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<td>FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 30 JUL 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Army Office Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-AT 13 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

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SECTION I
OPERATIONS

A. COMMAND

1. The Americal Division Artillery, in addition to exercising full command over the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, 155mm (towed) and 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery, 175mm/8-inch (SP), supervised artillery techniques and coordinated the fires of four direct support artillery battalions of the 11th, 196th and 198th Light Infantry Brigades and the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division. Division Artillery also provided supporting fires on a coordination and cooperation basis to the 2d Army Republic of Vietnam Division, the 2d Republic of Korea Marine Brigade, and for Special Forces Teams and US Marine Corps units operating in or adjacent to the Americal Division Area of Operations.

2. On 31 March 1968 a change of command ceremony was held in which Colonel Lawrence M. Jones Jr. assumed command of the Americal Division Artillery from Colonel Mason J. Young Jr.

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND WELFARE.

1. On 27 April 1968 the Americal Division Artillery opened a Rest and Recuperation Center (R&R) at the Headquarters Base Camp. Facilities include a properly safe-guarded swimming beach, a laundry, barber shop and an Enlisted and NCO Club. Headquarters Battery has a small but well-stocked library. It is expected shortly to have a boat in operation for daily pleasure fishing trips for up to 20 individuals at a time. Plans are being formulated for a gymnasium and an exchange in the local area. Duration of R&R is three days and is intended primarily for personnel from remote Fire Bases. Allocations are as follows:

   6th Bn, 11th Arty - 10 individuals per week.
   1st Bn, 14th Arty - 8 individuals per week.
   3d Bn, 16th Arty - 6 individuals per week.
   3d Bn, 18th Arty - 6 individuals per week.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. Countermortar/Counterrocket Program. On 5-6, 6-7, 13-14 February 1968 and 22-23 April 1968 the enemy initiated 122mm rocket attacks against the Chu Lai Air Base and the Division Headquarters area. To counter these attacks,
the Division Artillery greatly intensified its harassing and interdiction fire program on suspect rocket locations, enemy base camp areas, and avenues of ingress and egress. Detailed reconnaissance and terrain analysis have been conducted to determine possible rocket launch sites. Last light reconnaissance missions are flown daily to detect any activity in the rocket belt just prior to darkness.

2. At the end of the reporting period the searchlights of the 3d Platoon, Battery G (Searchlight), 29th Artillery were deployed in support of the division units as follows:

11th Light Infantry Brigade AO (including Muscatine AO) - 4
198th Light Infantry Brigade AO (including TF Roach - 4 and Wheeler/Wallowa - 5) - 9

The platoon deployed two lights on 20 April 68 to the Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV) area of operations due to an increased operational necessity for them in that area.

3. The two AN/MPQ-4A countermortar radars in the Division area at the end of the period were deployed in the Chu Lai and the Duc Pho areas. On 20 April the countermortar radar assigned to the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery deployed with the unit to the Phu Bai area. Two countermortar radar detachments, the 251st and 252d, are scheduled to arrive in country on 24 May 68. These detachments are programmed for assignment to the Americal Division.

4. 01 aircraft from the 21st Reconnaissance Aircraft Company continued to provide support to the division. The Division Artillery aerial observers performed missions in support of the division as follows:

a. Adjustment of artillery fires on targets of opportunity.

b. Registration of artillery units.

c. Visual reconnaissance throughout the division area of operations, particularly in areas of likely rocket launching positions.

d. Aerial convoy coverage for division units and, when requested, for ARVN units.

