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2 January 1969

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Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 68.

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

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101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 101ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96383

AVD-DAC 15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968

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1. (U) REFERENCE:
   a. USARV Reg 525-15
   b. PCV Reg 525-2
   c. 101st ACD Reg 1-1

2. (U) In accordance with references the Operational Report Lessons Learned for Division Artillery is submitted for reporting period 1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968.

3. (C) Section 1, Operation: Significant activities.
   a. Narrative of significant unit activities:
      (1) On 1 May 1968 the 101st Air Cavalry Division Artillery was disposed as follows:

         (a) Hq & Hq Btry, Division Artillery was collocated with Division Headquarters in Camp Eagle. In addition to its normal role, the Division Artillery was assigned the task of coordinating the Camp Eagle perimeter defense.

         (b) The 1st Battalion, 319th Artillery was attached to the 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division which is OPOON to II FFV and is located in the vicinity of Phuoc Vinh, in the III Corps area.

         (c) The 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery was DS to the 1st Brigade and was engaged in Operation Delaware. On 1 May 1968, its batteries were located at Fire Support Base Veghel, Bastogne, and Strike.

         (d) The 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery was DS to the 2d Brigade and was engaged in Operation Carentan II. Its batteries were located at Fire Support Base Mongoose, Omaha, and Birmingham.
(a) The 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery remained organic to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division which is under the operational control of the 101st Air Cavalry Division and was engaged in Operation Delaware. Its batteries were located at Fire Support Base Boyd, Geronimo, and Camp Rodriguez.

(f) The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery minus A Btry, which was attached to the 2d Brigade Task Force, provided General Support to the division from Fire Support Base Bastogne, Veghel, Birmingham, Shirley, and Pinky.

(2) On 1 May the following artillery units were supporting the 101st Air Cavalry Division Artillery:

(a) 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery (minus B Btry) was General Support, Reinforcing the 101st Air Cavalry Division Artillery, and was located at Fire Support Base Eagle, Panther I, and Bastogne.

(b) C Btry, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery was attached to the 1/83 Artillery and was located at FSB Sally.

(c) C Btry, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery was attached to the 2/11 Artillery and operated as the third firing battery for this battalion since its organic A Btry was detached to the 3d Brigade TF.

(d) C Btry, 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery was General Support, Reinforcing the 101st Air Cavalry Division Artillery and was located at FSB Bastogne.

(e) 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery; G Btry, 65th Artillery; and G Btry, 29th Artillery were in Direct Support of the 101st Air Cavalry Division as follows:

1. 40 mm (M-42), two at Camp Eagle and two at FSB Bastogne.

2. Quad .50 Cal (M-55) at Camp Eagle.


This equipment was used in base camp security. Additionally, the M55s were used to provide convoy security between Camp Eagle and FSB Bastogne.

3) In addition, the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery provided a fourth firing battery designated "D Btry" which was attached to the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry located at Phan Thiet in II Corps.


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to FSB Birmingham by air and remained there throughout the reporting period.

(5) On 5 May at 0200 hours, Camp Eagle and FSB Boyd were attacked by approximately twenty 82mm mortar rounds. The prearranged Camp Eagle Counter Mortar Program was immediately initiated and the attack terminated at 0440 hours with minimum damage and casualties.

(6) On 5 May Battery C, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery also deployed by air from FSB Birmingham to FSB Omaha, and Battery B deployed from FSB Omaha to LZ Pinky. These units were employed in support of a successful cordon operation at YD 690248. During this operation, light, medium, and heavy artillery were used to destroy the enemy defensive position within the cordon.

(7) On 6 May 1968 an artillery preparation was fired by 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery for a combat assault by the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry at YD 576171. The advance party of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery entered the area following the combat assault and established FSB "Snake". Battery C completed their occupation on 9 May 1968.

