<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCLASSIFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD388141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFICATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTHORITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 1979 per Group-4 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20. NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Operation Farragut Conducted by 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclusion is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Farragut. Operation Farragut was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the period 26 January through 23 March 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General
Copies furnished:
Office, Secretary of Defense, ATTN: OSD (SA), Southeast Asia Forces
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Research Analysis Corporation
Security Officer
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, ATTN: Joint Actions Control Office
CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION
FARRAGUT

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 1
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/RCS/33/52)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J3B
APO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation FARRAGUT.


3. (U) Location: KHIEN THUAN, KIEN THUAN and LAN DOM Province.


5. (C) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation FARRAGUT was as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-327 Inf</th>
<th>Miss Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engr LZ Clearing Team</td>
<td>Miss BHC (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327 Inf</td>
<td>A-17 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 plat, 1326 Engr</td>
<td>A/326 Engr (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>IRRF Plt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 plat A-17 Cav</td>
<td>MP Plt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(returned to parent unit control De-2)</td>
<td>20th Chem Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-320 Inf</td>
<td>161st M Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181 MI Det</td>
<td>181st M Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>181st M Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502 Inf</td>
<td>181st M Corp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The task organization was changed during operations against the LE BONG PHONG Secret Base by the addition of two CIDG Companies (LE SON KXK SF Camp) in direct support; one company with the 2-327 Inf and two platoons each in direct support of 1-327 Inf and 2-502 Inf. The 11th Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) operated in direct support of the Brigade during the last three phases of Operation FARRAGUT.

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 1
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAOUT (MACV/C3S/03/32)

7. (G) Supporting forces:
   a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.
   b. M/30 Arty: Provided general support reinforcing fires.
   c. 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two air mobile companies in general support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and resupply missions. The 10th Aviation Battalion was augmented with one additional air mobile company during Brigade air mobile assaults on 17 February and 9 March.
   d. 179th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Company: Provided four flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.
   e. 181st Aviation Company: Provided four O-1 aircraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and radio relay.
   f. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Pay War operations.
   g. 215th Pay Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support.
   h. 7th USAF: Flew 52 tactical fighter missions totaling 125 sorties. Fifty of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 25 minutes. In addition, 15 Combat Sky Spot missions (30 sorties), 6 Flareship (AC-47) sorties, 78 reconnaissance sorties, 130 Psychological Warfare sorties and 129 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. Eighteen B-52 sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flew 322 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.
   i. 35th Engineer Group: Provided general engineer support.
   j. 54th Signal Battalion: Provided general support.
   k. 498th Med Det: Provided responsive, rapid, evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.
   l. Det A-37, 5th SF Group and LUONG SON CIDO Camp: Provided two CIDO companies in direct support of Brigade operations in the LE HONG PHONG Secret Base area.
   m. 185th RF Company (HQA DA): Operated in direct support of the Brigade by securing Ia Loi Canal area vicinity PHU NGO.
   n. 10th Troop, 6th Cav (ARVN): Operated in direct support of the Brigade by providing convoy escort and security along National Route 1 between PHAN RANG and PHAM RANG.
   o. 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry (ARVN): Operated in close mutual coordination and cooperation with the Brigade in operations against Secret Bases 7 and 35.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.
Initiation of the operation, the Brigade (-) was withdrawn from Operation PARRAGUT and conducted Operations MATING I & II. Upon completion of Operation MATING II on 15 February 1967 the PARRAGUT AO was extended and the Brigade's mission modified to include the conduct of search and destroy operations in areas adjacent to National Route I between PHAN THANH and PHAN RANG. Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation PARRAGUT consisted of search and destroy operations conducted in four distinct phases. Phase I, Operation PARRAGUT was oriented into Secret Base 7 during the period 26 January - 16 February 1967. Following a feint by elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry toward Secret Base 35 on 26 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted air mobile assaults on 27 January to exploit a B-52 strike in Secret Base 7. 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted air mobile assaults to the north of the B-52 strike zone and conducted search and destroy operations to the south, while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted overland and conducted search and destroy operations north to Secret Base 7. Following the departure of the Brigade minus on 30 and 31 January for Operation MATING, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in and adjacent to Secret Base 7 through 16 February. During the period 17-28 February, Phase II of Operation PARRAGUT was conducted in the I.E. RUONG PHUCNO Secret Base, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted thorough search and destroy operations in exploitation of the B-52 strike while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus blocked the NE and SW respectively. During the later stages of Phase II, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations to the north, attempting to drive the enemy against blocking positions manned by elements of lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 17th Cavalry Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. Phase III of Operation PARRAGUT (16-21 March) was characterized by Brigade minus search and destroy operations against suspected enemy locations north of SONO MAO while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in and adjacent to Secret Base 35. Following the departure of 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, secret portions of Route 1 and conducted cordon and search operations against VC controlled villages and hamlets between PHAN RANG and SONO MAO. The final phase of Operation PARRAGUT was a three battalion search and destroy operation against Secret Base 15. Two battalions of the Brigade minus, 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, conducted air mobile assaults from SONO MAO into Secret Base 35 and conducted search and destroy operations to the south and west. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved overland along Route 1, conducted search and destroy operations to the east and blocked routes of egress out of Secret Base 35 to the west.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation PARRAGUT was characterized by small unit actions and sporadic contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included mountainous jungle, rolling hills, sandy scrub forest, and flat, cultivated lowlands.

b. Operation PARRAGUT was initiated seven days after the termination of Operation PICKETT in KON TUM Province. On 21 January 1967, the Brigade began air and overland movement from KON TUM to PHAN RANG. The Brigade minus closed PHAN RANG on 22 January and on 26 January convoy elements closed PHAN RANG after moving overland a distance of approximately 400 miles. Operation PARRAGUT commenced at 260000 January 1967.

c. Phase II: The three maneuver battalions of the Brigade were located at the Brigade Base Camp vicinity PHAN RANG. At 260000 January 1967, Task Force DONALD, composed of C/2-502 Inf, 1 plt A/326 Engs,

3 CONFIDENTIAL
AIDC-G

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/ RGS/3/32)

1 platoon A/2-17 Cav, and C Battery, 2-320 Artillery, conducted a tactical road march to an area NW of Secret Base 35. This move was an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the Brigade's true objective, Secret Base 35, and to position forces for the Brigade assault on Del. To further enhance the deception, 2d Battalion, 13th Regiment (ARVN) commenced operations SS of PHAN RANG in direct support of the Brigade and during the period 25-27 January, a heavy artillery and naval gun fire preparation was placed in Secret Base 35. On 27 January 1967, following a B-52 strike, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, accompanied the Brigade in an attempt to minimize VC/NVA military exploitation of the TET stand-down period. During the TET stand-down period, offensive operations in the FARRAGUT AO were terminated in observance of the TET stand-down. On 7 February, Troop A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, conducted air mobile assaults into the Secret Base 7 area to exploit the strike and destroy enemy forces and installations in zone. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an overland move from PHAN RANG into the southern portion of the AO and commenced search and destroy operations in the DMZ. (Inclosure 1, Tab A). Contact within the AO during the period 27-30 January was relatively light. On 28 January, in two brief contacts, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry produced 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individual weapons captured. Documents captured as a result of this encounter indicated that NVA forces were being used as fillers in local VC units. On 28 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a large base area believed to have been the VC Province Headquarters. The area contained 20 huts, two hospitals, a mess hall (75-100 capacity); radio repair area, printing plant, and a large amount of food, livestock, documents, and medical supplies. On 30 January the 2d Battalion, 13th ARVN Regiment terminated operations in direct support of the Brigade and resumed normal defensive posture from three locations south of PHAN RANG. On 28 and 31 January, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry extracted from the FARRAGUT AO to PHAN RANG and prepared to initiate Operation GATLING I in LAM DONA Province, while the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued Operation FARRAGUT. The movement of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry from field locations to PHAN RANG deserves comment in that a heliborne extraction of one infantry battalion was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Seven separate PZ's were utilized to extract 133 troops between 1947 hours and 2115 hours on 30 January 1967. At 211500H January 67, while conducting a tactical route reconnaissance south on Highway 1, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry was engaged by mortar and small arms fire resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA, 1 VC 1/2 ton truck destroyed, 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 SGS's captured. During the period 1-2 February, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued Operation FARRAGUT, making light contact and discovering numerous caches and base camp areas. On 2 February 67, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by a provisional platoon of Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), conducted an overland move into the AO and commenced search and destroy operations under OPCON of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. On 7 and 8 February, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered large caches of food, documents, and communications equipment. On 7 February Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry terminated search and destroy operations and returned to PHAN RANG. On 8 February offensive operations in the FARRAGUT AO were terminated in observance of the TET truce period. Units assumed a defensive posture astride known or suspected enemy lines of communications and conducted vigorous defensive reconnaissance patrolling in an attempt to minimize VC/NVA military exploitation of the TET stand-down. During the TET stand-down period, which lasted from 26-28 February 67, there were 2 VC/NVA initiated contacts in the FARRAGUT AO resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 US WIA, and 1 masuer captured. On 13 February, Task Force THUNDERBALL consisting of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry; Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry Battery G, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery; and 1 platoon, Troop H, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery conducted air mobile assaults and overland moves into selected LZ's and firing positions north of Route 1 and commenced search and destroy operations south to eliminate VC/NVA domination of Route 1 between KAM WAR (BIGS5U) and PHIN RAN (COS51). The task force was supported by elements of Company B, 11th Engineer Battalion which had the mission of repairing Route 1 to accommodate military convoys. On 16 February Task Force THUNDERBALL.
terminated operations S of PHAN RANG and conducted a combined airmobile and overland move to SONG MAO (BN2565) and prepared for future operations in the FARRAGUT AO.

