NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
ACTUAL VERSUS CONSISTENT DECISION BEHAVIOR

by

Jacob Marschak

Supported by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Number 233(75) and the Western Management Science Institute under its grant from the Ford Foundation.
ACTUAL VERSUS CONSISTENT DECISION BEHAVIOR

Jacob Marschak *

I. PURPOSE.

Like any other specialist in decision making, the Manager expects
Science to tell him:

(I) What is his optimal (effective, efficient) behavior, in the face
of a given task? That is; how should he impinge upon Nature (including
humans) to achieve, on the average, results that are best from his point
of view? (Normative Science: Engineering, Operations Research, Medicine
and other "know-how" sciences).

(II) How does Nature (including humans) behave? (Descriptive
Science: Physics, Psychology, Biology).

Normative Science develops methods that use the findings of
Descriptive Science to predict results from actions, and thus choose
optimal actions.

One particular subject of descriptive science of behavior is the
study of the limitations of men's capacities for finding optimal decisions;
or, more generally, the study of the cost of decision making, in a society
with a given supply of, and demand for, decision-making skills. The
normative science of management must take these limitations and costs
as described by behavioral science into account, and seek optimum results
of decisions, feasible under limited decision capacity, and net of decision
cost. Also, descriptive behavioral science may help to determine optimal

*) Based on studies carried out at the Western Management Science
Institute, University of California at Los Angeles, partially
supported by the Office of Naval Research, Task 047-041 and by the
Ford Foundation. The first 2 pages are identical with those of
strategies for training decision makers.

The "humans" in (I) and (II) above are the Manager's customers, competitors, co-workers, ..., including himself. Three particular (and not exhaustive) classes of managerial action:

1. to assign decisions to men in an optimal way;
2. to remedy the failure of some men (including himself) to optimize their actions;
3. to exploit the failure of other men to optimize their actions.

Each class calls for contributions of descriptive behavioral science. In particular, Class 1. calls for measurement of relevant variables (dimensions) of decision-making capacity: e.g., speed; memory; size and frequency of deviations from optimum under varying conditions such as cultural background, business experience, stress, etc.

Class 2. calls for the study of the behavior of successful optimizers. The study (by simulation or otherwise) of traditional, possibly outdated decision routines and habits of average managers is of smaller practical value. Besides the study of successful decision techniques, Class 2. calls also for the study of processes of learning and training.

By contrast, Class 3. does call for the study of average and below-average types of decision makers: installment buyers who fail to compute the true interest rates, or housewives fascinated by "economy size" packages.

In the next Section some general hypotheses will be stated. They are, at least in part, mutually exclusive: if actual behavior confirms
one hypothesis it may contradict another one.

Finally, the concluding Section will contain suggestions of possible experiments, to test the hypotheses. Few of these experiments have been carried out on a convincing scale. Tentative explorations performed by the author over a number of years on his own graduate students, or by these students on their wives or friends, do supply some preliminary evidence, deserving to be tested in a more rigorous way. It would be worth while to perform such experiments on mature executives (in business or in public agencies) rather than on students.

II. GENERAL HYPOTHESES.

The following general hypotheses, or some of their implications, will be considered. (S means: subject).

**HYPOTHESIS H.1. "RATIONAL" (or: "CONSISTENT") BEHAVIOR:**

The S's actions (choices) are consistent with a constant system of numerical utilities (attached by him to the possible outcomes of his actions, and characterizing his "tastes") and of numerical subjective probabilities (attached by him to events that he does not control, and characterizing his "beliefs"). These numbers, constant over some reasonably long period of time, have the following property: out of any set of feasible actions, S always chooses one with the highest average of utilities of outcomes, weighted by the subjective probabilities of events. This average is called "mathematical expectation of utility" or simply "expected utility". This "expected utility principle" follows, by ordinary rules of logic, from much simpler, basic postulates. I shall state presently. Later, I shall illustrate them, as well as some
of their logical implications, by appropriate experiments. Note, however, that a person whose behavior conforms with these postulates in simple experimental situations may or may not, when faced with more complex situations, obey the logical implications of these postulates, such as the expected utility principle. For it may be a stiff requirement for a man to be logical! This was, in fact, proved by some of the experiments.

