion were stiffening as the cold war moved into high gear.

The Cominform criticism of the JCP policy of peaceful revolution was the signal for a revision in the direction of the 1947 strategy, but the political and economic conditions of 1947 no longer existed in 1950. The consequence was a factional struggle within the JCP and confusion with respect to labor union policy. Further, with the opening of the Korean War, the JCP turned to active support of the Communist war effort by delays, strikes, and sabotage. This was of course largely inconsistent with the aim of rallying wide support for a general strike or establishing an atmosphere conducive to widespread production control tactics. In matters of security and control, the Japanese government and SCAP showed their concern. The JCP failed to meet the supreme test: it could not bring the ultimate weapon to bear in
support of the Fascist war effort. It did not even prove very effective with its propaganda and sabotage activities. The JCP thus passed through the transitional period between occupation and independence with the Party organization and program in a state of disruption and confusion and with the Party's control of labor broken.

When we recall that the JCP likewise proved totally ineffective in disrupting the Japanese war effort from 1937 to 1945, two conclusions with important implications suggest themselves: (1) The government and industry's desire and ability to limit and control JCP and labor union activity have in the past been a decisive factor. (2) The JCP-controlled labor union is most dangerous as a political weapon in such an era of peace as Japan entered with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty in 1952.
V. JCP SOHYO-ORIENTED LABOR STRATEGY, 1957-1958

I. SIGNIFICANCE AND VULNERABILITY OF SOHYO

In the Communists' use of labor as a political weapon, it seems evident that after 1952 or 1953 the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) became a principal target. This fact is directly related both to Sohyo's significance within the Japanese political and economic context and to its considerable susceptibility to Communist influence.

Sohyo is significant because it has claimed about one-half of Japan's 6,000,000 organized laborers as members. The largest of some forty major national unions affiliated with Sohyo have been the following: teachers (Hikkyosho -- 425,000), government railway workers (Kokutetsu -- 380,000), coal miners (Tanro -- 200,000), local and municipal government workers (Zentei -- 150,000), iron and steel workers (Tekkororen -- 100,500), private railway workers (Shitetsusoren -- 85,000), telecommunications workers (Zendentsu -- 135,000), Agricultural and Forestry Ministry workers (Zennorin -- 79,500), express workers (Zennitsu -- 76,846), and garrison forces workers (Zenchuro -- 65,000).

Both quantitatively and qualitatively the Sohyo complex has constituted a vital strategic component of the Japanese economy. By controlling Sohyo the JCP could decisively influence Japan's economy and, in turn, the

\[105\] Figures are those given by Sohyo, December 25, 1956.
direction of the nations' foreign and domestic policies. Short of total control, Sohyo would still represent an important Communist political weapon because of its susceptibility to Communist propaganda.

A number of conditioning factors have combined to produce in Sohyo a high degree of vulnerability to Communist tactics and a high correlation between short-run Communist objectives and those of Sohyo. The parallel with the "neutralist" policies of certain governments in South and Southeast Asia, if not pushed too far, is striking. The main elements which produce this state of high vulnerability appear to be: (1) the Marxist orientation of the majority of Japan's labor leaders (also true of a very large number of Japanese intellectuals); (2) the fact that the other major party that influences Sohyo, the Left Socialists, regularly presents platforms and slogans so nearly parallel to those of the Communists that only the most sophisticated and experienced labor leaders can distinguish between the two; (3) the prewar heritage of Japanese police suppression and militarism, which has produced an acute sensitivity and fear of any form of "government intervention"; (4) postwar pacifism and disillusionment, including reactions to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and (5) a natural reaction against the U.S. occupation of Japan, and after 1951 against the presence of U.S. military forces and bases on Japanese soil.

The outlook of the average labor leader of one of the Sohyo-affiliated unions might thus be characterized as "against capitalism and capitalist countries" (though he is unlikely to be well informed on either), "for
nationalization and socialism, "against war," (here he speaks with more authority), "against rearmament," against the further testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, "against the control of Japan implied by the continued presence on Japanese soil of American military bases, "for peace and friendly relations with all nations." All these ideas are rather vaguely formulated, often confused, rarely consistent, and not always very logical. But the essential point is that however amorphous and contradictory they do form a kind of ideology generally acceptable to the majority of Sohyo members, and one that can be readily exploited by Communists.

2. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOHYO -- AN OVERVIEW

Sohyo was inaugurated in July 1950 as essentially an anti-Communist labor organization. By the summer of 1953 it had become Japan's largest and most influential organization of trade unions, while its political orientation had swung far to the left. To say that by 1953 it was Communist controlled (as a number of Japanese labor leaders and journalists did say) may be going too far. There can be no doubt, however, that during 1953 and 1954 Sohyo policy came to reflect the Communist position on most critical issues involving foreign and domestic policy. Communist activity within the organization is known to have been substantial.

106 See, for example, Kyōkō Tsushin (Far Eastern Reports) of the period.
The origin of Sohyo, in spirit, dates from the abortive general strike of February 1947 which made labor aware of the need for greater union solidarity and at the same time created a certain reaction against left-wing radicalism. The emergence during 1948 and 1949 of the anti-Communist Democratization Leagues within the Japanese labor movement was a logical first step to the ultimate organization of Sohyo itself.

An interesting behind-the-scenes view of the events which culminated in the formation of Sohyo is provided by Haruo Wada, who participated in Sohyo's formation but later broke with the Takano-dominated organization over the issue of Communism. In an interview with the writer in Tokyo in 1954, Wada replied to a series of questions on the matter:

We rose up against Communist and leftist elements of the Sambetsu unions, starting a movement to democratize the trade union movement. We resolved to work together for the real democratization of Japan's labor movement and decided to secede from the Zenroren and to establish a new organization. In this way, an agency known as Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Toitsu Jumbikai (All Japan Preparatory Committee for the Unification of Trade Unions) was established during November 1949. Actual preparations had been launched before that time, and this organization became the forerunner of Sohyo.

Takano attempted to organize a separate labor front. More correctly, one might say, Takano tried to obstruct our efforts to establish Sohyo. However, our preparatory movement did advance. At that time the Sodomei (Japan Federation of Trade Unions) was confronted with a split, and Takano was its secretary-general. Sodomei was quite indifferent to our movement. It had been
energetic to establish Sohyo before Takano took office, but the Takano faction, who were left-wingers, was cool towards our movement. Nonetheless, Sodomei moved to join us and did become a part of Sohyo when the new confederation was organized. That was July 1950. After that time, Sohyo developed rapidly, and Takano set about attempting to establish his influence in Sohyo.

At first, Takano used to slander Sohyo, saying that it was a union sponsored by CHQ, that it was established by pressure from above and was not an organization based on the masses. But we did not receive aid from CHQ; Sohyo just grew. When Takano found that he was wrong and it appeared that all the trade unions in Japan might come under the influence of Sohyo, he decided to change horses. He made this known at the national convention held at Kawasaki. It was during December 1950 that Takano forcibly pushed the policy of dissolving Sodomei....

Sodomei decided to join Sohyo and at the national convention of Sohyo held during March 1951, Sodomei recommended Takano as secretary-general of Sohyo.107

One of the critical issues in Sohyo's development was the question of a union's proper relationship to politics and to a political party. In the inaugural declaration, Sohyo announced that its organization of free, democratic trade unions had "rejected the control of the Japan Communist Party over trade unions and their revolutionary tactics by force," and had "succeeded in laying a foundation for the unification of the labor front." Further, the declaration went on, "trade unions are organizations

107 Interview with Haruo Wada, Tokyo, September 1, 1954.
which are autonomously formed among workers for the purpose of promoting their common interests, both social and economic; they differ by their nature and functions from political parties organized on a basis of fixed political ideologies with the aim of acquiring political power. Finally, the resolution said, "the idea of regarding trade unions as an executive force employed for the acquisition of political power is unacceptable.... The workers' claims are considered strictly in conformity with the national economy.... Therefore, absolutely no approval should be given to the destructive extreme leftist labor movement that would purposely disrupt economic stability and social welfare, in opposition to the constructive efforts." The liberal, anti-Communist leadership had put its finger on the crux of the problem. The argument struck at the very heart of the Communists' labor strategy, but it was not an easy position to maintain as Japan moved, amid enormous political and economic problems, from occupation to independence. Haruo Wada suggests the real difficulties of the problem:

The leaders of Sohyo do not realize how a democratic trade union should operate. They were once our co-workers in our movement to democratize the trade union movement by fighting against the Sambetsu (Communist controlled National Congress of Industrial Unions). At first we thought they held the same view as we held, but as we worked with them for awhile our opinion changed. Observing these leaders well, we saw

clearly that they really had no sincere wish to establish a democratic labor movement in the real sense but instead simply wished to grab the leadership for themselves. And for this purpose, it was convenient for them at that time (1950) to use the words 'democratization of the trade union movement.'

Shortly after the formation of Sohyo, Sodomei (The Japan Federation of Trade Unions) and Shinsambetsu (The National Federation of Industrial Organizations) seceded from it. This development was part of the factionalism which split the Japanese socialists into right and left factions in October of 1951. As the strength of the conservatives and moderates waned, Sohyo began to take a gradual, then a sharp turn to the left.

Following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Sohyo had supported the action of the United Nations armed forces and had declared the North Koreans the aggressors, but at its second convention, held in July 1951, Sohyo put forward "Four Principles of Peace," in which the principle of anti-rearmament was added to the Socialist Party's "Three Principles" (Over-all Peace Treaty, Neutrality, Opposition to Military Bases). Sohyo, therefore, launched a peace movement opposing American policy in Japan and specifically singling out the Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Pact as instruments for perpetuating U.S. control of Japan. In March 1952,

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109 Interview with Haruo Wada, Tokyo, September 18, 1954.

Sohyo passed a resolution to support the leftist Socialist Party. In February 1953, attacking Sohyo's Communist coloring, four important members, including the Seamen's Union and Zenrō (Japan Federation of Textile Workers), formed a faction called Minroren within Sohyo.

With the fourth National convention of Sohyo in July 1953, the cycle was complete: Sohyo proposed a peace-time economy based upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism and alignment with the "peace forces," that is, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

In April 1954, the Minroren group broke with Sohyo to form a new federation, Zenrō (Japanese Trade Union Congress). Zenrō headed by Haruo Wada aligned itself with the right Socialists, who had come out in favor of neutrality and against the Communist domination of labor.

Answering questions on the reason for such a development, Matauta Hosoya, the veteran leader of Shinsambetsu, in an interview with the writer in 1954, said: "Japan’s labor is still too young to decide its character and direction for itself." Hosoya went on to characterize the changing impact of international forces upon Japanese labor: "Just when America launched a policy of suppressing the workers and developing the power of the capitalists, the Chinese revolution was completed. It shocked all Asian people," he said. "Thus," Hosoya concluded, "America, which once had been friendly to Japanese workers, seemed to show an antipathy toward them, whereas the Soviet Union and Red China smiled upon the workers. The Japanese naturally began to have a friendly feeling;
toward the continent. Minoru Takano utilized this situation to the limit.  

The relationship between Japanese labor's general outlook, tradition, and its vulnerability to Communist attack appeared in a characteristic, neat formulation in Contemporary Japan:

The complete volte-face of Sohyo can be attributed to the fact that, although organized in reaction against the infiltration of Communist influence among trade unions, it failed to make a thorough study of communism in Japan. The history of the Japanese socialist movement and socialism reveal how deeply Marxism has taken root in them, perhaps just as deeply as socialism has in the labor movement. Insofar as the criticism of communism ends with a protest against control over trade unions by the Japan Communist Party, and no resolution is made to fight against the infiltration of Communist ideology, there is a strong possibility of an organization such as Sohyo turning communistic. More likely so, when it has elected as its executive those persons who consider communism as theoretically rational.

3. JCP SOHYO-FOCUSED LABOR POLICY

The JCP prepared for a switch in policy toward Sohyo at a meeting of its central committee held in 1952 shortly after the general Communist line had been modified following the Tokuda July thesis. Abandoning the old line of trying to destroy Sohyo, the JCP adopted a new policy of

111 Interview with Matsuta Hosoya, Tokyo, August 27, 1954.
112 Contemporary Japan.
defending Sohyo and unifying trade unions under the leadership of Sohyo. From this point forward, the JCP has been consistent in its support of Sohyo. Statements of the JCP position show that this line has been a constant one through the course of some rather involved developments in Japanese politics and in the labor scene.

In reply to a question as to the nature of the new 1952 policy, Hosoya said: "The policy had two elements: one was unification of the labor front, that is unification of trade unions with Sohyo as its center, and the other an effort to make all unions join Sohyo. At that time, there were about ten neutral trade unions whose relations with the Sambetsu (National Congress of Industrial Unions) were friendly. These unions included Zenjidosha (All Japan Automobile Industry Workers Union) and Zenkowan (All Japan Federation of Harbor Workers Unions). All these unions did, in fact, join Sohyo by the end of 1953. These were the Communist so-called "surge-into tactics."

Perhaps the clearest formal statement of positive JCP support for Sohyo is found in the Party's message to Sohyo on the occasion of the latter's Fifth National Convention in July 1954. The text reads:

The peace policy adopted at the last (Sohyo) convention blocked the American and Japanese reactionaries' war policy, strengthened the peace camp, and defended the interests of the people. The struggle for defense and livelihood and democracy has delivered a serious blow to the American and Japanese reactionaries' exploitation and fascist policy as clearly shown by various struggles of the Sohyo unions.
The Sohyo convention is of greatest significance in view of the situation in Japan. The people, supported and encouraged by the working class, have launched a struggle against American and Japanese reactionaries' rearmament policy under MSA, their frenzied exploitation of fascism, and fear of the atomic and hydrogen bombs.

We believe that the Sohyo convention will adopt a policy whereby the working class will struggle hard as the nucleus of the national united front for salvation of the Fatherland in order to forge ahead towards victory in the people's struggle.

We also believe that in view of its historic experience of bringing about a split and confusion in the labor front by restricting labor union support to a specified political party, the Sohyo convention will uphold the principles of democratic operation of labor unions, their enlarged political activities and union members' freedom to support any political party, and will succeed in maintaining unity of the labor front by smashing the American and Japanese reactionaries' scheme to break up the labor front so as to march along the road to victory for the defense of national independence, peace and democracy.

Banzai to the Fifth Sohyo Convention!

This changing JCP labor policy was underlined in the summer of 1955 by the "Resolution Adopted at the Sixth National Council Meeting of the JCP." It stipulated as follows:

Without the support of the majority of labor unions, the Party cannot guide the millions of the working masses. In order to gain the support of the labor unions, efforts must be
made day in and day out within the unions to gain the confidence of the union members.

The Party must thoroughly correct left-wing sectarian errors in the labor movement — such as the organization of unification committees consisting solely of Party members and sympathizers — and devise a correct relationship between the Party and mass organizations. The labor union, regardless of political view, political party support, nationality or religious faith, is a mass organization which unites all workers and secures the daily demands of and benefits for the working masses.... The Party must always strive toward the unification of all labor unions and fight against the plots of wreckers who attempt to split labor unions because of differences in political views or political party affiliations and against all other mistaken tendencies which may split labor unions.

Our Party members must not mechanically force the Party's Program and policies on the labor unions. In the labor unions, Party members must tirelessly work for the daily interests of the masses of the union members, gain the confidence of the masses and on this basis win over the working masses ideologically by carrying out the work of political persuasion. There must be no attempt at realization of unification through a formalistic program. This will not produce true unification.

Therefore, Party members must accomplish their tasks as Party members by carrying out activities systematically devotedly and patiently in labor unions of all shadings, even in unions run by reactionary leaders. The Party must also organize the temporary workers, whose number among the workers is increasing, the many unorganized workers in medium and small enterprises, and the un-employed.
The Party has already begun to regain some measure of (public) confidence in the labor movement. In order for the Party to gain the support of a majority of labor, it is vital that increasingly positive activities be continued and that strong permanently rooted Party power be implanted among the workers.

By these means, ideological support will come from the majority of the working class, and the road will open for the unification of the labor front.114

The JCP's view of Sohyo following the important modification in JCP policy in the summer of 1955 and immediately after Sohyo's Sixth National Convention is further reflected in the comments of JCP leader (and former vice-chairman of the National Railway Workers Union) Ichiro Suzuki. In the September 1955 issue of Chuo Koron, Suzuki said:

The success of Sohyo's general meeting should be ascribed to the fact that the lessons of Tetsuren (National Federation of Iron and Steel Workers Unions), Tanro (Japan Federation of Coal Mine W.U.), Kokutetsu (National Railway W.U.), Zensen (Japan General Federation of Textile Industry W.U.), Densan (Japan Electric Power W.U.) and Zenji (All Japan Automobile Industry W.U.) which fought well against the capitalists' "productivity increase" and "wage pegging" were accepted and their stories listened to. Speaking from their own experiences, these unions stressed the necessity of stepping up the unification of trade unions and the solidarity of the

laboring masses for the settlement of the fundamental contradictions between the capitalist and laboring classes rather than the contradictions within or among individual unions.

Another thing I felt at Sohyo's convention was that union leaders appeared more concerned about maintaining their leadership than fostering laborers' unity from below.

Thirdly, I felt that the unity of Sohyo and the unity of those unions in the metal industry, the national railways, coal mining and chemical industries was still weak and that we had to study in earnest how to remedy this. For that purpose I thought efforts must be made to develop spontaneous and unified actions of laborers on the basis of their mass debates at their workshops, taking up their daily demands as major subjects of discussions.

Fourthly, I thought the organization of 5,000,000 unorganized laborers would be one of the keys to strengthening trade unions' power.  

On January 17, 1956, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu was reported to have told a Cabinet meeting that the plan for a spring labor offensive by Sohyo might have connections with international Communists.  

This point, which had been made from time to time by Japanese security officials, with little apparent effect or interest, received unusually wide attention in Japan. The explanation may be related both to developing relations between Japan and the

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continent and to recent major shifts in JCP strategy and
tactics then occurring.

A somewhat broader JCP approach to the labor scene
thus resulted from the 1955 JCP modification of strategy
and tactics. In general, this involved return to a sort
of popular-front tactic not unlike the earlier "lovable
Communist party" approach of Nosaka. Socialists,
neutralist and even "unfriendly" labor unions were sought
as allies, though Sohyo remained the central force. New
tactics were devised for JCP operations within the
unions. One Japanese wrote as follows:

"The JCP has decided to divide the working cells in
labor unions of private companies, factories and coal
mines into three groups. Group A cells will include
those who have thus far been identified as Communist
Party members. Group B cells will include those who have
been suspected of being Communists and Communist sympa-
thizers. Group C is the JCP's reserve and completely un-
official organization and it will include newcomers and
those who have never been known to be Communists. Group
C cells will not engage in regular cell activities but
devote themselves to secret investigation work."\(^{17}\)

The 1956-1957 JCP policy vis-à-vis Sohyo appears in
the November 1956 issue of the JCP official monthly Zenen,
where Fumio Sugimoto, Chief of the Party's Propaganda
Division, writes:

It is very unfortunate for the labor unions
of our country that the labor camp has been

\(^{17}\) Jitsugyo no Nippon, August 1, 1956.
divided into Sohyo, which is affiliated with the left faction of the Socialist Party, and Zenko (All Japan Congress of Trade Unions), which is affiliated with the right faction. The basic policy of labor unions must be to form a single national labor union for each industry and take concerted action with the various labor unions which are now divided.

What is most important for both labor unions and the Socialists, Labor-Farmer and Communist Parties is to establish relations for continuous joint struggles and unified actions among them.

It can be said that the primary condition of a democratic united front for national liberation will not be created until labor unions are united, until united action is taken by the three parties, and until relations for continuous joint struggles are established between labor unions and the three parties.

This was essentially the policy pursued by the JCP up to the Seventh National Party Congress in July of 1958. The JCP labor strategy as it emerged from that significant Congress will be examined separately.

4. SOHYO RESPONSE -- POLICIES AND ORIENTATION

The effectiveness of the JCP in the labor area may be measured in part by examining the Sohyo response. The critical period appears to have been the 1953 to 1954 transition from the "third force" to the "peace force" policy. In the years from 1954 up to the Seventh JCP Congress and Ninth Sohyo Conference of the summer of 1958,
Sohyo policy took a number of sharp turns, showing considerable confusion in the struggle between the left and right advocates within the organization. The orientation of the top leadership as well as the character of typical Sohyo campaigns and issues throw additional light on the political character of the labor organization and upon its usefulness to the Communist Party.

(a) The 1953 and 1954 Sohyo Conventions -- The Third Force Becomes the "Peace Force"

The Fourth Convention of Sohyo held in Tokyo from July 8 through July 11, 1953 devoted itself in large measure to discussing "peace." Long before the convention was over, it had become obvious to even the casual observer that Sohyo had made nearly a 180 degree turn since its organizational meeting of July 1950.

The convention opened with Ikutaro Shimizu's outcry, "Out with the American burglars!" It proceeded to re-elect the controversial Takano as General Secretary, and it ended by adopting an Action Policy which contained most of the Communist Party's principal demands and slogans of the time. Sohyo's orientation as of July 1953 may be more precisely described in terms of four central issues at the convention.

The first point relates to the analysis of the international situation. Three short, characteristic excerpts from the 1953 Action Policy suffice to illustrate Sohyo's position. Early in the document, we find the statement:

The conspicuous feature of the present world economy is that the armament-expansion economy that has been pushed by the American
monopolistic capitalists on a world-wide scale during the past few years is beginning to show contradictions wherever it has been adopted, and is now in danger of collapse before the march of the forces for peace.

In another section under the general heading "Peace forces gathering strength," the following passage appears:

It is apparent that war originates from the nature of capitalism, and, for this reason, they [the capitalists] have to cover up the defect even in peacetime by the enforcement of a war policy and economy -- as the old Roman maxim has it: "Si vis pacem, para bellum" (If you wish for peace, prepare for war). But the vast forces that defend peace against a handful of warmongers are now rapidly gaining strength.

Finally, a more substantial section entitled "Defence of Peace: Establishment of a Peace Economy" attempts to draw the appropriate lessons for Japan:

When the arms expansion programs of the capitalist countries were about to reach the limit, there came a series of peace bids from the Soviet and her satellites. Negotiations for peace came to Korea after three years of fierce battles...and the international situation has definitely shifted from cold war to peace....

We stand for neutralism and prefer amity and cooperation among peace-loving peoples. Domestically, we will work with "peace forces" in the country by upholding the peace Constitution as well as opposing rearmament and military bases. Surely it is high time that we help along a popular peace movement headed by the Left-Socialist Party.

A second point is Sohyo's attitude toward ICFTU. A neutral position was formally adopted. In fact, this may be said to represent the political strategy of attempting
to weaken Sohyo's ties with the ICFTU, since the Action Policy was critical of the Federation's being too much inclined toward Western Europe and in support of the Peace Treaty and Security Pact.

A third point is Sohyo's policy toward the so-called criticism of the four local unions of the Minroren. Sohyo contended that the appearance of Minroren was clearly a plot for disrupting the labor movement in Japan. Minroren for its part accused Sohyo of adopting a pro-Communist position. Commenting on the Action Policy, Haruo Wada, acknowledged leader of Minroren, charged that Sohyo had become pro-Communist in orientation, listing the following bill of particulars:

1. Class parties which Sohyo wanted to strengthen included the Communist Party.
2. Sohyo-advocated struggles for a united front of peace-loving nations included the Communist-dictated struggle for a racially unified front.
3. Sohyo wanted to join hands with the General Federation of Trade Unions of China as a democratic labor organization, contrary to its original contention in the platform that it was a Communist tool for controlling the masses.
4. Sohyo discarded the theory of the third force, which did not recognize the Soviet Union and Red China as peaceful influences, thus causing a rift with the Left Socialists.
5. Sohyo adopted the policy of collaborating with the Labor-Farmer Party as demanded by the Communists in Akahata.
6. Sohyo branded itself as pro-Communist by shelving a motion proposed by the All-Japan Seamen's Union calling for support for the laborers of East Germany.

7. Sohyo's pro-Communist turn was confirmed by Takano himself, who in an interview with Radio Tokyo after the close of the convention declared: "There is no disputing which power is the peace force, because it was the United States that started the Korean War and it was the Soviet Union and Communist China that proposed a truce." 119

A fourth point concerns Sohyo's relations with political parties, especially the Left Socialist Party. Sohyo decided on a close affiliation with the Left Socialists at its convention in 1952. This contributed to the Left Socialists' success in the general elections of April 1953 for the Lower House. The Left Socialists now outstripped their Right Socialist rivals. But the Left Socialists seemed in danger of being run from Sohyo headquarters. It was common in the early summer of 1953 to hear the Left Socialist Party referred to in Tokyo as "the political section of Sohyo." This was, of course, much resented by the Socialist leaders, who determined to maintain their Party's autonomy. In the process, the neutralist third-force group among the Left Socialists, led by Ota Kaoru, found itself confronted by the powerful Takano forces advocating the popular slogan of "peace" and "peace forces." The left neutralist faction lost, and although the official Left Socialist Party line did

119 Haruo Wada, "Sohyo Embarks on Pro-Communist Course," Diamond, August 5, 1953.
not acknowledge it, there could be little doubt that there was a deep and significant rift. 120

This was not the end of the story. Wada and Nomizo reacted violently against the Sohyo platform, disavowing the peace force idea, etc. The Left Socialists, in effect, completely rejected the Takano thesis. For the remainder of 1953 Wada and Nomizo carried on an attack against Takano, with Ota, somewhat timidly, officiating. After 1953, the Sohyo Executive Committee became aware of the problem and no longer permitted Takano to run things as a one-man show. Thus, while Takano's tactical position in 1953 could hardly have been more advantageous, by 1954 substantial organized opposition had begun to form within and outside Sohyo.

Asking the question in an interview in Tokyo during September of 1954, "What were the principal differences between the Sohyo conventions of 1953 and 1954?" Hatsuta Hosoya replied: "There is no difference between them. I mean that this year's convention is simply a development of last year's."

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120 The official Left Socialist position appears in this comment: "The words got around that Sohyo's action plans discussed at the general convention have caused friction with this Party's plans and that there is a gap between Sohyo and this Party. This rumor is baseless. There is no fundamental divergence between the two. At Sohyo's general Convention, the Communist Party and the Labor-Farmer Party attempted to drive a wedge between Sohyo and the Left Socialist Party, but all in vain. This Party must remain solidly united with Sohyo to frustrate any attempts against Sohyo and to help Sohyo grow strong." To Kataudo (Party Life) [Organ of the Left-Socialist Party] July 20, 1953.
When the four issues identified in the 1953 program are reviewed in terms of the 1954 Fifth Sohyo Convention, Hashida's statement, on the face of it, would need qualification.

With respect to Sohyo's analysis of the international situation, the introduction to the 1954 Action Policy does, indeed, reveal the same strongly anti-American character so conspicuous the previous year. The first two paragraphs read:

The working classes of Japan have persistently struggled against the United States' Far Eastern military policy and the militaristic reorganization of Japanese economy. For the policy of rearming Japan cannot but lower the standard of national life and lead to the revival of militarism to the detriment of peace, freedom and independence for the Japanese nation.

However, the Yoshida government, running counter to the trend toward international peace that is being furthered by the Geneva Conference and a world-wide desire for a ban on atomic and hydrogen arms, has accepted the MSA agreements. While proceeding recklessly with rearmament on one hand, it is making frantic efforts to ride out the crisis brought about by the failure of a war economy. It is attempting to find a way out of the existing depression by means of "social dumping," deflationary politics and wage stoppages.

But the section labeled 'International Situation Indicates that Possibilities of Peace are being Augmented' ends on a new note:

Although workers' movements aimed at peace... are making steady headway..., we cannot say that the danger of war has been eliminated. The confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union still continues. The Korean truce was followed by the outbreak of the Indo-China war, and when the truce talks in Indo-China were making favorable progress, the Guatemala conflict was provoked. War-mongers are sewing the seeds of fascism and war everywhere. The McCarthy tornado is a matter of fact. It is true that the Soviet Union is on its way to developing socialism, but a few incidents we have heard of make it hard for us to believe that democracy is in perfect shape in that country as yet, nor can we ignore the workers' loud cries for a better living in the various countries within the sphere of the Soviet influence.

On the question of the ICFTU, the 1954 document states: "We must remove the misunderstanding which exists between the International Confederation of Free Trade Union and us and strengthen our ties of friendship and solidarity." At the same time, Sohyo calls out "to all trade unions in Asiatic countries so as to strengthen solidarity for the self-determination of the Asiatic race and improvement of working conditions."

Sohyo boldly asks for cooperation from the arch enemy group, Zenro: "We candidly propose to Shinsambetsu, Zenro-Kaigi and neutral industrial trade unions that they form a united front with us in our struggle against reckless wagecuts, the discharge of workers, and the disruptive tactics of the capitalists as well as against the Yoshida government, which uses every means to cut down such movements as ours."

Finally, on the question of cooperation with the Socialists, the Communists, and with other political parties, the document states: "The political parties that we...are to support and cooperate with are the
Left-Wing Socialist Party, the Right-Wing Socialist Party and the Labor-Farmer Party.' As to the Communist Party, the Action Policy stipulates: 'We will never take part in any joint struggle in which the Communist Party participates...as it is clear that in its policy it leans solely toward the Soviet Union; we will not cooperate or make a joint struggle with the Communists.'

Clearly there had been a significant shift in emphasis, tactics and approach between 1953 and 1954. It was not thought that Takano had modified his fundamental viewpoint on major questions, and when it came to electing a General Secretary, the Takano forces won 140 to 107 with 12 abstentions. Although the vote was taken by secret ballot, the following balance sheet for the two factions was calculated on the basis of interviews in Japan at the time. It is thus submitted as representative and approximate.
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<td>18</td>
<td>A Few</td>
<td>almost all</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electric Power</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>minority</td>
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<td>Synthetic Chemistry</td>
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<td>Garrison Force Workers</td>
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<td>Metal Miners</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metal Workers</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Dockers</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monopoly Bureau Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal Transport</td>
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<td>Auto Workers</td>
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<td>Medical Workers</td>
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<td>Justice Ministry</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction Ministry</td>
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<td>Automobile Transport</td>
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<td>Tax Bureau</td>
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<td>Labor Ministry</td>
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<td>Printing Bureau</td>
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<td>Japan Broadcast</td>
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<td>Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
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<td>Running Water Workers</td>
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<td>Navigation Co. (Staff Union Workers)</td>
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<td>Welfare Ministry</td>
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<td>International Telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electric Wave Control Bureau</td>
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<td>Finance Ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspaper Workers</td>
<td>3</td>
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All of this suggests a significant modification of Sohyo tactics. For the Communists, it may simply represent the one-step-backward strategy that Lenin suggested. Like Hosoya, Wada was not convinced that any fundamental change in the character of Sohyo had taken place. Asked by the present writer how Communist tactics towards Sohyo in 1954 may have differed from those the previous year, he replied:

No fundamental change in the tactics of the JCP toward Sohyo this year (1954) has occurred. At the national convention of this year as well as that of last year, the Communists did not come on the scene openly advocating Communist policies. From a glance at Akahata it is clear that the Communists praised the Convention. It was an advance of workers.... Even though some works against the Communists were inserted in the Action Policy, they disregard the matter.

If anything changed at the national convention of 1954, it was that until last year (1953) Sohyo had adopted a Left-Wing Socialist Party-first policy. On this point, the Communists criticized Sohyo last year. This year, on the contrary, because Sohyo declared its readiness to work with Left-Wing and Right-Wing Socialists and Labor-Farmerites, the Communists say that Sohyo has made remarkable progress in its relations with other political parties.

However, it is a minority of Sohyo that is under direct Communist influence. What the Communists want from Sohyo is to let Sohyo lead the anti-American struggle for them.... Recently the Communists have become quiet. Members of Sohyo speak more strongly than Communists.... The communists willingly cooperate with anyone with whom they have
at least one common issue.... They act in concert with others and support what others assert and in so doing indirectly force others to agree to strike.

(b) Sohyo Policy Trends, 1955-1958

Two events of the 1955 Sohyo Conference mark the meeting as signifying a slight turn back to the right: (1) the election of Akira Iwai as Secretary General to replace the controversial, pro-Communist Takano, and (2) a decision not to participate in joint struggles controlled by the JCP. Otherwise, the Conference advanced the accepted domestic demands and spoke of opposing rearmament in order to protect peace and independence. A decision was also made to unify the labor movement by cooperating with Zenro, with Shinsambetsu and with neutral unions. Some observers saw in this tactical change shades of the JCP's 1955 popular front policy.

Speaking of the political orientation of Sohyo following the 1955 Convention, Diamond, in an economic journal reflecting the management point of view, asserted:

The antimilitary base struggle, the struggle for prohibition of A- and H-bombs and the Constitution-safeguard struggle are closely connected with the Japan Communist Party's anti-American struggle and have constituted the nucleus of political activities in the form of the peace struggle. Sohyo has decided not to stage a joint struggle with the Communists, but its "struggle policy" is along the same line as that of the Communist party. In the future, too, Sohyo will adopt the so-called people's-front tactics by connecting the peace struggle with the wage-hike and
antirationalization struggles. Accordingly its struggle policy has not changed at all in substance, although Mr. Iwai as Secretary General has taken the place of Mr. Takano.\footnote{Diamond, September 21, 1955.}

Takano, it should be noted, retained the position of chief of the important Sohyo organizational bureau.

The Action Policy adopted by Sohyo's 1956 Convention indicated a slight veering to the left. It also rather clearly revealed Sohyo's continuing vulnerability and usefulness to the Communists. Typical of statements on the international situation and its relationship to developments in Japan are the following:

The policy of the monopolistic capital to make Japan completely subservient to the US by turning it into a military base is suffering a setback in the face of the rising resistance of the Okinawan people and the stubborn antibase struggles in the country.

Despite the US measures restricting imports from Japan and the international criticism against Japanese social dumping, the monopolistic capitalists in our country are enjoying enormous profits thanks to the inability of the Western countries to export enough commodities to meet the increasing world demand.

...The "policy of power" held by the US has faced a setback and isolation.

The racial independence movements of the Asian and Arabic nations, including India and Egypt, have made a great progress in the past year.
A situation in which anti-imperialistic movements designed for peace and independence as are witnessed in Iceland and Okinawa cannot be ignored in the making.

Turning our eyes to our country, we see that the rearmament program is steadily being carried out under the pressure of the US in defiance of our "peace" Constitution and policies detrimental to the people's livelihood are being enforced in parallel with the reorganization of monopolistic capital.

In opposition to such policies, we have been making utmost effort in developing a widespread national movement for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, against the existence of foreign military bases in this country, and in defense of the Constitution and have succeeded to a certain degree in checking the attempt of the enemies to malrevise the Constitution through the recent House of Councillors elections.

We will make efforts for a speedy settlement of the negotiations between Japan and the USSR, for the hastening of the restoration of diplomatic relations with China, for deeper friendship with all nations and for the expansion of our foreign trade.

Our political course is based on four peace principles: opposition to rearmament, opposition to lease of military bases, maintenance of neutrality, and insistence on overall peace, which we have been advocating for the past several years. We see no need to change it even today.\footnote{122 "Sohyo's Action Policy for 1956," Sohyo News, October 25, 1956.}

With respect to the matter of the ICFTU vs. the WFTU, Sohyo in 1956 adopted a vague, equivocal position, an
apparent attempt to raise the popular front to the international level. Under the heading "Tieups with Working Classes Abroad," the Program of Action states: "At present however, the international labor front is divided into the camp of the WFTU and that of the ICFTU. Accordingly, in seeking international exchanges and tieups, careful consideration should be paid so that the labor front in our country may not be affected (by) the differences between the two camps."

The Ninth Annual Sohyo Convention took place during the first week in August 1957. Present were 309 delegates, 152 observers, and some 2,000 spectators. Keynote speeches featured Chairman Yukitaka Haraguchi of Sohyo, Mosaburo Suzuki of the Left-Wing Socialists, and Sanzo Nosaka of the JCP.

Haraguchi told the delegates that the "Kishi Cabinet... has doubled its reactionary character, particularly since Kishi's return from the U.S.A." Suzuki stressed the same point, adding: "Kishi's policies of getting around the public are absolutely dependent upon U.S. policies." Nosaka deplored Japan's "recent disclosure of participation in the U.S. atomic war setup" and warned against revision of the Constitution. "Kishi's reactionary policies," he concluded, "are based on cooperation with the U.S. on one hand and a growing tendency toward unity among reactionary monopolies of Japan."123

The predicted factional struggle between the moderate, main current leadership and the Takano radicals developed

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over the latter's insistence that Sohyo cooperate with "all workers' parties including the Communist Party," but a motion to this effect was voted down. After only minor revisions, the original Action Program was approved by an overwhelming majority vote: 208 in favor; 23 opposed. Sohyo's policy of supporting only the Socialist party was thus confirmed as were the top moderate executives: Chairman Yukitaka Haraguchi, Vice Chairman Kaoru Ota, Mitsuji Fujioka, Akira Imamura, and Secretary General Akira Iwai.

By the time of the Tenth Sohyo Conference (July 21-24, 1958), the challenge to the Ota-Iwai main current leadership from the Takano group had become intense, a fact which in part is thought to have contributed to the Convention's adoption of a "more aggressive" policy.

The Convention opened in Tokyo June 21 with some 240 representatives of 34 affiliated unions and district councils, but in the absence on the first day of 13 anti-main current unions, whose leadership demanded more delegates and a "more aggressive" policy.

Again, both the Socialist and Communist Parties provided the occasion with keynote speakers: Suzuki for the Socialists; Shiga for the JCP. Suzuki opened his remarks with a demand that the U.S. and British troops be withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan. The other point he made was that "Japan is subjected to the United States, under which circumstances reactionary and undemocratic policies are being carried out by the Government."
Yoshio Shiga's "greeting" bears citing in full:

The Congress of the Japan Communist Party is in session just at this time. These two organizations differ from each other, one being a political party and the other a trade union organization. However, we workers are one in our fight for peace and democracy.

The second Kishi Cabinet is much more reactionary: it has been frantically intensifying its measures of oppressions. Does the fact that the Kishi Cabinet has intensified its attacks mean that it is a real powerful cabinet? No, far from it. It is made a fool by Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee. Acting contrary to the will of the peoples of the Arab Republic in connection with the Lebanese question, it is laughed at by all the countries of the world.

Reactionary Government such as Kishi's can be overthrown in workers' unity. Aggressive nature of the United States is disclosed through the recent dispatch of troops into Lebanon.

Keep your vigilance upon the actions of the U.S. and Britain in Lebanon and Jordan where there are no military bases built by these countries. Nobody could tell what they would do in the countries where their military bases are constructed. We call on the workers to strike against such aggressive action by the U.S. and Britain.

I want to say a word in connection with the question of relations between trade unions and political parties. If cooperation between the Socialist and the Communist Parties be established, the Japanese democratic forces will become much more (sic) stronger. We want that this question be discussed at this Convention.

The Conference ended by re-electing the Ota-Iwal leadership, by approving a program which called for a 'more aggressive' policy, and by adopting 18 resolutions as well as a Conference Declaration. One resolution called for normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, another was against extension of military bases, and a third opposed the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. These last three will be recognized as major objectives of the Communist Party, though they are, of course, by no means the monopoly of that organization.

The essential point is that consistent Sohyo concern with such internationally significant issues and campaigns underscores the organization's usefulness to the JCP as a political weapon.

(c) Orientation of Sohyo Leadership and of Member Unions

If the JCP succeeded in placing one or more of its members in the policy-making body of Sohyo, direct JCP influence upon the whole organization would most certainly be increased. Even a dynamic labor leader sympathetic to the Communist cause could markedly influence Sohyo policy. Perhaps even more critical is the question of the political orientation of the member unions.

It has been suggested that Minoru Takano, influential Sohyo leader and long-time General Secretary, has been an important instrument in bringing Communist influence to bear upon Sohyo policies. There is wide agreement in Japan that he is dynamic. "Opportunist" is a term employed by many Japanese to describe him. His position has been close to that of the Communist Party on numerous issues, but beyond that the picture becomes cloudy.
Does he represent the essential Communist link to the policy-making body? Is he a secret Communist Party member? The consensus of expert Japanese opinion on this question as sampled during 1953 and again during 1954 in Japan is "We simply do not know." This is in itself more significant than it may appear. The point is that on most influential political or labor leaders the Japanese of both the right and left are quick to offer an opinion or a rumor that Mr. X is a secret Party member or that he is not a Party member, etc. The general lack of any firm opinion on Takano thus seems unusual.

Both Hosoya and Wada have known and worked closely with Takano for many years. Consequently, it seemed important to question them closely on the point. The Hosoya comments, based as they are upon long personal observation, seem worth quoting at length:

Q: Is Takano a Communist?
A: It is very difficult to say, though he is my very old acquaintance.

Q: What is your impression of him?
A: His true color is opportunist.

Q: Was he once a Communist?
A: Yes. More than thirty years ago, when he was a student at Waseda University.

Q: Was he a regular Party member, not just a sympathizer?
A: It is very easy to say whether or not he was a regular member of the Party, because the group of Communists at the time numbered only about thirty people. It is certain that he was a regular member of the Party at that time. He escaped disaster then maybe because he was a
minor. But, on the ground that he committed treachery, I understand, Kyuichi Tokuda and others hate him very much. It was about thirty years ago that Hitoshi Yamakawa left the party. Immediately, Mr. Takano followed him. He then supported Tsunao Inomata, a theoretical leader of the Labor-Farmerites in those days. He remained for a long time a member of the Labor-Farmer group. In spite of my long association with him, there is one point I cannot understand: he presented himself at the central office of the JCP on his own initiative and stated that the postwar trade unions should not be organized separately but on a nation-wide basis...though he did not act with them, because he knew that they had another end that they were pushing for the labor movement. But he sometimes visited the central office.

However intimate with the Soviet Union and however closely connected with Red China he may become, I think no one can say when his relations with them will change because he is an opportunist....

Except for a short time during his school days, Takano has not been a member of the JCP. Though he has not been a Communist, he has always had a connection with the JCP and worked for the JCP. He led the people's front movement. This is another important point about his relations with the Communists. About ten years ago, I was in prison too. When I came out of prison, I found him a leader of the people's-front movement. The Japan's people's-front movement was not led by Communists but by non-Communists. Documents were sent to leaders of the movement in Japan through America. It was comparatively easy to get such documents because they were distributed not through Communists but through Mr. Takano. In those days too, Mr. Takeno
had no connection with the JCP. This was the situation in about 1936. Such is the true color of Mr. Takano. He considers always who is the best person or party to join in order to seize the initiative of the Japanese labor movement. It was for this reason that he concluded that a tie-up with the Soviet Union and with Red China was the right thing for pushing Japan's labor movement. No one can tell when he will change if he finds such relations no longer advantageous for him. He has no permanent view or ideals.