d. Phase II: The second phase of Operation FARRAGUT began on 17 February; two days after the termination of GATLING II by the Brigade minus and one day after Task Force THUNDERBALL moved to SONG MAO. On 17 February the Brigade initiated search and destroy operations in the western portion of the LE HONG PHONG Forest. Airmobile assaults were conducted by all battalions at first light from PHAN THIET and SONG MAO to selected LZ's in the AO and following a B-52 strike at 0000 hours, all elements initiated search and destruction operations and extensive patrolling to deny enemy egress out of the area. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with one DS CIDG Co blocked routes of withdrawal to the SS, while 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry each with 2 DS CIDG Platoons conducted search and destroy operations to the SS. 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus, supported by 1 DS ARVN Co and 1 DS RF company, screened SW of the Brigade's AO and the Brigade's original cavalry troop screened the road network north of the LE HONG PHONG (Inclosure 2, Tab B). The airmobile assault phase of the operation was conducted prior to and in conjunction with the B-52 strike. All elements of the blocking force and assault elements from 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were in position prior to the B-52 strike and the airmobile assault continued during the B-52 strike. Concurrent with the assault on the LE HONG PHONG, engineer elements supported by 4th Troop, 6th ARVN Cavalry began repairs and re-opening of Route 1 from PHAN THIET to SONG MAO. The operation during the period 17-22 February was characterized by numerous, but light contact and frequent encounters with mines, booby traps, entrapment and harassing fire. During this period the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry discovered numerous base camps and fortified positions ranging in size from 17-100 bunkers. On 22 February, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus, terminated their screening mission SW of the Brigade AO. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the western portion of the LE HONG PHONG and extracted to SONG MAO and the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry repositioned forces in order to conduct search and destroy operations against the eastern portion of the LE HONG PHONG. On 21 February the Brigade began operations in the eastern portion of the LE HONG PHONG. 1st and the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 1 DS CIDG company blocked routes of withdrawal to the N and W and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with 1 CIDG company BS conducting search and destroy operations to the N. Contact during the period 23-27 February consisted of harassing fire and numerous small unit engagements. Several large campsites and food caches were discovered and destroyed or evacuated. The enemy continued attempts to interdict convoy traffic on Route 1. On 26 February, in response to a request for assistance from LEH DONG Province, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and C Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted airmobile assaults from SONG MAO to selected LZ's west of DI LINH and began search and destroy operations to locate and destroy an estimated VC battalion which had ambushed local ARVN forces. On 25 February elements of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry contacted 1 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), 1 VOC and 1 individual weapon captured. Acting on intelligence received from the captured VC, one company conducted an airmobile assault to LZ's SW of DI LINH to block enemy routes of withdrawal. The company contacted an estimated 2 company force just prior to dark resulting in 1 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 9 VC KIA (BC) and 10 individual weapons captured. The enemy broke contact at dark and TAC air and artillery were utilized throughout the night in an effort to block enemy routes of egress. On 27 February the Brigade terminated operations in the LE HONG PHONG Forest and DI LINH area and extracted to SONG MAO to conduct maintenance and prepare for future operations in the FARRAGUT AO.
e. Phase III: The third phase of Operation FARRAGUT was characterized by the Brigade's continued use of land LOC's, the conduct of several cordon and search operations in the SONG MAO - TUY PHONG area, and the conduct of search and destroy operations in the area north of SONG MAO. An FSP was established at SONG MAO by elements of the 1st Logistical Command and the Brigade provided security for the beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN (BN377). On 1 March, reacting to intelligence indicating from one to two VC companies were occupying hamlets near TUY PHONG, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on two hours notice, executed an airmobile assault into LZ's vicinity near TUY PHONG and TUY TINH VIEI (BN468). Elements of two companies, assisted by the Sector Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon and 2 PF companies, completed a cordon and search of the hamlets. Results of the operation were 1 VC KIA and 4 SA captured. The battalion was extracted to SONG MAO on 2 March. On 3 March, the 1st BN company replaced Brigade elements securing the beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN. At 0300 hours on 3 March, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, conducted a night airmobile raid under vehicle illumination on the village of VIUH HOA (BN5521). The raid had been a center of VC tax collection along Route 1 between PHAN THIET and PHAN RANG. The raid achieved complete surprise as evidenced by the effective sealing of the hamlet prior to detection by the local population. No contacts were made as a result of the operation, significant results were achieved in the fields of intelligence and civic action. As a direct result of this operation, the entire populace of VIUH HOA (over 500) elected to leave the hamlet and return to SVN control by relocating at TUY PHONG. At 030730H March 67, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, conducted airmobile assaults into LZ's in the southern portion of SONG MAO and began search and destroy operations to the north and south respectively, (Inclosure 2, Tab C). No significant enemy contact was made, and on 6 March both battalions were extracted to SONG MAO. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued to secure National Route 1 while Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, supported by 1st Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) provided convoy security and escort for logistic convoys between PHAN RANG and SONG MAO.

