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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 October 1968. RG 357 FOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
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FOR THE COMMANDER:

WEBSTER PARKER
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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Section 1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. COMMAND

1. (U) Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, CG, Provisional Corps Vietnam, was promoted to that rank by Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor in a brief ceremony held at Thu Bai on 1 August 1968.

2. (U) Colonel Harry L. Givens Jr., U.M.C., was appointed Deputy, Chief of Staff on 13 August 1968.

3. (U) Headquarters, XXIV Corps was activated on 15 August 1968 by USARPAC GO 397, dated 12 August 1968. Personnel and equipment of Headquarters, Provisional Corps, Vietnam were absorbed by the newly-activated Corps.

4. (U) Major General Lee H. Schreiber, Chief of Staff, XXIV Corps, was promoted to his present rank on 1 October 1968.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Intelligence Planning: During this report period, planning was completed for the "Northeast Monsoon 1968-69," with special emphasis placed on the targeting and destruction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). A separate intelligence annex, "Attack Against the Infrastructure," was included in the "Northeast Monsoon 1968-1969" Operation Order.

2. (C) B-52 Bombing Program:

a. During late July and early August, intelligence reports indicated the enemy was reestablishing his supply bases in the A Shau Valley. Operation Somerset Plain was planned and launched into the Valley by elements of the 101st Airborne (AM) and 1st ARVN Divisions. The combat assault was preceded by B-52 strikes on known defensive positions and supply areas. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) revealed numerous secondary explosions, sustained fires and destruction of enemy supply areas, vehicles and defensive positions. The enemy's lines of communication were disrupted and his troops shocked and demoralized. Subsequently, the enemy was unable to organize a coordinated defense, as US and ARVN forces assaulted into enemy strongholds and rapidly seized assigned objectives.

b. B-52 strikes during August also supported 3d Marine Division operations and facilitated landing heliborne forces without casualties or helicopter losses. During September, B-52 strikes supported the
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3d Marine Division operation against enemy forces in the DMZ. As a result of the strikes, attacking units found enemy forces disorganized and confused. Ground follow-up activities uncovered 146 NVA bodies in six mass graves. Increased enemy activity in the Thor area of the DMZ since July 1968 necessitated the targeting of the area for B-52 strikes. Bomb damage assessment revealed numerous secondary explosions and the destruction of enemy supply areas, weapons and weapon positions.

3. (0) Counterintelligence:

a. Attack on the VC Infrastructure (VCI): The G2 Security Division, XXIV Corps, was tasked with the mission of monitoring VCI information and maintaining a VCI data base. This is being accomplished by screening reports from all intelligence agencies and is supplemented by frequent liaison visits to province and district level TNF agencies. Developed information is recorded in counterintelligence personnel, area, and organizational files. An outline of the VCI organizational structure, listing cadre presently identified at province and district level, was produced by researching unit and Phoenix Committee files. Methods for monitoring the progress of the attack against the VCI were developed and implemented.

b. Base Counterintelligence: When the 1st Counterintelligence Team (CIT), US Marine Corps, left Phu Bai and nearby Gia Le combat bases, the Security Division, G2, XXIV Corps, was assigned the responsibility for Phu Bai Base counterintelligence. Action was initiated to determine what improvements in access security, employee security and passive physical security are required. An installation source program is being initiated.

c. Arc Light Information Review: Procedures for processing Arc Light requests within XXIV Corps Headquarters were reviewed. Recommendations to further limit access to, and dissemination of, Arc Light information were submitted and have been implemented.

4. (C) General Enemy Situation:

a. At the beginning of the report period enemy contacts were scattered and light with the enemy's efforts directed toward gathering rice, receiving reinforcements and retraining. Numerous reports indicated a major offensive was planned to begin about the middle of August. The deployment of the 320th NVA Division into the central DMZ and the arrival of the 138th Independent Regiment in the eastern DMZ added credence to the reports. The enemy apparently attempted to launch his offensive on schedule with the 320th Division moving south of the DMZ and threatening the Rockpile and Camp Carroll, and the 138th and 270th Regiments launching abortive attacks in the Gio Linh area. The 138th and 270th Regts. were repulsed with heavy losses.
and the 320th Division limited its offensive to attacks by fire and to small limited ground probes. Aggressive action by the 3d Marine Division and the 2d ARVN Regiment countered every enemy move, administered heavy losses and forced the enemy to withdraw into the DMZ. Through the use of B-52 strikes, tactical air and aggressive counterbattery fire, the enemy’s artillery in the DMZ, which would have supported an offensive, was harassed and suppressed. There are strong indications that enemy elements located in base Areas 101 and 114 had planned to launch attacks coordinated with the 320th NVA Division, however, they were never able to attain an attack posture. Highly successful rice denial operations by U.S. and ARVN forces prevented the enemy from replenishing his food supplies in the base areas and forced him to fall back towards the A Shau Valley to obtain sufficient food. Operations deep in the enemy base areas uncovered large ammunition caches and denied him the use of customary staging areas for attacks into the coastal areas. Operation Somerset Plain into the A Shau Valley further upset his timing for the planned offensive.

b. Following the abortive offensive of the 320th NVA Division, sweeps into the area west of the Rockpile and into the DMZ uncovered enemy base areas containing large quantities of ammunition and other supplies. With the forced withdrawal of major enemy units from southern Quang Tri Province and Thua Thien Province, allied units, while continuing operations in the enemy’s base areas, began a series of cordon and sweep operations in the coastal areas, fragmenting and destroying local force guerrilla units and the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

c. Currently, the majority of NVA main forces have withdrawn into North Vietnam or Laos. Allied operations have cleared all but scattered enemy units from the Khe Sanh Plateau and the southern half of the DMZ. The 7th Front remains with part of its forces generally west of Base Area 101, and the 4th and 5th Regiments remain in the southern part of the XXIV Corps AO. Other remaining forces consist of understrength local force companies plus guerrillas located throughout the two provinces. The enemy retains a capability to conduct attacks by fire and limited ground attacks; however, large-scale ground attacks within the Corps AO are not imminent.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) During the report period, the XXIV Corps area of operations (AO) expanded to include all of Thua Thien Province, less the northern half of the Hai Van Pass and an unpopulated portion west of Da Nang. The boundary change resulted in movement of HQ, Task Force X-Ray and elements of the 26th Marine Regiment from the Phu Bai area to SICTZ. The 101st Airborne Division (ARM) absorbed the AO formerly held by Task Force X-Ray of the 1st Marine Division.

2. (C) Operation Golden Sword conducted from 16 September – 19 October moved the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (ARM) to SICTZ
and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division to 111 CTZ.

3. (C) At the close of the report period, Operation Liberty Canyon was in progress. This operation, which began on 28 October will redeploy the 1st Cavalry Division (AN) to 111 CTZ by mid-November.