(8) On 7 May 1968 a company platoon, Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery deployed by road to LZ Pinky to support the 2d Brigade cordon operation which commenced on 5 May 1968. This unit was credited with 50 VC KIA by body count during this operation. Additional support was also provided by Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery, 1st Air Cavalry Division which was under the operational control of the 2nd Brigade 101st Air Cavalry Division during the period 6-10 May 1968.

(9) On 13 May 1968 Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery airlifted three 155mm howitzers from FSB Veghel to FSB Bastogne.

(10) On 15 May 1968 Battery C, 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery deployed three 155mm howitzers by road from FSB Birmingham to FSB Shirley to provide General Support Reinfocing fires for the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery.

(11) On 16 May 1968 Battery B, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery was assigned a direct support mission to the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry for operations east of Hue. Battery B was located at FSB Panther I.

(12) On 15 May 1968 Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery deployed by road to FSB Mongoose (YD 790272) to support operations of the 1st Battalion 501st Infantry east of Hue.

(13) On 17 May 1968 Operation Carentan and Operation Delaware terminated and Operation Nevada Eagle began. At this time, Division Artillery and artillery with the division was deployed as follows:
On 21 May Camp Eagle and FSB Boyd received a combined rocket and mortar attack. Light ground probes also occurred at several points along the Camp Eagle perimeter. Illumination supported the perimeter defense while artillery fire, light fire teams in UH-1D helicopters and AC-47 aircraft engaged known and suspected rocket and mortar positions. The attack began at 0033 hours and terminated at 0355 hours. During the attack the AN/PQ-4 counter mortar radar and flash observation posts were successfully employed to locate enemy rocket/mortar positions.

On 23 May 1968 two Platoons of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery displaced by road from LZ Sally to FSB Forward (YD627) to assume direct support of the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry. Battery C, 6th Battalion 33d Artillery(-) was released from support of the 17th Cavalry and returned to Division General Support.
(16) On 26 May the 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery because of major rotation of personnel was placed in a reorganization and training status until 1 August 1968. The battalion initiated a training program with emphasis on FDC and FO procedures and airmobile operations.

(17) On 30 May 1968 Battery C, 6th Battalion 16th Artillery displaced one platoon from FSB Pinky and one 155mm howitzer from FSB Sally by road to FSB Jom (Phu Bai). This element was assigned the mission of General Support, Reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery.

(18) On 31 May 1968 two platoons, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery displaced by road, from FSB Forward and FSB Sally to FSB Sab (YFB6187) to support operations in the coastal plains.

(19) On 2 June 1968 Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced three 155mm howitzers by air from FSB Bastogne to FSB Strike. Their mission was General Support, Reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(20) On 8 June 1968 Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced three 155mm howitzers by air from FSB Strike to FSB Veghel. This is believed to be the first tactical airlift of 155mm howitzers by the CH47 in Vietnam. Since that time air movement of the 155mm howitzer is common place with the exception that the CH54 is required when displacing 155mm howitzer positions at extremely high altitudes or during the heat of the day (0930-1600 hours).

(21) On 10 June 1968 the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was detached from 23d Artillery Group and assigned to the 101st Abn Div by USARV GO 2754. USA RV GO 2755 further detached Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery which remained attached to the 23d Artillery Group.

(22) On 11 June 1968 Battery B, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery displaced from FSB Panther I and was released from Operational Control of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery and returned to control of the 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery.

(23) On 10 June 1968 Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery moved by air from FSB Sabne to FSB Forward and continued in direct support of the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry.

(24) On 17 June 1968 Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery displaced by road from FSB Sabne to FSB Sally. Its mission was general support reinforcing the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery.

(25) On 28 June 1968 the Division Artillery Commander, Colonel Richard Pohl, and Sergeant Major Leroy Browning were killed in a helicopter crash at FSB Bastogne. LTC Edward Vogel assumed command on 29 June 1968.
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(26) On 25 June 1968, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, displaced three 155mm howitzers by road from FSB Shirley to FSB Boyd and were given the mission of General Support, Reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery.