(1) Postulate of **consistent preferences** between actions [see Experiments 1., below]: If S prefers action A to B, and B to C, he prefers A to C. It follows that outcomes of actions are also ranked consistently, since a given outcome (e.g., a "job") can be identified with an action (viz., "choosing the job") that yields this outcome with certainty whatever the external events. Choice under certainty is a special case of choice under uncertainty. In fact, Postulate (1) suffices for the economic theory of certainty; but to tackle economics of uncertainty, it is to be supplemented by (2) and (3) which follow.

(2) [See Experiments 2. below]. **Admissibility postulate**: suppose two actions, A and B, would result in the same outcome if certain events would occur; and that otherwise A results in an outcome that is preferable to B's outcome. Then A itself is preferable to B. (Laws that threaten death penalty for desertion from battlefield utilize, in effect, this postulate!)

(3) [See Experiments 3. below]. **Independence of tastes and beliefs**. If the S's choice among actions reveals that, in his view, one event is more probable than another, then, in the absence of new information, his subsequent choices must be consistent with this view, regardless of the
outcomes. One should neither think wishfully nor be subject to per-
secution mania!

The experiments that follow below tend to confirm that the basic
postulates are actually obeyed when and only when stress is absent (e.g.
memory is not overloaded, ample time is provided etc.) and, above all,
when and only when the structure of the problem is very simple and is laid
bare, by the use of lucid syntax, tabular presentation, etc.

Thus, Roger Crane, a member of a nationally known accounting firm
reports the use of "Payoff Tables" in his attempt to make the discussions
at Corporation Board meetings more orderly and fruitful, and even to apply
the Expected Utility Principle. Uncontrolled events (e.g. the future
possible states of the market) head the columns of the Table; the available
actions (whether to merge with firm A, B, C, or not at all) head the rows
of the Table; and the outcome of a given action and a given event is

\[ \text{FOOT-} \text{entered in the appropriate cell of the Table.} ^{2)} \]

Under stress, or if the problem is complex, or has not been pre-
structured ("pre-digested") for S's use, the "rational" hypothesis seems
to be rarely satisfied; it is not good descriptive psychology. Other
hypotheses present themselves:

\[ \text{FOOTNOTE} \text{ H.2. "LEARNING THEORY";} ^{3)} \]

As trials are repeated, S approaches asymptotically a stable
behavior (which is, in general, not the rational one). In particular,
S's decision may depend on the success or failure (possibly measured from
some "aspiration level") of his previous decision; and the degree of this
dependence - the "reinforcement parameter" - determines the speed of
learning, characterizing a given S.

**HYPOTHESIS H.3. STOCHASTIC DECISION THEORY:**

S's choices are described by probability distributions which can be construed as weak (i.e., generalized) forms of rational behavior. For example a very weak postulate of stochastic behavior is this: "if S is more likely to prefer, than not to prefer, A to B; and is more likely to prefer, than not to prefer, B to C; then he is more likely to prefer, than not to prefer, A to C". On the other hand, a very strong postulate of stochastic behavior ("Luce's Axiom") is this: "if, when presented with the triple (A, B, C) S chooses A or B or C with relative frequencies in proportion $p_A : p_B : p_C$; then, if presented with the pair (A, B), S will choose A or B with relative frequencies in proportion $p_A : p_B$." This leads to a new definition of utilities (viz., numbers proportionate to $p_A, p_B, p_C$ ...). A stochastic behavior postulate of intermediate strength has been used by the late L. L. Thurstone and his followers who, in essence, equate utility with "subjective sensation", taken from Fechner's psychophysics (1859). Still another postulate (also weaker than Luce's Axiom) assumes that the subject's ranking of all considered alternative actions varies according to some probability scheme:

**HYPOTHESIS H.4:**

**FOOTNOTE 6** A combination of H.2 and H.3.

**HYPOTHESIS H.5. APPLICATION OF GESTALT THEORY:**

S has sudden insight in the rational structure of a decision problem ("Aha!").