4. (C) Operation Somerart Plain was conducted during the period 4 - 20 August. This operation was a combined 101st Airborne Division (AM) - 1st ARVN Division multi-battalion raid/RIF into the A Shau Valley. The purpose of the operation was to disrupt and interdict the VC/NVA logistic complex and lines of communication. Results were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
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<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
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<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24/11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
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<td>164</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46/13</td>
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5. (C) The following operations remain in progress with the results for the reporting period listed in para 5h below.

   a. Napoleon/Saline: Elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and 1st Armct Battalion conducted combat operations along the Cua Viet River in northeastern Quang Tri Province to provide security for the Cua Viet LOC. US forces assisted GVN forces in the Revolutionary Development Program within the AO. Contact was light and sporadic throughout the reporting period.

   b. Scotland II: 3d Marine Division's Task Force Hotel conducted mobile company/battalion size operations around Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province to interdict enemy troop and logistical installations and to determine the enemy's intentions. Contact throughout the report period was light and sporadic.

   c. Lancaster II: The 3d Marine Regiment conducted mobile combat operations in the area from the Rockpile to the DMZ in northern Quang Tri Province to block and force the 320th NVA Division to abandon the offensive posture established in August and early September and to clear the area within the DMZ. Contact early in the report period was moderate, reverting to light and sporadic at the end of the period.

   d. Kentucky: Elements of the 3d Marine Regiment and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) conducted company/battalion size raids/RIF in the area of Cam Lo, Con Thien and into the DMZ to harass and eject
the enemy from this section of the X-IV Corps. Contact was moderate to heavy throughout the period.

e. Jeb Stuart III: The 1st Cavalry Division (A) conducted company/ battalion size combat and search and destroy operations in the populated coastal plain of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces to ferret out the VC, destroy the enemy main force units and support the Revolutionary Development Program. In addition, company/battalion size RIF operations were conducted in the mountainous areas within the 1st Cavalry Division area to destroy the enemy main force units and support the Revolutionary Development Program. Operation Nevada Eagle, that one of the last successful operations of the war, was planned and executed. Elements of the 1st Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions, TF Clearwater, Regional/Popular Forces, National/Special Police and Armed Propaganda Teams demonstrated the effectiveness of combined action in stability operations. The combined operation on W ich To Island was conducted to wrest control of the island, fifteen miles east of Hue, from Viet Cong local force units and destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure that had dominated the island since Tet. The operation lasted from 11 to 20 September resulting in 2 friendly KIA's and 12 wounded, while the enemy suffered 134 killed and 370 prisoners, 177 individual weapons and 9 crew served weapons captured (These data are included in statistics for Operation Nevada Eagle listed below).

h. Statistical Data (1 Aug - 31 Oct 68):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA (WAC)</th>
<th>FIA</th>
<th>FIA F11N</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>INCL 1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAPOLISGUN/</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S-LINKS</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND II</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANCaster II</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KESTURY</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEB STUART III</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMANCHE FALLS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
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6. (C) Task Force Clearwater.

a. TF Clearwater, a US Navy command CPOC'ed by 24 Corps, has the mission of providing security and coordination of waterborne logistic craft on the Chua Viet and Qume River IOCs and conducting riverine operations on these and adjacent waterways, including Dan Co. 24. During the report period TF Clearwater detected 84,763 vessels on the inland waterways within the XXIV Corps AO, boarded and searched 16,332 vessels and detained 411 individuals for the following reasons:

- 207: Suspect VC
- 293: Curfew violation
- 126: Improper ID card
- 45: Restricted area violation
- 26: Draft dodgers
- 5: Miscellaneous

b. TF Clearwater supported land combat operations near the inland waterways within the Corps AO by providing insertions, extractions, screening, blocking and/or reaction forces.

(1) During the report period TF Clearwater supported two major operations.

(a) On 9 August TF Clearwater's PBRs and FDCVs formed a blocking/reaction force in the vicinity of Operation Nadir and in support of the 11th Airborne Division (AVN). The results of this operation were 42 VC KIA and 94 FOWs.

(b) From 11 thru 20 September the PBR/FDCV combination was used to provide a blocking force for the sweep of the Yyd Jel Peninsula, mentioned in paragraph 3e, above.

7. (C) Operations Summary: 6

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a. During the report period, XXIV Corps efforts were designed to destroy the VC Infrastructure, defeat enemy main force units, support revolutionary development, and harass and interdict the enemy's main command and logistical installations. To accomplish this, the Corps seized and maintained the initiative by conducting brigade/regimental and smaller size cordon and search and RIF operations. Consequently, there was a lack of significant enemy-initiated action other than attacks by fire and ground probes. The enemy avoided major contact throughout the AO. Operations were continuously conducted into the enemy's base areas and other suspected areas of the mountainous regions, to harass, interdict and deny the enemy their use. Large quantities of NVA medical and other supplies and several field hospital installations were captured during the period. Additionally, the operations within the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) AO on the coastal plains uncovered large rice caches.

b. The 1st ARVN Division has constantly participated, with great competence, in combined operations with the three US divisions in XXIV Corps. The close team work, as well as the mutual confidence and respect generated between the 1st ARVN Division and US forces, has been formed and tested in the heat of battle. The 1st ARVN Division contributed in full measure to the successful operations conducted throughout the XXIV Corps area.

D. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, DISCIPLINE, AND MEDICAL

1. (U) Military Personnel Management. During the report period, there was an increase in personnel activities which included the processing of awards and decorations for the 1100-man 8th Radio Research Field Station. In connection with Phu Bai Base coordination functions, the G1 Section assumed the responsibility for collecting twice-monthly strength reports from all units in the Phu Bai area to provide Base Defense with strength statistics to compute unit participation in perimeter defense activities.

2. (U) Civilian Personnel Management. HHC, XXIV Corps, plus assigned and attached units, received authorization for an increase in total number of direct hire Vietnamese Nationals from 34 to 52. Authority for the daily hire of 100 Vietnamese Nationals for the second quarter Fiscal Year 1969 was granted.

3. (U) Religious Activities. The continuous turnover of personnel and relocation of units within the XXIV Corps AO required timely monitoring of religious coverage. Cross service support between Army, Navy and Marine Corps chaplains was effective in providing adequate coverage for all Corps units. Units serving at rear echelons are in a position to observe the Sabbath in accordance with the dictates of the individual's faith. For units in the forward areas and those involved directly in military operations, the Sabbath must be observed when the chaplain visits the area. The availability of Catholic and Jewish Chaplains is limited; however, coverage for personnel of these faith was thoroughly planned and coordinated, and spiritually effective.
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4. (U) Provost Marshal Activities. The PM performed designated functions outlined in FM 101-5 and XXIV Corps Organization and Functions Manual, including advising the commander and staff on the maintenance of order and discipline; the enforcement of laws, orders and regulations; planning and recommending requirements for, and supervising the employment of, military police troops within the Corps area of operations; and exercising technical supervision over, and coordinating the activities of, military police within XXIV Corps. Divisional military police companies assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 101st Airborne Division ("A") and the 3d Marine Division continued to provide tactical military police support to their parent divisions. The 16th Military Police Group Task Force (ICG) continued to provide area military police support, to include convoy escorts, traffic enforcement, and accident investigation on main supply routes; evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points to the III MAF collecting points at Da Nang; discipline, law and order in the cities of Quang Tri and Hue; and investigation of criminal offenses involving non-divisional troops.

5. (U) During the report period, excellent medical support was provided Army and Marine units of XXIV Corps. A medical complex was established at Phu Bai and occupied by the 366th Medical Company (Clearing); 56th Medical Detachment (Dental); 4th Advance Platoon, 32d Medical Depot and the 175th Veterinary Detachment. The 903d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron established a casualty staging unit at Phu Bai, which added a capability for holding 25-30 litter patients awaiting evacuation. A team of the 172d Preventive Medicine Unit (Svc Id) was assigned to the area to provide guidance and technical assistance to Corps units. The decision was made to construct a 400 bed evacuation hospital at Phu Bai for which the site has been selected and construction scheduled to begin in the near future. As a temporary measure, the US Army Hospital Phu Bai (Provisional) with a capacity of 100 beds was established to alleviate the shortage of hospital beds in NCTZ.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (C) During the report period the logistics structure within XXIV Corps was altered by several organizational and operational changes. Significant among these changes was the phase out of the Wunder Peach, Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) Operation; relocation of the 25th General Support Group Headquarters from Quang Tri to Phu Bai; relocation of the 525th Supply and Service Company from Wunder Peach to Phu Bai; establishment of Movements Control Centers by the Director of Transportation, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASCOM) at Phu Bai and Quang Tri; the departure from Northern I Corps of the 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-Ray; and the relocation of the Marine Corps Force Logistic Support Group - Alpha facility from Phu Bai to the Da Nang area, now in progress.