D. PLANS, OPERATIONS, TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

1. Operations:
a. Heavy artillery (8"/175mm) was employed in the WHEELER/WALLOWA AO to achieve maximum effect from the 175mm gun range capability. In the Chu Lai TAOR, it was necessary to split the heavy artillery battery to provide support throughout the area of operations. Due to the loss of Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery from the Duc Pho AO on 23 February 1968, there is no heavy artillery coverage in that area. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery was deployed north to Phu Bai to reinforce the fires of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery. The 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery minus one battery was also deployed north with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and placed under the operational control of Provisional Corps Vietnam. In addition, the 198th and 11th LIB provided forward observer parties for four additional companies in each brigade. These parties were provided from existing resources.

b. Artillery ammunition expenditures and the percent of observed fires by caliber for the period were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>EXPENDITURES</th>
<th>PERCENT OBSERVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>223357</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>105721</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 inch</td>
<td>18589</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>10142</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The Division Artillery provided supporting fires for the following major operations of the Division:

- Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA
- Operation MUSCATINE
- Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL
- Operation NORFOLK VICTORY

(1) Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA continued during the reporting period with the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division conducting operations in the Hiep Duc-Que Son Valley. On 29 February 1968 the 196th Brigade assumed control of the entire operation when the 3d Brigade, 4th Division deployed to the II Corps Tactical Zone. On 20 April 1968 the 198th Light Infantry Brigade assumed control of the operation when the 196th Light Infantry Brigade deployed to the Phu Bai area. Division Artillery supported the operation as follows:

(a) The 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery provided direct supporting fires to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade from locations at Fire Support Base West (AT 990 251), Center (BT 050 250) and Ace (BT 140 446). On 3 February Battery C deployed to LZ Baldy (BT 135 305). Battery D moved to LZ Colt (BT 115 371) on 4 February, Battery A displaced to vicinity AT 991 676 on 9 February in support of Task Force Miracle which was deployed south of Da Nang on 7 February. Battery C moved from LZ Baldy to LZ Polar Bear (AT 897 472) on 12 February and on 13 February Battery A moved to LZ Ross (BT 027 341). On 9 March Battery C moved to LZ Baldy, on 14 March they moved to Hill 29 (BT 226 318), and on 19 March they displaced to LZ Ryder (AT 946 342). Battery D displaced to LZ O'Connor (AT 934 242) on 22 March, then to LZ Baldy on 6 April. On 31 March Battery A moved to Fire Support Base Sooner (AT 869 359) and on 17 April

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they moved to LZ Baldy. On 19 April Battery C moved to LZ Baldy. Batteries A, C, and D departed the Americal Division AO on 19, 20 and 21 April, respectively, to the Phu Bai area of operations.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery provided direct supporting fires to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from firing positions at LZ Baldy, Ross, and Colt. On 3 February Battery B moved to LZ Cacti (BT 063 470) and on 4 February Battery A displaced to LZ Hardcore (AT 977 502). On 14 February Battery C moved to LZ Ryder and Battery B moved to LZ Baldy on 17 February. On 19 March Battery C moved to LZ Baldy. Batteries A, B and C departed the Americal Division AO on 28 February, 27 February and 26 March, respectively.

(c) Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery provided direct supporting fires to the 198th Brigade (minus) from LZ Baldy.

(d) Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T) provided reinforcing fires for the operation from LZ Ross. "WX" Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (155T) provided reinforcing fire from LZ Baldy until it departed the Americal Division AO on 4 March. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175G) provided general support reinforcing fires for the operation at LZ Ross.

(e) Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105 T) DS 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Div.
"WX" Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (155 T)
1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (105 T) DS 198th Light Infantry Bde.
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (105 T) DS 198th Light Infantry Bde.
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T) Reinf 2d Battalion, 9th Arty.
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 T) Reinf 3d Battalion, 82d Arty.
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175G) GSR 2d Battalion, 9th Arty.
1st Battalion, 14th Arty.
3d Battalion, 82d Arty.

(2) MUSCATINE.

(a) Operation MUSCATINE continued during the reporting period with the 11th Light Infantry Brigade conducting the operation.