f. Phase IV: The fourth phase of Operation FARRAGUT was directed into Secret Base 35 and was initiated by three Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Teams on the 7th of March with the objective to conduct ambush and surveillance operations along enemy LOC's between Secret Base 7 and Secret Base 35. On 090700H March 67 the Brigade initiated search and destroy operations against Base 37. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, executed an early morning airmobile raid with one company and the reconnaissance platoon to cordon and search the hamlet of SONG HAI (BN8626). National Police assisted in the search, segregation and screening of inhabitants upon completion of the cordon. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, conducted airmobile assaults on SONG HAI to secure LZ's in the northern portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations south on multiple axis. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved overland from TUY PHONG into the western portion of the objective area and conducted search and destroy operations to the north and south. One company continued to secure National Route 1. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, conducted an airmobile assault into the southeast portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations to the west. At 091200H March 67 elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were relieved of their mission at SONG HAI by elements of the 2d Battalion, 44th Regiment (ARVN) which moved overland on Provincial Route 407, (Inclosure 2, Tab D). These elements rejoined the battalion minus in the AO and by 1200 hours the airmobile move was complete. On 10 March the Brigade Main Command Post and trains began movement overland from SONG MAO to PHAN RANG. Operations in the Secret Base 35 area were characterized by light and scattered contacts.
and attempts by the VC to harass traffic on Routes 1 and 407 through the use of mines. On 13 March 67 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reinforced with one battery of artillery and one platoon of engineers terminated operations in Secret Base 35 and commenced overland movement to TUY HOA. The battalion closed TUY HOA and became OPCON to Task Force IV at 111800H March 67. On 13 March the 2d Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN), terminated operations in support of the Brigade. This unit was responsible for the Brigade's successful utilization of land LOC's during the final stages of Operation FARRAGUT. VC contact was established by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry on 13 and 14 March in a series of caves in the northern portion of the AO and resulted in 9 VC KIA (BC) and 6 SA captured. On 15 March, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry minus, conducted an airmobile and overland move to an area just south of Secret Base 7 and began search and destroy operations. One company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry continued operations in the NE portion of Secret Base 35 until 18 March when it rejoined the battalion. On 16 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry discovered a large campsite and contacted an estimated 6 VC resulting in 1 US WIA, 5 VC KIA (BC), 1 WOC and 4 SA captured. The 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment (ARVN) terminated operations north of Secret Base 35 in support of the Brigade on 16 March. During the conduct of operations in Secret Base 35, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by the Brigade Security Platoon established and maintained TSP's on Route 1 to monitor movement of civilian traffic and gather intelligence on VC tax collection efforts. The troop conducted daily road clearing and screening operations on Routes 1 and 407. On 22 March the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated operations in Secret Base 35 and conducted an overland move to PHAN RANG to begin preparation for future combat operations. At 221200H March 67 elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile raid against the deserted hamlet of VRIH HOA resulting in the capture of 2 ARVN deserters and 5 detainees. On 23 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the FARRAGUT AO and conducted an airmobile and overland move to the Brigade base camp at PHAN RANG. Operation FARRAGUT terminated 232400H March 1967.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces in the FARRAGUT AO.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 135 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 13 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 2 NVAC, 18 WOC, 1 raller, 139 detainees (28 classified civilian defendants), 80 individual weapons, 504,1 tons of rice, 6.6 tons of corn, 17 radios, 2 generators, 4 miscellaneous ammunition, medical and administrative supplies.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were: 15 US KIA, 114 US WIA, 5 ARVN WIA (supporting forces); 3 M-151 1/4 ton trks, 1 M-50, 2 M-79 and 1 AN/RC-25 destroyed, 1 25 ton trk damaged.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:


b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: See Inclosure 6, Civil Affairs.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The successful execution of an illuminated airmobile raid by one battalion minus, emphasizes the value of this tactic in achieving surprise as well as the desirability of all aviation units achieving this

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFLICT


capability. In planning and executing the night airmobile assaults, several techniques were developed which are worthy of note.

(1) The PZ was organized by 10th Aviation Battalion pathfinders who placed lamps at each touchdown point. This facilitated both the movement of troops and aircraft on the PZ.

(2) The first flare was ignited on order of the mission commander as the first flight was on short final into the LZ. Continuous illumination was then utilized to facilitate the landing of aircraft, to assist ground troops in movement, and to aid in the observation of the target area.

(3) The air corridor into the objective area was planned so that critical azimuth changes were made above friendly installations on the ground. Fire arrows (fire pots placed in the shape of an arrow) ignited at these friendly positions assisted aircraft navigation.

b. Repetitive patrolling over the same area in varying patterns uncovered numerous caches and camp areas sometimes only meters away from earlier discoveries.

c. During Operation FARRAGUT air warning messages were broadcast by 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery utilizing an Air Force survival kit radio, AN/ARC-10. Broadcasting air warning messages in this manner permitted pilots to continually monitor ground unit command nets.

d. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery made extensive use of the organic counter-mortar radar, AN/FFQ-4A, during Operation FARRAGUT. The radar was utilized with varying degrees of success in computing survey coordinates by:

(1) Tracking a low charge, high angle round.

(2) Tracking a balloon floating above the point at which survey coordinates are desired.

(3) Tracking a beer can dropped from an H-13 to the point at which surveyed coordinates are desired.

15. (c) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Inability to fire accurately at fleeting targets that appear in a hasty engagement continues to be a subject for continuous training.

(2) All individuals detained by the brigade should be evacuated through brigade channels. Immediate release of detainees to GVN authorities often precludes the collection and dissemination of intelligence of immediate tactical significance.

(3) In lucrative areas, it is desirable to re-enter the area using varying patterns in order to fully exploit or develop the situation.

(b) Detailed arrangements must be made to insure ARVN and CTDG troops operating in direct support of US troops are properly equipped and supplied to remain in the AO for the duration of an operation.

(5) The conduct of illuminated airmobile operations is tactically feasible and greatly enhances the brigade's capability to surprise the enemy.

(6) Night airmobile operations require detailed planning and
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAOUT (MACV/ RGS/3/32)

thorough reconnaissance.

(7) Civic Action activities, in addition to their contribution to Revolutionary Development Programs, provide an excellent source of intelligence.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Operation FARRAOUT was characterized by extensive use of the available road network to position and resupply brigade maneuver elements. The Brigade plans to continue making maximum use of land LOC's whenever feasible.

(2) The 1st Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) supported the Brigade during the overland move from PHAN THI to SONG MAO, during operations in the SONG MAO area, and during the overland move from SONG MAO to PHAN RANG. The troop displayed aggressiveness, initiative, and a high degree of professional competence, and contributed materially to the brigade's successful utilization of land LOC's.

(3) The command relationship between the Brigade and MACV/CIDO units in the FARRAOUT AO was not clearly defined at the initiation of operations. This situation led to misunderstanding, created problems in coordination of efforts, and prohibited maximum utilization of all available resources. This problem has since been resolved.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That during the assault phase of operations requiring exploitation of B-52 strikes or when a tactical advantage can be gained by placing maximum troops on the ground as rapidly as possible, the Brigade's normal aviation support of two light airmobile companies be supplemented by at least one additional light airmobile company.

(2) That survival type mirrors and strobe lights (Light Marker, Distress) be issued to units in quantity for use in signalling aircraft and marking LZ's.

9 Inclusions
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operation Schematics
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Communications
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Psy War
8 - Artillery
9 - Engineer

S. R. MATHERSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Distribution:
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
   Dept of the Army, Washington, DC 20310
1 - CO, USAFPC (ATTN: OGP-DE)
3 - CO, MACV (ATTN: MACV J-3)
1 - CO, MACV (ATTN: MACV J-2)
2 - DOS, USARV
1 - CO, USAF (ATTN: AVC Historical Division)
5 - CO, IPFORCE
2 - CO, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky

Internal Distribution:
0 (1 per staff section)
10 - 83
3 - 110

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (C) Terrain: The area of operation consisted of flat lowland used for cultivation; sandy, bordering on the south China Sea; sandy scrub forests of the LE SON PHONG; and rugged, forested mountains in the northern and eastern portions of the area of operation. The sparse vegetation in the lowland along Hwy #1 provided good observation and fields of fire, but poor cover and concealment. In the mountains, the heavy forest afforded good cover and concealment, but poor observation and fields of fire. The main avenues of approach were along Hwy #1 (N-S). The hydrography of the area had no effect on military operations.

2. (C) Weather: The period of the operation fell into the dry season for Ninh Thuan and Binh Tuan Provinces. Rain occurred on an average of less than one day a month with no effect on air or ground operations. Winds were slightly in excess of predicted speeds, but there were no days that were unfavorable for low-level flying. The lack of rain during this period created a drastic shortage of water which resulted in a major resupply problem. Generally, the weather is excellent for the conduct of military operations.

3. (C) Analysis:
   a. The entire operation was conducted against local VC forces and a thorough search of the area resulted in no significant contact. Light, scattered contacts, involving no more than squad size enemy forces, occurred almost on a daily basis. The enemy made frequent use of mines and booby traps along roads and trails in the AO, and employed snipers to slow down and harass friendly forces.
   b. In SB 7, the VC Provincial Headquarters (K50) and 274th LP Company sustained sufficient casualties to disrupt and weaken the enemy's influence and control over people. The enemy base in this area was found destroyed; large quantities of documents, training materials, medical supplies, radio parts, and miscellaneous equipment were captured.
   c. In SB 35, the 270th LP Company was contacted and its base camp destroyed. The VC District Headquarters and a small PW camp were also found and destroyed. The hamlet of Son Hoa has been, and will continue to be, stronghold for the VC operating in SB 35. The 270th LP Company has been integrated with PWI up to 50 percent. These PWI soldiers were assigned to SVN infiltration groups and were used to bolster local VC forces in Ninh Thuan Province. This is the first reported incident of PWI being integrated into local VC units.
   d. VC tax collection points between Phuoc Bong and Phan Thiet were frequently disrupted by surprise raids; several tax collectors were apprehended.
   e. A thorough search of the area north of Song Khe failed to produce evidence of any large enemy forces in the area or of any sizable base areas. Contacts made in the area were limited to scattered guerrilla elements.
   f. The LE SON PHONG Forest has in the past been used as a base area for battalion size units. The forest contains a complex of small camps, complete with communication bunkers and trenches, and training areas. During the dry season there is acute shortage of water in the area with the only water supply being a few local wells. For this reason, it is doubtful that large enemy units will be found in this area during the dry season.
   g. The VC are losing control of the civilian population throughout the AO, but to a much greater extent in Ninh Thuan Province than in Ninh Tuan Province. This fact is substantiated by the significant increase in the number of Boi Chanh's during the period of US operations in the area.
   h. The following COMENDO was provided during Operation FARRAGO:

GROUP 4
DOMINATED AT 3 Year INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL
In Intelligence to Combat Operations After-Action Report, Operation PARAGUT (cont'd)

(1) 8,204 transmissions were monitored on the FM nets during the period 28 Jan - 23 Mar 1967.