**HYPOTHESIS H.6. EFFECT OF TRAINING:**


S's insight can be brought about or accelerated by appropriate training strategies (which?).

III. EXPERIMENTS

EXPERIMENTS 1. Consistent ranking of actions.

Experiment (1.1) Complex objects such as "a Patent", "a Labor Contract", "Plant", etc., each described in detail, each wrought with uncertainties, and none having a market price, are presented in pairs, without cost to chooser (or with cost counted in), in the following order:

the \((A,B)\)-pairs: \(A_1,B_1\) ; \(A_2,B_2\) ; ... ; \(A_m,B_m\);
the \((B,C)\)-pairs: \(B_1,C_1\) ; \(B_2,C_2\) ; ... ; \(B_m,C_m\);
the \((C,A)\)-pairs: \(C_1,A_1\) ; \(C_2,A_2\) ; ... ; \(C_m,A_m\).

\(S\) is not consistent if he prefers \(A_i\) to \(B_i\), and \(B_i\) to \(C_i\), yet also prefers \(C_i\) to \(A_i\), for some \(i\).

Experiment (1.2) If for a given number \((m)\) of trials \((A_i,B_i,C_i)\), \(S\) has behaved consistently in Experiment (1.1), he is now made to choose from a set such as \((A_1,B_1,C_2)\). \(S\) is not consistent if he prefers \(A_1\) when presented with the pair \((A_1,B_1)\), yet prefers \(B_1\) when presented with the triplet \((A_1,B_1,C_2)\). We invariably laugh at the story of the man who chose steak from a menu containing steak and fish; but changed his choice to fish when told that chicken was also available! (the story is Luce's; its principle was first stated by Arrow).

Experiment (1.3) Finally, \(S\) is asked to rank all \(3m\) alternatives. The ranking is tested against his preferences as exhibited in Experiment (1.1).

Preliminary evidence: Experiments on my own students suggest that they satisfied the Postulate of Consistent Ranking when, in Experiment (1.1),
m, the number of triads used, was small—e.g. \( m = 5 \). Inconsistencies arose more often in Experiments (1.2) and (1.3). However, the objects considered were those appropriate for the experience of (married) graduate students, rather than businessmen: jobs, trips, apartments, house furnishings, investment information, medical care, etc.

In other experiments, on students of logic and mathematics at Stanford University, the weak stochastic hypothesis mentioned above under H.3, was satisfied by almost all subjects; but not the Fechnerian hypothesis. The objects considered were small monetary wagers. 7)

EXPERIMENTS 2. Admissibility Principle

Experiment (2.1) "You may get a job in a foreign country or an equally good one at home. If a revolution in a foreign country occurs you lose the job; but it can't happen here". Your choice?

Experiment (2.2) "Write down, but don't tell me the cash value \( (v) \) of your property to you: that is, the smallest acceptable price. Then name your asking price \( (a) \); after this, I (your broker) shall draw at random a number \( (b) \) as the buying price. If \( b \) exceeds \( a \) you'll get \( b \). Otherwise you will keep your property. Now name your asking price".