2. (C) Significant Activities.
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a. In anticipation of the forthcoming monsoon season, the ICTS site at Wunder Beach was closed to cargo input on 30 September. The two remaining port complexes in the XXIV Corps area, Dong Ha/Cua Viet and Hue/Tan My, respectively, absorbed the daily tonnage inputs formerly handled at Wunder Beach.

b. Concurrent with the departure of 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-Ray, and the subsequent realignment of support areas, it was deemed advisable to relocate the headquarters element (minus) of the 26th General Support Group from Quang Tri to Phu Bai. Movement of Task Force X-Ray abated the requirement for maintaining a Marine Corps logistical support base at Phu Bai. Consequently, Force Logistic Support Group - Alpha has commenced phase out and is being replaced by elements of the 26th General Support Group. Force Logistic Support Group - Alpha is scheduled to be completely displaced by 1 Jan 69. Present agreements between Force Logistic Support Groups - Alpha and Bravo and the 26th General Support Group, provide that support of all US forces at Dong Ha, and North thereof, will be furnished from Force Logistic Support Group - Bravo and that all US forces from Quang Tri, South to Hai Van Pass will be supported by the 26th General Support Group. The 26th General Support Group maintains a forward headquarters at Quang Tri in order to supervise the operation of its supply, maintenance and transportation responsibilities in that area. The present reorganization is felt to have effectively consolidated the NICTZ support areas and to have resulted in a more efficient and less complicated supply system.

c. Collocation of MCC offices with the 26th General Support Group forward headquarters at Quang Tri, and with 26th General Support Group main headquarters at Phu Bai, has streamlined the management of transportation assets within NICTZ, and has established a workable transportation priority system.

d. Introduction of several specialized units into the NICTZ support matrix has materially improved the logistical structure of the AOR. The recent arrival of the 259th Petroleum Battalion and the 1003d Supply and Services Company will provide for an even stronger logistical support system within NICTZ.

e. During the first week of September, LOC's within XXIV Corps were disrupted by Typhoon Bess. Land and air LOC's were interrupted from 4 through 7 September. Due to high seas and resultant channel silt, port complexes within NICTZ were closed, as indicated below:

- Tan My - 25 days in September and 5 days in October
- Hue - 5 days in October
- Dong Ha/Cua Viet - 3 days in September and 3 days in October.

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While the Corps logistical posture remained at an acceptable level during the typhoon, degradation of supply input, due to inclement weather (1469 Monsoon Season), warranted special attention. Prompt action was taken to ensure cargo "surge" during periods of fair weather and shipment priorities were closely monitored by this headquarters.

f. XXIV Corps ACoFS, G4 Transportation Division increased the scope of its operations during the period with the formation of the Corps Convoy Central Center. Some 204 convoys, made up of 6803 vehicles, were coordinated through the G4 Transportation Division. This total reflects an increase of 54 convoys and 3203 vehicles over that of the last reporting period.

g. Aircraft maintenance and supply status during the reporting period has shown improvement. It will continue to improve as additional units arrive, and newer aircraft are accepted into the inventory to replace older models, i.e., AH-1G to replace UH-1 F/G, CH-47A to replace CH-17/23 and CH-47C to replace CH-47 A/B. "EM" Co, 5th Transportation Battalion (AWP), 101st Airborne Division (AW), is scheduled to close by 2 Nov 69. This, along with the eleven aircraft maintenance detachments that are programmed to arrive in country in February and March of 1969, will greatly improve the maintenance posture of 101st Airborne Division (AW). As the MTo's and "T"s of the organizational and direct support units become purged with experienced demand data, an improvement in the Not Operationally Ready, Supply (NORS) rate for the U-21 aircraft will be experienced.

3. (C) Operations.

a. Operation Somerset Plain demonstrated the responsiveness of the XXIV Corps logistical system. Early in the planning stages, it was determined that sufficient helicopters were not available to support the operation logistically unless flight time from source of supply to operating units in the A Shau Valley was reduced. This problem was resolved by establishing a supply point at FSB Birmingham (V D 70K102). Supplies were then transported by truck from Camp Eagle and Hue to the supply point. A five day level of supplies was stocked prior to initiation of the operation. Resupply from FSB Birmingham to forward support elements at landing zones (LZ's) Son, Georgia, Eagles Nest, and Berchtesgaden was provided by CH-47. Supplies were then divided into company level packets and transported into the Valley by UH-1. This system served to provide an orderly input of supplies and concurrently avoided exposing the CH-47 to enemy anti-aircraft fire.

b. Operation Golden Sword exchanged the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division at Gia Le, for the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (AW) at Phuoc Vinh. The movement was made largely by air LCC between IGTZ and III CTZ and was accomplished in three phases:
F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) None.

G. INFORMATION

1. (U) General: Action has been initiated by this headquarters to establish a Stars and Stripes bookstore in Phu Bai. The III Corps Information Division received a grant from Central Post Welfare Fund for the purchase of a Polaroid Camera, a radio and tape recorder. The radio and recorder have been used to pass news from Voice of America to subordinate units during periods when Armed Forces Vietnam Radio has been off the air. The recorder will facilitate taped hometown news releases. The camera is to be used for CG visits to hospitalized members of the Command to provide pictures as mementos of the visit.

2. (U) Command Information: Official photo coverage was provided for VIP visits to the command including Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Paul Ignatius and Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Stanley R. Resor.

3. (U) Public Information:
   a. A total of 71 hometown news releases were processed.
   b. A total of one news story and two feature stories were released.
   c. A total of 508 news media representatives were provided with billeting, mess and transportation services.
   d. The Commanding General and key staff officers participated in 19 press interviews.

H. COMMAND HISTORY

1. (U) Historical Study 5-68 (Vinh Loc) was completed during the report period. This study was done in coordination with the 22d Military History Detachment, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and serves as both a historical and doctrine study of combined operations using US, ARVN, province, and district elements.
I. AVIATION

1. (U) During the report period, the Corps Aviation Co (Prov) aviation assets increased to two OH-6A, eight UH-1H and two U-21A aircraft, and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) received aircraft assets for a total of four OH-6A and three UH-1H aircraft.

2. (U) The MTOE for the Corps Aviation Company (Prov) submitted on 30 July 1968, was returned by Hq, USARV for further justification of requested additions. The MTOE was resubmitted on 30 October 1968.

J. SIGNAL

1. (C) Operation Somerset Plain.

   a. At the onset of this report period plans were being developed for a return to the A Shau Valley by XXIV Corps and ARVN forces.

   b. Due to the limited capability of the 101st Airborne Division (AM) to extend command/control communications into the A Shau Valley, XXIV Corps used contingency assets to support the operation. One TRC-24 system was established from Camp Eagle to Eagles Nest (HD 1407) prior to the assault. Although preparation of the equipment and positioning of the equipment was hampered by poor weather and overcrowded conditions at Eagles Nest, the system became operational 1 August and performed without failure during the operation. In addition, two I-channel systems were required from Corps that could not be satisfied by the Division. One AN/MRC-112 system was established between Eagles Nest and FSB Berchtesgarden (HD 423012) and a AN/ORC-113 system held for commitment into the A Shau Valley if required.

   c. The terrain between the A Shau Valley and Camp Earle necessitated automatic retransmission of several radio nets. The requirement was satisfied by one ground mounted ARC-121 radio and four U-1A aircraft equipped with ARC-121 radios. Although the airborne relays did not prove satisfactory because of stringent safety requirements and insufficient quantity of blade antennas, the ground mounted station relayed three FM radio nets reliably throughout the operation.

   d. Somerset Plain terminated on 20 August and Corps contingency communications equipment was lifted out by helicopter on 21 August.

2. (U) Activation of Mode V AUTODIN Terminals.

