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AGAM-P (M) (30 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683185

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division

5 November 1968

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 5-3-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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THRU: Commanding General
VII Corps
ATTN: AETSGC
APO 09107

TO: Commander-in-Chief
USAREUR
ATTN: AEAGC-TU
APO 09403

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

   a. During the period being reported, the MARNE Division participated in Exercise CARBIDE STEEL I, a VII Corps CPX. The level of participation within the MARNE Division was to battalion level. The exercise provided valuable training for all participants in command and control procedures. Additionally, CARBIDE STEEL I served as a medium by which to war-game the 3d Infantry Division Emergency Defense Plan in order to determine areas in which revision would be required due to changes in Task Organization as a result of REFORGER, and refinement of current plans.

   b. During the period being reported the infantry battalions of the MARNE Division completed MISPC training at the Hohenfels MTA. Of 109 squads participating, 97 qualified for a qualification rate of 88.9%.

   c. The armor battalions and cavalry squadron organic to the division completed TCQC during the reporting period. 149 of 243 tanks qualified for a qualification rate of 78.6%.

   d. All artillery battalions of the MARNE Division underwent ATT's during the reporting period. All units successfully completed the ATT's.
2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned.

a. PERSONNEL: Assignment of Bulk-fill Personnel

(1) Observation: During the 4th quarter of FY 68 a considerable turbulence took place within the division. This included the shortage of hard skill MOS and the subsequent filling of such positions with bulk fill personnel. In essence, the division has been receiving quantitative fill, as opposed to qualitative fill, which results in mass OJT Programs.

(2) Evaluation: Personnel turbulence involved the loss of approximately 2400 personnel and gain of over 3000. This presents a good personnel picture on the surface as the division gained more than it lost during the quarter. However, for the most part, losses were skilled personnel and gains were unskilled. Many gains were not even in an infantry division related MOS. Thus, by the end of the quarter the division had over 1140 personnel in OJT status. When applied against the operating strength of the division 8.6% or one of every eleven individuals fell into this category. The end result is a reflection on mission accomplishment and a growth of morale problems.

(3) Recommendation: That a more intense screening take place to ensure that personnel, particularly those in higher enlisted grades and those drawing propay, are assigned in accordance with stated unit requirements and in appropriate and/or related MOS. Further, personnel who do not meet this criteria should be schooled for existing USAREUR requirements prior to their departure from CONUS.

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) Displacement:

(a) Observation: The problem of maintaining a capability for controlling the fires of a battalion during displacement continues to exist. Several methods of displacement have been tried by Division Artillery battalions. The method described below has been most successful.

(b) Evaluation: The alternate battalion FDC is given priority for equipment and training and is augmented with additional critical items of equipment such as computer equipment. During a deliberate occupation, all wire lines to the Bn FDC are extended to the alternate Bn FDC, giving them the same wire communications as the Bn FDC. The FM radios organic to the battery designated as alternate FDC are adequate for FM control if all are operating properly. The AM radio capability is organic to the battery designated to provide the alternate OTC. The alternate FDC must maintain a current operations map and have a list of current data such as GFT settings, ammo count, status of howitzers and preplanned firing data.
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When the battalion is ordered to displace, the FDC displaces in total to the new location with the registering howitzer or battery. The assistant S-3, the assistant chief computer and an additional computer/FADAC operator from the battalion FDC augments the alternate FDC during displacement to handle fire planning and other operational functions. As soon as the registering battery is in position, ready to fire and the Bn FDC is set up, control reverts to the Bn FDC, and the alternate Bn FDC (and battery) is released to displace.

(c) Advantage: The greatest advantage of this method is the smooth transition of control to the alternate FDC with no interruption of any communication systems. No significant disadvantages have become apparent. We have suffered no decrease in accuracy and the loss of speed of adjustment has been less than that experienced by displacing the battalion FDC by echelon.

(2) Ammunition M-564 Time Fuze:

(a) Observation: During the Division Artillery May-June 1968 MTA priority period, the new M-564 Time Fuze used in conducting time registrations resulting in the use of 6 to 8 additional rounds over and above the number normally used in conducting a Time Registration with the older M-520 Time Fuze.

(b) Evaluation: After conducting many time registrations, an experience factor of 1.0 second was determined, to be subtracted from the time corresponding to the adjusted elevation so as to obtain an air burst. By using this experience factor, shorter time registrations were conducted.

(c) Recommendations: That artillery units determine an experience factor for Time Registrations and apply it when the M-564 Time Fuze is used.

(3) Organization for support at Major Training Areas.

