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6 April - 11 October 67

OPERATION FRANCIS MARION

4th Infantry Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-00

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - -- FRANCIS MARION

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached Combat Operations After Action Report -- FRANCIS MARION is submitted for the information of all concerned.

2. a. The 1st and 2d Brigades initiated Operation FRANCIS MARION on 6 April by redeploying from the area west of New PLEIKU City, the 1st Brigade establishing their CP northeast of DUC CO at LE THANH (Jackson Hole); the 2d Brigade at THANH AN (the Oasis). This repositioning put the division in a posture to screen the NVA's traditional infiltration routes -- just north of DUC CO, along Route 19W and through the IA.DRANG Valley -- and to operate against increased small unit NVA/VC activity in areas adjacent to PLEIKU City.

b. The initial contacts came in the latter part of April when the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, had 10 days of brief contact with small NVA reconnaissance groups close to the border between the CHU PONG massif and DUC CO. During the same period the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, had a series of contacts that eventually led to an engagement with an NVA battalion on 30 April - 1 May in a large, well-fortified base area between the Oasis and PLEI NE. The NVA battalion had infiltrated before the division's redeployment and was preparing for defensive operations in this area north of the IA MUIR River. Following an intensive artillery and air preparation, a mechanized infantry company led by a section of tanks from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry moved into the enemy complex on the second day. The tanks used cannister, machine guns, and the crushing weight of the vehicles to beat down the jungle, reduce the bunkers and route the enemy. The two day action accounted for 133 NVA killed at the cost of three US lives.

c. In May, the battalions of the 1st Brigade were positioned in the rugged CHU GOUNGOT - CHU YAM Mountains to the west of Route 14B between DUC CO and PLEIKU DJERENG. On 18 May Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with a large NVA force northwest of DUC CO. This began nine days of vicious contact during the period 18-26 May, in which the 1st Brigade's three battalions -- 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry -- had almost continuous contact with never less than a battalion of the two well-armed and well-trained NVA Regiments contacted. During this period, 31,304 rounds of artillery and 219 sorties of TAC air were placed into the area of contact. As May ended, the enemy had been driven out of this area, leaving 367 bodies they were not able to carry away. Again in July, after refitting and replacing their losses, these same
NVA units attempted to recross the western border of South VIETNAM. This time the area was the rolling, rock-covered hills south of DUC CO. On 12 July, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, had a violent, head-on meeting with two NVA battalions just five kilometers from the border, killing 142 NVA. Again, on 23 July, two rifle companies of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry were engaged just south of DUC CO. A good defensive perimeter, the immediate reinforcement by the second rifle company, the massive artillery fires of 42 tubes from eight batteries firing 6,600 rounds during the contact and the following night, and 12 TAC air strikes devastated not only the attacking forces, but also a reserve battalion, 1000 meters south of the area of contact. In the end, 189 NVA bodies littered the ground, large numbers of weapons of all types and 10 captives resulted from this action. All the enemy's attempts at a monsoon offensive had been repulsed soon after his incursion of the South VIETNAMESE Border and before he was able to reach his objectives, which apparently were either the DUC CO Special Forces Camp, the 1st Brigade command post at Jackson Hole, or the Government of VIETNAM's resettlement area of EDAP ENANG.

d. Having failed to force their way into the Central Highlands, the NVA began to break down into small groups, avoiding all contact with our forces by circumventing the division area of operations. To counter this apparent new tactic, the mission of providing surveillance and conducting screening operations along the border was tasked to the 1st Brigade, allowing the 2d Brigade to conduct operations against the NVA/VC infiltrated areas northwest, northeast and east of PLEIKU. A 122mm rocket attack on Jackson Hole, which was the first use of these weapons in PLEIKU province, proved to be the most significant enemy effort during the latter months of the operations. In the closing weeks of FRANCIS MARION, the 2d Brigade conducted an extensive search and destroy operation in the DAK PAYAU Valley east of PLEIKU in an attempt to discover and destroy an enemy unit that had infiltrated into the area. On 1 October, a Headhunter aircraft spotted a large group of NVA to the northeast of PHU NHON. Six air strikes were placed on the area of the enemy sighting, followed up by helicopter gunships working over the area and a combat assault by Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry into a "hot" LZ. Contact was broken shortly after the LZ was secured and sweeps of the battle area produced 49 NVA bodies killed as a result of air strikes and small arms. A POW from this action related that this was a replacement group infiltrating to join an NVA battalion operating east of PLEIKU.

e. As FRANCIS MARION terminated, the 1st Brigade continued to screen the border area between PLEI DJERENG and the CHU PONG Mountains and the 2d Brigade was moved to an area of operations in southern PHU BON Province to begin search and destroy operations.

f. The overall success of Operation FRANCIS MARION was the result of a maximum effort by all men of the division and its supporting units. The operation was conducted during the highland's southwest monsoon season which, while making living conditions in the field more difficult, also compounded the task of keeping the supplies moving forward in the needed quantities. It was during this period that the 4th Engineer Battalion and units of the 937th Engineer Group, principally the 20th Engineer Battalion, kept the MSR's open to the convoys despite some periods of tremendously heavy rainfalls with the resulting run off on the unpaved roadways, which required long and hard hours of frustrating effort just to keep the roadbeds from failing to bear the heavy
The combat support provided by the Division Support Command was nothing less than outstanding. On 23 April, a division-operated FSA replaced the FSA located with the 1st Brigade at Jackson Hole and on 4 July the FSA was withdrawn from the 2d Brigade and replaced by an FSE. From this date, all support for both brigades came from the division's resources. As the monsoon rains increased, transportation of supplies became an increasingly arduous task; traffic became one-way, vehicles bogged down in unlocking zones and the larger capacity tractor and trailer vehicles became unmanageable on the slippery roads. These and other factors combined to require more trucks and more time to complete a single haul; putting increased stress on men and equipment. This required all division units to contribute trucks and drivers to the task of moving the required quantity of supplies. Nevertheless, at no time were combat operations hindered by a lack of supplies.

It is inevitable that tactical operations will overshadow other areas of accomplishment by the units of an infantry division in combat; however, several accomplishments in other areas should not be overlooked. In April, the division's base camp was still primarily a "tent city"; only a few permanent buildings had been erected. But with the approaching monsoon providing the impetus and the engineers furnishing the technical supervision, and needed basic materials, the units in base camp began a self-help program in which the men of each unit provided the manpower. By October, roughly 85 percent of the projected permanent buildings had been completed. In addition, the engineers had provided adequate drainage and by previously paving half of each roadway of the primary internal base camp road net, had prevented a recurrence of the serious movement problems suffered during the previous year's rains. The airfield was improved by completely covering the runway and ramps with steel planking, together with constructing revetments for all organic aircraft.

In proximity to the base camp, the TAOR was extended out to 10,000 meters. Within this circumspherical boundary lived our 15,000 MONTAGNARD friends who became the recipients of the division's Good Neighbor civic action program. Five times a week, the members of all the division's units that lived in base camp visited each of the 69 villages. During the last six months, various health improvement and self-help construction programs were initiated and enthusiastically received by these villages. Similar, but less extensive, civic action programs were initiated in the forward brigade areas; in THANH AN and PHU NHON districts by the 1st and 2d Brigades, and by the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor in the LE TRUNG district along Route 19E. Also included in the civic action program of the brigades was the provision of transportation, medical and construction support to the GVN's EDAP ZAANG Resettlement Village on Route 19N. The reception of these programs by the MONTAGNARD and VIETNAMESE inhabitants of PLEIKU Province has, on the whole, been indeed rewarding.

1 Incl

W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding
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**COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT**

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation FRANCIS MARION - Search and destroy.


3. (U) LOCATION: Area of operations is shown on overlay 1. (Reference: Map VIETNAM, Scale 1:250,000; Series JGO (G) 1501; Sheets 68-8, 48-12, 49-5, 49-9; and map VIETNAM, Scale 1:50,000; Series I7014; Sheets 6437 I, II; 6436 I; 6537 I, II, III, IV; 6536 I, II, III, IV; 6535 I, II, III, IV; 6637 I, II, III, IV; 6636 I, II, III, IV; 6635 I, II, III, IV.

4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in the operation are listed at inclosure 1.

6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Inclosure 2.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:
   a. Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength Prior to Operation FRANCIS MARION.

   (1) At the beginning of Operation FRANCIS MARION, the NVA B-3 Front was preparing the battlefield northwest of DUC CO Special Forces Camp. The enemy mission was to move forces east into the IA DRANG Valley and conduct attacks on US forces and the Special Forces Camps at DUC CO, PLEI ME, New
PLEI DWEN and the District Headquarters at THANH AN. These planned attacks were to be combined with widespread harassment to achieve the general objectives of holding US units in the Western Highlands and drawing in additional US forces to relieve pressure on the coast. The plan was also intended to contribute to the countrywide goal of inflicting heavy casualties on US forces and disrupting the Revolutionary Development Program.

(2) Summary of enemy composition, disposition and strength at the beginning of Operation FRANCIS MARION.

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<td>5,500</td>
<td>YA4966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Rgt</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Ya6952</td>
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<tr>
<td>66th Rgt</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>Ya6055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Rgt</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>Ya6058</td>
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<td>10th NVA Division</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>UNK loc, CAMBODIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>95B Rgt</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>Ya1317</td>
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<tr>
<td>101C Bn</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Ya7518</td>
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<tr>
<td>200th Arty Bn</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Unk loc, PLEIKU, KONTUM Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>407th Sapper NF Bn</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Northeastern PLEIKU Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-15 LF Bn</td>
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b. Enemy Activity During Operation FRANCIS MARION.

(1) Operation FRANCIS MARION began on 6 April, but no contact of any significance occurred until 17 April, when Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, engaged two NVA companies at ZA130167. This marked the beginning of a series of contacts, as the enemy moved large forces into southwestern PLEIKU Province. On 26 April, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged one NVA Battalion at Ya845132. Company C of the same battalion contacted two NVA Platoons on 28 April at Ya840135.

(2) 4th Infantry Division forces were deployed generally west of Highway 14 to counter the enemy's repeated and determined efforts to attack friendly forces and installations in the area. Two major engagements took place on 1 May. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry in an engagement which began 30 April, killed 133 NVA (8C) of the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment at ZA11118, while 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry contacted the 7th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment at Ya791337, killing 20 of the enemy and capturing one.

(3) In spite of initial reverses, the B-3 Front persisted in

1Captured NVA Document "Outline of Campaign Plan of B-3 for the 1967 Rainy Season" recovered on 3 May by 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, after the battle with the NVA 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment on 1 May.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV J3-22)

its plans to attack in southwestern PLEIKU. In most of the efforts, DMC CO Special Forces Camp was the apparent target. These attacks were thwarted with heavy enemy losses. The major engagements in this campaign were as follows:

18 May YA721308 B/1-8 Inf contacted K4/32d NVA Regt. 119 NVA KIA
20 May YA717317 A, B, C/1-8 Inf contacted K5/32d NVA Regt 37 NVA KIA
22 May YA732345 A, B, C/1-8 Inf contacted 7/66th NVA Regt 78 NVA KIA
24 May YA732346 B, C/3-12 Inf contacted K5/32d NVA Regt 37 NVA KIA
26 May YA735310 B, C/3-8 Inf contacted elements of the 32nd NVA Regt 96 NVA KIA
12 July YA836123 B, C/3-2 Inf contacted 66th NVA Regt 2 NVA CIA
23 July YA855190 B, C/3-8 Inf contacted 32d NVA Regt 188 NVA KIA

(4) After each of these battles the enemy withdrew to safe areas in or near CAMBODIA to receive replacements and rebuild his forces. The exception was the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment which evaded further contact, but remained in the area of the 1 May battle, then moved to areas to the north-west and east of PLEIKU Province in June.

(5) Frustrated by aggressive US action which exacted heavy enemy casualties, the B-3 Front apparently revised its tactics during the remainder of Operation FRANCIS MARION. This was signaled by the eastward movement of the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment to the ĐAK PAK HU Valley. One of the objectives set forth in the document captured on 3 May was the revitalization of VIET CONG forces. Integration of individual NVA replacements and support units into VIET CONG forces had begun as early as January. Now, the NVA began to emulate VC tactics, operating in company and smaller forces and engaging in ambushes, attacks by fire and harassment. This became the principal mission of the under strength 95B Regiment, with one battalion in the ĐAK PAK HU Valley area and one in the western CHU PRONG Mountains.

(6) The introduction of the 122mm rocket into the FRANCIS MARION area of operations marked another major development in enemy capabilities and tactics. On 23 August the 1st Brigade forward command post at Jackson Hole (LE THANH) was attacked with up to 50 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. This incident, combined with mortar attacks throughout the area of operations and the absence since 23 July of major ground efforts, suggested that the enemy had adopted attacks by indirect fire, without a ground follow-up, as an economy of force measure. Infantry forces were deployed with the artillery units, but only to provide security. Indirect fire attacks were accompanied by small harassing action and road mining operations.

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c. During Operation FRANCIS MARION the following enemy techniques were used against friendly forces.

(1) Ground attacks, up to regimental strength, were conducted. The enemy especially sought small units operating alone, which they attempted to attack with overwhelming superiority. The enemy also attempted, with some success, to isolate small elements from the main body during the course of a battle. The US forces capability to reinforce rapidly deprived the enemy of significant successes.

(2) Attacks by fire were employed against friendly forces and fixed installations as an economy of force measure. The introduction of the 122mm rocket added significantly to this capability.

d. Terrain.

(1) The central region of PLEIKU Province is characterized by rolling hills which are lightly vegetated. The western region of the province consists of densely vegetated, rugged mountainous terrain. The CHU PONG Mountains form a prominent terrain feature in southwestern PLEIKU Province, adjacent to the CAoBODIAN Border. The IA DRANG and IA PUCH Rivers extend northeast from the CHU PONG Mountains to the central region. The northeastern region of the province is dominated by the CHU RPH Mountains. Like the CHU PONG, they are contrasted by the surrounding terrain which is comparatively flat. One of the most prominent terrain features in the FRANCIS MARION area of operations is the DAK PAYAU Valley. It extends north and south adjacent to the PLEIKU - BINH DINH Province boundary. The highest point in PLEIKU Province, the CHU RPHAN Mountain, is located there and is 1551 meters above sea level.

(2) Military aspects of the terrain.

(a). Observation and fields of fire: Observation and fields of fire are good in open plains, but severely reduced in the open forest plains. The hills and mountains restrict fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons, and the dense undergrowth will deflect small arms fire. Vegetation and terrain irregularities limit target acquisition and adjustment of fire for high angle fire weapons.

(b) Cover and concealment: Cover from flat trajectory fire is good in most of the area of operations because of the numerous valleys and the relatively steep stream embankments. The southwest portion of the area of operations, with the exception of the CHU PONG Mountains, is relatively open with rolling hills offering a greater susceptibility to flat trajectory fire. Concealment is fair to poor in this area however, it is excellent in the mountainous and densely vegetated areas.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS 120V J3-32)

(c) Obstacles: The SE SAN River forms a major obstacle in the western portion of the area of operations as do the IA DRANG and IA PUCH Rivers. All rivers were flooded during the monsoon season making crossings difficult, but most are fordable during the dry season.

(d) Trafficability: The soil in the area of operations offered limited off road trafficability. The maximum trafficability consisted of 6-10 wheeled vehicle and 15-20 tracked vehicle passes. Any further use resulted in excessive rutting with reduced drainage.

(e) Road nets: Within the area of operations there are no first class roads with the exception of some of the interior roads within Camp Enari and a short stretch of paved road joining Camp Enari with Route 14. Highways 14, north and south, and Highway 19 East, the main roads leading from PLEIKU, have deteriorated asphalt surfaces. Although passable during the monsoon season these routes were hard on vehicles and were frequently interdicted by unstable conditions at bypasses around damaged bridges. The main roads to the west of PLEIKU are the unpaved routes 19 West, 14B and 509. In the monsoon season, Route 509 became impassable and only portions of it were used for tracked vehicles during battalion-sized operations in that area. Routes 19 West and 14B were the main supply routes to the 1st and 2d Brigade command posts and to PLEI DJERENG. Sections of these roads deteriorated because of poor drainage and base course failure and all or portions of these roads had to be temporarily closed. The closing of the routes was necessary to prevent complete destruction of the roads until repairs could be effected. All other roads in the area of operations were unimproved and impassable to wheeled vehicles during the monsoon.

(f) Key terrain features: The CHU PRONG (ZA0049) and CHU KAN YAN (YA9348) Mountains in the northwestern portion of the area are two key terrain features overlooking Route 509, the only surface link between PLEIKU City and New PLEI DJERENG. The west central portion of the area is dominated by the CHU GOUNGOT Mountains (YA7632) which are north of DUC CO and bounded roughly by Highways 509, 14B, 19W and the SE SAN River. In the southwestern portion of the area the CHU PONG Mountains (YV8998) form a prominent terrain feature situated astride the South VIETNAMESE - CAMBODIAN Border. The CHU GROH Mountains in the northeast (AR9664) and the DAK PAYAU Valley in the southeast (BRL439) form the key terrain features in the eastern portion of the area.

(g) Avenues of approach: There are numerous avenues of approach into the area. The most significant ones are: 1. From the east along Highway 19; 2. From the north along Route 14; 3. From the southwest along the many tributaries of the IA DRANG and IA PUCH Rivers; 4. From the south along Route 14. There are many infiltration trails from CAMBODIA into South VIETNAM in the border area between the KONTUM Panhandle and the CHU PONG Mountains. These are readily accessible and frequently used by the enemy.

Weather: the weather throughout the area of operations was fair to poor. This was due mostly to the monsoon season and the large amount of precipitation received. As a result of the poor weather, maximum utilisation of VR aircraft and helicopters was not possible.
f. Enemy use of mines.

(1) The enemy continued to interdict the LOC's west of PLEIKU by the extensive use of mines. The mines used were predominantly M1A1 CHICOM AT mines, boosted with four to 60 pounds of explosives. A homemade mine consisting of a mortar round with a reinforcing charge was also found. The mines were pressure detonated and none were found to be booby trapped. Many of the mines that were found were detected visually; indicating poor training on the use of mines, or hurried emplacement.

(2) The total number of mining incidents during Operation FRANCIS MARION was 93.

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<td>May</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>September</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>October (to 11 October)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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A breakdown of type vehicle involved is as follows:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2 Ton</td>
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</tr>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANK</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. The total number of mines located and either evacuated or destroyed during Operation FRANCIS MARION was 83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>MINES EVACUATED OR DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April (from 6 April)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Inclosure 3 contains a list of all mines hit, including time, location, type vehicle, number of friendly casualties and damage to the vehicle. Overlay 2 is a graphic representation.

3 Inclosure 4 contains a list of all mines located and evacuated or destroyed, including time, location, type of mine and additional charge. Overlay 3 is a graphic representation.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>MORTAR ATTACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October (to 11 October)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>83</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

h. A total of 61 mortar attacks were experienced during Operation FRANCIS MARION which involved a minimum enemy expenditure of 1,398 rounds (60 and 82mm) fired at friendly positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>MORTAR ATTACKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April (from 6 April)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October (to 11 October)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Field Fortifications - Tunnels and Bunkers

(1) Enemy tunnels found in the area of operations were of two designs: Attack tunnels and base complexes. The attack tunnels consisted of spid-r holes placed on both sides of a ravine with approximately every three connected to a sleeping compartment constructed between the holes. The base complex was more extensive and often was of three level construction. At the top was the command compartment, beneath it was the storage and sleeping area and at the bottom was hospital compartment; nearby was a cooking and mess area.

(2) There were three type of enemy bunkers found. The first was an overnight type with sleeping facilities above ground and small protective bunkers which were generally dug under fallen trees. The second type was more permanent with two to three feet of dirt over a log mesh. The excavated soil was used for cover and the finished bunker looked like a large ant hill. The third type of bunker was the largest and best built. It had two to three layers of logs with three to five feet of dirt and rocks for overhead cover.

Inclosure 5 contains a list of all mortar attacks occurring during Operation FRANCIS MARION by date-time-group, unit, location, number of rounds received, type ammunition used, and friendly casualties.
j. Demolitions. The only successful use of demolitions occurred on 30 July at Z'098208 when the enemy totally destroyed a reinforced concrete bridge 78 feet long and 26 feet wide and severely damaged both abutments. It was estimated that from 1200 to 1500 pounds of demolitions were used.

k. JA Evaluation of Population and Attitudes. Throughout the operation the division conducted civic action and psychological warfare in support of the SVN Revolutionary Development Program to win the allegiance of the civilian population. The environment in which pro-GVN attitudes could survive grew with the movement of 55 villages into more secure locations. Forty-seven villages moved from isolated locations in insecure territory to the EDAP ENANG resettlement area. Eight other villages voluntarily moved to be closer to the center of support and protection in the TAOR. VC propaganda teams and patrols operated openly and seldom suffered casualties. Consequently, pro-GVN attitudes were reversed overnight by VC threats and murders. The VIET CONG terror groups kidnapped village chiefs, murdered several people and killed animals; they delivered many threats that they did not execute; they conducted propaganda meetings in peripheral villages; and they mined the roads. Their operations were sporadic and apparently did not achieve the desired objective of alienating the pro-GVN attitudes of most villagers. Only two villages appeared to be willingly pro-VC (PLEI PHU KM - AR902342 and MT THACH - AR833178). A few villages on the periphery have manifested suspicious behavior or have been forced to provide unwilling assistance to the VC. The attitude of the population at large was pro-GVN, but lack of security prevented some from expressing their support overtly. During FRANCIS MARION the amount of voluntarily proffered information about VC propaganda, movements and personnel increased.

1. Evaluation of Enemy Morale and Psychological Operations. The intelligence obtained from PWs and HOI CHANS indicated that both the VC and NVA are becoming tired of the war. Many of the NVA soldiers, particularly those who came down with the first battalions or regiments, are beginning to believe that they will never return to North VIETNAM. Most of the replacements infiltrating into South VIETNAM from the north have received three months to a year of training, but a few have received less than a week. The NVA and VC fear artillery and air power more than anything else, primarily because they have no protection against these weapons—particularly during movements. The NVA units operating from CAMBODIA generally have a reliable supply system. Units which are based in PLEI KM Province itself have a much more difficult time obtaining adequate supplies and consequently their morale is lower. The NVA/VC generally have a high rate (15% to 50%) of malaria with a fatality rate of 10%. PWs have stated that leaflets with pictures of home on them have caused them to experience homesickness. Many soldiers have seen leaflets urging them to rally, but there was doubt in their minds about what kind of treatment they would receive and they were not certain that they could avoid other NVA on the way to a rally point. The attitudes of the civilians outside of the TAOR have been slowly changing. Those who were uncommitted to either side are slowly beginning to favor the PVN/MF and provide information to them.
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m. Use of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols.

(1) The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoons of the division, that were organized during Operation SAM HOUSTON, were fully operational by the beginning of Operation FRANCIS MARION. One platoon was assigned to each brigade and one platoon designated to operate under division control was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.

(2) Each of the platoons had 56 US and six MONTAGNARD personnel and were organized into a platoon headquarters, eight five-man LRRP teams; and three Hawkeye or hunter-killer teams. The platoon headquarters consisted of a platoon leader, assistant platoon leader, operations sergeant, intelligence sergeant and six communications specialists. Each Hawkeye team was composed of two US and two MONTAGNARDS.

(3) The LRRP teams had the broad mission of infiltrating into enemy controlled areas to observe and/or conduct harassing activities. In addition to this mission they observed and reported enemy activities, conducted terrain analysis for future operations, conducted reconnaissance in and around potential landing zones, served as stay-behind patrols near recently evacuated fire support bases and areas of operations, conducted hit and run ambushes, directed artillery and air strikes on enemy locations, served as surveillance forces to screen the front or flanks of an area of operations and served as surveillance forces to screen the enemy into a given area.

(4) The Hawkeye teams, while designed primarily for a hunter-killer role, performed on numerous occasions as LRRP teams.

(5) LRRP teams were the forward eyes and ears of the division and the surveillance scheme was developed with that in mind. Within each brigade area of operations, LRRP and Hawkeye teams most often worked directly under brigade control to screen the front and flanks, but on occasion were attached to a battalion. The division LRRP platoon was used to supplement the brigade LRRP teams, to screen the division's flanks and to provide LRRP support to the armor and cavalry units and infantry battalions under operational control of the division.

(6) The teams established communications with brigade headquarters (in the case of the division LRRP's with the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry), or with the unit, to which they attached. Because of the extended distances over which they operated it was often necessary for the teams to relay their reports through other units to their headquarters.

(7) The capabilities of the LRRP teams are shown in the following examples:

(a) In late May, an increase in VC initiated activities to
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the east of Camp Enari resulted in a division LRRP team being assigned the
mission of maintaining surveillance over a suspected VC crossing site on
the IA AYUN River. During the period 8-12 June, the team established an
OP overlooking the site and observed 187 individuals, many armed with
individual weapons, using the crossing. A trend was noted that throughout
the duration of the mission, movement was to the northwest during the morning
while in the afternoon it was to the southeast. Moreover, no movement
across the bridge was detected at night. This LRRP team was highly successful
in providing the pattern of movement within one portion of the area of
operations. This intelligence was later used by a brigade when it moved
into the area for operations.

(b) On 19 May, a brigade LRRP was inserted into the CHU
GO Mountain area, which was suspected as being occupied or used by VC and NVA
units. The LRRP mission was to determine the nature of the enemy activity in
the area and to conduct limited harassing of operations. On 20 May, after
patrolling in the mountain area, the LRRP observed three armed, well-camouflaged
NVA. Rather than uncover the team by firing small arms, artillery fire was
called which caused three secondary explosions in the target area. The team
moved to another site and established a night location. The following morning
the team heard an NVA patrol moving toward their position. Electing to stay
and ambush rather than attempt to evade, the team established a hasty ambush.
An NVA squad walked into the ambush and five of them were killed. The NVA were
well-trained and executed immediate defensive tactics. Handgrenades were
exchanged and both the LRRP and the NVA broke contact. All four members of the
LRRP received slight wounds from enemy grenades. In moving toward a preselected
 LZ, the LRRP encountered two more NVA who they killed before being safely extracted

(b) Being basically an intelligence operation, much emphasis was
placed upon reporting. In addition to spot reports of sightings or contacts,
all LRRP teams upon return from a mission were required to submit a written
narrative report relating the activities of the patrol and complete
information on any sightings or incidents that took place.

(9) The average number of LRRP teams participating in operations
at any one time during Operation FRANCIS MARION was 35-40 percent of the total
teams organized. Fatigue and tension resulting from LRRP missions was such that
the teams upon completion of each mission were given time off for rest and
recuperation equivalent to the number of days of the mission. These personnel
combined with the number of personnel on R&R, leave, light duty and in the
hospital reduced the number of teams available for operation to the 35-40
percent figure.

(10) The LRRP platoons of the division conducted 555 missions during
Operation FRANCIS MARION. Of these 366 produced at least one intelligence
sighting and 82 contacts were made with enemy forces resulting in 90 NVA/VC killed
with the probability of many more which could not be confirmed. On 14 occasions
LRRP teams were extracted under fire. The high level of training of the LRRP's,
the caliber of the individuals and the support they receive is attested to by the
fact that with all the activity of the LRRP teams only one LRRP member has
been killed by hostile action.

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2. (C) MISSION: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations in FRANCIS MARION area of operations to:
   a. Detect North VIETNAM Army (NVA) infiltration into Republic of VIETNAM (RVN).
   b. Conduct spoiling attacks to prevent enemy buildup in the West Central Highlands.
   c. Provide security for engineer construction, land clearing, road upgrading, logistical installations and Highways 14 and 19.
   e. Conduct a continuing Civic Action Program consisting of short range, high impact projects in the forward areas and long range, nation building projects in the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The 4th Infantry Division initially employed one brigade to screen in depth along the CAMBODIAN Border from PLEI DUERANG on the north to the IA DRANG Valley in the south. The screen was set up in echelon with the main force generally along Route 14B in the northern portion and bending to the southeast toward PLEI ME in the southern portion. A surveillance line out to 10 kilometers was maintained forward of the main forces. Five to six kilometers in front of the surveillance line, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's) operated. The other brigade conducted search and destroy and cordon and search operations behind the screen and west of Highway 14. The positioning of this brigade was such that it could readily be employed to reinforce the screening brigade. This posture was maintained until the latter part of May when an enemy build-up in the CHU GOUNGOT Mountain area dictated a repositioning of the brigades. The brigade that had been maintaining the screen closed on the enemy. The other brigade assumed the screening mission for the southern portion of the line. It was this screen that detected and engaged the enemy forces in July when, after their first unsuccessful attempt in May to establish themselves in South VIETNAM, two attempts were made to move across the border in force. These attempts were also defeated and the enemy driven back into CAMBODIA. After the actions in July, the enemy changed tactics and began infiltrating small groups into South VIETNAM. The division shifted back into the one brigade screen, using the other brigade to operate in the central and eastern portions of PLEIKU Province to seek out and destroy the small infiltrating elements to enable them to cover the maximum amount of area. The armor battalion and the cavalry squadron(s) provided security for the LLOC's and convoys in the area of operations by strong

5From 6 April to 30 August the division had one armor battalion and one cavalry squadron assigned. On 30 August a second cavalry squadron (minus the air cavalry troop) was attached and became operational on 15 September.
pointing the roadways or by escorting the convoys. These units also provided blocking forces in the contacts south of Duc Co. They reinforced the infantry elements when the terrain was favorable and conducted search and destroy and cordon and search operations in areas adjacent to the LLOC's.

10. (c) EXECUTION:

a. General.

(1) Operation FRANCIS MARION was initiated by the 4th Infantry Division at 06001H April 1967 by OPORD 2-67. The initial area of operations was the same as that of SAM HOUSTON. Subsequently, with temporary boundary extensions, the area of operations took in the whole of PLEIKU Province and a portion of northern GARN Province. At the beginning of the operation, the major elements of the division were disposed as follows: The 1st Brigade was deployed between PLEI DJERENG and the IA DRANG Valley, and west of Route 14B along the CAMBODIAN Border; the 2d Brigade was east of the 1st Brigade and west of Highway 14 with forces deployed from the CHU PRONG Mountains to PLEI ME; the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was west of PLEIKU along Route 509; and the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was east of PLEIKU on Highway 19B.

(2) At the end of Operation SAM HOUSTON, the two brigades of the division had been deployed from the area west of the SE SAN River to the area previously described. The repositioning of the forces was done at this time for two basic reasons:

(a) To be in a more tenable posture for the impending summer monsoon season.

(b) To counter an expected enemy move into the Central Highlands through the CHU GOONGOT - CHU YAM Mountains, along Highway 19W or through the IA DRANG Valley.

(3) As the 1st Brigade established their command post at Jackson Hole, the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry began conducting extensive reconnaissance along the border from the CHU PRONG massif to southwest of Duc CO. Almost daily for a 10 day period during the last of April and into May the companies of the battalion had brief contacts with small groups of NVA who were most likely reconnaissance elements from NVA infantry units preparing to move across the border into South VIETNAM. Along this same infiltration route, further to the east, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated search and destroy operations south of the 2d Brigade CP at the Oasis, the IA DRANG tributaries and north of the IA MUER River. On 17 April Company C, later reinforced by Company B, battled a dug-in NVA company throughout the afternoon. During the following two weeks, elements of this battalion had several brief contacts in the same general area giving rise to the suspicion that a sizable NVA unit had infiltrated through the IA DRANG Valley before the 1st Brigade's reconnaissance screen had been established.
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(a) It was during this period that the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry converted to a mechanized infantry battalion. On 30 April, a dismounted platoon from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry ambushed a NVA platoon moving on a trail. They pursued the survivors into a bunker complex; but heavy enemy machine gun fire prevented them from penetrating into the position which was two kilometers southwest of the battalion's 17 April contact. During the night artillery and TAC Air continually fired on the area as the remainder of Company A, which had joined with the platoon, withdrew 1000 meters and requested APC's and tanks. The next day, with two tanks from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry in the lead, the mounted company moved toward the area of the proceeding day's contact. They drew fire from their flank and reacted by moving towards the enemy fires and into the well concealed base camp of the 2d Battalion, 95B NVA Regiment. The enemy battalion had successfully infiltrated and had established a secret base from which to operate during the impending monsoon season. The base area was well camouflaged with no trails leading into it and no fire lanes cut. There were no visible signs of the enemy anywhere in the vicinity of the camp. As the tanks and APC's fired canister and machine guns, the infantry periodically dismounted and moved through dense undergrowth to neutralize bunkers with hand grenades. Sweeps of the area the following day produced 133 NVA bodies, numerous weapons and documents at a cost of only three US lives for both day's activities. Most of the NVA bodies were found where they had fallen, indicating the enemy unit had suffered heavy casualties that prevented policing of the battlefield.

(b) Also on 1 May, Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, operating west of Highway 14B midway between DUC CO and PLEI DJERENG in the CHU GOUNGOT Mountains, was engaged by an NVA company as they were preparing to leave their night location. Artillery and TAC air supported the company as they repulsed the two pronged enemy attack. Sweeps of the area produced 24 bodies and 20 weapons.

(c) As a result of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry's reconnaissance activities to the south of DUC CO and the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry's contact on 1 May, it was apparent that NVA units were preparing to conduct extensive offensive operations with the probable targets being the DUC CO or New PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp or the 1st Brigade CP at Jackson Hole. The battalion engaged south of the Oasis very possibly had the mission of attacking PLEI ME or the division base camp, or to interdict the MSR's in coordination with attacks in the forward areas near the border.

(d) During early May, the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry continued having scattered contacts south of DUC CO with evasive enemy reconnaissance elements. On 13 May, the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moved north and established a fire support base to the west of DUC CO. The battalion's companies began moving toward the northwest between the CHU GOUNGOT Mountains and the border to search out B-52 strike areas. Indications of enemy activity in the area had been reported by the LRRP's and the B-52 strikes had been made on suspected enemy locations. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was operating to the north of
these mountains. On 18 May, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an NVA battalion. One platoon became surrounded and cut off. When the rest of the company attempted to reach the platoon, they came under heavy attack from three sides which lasted throughout the afternoon and prevented them from reaching the beleaguered platoon. The battalion’s Company A was helilifted into the area to attempt to link-up with the platoon. The following day Company A found the platoon with eight members still alive and one missing. The companies swept the battlefield, finding 119 NVA KIA. There was sporadic, light contact the following two days. On the night of 20–21 May, the three companies and reconnaissance platoon 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry were in a defensive perimeter on a hilltop, 800 to 1000 meters northwest of the 18 May contact, when they came under an extremely heavy mortar barrage followed by a NVA battalion attacking the perimeter from the southwest, south, and southeast. Three assaults were mounted by the NVA force, each getting to within hand grenade range before being repelled. An early morning sweep of the area disclosed 37 NVA bodies and one NVA WIA. It was clear that the NVA was in the area and in force.

(e) On 21 May Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry were directed to move south and link-up with Companies A and C of the 1st Battalion 8th Infantry. After moving over 6000 meters on separate routes, the companies joined for the night approximately 5000 meters north of 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry’s 20 May contact. As they were preparing to move out to the south just after dawn, the position began receiving rocket and mortar fire from three sides. This was followed by a ground attack from a high ridge line to the west. The two companies returned fire from their still occupied night defensive positions. Artillery and TAC air were employed; however, a low ceiling hindered the strike aircraft. Contact was broken about mid-morning and a sweep of the battlefield found 78 NVA KIA and four NVA WIA.

(f) Company C was lifted in to replace Company A on 24 May. Company B was establishing a night position approximately 1000 meters northwest of and on the far side of the ridgeline over which the NVA attacked on 22 May, when they began receiving mortar fire followed by a ground attack from the north and northwest. Company C moved into Company B’s position from the southwest. Artillery and TAC air were called and the mortar position was silenced. The ground attacks were repulsed by the companies. Since it was after dark when enemy fire ceased, the NVA were pursued by indirect fire. A sweep of the battlefield the next morning produced 37 NVA KIA and one NVA WIA.

(g) The 1st Brigade was reinforced by the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry moving up from Dak RlC Province and the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was moved into the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry’s fire support base, when they were lifted back to Jackson Hole to refit. On 26 May Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry had its patrol base on a hilltop in the CHU GOUNGOT Mountains approximately 1500 meters east of where the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry had its contact six days previous. As Company C was moving toward Company B from
the southwest, a NVA battalion attacked across a ridgeline on their flank. The company immediately formed a defensive perimeter to repel the NVA assault. The force of the initial assault had pushed the company off the ridgeline. They counterattacked and regained control of the ridge, where they beat back repeated NVA attempts to dislodge them. Two platoons of Company B moved through heavy enemy fires to link up with Company C. Contact was broken and the enemy battalion withdrew leaving 96 killed and two wounded.