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On 7 August two Mode V AUTODIN Terminals were activated in the Phu Bai Army Area Communication Center to provide faster teleprint service in support of XXIV Corps and other local subscribers. These terminals, each providing 100 words per minute full duplex service, were connected to the Nha Trang Automatic Switching Center.

Initially, the Mode V Terminal proved to be unreliable because of lack of maintenance parts, operating spares, and qualified maintenance personnel. Outages during the early stages of operation were numerous and prolonged. These problems have been reduced as operator and maintenance personnel gained experience. Satisfactory operations were realized during the last month of this report period.

3. (U) Relocation of TF X-Ray.

a. During September the responsibilities for the base defense and area coordination of the Phu Bai area were transferred to XXIV Corps. This resulted in XXIV Corps assuming responsibility for base defense, convoy central and Air Warning Control Center (AWCC) activities formerly operated by TF X-Ray elements. XXIV Corps also assumed responsibility for maintenance of Marine Corps cables in the Phu Bai area.

b. XXIV Corps Artillery assumed responsibility for base defense communications. Equipment required for base defense communications was not available within Hq, XXIV Corps. To preclude loss of communications, the Marines left critical items in place for use until like items could be obtained thru supply channels. Sufficient communication equipment for base defense continues to be a problem as equipment must be diverted from its intended purpose to satisfy defense requirements.

c. The Marine cable and base defense wire system responsibility was absorbed by the Army Area Signal Battalion (33d Signal Battalion). Turnover of responsibility and installed assets was accomplished with little difficulty thru close coordination between TF X-Ray and XXIV Corps.

d. Air Warning Control Center activities of Phu Bai DASC were transferred to XXIV Corps with little difficulty. Circuits were transferred to the XXIV Corps Artillery S-4-Plane operations with no circuit outage time. Radio requirements presented problems in availability of equipment. TF X-Ray loaned equipment to the Army pending receipt of Army equipment.

e. Convoy control communications responsibilities were assumed by the 101st Airborne Division (AM) as part of their convoy security responsibility. Frequencies were coordinated with 1st Marine Division.
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teallow convoys to use common frequencies during movement through the
101st Airborne Division (AM) and the Ist Marine Division (MCU's). The
only difficulty experienced was coordination of artillery fires in sup-
port of convoy movement between the two division areas. Dedicated ar-
tillery fires in support of convoy movement between the two division
areas. Dedicated artillery coordination circuits were requested and
activated within five days by Defense Communication Agency - Southeast
Asia Mainland (DCS-Y).

f. Communication center support for Marine and Navy units re-
mainin in the Phu Bai area after relocation of TF X-Ray was provided
by over-the-counter service by the Army Area Communications Center.

4. (C) Activation of AUTOSEVCCOM.

a. On 1 September the XXIV Corps SigC assumed responsibility
for coordination of AUTOSEVCCOM activities and associated subscriber
terminals housed on the Phu Bai Switch. This responsibility was for-
erly carried by TF X-Ray. From 1 September to 16 October considerable
difficulties were encountered in activating the AUTOSEVCCOM facility
and subscriber terminals. Technical assistance was required to solve
equipment problems, to condition circuits for narrow band subscribers,
and to activate terminal equipment at the 101st Airborne Division (AM)
and Ist Cavalry Division (AM).

b. Technical assistance was provided by the 1st Signal Brigade,
AUTOSEVCCOM Company and representative of Philco-Ford. Through the
efforts of this combined team of technicians, the AUTOSEVCCOM Switch
was accepted for operation on 14 October.

5. (C) Increase in Corps Contingency Communications Assets.

a. With the expansion of the Corps AO and increase in troop
density within the Corps area the need for increased communications
capabilities was realized by HQ, USARV. On 20 September USARV CP AN
82-69 (C-E Augmentation to XXIV Corps) designated the following items
of equipment to be placed under XXIV Corps control:

3 ea 24-channel troposcatter systems,
2 ea 12-channel radio systems with relay capability,
4 ea 4-channel radio systems.

b. Equipment was provided to extend Corps command/control communi-
cations to meet tactical requirements within the shortest possible time.
This equipment provides the Corps with a limited capability to compensate
for lack of a corps signal battalion.
6. (U) Activation of Mode I Terminal. On 25 October a Mode I Terminal (UNIVAC 1004) was activated as part of the Phu Bai Army Area Communications Center. It provides duplex asynchronous operation for digital message and card traffic with automatic error-detect and control channels allowing independent, simultaneous two-way transmission. The Phu Bai AACC Mode I Terminal is a subscriber of the Phu Trang Automatic Switching Center, which provides secure store and forward switching to the AUTODIN System. Activation of the terminal was accomplished without difficulty.

K. ENGINEER

1. (C) Command Relationships. No changes have occurred during the report period. The two US Army engineer battalions supporting the 1st Cavalry Division (AC) and the 101st Airborne Division (AC) are assigned to the 45th Engineer Group (Const.) and are tasked by III Marine Amphibious Force. The 11th Engineer Battalion, FTP, which supports the 3rd Marine Division is also tasked by III Marine Amphibious Force. Five Navy mobile construction battalions (Seabees) are assigned to the 72d Naval Construction Regiment and are tasked by Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam upon request from III Marine Amphibious Force. The 96, XTV Corps has no direct tasking authority of any general support engineer units within the Corps AO.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Support of Tactical Operations. The denial plan of Operation Somerset Plain included minefields at three defiles along Rt 54P in the A Shau Valley. Chemical delay fuzes were adapted for use with M-16, AP and M-19, AT mines. The fuzes were set so that the minefields would self-destruct in approximately 45 days. Electronic sensors (Hansids) were also placed within the minefield so that enemy minefield breaching activity would be detected.

b. LOC and Logistical Support Facilities.

(1) Upgrading of CL-1 from Lang Co to Dong Ha continued during the period. Paving from Hue south to Phu Bai is complete. Paving from Dong Ha to Quang Tri is 5% complete.

(2) Two lane, class 60 timber pile bridges were completed at YD 623302 and YD 460400 during the period.

(3) Rt 551 was paved and a two lane class 60 bridge was completed at YD 312296.

(4) Airfields - The airfield at Camp Evans was upgraded to Type II C-130. Work was completed on 30 September. Approval was obtained for the construction of a parallel taxiway at the Phu Bai Airfield.

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3. (U) Base Development - On 5 September authorization was received from USARV to upgrade Army construction standards at tactical operating bases under the Hotel Billeting Concept. A request was submitted on 14 September for Seahut-type construction of 280 billets, 949 dispensaries and 409,684 square feet of mess facilities. Construction has proceeded up to the scope approved by USARV on 16 October and it is anticipated that the remaining administration buildings, dispensaries, and morale and welfare facilities will be completed in the near future.