(a) Observation: During the months of May and June 1968, DISCOM provided logistic support to division units training simultaneously at two dispersed major training areas while maintaining support of the remainder of the division in widely separated garrison cities. To accomplish this task, quite similar in respect to dispersion as that which may be found in combat, DISCOM utilized Forward Support Elements (Provisional) consisting of a field grade officer or senior captain from one of the DISCOM battalions and a junior officer from Support Command at each major training area. A DISCOM Forward Command Post staffed by a field grade officer and senior NCO from Support Command supervised and coordinated the activities of the FSE (Prov) at each major training area. DISCOM battalions provided tailored units at each major training area to provide maintenance, medical service,
supply and services in proportion to the unit and equipment density at each training area.

(b) Evaluation: The employment of Forward Support Elements (Provisional) complete with a small command and control element is an effective means of insuring support to major portions (brigades or task forces) of the division in remote or dispersed locations. Support unit commanders are thus allowed to concentrate on supervision of their mission while the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the FSE (Prov) acts as the coordinator, brief, and point of contact for logistics support to the supported unit commanders. Utilization of field grade officers of DISCOM battalions as the OIC of the FSE (Prov) is not the most satisfactory method of staffing this position however since each OIC thus has a special interest area rather than the training, experience, and interest to supervise all logistics activities of the DISCOM units. A far more adequate solution would be to organize DISCOM headquarters similar to that of the Airmobile Division with three (3) field grade officers assigned to DISCOM specifically for use in the capacity as OIC's of FSE's. The establishment of a DISCOM Forward Command Post during MTA periods provided the DISCOM Commander with an on the ground representative to establish policy and provide immediate attention to problems which arise. Such a command post need only be established when two (2) or more remote logistics support requirements at separate areas exist as in the May-June 1968 MTA periods.

(c) Recommendations: Such organization of DISCOM to support the division in the field will be continued when circumstances dictate. A recommended change to TO&E 29-2E Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Band, 3d Infantry Division Support Command will be submitted adding the necessary personnel and equipment to DISCOM headquarters to staff three Forward Support Elements, since drawing personnel to fill these assignments from DISCOM battalions reduces the command and control efficiency of the tasked battalions.

c. TRAINING:

Redeye Training

(a) Observation: Redeye training conducted on a consolidated basis increases the level of proficiency of the Redeye personnel within the MARNE Division.

(b) Evaluation: Because of the relatively small number of personnel associated with the redeye program it has been found that the training of those personnel is enhanced by conducting all training at Brigade and Division level. Three (3) weeks of each month's training is conducted at Brigade level with primary emphasis being placed on fundamental usage and weapon system operation. The fourth week of training is spent at Division level in aircraft recognition and tracking. During this week the use of close air support is coordinated with the Division Air Liaison Officer to
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provide fly-overs of actual aircraft whereby all redeye personnel in the Division are afforded the opportunity of engaging aircraft in flight. The principal advantage of this procedure is the realism lent to the training.

(c) Recommendation:

1. That the Army Training Program be written with an eye towards consolidating all redeye training at Brigade/Division level.

2. Provisions be made in the Army Training Program for the use of Army/Air Force aircraft, where possible, to provide realism.

d. INTELLIGENCE:

(1) FM Intelligence Net

(a) Observation: During the Conduct of Exercise CARBIDE STEEL I it became evident that the best way to effectively maintain the flow of information through intelligence nets at brigade level is to have an additional AN/VRC 47 radio with RC-292. This enables the Brigade S-2 to keep the brigade and division intelligence nets separate so that traffic passed on one net does not interfere with passage of traffic on the other. The use of the RC-292 antenna increases communications capability for the highly mobile and far ranging operations which might be expected in this theater.

(b) Evaluation: The use of only one radio requires a constant switching of frequencies on the main set causing loss of air time and delays in passing messages. It is important for the brigade to know what is happening in other unit sectors (division net) since it may have to assume another unit's mission. It is equally essential that enemy information from subordinate units be passed rapidly through channels for early processing and use.

(c) Recommendation: That an additional AN/VRC 47 radio and RC 292 antenna be authorized in the brigade S2 section.

(2) Exercise Play

(a) Observation: Counterintelligence and Aerial Surveillance play was used to a great extent during Exercise CARBIDE STEEL I.