Experiments performed in my class on my students, and by them on their friends or wives, tend to suggest the following evidence:

In the case (2.1) the foreign job is rejected, in accordance with the admissibility principle. But in the case (2.2) the admissibility principle is applied only if the experimenter "untwists" the problem by presenting and explaining a formula, a table, or a diagram, for example: Suppose the value of the property to you is \( v = 25 \). It is arranged that if
b > a you receive b; if b ≤ a, you keep v. Hence the payoff will depend on a (which you control) and b (which you don't control) in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b:</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly the only admissible action is to name an asking price a equal to 25, i.e., to the value of the property to you (v). If you ask more or less than 25, you lose (compared with the admissible action) whenever b happens to fall between a and v, and you fare equally well otherwise. Honesty is (in this case at least) the best policy! Instead, most subjects named an asking price in excess of the value of the property to them, when the above tabulation was given. Perhaps they assumed, albeit unconsciously, that some bargaining will ensue, although this was explicitly excluded under the conditions given in the experiment.

EXPERIMENT 3. Independence of tastes and beliefs.

Consider the following events, not controlled by you:

X: Kennedy wins in 1964
X: he does not win

Y: next card drawn is a spade
Y: it is not.
We consider now 6 actions (bets) $A, B, C, A', B', C'$, and tabulate their outcomes (gains and losses) which depend on the events, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>\bar{X}</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>\bar{Y}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$:</td>
<td>$$100$</td>
<td>$$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A'$:</td>
<td>$$50$</td>
<td>$$-50$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B$:</td>
<td>$$100$</td>
<td>$$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B'$:</td>
<td>$$50$</td>
<td>$$-50$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$:</td>
<td>$$100$</td>
<td>$$0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C'$:</td>
<td>$$50$</td>
<td>$$-50$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you prefer $A$ to $B$ (i.e. bet on Kennedy rather than on his rival); and $B$ to $C$ (i.e. bet on Kennedy's rival rather than on spades); then we usually say that you think $X$ is more probable than $\bar{X}$, and that $\bar{X}$ is more probable than $Y$: This is the common English use of the subjective probability concept. The experiment consists in finding whether a subject retains this ranking of the three probabilities also when the stakes are changed: on bets $A', B', C'$, instead of gaining $\$100$ or nothing, he now will gain or lose $\$50$. If his beliefs and tastes are independent, this change of outcomes should not affect his ranking of events according to their probabilities: $X$ should, as before, appear to him more probable than $\bar{X}$, and $\bar{X}$ more probable than $Y$ and this should be reflected in his choice of action. Hence he should prefer $A'$ to $B'$, and $B'$ to $C'$.

When the conditions are presented in tabulated form as above, few subjects show inconsistency. But would they remain consistent if the job of structuring had been left to them?

Experiment 3 verifies, or refutes, the independence of tastes and beliefs. We have seen that if such independence prevails, a probability ranking of events will express the subject's beliefs. Moreover, if
Postulates (1), (2), (3) are verified, and, in addition, the subject follows rules of logic, then it can be shown that his beliefs can be expressed by assigning to the events not only probability ranks, but actual numbers which we can call (subjective) probabilities because they have the same mathematical properties as those established in the classical theory of probabilities. In particular, if two events \( X \) and \( Y \) are mutually exclusive the subjective probability assigned to the event \( "X \text{ or } Y" \) is the sum of the probability of \( X \) and of that of \( Y \) (the "additivity law"). The logical grounds for the existence of such numerical subjective probabilities can be roughly illustrated in the context of the following experiments.

**EXPERIMENT 4. Numerical subjective probabilities.**

Denote by "D.J." the "Dow-Jones Stock Price Average at this year's end", and by \( x \) some positive number. Consider two actions (bets) \( A \) and \( B \) such that:

- If you choose \( A \) you will get \$100 if D.J. exceeds \( x \), and you will get \$0 otherwise;
- If you choose \( B \) you will get \$0 if D.J. exceeds \( x \), and you will get \$100 otherwise.