L. O5 ACTIVITIES

1. (U) General.

   a. In March 1966 when Provisional Corps, Vietnam was established, the role of the Corps O5 was visualized as the standard O5 role; i.e., civil affairs and psychological operations. Since its original formation, the O5 Section has undergone repeated reorientations. Today the role of the O5 is, in the main, oriented toward pacification, revolutionary development and reconstruction. The functions of civil actions and psychological operations are not being reduced in scope; they are being intensified and integrated into the pacification and revolutionary development effort. The O5 therefore performed the tasks of developing channels with ODRDS officers and staffs (from III Marine Amphibious Force level down to district advisor level); increasing the interchange of information between this headquarters and those offices; and performing the principal XXIV Corps liaison functions to and with those offices. The O5 Section sought and began to acquire, through the cooperation of Province Senior Advisors of both Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, information with which to develop a data base on the activities of the many OVN agencies associated with pacification effort e.g., revolutionary development (RD) cadre, Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), National Police Field Forces (NPFF), etc. As of the end of this quarter this data base is still being assembled although a significant amount has been recorded.

   b. During August, the Corps Commander's emphasis turned increasingly toward the approaching Northeast Monsoon. This produced a shift of tactical operations from NVA/VC main force units in the western Corps AO, to those in the piedmont and coastal plains. The successful, combined operation in Vinh Loc (11-20 Sep 66) resulted from very close coordination between the Province, ARVN, and US forces. This operation demonstrated the value of well developed knowledge and understanding of the various provincial agencies and territorial forces. In this regard, the Corps Commander tasked the O5 Section to provide the information from which to build this knowledge and understanding. Answers were required to a variety of questions. For example, regarding the RF/PF
in a given district, representative information sought was the current unit deployments, strength, status of training, battle effectiveness, status of equipment, and the pertinent local regulations and ground rules which govern their potential in combined operations. The same type of questions were to be answered concerning such GVN agencies as RD cadre, Vietnamese Information Service, Police Special Branch, WPFF, Phung Hoang, etc. Planning for the support of the GVN Special Pacification Plan made obvious the need for further expanding the existing data base so that the important information to be gained therefrom will be more readily available to the Commander.

c. G5 Bulletins. During the reporting period the XVII Corps G5 Section instituted a periodic G5 Bulletin. The purpose of the publication is to provide a consolidated source of guidance and information for the units OPCON to the Corps. The content of the bulletin includes the latest pacification activities, civic action and PSTOP guidance, ideas and innovations from higher and lower headquarters, as well as from this office. The bulletin also serves as a showcase for the activities of the Corps units and provides an excellent means of transmitting ideas from one unit to another. Through its wide dissemination to other staff sections, it provides the Commander with a consolidated source of information on pacification matters, civic action activities, and psychological operations within XXIV Corps.

d. G5 Conferences. During the past three months XVII Corps G5 has instituted a series of monthly G5 Conferences. The purpose of these meetings is to provide a forum for the interchange of ideas, to plan future activities and to permit detailed explanations of current operations. The first conference was held at XVII Corps Headquarters and was addressed by MG Drake, the Deputy Commanding General of XVII Corps. The basic format of the conferences consists of a brief resume of the month's activities by each division, presentations by Corps representatives and a discussion period. Presently, representatives from the three US divisions, Thua Thien and Guang Tri Provinces, and the 1st ARVN Division attend the conferences.

2. (U) Civic Action:

a. Civic Action Progress:

(1) During the reporting period, civic action activities continued to increase. The experience gained and the relationships established with local officials during the spring and early summer bore fruit as more and more interest in civic action projects was displayed by the people, especially in their participation in self-help programs. Units report an average of 70%-80% of the labor performed on civic action projects during the reporting period was self-help. During this time the units OPCON to XXIV Corps spent nearly 3600 man-days (ten hour days)
in civic action work and treated nearly 60,000 patients in the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). Corps units have utilized and/or made available to the people some 50 tons of commodities per week during the past quarter. This constitutes a 500% increase over the previous reporting period. These commodities included soap, food, medical supplies, various CARE Kits, and construction materials such as sand, gravel, tiles, bricks and both salvage and quality lumber. There was an increase in support to nearly 200 institutions (schools, orphanages, and hospitals) by moneys and technical advice and assistance in addition to the above commodities.

(2) Civic action projects undertaken covered a broad spectrum. The Third Marine Division Memorial Children's Hospital (Donc Ha Facility) was opened in early September. This hospital has operated at its capacity of 15 inpatients since the first day of operation and has provided outpatient treatment to nearly 200 children each day. Another G4 project is the 101st Airborne Division (AW) Corrective Surgery for Little Tots (CSSTTT). Through this project four children, chosen by the Division Surgeon on visits to various schools and orphanages are sent each week to the 94th Evacuation Hospital in Da Nang for surgery on correctable physical defects. The 1st Cavalry Division (AV) has sponsored a school house construction project in Quang Tri City. Aside from the US contribution of a supervisor to assist in the construction, the project is essentially a combination of Vietnamese efforts. The bricks used were made at a brick factory in Quang Tri where Chieu Hoi labor is employed. The people themselves are building the school. This type of action indicates the people have the interest and desire to accomplish their own projects.

(3) During the reporting period the XIV Corps C5 Section assisted and coordinated on a number of activities in the field of civic action or related areas. The following are representative of these activities.

(a) On 8 August representatives of four mobile advisory teams from Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces took part in a seminar chaired by the Corps G5. The purpose of the seminar was to relate to the Corps Staff what a mobile advisory team is, its capabilities, and the ends toward which MAT activities are directed. Representatives from the major staff sections at XIV Corps Headquarters and the Third Combined Action Group attended. This seminar enabled the Corps Staff to become cognizant of the various MAT activities and those areas where the Corps might provide advice and/or assistance.

b) For personnel assigned to Headquarters XIV Corps, the G5 Section presented a film on civic action and psychological operations entitled "The Unique War". During a two day period nearly 200 of the headquarters personnel attended this presentation.
(c) During the last quarter the G5 Section began publishing a series of G5 Information Papers for HQ, XXIV Corps. The purpose of these papers is to present the Vietnamese people in the context of their society and environment. Beginning with a paper explaining the Buddhist holiday Trung Nguyen or Landing Souls Day, the series has progressed from a sketch of the background of the religions of Vietnam to brief papers on Animism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Then this portion of the series has been completed, the customs and traditions of Vietnam will be presented and future plans call for coverage of such subjects as Vietnamese history and heritage.

(d) This office acted as a coordination point for the 7th Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company in its Thuy Phu Dam Project. Coordination was made with the 32d Naval Construction Regiment, the Army’s 27th Engineer Battalion, XXIV Corps Engineers, and 172d Engineer Detachment for transportation assistance for the materials needed at the dam site. Shortly thereafter, with the southward extension of the “CIV Corps Area of Operation, this office coordinated with G5, III Marine Amphibious Force in the transfer of the 7th Platoon from Task Force “X-Ray” to its attachment to the 101st Airborne Division (A/B).

(e) During early January, Typhoon Press struck “US” causing extensive flooding and some brief displacements of the populace. The G5 Section acted as a coordination point for province and division civilian relief reports and activities. Requests from the province senior advisors for assistance were channeled through this office and then relayed to the appropriate division. The 101st Airborne Division (A/B) and the 1st Cavalry Division (V) provided helicopter transport and XXIV Corps supplied over 5000 cases of C-rations to support refugees in Huong Tra, Phu Thuy, Phu Loc and Huong Dien Districts in Thua Thien Province. In coordination with the Corps Surgeon, the G5 provided medical supplies for preventive inoculation in Quang Tri Province. In addition, necessary arrangements were made to insure the CORDS inoculation team from Da Nang stayed a “US” town long enough to provide complete protection to the populace.

(f) Other projects instituted by the Civil Affairs Division included the provision of some 700 books to the Hue Cultural Center Library. Coordination was made with the G6 Section to provide over 20,000 members to a mobile advisory team in Huong Tra District of Hue Thien Province and to the Division to implement security at the locations. The G5 Section also was instrumental in obtaining an area at the Hue Tai complex for the G5 of the 101st Airborne Division (A/B) to open a salvage yard to provide a central location for units performing civic action in the Phu Bai area to store and receive supplies of lumber for their projects. In coordination with civil affairs platoon leaders in direct support of the province senior advisors in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, the Civil Affairs Division is gathering a list of province approved civic action projects for the 101st Airborne Division (A/B).
Division has prepared and distributed a District Survey Sheet. This comprehensive list of questions covers province/district activities from government and political through economic, agricultural and the pacification effort. As answers are received they are compiled into a usable data base for the Headquarters as well as forming a core of information for a study of the NICTZ area.

b. Civic Action Effectiveness.

(1) The following trends were noted in civic action reports received by this headquarters:

(a) MEDCAPS are still the most effective high impact civic action program available due to the large number of people reached and the immediacy of the results of the assistance provided. The training of health workers and Popular Force soldiers will help the SVN place greater emphasis on MEDCAP and thus enable the people to more closely identify with the government.