Asked the same line of questions, in an interview with the author, Wada replied: "Though we have no grounds for calling Takano a member of the Communist Party, it is clear that he has faith in Communism. Once he said that he was not regularly enrolled in the JCP, but that he believed in Communism."

Wada and Hosoya disagreed on the extent of Communist influence on the other top leadership. Hosoya said: "Though it is sure that there are no Communists among the headquarters staff of Sohyo and the leaders of its main affiliated unions, there are some Communists and secret Party members among the leaders of the lower level." Wada's comment, though vaguer, seemed to differ in emphasis. He felt in 1954 that there may have been several secret Party members on the top echelon of Sohyo. Certainly, he suggested that there were a number of sympathizers.

It remains to comment on the question: What has been the possible effect of the change in 1955 when Iwai and Ota took over the top leadership from Takano in terms of JCP influence and control of Sohyo as a political weapon? While on the surface, the shift to a leadership dominated
by Ota (known for his anti-Takano feelings) and Iwai (at

times openly critical of the JCP) suggests that Sohyo

policy after that time may have become less directly

aligned with JCP objectives, other factors serve to cancel

out whatever gains may be implied. Among these negative

factors must be mentioned the following: (1) Iwai won the

election of 1955 by a narrow margin, (2) Iwai was young

(35 years old) and did not have a background of powerful

industrial unions, (3) Takano retained considerable in-

fluence and power as Chief of the Sohyo Organization De-

partment, (4) Ota did not appear a dynamic leader and

tended to equivocate on the Communist issue, and (5) the

1955-1956 JCP popular front tactic gave the JCP greater

access to the top leadership.

Two events of 1955-1956 demonstrated the new trend:

First was the clear implication in the 1956 Sohyo program

decision that Sohyo may now find it advantageous to work

with the JCP. The other was Ota's comment to the effect

that the JCP appears to be mending its ways.

Haruo Wada insists that the differences between the

Takano and the Ota-Iwai leadership were not fundamental.

"When we criticized Sohyo's failure in...the Densan and

Tanro strikes of 1952, Mr. Ota was Vice-chairman and Mr.

Takano was Secretary General, and they presented a united

front against us. At the fourth convention of Sohyo in

1953, [we presented]...an alternative plan on the action

policy, but it was rejected. As a result, we unavoidably

seceded from Sohyo.... Such being the case, there exists

125 In the November 1955 issue of Chuo Koron, Iwai

expressed certain doubts about the JCP 1955 change in
tactics.
no substantial difference between the Takano and Ota factions."126

Short of influencing and controlling the top leadership, the JCP can perhaps next most effectively work on the second echelon level, through the influence and control of member Sohyo unions. The so-called JCP "surge in tactics" were designed precisely to increase the number of Communist-controlled unions within Sohyo. Hosoya elaborates:

"I will explain the system and purpose of Communist 'surge into tactics.' It was the unification committee and Communist cell of each factory that actually started the movement, the other workers cooperating but without knowing that the initiative came from the Communists and Communist sympathizers. The activities of these unification committees and Communist cells could cause their union as a whole to join Sohyo."

When both the National Railways Workers Union and the Japanese Teachers Union, at their national conventions in June 1953, displayed distinct pro-Communist and militant tactics, the Tokyo Asahi newspaper commented: "The JTU and the NMU are the biggest unions under the leadership of Sohyo. Their becoming radical organizations will perhaps affect the Sohyo Conference scheduled for next month."127

Hosoya provides an explanation of the shift in the direction of union policies and its implications: "The

127_Asahi_, July 18, 1953.
National Railway Workers Union (NRWU) is an excellent example of the effectiveness of the JCP's unification committee tactics. Unification committees were established at various working places. The union came to consist of representatives of the unification committees. Such representatives were active on the national level as well as at their working places. Thus, affiliation with Sohyo was decided at a national convention of the NRWU. In a similar development, some ten trade unions joined Sohyo toward the end of 1952."

Hosoya further explains the operation of the JCP controlled unification committee and the significance of the second-echelon labor leaders and organizations to the question of JCP labor union control:

"There are unification committees inside the NRWU, and well-known Communist groups send messages to the NRWU through the unification committees at the time of the union's national convention.... Though it is certain that no Communist is on the headquarters staff of Sohyo or among the top leaders of its main affiliates, there are some Communists and secret party members among the leaders at the lower levels. It is on the district committee where the Communists are most influential."

The March 1953 issue of the secret JCP publication Kokumin Hyoron set forth the Party's mission vis-à-vis labor in the following terms:

The task of Party groups in the control commissions of the industrial unions is to fight with perseverance against a split of Sohyo, Sambetsu and Shinsambetsu, Sodomei and other organizations; to organize united action, championing the discontent and
demands of the masses; to win the consolidation and militancy of the unions; to establish the control of Sohyo over all the workers in every industrial organization and every region; and to make them democratic and militant so that they may be linked with the World Federation of Trade Unions.128

The effect of this policy in terms of the political orientation of key Sohyo affiliates is suggested in evidence submitted to the Japanese Diet in 1954, based upon Public Safety Investigation Board and National Rural Police files. Among items included were:

1. During the January 1953 convention of the Teachers Union, the JCP placed Party members at all entrances to the convention hall to distribute handbills to the delegates. Further, a special bookstall was set up to distribute Party publications.

2. The Teachers Union held a third Educational Study Convention in Shizuoka during January 1954, with some 6,000 persons in attendance. A JCP group within the Teachers Union held a special meeting the day before the convention opened, planned its strategy, and passed on orders to its members.

3. On February 24, 1954, Saito, Head of the National Rural Police, made a statement before the House of Representatives on "Activity of the JCP Group within the Teachers Union" in which he declared that there were JCP groups organized as cells within the Union and that the Union was being directed locally and centrally through

these cells. The group was publishing a secret organ
Kyōiku Sensei (Education Front). 129

(d) Characteristic Campaigns and Issues

While the JCP has been conspicuously unsuccessful in
securing top-level and official cooperation from either
Sohyo or the Socialist Party, cooperation at the working
level has been a different matter. Indeed, one of the
most direct and effective JCP accesses to Sohyo lies in
the ability of the Communist Party to encourage joint
enterprises with a wide range of representation, including
Sohyo. Several examples may serve to suggest the manner
in which "popular movements" provide a vehicle for JCP
influence and control of Sohyo and other groups.

1. The Standing Executive Committee of the People's
League for Preservation of the Constitution, in which the
JCP is known to have taken a significant interest, held a
meeting at the Second Dietmen's Hall on January 11, 1956.
There it was decided to launch a propaganda campaign in
cooperation with the Socialist Party and with Sohyo for
the purposes of checking revision of the Constitution and
to start a nationwide signature collection movement
against military bases.

The February 1956 issue of Zembo provides the follow-
ing pertinent comment on the league's political orientation
and vulnerability:

"The League held the 'meeting for the safeguarding of
the Constitution' attended by about 3,500 representatives

129 Nihon Shūho, April 9, 1954.
of labor, women and other organizations at the public park near Yotsuya Mitsuke, Tokyo, on November 5 last year. On the following day, a group of 29 representatives of labor and cultural organizations headed by Tetsu Katayama left for Red China at the invitation of the Red Chinese Federation of Labor Unions.... On November 27, representatives of the League and leaders of the People's Foreign Culture Association of Red China signed an agreement on cultural exchange between the two countries. Another agreement was concluded between Japanese and Red Chinese labor leaders.

"The Japanese Communist Party, which has changed its tactics drastically since its Sixth National Council Meeting (summer 1955), is watching for an opportunity to infiltrate the League. It must be said that there is great danger that the League headed by Katayama, who was once called a 'yesman,' will play into the hands of the Communist Party."

2. Conferences against H-bombs were sponsored by Sohyo on August 6, 1955, and 1956 as part of a so-called "Sohyo Peace Movement Week." Sohyo characterized the occasion as follows:

"The August 6th is at hand, and the Second World Congress Against A-H bombs is going to be held at Tokyo and Nagasaki the town of Atomic Bomb, participated by the labours, farmers and peasants, youths, women, citizens in general at home and from many countries in the world.

"It is the Second Conference, the first being held last year. The struggle against A-H bombs is said to have

130 Zembu, February 1956.
won 31 million signatures at home and 700 million signatures in the whole world to defend peace against the threats of A-H bombs.  

3. Popular mass meetings for the Upper House Election of 1956 were sponsored by Sohyo in May 1956 "to arouse public opinion outside the Diet in concert with the struggle of the Socialist Party so as to block passage of the small electorate bill, two education bills, National Defense Council organization bill and the Health Insurance revision bill."  

4. A nationwide signature campaign focused on the antibase struggle was carried out in the spring of 1956. This campaign was launched in connection with the 5th Conference of Delegates of the National League for Opposition to Military Bases on February 21 at Osaka. Sohyo comments officially:  

"Following the addresses by Jiichiro Matsumoto, Masaru Nomizo and Tokuji Kameda of the Socialist Party, Chairman Kato, Deputy Chairman Yoshida and General Secretary Rikiya Nishimura of the Anti-military Base Committee and the Rev. Nittatsu Fujii of the Mohyoji Temple, the 300 delegates from 21 military bases elected Kameda (Socialist Party), Ikeda (delegate from Shinodayama) and Shioya (vice-President of Sohyo) co-chairman and entered into discussion. Reports on the various sufferings at the military and the progress of antibase struggles were confirmed, after which

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a 1956 action policy was deliberated on and unanimously approved and determined.133

1. One of the most interesting and seemingly innocuous of the Sohyo-sponsored "popular" conferences was the National Cultural Conference which was organized by Sohyo in July 1955. We are told simply:

"The time having got ripe for the formation of the 'National Cultural Conference' for which active preparations have been underway extending over nearly one year since August of last year, the inaugural mass meeting was opened at 1:00 p.m. on July 17 at Nihon Seinenkan Hall, Aoyama, Tokyo, attended by a total of 1,500 delegates from Sohyo-affiliated trade unions and various cultural organizations. In a pleasant and peaceful atmosphere the program of the rally was proceeded with and thus the new organization bravely took its first step in the face of many difficulties which may be in store for it, for the single purpose of creating up-to-date and sunny culture for the working people."

A declaration issued by the Conference concluded:

"We hereby pledge ourselves to do our very utmost from now on for the creation of peaceful and sunny culture through this National Cultural Conference with mutual respect for the respective positions of those who are present here today as the people's delegates." 134

In Japan, a combination of "peaceful atmosphere," "various cultural organizations," and "people's delegates"
normally add up to JCP influence and activity. This has been especially true where Sohyo has been involved. Thus, given the JCP's well known emphasis on "the laboring class," "culture," and "peace," it seems a fair assumption that a "National Cultural Conference" sponsored by Japan's most powerful and left-wing Union Confederation and devoted to the cause of peace through the good offices of "people's delegates" is likely to constitute a major JCP target and perhaps ultimately a significant JCP front group.

Thus, a number of the national conferences, campaigns and organizations that Sohyo has sponsored or actively supported have several important elements in common: (1) They are directed at essentially political rather than economic issues. (2) These political issues have important international implications. (3) They are all issues to which the JCP has also been devoting significant emphasis. (4) Sohyo's official position on all of the issues, i.e., A-bomb, U.S. military bases in Japan, revision of the Japanese Constitution, etc., has been essentially the same as that taken by the JCP. (5) JCP participation in these meetings, campaigns and organizations has tended to be by remote control and somewhat subdued since 1955. Indeed, the moderate "popular front" tactics employed by the JCP have become a matter of official concern to the Japanese authorities, lest the Socialists and other left-wing elements in Japan be misled on JCP intentions.

The Sohyo-sponsored joint fronts, conference, and movements at home, then, have a double significance to the JCP's use of labor as a political weapon. On one hand they afford JCP access to Sohyo at the working level,
and thereby an important chance to influence higher Sohyo policy by convincing the lower-echelon leadership on critical issues. On the other hand, these Sohyo-sponsored enterprises represent potential weapons which the JCP seeks to control in order to influence Japanese public opinion and to exert pressure on the Japanese government.

5. JCP LABOR POLICY AS OF THE SEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE TENTH SOHYO CONVENTION, JULY 1958 -- A PROJECTION

A major article in *Akahata* July 9, 1958, entitled "The Japanese Working Class Should Advance," was clearly intended to serve as "guidance" for the Tenth Sohyo Conference. The text begins: "The General Council of Japan Trade Unions, Sohyo, will hold a convention on July 21. This convention will be of great importance in deciding the course of the labor movement in Japan." Stressing the importance of Sohyo, the article continues: "In the past year the strength of the labor unions in Sohyo has been a major factor among the democratic forces in Japan and for a bulwark against the attacks of the reactionaries in power." The article adds: "It is the common duty of progressive workers today, therefore, to support Sohyo and to strengthen and advance it toward a united front. Our party also accepts this as an important task of the moment."

After noting the Kishi Cabinet's attempts to destroy Sohyo and pointing to other "reactionary" and "counter-revolutionary labor activity," the article has a few proposals to suggest for adoption at the coming convention:

In the first place, we want all Sohyo workers to organize an influential united
struggle in order to safeguard their livelihood and democracy.... Advocacy of a national movement for the improvement of Japanese-Chinese relations is particularly timely and has, at the same time, a great significance.

In the second place, we want to remind Sohyo workers of their duties in safeguarding peace and independence, and in strengthening international solidarity.... As has been clearly shown in past struggles, Sohyo has played an important role in promoting the advance of the peace forces in Japan.

Since the Kishi cabinet is trying to involve Japan in the American imperialistic atomic warfare system and also to strengthen its dangerous reactionary offensive, and since international imperialism is always striving to promote local wars in Asia, the most important fundamental problem to be solved is that of further accelerating struggles for peace, strengthening the attitude of workers and labor unions, and clarifying the position of working classes in respect to warmongers.

In the past, the danger and initiation of war have always been the result of the aggressive ambitions of the American imperialists, while the Soviet Union, other socialist nations, independent Asian-African nations and other peace-loving nations in the world have exerted their utmost efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in order to preserve peace in the world.

We feel that it is necessary, therefore, for Sohyo to reconsider its stand of "adherence to neutrality...."

In the third place, Sohyo's dubious and erroneous principles respecting the problem of a united front must be corrected.... Progressive workers and labor unions are beginning to insist that the realization of
a joint front between the Socialist and
the Communist parties is a prerequisite
to the unification of working people's
fronts.

The Communist Party believes that the first
prerequisite in the unification of workers'
fronts is a united front of Socialists and
Communists....

Sohyo has decided to support the Socialist
party alone and to try to make this party
take the responsibility for union political
struggles. This attitude is incorrect....

Fourthly is guidance on economic problems,
which underlines Sohyo's draft policy....
The draft policy terms the "enterprise
first" policy one of the major weaknesses in
the struggle.

The idea that the enterprise is most important
is a result of the labor union's policy of
placing too much emphasis on economic
matters....

We should not, however, underestimate the
political significance of the economic
struggle.

Let us establish peace, prohibit armament
with nuclear weapons, restore diplomatic
relations with China, and accomplish a
powerful united action for the protection
of national independence and democracy, and
for a better livelihood and greater prosperity.

Let us strive for a national, democratic
united front together with all workers and
all democratic forces. The Japan Communist
Party fully supports and expects great things
of the Sohyo workers' glorious struggle.

Banzai to the 10th Sohyo convention! Banzai
to the unity of the working class!

When the Seventh Congress of the JCP was held,
simultaneously with the Tenth Sohyo Convention (July 21-24,
1958), the Party re-examined its own labor policy and
mapped out its future strategy in which labor as a political weapon was assigned a significant role.

Labor came in for a generous portion of attention in several different sections of the JCP Political Report. Within the context of reporting on the "Domestic Situation," the document asserts:

The most important problem confronting American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital is how to block the development of democratic forces in Japan. Monopoly capital intends to establish a long-term conservative regime, malrevise the Constitution and create a reactionary, militaristic system. The Kishi Cabinet, which is shamelessly attacking the democratic rights of the masses, is planning to pervert the democratic system, with the intention of weakening the democratic forces. It is concentrating its attacks upon the workers, especially the organized workers, who constitute a tremendous social and political force, since they are becoming the leaders of the people. The Kishi Cabinet's present objective is to weaken the most militant elements in the labor unions. It is planning to deprive the members of Korokyo (Council of Public Enterprise Workers Unions), first among whom are workers of Kokutetsu (National Railway Workers Union), the backbone union of Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions), of not only the right to strike but the right of association as the initial step toward the emasculation of all labor unions, including those in the private enterprises. It intends to make labor unions servile to the interests of monopoly capital.

In a separate section of the document, entitled "Problems of the Party," Communist labor strategy is re-examined with the following conclusions: "The Party... failed to counter the intensified attack of the enemy
effectively, and, consequently, lost its leading position in the labor movement." Five reasons are given for this failure, the obverse of which, presumably, should be the basis for Party policy in the future:

First, the Party lacked correct evaluation of the nature of the American occupation and control of Japan and the complicated class relations in postwar Japanese society; consequently, the Party had no definite fundamental strategy.

Secondly, the absence of a definite fundamental strategy caused the Party, on the one hand, to favor rightist and legal means of struggle, as in the argument for a peaceful revolution under a foreign military occupation, and on the other hand, to allow the rise of leftist opportunism, which reflected the subjective evaluation of the circumstances and power relations by frenzied petty bourgeoisie. The leftist opportunism found expression in the arguments for regional people's struggles, tactics of deserting working places, and imminence of revolutionary crisis.

Thirdly, owing to deep-rooted sectionalism, the Party was not prepared to establish correct relations with labor unions and other mass organizations, and it could not get the ideological and political support of the masses or push the reconstruction of the Party steadily.

Fourthly, the Party underestimated the importance of arming itself with the ideologies and theories of Marx and Lenin. Consequently, it neglected the training of new cadres and failed to overcome subjectivism and empiricism among its members, to secure and develop its advance and achievements, and to correct the ambiguity, defects and errors of its policies and programs.
Fifthly, a patriarchal cult of personality took form in the course of the postwar reconstruction of the Party, with Comrade Tokuda Kyutichi as the central figure. This prevented the establishment of intra-party democracy; moreover, many members of the Central Committee and Control Commission blindly obeyed personal authority instead of fighting against it. They neglected the principles of collective leadership and mutual criticism and even fostered, instead of correcting, the defects of the Party. They laid emphasis on the prosaic theory of practice, ignored the importance of theoretical activities and suppressed the views and opinions demanding the correction of the defects of the Party. This enabled unwholesome elements to infiltrate into Party organs and engage in undercover activities.

The report recommends that the working class "strengthen class solidarity and unite in action to fight against illegal dismissals and for the freedom of union activities and the rights to organize and to strike." The Kishi Cabinet is accused of frightening workers, splitting labor unions, and attempting to prevent the "swing to the left of the Socialist Party." The Kishi Cabinet is also criticized for attacking Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union), the "great fortress of democratic education" in a move to "deprive teachers of the freedoms of thought and political activities."

After again stressing the importance of labor and labor unions, in a section of the document entitled "Mission for Struggles of the Various Strata of People," the report cites four "serious weaknesses" of labor unions. These are identified as: (1) the powerlessness of the lower echelons of labor unions, (2) the inadequate
and faulty organization of labor unions, (3) weakness in the struggle against the disruption tactics of monopoly capital and separationists, and (4) the disunity of the labor front.

The document offers specific recommendations for Party strategy and tactics in the labor field. These include: "The Party must make systematic efforts to unify labor unions. The Party must correctly evaluate the importance of the role now being played by Sohyo, and criticize and support Zenro and independent unions."

The Party must also strengthen the international solidarity of the labor movement. Finally, "the Party must assure that it has ideological and organizational influence over the workers and try to win the support of a large number of labor unions. This task cannot be separated from the mission of establishing cells in enterprises."
VI. THE CRITICAL YEARS: 1958-1960

The years 1958-1960 are of special significance to any attempt to assess the twists and turns, the alternative strategies and tactics, the pattern of Japanese Communism. The same years proved critical to the development of world Communism. And the two turn out to be related.

On the world scene, perhaps the most decisive change in the world Communist movement was, as we now know, the increasing disaffection between Moscow and Peking. Here the years 1958-1960 represent a critical period which saw a dramatic escalation in Sino-Soviet differences. The JCP began to be faced seriously with the problem of choosing among policies, pronouncements, and practices in a context of the increasing struggle between the two Communist giants.

As the 1950's gave way to the 1960's, Communist strategy for Japan came to be focused more sharply on the twin issues of anti-Americanism and the neutralization of Japan. The Japanese Party sent high-level delegates and individuals to Moscow, Peking, Eastern Europe, Italy and elsewhere in an apparent effort to devise a policy both internationally "correct" and domestically effective. The Japanese Party sought to increase Party membership to broaden its basis of popular support in Japan and to close its ranks, while simultaneously maintaining bridges to both Russia and China. This was, no doubt, a policy doomed to failure from the beginning, but a look in depth at the process reveals a pattern of Communist operation, in effect, a manual on Communist strategy and tactics that may be applicable to situations beyond the shores of Japan.
For these reasons the full translation of the Japanese government's exhaustive report on Communism in Japan 1958-1960 has been included as an integral part of this case study. What has happened since in Japan and in the Communist world abroad becomes more understandable when analyzed against the detailed and documented record of this first postwar decade and a half.
PART II

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WHITE PAPER ON COMMUNISM IN JAPAN

(February 1960)

A FULL TRANSLATION*

GENERAL ANALYSIS

I. AN OVER-ALL VIEW

A. SUMMARY OF PARTY ACTIVITIES

1. At its 6th National Party Conference in July 1955, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) criticized its erstwhile ultra-leftist adventurism (the so-called "flame-bottle struggle") and decided on tactics consistent with an ebbing period of revolution. However, at this meeting, the Party attempted to carry out a change of policies without changing its existing framework. Thus, it continued to adhere to the "1951 thesis" (known at the time as the "New Program") and retained SHIDA Shigeo and SHINO Etsuro, who had been the leaders in the Central Committee during the ultra-leftist period. For this reason conflicts over policy as well as personnel matters continued to the disadvantage of Party stability. Finally, however, the guidance provided by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) in February 1956 made it possible to begin considering a revision of the program. Intra-Party dissension was also gradually reduced after disciplinary measures were taken against SHINO Etsuro (July 1958) and after the reinstatement of KAMIYAMA Shigeo in the Party (March 1958).

Meanwhile, the international Communist camp also went through a temporary crisis because of the change of government in Poland and the Hungarian revolt (both in October 1956). These events occurred following the criticism of Stalin at the aforementioned 20th Congress of the CPSU.
The situation gradually improved, however, and at the conference of representatives of Communist parties and workers' parties of the world held in November 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution, the so-called "Moscow Declaration" was adopted. With this the international Communist camp achieved agreement on the direction to proceed thereafter.

2. Between July 21 and August 1, 1958, the JCP held its 7th National Party Congress. Following the line of the aforesaid "Moscow Declaration" that socialism was in the ascendancy, the Party adopted political policies that gave top priority to the struggle for peace, an immediate action program, and new Party rules and regulations.

At this Party Congress heated controversy arose over two questions:

a. The unity and solidarity in the Party (solution of the "Problem of 1950"). [Translator's Note: the old Centrist-Internationalist quarrel.]


Although no decision could be reached on the new platform, a tentative solution was arrived at by a decision to make the "Moscow Declaration" the Party's guide to action. The issue of unity and solidarity in the Party was also temporarily resolved by the retreat of the old main-stream faction. Thus, the Party was able to switch from its former "backward looking" posture to a "forward looking" one.

3. Following the Party Congress, the Party Headquarters chose a chairman of the Central Committee
NOSATA Shunro), a Secretary General (MIYAMOTO Kenji), and decided on the structure and personnel of other central Party organs. Each local Party organization likewise held Party conferences to re-elect officers. Thus, the re-adjustment of the Party's internal structure implementing the new Party regulations was carried out.

The Party decided upon a multi-faceted mass struggle policy which featured an anti-H-Bomb movement, a campaign for the normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations, opposition to the teachers' efficiency-rating system, and opposition to [economic] rationalization. The Party's immediate efforts were concentrated on the struggle against the efficiency-rating system, and September 15, 1958, was designated the first nationwide united action day. Especially for this purpose, the Party formed local joint struggle organizations.

The Party was also quick to take part in the movement against the bill for revision of the Police Duties Law, which had been placed on the Diet agenda on October 8, 1958. Although not accepted at the national level as a member of the People's Congress to Oppose the Revision of the Police Duties Law, the Party did succeed in winning acceptance as a formal participant in most of the local joint struggle organizations. This it did by virtue of its substantial achievements in the movement for the normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations and in the struggle against the efficiency-rating system. The Party thus created an important foundation for its role in the later struggle against the U.S.-Japan Security Pact.

4. Immediately after the struggle against the revision of the Police Duties Law came to an end, the Party
A notable feature is the fact that the prefectures where there was a decrease are, by and large, rural prefectures.

b. HC national constituency election (June 1959).

(1) Twenty prefectures showed an increase in votes received, and among them only the following four prefectures showed more than 2,000 votes increase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Votes Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niigata</td>
<td>7,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>5,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>3,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>2,087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Twenty-six prefectural level areas showed a decrease in votes and, among them, the following nine showed more than 2,000 votes decrease.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Votes Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>30,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>6,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyagi</td>
<td>6,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>5,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>3,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mie</td>
<td>2,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>2,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaragi</td>
<td>2,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>2,087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
v. BC local district elections (June 1959).

(1) Ten prefectures showed an increase in votes and among them the following eight showed more than 5,000 votes increase:

- Shimane: 41,509 votes increase
- Saga: 28,967
- Nagano: 22,666
- Niigata: 13,447
- Osaka: 8,496
- Kanagawa: 8,471
- Nagasaki: 8,069
- Saitama: 6,434

(2) Fifteen prefectures showed a decrease in votes and among them the following ten showed more than 5,000 votes decrease:

- Tokyo: 188,338 votes decrease
- Aichi: 34,335
- Kagoshima: 20,595
- Hyogo: 12,984
- Fukuoka: 11,509
- Gifu: 10,040
- Iwate: 9,215
- Gunma: 9,005
- Yamaguchi: 7,007
- Shiga: 5,727

Note: The above comparison was made in prefectures and electoral districts where Party candidates ran in both elections.
4. Party strength as reflected in votes received.

1. Evaluation of the recent election results.

(i) The outcome of National Diet elections is greatly influenced by the size of the Party membership at the time of the election and by the nature of Party activities (i.e., whether the activities are open or covert). Thus it can be said that the fact that the Party's votes did not increase in the 1958 Lower House and the 1959 Upper House elections reflected the stagnation in Party strength over the past several years.

(ii) Local election contests generally depend on the support of the residents of the area who are won over by the personal services rendered by the Party and the candidates. This point is indicated by the fact that many of those who won in local elections were those who based their campaign on personal service activities. Accordingly, in the case of local elections, the increase in votes received cannot be regarded directly as reflecting an increase of political supporters who support the policies and slogans of the Party. The fact that the results of the combined local elections of 1959 represented a considerable advance when compared with the results of previous elections, despite the stagnation in the NC elections of that year, should be attributed to the support given to the candidates by local residents which had been developed through steady personal service activities and through local government struggles since the 6th National Conference.
b. JCP electoral support.

Comparing the results of the Lower House, Upper House national constituency, and Upper House local district elections, the following votes were received:

- HR (May 1959) 1,013,035
- HC national constituency (June 1959) 551,915
- HC local district (June 1959) 999,255

Although there are differences of magnitude in the number of votes received in these three elections, the results of each reflect the current strength of the Party at the time of election.

(1) The results of some of the HR and HC local district contests are greatly influenced by whether or not the Party candidates are outstanding persons and by whether or not other renovationist candidates run. Hence, sometimes the results of these contests cannot be regarded as direct reflections of Party strength.

Note 1: Examples where the prominence of the candidates influenced the results:

(a) The votes received by KAMUYAMA Shigeyo in the 5th District of Tokyo in the HR elections (May 1958) exceeded those received by AOYAGI Morio in the previous elections by about 25,000 votes.

(b) The votes received by HAKAMADA Satomi in the Tokyo District in the HC elections (June 1959) decreased by about 180,000 votes from the total received by NOSAKA Sanzo in the previous elections.

(c) The votes received by TAKAKURA Teru in the Nagano District in the HC elections (June 1959) exceeded by about 20,000 votes the total received by TANAKA Sakuzo in the previous elections.
Note 2. Examples of a marked increase in votes due to the fact that no [other] renunciationist candidates ran in the same district:

(a) Although only one candidate (KATO Ichiro) ran in the Shimane District in two successive Upper House (HC) elections, the number of votes he received this time increased by about 41,000.

(b) The number of votes received (by candidate IDE Taro) in the Saga District in this Upper House (HC) election showed an increase of about 29,000 votes over the total received (by candidate HATA Shikaru in the previous election).

(2) In the National Constituency for the Upper House the ties between individual candidates and the electorate are weak, and we think the votes cast for national constituency candidates may be regarded as so-called "conscious votes" -- which support the policies and slogans of the Party -- constituting the Party's electoral strength. Viewed in this light, the Party's supporters number approximately 600,000 at the present time, whereas in the past the numbers varied between 1,330,000 (June 1950) and 290,000 (April 1953).

(3) Geographical distribution of Party supporters: The following chart shows the number of votes cast for the Party in the 1959 Upper House (HC) elections by prefectural districts:

1. The best ten [districts] are Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kanagawa, Hyogo, Niigata, Fukuoka, Aichi, Nagano, and Hokkaido in that order, and there is almost no change in the order and the profile of the previous elections, i.e., Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Kanagawa, Fukuoka, Aichi, Hokkaido, Nagano, and Shizuoka.
ii. The total of votes received in the best ten districts was 322,745, which is 56% of the national total of 551,915. On the other hand, when it is considered that the number of eligible voters in these ten areas is 23,567,282, or 34% of the nationwide total of 69,516,473, the fact that the number of Party supporters is not in direct proportion to the population stands out.

iii. It can be seen from the above that generally Party supporters are most numerous in prefectures which contain big cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kanagawa, Hyogo, and Aichi), which embrace industrial and mining areas (Fukuoka), or where Party membership is large (Niigata, Nagano, and Hokkaido).

F. PARTY PUBLICATIONS

1. At the 7th Party Congress, the Party in revising its rules and regulations dissolved the former unified Central Party Publications Editorial Committee, and re-organized it into separate editorial committees for each central headquarters publication. Further, the Central Party Publications Department was abolished, and the Business Office which had been subordinate to it was renamed the Central Party Publications Business Bureau and given coequal status with other specialized departments. At the same time, at the 3rd CC Plenum, the Party set up, with a view to strengthening and promoting a unified publications program, a Central Party Publications Policy Committee consisting of the heads of the Akahata Editorial Bureau, the Central Party Publications Business Bureau,
the Zencl Editorial Department, the Organization Department, and the Propaganda and Education Department.

2. At the present time the central Party publications are Akahata (daily and Sunday editions), Zencl (Vanguard), Sekai Seiji Shiryo (World Political Data), and Gikai To Kyosanto (The Diet and the Communist Party -- Note 1). In addition, there is the Japanese language edition of Heiwa To Shakaishugi no Shomondai (Problems of Peace and Socialism), which is published by the Party but is an [official] information publication of international Communism (Note 2). There are also the Heiwa Fujin Shinbun (Peace-Women Newspaper), which is published by a non-Party newspaper company but which may be regarded as a central Party publication in fact (Note 3), and the Shukan Wakamono (Weekly Youth), which serves as a quasi-official publication (Note 4). In addition, there are intra-Party publications such as Akahata Katsudoka (The Akahata Activist -- a successor to the Party Publications Activity News), Toho (Party Gazette), and Keieikyoku Nysu (Business Bureau News).

Note 1: The purpose of the monthly publication Gikai To Kyosanto is to review and exchange information on the Party’s election activities and on the experiences of JCP delegations in representative assemblies of all levels, to help advance Party policy, strategy and theory, and to expand the Party activities in these fields.

Note 2: The monthly Heiwa To Shakaishugi no Shomondai is a theoretical and informational journal published jointly by the central committees of the various parties which participate in the conference of representatives of Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties held in Prague in March 1958; it constitutes a link in the strengthening bonds of international cooperation.
At the 12th Osaka Urban Prefecture Party Conference held on October 10, 1959, Secretary General MIYAMOTO stated that: "There is a need for a national alliance of women, but there is no matrix to serve as its basis. The Heiwa Fujin Shinbun is published by the Party for the purpose of bringing about a national organization of women, and to take this national organization toward unity with the democratic women's clubs." It was thus made clear that this paper was being issued by the Party.

The Shukan Wakamono was first published on October 19, 1958. Its purpose is to propagandize and educate politically the youth and women among the general public in the various factory districts. The publisher is NISHIZAWA Ryuji [pen name (NUYAMA Hiroshi) a former CC member].

The Party emphasizes that the Party publications have an important mission in carrying out the policy of expanding Party strength, and has devised measures to increase the mass readership for Party publications (Note 1). It has issued instructions within the Party on concrete methods to achieve this end (Note 2), and is undertaking by these means to secure new members and to expand Party support. The main emphasis of the drive to expand the readership of Party publications is being placed on the working masses in important industries. Moreover, instructions are out to expand the circulations of not only the official Party publications, but also the Heiwa Fujin Shinbun, Shukan Wakamono, and even such non-Party magazines as Gakushu no Tomo (Study Companion) (Note 3) combining all these efforts so as to contribute to the expansion of Party strength (Note 4).

Note 1: These measures were the inauguration of the new Party publications, the Shukan Wakamono (on October 19, 1958) and the Akahata Sunday edition (on March 1, 1959), and the issuing of special editions of Akahata.
Note 2: The instructions on concrete methods of expansion included public promotion of Party publications (street sales, open distributions at place of work), an "every member secures one new reader" campaign, and the organization of readers' clubs and Party publications study groups.

Note 3: The Gakuushu no Tomo is a study aid magazine compiled by the Workers' Education Association and stresses the ideological education and class solidarity of the working class. Circulation was about 21,000 (as of December 31, 1959).

Note 4: See items confirmed at the Party Publications Expansion Policies Conference held November 24-25, 1959, in Akahata, November 27.

4. The question of reviving branch bureaus and strengthening of local offices in order to strengthen the distribution system and management of Party publications, especially Akahata, had been discussed since 1957. Beginning with the establishment of the Tokyo and Osaka branch bureaus in the autumn of 1958, additional branch bureaus have been steadily established in each prefecture. By the end of December 1959, 17 branch bureaus had been established. Weak and small local offices have gradually been eliminated (Note 1), and at the present time there are about 830 local offices.

The circulation of Party publications (as of December 1959) is as follows:

Akahata "daily" Approx. 53,000
Akahata (Sunday edition) 53,000
Zenei (Vanguard) 27,000
Sekai Seiji Shiryō (World Political Data) 10,000
Heiwa Fujin Shinbun (Peace-Women Newspaper) 13,500
Shukan Wakamono (Weekly Youth) 9,000
Note 1: In Secretariat Directive No. 39, dated February 21, 1959, entitled "Standards for establishment of Akahata local offices," it was stated that: "Formerly the standard for the establishment of a local office was [the handling of] more than 10 copies of Akahata, but this has not been observed. Hereafter this standard shall be strictly adhered to and local offices [handling] fewer than 10 copies shall be liquidated."

Note 2: In the editorial "The Expansion of Akahata Readership and the Movement to Stamp out Arrears in Subscription Payments," which appeared in Akahata October 9, 1959, it was stated that: "The circulation of Akahata, which had been continuously decreasing since the 6th National Conference, showed its first large improvement in May, when the general elections were held, with an increase of 2% plus. This trend continued until June, decreased in July and August, and then increased again in September, as it usually does. However, the rate of increase was about three times that of September 1958.

Note 3: The circulation of Akahata showed a declining trend after the 6th National Conference, but this trend has been reversed since about the time of the 7th Party Congress. By the end of 1959 circulation had exceeded the 51,000 circulation at the time of the Congress by 2,000 copies.

The readers of Akahata are 56% Party members and 44% non-Party members. The petty bourgeoisie are the most numerous, 30%, farmers and fishermen 15%, workers 14%, public officials 10%, students 4%, and others 27%. It is to be noted that the number of worker readers is small. This may be the reason why the Party has set as its goal the securing of new readers from the working class.

5. The collection of Akahata subscription fees has been gradually improved since January-February 1958. During 1958 the collection rate was 85.5%. The average collection rate during the first half of 1959 was 83.3% (10% above the same period in 1958), and after May 1959
The mobilization rate remained over 90% and the rate for the whole area was 95%. The collection rate has shown an ascending tendency and the recent situation suggests there is considerable latitude in management.

Note 1: The fact that the management of central Party publications has been improved and strengthened as a whole may be due to the fact that this was made an important all-Party problem in a resolution of the 7th Party Congress, and that at the 2nd CC Plenum this resolution was made the basis of an all-Party drive to eliminate late and incomplete payments of subscription fees and Party dues -- a drive that was pushed with vigor.

Note 2: In order to strengthen Party publications the Business Bureau adopted such positive measures as raising Akahata subscription rates (after October 1, 1958), re-establishment of branch bureaus, and institution of a system of rewards for collecting Party publication subscription fees. Moreover, these measures constitute an important part of the movement to "build up Party activities and expand Party strength" of the 3rd CC Plenum.

6. The local Party publications activities of the Party are being gradually strengthened. The majority of publications issued by prefectural level, district, and city committees do not show a great improvement, but recently there has been a slight trend toward growth. Cell newspapers are showing greater growth in number than those published by the other Party echelons. This is due to the fact that the Party headquarters, abandoning its former passive policy, has clarified its policy with respect to the necessity of cell newspapers (Note 1). Ever since the role of local political newspapers was emphasized at the 7th Party Congress and at the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee, their importance has been recognized within the
Party and their publication has been greatly stepped up under the 7th Party elections (Note 1).

Note 1:  
(a) The Party revised the policy of "one cell -- one cell paper," which it had pursued up to the time of the 6th National Conference, and adopted the line that "unreasonable publication of cell newspapers, without regard for the [existing] situation and power relations, shall not be undertaken."

(b) However, in the "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress, the need to publish them was once more emphasized in the following words: "Hereafter the entire Party will as a rule publish cell newspapers and publish local political newspapers as its resources and the situation warrant. It is necessary that cell newspapers and Central Party publications activities be combined and that the leadership and assistance of the Central Committee toward these activities be strengthened."

Note 2: The "Resolutions of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee" stated that: "In certain regions preparations for publishing local political newspapers are being pushed as a result of decisions by prefectural Party congresses and other authorities. Such plans are necessary when we consider the roles played and lessons taught by various kinds of local political newspapers in the period between the defeat in the war and 1950."

Note 3: "Local political newspapers" are newspapers published by cells or other Party organizations for the purpose of promoting and clarifying Party policies among the masses in a specific area, either under their own auspices or by other organizations and individuals under their guidance.

G. CURRENT FINANCIAL STATUS

1. Summary.

a. After the 6th National Conference, the Party endeavored to establish a sound financial condition. At the 7th Party Congress, it affirmed a policy which
administrative sound finances. The building up of financial
stability and development of correct financial activities
were consistent with the political policies (Note 1).
In order to the need of the various Party
echelons to firm up their finances by such means as
maintaining Party dues, account books, one can note a
general improvement in financial health, the payment of
fees, dues, and subscriptions fees, the rise of budgets,
and in securing the livelihood of Party activists
throughout the nation. On the other hand, the mistrust
of the adventurous financial practices of the past has
not yet been overcome. Contributions still constitute
only a small part of Party income, and the lack of
sufficient funds for struggle activities still remains
a problem throughout the entire Party (Note 2).
c. Each Party echelon manages its own finances. At
the same time, in accordance with the principle of demo-
cratic centralism, lower echelons remit a certain percent-
age of their income to higher echelons, which may in turn
render financial support to weak subordinate echelons.
This procedure gives substance to the view that the
entire Party is financially managed as a single body
(Note 3).

Note 1: The "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress
contained a self-criticism of past methods of financial
administration stating that: "We must be aware that
deviationist business activities based on departures from
correct political policy bring great harm to the Party,
and correct financial methods and policies must be
adhered to at all costs."
2. Revenues. The sources of party revenues are party dues, income from party enterprises, and contributions (article 55 of the party rules and regulations).

a. party dues.

(1) The party dues are what all party members pay: 1 per cent of their monthly income in accordance with article 6 of the party rules and regulations. Even members in straitened circumstances are supposed to pay the minimum monthly amount of ¥30 (note 1). Paid-in party dues are distributed among the various party echelons according to prescribed formula (note 2). in november 1958, the party set up a new account book system for achieving complete payment of party dues. this account book is a journal for recording the payment of party dues and contributions with the names of the payees.

(2) the national average of party dues per member in fiscal 1959 is estimated at ¥120, a considerable increase over the previous year (note 3).
(3) The national average percentage of paid-up dues for the first half of fiscal 1959 was 71 per cent (Note 4).

(4) The proportion of total revenues derived from Party dues is about 4 per cent at the Party headquarters level, 24.4 per cent at the prefectural level, and 34.6 per cent at the district level and below.

**Note 1:** Article 6 of the Rules and Regulations is not necessarily observed, and in some instances the 1 per cent rule is not followed. Among the Party members in farm village cells and in residential area cells, there are some who violate the rules by paying only ¥20 or ¥30 when they can afford more. Some well-to-do businessmen members pay only ¥100 (see Report of the Expanded Conference of Finance Departments).

**Note 2:** The present Party dues distribution formula was put into effect August 1, 1958, and allots 15% to Party headquarters, 25% to the prefectural level, 40% to the regions and 20% to the cells.

**Note 3:** The average amount of dues per Party member was as high as ¥151 a month (¥141 in the fiscal 1958) in some of the large metropolitan cities and prefectures, and as low as ¥75 a month in some rural prefectures.

**Note 4:** The section on "Organizational finances for the first half of 1959" in Toho (Party Gazette), August 10, 1959 (No. 10), stated that: "The amount of payment for the first half shows an average increase of 18% compared with the same period the previous year. But the rate of payment rose no higher than 71%... Nationally, there are 12 prefectural areas which exceed the national average (Kagoshima, Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Niigata, Kyoto, Ishikawa, Toyama, Kochi, Nara, Tokushima, and Kanagawa). These produced 1/4 of the total. But the rate in Nagano is 38%, the lowest in the nation. On a monthly basis, January saw the highest rate with 91%; April and June fell below the national average with 55%
This was due partly to the fact that the handling of financial affairs fell behind because of the elections and partly to the diversion of money to election expenditures."