(2) 226 transmissions through the "Strike" switchboard were monitored during the period 28 Jan - 23 Mar 1967.

(3) Communication security during all phases of the operations was quite good, with only one transmission security violation being observed and reported. This violation was the disclosure of classified plans and operations.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. Red Haze: It has become apparent that during the dry season when the local inhabitants are burning their fields, the effectiveness of Red Haze is further decreased. Rather than attaching importance to large sitings which are indicative of brush fires, the small sitings of less than ten fires are of greater significance. All reported fires must be checked by visual reconnaissance.

b. Photography: Aerial photography was readily available and trail, LZ and OD studies prepared of those areas which covered in the original planning. However, when the Brigade began moving out of preplanned area, aerial photographic support was not able to keep up. Experience shows that it requires a lead time of approximately seven days to obtain the photography, and the intelligence derived from the photography, for any sizable area. The problem seems to be the availability of Air Force photorecon aircraft. Future plans call for an aerial surveillance and target acquisition flotilla, with Mohawk aircraft, to be stationed out of Nha Trang under IFV control. The small ability of this unit should alleviate the problem by reducing the time following submission of requests.

c. IDP: It should be re-emphasized that due to the complicated classification system of detainees, the low intelligence level of detainees, and large areas of operations, all possible capture data should be placed on capture tags to include coordinates of capture, date-time group, unit of capture, circumstances surrounding capture, and a description of all weapons and documents captured with the individual.

d. All individuals detained by the brigade should be evacuated through channels. The recent experience of evacuation detainees through local channels points out that local Vietnamese do not use the same classification system as we do, do not have the same intelligence interests, and do not have a system for the expeditious dissemination of tactical information. It is also necessary that in operations with the Vietnamese a great deal of specific coordination is necessary. It must be determined beforehand where detainees are to be kept and interrogated, where pick-up points, screening points, and LZ's are to be located, and exactly what physical sets are to be followed by all detained personnel.

e. The VC have a definite radio monitoring capability and have, on several occasions, attempted to enter our FM nets. This makes it mandatory for radio operators to be familiar with the use of authentication tables and be able to challenge suspect stations.

f. When entering a new operational area, all possible intelligence agencies must be screened for information, and personnel who are familiar with the AG. In the past, sources of information (PW's, Ho Chi Minh) have not come to light until the operation had started. Although these sources were available and could have provided invaluable information prior to the commencement of the operation.

g. When operating against local force VC, the longer a unit remains in the area the better the chances are of finding the enemy. Although search must be made to detect hiding places, caches, and base areas. Eventually the VC will leave their hiding places to gain food and water, or due to general restlessness.
CONFIDENTIAL

In Intelligence to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (cont'd)

b. Intelligence leads must be reacted on immediately to obtain the best result when fighting guerrilla. Delays in reacting to intelligence will find the enemy gone from the area and the target no longer lucrative. It must be anticipated that many reports and sightings of enemy activity will not pan out; however, some are bound to bring results.

i. During the dry season the enemy will not occupy the highest ground, but will move his camps to areas more accessible to a water supply. Ambushes can be very successful in and around potential sources of water.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of the enemy weapons and material losses during Operation FARRAGUT:

a. Weapons Captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauser Rifle</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1 Garand</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Shotgun</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.35 Cal Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield 30-06</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson SMG</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosin Nagant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French SMG</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifle</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 80

b. Ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortars</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore, HD 10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore, HD 3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Mines</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-99 Rounds</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Grenades</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blasting Caps</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Other:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transistor Radios</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volt Meter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohm Meter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio/Receiver</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS Key</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS-9 Generator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3/4 H.P. Generator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC-10 Sand Set</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing Machines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microscope</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micrograph Machine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriter Ribbon</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab At Order of Battle

1-3

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (C) VC NVA Initial Order of Battle

a. NVA Units

(1) At the beginning of Operation FA'%LIT the 324th Co, 726th NVA Rn (possibly of the 9th VT NVA Div) was believed to be located in Minh Thuan Province. Numerous reports indicated its location as in vicinity of Rn 6574, operating close to SECRET BASE 7 (Rn 5974). One report indicated its operational area as being in the northern position of Minh Thuan Province and probably using SECRET BASE 22 (BP 8006) as its center of activity. Its mission was believed to include preparation for and conduct of a mortar assault on the Phan Rang Air Force Base complex in early 67.

(2) No other NVA units were believed to be located within the area of operation. Some of the local VC units (specifically the 270th VC LN) was believed to have an undetermined amount of NVA personnel as cadre.

b. VC Units

(1) Minh Thuan Province

(a) The following VCIF units were confirmed as operating in the Minh Thuan Province area with the most recent center of operations as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>270th VCIF Co</td>
<td>BN 7568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 VCIF Co</td>
<td>BN 6567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL30th Co</td>
<td>BN 7174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL15th Co</td>
<td>BN 9765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL25th Co</td>
<td>BN 7875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL50th Co</td>
<td>BN 9775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL20th Co</td>
<td>BN 7869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL50th Co</td>
<td>BN 9799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL40th Co</td>
<td>BN 6184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL30th Co</td>
<td>BN 7816</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The following VCIF units were believed to be located in the Minh Thuan Province area with operational areas undetermined:

1. XL30 VCIF Co
2. XLB5 VCIF Co
3. C274 VCIF Co
4. C285 VCIF Co

(c) Secret Base Areas were believed to be established in the following vicinities with the most protracted activities reported in Secret Base 7 and 304:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECRET BASE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>BN 6574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>BN 9792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>BN 6464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>BN 7559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Binh Thuan Province

(a) The following VCIF units were believed to be operating...
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation PANAMA (cont'd)

in Binh Thuan Province with possible locations indicated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>840 VC Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602 VC Bn</td>
<td>AN 7305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>489 VC Bn</td>
<td>BV 0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>490 VC Co</td>
<td>AN 7420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430 VC Co</td>
<td>AN 7427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440 VC Bn</td>
<td>BV 1530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450 VC AN</td>
<td>AN 7314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>480 VC Co</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>480 VC Co</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481 VC Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) A VC Mobile force Bn, identification unknown, was reported numerous times operating in the vicinity of AN 9421. The unit was reported to have a strength of 600 to 700 personnel and an assortment of weapons to include 60mm Mortars.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in the Operation Area.

a. Binh Thuan Province

(1) In late Jan 67 elements of the Brigade searched and destroyed the area described as Secret Base 7. Only small, isolated contact was made and as a result an insignificant amount of intelligence was gathered. The presence of small installations and facilities as well as agricultural and built up areas confirmed the assumption that the enemy (most probably Provincial VC Bn) extensively used the area as a staging area, Rest Area, and control center. It was not established that contact with the enemy units listed in 1b (1) (a) and (b) was made; however, the VC Bn were most probably members of the ZLQ1 VC Provincial Hqs and/or its subordinate units. As a result of captured material, which included typewriters, a reproduction machine, printed propaganda leaflets, directives, posters, etc., it was established that the ZLQ1 Provincial Hqs was located and operating within the immediate vicinity of BN 574.