By definition, if your beliefs and tastes are independent, your preference ranking as between the two actions will remain the same if the pair of outcomes (\$100, \$0) is replaced by some other pair \((O_1, O_2)\) such that \( O_1 \) is better than \( O_2 \). Your choice as between \( A \) and \( B \) will indicate whether you consider the event "D.J. exceeds \( x \)" more or less probable than its negation. Therefore, if we adopt the useful convention that the probabilities of an event and of its negation add up to 1, we shall say that
the subjective probability of the event "D.J. exceeds x" is larger than 1/2 if you prefer A to B; smaller than 1/2 if you prefer B to A; and equal to 1/2 if you are indifferent between A and B. Hence, by adjusting the variable \( x \) up and downward we can find a value of \( x \) such that your subjective probability of the event "D.J. exceeds x" is equal 1/2.

We can find in a similar way two numbers, \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) such that you will be indifferent between three following bets C, D, E:

- If you choose C you will get $100 if D.J. is less than \( y_1 \), and $0 otherwise;
- if you choose D you will get $100 if D.J. is \( y_1 \) or more, but less than \( y_2 \), and $0 otherwise;
- if you choose E you will get $100 if D.J. is \( y_2 \) or more, and $0 otherwise.

Or, in tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>( y_1 )</td>
<td>( y_2 )</td>
<td>( \text{D.J. Scale} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your indifference between C, D, E will indicate that you deem the three mutually exclusive events (the three intervals I, II, III on the D.J. scale) to be equally probable. In other words their subjective probabilities are 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 - provided your (the subject's) tastes and beliefs are independent. Whether they are, can be tested by finding whether you are
also indifferent between the following three bets (with the same meaning of $y_1, y_2$):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C'</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E'</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(your indifference between C and D revealed that, for you, events I and II are equally probable; this belief should not be changed if the outcome of either action in case of event III is changed from $0$ to $100$; hence you should be indifferent between C' and D'; and similarly between D' and E'.)

On the other hand, any of the actions C', D', E' is better than any of the actions C, D, E, by the admissibility principle. Accordingly, having assigned probabilities 1/3 to each of the events I, II, III, we may assign probabilities 2/3 to the events "I or II", "II or III", "I or III", thus at the same time satisfying the additivity law for probabilities. And if we call $100$, $0$,"success" and "failure" respectively, we see that you prefer that action which has a higher subjective probability of success. Again, this agrees with usual English.

Using 3 mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, we have defined subjective probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 as revealed by a consistent subject's preferences between actions. This reasoning can be extended to any number $- 4, 5, \ldots, n$ of events, - and leads to the definition of any subjective probability expressed by a rational fraction $m/n$; and, in fact, as expressed by any number (whether rational or irrational) between $0$ and $1$. 
If each of two actions $A_1$ and $A_2$ can yield either "success" or "failure", and if $A_1$ is preferred (indifferent) to $A_2$ then the probability of success, $p_1$, of $A_1$ is larger than (equal to) the probability of success, $p_2$, of $A_2$, as viewed by the subject.

Let us agree to assign utility = 0 to failure (or to an action that always leads to failure). Then the utility of success (or of an action that always leads to success) must be larger; let it be = 1. By admissibility principle, any action that yields possibly success, and possibly failure, is better than sure failure and worse than sure success. Therefore its utility must be assigned a number between 0 and 1. In particular, to a lottery (action, bet, venture) $A_1$ that succeeds with probability $p_1$, we may assign the utility $P_1$; this will agree with our previous statement that $A_1$ is preferred to (hence its utility is larger than that of) $A_2$ if $p_1 > p_2$. Now note that such an assignment of utilities agrees with the expected utility principle! for indeed