Note 5: Because most of the income of Party headquarters comes from the Party publications revenues, the relative importance of Party dues appears small, but since the income from the Party publications is at the same time diminished by the costs of publication, the net income from them is not so large. Compared with the income from Party dues in the 1958 fiscal year, estimated at about Y5,700,000, the net profit from Party papers and journals was approximately Y4,900,000.

Note 6: The relative importance of Party dues is greater in the budgets of district organizations than in the prefectural organizations, because the allotment of Party revenues is higher for the districts and also because the financial expenses of the districts is generally smaller than that of the prefectures.

b. Income from Enterprises.

(1) The largest income from Party enterprises comes from the sale of Party publications, which is distributed among various Party echelons at the following rate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Subscription fee (per month)</th>
<th>Business Bureau</th>
<th>Branch Bureau</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Effective Since</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akahata (daily)</td>
<td>¥200</td>
<td>¥150</td>
<td>¥40</td>
<td>¥10</td>
<td>Oct. 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akahata (Sunday edition)</td>
<td>¥70</td>
<td>¥50</td>
<td>¥10</td>
<td>¥10</td>
<td>March 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zenei</td>
<td>¥100</td>
<td>¥70</td>
<td>¥20</td>
<td>¥10</td>
<td>Oct. 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Political Data</td>
<td>¥100</td>
<td>¥80</td>
<td>¥15</td>
<td>¥5</td>
<td>Oct. 1957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Other sources of income include the profits from the publication of Party documents and pamphlets
at the headquarters level, and the income from the sale of these publications at the local level. There is also an income from undertakings related to the cultural field.

Note: The decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee stated that: "We must never underestimate [the value] of activities of all kinds that fulfill the interests and serve to uplift the culture of the people and that as a by-product contribute to Party finances. The Party [headquarters] has supported various cultural activities and by so doing has brought about financial gains." This seems to refer to the propaganda activities that have accompanied the visits to Japan of Soviet bloc theater groups and circuses, which have become frequent since 1958, and the profits derived from their handling of advance sale tickets, reserved, and from one day benefit performances. In accordance with this Party headquarters policy, lower Party echelons not only conduct lecture and research meetings, but also put on motion picture and other cultural performances to bolster their income.

c. Contributions.

(1) The greatest source of income for all Party echelons are contributions. Since, in many cases, the income from the Party dues and enterprises is inadequate to meet the Party's regular financial needs (Note 1), more than one-half of its fiscal requirements are met by contributions (Note 2).

(2) Since there has been in general a tendency to emphasize campaigns for large contributions, the Party has made clear that there must be special emphasis on combining fund-raising with organizational and propaganda activities and efforts toward creating organizations to garner small contributions (Note 3). Whereas formerly the various
Party echelons had treated the contribution they collected as their own income, the Party now required all such revenue to be paid to higher echelons in the prescribed ratio as stated above (Note 4).

(3) Special campaigns. The collections of contributions for special purposes include the following:
(a) "Maintenance of Party organizations campaigns." Because the income from Party dues and from Party publications is insufficient to meet financial needs and because the income from contributions is unreliable, Party members are required to pay a certain amount of money every month, in addition to their Party dues, to meet the financial needs of some local Party organizations. This is called the "Maintenance of Party organizations campaign" (Note 5).
(b) Emergency special fund drives. Special purpose campaigns for funds conducted since October 1957 are the following: The ¥1,000,000 Fund Drive for the 7th Party Congress (October 1957 to July 1958); the ¥5,000,000 Fund Drive for mass struggles and election struggles (November 1958 to June 1959); the ¥3,000,000 Fund Drive for the expansion of the Security Treaty struggle and the strengthening of Party activities (November 1959 to December 1959). It is not known to what extent these fund drives achieved their goals.
Note 1: At the aforementioned "Expanded Conference of Finance Departments" it was stated that: "Even if all the Party dues and receipts from Party publications are collected, it is impossible for many organs to meet their Party expenses."

Note 2: As discussed in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 [above] on the financial status of Party headquarters, prefectural, and district levels, headquarters receives 12.6% of the total receipts, the prefectures 37%, and the districts 35%.

Note 3: The aforementioned "Expanded Conference of Finance Departments" considered the proposition: "The organization of broad campaigns for small contributions is the major immediate task for the expansion of Party finances." After debating the importance and problems of this activity, it was determined that this was "a major immediate task" to be dealt with energetically.

Note 4:
(a) Previously, the payment to higher organization was made only in those campaigns which had been carried out nationally.
(b) With respect to the distribution of payments to higher organs, a view was expressed at the aforesaid Expanded Conference of Finance Departments to "give headquarters 10%, prefectural level committees 20%, districts 50%, and cells 20%.

Note 5:
(a) At present the "maintenance of Party organization campaign" requires that each Party member contribute the same amount as his Party dues. This money is in many cases distributed among prefectural, district and cell organizations.
(b) The distribution ratio differs from prefecture to prefecture, but in several Kyushu prefectures which adopted this system earlier, the ratio in force is: 30% to the prefecture, 60% to the district and 10% to the cells.
(c) In Tokyo it was called the "¥100 Campaign," and each Party member contributed ¥100 a month. The distribution was ¥30 to the Metropolitan Committee, and ¥70 to the districts and cells combined.
(d) The "maintenance of Party organizations campaigns" originally began with Party members themselves contributing, but at present it is being shifted to a system which has Party members making collections from among the public and which is merged with the policy of building up the campaign for small contributions.

Note 6: National Congress Fund Drive reached 94 per cent of its goal, and 36 per cent of the ¥5,000,000 Fund Drive campaign had been paid to the headquarters by June 30, 1959 (Party Report, No. 7, "Party finances for the first half of 1959" cited above).

3. Expenditures.

Party expenditures, unlike income, cannot be classified by type because each Party organization determines its own categories of expenditures in accordance with the scale of its financial operations and the ability of those in charge of financial matters, but there are three major forms of expenditure common to all organs: personnel expenses, office expenses and activity expenses (Note 1).

The ratio of these expenses to total expenditures varies according to the size of the budget concerned (Note 2). However, generally speaking, personnel expenses constitute the largest portion: an average of 38.5 per cent at the prefectural level and 45 per cent at the district level. The activity expenses are proportionately extremely small: 29.2 per cent at the prefectural level and 12.5 per cent at the district level (Note 3).

Note 1: Breakdowns of the major expenditure categories follow: Personnel expenses: Salaries, of full-time staff members of the Party organs, of permanent committee members and of family allowances, office allowances,
year-end and summer bonuses; health expenses, social security payments, commuting expenses. Operating expenses: Stationery and other materials necessary for day-to-day operations, newspaper subscriptions, book purchases, communications expenses (such as telephone, telegram, postage fees) and printing costs. Activity expenses: Expenses connected directly with Party activities, including usually travel expenses (hotel bills, transportation, and per diem allowances); conference hall rentals and conference expenses; publicity expenses, paper and printing costs for posters and leaflets, and costs of construction as well as social contacts.

Note 2: See the section on prefectural and district level finances.

Note 1: According to a report submitted in conformity with the Political Funds Law, personnel expenses constitute 30 per cent of central Party headquarters finances, while the activity expenses are a mere 2 per cent if the expenses of Party publications are not included.

4. Borrowed Funds.

Although the Party tries hard to avoid borrowing funds from the standpoint of a sound financial policy, the Party headquarters as well as other Party echelons all depend on borrowing to meet their financial needs.

Note: In a statement of the Central Committee Presidium of June 30, 1959, appealing for full payment of Party dues and Party publication subscription fees, it was admitted that: "Despite the fact the central finance has done its best in the midst of the important struggles, it had to borrow several million yen temporarily."

5. Financial Status of Party Headquarters.

a. The budget of the Party Central Committee for fiscal 1958 was estimated at ¥130 million. The summary of income and expenses is as follows (Note 1):
Income:

- Party dues: ¥5.7 million
- Party publications: ¥98.7 million
- Contributions, etc.: ¥27.6 million
- **Total**: ¥132.0 million

Expenses:

- Ordinary headquarters operating expenses (personnel, office, activity expenses): ¥33.4 million
- Party publication publishing expenses: ¥96.0 million (Note 2)
- **Total**: ¥129.4 million
- Extraordinary expenses (elections, Party Congress, etc.): ¥132.0 million

**Note 1:** The above figures are estimated from data in Party documents and Akahata.

**Note 2:** Party headquarters finances are formally divided into headquarters expenses and publishing expenses, but both are managed as one.

b. The financial report of the JCP Central Committee for the same year, submitted in accordance with the Political Funds Law, is as follows:

(1) Pertinent data are:

Income:
- Carried over from the previous year: ¥1,076,022
- Income for this period: ¥102,262,861
- **Total**: ¥103,338,883

Expenditure:
- Total expenditure: ¥95,592,077
- Carried over to fiscal 1959: ¥7,746,806
Note: The law requires semifinal reports, from January to June and from July to December. The above represents totals for two periods.

(2) Details of Income:
(a) Specified in the report were the names of contributors of over ¥1,000 and the amounts contributed in each case, but most of these were individual contributions by Party officers, totaling ¥10,676,068.

Note: The total income reported from contributions was ¥12,982,550. This sum, less the above large contributions, gives a balance of ¥2,306,482, representing small contributions with donor unnamed.

(b) The details of the balance of ¥89,280,311 (i.e., the total income, minus contributions) were not specified, but judged from what is known about Party finances, this sum seems to represent income from Party dues, publications, and other enterprises.

(3) Details of expenditures:
(a) The amount of specified expenditures was ¥94,764,792.

Note: Specification was made of items exceeding ¥1,000 in amount. The unspecified amount totals ¥827,285.

(b) Of this amount, ¥63,761,115, or 67.3 per cent, was directly connected with the publishing of central Party headquarters publications.
Note: The details of expenditure categories and amounts are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paper, newprint</td>
<td>¥13,119,553</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>¥16,614,800</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookbinding</td>
<td>¥1,472,767</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic material</td>
<td>¥6,546,610</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packing materials</td>
<td>¥6,804,378</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>¥2,298,640</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>¥1,523,606</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal expenses</td>
<td>¥2,142,642</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money order fees</td>
<td>¥226,460</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>¥1,552,693</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>¥1,373,552</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>¥101,335</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥63,761,115</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Accordingly, the balance of the Party headquarters expenses is ¥31,003,677, or 32.7 per cent (Note 1). Most of this is devoted to personnel expenses (salaries and health insurance), and that which goes into activities is extremely minor (Notes 2 and 3).

Note 1: The finances of the Party headquarters and of the Party Publications Business Bureau are normally treated separately, but not in this report (see Note 3 of C, 5, 1 above).

Note 2: Details of the remaining 32.7 per cent are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>¥26,013,400</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health insurance</td>
<td>¥2,308,313</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenses</td>
<td>¥446,296</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>¥281,244</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>¥620,032</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office expenses</td>
<td>¥975,495</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>¥358,897</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥31,003,677</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.7%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note 1: The activity expenditures of Party headquarters consist of transportation expenses, a part of the "other" category, and the unspecified amount mentioned in Note 2 (a) above: "Details of Expenditures." They are estimated at about ¥1,800,000 maximum.

c. A financial report presented by TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo, a Central Committee member at the 7th Party Congress, gives the following figures for the Congress:

Receipts:

- Payments from local units: ¥6,775,000
- Contributions to headquarters: ¥702,000
- Other: ¥78,000

Total receipts: ¥7,555,000
Anticipated receipts: ¥618,000
Grand total: ¥8,173,000

Expenses:

- Preparatory expenses: ¥2,299,000
- Operating expenses: ¥1,290,000
- Total expenses: ¥3,589,000

Anticipated expenditures: ¥4,584,000
Grand total: ¥8,173,000

The operating expenses of the Congress included disbursements for the conference hall, travel by representatives, hotel bills, meals, emergency expenses, printing and office costs, etc.

6. Prefectural Level Finances.

a. Size of Budget.

The budgets of the 46 prefectural committees throughout the nation vary greatly in size according to the membership and financial resources of each prefectural
organ. The national average is about ¥100,000 [per month], with five standing committee members per prefectoral unit.

Note: The more powerful units have 7 standing committee members and a monthly budget of about ¥640,000; most middle-scale units have 4 to 5 standing committee members and a monthly budget of about ¥70,000, while among the weaker are units with 3 standing committee members and a budget of about ¥10,000 per month.

b. Income and Expenditures.

The following table, based on materials on prefectoral level finances, shows the income and the expenditures by categories with relative percentage:

Income:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party dues</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party publication sales</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from enterprise</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies [from above]</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debts</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous income</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry-over</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel expenses</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenses</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office expenses</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity expenses</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dues</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to higher echelons</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. Special characteristics of prefectural income.

(1) The fact that Party dues and income from Party publications cannot by themselves satisfy the financial needs at the prefectural level is amply shown by these figures.

(2) A high percentage of contributions was a feature common to a great majority of the prefectural units. This indicates that Party finances depend largely on contributions. However, this percentage includes not only contributions from the general public but the proceeds from the "Maintenance of Party Organization" drives as well. Hence, the contributions are not all from outside of the Party.

(3) Debts are a barometer of financial ill health, but a considerable number of Party organizations still depend on borrowed funds.

(4) The "other" category covers a large percentage of Party income (15 per cent), but this includes the salaries received by Party members or assemblymen in the local legislatures which are regarded as Party income (8.6 per cent). The remaining
6.6 per cent consists of income from the repayment of loans and advances.

d. Special characteristics of prefectural expenditures.

(1) The common items in all prefectural budgets are personnel, operating, and activity expenses.

(2) The fact that personnel expenses occupy the largest share, larger than activity expenses, indicates that the financial situation at the present time is barely adequate to pay personnel expenses and that these units are unable to appropriate sufficient funds for activities.

(3) The percentage of payments to higher echelons is small because this category of expenditures, which should be an item in the budget of all lower echelon units, was not found in many cases. This is because net income is sometimes calculated after the deduction for payments to higher echelons from such income as Party dues and special campaign receipts.

(4) The average pay of a member of a standing committee is a little over ¥7,900 a month.

e. Special characteristics common to both income and expenditures.

(1) The fact that outgoing subsidies to lower echelons are smaller than incoming subsidies from Party headquarters indicates an overall weakness in the finances of prefectural organizations, which are the intermediate echelons in the Party hierarchy.
(2) While borrowed funds constitute a fairly large percentage of income, the repayment on this indebtedness is small. This also indicates poor financial health.

7. District Finances.
   a. Size of Budget.
   (1) The budget of a district committee varies according to the size of its Party membership and financial resources.

Note: In the strong city districts the budgets average about ¥200,000 a month; in rural districts they are only ¥3,000 or ¥4,000. Most districts in small and medium enterprise areas have ¥30,000 or ¥40,000 budgets.

(2) Finances according to area. Districts are classified by locations as follows: (a) districts in the urban areas centering around the prefectural capitals, (b) districts in farm villages and rural areas, and (c) districts in industrial areas with small and medium enterprises. The monthly average budget of each of these is: urban districts about ¥80,000, rural districts ¥18,000, and industrial area districts ¥35,000. The average is about ¥41,000.

b. District income and expenditures.
   The state of income and expenditure and the percentage according to items are shown in the table on the following page in accordance with the above classification.

c. Special characteristics of district income.
   (1) The average percentage of Party dues approximates that of contributions. However, if the 1, 2
and 3 categories are examined separately, we find that the percentage of contributions greatly exceeds that of Party dues in 1 and 3, while Party dues greatly exceed contributions in the 2 category. This demonstrates that the rural districts with their small budgets are not very successful in their fund-raising campaigns and lack strength to push activities.

(2) The average 6.1 per cent in the "other" category includes 2.7 per cent derived from salaries of Communist assemblymen. The remaining 3.4 per cent represents repayments of loans and advances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party dues</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party publication sales</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from enterprise</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>Subsidies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debts</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous income</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other income</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried over</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Expenditures:

<table>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel expenses</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
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<td>13.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office expenses</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dues</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment to higher</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>echelons</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Repayment of</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenses</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The debts category reflects the fact that it is difficult to borrow in rural areas, not very necessary to borrow in the urban areas, and easy to borrow in the middle-and-small enterprise areas.

d. Special characteristics of district expenditures.
(1) Personnel expenses are 6.5 per cent higher than those shown in prefectural budgets, but this is because the total budget is small in scale. Compared with each other, the districts in the 2 category have both a smaller budget and a smaller percentage of personnel expenses than those in 1 and 3. This is because in many cases personnel expenses have not been listed at all or, when listed, they were less than 30 per cent (the lowest was 17.8 per cent). This demonstrates the
fact that many members in rural district organizations carry on Party activities without pay or for small remuneration.

(2) The fact that the percentage of activity expenses is small and that the percentage of payments to higher echelons is large in comparison with prefectural level organizations is less a function of size than an indication of a lower level of activity.

(3) The average pay of a district standing committee member is a little over ¥7,600 a month. The relationship of subsidies received to subsidies given and of debts incurred to debts repaid tells the same story with regard to the financial health at the district level as at the prefectural level although the figures at the former level are smaller in magnitude.

H. PRESENT STATE OF EDUCATION AND STUDY [OF THEORY]

1. Following the fundamental policy decided upon by the 7th Party Congress, the Party replaced the personnel and expanded and strengthened its Propaganda and Education Department. The 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee had made it clear that the educational policy was to strengthen the Party and to expand Party membership. At the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee, educational policy was further deliberated and a policy for the Party's educational system, based on the results of a review of practical experience since the 7th Party Congress, was determined.
Note 1: The "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress stated its policy on education and study of theory as follows:

(a) A systematic studies program will be set up and carried out from the Party central headquarters down through the cells so that all Party members can study the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism. This program will tie in with study activities for the masses outside the Party.

(b) Special education will be conducted for new Party members. Party units at all levels will carry out a study program, adjusted to local conditions, through schools, lecture meetings, and study clubs and circles.

(c) The Central Committee will work on a central Party school, the preparation of textbooks, and the training of lecturers. For the purpose of training a great number of new cadres, Party schools shall be established locally as well as at the national level.

Note 2: The Report of the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee stated that "the strengthening of educational activities is an indispensable condition for building up the Party ideologically, politically, and organizationally," and laid down the following guidelines for the current educational activities:

(a) The training of new Party members should be based on the Party Rules and Regulations and its Program of Action and should have as its main content the elementary doctrines of Party construction.

(b) In the movement to educate workers and youth outside the Party, training must not be confined to the social sciences as ordinarily taught; an effort must always be made to educate them in the mission of the vanguard party.

(c) With respect to urgent current political questions (e.g., the question of the Security Treaty today), it is necessary to organize quite specialized all-Party policy study sessions. In short, educational activity which properly combines theory and practice must always be promoted.

2. A recent outstanding characteristic of the Party is that it has abandoned what is commonly called theoretical studies and is stressing the promotion of solidarity
and unity in the Party and, at the same time, the improvement of the ability of Party members to lead the masses, especially workers, farmers, and the youth.

3. The question of establishing a people's university incorporating the experiences of fraternal parties overseas appears to be under discussion by Party headquarters, and some of the buildings of the already planned central Party school have been completed. However, the school has not reached the formal opening stage (Notes 1 and 2). Following the educational policy outlined by the 6th CC Plenum resolution, a "Lecture Meeting on the Security Treaty Question" was held at the Party headquarters in October 1959. It deserves our attention as an indication of the direction being taken by the national headquarters study program.

Note 1:
(a) The Party headquarters decided to construct a school building for the central Party school as one of several undertakings commemorating the 7th Party Congress (Akahata, November 28, 1957).
(b) This was followed by a progress report on the fund raising campaign and on the construction on the school building, together with another call for a campaign to raise money for the school buildings of the central Party school.
(c) Furthermore, in addition to holding various lecture meetings, the Party headquarters is contemplating the establishment of a "People's University." Efforts are also being made to set up Party schools and to strengthen educational activities in local areas.

Note 2: The central Party school building (two story on a 34 tsubo plot) at 526 Sendagaya 3-chome, Shibuyaku, Tokyo, was completed July 20, 1958.

4. Educational activities at various local level Party echelons also show a notable recent trend toward
the organization of rather long term study programs in accordance with central Party policy and toward gradually regularizing these programs. Among those trained in 1959, ordinary Party members ranked first in number, followed by activists, new members, and Party leaders, in that order. Seventy per cent were trained in study groups, twenty per cent in Party schools, and ten per cent at lecture meetings. Prefectural level committees trained 17 per cent; district committees, 47 per cent; enterprise cells, 24 per cent, and residential cells, 12 per cent. We can see in these figures the relative importance placed on the education of group members.

5. The education of the masses outside the Party is stressed as a close adjunct to the movement to expand Party membership, and the Party endeavors to propagate its policies and conduct ideological education among the masses by holding meetings to debate policies during elections and by holding mass assemblies in connection with various anniversaries. Recently there has been a trend toward planning large-scale study meetings under Party auspices. This trend is a great advance as a Party educational system designed to influence the masses.

Note: The labor movement study meeting held under the Joint auspices of the Party headquarters and the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee is an example of this trend. Lectures on labor and politics for people outside the Party sponsored by the Party's district committees are recent outstanding developments. Of mass study meetings held in 1959, the Central Committee sponsored only two; but prefectural committees accounted for 15 per cent, district committees for 35 per cent, and cells for 50 per cent. One-fourth of the participants were made up of Party activists and the general public made up three-fourths. The participants were workers (5,070 of the
totally with teachers, peace activists, youth, women, and students, in that order, making up the rest.

6. Recognizing the important role played by scholars and men of culture in cultural movements and mass education, the Party employs such individuals in its educational activities among such mass organizations as labor unions, farm groups, and women's organizations. Organized groups of lecturers for study meetings and for policy research have recently become conspicuously active, but the Party uses them in conjunction with Party activists who have infiltrated various mass organizations and work from within. By this dual approach the Party is striving at present to attract new members and increase its support from the masses.

Note: See the "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress.
1. THE PEACE MOVEMENT

A. GUIDANCE POLICIES

1. In the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, the Party described the peace movement as "a glorious mission to be fulfilled in the spirit of proletarian internationalism." It also decided that the peace movement must be developed so as to "oppose American policies for aggressive war and for the revival of Japanese militarism," while constantly strengthening international cooperation and solidarity, under the leadership of the working class (Note 1). To achieve this purpose, the Party proposed the following four points as immediate practical struggle objectives:

   a. Immediate and unconditional cessation of A- and H-bomb tests leading to a complete ban on the manufacture and use of such bombs.

   b. Opposition to the importation of nuclear weapons into Japan, prevention of the nuclear armament of the Japanese security forces, and the withdrawal of American military bases.

   c. Opposition to military bloc policies (opposition to any participation in a "Northeast Asian Military Alliance"), but support for the establishment of a general collective security system in the Asia-Pacific area, including the Soviet Union and Communist China.

   d. Normalization of relations with the Socialist states, and friendship and amity with the Asian-African states.
Further, the Party stressed that in pushing the movement forward it must continually identify the "enemies of peace," "reconsider its previous tendency to concentrate on horizontal growth," and seek to promote qualitative growth (Note 2).

Note 1: "The Policy for the Peace Movement," adopted by the 8th Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1956, made (a) the question of disarmament and (b) the question of establishing a general security system the central objectives of the peace movement. The Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, however, defined as the fundamental objectives of the peace movement the more pragmatic demands that the aggressive war policies of American imperialism be opposed internationally, that the pro-American policies of the Kishi Government and the Liberal-Democratic Party be terminated domestically, and that they be replaced by a policy of peaceful coexistence among nations (Zenei, November 1956).

Note 2: The current four struggle objectives were put forward in the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, but the JCP is exploiting the fact that the peace movement does not aim at direct revolution but seeks to meet a humanitarian demand for the defense of peace. It tries to unite people of all classes and all walks of life. But the Party also insists that just "crying for peace and obscuring the reality of American imperialist ambitions and military control of Japan will turn the movement into nothing more than a pacifist movement" (see "The Revolution of Japan and the Peace Struggle," by Central Committee member, II Yashiro, in Zenei, February 1958). Believing that this eventuality would make the outlook for revolution and liberation of the working class impossible, the Party seeks (a) to make the broad masses of the nation understand that "the enemy of peace is imperialism" and (b) to improve the movement qualitatively by uniting the masses of the working class and developing it under working class leadership.

2. The Party's peace movement, making use of the sincere and universal demand of mankind for peace,
responsible calls for the development of a united humani-
tation action transcending ideology and parties based on
the following three principles:

a. The different social systems of the world can co-
exist peacefully (peaceful coexistence).

b. The controversies among nations must be solved
by negotiation and agreements acceptable to all peoples
(the conference spirit).

c. Domestic controversies within a nation are for
the people of that country to resolve for themselves, and
the rights of self-determination for all peoples must be
respected (noninterference in domestic affairs) (Note 1).

However, the Party basically adheres to the premise
that while the socialist camp has been consistently main-
taining peace, the imperialist camp is "frantically pre-
paring for a new war." It holds that both the struggle
for peace and the struggle for national independence are
directed against imperialism and that both are interlocked.
It thus directs the peace movement toward anti-American,
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese goals and, merging it with
"the struggle for independence," attempts to utilize it for
the formation of a national democratic united front (Note
2).

Note 1: These three principles were adopted...by the
general assembly of the world peace council held in
Vienna, November 1951. The JCP maintains that "these
principles are correct and, supported by everyone, will
prevail," and that "without such broad principles, the
peace movement in Japan will not advance on a broad
front" (See "Policy for the Peace Movement" [draft],
loc. cit.).
Note 2: The relationship between the "peace movement" and the "struggle for independence" was the subject of a furious debate in the pages of Zenei in 1957, between KAZAHAYA Yasoji and Itty Yashiro. The argument was temporarily settled by the international leadership through the so-called Nakane article in favor of Itt and his supporters. However, [according to a critic] the Nakane article did not pursue the question of the internal ties between the peace movement and the independence movement, and expounded the view that both movements exist separately and must not be subordinated one to the other or allowed to cancel each other out. Accordingly, the aforementioned Draft Policy for the Peace Movement, which was based on the Nakane article, declared the peace movement to be "the central mission" of the Party and stressed its importance, but it failed to link this theoretically with the problem of revolution, which is the political task of the Party membership. As a result, "there was a serious flaw in the peace movement of our country: that of omitting the problem of independence" (KAMEDA Togo, "Problems of the Anti-Security Treaty Struggle and the Peace Movement," Zenei, August 1959). Therefore, in the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress it was stated that "the primary duty of our Party is to strengthen even more the struggle for peace and independence." "The total collapse of the imperialist world system can be hastened only by combining the energy to protect peace with the energy for national independence, by isolating imperialism and its collaborators, the traitorous reactionary forces, from the general public, and by driving them from every country now controlled by imperialism" (Report on Party Platform Question). Thus, the Party is attempting to bring "the peace movement" and "the struggle for independence" into closer harmony.

3. Thus, the Party views its most significant issue, the blocking and abolishing of the revised Security Treaty, from the standpoint of both the peace movement and the struggle for independence, and is attempting to transform the peace movement qualitatively by combining the two (Note 2). However, fearful of adversely affecting
the peace movement by narrowing its scope, the Party is extremely cautious in promoting this double movement.

Note 1: KAMISHA Togo, vice-chief of the Peace and Base Policy Department in central Party headquarters, maintains that the peace struggle in Japan fails to consider the question of independence, that the Security Treaty issue is still seen mainly as a question of war or peace, that the issues of independence, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism are either weak or neglected. He goes on to state that "without independence, there is no peace. And without the emergence of a national consciousness, there can be no struggle for independence. If the treaty struggle is waged mainly from a pacifist standpoint, its objectives will not be achieved" (Problems of the Anti-Security Treaty Struggle and the Peace Movement, loc. cit.).

KAMIYAMA Shigeo, chief of the Peace and Base Policy Department, discussing the present stage of the peace movement, stated: "Have we not reached the point where we must clearly enunciate politically and theoretically those facts which we have disregarded thus far in the peace movement, namely that the root of war is imperialism, that socialism is the main force for peace and the stronghold of people today, and that the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces are its allies?" ("War Can be Eliminated," Zenei, May 1959).

Note 2: The article "Let's Make the 5th Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb World Conference of August 1-7 a Success Despite Various Obstacles" stated: "Mass organizations are created to serve limited and specific causes. The Japan Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council has been expanding because the banning of nuclear weapons has become an earnest wish of the entire Japanese people. Even those who do not ordinarily take part in peace movements have been participating in the move to ban nuclear weapons, which has attracted the support of even Liberal Democratic Party members and local governments." Accordingly, it warned, the attempt by a Trotskyite group of students to introduce separate resolutions on the obstruction of the Security Treaty and the overthrow of Teshi Cabinet and to make them the principle items on the agenda of the World Conference "stems from the mistaken idea that all current political issues may be introduced into any mass organization...."
1. The value, emphasis, international solidarity, and the objectives of the peace movement cannot be achieved without international united action, and this especially at strengthening its ties with the World Peace Council, the international Communist-front organization.

Note 1: The Japan Peace Committee is the only Japanese organization which is a member of the World Peace Council, but the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council and the Japan-Asia-Africa Solidarity Committee also maintain close relations with the Council

Note 2: Although the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council is not a member of the World Peace Council, their joint statement in Akahata, November 18, 1959, said:
(a) Our two organizations have always in the past worked together for peace, but in view of the new international situation we shall strengthen our mutual cooperation even more.
(b) The World Peace Council supports all activities of the Japan Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council and will send representatives to its conferences.
(c) The Japan Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council supports all activities of the World Council for peace, disarmament, and abolition of nuclear arms. It will send representatives to the latter's conferences and work to propagate all World Peace literature inside Japan.

The Extraordinary General Conference of the World Peace Council held in Stockholm for seven days beginning May 7, 1959, decided to award a "gold medal" to the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council and to the Japan Peace Committee. At the "Japan Peace Congress to Promote the End of the Cold War and to Smash Revision of the Security Treaty," held by the Japan Peace Committee for three days in November 1959, the World Peace Council awarded silver medals to persons performing meritorious services for the peace movement.

Note 3: The Japan-Asia-Africa Solidarity Committee is a member of the "Permanent Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organ." As a constituent member of the Permanent Secretariat (11 members), it has one representative in Cairo,
The organizations which the Party attempts to utilize in connection with its promotion of the peace movement are: the Japan Peace Committee, the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council, the Japan-Asia-African Solidarity Committee, the National Alliance for Protection of the Constitution, the National Liaison Council to Oppose Military Bases, the National Council for Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations, the Japan-China Friendship Society, the Japan-Soviet Society, and the Japan-Korea Society. However, the Party places most emphasis on the anti-nuclear weapons movement by depending primarily on the Japan Peace Committee for organization purposes and on the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council for activities.

Note: The fact that the peace movement involves so many different organizations devoted to such matters as normalization of international relations, military bases, protection of the constitution, and nuclear bombs is one of the special characteristics of the Japanese movement. It might thus be said that these broad forces have to a certain extent been combined into one (see "Policy for the Peace Movement" [Draft], op. cit., and "History of the Postwar Peace Movement," by KUMAKURA Hiroyasu).

5. b. Furthermore, the Party realizes that the greatest weakness in the peace movement at present is that the movement does not have roots in the working class. Hence, the Party has issued directives to make efforts to overcome this weakness.

Note: KAMEDA Togo, cited above, points out that "the greatest weakness in the Japanese peace movement is that the movement has no strong roots in industry," adding that "the year 1949, when the peace movement began, was the time of the Red Purge. Ten years have passed since"
the Party members were purged from their workshops. The peace movement has been forced to grow in isolation from the workshops. We must fill this gap as fast as we can."

B. RECENT MAJOR PARTY ACTIVITIES

1. Since the launching of the first Soviet satellite in the autumn of 1957 and the Declaration and Peace Appeal of the Moscow Conference, the JCP, which interprets the international situation as "the east wind prevailing over the west wind," has designated as its objectives: realization of a neutral Japan by means of summit conferences among the big powers; establishment of a collective security system; realization of peaceful coexistence through disarmament, opposition to a revival of militarism; nuclear demilitarization; obstruction and abolition of the Security Treaty; and normalization of relations with "socialist" states. The Party promoted various struggles in connection with the 4th and 5th Nuclear Ban World Conference and thus strengthened various peace organizations and international solidarity. Encouraged by the Eisenhower-Khrushchev joint statement in September 1959, that "international problems are to be solved not by force but by peaceful negotiations," and by the Soviet total disarmament proposal at the 14th U.N. General Assembly, the Party further expanded these struggles.


a. As mentioned above, the Party has long attached great importance to the Japan Peace Committee, and by sending many Party members into it, especially into the
pivotal positions of its secretariat, the Party exercises strong influence over the Committee.

b. The Party has not only established a "Central Group" in the Peace Committee, but at all conferences sponsored by the Committee the Party has always assembled those Party members who are delegates in a pre-conference meeting to discuss the strategy for the conference so as to lead it in the direction the Party desires.

Note 1: The Japan Peace Committee is an extension of the preparatory committee of the Society to Protect the Peace formed at the Japan Peace Congress held in Tokyo in April 1949. On the occasion of the formation of the World Peace Council on November 22, 1950, the Committee sent OYAMA Ikuo and HIRANO Gitaro as World Peace Council members. The Japan Peace Committee thereafter (1) nominated World Peace Council members, (2) made contact with various peace organizations throughout the world, (3) cooperated in various movements of the World Peace Council and carried out effective activities according to its decisions (Article 3 of the by-laws of the Japan Peace Committee). As an organization it seeks "to promote the peace movement on an over-all basis without adhering to any one movement, and to contribute its support and joint action by maintaining close mutual coordination and cooperation [with other organizations]" (see "Policy for the Peace Movement," loc. cit.).

At the present time Director HIRANO Gitaro and 28 other persons are World Peace Council members, and a permanent director is stationed in Vienna as a member of the secretariat. The Japan Peace Committee is composed of about 500 Japanese members and 28 prefectural peace committees are now in process of affiliating with it. Below the prefectural committees there are 217 local peace committees and 88 peace workshop committees.

Note 2: Recent meetings of JCP delegates to Japan Peace Committee conferences were held on the following occasions: Japan Peace Congress (June 13 and 16, 1958), the Committee's National Activists Conference (December 12, 1958), Japan Peace Congress to Abrogate the Security
Treaty and to Promote Peaceful Coexistence (February 26, 1959), Japan Peace Committee Central Assembly (June 26, 1959), Japan Peace Committee National Activists Conference (October 2, 1959), Japan Peace Congress to End the Cold War and To Block the Security Treaty (November 20, 1959).

c. At present the Party policy toward the Japan Peace Committee is:

(1) to unite peace activists in prefectural and local areas, especially in the workshops (Note 1),
(2) to achieve functional unity of struggle organizations in every field of the peace movement, and
(3) to use the Committee to strengthen international solidarity (Note 2).

The current objective is to interject the struggle to block and abrogate the Security Treaty more fully into the peace movement.

Note 1: A pamphlet entitled "Several Problems on the Occasion of the Japan Peace Congress," issued by the JCP Base Policy Department and distributed at the Japan Peace Congress JCP delegation meeting held on February 26, 1959, advised "expanding all workshops and local organizations having any connection with the Japan Peace Committee."

"The Lessons of the Peace Movement and Japan Peace Committee Activities in Fukuoka Prefecture," published by the Kyushu Regional Bureau on February 1, 1959, described the work of the Omuta District, which promoted study activity among its cells and peace activists and, with a peace parade as a starter, organized peace committee groups in the area and in workshops with workers as their core. The publication also described how the Fukuoka Prefectural Committee had one of its leaders appointed chief of the Prefectural Peace Committee General Affairs Bureau, exerted itself in reviving the prefectural peace committee, guided and supported district and cell activities, and strengthened and expanded peace committee organizations throughout the prefecture.
Note 2: It has been indicated that the Japan Peace Committee is an organization with strong international ties. The aforementioned "Several Problems on the Occasion of the Japanese Peace Congress" pointed out "the vital role of the Japan Peace Committee in carrying out in Japan the policies laid down from time to time by the World Peace Council and in linking the peace movement of Japan with the worldwide peace movement."

1. Party Attitudes Toward the World Congress to Ban Nuclear Weapons.

a. The Party attaches the greatest importance to the nuclear test ban movement, which, "as the broadest peace movement in Japan, combines and makes use of the experiences of many other organizations." It is, so to speak, "the largest public plaza for united action of the people of all classes." The Party, by making use of it, intends:

(1) to promote public opinion for peace and to elevate the national public ideology,
(2) to criticize Government policies and to seek policy changes,
(3) to strengthen international solidarity,
(4) to help and support victims of the A-bomb.

Note: The following reflects the situation with respect to conference of Communist Party members who were present at recent meetings of the Japan League against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

- Conference of Party members present at the Eleventh National Directors Meeting of the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (July 22, 1959).
Conference of Party members who had been present at
the Fifth World Ban the Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Conference
(July 31, August 4-6 and 8, 1959).

b. Accordingly, through not formally affiliated with
the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council and the central organiza-
tion of the nuclear ban movement, the Party has put many of
its members in the Council's secretariat and in its execu-
tive organ, the board of directors. Also at meetings held
under Council auspices, the Party convenes Party member
delegetes in order to unify their will. By these methods
the views of the Party are introduced into the Council.
Prefectural organizations of the Party have formally
affiliated with most of the prefectural Anti-A and Anti-H
Bomb Councils, have had Party officials appointed as
Council officers, and have infiltrated many Party members
into the secretariats of various prefectural council
units. The Party is now endeavoring by means of these
members to introduce its policies into the Anti-A and
Anti-H Bomb Council.

Note: See "Peace Movement Policy (A Draft)," April 15,
1958, Central Committee Mass Movement Section Publication,
"The Results and Significance of Two World Congresses"
(The Road to Peace -- No. 1); Central Committee; Section
on Peace and Base Strategy, "New Development in the Ban
the Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Movement" (Zenei, October
1959).

c. The Party sent a delegation from the Party head-
quartes (KAMIYAMA Shigen and six others) to the 6th World
Congress in August 1958. All told, Party members comprised
about one-tenth of the 6,000 local delegates. During the
Congress, the Party held three 'World Congress JCP Dele-
gates Meetings' in order to interject Party ideas into
the World Congress, where the Party "attained excellent results as a whole." Again the Party sent a delegation from Party headquarters (KAMUYAMA Shigeo and ten others), and Party members comprised about one-tenth of the local delegates to attend the 5th Congress in August 1959. During that Congress, the Party held five "World Congress JCP Delegate Meetings" for the purpose of unifying their will and maintaining close liaison with representatives of Communist states. As a result, the Party succeeded in having its policies reflected in various decisions of the Congress, and "attained considerable success both in bringing the Congress to a good conclusion and in promoting Party policy."

**Note 1:** The determination "to oppose...the nuclear armament policy of the Kishi Cabinet...is a policy that the Party had worked out since early that year. This policy was confirmed at the Japan Peace Congress (sponsored by the Japan Peace Committee) held two months prior to the World Congress. Although the 5th World Congress did not approve a resolution against the revised Security Pact, it adopted a policy which was tantamount to embarking on a political movement against the Treaty. This demonstrated that it was a mistake for the Party to make independent resolutions against the Security Treaty or for overthrowing the Kishi Cabinet, and that the broad peace front tactics of the Party was a success. According to Akahata, "the important thing is (a) to unite even those people who support the Kishi Cabinet and the Liberal Democratic Party on the single issue of opposing nuclear weapons, (b) to carry on discussions among the many people who are not able to understand the essence of the revised Security Treaty, (c) to thus deepen their understanding, and (d) to lead such people in the direction of positive participation in the struggle against both the Treaty and nuclear weapons."
Note 2: The 5th World Congress to Ban Nuclear Weapons took a position close to the Soviet and Communist Chinese foreign policies by alluding, in its declaration to the question of Algeria and the recognition of Communist China. Later the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council decided at its 3rd Board of Directors Meeting on January 24, 1959, to hold an open "International Nuclear Discussion Meeting" as part of the program at the 5th World Congress to Ban Nuclear Weapons. This plan was finally cancelled owing to opposition from Communist China. Further, on the first day of the 5th World Congress, four delegates from England and West Germany refused to attend the Congress on the ground that "the preparatory conference report attacked the policies of the Western European bloc and failed to touch upon manifestations of Communist Chinese nuclear armament."

d. The Party has promoted "Peace Marches" to stimulate the anti-nuclear weapons movement and has attained considerable success in this.

Note: It is said that the Party inspired the Anti-A and Anti-H Bomb Council to sponsor "The 1,000 Kilometer Hiroshima to Tokyo Great Peace March," which activated the anti-nuclear weapons movement prior to the 4th World Congress. About one million people participated in this march. The "5,000 Kilometer Great People's Peace March to Ban Nuclear Weapons and Obstruct Nuclear Armament," starting from Tokyo, Niigata, and Yoron Island, prior to the 5th Congress, is said to have included 10 million participants. The propaganda and agitation thus generated against nuclear armament and the revision of the Security Treaty have had a tremendous influence on people of slight political consciousness and have given a major impetus to the formation of local peace organizations.
A. GENERAL GUIDANCE POLICIES

1. The JCP's fundamental purpose in guiding the labor movement is to raise the political level of the workers' struggles and to foster and strengthen labor unions as the main force in a national democratic united front centered around the Party. For this reason, the Party has adopted the following general guidance policies:

a. To combat the suppression of the labor movement by monopoly capital and the Kishi Cabinet, and to protect the democratic rights of workers and labor unions.

b. To fight for the protection of the worker's livelihood against such worsening of labor conditions as produced by economic recession and lower standards of living.

c. To clarify the mission of labor unions, to defend peace and independence, and to strengthen international solidarity.

2. In order to achieve these objectives, the Party is endeavoring to extend Party membership among workers and labor unions.

3. Further, in regard to labor unions, the Party persistently advocates the industrial rather than an occupational union and has as its objectives: "One industry -- one union," and "One country -- one central labor union." Accordingly, the Party attaches great importance to Sohyo at the present time and is attempting to make it an important force for a united labor union front.
Note 1: See the Political Report presented to the 7th Party Congress.