(27) On 30 June 1968, Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery, displaced three tubes of 155mm howitzers from FSB Sally to FSB Mongoose to provide adequate medium artillery support in the 1st Battalion 501st Infantry area of operation. Their mission was General Support, Reinforcing the 1st Battalion 321st Artillery.

(28) On 3 July 1968, Battery B, 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery, conducted an artillery raid moving by air from FSB Panther II to FSB Panther III. The battery fired 1000 rounds on suspected enemy positions. The battery returned to Panther II at the completion of the raid.

(29) On 4 July 1968, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery, moved by road from FSB Mongoose to Camp Eagle to fire a 50 gun salute commemorating the holiday. The battery then returned to Mongoose. In conjunction with the salute, all the Division Artillery elements fired commemoration rounds. In all, 101 rounds were expended.

(30) On 5 July 1968, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, displaced their 155mm howitzers from FSB Boyd to FSB Bastogne to reinforce a preparation of the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, in support of the 1st Brigade combat assault. The battery returned to FSB Boyd the same day.

(31) On 6 July 1968, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, displaced their 155mm howitzers by air from FSB Boyd to FSB Normandy. The location of this element at FSB Normandy provided more complete medium artillery coverage as the 1st Brigade expanded their AO.

(32) On 9 July 1968, 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery, fired a preparation on LZ Green (YD76105) (Nui Ke). This LZ has since been developed into a battalion observation post.

(33) On 11 July 1968, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, displaced their remaining three howitzers by air from FSB Boyd to FSB Panther III. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery, displaced by air to FSB Bastogne and was attached to 2/321st Artillery. Battery B and C, 1st Battalion, 33d Artillery, moved by road from Panther 2y (YG05905) while Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, moved by helicopter from Bastogne to Panther III. This repositioning was accomplished to prepare for the combined ARVN/US operation on Loa Island (YG 8199) in the extreme southern portion of the Division area of operation.

(34) On 12 July 1968, Battery C, 11th Artillery (-) (ARVN) was moved by air from Birmingham to Panther III. This unit was in direct support of the
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ARVN Task Force consisting of the 37th or 39th ARVN Ranger Battalions which participated in the operation in the vicinity of Leach Island.

(35) On 13 July 1968 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery supporting medium and heavy artillery conducted a one hour preparation of LZ Leach prior to the assault on this LZ by elements of the 1st Brigade.

(36) On 18 July 1968 FSB Brick (YD835998) on Leach Island was occupied by Battery B, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(37) On 19 July 1968 Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) moved from FSB Panther III to FSB Brick while Battery B (-), moved from FSB Bastogne to Brick. These two elements were controlled by Battery C and were general support reinforcing to the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. Reinforcing medium artillery fires were also available for the ARVN Task Force.

(38) On 20 July 1968 Battery B, 11th Artillery (-) (ARVN) moved from FSB Panther III to FSB Brick by air.

(39) During the last 10 days of July extensive planning and movement began in preparation for Operation Somerset Plain. This combined operation in the A Shau Valley, which was to begin on 4 August 1968, required a major repositioning of artillery throughout the Division Area of Operations and a phase down of the operations in the vicinity of Brick and Normandy.

(40) On 21 July 1968 Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) displaced three 155mm howitzers by air from FSB Brick to FSB Bastogne. Batteries B and C, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery returned to Boyd and Gia Le respectively. Reconnaissance was conducted for new Fire Support Bases and FSB Son (YD473021) and Eagle's Nest (YD436035) were selected. Re tubing of Batteries B and C, 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery from eight inch to 175mm gun also commenced.

(41) On 23 July 1968 Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery moved by air from FSB Veghal to FSB Son. This was the first battery of the 101st ACD to fire into the A Shau Valley. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from FSB Boyd to FSB Veghal to replace A Battery, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.

(42) On 25 July 1968 Battery C, 11th Artillery (-) (ARVN) moved from FSB Brick to Hue.