(h) This proved to be the last engagement with NVA forces in the CHU GOUNGOT - CHU YAM Mountain area during this period. The battalions of the 1st Brigade moving up from the south and down from the north had discovered the presence of the two NVA regiments and forced them to fight. The heavy losses that were inflicted by the infantry units supported by 219 sorties of TAC air and 31,304 rounds of artillery had driven the NVA units from South VIETNAM before they could get into position to attack FMAF installations in western PLEIKU Province.
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(i) Contacts and enemy sightings fell off substantially during
the month of June. The brigades went into a surveillance posture emphasizing
extensive patrolling along a line to detect any further enemy attempts to
reinitiate an offensive under the cover of the monsoon weather. During June,
battalion size operations were conducted to the east and northeast of PLEIKU re-
sulting in no significant contact with local VC forces in suspected secret
base areas in the CHU GROH Mountains or along the DAK AYUNH River south of
Route 19E. This month also began the period when units of the division would
reach their anniversary date of deployment to VIETNAM and large numbers of
personnel began rotating back to CONUS. Much of the experience gained during
the previous year’s operations departed with them. The large turnover of
personnel conditioned operations during this DEROS period. Some units were
composed almost totally of new personnel. These “new” units were not employed
in areas where sizable enemy contact might be expected until a measure of
tactical and physical conditioning was obtained.

(j) In early July, an increase in enemy activity south of
DUC CO was apparent. Sightings and harassing mortar attacks in late June drew
attention to this area. Two B-52 strikes were put into an area 12 kilometers
south of DUC CO. Two companies of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry began moving
in an arc toward the border to conduct a reconnaissance of the strike areas.
Sightings and small contacts were made daily, then on 12 July, Companies B
and C ran head-on into a NVA battalion moving east, north of the IA DAKUH
River. Company B, attempting to reinforce one of its platoons which had become surrounded
and cut off, bore the brunt of this meeting engagement. Company C moved to
reinforce from the north and Company A was helilifted to the south. Company
B, split into platoon-size elements by the attacking NVA regulars, was forced
to withdraw toward the company base where they linked-up with the two
reinforcing companies. The battle, fought at extremely close quarters, accounted
for 142 NVA bodies discovered later in mass graves.

(k) On 23 July, just south of DUC CO and north of the 12
July contact, Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry were patrolling out
of company bases, 1000 meters apart. Directly astride the 32d NVA Regiment’s
path, Company C’s patrol base came under attack by the two leading battalions of the
enemy regiment. Immediately, Company B reinforced and artillery and TAC air
were called; helicopter gunships arrived and began strafing NVA troops moving
to attack, while strategically emplaced claymore mines were employed against
the first assault on Company C’s perimeter, just prior to Company B’s reinforce-
ment. The division’s forces were deployed in such a manner that eight artillery
batteries — six of them medium and heavy — were able to fire in support of
this contact. Over 6,600 rounds of artillery were fired into the area impacting
on not only the two attacking battalions, but also on the reserve battalion
1000 meters to the rear. Twelve TAC air strikes were also put into the area.
These combined arms accounted for 189 NVA KIA and 10 NVA captured. This was the
last attempt by the NVA to force their way into the Central Highlands during
this operation.

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(1) After refitting from these last two contacts, the NVA forces broke into small groups and during August and September began infiltrating north and south of the two brigades, placing emphasis upon avoiding contact with US forces. During this time, there were numerous indications of an enemy battalion near PLEI MRONG, and a possible enemy battalion operating with local VC forces east of PLEIKU. During the middle of August and into September, the brigades were repositioned with the 1st Brigade responsible for surveillance of the border, while two battalions of the 2d Brigade operated northwest of PLEIKU and the third battalion to the south and east of PLEIKU. Recon patrol operations were begun east of the DAK PAYAU Valley.

(m) The only significant activity in the 1st Brigade area during this period was a 122mm rocket attack on the 1st Brigade CP at Jackson Hole. Approximately 50 rounds were fired with most of them landing outside the perimeter. About 10 rounds landed inside the perimeter destroying four 10,000 gallon POL bladders and wounding one individual. Eight artillery batteries immediately responded by firing the preplanned counter-rocket program. The effectiveness of this program was attested to several days later when a company from the 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry discovered the launching site. The searchers found a 122mm rocket motor pierced by artillery fragments, one CHICON radio, one AN/PRC-25 radio, numerous rocket cannisters, NVA equipment, one AK-47 rifle and the bodies of 24 NVA.

(n) During the last half of September, the 2d Brigade moved from the operations area around PLEI MRONG to the DAK PAYAU Valley with their CP at PLEI DO LIM. They conducted extensive search and destroy operations in the DAK PAYAU Valley having only light, scattered contact, but uncovering many caches. On 1 October, a Headhunter aircraft observed a group of NVA moving along an open trail. Air strikes and gunships were called and the first strike aircraft received ground-to-air fire on each pass. A total of six air strikes were placed into the area followed by an infantry company combat assault. The area was swept, producing 49 NVA bodies and two NVA.

(o) After the battalion size contacts in May and July, contact with NVA forces was sporadic with the enemy attempting to break contact immediately. The indications were that although the enemy was operating in the area of operations, he was primarily operating in small units, most likely engaged in training activities and at most would conduct harassing attacks on the LLOC and installations in the area. As Operation FRANCIS MARION concluded, the 2d Brigade was preparing to deploy south into PHU DON Province and the 1st Brigade continued its surveillance of the border.

(p) A significant portion of the division's combat forces -- initially the armored cavalry squadron and the tank battalion and after 15 September a second armored cavalry squadron -- had the mission of securing the LLOC throughout the FRANCIS MARION area of operations. The most heavily travelled of these roads was the 33 miles of Route 19E from the MONG YANG Pass to PLEIKU City, over which all the supplies that are trucked into the Central Highlands must travel. From 6 April until 16 September, this vital route was secured by the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, using the mobile strong point concept. A strong point normally consisted of two armored type vehicles --
tank, APC, or N2 duster -- occupying critical terrain features. A reaction force was always within a few kilometers. After 18 May, the 69th Armor adjusted the positioning of their strong points to the nine bridges on Route 19 since two of them had been the target of VC sappers. Two other strong points were in and adjacent to XANG XANG Pass. These bridge strong points were later reinforced by RF/PF elements from LE TRUNG district to guard against infiltration. The tank battalion was supported by the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm, SP) and the battalion’s 4.2 Mortar Platoon, deployed in sections so that most of the route was covered by indirect fire. An armor reaction force was maintained at the battalion fire support base located approximately midway of their sector of responsibility. In June, when a brigade-size operation was initiated in KONTUM Province, and later increased to two brigades under division control, the armor battalion was tasked with providing security for the daily resupply convoys from PLEIKU to KONTUM over Route 14. With one company OPCON to the 1st Air Cavalry Division and out of the area of operations, the tank battalion did not have the assets to secure the road on a 24 hour basis using strong points. Instead they provided security by escorting each convoy.

During this same period, the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry secured routes 19N and 14I, the main supply routes to the two brigade headquarters and their FSB’s. Again the concept of strong points was used, however, the strong points were not manned on a 24 hour basis as were the bridge strong points on Route 19E. The heavy mining of these routes required that they be swept each day. Strong points were established early each morning from the Oasis to DUC CO on Route 19N and from the intersection of Routes 19W and 14E to Route 509, depending on the deployment of forces and the location of engineer work parties. In addition, the cavalry squadron assisted in security for accessible battalion fire support bases and the two brigade CP’s, and provided reaction and blocking forces for two major engagements with the enemy south of DUC CO in July. These reaction force usually came from the strong points which were replaced with other forces later.

The arrival and attachment of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry to the division increased the forces available for road and convoy security and in addition permitted each of these three armored units to conduct continuous screening and search and destroy operations out several thousand meters from routes they were responsible for securing. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor of the security mission of Highways 19E and 14 north of KONTUM. The cavalry squadron continued to employ the strong point concept of Highway 19E and their additional forces permitted them to initiate this type of route security on Route 14 N rather than the more burdening system of providing escort for each convoy. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor deployed south of PLEIKU and initiated route security of Route 14 south from Dragon Mountain (4th Infantry Division base camp) to PHU NHON. In addition to securing the highway, a company of the battalion began conducting search and destroy operations south of PLEI-D0 LIK to block and interdict infiltration routes into the area.
b. The significant events that occurred during Operation FRANCIS MARION are listed chronologically at inclosure 6, with the following exceptions.

(1) Details of mining incidents, mines evacuated and destroyed and mortar attacks referenced in subparagraphs are at inclosures 3, 4 and 5 and graphically illustrated on overlays 2 and 3.

(2) Significant contacts during Operation FRANCIS MARION are at inclosure 7 and on overlay 4.

(3) Displacements of battalion fire support bases and brigade command posts are shown on overlay 5.

c. Chemical Operations.

(1) Chemical operations in support of Operation FRANCIS MARION consisted of Riot Control Agent (RCA), defoliation and crop destruction and Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) missions.

(2) RCA operations. (Complete statistical data is at inclosure 8 and on overlay 7.)

(a) 26,720 pounds of bulk CS were dropped in 19 CH-47 sorties.

(b) A total of 3956 M-7A3 CS grenades were dropped in eight UH-1 sorties, using a locally fabricated grenade dispenser.

(c) Fifty-four E-158 R2 CS canister clusters were dropped in 8 UH-1 sorties.

(3) Defoliation operations were conducted throughout the area of operations using Air Force C-123 aircraft, UH-1 helicopters and ground based spray missions. (Complete statistical data is at inclosure 8 and on overlay 7.)

(a) Aerial defoliation (Traildust) missions sprayed 110,000 gallons of ORANGE in 11 C-123 sorties.

(b) For crop destruction missions, a total of 4,345 gallons of ORANGE, BLUE and WHITE was sprayed during 67 UH-1 helicopter sorties.

(4) Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) were used extensively during the operation. Five APD’s were received in early June and were employed for the first time on 15 June. A total of 126 missions were flown. The employment of APD’s is discussed in detail in paragraph 14.

11. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Non-organic and non-attached supporting forces.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCA: MACV J3-32)

(1) 7th Air Force.
(2) 52d Artillery Group.
(3) 937th Engineer Group.
(4) 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.
(5) Pleiku Sub-area Command
(6) 20th ARVN POLVAR Battalion.
(7) Det, 5th Air Commando Squadron.
(8) 9th Air Commando Squadron.
(9) Det, 245th Psyops Company, Pleiku.
(10) USAID, Pleiku Province.
(11) JUSPAO, Pleiku Province.
(12) GVN District Contact Teams.

b. Artillery Support.

(1) To provide direct support to the maneuver elements, the
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T) was placed in direct support of the
1st Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 12d Artillery (105mm T) was placed in
direct support of the 2d Brigade. Road security missions were supported,
when possible, by placing self propelled units in support, thereby complement-
ing the armored force normally assigned this type of mission. With the
concurrency of the Commanding Officer, 52d Artillery Group two batteries of
the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) provided direct support to the
1st Battalion, 69th Armor on Highway 19 East and one battery of the 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery was placed in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
along Highway 19 West. This battery also supported "Road Runner" operations
to the south. Upon attachment to the division the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry,
assumed the road security mission on Highway 19 East. It was supported by
two batteries of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T) providing medium
artillery coverage on Highway 19 East from the eastern boundary of the area of
operations at WANG YANG PASS westward to LE TRUNG. The battery of the 3d
Battalion, 6th Artillery remained in direct support of the 1st Battalion,
69th Armor, as they assumed road security and screening mission on Route 14
from Dragon Mountain south to PHU NHON. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery,
and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group units, provided general support
and general support/reinforcing fires for the division.
(2) As operational control of maneuver battalions was shifted between brigades, the battery of the normal direct support battalion usually associated with the maneuver battalion was shifted with it.

(3) Throughout the operation the requirements for medium artillery support exceeded the capabilities. In order to provide medium artillery support for the maneuver elements, countermortar and counterrocket defense within the TAOR, and support route security operations in the area of operations, it was often necessary to employ the 155mm batteries by platoon. Although this deployment did not always provide the desired mass of artillery support and created problems in sustainable operations and security, it did provide the minimum medium artillery support where needed.

(4) ASF/CIDG Camps were supported by positioning batteries of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8-in SP) within or adjacent to ASF/CIDG Camps. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175mm/8-in SP) at Oasis provided fires to the camp at PLEI ME. The camp at PLEI DO LIM was supported on numerous occasions by the provisional 105mm and 155mm batteries at Camp Enari and the 175mm guns of the 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery from Oasis. The heavy batteries at DUC CO and New PLEI DJERING provided long range fires along the CAMBODIAN Border. These fires were used for the suppression of enemy anti-aircraft fire, mortar fire, and rocket fire and in heavy harassment and interdiction programs along the border area. Fires were placed on known crossing sites and infiltration routes during the potential heavy infiltration of the monsoon season. In an attempt to reach targets normally out of range of the artillery, the artillery initiated "Operation Hip Shoot", which moved one or two 175mm guns to positions from which they could hit the targets developed by intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on areas to which the enemy returns after termination of US ground operations.

(5) Mutually supporting fire support bases containing single and multiple batteries were used regularly and effectively. The bases were positioned to support one or more of the units operating in the area and permitted massing of fires from one or more bases in support of operations and in defensive and countermortar programs.

(6) When troop dispositions provided adequate security, medium batteries were located so that their fires overlapped and completely covered the western perimeter of the area of operations with overlapping fires.

(7) As the operation progressed, sharply increasing ammunition expenditures caused Division Artillery to exercise more control over them and to provide guidance for expenditures to both the direct support and general support artillery. The policy was to deliver maximum intensive fires of all calibers in support of contacts. When contact diminished, expenditures were appropriately decreased. Toward the end of the operation H&I fires were decreased, except for special heavy programs in reaction to specific intelligence.
During Operation FRANCIS MARION, Division Artillery assumed control of the planning and dissemination of preplanned artillery programs and of H&I programs for general support/reinforcing artillery. Preplanned fires and H&I targets from the direct support battalions were integrated into the master program.

Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery and 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW SP) were attached to the division and placed OPCON to Division Artillery during the operation. These units provided automatic weapons support for the division. During daylight hours their weapons were used for convoy security and on-road security strong points. During the hours of darkness they were positioned on the perimeters of the base camp and fire support bases. These weapons were also used in conjunction with searchlights to provide an effective close-in H&I program for the fire support bases. Weapons were divided among the units so that on the average Camp Enari had three M42's and two M55's, 1st Brigade had seven M42's and three M55's, 2d Brigade had six M42's and three M55's, and the unit providing security on Route 19 East had four M42's.

Countermortar programs were developed for Camp Enari and all fire bases. All artillery units within range were included in the programs. This proved invaluable in placing immediate counterfire on suspected mortar locations and in disrupting attacks. Counter rocket programs were also developed for Camp Enari and the more static fire bases and for the other fire bases as time permitted.

Countermortar radars were used effectively throughout the operation. The countermortar radars were located with the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery in support of the 1st Brigade, with the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in support of the 2d Brigade, and with Division Artillery at Camp Enari. The 237th Radar Detachment was located at DUC CO. On numerous occasions the countermortar radars were able to locate enemy mortar and rocket locations and direct the counter battery artillery fire on to them. The radar was also used to register artillery units within range when weather or lack of aircraft precluded registrations by an observer.

Artillery meteorology was provided and used throughout Operation FRANCIS MARION. Meteorological stations were established at New PLEI DJERENG, DUC CO, DAK TO, and Camp Enari to give reasonably complete coverage of the area of operations. In September the meteorological station at DAK TO departed this area and the DUC CO station was moved there. This resulted in inadequate coverage in the western part of the area of operations. Visual meter teams were attached to isolated firing batteries as required.

Fourth order survey was established at Danis, DUC CO and on Route 19 East. This survey control was particularly useful to the batteries using FADAC and increased the artillery accuracy potential in these areas.
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(14) Ammunition expenditures for FRANCIS MARION.

(a) Forward area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 29th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>100,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 42nd Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>82,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 6th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>37,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 319th Arty</td>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>7,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 92d Arty</td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>18,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 16th Arty</td>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>80,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 16th Arty</td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>12,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>14,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 14th Arty</td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>8,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 18th Arty</td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>4,96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn, 18th Arty</td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>1,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 32d Arty</td>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>365,885</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Base Camp.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>2,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>2,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2&quot;</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,086</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAND TOTAL**: **370,971**

(15) Average artillery available for FRANCIS MARION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105mm</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(16) Searchlight missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>11,315</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(c. Air Support)

(1) Experience gained from previous operations continued to improve the use of close tactical air support during Operation FRANCIS MARION. Units of the division have almost without exception called for TAC Air within
minutes after they gain contact with enemy forces. The close tactical air support throughout the operation was extremely quick in response and its deadly accuracy in delivery gave the infantry commanders absolute confidence in employing strikes that often were placed within 100 meters of their position. TAC air's tremendous firepower and its flexibility, allowing rapid shifting of targets, contributed significantly to the division's successes in this operation.

(2) Summary of close air support flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Req Flown</th>
<th>Flown</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>B57</th>
<th>F4C</th>
<th>A/C47</th>
<th>F100</th>
<th>Ruts Bunk-AM/Sec</th>
<th>Exp</th>
<th>Est</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAC PP</td>
<td>F4C</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>2179</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2513</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC Imped</td>
<td>F4C</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS PP</td>
<td></td>
<td>765</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS Imped</td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>4901</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4436</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Damage assessment shown on the chart is less than complete and does not show the true results of the tactical air employed. It is estimated that 25% of damage assessment was made by ground exploitation and 75% by visual reconnaissance from the air.

(4) B-52 Strikes: B-52 Air Strikes have proved to be a source of tremendous firepower. The enemy fears the B-52 strike more than other sources of firepower because of its sudden and complete destruction of an area. There were 43 B-52 strikes flown in support of Operation FRANCIS MARION (see Overlay 6).

(5) Weather: Adverse weather conditions significantly affected air operations during the period 1 May to 30 September. It was necessary to schedule preplanned air strikes after 1000 hours and each FAC mission was backed up by a CSS, if at all possible. The only restriction placed on
 ordnance was that CSS were not allowed to carry napalm. Also, friendly forces could not be closer than 1,000 meters to a CSS unless the ground commander requested a closer strike.

(6) Test ordnance: During Operation FRANCIS MARION the division tested Ring Trop and BLU 26B interdiction devices.

(a) Ring Trop: Air dropable, self-sterilizing, anti-personnel interdiction device was seeded in the division area of operations between 30 June and 5 July. Evaluation of Ring Trop disclosed that it could be detected at approximately 30 meters because its grey color was in contrast to the surrounding vegetation. It was also found that anyone could pick the Ring Trop device up and relocate it with no danger to the individual as it did not have an explosive capability. Ring Trop was not satisfactory as an interdiction device.

(b) BLU 26B: BLU 26B munition was tested on a B52 strike and found to be extremely effective against personnel in the open; however, an excessive number of BLU 26B duds were found in the target area which produced a definite hazard for friendly personnel moving through the strike area. The strike area was declared an unmarked minefield.

d. Army Aviation Support.

(1) Aviation support for operational and contingency missions assigned to the division during Operation FRANCIS MARION was provided by the organic 4th Aviation Battalion and the direct support 52d Combat Aviation Battalion. The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion allocated aircraft directly to the division and were assigned missions by 4th Aviation Battalion operations. Generally, although it was not an inflexible arrangement, the 4th Aviation Battalion provided aircraft to support the 2d Brigade and the aircraft from the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion were assigned to support the 1st Brigade. The CH-47 helicopter support to both brigades was from the 179th Assault Support Helicopter Company, 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) Company A, 4th Aviation Battalion provided direct aviation support including slicks, radio console equipped command and control aircraft and helicopters having special equipment installed, such as APD personnel detectors, grenade dispensers and spray rigs. Company A provided the following aircraft on the average daily basis: Seven helicopters for command and control/resupply to the brigade; one helicopter each for division command and control, C-2/chemical operations and division staff liaison; three helicopters were on standby for contingency missions. Company B provided general support on the following average daily basis: Two helicopters for division command and control; two armed helicopters for division gunship support and two armed helicopters for brigade gunship support; one helicopter for division liaison.
(3) The following is a summary of operational data and support furnished by the 4th Aviation Battalion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co. A</th>
<th>Co. B</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Hours flown:</td>
<td>12,227</td>
<td>4,381</td>
<td>16,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Sorties completed:</td>
<td>40,147</td>
<td>25,651</td>
<td>65,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Passengers carried:</td>
<td>62,397</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>66,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Tons of cargo transported:</td>
<td>2,211</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion from 6 April until 15 June supported the division with one assault support helicopter company and one assault helicopter company providing 13 UH-1D, five UH-1C and nine CH-47 helicopters. On 15 June an additional assault helicopter company was allocated to support the division and from this date until 11 October the average daily aircraft available were 24 UH-1H, eight UH-1C and nine CH-47 helicopters.

(5) The following is a summary of operational data and support furnished by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UH-1H and UH-1C</th>
<th>CH-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Hours flown:</td>
<td>22,581</td>
<td>6,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Sorties completed:</td>
<td>60,112</td>
<td>20,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Passengers carried:</td>
<td>154,590</td>
<td>75,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Tons of cargo transported:</td>
<td>31,258</td>
<td>29,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Casualties evacuated:</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Engineer Support.

(1) The 4th Engineer Battalion provided direct combat engineer support to the division's two brigades conducting search and destroy operations during Operation FRANCIS MARION.

Figures for the 52d Aviation Battalion are not exact totals since the battalion's records combined all support to the 4th Division and did not differentiate between Operation FRANCIS MARION and Operation GREELEY.
(2) Ground and aerial reconnaissance of routes within the area of operations were performed by the battalion's 3-2 throughout the operation. Ground and aerial reconnaissance were made of Routes 1A, 509 and 7C. Aerial reconnaissance was flown over Routes 1A, 14B, 6C, 19W and 14B. A ground reconnaissance of Route 6C was conducted in conjunction with the 20th Engineer Battalion.

(3) Headquarters and Headquarters Company provided general support to Companies A and B in the support of the two infantry brigades. In addition, the composite platoon of engineer tanks and flame APC's provided security for convoys and land clearing parties throughout the area of operations. The heavy equipment platoon furnished bulldozer, road grader and crane support as required. A 1500 gallon-per-hour water purification unit was installed and operated at each of the brigade forward areas. Five 600 gallon-per-hour purification units were modified by mounting them on skids and employed in battalion fire bases when a water source was available. This was extremely beneficial in lightening the requirements for CH-47 resupply sorties.

(4) Company A supported each of the 1st Brigade's three infantry battalions with a minimum of a platoon headquarters and two squads to clear LZ's and construct fire support base positions. This modification of the line platoon's strength was necessary as Company A was heavily committed to conduct daily, time consuming mine sweep operations on Route 19W from ZA031312 (CP34) to DUC CO (YAG21252); from the junction of Route 19W and Route 14B north on Route 14B to the junction of Route 14B and Route 509 and frequently to the New PLEI DIERENG Special Forces Camp. An augmentation of two Rome Plows enabled the company to construct 16.5 kilometers of fair weather, tactical road from Route 14B at YA904384 to YA760385, an area near the CAMBODIAN Border, to accommodate medium, self-propelled artillery. In addition, extensive Rome Plow clearing of Route 19W and 14B, 100 meters on each side of the road, from YA90278 (CP35) east on Route 19W to YA90279; from YA90278 (CP35) north on Route 14B to YA903385 (CP37); from YA903270 (CP35) west on Route 19W to DUC CO Special Forces Camp a total distance of 31 kilometers to improve observation and assist in detecting enemy mining and possible ambush activities especially prevalent in these areas. Extensive engineering effort was furnished by Company A in the construction and maintenance of the 1st Brigade command post at Jackson Hole to include fifteen protective berms for ammunition and aircraft; timber crib firing positions for an 8" artillery battery, and a Class I yard. Also, fields of fire were cleared at DUC CO Special Forces Camp and a helipad-and protective berms were constructed at New PLEI DIERENG Special Forces Camp.

(5) Company B provided direct engineer support to the 2d Brigade. The two infantry battalions normally established fire support bases in areas inaccessible by wheeled or tracked vehicles. As a result, greater effort was required in clearing the fire bases, cutting overhead cover, putting in perimeter wire, and clearing fields of fire. This was the standard task of the engineer platoon headquarters, augmented by the engineer squad which supported the infantry company securing the fire base during the initial construction. The demolition specialist assigned to the platoon headquarters also constructed fougasse mines.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MCW-VJ3-32)

on the perimeter. The squads attached to the infantry companies were employed in clearing LZ's, destroying enemy tunnel and bunker complexes and assisting in river crossings. The latter problem was magnified by the increased runoff due to the heavy monsoon rains. The mechanized infantry battalion, because of its increased mobility and restriction to more trafficable terrain, required a tailoring of its supporting engineer platoon. Again one squad generally operated with each line company. However, the squad lacked the necessary means of transport to work with the company and still maintain squad integrity. The squad was broken down in several tracks with a common breakdown into minesweep teams and demolition teams with increased emphasis on mine sweep responsibility due to the battalion's dependence upon roads. The headquarters of the platoon employed a D-7 dozer for clearing fields of fire for the fire bases of the mechanized battalion since they were generally accessible by road. The brigade base camp at the Oasis was maintained by Company B during the monsoon season by continuous effort on drainage and culvert maintenance. Engineer equipment was continually utilized in maintenance of the ammunition supply point, roads, helipads, bridges, and fortifications in the area.

(6) Company D was primarily engaged in continuing the construction of the division's base camp. However, on numerous occasions minesweep and chainsaw teams augmented Companies A and B when their requirements were especially heavy. This augmentation was generally used during the moves of battalion fire bases and proved to be very successful by limiting time of vulnerability to enemy fire.

(7) Company E provided general support by installing and retrieving bridges, primarily AVLB's, throughout the area of operations. In addition, the company's 5-ton bridge trucks were employed by the division to haul combat essential supplies to the division's forward supply elements located with each of the brigades forward command post.

(8) The 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat) provided general combat engineer support to the division throughout Operation FRANCIS MARION. The battalion's main effort was committed to the maintenance and upgrading of Route 19N from junction with Route 14 at Dragon Mountain (CP 31) west to DUC CO and Route 14B from the junction of Route 19N, north to New PLEI DURRING. These roads were the only overland supply routes to the two brigade command posts and the Special Forces camps at DUC CO and PLEI DURRING. The volume of traffic combined with heavy monsoon rains made this a formidable task, however, while the roads had some persistent areas of deterioration requiring a herculean effort at times to keep the road open, only once, for a brief three day period, did the deterioration of these roads require them to be closed.

(9) A Company of the 20th Engineer Battalion and the 509th Engineer Company (Paved Bridge) constructed a 120 foot, double double, Bailey bridge on Highway 19N at ZH098279. The bridge replaced a reinforced concrete bridge which was completely destroyed by enemy sappers during the early morning hours of 30 July. The bridge was completed on 31 July.

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On 4 August the Bailey bridge collapsed under the combined weight of a VTR pulling a tank. A second bridge was installed by the 509th Engineer Company (PB) and completed on 6 August.

Again, on 15 September, the Bailey bridge, heavy with mud buildup from the monsoon soaked roads, was collapsed by a VTR. Construction of the third bridge was completed on 17 September.

(10) The 20th Engineer Battalion also constructed an 80 foot, four span, timber bridge on Route 509 at ZA041430.

(11) The heavy incidence of mining on the two main supply routes (Highways 19B and 14B) resulted in the daily requirement to sweep the LLOO. The 20th Engineer Battalion worked in conjunction with the 4th Engineer Battalion to keep these vital routes open for convoys and engineer work parties. For a breakdown of the mines evacuated and destroyed see inclosure 4 and overlay 3.

(12) The 937th Engineer Group had other elements in addition to the 20th Engineer Battalion providing general support to division operations. The 259th Engineer Battalion was responsible for maintenance and repairs on Route 19B between PLEIKU and MANG YANG Pass. On 18 May two bridges on the route were damaged/destroyed by enemy explosives during the night. The bridge at BR208525 was damaged, but remained open to one way traffic while the battalion repaired it. The other bridge at BR097552 was completely destroyed. The battalion, supported by the 509th Engineer Company (PB) replaced the destroyed structure with a 50 foot, double single, Bailey bridge. The bridge was completely installed by 190110 May.

(13) On 19 August the 35th Land Clearing Platoon was attached to the 937th Engineer Group and further attached to the 20th Engineer Battalion to assist the division in the mission of clearing 100 meters on both sides of designated roads and trails in the Central Highlands. Work was immediately begun on the major resupply routes in the area and continued at the end of the operation.

f. Psyops Support.

(1) Psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with tactical operations to spur disaffection and desertion of enemy soldiers through CHIEU NOI themes and to deny support to the NVA/VC by encouraging support for the GVN.

(2) A total of 653 psyops missions were flown covering 1,810 target areas utilizing U-10, O-2 and C-47 aircraft and UH-1 helicopters. Adverse weather hampered the execution of a consistent airborne psyops program. Even during periods of clear weather, the high winds prevalent during the southwest monsoon season attenuated both the accuracy of leaflet dissemination and effectiveness of Loudspeaker missions. "No Dope" missions...
were flown in the early weeks of the operation, but weather forced them to be discontinued.

(a) Leaflets dropped 99,020,000
(b) Loudspeaker missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Night</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;No Dose&quot;</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) The 245th Psyops Detachment (US) located in Pleiku printed and supplied psyops material. Two audio visual teams from the detachment and three psyops teams from the 20th ARVN POLWAR Battalion supported the division throughout the operation. Road conditions hampered the frequency of the audio/visual team visits during the months of June, July and August; however, as conditions improved in the early part of September, teams were again used with increasing frequency. A VIETNAMESE Cultural Team put on shows in four villages. An ARVN audio/visual team was used on seven occasions.

(a) Villages visited 93
(b) Ground loudspeaker time 156 hours
(c) Movies 78½ hours

g. Civic Action Support.

(1) During April the Good Neighbor Program, the division's civic action program in the TAOR, was expanded. The TAOR was extended out to 10,000 meters radius from Camp Enari to encompass 69 villages with a combined population of approximately 15,000. The area was divided into five sectors, each of which was the responsibility of a major subordinate command. Within each sector, there were four major responsibilities: The manning of the perimeter defense bunkers; the conduct of day and night patrolling; the provision of a reaction force, if necessary; and the conduct of the Good Neighbor Program. Each sector was given a special project for the perpetuation of the Good Neighbor Program. The 1st Brigade and DISCOM were assigned projects that would improve the livestock of the villagers. The 1st Brigade was responsible for the Pig Improvement Program and DISCOM was responsible for the Cattle Improvement Program. These units were the project managers for the development and implementation of the programs for the entire Good Neighbor Program area. Close coordination was maintained with the Division Veterinarian and plans were developed for the worming and the innoculation of livestock. The abundance of edible garbage available from Camp Enari was an ideal source of feed for the Pig Program. Cross-breeding studies were initiated to improve the MONTAGNARD heards in the cattle program. The 2d Brigade became the sponsor of the LE TRUNG District Health Worker's School. In this essential program,

young women from the hamlets in and around the TAOR were schooled in basic health and hygienic procedures. Assistance to the school included instruction, limited medical supplies and transportation for the students to the villages in the TAOR for on-the-job training. The 3d Brigade began managing the utilization and maintenance of the Good Neighbor Council House. Plans were initiated for the council house to be used as a Civic Action Center in addition to a meeting place. The beautification of the grounds was also included in the brigade's responsibility. Division Artillery assumed sponsorship of the Highlands Junior Military Academy. Plans were developed and work was begun on the reconstruction of buildings and grounds and the installation of a water system. An English instructor was furnished to the school. These special projects that have been briefly described were in addition to civic action already being conducted in the area such as MEDCAP visits, construction of spillways, improvement of gardens and animal husbandry. Division personnel visited the hamlets within the TAOR five times per week. Hamlets in the forward areas in close proximity to the brigade CP's at the Oasis and Jackson Hole and the villages along Route 19 east of PleiKU to the division boundary at Mang Yang Pass received civic activities patterned after the TAOR's Good Neighbor Program.

(2) The division undertook support of the GVN's EDAP ENANG (Peace and Security) MONTAGNARD Resettlement Plan on 1 April. This project resulted in the voluntary relocation of 47 MONTAGNARD hamlets. A total of 8,861 people -- previously subject to VC and NVA terrorism and forced logistics support -- were moved into a secure area along Route 19N, a rectangular area bounded by ZAO0310 - ZAO0324 - ZAO04506 - ZAO05292. The previous location of these hamlets was within a 7000 to 8000 meter wide area south of Highway 19N, from the Oasis to Duc Go Special Forces Camp (Y:AB:745). The division support for this project included tactical units for security, air and ground transportation for the initial move and medical assistance. This relocation of indigenous inhabitants had the tactical advantage of reduced civilian interference within that portion of the area of operations and creating free fire zones. The 1st and 2d Brigade had concurrent tactical and civic action responsibility for this plan. Both brigades furnished civil affairs teams to help develop social and economic programs within the resettlement area. The 41st Civil Affairs Company, CA Team #9 (US), was the full-time technical supervisor and coordinated the various CA efforts. Most notably, a dispensary was constructed in the leper colony which was a great improvement over former treatment facilities. Land was cleared and it is expected that, by the fall of 1968, rice will be grown in sufficient quantities to support the EDAP ENANG population.

(3) The following is a summary of the division's support to the GVN's EDAP ENANG program:

(a) LAND CLEARING:
Homeland - 823 acres
Farmland - 600 acres
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(b) MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT SUPPORT:

- Bulldozers - 4800 hours
- Vehicles - 2½ ton - 1920 hours
  Stake/Platform - 160 hours
- Chickens - 480 hours
- Cement - 240 bags

(c) PERSONNEL:

- Supply Team - 20 days
- Infantry Company - 47 days
- Civil Affairs Teams (2) - 180 days

(d) PROJECTS COMPLETED:

- Market Place - 1
- Spillways - 3
- Dispensary - 1
- Immunizations - 8,611

(4) During the period 15 July - 15 September, the 2d Brigade initially conducted search and destroy missions followed by extensive civil affairs activities within the area known as the "Golden Triangle". The southeast angle is located at grid coordinate AR865000, the southwest angle is located at grid coordinate ZA164064 and the apex of the triangle is located at grid coordinate AR765274. The area within these coordinates is bounded by Routes 60 and 14. A far reaching and comprehensive civil affairs plan was developed for the complete pacification of this area. The plan provided for the conduct of short-range and long-range civil affairs projects that stressed "self-help" and a closer alignment with the GVN. The GVN image was greatly enhanced through the thorough coordination and cooperation of the US forces, ARVN forces, and GVN officials conducting the operation.

(5) Extensive psychological operations were integrated into every facet of the military and civil affairs activities. These included the use of ARVN psyops personnel, ARVN medcap personnel, an ARVN Audio Visual and loudspeaker team, and an ARVN Cultural Team. When the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor redeployed to this area they continued the "Golden Triangle" civic action program.
(6) The following is the summary of civic action activities for Operation FRANCIS MARION:

(a) HEALTH ACTIVITIES

- MEDCAPS (Patients) 54,198
- Inoculations 10,492
- VETCAPS (livestock) 471
- Village dustings 6

(b) COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION

- Food 35,019 lbs
- Clothing 4,470 lbs
- Soap 10,173 lbs
- Sanitary items 2,267 lbs
- Edible garbage (livestock) 5,382 lbs

(c) INSTRUCTION - attendance

- Personal hygiene 9,432
- English classes 4,345
- Health workers trained 58

(d) CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS

- Lumber 7,550 bd. ft
- Cement, sand, gravel 96,037 lbs

(e) PROJECTS - self-help

- Foot bridges 5
- Culverts 5
- Market place 1
- Dispensary 1
- Playgrounds 30
- Schools 2
- Community house 1
- Wells 2
- Spillways 30
- Fish ponds 4
- Pig troughs 31
- MEDCAP shelters 5
- Bulletin boards 11

(f) LAND CLEARED - acres

- Home 583 acres
- Farm 800 acres
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(g) DISTRIBUTED GOODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>4,400 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>90 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>58 head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swine</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. (c) RESULTS:

a. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses.

(1) Personnel.