Note 2: Above all, the Party regards labor union unity and solidarity as the pivot for a formation of a united front, and it is extremely careful not to cause union discord through its struggles. When the National Government Workers Union accepted the Fujibayashi good" raises proposal in October 1957, and the Niigata area headquarters of the national union, which had continued to fight despite this decision, was about to split, the Party instructed the members in the Niigata area to change to a soft line to preserve unity. When the struggle against the efficiency-rating system threatened to divide the Japan Teachers Union, the Party (in a resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee) ordered a shift from the labor union struggle to a people's struggle. These are cases in point.

Note 3: Since it had arbitrarily imposed its will on workers and labor unions with little consideration for their conditions up to the time of the 6th National Party Conference, the Party ran the risk of alienating the labor force. The 6th National Party Conference seriously considered this problem and warned against self-righteousness and sectarianism. The result was a tendency toward subservience to the masses. Accordingly, Party headquarters made it clear that the Party should follow a moderate course, indulging in neither sectarianism nor subservience. By the time of the 7th Party Congress, Party activity was practically restored to the normal path. As the Party itself admits, 'at present the leadership of the Party in the labor union movement is extremely weak' (Political Report of the 7th Party Congress). To overcome this problem, Party organs at each level are to work on the labor unions from the outside, but it is regarded as even more vital that the cells and Party members within enterprises, in carrying out Party activities from day to day among the workers, seek to influence labor union activity from within the unions. Thus, the expansion of Party membership within the labor unions has been made an urgent task of the Party.

Note 4: Although the Party stresses the importance of Sohyo, it also advocates, in the interest of forming a
B. CURRENT STRUGGLE OBJECTIVES

The Party details the objectives that the labor unions must strive for: "opposition to the revision of the Security Treaty," "opposition to industrial rationalization," and "the protection of workers' rights."

1. The Struggle Against the Security Treaty.

The Party agrees wholeheartedly with Sohyo, which has made this struggle its major objective. Combining this end with the struggle for peace and independence, Sohyo insists not only on blocking any revision of the treaty but also on its abrogation. In this struggle, the Party endeavors to develop the demands and struggles of workers and all other classes, to strengthen united action by combining these with the Security Treaty struggle, and to achieve complete solidarity in a national democratic united front.
b. From this standpoint, the Party advocates the following practical struggle policies:

(1) To block the rationalization offensive while it is in the test case stage.
(2) To secure the right of prior consultation in changing job functions.
(3) To increase the struggle against unemployment.
(4) To increase the wage struggle so as to raise the standard of living.
(5) To promote united struggles within each industry.
(6) To tie the struggle against rationalization to the struggle against the revision of the Security Treaty.
Four months later the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee made an analysis based on the policy of the 7th Party Congress: "Under the present unstable economic situation, monopoly capital faces the pressing necessity of reorganizing its private enterprises so as to secure stable monopoly profits. For this reason, the following results: a refusal to raise wages, layoffs because of new equipment, reduction of personnel, revision of wage schedules, and wage cuts. This is the rationale behind the aforementioned opposition struggle policies.

(c) At the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee in August 1959 (6 months after the 3rd Plenum), the rationalization problem and the Security Treaty revision problem were taken up and considered to be the two major struggle objectives confronting the working class. The significance of the rationalization struggle and its relationship to the revision of the Treaty were explained as follows:

Regarding the significance of the rationalization struggle, the Party, following the line of the 3rd Plenum, declared its opposition not to technological progress per se, but to capitalistic rationalization, which monopoly capital uses to reap excessive profits and which forces sacrifices upon the working class.

As for the relationship between rationalization and Security Treaty revision, the Party described the present rationalization trend as stimulating the growth of political reaction and as leading toward war. In this respect, it is closely connected with the revision of the Security Treaty which is actually a Japanese-American military alliance. In other words, the present rationalization scheme, politically and militarily, is one of the means of promoting the formation and strengthening of a military bloc. Also the revision of the Security Treaty is a manifestation of the current plot to strengthen rationalization.
1. Struggle for the Protection of Rights.

Judging that suppression of workers' rights has recently become more severe and that the oppression of workers, especially in public, middle and small enterprises, is especially notable, the Party has defined its struggle methods as follows: "We must turn the struggle to protect each and every workshop right into an overall drive by public enterprise workers to ratify the ILO treaty, to recover the right to strike, and to oppose any retrogressive revision of the labor laws."

Note: Akahata editorial of August 21, 1959, entitled "Strengthen the United Front and Advance the Struggle for Security and Rationalization."

C. GUIDANCE STRUCTURE

1. Organs at each level.

a. At present, at the Party headquarters level, there is a labor union department in charge of the labor movement within the secretariat. In addition to a chief and a vice-chief, it has about 10 other officials. Each official is in charge of a section devoted to an industry. In addition to guiding the labor departments of each regional and prefectural level committee, the central
department provides guidance to Party members, cells, and groups in labor organizations throughout the country. At the 6th Party Congress, the Party decided to employ the collective leadership of the Central Committee in order to stimulate Party activity in major industries. Thereafter, the Party frequently dispatched members of the Central Committee and other staff members to each major industrial area to carry out the task of education and guidance for local staffs, for cells in major industries, and for Party members. At the same time, it endeavored to facilitate the work of the local Party organizations by holding lectures and round-table discussions, and by so doing, setting as close as possible to local labor union leaders and members.

b. A "Labor Union Policy Department" (Rodo Kumi ni Tassaku Bu) is set up in each prefectural level committee. This department may be headed by a fulltime chief or by the CC chairman or other member of CC holding this position concurrently. Almost all the areas that are recognized as important in the labor movement have fulltime chiefs.

The district committees have about the same setup, but in districts where there are few businesses and factories there are no labor policy departments. As for city and county committees, which are under the district committees, the labor policy departments exist in nearly all city committees, but not in county committees.

c. Because of the extreme covert posture adhered to in the past, Party members within business enterprises have been following a policy of not standing for Party officer posts for fear of exposing their Party membership.
not at the 8th Party Congress, it was stipulated in the
new rule that: In the class composition of organizations
there must be a constant rise in ratio of workers. The
same applies to the composition of leadership organs.
(Article 16). At that time a great many Party members
of worker origin were appointed to headquarters posts.
Thereafter, in the election of officers of each Party
echelon, efforts were made to strengthen Party leadership
within the labor movement by Party members from industry.
A considerable number of them are already holding Party
office at the prefectural level as well as at the district
level.

Note: In the past it was the policy to conceal the
participation of Party members employed in enterprises
in prefectural and district level Party conferences by
holding separate Party meetings only for such Party
members. But recently, reflecting the trend toward un-
covering Party organizations and activities, the number
of Party conferences at each level in which members from
business enterprises participate is increasing. Moreover,
at these conferences, such Party members have also been
elected as Party officers.

2. Cells.

a. According to regulations, a Party member must
belong to a cell, which is the basic organization of the
Party.

(1) When three or more Party members are
employed in the same management unit in a
government or a civilian industry, they form
an enterprise cell.

(2) Where there are fewer than three Party members
in the same office or place of work:
A joint cell is formed of those who work in a given area and are associated with the same industrial or professional organization, e.g., the National Railways, a private railway corporation, or the school system.

(b) A joint cell may also be formed by those in different enterprises but in the same industrial field (e.g., metal-working, government work).

(c) In case either of the above is impossible, a member joins the resident cell where he lives.

b. These cells are, as a rule, under direct guidance of the district committees for the area concerned, but as mentioned above, those cells which are composed of officers and workers in the national labor union organizations constitute special cells which are under the direct guidance of the Central Committee. Similarly, cells not in national level organizations, but in regional or prefectural level organizations, are subject to the guidance of the regional bureaus or the prefectural level committees as the case might be. The Party has designated certain of the government offices and major industries as "key points" because of their extremely vital character and has been concentrating its activities on them. Cells located in such key areas receive not only the guidance of the district committees but also, according to the degree of their importance, the direct guidance of the regional and prefectural level Party organs.
The new rules and regulations of the 7th Party Congress provide that "general cells" may be formed when sanctioned by either Party members. Some of these "general cells," composed of several cells in the same area and in the same field, have already been formed and are attempting to achieve unity of will and activity.


The Party rules adopted by the 6th CC National Party Conference revised the pre-existing provision that Party groups should be formed whenever there are three or more Party members in a mass organization, stipulating that such a group should be formed only when there are three or more Party members among the elected officers of a mass organization. Therefore, since the 6th National Conference, Party groups are found only in a small number of local labor unions. Only a few appear to have been organized inside the headquarters of national labor organizations.

Note 1: Formerly, whenever a national congress of the labor union was convened, the Party usually assembled Party member delegates at the site of the congress and held a strategy meeting. These delegates were not members of a Party group as defined by the rules, but within the Party these meetings were called "Group Conferences." But, because it was felt that such Party member meetings were counterproductive, they were discontinued after the labor union congress of the spring of 1959. The Party Gazette of May 10, 1959, No. 7, carried the following instructions:

"Beginning this year, on-the-site meetings of all Party member delegates to national conferences will no longer as a rule be held. This is because a fundamental and nationwide unity of will of Party members through guidance by the [regular] Party organs is deemed to be of utmost importance. Therefore, although some inconvenience may be felt, group-type guidance at conferences
is reluctantly abandoned. Other reasons for this decision are (1) that even though such meetings are held at the conference sites they result in detailed guidance of conference tactics and speeches that give rise to insubordination tendencies, and (2) the danger arising from the difficult situation into which enterprise cells have been now placed ("On the Spring Labor Union Congresses and Party Guidance").

Note 2: In some unions where the lack of the required number of Party members in the executive posts of the union prevents the formation of the prescribed "Party group," irregular "groups" made up of Party members employed as secretaries and office personnel in the union offices have been formed and are carrying out group activities. The importance of Party activities carried out by Party members employed as secretaries and office workers in a union increases to the extent that the group includes officers who are members of the union's executive department.

4. Party Member Labor Union Executives Within Enterprises.

In order to exercise guidance over a labor union, the Party as a rule has adhered to the method of infiltrating the workers, raising their class consciousness, bringing them under the influence of the Party, and thus exerting pressure from below on the union leadership. Recently, moreover, the Party has been emphasizing guidance from above by getting Party members elected as officers of the labor union. At the present time, the number of Party members elected to the executive staffs of labor unions throughout the nation is fairly large, but those who have formed Party groups, as called for by the Party regulations, are extremely few. However, among the Party members already elected to the executive positions in labor unions, some
are carrying on Party activities and promoting Party policies and principles by taking advantage of labor union activities or by hiding behind them.

a. DISTINGUISHABLE FEATURES OF PARTY ACTIVITIES

The distinctive features of the Party's guidance of the labor movement and related Party activities are as follows:

1. The Party attempts to train labor union activists in the workshops, band them closely around the Party, and thereby strengthen the labor unions as a class (Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, the Resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee).

2. The Party emphasizes the workers' economic struggles and is ceaselessly endeavoring to develop them into political struggles.

3. The Party stresses the conquest of enterprise-centered unionism and of anti-Communism within the labor unions and defines the present character of labor unions as follows:

a. Starting as enterprise unions under the firm control of the occupation army, the unions are strongly inclined to remain such and for the most part lean toward labor-capital cooperation (industrial conciliation).

b. Labor unions since the "Red Purge" are still basically anti-Communist.

But the Party concludes that the above situation is attributable not to the working masses but to the fact that the views of the workers are suppressed by their leaders who are enslaved by "enterprisism" and anti-Communism.
Note 1: The Party regards the present position of the workers thus: "Since monopoly capital and the Kishi Cabinet, aiming at a revival and strengthening of militarism, have begun violently to oppress the working class, the working class itself must turn to political violence. In view of this, the Party is critical of Sohyo leadership's present "low posture" (nonprovocative) doctrine. Immediately after the 1959 spring struggle, the newspapers were filled with the self-criticism of Sohyo's leaders, which the Party criticized as follows: "The speeches of the Sohyo leaders, as reported in the bourgeois newspapers, and the contents of their internal discussions, whatever their real intention, have pointed only to the shortcomings of the struggles and have been so worded as to make the conclusion unavoidable that these shortcomings were due to the fact that 'the masses are far behind; only the leaders have forged ahead.' In regard to this movement, which is at present being promoted by one part of the leadership, there are various opinions being expressed: that the leaders are trying to defend themselves by passing the responsibility on to the masses; that basically it is an attempt to justify a return to a low posture position; that it is an attempt to divert the workers' criticism from the Socialist Party. The Party does not regard this self-criticism as originating necessarily from malicious intent. However, it is certain that this weakness does exist, and that there is a need, moreover, to be concerned more with the results of self-criticism than with whether its intentions are good or bad ('On Sohyo's Self-Criticism Movement,' Party Gazette, No. 6, April 25, 1959).

Note 2: The Party criticized Sohyo's so-called "scheduled struggle" as follows:

(a) Most of the labor unions in Japan confuse the scheduled struggle with the united struggle and do not endeavor to bring out the initiative and creativity of the workers. They have the illusion that the united struggle is simply to set mechanically the times and dates of the struggle.

(b) Workshop struggles should be executed as preliminaries to a united struggle in order to make up for the shortcomings of this scheduled struggle and should cease when the major struggle begins. Guided by this doctrine, the Party thus emphasizes workshop struggles
and insists that, with union leaders standing in the vanguard of the workshop struggles, union organization must be fostered in the workshops, that the initiative and determination of union members must be encouraged, and that the struggle must be developed on the basis of these factors.

4. The Party stresses the correct relationship between a political party and the labor union.

a. In carrying out its united front tactics, the Party's primary objective is the acceptance of Party policy by the labor unions. Because the Party regards itself as the vanguard of the working class, its ultimate goal is to gain the support of the labor unions. However, in view of the present situation, it is making only such easily acceptable demands as "freedom of political activities" and "freedom to support any political party." In this way it is attempting to foster criticism of the Socialist Party and to gain support for the Communist Party.

b. The Party regards the labor unions' official support of the Socialist Party as disruptive of labor union unity and solidarity. The Party also feels that Socialist-Communist rivalry in the face of today's reactionary offensive is a hindrance to the organization of broad united actions. It therefore insists that the unions must neither support nor reject a specific political party, but must allow their members to support whom they wish and must protect their [right to engage in] political activities.

c. Recently this policy has taken hold among organized workers, and since 1958 they have waged
formous arguments at labor union congresses over which political parties to support and which candidates to nominate for public office. Moreover, on the occasion of the House of Councillors elections in 1959, Party members and sympathizers in the National Railway Workers Union (Kolu) and the Telecommunications Workers Union (Kori) organized support for Communist Party candidates and campaigned for them in defiance of their union's official support of the Socialist Party.

d. This act of defiance became an issue at subsequent union congresses and occasioned an unprecedented degree of controversy. The Sohyo assembly (August 26, 1959), convening after the major labor unions had held their congresses, became entangled in this problem. The motion to get "support of the Socialist Party" into Sohyo's platform passed by a bare majority of delegates votes, but was rejected by a majority of the organizational vote.

Note: In the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, the Party stated that "...for the labor union to give its official support to a specific political party is to obstruct the unity of workers and to violate the freedom of union members to engage in political activities and to support political parties. Our Party regards as highly significant the fact that at present the labor unions are supporting both the Socialist and the Communist parties as they conduct their struggle. This is a noteworthy step toward freedom of political activity for union members and toward normalizing the relationships between labor unions and political parties."

5. The Party advocates the strengthening of the international solidarity of the labor movement.

a. For this reason, the Party has made the 'Moscow Declaration' and the "Peace Appeal" its
principles of action, and on the basis of these principles is endeavoring to strengthen the ties of the labor unions in Japan with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Note 1).

b. In recent years the relationship of Japanese labor unions to both the WFTU and the labor unions of the Communist countries has deepened. The Party regards this tendency as necessary and important and supports it on the grounds that through such intercourse Japanese labor unions will strengthen the international solidarity of the working class in accordance with the policies of the WFTU and will organize united action aimed at common objectives.

Note 1: The WFTU was formed in 1945, but because of political tendencies arising from control by the Communist parties, the organization split in 1949, giving rise to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Since February 1958, when the WFTU affiliate, the All-Japan Congress of Industrial Trade Unions (Sambetsu), was dissolved, no Japanese labor union has been affiliated with the WFTU.

Note 2: Sambetsu, as a Communist-controlled labor organization and as an organization affiliated with the WFTU, was the only Red labor organization in Japan. During its peak period, it had 1,500,000 union members and was extremely active as the nucleus of the Japanese labor movement. But it later underwent a gradual decline (at the time of dissolution it had 12,000 members) until it became difficult even to maintain its organization. Thus, on February 15, 1958, one of its components, the All-Japan Metalworkers Union (Zen Kinzoku) merged with the Sohyo affiliate, the National Metal Workers Union (Zenkokuse Kinzoku), and the All-Japan Council of Medical Employees Unions (Zen Ikyo) became a neutral, independent union. On the relationship between Sambetsu and the Party, KASUGA Shoichi (then chairman of the JCP Control
"Labor unions and the political parties should each have an independent position. It was a mistake for the Communist Party to treat the Sambetsu as its own union." (Akahata, July 31, 1956). Sambetsu's function of publicizing the ideology and the policy of the WFTU in Japan, which it was carrying out during its last days, was inherited by the "WFTU Japan Publishing Association."

Note 4: In Notice No. 161 of the Party Central Secretariat, dated February 18, 1958, and entitled "On the Developmental Dissolution of Sambetsu and the International Solidarity Movement of Labor Unions," the Party issued the following instructions: "The fundamental objective of the Party and the working class is to unite the labor unions of our country under the policies of the WFTU. Insofar as conditions permit, the Party endeavors to deepen the contacts and have our industrial unions affiliate with the international unions of the WFTU. Sambetsu having been dissolved, the Party will hereafter:

(a) Give positive support to the undertakings of the WFTU Japan Publishing Association.

(b) Give positive support to the Association's monthly publication, "World Trade Union Movement," by distributing it and securing readers.

(c) Consider giving assistance to the Association's campaign for contributions to this publication. We must see that accounts of the "struggle experience" of the Japanese labor unions are sent in.

(d) To assist the Association in strengthening its ties with labor unions by placing a regular representative of local industrial labor organizations on the directorship. Until now, the representative has been either an individual labor union activist or a representative of such unions as the General Federation of National Printing Industry Workers (Zen-in Soren) and the All-Japan Federation of Department Store Workers (Zen Hyakka).

Note 4: The participation of the Japanese labor unions in the international conferences of the WFTU has increased each year. Recently the unions have participated in international conferences of teachers, public officials, and workers in commerce and in such industries as chemical, petroleum, coal mining, metal machinery, lumber, and construction materials. The Party attaches great significance to this activity because it strengthens international solidarity (see Akahata, August 21, 1959).
Note 5: Sobyo and the Central Council of All-Soviet Labor Union, for the first time, had their representatives attend the regular congress in 1959. In May of the same year, the First Pacific and Asia Port and Harbor Workers Conference was held in Japan. The Party considers these developments of the greatest significance in strengthening Japanese labor and the international solidarity of the labor movement.

Note 6: Among the labor unions of Japan, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, there has recently been an increase in exchanging personnel and a strong trend toward issuing joint statements and agreements on the protection of peace. The Party welcomes these developments as strengthening international solidarity.

Note 7: In the "Party Report" of March 25, 1959 (No. 4), the Party contended that: "Because there are representatives who leave the labor movement after returning from a trip to the Communist union, the Party must endeavor to select faithful and responsible staff members for the personnel exchange program." This program appears to aim at strengthening the influence of the WFTU in the Japanese labor movement.

Note 8: The WFTU Japan Publication Association, using subsidies from WFTU and income from its own publications, issues the journal "The World Labor Union Movement" (in the Japanese language). In this manner, the Association can make known the policies, principles, and activities of the WFTU among domestic labor unions and can introduce the Japanese labor movement to the whole world. Since the dissolution of the Sambetsu Confederation, the Association operates essentially from a Japanese Bureau of the WFTU.

6. The Party emphasizes the importance of workers in the Party organization and endeavors to enlarge the Party by stressing the importance of on-the-job workers and young laborers, especially those in major industries and in major industrial centers.
In the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, the major industries included metal, transportation, coal mining, chemistry, and all public institutions. The major industrial centers included Tokyo-Yokohama, Kyoste-Osaka-Kobe, Northern Kyushu, Nagoya area, the Inland Sea Industrial Zone, and the Hokkaido Mine Ore Center. For this reason, emphasis is placed on the collective leadership of the Central Committee to establish a systematic leadership structure: city-province-regions, prefecture, district and cell, as well as to strengthen the independent action of the Party.

In regard to the Party activities of Party members in business and industrial enterprises, the Party center and other various class organs point out that: "There are many Party members who conceal their Party activities under the cloak of union activities." The Party also regularly emphasizes the necessity for Party members to overcome unionism and to strengthen the Party's independent action. Such a trend, due in the past to the non-open (hidden) nature of the Party members in enterprises, is being stressed while at the same time open activities are being strengthened. Accordingly, Party members in enterprises should facilitate not only the labor union movement but increasingly also those Party activities that are related to it. One example of the latter would be to invite famous Party members as lecturers to union study meetings held under the auspices of the labor union. Another would be to voice strong support for the Communist Party at labor union congresses.
6. Since the 7th Party Congress, the Party, altering its standard non-open 'closed' system, has been carrying on open action. Because of this policy, Party members in enterprises and the Party organization have gradually come out into the open. Though not all have surfaced, the intention of the Party to carry out various activities in the open has been increasingly realized.

Note 1: In the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, the Party emphasized that: "It is important to make known to all members the concept of open activity of Party cells and to fight and overcome false sectarian irrationalism." On the other hand, it went on to state that: "The fact that the Party is compelled to carry out non-open [secret] activities is due simply to the power relations between enemies and friends. Under present conditions, therefore, a clear distinction must be made between the open actions of the Party organization in enterprises and the organizational Party members." The latter must be kept secret, it was indicated. At the Party's All-Nation Organization Department Chiefs Conference held January 19-20, 1959, Matsushima Shigenori, Central Organization Chief, urged that: "In regard to open actions, do not rely on the doctrine of 'defense of organization first.' The first task is to promote Party policies, to secure votes, to expand Akahata, and to win new Party members, and unite this with defense." The acquisition of votes, of Akahata readers, or of new Party members will be handicapped unless the existence of Communist Party cells in enterprises is known to the masses, and the Party's prestige is raised by the cells' daily activities. And at the All-Nation Prefectural Committee Chairman Conference held in October 28-30, 1959, the necessity of an open policy was urged on the one hand and the excess of open policy was warned against on the other.

Note 2: Of late, while Party membership is kept secret, activities for the Party are vigorously carried on at places of work by interpreting and promoting Party policies and principles in relation to the revised Security Treaty struggle, by demanding that the union
c. In the past as a method of expanding its influence, the Party had resorted to selling subscriptions to Party organs [Akahata, Zenki, etc.] and to individual solicitation of new members. However, recently the Party has been endeavoring to prepare the foundations for enlarging its influence by various and sundry means, among which is the organizational and planned method of augmenting the Party influence while gradually gaining wider Party support (securing Party sympathizers, increasing the readership of the Party organs, proselytization):

(1) The exploitation of the various regional and local united struggle movements:
The political struggles such as the Anti-Police Power Struggle, Anti-Mutual Security Pact Struggle, Anti-U.S. Base Struggle, as well as the anti-Evaluation Struggle of Nikkyoso, the organized
workers season (spring, autumn and year-end) struggles, and the Anti-industrial Rationalization struggles in various industries are being exploited by the Party in its attempt to combine these various struggles into a unified struggle encompassing all workers. The Party is attempting to gain its ends by appealing to the workers sense of labor solidarity and by exploiting the organizational powers of the various united struggle organizations established on the regional and prefectural levels. The Party is expending special efforts to bring these united struggle organizations under its leadership, and is plotting the course of the various struggles and the enlargement of the Party influence through instructions disseminated at cadre-group conferences and Party activities conferences convened for these special purposes.

(2) The exploitation of the educational activity: the Party is exploiting the various educational and propaganda activities sponsored by labor unions by supplying them with cadre scholars and leftist activists as lecturers for the purpose of inculcating them with the Communist ideology. Moreover, recently the Party itself has begun to sponsor educational facilities as a means for promoting its ends. On the whole, it has been successful. The Party is exploiting these educational facilities as a way of proselytizing the radicals among the workers who attend these facilities.
Note 1: In January 1959, the Labor Movement Study Group sponsored by the Party Central Committee and the Party Tokyo Municipal Committee was convened as a novel way of thoroughly disseminating the Japan Communist Party's labor movement policies. A fairly large number of labor union officials, the mainstays of their respective unions, attended the meeting. It was a success. Subsequently, in various parts of the country, this type of meeting has been sponsored and vigorously promoted by the regional, prefectural local and cell apparatus. Most of the lecturers for these meetings were the Party's Central Committee officials and Party scholars and writers. The course of studies and the debates at these meetings included, in addition to general studies of ideologies, a great deal on current affairs, such as the Anti-Mutual Security Pact and Anti-Industrial Rationalization issues — all aimed at the reinforcement of political struggles. As texts they used such Party organs as Akahata and other Party publications.

Note 2: In addition to the labor unions, there are other organizations devoted to the promotion and education of the labor movement that the Party has made its special target for exploitation. These include the Workers Education Association and Japan Organ Association. The Party expects these organizations to follow the Party line without overt expression of Communist sympathy. The importance of the role assigned to these educational organizations has been on the increase in keeping with the stepped up educational activities of the labor unions.

Note 3: The relationship between the Workers Education Association and the Party requires special attention. The textbook, Friend of Study, published by this association, is unswervingly leftist, and is widely used as a textbook for workers. The chief target of the Workers Education Association is the young worker. For such workers the association frequently sponsors labor lectures and study groups based on leftist ideology and aimed principally at increasing the workers' class consciousness.

(i) The exploitation of various circles, i.e., clubs.
E. EXTENT OF PARTY INFILTRATION OF VARIOUS ENTERPRISES

Cadres in the civil service and major industries on the management level are estimated to total approximately 15,000 individuals. Their distribution in the various management areas is as follows:

- Civil service: 55% (8,250 cadre members)
- Major industries: 40% (6,000 cadre members)
- Others: 5% (750 cadre members)

1. The percentage distribution of cadre members (8,250 individuals) in the various civil services is:

- National government and courts: 11% (907 individuals)
- Nationalized enterprises: 39% (3,217 individuals)
- Prefectural and local governments: 187 (1,485 individuals)
- Teachers and professors: 32% (2,640 individuals)
Of the aforementioned cadre in the nationalized enterprises, nearly half (1,600 individuals) are employees of the National Railroads. The Post Office Ministry and the Telephone & Telegraph Corporation, respectively, contain approximately one-fourth of these cadre members (800 individuals).

Cadre members among teachers (totaling approximately 2,600) are distributed as follows:

- Elementary schools: 31.3% (800 individuals) total 57.7%
- Junior High schools: 26.4% (700 individuals)
- High Schools: 21.9% (570 individuals)
- Universities: 19.2% (500 individuals)
- Special Schools: 1.2% (30 individuals)

Of the above cadre members, 57.7% (totaling approximately 1,500 individuals) are elementary and junior high school teachers, the great majority of whom provide the leadership for the Japan Teachers Association [the teachers' union for elementary school teachers]. Of the high school teachers, 90% (510 individuals) belong to the Japan Teachers Association instead of the Japan High School Teachers Association, where one would logically expect to find them.

2. The percentage distribution of cadre members (numbering approximately 6,000 individuals) in the management level of major industries is as follows:

- Machinery and instrument manufacturing (chiefly metal fabrication): 20.1% (1,210 individuals)
- Mining: 18.9% (1,230 individuals)
- Chemical: 12.4% (740 individuals)
- Electric power and gas: 10.2% (600 individuals)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, (private railroads, Nippon Express, etc.)</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>590 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>440 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing, publishing, newspaper and broadcasting</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>360 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipbuilding</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>260 individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiber</td>
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<td>260 individuals</td>
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III. AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

FUNDAMENTAL PARTY POLICIES

1. The Party's basic agrarian policy is a part of the anti-monopoly struggle, which seeks a showdown with American imperialism, Japan's monopoly capitalism, which is subservient to the United States, and with the Japanese government's policies of rapaciousness against the farmers and the revival of militarism.

Note 1: The Party had debated in the past as to whether the Party's agrarian movement should be based on anti-monopolism or anti-feudalism. At the 6th National Council Meeting held in April 1955, the Party decided on anti-monopolism. At the 7th Party Congress the anti-monopolism policy was adopted and continues in effect to date.

Note 2: The Political Report of the 7th Party Congress stressed the importance of the struggle for democratizing the farmers. Feudalistic customs and thoughts remain strongly rooted among the farmers; in village politics the conservative, reactionary forces maintain a strong influence. Therefore, the political, social, and cultural struggle to democratize the farmers will play an important role in expanding every struggle related to the farmers' demands.

Note 3: Regarding the agrarian land problem, which had been the central issue in the anti-feudalism struggles in the past [prior to the 1952 enactment of the Agricultural Land Law passed under General MacArthur's fiat], the Party holds the following view: "The land problem, which does not concern the land redistributed by the 1957 Agricultural Land Law, is an important issue for the marginal farmers. It is now becoming a serious matter because of the farmers' demands for a redistribution of arable lands, amounting to several millions of acres and held by the government, national and local. There is also a vast acreage of forest land, unaffected by the 1957 legislation, held by landlords. The land issue bears heavily on many:

2. The Party's estimate of the current situation in the villages with respect to farmers is as follows (see also Note 1):

a. Concomitant with the rapid introduction of agricultural machineries, an heretofore unexpected development in capitalistic management and production in agriculture has become apparent; more and more the farmers are acquiring the characteristics of small merchandise manufacturers.

b. Nevertheless since [MacArthur's] 1952 land redistribution by the Agricultural Land Law, class stratification is intensifying in the villages. The farmers are progressively being impoverished by American imperialism, the U.S.-Japan monopoly capitalism subservient to it, and by the repressive and rapacious agrarian policies of the reactionary Japanese government. This progression of class stratification has produced a small minority of wealthy farmers, has hastened the ruin of a great number of middle-class farmers, and has measurably enhanced the number of the extremely marginal farmers.
c. These regressive and rapacious policies are evident in the economic realities: the growing price differential between high commodity prices and low agricultural prices; the increasing burden of various taxes; the continuance of budgetary appropriations for the Agricultural Price Stabilization Act and for the program for increasing food production, land improvement, land reclamation, reforestation, flood control and disaster relief; the termination of proactive programs; and the program for substituting loans for grant-in-aid to farmers in financial straits.

d. Particularly, the policy imposed by American imperialism of importing surplus U.S. agricultural products has served to oppress Japan's agriculture.

e. The great majority of present-day farmers are under the thumb of conservative forces. The Federation of Japan Farmers Association (Zennichino) still does not embrace a large number of farmers; its activities also fail to promote nationalism and class consciousness (see Note 2).

Note 1: See the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress; the Resolution of the Sixth Central Committee Plenum; and the previously mentioned article in Akahata, December 17, 1959.

Note 2: (a) Presently, the farmers' nationwide organizations in Japan are the following three: Federation of Japan Farmers Association (Zennichino), National Farmers League (Zennoren) and Japan Pioneers League (Zenkairen). The percentage of Japanese farmers organized by these three at present is extremely low; about 5 per cent only. Zennichino claims a membership of 250,000.
(b) Zennichino was founded on March 24, 1959, by the unification of the following three organizations on the principle of freedom of choice in supporting political parties: National Federation of Japan Farmers Association, New Village Construction Faction of the defunct Nichino and National Farmers Association. The National Federation of Japan Farmers Association was formed earlier on September 10, 1957, by the union of the Unification Faction and the Autonomy Faction of the defunct Nichino. This was accomplished through the maneuvering of the Farmers United Front Acceleration National Representatives Conference.

(c) Zennichino started out with a temporary executive committee system because at its constitutional congress the issue of selecting executives was hotly disputed and the appointment of the president and vice president was left up in the air. However, at its Second National Congress, held for three days from August 29, 1959, the president as well as other officials were decided upon and the format of unification was established.

(d) Presently, the fundamental policies of the aforementioned four factions comprising Zennichino are not necessarily in harmony. At the Tokyo headquarters of the organization, the defunct Nichino’s Unification Faction and Autonomy Faction, forming the leftist group, are antagonistic to the rightist group, comprising the defunct Nichino’s New Village Construction Faction and the National Farmers Association. This tendency is reflected in the prefectures and constitutes an obstacle to the unity of the organization on the prefectural and local levels.

(e) The local factions of Zennichino have now been unified in the 15 prefectures: Yamanashi, Niigata, Nagano, Gunma, Osaka, Kyoto, Nara, Aichi, Fukui, Toyama, Tottori, Okayama, Tokushima, Nagasaki and Oita; in the other 31 prefectures, the local factions are still to be unified (see Zennichino Second National Congress, publication issued in August 1959).

3. Because of the situation outlined above, the Party prescribed for its agrarian movement the shattering and ultimate overthrow of both the U.S.-Japan monopolistic capitalism and the rapacious policies of the Japanese
This is to be accomplished through
the formation of a class-conscious political alliance of
workers and farmers by developing a common front struggle
arising out from the voluntary mass organization of the
farmers -- founded on the leadership and support of the
Party and working class. This, then, is to be expanded
into a national, democratic united battlefront. To attain
these objectives, the Party is seeking the allegiance of
the marginal and the middle-class farmers -- the two
classes which form the overwhelming majority of the farm
population.

Note 1: See the Political Report of the 7th Party Con-
gress; Resolutions of the Sixth Central Committee Plenum;
and the previously mentioned article in Akahata,
December 17, 1959.

Note 2: In the above Political Report, the Party
classified the farmers into three groups, marginal,
middle-class, and wealthy:

(a) The marginal farmer is unable to make a liveli-
hood from his farming alone and must therefore hire out
his labor to others. As a class, the marginal farmer
bears semiproletarian characteristics. His current role
is modest, but in revolutionary struggles he would be
the most trustworthy ally for the Party and the working
class.

(b) The middle-class farmer generally manages his
own farm and secures his livelihood solely from his farm
income. As a class, he is typically small bourgeois,
and could maintain himself by fighting in collaboration
with the marginal farmer. The Party emphasizes the im-
portance of organizing these middle-class farmers into
an agrarian movement.

(c) The wealthy farmer, whose principal occupation
is agriculture, constantly employs a number of laborers,
but may invest in nonagricultural enterprises (lumber
mill, tile factory, brewery, etc.) and exploit profits
therefrom. Most of these wealthy farmers are regarded
by the Liberal Democratic Party as its most reliable
strength in the villages.
The basic attitude of the marginal and middle-class farmers toward the wealthy farmers should be as follows: The wealthy farmers might possibly join in united actions with the marginal and middle-class farmers, but since they are fundamentally reactionary the other two groups should alienate the wealthy farmers' influence in the villages and seek independently to safeguard their own interests. They should thereby become the nucleus for uniting and reinforcing the democratic forces in the villages.

Note 1: In its class theory regarding farmers, the Joto Farmers Organization General Conference, which is promoting its agrarian movement under the anti-monopoly banner, maintains the thesis that farmers as a whole [wealthy, middle-class and marginal] form a single indivisible class (see The Agrarian Movement Combating Monopoly Capital in the December 1935 issue of Agrarian Movement Study Society). This one-class thesis is also held by the Communist Party's anti-orthodox faction. Of this view, the Party is highly critical. In the previously mentioned article, The Current Agrarian Struggle and the Party's Objectives, the Party states that "the argument which... blurs the difference between the marginal, middle-class and wealthy among the farmers will sidetrack the agrarian struggle."

4. The Party is stressing the importance of forming a political alliance based on class and directed against its strategic target, the U.S.-Japan monopoly capital. It considers the possibility of uniting the workers and farmers in a common struggle as increasingly favorable. The Party thus emphasizes the importance of accelerating the revolution by politically awakening the farmers and allying them with the working class.

Note: Regarding the matter of worker-farmer alliance, the Party heretofore had only stated its desirability in the several discussions at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee (Rokuchuho) held in April 1935, which are contained in the meetings' reports, 'Proposals for the
Based on the aforementioned fundamental orientation, the Party has set for itself the following targets: the organization of unorganized farmers and their absorption into Zennichino; the reinforcement of the acceleration of worker-farmer collaboration; a price hike in agricultural products; a struggle for better crop insurance coverage; and an anti-Mutual Security Pact. The Party is placing its greatest emphasis on the marginal farmers and their organization. The guiding policy on this matter is as follows:

1. The organization of the unorganized farmers and their absorption into Zennichino.

The Party regards the organization of the unorganized farmers and their absorption into Zennichino as one of its most important policies. To accomplish this, the Party stresses that the farmers' everyday grievances and economic demands be articulated. Zennichino, whose current strength is weak, must become a viable farmers' organization. It is also especially necessary to penetrate deeply among the farm laborers and marginal farmers and amalgamate these under Party influence.
Note 1: From the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, the Resolutions of the Sixth Central Committee Plenary, the editorial titled "The Important Problems of Zennichino" which appeared in the December 17, 1959 issue of Akahata; the article "Review of the Zennichino Congress and the Future Mission of the Party" in the Party Report No. 17, the September 10, 1959 issue.

Note 2: To absorb the farmers into Zennichino the Party has adopted the policy of reinforcing the town and village organizations, county associations and prefectural associations from the bottom up by starting with the organization and reinforcement of the smallest village communities or some other suitable geographical localities as the basic unit of build-up. Moreover, the Party is also emphasizing the policy of organizing and reinforcing the special interests organizations; this has much in common with the National Council policy (see the February 1958 issue of Agrarian Movements Study, the organ of the Agrarian Movements Study Society) built on the foundation of special interests organizations -- the fundamental organizational policy of the Joto Conference.

2. The Reinforcement and Acceleration of the Worker-Farmer Collaboration.

The Party is critical of the worker-farmer collaboration movement promoted under the sponsorship of Sohyo and Zennichino because it is not primarily directed towards the formation of a revolutionary political alliance but remains united action for economic ends, strongly slanted toward securing economic benefits and unionism.

The Party is plotting the infiltration of revolutionary ideologies into the worker-farmer collaboration as well as the positive acceleration of the collaboration under the Party's influence and leadership. It stresses that this should be elevated into a class based labor-farmer political alliance.
Note 1: The reasons why the Party is promoting the worker-farmer collaboration and emphasizes the importance of elevating it into a worker-farmer political alliance are as follows:

(a) The Party had designated monopoly capitalism as the common foe, the target of offense of the worker-farmer political alliance.

(b) When the farmers' organizations -- in a state of disintegration for many years -- had been more or less consolidated into the Zennichino organization, the exchange of ideas and collaboration between the workers' organization and the farmers' organization (Zennichino) had become readily possible.

(c) In January 1958, the Worker Farmer Conference was established in Tokyo in line with the worker-farmer collaboration program which Sohyo had promoted since 1957. Worker Farmer Councils have since been organized in 17 prefectures, which have made possible mutual economic and joint educational-cultural activities between farmers and workers organizations. This provided the base from which the tendency for gradual enlargement of joint struggle is being promoted.

(d) Recently, especially in regard to the struggle against the revised Security Treaty, an important political task of the Party has been to strengthen the joint struggle posture with the labor union in order to overcome the lag of the farm villages and to achieve united action on a nationwide basis.

Note 2: On the basis of the worker-farmer coalition policy advanced by Sohyo and by Zennichino, a Central Assembly (October 1958) and a Blue Assembly, which promote the worker-farmer coalition, were set up in Tohoku (December 1958), Kanto (January 1959), Kansai (February 1959) and Hokuriku (December 1959); and Party intervention, such as JCP members' participation, is discernible.

Note 3: At the prefectural level, there are 12 prefectures where the worker-farmer conferences have been formed as the worker-farmer organization (as of January 1960), and in all these organizations JCP members participate in discussing the action policy.
4. on farmers' demand (mass struggles).

a. Raise in the prices of farm products. The Party regards the farmer's demand for a price guarantee on farm products as comparable to the demand of the working class for a minimum wage. Therefore, the Party is opposed to the surplus farm products agreement and to the importation of foreign foodstuffs, which are contrary to the interests of the farmers. The Party asserts that a united action composed of farmers and consumers might be possible by demanding an increase in the farm budget, a raise in prices for rice and barley producers, a reduction in monopoly prices of fertilizer and farm insecticides, and a cut in rice prices for consumers by means of a double price system.

Note 1: See the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress.

Note 2: The price struggle covers, in addition to rice, sweet potatoes, milk, tobacco, and in each case the Party's intervention is recognizable.

Note 3: Especially with respect to the rice price struggle, the Three Prefecture Rice Production Joint Struggle Conference (Niigata, Yamagata and Akitda), formed in June 1957, gave rise to the Six Prefecture Joint Struggle Conference (Aomori, Fukuoka and Miyagi) also participating in March 1959, and further to the Ten Prefecture JSC (Iwade, Ishikawa and Toyama added) in October 1959; in each case the intervention on the part of JCP members is recognizable. Furthermore, the Farmers Department of the Party center sent on June 14, 1959, 200,000 leaflets on the rice price struggle to Tohoku and Hokuriku rice producing prefectures (see Akahata, June 15, 1959).
b. Agricultural mutual aid struggle.

The Party regards the present agricultural mutual aid system as inadequate for the farmers. It sets its struggle objectives on a reduction of farmers' financial burden and opposition to the compulsory collection, on an increase in the state subsidy, and on a demand for farmers' participation in decision-making. Primarily the Party aims at a dissolution of the present mutual aid union and the establishment of a mutual aid system totally subsidized by the national treasury (government).

Note 1: See the Political report of the 7th Party Congress.

Note 2: This struggle, which has been waged since the autumn of 1977, is being pushed in the following prefectures: Haragi, Amori, Tiake, Miyagi, Niigata and Hiroshima.

c. In addition to these, the Party demands reduction in and exemption from taxes and public charges; release of arable land now in public or private hands; opposition to the union cultivation plan and the highway plan for the interests of monopoly capital; acquisition of funds for land improvement and cultivation; return of military bases and training grounds; and reform of agricultural cooperative unions. The Party asserts that these mass struggles and the organizational activities must be strengthened.


To step up the farmers' struggle in this matter, the Party insists that, using the impoverished farmers as a
C. ORGANIZATION FOR GUIDANCE

1. There is no change in the establishment of the farmers' section in the central and local organizations as the specialized section for the guidance of the agrarian movement. Some Party members, in line with the Party Rules and Regulations, are in the central and local organizations of the farmers' groups and carry out activities.