(43) On 26 July 1968 Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery moved three 155mm howitzers from FSB Normandy to FSB Boyd in preparation for operation Somerset Plain and the closing of FSB Normandy. This element then moved by air on 27 July to FSB Son.
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(44) On 27 July Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery moved three 155mm howitzers from FSB Sally to Eagle's Nest. Division Artillery's AN/TPS-25 radar was also positioned at Eagle's Nest, at an altitude of 1487 meters.

(45) On 28 July Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery moved three 155mm howitzers from FSB Bastogne to Birmingham. The date for the commencement of Operation Somerset Plains was changed to 4 August 1968.

(46) On 30 July 1968 Battery C, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery moved from FSB Normandy to Panther II. FSB Normandy was closed on this date.

(47) On 31 July 1968 FSB Brick was closed with Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery moving the remainder of the battery from FSB Brick to FSB Son. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery moved from Brick to Camp Eagles. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery moved by air from Panther III to FSB Boyd. This move closed out Panther III. Preparation of FSBS Georgia and Bercht-Osgaden for operation Somerset Plains also began.


c. The following number of days units were engaged in:

(1) Training 13

(2) Troop movement 16

(3) Operations 92

* Includes 2/320, 1/321, 2/11 only.

d. The detachment of elements of major units continues to present logistical, administrative, personnel, and tactical difficulties that are as yet unresolved. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery Metro Section and Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery remain detached from their parent unit. Combat necessity may dictate detachment of units from their parent organization but it should not be for extended periods. The detachment of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery is a severe burden in that its organization was never approved and this battery has been formed since 10 October 1967. Personnel and equipment for this battery came from the resources within the battalion. This was a contributing factor to the increase of incidents in the battalion and affected its ability to perform its combat mission. To alleviate the problem 70 personnel (Officers, Section Chiefs, FDC personnel, and other specialist) were transferred from the 1st Battalion, 321st Artillery and a lesser numbers from the 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery to the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery.
a. Combined operations with regular ARVN units and local RF/PF elements have increased. While language difficulties prevail, this has been overcome by proper use of US Liaison Officers placed at the Bn/Btry and Task Force level. These Liaison teams are briefed on the overall mission and are provided with the communications to permit proper coordination between US and ARVN units. It has also proved extremely beneficial to have direct communications between the Task Force IMO and Division Artillery Tactical Operations Center. Thus when problem areas arise they can be resolved at the command level which has the capability to react promptly to a specific situation. It is imperative, however, that in the planning phase for combined operations that both US and ARVN Commanders have a clear understanding of each other's problems and procedures, both tactical and logistical.

2. (C) Section 2 Lessons Learned, Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Operations:

(1) Cordon operations: Lessons learned from the Battle of Phuoc Yen, 29 Apr 1968 conducted by elements of the 2d Brigade and its reinforced direct support Battalion, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Artillery. Coordinated ground action, over 13,500 rounds of artillery, numerous airstrikes, and employment of CS resulted in a highly successful operation that cost the NV 429 KIA, 107 POW, and numerous weapons captured versus 15 US KIA, and 31 WIA.

(a) OBSERVATION: The ability to react quickly to fast changing airborne operations and to provide sufficient artillery support for a continuous operation requires the closest coordination with the infantry brigade and battalions concerned and the additional support of division corps artillery units.

(b) EVALUATION:

During the early stages of a cordon operation, quick fire channels should be obtained in order to provide readily available medium and heavy artillery support. As the cordon is being closed heavy and medium artillery should be adjusted, preferably by an air observer, on known and suspected enemy locations, and to reinforce the support of ground units moving into position to seal off the cordon. Replot data should be computed so that targets can be quickly refired throughout the entire operation. Liaison and forward observer teams are dispatched to non-US units participating in the cordon in order to coordinate their supporting artillery with US artillery and to provide a quick fire channel. Additional ammunition, particularly illumination, should be stocked at battery locations. Sufficient illumination should be available
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15 August 1968

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I have learned that the battalion FDC in coordination with the LNO of the infantry task force, controls all firing and all forward observers, some of whom come from different battalions. All fire units and observers should be on the same fire direction net for centralized control. Medium artillery batteries may have to be split during the operation in order to safely and effectively attack targets within the cordon from different directions. An AN/FPS-4 radar should be positioned to cover the area.