(2) The deployment of elements of the Brigade in SB 35 (BN 7559) on 9 March 67 initially did not produce a significant amount of contact. The search and screening of Son Hai (BN 8362) resulted in approximately 30 detainees, believed to be local VC infrastructure, which established the fact that the hamlet was controlled by VC units in SB 35. During the search mission, contact with these elements was extremely light indicating that the enemy was successfully conducting concealment and escape and evasion tactics. The possibility of exfiltration into SB 7 (BN 5574), however, appeared remote in light of the friendly deployment of troops in the operational area west of Son Hai. The discovery of numerous small base camps, some fortification, individuals with various caches, and well used trails indicated that SB 35 was extensively used by small VC forces.

b. Binh Thuan Province

The Brigade deployment into Binh Thuan Province produced an insignificant amount of intelligence primarily due to lack of contact with enemy combat forces. All available evidence pointed to a possible enemy exfiltration from the operational area approximately 72 hours prior to friendly insertion.

c. Conclusion

(1) The enemy forces in Binh Thuan Province, particularly the 840th VLP Co and the 490th VLP Co, appear to have been well trained and organized as evidenced by their successful conduct of concealment and escape and evasion tactics in the area of operation during Feb 67.
The 840th VCLF Co remains in the northern portion of Binh Thuan Province and can be expected to conduct harassment type operations along Hwy #1 in the Ngay Phong Area (BN 5342) in the coming months. The 490th VCLF Co also remains in the Ngay Phong Area operating as a stable but flexible VC local force and will continue to interdict Hwy #1 in Vinh Hoa Village with tax collections, terrorism, and propaganda.

The Ninh Thuan Provincial Forces remain intact and operational within the Province. SE 22, 19 and 25 have been undisturbed by friendly forces. The search and destroy operations in SB 7 and SB 35 have probably preempted the NVA/VC plans to appear, prepare for, and conduct a mortar attack on Phan Rang AFD complex. The 274th and 113th VCLF Co's remain operational in SB 7 area. Due to the destruction of certain installations/facilities and the discovery and confiscation of a great amount of enemy materials in SB 7, the 141st VC Prov Hqs will have to recuperate and reorganize before they can reach maximum operational efficiency. The 270th VCLF Co and the 112th VCLF Co appear to have exfiltrated SB 35 but probably left small scattered groups concealed within the area. Son Dai Hamlet (BN 4362) remains under VC control. With the exfiltration of the NVN personnel assigned to the VCLF units, there are no NVN in the southern portion of of Ninh Thuan Province.
Inclusion 2 (Operation Schenectady) to Combat After Action Report, Operation Farragut.
South China Sea

Inclusion 2. Tab C
1. (D) UNIT PREPARATIONS:

   a. Beginning of Operation FAMAGUT.

      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation FAMAGUT were as follows:

            Authorized Augmented (WTQB) 4490
            Assigned 4876
            Present for Duty 4534
            PARAGUUT AO 3443
            Base Camp - Phan Rang 1092
            GATLING AO (voc Sec Loc (1 Feb - 15 Feb 67) 1773
            Not Present for Duty 342

      (2) The assigned strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 103% of the augmented authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength; 6 were hospitalized, 100 were in transit, 128 were on T/35/3D status, 76 on leave, 19 in confinement, and 5 AWOL.

   b. Conclusion of Operation FAMAGUT.

      (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation FAMAGUT were as follows:

            Authorized Augmented (WTQB) 4490
            Assigned 5093
            Present for Duty 4898
            FAMAGUT AO 1901
            Base Camp - Phan Rang 2249
            TF 117 AO 745
            Not Present for Duty 225

      (2) The assigned strength was 113% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 109% of the augmented authorized strength.

      (3) Of the not present for duty strength; 13 were hospitalized, 11 were in transit, 134 were on T/35/3D status, 104 on leave, 19 in confinement, and 4 AWOL.

      (4) The 16th Army Postal Unit, attached to the Brigade, remained at 9 personnel present for duty of 11 authorized throughout the operation.

          "This figure includes the Brigade Headquarters, and the logistical elements of the units that were participating in Operation FAMAGUT but were providing their normal support, in this particular case from the Base Camp.

      (5) The 16th Public Information Detachment with 1 officer and 3 enlisted men assigned of 1 officer and 4 enlisted men authorized were attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the operation.

   a. Replacements received during the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

            OFF  EN
            1/327  0  275  2/320  5  71
            2/327  4  153  Spc 8n  2  122
            2/502  2  171  Separate Companies 2  142

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

    3-1
a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/327</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/302</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17th Cav</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326th Engr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, Rce</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Total casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>372</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (c) PERSONNEL PROGRAM:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit continued its visits to forward units during the operation.

b. Beer, soda and limited sensitive items were provided to the units in the forward area during the operation.

4. (c) PERSONNEL PLANNING:

a. During the operation, continued emphasis was placed on accuracy of personnel records by affording personnel the opportunity to personally review their Military 201 Files.

b. Classes on Administration and postal operations were held for all units during the operation.

5. (c) MEDICAL:

a. Patients treated:

   (1) KIA: 114
   (2) Non Hostile Injury: 114
   (3) Disease: 643
   (4) Returned to Duty: 410
   (5) Evacuated to Hospital: 562
   (6) Remaining in Holding: 10
   (7) Total Patients Treated: 862

b. Hospitalized personnel categorized by wounds:

   (1) Head: 5
   (2) Chest: 5
   (3) Abdomen: 1
   (4) Upper Extremities: 26
   (5) Lower Extremities: 112
1. (C) ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT

a. General

Operation PARCHM was noteworthy for the extensive road convoy activity, in comparison with other recent operations. Major convoy efforts occurred from Phan Rang to Song Mao, Phan Thiet to Song Mao, and Song Mao to Phan Rang. In addition, smaller convoys operated between Phan Thiet and Luong Son almost daily while the Brigade headquarters was at Phan Thiet. A number of deficiencies in convoy operation became apparent. These included failure to maintain prescribed vehicle interval, speed, and failure to report crossing of check points.

The operation differed also in that it was logistically supported, in large measure, direct from Phan Rang base camp. During the initial and final stages of the operation, the Forward Support Element (FSE) was activated and its functions were assumed by the Support Battalion. This is feasible due to the proximity of the base camp and the area of operations. During such periods, some difficulty was experienced in the duplication of logistical requirements. That is requirements for the same item were placed upon logistical personnel from several sources. This sometimes resulted in confusion and duplicative issues.

b. Support Battalion. When necessary, Support Battalion established an FSE consisting of Company D, 326th Medical Battalion, and administrative, maintenance, ammunition, supply, transportation, and command and control elements. The FSE provided responsive support to committed units from successive locations at Phan Thiet and Song Mao. A Forward Supply Point (FSP) was opened for a short time at Luong Son due to the relatively large size of the area of operations.

c. Supporting Forces:

(1) USASOC, Cam Ranh Bay provided overall logistical support. It also established separate forward support areas (FSA) at Phan Thiet and Song Mao. These installations provided the Brigade with the bulk of Class I, III, IV, and V supplies and were co-located with the FSE.

(2) Phan Rang Sub Area Command, USASOC, Cam Ranh Bay provided transportation assets. Of particular importance the 329th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) provided the bulk of transportation required to execute major convoys.

(3) 10th Combat Aviation Battalion helicopters provided logistic and tactical support.

(4) USAF C-130 and C-123 aircraft transported most of the Brigade routine resupply of Class II and IV equipment from Phan Rang to the forward area.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a. Supply

(1) Class I supplies were received in sufficient quantity, and no major shortages were experienced. Some difficulty was initially encountered with resupply of ice and ice cream. However, the proximity of Phan Rang made it possible to fly in ice and ice cream on a daily basis aboard C7A aircraft. A total of 330.2 short tons of Class I were issued.

(2) Class II and IV supplies continued to be flown directly to the forward area aboard USAF fixed wing aircraft. A total of 112 short tons of Class II and IV supplies were issued during the operation.
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation PARRAGUT

(3) Class III. The large extent of road convoy activity inflated consumption of M-46 and SPF fuel to a level above the average for previous operations. The Brigades organic and attached vehicles consumed 526.2 short tons of Class III products throughout Operation PARRAGUT.

(4) Class V. Although no major engagements occurred during the operation, ammunition issue accounted for 599.8 short tons. This entire amount was not expended, and Brigade units completed the operation with full basic loads.