2. However, generally speaking, they are inactive, and guiding the struggle is left to the persons in charge. The Party criticized this, attributing it to the
negligence of the local Party organs and staffs, and, therefore, has called for stirring up of all organs and staffs especially since the 6th CC.

B. PARTY STRENGTH IN FARM VILLAGES

1. The Party tries to saturate with its policies both the old Japanese Farmers' unity faction, with which the Party had maintained a profound relationship, and the National Farmers. However, because of the lack of unity in the National Farmers and because of the weakness at the foundation of the farmers' struggle, Party forces have not shown a substantial expansion in the farm villages. With the exception of one or two special areas, they have tended to decrease.

Note: The number of union members in the unification faction of the Japan Farmers Federation has not shown any particular change during the past few years. The figure has remained at about 7,000 members, but includes far the largest number of Communist Party members among the various farm organizations.

2. As to Party members, those engaged in farming, forestry, and marine enterprises comprise 20.18% of the total Party members, less than the number of those in cities. Compared with those of two or three years ago, it shows about a 5% decrease.

3. As to the cells, the farm and forest cells comprised 21.9% of the total, less than the number of those in cities. Compared with those of two or three years ago, it shows about a 5% decrease.
1. Party members in the regional agricultural committees occupy about 1.3% of the agricultural committee members re-elected since 1957.

2. Party members in the central headquarters offices of the National Farmers comprised 15% of all officers at the second Congress in August 1959. But as compared with the number at the time of the inaugural meeting in March 1958, this shows a decrease of about 67.

6. Party members in the central headquarters offices of the National Farmers Youth Section, which is the driving force of the movement, comprised 25% of all officers at the inaugural meeting in December 1958.
IV. THE URBAN MOVEMENT

A. The guidance policies of the Party for the urban residents' movement are, like the general Communist line, those of the united front. Currently the emphasis is placed on combining the struggle of the urban residents of various strata with the struggle against the Revised Security Treaty.

Note 1: See Zenei, special issue of July 1956, and the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress.

Note 2: An article, "Urban residents' struggle against the Revised Security Treaty and Party building," in Akahata, December 17, 1959, summarizes the demands of the urban residents of various strata as follows:

(1) Guarantee of work and livelihood.
(2) Expansion of social security and reduction in military expenditures.
(3) Opposition to a raise in monopoly prices and heavy taxation, and
(4) Guarantee of democratic rights.

It explains that "these demands have the possibility of expanding greatly to include the struggle aimed at an obstruction and renunciation of the Revised Security Treaty and they coincide with the basic line of the Party, i.e., peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and improvement of living standards and reveals a capability of playing a role as a wing of a national democratic united front which the Party aims to create.

B. The Party indicates the following as the concrete guidance policies with respect to the urban residents of various strata:

1. In regard to the middle and small entrepreneurs, the Party regards them as "having dual aspects and wavering." On the one hand, they are unstable because of the depredation and oppression of monopoly capital and
Consequently, as a victim, they are driven in the direction of anti-monopoly. On the other hand, they are the exploiters of the workers. Hence, the Party will:

a. Fight reactionary and anti-democratic tendencies of the middle and small entrepreneurs.

b. Positively support anti-monopoly, anti-war, and anti-American demands.

c. Make it clear that a genuine liberation of the middle and small entrepreneurs cannot be achieved without coalition and united action with the working class.

And the Party emphasizes the necessity of having the middle and small entrepreneurs grow into a wing of the national democratic united front (Note 1).

2. With regard to the working urban residents, the Party states:

a. The class character of domestic laborers and the lower strata of manual industrial workers (carpenters and shoemakers) is semi-proletariat.

b. The class character of the upper strata of independent, self-employed businessmen (small merchants, manual workers, service business, etc.) and free businessmen (general practitioners, pharmacists, midwives, lawyers, and tax accountants) is petty bourgeois in cities.

The basic demands of these groups in different social strata are "stable work," "liberation from poverty," and "prosperity in business." The Party believes that because the Kishi Cabinet proceeded to revive militarism and has adopted a policy of placing all sacrifices on the shoulders of the people, these demands necessarily tend to become stronger. Therefore, the Party urges a strengthening of
The struggle between the Party and the working urban residents through the struggle for these demands, so as to organize them, to carry out their "thought reform," and to incorporate them as part of the forces of a united front (Note 2).  
In regard to the poverty-stricken strata, their class character is semi-proletarian. They are "formidable forces that can ally" with the working class. Their basic demands are "stable work and state guarantee of living," but their daily life is more and more driven into hardships under an economic panic. The Party has made it clear that organizing this class is an important task (Note 4).  

Note 1:  
(b) In the above "Medium and Small Capitalists and Small Marginal Manufacturers," Uda estimates that "the manufacturers employing fewer than 100 workers number approximately 100,000, whose potential for collaborating with the labor class, in its demands for independence, peace and democracy, is great." It is also stated that these 100,000 medium and small entrepreneurs closely resemble the laboring class in important respects.  


Note 3: See Party headquarters' Urban Section Vice Section Chief, Koshio Kuri's article "The Current Status of the Urban Poverty-Stricken People and Their Struggle" in the February 1960 issue of Zenzai; "The Poverty-Stricken People's Fight to Safeguard Their Health and Livelihood" by the Party Central Committee Urban Section, which appeared in the September 24, 1959, issue of Akahata; and the above-mentioned "The People's Struggle Centered on Anti-Mutual Security Pact and Party Building."
The Party has designated the following urban organizations as autonomous democratic mass organizations, whose interests are specifically centered on the issues of safeguarding their members' business, health and livelihood. The Party is attempting to influence them.

1. Democratic Trade and Industry Councils (Minshe), whose main struggle issue is lower taxation. These locals are affiliated nationally with the National Trade and Industry Organizations Federation (Zenshoren), comprising approximately 140 local organizations, with about 36,000 individual members.

2. Organizations whose struggle issues are based on better social welfare protection:

   a) Democratic Clinics and Democratic Hospitals (Minshe). These locals are affiliated nationally with the All-Japan Medical Facilities Federation (Zen-okumiren), comprising approximately 210 local organizations, with about 3,300 individual members.

   b) Hospitalized Tubercular Patients Self-Governing Societies. The National structure, the Japan Patients League, is comprised of some 550 chapters with a total membership of about 47,000.

   c) The Committee to Protect Health and Life. This body's National organization, the National Liaison Council of the Committee to Protect Health and Life, is comprised of 140 organizations and some 90,000 members.
Note 1: The People's Front states that the following urban
organizations are at the vanguard of the "democratic forces"
in the urban areas, echoing the article "For the Development of the Urbanities" (p. 86) by KAN'ITI Sato, a leader of the Party's
organization, in the February 1958 issue of Zenzai:

- New Life Medical Association (Shinkyo)
- People's Carriage Federation
- Japan Livelihood Cooperatives Federation (Nikkyoren)
- Better Social Welfare Promotion Conference
- National Domestic Industrial Workers Unions
- Conference Preparatory Council
- Japanese Medics and Small Entrepreneurs Society
- Free Attorneys Association
- Young Accountants Society
- Federation of Consumer Organizations (Shokanren)
- All-Enom Pay Laborers Union (Zennichijiro)
- All-Japan Construction Workers Unions General
  Federation

Note 2: The December 26, 1958, issue of Akahata carries
an article by the Central Committee Urban Section en-
titled "Renewal of Cadre Activities on the Middle
Levels of the Party and the Reinforcement of Party
Movements," providing the following instructions for all Party
apparatuses:

(a) The nucleus of united actions for businessmen
with varying interests should be the Minsho; its demand
and struggles should be actively supported, and its
organization expanded. The cadre should further endeavor
to unify and to consolidate the businessmen's front.

(b) The cadre should endeavor to strengthen the
Democratic Clinics, which are playing the role as local
strengthholds for better social welfare struggles. It
should also support the demands and the activities of
progressive physicians groups such as Miniren and
Shinryu; reinforce the latter's organizations; and thereby
unify and develop the medical front of physicians and
others in the medical care field.

3. Sharing one important segment of the relief
activities for bringing aid and comfort to victims of the
Ise Bay typhoon disaster, the Party instructed the Miniren
of Tokyo and other localities to dispatch from Democratic
In the face of sudden and severe natural disasters, the Party's medical team arrived swiftly and began providing medical care. The Party's directive was to establish a central medical facility in the disaster area. The Party's effort was not confined to medical care; it also aimed at expanding the Party's influence in the disaster area.

In spite of the Party's efforts, the percentage of urban population organized in the various cities is still lower than in general. Though the Party has placed great importance on organizing the poverty-stricken stratum of city dwellers, the movement has hardly made any noticeable advance. The inclination of Party influence at all levels of the urban dwellers tends in general to be retarded.

Note: See the previously mentioned "The People's Struggle Centered on Anti-Mutual Security Pact and Party Building."
1. "Youth Politics"

1. Tendent of the idealistic and progressive nature of youth as well as its "zest, order and enthusiasm in action," the Party considers the capture of youth as an indispensable factor in affecting revolution (Note 1).

2. The Party states that, especially in recent times, among the youth there is a growing dissatisfaction against Japan's imperialistic monopoly capitalism's subservience to the United States, the revival of militarism, and the government's preparation for nuclear warfare (Note 2).

3. Accordingly, the Party plans to exploit the discontent, dissatisfaction and demands peculiar to youth, to form a united youth front, and to make that front one sector of the nationalistic democratic united front.

Note 1: The July 1956 Party announcement "Tentative Plans for Youth Movements," which appeared in the July special issue of Zenei, stated that "Whatever its circumstances, youth is never satisfied with the status quo. It always seeks the new and the idealistic. This is the wellspring of its strong sense of justice, enthusiasm and motivation for action and makes it cast its lot with enterprises which seek to improve and revolutionize society." The same source stresses that "at all times in history, the revolutionary class of each age has expended special efforts to attract youth as its ally, to indoctrinate it with the class ideology, and has thus won its revolution and succeeded in consolidating the results of its endeavor.

The Political Report of the 7th Party Congress asserts that "whether the great mass of youth is captured by the reactionary forces or is won over as an active instrument of democratic forces will have a decisive significance in the struggle of the working class and
4. Youth can be divided into three groups according to their societal status: workers, farmers and students. The Party regards the young workers as the chief dependable force among youth in general. As for the students, the Party, though recognizing their uniqueness, on the whole regards them as merely sustaining one sector of the general youth movement.

Note. See the previously mentioned Political Report and also "The Guidance Policy for Student Movements" which will appear in later pages.
As the Party made these advances it also gradually made progress in its drive to "build up Party life" and to expand Party strength.
5. On the other hand, a call for the "neutralization" of Japan was heard from Communist China and from the Soviet Union, beginning with a statement to this effect by Communist China's Foreign Minister CHEN YI in November 1958. The Japanese Communist Party Presidium immediately issued a statement (dated December 11, 1958) in support of this policy. However, because the Party had previously been opposed to a neutralization policy and because its platform had not yet been adopted, this action by the Presidium created a doctrinal dispute. This conflict was in effect resolved on March 3, 1959, when a joint communique by the Japanese and the Chinese Communist Parties supported the JCP's Draft Party Charter and thereby re-emphasized the anti-American independence struggle. In the theoretical sphere, however, the matter remained unresolved within the Party.

6. In the elections held in the spring of 1959, the Party changed its policy and actually campaigned to win seats [i.e., no last minute withdrawals, deals with Socialists, etc.]. As a result, the Party was moderately successful in the local elections, but its showing in the Upper House elections fell below that of the previous contest (1956). The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee, convened (June 29-July 9 and July 31-August 1, 1959) in order to consider the election, produced a heated discussion of the election results. There was also severe self-criticism concerning the small size of Party membership. The decisions on future policy were as follows:

a. To advance beyond the effort to "build up Party life" and to devote every effort to the campaign to expand Party strength by doubling the number of Party members.
6. To consider the struggle against the revision of the Security Pact not merely as an immediate and temporary struggle, but as a vehicle for the creation of a more fundamental national democratic united front and, for this purpose, to expand the existing joint struggle organizations quantitatively (participation of farmers, citizens, women, etc.) and to evaluate it qualitatively (in the direction of the anti-American struggle).

The duration of this meeting was unusually long for a Central Committee Plenum, and since its discussions covered even the problem of the Party Platform as well as the problem of convening an 8th Party Congress, it was thus an important conference, which might be termed virtually a "Party Congress."

7. With the visit of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to the United States in September 1959 and his proposal in the United Nations for complete disarmament, the international Communist camp began a propaganda campaign to the effect that it had achieved a new and favorable international position. In addition, NOSAKA, Chairman of the Central Committee, attended a celebration of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, where he and the Chinese Communist Party issued another joint statement on October 20, 1959.

Although this joint statement did no more than to reaffirm the previous one, the editorial of the Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily) of October 22 discussed the statement at length and supported the JCP's Draft Party Charter. This constituted a powerful expression of external guidance with direct bearing on the question of JCP's Platform.
3. As soon as the new U.S.-Japan Security Pact was signed on January 19, 1960, the JCP's 8th Central Committee Plenum (held January 22-26) discussed and decided upon policy as follows:

a. To reaffirm the policy established at the 6th Plenum emphasizing action to form a united front, and to denounce Zengakuren's storming of the Diet grounds and the Harae demonstration as Trotskyite provocations.

b. To demand a general election; to actively promote the slogans "Dissolve the Diet" and "down-with-the-Kishi-Cabinet," and to commence preparation for elections.

B. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF PARTY ACTIVITIES

The main outlines of Party activities since the 7th Party Congress have been described above. The distinctive characteristics of this period were as follows:

1. Ever since the "Moscow Declaration," the Party has been carrying out all its activities on the assumption that the Socialist camp has achieved decisive superiority in the present international situation.

Also, the Party's "subservience to international Communism" has been intensified. Its ties and coordination with international Communist forces have become closer owing to the accelerated frequency of the Party's international contacts, such as Chairman NOSAKA's visit to China, Secretary General MIYAMOTO's visits to the USSR, China and Korea, and the presence of Soviet Communist Party representatives at the JCP's 7th Party Congress.

2. The Party's efforts since the 7th Congress to reorder its internal structure gradually achieved results and
the campaigns against the efficiency-rating system, the Police Duties Law, and the revision of the Security Pact attracted increased support. The earlier decline in Party strength was checked and Party strength began to show a slight rising tendency. Thus, Party membership has increased by 2,000 persons since the 7th Party Congress, a great many of whom, moreover, are young industrial workers. Circulation of the Party paper Akahata stood at about 53,000 copies as of the end of September 1959, an increase of about 2,000 copies since the time of the 7th Party Congress. Collection of Party dues and of Party newspaper subscription fees has likewise improved.

3. Defining the present situation as one which has certain favorable features but which is fundamentally an ebbing period of revolution, the JCP has adopted appropriate tactics and has pursued a sober course of action so as to avoid being criticized by the public as untrustworthy. As a result, through its role in the movement to restore Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, and in the campaigns against the efficiency-rating system as well as the revision of the Police Duties Law, Party infiltration of various joint struggle organizations has been gradually deepened. In the struggle against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, not only was the Party a member of the "People's Congress" at the national level, but it was also able to attend and speak, even though only as an observer, at that Congress' executive meetings. Party infiltration of joint struggle organizations at the local level has also been remarkable.
The Party has also placed heavy stress on infiltrating the labor unions. This has gradually produced results and JCP influence in labor unions has increased considerably.

On the other hand, however, the leadership of Zengakuren has been opposed to this course, and the Party has been having a difficult time controlling this group.

4. Since the Party platform has not been agreed upon, there are outstanding doctrinal differences in regard to such important matters as neutralism and the Security Treaty. These differences still constitute difficult obstacles to ideological unity.
II. THE BASIC CHARACTER OF THE PARTY

A. SUBSERVIENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY

1. The unchanging fundamental characteristics of the Party, regardless of the situation at any given time, are its subservience to international authority and its adherence to the "doctrine of violent revolution," but, of late, the former characteristic has been especially marked.

2. Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party held in February 1956, followed by the political upheaval in Poland and the Hungarian uprising, profoundly disrupted the principle of subservience to Moscow (the so-called "international solidarity") within the Communist bloc. As a result, within the Communist parties of the world, criticism was leveled against the old attitude of "blind subservience to international authority," and intra-Party disorders broke out.

After the Soviet armed forces put down the Hungarian uprising, stability within the international Communist camp was gradually restored. In November 1957, a "Conference of Representatives of Communist Parties and Workers' Parties of all Socialist Countries" commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution and adopted a joint declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties of twelve nations. A "Conference of the Representatives of 64 Communist and Workers' Parties also adopted an "Appeal for Peace." With these developments the solidarity of
the international Communist camp, headed by the Soviet Union," was reaffirmed.

A. Concerning the question of "subservience to international authority:" the Communist Party in Japan was considerably less assertive than the party in other countries. Whenever members questioned the handling of the Hungarian revolt, the Party always cited the views of international Communism by way of counter argument. As soon as the "Moscow Declaration" was announced, the Party took the following steps:

a. It immediately expressed its unconditional support through a statement of the JCP Presidium dated November 29 (Akahata, November 30, 1957).

b. Subsequently it revised the "Political Report," which was scheduled to be submitted to the 7th Party Congress, and other documents to conform with the following declaration: The first of the Party's immediate tasks was "to make the 'Declaration' and the 'Peace Appeal' adopted at the Moscow Conference the guiding principles of our Party and to thoroughly indoctrinate the whole Japanese nation with the ideas of these two declarations" [Political Report].

Subsequent to these actions the Party advanced further and further in the direction of subservience to international Communist authority.

Note 1: The Party sent Central Committee member SHIGA Yoshio and two others to Moscow in order to participate in the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. They "voluntarily agreed" with the "12-nation joint declaration," attended the "64-nation conference," and voted for the "Peace Appeal" (Report of Central Committee member SHIGA to the 7th Party Congress).
Note 2: On the significance of the "Moscow Declaration," an Akahata editorial dated August 1, 1958, said, for example: "The 'Moscow Declaration' is a document which constitutes a common platform for the international Communist movement. It is also a platform for the Japanese Communist Party." Therefore, "if in carrying out the tasks enumerated in the Party's 'Political Report' and in the 'Program of Action' we are not to fall behind the various immediate problems as they successively arise, develop, and change, but are to deal with them and move forward, we must constantly regard the 'Declaration' as our criterion."

4. Various facts which prove the Party's subservience to outside control in the more recent period are as follows:

a. On such diplomatic issues as the normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations, the Japanese-Soviet peace treaty and the Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations, the Party has always supported and propagated the Soviet and Chinese views and has persistently defended their position.

Note 1: In regard to the territorial question between Japan and the Soviet Union there has been criticism by some members of lower echelons of the JCP that the policies of Party headquarters ignored the national sentiment of Japan. Each time, however, the Party has suppressed such views. Nevertheless, Party headquarters has found it impossible to simply disregard this national sentiment, and in his report to the 5th Central Committee Plenum, Secretary General MIYAMOTO stated as follows: "If Japan becomes an independent, peaceful, neutral, and democratic nation, and if in Japan a genuine people's democratic government is established, a way will be found to solve properly every internal as well as external problem. Then, indeed, we firmly believe that a new attitude can be taken on the question of the Southern Kurile Islands so that, given a strong friendship between Japan and the USSR, the interests of peace may be served in the Far East and in the Pacific area."
Note 2: When the Soviet Government published, on January 27, 1960, its memorandum to the effect that "unless all foreign troops are withdrawn from Japan, National and Shikotan Islands would not be returned," the Party immediately gave it full support by announcing the next day a comment of Chairman NOSAKA and by issuing again, on February 7, a statement of the Central Committee Presidium. Moreover, this memorandum's description of the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as an instrument to "deprive Japan of its national independence by perpetuation of the occupation and by placing Japanese territory under foreign control," was an important dictum with a bearing on the heart of the JCP's Party Platform question -- namely, the present status [of Japan].

Note 3: It is notable that the Party has stressed the interests of fishermen and fishery workers with reference to Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-Chinese diplomatic problems and that it is seeking to relate these interests to the diplomatic problems by including a paragraph on "fisheries" in the "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress and in a resolution of the 6th Central Committee Plenum.

b. At its 7th Party Congress, the JCP was host for the first time to a Soviet delegation. Soviet Communist Party Central Committee member MITIN and two other Soviets attended the Congress and emphasized "international solidarity."

c. As soon as the neutralization of Japan was called for, first, in the statement of Communist China's Foreign Minister CHEN YI, on November 19, 1958, and then in the Soviet Government's memorandum to Japan, December 2, 1958, the Party reversed its previous attitude by coming out for a neutralization policy and by adding "Neutrality" to its former slogans "Peace, Independence, Democracy and Livelihood."
Note 1: The Japanese Communist Party had hitherto main-
tained that "there can be no neutral position between war
and peace" and that "a neutralist position is really tant-
amount to supporting war" (20th Central Committee Plenum,
March 1951). In July of 1958 the Party had criticized
the "adhere-to-neutrality" stand, which was one of the
four principles of peace proclaimed by Sohyo, stating
that "this position once served a definite function as a
tactical consideration under the power relations which
obtained in a certain period. However, in the present
state, instead of serving this function, this position
has become a source of ambiguity as to who is the real
enemy in the struggle of workers and labor unions for peace
and independence. It has served to weaken the workers'
ideological armament against American imperialism, the
true enemy of peace and independence, and thus retards
positive progress in the struggle for peace and in-
dependence."

Note 2: The problems that arise should the Party recognize
neutralitv are:
(a) How to harmonize this with the position of
proletarian internationalism (subservience to interna-
tional authority); and
(b) how to harmonize it with the position outlined
in the Draft Party Charter.
In regard to the former, the Party has rationalized
its present neutralization policy as one which merely
advocates the nonalignment of Japan with any military bloc
and as not being inconsistent with past policy because it
calls for no change in political, economic or ideological
orientation with respect to the second problem which is
not yet resolved (see infra III, B. 2).

d. Secretary General MIYAMOTO and two others
attended the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party
(January 27-February 5, 1959). At the 5th Plenum of the
Central Committee, held immediately after their return,
Secretary General MIYAMOTO praised the 7 year plan of the
USSR. This plan, he stated, would become a "powerful
inspirational pillar" for the world Communist movement
because, through its implementation, "the superiority of socialism over capitalism shall be demonstrated before the peoples of the world as an unshakable fact." He declared that it was an important duty, therefore, of the Party to publicize this plan among the masses.

Note 1: The announcement of this economic 7-year plan brought about a considerable boost in the morale of Party members, but it also led some to think that "in seven years the revolution will be automatically successful." Thus, at the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee, Secretary General MIYAMOTO warned as follows: "We cannot for a moment neglect our responsibility for strengthening the people's struggle and solidarity against the American imperialists and traitorous reactionary forces. If we beguile ourselves with the prospect of a strengthened socialist world structure after the 7-year plan and neglect even slightly the grave responsibilities that Japanese Communists and the Japanese people must meet, we will be betraying our honorable position as Communists."

Note 2: At the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, there was a proposal to "establish a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and Pacific area," and the JCP thereafter began propaganda under this slogan. However, after Premier Khrushchev's proposal for "total disarmament" was made in the United Nations in September 1959, the Party dropped the slogan of "establishment of a nuclear-free zone" and switched to a slogan of "total disarmament."

e. On the way home from the USSR, Secretary MIYAMOTO and his party visited Communist China and North Korea where they issued joint statements with the Communist parties of these countries. In these statements, emphasis was placed on the necessity of joint struggles against "American imperialism" by the Communist parties of three countries: Japan, China and Korea. Thereafter the JCP began to emphasize the anti-American independence struggle.
After the publication of this statement, the Party began to stress the importance of the anti-American independence struggle which, since the Party’s acceptance of the neutralization line, had been subordinated to the peace struggle.

In the autumn of 1959, a five-man mission headed by Chairman NOSAKA went to Communist China to participate in the 10th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Another joint communique of the two Communist Parties reaffirmed the slogan “American imperialism is the common enemy of Japanese and Chinese peoples.” The following two developments that occurred during this visit to China are worth noting: (1) Peking was the scene of a conference of representatives of various Asian Communist Parties. (2) The *Jen Min Jih Pao* editorial of October 22 commenting on the joint communique developed detailed arguments which supported the Draft Party Charter of the JCP.

Note 1: The aforementioned editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* entitled "It is the Common Mission of the Peoples of China and Japan to oppose the US-Japanese Military Alliance and to Defend the Peace in the Far East" supported the position of the Draft Party Charter in its detailed analysis of Japan’s present status and of the structure of power in Japan. It declared: "It is a very easily understood fact that the establishment of a peaceful, independent, democratic, and neutral Japan is an historical stage that the revolutionary activity of the Japanese people cannot transcend. In this historical stage, the Japanese proletarian and vanguard corps, unifying all patriotic and democratic forces under the banner of peace, independence, democracy and neutrality,
and forming a broad united front which includes the
German Social Democratic Party and which is led
by the working class, are waging a fierce battle against
German imperialism and its followers, the Japanese re-
actionary forces. It is not at all an easy task to ful-
fill the requirements of this historical stage; a long
period of revolutionary struggle must be gone through.
If it is thought that this historical stage may be
transcended and that the immediate duty of the Japanese
people is not to achieve, by casting off the American
control, complete independence of the Japanese people and
to establish a peaceful, independent, democratic, and
neutral Japan, then the Japanese proletariat and its vanguard
will be separated from reality and from the masses
and will be themselves reduced to an isolated position
before the strong and formidable enemy. Marxist-Leninists
are believers in stages of revolutionary development. At
the same time they are advocates of continuous revolution;
they must not only distinguish the difference between
democratic revolution and socialist revolution, but they
must also recognize the relationship between these two
revolutions.'

Not only did this editorial give impetus to the present
struggle against the revision of the Security Pact, but
it also gives great support to the deliberations on the
Party Platform at the 6th Party Congress scheduled to be
held this year (1960).

Note 2: In his "Report of the JCP Delegation to China,"
delivered to the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee,
Chairman NOSAKA spoke of conferring "in Peking with the
representatives of fraternal parties of the world, and
especially of various Asian countries...." Also at the
"Homecoming speech meeting" held on October 2, 1959, in
Tokyo, he said: "On this visit we signed a joint declara-
tion of the Japanese and Chinese Communist parties. This
is the new form of solidarity between the Communist and
workers' parties of the world since the dissolution of
the Comintern" (cf. Akahata, November 2, 1959). On the
other hand, a conference of representatives from seventeen
Western European nation Communist Parties was held in
Rome between November 21 and November 24, 1959, to decide
on the execution of joint struggles. Thus, it is by such
a method that the various Communist Parties of the world
have carried out joint struggles and maintained ties among themselves since the abolition of the Comintern and Cominform (see also "Significance of Joint Appeal of European Communist Parties," Communist, No. 18 (1959), with respect to the relationship between this joint struggle and the "Moscow Declaration").

In addition to the above, visits of JCP leaders to the Communist bloc have become frequent of late and this has strengthened the Party's ties with international Communism.

Note 1: A rundown of recent visits by JCP leaders to the Communist bloc follows:

(a) Secretary General MIYAMOTO, Central Committee Presidium member KASUGA Shoichi, and NISHIZAWA Tomio, Vice-chief of the JCP Investigation Department, attended the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and visited Czechoslovakia, Communist China and North Korea between January and February 1959.

(b) SUZUKI Ichizo, a Central Committee Presidium member, YAMADA Rokuzoemon, a Central Committee member, and NISHIKAWA Ichiro of the Party headquarters staff visited the USSR from August to September 1959. The reason given was "rest and recuperation."

(c) NAKAGAWA Kazuo, a Central Committee member, and TERADA Mitsugu, a member of the Central Control and Auditing Committee, visited the USSR in December 1959. The reason given was the same as for the SUZUKI group.

(d) Central Committee Chairman NOSAKA HAKAMADA Satomi and KURAHARA Korehito, Central Committee Presidium members; SUNAMA Kazuyoshi and IWAMA Masao, Central Committee members and HOSHINO Chikara, Vice Editor-in-Chief of Akahata, visited Communist China from September to October 1959.

(e) YONEHARA Itaru, a Central Committee member, left for Czechoslovakia on November 29, 1959, ostensibly to study socialist economics at the Economic Research Institute of the Academy of Science located in Prague.

Note 2: Even outside the Communist orbit, the visits abroad to strengthen ties with other Communist Parties have increased. For example:
(a) YONEHARA Itaru, a Central Committee member, and TAKAHARA Shiroichi, a candidate (alternate) member of the Central Committee, visited Italy in order to attend an international conference on the "Theory and Practice of Human Relations in Capitalistic Enterprises" held under the auspices of the Gramsci Institute of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party in October 1958. On the way home, they stopped in France to observe the activities of the French Communist Party.

(b) Secretary General MIYAMOTO and NISHIZAWA Tonio, Vice-Chief of the Investigation Department, departed for Italy on January 28, 1960, in order to attend the 9th Congress of the Italian Communist Party, and returned on February 29 via Moscow and Prague.

B. DOCTRINE OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION

1. Advancement of the "Doctrine on the Possibility of Revolution by Peaceful Means."

a. The Party Platform adopted in October 1951 (it was then called "the New Program" but is now called the "1951 thesis") declared that a revolution in Japan could not be achieved by peaceful means. Even the 6th National Party Conference (July 1955) at which the Party reportedly denounced "extreme left adventurism," confirmed the "1951 thesis" as correct.

b. However, the following year when the "Doctrine on the Possibility of Revolution by Peaceful Means" was advanced at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, the TCP immediately shifted its former line and at the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee, held in June 1956, proposed a revision of the "1951 thesis." The Party decided that the doctrine of the "inevitability of violent revolution" incorporated in the "1951 thesis" was "not suitable to the present..."
situation," and that a "peaceful transition of the revolution" was possible under favorable international conditions provided that three conditions could be established within Japan.

Note: The three conditions are: (1) Democratic elections and democratic operation of the Diet, (2) strengthening of the Communist Party and establishment of its decisive influence, and (3) strengthening of mass movements outside the parliament.

c. In the "Moscow Declaration" of November 1957 the doctrine on the "possibility of revolution by peaceful means" of the aforesaid 20th Party Congress was reaffirmed, and the JCP Secretary General MIYAMOTO in his explanation of the Draft Party Charter at the 7th Party Congress expounded the "doctrine on the possibility of revolution by peaceful means" in accordance with the "Moscow Declaration."

d. This theory of the "possibility of peaceful revolution" has naturally caused some controversy within the Party. However, the focal point of the debate on the Party Charter issue as a whole was concentrated on the characterization of the present status of Japan, and no serious arguments arose regarding this other question.

Note: The general trend within the Party today is to accept the possibility of peaceful revolution. Those who advocate the doctrine of the "inevitability of violent revolution" are few. However, even among those who believe in the possibility of peaceful revolution, there are some differences in degree. Generally speaking, the Party-charter faction is more cautious in its acceptance of the possibility while the anti-Party-charter faction takes the position that the Party should embrace the doctrine more positively.

It cannot be said that the doctrine of the "possibility of revolution by peaceful means," which is supposed to have revised the "1951 thesis," has changed the Party's long-held doctrine of violent revolution as the means of establishing the "authority or dictatorship of the proletariat."

a. This theory of the possibility of peaceful revolution seeks the seizure of power through the parliament on the basis of violent popular class struggle and with the aid of a "favorable international situation." This simply means that a "civil war" (full-scale armed uprising of the people) will not be involved, but it definitely does not rule out the use of other forms of violence.

b. Moreover, the Party merely advances this form of revolution without civil war as a possibility. Whether or not such a revolution is in fact possible is to be "determined in the final analysis by the conduct of the antirevolutionary forces." Furthermore, the Party has always emphasized the danger that the "antirevolutionary forces" will resort to violence, and has been exercising vigilance and making preparations to cope with precisely this contingency.

Note 1: According to the "Moscow Declaration," the seizure of national power without a civil war may be possible only when the class struggle develops without interruption on a broad scale. This struggle will involve the workers, the peasant masses, and the urban middle strata, who are opposed to the big monopoly capitalists and the reactionaries and who strive for a thoroughgoing social reform, for peace, and for socialism. It further states that: "In the event that the exploiting class resorts to force against the people, the possibility of a nonpeaceful transition to socialism must be taken into consideration. As Leninism teaches
and as experience has shown, the ruling class never voluntarily abandons power, and the severity of the class struggle is determined by the resistance of the reactionaries to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people rather than by the proletariat. It is determined by the reactionaries who exercise force in various stages in the struggle for socialism."

**Note 2:** Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, at the 15th National Congress of his Party (June 24-28, 1959) explained the peaceful transition of the revolution in this fashion: "As emphasized in the joint declaration of the representatives of Communist and workers' parties, assembled to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, the peaceful transfer of power into the hands of the working class is nothing but a revolutionary overthrow. Although the reformists and revisionists attempted to make us believe otherwise, there can be no gradual unconscious transition from capitalism to socialism. The transition necessarily takes the shape of a revolutionary leap. This leap always takes place as the result of a sharp class struggle. This revolution consists of the destruction of the old organs of state -- the military, the police structure and the bureaucratic hierarchy -- and their replacement with other structures -- structures which are organized by the various forces of the people and which will serve the dictatorship of the proletariat."

**Note 3:** According to the "Report on the Party Platform Question" submitted to the 7th Party Congress, the form of the revolution "will be determined ultimately by the conduct of the antirevolutionary forces." It was discussed as follows: "In the first place, the premise that the united front government will be established peacefully is by no means an absolute thing. It is anticipated that should a united front government be about to be created, such a political crisis would be the occasion for the enemy to resort to ferocious methods. American imperialism would desire to provoke antirevolutionary civil war as it did in Indonesia and elsewhere. Secondly, should a people's united front government be established, the united front government would have the political and legal advantage of being able to label antirevolutionary forces instigating the civil war as traitors. But before the
people have seized power a situation involving 'nonpeaceful transition' cannot be ruled out. Thirdly, the forces of the United States have the legal right of intervention under given conditions as stipulated in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The various traitorous treaties do not contain stipulations permitting them to become voided by unilateral denunciation. Thus, there is no legal guarantee requiring American imperialism to accept a notice of abrogation. Accordingly, there is no ground for concluding that the American imperialists can neither legally reject a notice of denunciation nor remain where they are. In these cases as well, it is not correct to regard the possibility of peaceful transition as the only and as the practically inevitable path. When considering the outlook for revolution in our country, it is necessary to remember the dual aspects of the question: whether a revolutionary transition is to be peaceful or nonpeaceful depends in the final analysis on the historical, concrete conditions within each country and on the behavior of the anti-national, antipeople forces."

Note 4: The 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party asserted "the possibility of peaceful revolution by parliamentary means," but, on the other hand, it also confirmed the inevitability of violent revolution by stating that "in those countries where capitalism still holds in its hands powerful and enormous military and police organizations, a great resistance by the reactionary forces is inevitable." Also TOYODA Shiro, a member of the JCP Propaganda and Education Department, stated that "at present in Japan a revival of militarism is under way, and the conditions obstructing a peaceful revolution are strengthening (Akahata, September 11, 1959).

3. Once having seized power, the Party insists on the absolute necessity of establishing "the dictatorship of the proletariat." Fundamentally, the Party's so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" consists of three elements: "the suppression of the class enemy" by the power monopolized or controlled by the working class; "the leading role of the working class vis-à-vis the allied classes"; and "guidance by the Communist Party
of the friendly classes." Thus, in essence, it differs completely from democracy, which is based on freedom. In addition, this "dictatorship of the proletariat," under the guise of political guidance, becomes in reality the dictatorship of a single party.
III. THE PARTY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS

A. INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. Stipulations at the 7th Party Congress:
   a. The "Political Report" adopted at the 7th Party Congress stipulated that the principal characteristic of the present world situation is "the transitional period from capitalism to socialism which began with the Great October Socialist Revolution of Russia," and that "the direction of the present world situation is determined by the process and the result of the competition between the two conflicting social systems, i.e., the socialist system and the capitalist system."
   b. As to recent changes in the international situation, the following four points were singled out:
      (1) The socialist camp headed by the USSR has come to occupy a superior position to that of the imperialist camp headed by the USA (socialist states vs. imperialist states).
      (2) The national liberation movement has spread throughout the world and a total collapse of the colonial system is in process (imperialist states vs. colonial states).
      (3) The Communist movement and the labor movement in capitalist countries have achieved a remarkable development (capitalist class vs. workers' class).
      (4) The contradictions among the imperialist nations have been aggravated (imperialist states vs. imperialist states).
Furthermore, among these four points above, the "Political Report" attached most importance to the conflict between "the socialist camp" and the "imperialist camp." It stated that "the strengthening of the forces of socialism and their consistent peace policy have created conditions for peaceful coexistence between the two systems, socialism and capitalism; and the demands and the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence have become a powerful current among the broad masses of the world, thus creating the possibility of preventing war. At the same time, on the other hand, a fierce struggle is being waged between the peace policy and the war policy of the two systems. The conflict between the socialist camp, which follows the policy of peace and progress, and the imperialist camp, which follows the policy of war and reaction, is indeed the driving force which moves the world. This conflict between the two camps is the fundamental contradiction. Herein lies the essential characteristic of our time."

d. Thus, since the imperialist camp, headed by the United States, "is frantically preparing a new war against the socialist camp and is plotting to start a fire somewhere in the world in order to maintain the collapsing colonial system," the struggle to preserve peace is the primary responsibility of all Communists at the present time.

e. This estimate of the situation was in line with the "Moscow Declaration" announced in November 1957, the year preceding the 7th Party Congress.

Note 1: While the JCP on one hand advocates peaceful coexistence, emphasizing its belief in the superiority of the socialist camp and contending that it is possible to
Hold the aggressive actions of imperialism in check; it
came, at the same time, against the danger of aggression
by American imperialism. The Party always has difficulty
in reconciling these two stands. For example, "The Report
on the Platform Problem" presented to the 7th Party Con-
gress pointed out the following: "It is, of course, correct
to emphasize the fundamental change in the international
situation since World War II -- a fact made clear at the
20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. But there
are opinions, taking off in flights of theory from this
fact, which arrive at such conclusions as the following.
One view holds that the laws governing capitalist and
imperialist dynamics have been "strikingly inhibited" and
can no longer function freely and that this is the
"fundamental significance of the change in the world
situation and the reason for the inevitability of peace-
ful coexistence." The special feature of this view is
that it mistakenly assumes that the laws of imperialist
development have been fundamentally suppressed. It thus
obscures the aggressive and oppressive essence of American
imperialism. This in turn leads in the end to a conspicuous
neglect of the tasks of resisting the "power policies"
which the Imperialist camp directs against the peaceful co-
existence policy of the socialist camp, and of struggling
for the independence of oppressed nations. The 20th Party
Congress and the two declarations have never taken such a
one-sided view of the fundamental change in the interna-
tional situation.

Another view is that the change in the international
situation is immediately reflected in our internal
situation. By this token, the control of Japan by Ameri-
can imperialism has automatically weakened; the struggle
against this control will become easier; and, accordingly
as the relative importance of that struggle diminishes,
the struggle against monopoly capital will become more
and more important. The special error of this view lies
in its neglecting the fact that the development of the
international situation in favor of a people -- in other
words, to the disadvantage of the Imperialist camp --
makes the control and intervention of imperialism in
that country more brutal and more undisguised than ever
before. This view also forgets that the advantage in the
international situation is realized in a country's internal
power relations only through the struggle of the people of
Note 2: With respect to the struggle policy to be applied under such an international situation, the aforementioned "Political Report" stated: "We must not only regard the Declaration of the Peace Appeal adopted at the 'Moscow Conference' as our Party's guide to action, but, at the same time, we must exert ourselves to unify the entire nation behind the cause of peace by thoroughly permeating the whole nation with the ideas expressed in these two declarations. On this foundation, we must oppose every scheme for aggressive war of the imperialists; we must organize mass movements to block such schemes no matter where or when they develop, and we must fight in the vanguard of these movements. These are the supreme responsibilities that our Party, as a member of the international Communist movement, must fulfill in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that our Party in exercising leadership in the struggle for peace should always adhere firmly to the international position and that as we fight we strengthen international cooperation and solidarity. For without this international solidarity and cooperation among the defenders of peace throughout the world, it is impossible to curb the danger of war and to maintain world peace."

2. Developments Since the Party Congress.

The above assessments of the international situation have remained basically unchanged to the present, but the Party, claiming that the superiority of socialism has become even more pronounced, has since made the following additional assessments:

a. It evaluates the 7-year economic plan of the Soviet Communist Party very highly and asserts that by the time the plan is completed the socialist camp will occupy a position of decisive economic superiority vis-à-vis the capitalist camp and that the plan will
result in a tremendous boost to the working class and the toiling peoples of the world, thereby easing their path to victory.

b. "Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the Premier's proposal for total disarmament at the UN General Assembly, the similar proposal of the Soviet Government, and the affirmative response in every country to these proposals have dealt a heavy blow to the cold war forces of the United States and have given new impetus to the trend toward a lessening of international tensions."

c. "In spite of these developments, the pro-war groups in the United States still have no intention of abandoning their cold war policies but, on the contrary, are attempting to aggravate international tension by interfering in other nations' internal affairs and through provocations."

Note: See the report of Secretary General MIYAMOTO to the 5th CC Plenum and the Report of Chairman NOSAKA to the 7th CC Plenum.

B. THE DOMESTIC SITUATION

1. Definition of Japan's Present Status.
   a. The "Political Report" adopted by the 7th Party Congress rendered the following judgment with respect to the current situation in Japan.

   (1) Against the background of the favorable international situation described above, American imperialism, in an effort to regain the position which it lost in international politics, is strengthening its alliance with Japanese monopoly capital and
with all other reactionary forces and is attempting
to make Japan a base for war and reaction in Asia
(Note 1).
(2) Japanese monopoly capital has seen rapid develop-
ment and has established the economic foundation for
an imperialist revival. However, for the present it
sees profit in its subservience to the United States,
and with U.S. assistance is taking the road toward
the revival of imperialism and militarism (Notes 2
and 3).
(3) The Kishi Government is a creature of Japanese
monopoly capital, and its policy is to serve the
interests of the latter at the same time it deepens
its subservient relationship to American imperialism.
Consequently, it takes a hostile posture toward China
and is seeking to suppress all the democratic in-
stitutions and rights that have been acquired since
the war.
(4) Against these forces, the struggle for peace,
independence, democracy, and a better livelihood
has developed among the Japanese people. However,
there are still various weak spots. In particular,
the weakness in the Party's leadership role and the
lack of unity of action and policy between the Commu-
nist and Socialist Parties constitute the fundamental
vulnerabilities of the democratic forces.
(5) The Party is still in a very inadequate state.
b. There is no substantial difference between this assessment of the situation and those made in the report, "The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party," presented to the 6th Plenum of the old Central Committee (Translator's Note: The old 6th Plenum held before the 7th Party Congress) held in April 1956, and in the Central Committee statement, "The Policies of the Kishi Government and the Fundamental Attitude of Our Party," published in Akahata, April 27, 1957. However, the following changes may be noted:

(1) Recognition that monopoly capital has made progress is seen in the assertion that Japanese monopoly capital has laid the economic foundation for a revival of imperialism.