Once the cordon is sealed off, usually as darkness descends over the battlefield, illumination is adjusted over the sealed area. Artillery and naval gunfire should be prepared to provide continuous illumination or to rapidly replace USAF flare ships when they go off station. To provide immediate illumination, one howitzer from each light and medium artillery battery should remain on its adjusted illumination data with several projectiles completely prepared for firing. The direct support battalion S-3 and task force S-3 coordinate their illumination resources and develop a plan for continuous illumination. At dusk, close-in defensive targets are adjusted in and forward observers with the units in the cordon adjust fire on suspected locations throughout the night, each being provided a battery or platoon of light artillery. Targets located during daylight hours and intelligence targets are attacked by medium and heavy artillery. All firing must be controlled, continuous and deliberate. Observers should assist each other by sensing rounds controlled by another observer, to insure safety and maximum effectiveness of artillery fire.

During daylight operations, artillery and air must be closely coordinated. The size of the cordon generally requires that all the artillery fire be suspended until an air strike is completed. Direct communication between the FAC and the LNO permits the lifting of the artillery check fire as the last run is made by the aircraft. Artillery fire should not be suspended until the aircraft are on station. An air observer should be over the cordoned area during all daylight hours to conduct visual reconnaissance, assist the ground observers, and attack targets of opportunity or other designated targets. TOTs employing all available weapons are planned and employed, particularly on an area where CS has been dropped. The target should be attacked one or two minutes after the completion of the chemical operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That these techniques for employment of artillery during a cordon operation be disseminated to all USARV artillery units.

2. That Division and Corps artillery headquarters be prepared to provide reinforcing artillery, on short notice to the direct support battalion supporting a cordon operation.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
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(2) Inadequate Artillery Coverage.

(a) OBSERVATION: Experience has demonstrated that medium artillery batteries must often be split into two platoons in order to provide adequate support throughout a division area of operation and to permit the safe attack of targets from different directions.

(b) EVALUATION: The splitting of batteries only slightly reduces the effectiveness of the battery. This limitation can be overcome if additional personnel are provided from battalion resources to permit twenty-four hour operation. Command and control problems can be alleviated by good communications and the availability of aircraft to allow the battery commander to frequently visit his separate platoon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When possible, Corps Artillery should provide adequate medium and heavy artillery to support operations. If sufficient resources are not available within corps, permission should be granted by the controlling headquarters to split those units not under the operational control of the division artillery.

(3) Preparation of Fire Bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 101st Air Cavalry Division has established a procedure which has cut the time of preparation of a fire support base considerably while at the same time increasing the overall efficiency of the base. This system follows a step by step procedure as outlined below.

1. Air strikes carrying "Daisy Cutter" bombs are requested to be placed in the location of the proposed site.

2. An infantry company is combat assaulted into an LZ as close to the proposed fire base as the situation permits. This company then proceeds to the proposed site.

3. Upon arrival at the proposed location, the infantry company immediately expands and clears a landing pad for a UH-1 type helicopter.

4. Abord the initial helicopter which arrives at the site are representatives of the future tenant units, normally the infantry battalion commanding officer and artillery battalion commanding officer, along with representatives from the division engineers. A reconnaissance of the area is then conducted and the approximate areas of each tenant defined.

5. Within less than an hour after the helicopter pad is completed, a D-4 (airborne bulldozer) is lifted into the fire base by a CH-47 and it begins expanding the size of the helicopter pad. At the same time,
the engineers commence to blow the larger trees using primer cord.

6. From four to six hours later, after the initial cut in the jungle has been expanded the area at least 50 feet x 50 feet, one or two D-6 dozers are brought into the area, normally by CH-54 (Crane). This requires two moves, one for the blade and tracks, the second for the bulldozer body.