(b) Division Artillery supported the operation with Batteries B and D, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery providing direct support from LZ Sue (BS 566 877) and LZ Uptight (BS 728 850) respectively. On 8 April Battery B moved to vicinity (BS 615 639) to provide direct support to Operation NORFOLK VICTORY and returned to LZ Sue on 19 April upon completion of that operation. Two howitzers from Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155 T) provided reinforcing fires from LZ Dottie (BS 630 856) until the battery departed the division area of operations on 18 March. Two howitzers from Battery B, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 T) provided reinforcing fires from LZ Dottie. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL
6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105 T) GSR 6th Battalion, 11th Arty
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-)(8"/175G) OPCON
Battery B (-), 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155 T)
Battery B (-), 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 T)

(3) BURLINGTON TRAIL.

(a) The Americal Division, in conjunction with the 2d ARVN Division and the Tien Phuoc SF/CIDG Damp, conducted offensive operations to open permanently the road between Tam Ky (BT 310 225), the Quang Tin Provincial Capital, and the Tien Phuoc SF/CIDG Camp (BT 105 142). The Division Artillery established a joint fire support coordination center with representatives from the participating US and ARVN units in order to facilitate fire support coordination and reduce the time for clearance of fires. The operation started on 8 April and continued through the reporting period.

(b) Division Artillery supported the operation with Battery B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery displacing to Hill 68 (BT 316 131) on 8 April, Battery D, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery, moving to LZ Bowman (BT 237 140) on 9 April, and two 155 Howitzers from Battery A, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery moving to Tien Phuoc on 12 April to provide direct supporting fires for the maneuver elements.

(4) NORFOLK VICTORY.

(a) On 8 April the Americal Division conducted offensive operations in the mountains and lowlands southwest of Quang Ngai City (BS 645 728) to destroy the enemy in the area. The operation terminated on 18 April.

(b) Division Artillery supported the operation by displacing Battery B, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery to vicinity (BS 615 639) on 8 April and two 155 Howitzers from Battery B, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery to the Quang Ngai Airport (BS 605 719) to provide direct supporting fires to the maneuver elements. Two 175mm guns from Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery with two 155mm Howitzers attached provided general support from LZ Dottie. (BS 630 857)

(5) CHU LAI Area of Operations.

(a) The 198th Light Infantry Brigade continued operations in the Chu Lai area. On 20 April Task Force Roach was formed from elements of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade and assumed control of the area of operations.

(b) Division Artillery provided support as follows:

(1) The 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery, provided direct supporting fires to the 198th Light Infantry Brigade from positions at Hill 54 (BT 396 144), LZ Chippewa (BS 485 968), and LZ Ann (BS 655 960). On 14 February, Battery D moved to LZ Baldy to support Operation WHEELER/MALOWA. The 2d Battalion, 321st Artillery, the direct support battalion of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, arrived in the Chu Lai AO beginning 19
February. The battalion reinforced the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery while it received in-country orientation and training. The last battery of the battalion departed the Americal Division AO on 6 March. On 8 April, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery displaced to Hill 68 and on 9 April, Battery D moved to LZ Bowman to support Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL. On 21 April, Battery B moved to 26th Engineer Base Camp (BT 439 075) and on 22 April, Battery A moved to LZ Gator (BS 572 965) to support Task Force Roach.

(2) Battery B, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided reinforcing fires with three howitzers each from positions at Hill 54 and LZ Gator. On 20 April the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, with Batteries A and B, provided reinforcing fires for Task Force Roach. Two 8-inch howitzers from Battery A, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided general supporting fires from Hill 54.

(3) Artillery organization for combat was as follows:
1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-)(105 T) DS 198th Light Infantry Bde.
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-)(155 T) GSR 1st Battalion, 14th Arty
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 T) DS Task Force Roach
Attached
Batteries A and B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (105 T)
2d Battalion, 321st Artillery (105 T) Reinf 1st Battalion, 14th Arty
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (8"/175G) GS

(6) DUC PHO Area of Operations.

(a) The 11th Light Infantry Brigade continued operations in the Duc Pho area of operations.