(b) Evaluation: The injection of incidents into CPX play is of value to intelligence personnel in the conduct of exercises. It is felt that in many cases, this area has not had sufficient emphasis. In the course of actual operations, counterintelligence would be very important. Aerial surveillance play was of significant value in that the G2 Air and Air Liaison Officer were able to practice procedures used in the request-
ing of and assessment of aerial surveillance missions. The results of the aerial surveillance missions provided important enemy information to the commander and aided in the making of sound and timely decisions.

e. LOGISTICS

(1) Implementation of Combat Service Support System Maintenance Reporting and Management:

(a) Observation: The CS3MRM card processing of maintenance management information which was implemented on 21 June 1968 was superimposed on existing key punch and transceiver facilities in the 703d Maintenance Battalion and the DISCOM Data Processing Center (DPC) which were established and manned for the card volume anticipated for SEACAPS. No additional machine operator personnel for key punch equipment were authorized to process the additional workload imposed by the CS3MRM system. As with the SEACAPS system, personnel to operate the key punch and transceiver equipment the additional shift required to process CS3MRM information must be taken from other critical maintenance positions within the 703d Maintenance Battalion or the 3d Supply and Transport Battalion. Personnel so taken are not trained, are not working in authorized MOS's and necessarily detract from critical maintenance and supply missions of battalions concerned.

(b) Evaluation: The implementation of the CS3MRM system, requisite changes to TO&E's authorizing additional personnel for key punch machine operators, assurance that SEACAPS was functioning smoothly and would not be degraded or retarded by imposition of an additional system onto existing equipment and personnel, and sufficient training of organizational maintenance clerical and supervisory personnel to insure accurate basic data preparation has resulted in an erosion of the proposed timetable for implementation, a marginal surety that information submitted by organizational maintenance personnel is accurate and complete, and user confidence that the system will be capable of providing useful management data to maintenance personnel and commanders at battalion, brigade, and divisional levels.

(c) Recommendation: CS3MRM would benefit by a slowing of the pace of implementation target dates and a reanalysis of the output of the system to ensure that outputs present commanders and maintenance management personnel at all levels of command with usable information on equipment deployability and serviceability. Accuracy of the initial data input (DA 3304 (CS3) forms) is especially critical if the necessary system accuracy of the data bank is to be assured. Hasty submission, by units, of this information in an attempt to meet a suspense date plus inadequate numbers of experienced key punch machine operators working extra shifts in an attempt to meet submission suspense dates may result in a high error rate in data cards being submitted. This will definitely impair the accuracy and overall usefulness of the management data output of the system. Future programs of this nature should progress through a planned phase-in period with completion of a phase, such as authorization and training of
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personnel required for the system and assignment of these personnel to the implementing units, required before initiation of the following phase is permitted, such as the submission of initial information to establish a data bank.

(2) Supply Management in the 3d Supply and Transport Battalion:

(a) Observation: The MILSTRIP System and the supply procedures in USAREUR for division supply of Class II, IV, and VII supplies makes it impractical to organize a Class II, IV, and VII Section under the structure provided for in TO&E 29-65E. Major items of equipment (Class VII) are requisitioned from COMZ without regard to Tech Service or Commodity Management. Similarly, excess property is reported to COMZ for disposition instructions. ASL items are requisitioned from the supporting General Supply Company without regard to Tech Service. The General Supply Company also furnishes direct exchange (DX) support under a monetary credit system as well as local procurement of lumber (Class IV). All requests for nonexpendable (NX) secondary items and fringe expendables are procured from the supporting General Support Company. Accordingly, general supplies (Classes II, IV, and VII) are managed in a single section: the supply Management Office. This station consists of a Supply Management Officer, an assistant, and an NCOIC. In addition a small automatic data processing section functions under the supervision of this section. The Major Items Subsection is responsible for requisitioning, receiving and distribution of major items of equipment. This Sub-section is also responsible for disposition of such items of excess equipment as well as the monitoring of the RCS-AMC-124 Equipment Status Report, for the Division. An Editing/Document Control Sub-section is charged with editing and maintaining document registers while a Stock Control Section maintains stock accounting records, demand data, and supervises the maintenance of supplies on hand. All Sub-sections are organized without regard to Tech Service or Commodity Management.

(b) Evaluation: The above stated organization for the management of Division Supply (Class II, IV, and VII) functions efficiently with the supply system which exists in USAREUR. Although contrary to the TO&E organization applicable to a divisional Supply and Transport Battalion, this organization is in consonance with the ground requirements.

(c) Recommendation: The tailored organization of the Supply Management Office and its' sub-sections are worthy of consideration for adoption by all divisional supply and transport battalions within this Theater of Operations. Although such an organization may not be applicable on a world-wide Army scale, the TO&E of such a battalion should allow sufficient flexibility to allow adoption to Theater Supply doctrine.
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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Infantry Division (WAMHAA) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65

TO: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army, ATTN: AEAGC-TU, APO 09403

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs in the Operational Report of the 3d Infantry Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. MoAI.KKiyjr
Lt.Col