(5) Water.

The resupply of water provided some difficulty while the Brigade was located in the Khan Thiet area. The dry season prevented units from utilizing the many intermittent streams in the area of operations. As a result, water came primarily from a small number of central sources. The plastic, 3 gallon capacity, free drop container again proved its worth. Although this item has attained a high degree of acceptance and use, stocks are limited. Consequently every effort must be made to recover and re-use these containers.

b. Maintenance. The following maintenance problems presented the greatest degree of difficulty during the operation:

(1) The H-138/U handset continues as a source of difficulty in signal maintenance. Pending issue of an improved replacement item, field expedient measure and frequent replacement provided the only solutions.

(2) Vehicle engines, particularly for the 3/4 ton truck, failed at an increasing rate. This was due to excessive heating and advanced engine life.

(3) Generators experienced a high rate of failure due to the excessive heat, humidity and breakdowns in viscosity of the oil used. A running limit of 15 hours was established in order to insure adequate lubrication.

(4) Strut members under the rear 2 1/2 ton truck cab and vehicle had begun to fail. This can be attributed to constant operation over poor roads while carrying heavy loads.

(5) Starlight scopes are failing at an increasing rate. The primary difficulties are caused by the damage to knobs and rubber covers. Each scope must be evacuated to Sacramento for repair at an estimated cost of approximately $2500.00.

(6) Small arms revealed signs of extensive wear and some corrosion. This is natural since these weapons have been in almost constant use.

(7) Lack of repair parts for signal and engineer equipment created unnecessary dead-ends periods. Primary examples included handset cables and generator engines.

(8) The following is a summary of maintenance activities and job orders during the operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Incomplete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Operation PAKWAT

1. Other Services:
   (1) Officer Registration, quartermaster laundry and bath services were provided in the Phan Thiet and Song Mao with personnel and equipment drawn from U.S.S.C., Cam Ranh Bay. During the period when the Brigade operated directly from base camp, the Phan Rang Sub Area Command provided these services.

3. (U) SUMMARY. Operation PAKWAT presented no major logistical problems. The logistical system remained fully capable of supporting tactical operations. Some shortcomings were noted in the operation of vehicle convoys, however these remain relatively minor in scope.

1. (U) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The present logistical system and support concepts have proven valid and should be continued.

b. Some efforts are required to raise the Brigade's proficiency in the conduct of road convoys.
CONFIDENTIAL

Incloure 5 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Report, Operation PARRAOUT

1. (U) MISSION: The 1st FASP, 501st Signal and the Communications Platoon, HHC 1st Brigade 101st Abn Div had the joint mission of providing signal support for the Brigade.

2. (C) OPERATIONS

   a. GENERAL: The 1st FASP, 501st Signal and the Communication Platoon, HHC 1st Brigade 101st Abn Div provided signal support during Operation PARRAOUT by establishing the Brigade Command Post and Communications Systems at Song Mao and Phan Rang.

   b. VHF Section provided circuits at Phan Rang from the Bde CP to MACV, 101st Arm Section and 10th Arm BN.

   c. Communication Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at Song Mao. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Company Communication Center terminated three secure teletype circuits. Brigade Communication Center personnel augmented the 278th Signal Company Communication Center in support of the Brigade.

   d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade CP at Song Mao terminating 86 circuits and installed approximately 50 miles of wire. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Co operated the switchboard and terminated the circuits for the brigade. The switchboard/wire section augmented the 278th Signal Co personnel.

   e. FM Radio Section provided FM radio stations at Song Mao and Phan Rang. Automatic retransmission and relay stations were employed at RN 677567. The MARS Station was established to provide phone patch service to USA.

   f. AM Radio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between Song Mao and Phan Rang. A secure teletype circuit between Phan Rang and Tay Hoa was established in support of the 2/327 with 77 Foy.

   g. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade HHC and attachments.

   h. Field Forces Signal Support; Det H, 5th Signal BN continued to provide circuits into the in-country system. secure radio teletype between FFORCEN, Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear and a single sideband phone patch net paralleling the radio teletype net.

CONFIDENTIAL
1. During Operation Farragut civil affairs activities were conducted in Phan Thiet and Song Hao of Binh Thuan Province and at Phan Rang in Ninh Thuan Province. In all areas liaison was immediately established with the GVN officials, their US counterparts and representatives of the civilian agencies. In conjunction with local officials price lists were established and distributed, fair wages were determined and labor was procured for the Brigade. In less populated more remote areas there is a tendency for laborers to demand higher wages as was the case in the Song Hao area. Initially a daily wage of 130,000 VN per day was demanded even though a wage of 90,000 VN per day was fair and adequate for the area. However as soon as it was learned the Brigade would not exceed 90,000, the local labor force agreed to work at that price. The Song Hao area was also unique in that it contained three different ethnic groups living in close proximity to one another. Vietnamese, Hongs of Chinese decent and Montagnards. Although the Brigade drew labor from all of these groups on a daily basis, no problems were encountered. Although Phan Rang is a relatively prosperous area and the GVN employed hundreds of local workers on a permanent basis, the Brigade had no trouble obtaining daily hires for 90,000 VN per day. The practice of allowing the units to procure their own labor rather than operating a central hire point continued to prove more efficient when operating in the Phan Rang area. During Operation Farragut over 200 Montagnards were resettled in secure areas, 30 innocent civilians were returned to their homes and the VC village of Vinh Hao in Binh Thuan Province, (approximately 500 people) was resettled in a GVN controlled area. At the conclusion of the operation 40 families from the VC village of Song Hao in Binh Thuan had moved back to GVN control in the Phan Rang area. The Brigade provided 3 tons of food stuffs and 2 tons of captured rice to help feed the refugees from Vinh Hao and 5 tons of captured rice for the families from Song Hao.

2. As the Brigade operated in three different areas during Operation Farragut, civic action efforts were aimed at high impact short duration projects attempting to integrate the GVN officials and forces wherever possible. Significant activities during the operation were as follows:
   a. Joint US/VN sick calls were conducted in all 3 areas treating more than 2000 patients.
   b. Extensive work was conducted on Highway One between Phan Thiet and Song Hao resulting in the repair of 2 culverts, 1 bypasses and 27 seuts.
   c. A running water system was installed in the Notre Dame Orphanage at Phan Thiet. The Brigade provided the materials and the local Public Works Dept installed the system. Prior to installing the system, water had to be drawn from a well and carried to the orphanage. With the new system water can now be drawn from any of 13 taps located throughout the orphanage.
   d. Two captured VC sewing machines were repaired and presented to the Girls Club at the An Phouc District high school in Ninh Thuan.
   e. More than 100 students in the Phan Rang area were given scholarships for at least one year by troopers of the brigade stationed at Phan Rang.
   f. Large quantities of food, clothing, soap, scrap lumber and various captured commodities were distributed to refugees and needy handouts.

3. Lessons Learned:
   a. Several packages of gifts were sent by an organization in the States to a member of the Brigade for distribution to needy Vietnamese children. Most of the items were gift wrapped and an attempt was made to distribute them in this form. This proved extremely difficult as many of the items were not suitable for the ages of the children receiving them. Regardless of fancy gift wrapping all packages must be opened and examined prior to distribution.
   b. When the brigade enters a new area the local labor force
will often demand wages much higher than the normal scale. These high wage demands must not be met and when the labor force learns that they won't be met, they will work for the normal scale.

c. While in the Song Lô area it was learned that USID had provided the means and advised local farmers to grow an onion crop. This was done and an ample crop was grown. However there was no local market for that amount of onions and no means to get the crop to a distant market. Production of a cash crop of this nature should not be encouraged unless there is a market readily available to turn the produce into cash.

d. As a result of inadequate storage facilities in Phan Rang for SS supplies, food items stored there spoiled and had to be disposed of. Steps are being taken to provide a permanent SS storage facility in Phan Rang.

e. Until recently new tags for daily hire laborers were made on a daily basis. This method proved difficult and time consuming. Laminated tags were procured and are now used. These tags are issued and taken up daily and can be used in any area the brigade operates in.
Inclosure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

1. Psychological Objective:
   a. To induce VC, VC sympathizers and SVN supporters living in VC controlled areas to avail themselves of the SVN Chieu Hoi Program.
   b. To encourage the populace "on the fence" to join the SVN as opposed to the VC.
   c. To strengthen the will to resist the VC and increase the morale of the pro-SVN populace.