(a) Kil. (PC) 1204
   1. NVA 1127
   2. VC 77

(b) Detainees

   1. NVA's 37 122
      a. NVA 85
      b. VC
   2. Civil Defendents 284
   3. Innocent Civilians 553
   4. Hostages 11

(2) Weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SMALL ARMS</th>
<th>CREW SERVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Inf</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-8 Inf (M)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8 Inf</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 Inf</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-22 Inf</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69 Armor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recondo Ptls</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Units</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq 24th Bde</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-503 Abn Inf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVPDH-GC
25 November 1967


(3) Ammunition and explosives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>SMALL ARMS</th>
<th>CRAW</th>
<th>EXPLOSIVES</th>
<th>MINES</th>
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<tr>
<td>1-12 Inf</td>
<td>10,999</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-12 Inf</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-69 Armor</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-8 Inf</td>
<td>13,033</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>138.75</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-8 Inf</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-503 Abn Inf</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-6 Inf (M)</td>
<td>3,071</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recondo Plts</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-22 Inf</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>131.50</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>1-10 Cav</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173d Engr Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Engr Bn</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(^7)</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>165.75</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>34,938</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>832.00</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Structures and fortifications destroyed, Foodstuff and documents captured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRUCTURES</th>
<th>FORTIFICATION</th>
<th>RICE (TONS)</th>
<th>SALT (LBS)</th>
<th>INCHES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-12 Inf</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>.455</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
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<td>.557</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-69 Armor</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8 Inf</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>3.222</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Inf</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-503 Abn Inf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6 Inf (M)</td>
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<td>724</td>
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<td>254</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>173d Engr Co</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Engr Bn</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(^7)</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>4,985</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>666</td>
<td>3390</td>
<td>19,850</td>
<td>194.25</td>
<td>109.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Body count and estimates of enemy losses during Operation FRANCIS MARION were affected by several pertinent factors.

\(^7\)Includes units OPCON to the division that are not listed above.
(a) Terrain and vegetation. The difficult terrain and dense vegetation in the area of operations assisted the enemy in his efforts to evacuate casualties from the immediate areas of major contacts and made the friendly efforts to search for and locate enemy casualties more difficult. The absence of landing zones or clearings, suitable for helicopter extraction of casualties, required units to cut clearings in the jungle immediately following contacts with the enemy so that the seriously wounded could be evacuated. At the same time the enemy was able to remove his own casualties from the battle area.

(b) Proximity to CAMBODIA. The proximity of the CAMBODIAN Border to the sites of most of the major contacts and B-52 strike areas made it possible for the enemy to transport most of his casualties to his CAMBODIAN safehaven for burial or medical treatment. Agent reports and prisoner reports described several movements of numerous enemy casualties into CAMBODIA following contacts.

(c) Enemy doctrine. The enemy consistently makes a determined, almost fanatical effort to recover his casualties from each contact. His preparations for such recovery and his demonstrated efforts and willingness to risk fresh casualties to police his dead and wounded have generally proven successful for him. Enemy battle orders for defense of landing zones and plans for attacks on FFWAF positions have invariably included emphasis on all NVA dead or wounded being evacuated.

(d) As a result of the factors described above it is concluded that the actual body count of enemy KIA during Operation FRANCIS MARION is not a complete count of enemy KIA and is far less than the actual enemy KIA during the operation. Unit after action critiques and reports have indicated that in almost every contact with the enemy, US personnel, who observed kills or hits on enemy personnel, found the enemy had evacuated these casualties when contact was broken.

(6) The following is an estimate of enemy KIA losses using the MACV formula. The total estimated enemy KIA is determined by multiplying the actual body count (BC) by .28.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENEMY UNITS</th>
<th>ACTUAL BC</th>
<th>MACV COMPUTED</th>
<th>ADDNL LOSSES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95B Regt</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Regt</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d Regt</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>573</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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b. Summary of friendly losses.

(1) Personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
<th>BATTLE</th>
<th>NON-BATTLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INFECTED</td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KIA/WIA/MIA</td>
<td>KIA/WIA/MIA</td>
<td>KIA/WIA/MIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9 1 Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Inf</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8 Inf</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12 Inf</td>
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<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 1 Bde</td>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 Inf</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4th Engr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1 Cav</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 Cav</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69 Armor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Med Bn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th S &amp; T</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>704th Maint</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 4th Div</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Med Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Med Bn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Med Bn</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Inf Plt (Set Dog)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indicates missing status from non-battle circumstances.
(2) The ratio of enemy killed to friendly killed for the operation was 6 to 1.

(3) Equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NR DAMAGED</th>
<th>NR DESTROYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crew served weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/PRC-25</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Sets AN/PRC-A &amp; PRR-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M42 Duster</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulldozer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, cargo</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-62 Wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generators, 10 KW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle, Tank Recovery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M48A3 Tanks</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>6/5</td>
<td>5/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) It is not possible to determine with any accuracy the number of enemy killed and wounded as the result of artillery fires and air strikes.

(2) During the contact of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry southeast of Duc Co on 23 July, there were eight artillery batteries in a position to fire in support of the contact. This was one of the rare occasions when the artillery has been able to mass its fires. These fires, combined with air strikes and ground fires, resulted in the destruction of a sizable enemy force.

(3) On 23 August when the 1st Brigade command post at Jackson Hole received approximately 50 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, eight artillery batteries (light, medium and heavy) immediately responded by firing a preplanned counter-rocket program. Nearly 2000 rounds were fired in countering this first enemy use of 122mm rockets in Pleiku Province. Later an infantry battalion on a search and destroy mission west of Jackson Hole uncovered the rocket launching positions. A search of the immediate area revealed the results of the counter-rocket fires delivered by the artillery. The searchers found a 122mm rocket motor which had been pierced by artillery fragments, 15 bunkers

9Helicopter loss totals are shown for 4th Avn Bn/52d Avn Bn (in DS of Div)
with overhead cover, many rocket canisters, NVA equipment, one AK-47 rifle and 24 bodies of enemy soldiers.

(4) A Headhunter aircraft flying a visual reconnaissance mission on 1 October sighted approximately 45 enemy at AR971142. An airstrike was called in on the area and as they were making their passes the aircraft received ground to air fire from all around the target area indicating a larger force. Five more airstrikes and four gunships were put into the area followed by a combat assault by an infantry unit. The unit in a sweep of the area found 49 NVA KIA and captured four NVA.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. General.

(1) The concept of logistical support for Operation FRANCIS MARION was to provide supply point distribution as far forward as possible. To accomplish this, the logistical bases were collocated with the brigade trains. Class I, III, III, V, material supplies, bath, laundry, graves registration, direct exchange facility for personnel clothing, maintenance and medical services were provided. Resupply was primarily by LLCC.

(2) 1st Logistical Command Forward Support Activities (FSA) were initially located at LE THANH (YA829251) to support the 1st Brigade and at Oasis (ZA125285) to support the 2d Brigade. Both bases became operational on 6 April. Organic elements from Division Support Command (DISCOM) provided medical support, maintenance support and a direct exchange facility for personnel clothing. Class II and IV materials, less barrier, were provided from Camp Enari thru established supply channels.

(3) The FSA at LE THANH withdrew on 23 April and the FSA at Oasis withdrew on 4 July. Forward Support Elements from DISCOM and other division resources were grouped to replace the FSA's. LLCC continued to be the primary means of resupply. A lack of organic personnel and equipment necessitated a requirement for certain Logistical Command/Facilities and equipment to remain. These were the laundry service, rough terrain forklift and refrigerator semitrailer at LE THANH and the Graves Registration (partial), laundry and bath services, rough terrain forklift, 5-ton wrecker, and refrigerator van at Oasis.

(4) The principle reason for switching from FSA support to FSE support was to provide the tactical commander with a greater influence over logistic levels. In the case of the switch at Oasis there were other influencing factors. PLEIKU Sub-Area Command (PKSAC) was operating an FSA at DAK TO and KONTUM in support of Operation GREELEY in addition to the FSA at Oasis. So that they could meet all their requirements it was necessary for the division to supplement them with transportation. It was more feasible to use division vehicles for the short haul between PLEIKU and Oasis under division control than to provide the same number to PKSAC for long hauls under their control.
The FSE at LE THANH relocated to Oasis simultaneously with the 1st Brigade on 21 September. The FSE at Oasis returned to Camp Enari. However, to support 2d Brigade operations in the DAK PAYAU Valley emergency JP4 and rearming points were established at the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, forward CP on 19E.

The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor; 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry; and the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, drew supplies directly from Camp Holloway and Camp Enari and were not supported from FSA’s or FSE’s, except on special occasions. This was also true of battalion task forces operating under division control. During the 2d Brigade’s operation in DAK PAYAU Valley, all the participating battalions were responsible for their own resupply.

Deteriorating road conditions along Highways 19N and 14B forced the division to restrict travel to 5-ton or smaller vehicles and to limit traffic to combat essential vehicles and supplies. Roads were closed periodically throughout the monsoon season. Resupply under these conditions was provided by LC hauling supplies to Camp Enari or Oasis, when possible, and helilifting to the FSE or directly to the FSBs. Emergency resupplies by C-130 aircraft were also utilized to bring stocks up to desired levels. The airfields at Oasis and DUC GC, which was in close proximity to LE THANH, were used in these instances.

b. Material and Services.

(1) Supply.

(a) The majority of supplies consumed during Operation FRANCIS MARION were issued through FSA’s or FSE’s. An estimated 12,000 tons of Class I, III, and V supplies from Camp Holloway and Class I, II, III, and IV supplies from Camp Enari were issued directly to the units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Avg Daily Issues</th>
<th>Total Issues</th>
<th>WT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I (Rations)</td>
<td>3,474</td>
<td>492,596</td>
<td>1,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4 (Gal)</td>
<td>8,232</td>
<td>740,900</td>
<td>2,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg AS (Gal)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>20,700</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogas (Gal)</td>
<td>3,216</td>
<td>288,400</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel (Gal)</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>292,500</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V (S/T)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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AVDDH-GC

25 November 1967


(b) A summary of supplies issued from the supporting FSA's is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>AV DAILY ISSUES</th>
<th>TOTAL ISSUES</th>
<th>WT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Rations</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>290,530</td>
<td>871.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Rations</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>121,633</td>
<td>273.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry Packs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandbags</td>
<td>10,042</td>
<td>984,200</td>
<td>115.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Picket 8' (ea)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U Picket 5' (ea)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3,686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertina Wire Bale</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbed Wire</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4' Screw Picket</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3' Screw Picket</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP-4</td>
<td>6,589</td>
<td>685,000</td>
<td>2,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV GAS</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>28,400</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO GAS</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>248,000</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIESEL</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>327,000</td>
<td>1,114.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) A summary of supplies issued through supporting FSE's is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>AV DAILY ISSUES</th>
<th>TOTAL ISSUES</th>
<th>WT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A&quot; Rations</td>
<td>3,581</td>
<td>648,000</td>
<td>1,943.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;C&quot; Rations</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>325,760</td>
<td>732.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry Packs</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6,940</td>
<td>162.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5,418</td>
<td>980,700</td>
<td>2,839.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Class III

| JP-4               | 19,030          | 2,343,500    | 7,499.2  |
| AV GAS             | 250             | 45,100       | 139.8    |
| MO GAS             | 5,130           | 929,000      | 2,787.0  |
| DIESEL             | 5,050           | 915,200      | 3,203.2  |
| TOTAL              | 29,470          | 4,232,800    | 13,629.2 |

Class IV

| Sandbag            | 12,546          | 2,270,800    | 283.9    |
| U Picket 8'        | 72.6            | 13,124       | 104.8    |
| U Picket 5'        | 34.3            | 6,206        | 37.9     |
| Screw Picket 4'    | 18.4            | 3,320        | 14.6     |
| Screw Picket 3'    | 6.1             | 1,100        | 3.3      |
| Concertina Wire Bale | 1.2           | 200          | 110.0    |
| Barbed Wire Pallets | 1.4            | 266          | 278.0    |
| TOTAL              | 12,680.5        | 2,295,015    | 852.5    |
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AVDBH-QC

25 November 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MGV #3-32)

Class V

WT (S/T)

TOTAL 15,500

Major items consumed were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40mm (Grenade)</td>
<td>93,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm HE</td>
<td>145,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm (Tank gun)</td>
<td>8,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm HE</td>
<td>183,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 in HE</td>
<td>56,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm HE</td>
<td>87,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; HE</td>
<td>18,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75 in Rkt</td>
<td>8,971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Water Point issues: Two water points were operated at the logistical bases in addition to water points periodically established at the battalion fire bases. An approximate total of 3,900,000 gallons of potable water was issued for a daily average of 20,635 gallons.

(e) Recapitulation of supplies consumed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUED FROM</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>10,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>32,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMP ENARI andASP #341</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55,568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) In addition to tonage of Class III and V used by division units, the US Air Force expended the following Class III and V in support of Operation FRANCIS MARION.

CLASS III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>QTY (IN GAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>49,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52's</td>
<td>82,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>131,330,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLASS V

DELIVERED BY FIGHTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDNANCE</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>WEIGHT (S/T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>17,412</td>
<td>4,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>3,393</td>
<td>1,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

DELIVERED BY FIGHTERS AND AC-47 (SPOOKY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMMUNITION</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>WEIGHT (5/7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>272,400</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62mm</td>
<td>441,800</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DELIVERED BY B-52's

| BOMBS      | UNK   | 6,196        |

TOTAL 13,789

(2) Services.

(a) FSA Services

1. Laundry Processed
   a. LE THANH - 58,656 lbs
   b. Oasis - 340,799 lbs

2. Baths
   a. LE THANH - 9,600 individuals
   b. Oasis - 32,009 individuals

2. Graves Registration
   a. LE THANH - 4 remains
   b. Oasis - 19 remains

(b) FSE Services.

1. Laundry Processed
   a. LE THANH - 274,466 lbs
   b. Oasis - 350,288 lbs

2. Baths
   a. LE THANH - 49,036
   b. Oasis - 34,532
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

3. Graves Registration
   a. LE THANH - 122 remains
   b. Oasis - 34 remains
   c. Maintenance.

(1) Support was provided through series of contact teams located with the combat units, Forward Support Elements (FSE's) and a support facility located at Camp Enari.

(2) Forward support of the 1st Brigade was provided by company C, 704th Maintenance Battalion (-) operating from the brigade trains area.

(3) Forward support of the 2d Brigade was provided by Company D, 704th Maintenance Battalion (-) operating from the brigade trains area.

(4) Contact teams were located with 1st Battalion, 69th Armor; 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry; and 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry in their respective areas of operations.

(5) Headquarters and Company A, 704th Maintenance Battalion provided back up support for all division main units and a technical supply base for assigned and attached units. In addition, contact teams were augmented with personnel and equipment as required.

(6) Company E, 704th Maintenance Battalion provided combat support maintenance and repair parts supply for organic division aircraft, to include recovery and evacuation of downed aircraft and the servicing and delivery of replacement aircraft.

(7) During the operation, the 704th Maintenance Battalion processed 14,919 work orders with a breakdown as follows:

   (a) Mechanical - 1,183
   (b) Electronic - 7,654
   (c) Armament - 5,134
   (d) Aircraft - 898

   d. Transportation.

   (1) The land line logistical resupply nets within the area of operations included:

      (a) Highway 14B - PLEIKU (via 19W) to PLEI DJERENG.
      (b) Highway 19W - PLEIKU to Oasis and DUC CO.
AVDDH-02

(2) Inclement weather and deteriorating road conditions forced implementation of one-way traffic along Route 19N between CP31 and DUC CO.

(3) The DTO effected direct coordination with the 4th Military Police Company and the Provost Marshal to insure efficient utilization of Military Police escorts. Military Police gun jeeps provided limited security and excellent convoy control along the road net. In addition, the 4th Military Police Company established TCP's at the following locations.

(a) CP-31 (AR775367)
(b) CP-33 (ZA12288)
(c) CP-35 (YA904270)

(4) During the operation three brigades were relocated. The 173d Airborne Brigade was moved from New Pukku Air Base to CATUCA and subsequently to DAK TO. Using a shuttle system, the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division moved from LE THAH to Oasis during the period 15-23 September. This relocation was accomplished utilizing 859 2½ ton loads. Three hundred and sixty-one 2½ ton loads were utilized in relocating the 2d Brigade from Oasis to Camp Enari.

(5) The extensive deterioration experienced along the road net was caused by the monsoon and resulted in increased aerial resupply utilizing the CH-47, C-123, and the C-130 aircraft. The CH-47 provided flexibility in effecting resupply of the forward fire bases.

(6) A total of 18,398 vehicles utilized the road net during the operation.

e. Medical Support.

Division level medical service in support of the division, and all attached elements was as follows:

(1) Company B, 4th Medical Battalion (-) provided a forward clearing section in support of 1st Brigade and supporting elements consisting of 28 personnel. The section provided an admission and disposition facility, one 16 bed ward capable of expanding to 40 beds, one medical laboratory and communication, ground evacuation, treatment and dental sections.

(2) Company C, 4th Medical Battalion (-) provided a forward clearing section in support of the 2d Brigade and supporting elements consisting of 28 personnel. The section provided admission and disposition facility, one 16 bed ward capable of expanding to 40 beds, one medical laboratory and communications, ground evacuation, treatment and dental sections.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(3) The 4th Medical Battalion (-) provided medical service and manned the rear clearing section at Camp Enari. The 39th KJ Team provided necessary dental support.

(4) Aeromedical evacuations were accomplished by the 2d Platoon, 49th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) from 6 April - 10 September and the 283d Medical Detachment (Air Ambulance) from 11 September - 11 October.

(5) Army level supporting facilities consisted of the 18th Surgical and 71st Evacuation Hospitals located in PLEIKAU.

(6) The 2d Platoon, 32d Medical Detachment in QUI NHON, furnished medical supplies and maintenance support.

(7) Summary of medical service provided by clearing sections:

(a) Patients seen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IRHA</th>
<th>INRHA</th>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRHA</td>
<td>564</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,017</td>
<td>7,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRHA</td>
<td>1,524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Patients evacuated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IRHA</th>
<th>INRHA</th>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRHA</td>
<td>554</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>4,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRHA</td>
<td>962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Returned to duty:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IRHA</th>
<th>INRHA</th>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRHA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>2,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRHA</td>
<td>562</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2,253</td>
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f. Problem Areas:

(1) Maintenance Support: The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry became mechanized and the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was attached to the division during Operation FRANCIS MARION. This coupled with the fact that the division's medium artillery battalion is self-propelled presented an awesome maintenance support task for the maintenance battalion since its TOE is designed for the standard infantry division. Consideration should be given to augmenting the TOE by the standard ratio of mechanics to tracks and by appropriate equipment.

(2) FSE Equipment: There is insufficient material handling and lift equipment authorized for the division to support FSE activity as efficiently as desired. Additional fork lifts and wreckers are required. Further, there is a need for 5000 gallon fuel tankers to haul fuel from depots to forward storage areas. These additions would free the division's present authorized equipment to be used as intended.
(3) Road Conditions: Deterioration of the MSR during the monsoon forced the division to restrict the type of vehicles that could haul required supplies. This taxed the division assets in 5 ton and 2½ ton vehicles. Subsequently, travel on the MSR had to be restricted to essential supplies. Because traffic moved slowly, vehicles were invariably being locked in at the forward area thus taxing the assets even more. Use of the CH-47 helicopter increased in an effort to maintain minimum stockage levels. As stock levels continued to dwindle, emergency airlifts of supplies by C-130 aircraft were required. Virtually all these steps could have been eliminated had the MSR been paved. It is essential that Highway 15W be paved to DUC CO and 1AB be paved to New PLEI DJERENG. This would allow the larger vehicles to be used regardless of weather. It would reduce vehicle maintenance, helicopter resupply missions and the costly use of Air Force aircraft. From a tactical viewpoint it would be more difficult for the enemy to mine the road.

g. Communications.

(1) The 124th Signal Battalion provided the division with normal communications support throughout Operation FRANCIS MARION.

(2) VHF, multi-channel systems were established and operated from division to the brigades and to the separate battalions under division operational control. The 1st and 2d Brigade's communication requirements necessitated two 12-channel VHF systems to each of their forward command posts. A 12-channel VHF system was established with the 173d Airborne's Brigade command post at CATECXA on 28 May and operated until the final element departed for DAK TO on 27 June. During September the 2d Brigade established a TAC CP at FLEX MRONG which was supported with one VHF system. This additional system caused considerable difficulty both in equipment and in power units since at the same time the brigade was operating their main CP at Oasis and had set up a forward CP at FLEX DO LIM. VHF, multi-channel systems were established to separate battalions; the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located at CATECXA, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor located on Route 19E. On 15 September, after the arrival of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, there was an additional VHF system installed to their CP. At various times during the operation infantry battalions operated directly under division control. At these times VHF systems were established at their CP until they reverted back to brigade control.

(3) FM radios continued to provide the primary means of communication for the division. The division's units operated as many as 313 separate radio nets ranging from the Division Command Net to individual platoon nets. FM radios operated far beyond standard ranges and under the most favorable conditions it was not unusual to span distances up to 100 kilometers. Secure mode transmissions were continuously accomplished with a transmitter in the division base camp on Signal Hill and remoted to the DTOC. On occasion it was necessary to relay through Dragon Mountain. Current equipment prevented secure mode retransmissions. However, by placing a KY-8 at each relay and having the operators manually retransmit the messages, secure traffic was handled with a minimum delay.
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h. Personnel. The following enlisted replacements were received during Operation FRANCIS MARION:

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14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD).

(1) The introduction of the Airborne Personnel Detector added a new and significant dimension to the family of intelligence collection agencies. The APD is an area search device primarily designed to locate human beings. Dense vegetation and sparse population in the area of operations proved an ideal environment for the APD. When visual reconnaissance proved ineffective, the APD literally, "sniffed" through the vegetation to locate the enemy.

(2) The accuracy of the APD's sensing is affected primarily by wind, terrain contour and ordnance fired into the area. Wind displaces the ammonia scent from the source in direct proportion to the force and direction of the wind. This effect is reduced in mountainous terrain. When artillery and air ordnance has been employed in an anticipated APD target area, the TOT for the APD should not be sooner than 18 to 24 hours later. Earlier employment in the area will be adversely affected by the lingering smoke and ammonia from the ordnance.

(3) Initially, during Operation FRANCIS MARION, there were three aircraft and crews allocated daily to "People Sniffer" missions throughout the area of operations. Subsequently, because of the non-availability of APD's, the requirement was reduced to two aircraft. By the end of the operation only one aircraft was required for APD missions because of inoperative sets and the requirement to provide two sets and an operator to III Marine Amphibious Force. To cover both brigade sectors of the area of operations the aircraft would fly one mission in one brigade sector in the morning and another mission in the other brigade sector in the afternoon.

(4) A light team of gunships (two armed helicopters) were normally assigned to escort the APD aircraft because of the technique required to fly an APD mission. The APD aircraft would fly at tree top level and escorting gunships would fly at a higher altitude. This served a threefold purpose.

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(a) Protect the APD aircraft.

(b) Assist in map spotting locations where sensings are made.

(c) Provide, because of their higher altitude, more reliable communications with friendly elements when flying in remote locations.

(5) The effectiveness of the APD was determined to a large extent by the proficiency of both the aircraft crew and the APD operator. Another major factor was the briefing given the APD mission personnel. A through briefing inevitably produced better results. Briefings included locations of friendly units, suspected locations of enemy units, a statement of mission requirements and expected results, call signs and frequencies of the controlling headquarters, friendly units and supporting artillery, actions required when significant sensings are obtained in the search area, procedures to be followed in the event one of the mission aircraft go down, and time and location for the debrief.

(6) Since the APD provides an instantaneous reading of a probable enemy location, the value of the intelligence is directly proportional to the rapidity which the sensing is correlated to other information, disseminated to other headquarters and appropriate action taken.

b. XM-148, 40mm Grenade Launcher:

The field evaluation of the XM-148 40mm grenade launcher was concluded during Operation FRANCIS MARION and the device was withdrawn from use. Deficiencies of the XM-148 were the poor position and projection of the sight, difficulty and unreliability in operation of the cocking and firing mechanism, unsatisfactory pointing and handling characteristics, slowness in loading, and degradation of mobility in some circumstances. Additional deficiencies were slow rate of fire, unreliability of functioning, and inadequacy of safety features.

c. Fragmacord:

Fragmacord is a new linear anti-personnel munition which was produced in limited quantities. During Operation FRANCIS MARION the division received 2,520 feet of the munition, which was positioned, but never fired against the enemy.

d. M-56 Light Weight Load Bearing Equipment:

The M-56 light weight nylon load bearing equipment was evaluated during the operation. The equipment was very well accepted within the command due to the lightweight and quick drying, mildew resistant qualities. Several minor modifications were recommended as a result of the evaluation. These include a larger pack (similar to the rucksack), more durable snap fasteners, interchange of hooks on the suspenders and eyelets on the pack, and web straps sewn to the padded front portion of the suspenders to attach items of equipment, i.e., flashlight, compass, first aid packet, etc.
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o. M-16 Stripper Clip Ammunition:

An evaluation of tactically package 5.56mm ball (stripper clip) ammunition was conducted to determine if this ammunition satisfied the original requirement for preloaded expendable magazines. As a result of the evaluation it was concluded:

(1) The stripper clip has a significant advantage over one-round-at-a-time magazine loading but the need for a preloaded disposable magazine still exists.

(2) Since the clip and necessary adapter are separate items and are not provided in equal quantities some delay results while each adapter is used by several riflemen. The requirement for the small adapter which could be easily lost significantly reduces the speed advantage inherent in the clip.

(3) The reduction in weight and the preloaded configuration of an expendable magazine would make it a valuable item for combat operations. However, a unit once supplied with expendable magazines must be resupplied with expendable magazines. Under a limited procurement basis it is doubtful that this would occur within a reasonable period of time unless sufficient quantities were stockpiled and earmarked for specific units.

(4) A disposable magazine would eliminate the burden of re-loading magazines while engaged in combat.

(5) The following specifications should be incorporated into the design criteria for disposable magazines:

(a) The magazine feed spring must be able to operate satisfactorily after prolonged storage in a compressed configuration.

(b) The plastic magazine must be able to withstand the rough use normally expected under combat conditions.

f. 40mm Yellow Smoke (Ground) Cartridge (XM-635).

Evaluation of the XM-635 yellow smoke ground cartridge was completed during Operation FRANCIS MARION. Performance of this round was unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

(1) Smoke density is considered too thin. During cloudy or overcast weather conditions, the smoke could not be observed for any great distance.

(2) Smoke duration is considered to be too short. In several instances the cartridge burned less than 60 seconds, considerably less than the stated 2 minutes burning time.

g. 40mm Signal Flare Cartridges.

A limited quantity of these white star cluster and parachute cartridges were received and proved extremely satisfactory. Because of the dense jungle canopy covering a large portion of the area of operations a requirement exists for an accurate signaling system capable of penetrating this canopy for use by maneuver units. This type of flare would permit each squad to have a signaling or marking capability that is essential for marking front lines or directing aerial fire support. Use of colored smoke grenades and standard hand held signal flares have proven unsatisfactory due to the height and density of the jungle canopy and the requirement to fire through small openings in this canopy.

h. CAR 15 Sub-Machine Gun (X71-177E1):

Evaluation of the CAR 15 Sub-Machine Gun was concluded during the operations. It was found to be reliable and durable in combat and had no major deficiencies. It is suitable for extensive employment in RVN. Combat leaders and their troops at all levels desire the weapon.

i. RINGTROP:

Effectiveness of RINGTROP could not be measured since there was no intelligence input, however it is doubtful that the device would be useful for interdiction and area denial due to the following limitations:

(1) The device is relatively easy to see and the only requirement for neutralization is a careful visual search.

(2) If the devices are discovered by the enemy prior to deterioration they can be used against US personnel in the original configuration.

(3) After deterioration, RINGTROP components can be used by the enemy to manufacture primitive weapons.

(4) The long period required for deterioration deters US forces movement through the target area for up to 90 days.

j. Fougasse Mines: The Fougasse mine was a very effective final perimeter defense weapon of battalion fire bases. Experimentation with several combinations of mix and explosive propellants found the following materials to be most effective:

(1) 55 gallon drum

(2) 45 gallons of gasoline

(3) One case of H-1 thicker

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A mixture of 32 canteen cups of thickener per drum of gasoline will suffice, however, additional thickener produces a heavier liquid. The only problem with using additional thickener is that the mixture must be strained daily to keep it from separating. When detonated the napalm spread is 50 meters wide and 20 meters deep.

k. Rome Plow.

The use of the Rome plow blade on a D7E dozer in clearing brush and trees proved to be very effective in land clearing. The Rome plow blade was far superior to the standard bull blade for clearing operations. It was found imperative that commanders utilize the blades in a proper manner so that maximum production can be obtained. It should be noted that the Rome plow is not a piece of earthmoving equipment or a grass cutter, it is designed to cut dense, heavy vegetation in a speedy manner. The Rome plow, used in three to four dozer teams, proved to be most effective when clearing for farm land with the plow set to cut the top two inches of soil. Some problems occurred while operating during the monsoon season. Since dozers became stuck repeatedly, it was a must to work in teams. Average production of cleared land has been about 1.0 acres per hour in light clearing, about 0.8 acres per hour in medium clearing and approximately 0.6 acres per hour in heavy clearing.

l. Waterborne Psyops.

Psyops leaflets with various themes were placed in airtight plastic bags. These bags were dropped in the rivers to float downstream. No positive indicators of the effectiveness of this program have been obtained.

m. Airborne Psyops.

At the beginning of July the 9th Air Commando Squadron replaced the U-10 aircraft and the 1000 watt speaker systems, which had been flying the loudspeaker missions, with O2-B aircraft having 1800 watt speaker systems. The new 1800 watt systems were a definite improvement over the old 1000 watt systems and could be heard better from the ground.

n. 1000 watt Loudspeaker Systems.

Four 1000 watt loudspeaker systems were received during September. These speakers were very effective when used from a helicopter at altitudes between 800 to 1600 feet.
c. Civic Action, Socioeconomic Projects:

1. Establishment of division Civic Action Sundry Fund to subsidize Civic Action projects.

2. Audio/Visual Teams, both US and ARVN.

3. High-density hamlet visitation (5 visits/week).

4. Youth Health Programs of daily milk and vitamins.

5. Division DMCAP and WTCAP Programs.

6. Brigade sponsored meetings and banquets for village chiefs.

7. Support of hamlet/village meetings called by district chiefs.

8. Division Band concerts at local villages.

9. Transportation of civilians to local market places for sale of artifacts and purchase of family foods.

10. 20th Polwar Battalion Cultural Team performances.

11. Assignment of a major Civic Action project to each major command of the division (sponsorship of the LE TRUNG Health Workers School, the Highlands Junior Military Academy, a pilot pig program, importation of cattle from the United States and the PLIITU Leprosarium).

12. Stamping all goods given to the people with GVN images and slogans.

13. Escorting District and Provincial officials into forward portions of the division area of operations.

14. Use of armored personnel carriers for C1 teams working in areas where there are no roads and marginal security.

p. Psyops Techniques:

(1) Night speaker missions. During the latter part of September and early October speaker missions using standard propaganda tapes were initiated. The effects of these missions have not been obtained due to the short time that they have been utilized.

(2) Leaflet Dolls, that delay dispersal of leaflets for a predetermined time, were used for leaflet drops. These provided a more accurate dispersion of leaflets.

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15. (c) LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Operations

Actions Following an Enemy Contact

Item: Pursuit, sweep of the battlefield, and evacuation of the wounded.

Discussion: There is a built-in conflict as to the action which should be taken immediately upon the termination of a contact with the enemy near the border. The ideal situation would be to have an LZ in the immediate proximity of the contact area through which reinforcements could be inserted to initiate an aggressive exploitation of the contact, or, should the enemy be in a disorganized state, to rapidly effect pursuit. Simultaneously, the US unit in contact should evacuate its wounded and KIA's, and then initiate an immediate sweep of the battlefield. The nature of the terrain in the border area, however, is such that LZ's are not readily available in the vast majority of cases and must be cut out of the dense jungle foliage. The normal contact is usually violent and of short duration - four to six hours - invariably involving a US infantry company opposing an NVA battalion size or larger force. The NVA employ mortars extensively during a contact, causing a disproportionate number of wounded as compared to KIA. Upon breaking contact, and in the absence of an LZ, the US unit must direct its attention first to cutting an LZ out of the jungle foliage to evacuate the wounded. The normal time required to cut such an LZ is about 15 hours, but may often extend to 24 hours and, on occasion, exceed 36 hours. During this period, the enemy is making a maximum effort to evacuate his wounded, documents, weapons and other items of equipment from the battle area. In many cases, he is able to physically remove his dead before a sweep of the battlefield can be accomplished.

Observation: There can be no set rule for the action to be taken immediately upon termination of contact. Each situation must be analyzed carefully to determine the sequence of the actions to be taken. If at all possible, reinforcements should be inserted to conduct pursuit of the enemy and to otherwise exploit the contact. Moreover, immediate action must be taken either by the US unit in the contact or by the reinforcing unit, as the case may be, to effect an immediate sweep of the battlefield. Artillery fired into the contact area will discourage the enemy from policing the battle area of bodies, weapons and equipment prior to the time a sweep can be made. Obviously, the seriously wounded must be evacuated from the battlefield by the fastest method in order to prevent further loss of lives. To accomplish all of these things in the proper order, or simultaneously, requires the careful judgement of the commander on the ground as well as his senior commander at battalion or brigade level.
Changes in Tactics

Item: Quick reaction to changes in NVA tactics.

Discussion: The nine engagements in close proximity to the COMAGDLN border with battalion and multi-battalion enemy forces in May and July reinforced the previously learned principal of operating in no less than company size units with one hour reinforcing distance between companies, when positioned in this high risk area near the border. In these engagements the enemy suffered nearly two-thirds of the casualties they incurred during this operation and still were not able to reach their objectives, which apparently were either the DUC CO Special Forces Camp, the 1st Brigade CP at Jackson Hole, or the GVN resettlement area of EDAP ENANG. After the July contacts the NVA apparently realized they would be unable to move in force through the Highlands. During the next several weeks a change in NVA tactics became apparent. The NVA was attempting to infiltrate through the Highlands in small, squad-size groups, placing emphasis on avoiding all contact with our forces which were still operating in company strength.

Observation: Infantry commanders have to be constantly alert for changes in NVA/V.C. tactics. The enemy's rapid change in tactics allowed small NVA units to infiltrate through the Highlands skirting the massed strength of rifle companies operating in the proximity of the border. It was difficult to discern this change since in the past, after severe losses, NVA units withdrew across the border for a month to six weeks to refit and receive replacements. However, we must be quick to recognize such a decided shift in tactics and more important react to them. In the latter weeks of the operation the command emphasis was on companies breaking down into platoon and squad-size operations. The companies operated much further apart with the platoons and squads separated and conducted ambushes against the groups of infiltrating NVA.

Reinforcement of Units in Contact

Item: Rapid reinforcement of units in contact.

Discussion: It is difficult to reinforce a unit in contact quickly enough to decisively influence the outcome of the battle. There are many factors which hinder movement of reaction forces to the battle area. Among these are the limited number of suitable landing zones, dense vegetation, adverse weather and the fact that most contacts are of short duration.

Observation: The planning of search and destroy operations must also include plans for the relief/reinforcement of units in contact. Landing zones should be preselected along the patrol routes. Then to insure timely response when contact is made, place the reaction forces on standby, and request helicopters for the combat assault. The helicopters should be requested sufficiently early so that there will be no delays in lifting the reaction force at the propitious time.
Item: The dividing of the base camp TAOR into sectors of responsibility.

Discussion: The TAOR for the division base camp extends out 12,000 meters from the bunkered perimeter of the camp. To define clearly areas of responsibility for security of the base camp and for civic action programs in the TAOR, the perimeter and the surrounding area have been divided into five sectors, with the responsibility for each being assigned to a major subordinate command of the division. Each command is responsible for manning the perimeter bunkers and towers 24 hours a day; maintaining an adequate number of patrols in their sector 24 hours a day; having a reaction force on 30-minute standby for deployment anywhere in sector; and conducting an active civic action program in their area.

All sectors report into the Installation Coordination Center (ICC) which is operated by Headquarters, Division Artillery. The ICC is responsible for the control and coordination of the defense of the division base camp. The ICC coordinates the sector's patrol plans, plans and executes the H&I program for the base camp, controls the commitment of the sector reaction forces, maintains communications with civic action teams operating in the TAOR and is responsible for conducting frequent visual reconnaissance flights over the TAOR.

Observation: There are many facets to a workable, coordinated base camp defense plan. The defense must be set up in depth from the bunkered and barbed wire perimeter of the base camp out to the fringes of the TAOR, which should be extended to beyond range of 122mm rockets. The entire area should be under the continuous surveillance of the sector patrols and VR aircraft. Civic action teams are an integral part of the defense. Through frequent visits to the villages and hamlets in the TAOR, they befriend and assist the people. Thus is addition to the valuable civic action operations, these teams disrupt the Viet Cong influence over these people and gain valuable intelligence information.

Rocket Attacks

Item: Defense of the division base camp against enemy rocket attacks.

Discussion: The increased use by the enemy of 140 and 122mm rockets in attacks on FMfAF bases and installations, since their introduction at Da Nang earlier this year, has necessitated a reappraisal of defenses. The ranges of the rockets are such that previous defensive measures planned to counter mortar attacks must be expanded to provide for the greater range of this weapon.