(b) Division Artillery provided support as follows:

(1) The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery, provided direct supporting fires to the 11th Light Infantry Brigade from positions at LZ Liz (BS 753 434) and LZ Thunder (BS 870 321). Battery B, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) provided reinforcing fires from LZ Dragon (BS 731 528) until 18 March when it departed the Americal Division AO. Two 155mm howitzers from Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general support reinforcing fires from LZ Bronco (BS 812 375) until the unit departed the Americal Division AO on 23 February.

(2) Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-)(105 T) DS 11th Light Infantry Bde.
OPCON
Battery B (-), 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155 T)
Battery B (-), 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155 T)
Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175G)

2. Battery G, (MG) 55th Artillery

a. Battery G (MG), 55th Artillery is organized under TOE 44-58T with 2 officers and 115 EM. The battery consists of a battery HQ and 6 MG sections, 4 squads per section. (Total 24 MG's) The battery arrived in country on 26 Feb 68. After in-country training and orientation G/55
was declared ready for combat on 13 March. The unit was used in perimeter security missions in the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area prior to its deployment to the ICTZ. G/55 arrived in the Americal Div TAOR on 15 April 1968.

b. The bed of the 2½ ton prime mover has been armorplated and batt-\+\wings have been affixed to the M55 to give the crew a measure of protection from small arms fire and shell fragments. The mobility of the heavily laden 2½ ton truck is restricted to existing road nets. The potential for successful engagement of targets during hours of darkness is greatly increased by employing the M55 with a searchlight, AN/MSS3. The searchlight, using its IR mode can acquire targets and relay the information to the M55 crew. The M55 can then engage the target as the searchlight switches to white light.

c. G/55 is presently performing perimeter security missions of landing zones and fire support bases (FSB), security of mine sweep and construction crews, and convoy security. The current disposition of the M55's is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LZ BALDY</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ COLT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ ROSS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ RYDER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ CENTER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 29/35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/1 Cav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Eng Base Camp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLDC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CLDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ BAYONET</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ GATOR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ ANN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ DOTTIE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ DRAGON</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ LIZ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ BRONCO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ THUNDER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6/11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Training.

a. Selected Munitions Training was conducted on 29 January 1968 by an Instructor Group from Ft Sill headed by BG Kenney, the Assistant Commandant at Ft Sill. In addition to presenting instruction to representatives of the various artillery battalions of the Division the team gave certain individuals of the Division Artillery Staff detailed instruction in the employment of selected munitions. Division Artillery personnel have conducted numerous refresher courses; moreover, computation of selected munitions firing data has become a regular subcourse in the quarterly Division Artillery FDC School.
b. The Americal Division Artillery conducted a Gunnery School for all artillery units in the Americal Division. The course was conducted 19-23 February for units in the Duc Pho area and 26 February - 1 March for units in the Chu Lai area. A total of 32 personnel attended. The course was for FDO's and FDC computers and included all aspects of gunnery techniques peculiar to Vietnam conflict. Included in the course was computation of selected munitions data.

a. During the period 16-19 April 1968 Division Artillery hosted the FADAC New Equipment Training Team which conducted a course at Chu Lai for FADAC operators and maintenance personnel. Units in attendance included all artillery units in the Americal Division and personnel from the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 105th Artillery Group. Upon completion of the course, FADAC's were issued to those units which had not yet received them.

E. LOGISTICS: SELECTED MUNITIONS

The following items were received at the Chu Lai ASP on 14 February:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C462</td>
<td>105 HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D561</td>
<td>155 HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D684</td>
<td>8&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional quantities have been received since 14 February. The quantities presently on hand are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C462</td>
<td>105 HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D561</td>
<td>155 HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D684</td>
<td>8&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. CIVIC ACTIONS/CIVIL AFFAIRS


a. Bricks and cement for construction of a dispensary in Ly Tra Refuge Camp.

b. Bricks and cement for construction of a dispensary in Lor 6 Phu.

2. Support was provided to Binh-Sah Catholic School in the form of funds, food, clothing, construction materials and health and sanitation items.