(2) Emphasis is placed on the increased sacrifices of the people and on the readjustments in relations with the "anti-States, which are described as reactions to the "development of a favorable international situation" [for the Socialist camp] discussed above.

c. Since the 7th Party Congress, no fundamental amendments to this assessment have been made, but certain changes may be seen in the following:

(1) The Party's claim that the proposals to revise the Security Treaty and to resubmit the Police Duties Law as well as other measures to strengthen reaction are all indications that imperialism and militarism have been steadily reviving.

(2) The observation that although united action of democratic forces throughout the nation, including
the Communist and Socialist parties, has developed through the struggles against the revision of the Security Pact and against the revision of the Police Duties Law, the Party, on the other hand, is split into left and right wings.

... The assertion that although still inadequate, the Party's condition has improved considerably.

d. From about the time of the 6th National Party Conference (July 1955), the Party has described the current situation as "the ebbing period of revolution." There is no change, even today, in the view. However, the destructive difference between today's assessment and earlier ones is that the present situation is regarded as considerably more favorable than the situation in 1955 even though both are considered "in the ebbing period" (Notes 5 and 6).

Note 1: United States policy toward Japan as viewed by the Party is as follows ("The Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress): "America's policy toward Japan at the present time is to strengthen its alliance with Japanese monopoly capital and with all the reactionary forces; to prevent Japan from drawing nearer to China and the USSR and to turn her once again against these states; and to assist the building up of Japanese militarism by encouraging the suppression of all democratic movements in Japan. In brief, American imperialism is plotting, as one of the prime means of furthering its adventurous world policy, to make Japan the greatest base in Asia for war and reaction."

Note 2: The degree of Japan's subordination to American imperialism is the most important point of controversy in [affecting] the JCP's Party Program question, and constitutes as well the basis for differences of view on important Party policy matters. It is true that the "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress was adopted
only after a number of amendments, but the view of the Party-charter faction is still the keynote of the Report's analysis of Japan's current status. This is suggested, for example, by the following passage in the above report: "We have formulated a Draft Party Charter which sets forth the basis for the correct strategy and tactics as applied to the real situation in Japan."

Note 3: Adhering to this "subordination to the American line," the Party criticizes as one-sided the position which views the question of the revision of the Security Pact solely as an "aspect of the revival of imperialism by Japanese monopoly capital." The Party's position is that the problem has two aspects: "the subordinate status of Japanese monopoly capital to America," and "the revival of Japanese militarism and imperialism." This position further asserts that "American imperialism is the dominant element seeking revision of the Security Pact." Accordingly, the Party stresses the subservience of Japanese monopoly capital to America, and emphasizes the need for complete national independence. (See the editorial "For the Advancement of the Joint Struggle Against the Security Pact," Akahata, September 16, 1959; and TOYAODA Shiro and INOUE Hayashi, "Experience and Lessons in the Study of Politics," Zenso, September 1959).

Note 4: See the Resolutions of the 6th and 7th CC Plenums and the Report of Secretary General MIYAMOTO to the National Conference of JCP Prefectural Committee Chairman (October 28-30). (Akahata, November 26, 1959.)

Note 5: (a) That the Party still regards this as the ebbing period of revolution is evident in the light of the following 6th CC Plenum Resolution: "Although the counterattack by the democratic forces is gaining strength, the situation today permits no easy optimism. Although our enemies are not free from internal contradictions, they are adjusting for these contradictions and are strengthening their determination to push through the revision of the Security Pact at all costs using every prerogative available to those in power. At the same time, the solidarity of the democratic forces has not yet reached a strength commensurate with the importance of this struggle. It was decided at the 3rd CC Plenum that
the enemy, despite its failure to pass the Police Duties Law, holds the over-all superiority. The election results also show that the enemy is still able to maintain its superior power position and is continuing to push its attack as opportunities permit.

(i) At the 8th CC Plenum, which was held after the storming of the Diet by the leaders of Zengakuren (November 27, 1959) and the Haneda Airport Incident (January 16, 1960), the Party confirmed the correctness of the decisions of the 6th CC Plenum. KAMIYAMA Shigeo of the Central Committee stated in his article "For the Development of the People's Congress to Prevent Revision of the Security Pact" (Akahata, February 20-23, 1960): "Opinions have been expressed from various quarters to the effect that we have not correctly assessed the explosion of energies from below and that we have opposed this tendency and even suppressed it. Such criticisms are not valid. A common characteristic of these views is their failure to recognize the fact that while the power relationship as between friend and foe is favorable to us internationally, it is favorable to our enemies domestically and that the struggle will be a long and very difficult one. Given the situations and the power-relations described above and considering the present status of the joint struggle against the Security Pact, wherein politically immature workers have formed the core, we have in the past striven and are continuing to strive to suppress provocative extreme-left adventurists policies and actions and to develop those forms of struggle best suited to promoting the united action of the masses."

Note 6: In the "Political Report" presented to the 7th Party Congress, the Party pointed out that "the Japanese economy is entering a crisis stage and that serious economic difficulties are ahead." Later, the 3rd CC Plenum (November 1958) stated that "the Japanese economy is still moving toward a crisis situation" and it interpreted the business prosperity obtaining at the time as follows: "A state of brief tranquility appears to prevail because bumper rice crops have put money from rice sales to the government in abundant circulation or because of seasonal increases in demand, but this is merely a situation produced by temporary factors." However, at the 6th CC Plenum (July 1959) the Party finally abandoned its doctrine of chronic crisis and claimed that a depression had taken place.
Of course, there have been differences of opinion even in the international Communist camp on the crisis question. On the one hand, Chinese Communist scholars unanimously decided that "a crisis is now in process and from now on an even more serious situation will develop." On the other hand, Soviet scholars seemed to have diverse opinions. Some agreed with the Chinese scholars, but there were others like Varga who believed the world economy had already passed through a crisis situation and was in a succeeding state of depression. (See WATAHABE Takeshi, "Recent Theories on [Economic] Crisis," Zenrei, September 1959.)

7. The Party Platform Question,

(1) The "1951 thesis" labeled Japan a "colonial dependency," but the Draft Party Charter, changing this, calls Japan "a highly developed capitalistic country," and describes the coming revolution as "a people's democratic revolution," which "must be developed rapidly into a succeeding socialist revolution."

(2) With regard to the relationship between Japan and America, the Draft Party Charter revises the position of the "1951 thesis," which had claimed that Japan was "under the total occupation control of American imperialism," and declares that Japan has "shifted to a semi-occupied status." It declares that Japan, "despite being a highly-developed capitalistic country, has in fact become a dependent state under semi-occupation by American imperialism," and further that the forces "which basically control Japan are American imperialism and Japanese monopoly..."
capital, in subordination to and in alliance with American imperialism.

(1) The Draft Party Charter change revises the definition of national power in the "1951 thesis" with the following points: (a) "The absolutistic Emperor system" has changed into "a kind of bourgeois monarchy," and the political position of the emperor has become that of an instrument of control by monopoly capital. (b) Although the land reform is a compromising bourgeois reform, "the semi-feudal landlord system" has been fundamentally dissolved. (c) On the other hand, "monopoly capital" has been revived and strengthened, and has become politically the central element among the reactionary forces.

(4) The "1951 thesis" enunciated the doctrine of "the inevitability of violent revolution," but the Draft Party Charter makes no allusion to this doctrine.

Note 1: The so-called "Cominform criticism" of January 1950, described Japan's status at that time as a "colonial dependency" and the "1951 thesis" reiterated this opinion. Subsequent to the Korean War Armistice, both Chinese and Soviet policies toward Japan changed, and in the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration on Japan in October 1954 Japan was officially described as "a semi-occupied country." The Party also revised its position the following year at its 6th National Party Conference held in July 1955. The "Decisions" of this conference stated: "Japan is a developed capitalistic country, but it has been occupied by the USA and is a dependent country which has lost its independence." However, at the same time, the Party still declared that "all formulations of the New Program* are

*"New Program" is another name for the "1951 thesis."
Thus, it undertook to preserve the "1951 thesis" by revising only its interpretation. However, when as the result of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, [when the] international ruling was that Japan was clearly "a capitalistic country," the Party issued a statement at its 7th CC Plenum held in June 1956 calling for Party-wide discussions on the revision of the "1951 thesis." Later, on September 29, 1957, the Party made public the Draft Party Charter, and a revised version of this draft was submitted to the 7th Party Congress.

Note 2: In the past the Party [usually] had drawn up its Party Platform and its Party Rules and Regulations as separate documents, but the Draft Party Charter presented to the 7th Party Congress combined them into a single consolidated form. This format was patterned after the Party Charter of the Chinese Communist Party. This was explained by Secretary General MIYAMOTO as follows: "We did not adopt this format in mere imitation of the Chinese Communist Party. We borrowed it because we found it was reasonable" ("Report on the Party Platform Question," p. 2).

Note 3: The position of the "1951 thesis" was to include the "national capitalists," with the exception of "comprador capitalists" as one wing of the united front, but the Draft Party Charter, changing this concept, merely regarded them as contradictory elements within the enemy camp which could be utilized. On this matter, the "Report on the Party Platform Question" at the 7th Congress stated: "The non-monopolist big bourgeoisie may be divided into two groups: one which competes with monopoly capital in the national markets, and the other which may be described as local Zaibatsu (plutocrats). With raw materials, markets and finances under the control of monopoly capital, the former group suffers oppression by the monopoly capitalists. Because of this it stands in opposition to monopoly capital and is anti-monopolistic. Since the monopoly capital markets are preempted, this group seeks to open up new markets by expanding trade with China and the USSR. But most of them tend to lose out in their competition with monopoly capital and [have a tendency] to be incorporated into the monopoly capital.
to obtain funds from the banks in order to expand their enterprises. The contradiction between this group and monopoly capital can be utilized as an internal contradiction within the reactionary forces, for the purpose of disrupting and weakening monopoly capital and its government. The non-monopoly big bourgeoisie of the local Zaibatsu-type take the form of small-scale 'Konzern' or cartels, which control the local banks and operate local transportation systems as well as various local industries. They are distinguished from monopoly capital only because [their scope of operations] is not nationwide, but their actual class character approximates that of monopoly capital. They continue to possess feudal landlord features and the character of local versions of the prewar capitalist plutocracy (Zaibatsu). They are extremely reactionary and anti-labor. Most of them are the real leaders of local branches of the Liberal Democratic Party and are the big bosses who manipulate local politics.

b. The Debate at the 7th Party Congress.
(1) In the debate at the Congress, there was almost no controversy among the participants over the proposition that "Japan is a highly developed capitalistic country" and that "Japan is a subordinate of America to a certain extent."
(2) The discussion at the Congress was [concentrated mostly on] the question of the degree of this subordination to America and the question of how to view this subordinate status in connection with the revolution, i.e., (1) "What is the present status of Japan? and (2) What is the character of the coming revolution?"
(3) On the issue of the status of Japan, the Draft Party Charter emphasized Japan's subordination to American imperialism, but the anti-Charter faction was of the opinion that "the relationship between
Japan and the United States under the San Francisco Treaty is a mutual treaty relationship. It is true that in this mutual relationship the prerogatives of the United States have greatly encroached upon those of Japanese monopoly capital, but Japanese national power is in the hands not of American imperialism but of Japanese monopoly capital."

(4) With respect to the nature of the coming revolution, the Draft Party Charter contended that: "The coming revolution is a struggle for the protection of democracy and for complete independence in opposition to the semi-occupation by American imperialism and to the exploitation and suppression by Japanese monopoly capital. This revolution, the main force of which is the alliance of workers and peasants led by the proletariat, is a people's democratic revolution and is to be achieved by a national democratic united front which has consolidated around the main force, the broad national masses including urban people, youths, students, and intellectuals." The opposition faction, on the other hand, contended that it should be a "socialist revolution," its struggle being directed primarily against Japanese monopoly capital, and only secondarily in the interests of the anti-American campaign.

(5) Unresolved at the Plenary Session of the 7th Party Congress, this controversy was discussed by a "Party Platform Subcommittee," but, since there was no prospect of receiving an overwhelming majority (over two-thirds of all representatives), the question
was not put to a vote, and it was recommended that
the draft be studied further until the next Party
Congress. At the 2nd CC Plenum, a "subcommittee on
the Party Platform Question" was established for this
purpose.

Note: "The Report on the Party Platform Question" pre-
sented to the 7th Party Congress, cited the "Moscow
Declaration" and stated that: "We think that the basic
outlook of the Moscow Declaration is in fundamental agree-
ment with the substance of the national democratic united
front of the Draft Party Charter and with its view on
popular liberation." On international guidance on the
"Party Platform Question," see above Chapter II, A
"Subservience to International Authority."

c. Effects of the Failure to Adopt a Party Platform.
(1) The Party headquarters has been contending that
although the Party Platform portion of the Draft
Party Charter was aborted, this had no particular
effect on Party activities because immediate politi-
cal policies had been adopted and the "Moscow De-
claration" had been declared the Party's guide to
action. However, it was not entirely feasible to get
along without a Party Platform [factual circumstances
forced reconsideration of general principles], and the
6th CC Plenum Report recognized the need for a speedy
solution to the problem, stating that "the fact that
the Party has not yet achieved agreement on the Party
Platform Question undeniably constitutes a barrier to
the Party's theoretical and ideological solidarity in
tackling various tactical and theoretical problems."
(2) Further the unresolved Party Platform issue
gives rise to the following practical problems:
(a) The fact that there is no agreed theoretical position in the Party concerning such important questions as the neutralization policy and the essential nature of the revision of the Security Pact is linked to a solution of the "Party Platform Question" (Note 1).

(b) One of the reasons given by the trade unions when they turn down an appeal to "support the JSP and JCP" is that "the JCP has no clearcut revolutionary theory" (Note 2).

(c) Criticism that the low morale of Party members in the lower echelons is due to the lack of a Party Platform (Note 3).

Note 1: The neutralization policy of Japan was developed quite suddenly by the international Communist leadership, and the JCP, without sufficient theoretical preparation, discussed it heatedly at the 4th CC Plenum of the Party. The core of the question was the relationship between neutrality and independence. The Party Charter faction emphasized independence, arguing that neutrality was merely a form of independence, while the faction opposing the Charter faction stressed neutrality rather than independence on the grounds that Japan had basically achieved its independence, and that, therefore, neutrality had become the immediate goal.

(a) For example, UEDA Koichiro, a member of the JCP Nakano District Committee in Tokyo, wrote the following in his article "The Revival of Japanese Imperialism and the Neutrality Problem" for the magazine Chuo Koron (May 1959):

i. Japan, a monopolistic-capitalistic country, has recovered economically, but it has not become politically an imperialist country.

ii. In the contemporary world, neutralization cannot be expected of an imperialist country, but a non-imperialist country can still become a neutral country.
III. Japanese imperialism has not yet completed its recrudescence and Japan can be converted into a new type of monopoly-capitalist country: a peaceful, disarmed neutral nation. This can be done because of such favorable conditions as: the existence of a Constitution which prohibits rearmament and guarantees a democratic system, the split among the bourgeoisie, the ambivalence of the petit bourgeoisie, the class growth of the labor union, and the strengthening of the Left wing in the Socialist Party.

iv. Accordingly, the question of the form of government which will realize neutrality must not be prematurely injected into the neutrality movement. At present the slogan of "a realization of neutrality through a revolutionary government" implies no possibility of neutrality unless we establish either a socialist or a socialist-communist coalition government.

(b) This view that there is the possibility that "Japanese monopoly capital will adopt a policy of neutrality and peaceful coexistence voluntarily" was criticized as revolutionary by DOKI Tsuyoshi, candidate member of the Central Committee, in the magazine Zenei (December 1959). He said that the fallacies in this view were:

1. Underestimation of the aggressive role of American Imperialism.


3. Ignoring the fact that despite the contradictions among monopoly capitalists, they have to strengthen their alliance in order to oppose socialist and democratic forces. This, he said, contradicted the "Political Report" presented to the 7th Party Congress. This question, as was shown at the 6th Plenum Meeting, is naturally related to the "Party
Platform question," which is still unsettled, but in the practical activities of the Party, emphasis was placed on independence rather than neutrality.

Note 1: As an example of labor union criticism of the JCP the Sowa Standing Committee Decisions (June 20, 1959) stated as follows: "The JCP accepts the international Communists' view of the current Japanese domestic situation as its own, and thus does not give due weight to the complexities of the domestic situation. It tends to carry on its struggles without accurately evaluating the domestic power relations from an independent standpoint. The "New Program" (1951 thesis) put forward the formula of violent revolution. Later at the 6th National Party Conference, it was decided to change the "New Program" because it no longer measured up to the situation, but no revision has yet been made. The Draft Party Charter, which failed of adoption at the Party Congress last year, declared that the question of whether a revolution would be violent or peaceful would depend on the behavior of the enemy. For the JCP, operating in a country where the power of advanced monopoly capital has been established and where a strong workers' class has grown, to change again and again the basic strategy that is ultimately to establish the power of the working class indicates that the JCP has no clear-cut revolutionary theory."

Note 3: An example of the effect of the lack of a Party Platform on the morale of lower echelon Party members is seen in the following report of one Prefectural Committee: "In this election the Party cannot be said to have done the most within its power. Since the 6th National Conference the Party has been in a state of demoralization and one must admit that the passion, conviction, devotion, and positiveness with respect to Party activities have been slack. One of the basic reasons for this state of affairs may lie in the fact that the revolutionary prospect and the revolution [or its] ideology are not clear. 'A Communist Party which has forgotten the revolution, like a canary which has forgotten its song, or like ice cream which has no sugar, naturally lacks appeal.' Looking back on Party activities in the prewar and immediate postwar periods, [we see that] Party activities at the time had deep-rooted shortcomings, but at the same time
Party activities were filled with revolutionary passion. After the 6th National Party Conference we were told that the revolution would require a long period of time and would involve many difficulties, and also that there was a possibility of peaceful transition. It was never made clear, however, in a categorical fashion how the revolution in Japan would advance. Since there was no decision on the Party Platform at the 7th Party Congress last year, this confusion still prevails within the Party.

Further, although the Decisions of the 6th Plenum declared that there were no obstacles to the expansion of the Party, it could not deny the existence of the kind of complaints typified by the above. Thus, it declared, 'there are some who say that the Party cannot expand unless the Party Platform is completed. The completion of the Platform is indeed important and the Decisions of the 6th Plenum have marked this fact.'
IV. CURRENT EMPHASIS IN PARTY ACTIVITIES

On the basis of the estimate of the situation which we have discussed above, the Party has been employing, since the 6th National Party Conference (July 1955), tactics suitable for an ebbing period of revolution and defines its most important mission to be "to promote the solidarity and unity of the entire working class; to consolidate the alliance between the working class and the farmers; and to build, on the basis of this alliance, a national democratic united front which would unify all the workers and all progressive people" ("Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress). For this purpose the Party at present lays emphasis on: (1) formation of a united front, (2) expansion and strengthening of the Party, and (3) utilization of the parliament and the election system.

Note: The Party intends to carry out the revolution by forming a strong united front, and establishing through it a united front government. In this regard, the "Report on the Party Platform Question" presented to the 7th Party Congress stated as follows: "Our Party intends to form a strong united front government on that foundation. This is a struggle to be waged in the face of enemy obstacles presented by American imperialism and Japanese reactionary forces. Whether this united front government shall become a revolutionary government or not depends on the degree to which the united front which supports it grows in power. If the united front succeeds in receiving the support of the people but is not strong enough to cope with the power of the enemy, a democratic government may be established during an unstable transitional period. Also if the leadership of the united front is not secured by the proletariat, there is no guarantee that the revolution will succeed. However, if the new government is established under conditions where the united front rests on the foundations of an absolute majority of the people and if the working class and its vanguard Party demonstrate a
solid proportion of this united front, this will be a government able to carry out the revolutionary task.

A. FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT

1. Basic policies.

a. On the basis of the above analysis of the international and domestic situations, the Party is promoting united actions for the realization of various demands represented in the slogan "peace, independence, democracy, livelihood, and neutrality" (Note 1 and 2), and intends through these actions to form its desired united front (Note 3). To achieve this end, the "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress emphasized the following immediate activities:

(1) To organize and expand various united actions among the masses, and through these, attempt to accumulate the combined power of the masses in order to create the foundation for a united front.

(2) To deepen the ties between the Party and mass organizations and at the same time to inspire the latter to become the [component] units of the united front.

(3) To spread among the workers the consciousness that the working class is the leader of the united front and to this end to establish the power and leadership of the Party especially within the labor union movement. This is the prime responsibility of the movement.

(4) To strengthen Party influence among the farmers in order to establish the labor-farmer alliance, which is the foundation of a united front.
(6) To build up a cooperative relation between the Communist [Party] and the Socialist Parties.

b. The struggles on which the Party, on the basis of the above views, has recently concentrated its main forces have developed as a broad joint struggle of various groups. These are as follows:

1. The movement to normalize Sino-Japanese relations.
2. The struggle against the [teachers'] efficiency-rating system.
3. The struggle against the revision of the Police Duties Law.
4. The struggle against the revision of the Security Pact.

By making use of the joint struggle organizations created for these struggles, the Party has been trying to build a "national democratic united front" (Notes 4 and 5).

c. The number of these recently organized joint struggle organizations has been gradually increasing, and these organizations are gradually beginning to develop from temporary campaign organizations into more permanent bodies. The power of the JCP within these joint struggle organizations, of course, is not dominant, but the Party is gradually increasing the extent of its infiltration. In addition, these struggles have strengthened the tactical leadership within the Party, and have inspired many people to join the Party.

Note 1: The "Moscow Declaration" defined the mission of a Communist Party in a country which is an American dependency as follows: "In capitalistic countries where American monopoly capital is frantically attempting to
establish its own leadership and in those countries that are already suffering under American economic and military expansion, objective conditions are being created which will unite, on a broad scale, all classes of people. Under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary political party, they will fight for peace, national independence, and democratic freedoms. They strive to raise their standards of living, to carry out fundamental land reforms, and to overthrow the rule of monopoly capital which betrays the national interests."

Note 2: In the "Political Report" and the "Action Program" of the 7th Party Congress the following immediate demands were put forward:

(a) For the sake of peace: an immediate ban on A- and H-bomb tests; total ban on the manufacture and use of A- and H-bombs; opposition to the importation of nuclear weapons into Japan; prevention of nuclear weapons for the Self-Defense Forces; elimination of military bases; opposition to any "Northeast Asian Military Alliance"; establishment of a broad collective security system in Asia and the Pacific including the USSR and China; conclusion of a peace treaty with Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam; and friendship and amity with Asian-African countries.

(b) For the sake of independence: destruction of the San Francisco [treaty] system; abandonment of the Japan-United States Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement; revision of the Peace Treaty; restoration of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands; and withdrawal of American troops and removal of all bases.

(c) For the sake of democracy: blocking of the small-election-district system and of amendments to weaken the Constitution; thorough democratization of the election system based on the representative principle; abolition of all laws and regulations restricting democratic rights; opposition to all oppression of democratic movements; abolition of police government and of the Thought Police; blocking of efficiency-rating for teachers; and protection and fulfillment of democratic education.

(d) For the sake of raising living standards: broad-scale salary increases for workers; establishment of a minimum wage system; opposition to discharges and rationalization; shortening of working hours and guarantee of full employment; guarantee of land and work for farmers;
implementation of a price-support system for farm products, guarantee of capital, raw materials, and markets for small enterprises; expansion of the social security system paid for by the State and by capitalists; abolition of consumer taxes and expansion of progressive income taxation; and expansion of mutually beneficial trade with Socialist states including the USSR and China.

Note 3: In his "Report on the Party Platform Question" presented to the 7th Party Congress, Secretary General MIYAMOTO described the status of united action as follows: "The problem is not merely that while united action on specific problems has developed considerably, we still find disunity and narrowness within the movement, but that the movement has not advanced beyond this stage. This is due to the fact that the formation of a national united front based on a comprehensive common program such as the current situation demands is not being consistently pursued as a serious and concrete objective. Accordingly, great indefatigable effort to form a united front is an indispensable precondition to the building up of revolutionary power." A JCP Central Committee member, KAMIYAMA Shigeo, gave the following evaluation of the recent "People's Congress Against the Revision of the Security Pact." "It is not the same kind of a united front organization with a unified program, and a unified leadership as the ones formed in Spain, Austria, and France in the anti-Fascist Popular Front era. It is not even the kind of united front organization with a military-type unitary command center which was created in France and China during World War II. It is an organization for united action which is the first of its kind and one having the greatest significance in Japanese revolutionary movement. It is a bud which will become the flower of our goal, a national democratic united front -- but the bud is still extremely young and weak and, for this very reason must be nurtured with the greatest care" ("For the Development of the People's Congress Against the Revision of the Security Pact," Akahata, February 20, 1960).

Note 4: The primary objective of these four central struggles, including that opposing the revision of the Security Pact, was the formation of a "national democratic united front" through which the revolution would be
achieved, rather than their respective goals per se. Thus, with regard to the struggle to prevent the revision of the Security Pact, the Party stated: "The struggle against the revision of the Security Pact and for its abrogation cannot be successful merely through the efforts of a single party or group, nor can it be taken care of by a temporary campaign. Rather it calls for bringing together into the united action everyone who is opposed to the revision of the Security Pact and who seeks its abrogation. It requires above all the creation of strong solidarity among the people. The struggle must take a positive course. It must be based on the realization of the present demands of the people and combine in a broad and strong united front all the patriotic, peaceful and democratic people who, opposed to American imperialism, to traitorous Japanese monopoly capital, and to the Kishi Cabinet, seek independence, peace, neutrality, and a better livelihood. This indeed is the most correct way to bring together to the maximum extent all the energies of the national and class struggles. Accordingly, any view which regards victory against the Security Pact, including its abrogation, merely as an adjunct to the program of a single party to seize political power and overlooks or treats lightly the prospects for united action or a united front, cannot possibly guide us to the correct solution of this important task" ("For the Advancement of the Joint Struggle Against the Security Pact," Akahata, September 16, 1959).

Note 5: Holding to this view, the Party opposed the policy which demanded the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet and the dissolution of the Diet in order to block revision of the Security Pact. It criticized this policy as one which neglected the fundamental task of forming and strengthening the national democratic united front and which converted the movement into a parliamentary or electoral struggle. Also the decisions of the 3rd CC Plenum emphasized, on the one hand, that "the present struggle over the revision of the Security Pact is being promoted and fought in connection with a demand for Diet dissolution and with a demand for the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet. Because of the instability of the political situation, it is necessary to stress the question of Kishi's responsibility and of overthrowing his cabinet." On the other hand, it also declared that "in the light of our fundamental outlook,
It is important that we struggle harder and unite more firmly in order to build the power of the people so that the reactionary government will be isolated, not temporarily but permanently. Accordingly, given today's power relationships, emphasis should be placed above all on developing a continuing mass struggle and on turning the power balance to the people's advantage. At the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee, held immediately after the signing of the new Security Pact, it was confirmed that this opposition struggle "must be pursued as a long-term continuing struggle to form a national democratic united front." At the same time, however, with the reconvening of the Diet to ratify the pact, the Party again raised its slogans calling for Diet dissolution and the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet.

2. The Movement to Normalize Sino-Japanese Relations.

a. With the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1954 as the turning point, Communist China, while strongly denouncing Japan's U.S.-oriented diplomacy, began ardently to promote the normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations through unofficial diplomacy, using its so-called "irritation tactics." As a result, the frequency of intercourse between the two countries increased each year. However, expressing its dissatisfaction with the 4th trade agreement finally signed in March 1958, after difficult negotiations, and with the measures taken by the Japanese Government with respect to the Chinese flag incident in Nagasaki in May of the same year, in the CHEN YI statement May 11, 1958, Communist China severed all trade and cultural relations with Japan. In the period since that time the movement to open up Japanese-Chinese relations and to restore diplomatic relations was carried out initially primarily by Japanese-Chinese traders and organizations concerned with Sino-Japanese relations.
But since the summer of 1958, it has developed into an organized united action movement comprising Socialists, Communists, labor unions, and peace groups, and has been converted into an anti-government joint struggle movement tied in with the movement to ban nuclear armaments, to oppose the efficiency-rating [of teachers], to oppose the Police Duties Law, and to block revision of the Security Pact.

b. As the drive to restore Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations came to be organized as a broad popular movement, the Party took part from the very beginning in the central joint struggle organization, and has been gradually strengthening its substantial voice in the operation of the movement. An outstanding example of this influence is to be seen in the revision of the "Policy for a Solution of the Sino-Japanese Crisis" at the 10th Sohyo Congress, July 1958. The original draft, which declared that Sohyo would "cooperate with the Socialist Party," was revised to read "cooperate with progressive political parties."

Another example is the fact that both the Policy Council on the Formosa Straits Question, established at the time of the Formosa Straits crisis, and the Secretariat of the People's Congress for the Restoration of Sino-Japanese Relations, were Socialist-Communist joint struggle organizations. The success of these Socialist-Communist united actions has been noted by Communist China, which praised them highly in a joint statement with a group of representatives of the JCP visiting China.
Note: The joint statement of the Japanese and Chinese Communist Parties, October 20, 1959, stated that the JCP "has carried on its struggle devoting its full energies to the formation of a united front between the Communist and the Socialist Parties. The Chinese Communist Party supports the JCP's just claims completely and expresses its limitless respect for the heroic struggle of the JCP and the Japanese people."

c. The backing of Sohyo made the People's Congress for the Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations the central organization of the movement to restore Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. During September-October 1958, 28 local joint struggle organizations (which were in effect its subsidiary organizations) were created in 27 metropolitan areas and prefectures and in 1 municipality. The number of such organizations reached 44 in early 1959. These, of course, were groupings of democratic organizations organized around regional and prefectural councils as their core, but in reality most of them owed their formation to the efforts of the local organizations of the JCP and JCP members of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Society. Accordingly, the coordinating points (offices) of most of them were located at the branch offices of the Japan-China Friendship Society and their operations were almost entirely controlled by JCP members. Later, as the struggles against the Police Duties Law and the Security Treaty developed, these local joint struggle organizations developed into, or were absorbed by, new joint struggle organizations. As of the end of December 1959, such organizations continued to exist in 17 prefectures and one district, and were under the strong influence of the JCP.
Note: The People's Congress for the Restoration of Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet Diplomatic Relations was formed in October 1954, but, upon the resumption of Japanese-Soviet relations, it was reorganized in July 1957 as the People's Congress for the Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations.

3. The Struggle Against the Efficiency-Rating System.
   a. The struggle against the efficiency-rating system began in Ehime Prefecture in October 1957. As efficiency-rating regulations were enacted in various localities, the struggle became nationwide and was led by the Japanese Teachers Union. Joint struggle organizations were rapidly formed prior to the first national united action day to oppose efficiency-rating on September 15, 1958. Although a nationwide joint struggle organization was not formed, local organizations were formed in many localities.
   b. The basic attitude of the Party in the struggle against the efficiency-rating system was that the system was one of the links in a war policy and the struggle against it a conflict between reactionary and democratic forces. The Party, therefore, absolutely opposed the system and urged that the movement should be considered not merely a class struggle of educational workers but made into a broad mass movement. It emphasized its expansion as a united struggle which would mobilize all democratic forces around the Japanese Teachers Union, and to this end advocated formation of area-wide joint struggle organizations and the participation of the Party in these organizations.
   c. As a result, the Party formally participated in a good many of the prefectural level anti-efficiency-rating joint struggle organizations and also achieved
considerable success in affiliating itself with lower level organizations. Of course, even where there was no formal participation by the Party itself, there were many cases of infiltration by the Party in the form of participation by Party members as individuals or as officers of participating mass organizations.

d. The Party still placed a high value on the achievements of these joint struggle organizations, but in the light of the organizational crisis due to the internal controversy in the Japanese Teachers Union over the so-called "Kanagawa formula" in December 1958, and because the efficiency-rating system had already been implemented in many areas, the Party's struggle policy has changed somewhat. Switching from all-out struggle over the efficiency-rating system, it has now begun to advocate a flexible strategy which, while seeking the same final goal, pursues this end in combination with various other demands.

Note 1: The Party decided at the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee that:
(a) The Party will maintain its position of fundamental opposition to the efficiency-rating system but will fight it by combining the demand for its elimination with other popular demands.
(b) Refusing to permit children to attend schools is a rather high-handed tactic in a situation where the children of Union members do not constitute a majority [of the school population]. And, while supporting Sohyo's united struggle policy, it warned that dangerous tactics could be harmful to the development of united action.

Note 2: With respect to the significance of the recent struggle against the efficiency-rating system, the Party emphasized the necessity of developing it into a struggle to destroy the Security Treaty's structure and declared: "In the struggle against the efficiency-rating system,
the Party has from the beginning exposed and publicized the reactionary political character of the system. However, we treated the reactionary education policy of the Rishi-Liberal-Democratic party government simply as a policy for the control of education by a resurgent and strengthened Japanese monopoly capital and have thus far stressed it as a struggle against monopoly capital. We must point out that our exposure of this reactionary education policy, resulting from Japan’s subjugation to American imperialism, has been extremely weak. The rating system is not only a policy designed to strengthen the control of education by a resurgent and strengthened Japanese monopoly capital, but is, at the same time, the first step toward the revival of militarism. The struggle against it is truly a struggle to defend peace. More importantly, however, the point that this struggle is a struggle for national independence must not be forgotten. This point is especially important if we are correctly to develop this struggle against the rating system in connection with the currently advancing fight to destroy the Security Treaty system ("For the Advance of the Educational Workers," Toho (Party Gazette) No. 7, May 10, 1959).

Note 3: The Wakayama organization may be cited as an example of a local joint struggle organization. It was formed by seven organizations: the Wakayama Teachers Union, the High School Teachers Union, the Prefectural Government Employees Union, the Education Bureau Employees Union, the Buraku (eta) Liberation League, the Wakayama University Students Self-Governing Association, and the Prefectural unit of Sohyo. Although no political party participated in the joint struggle organization, the JCP endeavored to seize its leadership by having many Party members infiltrate the executive unit of the seven organization joint struggle conference.

4. The Struggle Against Revision of the Police Duties Law.

a. As soon as the bill to amend the Police Duties Law was put on the agenda of the Extraordinary Session of the Diet on October 9, 1958, the opposition struggle for withdrawal of this bill, led by the Socialist Party,
developed into an unprecedentedly broad united action movement which included not only Sohyo but also Zenro, Shinsambetsu, and many urban peoples and intellectuals. As a result, the "People's Congress Against the Revision of the Police Duties Law" was formed on October 14, 1959, and in addition 45 prefectural level and more than 200 district level local joint struggle organizations were also created.

b. The Party immediately issued on October 10, 1959, a statement of opposition in the name of the JCP Presidium Committee and the JCP Diet Delegation. It then proposed a joint struggle with the Socialist Party and Sohyo. However, the Party was unable to participate in the "People's Congress Against the Revision of the Police Duties Law," which had to be formed at the national level because of the opposition of Zenro and Shinsambetsu, but it did succeed in participating formally in the joint struggle organizations at the prefectural level (in 34 prefectures) and at the district level. This was because the Party had previously worked hard in the movements to restore Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and in the struggle against the efficiency-rating system, which movements it had infiltrated at various local levels (Note 1).

c. The Party's basic attitude toward this (police bill) struggle was to treat it as part of the movement for normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations, which was related to the then erupting Formosa Straits issue and as part of the struggle to oppose revision of the Security Pact, rather than to regard it as the central issue.
d. The Party regarded this struggle as achieving some results in that some kind of joint struggle organizations which had included the Socialist and Communist Parties had been formed. But it pointed to the following shortcomings:

(1) A nationwide united front embracing all democratic forces had not been formed, nor had cooperation been established with other organized democratic forces.

(2) The joint struggle organizations which were established had no permanence because of the influence of Right-wing social democrats.

(3) The response of the workers in the large firms was weak.

(4) The activity of the farmers, middle and small businessmen and urban people was also weak.

Attributing these shortcomings basically to the lack of the Party's influence on labor union members, the Party emphasized the importance of building up the Party (Note 2).


Note 2: Decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee.

5. The Struggle Against Revision of the Security Treaty.

a. The formation of joint struggle organizations and the extent of Party infiltration.

(1) The People's Congress to Block the Revision of the Security Treaty, which was the central
joint struggle organization of this struggle, was formed on March 28, 1959, by 174 organizations with Sohyo at the core (Note 1). The formation of local joint struggle organizations at the prefectural level became nationwide on August 1, 1959, when Saitama Prefecture completed the roster. As of the end of December 1959, there were 520 organizations at the district, town and village level with 175 more in the preparatory state. The number of organizations had increased tremendously compared to those created for the struggle against the Police Duties Law.

(2) Not only was the Party a formal participant from the beginning in the above central organization, but with observer status it had a voice in the executive staff conferences of the organization. At the prefectural level, it formally participated in all organizations, with the exception of Chiba and four other prefectures where the Party was merely an observer. Also a striking number of Party members won posts as vice-chairmen and executive bureau chiefs [at this level]. An even greater degree of Party infiltration was achieved at the district level and below.

(3) Such infiltration by the Party in the joint struggle organizations at the center and at the local level was made possible primarily because of the following factors:

(a) The fact that at the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee, held in November 1958, the Party had already decided to regard the
struggle to obstruct and abrogate the revision of the Security Treaty as the core of all struggles, and that thereafter it vigorously pursued this movement.

(b) The fact that in the course of the struggles for the formalization of Japanese-Chinese relations, and against the efficiency-rating system and the Police Bill, the Party had been gradually increasing the degree of its infiltration into the local joint struggle organizations.

(c) The fact that the international Communist camp had strengthened its propaganda and agitation.

b. The Party's evaluations and future policy.

(1) The Party has made the following evaluation of the developments of the joint struggle organizations opposing the revision of the Security Treaty:

(a) Results

i. The united action from below of democratic forces including the Communist and Socialist parties is expanding throughout the country on a great scale.

ii. In many prefectures the Party occupies equal status with others, in name and in fact, both as a participating organization and as an executive member of the joint struggle organizations.

iii. The Party has played an important role at the national representatives' conference of local joint struggle organizations.
(b) Shortcomings

i. Even at the present time, [in the movement] as a whole the nature of the struggle as a struggle against American imperialism is still not clearly understood.

ii. The joint struggle conference has not yet become a united front organization, but is still an organization for a one-time campaign.

iii. There has been inadequate effort to develop independently various popular demands and to combine them with the struggle against the Security Treaty.

iv. The Central People's Congress still does not recognize the Party as an executive member but only as an observer; in addition it has made the executive member group the highest [policy] organ, without attempting to call a general conference of all participating organizations.

(2) As a result of this assessment the purpose of the infiltration policy of the Party with respect to the Security Treaty joint struggle organizations is:

(a) To build up a favorable position for the Party in the local joint struggle organizations;
(b) To reflect that position on the center through a national representatives' conference, and to strengthen efforts at the center itself to make it receptive to these pressure from below (Note 2);
(c) To eliminate thereby the discriminatory
treatment toward the Party in the national People's
Congress and at the same time to strengthen the
Party's voice in the fight against the Security
Treaty;
(d) To establish gradually, after developing
these objectives, a nationwide united front em-
bracing both central and local units.
In pursuing this policy, however, the Party is
conducting its activities with great circumspec-
tion, and is extremely careful to avoid precipitate
action (Note 3).

Note 1: The executive organizations of the People's Con-
gress to Block the Revision of the Security Treaty are at
present the following 13 organizations: Sohyo, Anti-A and
H-bomb Associations (Gensuileyo); the League to Defend the
Constitution; the People's Congress for the Normalization
of Japanese-Chinese Relations; the Peace Committee; Japan-
China Friendship Society; National Anti-base Alliance;
All-Japan Farmers' Union; the Labor Alliance for Neutrality;
Women's Association to Protect Human Rights; the Socialist
Party; Youth and Students Joint Struggle Congress, and the
Tokyo Joint Struggle Congress.

Note 2: In order to exchange experiences of these local
joint struggle organizations and to discuss struggle plans,
National Representatives Conferences were held three times
in 1959 (June 16, September 16, and December 15). The
Party devoted a great deal of its efforts to these meetings
and, by making use of its favorable position in the local
organizations, is seeking to generate criticism of the
Socialist Party-dominated policies of the central organiza-
tion and to seize the leadership. For example:

(a) One-third of the 336 participants in the 2nd
National Representatives Conference were JCP members;
among the 46 prefectural representatives who delivered
reports on their localities, 19 were Party members.
(b) At the Party member meeting held on the occasion of the 1st Representatives Conference, Secretary General N. YAMOTO stated that "this Representatives Conference was convened on the initiative of the Party," and even in Akahata it was made known that the Party's wishes were fully reflected in these conferences.

Note 3: The question whether the name of the People's Congress opposing the revision of the Security Treaty should include the word "abrogate" in addition to the word "block" was violently debated by the Socialist and Communist parties in the preparatory meeting. In the end the Party gave in and agreed to leave just the word "block" in the title. Thereafter, however, it continued to promote the idea of "abrogation" at every opportunity.

6. Attitudes toward the Socialist Party.

a. The ultimate objective of the Party is to form a united front led by the Party, but, for the immediate future, the Party attaches importance to the position and role of the Socialist Party in the formation of a united front, and is doing its best to make use of this position and role. It thus is seeking to organize various united actions [with the Socialists] and to increase the Party's influence in them (Notes 1 and 2).

b. Accordingly, the Party, even while it criticizes the Socialist Party's view that "proletarian internationalism" cannot succeed and its "anti-communism" is following overall a policy of promoting united actions and cooperating positively with the Socialist Party. At the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee, the Party had charged that "in recent years as the attack of the reactionary forces has mounted in intensity, the Socialist Party's tendency to avoid a confrontation and to compromise with the reactionary forces has become increasingly conspicuous," and from about that time the Party's criticism of the Socialist Party had become more intense than ever before.
c. After the split of the Socialist Party last year, however, the Party made the following evaluation:

(1) There have always been two tendencies in the Socialist Party, "the tendency toward compromise and cooperation with the reactionary forces" and an opposite tendency.