Observation: An active defense must be conducted and should include these considerations:
(a) Extend the FOB boundaries outward the range of the rockets or 12,000 meters from the base camp installation perimeter in all directions.

(b) Maintain an adequate number of patrols in the area 24 hours a day, paying particular attention to the fringe areas of the TAOR.

(c) Conduct numerous ambushes at night.

(d) Develop counter-rocket programs.

(e) Identify and record locations of possible launching sites.

(f) Conduct comprehensive visual reconnaissance flights over the TAOR frequently.

(g) Locate surveillance radar to provide maximum coverage of the TAOR.

(h) Conduct an active Civic Action program in the TAOR making nearly daily visits to the villages and hamlets in the area.

Passive defense considerations are:

(a) A frequently rehearsed, comprehensive alert plan.

(b) The construction of personnel bunkers strong enough to withstand an attack.

(c) Prepare billets and work areas for personnel protection.

(d) Revet sites for protection of critical equipment and supplies i.e. aircraft parking areas, signal installations, POL and ammunition storage areas.

The application of the measures outlined above cannot be considered the ultimate in rocket defense and there are undoubtedly additional items that can be added to the list, but if a rocket defense included the items enumerated, it will reduce the likelihood of an attack and reduce personnel casualties and equipment losses if attacked.

Rocket Attacks on Forward Bases

Item: Defense of forward bases against enemy rocket attacks.

Discussion: The increased use by the enemy of 140 and 122mm rockets in the area of operations necessitated that defense plans for FSB's and forward command posts be revised to include provisions to counter the greater range and destructive power of the rockets.
Observation: The NVA's and forward CP's must be defended primarily by an active defense; though there are certain passive measures that can and should be taken. The active measures are:

(a) Plan so that units conducting search and destroy operations in the area periodically pass through portions of the fringe areas of a 12,000 meter circle drawn around the forward bases.

(b) Conduct numerous ambushes at night within the 12,00 meter zone when operations permit.

(c) Develop counter-rocket programs targeting likely launch areas.

(d) Employ LRRP's to maintain surveillance over possible launching sites.

(e) Conduct frequent visual reconnaissance over the area surrounding the forward bases.

Passive defense measures are

(a) A rehearsed, comprehensive anti-rocket defense SCP.

(b) Construct personnel bunkers strong enough to withstand an attack.

(c) Revet or sandbag ammunition and POL storage sites.

(d) When vehicles or aircraft are parked in forward bases, they should be revetted or sandbagged.

**Enemy Mines**

Item: Preventive measures to inhibit mining and ambushes along the LLOC.

Discussion: The NVA/VC consistently mined certain stretches of road throughout the operation. Rome plow operations were initiated to clear land out to 100 meters on each side of the road in the division's area of responsibility, some parts of which in the past had a high incidence of mining and other areas which were considered to be potential ambush sites. This improved the visibility both from the air and from the road thus increasing the chance of observing mining activities since enemy personnel would have to cross 100 meters of open area. In the event of a mining incident the cleared area adjacent to the road would lessen the chance of ambush and provide fields of fire for the convoy security elements. At night H & I fires using white phosphorous rounds were fired along the roads to negate the concealment of darkness. White phosphorus rounds are used for these fires because HE rounds leave metal fragments on the roads that hamper the effectiveness of the mine detectors.
Aerial Reconnaissance

Item: Compromise of operations by increased air activity.

Discussion: Interrogation of POW's has revealed that the enemy is able to anticipate planned US operations by the marked increase of aerial reconnaissance and liaison missions where particular interest was not previously evident.

Observation: Reconnaissance and liaison flights should be conducted routinely throughout the division area of interest so that the presence of aircraft will not arouse undue suspicion. When an area of operations is reconnoitered, flights should be minimized in an attempt to make them appear part of the established pattern.

Movement of Fire Support Bases (FSB)

Item: Movement of FSB's during monsoon season.

Discussion: A unit must be ready to move its FSB at any time regardless of weather. However, during the monsoon season, a greater than normal amount of supplies and equipment tends to accumulate in the forward FSBs. This is because regular aerial resupply missions are often impeded by the bad weather. This tendency was demonstrated clearly during a recent battalion move where more than one and one-half times the normal number of CH-47 sorties were required to accomplish the move.

Observation: Units should be alert for an excessive build-up of items in their FSB's. Only essential items should be kept on hand. When a unit is notified that its FSB is to be moved, all possible measures should be taken to reduce stockage levels and to reduce the number of items being brought into the FSB.

Cordon and Search Operations

Item: Effectiveness of cordon and search operations.

Discussion: Village cordon and search operations are an effective method of temporarily destroying or neutralizing local VC infrastructure. As soon as the tactical units leave the area however, the VC will begin to rebuild their organization unless GVN Revolutionary Development teams or similar type government organizations move in to permanently secure the area and prevent the VC from re-entrenching themselves.
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OBSERVATION: Revolutionary Development efforts must follow immediately tactical cordon and search operations if the full value of the tactical efforts are to be realized. From then on these efforts must be continuous to prevent the cadre from reentering or rebuilding in the area.

Cordon and Search Techniques

Introduction. Cordon and search techniques.

Discussion: Several techniques have been recognized during cordon and search operations as contributing to a successful operation:

(a) All available intelligence should be compiled before the planning cordon and search operations. This included detailed information on the layout of the village and personality files of VIET CONG and VIET CONG sympathizers within the village. These files will facilitate the selection of the village to be cordoned and will enhance interrogation and screening during the search. Personality and village information is available from interrogation reports, information reports, agent reports, Intsums, and reports of MEDCAP operations.

(b) Movement to and selection of positions should be closely supervised by the unit leaders. Since movement into an area is done under the cover of darkness, positions must be constantly reevaluated for fields of fire and concealment as daylight approaches and relocated when necessary to retain concealment.

(c) After the village is given notice of the impending search, inhabitants must then be assembled immediately or they will use any intervening time to hide weapons and ammunition. Trace metal detectors are very useful in this respect.

(d) When tracked vehicles are utilized by the cordoning unit, the following principles must be followed so as not to warn guerrillas of the impending cordon of their village:

1. Tracked vehicles should not move any closer to the village than two or three thousand meters. After a foot cordon is complete, the tracks should be brought up for security.

2. Another technique which has proved to be effective and which uses deception is to momentarily move the tracks into an area within one or two thousand meters of the village, drop the troops, and immediately move the tracks out of the area.

(e) MEDCAP and civic action activities should not be performed during the screening and interrogation portion of cordon and search operations. Experience indicates that these activities distract the attention.
of the villagers and tend to ease their anxieties, limiting the initial psychological advantage and, as a result, the amount of information obtained.

(f) The use of GVN/ARVN personnel accompanied by division MI personnel to search the village while the US unit remains in concealed cordon positions has been very effective. The indigenous intelligence personnel speak the language and know the habits and customs of the people and they signify the GVN's presence and sanction of the operation.

Observation: Cordon and search operations have been successful, but require a great deal of supervision by the squad and platoon leaders with particular emphasis on the selection of positions that remain concealed from the village.

Individuals involved in cordon and search, whose presence is not needed within the village for security or search, should be denied access to the village until the intelligence portion of the operation is completed.

The use of indigenous intelligence personnel who speak the language and are familiar with the habits and customs of the native population increase the effectiveness of the search and demonstrates GVN presence in the area.

Cordon and Search Operations

Item: Use of intelligence personnel on cordon and search operations.

Discussion: Tactical elements engaging in such operations generally do not have the organic capability to screen and interrogate all civilians. As a result they must forward these people to brigade or division collection and interrogation points. This practice has three distinct disadvantages: it severely taxes unit transportation resources; it creates an excessive captive population; and it causes a difficult civil affairs problem with the many innocent civilians who have been uprooted needlessly and treated with suspicion. The VC can easily exploit these incidents to their own advantage. CI/IPW personnel with indigenous intelligence teams have the background knowledge and screening ability to eliminate most of the innocent civilians on the spot and thus insure that only those people of intelligence value are forwarded to the collection points.

Observation: Deployment of intelligence personnel with tactical units involved in village search type operations is an effective method of providing initial screening and interrogation of civilian personnel.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

ITEM: Effective Use of Firepower

Discussion: During Operation FRANCIS MARION the most successful contacts have been those using artillery and tactical air fire support simultaneously. However, air support should not be used at the expense of reducing direct support and reinforcing artillery. Rather, tactical air is a supplement to the ground support, provided the maneuver element. The calling of a "Check Fire" to bring in tactical air is dangerous and should be limited to the immediate area/axis of the airstrike.

Observation: Units in contact should not sacrifice artillery fire for the sake of an airstrike. Both means of support should be employed to complement one another. If an airstrike is to be placed on a particular target, artillery fires may be shifted from the immediate area of the strike for its duration, but not cut off entirely. In the same manner, if artillery is being fired in support of a particular contact, tactical air should be used to block likely routes of withdrawal or to strike areas where the enemy may be assembling his reinforcements.

ITEM: Control and adjustment of supporting fires.

Discussion: A company commander on the ground does not have the knowledge of the overall situation nor the advantage the battalion commander flying overhead has to control the blocking fires and TAC air strikes. The most effective control of blocking fires on the avenues of approach or withdrawal and suspected areas of enemy reserves can be accomplished from the battalion commander's position in the air overhead. However, the most effective use of close in, direct supporting fires - out 200 to 400 meters from the perimeter - is attained when these fires are controlled and adjusted by the personnel on the ground. The battalion commander should take over control and adjustment of these fires only when personnel on the ground are casualties and no longer able, or if an isolated element is cut off and does not have adequate communications or experience to control or adjust their own close in fires.

Observation: The control of reinforcing and blocking fires is most effective when the battalion commander controls it from his C & C ship overhead, but the control and adjustment of close in, direct support fires should be left to the company commander or artillery FO.
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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACV J3-32)

Unobserved Artillery Fires

Item: Adjustment of unobserved artillery fires.

Discussion: The terrain and especially the dense vegetation in most of the areas the division operates often precludes observed adjustment of artillery fires by the forward observer calling in the fire mission. It therefore becomes necessary to adjust the initial rounds by sound alone. This has necessitated modifications to the normal procedures and techniques of artillery adjustment. Because of the increased safety hazard of adjusting unobserved fires the first round should be smoke or illumination. Also, a creeping method of adjustment using 100 meter shifts from 600 to 300 meters from the forward observers position and 50 meter shifts within 300 meters until the burst of the round can be seen or it is ascertained to be on target.

Observation: Training of artillery forward observers should include techniques of adjusting artillery by sound. When adjusting by sound the firing battery should be aware that this method is being used and enforce the creeping method of adjustment.

Employment of Artillery

Item: Employment of artillery by platoon or section.

Discussion: During FRANCIS MARION because of the extensive area over which the division's maneuver elements were deployed, it became necessary at times to split medium and long-range, heavy artillery batteries into platoons or gun sections to get the maximum general support/reinforcing artillery coverage. Employing artillery in platoons or gun sections reduced the massed fires available at both battery (-) locations. In addition the halving of the FDC put extra stress on the personnel, still required to operate 24 hours, and reduced the officer supervision available, creating a definite firing safety problem.

Observation: If operational requirements continue to require medium and heavy artillery to be employed by platoon and gun section for extended periods, the TOE of the batteries FDC section should be augmented or additional medium or heavy artillery should be employed in the area during these periods.

Marking Friendly Positions

Item: Marking positions of friendly units for supporting fires.

Discussion: Since the division began operations in the Central Highlands, it has experienced continuous difficulties in adequately marking unit positions for air and artillery support. The smoke from a hand thrown smoke grenade or the projectile from a handheld flare frequently will not penetrate the thick jungle canopy. When the smoke does penetrate the canopy it often emerges 100 - 400 meters from the point of origin. Further, in a contact during the operation, the use of hand thrown smoke grenades to mark a unit
position proved costly. The area was relatively open in contrast to the dense jungle terrain in which contact with the enemy usually occurs, and when smoke grenades were thrown to mark the perimeter of the unit for an air strike, they immediately began receiving accurate enemy mortar and rocket fires. The enemy used the marking smoke grenades as a reference point for adjusting mortar and rocket fires.

**Observation:** A satisfactory method of accurately marking the position of a unit in contact has been needed critically. Experience has shown that the 40mm, white star cluster and 40mm parachute round fired by the M79 grenade launcher was extremely effective in penetrating the double-canopied jungle. They provide exact reference points from which to adjust TAC airstrikes and artillery fires. The division received a limited amount of 40mm white star cluster and 40mm parachute rounds initially, but has been unable to obtain any additional rounds since. Every effort has been made to obtain this critical item.

**Enemy’s Use of Colored Smoke**

**Item:** NVA use of colored smoke to confuse our identification procedures.

**Discussion:** There have been several occasions when one of our units on the ground attempted to indicate their location by using colored smoke grenades only to have the same color smoke observed in the air from two separate locations at approximately the same time. When a second smoke grenade of a different color was popped, this smoke was again duplicated in a different location.

**Observation:** NVA units monitor the command radio nets of US units with personnel who possess a high degree of English comprehension. The best procedure when attempting to identify friendly smoke from the air is to have the unit on the ground indicate exactly when they pop smoke without disclosing the color. The observer in the aircraft can then identify the color seen, which is either confirmed or denied from the ground. If the same color smoke is observed from two locations the observer should indicate he cannot identify it without disclosing the color, but ask for a combination of two colors. This procedure will eliminate the chances of aircraft overhead being confused as to the friendly units location on the ground caused by the enemy’s duplication of the smoke signal.

(2) **Intelligence:**

**VIETNAMESE Linguists**

**Item:** Employment of US qualified VIETNAMESE linguist.

**Discussion:** The assignment of a US Army qualified VIETNAMESE linguist to the division has yielded immediate and significantly beneficial results.
The US linguist has been used in interrogation of important POW's to produce rapid assessment of tactical significance without the necessity of the time-consuming process of translation. The possibility of errors inherent in translation through an intermediary has also been reduced to a minimum.

Observation: The assignment of qualified US Army VIETNAMESE linguists enhances the rapid and accurate interrogation of POW's, translation of important captured documents, and conduct of business with VIETNAMESE, either friendly or enemy, which requires rapidity and accuracy. US-VIETNAMESE linguists have not been assigned in sufficient numbers to provide the division with an adequate capability in this respect. A minimum of ten US Army VIETNAMESE linguists should be assigned to the division.

Requirement for LRP Platoons

Item: An adequate number of LRP teams to cover an extensive area of operations.

Discussion: During Operation FRANCIS MARION, the division was responsible for an area of operations in excess of 3,000 square miles that included all of one province and portions of two other highland provinces adjacent to the CAMBODIAN Border.

One brigade had the mission of screening the CAMBODIAN Border in western PLEIKU Province. The brigade's LRP platoon conducted surveillance of the border area in front of the brigade screen and to the flanks of the brigade area of operations.

Another brigade operated primarily in the central and eastern portions of the province and used their LRP platoon to screen the flanks of the area of operations and to conduct surveillance and interdict enemy infiltration routes in the area.

The third brigade of the division was OPCON to another division and operated as a separate task force in another part of the country.

The division's LRP platoon operated in the areas not covered by the brigade areas of operations and at times supplemented the brigade platoons.

All four LRP platoons, one at each brigade and one at division, were organized from local resources and represented a manpower drain on the combat units to maintain these vital units at operating strength.

Observation: To provide adequate ground reconnaissance over widely diverse brigade areas of operation it is essential that each brigade have an organic LRP platoon to provide brigade operations with an adequate surveillance and reconnaissance capability. A fourth platoon is required at division level to provide the same capability to the three armor units and infantry battalion task forces operating under division control.
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(5)

LRRP Reporting

Item: Reporting procedures.

Discussion: At all times and especially when operating in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, LRRP's must be trained to provide reports that are brief, clear and concise. Sufficient information must be given to form the basis for reaction to sightings or contacts but this must be accomplished with a minimum time spent in radio transmission. This requirement has become more important when radio relay stations are used and information must pass through several operators which increases the chances of distortion.

Observation: LRRP's including radio relay personnel, must be trained extensively on radio reporting procedures so that complete, clear and concise reporting is accomplished routinely.

LRRP and Aircrew Teamwork

Item: Teamwork between LRRPs and aircrews.

Discussion: Operations have revealed a necessity for LRRPs and aircrews to work together as a team to permit rapid insertion and extraction under all conditions. The covering support of gunships must fit into the plan to minimize fire on the troop-carrying aircraft and be able to provide maximum fire support for the extraction or insertion.

Observation: Aircrews and LRRP's must be trained together for extraction and insertion operations with the aircrews participating in the briefing of patrols. Time should be devoted to joint rehearsals to provide a coordinated effort and maximum support for LRRPs during extractions and insertions.

LRRP Alertness

Item: Sleeping schedules for missions.

Discussion: It was determined that certain LRRP teams were attempting to stay awake throughout the duration of a mission by using stimulants. The result of this was a marked decrease in individual efficiency or responsiveness. A definite watch program must be established to allow each member at least four hours sleep a night to maintain the necessary degree of alertness.

Observation: The use of stimulants by LRRP members to remain awake throughout patrols results in a decline in effectiveness after several days. Sleeping schedules must be arranged to provide needed rest during an operation.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

LRPRP Communications

Item: Limitations of present radio equipment.

Discussion: The AN/PRC-25 radio presently used by LRRP teams has been only moderately satisfactory for this type of operation. Problem areas include weight, range, and the line of sight transmission. The LRRP of necessity must travel with a minimum of equipment and the additional weight of the AN/PRC-25 is considered excessive for their operations. He often operates at extended distances from friendly stations and the short range of the AN/PRC-25 requires use of radio relay. The line of sight of transmission places a definite restriction on where LRRP teams can be employed and in many cases causes the employment of an additional team to act as a radio relay.

Observation: A need exists for a lightweight radio that has the capability of long range transmission without signal attenuation that is caused by jungle foliage or hill masses. Until such a radio is made available operations must be planned within the limitations of present equipment.

LRPRP Replacements

Item: DROS effect on LRRP strengths.

Discussion: During Operation FRANCIS MARION, a period of time was encountered where the majority of LRRP personnel within a single platoon rotated within a short period of time. Each platoon was faced with this same problem and as a result the operational capability of the particular platoon was hampered until replacements could be obtained and trained. Most critical was the loss of team leaders.

Observation: Replacements must be programmed into a LRRP platoon in advance of anticipated losses. This will require a temporary overstrength to exist but will allow for a transition to be made with a minimum loss of operational capability. Losses of team leaders must be anticipated and new team leaders selected before the loss occurs.

Indigenous Personnel on LRRP's

Item: Use of indigenous personnel on LRRP teams.

Discussion: Effective use has been made of RHADE MONTAGNARDS on not only Hawkeye teams, but also LRRP teams. The RHADE have shown native abilities in observation and the detection of indications of unusual conditions which complement the abilities of US members. Their use has greatly benefited LRRP and Hawkeye operations and the results justify any difficulties encountered in recruiting and training them.
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Observation: Maximum use should be made of indigenous personnel in LRRP activation. Their capabilities and knowledge complement those of US LRRP members to form an effective team.

LRRP Impatience

Item: Impatience on the part of LRRP team members.

Discussion: LRRP teams on a mission have a tendency to continually change their position rather than remain stationary and observe a single location. When activity is slight or nonexistent in an area the team will become impatient and soon move to another area in search of enemy activity. Each time a team moves they expose themselves to possible compromise by natives or detection by the enemy, and lessen their chances of completing their mission successfully. There have been numerous instances where compromise has occurred because of the impatience of LRRP teams and consequently the full potential of the team was not realized.

Observation: LRRP team members must be instilled with quiescence and overcome the tendency to move based upon impatience on the part of patrol members.

(3) Personnel.

Item: The effect of a large rotation of personnel within a unit.

Discussion: Several significant problems were encountered as the result of the large personnel rotations that took place following the deployment anniversary date of the battalions. Replacements did not become available to the unit as quickly as the unit lost men rotating to CONUS. Additionally, the large influx of new personnel that were received completely changed the character of the previously experienced battalion. During an engagement involving a battalion that was in the process of rotating a large number of its personnel, the field strength of the line companies was less than one hundred officers and men. In addition there had been an almost complete turnover of small unit leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned officers, and as a result, the tactical experience of the battalion was greatly reduced. The two companies that made the contact with two battalions of an NVA regiment were not as prepared for the violence of the engagement as would have been two experienced companies.

Observation: As the anniversary date of a battalion approaches, it must be recognized that for a period of time, the tactical experience level of staff and unit leaders will be reduced sharply as the unit assimilates new personnel. The combat effectiveness of a unit that has just experienced the rotation of a majority of its experienced personnel is indirectly proportionate to the number of new, inexperienced personnel. i.e. a unit constituted of 70% replacements is 30% combat effective. Efforts to eliminate the rotation of a majority of a unit's personnel within the span of one or two months are essential to preserving the effectiveness of all units of a division. The USARV program is
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attempting to even out the rotational humps of all units in RVN by intra-theater transfer. This type of program was accomplished successfully on a smaller scale between the 4th Division Artillery and the 52d Artillery Group. In addition to these internal programs, units being sent to RVN from CONUS should be composed of personnel who will DEROS through ETS in all the months before a unit completes one year in country. This would result in less of an infusion program for the unit and replacements would come through normal replacement of personnel.

(4) Logistics.

Use of Tracked Cargo Vehicles

Item: Reduction of CH-47 resupply sorties by using tracked cargo vehicles.

Discussion: The armored units of the division in the conduct of search and destroy, and reconnaissance and security missions, operate in areas that are covered with secondary growth or low order jungle. Roads and vehicular trails are non-existent in these areas and so the tracked vehicles cut their own. The resultant tracks do not permit any type of wheeled vehicles to follow, and therefore leaves the unit without an adequate organic means of resupply.

Presently to resupply an armored unit operating off the roads, numerous CH-47 "Hook" sorties are required to transport the quantities of fuel, ammunition and rations necessary to sustain the unit. To be dependent upon "Hook" resupply for all items is not desirable for several reasons: The availability of aircraft, the cost involved, both in aircraft operation and in man-hours required, and the vulnerability of the aircraft in a close combat support role.

Observation: The substitution of the M-548 full tracked cargo carriers for an equal number of 5 ton trucks would provide the armored units with the capability of resupplying themselves overland and significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the number of critical "Hook" sorties required to resupply these units.

Tankdozers

Item: Utilization of tankdozers.

Discussion: During cross country movements by armor units, many obstacles are encountered. The most difficult are the streams and thick jungle vegetation. The utilization of a tankdozer greatly facilitates overcoming these obstacles and especially aids in crossing streams.
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Observation: Since the tank units are most often employed by platoons the addition of a bulldozer kit to one of the tanks in each platoon would greatly enhance the cross country movement capability of the unit. The added weight of the bulldozer kit (approximately three tons) would not reduce the capabilities of the tank.

Caliber .50 Machine Gun

Item: The tank mounted caliber .50 machine gun.

Discussion: The caliber .50 machine gun mounted in the commander's cupola of the M-48A3 tank has caused the armor units many problems. In the manner it is presently mounted on the tank the weapon is virtually useless. The ammunition container holds only 50 rounds which is insufficient. The charging cable breaks too easily and the weapon is mounted in such a way as to make loading and operation difficult.

Observation: A modification is needed on the caliber .50 machine gun mount so that the tank may make maximum use of all the firepower it possesses. One method that has been used with some success is to mount the machine gun in a pedestal mount that has been welded to the top of the turret outside of the cupola.

Coaxial Machine gun

Item: M-73 Coaxial machine gun malfunction.

Discussion: During sustained firing, the retainer clamp, which secures the flash-hider and gas booster, breaks away, releasing the flash-hider and gas booster, which results in the weapon becoming inoperative.

Observation: A modification of the M-73 coaxial machine gun to improve the durability of the retainer clip would increase the weapon's effectiveness in heavy and sustained combat operations.

External Interphone System


Discussion: The external phone greatly aids and facilitates tank - infantry operations. Because of the location of the external phone on the rear fender of the tank, it is highly susceptible to being torn off by the thick vegetation in which the units must operate.

Observation: To retain the much needed capability of the external phone it should be relocated to a less vulnerable position on the tank.
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5 Ton Wreckers

Item: Increase 5-ton wreckers available to a brigade.

Discussion: The present TOE does not authorize the number of wreckers that could be gainfully employed within the brigades, with individual units split between two and sometimes three locations, the need for additional wreckers is increased. In addition, with the placement of an ammunition supply point and a forward supply element within a brigade area of operation, additional wreckers or similar machinery is a must to meet the added workload involved in operating these facilities.

Observation: Two additional 5-ton wreckers should be allocated to brigades for efficient operation of the ASP and the FSE.

(5) Civic Action.

VIETNAMESE and MONTAGNARD Interpreters

Item: Shortage of ARVN VIETNAMESE and MONTAGNARD Interpreters.

Discussion: A present shortage of interpreters assigned to the division hinders both combat and administrative operations, delays intelligence exploitation of detainees, and impedes the civil affairs program. To help alleviate the problem in the long run, the assignment of ten US Army VIETNAMESE linguists has been authorized when they become available. In the interim period and even after the US linguists are assigned, the division will still depend on ARVN interpreters. These interpreters are in short supply because ARVN needs personnel with proficiency in English for its own use.

In our area of responsibility, an additional problem exists which is not experienced by most US units in VIETNAM. The division must deal extensively with three or more MONTAGNARD tribes whose dialects are mutually unintelligible. ARVN has not been able to provide sufficient interpreters for two reasons. First, ARVN itself has extensive need for MONTAGNARD - VIETNAMESE interpreters. Secondly, and more important, the MONTAGNARDs in ARVN have little or no opportunity to learn English. As an interim measure, interpreter teams pair a VIETNAMESE-speaking MONTAGNARD with an English-speaking VIETNAMESE to communicate through a double translation process. This is not satisfactory, since it is time-consuming, and much information is lost or distorted in the double translations. However, as a temporary solution, double translation is acceptable. The division also hires English-speaking MONTAGNARD civilians, most of whom speak VIETNAMESE. While this is a workable solution, it is expensive, and the personnel so hired frequently prove to be unreliable. The ability to use these civilians in combat operations is also limited.

Observations: In that the GVN does not have the capability to furnish additional interpreters, a program for training additional VIETNAMESE and MONTAGNARD interpreters should be initiated.
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US personnel working with the MONTAGNARDS who have an adequate language aptitude should be required to learn the language.

The training of US-VIETNAMESE linguists should be increased to the extent required to maintain ten of these linguists assigned to the division at all times.

Improveinent of Livestock

Item: The use of edible garbage from the base camp areas to improve the production of pork by the local populace.

Discussion: A considerable amount of edible garbage was generated daily by the mess halls in base camp areas and was being hauled to the sanitary fill and buried. The swine being raised by the MONTAGNARDS in the TAOR were scrawny and were obviously not very productive. It was determined that the edible garbage instead of being buried could be put to use in improving the productivity of the local pigs. This became a civic action project and excellent results were realized in a relatively short period of time.

Observation: The use of edible garbage from base camp areas to feed the swine of the local inhabitants has aided the base camp in disposing of the garbage and has made a substantial contribution in the civic action program.

(6) Engineer.

Minesweeps

Item: Sweeping of LLOC's for mines.

Discussion: The major enemy harassing tactic that has been used against the movement of vehicles and convoys over the LLOC's has been the use of mines. The enemy has made extensive use of pressure detonated anti-vehicular mines consisting of US artillery and mortar rounds, Air Force bombs, and CHICOM M1A1 AT mines with TNT boosters. During Operation FRANCIS MARION, 92 vehicles, wheeled and tracked, were damaged by mines. The only method available to sweep the roads has been the use of dismount mine-sweep teams. Though this method was highly effective, it was extremely time consuming and an inefficient use of manpower, considering that a minimum of 42 kilometers of road had to be cleared daily before the resupply convoys could proceed.

Observation: Although dismounted mine-sweep teams are successful in detecting enemy mines, their employment has an adverse effect on the movement of vehicles over the LLOC's. A vehicular mounted mine detector is greatly needed to speed up the clearing process and to free manpower that could be utilized to good advantage elsewhere.
Item: Organization of a fourth squad in the line platoons of the Combat Engineer Companies.

Discussion: The rationale behind the organization of the engineer combat company is that the company will be capable of providing direct engineer support to a brigade sized unit, with a platoon in support of each infantry battalion, and a squad in support of each rifle company. This concept works well in VIETNAM where infantry battalions are widely separated and operate two or more company sized search and destroy operations out of the battalion fire base. The engineer squad attached to the infantry company on a search and destroy operation provides support in stream crossing, clearing landing zones for medical evacuation and other purposes, and destruction of tunnel and bunker complexes. The squad that remains with the infantry company in the fire base assists the battalion in clearing fields of fire around the fire base, construction of field fortifications, minisweeps and other tasks as required.

Observation: At the present time two factors prevent the combat engineer companies from providing support to the infantry within this concept. First, by normal TOE, the engineer squad is composed of 10 engineer soldiers. By MTOE, two pioniers were eliminated from the squads to provide spaces for additional equipment operators and maintenance personnel commensurate with additional items of heavy equipment which were also added by MTOE especially for use in VIETNAM. This was a logical trade off since the equipment had proven most beneficial and the eight man squad could still perform its mission. The additional factor which has overstretched the capability of the engineer company at platoon level is the addition of a fourth rifle company to each of the infantry battalions. By reorganizing the squads within the platoon to support all four companies, the size is reduced to six engineer soldiers, which is too small a unit to provide the support required, especially to provide concurrent fire base development and minisweeps.

Soil Foundation Engineering

Item: Soil foundation engineering in preparation for monsoon season.

Discussion: The natural soil found in the FRANCIS MARION area of operations is highly sensitive in that the shear strength is reduced significantly by remolding. The soil is highly influenced by moisture. As a result, any soil foundation must be well drained and disturbance should be minimized during the monsoon season. The laterite surface of the roads was crowned, to provide drainage, but at the same time, the crown created a safety hazard because of the slippery conditions of the wet clay. This problem can be solved by a daily sanding of the roads, particularly the intersections.

Ammunition supply point construction must receive strong engineering emphasis. Of paramount importance is the drainage pattern. Since most of the ASP's were constructed in the dry season, drainage was overlooked. The traffic pattern within the ASP where heavy trucks maneuver must be sufficiently reinforced with rock. Any areas without such reinforcement deteriorate rapidly and corrective work is most difficult during the wet season.
The technique used to correct drainage was quite simple and many of
the problems areas were corrected by shovel work. Each hole or "puddle"
in the road was drained nightly and at random intervals during the day by
a drainage team responsible for this work. No heavy equipment or tracked
vehicles were allowed on major sections of the road net. Areas of deterioration
were filled with rock, when available, and areas where vehicles were required
to turn were reinforced with rock. These points of intensive wear were
protected as well by having an abrasive surface for skid control.

Observation: Construction involving soil disturbance must provide for
reinforcement of the soil foundation, especially if the area receives heavy
vehicle traffic. Prior plans must provide a drainage system that will
adequately carry away the heavy runoff of the monsoon rains. After the monsoon
season begins, quick attention to the roadway and the turn around areas at
the first sign of deterioration will prevent complete failure of the roadway
or turn arounds.

b. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

1. A vehicular mounted mine detector be developed and issued
to units in the field at the earliest practicable date.

2. Tracked cargo vehicles, M-540, be substituted for a
portion of the wheeled cargo vehicles authorized armor and cavalry units
to facilitate resupply in areas only traffable to tracks.

3. Personnel and equipment for a fourth squad be added to
the three line Platoons of the Combat Engineer Companies (A, B, C and D)
of the Combat Engineer Battalion so that adequate support can be provided
the fourth rifle company that was added in the reorganization of the infantry
battalions.

4. Additional track vehicle mechanics and associated
equipment be authorized the Maintenance Battalion to compensate for the
increase in tracked vehicle density in the division. (One infantry battalion
has converted to mechanized and one additional cavalry squadron has been
attached.) The total armor, cavalry, mechanized and self-propelled units
supported by the division's Maintenance Battalion are: one armor battalion,
two cavalry squadrons, one mechanized infantry battalion, and one self-propelled
medium artillery battalion.

5. Nine bulldozer kits be authorized the tank battalion
for mounting on one tank in each platoon. This addition would increase the
cross-country movement potential of the platoons.

6. Additional material handling equipment and 5 ton wreckers
be issued the Division Support Command so that sufficient equipment is
available to adequately support a minimum of two FSE's and normal base camp
logistical activities.
(7) The Artillery School emphasize training in the adjustment of artillery by sound alone.

(8) The training of VIETNAMESE-MONTAGNARD interpreters be accomplished, the training of US-VIETNAMESE linguists be increased; and that selected US personnel working with the MONTAGNARDS be required to learn the language.

(9) Each brigade be authorized a LRRP platoon and that a LRRP platoon be authorized at division level for operations under division control.

(10) The "lessons learned" contained in this report be made available to those individuals and agencies responsible for the training of personnel to be assigned to the Republic of VIETNAM.

16. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

With the termination of Operation FRANCIS MARION the 4th Infantry Division also rounded out its first year of combat in VIETNAM. It was a long and arduous year with many hard fought battles, in which the soldiers of the division performed admirably.

The area in which the battles of FRANCIS MARION were fought was very much the same as that over which previous operations - PAUL REVERE IV and SAM HOUSTON - were fought. The bulk of our contacts occurred in the CHU GOUNGOT - CHU YAM Mountain area which is located between DUC CO on the south and PLEI DJERENG on the north and bounded east and west by Highway 14B and the CAMBODIAN Border. The terrain inside that square is mountainous with deep valleys and is densely covered with double canopied jungle. Bordering this area to the east and south are rolling hills interspersed with open areas, but these are deceptive for tall elephant grass and bamboo clog many of these areas. This was the terrain over which much of FRANCIS MARION was fought.

The weather during the period favored the foot mobility of the enemy. May through September were the months of the southwest monsoons that restricted both our land and air mobility.

It was in this environment that FRANCIS MARION began. In Operation SAM HOUSTON the enemy had been soundly defeated and forced back into his CAMBODIAN sanctuary. With the beginning of the summer monsoons he began deploying back across the border into South VIETNAM. This challenge was met squarely and in nine days in May the enemy's monsoon offensive was halted hardly before it had begun. In July two other attempts were made by the enemy to salvage a measure of success from his unsuccessful offensive, but these forays into the division's area of operations were also soundly defeated and the enemy was again driven back into his safehaven.
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Up to this point enemy tactics had been pretty much the same as those we had encountered during Operation SAM HOUSTON. They attacked our companies while on the move during search and destroy missions and avoided ground attacks on prepared positions. In the attacks on our patrolling companies he would employ all the tactics that had become so familiar.

a. The employment of trail watchers along the friendly route of advance to report our movements and to lure our units into areas which favored his tactical disposition.

b. Attempted to pin down maneuver elements who were in a position to reinforce units in contact.

c. Used snipers in trees extensively.

d. Employed hugging tactics when in contact with our units (staying in close-to-avoid the effects of our fire support).

e. Fought from unprepared or hastily prepared positions, employing a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and B-40 rockets in his attacks.

A minor change, but an effective one, was the enemy's increased use of B-40 rockets to deliver accurate and deadly fire on the unit in contact.

After the contacts in July the enemy appeared to change his tactics drastically. He fragmented some of his forces into small groups and moved them into the Central Highlands. He cooperated more closely with the local VIET CONG than he had before and initiated a series of harassing attacks against LCC's, bases in the area and in one instance ambushed a resupply convoy. Elements of two battalions were identified deep in the Highlands: one northwest of PLEIKU near PLEIKU NORTH and another in the DAK PAVAU Valley east of PLEIKU.

The enemy's change in tactics dictated that we change our tactics correspondingly. Our units had to loosen up — break down into platoon and squad size patrol elements so that we could cover more area in our searches for the elusive enemy. This did not come easy to our troops. Heretofore, when operating in close proximity of the CAMBODIAN Border, company size patrols with another unit within one hour's reinforcing distance was the standard. When platoons were sent out on sweeps, they rarely moved more than two to three hundred meters from the company base. This was a requirement for survival.

The units began to loosen up in the search and destroy operations, north and east of PLEIKU, but the experience gained in the May and July contacts had been painfully learned and was well ingrained in the units. It took considerable emphasis to have the companies initiate platoon and
squad size ambushs and conduct patrol operations with platoons more than
300 meters from the rest of the company. Soon realizing the enemy units
were small, infiltrating groups, our units began working in smaller elements
over a much larger area. They had only scattered contacts with small groups
of NVA/VC but uncovered numerous enemy supply caches, and base and rest areas.

The performance of all personnel in this operation was uniformly
excellent. The division had nearly a 100% turn-over of personnel during
FRANCIS MARION. The training the replacements had received prior to
joining the division was such that they had little trouble assimilating into
the units and becoming members of the fighting team. The individual soldier
is the backbone of this war in VIETNAM. He is tough, capable and well trained.
Our leaders, noncommissioned and commissioned, are of a high caliber. Both
the soldier and the leader made a good account of themselves in all phases
of the operation.