2. Concept of Operations:
   a. Phase I: During this phase of the operation emphasis was placed on conducting Psychological Warfare. The majority of leaflet and loudspeaker missions were conducted in the AO. After all target areas in the AO had been covered missions were conducted over populated areas outside the AO. These missions concentrated on target areas immediately adjacent to the AO which were known to be VC or have strong VC sympathies. All missions during this phase were daytime missions conducted from USAF U-10 aircraft.

   b. Phase II and III: During this phase of the operation emphasis was shifted from Psychological Warfare to Psychological Operations. The priority targets were the populated areas. Emphasis was placed on conducting missions over VC controlled and contested villages. Three leaflets and three tapes were secured from the Province Chief, reproduced, and distributed throughout the Province. Two C-47 loudspeaker missions, each 2 hours in duration, were conducted over the populated areas each night. Daily U-10 leaflet missions covered the populated areas also. Operations within the AO included a mass leaflet drop designed to saturate the entire area at the outset of the Combat Operation. Loudspeaker and leaflet missions were conducted in the AO as the tactical operation uncovered likely targets.

   c. Phase IV: During the last phase of the operation emphasis was again placed on conducting missions in the populated areas. Two leaflets and three tapes from the Province Chief were obtained, reproduced and disseminated. A mass leaflet drop was conducted to saturate the AO (SB-35) and daily leaflet and loudspeaker missions were conducted against likely targets discovered as a result of tactical operations.

3. Operations Conducted:
   a. Missions: 102 missions covering 177 target areas were conducted. Target areas ranged in size from several huts to areas as large as 216 sq. km.

   b. Leaflets: 15 different leaflets were used totalling 11,897,000 dropped. National Safe Conduct Passes were dropped on each leaflet mission. (See Tab A, Leaflet List).

   c. Loudspeakers: A total broadcast time of 154.5 hours was logged. These consisted of:
      (1) Aerial
         (a) Day (live): 8.5 hours.
         (b) Day (tape): 28 hours.
         (c) Night (tape): 101 hours.
      (2) Ground (day, live): 1h hours.
      (3) Sea (night, tape): 3 hours.

CONFIDENTIAL

29
Inclioei-e
7 (psychological Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

1. Summaries
   a. Evaluating the effectiveness of the 5th Psy Ops program continues to be a major problem. However, indirect indicators tend to show the program is effective.

   (1) Several Hoi Chanh questioned at the PHAN THIET Chieu Ho1 Center (FARRAGUT IV) indicated they had heard loudspeaker broadcasts both day and night prior to their rallying.

   (2) Most Hoi Chanh were in possession of one or more leaflets at the time they rallied.

   (3) Chieu Ho1 Center officials at PHAN RANG confirmed that they received 1 Hoi Chanh as a direct result of a loudspeaker appeal conducted by this Brigade. A VC made the appeal from a US-LD via SONO MAG to his 4 friends. His friends heard the appeal and returned to the GVN.

   (4) Village of SON HOI commenced evacuation to a GVN secure area several days after a low level leaflet drop had been conducted against the village.

   (5) 100 persons rallied to the GVN in a group NW of PHAN THIET. These people's village had had several leaflet and loudspeaker missions conducted against it approximately 1 week prior to their rallying.

   b. This operation marked the first use of "Key Communicator" leaflets and taped messages. The results achieved indicated that this method of getting across a message is highly successful. One Hoi Chanh who rallied to the PHAN THIET Chieu Ho1 Center said he did so because he heard "the Province Chief wanted the VC to come back to the government". He further stated that he "heard the Province Chief talking from an airplane" (U-10 using one of the prepared tapes).

   c. Several Hoi Chanh stated that of all weapons systems used by the 5th, the one most feared is the helicopter. The VC know its capabilities and are therefore uncertain what any helicopters intentions are when one is sighted. It is interesting to note that the majority of indications pointing to a successful Psy Ops program involved helicopter missions. Whether this is the result of probability or a direct correlation is not known at this time. However, continued efforts will be made to define the relationship between effective Psy Ops missions and the use of helicopters as Psy Ops vehicles. Two reasons why the helicopter may be more successful than other type aircraft in conducting Psy Ops mission are;

   (1) The helicopter instills greater fear in the VC initially. After it become apparent that the helicopter is conducting a Psy Ops mission a feeling of relief would be manifested. At this time the Psy Ops message might be more meaningful to the VC.

   (2) The helicopter normally is used at much lower altitudes in conducting Psy than are the USAF Fixed Wing aircraft. This fact allows greater accuracy in leaflet drops and closer range for the loudspeaker broadcasts.

   d. Based on the effectiveness indicators received to date, the current program of concentrating on population centers using Key Communicator appeals will be continued and the results evaluated.

5. Lessons Learned:
   a. The availability of a proficient interpreter or linguist is essential to conducting effective Psy Ops particularly in rapid reaction situations.

   b. Key communicator appeals approach Face-to-Face communication in that the audience can identify with the speaker.

   c. General appeals promising good treatment and encouraging VC to rally to the Brigade are ineffective due to a lack of credibility. Emphasis should be placed instead on encouraging VC to rally to the GVN. Key communicator appeals
Coupled with the demoralizing effects of combat operations create a high measure of persuasiveness and credibility.

d. The helicopter makes an ideal Psy Ops aircraft. Its use on leaflet missions allows pinpoint accuracy since leaflets can be distributed at very low levels. Loudspeaker broadcasts similarly can be pinpointed and the effects of high winds, on clarity, minimized.
After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT

During Operation FARRAGUT the following leaflets were used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Leaflet Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SP-331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SP-766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>SP-769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SP-782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SP-868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SP-941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SP-962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SP-967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SP-951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>SP-954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>SP-957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>SP-958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>SP-1114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>SP-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>SP-1389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>SP-1531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>SP-1539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>SP-1619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>SP-1716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>SP-1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>SP-1803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>21SN-123-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>21SN-124-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>21SN-125-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>21SN-126-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>21SN-127-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>21SN-128-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>21SN-129-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>21SN-130-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>21SN-131-67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1-7-1

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT


2. Summary of Operation:
   a. In the conduct of Operation FARRAGUT the same techniques of fire support coordination and artillery employment which have proven successful in previous operations were utilized. Favorable terrain and the concept of operation of the maneuver elements allowed extensive employment of radar throughout phases II, III, and IV. Battalion FDC was utilized throughout the operation, centrally located, as the controlling FDC.
   b. An additional forward observer requirement was imposed by the attachment of a forward observer party to the 2/144 ARVN during the conduct of Phase IV. This exceeded the organic forward observer capability of the battalion, and was fulfilled by utilizing personnel with associated training and experience from within the battalion.
   c. Naval gunfire provided reinforcing fires to the brigade during phases III and IV of FARRAGUT. Liaison was maintained at the brigade level as well as periodic radio communications between the supporting ships and battalion FDC.
   d. B/1/30 was frequently split into two platoons, each platoon collocated with a battery of 105mm howitzers, throughout the operation. Several fire missions were conducted, adjusting with the 105's and masking the fires of both the 105's and 155's in effect. Flexibility was obtained by shifting the fires of one element (usually the 105's) onto possible escape routes while the other maintained suppressing fires on the enemy.
   e. The amount of H and I fires was increased during this operation. These fires are effectively utilized to deceive the enemy as to the objective of the maneuver elements and to deny the enemy use of critical terrain, roads, bridges, fords, campsites, etc. Likely H and I targets can be obtained from the maneuver elements relaying through their forward observers.
   f. Air warning messages are now being broadcast over the "Guard" UHF frequency by the fire direction center, using an air force survival kit radio. Tests thus far have been generally favorable, although the radio's range seems to be extremely limited. Broadcasting air warning messages in this manner is convenient for the pilots since the UHF "Guard" frequency is monitored by them at all times. A search is being made for a more powerful, portable UHF radio.
   g. A schedule of fires conducted at the beginning of Phase IV was terminated about halfway through due to the flight paths of helicopters, lifting in the maneuver elements, crossing the gun-target line. Strict adherence to the proposed flight corridor by the pilots would have enabled the schedule of fires to be completed.