3. MEDCAP's were conducted in Long Phu I, Long Phu II, Nui Tron, Binh Sah and Xuan Trung. Periodic MEDCAP's were conducted in Khuong Dai I and Khuong Dai II previously worked because of heavy VC infiltration. A total of 3102 cases were treated. Common ailments were respiratory and skin diseases and minor infections.

4. DENTCAP's were initiated in Long Phu I and II and Nui Tron. There is a widespread need for dental care and this program has been enthusiastically accepted by the Vietnamese.

5. Showing of movies in hamlets at night was initiated and is one of
the most successful projects initiated by the Division Artillery. The advantage of this program is that the people are educated, influenced and entertained simultaneously. This program reaches almost all of the people in a hamlet and the surrounding area. The important aspect of the project is the impact it will have on the minds of the many young people. They are at the age where they are easily influenced and it is felt that by seeing that higher standards of living exist in other parts of the world, a desire to improve their own country's standard of living will be instilled in their minds and result ultimately in an improved economic state for South Vietnam.

6. General Walt Scholarships were presented to children from Long Phu I, Binh Sahn, Nui Tron and An Tan in the amount of 17,000 VN. Students were selected from the upper one third of the class academically.

7. Yorkshire pigs were presented to the villagers of Xuan Trung. This program has two purposes; first to provide for a better breed of pig in the local area by cross-breeding, and secondly to provide the Vietnamese the opportunity to raise the much larger American breed of pigs. A total of 4 pigs from the first two litters are returned to Division Artillery in order to allow expansion and continuation of the program.

G. CHU LAI DEFENSE COMMAND

1. The Chu Lai Defense Command, under the command of the Division Artillery Commander, Col Lawrence M. Jones Jr, is an operational headquarters to control the defense of the Chu Lai Installation. Tenant units and organizations within the Chu Lai Base provide personnel for the defense. The area is divided into eight subsectors under a single commander who has operational control over other units in his subsector. Additional support is provided by artillery, gunships and reaction forces provided by combat units outside the area. Various alert conditions have been established to permit the maximum readiness with minimum interruption of normal duties. The CLDC also conducts periodic surveys of bunkers to determine adequacy and recommend repair or reconstruction where necessary.

2. Rocket/Mortar attacks on Chu Lai Base.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Time</th>
<th>Sub Sector</th>
<th>Nr Rockets/Mortars</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>052320 Feb</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>12/122mm Rockets</td>
<td>12 WHA</td>
<td>5 Bldgs damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Bldgs destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>070314 Feb</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>6/122mm Rockets</td>
<td>1 WHA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142044 Feb</td>
<td>IV&amp;VI</td>
<td>6/122mm Rockets</td>
<td>1 WHA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040144 Mar</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>10/82mm Mortars</td>
<td>2 WHA</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230251 Apr</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>18/122mm Rockets</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 Bldgs damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 H34 Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>slightly damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260054 Apr</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>9/60mm Mortars</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Locations of impact points are shown on attached sketch.

3. On 24 April 1968 CLDC bolstered its defenses by emplacing 2 each quad 50 Cal MG teams on the perimeter. One on the southern perimeter and one on the northwest perimeter, each covering likely avenues of approach.
of enemy units. Communications were provided by use of PRC-25 radios.

4. On 26 April CLDC implemented a system of coordinating directly with search light teams. This illumination is coordinated with the firepower provided by the normal defenses supplemented by the M55 Multiple caliber 50 machine gun.

5. Defoliation next to the tactical wire continued during the quarter. In most cases diesel fuel was applied to the foliage and set afire. Applications of fuel was accomplished utilizing back pack dispensers. Several applications were necessary where vegetation was heaviest. The temperature of the tactical wire was not affected by the heat.
SECTION II  LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. SUBJECT: Shortages of 13F MOS's.