(2) The right [Socialist] wing represents the former.

(3) However, even after the split, the Socialist Party continues still to be influenced by the anti-Communism of the right wing and is now tending toward the position of "opposing the right wing but also opposing the left wing." The Party thus indicated the need to use caution if united actions were to be promoted and has become somewhat circumspect in its criticism of the Socialist Party. At the same time, while furiously attacking the leaders of the Democratic Socialist Party, the Party is attempting to woo away the lower level supporting forces of the DSP (Notes 3 and 4).

Note 1: According to MIYAMOTO'S report presented to the 7th Party Congress: "The Socialist Party has its organizational basis among farmers, workers, urban bourgeoisie, and part of the middle and small capitalists, and is in reality a conglomerate of these various classes. For this reason, it lacks unity and consistency in ideas, in ideals, in policies, and is unstable. But the strata which constitute its organizational basis are all strata which form the constituent elements of a national democratic united front. Accordingly, as the struggles of these strata advance, the Socialist Party, reflecting the orientation of these struggles, is also able to fight against the ruling strata of the United States." The Decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee further stated that: "The Japanese Socialist Party has
an aspect that differentiates it from a social democratic party in an imperialistic state possessing colonies. Being a socialist party in a dependent nation, it cannot receive mass support unless it reflects in some degree the progressive demands of the working class and of the popular masses on the issues of peace and war and of independence and dependence."

Note 2: In appraising the Japanese Socialist Party, international Germanism stated that: "Cooperation between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, as in the contact between the Socialist and the Communist Parties of Japan and Chile, has suddenly been strengthened recently and favorable conditions for solidarity have been created: ("What Did the Socialist International Conference Show?" Pravda, July 15, 1959).


Note 4: Regarding the Democratic Socialist Party, the Party stated in the Decisions of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee: "Our Party must expose the anti-worker, anti-people's character of the democratic socialism of Nishio's new party and must combat its ideological and political influence. In view of the fact that in many areas workers and labor unions under Zenro's leadership are actively participating in united actions against the Security Pact, our Party must endeavor to draw the forces supporting the Party also into united actions focussing on the struggle against the revision and the abrogation of the Security Treaty."

B. EXPANSION AND STRENGTHENING OF THE PARTY

1. General Policy

   a. At the 7th Party Congress the Party made a report on the progress of the so-called "1950 problem" and at the same time Central Committee Chairman NOSAKA (then first
secretary) and other staff members conducted self-criticism. These actions enabled the Party to put an end for a time to the distrust and instability within the Party which had resulted from its self-examination of its former "ultra-leftist adventurism." Also at this time in order to achieve greater Party solidarity in the future, the Party revised its regulations and, instead of centralizing Party control, somewhat strengthened expanding intra-Party democracy (Note 1). In this way, the Party ended the period of constant intra-Party strife which began after the 6th National Party Conference, firmed up its central leadership structure, and was able to direct its energies toward mass struggles outside the Party when the struggle against the Police Bill and other mass struggles began to develop (Note 2).

b. However, although this Congress wrote a tentative finis to the past conflict between the Internationalist and Main Current factions, there remained problems:

(1) [As a result] of the unrest within the Party since the 6th National Conference, the denigration of Stalin and the Hungarian revolt, Party strength had suffered a sharp decline and Party activities had atrophied. Recovery and revival was an immediate necessity.

(2) Further, the controversy over the Draft Party Charter produced theoretical conflicts within the Party and hindered its ideological unity.

c. Thus, the Party:

(1) On the one hand, sought to expand and strengthen itself by promoting the "movement to build up Party life and expand Party strength"; and
(2) On the other hand, attempted to bring about ideological unity among Party members by stressing "ideological struggle."

Note 1: At the 6th National Party Conference, the Party made a partial revision of its regulations by emphasizing collective leadership and respect for intra-Party democracy, discretion in dealing with violations of regulations, and the limitation of appointive Party posts, in favor of the elective principle, all of which reflected an effort to promote Party unity and solidarity. While paying lip service to the regulations adopted at the 6th National Conference, the Rules and Regulations contained in the Draft Party Charter, drawn up in September 1957 by the 14th Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee, actually provided for the suppression of intra-Party democracy by subjecting it to control from the Party center (for example: Article 3a, 61, the abolition of regional committees, and restrictions on the number of years of officers' service). The Tokyo Metropolitan Committee and others attacked the draft, charging that it did not expand but abridged "intra-Party democracy" (ref: Toho, Tokyo Party Report X, October 13, 1957). As a result, the regulations adopted by the Congress allowed a somewhat greater degree of intra-Party democracy than did the draft version, but, taken as a whole and compared with the regulations of the 6th National Conference, they strengthened central authority.

Note 2: Listed as examples of the fallacious thinking in the Party since the 6th National Conference were the following tendencies:

(a) One is the loss of self-confidence resulting from the past errors revealed at the 6th National Conference. Another is the negativist attitude which stems from the inability to tolerate excessive criticism and from the inability of members to reflect on their own mistakes. In addition there is the disinclination to carry on unless the problems which existed before the 6th National Conference are solved.

(b) While the entire Party is trying correctly to establish both intra-Party democracy and Party centralism, there exists a tendency toward unprincipled liberalism and dissolutionism. There are also such tendencies as
ignoring central party decisions; understanding decisions but not carrying them out; ignoring the guidance of superiors on the grounds that everything should be decided by one's own thinking; criticizing superiors without cooperating to rectify the shortcoming and the like. Also, there has appeared an unprincipled liberalism which takes problems which should be solved within the Party outside the Party and which criticizes and attacks the Party from the outside (Political Report of the 7th Party Congress).

2. "The Movement to Build up Party Life and Expand Party Strength."

a. At the 7th Party Congress, the Party emphasized the importance of building the Party's organization (Note 1). Later the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee, to implement this objective, made the following four decisions as a means of preparing for the House of Councillors elections in May 1959 (Notes 2 and 3):

(1) That cell meetings be held regularly.
(2) That all Party members read Akahata.
(3) That Party dues and Party newspaper fees be completely paid up.
(4) That the number of Party members and the number of readers of Akahata be increased. The movement during this initial period stressed "the building up of Party life," which is related to the first three decisions just enumerated.

b. To accomplish this mission the Party, on the one hand, issued due books through which it sought to encourage members to become more conscious of their membership, as well as to become more aware of their standing. On the other hand, the Party convened a nationwide conference of chiefs of the organizational departments [of
all JCP units; (January 19-20, 1959) to stress the central policy and to arouse the whole Party to action. By these and various other means, it endeavored to promote the success of this movement (Note 4).

c. As a result of these efforts, there was considerable improvement in the holdings of regular cell meetings, and in the payment of Party dues and Party newspaper fees. There was also a substantial increase in the number of new Party members and new Akahata readers. On the whole, the Party arrested its decline, which had lasted from the 6th National Conference to the 7th Party Congress, and began to improve its position slightly (Notes 5 and 6).

d. Though encouraged by these developments, the Party deplored the fact that it was still "too far behind" the needs of the present situation and particularly that "the absolute number of Party members was small." Consequently, the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee decided on a drive to double the number of Party members before the 8th Party Congress and sent letters to "all Party comrades" with instructions that all cells were to set up plans to expand and strengthen Party strength and to submit these plans to the General Committee. Fulfillment of this drive was strongly urged (Notes 7 and 8).

e. The present emphasis in this drive to expand Party strength is directed toward securing worker-members, especially workers in basic civilian industries. A notable feature of the drive is that by holding workers' educational lectures and by other methods the Party is attempting to strengthen its influence primarily among the working class.
Note 1: On the necessity of improving the constitution, the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress stated: "Immediately after the war, the Party grew large in one leap because of the affiliation of many young progressive elements. But those who joined at that time have now become middle-aged. The time has now come when our Party must rejuvenate and enlarge itself by winning over the many progressive workers and activists who have grown up in the postwar labor and democratic movements and thereby develop a mass vanguard party of the working class."

Note 2: According to the resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee, despite the fact that, in the struggle against the Police Bill, the Party's "political policy was correct and considerable efforts were made to implement it...the Party's influence on labor unions was very limited" and "our leadership was not established." As a result the struggle came to be a Socialist Party struggle and "we were unable to keep it developing." This is why the strengthening and expansion of the Party was deemed necessary.

Note 3: This resolution of the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee appears at first glance to enumerate objectives not worth making the special targets of Party effort. But the resolution went on to state: "Some people may think that objectives enumerated here are too picayune and that some other objectives should be included. However, in view of the actual situation of our Party, it is by no means a simple task to fulfill even these objectives." From this, the internal Party situation can be surmised.

Note 4: The visits of Secretary General MIYAMOTO and other Party leaders to the Soviet Union and China had a great influence on this movement to enlarge the Party. During their visits to the USSR, they made contacts with Communist Party leaders from other countries, deplored the fact that the JCP had such a small number of Party members compared, for example, with the number of votes received in elections, and emphasized after their return the urgent need to expand Party strength. The publication of the article on the "Communist Party of Indonesia" in a special issue of Sekai Seiji Shiryo (World Political Data) was also a manifestation of concern (KASUGA Shoichi, "On the Expansion of Party Organizations -- Lessons We Learn from the Experience of Fraternal Parties," Zenei, September 1959).
Note 5: The "Decisions of the 6th CC Plenum" described the progress of the movement to build up Party life and to expand Party strength since the 3rd CC Plenum and emphasized the need to expand Party strength as follows: "The number of Party members increased by several hundreds in May and June. The Akahata circulation grew by 1,200 in May and June, and the Sunday edition from 30,000 in March to 48,000 at the end of June. The Akahata subscription payment rate from January to June of this year was 83.3%, an increase of 11.5% compared with the same period last year. The number of cells holding regular meetings increased, while the number of Party members who did not read Akahata regularly but who do so now also increased. The payment of Party dues has also improved. Normally the payment decreases at election time, but that did not happen this time. It is the first time since the [postwar] re-establishment of the Party that the payment of Party dues and proceeds of Party papers have increased so rapidly." On the other hand, 'Party membership has not yet revived to the level of three years ago. The number of regular readers of Akahata and the number of registered Party members fall short by 20,000 and 10,000, respectively, of the levels of that time. Granted, of course, that there may have been some padding of figures for the number of Party members and readers at that time, we cannot deny that there has been a numerical decline.'

Note 6: The improvement in the Party since the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee is due to the efforts of the Party itself, but the mounting succession of mass struggles, beginning with those against the efficiency-rating system and the Police Bill, which occurred in the interim played an important role. A great many new Party members were secured in connection with these mass struggles.

Note 7: According to the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee, the ratio of nonclerical workers to the total Party membership was below 20%. KIKUNAMI Katsumi, a member of Party Central Committee Presidium, stated: (1) The composition of district level Party organs used to consist of workers, but at present they are made up mostly of small shopkeepers, salesmen, and officials of democratic organizations, all of whom live as petit bourgeoisie. (2) As for the nature of district
Party organizations, in comparatively large cities a standard feature is the conspicuous number of cells in clinics, democratic enterprises, democratic book shops, offices of democratic organizations, and organ papers ("The Party's Fundamental Course and the Problem of Party Building," Zengi, December 1959).

Note 8: The Party published in Akahata August 7, 1959, a "letter to all Party comrades for the purpose of expanding and strengthening the Party" (in the name of the Central Committee) and at the same time sent out actual letters to all Party members requesting all cells to send replies to the Party [Headquarters]. This was a measure to stir up the enthusiasm of all Party members for expanding and strengthening the Party, but it served also to strengthen centralized control. This letter campaign was vigorously followed up and Akahata frequently called attention to it. On December 26, 1959, the organization department chiefs of 27 prefectural units which were behind in their replies to the letter were brought together to a meeting at Party Headquarters. According to the resolution of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee: "At present, nearly 50% of Party organizations have sent replies to the Central Committee.... As of December 21, 1959, there were 27 prefectures where the number of cells replying was less than 20% of the total number of cells. But...as of January 20, this situation has improved so that only Tokyo and 5 prefectures report less than 20%. This performance level of 50% does not necessarily imply either disregard of Party Headquarters or lethargy in the Party since there may also be technical reasons for their inability to write a suitable reply.

3. Ideological Struggle.

At the 7th Party Congress the Party criticized itself with the observation that "the ideological and theoretical activity of the Party is notably backward" and stressed the fight against right or left deviations by encouraging all Party members from the central headquarters level to the cells to strengthen their studies (gokushufu) of doctrine. The ideological deviations referred to by the
Party are: (1) The left wing deviation of "Trotskyism," which is recognized as having some influence in the Party, primarily among student Party members; and (2) the right wing deviation of "revisionism," which is likewise recognized as having influence in the Party, primarily among the scholarly Party members.

Note: For this reason, the Party has recently been exerting itself to promote a study program, and finally published in March 1959 the first volume of the "Textbook on Communism," the publication of which had been planned since early 1957 following the 6th National Party Conference. However, this volume deals only with basic theory. The second volume, which we believe will contain an analysis of Japan's present situation and other material more pertinent to the various immediate struggles that face the Party, has not yet been published (Ref: "Proposed Contents of the Textbook on Communism," Akahata, March 9, 1958).

a. The Struggle against Trotskyism.
(1) This is primarily an attack on student Party members which came into the open at the Conference of the Party Member Group attending the 11th Zengakuren National Congress held at JCP Headquarters on June 1, 1959. At this Conference a controversy broke out between the Party leadership and the student leaders, ending in a riot. Thereafter the Party began an ideological criticism of Trotskyism, followed by expulsions and other forceful disciplinary measures.
(2) The characteristics of Trotskyism, as enumerated by the Party, are:
(a) It describes the present world situation in terms of a conflict between the imperialistic
bourgeoisie and the international proletariat and does not understand the significance of the socialist world order.
(b) It thinks the time is imminent now for the decisive class war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
(c) It regards as inevitable an imperialist war arising from the sharpening of competition for markets among various imperialist states.
(d) It holds that Japanese monopoly capital has revived and that our country is an almost completely independent imperialistic state (Note 1).

(3) However, the Party, taking into account the [characteristic] reformist atmosphere among students, avoided branding the Zengakuren organizations as enemies. While carrying out measures of expulsion, the Party also attempted to solve the problem by seizing control of Zengakuren through the student Party members faithful to the will of the Central Party leadership (Note 2).

Note 1: Cf., Youth and Student Department of the Central Committee, "For the Demolition of Trotskyism and Ultra-leftist Opportunism in the Student Movement," Akahata, April 14, 1959.

Note 2: Examples of Party members recently expelled as Trotskyists include YAMAZAKI Morimori and TAGAWA Kazuo, Tokyo District Committee functionaries.

b. The Struggle Against Revisionism.
(1) The rejection of revisionism has been an international responsibility since the "Moscow
Declaration" (Note 1), and for this reason the Party is endeavoring to strengthen the study and educational activities of Party members (including members of central headquarters staff). But, unlike the case with Trotskyism, while the Party raised its voice in denouncing revisionism in general, it was reserved about branding anyone specifically with the revisionist label.

(2) The Party notes the following four points as characteristics of recent revisionism (Note 2):

(a) It does not recognize the leadership role of the Communist Party.
(b) It underestimates the strength of American imperialism and of monopoly capital and contends that socialism can be realized through the accumulation of reformist changes.
(c) It denies the organizational principles of the Party, tending to make it into a collectivity of individual groups or a debating club.
(d) It underestimates the achievements of the socialist states, especially of the USSR, and the leading role of the USSR in the international Communist movement.

(3) At the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee, Secretary MIYAMOTO, having returned from Russia, once again emphasized the necessity of rejecting revisionism; and at the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee the elimination of revisionism took a concrete form with a debate on whether to continue publication of the monthly magazine Contemporary.
Along with this ideological offensive, the trend toward taking organizational disciplinary action is finally becoming increasingly apparent (Note 3-5).

(4) Accompanying this movement to eliminate revisionism, Party Headquarters is planning to establish an "Ideological Science Committee" [tentative name] directly under the Central Committee for the purpose of bringing about ideological unity among Party intellectuals (Note 6).

Note 1: According to the report by Secretary MIYAMOTO at the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee, it was said that: "To fight against revisionism until it is thoroughly eradicated is a vital mission for the strengthening of our Party's ranks and also our sacred duty to the international Communist movement."

Note 2: See the "Political Report" of the 7th Party Congress.

Note 3: The Party has this to say about the Party intellectuals of the recent period: "The ideological confusion which has appeared among some of the intellectuals in the Party since the 6th National Party Conference, and the various kinds of opportunism, and revisionist deviations, as well as the negative attitudes toward Party activities which this confusion has bred, have not yet been completely overcome (Resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee).

Note 4: The monthly magazine Contemporary Theory has been edited and published by the editorial department of the Otsuki Bookshop since April 1959. In the foreword to its first issue it is stated that: "Marxism can live and prosper only in the crosscurrent of broad discussion which breaks through the shell of a self-contained perfectionism. This magazine desires to be in a position to give genuine criticism and stimulation to those who
love progress and peace, but who differ with Marxism." The writers for this magazine were not necessarily all Party members and they included non-Marxists, although the main editorial and publication posts were held by JCP members. Because of the criticism from the Party central headquarters, it ceased publication in August 1959, after its 5th issue.

Note 5: Standing on the Marx-Leninism premise that the supreme authority resides in the Party, the Party regards it not merely an ideological error for Party members to publish, in collusion with persons outside the Party, such a magazine as Contemporary Theory for the expansion of Marxism, but also a violation of the "organizational principles" of the Party. According to editorials in Akahata (August 1 and September 26, 1959), the "organizational principles" are as follows:

(a) The Party needs unity of action not only in practical affairs but also in theoretical matters.
(b) The criteria governing these theoretical matters are to be found in the action programs, rules and regulations and other decisions of the Party.
(c) Article III of the Party Rules and Regulations, that Party members may discuss theoretical and practical questions regarding Party policies in Party conferences and Party newspapers, does more than merely define the rights of Party members. It also imposes the obligation on Party members not to carry on this discussion freely outside the Party.

Note 6: On July 9, 1959, the Party invited to Party Headquarters various representatives of those concerned with ideology, science, and culture in the Party and discussed a plan to set up an "Ideological Science Committee" (tentative name) for the purpose of bringing about a nationwide unification of Party scholars. The plan for this committee as conceived by the central Party Headquarters is as follows:

(a) An Ideological Science Committee directly attached to the Central Committee will be established.
(b) The Central Committee will appoint the approximately 10 members of the Ideological Science Committee.
The Ideological Science Committee will study ideological and theoretical questions confronting the Party, under the guidance of the Central Committee.

Various special committees (about 10 members) will be established under the said committee (including not only the area of social sciences but also the natural sciences).

Qualified Party member scholars throughout the country will be registered with Party Headquarters.

C. STRENGTHENING DIET AND ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES

1. At the 7th Party Congress, the Party revised its existing policy toward the Diet to emphasize the fact that the Diet is a place to be utilized not merely for propaganda and agitation but to protect specific interests of the people and is further extremely useful for establishing a united front. From this point of view, the Party stressed the necessity of electing as many national Diet and local legislators as possible, not by carrying out the various election struggles only as temporary election-time campaigns but by systematically preparing for elections at all times (Note 1).

2. Subsequently, after the local elections of the spring of 1959 and the House of Councillors elections, the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee undertook an evaluation of the results. But because of a furious intra-Party argument, it was unable to determine whether the overall results were a success or failure. Treating the local and House of Councillors elections separately, the Party pointed out both the achievements and the shortcomings, and resolved to strengthen its parliamentary and election activities (Notes 2 and 3).
3. In addition, at this 6th Plenum of the Central Committee, the Party concluded that "at present the apathy of the masses toward the Diet and elections is increasing and, as a result of this, a Fascistic reaction may be permitted," and called for a further strengthening of Party activities in the Diet and in elections. It gave the following reasons for this situation:

a. Given the present trends favoring reactionary Fascism, the reactionary forces are attempting by various means to emasculate parliamentary democracy.

b. The Socialist Party, absorbed by the concept of a two-party system, is attempting to decide issues by bargaining and compromise.

c. The power of the Communist Party is small and has not yet become a force that exerts positive influence on national politics.

4. In order to "strengthen Diet and election activities" the Party recently adopted the following measures:

a. The Party has sought to promote a nationwide exchange of experiences in election activities in various localities and the activities of the JCP, Diet and local assembly delegations, by publishing a monthly magazine called The Diet and the Communist Party beginning on September 22, 1959. Another purpose of the magazine is to promote unified activities of the whole Party under central leadership.

b. The Party is preparing to carry out on a national scale the plan implemented already by the Kyoto (municipal) Prefectural Committee and other Party units, whereby the
total annual allowance of a Diet or assembly member is
turned over to the Party, which then pays his living and
activity expenses (Note 4).

Note 1: The Party’s Diet policy is fundamentally directed
toward strengthening of a national democratic united front,
and differs from the so-called "parliamentarianism," which
deals with political questions through a parliament recognized
as the supreme organ of national sovereignty.
Accordingly, the Party condemns "parliamentarianism" as
revisionism. For example, in the struggle against nationa-
ization, the Party opposed nationalization and national
management of major industries, which is "beginning to
capture the workers" (Decisions of the 6th Plenum of the
Central Committee). It also opposed the policy of com-
bining the Security Treaty struggle with Diet dissol-
ution and the overthrow of the Kishi Cabinet under a single
slogan. On both occasions the Party opposed the actions
as "parliamentarianist tendencies."

Note 2: The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee was
convened with the evaluation of the results of the elec-
tions as the major agenda item. Disagreeing with the
appraisal of the Party’s main stream faction that the
elections had been a success, the opposition faction, led
by Chairman KASUGA Shojiro of the Control Committee, ex-
pressed the opinion that it was a failure and, without
reaching a conclusion on this question, the argument was
further expanded to cover the Party Platform Question and
even the question of the forthcoming 8th Party Congress.
This was the reason why the 6th Plenum lasted an un-
precedentedly long time (12 days). Moreover, as the
result of this debate, Chairman KASUGA produced a self-
criticism of his article, "Let's Overcome the Grave
Situation with All-out Efforts," in Zenei of August 1959.
But this self-criticism dealt with his breach of proper
procedure in publishing his article rather than with its
content.

Note 3: The outstanding feature in terms of votes received
and seats by JCP candidates was the fact the Party received
more votes in the local elections and fewer votes in the
House of Councillors elections than in previous elections.
There were various reasons for this, but the difference
in the results was essentially due to the fact that the
Councillors election campaign was conducted as a political struggle with emphasis on the political side of the JCP, whereas in the case of the local elections the emphasis was on the personal service activities of the candidates. These personal service activities were carried out notably through "Democratic Chambers of Commerce and Industry," "Democratic Medical Clinics," "Protection of Livelihood Associations" and "Tenants and Renters Unions." The Party stated that "the tendency for the elections to focus on the candidate has been rather strongly demonstrated in various local elections, but this is a serious defect which our Party must overcome as soon as possible" (Resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee).


Note 5: In regard to the annual allowances of Party Diet members, the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee decided to adopt the method described in the text on October 1, 1959 (Party Report XVI, February 16, 1960).
V. THE CURRENT CONDITION OF THE PARTY

A. PARTY MEMBERSHIP

1. Present number of Party members.
   a. The present number of Party members is estimated at 47,000.
   b. At the time of the 7th Party Congress, the number of Party members was 45,000, but the number of new affiliations since then was confirmed as more than 2,300.
   c. On the other hand, the members expelled comprise 84 students and 27 general members, total 111. Since there were also those who were dropped from the rolls because of delinquency in payment of Party dues and a number of voluntary resignations, the present number of Party members totals the net balance above.
   d. On February 1, 1959, the Party conducted a very extensive survey on the status of Party organization, but the result was not made public.

Note: The report of various Party organs in this survey were apparently inaccurate and it was said that: "The reports due by the end of February were delayed until August. In addition they contained errors in calculation, and the total number of Party members could not be determined even by recount."

   e. As of April 1, 1959, the number of Party members by area as confirmed by this office was as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Party Members as a percentage of total membership</th>
<th>No. of eligible voters (H.C. election parl. district 1959)</th>
<th>Ratio of Party mem. to eligible voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>2,682,208</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tohoku</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>5,288,972</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanto</td>
<td>40.18</td>
<td>15,921,302</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chubu</td>
<td>7.97</td>
<td>7,398,359</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinki</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>8,114,742</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chugoku</td>
<td>8.93</td>
<td>4,199,776</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shikoku</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>2,542,349</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyushu</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>7,368,765</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>53,516,473</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Data on Party Members.

a. Classification by age, occupation, and education:

(1) **Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 20</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20's</td>
<td>18.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30's</td>
<td>46.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40's</td>
<td>17.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50's</td>
<td>8.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60's</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) **Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Party member</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory worker</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General laborer</td>
<td>9.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual worker</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public official</td>
<td>8.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teacher</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Student 2.35
Farm, forest, marine worker 20.18
Company or store employee 9.24
Merchant 8.73
Company manager 0.81
Self-employed 3.45
Others 4.55
Unemployed 3.93
Unknown 10.92

Note: The general laborers are the laborers, carpenters, plasterers, and furniture makers in town factories and business establishments belonging to individual medium- and small-size enterprises.

School teachers in national and public schools, listed separately, are not included in the public official category.

(3) Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University graduates</td>
<td>12.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>14.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school graduates</td>
<td>30.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school graduates</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>40.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Under "university" are included the new system [postwar] universities (Shinsei daigaku) and junior colleges (teikyu daigaku) as well as the old system higher schools (kotogakko) and technical schools (senmon gakko).

"High schools" include new system high schools (shinsei koko), old system normal schools (shihan gakko), and middle schools (chugakko).

"Middle schools" include new system junior high schools (shinsei chugakko) and the old higher elementary schools.

The majority in the "unknown" category are believed to have received an education roughly equivalent to that of elementary school graduates.
b. Classification of professional Party members by
age, class, origin, education, and length of years in the
Party:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Age</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 20</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20's</td>
<td>16.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30's</td>
<td>46.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40's</td>
<td>20.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50's</td>
<td>13.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60's</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) Class of origin</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>27.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public official</td>
<td>16.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School teacher</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, fisherman</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company or store employee</td>
<td>17.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company manager</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant, artisan</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>18.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(3) Education</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University graduate</td>
<td>27.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>24.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td>26.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>18.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Party membership</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than a year</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 years</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 years</td>
<td>37.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15 years</td>
<td>39.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-35 years</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>10.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. CENTRAL PARTY ORGS

1. General.

a. From July 21 to August 1, 1958, the Party held its 7th National Congress at Nakano Public Hall and elsewhere in Tokyo. It was actually 11 years since the 6th Party Congress (December 1947). The attendance at the Congress totaled 445 (Note 1). It was not open to the public. According to the Party Rules and Regulations adopted at the 7th Party Congress, a National Party Congress is "to be convened at least once in two years," and this year (1960) is the second year. Chairman NOSAKA has said that it is planned to convene the 8th Party Congress around July (Note 2), but no concrete preparations appear to have been begun.

Note 1: The breakdown of the attendance at the 7th Party Congress consisted of 387 representatives elected by regional and prefectural level Party conferences; 20 representatives elected from the cells under direct control of the Central Committee and regional committees; 20 then incumbent members of the CC, the Central Committee candidate pool, and the Control Commission; and 18 others from the Central Committee, the Central Committee candidate pool, and the Control Commission elected by the 6th Party Congress; total, 445.

Note 2: See Akahata, February 9, 1960.
b. As of January 1960 a total of eight Central Committee Plenums have been held since the 7th Party Congress, and the provision of the new rules and regulations that they "shall be held at least once every three months" is being carried out. Of these Central Committee Plenums, the "6th Plenum" was the longest in duration (June 29-July 9 and July 31-August 1, 1959), and its decisions are presently extremely important.

c. The Central Committee, the Central Committee Presidium, the Central Committee Secretariat, and the Central Control and Audit Committee are known collectively as "the Party Headquarters," and at the headquarters there are various committees and specialized departments set up as its internal structure.

d. Headquarters personnel numbered 523 (of which 86 were on the Party publications staff) in December 1955 (after the 6th National Party Conference); 535 (of which 244 were on the Party publications staff -- the increase in publications staff was particularly conspicuous) in October 1957 (before the 7th Party Congress); and 309 (of which 114 were on the publications staff) in September 1959 (after the 7th Party Congress).

Note 1: In addition to the Party Headquarters organ, there are the Regional Bureaus, which were established after the 7th Party Congress as representative organs of the CC at the sites of the old Regional Committees, which were abolished. The Regional Bureaus (10 in number) are presently located in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Tokyo, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu; and 12 Central Committee members (CC) and 4 CC candidate members have been assigned as Representatives or bureau officials. The Regional Bureau personnel receive the same privileges and pay as Headquarters personnel.
Note: The decrease in Headquarters personnel after the 7th Party Congress is due to their transfers to Regional Party organs.

2. The situation of the central [Headquarters] staff.

a. The Central Committee. At present the Central Committee is composed of 31 committee members and 6 candidate [alternates] members, each of whom was elected at the 7th Party Congress.

The special characteristics of membership:
(1) Many of those elected were trade unionists who grew up in the postwar labor movement.

Note: Nine members fall in this category, illustrating the Party's policy of emphasizing the labor movement:
CC Member II Yashiro, former Committee Chairman Kokuro (National Railway Workers Union), leader of "February 1 strike."
CC member KANeko Kenta, former Committee Chairman, Zen Kinzoku (National Metal Workers Union)
CC member KIKUNAMI Katsumi, former Chairman, Sambetsu (All-Japan Congress of Industrial Labor Unions), Zen Shimbun (All-Japan Newspaper Workers Union)
CC member SUZUKI Ichizo, former Committee Vice-Chairman, Kokuro (National Railway Workers Union)
CC member NISHIKAWA Hikoyoshi, former executive officer, Zen Kinzoku (All-Japan Metal Workers Union)
CC member TWAMA Masao, Committee Chairman Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union)
CC member TAKAHARA Shinichi, former executive officer, Zentel (All-Communications Workers)
CC member MASEBA Yoshizo, former executive officer, Zen Kowan (All-Japan Longshoremen's Union)
Central Control and Audit Committee member YOSHIDA Sukeharu, former chairman, Sambetsu (All-Japan Congress of Industrial Labor Unions), Zen Kinzoku (All-Japan Metal Workers Union).

(2) Since the war or since the 6th National Party Conference, Regional leaders who had been working
steadily for the expansion of the Party in Regional Party organizations were chosen.

Note: An example is MATSUSHINA Harushige, who is now concurrently a member of the Presidium, a member of the Secretariat, and Chief of the Organization Department.

(3) Party members who exerted themselves in the public trial and cultural struggles were chosen.

Note: Examples are Free Lawyers Group members AOYAGI Morio and OKABAYASHI Tatsumi (both appointed members of the Public Trials Committee of the Central Committee), and NAKAMA Shigeharu of the cultural world.

(4) Although the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee, which had up to the time of the 7th Party Congress been the center of the headquarters forces, sent over 110 representatives to the Congress, not one of them was elected to a Central Headquarters post.

Note: The old main stream faction lost out heavily in the selection of Central Headquarters personnel at the 7th Party Congress. Among those regarded as the men of power in the old main stream faction, the following managed to win posts: KONNO Yojiro, a leading officer in the Tohoku Regional Bureau; HASEGAWA Hiroshi (Ko), Chief, Youth and Students Department; TAKENAKA Tadesaburo, Vice-chief Central Headquarters Finance Department, and Chief, Organ Publications Business Bureau; and MATSUMOTO Saneki, Chief, Central Headquarters Urban People's Department. It took NISHIZAWA Ryuji until October 1958 before he was appointed Chief Editor of the magazine Wakamono (Youth), but MATSUMOTO Ichizo was dropped from Party Headquarters altogether.

b. Seven members of the Control and Audit Committee were elected at the 7th Party Congress. This Control and Audit Committee was newly established at the 7th Party
Congress and carries out the auditing of accounts in addition to performing the functions of the former Control Commission.

c. The breakdown by age groups, occupation, schooling, and length of Party service of Central Committee members, CC candidate members, and Control and Audit Committee members is as follows:

(1) Age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40's</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50's</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 50's age group constitutes 72%.

(2) Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No occupation</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (lawyers)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Diet members)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduated university (old system)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left university (old system)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated higher or technical school (old system)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left higher or technical school (old system)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated normal school</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left normal school</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated middle school (old system)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left middle school (old system)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated higher elementary school</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated elementary school</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Those with incomplete old-style high school records or better constitute 52%.

(4) **Length of Party Service**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 10 years</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 30 years</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The members and candidate members of the Central Committee, as top leaders of the Party, hold concurrently the key positions in each central headquarters organ. For example:

(1) CC member NOSAKA Sanzo, as the Chairman of the CC as well as the Chairman of the CC Presidium, occupies the position of representative of the Party [to the outside].

(2) CC member MIYAMOTO Kenji, as the Secretary-General and as a member of the Presidium, occupies the position of actual responsibility for Party operations.

(3) The Secretariat (the Secretary-General and 6 other officers) is entirely staffed by CC members.

(4) CC members and candidates have been appointed chiefs and vice-chiefs in the important departments such as the Organization Department, the Elections and Local Governments Department, the Legislation Department, the Labor Unions Department, the Peace and Bases Department, the Propaganda and Education Department, the Cultural Department, and the Finance Department.

(5) The majority of important committees such as the Subcommittee on the Party Platform Question and others are occupied by CC members and candidates.

(6) CC members and candidates have been assigned to the Regional representative organs of the Central Committee as Regional Bureau Representatives or Bureau officers.

C. **Organizations at Various Levels**

1. The number of organizations at each level.

   a. The Prefectural level Committees

      | Category          | Number |
      |-------------------|--------|
      | District Committees | 294    |

*Includes Tokyo Metropolitan (To), Urban Prefectures (Fu), and Prefectures (Fu).
Note 1: The number of the district committees has increased because after the 7th Party Congress many large districts were divided into small districts.

Note 2: As auxiliary organs of the district committees, there are at present 21 gun (country) committees and 80 shi (city) committees.

2. Prefectural level Party Conferences.
   a. After the 7th Party Congress, each prefectural level committee held its own Party conference. Details are as follows:

   (1) Forty-six prefectural level Party conferences were convened in a five-month period beginning with the Fukuoka Prefecture Party Conference held September 6-7, 1958, and concluding with the Aomori Prefecture Party Conference held February 8-9, 1959.

   (2) These prefectural level Party conferences were unusually busy. Their business included such major tasks as (a) reviewing past Party activities in the light of the decisions of the Party Congress, (b) deciding on action policies which would put into practical effect decisions of the Party Congress, and (c) choosing a leadership staff in accordance with the new Party rulers as well as deciding what positions to take toward the burgeoning mass struggles against the [teachers] efficiency-rating system, the delivery of the Oerlikon [rockets], the Police Duties Law, and the Security Pact.

   (3) Party Headquarters exercised strong guidance by sending its key personnel to these conferences to make forceful appeals for unconditional
Implementation of the decisions of the Party Congress. The most outstanding example of this kind of guidance was seen at the Tokyo Metropolitan Party Conference.

Note: At the 4th Tokyo Metropolitan Party Conference, Party Headquarters demanded a self-criticism of the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee in which anti-Headquarters tendencies were strong, and by effective maneuvering in the election for new leaders, compelled all members of the anti-Headquarters faction to withdraw from candidacy. As a result, the chairmanship of the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee went to CC Presidium member KASUGA Shoichi, and a majority of the seats on the Committee came to be occupied by members of either the pro-Headquarters faction or by middle-of-the-roads.

b. The second series of Prefectural level Party Conferences held since the 7th Party Congress in accordance with the provisions of the new Party rules began with the Tochigi Prefecture Party Conference on August 16, 1959. Others began to convene around the end of September. As of the end of 1959, 41 had been held.

(1) The main business of these conferences was (a) a review of Party activities during the preceding year, (b) the adoption of operational policies for the implementation of the decisions of the 6th CC Plenum, and (c) the adoption of practical measures to double the number of Party members.

(2) In dealing with the problem of doubling the number of Party members, many of these conferences adopted, as operational tactics, the setting up of priority target groups with emphasis on factory (blue-collar) workers, the maintenance
of close cooperation with each of the other prefectural level conferences, and selectively advancing the recruitment of Party members.

(3) In order to strengthen its leadership role, Party Headquarters carried out the following measures: (a) enforcement of prior review of the draft reports to be presented to prefectural level Party Conferences, and (b) the dispatch of key personnel from Party Headquarters to Party Conferences.

Note: Secretary-General MIYAMOTO attended the Osaka Urban Prefecture Party Conference where he caused YAMADA Rokuzemon to be appointed Kansai Regional Bureau Representative, Chairman of the Osaka Committee, and where he also exerted himself toward correcting the pre-existing tendency to compromise with the anti-Headquarters faction.

3. The organization of various echelons.

a. Size. The size of prefectural level committees and of the district committees varies greatly according to the size of Party forces which support them. Among the prefectural level committees, the largest are the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee with 23 members (9 standing committee members) and the Osaka Urban Prefecture Committee with 29 (12 standing committee members), while the smallest is the Fukui Prefecture Committee with 10 members (2 standing committee members). Among the district committees, the largest are the Fukuoka District Committee with 27 members (8 standing committee members) and the Ota District Committee (Tokyo) with 23 members (7 standing committee members) while the smallest is the Shimokita District Committee (Aomori) with 3 members (1 standing committee member).
b. Internal Structure. Although there are differences according to their size, the internal structure of these organs is as a rule made up of the following specialized departments: an Organization Department, a Labor Union Department, and a Organ Publications Department. The work of these departments is divided among the standing committee members. The prefectural level generally have well-developed structures, and there is no great difference between the Municipal Prefectures and ordinary prefectures. The internal structure of Osaka Urban Prefecture Committee provides a typical example:

(Internal structure of the Osaka Committee)

The Business Office, Organization Department, Finance Department, Party Publications Department, Cultural Department, Propaganda and Education Department, Research Department, Labor Unions Department, Farmers Department, Peace and International Friendship Department, Urban Peoples Department, Youth and Students Department, Womens Department, Local Government Department, and Elections Department.

The internal structure of large district committees is usually similar to that of the prefectural level committees, but most small districts have only two or three specialized departments, as necessary, in addition to such basic specialized departments as the Organization, the Finance, and the Party Publications Departments.

4. Characteristics of officers of prefectural level and district committees elected after the 7th Party Congress.

a. Characteristics common to these two groups:

(1) The fact that large numbers of unknown Party members from government office cells and
business enterprise (shop) cells have been elected. This reflects the policy of placing many on-the-job workers in the leadership organs of the Party in order to overcome the lag in the leadership of the Party with respect to the labor movement.

(2) The fact that the number of officers has increased is shown by these comparative figures of the numbers before and after the 7th Party Congress:

(a) Increase of officers in prefectural level organizations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Committee Members</th>
<th>Number of Standing Committee Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Congress</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Congress</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase (%)</td>
<td>117 (20.0%)</td>
<td>34 (17.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This increase is 2.5 persons per committee and 0.6 person per standing committee at the prefectural level.

(b) Increase of district officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Committee Members</th>
<th>Number of Standing Committee Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Congress</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Congress</td>
<td>2,697</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase (%)</td>
<td>201 (8.0%)</td>
<td>153 (26.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This increase is 0.7 person per committee and 0.5 person per standing committee at the district level.

b. A special characteristic of the officers of prefectural level committees only is the fact that the number of key headquarters personnel appointed as prefectural level officers has increased.
Note: Central Committee members and candidate members elected to prefectural level committees are as follows:

CC member KISHIDATE Hitoshi, Chairman, Hokkaido Committee
CC member MAKAMAM Kazum, Member, Hokkaido Committee
CC member KASUGA Shoichi, Chairman, Tokyo Metropolitan Committee
CC member SUNAMI Ichiro, Member, Shizuoka Prefectural Committee
CC member KAWADA Kenji, Chairman, Kyoto Urban Prefecture Committee
CC candidate MASEBA Yoshizo, Chairman, Osaka Urban Prefecture Committee
CC candidate NARA Zengo, Osaka Urban Prefecture Committee

D. CELLS

1. The number of cells at present has been established as 6,000.

Note: Included in this are 30 general cells and 89 cells in the preparatory stage. General cells are akin to cell group committees, and preparatory stage cell committees refer to those which have fewer than three Party members.

2. Since the 7th Party Congress, the JCP has been endeavoring to expand Party strength with the building up of a stable Party [organization] in industry as its target. However, as is shown below, there has not been a large growth to date of Party cells in business firms, government and public offices, schools, and mass organizations, where the Party's efforts at expansion are most concentrated.

3. The percentage distribution of cells by type is as follows:

- Party organs: 1.97
- Business firms: 16.27
E. ELECTION ACTIVITIES

1. Policy on candidacy.
   a. In the House of Representatives elections of May 1958, and the House of Councillors elections of June 1959, the Party adopted a general policy of running its own candidates in all electoral districts.
   b. In the combined local elections of April 1959, it sought (1) to secure the re-election of incumbent members, and at the same time (2) to provide candidates in all electoral districts with "one [JCP] seat per assembly" as its goals.