(b) Vietnamese civilians continue to respond favorably toward the Civil Affairs Program and continue to return low level intelligence information concerning local Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities.

(c) In many areas cooperation between local officials and civil affairs personnel continued to improve. Requests for civil affairs assistance generated at hamlet and village level were forwarded through district headquarters where district authorities could bring the requests to the attention of division civil affairs personnel when assistance was necessary. This is significant inasmuch as the role of the district government is increasingly recognized and relied upon by the people in the hamlets and villages.

3. (U) Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

a. The XTV Corps, G5 PSYOP Officer continued to monitor PSYOP conducted by OPCON units within the AC and to coordinate XTV Corps activities with ARVN, Provincial and III Marine Amphibious Force PSYOP agencies.

b. The majority of XTV Corps PSYOP efforts was directed against the NVA and VC main force units. However, in conjunction with the Military Assistance Command PSYOP Directorate, "Five Campaigns Program," propaganda efforts were also directed at local nationals and WNI.

c. One of the primary goals for the PSYOP effort during the quarter was improved targeting techniques. In this regard, subordinate headquarters were asked to justify targets of questionable appropriateness. Thus, where divisions formerly proposed targets of nine square kilometers they have become more selective, targets as small as one square kilometer are now being requested. Further, through close monitoring of available intelligence information, PSYOP officers are now disseminating propaganda messages much more applicable to the intended target audience than ever before.
d. A second primary goal, the expansion of the Chieu Hoi program was achieved within the Corps AO. Aggressive combined tactical operations, coupled with well planned PSTOP has resulted in an increase in the number of ralliers, 728 for this quarter as compared to 590 during the second quarter of this year and 132 for the same reporting period of last year.

e. During this quarter, a lack of an adequate number of leaflets to support the PSTOP effort existed for a short period of time. One beneficial result of this was that all units were forced to select carefully their targets. This careful selection of targets continued after the supply problem was solved.

f. The Corps PSTOP Section specifically designed five "type" leaflets, three tape messages, two annexes to Corps OPFANS and an annex to the Corps Tactical SOF.

g. One existing problem that cannot be resolved at this headquarters is the shortage of personnel assigned to the 7th PSTOP Fr. This shortage has resulted in a considerable reduction in the quality of HP (loudspeaker) and HE (Audio-Visual) Teams. Some teams have been augmented by untrained personnel from the 3d Marine Division, others continue to operate at reduced strength, and some teams have had to be recalled.

h. During this quarter, the section processed an average of 100 requests weekly, and in response to these requests a total of 194,929,620 leaflets were disseminated and 10 3/4 hours of messages were broadcast over loudspeaker (aerial and ground).

i. To inform XXIV Corps headquarters of some of the various methods used in PSTOP, the 05 brought the 10th Political Warfare Battalion Drama Team to Phu Bai to perform for officers and enlisted members of the XXIV Corps Staff.

j. The following actions were taken to improve the equipment status of, and rapport with, the Thua Thien Province Armed Propaganda Team (APT):

(1) Arranged for Mr. Nguyen Thuy, Company CO of the APT to be evacuated through U.S. medical channels to the 95th Evac Hospital to receive corrective therapy for an improperly healed broken arm.

(2) Issued to the provinces, for repair and issue, some field equipment not available to the APT (helmets, web gear, etc.) which was obtained from salvage. This equipment will improve the effectiveness of the teams.
Section 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. COMMAND

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Item: Combined Screening and Interrogation of Detainees

   a. OBSERVATIONS: During combined US/GVN operations, intelligence information is often lost or its value decreased due to delays in processing detainees. Problems noted are: interrogation teams not available at the point of capture; delays in moving detainees to a collection point where they can be screened, classified, and interrogated; lack of sufficient trained personnel at collection points to process large numbers of detainees; and absence of standard dissemination procedures.

   b. EVALUATION: Combined interrogation facilities, established by mutual agreement at a preselected point prior to each combined operation, alleviates the problem. Establishment of such a facility concentrates interrogation assets of all participating agencies at one point in the area of the operation. This enhances expeditious processing and dissemination of information.

   c. RECOMMENDATIONS: Prior to each combined operation, all participating US/GVN forces and agencies:

      (1) Establish a combined interrogation facility, pooling interrogators and interpreters.

      (2) Establish procedures for displacement of detainees to the facility, screening the detainees, and selecting detainees for detailed on-the-spot interrogation.

      (3) Establish procedures for rapid dissemination of intelligence information, and rapid exploitation of detainees.

      (4) Arrange for the use of mobile interrogation teams to augment organic assets.

C. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) Item: Combined Ground and Naval Operations

   a. OBSERVATIONS: During the report period, numerous successful
combined US/RVN ground and naval operations were conducted within the Corps AO.

b. EVALUATION: These successful operations were the results of the cooperation, coordination, planning and employment of both naval and ground forces in conducting operations along the inland and coastal waterways within XXV Corps AO. The ground commanders, by employing naval assets to deny the enemy use of the waterways as withdrawal and resupply routes, can better achieve his combat mission.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That ground commanders conducting operations in the vicinity of the inland and coastal waterways routinely consider using naval assets to provide blocking and screening forces to complement their scheme of maneuver.

2. (C) ITEM: Cordon and Search Operations

a. OBSERVATION: During the report period, there were many successful combined cordon and search operations using US, ARVN, PF, RF and National Police.

b. EVALUATION:

(1) Often during these operations, the cordon would be established by US, or US and ARVN forces while the searching/sweeping/screening/interrogating force consisted primarily ARVN, National Police, and RF/PF forces. The native Vietnamese, due to their patience, background and knowledge of the people, are better suited than US units to perform the detailed searching, screening, and interrogation tasks. This technique was successfully employed in uncovering numerous rice and arms caches and capturing many VC/NVA detainees.

(2) The effectiveness of a cordon and search operation depends heavily on allowing the operation to continue for sufficient time. Sustained control of an area for extended periods by US/Fr/RF/ARVN forces, eventually forces the enemy to search for rations and to attempt a break-out. At this time he is vulnerable to capture or destruction.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all future cordon and search operations be conducted as combined operations.

(2) That cordon and search operations be conducted for extended periods in a local area to provide sustained control of the area and surveillance of local inhabitants.

3. (U) Item: ORLL Preparation

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a. OBSERVATION: A meeting of action officers preparing general and special staff inputs to XXIV Corps' Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) reduces time required to organize, coordinate and publish the ORLL.

b. EVALUATION: Rotation and reassignment of personnel within Corps Headquarters impairs continuity of staff inputs to quarterly ORII. The result of personnel turbulence is attenuated by a meeting held two weeks prior to the close of the report period for all general and special staff personnel preparing ORII inputs. At this meeting previous ORII's are reviewed and details of AR 525-15 and USARV Rep 525-15 are discussed. As a result of the meeting, staff inputs to XXIV Corps ORII conform to regulations governing preparation of the ORII and require little editing.

c. RECOMMENDATION: ORII preparation meetings be held at headquarters with general and special staffs to insure staff inputs conform to regulations governing preparation of the ORII.

D. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) ITEM: Finance Section

a. OBSERVATION: Since February, all non-divisional US Army units in the XXIV Corps AO have been serviced by a finance unit at Da Nang which is 30 to 90 miles from the units. Payment has been accomplished by means of pay teams furnished by the finance unit at the end of each month.

b. EVALUATION: The lack of a finance records keeping and disbursing facility in the area caused many problems in the receipt of assigned personnel. Many man-days were lost due to personnel from US Army non-divisional NIOTZ units travelling to and from Da Nang to process finance records or to conduct other pay actions requiring personal appearance at the finance section. The distance involved, required accumulation of pay complaints and day-to-day pay actions for periodic delivery to the finance section. This caused delays in processing, and required initiation of a courier service to insure receipt of actions at the finance section.

c. RECOMMENDATION: When sizeable military concentrations are established in an area there should be an accompanying finance unit. Lacking this, the servicing finance unit should provide liaison teams to these areas to handle day to day finance transactions. (The establishment of a finance unit at Phu Bai the last part of October has partially alleviated this situation.)