DISCUSSION: Btry G, 55th Artillery Group, attached to the Americal Division Artillery is authorized 103 EM in the 13F MOS and has 107 presently assigned come of which are 13A working in the 13F position. DEROS losses by 31 July are 17 and an additional 13 by 31 August 1968. No projected gains are forecasted. Presently the Americal Division PSD is screening all EM records of the Division to see if any individual with primary or secondary MOS's in 13F exists in grade E5 or below to offset these losses.

EVALUATION: The shortage of 13F MOS's is acute now, and will continue to affect adversely the mission of the Battery.

RECOMMENDATION: That 13F personnel be trained in CONUS and their deployment be expedited to satisfy existing and future requirements.

2. SUBJECT: Shortages of Artillery Captains.

DISCUSSION: Presently the Americal Division Artillery including DS units is authorized 72 Artillery Captains. The assigned strength is 60. DEROS losses by 31 July 68 are 24. Projected gains through 31 July 68 are 15.

EVALUATION: The shortage of Artillery captains is acute now. It will affect adversely the mission of artillery units in Americal Division Artillery. 1st and 2d lieutenants are being used to function in these vacant captain positions.

RECOMMENDATION: That aggressive action be taken to expedite assignment of Artillery Captains to the Americal Division.

3. SUBJECT: Additional FDC (13E) personnel in a heavy composite artillery battery.

DISCUSSION: Heavy composite artillery firing batteries are organized under TOE 6-44E which authorizes two Fire Direction Computers (E5-13E), two Chart Operators(E-4, 13E) and one RTO (E3-13A). Unit SOP currently requires four enlisted personnel to be on duty in all FDC's; for 24-hour operation, the TOE allotted strength figure is inadequate. Two additional factors, peculiar to a composite structured battalion, compound the problem of constantly requiring qualified FDC personnel. Two separate calibers require double firing charts at the firing battery FDC to preclude gunnery errors. Moreover, the composite firing batteries are frequently split and deployed as separate Platoons requiring individual fire direction centers. In seven of the past ten months, the heavy battalion of the Americal Division has had at least one FDC split. During these periods, one battery must have sixteen FDC personnel available, trained and functioning.
EVALUATION: In addition to the personnel drain in other battery areas, personnel selected to supplement the FDC present an immediate training problem and degrade the unit's effectiveness until trained. An MTOE to effect a personnel strength authorization was submitted on 18 August 1967.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That approval of the MTOE be expedited.

4. SUBJECT: Authorization of a Turret Artillery Repairman (45G20) for each firing battery.

DISCUSSION: Self-propelled artillery units are normally deployed at distant, isolated fire bases. Repair capabilities for turret mechanisms of M107/M110 self-propelled artillery weapons are not readily available.

EVALUATION: Old weapons and a heavy volume of fire at maximum charge causes a continual stress on the turret mechanism resulting in numerous malfunctions. If each firing battery had a turret mechanic, immediate determination and identification of the nature and causes of turret malfunctions, as well as immediate repair, would be possible. This would decrease down time and increase mission capability.

RECOMMENDATION: That a Turret Artillery Repairman (45G20) be authorized in each firing battery.

5. SUBJECT: Authorization of Power Generator Equipment Operator/Mechanic (52B20) for each battery.

DISCUSSION: The large density of general and multi-purpose portable generator sets required to provide adequate electrical power to artillery battalions and batteries demands almost continuous functioning and a minimum down time. This is difficult to accomplish because deadline generators must now be turned in to support maintenance for repair. The 3KW, 400 cycle generators are power sources for the FADAC and require a great deal of maintenance. Additionally, if one of these generators is deadlined, it is imperative that it be returned to a green status immediately.

EVALUATION: An authorized repairman (52B20) in each battery will enable "on-the-spot" repair and return to operation, greatly reducing the need for evacuation of vital equipment. Additionally, better preventive maintenance could be performed by a qualified person, thus eliminating problems before they become serious.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That a Power Generator Equipment Operator Mechanic (52B20) be authorized for each battery.