W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

10 Inclosures
as

8 Overlays
as
AVDDH-GC
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

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1 - Comdt, 4th Div Repl Tng Det
5 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
30 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
1 - AG File
Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in the operation were:

### 4th Infantry Division Headquarters

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### General Staff, 4th Infantry Division

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### Special Staff, 4th Infantry Division

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#### 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry

| **CO**                  | **LTC** Madison, John H |
|                         | **LTC** Wilson, Gail F |
|                         | **LTC** Gannon, Timothy C |

#### 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry

| **CO**                  | **LTC** Berres, John T |
|                         | **LTC** Duqueemin, Gordon J |

#### 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry

| **CO**                  | **LTC** Belnap, Glen D |
|                         | **LTC** Lynch, Thomas P |

#### 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry

| **CO**                  | **LTC** Birch, Harold B |
|                         | **LTC** Wright, Corey J |
UNCLASSIFIED

3d Battalion, 12th Infantry

CO
LTC
Vollmer, John P
6 May to 11 Oct

LTC
Peters, David M
6 Apr to 5 May

1st Battalion, 22d Infantry

CO
LTC
Junk, William P
16 Sep to 11 Oct

LTC
Rossell, Thomas G
6 Apr to 15 Sep

1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry

CO
LTC
Heiden, Charles K
11 Aug to 11 Oct

LTC
Cole, Thomas F
6 Apr to 10 Aug

2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry

CO
LTC
Gay, Joseph M Jr
29 Aug to 11 Oct

1st Battalion, 69th Armor

CO
LTC
Grant, William D
5 Sep to 11 Oct

LTC
Williams, Paul S
6 Apr to 4 Sep

4th Aviation Battalion

CO
LTC
Holloman, Robert A
9 Apr to 11 Oct

LTC
McDowell, William R
6 Apr to 8 Apr

4th Engineer Battalion

CO
LTC
Lee, Emmett C Jr
11 Jul to 11 Oct

LTC
Delbridge, Norman G Jr
6 Apr to 10 Jul

4th Medical Battalion

CO
MAJ
Anderson, Kirby V
16 May to 11 Oct

LTC
Peard, William G
6 Apr to 15 May

4th Supply & Transportation Battalion

CO
LTC
DeVille, David A
23 Jul to 11 Oct

LTC
Jacques, Jasper P
6 Apr to 22 Jul

704th Maintenance Battalion

CO
LTC
Rice, Marvin E
7 Aug to 11 Oct

LTC
Gilbanks, William R
6 Apr to 6 Aug

124th Signal Battalion

CO
LTC
Spitz, William M
2 Jun to 11 Oct

LTC
Keefer, Loren R
6 Apr to 1 Jun
UNCLASSIFIED

4th Administration Company

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4th Military Police Company

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Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division

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<td>Zwicker, Gary L</td>
<td>6 Apr to 23 Jul</td>
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1. (U) Detached units. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was attached to the 25th Infantry Division during the period 6 April - 31 July. On 1 August the brigade was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division and redesignated the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (U) Attached units.
   a. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, attached to the division on 13 February, was under operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division from 6 April to 25 April. On 25 April the brigade came under operational control of Task Force Oregon, which was later designated the Americal Division. On 1 August the brigade was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division and redesignated the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The brigade remained under operational control of the Americal Division.
   b. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was attached during the period 6 April - 31 July. On 1 August the battalion was assigned to the division.
   c. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry arrived in-country and was attached to the 4th Infantry Division on 30 August 1967.
   d. 374th Radio Research Company.
   e. Team 6, 41st Civil Affairs Company.
   f. Team 9, 41st Civil Affairs Company.
   g. HH Team 6, 245th Psyops Company.
   h. HH Team 9, 245th Psyops Company.
   i. 33d Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog).
   j. 50th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog).
   k. Combat Tracker Team Number 3.
   l. Combat Tracker Team Number 4.

3. (U) The 582d Military Intelligence Detachment was assigned to the division on 4 July 1967.

4. (C) Task Organization for Combat.
   a. Control headquarters was Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

Inclosure 2
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1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 1st Bde
1-12 Inf (On order rel to 2d Bde)
3-12 Inf
1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
6-29 Arty
B/4-42 Arty (OPCON)
(reat to parent unit on order)
237th Radar Plat, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)
1 Sec E/41st Arty (OPCON)
1 Slt B/29 Arty (OPCON)
0/3-4 Cav (-)
CO A, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 2d Bde
1-12 Inf (On order)
2-8 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
Plat, B/1-69 Armor
4-42 Arty (-)
1 Slt 29th Arty (OPCON)
Plat, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)
1 Sec E/41st Arty (OPCON)
Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
TACP

TF 1-69 Armor
1-69 Armor (-)
Plat, C/2-8 Inf
Cav Plat 1-10 Cav (On order)
3-6 Arty (Prov) DS
B/3-6 Arty
A/5-16 Arty

Div arty
HHC, Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)
6-14 Arty
236th Radar
1-92 Arty

DISCOM
4th S&T Bn
4th Med Bn
704th Maint Bn

Div Troops
HHC, 4th Inf Div
D/4-60 Arty (-)
4th Avn Bn
4th Engr Bn
124th Sig Bn (-)
43rd Cml Det
29th Ml Hist Det
33rd Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MI Det
4th MP Co (-)
4th Div TACP
Inf Plat
4th Admin Co


(1) 1-12 Inf OPCON to 2d Bde
(2) Plat 1-10 Cav OPCON to 2d Bde
(3) USSF Det A-241 (POLEI KLENG) OPCON to 2d Bde
(4) A/5-16 Arty OPCON 4-42 Arty
(5) 1-92 Arty GSR 3-6 Arty (Prov) with one btry
(6) One sec E/41 Arty atch 2d Bde off when 1-10 Cav (-) takes responsibility for security of hwy 19W.
(7) 3 Tms 33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog) atch 2d Bde.

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(1) Add 1-92 Arty: GS-reinf 4-42 Arty w/1 btry, reinf 6-29 Arty w/1 btry via DUC CO, reinf 3-6 Arty (Prov) w/1 btry on Rte 19E.

(2) D/4-60 Arty (+): Defend in priority 1st Bde (9 Wpns), 2d Bde (8 Wpns), TF 1-69 Armor (4 Wpns), DMBC (3 Wpns).

(3) E-41 Arty: Defend in priority 2d Bde (4 Wpns), 1st Bde (2 Wpns), DMBC (2 Wpns).

Task organization as changed by MACV 3-2-67 and modified on change 1 to MACV 3-2-67 effective 26 April 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1st Inf
2d Inf

3-12 Inf
1-22 Inf

6-2 Arty. (-) op
1-12 Inf

A/4-60 Arty (MIN) op
4-42 Arty (-) op

1/4-60 Arty (GC) op
1-2 Inf

25th Radar

1-69 Armor (-) op
2d Cav (-) op

2-6 Inf
1-10 Cav (-) op

3-29 Arty (Op) op
5-16 Arty (-) op

A/5-16 Arty (Atch for OPCON and log except maint)

1/4-60 Arty (-) op
1 Flat, 1-10 Cav

0/6-29 Arty (Atch for OPCON and log except maint)

3 Flat, 1-10 Cav
1 Flat, B/124th Sig Bn

DISCOUN
No change from OPerD

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Task organization as changed by FRAGO 4-2-67 effective 261500H April 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 1st Bde
3-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
6-29 Arty (-) DS
C/4-2 Arty (OPCON)
Plat (+) D/4-60 Arty (AW) (SP) (OPCON)
A/4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sign Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
TACF

TF 3-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
C/6-29 Arty Btry, Cpl
C/6-29 Arty (105)
A/5-16 Arty (155)
Det, D/4-60 Arty
1 Plat, 1-10 Cav.
1 Plat, B/4th Engr, Bn

Div Arty
HHR, Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)
6-14 Arty GS
235th Radar
1-92 Arty GSR

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 2d Bde
1-8 Inf
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
4-42 Arty (-) DS
A/6-29 Arty (OPCON)
Plat (-), D/4-60 Arty (AW) (SP) (OPCON)
B/4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sign Bn
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
TACF

TF 1-10 Cav
1-10 Cav (-)
A/3-6 Arty DS

TF 1-69 Armor
1-69 Armor (-)
3-6 Arty (-) DS
Det D/4-60 Arty (-) (AW)

Div Troops
No change from FRAGO 3-2-67

DISCOM
No change from OPORD 2-67

g. Task organization was temporarily changed by FRAGO 5-2-67 effective 291200H April 1967. The 1st Brigade was directed to provide one infantry battalion task force to division control to deploy to the vicinity of PLEI DO LIM and conduct cordon and search operations on 30 April 1967. The unit selected, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was returned to the battalion FSB and 1st Brigade control upon completion of the mission.

h. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 7-2-67 effective 070700H May 1967.

(1) 1-10 Cav (-) OPCON 1st Bde.
(2) Trp D, 1-10 Cav support Div on mission basis.
(3) Div LRRP Plat remain OPCON to Div.
(4) A/3-6 Arty GS; reinf 6-29 Arty.

i. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 9-2-67 DTG 111310Z May 1967.

1-8 Inf (-) changed OPCON from 2d Bde to 1st Bde.
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(1) TF 3-8 Inf returned to 1st Bde control and TF dissolved.

(2) 1-22 Inf changed OPCON from 1st Bde to 2d Bde.

k. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 11-2-67 effective 300001H May 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 1st Bde
1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-10 Cav (-)
6-29 Arty DS
   Plat, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)
   1 Sct, B/41 Arty (OPCON)
   Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co Ds
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 2d Bde
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
2-8 Inf (Nech)
4-42 Arty DS
   23rd Radar (OPCON)
   1 Slt, 29th Arty (OPCON)
   1 Sct, 29th Arty (OPCON)
   Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn
2d Plat, 4th MP Co Ds
TACP

Div Arty
HHC, Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)

173rd Abn Bde (Sep)
HHC, 173rd Bde
1-503 Abn Inf
2-503 Abn Inf
4-503 Abn Inf
3-319 Arty
B/15 Armor
E/17 Cav

173rd Cbt Spt Bn
173rd Engr Co
723d Sig Plat
39th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
Co B, 173rd Med Bn

TF 1-69 Armor
1-69 Armor (-)
3-6 Arty (-)

Div Troops
HHC, 4th Inf Div
D/4-60 Arty (-)
4th Avn Bn
4th Engr Bn
124th Sig Bn (-)
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
33rd Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MI Det
4th MP Co (-)
4th Admin Co
4th Div TACP

DISCON
No Change

1. Task organization was changed upon initiation of Operation GREELEY on 17 June 1967 and Operation STILLWELL on 20 June 1967.

(1) 173rd Abn Bde (-) with 1-503 Abn Inf and 2-503 Abn Inf and attachments were airlifted to GREELEY AO on 17, 18 June 1967.

(2) 4-503 Abn Bn TF initiated Operation STILLWELL, a sub-operation of FRANCIS MARION, in the area east of PLEKAN on 20 June 1967.
4-503 Abn Bn TF was withdrawn from Operation STILLWELL and moved to GREELY AO on 23 June 1967.

Task organization on 23 June 1967 was the same as FRAGO 11-2-67, less the 173d Abn Bde.

Task organization as changed by FRAGO 1-25-67 (STILLWELL) effective 30 June 1967.

4th Inf Div (-) same as FRAGO 11-2-67, less GREELY forces and a battalion task force to STILLWELL AO as follows:

TF 1-8 Inf
1-8 Inf
A/6-29 Arty DS
C/1-69 Armor (-) OPCON
Scout Sect/Reccon Plat/ 1-69 Armor OPCON
2 tubes B/5-16 Arty GSR

Operation STILLWELL terminated and TF 1-8 Inf dissolved and returned OPCON 1st Bde on 15 July 1967.

1-12 Inf released from 2d Brigade and placed under operational control of the 1st Brigade effective 20 August 1967.

(1) 1-12 Inf released from 1st Brigade, returned to operational control of the 2d Brigade.

(2) One plat, 1-10 Cav released from 1st Brigade and placed OPCON to the 2d Brigade.

3-12 Inf released from 1st Brigade, placed under operational control of the 2d Brigade effective 4 September 1967.

(1) 3-12 Inf released from 1st Brigade, placed under operational control of the 2d Brigade on 4 September 1967.

(2) 1-12 Inf released from 2d Brigade and placed under operational control of the 1st Brigade on 4 September 1967.

1-22 Inf released from 2d Brigade and placed under division control effective 040900 September 1967.
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(2) One engr plat released from 4th Engr Bn and attached to 1-22 Inf effective 040800 September 1967.

(3) 24th Mike Force Company placed under operational control of 1-22 Inf effective 040800 September 1967.

(4) The plat, 1-10 Cav released from 2d Brigade and returned to control of parent unit on order.


(1) 2-1 Cav became operational 15 September 1967. Placed under division control.

(2) 2-1 Cav release one plat to operational control of 173d Abn Bde.

(3) 173d Abn Bde release plat from 1-10 Cav to parent unit and receive Co B (-) 1-69 Armor, and plat from 2-1 Cav.

(4) 1-69 Armor release Co B (-) to operational control of 173d Abn Bde.


1-22 Inf release 24th Mike Force Company to parent unit on order. (Actual time of release 13 September 1967).


1-12 Inf released from 1st Brigade and placed under operational control of 2d Brigade effective 182000 H September 1967.


1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 1st Bde
1-8 Inf
2-8 Inf
1-10 Cav (-)
3-6 Arty (-) DS
6-29 Arty (-) DS
A-4-42 Arty (OPCON)
1 Slt, B/29 Arty (OPCON)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
HHC, 2d Bde
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
3-12 Inf
4-42 Arty (-) DS
B/6-29 Arty (OPCON)
1 Slt, 29th Arty (OPCON)
Plat D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)

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Flat, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)
1 Sec, E/41 Arty (OPCON)
A/4th Engr Bn (-) DS
ASC Flat, B/124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
TACP

1-62 Armor
1-65 Armor (-)
3-6 Arty (-) DS

Div Arty
HHC, Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)
6-14 Arty GS
235th Radar
1-92 Arty GSR

DISCON
No Change

237th Radar (OPCON)
B/4th Engr En (-) DS
ASC Flat, B/124th Sig Bn
2d Plat, 4th NP Co
TACP

Div Troops
HHC, 4th Inf Div
D/4-60 Arty (-)
4th Avn En
4th Engr Bn
124th Engr En (-)
129th Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th NP Co (-)
4th Div TACP
4th Admin Co

CONFIDENTIAL
### MINING INCIDENTS

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

OPERATION FRANCIS MARION

6 April. 4th Infantry Division commenced Operation FRANCIS MARION. The major elements of the division were disposed as follows: 1st Brigade with three infantry battalions was northeast of Duc Co on route 14B; the 2d Brigade with three infantry battalions was southwest of Pleiku at Oasis; 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was located west of Pleiku on route 509; 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was located east of Pleiku on route 19.

The 81mm Mortar Platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry located at YAS9913L received four separate chemical attacks delivered from the southeast and drifting to the northwest across the platoon's perimeter. The fourth attack was the most severe and caused eye irritation. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry closed into the division TACR on 2100 hours after a road convey from Tuy Hoa.

7 April. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry had brief contact with an unknown size NVA force at YAS88538 at 1245 hours resulting in one NVA KIA. Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with one VC at ZA075517 resulting in one US WIA. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at ZA120467.

8 April. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located 250 bunkers, foxholes and spider holes, 12 cooking houses, one spring-fed pool and 40 possible graves estimated six months old at YAS45071. Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with four VC armed with AK-47 rifles at ZA095503 resulting in one VC KIA. The Oasis complex received 40-50 rounds of mortar fire at 1900 hours; all rounds landed outside the perimeter. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry command post at ZA094447 received approximately 40 82mm mortar rounds from the southwest resulting in three US WIA; one M577, one M62 wrecker, and one 10 KW generator damaged. At 2020 hours, a tank and a 1/4 ton vehicle from Company C, 1st Battalion 69th Armor received intensive automatic weapons and anti tank fire at AR985505 resulting in three US WIA. Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor became OPCON to the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM).

9 April.

10 April. At 1250 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged estimated two NVA platoons at YAS54055. Company A (-), 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at 1928 hours made contact with two VC at YAS93374 resulting in one VC KIA.

11 April. At 1355 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed one NVA and captured one AK-47 at ZA071484.

12 April.

13 April.

14 April. Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery received 8-10 81mm mortar rounds at ZA029937 resulting in 11 WIA.

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15 April. An APC from Troop C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry hit a mine at YA935432 resulting in one US WIA. At ZA120467 a tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine.

16 April. At 0155 hours a suspected VC element attempted to blow the bridge at BR145535. The bridge remained intact but would not support traffic. An AVLB was emplaced until repairs were made.

17 April. A 1st Brigade civil affairs team received automatic weapons and small arms fire from an estimated VC squad at YA917323 resulting in one US WIA. Two platoons from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) operating with the PLZ NB CIDG company, make contact with an estimated NVA company at ZA130172. Contact lasted from 0811 until 1035 hours resulting in three US KIA, one of which was a US CIDG advisor. At 1220 hours, Company C (-), had a brief contact with an estimated three VC companies accompanied by NVA advisors resulting in one US KIA. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with seven VC at ZA109166 resulting in two VC KIA. At 1730 hours Company B again made contact with an unknown size force at ZA124177 resulting in two US KIA, six US WIA, two US MIA; three NVA KIA.

18 April. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with three VC at YA930327 resulting in three VC KIA. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) conducted a search of the battlefield and found two US KIA from the previous days action. Company B also found five NVA KIA, one SKS, one AK-47, 2000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, one bag of documents, seven CHIMCEv stick grenades, 500 pounds of rice, 30 sets of web gear, and five medical aid bags.

19 April. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) conducted a village evacuation and destruction mission at ZA156153. Approximately 13 tons of rice were found in the village. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA929280. A five ton dump truck from 4th Engineer Battalion hit a mine at YA938286 resulting in one US WIA.

20 April. Company B (-), 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry had contact at 1115 hours with 10 VC at ZA017405 resulting in one VC KIA; one pistol (unknown type), one carbine, two US grenades and one document bag captured.

21 April. At 1305 hours Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with three NVA at YA943432 resulting in one NVA KIA, one NVA CIA. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at YA929146 received five rounds of unknown type mortar fire at 2335 hours resulting in two US WIA. At 2335 hours the 1st Platoon, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 1st Platoon, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery at YA93375 came under mortar attack. The attack continued sporadically from the southwest until 0333 hours. A total of 205 82mm rounds were received resulting in three US WIA. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA938434.

22 April. Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry encountered punji stakes along a trail at YA972102 resulting in two US WIA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a large cache at YA974339 containing one...
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MAS rifle, nine 12 gauge shotguns, one pair wire cutters, two MG (type unknown), one barrel for an unknown type weapon, one carbine barrel, one teletypewriter set, 21 telephone sets, two sewing machines, nine boxes TNT with 54 1/4 pound blocks per box, one box of documents and miscellaneous radio parts.

23 April. Company C (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) at ZA07167 made contact with two NVA at 1050 hours resulting in one NVA KIA. At 1217 hours they made contact with an NVA squad resulting in two US WIA; two NVA KIA; two AK-47's captured.

24 April. An APC from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at ZA025216 resulting in three US WIA. Another APC from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, hit a mine at ZA175174 resulting in two US WIA. At ZA192447 a 4th Engineer Battalion 2-1/2 ton truck hit a mine resulting in two US WIA.

25 April. Company C (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact at 1440 hours with a small NVA force at ZA07166 resulting in two NVA KIA; one AK-47 captured; one US WIA. An APC from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine at ZA145213.

26 April. 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at 1755 hours made contact with an unknown size NVA force at YA848132. Contact was broken at 1950 hours resulting in 15 NVA KIA, one AK-47 captured, two US KIA, eight US WIA. Company C (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with an unknown size enemy force and received sporatic sniper fire from 1400 until 1700 hours resulting in one NVA KIA and one US KIA. At 1825 hours Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry had 30 82mm mortar rounds land 300 meters from their position at YA767393.

27 April. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry sustained one US WIA when an individual stepped on a mine at YA840091.

28 April. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at YA894378 received approximately 46 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from 0045 to 0136 hours resulting in 10 US WIA, counter-mortar radar generator and one M109 shop van damaged. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at 1530 hours sighted two NVA vicinity YA812134 resulting in one NVA KIA and two rucksacks captured. At 1725 hours they made contact with an estimated two platoon enemy force. Contact was broken at 1830 hours resulting in five NVA KIA, three AK-47's, one SKS captured; one US KIA.

29 April. At 1500 hours Recondo Patrol 2E made contact with eight VC in vicinity of AR755116 resulting in four VC KIA. A M-42 (duster) from Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery hit a mine at ZA085251 resulting in one US WIA.

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30 April. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with an estimated NVA platoon at ZA108175 at 1025 hours. Contact was broken and regained several times until 1510 hours. The results for the action were 13 NVA KIA; three AK-47's captured; two US KIA, 11 US WIA. The fire support base, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received approximately 30-40 mortar rounds with 5 to 15 rounds landing inside the perimeter. The attack lasted from 2155 until 2240 hours resulting in one US WIA.

1 May. At 0717 hours Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA Company A at YA974337. Contact was broken at 0900 hours but re-established in the same vicinity by a patrol from Company A. At 0935 hours the main body of Company A began receiving automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire at YA791334; this contact was broken at 1029 hours. The entire morning's action resulted in three US KIA, 16 WIA; 20 NVA KIA, one NVA, eight SKS, five AK-47's, one RPD, one pistol, one B-40 rocket launcher captured. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at 1510 hours engaged two NVA at YB808331 resulting in two NVA KIA. At 1420 the lst Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with three NVA at YA849337. Contact was broken ten minutes later resulting in two NVA KIA. At 1230 hours Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) engaged an estimated NVA Battalion in a bunker complex vicinity ZA109171. Contact lasted throughout the afternoon and was finally broken at 1745 hours. Results were one US KIA, 12 US WIA. The battlefield and bunker complex are to be swept on 2 May. An APC from Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at ZA174213.

2 May. Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered one NVA KIA and one AK-47 at YB799333. Company A found a NVA base camp and bunker complex at YB795334. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found at YB793337 a newly constructed base camp that included bunkers with overhead cover and an aid station equipped with an operating table. At YB696337 Company B found four NVA estimated killed by artillery. Contact was broken at 1652 hours resulting in one SKS and four NVA packs captured. Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry had continuous but intermittent contact throughout the afternoon with an unknown size NVA force vicinity YB777178. This contact was broken at 2000 hours. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) conducted search and destruction of the NVA's bunker complex attacked the previous day; results, 133 NVA bodies.

3 May. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found two NVA bodies and 31 60mm mortar rounds at YB793332. At 1430 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact and killed one NVA at YB779173. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, while sweeping their perimeter at 0645 hours, received automatic weapons and small arms fire. Fire was returned; results, seven NVA KIA, two AK-47's captured. At 1350 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received a short round of friendly artillery resulting in eight US WIA. A tank from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine at YB680195.
4 May. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry at 1220 hours at ZA0411420 made contact with two NVA, resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 captured. In the vicinity of the same location Company B found 11 bunkers, four huts and two small kitchens. At 0845 hours Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force at YA769171. Contact varied from light to heavy throughout the morning and early afternoon with contact being broken at 1315 hours. Result of contact; five US KIA, eight US WIA. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) continued sweeping the area of the 1 May contact, finding a total of 150 sets of web gear, four binoculars and three NVA killed by artillery at ZA117171. Recondo patrol 1E at 1314 hours at YA739333 made contact with six NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Patrol extracted after contact. At YA984006 a tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine. At YA972288 a road grader from Company A, 20th Engineer Battalion hit a mine.

5 May. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) received small arms fire at ZA105162 at 1226 hours. Fire was returned and a search of the resulted in one NVA KIA, one AK-47 captured. Recondo Patrol 2F at 1715 hours at ZA009257 made contact with an VHC squad. Contact was broken at 1720 hours resulting in two VHC KIA, one M-2 Carbine captured. At YA898408 a dump truck from the 20th Engineer Battalion hit a mine resulting in one US WIA.

6 May. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged five NVA at 1620 hours and pursued the NVA into a bunker complex vicinity YA812162 where the fire fight continued. Contact was broken at 1800 hours, resulting in eight NVA KIA, one NVAC; two AK-47's, one CHICOM radio and one CHICOM telephone captured.

7 May.

8 May. At 1129 hours Hawkeye Team H-1A observed a man carrying a basket near a village vicinity YA853358. The man spotted the team and began running, at which time the team opened fire. Results; One VC KIA, two CHICOM grenades captured and destroyed.

9 May. At 0240 hours Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry had two individuals wounded by friendly mortar H&I fire while on an ambush patrol.

10 May. At ZA03215 a tank from 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine.

11 May.

12 May.

13 May. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found three well camouflaged huts, one at YA953319 and two at YA960332; contained a total 1800 lbs of rice.

14 May. At 1740 hours a water-carrying party from Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at YA805405 received 25-30 rounds of small arms fire and one grenade; result, one US WIA.

15 May. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered two NVA bodies in a grave at YA778382. A road grader from 20th Engineer Battalion hit a mine at YA904418 resulting in one US WIA.
16 May. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found ten defensive type bunkers at YA873168.

17 May. Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry in vicinity of YA963316 found ten huts containing a total of 3000 lbs of rice. Rice was evacuated and huts were destroyed. At AR942566 a tank from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine.

18 May. At 1230 hours in the vicinity of YA713310 Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry was in contact with an estimated NVA Battalion. Company B's 4th Platoon was cut off from the rest of the company and at 1504 hours radio contact was lost with the 4th Platoon. Contact was broken at 1915 hours, results were 10 US KIA, 23 US WIA and 30 US MIA. Recon Platoon and Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry were airlifted to Company B's LZ to attempt to link-up with Company B's missing 4th Platoon. At 1958 hours at YA735397 Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry ambushed three NVA moving on a trail; results, three US WIA; one NVA KIA, two weapons captured. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor on early morning road sweeps discovered the bridge at BR097551, on Route 19E, had been blown and the bridge at ER208524 damaged by explosive charges. Both bridges were repaired by 0930 hours. At ER208524 a 2½-ton truck hit a mine resulting in one US WIA.

19 May. Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received two B-40 rocket rounds at 0155 hours resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located the missing 4th Platoon and found 21 US KIA, eight survivors (seven US WIA and one uninjured), one individual remained MIA. Companies A and B made a sweep of the battle area; results 119 NVA KIA, four small arms and one crew served weapon captured.

20 May. Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry at 0513 hours and again at 0100 hours at YA722310 received 10 to 15 rounds of mortar fire. At 0930 hours at YA939358 a CIDG Company from PLIZ DJERENG was ambushed by five VMC. Contact was broken immediately resulting in one CIDG KIA and one CIDG WIA. At 1400 hours at YA977956 Recondo Patrol 2D exchanged fire with six NVA; results, one NVA KIA. Patrol was extracted. At 2119 hours Companies A, B, C and Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry while occupying a night defensive position at YA71315, came under a heavy mortar attack followed by intense small arms, automatic weapons and rocket fire supporting a heavy ground attack from the south and southwest.

21 May. Companies A, B, and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry were still receiving sporadic small arms and rocket fire at 0100 hours. Three separate ground attacks were launched against the battalion perimeter from the south and southwest; all were repulsed. The battle area was swept at first light; results, 16 US KIA and 66 US WIA; 37 NVA KIA, one NVAC. The fire support base 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry located at YA835395 received 30 rounds of mortar fire at 0130 hours. At 1117 hours vicinity YA735385 an individual from 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry stepped on a CBU resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. Recondo Patrol 2E made contact at 0635 hours with an unknown size NVA force at ZA188550. Contact was broken at 0700 hours; results, three US WIA; seven NVA KIA. A resupply convoy from company A, 2d
Battalion, 8th Infantry, (Mech) had a 2½-ton truck hit a mine at ZA105215.

22 May. At 0715 hours while preparing to move out of their night location at YA723246, Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received heavy mortar, rocket and small arms fires from an NVA battalion size force. This was followed by a ground attack from the west. Artillery and air employed. Contact was broken at 1125 hours, resulting in 10 US KIA, 77 WIA; 61 NVA KIA, four NVA C, eight SKS, two RPG captured. At 2215 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received one mortar round in the night location at YA71318 resulting in three US WIA.

23 May. At 0820 hours at YA725334 Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was fired on by NVA snipers resulting in one US KIA. At 1215 hours, Company C again received fire from three NVA at YA727335, causing one US WIA. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found eight NVA bodies and one AK-47 at YA732345. At 1030 hours Recon Patrol 2F at ZA045119 made contact with an unknown size NVA force; result, one NVA KIA; patrol extracted. A vehicle from Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery hit a mine at ZA120226.

24 May. Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered five NVA bodies at YA728345. At 1315 hours Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry took two NVA soldiers under fire resulting in one NVA KIA, one AK-47 captured. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found four NVA bodies at YA728345. At 1612 hours at YA735346, Companies B and C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry began receiving mortar and rocket fires. Four minutes later the two companies were heavily engaged. Contact was broken at 1750 hours; results, four US KIA, 20 WIA; 37 NVA KIA, six small arms, two B-40 rocket launchers captured. At 2355 hours, Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry at YA749238 found three NVA KIA, two weapons, two packs with documents. At 1200 hours, Recon Patrol 2H made contact with five NVA at YA845105. Results were two NVA KIA, patrol was extracted. At 0800 hours, the 173d Airborne Brigade began arriving at New PLEIKU Airfield. At 2300 hours 34 sorties had arrived and moved from PLEIKU by truck to their new CP located vicinity ZA033420.

25 May. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found a large NVA base camp at YA803400 containing 160 bunkers, 55 foxhole-fighting positions and six latrines. At YA726316 Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found five NVA bodies at YA735346 and also, one machine gun and one rifle. At 1410 hours, Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry picked up one NVA WIA at YA742352. Also in the same area, Company C found a base camp with 25 sand bag bunkers, two underground mess halls, six mortar positions, 15 mortar rounds, miscellaneous medical supplies and 600 lbs of rice. At 1045 hours at YA926999 Recon Patrol 2B called artillery and TAC air on a suspected NVA position, there was one large secondary explosion resulting and the patrol observed many individuals fleeing the area. At 2000 hours, Recon Patrol 2B was being assaulted by an unknown size NVA force. Artillery and TAC air were called; patrol extracted at 2230 hours; results, two NVA KIA. An APO from 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at AR850375 resulting in 14 US WIA. 173d Airborne Brigade continued closing New PLEIKU Airfield. As of 2330 hours 102 sorties completed.
26 May. At 0858 hours Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA battalion at YA735310. Artillery and TAC air were employed and Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry linked-up with Company C at 0933 hours. Both companies received heavy automatic weapons, small arms and mortar fire. Contact was broken at 1212 hours. Results were 10 US KIA, 69 WIA; 96 NVA KIA, 18 AK-47's, five B-40, four SKS, one AR-15, and one CHICOM radio captured. 173d Airborne Brigade continued closing New Pleiku Airfield. A total of 155 shorties completed.

27 May. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry captured two NVA WIA while sweeping the previous day's battlefield. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) was engaged by eight NVA at 1101 hours at ZA132172; results, two NVA KIA, one APC damaged by a B-40 rocket round. At 1015 hours at YA773213, a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and tanks from the 3d platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, moving to reinforce Recondo Patrol 2F, had contact with two NVA platoons; results, 16 US WIA. Two 4th Aviation Battalion gunships received ground fire; results, one US WIA. 173d Airborne Brigade completed airlift and at 0800 hours closed into their new CP, located at ZA203342. The brigade continued preparation for future operations.

28 May. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located a bunker complex vicinity YA96735. The 25 bunkers were used approximately one month before. Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at 2255 hours received two rounds of artillery and mortar fire resulting in three US KIA, one US WIA. At 1555 hours at Hacel Army Airfield, Camp Enari, a gunship from the 355th Assault Helicopter Company accidentally fired a rocket which hit a 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry gunship on the ground; result, two US WIA, one UH-1C destroyed.

29 May. At 0400 hours the fire support base of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At 1615 hours Recondo Patrol 2D spotted three NVA vicinity YA850122; result, three NVA KIA.

30 May.

31 May.

1 June. At 0400 hours 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry's fire support base received 40 rounds of mortar fire and small arms fire from the north; results, one APC damaged. At 0505 hours an ambush patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, located at YA763395, received a friendly mortar round. At the same time Companies A and C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at YA750037 received two friendly artillery rounds inside their perimeter. Results of the two incidents, one US KIA, seven US WIA. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body and three AK-47's at YA763690.

2 June. At 1406 hours Recondo Patrol 2G made contact with 17 NVA at YA770221. A platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and three tanks from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor effected link-up with the patrol, after which contact was made with an unknown size NVA force. The
combined force received B-40 rocket and small arms fires. Artillery was called; results, one US KIA, five US WIA; eight NVA KIA, six AK-47's, two B-40 rocket launchers captured. At 1822 hours a VTR sent to aid a tank on Highway 19W at YA788226 struck a mine. At 1840 hours a 2½-ton dump truck slid off the road and overturned at BRC01506, killing two US personnel.

3 June. At 1345 hours a NVA walked into the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry's fire support base with a GHKU HOI pass. At 1855 hours Recondo Patrol 3B received fire from four VC. The patrol returned fire and called artillery. Results; one VC KIA; patrol extracted.

4 June. An APC from the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at YA 655192 wounding four US personnel.

5 June.

6 June. Recondo Patrol 4H vicinity ZA029397 at 0815 hours fired on five NVA at 15 meters distance; results, one NVA KIA.

7 June. At 1230 hours at YA794333, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body wrapped in a poncho. At 2000 hours a helicopter from Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry at Hensel AAF was destroyed when a flare ignited as the aircraft was being loaded.

8 June.

9 June. At YA82202 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found 100 foxholes and 50 bunkers with overhead cover. Position has been used within the last seven days.

10 June. A vehicle from the 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry hit a mine at ZA209599 resulting in two US WIA.

11 June. At 1000 hours a 2d Brigade Civil Affairs Team, accompanied by two squads from the 2d Brigade Reaction Platoon, received 50 rounds of small arms fire and one B-40 rocket round at AR864369, killing one US and wounding one US. At 1235 hours the 2d Brigade Reaction Platoon made contact with an unknown size force in the vicinity of the ambush, resulting in one NVA KIA. Recondo Patrol 2E at 0940 hours exchanged fire with seven VMIC at ZA011220; result, one VMIC KIA. An APC from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine at AR943565.

12 June. Two APC's from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit mines vicinity YA856229 resulting in three US WIA. At ZA190122 a 2½-ton truck from the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery hit a mine, resulting in one US WIA.

13 June. A gunship from the 8th Aviation Battalion fired on eight to ten VMIC with packs hiding in a stream at BRO18387 killing one VMIC. At 1630 hours Recondo Patrol 4F made contact with two VC vicinity BRO0418, resulting in one VMIC KIA, one M1 Carbine captured. A 1st Battalion, 69th
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Armor tank hit a mine at ZA182183.

14 June. From 1925 hours to 1940 hours the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry fire support base received 63 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the northeast; results, one US KIA, 13 US WIA, one M106 mortar carrier destroyed, two OH-23 helicopters damaged. At 2325 hours 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry's fire support base received 10 more mortar rounds. A tank from Company C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine at YB56226 wounding one US.

15 June.

16 June. At 1030 hours Company B, 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with three VC at ZA210166; results, one VC KIA. At 1610 hours at ZA205144 a squad from Company B received one round of small arms fire resulting in one US KIA.

17 June. At 2050 hours Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) engaged five NVA YA820175 resulting in one NVA KIA.

18 June. From 2130 hours until 2150 hours the Special Forces Camp at DUC CO received 20 to 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and three to five rounds of 75mm recoiless rifle fire; results, three friendly WIA. An APC from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at ZA147267, resulting in five US WIA. At 0020 hours a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) received one short round from a friendly mortar resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA.

19 June. At 0920 hours Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size NVA force resulting in four NVA KIA and four AK-47's captured. The fire support base of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) from 0904 hours until 0519 hours, experienced three separate mortar attacks; results, one US KIA, 14 US WIA. Operation STILLWELL: 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry initiated Operation STILLWELL with a combat assault and convoy movement into the assigned AO east of PLEIKU with 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (OPCON).

20 June.

21 June.

22 June. At ZA175390, an APC from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine. Operation STILLWELL: 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, commenced airlift to DAK TO.