2. (U) ITEM: Provost Marshal Staff Section
a. **OBSERVATION.** TOE 52-1T and present doctrine as contained in FM 19-2, Military Police Support in the Field Army show a corps headquarters without a separate Provost Marshal staff section. These publications provide for one military police officer, O5, as a staff specialist in the G1 section for discipline and law and order matters. These documents also provide for one military police officer, O4, in the G4 section for military police coordination in traffic management. These special staff officers so assigned, split responsibility for advising the commander and staff on military police support operations. Headquarters, XXIV Corps, I and II Field Forces in Vietnam are organized with a separate Provost Marshal staff section with one O4, O5, O4, O3, E9 and El.

b. **EVALUATION.** Experience has shown the Provost Marshal staff section as organized in Headquarters, XXIV Corps is best suited to conduct constant and continuous coordination with all staff sections within the corps headquarters and adequately provides for the accomplishment of all functions as listed in paragraph 4-4c, FM 101-5. The Corps Provost Marshal with his staff can more effectively monitor and coordinate division military police operations with the military police support furnished on an area basis by the Military Police Brigade. Additionally, this type staff organization relieves the G-1 of direct involvement in military police functions and provides a single point of contact for the corps commander and his staff for military police matters.

c. **RECOMMENDATION.** That TOE 52-1T and FM 19-2 be revised to reflect the organization of the Provost Marshal section as authorized for this headquarters.

E. LOGISTICS

1. (C) **Item:** NORS Rate (Not Operationally Ready, Supply).

a. **OBSERVATION:** The NORS rate for aircraft within the command continues to be desirably low.

b. **EVALUATION:** As the PLI's and ASL's within the command are purified through demand experience, the NORS rate can be expected to remain low. One of the most effective methods to obtain aircraft parts not in stock is by lateral search. This does not mean "scrounge." Aircraft parts transferred from one unit to another should be recorded and demands placed upon the supply system. This is an acceptable method of obtaining repair parts and lowering the NORS rate.

c. **RECOMMENDATION:** That aviation unit commanders continue to operate or establish a thorough system for lateral search, not only within their commands but with as many adjacent units as possible.
CONFIDENTIAL

2. (C) Item: NORM Rate (Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance) M107/M110 SP Artillery.

a. OBSERVATION: At the beginning of the reporting period, the NORM rate for subject items averaged 40% of on hand assets. This situation continued throughout most of the reporting period.

b. EVALUATION: NORM rate is due, in part, to mandatory continued use of weapons, time required for repair, and repair parts supply. Emphasis on the closed loop program is beginning to show some improvement in the NORM rate, and a marked improvement is expected in future reports. 1st Logistical Command is establishing a maintenance team to visit using units and support maintenance units in the near future. The team plans to update the training of operators and mechanics. Results of this training will undoubtedly improve the NORM rate.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That continued emphasis be placed on the closed loop support program.

(2) That the 1st Logistical Command maintenance team visit units with M107/M110's as soon as possible.

F. INSPECTOR GENERAL

None.

G. INFORMATION

1. (U) Item: Lifting Embargo on Information.

a. OBSERVATION: While lifting embargoes on information and releasing fast breaking news, delays were encountered in processing the facts of the operation.

b. EVALUATION: It was determined that timely release of news at MACOI could be expedited by having the IO of the requesting headquarters notify the MACOI releasing authority, to be alert for the message requesting release, so facts and figures could be readily verified at the COO and the information released.

c. RECOMMENDATION: Requests for lifting a news embargo of an operation should have MACOI listed as an information addressee. This will expedite release of information.

H. COMMAND HISTORY
1. (U) **Item:** Use of More than One Historical Detachment to Cover an Operation.

   a. **Observation:** During the period 11-14 September the 21st Military History Detachment in coordination with the 22d Military History Detachment recorded interviews and conducted research in Vinh Long District during a combined operation.

   b. **Evaluation:** The use of a detachment assigned to the Corps, in coordination with a detachment assigned to a division, enables a more complete coverage of all units and elements involved in the operation. Working together the two historians can coordinate their movements, evaluate the adequacy of each other's work and plan additional coverage as required.

   c. **Recommendation:** None.

I. **Aviation**

   None.

J. **Signal**

   1. (U) **Item:** Lack of Reliable Airborne Radio Relay Capability.

      a. **Observation:** During Operation Somerset Plain, it was planned to use U-1A aircraft equipped with ARC-121 radios to relay three FM radio nets from the A Shau Valley. Use of these aircraft, even equipped with blade antennas, proved unreliable. The U-1A aircraft could only fly under VFR conditions making 24 hour per day coverage impossible.

      b. **Evaluation:** An ARC-121 radio was ground mounted at Naples Nest (Hill 1487) which relayed three FM radio nets from the A Shau Valley floor to Camp Raleigh throughout the operation.

      c. **Recommendation:** That a reliable, all weather IFR aircraft be adapted to provide FM radio relay capability.

   2. (U) **Item:** Equipment for Base Defense Communications.

      a. **Observation:** The movement of the TF X-Ray from the Phu Bai area resulted in the removal of all USMC owned and operated communications equipment previously used in base defense operations. V Corps assumed the responsibility without equipment assets which resulted in delay of removal of the USMC equipment. Removal of some equipment was possible, but authority to requisition needed items was difficult to obtain and delayed acquisition of equipment required. A similar problem will occur with each change of unit responsibility.
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b. EVALUATION: By diverting equipment from its intended use and by temporary use of USMC equipment the initial problem was resolved. Action has been taken to obtain additional equipment for base defense communication requirements.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That base defense communication equipment be requested by TDA submission, and upon approval of the TDA, the equipment, be issued to the base camp coordinator, upon its arrival. The necessary TDA action to obtain these assets has been initiated.

K. ENGINEER

1. (C) Item: Chemical Fuzes

a. OBSERVATION: Threads on chemical delay fuzes are not compatible with the threads in the fusing well of M-19 AT mines. During Operation Severset Plain, the chemical fuse was imbedded in a booster charge of C-4 explosive which was then placed below the mine.

b. EVALUATION: The external booster charge provides enemy forces with a source of explosives if the anti-lift device is defeated.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That chemical delay fuzes with compatible mounting threads be procured for test and evaluation.

L. G5 ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Item: Military Police Rewards Program.

a. OBSERVATION: As noted in this report for the previous quarter, great success was anticipated for this program, wherein US Army roving MP patrols would have funds immediately available for the payment of rewards. Unfortunately, the program has not been a success.

b. EVALUATION: The entire Rewards Campaign in XXIV Corps is currently undergoing reevaluation. This MP program and all portions of the campaign have proven to be a disappointment. Corrective action will be taken when our errors are found.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

2. (U) Item: Chieu Hoi Program.

a. OBSERVATION: Again this quarter, the Chieu Hoi program is far ahead of the previous year. Thua Thien has proven to be the more lucrative province, from which came 612 of the total 728 ralliers for the quarter.

b. EVALUATION: Aggressive, combined, US and GVN tactical operations,
coupled with well planned PSIP integrated into the action, are considered the key to success. Where PSIP assets are handled like a weapon system fully integrated in the operation, success in this program has been realized.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.


a. OBSERVATION: During the reporting period, due to the substantial increase in civic action activity coupled with the building needs of individual units in the Corps, a shortage of building materials, especially lumber, continued to exist. This nonavailability of material slowed many construction/reconstruction projects.