B. OPERATIONS

1. SUBJECT: Employment of searchlights and quad 50 machine guns in a complimentary role.

DISCUSSION: A more accurate and expeditious method is to have the machine
crew equipped with infrared binoculars as well as the searchlight crew. This will enable the machine gun crew to lay directly on the target while the searchlight is still in the IR mode. This method results in less time loss between target detection and engagement, more accurate initial fire and precludes having to go to white light at all.

**EVALUATION:** In the fire base concept, artillery searchlights are employed with an artillery machine gun squad. The searchlight searches in the IR mode with the observer wearing infrared binoculars. When targets are detected, the searchlight's crew relays the information to the machine gun crew who lays the weapon on the target location. However, time is lost talking the machine gun crew onto the target and initial accuracy is lost until the gunner visually identifies the target after the searchlight switches to white light.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That where possible searchlights and artillery machine gun elements be employed together. Both crews should be equipped with infrared binoculars to facilitate rapid, accurate engagement of targets detected in the IR mode.

2. **SUBJECT:** Counter Rocket Program.

**DISCUSSION:** The enemy has the capability to fire 122mm rockets in salvos. While visual reconnaissance and interdicting artillery fire have countered the enemy's rocket threat to some extent, immediate attack of launch sites is required once a rocket attack is initiated to limit the number of salvos which may be fired. Countermortar radars and ground OP's are often ineffective in locating and adjusting artillery on the launch site. Aerial observers teamed with flare ships and gunships provide a more responsive vehicle. During periods of high probability of attack, this team can be airborne over the rocket belt. Once a rocket attack is initiated, it can immediately be identified, illuminated and attacked. Communications must be established and maintained with the Direct Support Artillery Battalion who has the responsibility for the area. Once the gunships have accomplished their mission or exhausted their munitions, artillery or additional gunships can assume the mission attacking routes or egress and possible storage sites.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That DA counter rocket doctrine include the use of aerial counter-rocket teams to locate and attack enemy rocket positions.

**C. TRAINING:** Omitted

**D. INTELLIGENCE:**

1. **SUBJECT:** Establishing liaison with local populace about permanent base camp areas.

**DISCUSSION:** Numerous liaison visits have been made to the local districts and villages and hamlets about the Chu Lai area by the commander and staff of the Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC).
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EVALUATION: Liaison visits with the local populace have provided enemy intelligence which might not have otherwise been obtained. Early warning of enemy offensive action has been obtained and confidence in the Allied effort fostered.

RECOMMENDATION: That close and continuing liaison be established at all echelons with local populations.

2. SUBJECT: Enemy ability to propel satchel charges great distances.

DISCUSSION: The VC have in the past constructed a crude launching device to propel satchel charges into friendly perimeters. The launcher is a slanting hole dug into the ground in which a small charge of TNT with a time fuze is placed. The TNT is covered with tamped earth and the satchel charge, armed with a short piece of time fuze and a pull/friction ignitor is placed on top. The ignitor is secured to some object near the launcher. On detonation of the propelling charge, the restrained igniter fires the time fuze and the satchel charge is propelled some 300 meters.

EVALUATION: Due to a field expedient method utilized by the Viet Cong to propel satchel charges into friendly positions, critical installations must be implanted at some distance from perimeters.

RECOMMENDATION: That munition storage areas and other critical facilities be placed a minimum of 300 meters inside friendly perimeters.

E. LOGISTICS.

1. SUBJECT: Requirement for additional vehicles with recovery and lifting capabilities for heavy SP Battalions.

DISCUSSION: Due to the remoteness of fire bases from heavy SP battalion CP areas and the frequency of tube change requirements on the M107 175mm self-propelled guns, a suitable recovery vehicle should be assigned to each firing battery. Restrictive bridge classifications and inaccessibility of fire support bases make it impractical to utilize the M88 tank recovery vehicle when required to move considerable distances.