23 June. At 1415 hours Aero Rifle Platoon, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was airlifted into an LZ vicinity ZA072407 and made contact with an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. Contact was broken at 1555 hours; results, one US KIA, three US WIA. At 1800 hours the Aero Rifle Platoon, reinforced by Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, found a bunker complex and captured two 82mm mortar tubes, three base plated, 1 bipod, one T&E mechanism. Operation STILLWELL: 1st Battalion, 69th Armor assumed the mission of Operation STILLWELL at 1800 hours.
24 June. At 0935 hours, the 4th Administration Company CA team (OPCON to 2d Brigade) made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity AR 890304. The team received B-40 rocket, automatic weapons and small arms fire. A platoon of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor linked-up and contact was broken at 1330 hours; results, four US WIA; three NVA KIA, three AK-47's captured. At 1836 hours at YA826394 the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with seven VMC; results, two VMC KIA.

25 June. At 2050 hours, vicinity AR960493, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor strong point on Highway 19E heard two explosions and moved to investigate. At 2100 hours at AR956492, the two tanks discovered a civilian bus had been ambushed while traveling east on Route 19E; results, three civilians KIA, 15 civilians WIA, two AT grenades captured.

26 June.

27 June. Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, vicinity AR951491, found five shallow graves containing five VC bodies killed by sattelite fire at ambush site on Route 19E, 25 June. Operation STILLWELL: 1st Battalion, 69th Armor terminated present phase of Operation STILLWELL.

28 June.

29 June. At 1300 hours Hawkeye Team H-4A made contact with unknown size VMC force. Patrol was extracted at 1345 hours; results, 1 VMC KIA. At 1650 hours at ZA088472, Hawkeye Team H-4B made contact with 30 NVA. Patrol extracted at 1705 hours; results, seven NVA KIA.

30 June. A tank from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was damaged by a mine at AR952497. Operation STILLWELL: 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry deployed into an AO northeast of PLEIKU.

1 July. At 1200 hours at YA973456, Recondo Patrol 1H made contact with an unknown size NVA force. Contact broken at 1240 hours; results, one NVA KIA, one automatic weapon captured.

2 July. At ZA906003, and APC from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine; results, three US WIA.

3 July. At YA889136, a UH-1D lost power and crashed, resulting in six US injured, one UH-1D damaged.

4 July. At 2130 hours at YA851296, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry observed 10-15 NVA approaching their perimeter. Artillery was called and small arms fire exchanged; results, one NVA KIA, one small arm captured. At 1145 hours at YA825144 Recondo Patrol 2A made contact with an NVA squad. Contact was broken at 1150 hours; results, one NVA KIA.

5 July. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA bodies in graves at YA850130.

6 July.
7 July.

8 July. At 1350 hours at YA324163 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA platoon. Contact was broken at 1355 hours; results, five NVA KIA, two small arms captured. Operation STILLWELL: At AR945528, a tank from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine.

9 July. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA bodies at YA34167 from their 8 July contact.

10 July. At 1604 hours at YA809142, Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Enemy broke contact at 1710 hours; results, one US WIA.

11 July. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered one NVA body from their previous contact.

12 July. At 1145 hours Companies B and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Contact was extremely heavy for a two hour period. Initially, the 1st Platoon, Company C received mortar and small arms fire at YA832122; radio contact with 3d Platoon, Company B was lost at approximately 1230 hours. Company B (-), while attempting to reach their 3d Platoon, became heavily engaged at YA835121, Company B (-) became surrounded and forced to withdraw, during which time contact with the company's command group was lost. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault to YA933115 at 1410 hours. Companies A, B, and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry linked up at 1630 hours vicinity of Company B's company patrol base. Company C moved out to recover the US casualties; results, 31 US KIA, 34 US WIA, 7 US MIA. An APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, carrying personnel from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, moving to link-up with 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, hit a mine at YA855222; results, five US WIA.

13 July. Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted sweep of the battlefield; results, 142 NVA KIA. Task Force Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry linked-up with 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry at 1010 hours.

14 July. Operation STILLWELL: 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry closed into Camp Enari at 1025 hours; operation terminated.

15 July. 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry reverted to OPCON 1st Brigade and was airlifted into a fire support base at ZA062447 at 1730 hours.

16 July. Two APC's from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit mines at YA859229 and at YA860230, resulting in 15 US WIA.

17 July.

18 July. At 1700 hours Recondo Patrol 26 made contact with six NVA; contact was broken shortly thereafter; results, three NVA KIA, patrol extracted.

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19 July. An APC from 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA52285 resulting in 4 US WIA. At ZA200220 a 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) M106 mortar track hit a mine.

20 July. At 1750 hours at ZA061512, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry gained contact with 15 NVA armed with AK-47 rifles. The NVA broke contact and fled to the north and Company B pursued. Results were one US KIA, nine US WIA. At 2043 hours at AR820358, base camp patrol 51 received small arms fire from the northeast.

21 July. At 0730 hours, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry experienced an incident in which a grenade accidentally exploded, resulting in one US KIA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found a bunker complex containing one NVA KIA and one AK-47. A tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at YA027280.

22 July. At 1150 hours at YA855190 Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated two NVA Battalions. Company B, 3d Battalion 8th Infantry moved approximately 900 meters to link-up with Company C at 1255 hours. Companies B and C began receiving heavy mortar, rocket and small arms fire from the south and southeast. Artillery, TAC air, and gunships were employed. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, one Platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) moved into blocking positions to the west. Contact was broken at 1700 hours; results, 20 US KIA, 38 US WIA; 188 NVA KIA, 10 NVAC. In the immediate and subsequent sweeps at YA855190, a tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine. An APC from Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine at ZA193196, resulting in five US WIA.

23 July. At 1000 hours at YA938086 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received one round of small arms fire resulting in one US WIA. At 1220 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed seven NVA; result, one NVAC. An APC from Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at ZA155213. A tank from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine at YA830179.

24 July. At 1135 hours at ZA113263, an APC from the Reconnaissance Platoon 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with an estimated NVA squad. A D-40 round hit an APC; result, one US KIA, three US WIA.

25 July. At 1135 hours at ZA113263, an APC from the Reconnaissance Platoon 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with an estimated NVA squad. A D-40 round hit an APC; result, one US KIA, three US WIA.

26 July. At YA856194 a tank from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine. At YA855196 another tank from Troop B hit a mine and shortly thereafter, a VTR sent to aid the latter disabled tank also hit a mine in the same location. There were negative casualties and only slight damage in each incident.

27 July. 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry continued a sweep of the battlefield; results, 20 NVA KIA, one NVAC, one 82mm mortar, one crew-served weapon and six rifles found. Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion, while conducting mine-sweeping operations of LLOC, found nine mines vicinity YA921272. The mines, found in five locations, all had six pound TNT booster charge.
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28 July. Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, while continuing to sweep
the battlefield, captured one NVA at YA86196; also, at YA864188 found one
grave containing one NVA body estimated to have been dead four to five days.
Company B found two SKS rifles and one B-40 rocket launcher. A 3/4 ton
truck from 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry hit a mine at YA195265; resulting in two
US WIA.

29 July. Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, located at YA
854188, received fire from friendly gunships; results were one US KIA, eight
US WIA.

30 July. The bridge located at ZA096298, Highway 19W, was blown. 1st
Battalion, 69th Armor sustained one US WIA (non-battle) when a claymore was
fired accidentally.

31 July. A UH-1D aircraft from the 109th Assault Helicopter Company,
52d Aviation Battalion hit the trees and crashed at ZA113343; results, three
US KIA, one US WIA; one UH-1D destroyed. At 0645 hours at ER247490 a tank
from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine. While moving to assist the dis-
abled tank, a second tank received two B-40 rounds and small arms fire and
also hit a mine at ER248488. A 24-ton truck from the 4th Battalion, 62d Art-
illery hit a mine at ZA085245; resulting in two US WIA.

1 August. At 1:30 hours EDAP ENANG, vicinity YA985294, received an
estimated 40 rounds of mortar fire and several burst of small arms fire;
results, one ARVN KIA, three ARVN WIA, damage to compound was light. At
0915 hours vicinity of YA837634 Recondo Patrol 4H made contact with three
VMC and exchanged small arms fire; results, one US KIA.

2 August. At 1058 hours a patrol from Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th
Infantry sighted six individuals at YA825315. Artillery called resulting in
five or six secondary explosions. 15-20 persons observed running from the
area. Reconnaissance Platoon was heli-lifted into vicinity of YA825315 and
at 1405 hours received small arms fire and a grenade, then enemy withdrew;
platoon extracted at 1450 hours. At 1201 hours an APC from Company A, 2d Battal-
8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at ZA083232 resulting in one US WIA.

3 August. The Aero Rifle Platoon, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was
inserted vicinity of YA692298 at 1348 hours to exploit and airstrike. At
1350 hours the platoon received one burst of automatic weapons fire. Aero
rifle platoon extracted at 1810 hours. An individual walked into a tail rotor
at the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry’s firebase; results, one US KIA (non-battle).
Hawkeye Patrol HIC made contact with two VC at 0815 hours vicinity YA944373;
results, one VC KIA. Recondo Patrol 2B made contact at 1655 hours with two
squads of NVA vicinity of YA963237; results, four NVA KIA; LHRP was extracted
at 1704 hours.

4 August. At 1340 hours the Bailey bridge vicinity ZA900299 collapsed
under the weight of a VTR towing a tank from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
A M-42 duster from 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery hit a mine at ZA083232.

5 August. At 1100 hours Hawkeye patrol HIC made contact with an
unknown size force; result, one US WIA; patrol extracted at 1125 hours.
At 0740 hours vicinity of ZA83229 an APC from Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battal-
8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine.
6 August.

7 August. At YAC24323 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body KIA in a bunker complex. Recondo Patrol 10 found a base camp containing 60 bunkers with overhead cover vicinity YA765261.

8 August. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered a two week old NVA body in a grave vicinity YA865190.

9 August. At 2050 hours a platoon from 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry reinforced a RF/PF force in CATEOKA which was under attack by two VC squads; contact broken at 2130 hours; enemy loses unknown.

10 August. Recondo Patrol 4J made contact at 1215 hours with an estimated VNC Company vicinity YA876164. Patrol 4J was reinforced by 1st Platoon, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry. Contact was broken at 1230 hours; results, one VMC KIA, one VNC WIA (CIA).

11 August. Vicinity YA936285 two APC's from Company B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit mines resulting in five US WIA.

12 August. At 0956 hours vicinity YA803336 Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with a platoon size NVA force. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moving to link-up with Company B made contact in the same vicinity. Artillery called and Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry air lifted into the area to reinforce. Contact was broken at 1145 hours; results, three US KIA, 15 US WIA, enemy casualties unknown. Recondo Patrol 2D made contact at 1115 hours with three armed individuals vicinity ZA017092; results, one VMC KIA.

13 August. At 1855 hours a base camp patrol within the TAOR received one round of small arms fire and, while taking cover, an individual detonated a booby trap resulting in one US WIA.

14 August. Recondo Patrol 4J made contact with five VMC vicinity BR156271; result, 1 VMC KIA; patrol extracted 1524 hours.

15 August. Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mech) fired on three VNC running into a hut vicinity ZA045293; results, one VMC KIA two VNC WIA (CIA). At 0855 hours vicinity YA966166 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received one short, friendly 81mm mortar round resulting in 10 US WIA. At 1010 hours Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry picked up 10 detainees vicinity ZA044395. Two detainees fired on as they later attempted to escape; result, two VMC KIA. At 0548 hours at tank from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a mine vicinity of EBO69902.

16 August. Recondo Patrol 4D made contact with five VNC vicinity of YA156271; result, 1 VMC KIA; patrol extracted 1524 hours.

17 August.
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18 August. At 0835 hours Recondo Patrol 20 made contact with six NVA vicinity ZA000088. Contact was broken at 0845; results, one VMC KIA, one VIC CIA.

19 August.

20 August.

21 August. At 1334 hours a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was inserted vicinity YAB66188 to exloit air strikes; results, found one NVA body KIA; platoon extracted at 1407 hours.

22 August. Company A, 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry at 0420 hours made contact with an enemy squad vicinity AR02131 while in their night location. An LP exchanged small arms fire and called artillery; results, two US WIA. At 1710 hours an ambush patrol from the Division Exploitation Platoon made contact with two VC; results, one VC CIA; ambush party extracted at 1835 hours.

23 August. From 0500 hours until 0545 hours 1st Brigade CP at Jackson Hole, YAB95305 received 122mm rocket attack from firing positions vicinity YAB033 and YAB53. An estimated 40 rounds were fired with seven rounds landing inside the perimeter; results, one US WIA, POL dump destroyed (40,000 gals JP-4 fuel). At 1000 hours Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received fire from a bunker and tunnel complex located inside a village vicinity ZAL144515. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry joined Company A and swept through the area having sporatic contact; results, one US WIA; enemy losses unknown.

24 August. At 1043 hours Companies A and C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size NVA force in a bunker complex vicinity ZA1053. Artillery and TAC air called. Contact was sporatic throughout the afternoon as Companies A and C swept through the area; results, one US KIA, two US WIA; one NVA KIA, one NVAC, two crew served weapons and documents also captured.

25 August. At YAB05336 Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry located a rocket position used to attack the 1st Brigade CP on 23 August. They found one NVA KIA, two radios damaged by artillery. In vicinity ZB0952 Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with two NVA and one VMG; results were one NVA KIA, one NVAC.

26 August. Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12 Infantry had scattered and sporatic contacts vicinity ZA9052 from 1445 hours until 1626 hours. Results were two NVA KIA, one crew served weapon captured. At 0600 hours the Division Exploitation Platoon, while conducting a cordon and search of a village vicinity AR780216, fired on two VMG attempting to break out of the cordon resulting in one VMG KIA.

27 August. At 1406 hours Company C and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact receiving fire from an enemy force in a bunker complex vicinity ZA075527. Artillery and TAC air employed; results, one US WIA; enemy losses unknown.

28 August.
29 August. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found one NVA KIA vicinity YAL55195.

30 August. At 1815 hours Recondo Patrol 1D observed 10 NVA armed with AK-47's carrying suspected 122mm rocket sections vicinity YA783288. Artillery called; results unknown due to darkness.

31 August.

1 September. 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry (-) moved by road from QUI NHON to Camp Enari closing 2145 hours.

2 September. At 0055 hours a UH-IH aircraft from 52d Aviation Battalion flying a C&C mission for the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry crashed and burned vicinity YA881293; result, two US KIA, four US WIA (non-battle). Vicinity ZA903736 a N-42 (duster) hit a mine resulting in one US WIA and a tank from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was damaged by a mine at YA950290.

3 September. 2d Brigade initiated an operation with two infantry battalions in the PLEI TIRONG area to detect and destroy the 4th Battalion, 95B NVA Regiment, the 407th VC Sapper Battalion, the H-15 VC Battalion.

4 September. Companies B and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry had light contact with an unknown size enemy force from 1020 hours until approximately 1200 hours when contact was broken; result, one US WIA. At 1430 hours vicinity ZA072525 a 'headhunter' aircraft fired rockets at NVA in the open. Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault into the area at 1645 hours and made contact with a squad size NVA force; results, one US WIA; four NVA KIA, three NVAC (WIA), one crew served weapon, three small arms, A 2½-ton truck from the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery hit a mine vicinity AR834390 resulting in two US WIA.

5 September. Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault vicinity of ZA072534 at 1032 hours and conducted a sweep of the 4 September contact; results, one NVA KIA, two small arms found.

6 September.

7 September.

8 September.

9 September.

10 September. At 1145 hours an artillery fire base vicinity AR886491 occupied by a section from Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery and secured by a section of tanks from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was penetrated by an unknown size VC force employing B-40 rocket launchers, machine guns, small arms and satchel charges. Fire was returned by the tanks and the fire base was reinforced by the Division Exploitation Platoon, Aero Rifle Platoon, and Scout Platoon from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor. Contact was broken approximatel
0258 hours; results, seven US WIA; 10 VC KIA, one VCC (nurse). Companies A and D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received a light probing attack, Artillery called; results, one US KIA, two US WIA. A H-23 helicopter from 2d Brigade Aviation Section, missing since 8 September, was recovered along with two US KIA. A 2½-ton truck from 1st Brigade hit a mine vicinity aR836583 resulting in two US WIA.

11 September. 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry began deploying at 0300 hours from division base camp with three armored cavalry troops. Their mission was to conduct an area reconnaissance between the base camp TAOR and the IA Ayun River from PLEI DO LNH north to Highway 19 East.

12 September. At 0708 hours Recondo Patrol 2D made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity ZA084174; results were one VMC KIA, one VMCC, patrol extracted at 0815 hours.

13 September. At 1815 hours 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry's fire support base located vicinity YA531146 and Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located vicinity YAB20141 received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy forces. Artillery and TAC air employed; results were one US KIA, four US WIA; enemy casualties unknown.

14 September.

15 September. At 1825 hours Recondo Patrol 2C made contact with a small enemy force vicinity ZA105529 resulting in one US WIA; one NVA KIA. Patrol extracted at 1855 hours.

16 September.

17 September. At 0918 hours Recondo Patrol 2A made contact with two VC vicinity ZA106665 resulting in one VC KIA.

18 September.

19 September. 2d Brigade CP began deploying from Oasis to Camp Enari, the brigade's tactical operations center moved from base camp to vicinity PLEI DO LNH. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry moved its squadron CP from CATECKA to Oasis.

20 September. 1st Brigade trains displaced to Oasis, 1st Brigade tactical operations center remained at Jackson Hole. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) conducted a cordon and search of a village vicinity ZA165578. Results were one VMC KIA and one VCC. At 0910 hours Hawkeye Patrol H2A killed one NVA and captured one weapon vicinity ZA159521.

21 September. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry killed on VC and captured one weapon vicinity of ZA101509. A member of Division Recondo Patrol 4G stepped on a punji stake during insertion at BR022763.

22 September.
23 September. At YA819299 Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found four NVA bodies in graves within a bunker complex. At YA789336 one NVA body was found in a bunker complex by Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

24 September. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Koch) made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity YA989504. Contact was broken immediately resulting in one US KIA. Hawkeye Patrol H4B had a brief contact at 1555 hours vicinity ZA145604 and killed one VC.

25 September. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Koch) made contact at 1522 hours with an unknown size enemy force vicinity ZA602498. They received heavy small arms fire and three rounds of mortar fire wounding two US. Company A returned fire and called artillery. Contact was broken at 1645 hours and a sweep of the area found two NVA KIA, Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact at 0730 hours with 15-20 enemy soldiers vicinity BR088293. Contact was broken at 0801 hours resulting in one US WIA. Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a CA vicinity BR124452 at 1115 hours and made contact with six enemy at BR075297 as they moved toward the area of the Reconnaissance Platoon's contact; results, one VC KIA. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA KIA vicinity YA788336. An APC from the 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was damaged by a mine at ZA215601. Company A, 1st Battalion 69th Armor returned to division control from OPCON 1st Air Cavalry Division.

26 September. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry captured one NVA WIA vicinity BR076293. A sweep of this area produced one NVA KIA. At 1725 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force vicinity BR142240. Contact was broken at 1745 hours; results, five US WIA; enemy losses unknown. The 1st Platoon, Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry received sniper fire vicinity ZA206622 resulting in two US WIA. The 1st Platoon returned fire and swept through the area with negative results. At 0712 hours Hawkeye Patrol H4B received small arms fire resulting in one US WIA; Patrol H4B was extracted at 0805 hours. Recondo Patrol 4D made contact at 1310 hours with one VC squad in vicinity BR244366. Contact was broken at 1320 hours; results, one VC KIA.

27 September. Company D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA and one weapon at their ambush site vicinity BR248362. At 1625 hours Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged four NVA at BR248362 resulting in one NVA KIA and captured one small arm.

28 September.

29 September. At 1945 hours Recondo Patrol 2D made contact with two VC resulting in one VC KIA.

30 September. Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body in a grave located vicinity YA803335.

1 October. At 0750 hours a Headhunter aircraft sighted an estimated two NVA squads with packs on a trail vicinity AR971142. Six air strikes were placed into the area with all flights receiving ground to air fire. At 1312 hours a platoon from Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry combat assaulted into an area south of the airstrike to sweep north. At 1545 hours a UH-1H
received ground fire resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. At 1800 hours Company B (-), 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault into the area to sweep the area and establish a night defensive position. Total results of the day's action were one US KIA, and one US WIA; 49 NVA KIA, four NVAC five crew served and 20 small arms captured during subsequent sweeps of the area.

2 October.

3 October. At 1455 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with six to 10 NVA vicinity AR990167. Contact was broken immediately resulting in one NVA KIA, one NVAC, two crew served and one small arm also captured.

4 October. At 1700 hours a platoon from 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with 15 NVA while conducting a night ambush operation. Contact was broken approximately 1710 hours. Results were three US WIA; enemy casualties unknown. Company C, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry sustained one slightly wounded by sniper fire vicinity BR132328. Vicinity BR010169 at 1107 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry engaged four VC; killing one VC and capturing one small arm. At 1650 hours Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received sniper fire and grenades vicinity BR177730 resulting in four US WIA; enemy losses unknown. A 2½-ton truck moving in a convoy hit a mine vicinity BR094960; one US WIA.

5 October. Recondo Patrol 1C had a brief contact with a small enemy force at 1118 hours vicinity YA975527 with one US WIA (minor) resulting. Patrol 1C moved overland and linked up with a platoon from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech).

6 October. At 0810 hours Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry sighted 10 NVA vicinity BR276335 and called artillery. Company A swept through the area finding one NVA KIA. Company A found two NVA bodies in a grave at BR278335.

7 October. Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found two NVA bodies in graves at ZA067522. At 1045 hours Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry sustained one US WIA from sniper fire vicinity BR108247. At 1955 hours Hawkeye Patrol H2B made contact with three NVA resulting in one NVA KIA and one small arm captured. Again at 1025 hours vicinity BR072335 patrol H2B made contact this time with an NVA squad. Results were one NVA KIA; Patrol extracted at 1125 hours.

8 October. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found two NVA bodies in graves at ZA069523.

9 October. At ZA099486 Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) made contact with an unknown size enemy force at 1340 hours. Contact was broken at 1500 hours resulting in three US WIA; one NVA KIA. An APC from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine at AR120483; results, two US WIA.
10 October. A 2½-ton truck from 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received sniper fire vicinity ZA177355 resulting in one US WIA (minor).

11 October. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry conducted helilifts to CHEO REO closing at 1435 hours and 1530 hours respectively. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry began road march to DAK TO.

Operation FRANCIS MARION terminated at 112400 112400H October 1967.
UNIT REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS

1. (U) The unit After Action Reports of significant contacts that occurred during Operation FRANCIS MARION are at the Tabs.

2. (C) The significant contacts are listed below and are keyed to the Tabs.

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Inclosure 7

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Protective Markings Will Be Removed when Separated From Protected Inclosures

TAB A

2-8 Inf
30 Apr - 1 May

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Brigade, 4th Inf Div
ATTN: AVDDB-BC
APO US Forces 96262

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDB-GG
APO US Forces 96262

1. OPERATION: FRANCIS MARION
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 300745 Apr 67 to 011930 May 67.
3. LOCATION: Pleiku Province, RVN, 2d Bn (Mech), 8th Inf Area of Operations, vicinity (Zall5175) Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 6536lI.
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Gordon J Duquesmin, CO 2d Bn (Mech), 8th Inf
CPT William R Harvey, CO Company A, 2d Bn (Mech), 8th Infantry.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Company A 2d Bn (Mech), 8th Inf with FO Party, Scout Plat 2/6, A 4/42 Arty Fl, Section tanks, B Troop, 1st Sqd, 10th Cav.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
      B 4/42 Arty (Reinforcing) (105) blocking and H&I fires.
      B 1/92 Arty (GS) (155mm) blocking and H&I fires.
      D 5/16 Arty (GS) blocking and H&I fires.
      C 6/14 Arty (GS) (175mm and 8") blocking and H&I fires.
   b. Air Force:
      (1) F-4's, F105's and A-1B's, flew a total of 48 sorties in support of this operation. Air strikes were responsive and accurate. Ordnance
consisted of napalm, 105mm, high drag 20mm cannon, (600, 750, and 1000 pounds), and 20mm cannon. Air (1000 lb bombs) proved to be the only effective means of destroying enemy defensive bunkers. During the strikes three secondary explosions occurred and were observed by ground troops.

(2) AC-47, "Spooky" proved invaluable, providing continuous illumination throughout the night of 1-2 May for airstrikes and in addition provided blocking fires with mini-guns.

(3) FNC, Cider 24 (CPT Davenport) and 27 (Lt Dreifuss) were most helpful in directing airstrikes, AC-47's (Spooky), providing continuous VHF and guiding troops on the ground.

c. Army Air:

(1) Gunships: 1/10 Cav delivered rockets and machine gun fire in support of this operation. Troops in the open were engaged by the gunships on the SE side of Objective B; the fires were effective.

(2) H-23's Aero Scouts: 1/10 Cav light scout section assisted in guiding Company A's APC's and attached tanks through the woods to the objective area and pin pointing bunkers. This scout section proved to be most effective.

3. INTELLIGENCE: Prior to the engagement it was known that an NVA unit was operating in the general area. Numerous minor contacts had been made by the 2/3 Inf (Mech) in the vicinity of the Ia Meur River and numerous Agent Reports had been noted in the area. The enemy engaged by Company A was the K-2 Bn of the 95B Regt (determined by infiltration cards and captured documents). It is believed that the Battalion (-) was in the complex when contact was made on 30 Apr 67 and again on 1 May 67 based on the subsequent body count, fires encountered, and wealth of documents found. The terrain was characterized by gently rolling hills with deep ravines and primary drainage was towards the Ia Meur River. A major ridge line ran NE to SW with extending fingers running South-SE off the major ridge line. The area was thickly vegetated with numerous cleared areas on the west. Observation in thickly vegetated areas was rarely over 3 feet. The weather was mostly clear during the day with rains during the hours of darkness. All villages in the area of contact had been moved in support of the EDAP ENANG Program. The following enemy equipment was captured:

- 26 82mm mortar rounds
- 29 82mm mortar fuzes
- 15-10 pounds satchel charges
- 4000 rounds 7.62 ammunition
- 26 B-40 Rockets
- 10 lbs of documents
- Two maps
- 2 NVA protective masks
- 1 US lensatic compass
- One month medical supplies
- 12 AK-47's (30 others destroyed by tank and APC tracks)
- 1 M-16 (belonging to Co C taken from 17 Apr 67 contact)
- 150 NVA packs and sets of web gear
- 1 mile of commo wire
10. CONCUSSION OF EVENTS: Searches were operation along the 1a River searching the area on foot in order to fix enemy locations and destroy him. Artillery support and immediate air strikes were available on call. In the AO a FAC was airborne during daylight hours and on call during hours of darkness.

11. EXECUTION: On 28 April 1967 the company was given the mission of conducting Search and Destroy Operations in the central portion of the Bn AO. The unit moved by APC from the FSB (ZA080216) to a dismount point (ZA080216) and remained there for the night, with the APC's returning to the FSB. On 29 April 1967 the unit moved north from the previous location and closed on C 2/8 at 1100 hours. Securing an LZ for the extraction of C 2/8. A Company then proceeded north (ZA105775) and established a Company Patrol Base. At 000745 Apr 67 the 3d Platoon moved south and was to move east along the Ta Meur River and return to the company base the 1st Platoon moved SE on an AZ of 120° and was to move east along the river and return to the Co Base; the 2d Platoon was in reserve and established an OP vic ZA150285. At 0914 hours, the 3d Platoon vic (ZA106168) spotted two NVA entering a wood line. They pursued the NVA and saturated the area with fires since definite targets could not be seen. At 00045 Apr 67 the 1st Platoon located at (ZA109271) saw 30 NVA moving north on a trail and im plemented a hasty linear ambush (Inclosure 1). The 1st Platoon permitted all the 30 NVA to enter the ambush, prior to initiating it. The NVA were totally surprised and did not fire a shot in return, but quickly picked up their dead and wounded and moved south, using the same trail. They withdrew about 200 meters and established a line of defense in order to treat the wounded, (Inclosure 5). The 1st Platoon pursued and forced the NVA to further retreat, leaving behind their dead and wounded.

When the 30 NVA were ambushed the 3d Platoon was put in a blocking position 300 meters to the west. Artillery fires were fired into blocking positions in the south and east. The immediate estimate of the situation was a patrol looking for a US unit. Since the NVA were on the run the plan was to drive them into the blocking forces. 1st Platoon moved to the east to continue the assault in a SW direction. However, the 1st Platoon began receiving enemy fire about 150 meters to the south from a heavy woodline, though the force he had engaged had not yet reached that point. However, the 1st platoon continued to assault till it reached a point 50 meters from the wood line when the volume of fire became very heavy and four NG's were identified (Inclosure 6). Unable to pin point the enemy locations, the 1st Platoon continued to assault endeavoring to drive the NVA into the blocking force which at this time was about 250 meters to the west.

The 1st Platoon continued fire and maneuver but was unable to route the enemy. The 3d Platoon (-) was pulled out of its blocking position. One rifle squad was left to engage any enemy forces fleeing east. Artillery fires were now directed on top of the enemy, to the south and east. The 3d Platoon (-) moved north and east and closed on the point of contact from the north. It was now estimated that the two platoons were engaging a NVA Company. Closing
on the 1st Platoon. A lead element, with two squads from the 3d Platoon, who were pinned down in an open field, laid down the bulk of the fire. (Inclosure 7). The maneuver element moved in on the west flank and concentrated the NVA positions. The NVA quickly reacted by increasing their fire. Elements of the 1st Platoon attempted to move in closer to the enemy defensive positions, but were met with a tremendous volume of fire. The 3d Platoon maneuver force, unable to make further progress, withdrew to the 2d Platoon area and provided covering fire while the two squads from 1st Platoon withdrew to the woodline with the 3d Platoon. These two squads had been exposed to direct sunlight with no water for three and a half hours and were beginning to suffer from dehydration. Contact was maintained and artillery fire continued until tactical air was on station. Friendly forces withdrew 150 meters and established a LZ for Med-evac while tactical air was employed on the target area. Two strikes were used, with 500 lb bombs, CBU and Napalm. The strikes and Med-evac were completed by 1800 hours. Two APC's of the Scout Platoon arrived during the Med-evac and were employed on the west flank to recce by fire. No enemy fire was received and the Scout Platoon APC's were withdrawn. With the 3d Platoon behind the APC's, another assault was made on the east flank (Inclosure 7). The 1st Platoon provided rear and west flank security so that the maneuver element could not be enveloped. The assaulting forces were not fired upon until they came within 15 meters of the woodline. The NVA forces opened up across a 150 meter line. The ensuing fire fight lasted for approximately 30 minutes. This fire, enemy forces and emplacements could not be seen, nor could the enemy see the US forces, since the NVA firing was area coverage rather than point targets. With darkness falling, A Company withdrew to its company base. Artillery was adjusted on the target area all night. There was no contact during the night. Company 3F and a selection of tanks, 1/10 Cav were directed to move to the company base and were dispatched at dawn on 1 May. Two APC's of the Scout Platoon 2/8 Inf (each) were sent from the company Base back to the FSB on 040615 May 67 to escort and guide A 2/8 APC's back to the unit. At coordinate 2A112179 at 0630 hours these two APC's were engaged by an unknown size force, but believed to exceed 10 personnel. They received a limited amount of small arms fire and one B-40 rocket was fired hitting one of the APC's. The disabled APC was towed back to A 2/8 Base while others continued on the original mission. Also a 2/12 was air-lifted to 2A1552209 with the mission of screening to the east and linking up with A 2/8. It was believed that the NVA had withdrawn to the east. At 1100 hours after all APC's had closed the company deployed to the east of the contact area (30 April) in the following order: 2d Platoon w/1 tank in the lead, 3d Platoon, the command track, one tank, 81mm APC, and the 1st Platoon, (Inclosure 8). The company moved east through the ambush site of the previous day. At 1310 hours the lead elements received sniper fire from the SE. The two tanks were then put on line with 2 APC's on the left and 4 APC's on the right, (Inclosure 8). As the company advanced, an APC from the 3d Platoon threw a track and was stripped, locked and abandoned in order to continue the momentum of the attack (Inclosure 9). As the 2d Platoon continued the attack to the east, the volume of enemy fire intensified. As the platoons closed on what seemed to be a second objective area east of the day before contact the NVA ran up to the tracks and threw grenades under them. They also tried, unsuccessfully, to throw grenades inside the tanks. The NVA were routed by the tanks who were firing canister rounds and APC's their 50 Calibers. The NVA panicked and started to flee and
entered a large bunker complex. The company continued to maintain contact with the NVA forces who sniped at them from trees and continued to engage with grenades (Inclosure 10). Air strikers were called for and employed. As darkness fell the NVA's volume of fire was significantly reduced and they broke contact. The company withdrew to its night location ZA126177 and using artillery (over 4000 rounds) and Tactcal air, hammered the area of contact all night. At 1930 hours A 1/12 closed on Company A's location. They had conducted an air assault and moved 3M in order to engage any fleeing enemy forces though no contact was made.

The Scout Platoon provided convoy escort for the resupply of Class IV and V items on 1 May 1967. Utilizing a tank trail made the previous day the supplies were transported from 3/8 FSB to the unit. On its return trip from the unit, the convoy was fired upon by two individuals at cord ZA126177. The Scout Platoon deployed and killed two (2) NVA (BC) and recovered two AK-47 weapons. During the next four days the route was used several times without incident. A three day sweep of both contact areas revealed how thoroughly the enemy had been defeated.

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties: 3 US KIA, 12 US WIA. No equipment was lost to the enemy.

b. Enemy casualties: 138 NVA KIA (BC) with a possible 140 more either KIA or WIA. Enemy equipment and weapons captured are listed in the Intelligence Section.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: There were no major administrative problems encountered during the battle. Medical evacuation was accomplished by the Bn C&Q helicopter during actual hostile enemy fire. Equipment belonging to KIA's and WIA's was evacuated on APC's. Resupply was accomplished by air and overland using APC's.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. H-23 Helicopters (1/10 Cav) were used for the first time in conjunction with a rifle company to assist in maintaining direction during movement to contact and in pinpointing enemy bunkers.

b. 81mm Mortar, track mounted, used for the first time, was most effective for close support and was readily and easily moved into position.

c. In dense vegetation the file formation proved best until contact, and then with the enemy pinned down, elements on line for the assault and movement through the objective prior to dismounting proved very effective.

d. The 90mm canister tank round was most effective, inflicting maximum casualties and clearing the dense vegetation at the same time. The terrain was not conducive to rapid movement of large numbers of tanks, but by maintaining a slow, steady rate of movement, they were used quite effectively.
15. COMMANDS AND DISPOSITION: The shock of a mechanized infantry attack cannot be over emphasized in this particular action. No anti-tank or other high explosive weapons were encountered, though "84-0 rockets" were present. Such weapons were not employed, it is believed, because of dense vegetation and the lack of fields of fire. Hand grenades were employed by NVA to try to stop the APC's and tanks, but were totally ineffective. The fire-power of the APC's and tanks, combined with M-79 grenade launchers and hand grenades, was overwhelming and apparently beyond the imagination of the enemy. The highlight of the attack was the 90mm canister at point blank range. Extensive road by fire was very effective and inflicted damage on the enemy. Tactical Air, with 1000 lb bombs, was used to destroy bunkers. BDA of bombs was generally two bunkers destroyed and 1-2 bunkers damaged severely, depending on point of impact. 8" Arty did not effect the bunkers unless there was a direct hit and then only the bunker hit was destroyed. The enemy forces within the battle area of 1 May 67 was estimated at two NVA Companies. Enemy mission was unknown, but the organization of the structures and bunker complex, and the fact that they were still building, strongly suggests that the complex was to be a regimental size base area. The enemy forces did not want to give up the ground and fought fiercely to retain control. In both battles (30 Apr and 1 May 67) the enemy tried desperately to deny penetration and subsequent occupation of the area. The NVA was in the process of moving equipment to this area; 82mm mortar rounds were found tied in bamboo carrying poles and the poles and vines lashing them together were fresh. C 2/8 had continuous contact with small groups in ambushes and patrols for 5 days prior to 29 Apr 67. The contact was made with enemy forces moving SW to NE or NE to SW. Contacts were made during day and night. A first hand evaluation of captured maps and documents indicated that the NVA wanted to establish a clandestine area as a base for attacks on unidentified objectives which logically could be Plei Me, Oasis, 2/8 FSB and the EDAP NANG resettlement area. US forces were outnumbered by a minimum of 2 to 1. Air (both helicopter and fixed wing) and artillery were used to contain the enemy and prevent withdrawal. This proved successful since the large body count indicates that the dead were not all evacuated, as is the general rule with NVA forces.

In summation, the success of the operation resulted from:

a. Momentum and shock effect of a mechanized attack.
b. Tremendous fire power of organic and support weapons.
c. The surprise gained by attacking an exposed flank.
d. The NVA lacked cleared fields of fire, and the thick underbrush hindered their escape from the onslaught of attacking US forces.
e. The deliberate employment of the company coupled with the maximum utilization of supporting assets possessed to the company commander, (ground commander) for employment.