$$p_1 \cdot 1 + (1-p_1) \cdot 0 = p_1 .$$

Consider now a "mixed" lottery. It yields a ticket of $A_1$ with subjective probability $\pi_1$, a ticket of $A_2$ with subjective probability $\pi_2$ etc. Since the ordinary probability laws are obeyed, such a mixed lottery will yield success with subjective probability $p_1 \pi_1 + p_2 \pi_2 + \cdots$. And since we have agreed to equate a lottery's utility with its chance of success we see that the utility of the mixed lottery is the weighted average of the utilities of the component lotteries that are its outcomes. Again, this agrees with the expected utility principle.
As a further step, extend this reasoning to any outcomes that are not better than the "success" and not worse than the "failure" defined so far. The consistent man will be indifferent between such an outcome and some lottery which has probability $p_1$ (say) of success; hence this outcome's utility can be set equal to $p_1$. And an action which yields, with respective probabilities $\pi_1, \pi_2, \ldots$, objects whose utilities are $p_1, p_2, \ldots$, will be equivalent, in that man's view, to the mixed lottery whose utility we have seen to be $p_1 \pi_1 + p_2 \pi_2 + \ldots$. This agrees again with the expected utility principle.

A complete and rigorous proof that the expected utility principle follows from the three basic postulates by ordinary rules of logic, is more lengthy and cannot be given here. Indeed this logical process, though elementary, does not seem to correspond to the behavior of an untrained, unprepared, or inexperienced "average" man of our culture. This is illustrated by the following experiment:

**EXPERIMENT 5. Existence of a utility function.**

Consider the following four lottery tickets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lottery ticket</th>
<th>If Heads, you get:</th>
<th>If Tails, you get:</th>
<th>Cash equivalent?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>$b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>$c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>$d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We either assume that the subjective probabilities of Heads and Tails are equal (i.e. that $S$ is indifferent between betting something on Heads or betting the same thing on Tails) or we test this assumption by actual trials. [As FOOTNOTE S was done by Davidson and Suppes 8] who painted one nonsense syllable on 3 sides
of a die, and another nonsense syllable on the 3 remaining sides, and tested whether the subject who chose to bet on the first nonsense syllable changed the choice when the rewards on that bet were lowered very slightly]. Under the hypothesis (H.1) of consistent behavior, the subject assigning a winning chance \( \frac{3}{4} \) to \( A \) should also assign,

- a winning chance \( \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \cdot (1) = \frac{3}{4} \) to \( B \);
- a winning chance \( \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \cdot (0) = \frac{1}{4} \) to \( C \); and therefore

\[
\text{a winning chance } \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{1}{4} \right) = \frac{3}{16} \text{ to } D.
\]

Consequently he should declare \( b > d = a > c \).

Moreover, if \( S \) is consistent and "averts risk" - so that, for him, money has "decreasing marginal utility" - he would name \( a < 50, b < \frac{(100 + a)}{2}, c < \frac{a}{2} \). The three cash amounts \( a, b, c \) permit us to estimate three non-trivial points on the curve representing \( S \)'s utility function of money gains and monetary wagers \( u(g) \), provided his consistency has been confirmed by his naming \( d = a \). For we are free to fix two points arbitrarily (as when "calibrating" a thermometer scale); say, \( u(\$100) = 1, u(\$0) = 0 \). Then, \( u(a) = u(A) = (1 + 0)/2 = .5 \); \( u(b) = u(B) = (1 + .5)/2 = .75 \); \( u(c) = u(C) = (0 + .5)/2 = .25 \).

In experiments on students they usually failed to name \( d = a \), unless they stated values \( a = 50, b = 75, c = 25 \). In this case we suspect that they have parrot-like followed the rule (which they have heard somewhere) of computing actuarial values, and did not name their genuine subjective cash equivalent. To check this, and educate them for later experiments, we can ask them whether they are really indifferent between "gain \$100, lose \$100 on the toss of a coin" and "gain a dime, lose a dime on the toss of a coin", thus dispelling the learned myth of actuarial values.9