b. EVALUATION: The 101st Abn Div (T) has instituted a scrap lumber project whereby all salvage lumber, pallets, ammunition boxes, and wooden crates are taken from the division trash dump and separated according to quality and type of wood. This is then delivered to the various division projects. The lumber which is not usable for construction is delivered wherever needed for firewood thus making the project 100% effective.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

Section 3. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION

A. ESCAPE, EVASION AND SURVIVAL

No report.
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFORD-65 (RL)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, XXIV
Corps.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning shortage of personnel, page 21, Section
1, paragraph 13g. The 4th Psychological Operations Group, parent unit of
the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, is critically short Translator-
Interpreters, MOS 04BL, senior broadcast specialists, MOS 71R4W, and
psychological warfare qualified personnel in other MOS. Headquarters,
Department of the Army, has been unable to fill USARV requisitions for these
MOS. USARV has been promised a substantial increase in MOS 04B input
during January and February 1968.

b. Reference item concerning combined screening and interrogation of
detainees, page 22, Section 2, paragraph B1. Concur with the recommendations
contained in paragraph B1c. The suggestions provide economical and effi-
cient ways to screen and interrogate detainees. At the present time USARV
is experiencing a shortage of qualified linguists. The pooling of these
assets and combining them with ARVN greatly increases their effectiveness
and insures their maximum utilization.

c. Reference item concerning finance service for nondivisional personnel,
page 24, Section 2, paragraph D1. Concur with the recommendations contained
in paragraph D1c. Two additional finance activities have been authorised
for I CTZ. These activities will be located at Quang Tri and Chu Lai and
are expected to become operational by 15 January 1969.

d. Reference item concerning Provost Marshal Staff Section, page 24,
Section 2, paragraph E2. Concur with the recommendation that TOE 52-T
and FM 19-2 be revised to include a Provost Marshal Staff Section. This
is a matter of concern for higher headquarters.
AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period
Ending 31 October 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

e. Reference item concerning NORM (Not Operationally Ready, Maintenance)
rate, M107/M110 SP artillery, page 26, Section 2, paragraph E2. Concur
with the recommendations. Emphasis on the Closed Loop Support Program will
be continued. The 1st Logistical Command maintenance team is now operating
in the XXIV Corps area.

f. Reference item concerning lifting of embargo on information, page
26, Section 2, paragraph G1. Concur. Action will be taken to advise
Information Officers to list the Military Assistance Command Office of
Information (MACOI) as an information addressee on requests for lifting a
news embargo of an operation. Information Officers have already been
notified to include the date/time groups of the message requesting the
lifting of the embargo when submitting a news release pertaining to that
particular operation.

g. Reference item concerning Lack of Reliable Airborne Radio Relay
Capability, page 27, Section 2, paragraph J1. Concur. An ENSURE request
has been submitted for a lightweight, four set radio relay installation
for the U-1A to improve its performance. Subsequent studies are being
conducted to determine the optimum aircraft for this mission in RVN. No
further action by higher headquarters is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W.C. ARNTZ
Assistant

Cy furr:
HQ XXIV Corps
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
XXIV Corps

HHC
Corps Avn Co (Prov)
MI Det (Prov)
FI Det (Prov)
Trans Co (Car) (Prov)
33d Chemical Det
24 Flat, Co A, 504th MP Bn
Team D, 221st Signal Co
31st Mil Hist Det
220th Recon Acft Co
45th FI Det

1st Cavalry Division (AM)

101st Airborne Division (AM)

HHC
1st Brigade
HHC
1st Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 327th Inf
2d Bn, 505th Inf

1 Troop List for 1st Cavalry Division (AM) is not listed due to Operation Liberty Canyon.

Incl 2 Troop List
2d Brigade

HHC
1st Bn, 501st Inf
2d Bn, 501st Inf
1st Bn, 502d Inf

3d Brigade

HHC
3d Bn, 167th Inf
1st Bn, 506th Inf
2d Bn, 506th Inf

Division Artillery

HHE
2d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 320th Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 321st Arty (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 11th Arty (-) (155mm) (T)
Btry A (OPCON II FORCEN)
F Btry, 16th Arty (155mm) (T)
HHE, 4th Bn ARA 77th Arty

160th Avn Gp
101st Aslt Hel En
159th Aslt Spt Hel En
163d Avn Co (GS)

Division Troops

3d Bn, 506th Inf (OPCON II FORCEN)
2d Sqdn, 17th Cav
3d Sqdn, 5th Cav (OPCON)
326th Engr Bn
501st Sig Bn
Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (Atch from 1st Cav Div)
Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armer (OPCON)
Co F, 58th Inf (LRP)
101st MP Co
265th RNC
42d Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
47th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
58th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
557th Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)
10th Cal Plat
20th Cal Det
36th Cal Det
22d Mil Hist Det
25th PI Det
34th PI Det
45th PI Det
101st MI Det
181st MI Det
359th ASD
Division Support Command

HHC & Band
5th TAM Bn
326th Med Bn
426th S&S Bn
801st Maint Bn

1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

HHC
1st Bn, 11th Inf
1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)
1st Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)
5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)
Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cav
Co A, 7th Engr Bn

75th GS Spt Bn

HHC
Co A (Admin)
Co B (Med)
Co C (S&T)
Co D (Maint)

48th PI Det
86th Cal Det
298th Sig Co
517th MI Det
407th RR Det
XXIV Corps Artillery

HHB

1st Bn, 83d Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)
2d Bn, 138th Arty (155mm) (SP)

108th Arty Op

HHB

8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

(Btry B, OPCON 1st Mar Div)

6th Bn, 33d Arty (105mm) (T)
1st Bn, 40th Arty (105mm) (SP)
1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)

Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 cal MG)
(Atch 1/44 Arty)

Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)
(Atch 1/44 Arty; OPCON III MAF)

2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

Btry F, 2d Bn, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)

235th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-4A Radar)
238th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-4A Radar)
239th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-4A Radar)
240th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-4A Radar)
245th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-4A Radar)
250th FA Radar Det (AN/MQ-4A Radar)

1st 8" How Dtry (FMF Pacific) (OPCON XXIV Corps Arty)

5th 155 Gun Dtry (155mm gun - 8" How) (FMF Pacific) (OPCON XXIV Corps Arty)
3d Marine Division

HQ Bn (-)(Rein)
Hq Co (-)
Serv Co (-)
MP Co (-)
Det, Comm Co
7th Intelligence Translation Team
15th Counterintelligence Team
7th Counterintelligence Team

3d Marines (Rein)
HQ Co
1st Bn, 3d Mar
2d Bn, 3d Mar
3d Bn, 3d Mar

1st AMTRAC Bn (FMF Pacific)

TF Hotel
HQ TF Hotel

4th Marines (Rein)
HQ Co
1st Bn, 4th Mar
2d Bn, 4th Mar
3d Bn, 4th Mar

9th Marines (-)(Rein)
HQ Co
1st Bn, 9th Mar
2d Bn, 9th Mar
3d Bn, 9th Mar
12th Marines (-)(Rein)
HQ Btry (Rein)
1st Slt Btry (FMF Pacific)
1st Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)
2d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)
3d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)
4th Bn, 12th Mar (155mm) (T)
1st Armd Amph (105mm LVTH)
2d Tank Bn (Rein)
3d Recn Bn (Rein)
3d Shore Party Bn
9th Motor Transport Bn (-) (Rein)
3d Motor Transport Bn (-) (Rein)
3d Med Bn (-) (Rein)
3d Dental Co (FMF Pacific)
3d Engr Bn (Rein)
11th Engr Bn (FMF Pacific)
Force Recon Co (FMF Pacific)

Task Force Clearwater
River Div 543
River Div 521
Coastal Div 17
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1968.
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE

** FOR OT UT #

***PAGE #

ITEM 2

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SUBJECT TITLE

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PAGE #

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT UT #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.
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