16. RECOMMENDATION:

a. Continued attachment of tanks to Mechanized Infantry units.
b. Mounting of 2 M-60 MG on each APC. (This will be done in September).

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c. JVC Helmets (for APC drivers and AFV's) should be reinforced to provide better protection from small arms fragmentation.

d. Claymore mines that could be mounted in multiples on the sides and rear of the APC and detonated from inside the truck.

e. Mounted flame throwers attached to mechanized infantry units when assaulting fortified positions. Use of the flame thrower would demoralize the enemy and would facilitate destroying bunkers and personnel therein.

10 Inclosures as

/s/Gordon J Duquemin
GORDON J DUQUEMIN
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

TRUE COPY

FRANCIS E CUTLER
MAJ, Armor
Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 6536II.
Inclosure 2 (Fighting Bunker of O1) to Combat Operation After Action Report

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series 1704L, Sheet 656II.

The fighting bunker was 30' long, 8' high at ground level.

There were 25 of these on the immediate area.

There were no firing galleries.

The fighting aperture was 20' long, 8' high at ground level.

Bunker measured 3 feet deep.

7 feet wide.

14 feet long.

Doorway.

Top View.

Ground Level.

Front View.

Overhead cover, 10' 3" diameter.

Firefighting bunkers of O1.

P70R
OFI=IQI'AL-USZ Oý4-Y
Inclosure 3 (Protective Bunkers A and B) To Combat Operation After Action Report


The bunkers were not sheltered or protected. Smaller jobs and branches then hard packed dirt. Grenades sent through about 3-4" in diameter. Often, two jobs were 5-6' deep. Overhead cover consisted of a layer of jobs. Jobs were some had three, generally holes were 4 feet deep, some were

- Entrance were about 20" wide with at least two steps,
- Dirt from the hole at the bunker.

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Inclosure 4 (Organization of NVA) to Combat Oparation After Action Report


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Draw 50 m each hole out in side of

24.7° and 1 type unknown
M=I was M-50

50m each

Plotting bunkers.

60% side was about

100 m, may be deep

about 60 m

MG 1

MG 3

MG 7

Trail

Woods

and not occupied

Forest

90 ambush site

50 ambush site

Clay A - line of defense and organization - NVA
Inclosure 5 (Direction of NVA Moving into Ambush) to Combat Operation

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series 170A, Sheet 65311.
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Inlosure 7 (1st Platoon Rear and Flank Security) to Combat Operation After Action Report
Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 653II.

[Diagram showing a line of defense and a note in Chinese characters]
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Inclosure 8 (Attack of Objective - 1 May 67) to Combat Operation After Action Report

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 65361I.

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Inclosure 9 (Attack of Objective B) to Combat Operation After Action Report

Reference: Map, Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 6536H.

As the attack continued the volume of fire became heavy and reserve was deployed to point B1. This attack lasted about 1½ hours. Mortar and Air Strike was put in.}

APC threw a track here and was left here. APC equipment was taken off.
UNCLASSIFIED

TAB B

3-12 Inf
1 May

UNCLASSIFIED
TO: Commanding Officer  
1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
APO US Forces 96265

1. Name of Operation: Francis Marion
3. Location:
   a. A Company - YA791337
   b. B Company - YA838333
4. Command and Control Headquarters:
   a. HQ, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
   b. Company A, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
   c. Company B, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
5. Reporting Officer: LTC John F. Vollmer
6. Task Organization:
   HQ, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf.
   Company A, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf.
   Company B, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf.
   Company C, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf.
7. Supporting Forces:
   a. Battery C, 1st Bn, 92nd Artillery
   b. Battery C, 5th Bn, 16th Artillery
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for 1 May 67

c. Battery B, 6th Bn, 14th Artillery

d. USAF, Tactical Air Strikes

8. Intelligence: An agent report from Special Forces Camp at Duc Co indicated there could be two companies of NVA located in grid squares YA 7933 and YA8033. This report was received at the Bn CP early morning of 1 May and relayed to A 3/12 at 010700H May 67.

9. Missions:

a. The 3rd Bn, 12th Inf was securing the 1st Bde CP at Jackson Hole and conducting search and destroy operations in assigned AO.

b. A 3/12 was conducting search and destroy operations while moving South to valley running East-West vic of YA790330.

c. B 3/12 was conducting search and destroy operations while moving South to vic of YA847310.

10. Background:

a. A 3/12 closed into a night location vic YA791337 at 301600 April 67. The next day the company was to continue South conducting a search and destroy operation.

b. B 3/12 closed into a night location vic YA838333 at 301600 April 67. The next day the company was to continue to move to the South.

11. Execution:

a. Early on the morning of 1 May Company A was preparing to depart its night location. At 010715, a patrol returning to the position discovered a telephone wire alongside a trail leading to the position. Discovery was made 300 meters South of the company position. Immediately thereafter, an LP 50 meters Southeast of the perimeter reported observing 30 to 40 enemy moving towards the position. Captain Jones immediately ordered movement preparations to cease and all positions manned.

b. At 010717, an estimated NVA Company attacked the perimeter from the Southeast. The 1st platoon received heavy automatic fire, B-40 rockets and mortar rounds.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for 1 May 67

Small arms fire was received from all around the perimeter to a lesser extent. Artillery fire was placed around the perimeter and immediate airstrikes were requested. At this point, only light casualties had been sustained by the company. At 010720, enemy small arms fire began to die down. Mortar fire continued to fall within the perimeter.

c. At 010720, another patrol attempting to get back to the perimeter reported a large enemy force moving towards the perimeter from the Southwest. Artillery fire was shifted to cover. At 010730, the perimeter was attacked from the Southwest. Heavy automatic weapons fire, mortar and rockets were received. An LP on the West side of the perimeter was overrun before it could be withdrawn. One man was killed, one wounded and an AN/PRC-25 captured.

d. At 010730, B Company, moving south from its night location, was ordered to move west to the .. Company position.

e. At 010740, a forward air controller arrived over A Company. Artillery fire was shifted to the East to clear a corridor for the fighters to make their runs.

f. By 0800, incoming fire became light, the perimeter receiving only sporadic rifle fire and some mortar rounds. Due to the volume of artillery fire and the air strikes, the enemy was believed to be hugging the perimeter in the dense underbrush. These forces appeared to be used as a delay element to cover the withdrawal of the main attack force and casualties. Personnel in the perimeter received intense small arms fire when any attempt was made to move.

g. After 010855, fire was not received in the perimeter and A Company began to reorganize for pursuit and to secure an LZ for evacuation of the wounded and resupply of ammunition.

h. At 010936 the company attempted to pursue the attacking force that withdrew towards the Southwest. The company immediately received mortar and small arms fire. Artillery fire was shifted from the possible withdrawal route back to the area surrounding the perimeter. Platoons were directed to sweep around the perimeter and be ready to move in pursuit.

i. At 011029, all firing had ceased and one platoon moved to the Southwest in pursuit. At 011030, this platoon began receiving small arms fire. Close artillery fire was called and the platoon again moved forward receiving sporadic small arms fire.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for 1 May 67

j. At 011058, the patrol rejoined the company. The patrol leader reported observing the enemy force carrying thirty dead and wounded moving South towards coordinates YA790330. This enemy force had spotted the patrol but contact had been broken. Heavy artillery fire was placed on the reported coordinates.

k. At 011058, sweeps around the perimeter began locating enemy bodies and weapons. All small arms fire had ceased by this time. The LZ was secured and medivac and resupply helicopters were called.

l. At 011140, B Company, observed two NVA moving East at YA81332. One was killed, the other escaped to the West.

m. By 011212 resupply and casualty evacuation had been completed and the element securing the LZ moved to rejoin the company moving to the southwest. An artillery aerial observer reported sighting many enemy wounded in vic of YA790330. An airstrike was diverted to that location and A Company instructed to move as rapidly as practical to that location and attempt to regain contact with the enemy.

n. There was no more contact with enemy forces. A Company moved south to vic of YA790330 and at 011800 linked up with B Company vic of YA794328. The A Company Commander was evacuated because of a head wound received earlier in the day. The B Company Commander was made commander of the combined force. Plans were made for a search of the area the next day.

12. Results of the search were:

24 NVA KIA (body count)
1 NVA MIA captured
18 individual weapons (7-AK47, 10 SKS rifle, 1 type 54 pistol)
1 RPD light machine gun
1 B-40 rocket launcher
4 60mm mortar rounds
44 82mm mortar rounds
11 B-40 rockets
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for 1 May 67

52 hand grenades
5 sets of web gear
24 pioneer tools

On 2 May, B Company located a bunker complex at Y=793332 which had been evacuated hastily. In this complex was an aid station with medical supplies, an operating table and whole blood.

US Losses were:

3 KIA
16 WIA

1 AN/PRC-25 radio captured and 1 AN/PRC-25 radio destroyed.

TRUE COPY /s/John P. Vollmer
FRANCIS E. CUTLER
Maj., Armor

LTC, Infantry
Commanding

1. (C) Name or identity and/or type of operation: FRANCIS MARION (MAC CO III): Search and Destroy Operation.

2. (C) Dates of Operation: 181040H May 67 to 241345H May 67.

3. (C) Location: PLEI DOG (YA719309, YA717308, YA716315).

4. (C) Control or Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

5. (C) Reporting Officers: Col Jackson, 1st Brigade Commander; LTC Cannon, 1/8 Inf Commander; Capt Williamson, 1/8 Inf Commander; Capt Sholly and Lt Allen, 1/8 Inf Commander; and Capt Peterson, 1/8 Inf Commander.

6. (C) Task Organization:

   1/8 Inf: A1/8 Inf
   1/8 Inf: A6/29th Arty
   1/8 Inf: B5/16th Arty
   1/22nd Inf
   1BL/69th Armor

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

   a. A6/29th Arty (105mm) DS Battery fired 8300 rounds in support of operation.
b. B5/16th Arty(155) (Reinforcement) Battery fired 4940 rounds in support of operation.

c. C5/16th Arty(155) Battery fired 1845 rounds in support of operations.

d. B6/14th Arty(8 inch and 175) batteries fired 1794 and 690 rounds respectively in support of operation.

e. Fires from all batteries were extremely effective. Artillery adjustments were within twenty-five (25) meters of supported troops. During the periods of limited or no contact, batteries fired battle field denial fires within 400 meters of the unit's perimeter.

f. Air: Immediate request for air support was forwarded thru both Army and Air Force channels. Throughout the period from 18 May to 23 May there were 57 sorties flown with mixed ordnance (napalm, cluster bombs, 20mm, and 500 GP bombs). Over all results of airstrikes are unknown, however a POW captured on 21 May indicated that he had heard that one airstrike had hit one of the NVA battalions. Gunships employed against small pockets of resistance supplemented airstrikes and artillery effectively.

8.(C) Intelligence: The terrain throughout the entire contact area is primarily single canopy jungle forest. The trees vary from 5 to 30 inches in diameter and from 15 to 75 feet in height. The vegetation is comparatively dense in most areas affording limited visibility and limiting speed of movement. There are numerous small streams in the area that generally flow northwest. They eventually flow into the SE San River which forms the Cambodian border to the west. To the north and east are densely wooded mountains. To the south towards Highway 19 the area opens and becomes somewhat level. There are numerous high speed trails throughout the area.

The enemy was estimated to be possible elements of the 66th NVA Regiment which had made previous contact with the 3rd Bn, 12th Inf. The enemy unit that was contacted was the 320th or 32nd NVA Regiment which had a total strength estimated between 1200 and 1400 personnel. All three battalions of the regiment were contacted at one time or another during the period.

During the contact on the 18th the 4th platoon was lured into an ambush. The NVA tactics could best be described as a "Lame Duck Act". The total enemy force contacted on the 18th was one NVA battalion.

Between the contact on the 18th and the 20th the NVA did not attempt to break contact. The NVA maintained contact through the use of small trail parties and reconnaissance elements.

During the contact on the 20th the NVA used an estimated force of two battalions with one battalion in reserve.

During both attacks the enemy made maximum use of terrain, cover, and concealment. The enemy used mortars and automatic weapons in a basically conventional role, and to maximum advantage. The amount of mortar ammunition fired indicates that the NVA were capable of more than harassing fire.
The morale and discipline of the NVA troops was considered very high. This can be accounted for by their recent arrival in South Vietnam from Cambodia. It is further demonstrated by the manner in which they conducted both attacks and their actions during the contacts, that they appeared to have been well coordinated and had good esprit de corps.

Enemy losses can be estimated between 150 and 200 KIA in addition to the 157 KIA (BC). It is estimated 150-250 additional personnel were wounded in the contact. A total of 400-500 were wounded or killed in the 32nd Regiment, thus decreasing its combat strength by an estimated 30 percent.

9. (C) Mission: 1/8 Inf to establish FSB vic DUG CO (YA769239) to conduct S&D operations in assigned AO to locate and destroy enemy forces and installations.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: 1/8 Inf established FSB vic YA790239 on 13 hr. Companies A and B (mutually supporting) commenced sweep to the west northwest to vic YA7331 where they would then sweep east. Co C initially provided security at FSB.

11. (C) Action prior to separation of the 4th platoon of Co B, 1/8 Inf:

Co B was moving north on an azimuth of 350 degrees, when at 1040 hours vic YA720306, it spotted and fired at, 1 NVA in khaki uniform with weapons. The NVA withdrew to the north on a high speed trail. The unit swept the area and continued to proceed north in a column of platoons with the 4th platoon on the left front, the 2nd platoon on the right front, and the 3rd and 1st platoons bringing up the left and right rear files respectively.

At 1055 hours vic YA721307 the point squad of the 2nd platoon observed three (3) NVA in khaki to their front. The column was halted and the platoon leader moved forward. The platoon leader was informed that the men heard voices to their front. At this time one (1) NVA in khaki and armed with an AK-47 stepped into view on the right front of the formation. The platoon leader yelled in Vietnamese for the NVA to "come here" in hopes of capturing him. The NVA then attempted to fire on the platoon and the platoon leader and several members of his platoon fired on the NVA. The one NVA fled to the north. The three (3) NVA first sighted fled to the northwest.

The company commander, Lt Allen, then maneuvered the company to sweep to the north along the ridge where the NVA were sighted. Upon sweeping the contact area the company found a fresh, well used trail running generally east-west and another well used trail running north-south. The unit established a perimeter and started cutting a PZ to evacuate the 4 NVA ruck sacks that had been found in the area (Sec T & B a).
The company commander then sent the 1st platoon to the east southeast to check that portion of the trail, and the 4th platoon was sent to the west and northwest to check out the trail in that direction. They were instructed to go no farther than 200 meters. The 1st platoon moved along the trail to the southeast for a distance of 250 meters and returned with negative findings. The 4th platoon started to the northeast along the trail. The trail forked to the north and the 4th platoon then moved in a northerly direction. At approximately 1130 hours the 4th platoon observed 1 NVA and received small arms fire. The platoon leader called back and requested to pursue the one NVA.

At approximately 1200 hours the volume of fire had increased in intensity and the platoon was receiving fire. The company commander informed the platoon to return to the company perimeter. The platoon attempted to return to the company perimeter but was unable to do so as it was receiving heavy AW fire from the east, between the platoon and the company.

The company commander then started to maneuver the company in a northnortheasterly direction to link up with the 4th platoon. The company was in a line formation with the 1st platoon in the rear as reserve, the 3d platoon on the left, the 2d platoon on the right, with the CP group in the middle. The company moved approximately 20 meters forward of the company perimeter. The point elements of the 2d and 3d platoons came under intense fire (See Incl B) in which several men were wounded. The company was unable to move forward and attempted to maneuver to the right and left flank but was pinned down by AW and small arms fire on both sides. The company then went into a perimeter defense.

At this point the description of the action has to be separated as the 4th platoon was one separate element and the company was another.

b. Action of the 4th platoon, Co B after separation:

The 4th platoon after initially moving to the west observed one NVA wearing a green uniform and carrying a ruck sack. The platoon attempted to close with the NVA and started following a trail that ran NW to SE from the main EW trail. The platoon then observed 4-5 NVA and then 10-15 NVA. It was at the last sighting that the platoon started receiving small arms and AW fire. At this time the platoon leader called in and requested assistance from the company. The company commander attempted to move to his aid. The platoon then started receiving heavy AW fire from the east, northeast and southeast between its location and the company's. The platoon leader then requested artillery fire.

The platoon was divided into two elements when initially moving along the trail. When the firing first started, the rear element was ordered to link up with the load element. As this was being accomplished the platoon was taking fire from the north in relatively heavy volume and receiving sniper fire from the west. The platoon at this time had one radio destroyed, leaving only one operational radio. The platoon then started receiving heavy AW fire from the southeast, east and northeast. They reported that they were cut off and could not move back to the remainder of the company. The platoon therefore moved to the west into a ravine to set up a defensive perimeter.
Apparently the platoon could not reach the company on the company net and switched the remaining radio to the BN command net. In this manner it established communications with the company. The platoon's fire commands were then relayed over the battalion command net.

The battalion commander was located in his O&C aircraft over the scene of the contact. He was able to communicate with company CP but could not talk to the 4th platoon. Occasionally he was able to hear the platoon leader relaying a report to the company CP.

The platoon is believed to have had only 2 smoke grenades, which were used early in the contact in an attempt to mark its position for the adjustment of artillery. However, due to the heavy canopy these two grenades were not effective markers.

As the platoon withdrew to the west it was surrounded and was receiving heavy AW, MG, B40, and sniper fire from all sides. Seven men of the platoon ran to the west and into a small creek bed. All but one of these men were immediately killed by machine gun fire from the northwest (See Tab C). The platoon established a perimeter approximately 15 to 20 meters in diameter which consisted of three groups (See IncI D).

The platoon leader moved from the vicinity of the stream to the command group and radio, and started requesting artillery fire to his west. The first round was smoke and the platoon leader was unable to observe. He then started calling in corrections to move the artillery to the west, and it was moved closer to his front. The platoon was getting hit from all sides with enemy fire. The survivors indicate there was a machine gun and B40 rocket launcher to the southeast, a B40 rocket launcher to the north northeast, and snipers and AW on all sides.

The platoon leader moved from the vicinity of the stream to the command group and radio, and started requesting artillery fire to his west. The first round was smoke and the platoon leader was unable to observe. He then started calling in corrections to move the artillery to the west, and it was moved closer to his front. The platoon was getting hit from all sides with enemy fire. The survivors indicate there was a machine gun and B40 rocket launcher to the southeast, a B40 rocket launcher to the north northeast, and snipers and AW on all sides.

The platoon leader attempted to overrun the platoon from the west across the creek but were repelled. At 1337 hours the artillery was cut off and the gunships started to work the area on the west side of the stream. The platoon leader talking to the aircraft indicated the aircraft were firing where he wanted them, but the survivors indicated the aircraft were not effective as they were firing too far west.

At 1404 hours the artillery was employed again. The platoon leader called for artillery fire closer to his position. At approximately 1458 hours the platoon leader requested artillery fire on top of his position because he was being overrun. About this time the command group was killed by machine gun and rocket fire.

The survivors indicated the NVA were in a line formation, firing as they moved, and stopping to search each body and gather the weapons, ammunition, canteens, and other personal effects, i.e. jewelry (watches and rings). The NVA tied two of the survivors hands behind their backs as if going to take them prisoner, but left them in place. The NVA swept the platoon's area from two directions, initially from the east, and a few minutes later another group came into the area from the northwest.

According to the survivors at least two persons who had been wounded were deliberately shot by the NVA. All of the survivors either played dead or were unconscious from wounds while the NVA searched the perimeter.
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One of the NVA's who was apparently the leader, would kick a body several times in the back or ribs and if it moved it might be shot. The survivors estimate the NVA were in the area approximately 30-40 minutes, methodically searching all personnel. After searching the bodies, the NVA withdrew to the west across the stream. The survivors indicate the NVA kept up constant activity during the night but never reentered the platoon area. In the morning the survivors could see only 1 NVA in a tree as Co A approached. He left the area without firing a round.

Co A closed with the 4th platoon of Co B at 1900/20 May and found 7 US WIA, 1 man unharmed, and discovered 1 man MIA. At this time a PZ was cut and all WIA'S and WIA'S were evacuated.

c. Action of Co B(-) after separation of the 4th Platoon:

The company commander of Co B, being unable to maneuver and close with the 4th platoon due to the intense NVA and sniper fire, organized the remainder of the company in a perimeter and at 1400 hours started cutting a PZ to evacuate the wounded.

Co A was located via Y733303 at 1330 hours and was instructed to move and close Co B's location from the northeast. At 1512 hours Co A was located via Y728308 moving west to assist Co B. At this time Co A was diverted to move south to a suitable PZ location via Y730305.

At 1620 hours the 2nd platoon of Co B again attempted to close with the 4th platoon and was again stopped at the ravine to the front. The company commander then ordered the company to remain in the perimeter and to complete the PZ as soon as possible. At 1645 hours Co B reported that it was receiving only sporadic small arms and sniper fire, and it had had no contact with the 4th platoon for the last hour.

At 1725 hours the first element of the Recon Platoon and Capt Sholly (Co B commander) were airlifted from the fire support base into the Co B(-) location. The last element of Recon closed Co B's location at 1745 hours.

At 1755 hours a Medevac aircraft reported receiving fire from the south west of Co B's location. Gunships and artillery were employed against the fire. Co B reported receiving sporadic NVA fire from the north but in a decreasing amount. It appeared that the enemy was attempting to break contact.

At 1815 May Co A closed into the designated area via Y730305 and proceeded clearing a sufficient area for a one aircraft PZ. At 1755 the first element of Co A was lifted to Co B(-) with the last of Co A closing Co B's location at 1915 hours. At 1925 hours Co A moved west in an attempt to link up with the 4th platoon of Co B. The movement utilized illumination from an Air Force flare aircraft. At 2245 hours Co A stopped moving and set up its night location via Y713306, having made no contact with the 4th platoon of Co B. (It was later determined that Co A had passed 100 meters south of the 4th platoon's location.)
At 190219H May Co B(-) reported receiving estimated 30 rounds of mortar fire from the north at a range of 500-600 meters. All mortar rounds landed outside the perimeter. No small arms fire was received during the night. At 0627H on the 19th Co B reported receiving 5 rounds of 840 rocket fire from the north.

At 190705H May Co A started moving north, then east and at 0820 hours linked up with the 4th platoon of Co B.

Co C, 1/8 Inf was relieved of mission of FSB security at 190800H May and Co C, 1/22 Inf was placed under OPCON 1/8 Inf. 1/22nd Inf closed 1/8 Inf FSB at 0940 hours and assumed security mission.

At 0940H the 1st element of Co C(-) was lifted from the fire support base into Co B's location with the last lift closing at 1100H. The 3rd platoon of Co C, operating with the CIDG, was lifted from vic YA793292 at 1100H closing Co B's location at 1914H May.

During the remainder of the 19th all three companies swept the battle field finding a total of 119 NV, KIA (BC). At 1730H May Co B received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from vic YA713313. Artillery and airstrikes were employed and the mortar fire ceased. All companies closed their night locations by 1700H. Co A located vic YA718309 and Co B and Co C vic YA722310.

d. Subsequent action: 20 May to 24 May 67:

It was planned that on 20 May all companies would sweep west with Co A and Co C abreast and Co B trailing. Upon sweeping west to the ridge vic YA710315 they would then turn north and close location vic YA715317. Both objectives would have an artillery prep prior to the movement of the companies.

At 200515H May Co B reported receiving 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire outside the perimeter. At 0730 hours an outpost for Co C vic YA723310 observed and fired on 3 NV, that were moving north. At 1005H Co B received 10 additional mortar rounds outside the perimeter. At 1130H all units were prepared to move awaiting the artillery prep.

At 1159H artillery prep commenced vic YA713315. At 1233H all three companies finding the current objective swept the first objective started moving north. Co C located 5 unexploded 82mm mortar fuses vic YA713313 and two mortar positions vic YA715310 along a NW to SE trail that had been recently used. At 1433H Co C observed and fired 1 NV with negative results. The NV withdrew to the west. At 1510H Co A found three mortar positions with fifty foxholes in a perimeter vic YA717318.

At 201600H Co A, Co B, and Co C went into their night location vic YA717317 and established one large perimeter 200 meters north and south by 250 meters east and west. Co B was on the south, Co A on the west and north, and Co C on the north and east. At 202000H Co A, Co B and Co C reported receiving mortar fire from the southwest and NV, attacking from the southeast, south, and southwest, at this time a FOG, FT flare ships, and immediate air strikes were requested. Artillery fire was employed to the companies' south vic

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The attack was primarily from the south. It was initiated by a mortar attack and when the mortars shifted to the north the enemy attacked from the south. The NVA attacked in three separate waves using grenades, B40 rockets, machine guns, and individual weapons. The enemy soldiers were able at times to advance to within five to ten meters of the company defensive position.

At 202247H May the companies reported that small arms fire had ceased, but they were still receiving sporadic mortar rounds and B40 rockets. Units estimated that a total of 175 mortars and 45 B40 rockets had been received as of 2400 hours in addition to the small arms, 60 fire, and three ground attacks.

At 210011H May Co B reported hearing voices on the hill to their south via YAZ12310 and artillery was fired into the area. At 210114H the first US WIA was evacuated utilizing a hoist. At 210347H Co B reported receiving grenades that were being thrown into the perimeter every two or three minutes. Units still reported hearing voices to their front in all directions. Co B received an estimated 35-40 grenades. At 210439H Co B reported movement to the south and artillery was fired into the area. At 210600H the Air Force ship was released. At 210600H Co B reported movement to the south and artillery was fired into the area.

At 210700H the companies started sweeping the perimeter in all directions. At 210718H Co B reported finding two armed NVA WIA's and was trying to take them prisoner. At 210745H the companies reported receiving mortar fire from vic YAZ12304. Artillery was directed into the area and the mortar fire ceased. By 210945H all companies reported that all fire had ceased and they were again sweeping the perimeter out to 500 meters. At 0927 hours Co B reported that it had captured the two wounded NVA but one had died of wounds. The other was evacuated at 0945 hours to Brigade Headquarters. At 1011 hours the Medevac aircraft reported receiving small arms fire via YAZ16320. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

The decision was made to again reinforce the battalion forward area. All personnel, not absolutely essential, were drawn from the base camp and trains area and sent forward. At 211305H the engineer squads from Co A, 4th Engineers were sent to the forward area to start clearing a suitable two-aircraft LZ. During the remainder of the day all companies were resupplied with ammunition, rations, water, and personnel. The companies swept the area in all directions finding several weapons and evidence that many NVA had been killed. The units also found enemy wire and small trails that had been cut to within 15-20 meters of the perimeter. At 1450H a Bn TACCP was set up in the forward area for greater control and increased communications.

Aircraft that went in and out of the forward area all day periodically reported receiving small arms and 60 fire 300-1500 meters to the west and northwest of the forward location. The battalion employed heavy denial fires around the company positions during the night.
On the morning of the 22nd Co A found a recently used, high speed trail vic YA713156 running north to south. The unit also observed 2 NVs running north on a trail and fired at them with negative results. The units conducted saturation patrolling during the remainder of the day finding one mortar position vic YA713313, a well used trail running east to west vic YA713166, several fresh graves, assorted equipment, and some documents.

At 211530H all patrols closed back into the perimeter; OP's were sent out, and preparations were continued until dark on the LZ, perimeter fortifications, and protective bunkers. During the night of the 22nd the LP's periodically reported seeing lights to the west, and hearing movement all around them.

The companies again searched in all directions from their position on the 23rd. It was planned to move the battalion back to Jackson Hole on the morning of the 24th and to move Co B and Co C, 3/8 Inf into the forward area. At 231615H an arm and an SF aircraft received AK-47 fire from vic YA 66290. Gunships and SF aircraft were employed and the fire ceased. There was negative contact the remainder of the day and on the 24th Co B and Co C, 3/8 Inf replaced 1/8 Inf. Some of the aircraft received small arms fire damaging two aircraft. Artillery and airstrikes were called and the fire ceased.

Searching of the battle area around the companies' perimeter on 21, 22, and 23 May resulted in a body count of 38 NVA KIA.

12. (C) Results:

a. EN Losses:

(1) 18 May: 119 NVA KIA (BC), 3 AK-47s, 1 SKS, 1 B40 rocket launcher, and 6 Chicom grenades.

(2) 20 May: 38 NVA KIA (BC), 1 NV.C(WL), 3 RPD, 4 AK-47s, 31 Chicom grenades, 1 B40 rocket launcher, 20 AK-47 magazines and ammo, 10 RPD magazines, 7 web bolts, 11 entrenching tools, and 22 82mm mortar rounds.

b. US Losses:

(1) 18 May: 29 KIA, 31 WIA, 1 MLA, 28 M16 rifles, 1 M60 MG, 1 PRC 25 radio.

(2) 20 May: 16 KIA, 65 WIA, 0 MLA.

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Resupply was initiated on the 18th and was limited to 4 cases of smoke, 6 cases of 5.56, 2 cases of 7.62 link, and 200 gallons of water. 19 May was normal resupply day. Resupply on 21 May consisted of 12 cases of smoke, 10 cases of grenades, 10 cases of 7.62 link, 10 cases of 5.56, 10 cases of bangalore torpedoes, 10 cases of claymore mines, 8,000 sand bags, 200 gallons of water, 4 chain saws, 20 'D' handle shovels, 15 axes, 16 cases of trip flares, 12 cases of hand flares, and 4 cases of 40mm ammunition. All this equipment was delivered by HULD helicopters.
All combat troops carried 3 times the basic load of ammunition. Weapons carried were the M-16 M14A1, and the M60 MG.

b. N/A

c. Initial treatment of injured was conducted by organic medics. On 18 May all WIA were evacuated by helicopter by 1900 hours with the exception of the WIA with the 4th platoon of Co B. Evacuation from the action on the night of 20 May was hampered by low ceiling and malfunction of the hoist on one of the medevac aircraft. Further evacuation started at 210114 hours and was completed at 21113011 May.

d. Transportation: N/A

e. Communications: Conmo was maintained with the companies with organic equipment during the contact on 18 May (292 mast head and lead wire attached to PRC 25 at company level). During the contact on the 20th communications were supplemented by the command and control aircraft. Communications were continuous throughout the actions with the exception of the loss of communication with the 4th platoon, Co B, (See Execution).

f. Medical Evaluation: Of all the US WIA only six were considered serious. Twenty personnel were returned to duty and the remainder were evacuated to higher medical facilities.

14. (C) Special Equipment: None

15. (C) Commander's analysis: There were no Civil Affairs in the contact area due to the lack of civilian population. From the 18th to the 24th ten leaflet drops consisting of 556,000 leaflets and eight tape missions with a total of eight and one-half hours of playing time were flown over the contact area.

16. (C) Recommendation:

a. Problem area: Ability to identify targets for air support and to provide continuous artillery coverage while aircraft are on target.

(1) Recommendation: Units should be issued additional 40mm star clusters or some equally suitable pyrotechnic for use in marking friendly locations, both during the day and the night.

17. (C) Lessons Learned: It is felt that there were no new Lessons Learned from those contacts, merely reinforcements of old Lessons Learned.

4 Incl as /s/ Timothy G Gannon
THOMAS G GANNON
LTC INF
Commanding

A TRUE COPY

FRANCIS E. CUTLER
Maj, armor

CONFIDENTIAL
A - Command Group
B - Pers Killed in Stream
C - Survivors
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 22 May 67

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
APO US Forces 96265

1. Name of Operation: Francis Marion
2. Date of Operation: 220700H May 67 - 221530H May 67
3. Location:
   a. 3rd Bn, 12th Inf CP - YA758386
   b. A 3/12 - YA732346
   c. B 3/12 - YA732346
   d. C 3/12 - YA758386
4. Command and Control Headquarters: Hq, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
5. Reporting Officer: LTC John P. Vollmer
6. Task Organization:
   Hq, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
   Company A, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
   Company B, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
   Company C, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf
7. Supporting Forces:
   a. Battery B, 6th Bn, 29th Artillery
   b. Battery A, 6th Bn, 14th Artillery
   c. Battery B, 6th Bn, 14th Artillery
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 22 May 67

d. Battery E, 5th Bn, 16th Artillery

e. Battery C, 5th Bn, 16th Artillery

f. USAF, Tactical Air Strikes

8. Intelligence: The 1st Bn, 8th Inf, was attacked on 18 May by an estimated NW battalion while conducting S&D operations 5000 meters south of the 3rd Bn 12th Inf.

9. Mission: The 3rd Bn, 12th Inf was to move south with two companies and link up with the maneuver companies of the 1st Bn, 8th Inf.

10. Background:

a. On 21 May, A 3/12 had moved south along high ground from vic YA728373. The company closed into a night location with B 3/12 at YA732346.

b. On 21 May, B 3/12 had moved southeast from vic YA728373 to valley running north - south vic YA735363; then moved south along valley. The company closed into its night location, prepared positions and waited for A 3/12 to arrive.

c. C 3/12 was securing the Bn FSB.

11. Execution:

a. At 220700 May, A&B companies were preparing to depart their combined night defense location at YA732346. Both companies reported all quiet at 220705 May.

b. At 220710 May, the defensive perimeter began receiving mortar fire. The number of mortars firing could not be determined. Immediate air support was requested in addition to all available artillery.

c. At 220723 May, the companies began receiving small arms fire from the west and southwest. Mortar fire became heavier and more accurate. The enemy force was estimated to be at least one company. B Company reported heavy attack from the west and fired defensive concentrations. The attack let up some at this time. Both companies reported still receiving mortar fire and rockets. Enemy personnel were seen around the perimeter but no concentrated effort was made to overrun the position.
SUBJECT: Combat after action Report for 22 May 67

d. At 220815, both companies were still receiving heavy fire from both mortars and small arms. Enemy personnel used the cover of this fire to move close to the perimeter. A Company received grenades and concentrated small arms fire from the west. As the attack intensified, troops from the east side of the perimeter were shifted to the west. This enabled the defense to stop the enemy before a penetration was made.

e. By 220900 May, both companies reported being low on ammunition and requested its resupply by air drop. Mortar and small arms fire were being received continuously.

f. Air Force fighters arrived over the area at 220941. Artillery fire was shifted to the east of the defensive perimeter and air strikes were run on the west, southwest, and northwest. This was followed quickly by gunships firing close to the perimeter. Upon completion of gunship attack, artillery fire was brought back around the perimeter.

g. At 221017 May, helicopters delivered two loads of ammunition into the perimeter. The perimeter still received mortar and small arms fire but the attack appeared to be letting up. Sporadic fire was received from the southeast. By 221050 May all firing had ceased.

h. Artillery and air strikes continued to be placed around the perimeter to block withdrawal routes from the battle area. At 221145 May, medical evacuation of wounded began. Both A & B companies prepared to secure the LZ for evacuation of wounded and equipment.

i. A Company with one platoon from B Company began to search the battlefield at 221250 May. B Company remained in the perimeter to secure the LZ for evacuation of wounded and equipment.

j. At 221300 May, A Company, 3rd Bn, 8th Inf arrived at the fire support base and assumed defense of perimeter.

k. C Company, 3rd Bn, 12th Inf began moving by helicopter from the fire support base to reinforce A and B Companies at 221434 May. C Company was directed to move to Vic Y471934 to prepare night defensive positions for all three companies. A and B Companies continued to search the battlefield.

l. By 221530 May, all companies ceased detailed search of the battle area and began moving to their night defensive positions. Plans were made to continue the search on the next day.
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 22 May 67

12. Results:

a. Interrogation of a POW captured during the search indicated A and B companies were attacked by a reinforced NVA battalion.

b. A search of the battle area by A, B and C Companies discovered the following:

1. 79 NVA - KIA (BC)
2. 4 NVA - WIA (POW)
3. Enemy Weapons and Equipment:
   - 10 AK47
   - 8 SKS Rifles
   - 2 RPD Light Machine Gun
   - 26 60mm Mortar rounds
   - 32 Chicom grenades
   - Miscellaneous web gear, helmets, uniforms, canteens and medical supplies.

c. Friendly casualties were:
   - A 3/12 - 2 KIA, 33 WIA
   - B 3/12 - 8 KIA, 36 WIA
   - Hq Co 3/12 - 8 WIA

d. It is felt that more enemy KIA and weapons would have been found if the truce for Buddha's Birthday had not forced a cessation of artillery fire at 222400 May.