2. Candidates and votes received:
   a. HR elections of May 1958:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>May 1958</th>
<th>February 1955</th>
<th>Increase or Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Elected</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Votes Received</td>
<td>1,012,035</td>
<td>733,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(2.6%)</td>
<td>(2.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The increase of 278,914 votes over those received in the previous election is deemed attributable to the fact that there were (1) 54 more candidates than in the previous election, and (2) the number of eligible voters
increased by about 2,780,000. At the same time the number elected decreased by one. When the votes of 58 electoral districts in which candidates ran in both the 1955 and 1958 elections are compared, the increase was only 11,763. When all these facts are taken into consideration there was no substantial increase in the 1958 elections.

b. The HC elections of June 1959:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Constituency</th>
<th>(June 1959)</th>
<th>(July 1956)</th>
<th>Increase or Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Elected</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Votes Received</td>
<td>551,915</td>
<td>599,254</td>
<td>47,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(1.9%)</td>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
<td>- (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Districts</th>
<th>(June 1959)</th>
<th>(July 1956)</th>
<th>Increase or Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Elected</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Votes Received</td>
<td>999,255</td>
<td>1,149,009</td>
<td>-149,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(3.3%)</td>
<td>(3.9%)</td>
<td>- (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As compared with the previous elections, the total number of votes received in this HC local district election decreased by 149,754 votes. Moreover, a comparative study of 25 prefectural districts in which candidates ran in both elections shows a decrease of 182,536 votes from the last elections.
The results of the combined local elections show an improvement in all contests over the results of the previous one, and also the number of assembly seats held increased by 130.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>April 1959</th>
<th>April 1955</th>
<th>Increase or Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prefectural Level Assemblies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Elected</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Votes Received</td>
<td>437,824</td>
<td>318,677</td>
<td>+119,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(1.17%)</td>
<td>(0.97%)</td>
<td>+ (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governorships</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Elected</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Votes Received</td>
<td>485,356</td>
<td>181,685</td>
<td>+303,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(2.4%)</td>
<td>(1.0%)</td>
<td>+ (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City-Ward-Town-Village Assemblies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>- 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Elected</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>+ 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Votes Received</td>
<td>569,917</td>
<td>370,977</td>
<td>+198,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(2.0%)</td>
<td>(0.7%)</td>
<td>+ (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City-Town-Village-Heads</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Candidates</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+ 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Elected</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Votes Received</td>
<td>185,490</td>
<td>81,329</td>
<td>+104,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(1.3%)</td>
<td>(0.7%)</td>
<td>+ (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to a latest announcement, the number of JCP assemblymen and local government executives as of September 1, 1959, were:

- Prefectural assemblymen: 11
- City and Ward assemblymen: 313
- Town and Village assemblymen: 439
- Town and Village heads: 2
- Total: 770

3. Increase or decrease in votes received by prefectures:
   a. HR elections (May 1958).
   (1) Twelve prefectural level (electoral districts) showed an increase in votes, and of these the following nine showed more than a 10% increase:
       - Saitama: 52.85% increase
       - Ishikawa: 39.54%
       - Shizuoka: 33.23%
       - Hiroshima: 30.91%
       - Hyogo: 25.31%
       - Osaka: 24.65%
       - Iwate: 23.43%
       - Miyagi: 13.21%
       - Tokyo: 10.07%
   (2) Seventeen prefectures showed a decrease in votes, eleven of them showing more than a 10% decrease:
       - Tottori: 62.01% decrease
       - Nara: 51.69%
       - Okayama: 50.28%
       - Kagoshima: 42.12%
       - Ehime: 32.78%
In Part II, the Party outlined the policy of expanding its influence in the Japan Democratic Youth Alliance, in order to prevent or prevent the unification of Japan. In part III, the Party intends to intensify the Party influence over the young workers and farmers and in the process, to recover the Party's leadership over the student movements.

Note: See the Political Report and the article "The Youth Movements and the Youth Alliance," by HIROSHI Rasayama, Youth and Student Section Chief, Party headquarters, in the May 1959 issue of Zenzai. The "Resolution of the Rakuchusha" states that "the Party must unwittingly fight the erroneous ideology and machinations of the Trotskyites who, while proclaiming the overthrow of imperialism, corrupt the mass of students into the extreme leftist struggle and deny peaceful coexistence. To attain this objective, the Party must bring the student movement back to the correct way by enlarging and reinforcing the Japan Democratic Youth Alliance.

6. In promoting its youth movements, the Party is especially interested in the following organizations and is endeavoring to infiltrate and to expand its influence in them.

a. Organizations for young workers: the youth sections of all labor unions, youth section of Sahyo (Sahosaienai);

b. Organizations for youth farmers: youth section of All-Japan Farmers Union Federation (Zenmichi); Conference of Japan Youth Organizations (Nisseikyo);

c. Organization for the joint struggle of youth: Youth and Students Joint Struggle Conference.
The Japan Democratic Youth Alliance

At the Sixth National Council meeting, the Party condemned the fact that it had made the mistake of weakening Murasakai's predecessor Minsei Ban by denouncing the organization's autonomy, by regarding it as the Party's Youth Section not sufficiently existing on its own, and by withdrawing cadre activists from the organization whenever it suited the Party's convenience. Nevertheless, even after Minsei Ban had changed its name to Minsei Do, to acquire a new image as a mass youth organization, the Party still regarded the new Minsei Do as the youth section of the Party and has been trying to direct the new organization's activities according to the Party's wishes.

Note 1: The Japan Democratic Youth Alliance (Minsei Do) is considered to be perpetuating the heritage of the prewar Japan Communist Youth Alliance and that of the postwar Japan Youth Communist Alliance. The Japan Democratic Youth Association (Minsei Ban), the predecessor of the Minsei Do, was formed under the guidance of the Japan Communist Party on April 20, 1949, for the purpose of attracting youth from a wide spectrum of society. This was renamed the Japan Democratic Youth Alliance (Minsei Do) in conformity with the change of tactics dictated by the Sixth National Council meeting of the Party and continues in existence to date.

The Minsei Do's membership comprises chiefly young workers, employed in the business field, who form the nucleus of the organization, augmented by some university and high school students. They total altogether about 2,000 individuals. Of this number about 500 are cadre members. Almost all of the organization's headquarters officials are cadre members, which in effect makes this organization the youth section of the Party.
Note 1: Since its 8th Central Committee conference held on December 21 and 22, 1955, Minseido has frequently convened Central Committee conferences to discuss the renovation of its programs and charter. At the first of these conferences, it was decided that Minseido should reconstruct and reinvigorate itself and that for this task it was desirable to clarify the ideology and objectives of its activities. From these conferences was born the policy of changing the character of Minseido back to that of its predecessor organization, Communist Youth Alliance, because "Minseido's program and charter should not be altered until the Party's prior political orientation on the matter has been determined." Minseido's agreement to the Party's demand was effected by the intervention of cadre members holding official posts in Minseido's Central Committee. The 9th Enlarged Central Committee meeting, held on December 27 and 28, 1956, definitively decided on deferring the renovation of the program and charter of Minseido.

Note 3: Minseido is affiliated with the World Democratic Youth Federation, a front organization for international communism, and concurrently has its emissary permanently stationed at the headquarters of the international organization as a member of its secretariat.

b. At the 7th Party Congress, the Party formulated its guidance policy for expanding and strengthening Minseido. In line with this policy, the Party's prefectural committees in Kyoto, Hyogo, Fukuoka, and Oita dispatched cadre youth activists as reinforcements to Minseido headquarters. The Party's diligent guidance and assistance has produced gradual extension of Minseido's organizational strength in recent times.

2. The Party's machination against the Federation of Japan Youth Associations (Nisseikyo).

The Party's influence in Nisseikyo is extremely weak, hence the Party attaches great importance to its machinations designed to infiltrate this youth organization. At
The election of officials of Nisseikyo, the party's organization, is aimed to elect as many cadre members elected to various posts as possible. At major conferences of Nisseikyo, cadre members who have infiltrated the organization have attempted to gain support for programs and policies reflecting the Party's designs. Nevertheless, none of the Party's efforts has as far borne fruit.

Note 1: Nisseikyo continues the heritage of the prewar Great Japan Federation of Youth Associations. This federation was organized on May 4, 1951, for the purpose of "effecting the collaboration of the nation's youth associations and concomitantly contributing to the development of a peaceful, democratic Japan." It is a federation comprising prefectoral youth associations. All 46 prefectoral associations are affiliated with this federation. A membership numbering 4.3 million individuals constitutes the strength of the federation. The number of cadre members among the federation's membership is extremely small.

Note 2: At the annual election of executives of Nisseikyo, held on April 5, 1959, the Party attempted to capture the organization by maneuvering to secure, unopposed, unanimity for a slate of candidates, endorsed by the Party. Nevertheless, the Party endorsed slate of radical candidates, which contained cadre members, was defeated. The Party was completely routed as in the previous year's election.

Note 3: At the Nisseikyo 9th General Congress, held for four days from May 11, 1959, the Party ordered many cadre members to attend the Congress as representatives of their local organizations under the instructions to propose "the complete renovation of Nisseikyo's activity policy" for the main purpose of fighting monopoly capitalism, challenging the nonradical policy of the executive group of Nisseikyo.

3. The Party's infiltration of the Youth and Student United Struggle Conference.
The Party has instructed every sector of its leadership
color to compete and provide evidence to every campaign
originating from the Youth and Student United Struggle
Conference. The Party's effort in this field has not
been conspicuously fruitful.

Note 1: The All-Japan Youth and Student United Struggle
Conference sponsored the Young Men, Young Women and
Students National Conference Against the Teachers Evalu-
ation and for Safeguarding Peace and Democracy in the city
of Kobe on August 16, 1958. The Secretary General and
approximately 30 members of Minseido attended this meet-
ing. The Party's Osaka Prefectural Committee provided
the use of its propaganda car to the Kobe District Committee
of Minseido to aid in publicizing the demonstration march
sponsored by the Conference.

Note 2: The Anti-Police Act Youth and Student United
Struggle Liaison Conference convened the Destruction of
the Police Act, Kishi Cabinet Overthrow Youth and Student
Central General Uprising Congress in the Diet Building on
November 20, 1958. Minseido sent many of its members,
including cadre members, to this Congress. Three of these
Minseido representatives were among the protest group
which besieged the Premier's official residence and other
public offices.

Note 3: The Anti-Mutual Security Pact Central Youth and
Student Joint Struggle Conference was formed on October 30,
1959, with Minseido and the Sohyo Youth Section as the
sponsoring nuclei. The Party's Youth and Student Section
joined this Conference as one of the executive member
organizations and has schemed to permeate the Conference
with the Party's influence.
VI. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

A. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

1. The principal organizations engaged in the student movements at present are:

- General Federation of All-Japan Student Governments (Zengakuren) (Note 1),
- Federation of Japan Socialist Students (Shakakudo) (Note 2),
- Federation of Japan Medical Students (Igakuren) (Note 3),
- Federation of All-Japan Student Newspapers (Zengakushin) (Note 4),
- National Federation of Private University Student Governments (Shiyakuren) (Note 5),
- School Corps of Japan Democratic Youth Alliance (Note 6).

Note 1: Zengakuren is a national student organization whose membership comes from the student governments of colleges and universities. It comprises four regional and nine prefectural student government organizations. Student government units affiliated with it number about 250 (from about 110 colleges and universities) representing approximately 290,000 students -- which is almost one-half of the total student body -- totaling about 670,000 -- of all colleges and universities in Japan. The student governments of almost all of the major colleges and universities are affiliated with the Zengakuren. It is the main organization promoting student movements in Japan.

Zengakuren's platform comprises the development of democracy in Japan, the unification of student movements, the intensification of international student collaborations through the International Students Federation (Kokusaiigakuren). In recent years, Zengakuren has been basing its activity policies on the class struggle principle and has been developing radical struggles.
After the January 1956 Comintour's criticism at Internationalism, the opposition by Japan Communist Party's Main Current Faction of the Party's Internationalist Faction became severe. A segment of the student leaders of the Internationalist decided to seize the leadership of the student Communist movement by forcing Hansengakudo. Chapters of this organization were formed in the major universities and colleges; membership was on an individual basis.

The Party's Main Current Faction relentlessly attacked Hansengakudo. At the 5th Congress of Zengakuren, held in June 1952, the Party had the Main Current Faction's cadre students propose a resolution seeking the liquidation of Hansengakudo. The resolution was passed and Hansengakudo was virtually liquidated. However, as a consequence of the Rekuzenkyo meeting, the Party confessed the error of its action against Hansengakudo and apologized to the executive committee of the organization.

This sparked the reconstruction of Hansengakudo. The 7th Enlarged National Committee Meeting of Hansengakudo held in December 1955 asserted that "student movements are political struggles" and decided to reinforce the political activities of Zengakuren. This positively influenced Zengakuren's 8th Central Committee meeting to adopt a political struggle policy. From this time, Hansengakudo become active as the mainstay organization of the Zengakuren movement. The 4th National Congress of Hansengakudo, held May 25-27, 1958, proclaimed the active promotion of the revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the working class by collaborating with it for the purpose of realizing socialism. For implementing this purpose it changed its name to Federation of Japan Socialist Students (Shagakudo). Since its Hansengakudo era, Shagakudo attracted the radical activist students. Shagakudo is active as the spearhead of all Zengakuren movements by providing the latter with its struggle targets and movement policies. Prior to every Zengakuren meeting, Shagakudo convenes its own meeting to predetermine the agenda and outcome of the former's. Its organizational strength comprises approximately 130 chapters in various colleges and universities with a total membership of approximately 1,800 students.
Note 5: Zengakuren is a federation of college newspapers. Its declared objective is the development of student newspapers for the safeguarding of peace and democracy, promotion of academic studies and culture, freedom of speech, and safeguarding the livelihood of students. However, its activity consists virtually in mutually providing information concerning policies and analysis of events and situations among student movements to affiliated student newspapers. This organization serves as the information bureau of the various student movements. Presently the student newspapers of all major universities and colleges, numbering about 150 altogether, are affiliated with this organization.

Note 6: As mentioned in Note 5, Shigakuren is a federation of the student governments of private colleges and universities -- numbering approximately 50-odd institutions altogether -- claiming a membership of about 150,000 students. Actual membership, however, is considered to be far less than this. This group was formed with the objective of challenging Zengakuren and developing a "sane" student movement. In recent times it has not been very active.

2. Since the end of World War II, student movements in Japan have been under the guidance of the Japan Communist Party and have invariably stood in the forefront of leftist movements (Note 1). However, recently many of
the leaders of student movements have been selecting this and our task is to challenge the Party's leadership in the student movements. For this reason such elements have been named the "Trotzkist group" by the Party. They are grouped in two different newly organized political organizations: the Communist Alliance (Kyodo) (Note 2), and the Japan Revolutionary Communist Alliance (kakukyodo) (Notes 3 and 4). The Party and these two organizations are involved in a harsh factional fight over the control of the policies and leadership of student movements.

Note 1: In March 1959 the Party cell of Tokyo University made a report to the Japan Communist Party Central Committee in which appears the following: "By means of the struggle for restoring education to normalcy in the aftermath of World War II, the cadre students have proselytized approximately 5,000 students and concomitantly established about 300 student cells in the various colleges and universities. They have also organized Zengakuren, comprising the student governments of 300 colleges and universities with a membership totaling approximately 300,000." Though this report contains a great deal of exaggeration, it does tell the process by which the Party established control of leadership over student movements. The article by the Party Central Executive Committee entitled "The Issues Concerning the Party's Actions on the Student Movements" in the December 29, 1958, issue of Akahata also confirms this fact: "The Party Central Committee's control is most advanced in several of the areas of its activities among which is the student movement field." Currently, students who are Party card holders are considered to number approximately 2,000. Up until the June 1 Incident student cadre members not only held most of the executive posts in the student organizations Zengakuren and Shagakudo, but also controlled the major executive posts in the student governments and student clubs in the major universities and colleges. Moreover, in the local chapters of Zengakuren and Shagakudo there are both cadre groups and Party cells. Even today it is estimated that about 100 student cells still exist in the nation's colleges and universities.
Note 1: Kakukyodo was organized some time in 1957 for the unification of Japan's Trotskyites. It proclaims Trotsky's thesis of perpetual revolution, the worldwide overthrow of the bourgeoisie, and the overthrow of the privileged Stalinist [style] bureaucracy of the U.S.S.R. It also seeks the downfall of the Japan Communist Party, which, as the union of Kremlin bureaucracy, advocates peaceful coexistence with the capitalist nations. It is working for the establishment of the Japan Chapter of the 4th International. Its current total membership is about 200, of which 170 are students. (See the article by the Party Central Committee's Discipline Committee which appeared in the June 10-12, 1958, issue of Akahata entitled "The Trotskyites Activities as Mainly Judged from their Publications Activities"; the article by the Party Central Committee's Youth and Student Section entitled "The Activities of Trotskyites and the Party's Duties," which appeared in the June 8 and 9, 1958, issue of Akahata; and also the article entitled "Kakukyodo's Programs," which appeared in the September 15, 1959, issue of the Kakukyodo organ, World Revolution.) Moreover, after the June 1 incident, Kakukyodo...
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B, CURRENT STATUS OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

1. The current factional strife over the control of leadership of the student movements.

a. The Party's guidance policy regarding student movements:

(1) As mentioned previously, the Party's guidance policy regarding student movements is to regard them as one sector of the united front of youth movements in general. For this reason, the Party
thought and action.

In conclusion, the Party has always been aware of the need to improve student life and the conditions of student study and to promote and foster a middle-of-the-road student movement. The Party has always been conscious of the need to establish contacts and understanding with other student movements, to develop student movement activities, to realize the will of the people, which would enable students to better pursue their studies and at the same time develop student movements (within the context of youth movements in general) as one sector of the people's general struggle for peace, independence, democracy and social progress.

(2) However, at present this Party policy is denounced as "rightist opportunism" by anti-Party students, who have monopolized the leadership roles in student movements and are developing their struggles independently of Party guidance. The Party is labeling and denouncing these students as "extreme leftist Trotskyites" and regards the elimination of these from student movements and the re-establishment of the Party hegemony over student activities as the Party's most urgent task.

Note: See the summary entitled "Policy for Youth Movements" issued by the Party's Youth Section's National Conference held on December 19 and 20, 1953, and also the Political Report of the 7th Party Congress, previously mentioned. The aforementioned article by the Party Central Committee's executive group entitled "The Issues Concerning the Party's Actions on the Student Movements" states: "Student movements should be based on the demand for improving the conditions of the students' livelihood and study facilities. They should be based above all on the
The dissolution of the Party's Sixth National Council Session produced extreme confusion in Zengelmen and brought it to the brink of dissolution. The leading cadres of the student activities of Zengelmen prided themselves on the fact that their cadres had restored Zengelmen from its sorry plight, enlarged its membership, and reinforced the organization without any help from the Party. For this very reason they were prone to act on their own initiative in analyzing and originating student movements and engaged in radical political struggles -- independent of Party control. When their extreme actions were criticized by the Party Central Committee, they counterattacked by claiming that the Party Central Committee had provided "misleading guidance" and charged it with "dereliction of duties" (Note 1).

(2) The students are aware that they possess the mental acuity of the intelligentsia and the youth's ability to react quickly to changes of events. This is what motivates the leaders of the student movements. For the same reason, they feel that they should assume the "pioneer" role in orienting the struggle policies of other social classes such
...must transcend the student leaders' faction, which is the principle on the Party's criticism of class struggle as a Party leadership doctrine with Zengakuren. This created antagonism between the cadre student leaders and the Party Central Committee, which led to the so-called Novel Incident (Note 3).

This incident was the turning point in the relations between the Party Central Committee and the student leaders and made public and irreconcilable their differences over the issue of student movement leadership. The antagonism between these two groups was apparent as early as the autumn of 1957 when they advanced diametrically opposed interpretations of the revolution. This break between the two commenced when Soviet Russia put the first man-made satellite into orbit, which caused the Communist camp to boast of its superiority and pre-eminence in the socialist system. Concurrently with this event came the "co-existence" thesis advocated by the Internationalist Faction in the Communist camp. A faction of the cadre student leaders of Zengakuren criticized the thesis as rightist opportunism which, ignoring the class struggle, abandoned the fight for eradicating the fundamental causes of imperialistic wars (Note 5).
The development of the Zengakuren was closely connected to the Party itself. The Party issued a resolution at the 11th Congress of Zengakuren, held from 5-11, 1956. It was nurtured by the Juntendo incident and became definitive by the time the 12th Congress of Zengakuren was held on September 5 and 6 of the same year. This produced the so-called "Transformation of the Student Movement" thesis (Note 1).

Note 1: See the Zengakuren report dated January 1, 1959, entitled "The Crisis of the Japan Communist Party and the Student Movement," issued under the name of Kenichi Kawai.

The Central Committee charged that the Party had caused this undesirable situation after the Sixth National Council Meeting when it formulated a policy heavily biased in favor of political campaigning, and faulted with respect to the guidance provided various organizations under Party control, among which Zengakuren played the central role. The results of these mistakes, combined with the post-Council Meeting tendency of the Party toward liberalism and decentralization, fostered the cadre students' inclination to challenge the Party itself and to create a Student Communist Party -- independent of the Party itself. Further, the Party charged that the recovery of the student movement was relatively easily effected in contrast to that of the worker movement and the farmer movement, and that the students had become conceited about their political capabilities. This, in turn, led them to think that they should provide leadership for the working class (see the previously mentioned "The Issues Concerning the Party's Actions on the Student Movements").

Note 2: This so-called "pioneer thesis" is most clearly indicated by the publication entitled Japan Student Movements, edited by the Tokyo University Student Movement Research Society. This book postulates that "student movements are social movements...and are also political struggles"; and that the strategic task of student...
[Note 1:] This is the June 1 Incident: On June 1, 1958, the Zengakuren 11th Congress Representatives Group Conference was convened at Party headquarters. The majority of the cadre students attending the conference rejected the guidance provided by the Party headquarters staff and passed a resolution demanding the dismissal of all members of the Party's Central Committee. The students also assaulted the Party staff members attending the conference and impeded their escaping from the conference room. (See the articles by the Party Central Committee Standing Executive Committee, titled "The Scandal at the Zengakuren Congress Representatives Group Conference," June 5, 1958 issue of Akahata; by the Party secretariat, titled "The Violation of Party Discipline by the Zengakuren Group and Some Relevant Facts," June 1, 1958 Issue of Akahata; and "Investigation Report on the Assault Incident and Violation of Party Regulations and Disciplines which Occurred at the Party Headquarters on June 1," July 19 and 21, 1958, Akahata.)

Note 4: The reason for student leaders' criticism of the Party was:

(a) At this time, in anticipation of the prospective 7th Party Congress, the prospective Party program was being discussed among the cadre members and the reevaluation of the revolution thesis was being publicly debated.

(b) At the 20th Party Congress of the U.S.S.R., held in 1956, Mihaylov, the First Vice President, had revealed that a portion of the Short History of Bolshevism contained
Since this book had been written in accordance with the authoritative views on the doctrine of Marx and Lenin, the cadre students were led to re-evaluate the facts of the Russian revolution which ultimately resulted, in turn, in a reappraisal and recognition of the importance of the role played by Trotsky.

(e) The French Communist Party's support of the French Republic on the Algerian issue, the stagnation of the revolution in Indonesia, the enforcement of the nationwide evaluation of teachers which commenced in China prefecture -- all of these adverse events, both domestic and foreign, drove the cadre students to the conclusion that these were facts which could not be explained away and justified by the peaceful coexistence thesis. They therefore concluded that in order to cope with this adverse situation it was necessary to shift the Party's policy from "peaceful coexistence" to that of "class conflict." (See the articles by KENNICHI Kishimoto, "What is the Meaning of the Student Movement?" Number 1 issue of the Shogakudo organ, The Theoretical Front: For the Advancement of the Student Movement, Number 10 Issue of the Kyodo organ, Proletariat News: "From Peaceful Coexistence to the Establishment of Perpetual Peace"; "Historical Significance of the Struggle for Safeguarding Peace," Number 3 revised issue of the Hansengakudo organ, Anti-War Banner Information; and the Number 8 and 9 issues of the Tokyo University cell organ, Marxism and Leninism.)

Note 5: The meaning of "the reconversion of the student movements" is as follows: Prior to this time the cadre students in control of Zengakuren had based their policy on "safeguarding peace." Henceforward they based their policies on the "class conflict," and they postulated that "student movements should be the allies of the working class." Accordingly they sought a formula that would enable student movements to join effectively in the struggles for freeing the working class (see page 8, "Reports and Decisions of the Zengakuren 12th Provisional National Congress"). On May 27, 1958, Hansengakudo proclaimed that "It is essential that student movements be better integrated with the struggle for freeing the working class, and that simultaneously socialist theories should be the guiding principles of student movements, as befitting the students, who constitute the revolutionary
c. The post-June 1 incident anti-Party factional
movements and the Party's effort to reassert its leadership
over the cadre students.

(1) The Party Central Committee was violently
traumatized over the June 1 incident as a disruption
of Party discipline and Party organizational
principles without parallel, not only in the
30-year history of Japan's Communist Party but
also in the annals of the world's Communist
Parties (Note 1). The Party Central Committee
immediately commenced investigation of the
incident and since the end of 1958 on three
separate occasions has either expelled or
restricted cadre privileges of 72 cadre students,
among whom were the committee chairman of the
Zenjukuren, RENICHI Kayama (Note 2).

(2) How did the cadre student leaders of
Zenjukuren and Shigakuren react to this? They
completely ignored the disciplinary actions of
the Party Central Committee and continued to lead
the student movements in a violent struggle against the Police Act and the evaluation of teachers. Consequently, these cadre students, constituting Zen-danren's Central Executive Committee, became the nucleus in the formation of a splinter Communist Party faction. On December 17, 1958, this faction organized itself into the Communist Alliance with the avowed purpose of being the truly revolutionary radical political party (Note 4). On the other hand, the Party Central Committee, exasperated by the June 1 Incident, recognized the necessity for immediate reconstitution of its student movement policy, and ordered cadre organs on the local level to reinforce their guidance and discipline over cadre student cells. Further, the Central Committee repeatedly warned the student movements against becoming biased in the editorials of Akahata (Note 4). The Central Committee disciplined one cadre student leader after another for engaging in anti-Party splinter faction movements. Such students were assailed as Trotskyites. The Central Committee has been attempting to expel them not only from the cadre but also from the student movement (Note 6).

Since then, up to the end of October 1959, the various echelons of the cadre have disciplined for anti-Party splinter faction activities approximately 130 cadre students of which about 80 were expelled from the Party (Note 7).

Kyo-ré subsequently decided to clarify the political nature of its programs. Simultaneously,
Note 1: See the articles by the Party Central Committee and the KOMA Shiraki, the former director of the Party Central Committee and the Communist Alliance, Akahati, November 11, and 19, 1959. (Original documents are lost.)

Note 2: See the articles by the Party Central Committee and the Second Management Conference which occurred at the Zomunen Committee, December 17, 1958.

Note 3: See the articles by the Party Central Committee and the Third Management Conference which occurred at the Zomunen Committee, December 17, 1958.

Note 4: See the articles by the Party Central Committee and the Third Management Conference which occurred at the Zomunen Committee, December 17, 1958.
cadre students who already were members at Kakukan continued in the new organization, however antagonism gradually developed between the Kankanido Faction and the main body of the Communist Alliance. At the 2nd Congress of the Communist Alliance held on June 9, 1956, the Kankanido Faction was expelled from the organization.

Note 1: See the Party central secretariat report number 187, June 2, 1958, titled "The Reinforcement of Guidance to Student Cells"; the secretariat report number 40, February 16, 1959, titled "The Normalization of Student Cells and Positive Action Against Anti-Party Splinter Organizations"; the editorial titled "For the Development of the Current Student Movement," Akahata, July 14, 1958; and the aforementioned "The Issues Concerning the Party's Actions on the Student Movements."

Note 2: The Party Central Committee's first exposure of the actions by the cadre students' splinter group appeared in an article by the Party Central Executive group titled "Destroy the Extreme Leftist Anti-Party Splinter Faction Which is Embedded in the Student Movements," Akahata, December 27, 1958. The Party also exposed the splinter party activities of Trotskyites in the June 2, 1959, issue of Akahata in an article by the Party Central Labor Union Section titled "New Machinations of the Trotskyites"; and also in the aforementioned "The Activities of Trotskyites and the Party's Duties." The Party Central Committee regarded Shagakudo as the base from which these anti-Party factions operated and therefore instructed cadre students to withdraw from this organization. Simultaneously the Party revealed its policy of reinforcing the organization of the School Corps of Minseido (see the aforementioned "The Issues Concerning the Party's Actions on the Student Movements"). Subsequently, the Party has emphatically reiterated its policy of reinforcing the cadre of the School Corps of Minseido for the purpose of "normalizing student movements," which was repeated in the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee titled "Student Movements and the Party's Duties," Akahata, November 9, 1959.
Note 6: See the article by the Party Central Secretariat
"The Expulsion of Shusei and Seven Others of the Extreme
Leftist Revisionist Anti-party Faction," Akahata,
December 19, 1958; refer to "Report of Expulsion of Anti-
people, Anti-party Faction," supplementary report of
convulsion of Trotskyist anti-party faction (same as
above mentioned), Akahata, April 29, 1959.

Note 7: See the article by the Party Central Secretariat
"Concerning the Organization of Party Program Discussion,"
No. 4 Kyodo organ, journal Kyoushukai; also "Central
Party Program Draft," also "Third Draft of Central Party
Program," ibid., No. 5.

Note 8:
(a) Shusei Rodo was organized under the direction
of Kyodo on December 14, 1958. Its purpose was to get
young laborers to operate as the core of the laboring
class for the realization of socialism in Japan. The
system consolidates the unit branches which are formed
according to the different industries. Most of the
members are night school students. It has not yet come
clear in capturing a majority of the intended youth. See
"New Maneuvers of the Trotskyists," ibid., (Akahata).
(b) Shufukyo was also organized under the direction
of Kyodo in February 1959. Its objective was the con-
struction of a socialist society for the suffrage of
women. It was also formed according to industries and
is still weak.
(c) Under the direction of Kyodo, on March 29, 1959,
Zenkyushudan was organized essentially as Shusei's
branch in Nikyoso; Shaseirodo aimed at the infiltration
of Nikyoso. The platform called for a struggle against
monopoly capital in the interests of a truly democratic
system of education. To this end the organization urged
all students of education to unite. The organization has
remained small and weak.

d. The status of the party factional struggle
surrounding the leadership of the student movement.

(1) Presently there are the Zengakuren and the
Shagekudo (which is generally grouped into three
prominent factions: JCP, Kyodo, and Kakukyo).
... and an arm of group actions such as Tai-ki-ka. They have all been opposed to one another with respect to their attitude towards the 7th International, their evaluation of policies of the Soviet Government, and their methods for leading the student movement.

(iii) The present central enforcement departments of Shagakudo and Zengakuren are dominated by the so-called Trotskyist group at the Party, such as Kyodo, which opposes Kikyo. The central JCP has been opposed to this set-up in Shagakudo since the latter part of 1958; therefore, from the fractional viewpoint, Shagakudo has been almost powerless.

(iv) As stated before, the Party is attempting to remove the Trotskyists from among the leaders of Zengakuren, from the Party system, and from the student groups. At the same time, it has sought to extend the powers of the Party faction. Consequently, the students of the Central Party support group are gradually expanding their influence in the lower echelons of Zengakuren. Their power is gradually becoming comparable to Kyodo's as far as the mobilization for public movements of students is concerned.

Note: The Central Party group made up 40 per cent of the representatives to the aforementioned Zengakuren 14th Session held in June 1959. Their power is said to be gradually expanding; however, except in two or three instances they are experiencing difficulty in the universities. In Zengakushir and Niigakusei Kyoten, etc., the Party is dominant. The Central Party has recently directed the student party members to become
A. Student movement leadership policy of each group

3. The view that Kyodo and Kikukyodo have in common is that the world's political situation is not to be decided by the peaceful competition of the socialist and the capitalist systems, but rather by the class struggle between the international bourgeoisie and the international proletariat. From this viewpoint the Soviets, with their "peaceful coexistence" policies and the Communist Chinese who uphold "peaceful coexistence" have abandoned Marxist-Leninism, the duty of world revolution, and have become just another bureaucratic government. These student organizations refuse to recognize the leadership of the Soviets and oppose the "peaceful coexistence" and "neutral Japan" policies of the JCP, which blindly follows the Soviet leadership, calling it "rightist opportunism which ignores the class struggle." However, Kyodo and Kikukyodo hold contradictory views concerning the specific leadership techniques appropriate for student movements.

b. Kyodo is the group that accelerated the "Student Movement Conversion Dispute" after the Zengakuren 12th Session held in September 1958. Their general position is that the analysis of the foreign and domestic situation should be made from the standpoint of the class struggle.
student activists, as an ally of the laboring class, should play an active role in labor's struggle for freedom. Their leaders should seek to develop a revolutionary intelligentsia by class propaganda and by leading the new middle class students' movements in this direction. In actuality, their aim is to strike a direct blow at the capitalistic class. They also encourage general strikes by laborers and students and advocate the pioneering activities that are a specialty with students for activating the struggle (Note 2).

c. Kakukyodo criticizes Kyodo for advocating violent struggle at a time when the labor movement has temporarily retrogressed. Such a policy could produce only temporary effectiveness. Instead, Kakukyodo argues for indoctrinating the students with labor's ideology. For this, Kakukyodo is criticized by Kyodo as being opportunistic (Notes 3 and 4).

d. The Party calls these views "Trotskyite" and attacks them as "dogmatic and extreme", in attempting to treat the student movement as if it were the labor movement (Note 5).

Note 1: Kyodo's program, which well represents this line of thought, advocates the following:

(a) What determines the progress of the present world is not the race for productive power between the Soviets and the U.S., but the class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. This must be not just a national socialistic revolt, but a world socialist revolution.

(b) Japan is a highly developed capitalistic country. The present duty of the Japanese proletariat is to overthrow capitalism, to prepare to take over politics directly" and eventually to bring about a revolution.
In order to advance proletarian action against objective circumstances, but independent, bureaucratic, leadership. The immediate need is to organize a proletarian vanguard.

Note 1: See article in Shokoku Central organ paper, "What is Student Movement Conception?" April 1959; an article in Kyodo organ paper, "Proletarian News, No. 10, Advancement of the Student Movement" and Ibid, No. 90, "Our Duty in the Student Movement.

Note 2: Gakuminkyo looks upon the majority of the students as proletarians and advocates the development of student movements. At present, schools are used in the interests of monopolistic capital. Gakuminkyo is against this infringement on education. They state that this struggle must be developed into a united national struggle. This point of view has been denounced by Kyodo and Kakukyodo as a petit bourgeois anti-monopolistic struggle (see article in Gakuminkyo organ paper, Student Movement, No. 1, "Student Movement Democratization Discussion Inaugural Meeting Purport.

Note 5: See article in Akahata, "Trotskyists in the Student Movement," and "For the Annihilation of Extreme Leftist Opportunists" (Party Central Seigakutai), April 14, 1959; article in Zenei, Tsuchima Kaoru, "The Student Movement and Trotskyism," June 1959.

1. Important recent student movements.
2. Important struggles since the Sixth National Council Meeting: The Party decided to eliminate the hazardous extreme leftist policy and to establish Party internal democratization and a group leadership system. These decisions shocked the Zengakuren leaders. As a result, the Zengakuren was nearly disbanded. However,
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Note 1: At the Sunakawa Expansion Struggle, Zenakuren and Gakuren mobilized 500 to 1,000 students in ten days and stubbornly fought off the police.

Note 2: In other words they demonstrated their opposition to preparing for atomic war according to the "like Doctrine," to the Okinawa nuclear base, to U.S.-British nuclear tests. May 17, 1957, opposition to atomic war preparation -- All Japan Student Action Day (student mobilization number largest since postwar -- 30,000 plus). August 17-16, 1957, actively participated at 3rd World Meeting for Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

November 1, 1957, International Joint Action Day against Nuclear War Preparation.
For two and one-half of the nation's nine years, national meetings were held by workers in the form of strikes. Demonstrations were held in 1958, in the official publication of the Zenkakuren, No. 17, in Japan, and 50 in foreign papers as well. There appeared an essay called "Struggle of Struggle for Struggle: America's Atomic Experiments as a Preparatory War in Japan." This essay insists that violent revolution in Japan is unavoidable. Moreover, there were demonstrations and appeals to the government and the Diet against nuclear armaments. Group protests against nuclear experiments were made frequently to the U.S. and British Embassies.

b. Principal struggles after "Conversion of Student Movements."

After the June 1, 1958, incident, Zenkakuren, which disapproved of the leadership of the Party, declared at the 11th Special Meeting, held in September 1958, that the student movement should develop the freedom struggles of the laboring class as their ally and advocated the "Student Movement Conversion." It actively participated in the struggle against revising the Security Pact, the Police Law, and against the efficiency rating system. In the movement to prevent the signing of the Security Pact, there was violence and the January 16 Haneda Incident and the November 27 Diet Intrusion Incident occasioned fierce agitation and propaganda.

Note 1:

(a) With the June 1958 struggle against the efficiency rating system in Mokotów, Zenkakuren began its protest demonstrations. The spirit shown at the Seventh Party Meeting surpassed that of the labor unions in resisting and in demonstrating against government offices. On August 16, 1968, in Mokotów, following the "National
Setting of the Youth, Moscow, and Students Against the Hillman-Banning System,” a fight took place with the riot police in the demonstration march. About 30 or 40 were wounded on both sides and five (three of them girls) were arrested.

(c) In comparison to the Moscow activities of Tokyo and the Party, Zengakuren marched in the streets and held meetings outside of schools on September 15, September 27, and October 10. At the September 15 meeting, they mobilized 16,000 students drawn from the entire nation.

(c) At meetings sponsored by the Ministry of Education, several hundred students resorted to violence, resulting in the arrest of 50 students throughout the country.

Note 1: On October 8, 1958, a proposal for revising the Comprehensive Plan was presented to the Diet. In consequence the students went on a general strike, using the slogans "Down with the Kishi Cabinet," and "Prevent the rebirth of imperialism." On October 28, 29,000 students were mobilized throughout the country. They held meetings within and without schools, marched in street demonstrations, and even held meetings cosponsored by the labor unions. Moreover, on November 5, 1000 students of the Tokyo branch of Zengakuren attended the meeting of the National Railway Workers.

Note 2: On October 8, 1958, a draft for revising the Comprehensive Plan was presented to the Diet. In consequence the students went on a general strike, using the slogans "Down with the Kishi Cabinet," and "Prevent the rebirth of imperialism." On October 28, 29,000 students were mobilized throughout the country. They held meetings within and without schools, marched in street demonstrations, and even held meetings cosponsored by the labor unions. Moreover, on November 5, 1000 students of the Tokyo branch of Zengakuren attended the meeting of the National Railway Workers.

Note 3: Calling for the downfall of the Kishi Cabinet, Zengakuren participated in joint action with labor against the revision of the Security Pact. On October 30, 1959, declaring that they should ignite the fighting spirit of the Labor Party Labor Union, Zengakuren enforced a general student strike as well as a general strike among production workers. Their actions became excessively violent, and on October 27, the 8th Joint Action Day against Revising the Security Pact, the organization became the principal group involved in breaking into the Diet, the most disgraceful incident ever to occur in the history of the country. They paid no attention to the reprimands of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, or the Sohyo leaders. This action was severely criticized by the Kakushin group also, and for this reason, on the 9th Joint Action Day, December 10, a second similar plan was abandoned. Moreover, on January 16, 1960, on the day that the Security Pact negotiation party
A wave of student protest erupted in the United States this week. The incident started when 700 students took over the New York airport lobby and staged a free-for-all fight with the police. In this incident 19 persons were arrested. Systematic group violence was subsequently repeated in an infiltration.

c. On this subject, the Party at first evaded the issue, and even praised the students for their part in the struggle for the protection of peace (Note 1). However, after the "June 1st incident," and after the student movement leadership was divorced from the Central Party, the JCP began to criticize aggressively the extreme leftist trend of the student leaders. Concerning the security struggle, the Party especially attacked the Trotskyist leadership of the student movement for (1) their opportunism, which evades the struggle against American imperialism, the enemy of peace and independence; (2) their riot policy, which hinders the unified action of the general public, and (3) their provocative action, which gives the enemy a reason to attack.


Note 2: See the aforementioned Akahata editorial, "Our Duty and the Student Movement"; "For Annihilating the Trotskyist extreme leftist Opportunist Related to the Student Movement," Akahata, April 14, 1958, Party Youth and Student Counter-Measure Planning Committee; Akahata editorial, "Illegal Suppression of Sohyo is an Impermissible Political Conspiracy," November 30, 1959; Akahata editorial, "Prepare for the 9th Unified Action; Repel the Enemy Scheme and Prepare for the 9th Unified Action and Strengthen and Advance the Struggle of the People for Patriotism and Righteousness," December 5, 1959.
II. INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY OPERATIONS

1. Zengakuren entered Kokusai Gakusei Renmei (Kokusai Gakuren headquarters group) (Note 1), which is the front-line action system of the International Communist movement on September 24, 1949. They continuously called for strengthening international solidarity by urging people to rally around the Kokusai Gakuren flag. They sent representatives to the major Kokusai Gakuren meetings, and some of them were elected as committee members. At present the post of vice-chairman of Kokusai Gakuren has been allocated to Zengakuren (Note 2).

Note 1: The Kokusai Gakuren (IUS), with its headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, was formed on August 27, 1946, by English students as an international cooperative institution under the antifascist flag. However, with the intensification of the conflict between the Free and the Communist worlds, the student movement came under the influence of the Communists, and in 1948, at the time of the Czechoslovakian revolution, the liberal students of the Kokusai Gakuren were imprisoned as an "anti-revolutionary faction." At this point, the student associations of several countries, including England, France and the United States, which have been prominent members since the establishment of the organization in 1949, decided to withdraw. In 1950 a non-partisan student organization called "Kokusai gakusei Kaigi" (ISC generally known as Gosec) was established. At present, student organizations from 60 free countries are members. There are student organizations from over 70 countries in the Kokusai Gakuren (officially 6 million members), the majority of them from Communist countries. Only a few are from such nations as Japan, Burma, Bolivia, and other free countries. Among them, the Zengakuren of Japan is held in high repute.

Note 2: In January 1949, Matsumoto Tokuo (Tokyo University), at that time vice-chairman of Zengakuren, attended the Kokusai Gakuren Executive Members Meeting, held in Vienna as the first student representative from
Japan. In August 1955, Tanaka Yuzo (Kyoto University), then chairman of Zengakuren, was elected vice-chairman of Kokusai Gakuren at the 10th Conference of Kokusai Gakuren held at Sofia. Since June 1955, Ono Ichiro (Kyoto University), has been residing in Prague as a member of the Kokusai Gakuren Secretariat.

3. Moreover, Zengakuren is currently preparing to join the World Democratic Youth Organization. The organization has already sent representatives to different meetings sponsored by the World Democratic Youth Organization. On the occasion of the anti-war alliance, Shagakudo decided to join the World Democratic Youth Organization. Such a decision was taken at the 3rd Special National Meeting held on the 23rd and 24th of November 1957 and at the 6th National Meeting held from the 25th to the 27th of May 1958 (from the 2nd day it became the Shagakudo 1st National Meeting).

4. The activities of Zengakuren as a member of the free world students association under the Kokusai Gakuren is well regarded by the Kokusai Gakuren. However, recent activities of Zengakuren have had little guidance from Kokusai Gakuren because they have been carried out under the leadership of the executive committee, which disapproves of peaceful coexistence. The situation seems to be that Zengakuren is independently pushing its crusade.