Gordon Becker collected evidence that in some cases the subject's cash-equivalents do gradually approach a consistent pattern as the experiment is
continued (a lottery is formed; $100 if Heads, $1 if Tails; etc.). It is not clear whether such subjects "learn" in the sense of Hypothesis $H_2$, or have a sudden insight ("Aha!") as in hypothesis $H_5$. To decide this, appropriate significance tests need to be developed.
1) An action is defined by the different outcomes it yields when different, specified events occur. In this sense, "not to act" (e.g., "not to invest", i.e. to keep cash) is also an action. Thus, any S is forced to compare between actions, as to which is preferable; but he can find himself indifferent. In what follows, the case of indifference is sometimes omitted to simplify presentation. In this and several other respects our presentation, sufficiently precise for its purposes, is not precise enough for complete logical analysis. This will be found in L. J. Savage's Foundations of Statistics (1954). Roughly, our Postulate (1) is his P1; our Postulate (2) is his P3; and our Postulate (3) is his P2 and P4. An elementary exposition will be given in Chapter 1 of the forthcoming Economic Theory of Teams by J. Marschak and R. Radner.

Economists will remember Alfred Marshall's (Principles of Economics 1908) use of the Expected Utility Principle, which goes back to Daniel Bernoulli and has been revived in the modern theory of decision as used in Statistics, Quality Control, and Operations Research; the latter includes, for example, modern Inventory Control, Scheduling of Production and Design, Investment Theory, etc., as well as applications to the economics of Effective Weapon Systems. These practical developments proceeded in spite of Frank Knight's warning (Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 1921) that probabilities in the classical sense (deduced from symmetry considerations or estimated from observed frequencies of events) were absent in the business world of not strictly repetitive events. The objection had been anticipated in the XVIII Century by D. Bernoulli's contemporary, Thomas Bayes, who first visualized the role of a priori probabilities (regardless of their psychological genesis), as well as the logical process of their subsequent revision by experience.
Most of the logical work deriving the expected utility principle from some basic postulates was done by F. Ramsey in the 1920-ies, B. de Finetti in the 1930-ies, J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern in the 1940-ies, L. J. Savage in the 1950-ies.

2) An Approach to the Problem of Growth by Company Acquisition. An address before the American Management Association's Orientation Seminary on Appraising Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions, by Roger R. Crane and Alvin E. Wanthal, Touche, Ross, Bailey and Smart. Mimeographed. Quoted with Mr. Crane's permission.


5) Think of the opinion-poll housewife in the New Yorker cartoon.
(14 November 1959): "I'd say I'm about 42% for Nixon, 39% for Rockefeller, 19% undecided!"


8) In their book, Decision Making; an Experimental Approach, 1957.

9) Jacques Dreze has pointed out to me that Experiment 5 can be generalized to the case when the subjective probabilities of the two events in question are not necessarily equal and indeed are unknown to the experimenter. For example, instead of "Heads or Tails" we may use "Kennedy wins or loses". A consistent person will behave as if he assigned to these two events some probabilities, \( p \) and \( q \), say, with \( p + q = 1 \); moreover, if as before, (without loss of generality) the utility scale is calibrated so that \( u(\$100) = 1 \), \( u(\$0) = 0 \), then a consistent man will behave as if he assigned to the four lottery tickets of the experiment the following utilities:

\[
\begin{align*}
    u(A) &= p \cdot u(\$100) + q \cdot u(\$0) = p \\
    u(B) &= p \cdot u(\$100) + q \cdot u(A) = p + qp \\
    u(C) &= p \cdot u(\$0) + q \cdot u(A) = 0 + qp \\
    u(D) &= p(p + qp) + q(qp) = p ,
\end{align*}
\]

since \( p + q = 1 \). And since \( p \geq 0, q \geq 0 \), we obtain the following ranking of utilities: \( u(B) > u(A) = u(D) > u(C) \); accordingly the consistent man should...
name cash-equivalents of the four lotteries, ordered thus: \( b > a = d > c \).

If neither event is judged impossible by the consistent man, i.e., if \( p > 0 \), \( q > 0 \), the ranking is exactly the same as in the text, \textit{viz} \( b > a = d > c \).