7. Under normal conditions a fire base 300 meters by 75 meters can be prepared in less than 48 hours utilizing this system.

(b) EVALUATION: This system has proved to be the most efficient and effective means of quickly preparing a fire base in dense jungle type area. On Operation Somerset Plains this system was employed to prepare three separate bases within a four day period.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this data and method be provided to all artillery units operating in dense jungle as a method of preparing a fire support base in a very short period of time.

   a. Intelligence: None.
   d. Logistics: Inadequate supply of air movement items.

(f) OBSERVATION: The serviceability life of air items is affected by usage, wear, and weather. Many slings and associated items must be condemned because of these factors, after less than three months usage. A sling, left exposed to the sun for four hours in RVN, may lose up to 50% of its tensile strength.

(2) EVALUATION: Insufficient or worn air items often cause inefficient operations and accidental dropping of loads. Aircraft must be diverted to back haul air items before subsequent loads can be rigged. Pooling of resources from other units has been a poor substitute and does not solve the problem of inefficient and slow resupply during sustained operations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to authorizing air mobile artillery units to stock a 50% overage of air items. In addition, it is recommended that air items be developed which are not as sensitive to weather as the currently issued items.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned
1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968

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EDWARD B. VOGEL
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

15 August 1968
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AVOG-GO-H (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind

DA, HQ, 101st Air Cavalry Division, APO SF 96383, 30 August 1968

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96308

1. (U) The inclosed ORLL, 101st ACD Artillery, is forwarded in accordance with XXIV Corps Reg 525-2 and USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 1, Operations, Significant Activities.

a. The numerous RIF operations conducted throughout the Division AO and the concept for employment of artillery necessitated the frequent moving of units as outlined in section 1 of the inclosed report. The concept for employment of artillery during the period was:

(1) To provide responsive, accurate 105mm howitzer fire for all ground maneuver forces. At no time were ground maneuver forces outside the supporting range of 105mm artillery fires.

(2) To position the Division's assets to cover operations throughout the AO and to provide harassing and interdictory fires in every sector of the AO.

(3) To keep the batteries supporting the same units when possible to facilitate close coordination and the establishment of standard operating procedures.

b. The location of the various fire bases referred to in Division Artillery's ORLL report are listed in inclosure 2.

c. Reference para 3d page 8, in regard to the problems created by the detachment of Battery A/2-11 Arty and Battery D/2-320 Arty. This Headquarters recommends:

(1) That local Corps artillery units replace these organic batteries.

(2) That Battery A/2-11 Arty and Battery D/2-320 Arty be returned to Division control.

3. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations are listed below:

a. Cordon operations, page 9, para b(1). Concur. These comments in conjunction with those included in this Headquarters ORLL report make an excellent guide for conducting cordon operations.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 101st Air Cavalry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1968

C. Preparation of fire bases, page 11 para b(3). Concur. However, more than four days are required to build adequate defensive bunkers with overhead cover and covered ammunition storage areas.

d. Inadequate supply of air movement items, page 12 para 2d. Concur. It has been brought to the attention of Division Artillery that investigations of accidental dropping of loads from cargo slings reveal that the most frequent cause was improper slinging, rather than worn slings. This Headquarters has implemented replacement procedures to insure cargo slings are replaced prior to their being worn-out, and has instructed Division Artillery to submit a recommendation for a modification of the direct support battalion’s TOE to increase the number of cargo slings. This Headquarters concurs in the Division Artillery’s assertion that a need exists to develop and distribute air items less sensitive to weather.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. P. TALLON, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-GCT (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968 (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV CORPS, APO 96308 21 September 1968

To: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The ORRL of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments follow:

   a. Item: Problem created by the detachment of Battery A, 2d Bn, 11th Arty and Battery D, 2d Bn, 320th Arty (Prov), page 8, para 3d, and 1st Ind, para 2c.

      (1) XXIV Corps Arty has provided Btry F, 16th Arty (155H Towed) and Btry F, 4/33d Arty (105H Towed) to the 101st Abn Div to compensate for the detachment of the organic units.