EVALUATION: The authorized M88 tank recovery vehicle located at battalion level does not provide sufficient lift and recovery support to the firing batteries. Its own size and weight reduces its mobility and one recovery vehicle is inadequate for the needs of a self-propelled artillery battalion under combat conditions. This support would readily be afforded by the assignment of one light recovery vehicle, M578 to each of the line batteries.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That a M578 be authorized each firing battery.


DISCUSSION: Barometer ML102 presently authorized as a component part of Q4 Station Manual set, is not stable enough to withstand the continual shock waves caused by artillery, demolition blasting and the like.

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This instability produces a resultant error in the Ballistic Density read out degrading the accuracy of the entire Meteorological Message. Within the Army Supply system, Barometer ML332/TM, a shock resistant barometer, is available for use though it is not presently authorized for Field Artillery Ballistic Meteorological Sections. Though metro section implantation procedures are optimized, it is impossible to avoid the concussion waves produced by field artillery pieces (heavy artillery particularly) due to the requirement of the 6400 mil firing capability currently being employed.

**EVALUATION:** The concussion produced by artillery/tank firing and demolition blasting produces a meaningful error in the Barometer ML 102, currently authorized Field Artillery Ballistic Meteorological sections.

**RECOMMENDATION** Barometer ML332/TM, a shock resistant instrument, be issued in lieu of Barometer ML102 presently authorized Field Artillery Ballistic Meteorological Sections.

F. **ORGANIZATION:** Omitted

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**SECTION III**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION

NEGATIVE INPUT

S/ Lawrence M. Jones, Jr.

t/LAWRENCE M. JONES, JR.

Colonel, Artillery

Commanding
ORD: 1st Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (DC-OSFOR-65)

II. 1st Armored Division, "0 San Francisco 96574 26 May 65

1. (U) Forward herewith is the subject report of the Aerial Division artillery.

2. (U) This commander concurs with the observations and comments contained in the report.

3. (U) Ref Section IV, para. 4 and 5, E.1 and 2, (pp 13 and 15) of basic equipment, unit has been advised to initiate ITV action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

E H GENTRY
LT, AG
ASH AG
AVHGC-DST (13 May 68) 2d Ind (U) CPT Arnold/hga/1BN 4495
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-GSPC-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery, as indorsed.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning shortage of MOS 13F, page 12, paragraph 1. Battery G, 55th Artillery is assigned to II FFORCFV and will receive enlisted replacements through that command as losses occur. Present strength of this battery in MOS 13F compares favorably with other USARV automatic weapons units. Sufficient personnel are on requisition to replace DEROS losses.

   b. Reference item concerning shortage of artillery captains, page 12, paragraph 2: Concur. Recently, the Americal Division redistributed their Branch Immaterial and Arms Material positions, increasing desired strength in artillery captains by 12 percent. Prior to this increase, the Americal Division was on a par with other USARV units in authorized/assigned artillery captains. After the increase the Americal Division compares to the projected USARV average for 31 July as follows:

      | USARV     | AMERICAN DIVISION |
      | 95.6%     | 70.0%            |

As of 13 May 1968, 66 artillery captains were assigned to the Americal Division. Twelve artillery captains are programmed for assignment to the Americal Division by 31 July 1968, while 15 captains are scheduled to depart. To correct the projected understrength, incoming artillery captains will be diverted to the Americal Division to bring their assigned strength up to the USARV average. This will be done gradually, and in such a manner as to be least disruptive to units from which the officers will be diverted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant Gene.

Copy furnished:
HQ, Americal Div (Arty)
HQ, Americal Div
GPOP-DT (13 May 68) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Division Artillery, for Period Ending 30 Apr 68, RCS CTO2R-55 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific APO San Francisco 96558 28 JUN 68

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C.L. Shortt
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
**Report Title**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery

**Descriptive Notes** (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968 (U)

**Authors** (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, Americal Division Artillery

**Report Date**

13 May 1968

**Contract or Grant No.**

682060

**Distribution Statement**

N/A

**Sponsoring Military Activity**

OAGSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**Abstract**

N/A