3. Execution:
   a. Phase I:
      (1) At 270700 January, A/2-320th displaced to BN5868.2. Unit closed at 1000 hours. Direct Support of 1-327th Infantry.
      (2) At 310730 January, A/2-320th displaced to BN746878. Unit closed at 1010 hours. General support of 1st Brigade.
Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAOUT

(1) At 271200 January, B/2-320th displaced to BN512768. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(2) At 311115 January, B/2-320th displaced to BN615695. Unit closed at 1615 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(3) At 051730 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN665690. Unit closed at 1330 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 1048:00 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN669668. Unit closed at 1140 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 150630 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN692376. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 270700 January, C/2-320th displaced to BN702598. Unit closed at 1715 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(7) At 301100 January, C/2-320th displaced to BN667688. Unit closed at 1815 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(8) At 281000 January, C/2-320th displaced to 1N674874. Unit closed at 1900 hours. Direct support reinforcing the fires of C/2-320th.

(9) At 170730 February, C/2-320th displaced to BN647639. Unit closed at 1740 hours. Direct support reinforcing the fires of C/2-320th.

Phase II:

(1) At 170500 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN662582. Unit closed at 1030 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(2) At 230700 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN625384. Unit closed at 1100 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(3) At 281100 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN664589. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 170500 February, A/2-320th displaced to BN252134. Unit closed at 0630 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 230600 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN225473. Unit closed at 1100 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 250600 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN242813. Unit closed at 1000 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(7) At 280800 February, B/2-320th displaced to BN664589. Unit closed at 1130 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 170730 February, C/2-320th displaced to BM625166. Unit closed at 1730 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(9) At 180600 February, C/2-320th displaced to BM224206. Unit closed at 1800 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(10) At 290700 February, C/2-320th displaced to BM669560. Unit closed at 1630 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(11) At 251100 February, C/2-320th displaced to BM669560. Unit closed at 2000 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

B-2
(12) At 170715 February, B/3-320th displaced to H780516. Unit closed at 1730 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of C/2-320th.

(13) At 281110 February, B/1-320th displaced to H766156. Unit closed at 2020 hours. General support of the 1st Brigade.

c. Phase III:

(1) At 030700 March, A/3-320th displaced to H797566. Unit closed at 1000 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(2) At 060515 March, A/2-320th displaced to H726456. Unit closed at 1035 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(3) At 080630 March, B/3-320th displaced to H737339. Unit closed at 1120 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 040730 March, B/2-320th displaced to H751820. Unit closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(5) At 050700 March, B/2-320th displaced to H7594521. Unit closed at 1615 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(6) At 060500 March, C/2-320th displaced to H705528. Unit closed at 0930 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(7) At 090630 March, C/2-320th displaced to H766156. Unit closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(8) At 090600 March, V/3-320th displaced to H7594521. Unit closed at 1615 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of B/2-320th.

d. Phase IV:

(1) At 090600 March, A/2-320th displaced to H785667. Unit closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 1-327th Infantry.

(2) At 201700 March, A/2-320th displaced to H776869. Unit closed at 1715 hours. General support 1st Brigade.

(3) At 090500 March, 2-320th displaced to H703597. Unit closed at 1745 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

(4) At 150700 March, B/2-320th displaced to H766682. Unit closed at 1132 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(5) At 230900 March, B/2-320th displaced to H777869. Unit closed at 1250 hours. General support of 1st Brigade.

(6) At 080600 March, C/2-320th displaced to H751019. Unit closed at 1250 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

(7) At 121300 March, C/2-320th displaced to H778669. Unit closed at 2130 hours. Direct support 2-327th Infantry.

(8) At 220700 March, B/1-320th displaced to H7624524. Unit closed at 1000 hours. General support reinforcing the fires of B/2-320th.

(9) At 230900 March, B/2-320th displaced to H774669. Unit closed at 1215 hours. General support of 1st Brigade.

i. Results:

a. 12 VC (KH Army).
b. 10 VC (VB Art) (EST).

5. Administrative matters: N/A

6. Special equipment and techniques: The radar was extensively employed during phases II, III and IV of PAMBAYT in the following manners:
   a. Registrations were conducted, both center of impact and high burst.
   b. Survey coordinates were computed for 6 battery by the tracking of a low charge high angle round fired by 6 battery, by radar.
   c. Further tests in computing survey coordinates for a given location were conducted by the radar section as follows:
      (1) Tracking a balloon floating above the point at which surveyed coordinates were desired.
      (2) Tracking an H-13 hovering above the point at which surveyed coordinates are desired.
      (3) Tracking a beer can dropped from an H-13 onto the point at which surveyed coordinates are desired.

7. Commander's Analysis: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, Battery "HO", 1st Battalion 30th Artillery, and tactical air continue to provide adequate fire support.

Tests conducted with the portable UHF radio in broadcasting air warning messages have been more satisfactory than methods employed in past operations. A more powerful portable UHF radio, once obtained, should eliminate the problem of adequate aircraft warning during the conduct of fire missions. Tests conducted with the radio have indicated many areas of possible employment in a counterinsurgency environment.

8. Recommendations: That four (4) C1-47's be provided this brigade at all times and that the aviation company assigned to support continue to provide a liaison officer.
1. The most significant Engineer activity in Operation FARRAM was the opening and use of land lines of communication. During the initial phase of the operation, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 50th Infantry moved into the Secret Base 7 area using Rt 1 and Rt 406. The later stages of the operations were characterized by daily usage of Rt 1 in the area in which the Brigade was operating. The displacement of the Brigade base from PHAN THIET to SON O MA to PHAN RANG was accomplished by road.

2. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division received general Engineer support from elements of the 35th Engineer Group. Company C, 11th Engineer Battalion provided support in the PHAN RANG area, specifically repairing 8 kilometers of Rt 406 in late January, assisting in the opening of Rt 1 from PHAN RANG to SONO MAO on 15 and 16 February, and in opening Rt 107 to SONO MAO in mid March. 2d Platoon, Company A, 11th Engineer Battalion provided support in preparing the Brigade base area at PHAN THIET and in opening Rt 1 from PHAN THIET to SONO MAO on 17 and 18 February. Company B, 87th Engineer Battalion constructed the airfield at SONO MAO, prepared the Brigade base area at SONO MAO, provided bulldozers for construction of access roads into the LE HONG PHONG Forest, and installed a bypass on Rt 1 on 1 March. The support rendered by each of these units was responsive and timely in every incident.

3. Throughout the operation Company A, 87th Engineer Battalion provided LZ clearing and demolition teams to the committed Infantry Battalions. Mine sweeping teams working with A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry and with the 9th Platoon conducted daily sweeps on Rt 1 from 10 February through the end of the operation. The company provided a provisional platoon, reorganized as Infantry, to secure Battery B, 1-10 Artillery, from 3 through 11 February. With equipment support from the 36th Engineer Group, Company A, 87th Engineer Battalion opened Rt 1 from PHAN THIET to SONO MAO, repairing 27 cuts and installing 3 bypasses. Elements of the company constructed approximately 25 kilometers of access roads into the LE HONG PHONG Forest and destroyed two bunker complexes totalling more than 100 bunkers.

4. The types of mines encountered in Operation FARRAM were the CMH booby traps and along Rt 1 between PHAN THIET and SONO MAO, a command detonated Claymore type mine used on Rt 1 north of TUT PHONG, and electrically detonated road mines emplaced on Rt 1 north of PHAN THIET. Electrically detonated mines used a firing mechanism made of two flattened sections of tin cans held approximately 1/8 inch apart by split wooden pegs. These metal sections were wired into the firing system and pressing the sections together completed the circuit and fired the mine. This simple but effective mechanism was used as a pressure device or for command detonation.

5. Drinking water was a distinct problem in the coastal regions around and north of PHAN THIET. The only water source found near PHAN THIET that could support the Brigade water point was the city reservoir. During the dry months of February and March this water has a strong, musty taste that is extremely unpleasant and even affects foods prepared with water. Salt was used to contaminate wells used by the TC on the edge of the LE HONG PHONG Forest.

6. There were no unusual Engineer problems encountered in Operation FARRAM. The requirement for careful road sweeping and the efficiency of roads as a means for moving supplies were again demonstrated.