J. McALEER Jr
Lt.Col AGC
Adjutant General
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AEAGC-TU (11 Aug 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Infantry Division (WAMHAA) for
Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65 (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army, APO
New York 09403 23 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Reference paragraph 2a, Section 2. Nonconcur in recommendation concerning the screening of bulk fill personnel prior to assignment to USAREUR. All incoming personnel to include requisition fill, bulk fill and senior NCOs are screened upon arrival in the command to determine, if individuals are assigned to positions requiring their primary or secondary MOS. Subsequent assignments to subordinate commands are determined after coordination with respective personnel officer. Personnel who have MOSs not related to the unit's existing authorizations are assigned as bulk fill to be trained for existing vacancies in accordance with instructions dispatched from this headquarters. Those personnel requiring formal schooling can be trained in various short courses of instructions at US Army School, Europe.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 2b(2), Section 2, Ammunition, M564, Time Fuze.

   a. This problem was identified in the summer of 1966 and information from Fort Sill was distributed to the field in "Ammunition Newsletter No. 1", 11 October 1966. This newsletter was reproduced by Artillery and Special Weapons, Fire Support Section, ODCSOPS, this headquarters, and distributed by the USAREUR FADAC Contact Team in the spring of this year. In addition, gunnery instructors on the FADAC team presented instruction on how to determine the M564 fuze setting. This instruction was presented to FDC personnel representing all Howitzer battalions in USAREUR. Third Infantry Division personnel received instruction in July after returning from the major training area.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Infantry Division (WAMHAA) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65 (U)

b. Graphical Firing Tables currently used are designed to compute the fuze setting for the M520 series fuzes which are being replaced by the M564. New Slant Scale FGTs are being developed which are designed to compute fuze settings for the M564. Tabular Firing Tables giving data for computation of the M564 fuze setting have been distributed in this command.

c. The solution presented by the 3d Infantry Division will produce acceptable results. However, more accurate fuze settings for the initial round of a registration are readily determined by using current tabular firing tables to obtain a correction factor. Enter table "M" (Corrections to Fuze Setting...) in the column headed "Fuze Setting, Fuze M564" with the fuze setting obtained from the GFT (Correct setting for the M520 fuze). Subtract the corresponding correction factor to determine the proper setting for the M564.

d. TFTs which have been changed to provide data for the M564 fuze are:

   FT 105-AS-2, November 1967
   FT 155-AH-2, C-2, October 1967
   FT 8-J-4, June 1967

3. (C) Reference paragraph 2c, Section 2, Recommendation, Redeye Training. The ATP is intended as a guide to preparation of training programs and schedules. Consolidation of training, where feasible and considered appropriate, should be accomplished. However, there are some situations where consolidation would be undesirable such as Armored Cavalry Units. The use of varying types of aircraft in target recognition and tracking exercises is encouraged. Information to this effect is now contained in the Draft ATT issued to Redeye units. It is assumed that when DA publishes the applicable ATT, it will contain something to this effect. However, the cost of scheduling such missions necessitates close control. Consolidation of training for these purposes is encouraged.
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AEAGC-TU (11 Aug 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3d Infantry Division (WAMHAA) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65 (U)

4. (C) Reference paragraph 2d, Section 2, Recommendation, FM Intelligence Net. The employment of two radio receiver/transmitters at brigade level to provide dedicated circuitry for both division and brigade intelligence nets is considered highly desirable. However, the brevity of the 3d Infantry Division report precludes full evaluation due to its lack of comment on the capability of the brigade to provide the required support, i.e., operator and maintenance personnel and back up materiel support. It is noted that the rapid flow of intelligence information at all echelons is primary to current combat needs for the obtainment of target data within a near real-time. Intelligence reporting and data handling procedures are currently undergoing study at this headquarters. Consideration will be given to the recommendation that an additional AN/VRC 47 radio and RC 292 antenna be authorized in the brigade S2 section.


a. No increase in personnel or manpower spaces has yet been authorized to support this program. Accordingly, internal Corps and Support Command personnel and manpower space realignments are necessary to insure adequate key punch operation support for the MRMS. These personnel must be trained on the job in the absence of formal training in USAREUR. CINCUSAREUR has tasked Commanding General, Seventh Army Support Command, to support MRM and key punch training by providing instructional material, MRM training, and key punch manuals.

b. The proposed timetable for implementing MRMS at the 3d Infantry Division was not met. This was because of the Division's decision to utilize a different method for constructing their end item master file than was prescribed for implementing Phase I of MRMS. All other units under Phase I were able to meet the timetables for implementing MRMS.
c. The 7th Inventory Control Center, to assist in installing the MRMS has assumed a large portion of the unit's initial punched card workload. This has greatly increased the accuracy of input to the data base and has allowed unit personnel to become better trained in the use of punched card equipment and MRM procedures.

6. (U) Reference paragraph 2e(2), Section 2. Concur with recommendation on organization of the Supply Management Office.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

BUD R. BURRELL
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant
### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 3d Infantry Division (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CG, 3d Infantry Division

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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