      (2) IAW USARV movement order 1-68, Battery A, 2d Bn, 11th Arty will return to OPCON of CG, 101st Abn Div prior to 2 November 1968.

      (3) On 24 August 1968, this headquarters, in a message to CG, III MAF, with information copies to CG, USARV and COMUSMACV, recommended the 3d Bn, 506th Inf Task Force be relocated from II CTZ to Camp Eagle/Hue/Phu Bai area. Battery D (Prov), 2d Bn, 320th Arty provides the direct support artillery for this task force. On 7 September 1968, CG, USARV informed COMUSMACV of MTOE action being taken to provide an additional direct support battery for 3d Bn, 506th Inf, and recommended Btry D (Prov), 2d Bn, 320th Arty be disbanded and replaced by an I Field Force artillery unit until the additional artillery battery can be added to the structure of the 101st Abn Div TOE. 101st Abn Div is presently preparing an MTOE to provide a direct support battery for 3d Bn, 506th Inf.

   b. Item: Cordon operations, page 9, para 2b, and 1st Ind, para 3a. Concur. Recommend HQ, USARV disseminate the commander’s evaluations and recommendations to all major subordinate commands to be included in their tactical SOP.

   c. Item: Inadequate artillery coverage, page 11, para 2b(2). Nonconcur. Splitting batteries is a violation of sound artillery procedures. Studies of effects demonstrate the smallest effective fire unit in the field artillery is the battery. When batteries are split into Platoons, the unit is divided into two subminimal fire units. Fire for effect is inadequate. Neither battery nor battalion personnel and equipment resources are adequate to provide the necessary fire direction and command and control for 24-hour split battery operations. Since the battery is designed to operate as an entity, key positions, such as battery commander, executive officer, chief of firing battery and 1st sergeant, remain uncovered in one position or the other even though the fire direction section is augmented to provide FDOs for both elements. Deployment of batteries by platoon reduces effectiveness, erodes command

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AVII-OCT
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968 (U)

and control, and offers increased opportunities for incidents involving misdirected ordnance.

d. Item: Preparation of fire bases, page 11, para 2b(3), and lst Ind, para 3c. Concur. Military explosives vary in availability and characteristics; the proper explosive to be employed and the quantities required should be determined by the engineer officer in charge of land-clearing operations, or by the demolition expert responsible for felling the trees.

e. Item: Inadequate supply of air movement items, page 12, para 2d, and lst Ind, para 3d. Concur with lst Indorsement. To preserve cargo slings, emphasis must be placed on care, storage and handling these items after delivery, and a requirement imposed for prompt retrograde of cargo slings to prevent damage from exposure to weather. Current directives requiring slings to be dated and retired from service within specified time frames are adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

H. R. TAYLOR
CPT, ADG
Asst AG

Cy Furn:
Co, 101st Abn Div (AM)
Co, 101st Abn Div Arty

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AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)  
MAJ Klingman/ds/LN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
May 1968 - 31 July 1968 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APC San Francisco 94375  
2 NOV 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-LT, APC 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 101st  
Airborne Division (AM) Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning the detachment of elements of major  
      units, page 8, paragraph 3d; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a. Action  
      taken as cited by XXIV Corps in 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a(3), is  
      considered appropriate.

   b. Reference item concerning inadequate artillery coverage, page 11,  
      paragraph 2b(2); and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Concur with 2d  
      Indorsement, paragraph 2c.

   c. Reference item concerning inadequate supply of air movement items,  
      page 12, paragraph d; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3d; and 2d Indorsement,  
      paragraph 2e: Concur with the 1st Indorsement and the 2d Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W.C. ARNTZ  
CPT AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fern:
HQ XXIV Corps  
HQ 101st ABN Div Arty
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1Q, 101st Airborne Division (AM) Artillery, for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C.L. SHORTY
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 101st Airborne Division Artillery (AM)

Period Ending 31 July 1968

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1968**

**CO, 101st Airborne Division Artillery (AM)**

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.