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/s/John P. Vollmer
JOHN P. VOLLMER
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS 3RD BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY
"Braves Always First"
APO 96265

AVDDA-BRAC-3C

8 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report for 24 May 1967

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96265

1. (U) Name of Operation: Francis Marion
2. (U) Date of Operation: 241600H May 67 - 241752H May 67
3. (U) Locations:
   a. 3d Bn, 12th Inf CP - YA 756396
   b. Company A, 3/12th Inf - YA 758396
   c. Company B, 3/12th Inf - YA 739346
   d. Company C, 3/12th Inf - YA 734344
4. (U) Command and Control Headquarters: HQ, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
5. (C) Reporting Officer: LTC John P. Vollmer
6. (C) Task Organization:
   HQ, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
   Company A, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
   Company B, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
   Company C, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
7. Supporting Forces:
   a. Battery B, 6th Bn, 29th Artillery
   b. Battery C, 6th Bn, 29th Artillery

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 24 May 1967

- Battery A, 5th Bn, 16th Artillery
- Battery B, 5th Bn, 16th Artillery
- Battery C, 1st Bn, 92d Artillery
- Battery A, 6th Bn, 14th Artillery
- Battery B, 6th Bn, 14th Artillery
- Battery C, 5th Bn, 16th Artillery
- USAF, Tactical Air Strikes

6. (C) Intelligence: Elements of the 32d NVA Regiment and the 66th NVA Regiment were known to be operating in the Chu Goungot Mountain Area. On 22 May 67, A 3/12th and B 3/12th were attacked by the 7th Bn, 66th NVA Regiment at YA 739346.

9. (C) Mission: The 3d Bn, 12th Inf was to conduct search and destroy operations with two companies while moving east along the northern lower slopes of Chu Goungot Mountain.

10. (C) Background:

   a. A 3/12th was airlifted at 241500H May 67 from pick-up zone located at YA 732345 to the 3/12th PSE located at YA 758386.

   b. B 3/12th had moved from its night location located at YA 728346 to the new defensive location located at YA 739346. The company was preparing positions, clearing fields of fire and awaiting arrival of C 3/12th.

   c. C 3/12th had secured the pick-up zone located at YA 732345 during the extraction of A 3/12th. Upon completion of lift, at 241500H May 67, the company began moving to join B 3/12th at YA 739346.

11. (C) Execution:

   a. At 241500H May 67, B 3/12th reported receiving 82mm mortar fire. The enemy mortars were believed to be approximately 1000 meters from the company on an azimuth of 340 degrees. The firing ceased at 241600H May 67 as artillery fire was placed on the suspected locations.
8 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 24 May 1967

b. At 241613H May 67, the company perimeter was attacked from the North, Northeast, and Northwest. The company received heavy small arms fire from these directions. The enemy force was estimated to be approximately 100 men. NVA were observed within 25 meters of the perimeter.

c. Company C 3/12th located at TA 734344, was instructed to move with deliberate speed to join B 3/12th. C 3/12th began moving at 241613H May 67 to close with B 3/12th from the Southwest.

d. At 24161911 May 67, mortar fire again started to fall within the perimeter. Small arms fire was continuous from the North, Northeast and Northwest. In addition, sniper fire was received from the East and Southeast. Artillery fire was placed around the perimeter on all sides except the southwest.

e. Gunships arrived over the area at 241635H May 67. They were directed to sweep North and South along the high ground West of the Company location. A forward air controller arrived shortly thereafter and was instructed to strike the ridge line vic of YA 732346 making all runs from Northwest to Southeast.

f. At 241641H May 67, the lead elements of C 3/12th linked up with B 3/12th. Capt Hamer, commander of B 3/12th was placed in command of all elements on the ground. As C 3/12th platoons closed they were placed on the South portion of the perimeter. The last element closed into the perimeter at 241744H May 67. Both companies received heavy small arms fire from the North, East and Northwest. Immediately upon closure of C 3/12th the Northwest, West and Southwest sides of the perimeter were sealed off by air strikes.

g. There was a noticeable drop in the amount of small arms fire being received at 241738H May 67. After this only sporadic rifle fire was received. At 241752H all firing ceased as the enemy withdrew from the battle area. The battalion commander made the decision to pursue the enemy by fire only as B 3/12th was drastically understrength, both companies were short on ammunition and it was very late in the day.

h. Resupply helicopters made air drops of ammunition and medical supplies at 241756H May 67.

12. (C) Results:

a. 37 NVA KIA (BC)

b. 1 NVA WIA Captured.
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 24 May 1967

3. Enemy Weapons:

   (1) Individual Weapons:

      (a) 3 - AK-47
      (b) 3 - SKS Rifles

   (2) Crew-served Weapons: 2 60mm Rocket Launchers

4. Friendly Losses:

   (1) B 3/12th

      (a) 3 KIA
      (b) 14 WIA

   (2) C-3/12th

      (a) 1 KIA
      (b) 3 WIA

13. (C) Commander's Analysis: B Company, 3/12th Inf had been ordered to organize the position for two companies and preparation of the position had already begun when the enemy attack began. This early organization of the ground facilitated the reinforcement of the position by C 3/12th. B-3/12th was considerably under strength from actions completed 2 days before. That they withstood the enemy attack until reinforced in large part can be attributed to three additional factors; one, the company was well led to include NCO's; two, the fire power of the M16 rifle provided a significant advantage over individual enemy weapons power and finally, the terrain selected for a night position though in the jungle still commanded the area around it. For example, discussion with defenders of the hill revealed that the enemy had difficulty throwing grenades up on to the B 3/12th position and the climb slowed him and increased his vulnerability to small arms fire. This experience supports the assertion that even in the jungle, terrain is still important.

As the fight matured artillery was adjusted to within 50 meters of the defensive perimeter and the radial area away from the battle point also was raked and pounded with artillery fire throughout the fight.
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for 24 May 1967

One air strike technique was used which may be worthy of note. It was used two days prior and believed to have favorably affected the outcome of both battles. It consisted of splashing napalm on the high ground nearest the battle point so that it would be visible to the enemy. Defenders in both battles relate that a permanent reduction in enemy fires was coincident with the napalm demonstration.

/s/ John P Vollmer
/t/ JOHN P. VOLLMER
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

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FRANCIS E. CUTLER
MAJ, Armor
CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded Unclassified
When Separated From
Classified Inclosure

TAB F
3-8 Inf
26 May

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report (RCS: MACV J-3132)

THRU Commanding Officer
1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
ATTN: ADMA-BMC
APO San Francisco 96265

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: ADMA-CG
APO San Francisco 96265

1. (c) Name or identity and/or type of operation: FRANCIS HURON (DG CO III): Search and Destroy Operation.


3. (c) Location: PLEI DONG (YA 738311 and YA 738314).

4. (c) Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

5. (c) Reporting Officers: Lieutenant Colonel Lynch, 3d Battalion 8th Infantry, Commander.

6. (c) Task Organization:
   3/8 Inf: A 3/8 Inf
   B 3/8 Inf
   C 3/8 Inf
   G 6/29 Arty (105) (DS)
   A 5/16 Arty (155SP) (Reinforcing)

7. (c) Supporting forces:
   a. G/6/29 (DS) provided close in and blocking fires, firing a total of 410 rounds in support of the operation.
   b. A/5/16 (Reinforcing 6/29) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 609 rounds in support of the operation.
   c. B/5/16 (General Support Reinforcing 4/42) provided blocking fires, firing a total of 198 rounds in support of the operation.
   d. G/5/16 (GSR 4/42) provided blocking fires and fired 210 rounds in support of the operation.
   e. D/5/16 (GSR 6/29) provided blocking fires and fired 316 rounds in support of the operation.
   f. C/1/92 (GSR 6/29) provided blocking fires and fired a total of 243 rounds in support of the operation.

Downgraded at 3 Year Interval
Declassified After 12 Year
DOD DIR 5200.10
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g. 3/6/29 (63-3/12) fired blocking fires and fired a total of 94 rounds in support of the operation.

h. 4/6/14 (63 175/8") provided blocking fires and fired 33 rounds in support of the operation.

i. 4/6/14 (63 175/8") provided blocking fires and fired 33 rounds in support of the operation.

j. Artillery fires were effective as blocking and harassing fires.

k. Air: One immediate request for air support was forwarded through the FAC to the Air Force. There were a total of two air sorties flown and both were directed at a suspected mortar position at coordinates Y4727321. Results of the strike are unknown.

l. 84 Army Aviation: A total of 10 gunship sorties were flown during the contact. Six sorties were used as an air cap in security roles and four sorties were utilized in direct support of ground forces as close-in support. Gunships were requested through Brigade Headquarters and arrived on station 23 minutes after initial request was submitted. Continual support was requested and received until gunships were released at 261555 May 1967.

8.(c) Intelligence: The terrain in the contact area is primarily single canopy on top of ridges and double canopy in the draws and sides of ridges. Beneath the canopy it is generally open with scattered brush and trees throughout the area. The brush becomes less dense the further up it is on the ridge. On the low ground, the undergrowth is very heavy and thick, with overhead leaves and vines. Trees are 100 to 150 feet tall, 12 to 30 inches in diameter. Scattered throughout the area are numerous smaller trees. Fields of fire and observation are limited and restricted to 50 meters at the maximum.

Weather at the time of contact was hot and humid. The area was heavily overcast and ground visibility severely limited by fog. There had been a heavy rain prior to the contact and a light rain fell twice during the contact.

The enemy was estimated to be possible elements of the 32nd NVA Regiment which made previous contact with the 1st Bn 6th Inf. The enemy unit that was contacted was the 6th Bn 320th or 3rd NVA Regiment with a total strength between 300 and 500 personnel. The entire battalion participated in the action.

During the contact the enemy launched six ground attacks in an attempt to overrun B and C Companies. Some of these attacks were characterized by enemy armed only with hand grenades. Snipers in trees were employing the B-40 rocket launcher as an anti-personnel weapon with good results and 82mm mortars was employed in its conventional role with minimal effectiveness because of the closeness of contact and geography of the contact area. Some of the enemy ground attacks were repelled with hand to hand combat.

The morale and discipline of the NVA was considered high because they probably believed our troops to be the understrength companies of the 1/3 Inf. They appeared to be well coordinated and disciplined, and well armed. A variety of uniforms was noticed including complete khaki uniform, some khaki trousers and grey shirts; some khaki shorts; some black FD's; some khaki shirts with black trousers; and some khaki trousers with no shirt and red headgear.

Enemy losses in addition to 96 NVA (BC) are estimated at 75-100 enemy KIA. It is estimated that 100 additional personnel were wounded in the contact. A total of 275 - 300 were wounded or killed in the 6th Bn 32nd Regiment decreasing its combat strength by 60 percent.

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9.(c) Mission: 3/8 Inf to establish FSB vic coord Ya 824395 and to conduct search and destroy operation in assigned AO to locate and destroy enemy forces and installations.

10.(c) Concept of Operations: 3/8 Inf established FSB at Ya 824395 on 24 May 1967. Companies B and C airlifted into 1/8 Inf FSB coord Ya 789237 and further airlifted from 1/8 Inf FSB to Ya 824395 and began Search and Destroy Operations to the east, northeast, moving by bounds from one prominent terrain feature to the next. Co A provided FSB security.

11.(c) Execution:

a. Events prior to the contact starting 251750 May 1967.

251750 May: Instructions for 26 May were issued to B and C Companies. Instructions were for Company C to move from night location vicinity coordinates Ya 734308 and to close on B Company night location vicinity coordinates Ya 738314; B Company to conduct local patrolling with platoon size elements.

252230 - 260230 May: Company C reported hearing a total of 17 mortar rounds leaving mortar tubes; however, the rounds were not heard detonating. Rounds sounded as if they were being fired from the north of Company C's location vic 72 73333.

b. Actions which took place on the day of contact:

260745 May: Patrols departed from B Company in the following directions: 1st Platoon northwest; 3rd Platoon south; 4th Platoon southwest. The Company Commander of B Company left his 2nd Platoon at the Company's night location to secure the high ground.

260855 May: Company C reported that it was receiving sporadic sniper fire from the trees. The company, at this time was in a diamond formation with elements in the following order: 2nd Platoon leading; 3rd Platoon on the west flank; 4th Platoon on the east and the CP centered with 1st Platoon trailing. The Company Commander, Captain Powers was killed in the initial action and Lieutenant Johnson assumed command.

260905 May: Company C reported that 1st and 3rd Platoons. It simultaneously received a heavy ground attack from the west and southwest against the 1st and 3rd Platoons. The Company Commander then maneuvered the 2nd and 4th Platoons to the high ground (location of CP on sketch) to close the company perimeter on the north and northeastern side. While the 2nd and 4th Platoons were tightening the company perimeter on the north and northeastern side a second ground attack was launched against that portion of the perimeter being retained by the 1st and 3rd Platoons on the south and southeastern sides. At this time the B Company Commander was directed to move his company (less the 2nd Platoon which was to clear a landing zone at the night location) to to link up with C Company; he accomplished this by moving the 1st Platoon southwest along the side of the ridge, the 3rd Platoon west along the side of the ridge and the 4th Platoon southwest along the top of the ridge (sporadically improving the existing trail).

260915 May: Company C repelled the second ground attack and further tightened the perimeter around its CP location. Heavy sniper and 840 rocket fire continued. The ground attack had been of such ferocity that the company continued to kill NVA who had fallen within the companies lines and were continuing to fight.
260935 May: Company B (-) and the B Company Commander closed on the C Company perimeter. Simultaneously the NVA launched a third ground attack from the west and southwest accompanied by intensified 82mm rocket and sniper fire. Because the enemy was attacking from lower ground he attempted to place more personnel in trees in order to bring more effective direct fire into the perimeter area. Many NVA therefore, were killed climbing trees. Lieutenant Johnson, the acting C Company Commander was killed during the third ground attack. Command of the company was assumed by 1SGT Childors (who himself was wounded) and other NCO's at the platoon level. The only other officer in the company, Lieutenant Canello, was also seriously wounded during this third attack.

261010 May: The enemy initiated a 4th ground attack from the west and southwest. This attack was repelled and 82mm rocket fire temporarily ceased. Enemy location at this time was vicinity Y= 730312.

261020 May: A fifth ground attack was launched, again characterized by heavy sniper and 82mm fire and contact at distances of 10-15 meters. This attack too, was repelled.

261103 May: Companies B and C received a 6th and final ground attack, launched from vicinity coordinates Y= 733310. This attack was repelled at 1115 hours.

261115 May: Gunships were brought in 200 to 400 meters west of Y= 733310. Sniper fire decreased to moderately heavy, however 82mm fire increased in intensity and 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire were received from the southwest. Companies C and B (-) began moving to B Company's night location. As friendly ground forces withdrew from the contact area they continued to kill NVA who were pulling their dead into the ravine to the north. As the companies began to withdraw, sniper fire again increased in intensity; the battalion commander, therefore directed that B Company cease its withdrawal, cover the withdrawal of C Company, and conduct a limited sweep of the contact area.

261345 May: Battalion Commander entered LZ and assumed direct control of ground forces. Battalion commander ordered B Company to conduct a limited sweep of the contact area and all elements of B and C Companies to close B Company night location for the evening. Instructed the ALO to plan heavy suppressive fires in the area of contact.

261430 May: B Company continued withdrawal to its company night location.

261730 May: Recon Platoon 3/P Inf began lift into E Company's night location and completed the lift at 1800 hours at which time it became OSCON to Company C.

261745 May: Company B(-) completed sweep of immediate contact area bringing the last of friendly wounded and killed to the LZ. On this initial sweep 92 NVA KIA (0K), in the immediate contact area, were counted. It was noted at this time that all NVA KIA were as a result of small arms fire.

261800 May: Companies B and C secured for the evening and sniper fire terminated.

c. Subsequent action 27 through 28 May 1967: A search of the contact area was planned for first light on 27 May with B Company and Recon Platoon conducting the search. The entire area was searched until 1300 hours. A Company was airlifted into the LZ and C Company and Recon Platoon pulled back to FSB on 27 May. The lift started at 1215 hours and concluded at 1545 hours. In additional 4 bodies were found, 3 killed by artillery and 1 killed by small arms.

On 28 May a complete resupply of A and B Companies was conducted. Another search of the entire area was made.

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12. (c) Results:

a. Enemy losses, 26 May 1967: 96 NVA (KIA) (BC), 2 NVA WIA (POW), 18 AK 47's, 6 LMG, 4 RPG's, and 3 RPG's. 65 Chicom grenades, 15 82mm rounds, 1 barrel MG, 27 canteens w/cover, 29 ponchos, 19 ammo packets, 7 packs, 24 hammocks, 6 helmets, 21 aid packets, 1/2 mile coax wire, 1 FM radio complete w/extra headsets, 2500 rounds S/A ammunition and assorted magazines.

b. Friendly losses: 10 KIA (1 B Co and 9 C Co), 69 WIA (3 B Co and 61 C Co), 0 KIA, 3 M-16, 3 .45 Cal pistols, 2ea 160 MG, 2ea P1W 25 w/hand 't. 18 compasses, 2 pr binoculars, 24 entrenching tools, 26 poncho liners, 29 ponchos, 11 air mattresses, 22 machetes, 26 bayonets and 2ea strobe lights.

13. (c) Administration Matters:

a. Supply: Resupply was initiated on 26 May and was limited to ammunition and water. The 28th of May was full resupply for A and B Companies in the field.

b. Initial treatment of injured was conducted by organic medics. All WIA were evacuated to Jackson Hole, except for minor injuries, on 26 May 1967 at 1700 hours. Evacuation started at 261315 hours.

c. Transportation: N/A.

d. Communications: Companies were maintained with the companies through retrans unit. Company C and B both utilized long whip antennas to maintain contact. The FO with Co C maintained contact with the FO Company B at the night location working with a 292 lead wire and mast. During the contact on 26 May, communications were supplemented by command and control aircraft. Communication was continuous through the operation.

e. Medical evacuation: Of all US WIA only four were considered seri. Fifteen were returned to duty and the remainder were evacuated to higher medical facilities.

14. (c) Special Equipment: None

15. (c) Commander's analysis: There were no civil affairs conducted, due to lack of civilian populace in the area.


17. Lessons Learned: See attached Lessons Learned format. It is felt that old lessons learned were reinforced in several instances.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

THOMAS P. LYNCH
LTC, Armor
Commanding

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4 June 1967


6 Incl
1. Terrain Sketch - Hill 521
2. Combat Lesson Learned - Safety of Engaged Troops
3. Combat Lesson Learned - Security of the Battle Area
4. Combat Lesson Learned - Weapons Against Snipers in Trees
5. Combat Lesson Learned - Utilization of Artillery in Close Contact Areas
6. Combat Lesson Learned - Movement of Rifle Companies

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Route for Company B from night location

- C Company's night location
- 59 = 1st Platoon
- 60 = 2nd Platoon
- 61 = 3rd Platoon
- 62 = 4th Platoon

Inclusions 1

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Item: Moving of elements out of contact area.

Discussion: After the heavy contact was broken, the battalion CO directed that a limited sweep of the contact area be made and that all troops be moved to B Company's night location, in order to prevent further friendly casualties from mortars or further ground attacks.

Observation: It has been observed in past contacts that after a contact, the enemy normally mortared friendly positions.

2. Supporting Fact: (Fill in applicable info)

a. Source of Information: Battalion Commander 3d Bn 8th Inf
b. Unit: 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry
c. Activity being conducted: Contact with NVA Battalion while on Search and Destroy operation.
d. Date: 26 May 1967
e. Location: YA 735311
f. Weather: Overcast with ground clouds and intermittent rain.
g. Enemy: Type (NV or VC): NVA
   Estimated Strength: Battalion
   Disposition: Above ground with snipers in the trees
h. How contact was made: NVA initiated action by sniping at the CP.
i. Time of initial contact: 0855
j. Length of time in contact: 2 hours 50 minutes
k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by firing 82mm mortars and B 40's and withdrawing.

l. Summary of event or events from which the Combat Lesson Learned is drawn (Include comments/observations by individuals who witnessed or participated in the event): The Battalion Commander directed that all elements move from the contact area to the high ground. He directed heavy suppressive artillery fire in the area. It should be mentioned that relatively little was policed from the contact area during the night and that the new location was neither mortared nor attacked it the evening of the 26th or morning of the 27th.

Inclosure 2
Combating Lesson Learned: Security of Battle Area

Discussion: After the contact was broken, a brief sweep of the contact area was made by Company B. Company B & C then displaced to B Company’s night location.

Observation: Even though terrain was only briefly searched, emplacing of heavy artillery suppressive fires prevented the NVA from significantly policing the battle area.

2. Supporting Facts: (Fill in applicable info):
   a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
   b. Unit: 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry
   c. Activity being conducted: On Search and Destroy, after a major contact, withdrawing elements to high ground.
   d. Date: 26 May 1967
   e. Location: YA 736314
   f. Weather: Overcast, low clouds and intermittent rain showers.
   g. Enemy: Type: (NVA or VC): NVA
      Estimated strength: Battalion
      Disposition: Above ground with snipers in trees
   h. How contact was made: Contact was made by C 3/8 Inf as they were conducting Search and Destroy. NVA snipers initiated fires.
   i. Time of initial contact: 0950
   j. Length of time in contact: 2 hours and 50 minutes
   k. How contact was broken: Contact was broken by the NVA firing mortar or 3 40 rounds and withdrawing.

1. Summary of event or events from which the Combat Lesson Learned is drawn (include comments/observations by individuals who witnessed or participated in the event): After contact was broken by the NVA the Battalion Commander directed a limited sweep of the contact area and moved the 2 companies onto high ground (B Co night location) and completely cleared the contact area of friendly forces. Friendly wounded and dead were evacuated, however, NVA dead and equipment were left in place. During the night heavy concentrations of suppressive fires were planned for the area, and continued until friendly elements began sweep of contact area on the following morning. During search of area, 96 NVA bodies were found, 2 WIA NVA, and 32 weapons were located in the morning. The Battalion Commander felt that moving the troops in contact to a new location prevented more casualties and the artillery preserved the battle area.

Inclosure 3

Item: Use of the M79 (Grenade Launcher) shotgun and M60 MG against snipers.

Discussion: During the contact Company C and Company B faced numerous NVA snipers located in tops of the high trees in the area.

Observation: It was observed that the M79 GL shotgun and the M60 MG was most effective against the snipers in the trees. This was accomplished by firing M79 and shotguns direct fire and the M60 MG by spraying the tree tops.

2. Supporting Facts: (Fill in applicable info)

a. Source of Information: Battalion Commander, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
b. Unit: Companies C and B, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Battalion while on S&D mission.
d. Date: 26 May 67
e. Location: YA 75331
f. Weather: Overcast with ground clouds and intermittent rain.
g. Enemy: Type (NVA or VC): NVA
   Estimated strength: Battalion
   Disposition: Above ground with snipers in the high trees.
h. How contact was made: NVA initiated contact by sniping at CP plus initiating a ground attack.
i. Time of initial contact: 0855 hours
j. Length of time in contact: 2 hours and 50 minutes
k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by firing mortars and 840 rockets while withdrawing.

l. Summary of event or events from which the Combat Lesson learned is drawn (Include comments/observations by individuals who witnessed or participated in the event). It was found that because the snipers were located above the friendly forces the M67 LAW was not capable of firing into the trees. The M79 was effective; however, due to ground attacks and positions M60s were used mainly against ground forces. The M79, shotgun, and M60 MG were said to be most effective because of explosion effect of M79, shotgroup of the shotgun, and the spray effect of the MG.

Inclosure 4
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Utilization of artillery in close contact areas.

Item: Use of artillery to seal off areas of close contact.

Discussion: During close contact with enemy forces (within 10-15 meters of friendly elements) or when enemy snipers are in trees, it is necessary to seal off the contact area with artillery fire.

Observation: Because of the enemy disposition it is not possible to place close-in fires on the enemy. Therefore to prevent reinforcement or escape the contact area should be sealed off with artillery fire.

2. Supporting Facts: (Fill in applicable info):

a. Source of Information: 1st Co, 3d Bn, 8th Inf, A10 3d bn, 8th Inf
b. Unit: 3d Bn, 8th Inf
c. Activity being conducted: SNIP

d. Date: 26 May 67
e. Location: Yn 735311

f. Weather: Overcast, low ground clouds and intermittent rain

g. Enemy: Type (NVA or VC): NVA
   Estimated strength: Battalion
   Disposition: Above ground in formation and in trees

h. How contact was made: NVA initiated action with sniper fire

i. Time of initial contact: 0855

j. Length of time in contact: 2 hours and 50 minutes

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by firing mortars and B40 rockets while withdrawing.

1. Summary of event or events from which Combat Lesson Learned is drawn (include comments/observations by individuals who witnessed or participated in the event): The close proximity of enemy forces to friendly forces precluded placing artillery fires directly on the enemy. Therefore, fires were placed all around the contact area to preclude reinforcement and hamper withdrawal of the enemy.

Incorporation 5
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Movement of Rifle Companies

Item: Moving of Rifle Companies by bounds

Discussion: Prior to the contact on the 26th the rifle companies had been moving by bounds, one company on commanding terrain (stationary) and the other company moving to a new key terrain feature.

Observation: During the contact the method stated above proved a saving feature because, B Company held the critical terrain and Company C was moving on the highest terrain available.

2. Supporting Facts: (Fill in applicable info)

a. Source of Information: Battalion Commander 3/8 Inf

b. Unit: 3rd Battalion 8th Infantry

c. Activity being conducted: Companies B and C were in contact with an NVA Battalion

d. Date: 26 May 1967

e. Location: 16 73504

f. Weather: Overcast, with ground clouds and intermittent rain.

g. Enemy: Type (NVA or VC), NVA

h. Estimated Strength: Battalion

i. Disposition: Above ground and snipers in heavy foliage in top of trees.

j. How contact was made: NVA initiated contact by placing sniper fire on the CP group.

k. Time of initial contact: 0555

l. Length of time in contact: 2 hours and 50 minutes

m. How contact was broken: NVA fired 82mm mortars and 840 rockets and began withdrawal.

n. Summary of event or events from which the Combat Lesson Learned is drawn (Include comments/observations by individuals who witnessed or participated in the event):

The Battalion Commander, due to intelligence in the contact area and prior experience, decided at all times to command key terrain. The plan is to move one rifle company while the other rifle company remains stationary, maintaining contact with 292 mast and cable on commanding terrain. The maneuvering company moves to a key terrain feature within 2-3 hours of the stationary company’s location. When the maneuvering company is established on key terrain, the stationary company begins to move.

Incl: C 15
SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96262


/e/ Alfredo C Giddens
ALFREDO C GIDDENS
CPT, MSC
Adjutant

TRUE COPY
FRANCIS L CULLEN
MAJ, Armor
Historian
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AF 3: OPERATION REPORT
(12 July - 1967)

1. BACKGROUND: Prior to relating a description of the engagement between NVA forces and the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry (Red Berets) on 12 July 1967, North of the In Thong valley along the Cambodian border, it is deemed appropriate to provide certain background data concerning the overall scheme of operation of the Red Berets, intelligence available to the battalion, and a synopsis of the conditions of weather and terrain.

a. OPERATIONS: In accordance with guidance provided by 2nd Bde, an operation was developed to search out an area forward of reconnaissance and surveillance line to determine enemy activity and intent in this locale. Incl 1 is a schematic portrayal of the operation for the period 10-14 July 1967. Prior to the conduct of this operation the repositioning of the two rifle companies of the battalion into the northern area of the 1/20 developed minor sightings and certain small contacts.

b. TERRAIN: The general area of operations included the following coordinates: 8A 8217, 8211, 8717, and 8711. The northern portion of this area is dense undergrowth, bamboo, thick trees with high canopy, hills and steep ridges all making for difficult land navigation. There are no landing zones available other than for single ship strips in this area. The northern half of this area is slightly more open in that ground navigation is not as difficult due to lesser undergrowth, rolling hills, and a greater dispersion of trees. Streams are of the intermittent type throughout the area and are trafficable to foot troops with some degree of difficulty. Other than the northeastern portion of the area, identified in the "one's are minimal. Movement was also impeded by scattered rain throughout the day and night.

c. WEATHER: A combination of periodic rain and early morning fog and heavy ground cover impeded ground operations and air cover throughout the morning hours.

d. INTELLIGENCE: Two NVA regiments, 66th and 86th were reported to be astride the 1/2 of the 1st Battalion 12th Infantry in the Cambodian Sanctuary. One document found by 4/12 on 13 July at grid 8A 8312 indicated individual was associated with the 66th NVA Regiment. Incl 2 is a summation of spot reports received during period 8-11 July 1967. Additional verbal information was provided the battalion on rights of 9 and 10 July that enemy forces apparently were on the flanks and possibly to rear of F and C Companies and their intent was to mortar or fix our forces. Enemy sightings and contact during the same period are shown on Incl 2, and spor reports for the period on Incl 3.

2. EARLY MORNING: The early morning hours of 12 July 1967 found low around fog and no ceiling. Accordingly, the planned movement of Company to the east at 0700 was held in abeyance, pending more favorable weather conditions.
1/C/1/12 commenced a local sweep south from C/1/12 Company base at 12 \( \text{GMT} \). At 1204/18 1/C/1/12 reported spotting 12 NVs at \( \text{GMT} \) 09127 and killing three of them. The remaining NVs were reported to have fled south. See Inc 4 for schematic of maneuver.

P/1/12 was alerted to check out immediate area due to proximity of enemy force and also establish contact with 1/3/1/12 in order to secure this force.

An CP at C/1/12 sighted 30 NVs northeast of company base at \( \text{GMT} \) 09145. Tight security was placed around this position and mortar/artillery fires were utilized. No air or helicopters were available due to inclement weather. See Inc 5 for fires and schedule.

1B/1/12 in checking immediate area to east and south of company base noted movement to south of B/1/12 area at \( \text{GMT} \) 0955. At 0920 1/C/1/12 reported enemy force to west, moving north. 1/B/1/12 was sighted by enemy and mortar fires were brought in on the enemy element.

3/B/1/2 in checking area to west of company base, was instructed to establish radio communication with 1/C/1/12. 1/C/1/12 at 0950 reported enemy movement still around position and artillery/mortar fires were continually being placed forward, rear and flanks of the element. 1/C/1/12 was unable to move from his position.

At 1014 report received that 1/C/1/12 and 3/B/1/12 have an enemy force between them.

Warning order given to 1/C/12 (-) to be airlifted to 17 Yankee upon receipt of lift capability and force required to secure FSB requested from 2nd Brigade.

Command and Control helicopter arrived at 1052 and immediately was airborne over contact site with Battalion Commander, artillery DMO, and Sergeant Major, S-3.

Report received for 3/B/1/12 that NVs were moving to northeast and were engaged resulting in 2 NVs killed.

At 1106 report received from 1/C/1/12 that 3/B/1/12 and 1/C/1/12 had enemy force in cross fire between platoons.

B/1/12 reported at 1108 that enemy movement was observed to south and southwest of company base and that artillery and mortar fires were being utilized.

Report received at 1125 from 1/C/1/12 that enemy mortar fire received by 3/B/1/12 from east resulted in one WIA. Immediately thereafter large enemy force utilizing mortars moved on 3/B/1/12 from west and southwest.

At 1140 1/C/1/12 received small arms and automatic weapons fire from three directions while 3/B/1/12 received mortar and small fire; 2nd Brigade verified that 1/A/1/2 was to be combat assaulted in 1Z.
At 1145 B/1/12 moved out in relief of forces in contact with 2/8/1/12 in lead followed by 1/8/1/12, company headquarters and weapons platoon. Artillery fires being utilized by 3/8/1/12 to south of engagement held up. 2/8/1/12 and 1/8/1/12 pushed through to take up lead of B/1/12 movement.

At 1150 FAC (Cider 25) checked in area; simultaneously the Reconnaissance platoon was ordered to the FSB to provide command and control element for security of that location.

At 1200 B/1/12 reported receiving fire from the north and company commander reported wounded from mortar fire at 1220. 1st FAC directed to assume command temporarily until new commander could be brought in. In H-23 was dispatched from FSB with the Battalion Mortar Platoon Leader to assume command of B/1/12. The helicopter took MG rounds at the LZ, wounding the pilot and the mission was aborted.

At approximately 1230, FAC placed air strikes in support. See Incl 6 for air strikes and schedule. Communication problems on ground at B/1/12 occurred due to command group being hit repeatedly by mortars. The Company Commander was mortally wounded the FAC using both artillery and company nets, in addition to using the battalion command net for air strikes. Difficulty between this ground commander and FAC on shifting of artillery fire in order to bring air strikes resulted in check fire artillery being placed by the Brigade, through Air Force request. The Commander on ground wanted artillery fires where he had them but was unable to direct the FAC. At this precise moment the command and control ship was requested to be refueled at Duc 130 and command of the battalion was on the ground at FSB. The check fire was lifted by the Brigade Commander and the air was directed from the airborne Command and Control group.

At 1230 C/1/12 reported linking up with 1/8/1/12 and being forced back to initial company base. C/1/12 ordered to move immediately to relief of B/1/12 utilizing maximum air and artillery fires on flanks during movement. Enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire continued to bring pressure on C/1/12 but, with use of air and artillery movement continued.

At 1330 C/1/12 reported B/1/12 no longer receiving enemy fire and that automatic weapons fire was being placed on C/1/12 from northwest. Air strikes placed on enemy positions. No contact with B/1/12.

Task force comprised of elements of 3/8 Infantry and 1/10 Cavalry reported as moving overland to reinforce 1/12 Infantry from the north.

At 1355 C/1/12 had been inserted into 12 Yankee and commenced movement to southwest of B/1/12 location.

By 1541 report received that commander of B/8/1/12 had consolidated at company base area and maximum medical assistance and Dust Off ships required. Dust Off ships immediately brought into B/1/12 position as C/1/12 and 1/12 closed and consolidated their positions. The command group was inserted (Battalion CO, SMaj, RTO, Artillery DFC). Immediate resupply of critical items, ammunition, radios, weapons, and food commenced.

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Command elements on ground at company base of 1/12 the perimeter and 
landing zone were enlarged. Security forces were established and preparations 
for maximum use of air and artillery around the perimeter throughout the 
night commenced.

At 1700 gunships spotted location of friendly KIA and immediately C/1/12 
was directed to secure area and recover bodies. Artillery fires were placed 
forward and on the flanks of C/1/12 during recovery operation and gunships 
provided air cover and navigational assistance. Recover operation terminated 
approximately 1930 with evacuation of 32 KIA and 1 WIA. Sweep of battle area 
for weapons and enemy body count was precluded by darkness and priority of 
body recovery mission.

The night of 12 July found maneuver elements of 1/12 Infantry, less 
the reconnaissance platoon, established in perimeter at B/1/12 location. A 
total of 2059 artillery rounds were fired in general area the evening of 12 
July in addition 12 skystop missions being flown. A recap situation of air 
and artillery is included as Inc 5 and 6.

The search of the battle area for seven KIA was conducted by C/1/12 and 
C/1/12 on 13 and 14 July. Negative results in regard to recovering any US 
personnel but in grave search operations an additional 30 NVA KIA were dis-
covered. Total enemy body count for operation resulted in 152 NVA KIA.

The enemy force encountered appeared to be the better part of two 
battalions. One force came from the northwest and apparently withdrew in 
the same direction. Another force, equipped in different uniforms came from 
the southwest and withdrew in the same direction.
As has often been stated, the choice of time and location for a sizable engagement in the Central Highlands basically rests with the NVA. Occasionally, our forces are postured and located in areas favorable to the enemy choosing to fight. The battle of 12 July 1967, north of the In DMZ Valley astride the Cambodian border verifies this thesis.

From his Cambodian sanctuary the enemy is capable of staging sizeable forces, alerted to be employed at a time and location of his choosing. The operation conducted by the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry to move west toward the Cambodian border, exploiting an arc light strike, presented the enemy the opportunity to strike when he decided it feasible.

The sophistication of enemy reconnaissance and tracking parties allows him the opportunity to precisely identify location, strength and posture of friendly forces. Adverse weather conditions, coupled with difficult terrain further jeopardize the posture of friendly troops in that no capacity for external reinforcements existed. This point was vividly shown by the unrealistic time required to move a mechanized element overland to reinforce the ground elements. The fight comes on fast and results in a fairly quick conclusion unless the enemy force is fixed. Conversely when he fixes friendly forces he stays with the fight until his position is no longer tenable.

Intelligence available to higher echelons appears to be able to deduce the intent of the enemy. Whether this same collection ability can precisely identify size, composition and location of enemy forces in not known at the battalion level. If such information is known there is no element requiring the need for this data more than the infantry battalion.

The personnel turbulence during this period had reduced the strength of line companies to less than 70% of the aspired 130 personnel in the field. Coupled with the turnover of small unit leaders, commissioned and non-commissioned officers alike, the tactical experience of Platoons and Companies is drastically reduced. At the battalion staff level, the same experience is lacking during this transition phase. It may appear sound to realign experienced units from the 1st Brigade, along the border frontier during the personnel turnover of the 2d Brigade and repurpose the brigades again during the transition period of the 1st Brigade.

Once again the young American soldier fought tenaciously against overwhelming odds. The ability of the NVA to mass forces against smaller friendly elements and the mixture of local fire power available to the NVA ground commander brought heavy casualties to exposed friendly troops. The technique utilized by the NVA of bringing mortar and rocket fire in on every smoke grenade used by friendly forces, marking ground locations for FACs requires a reevaluation in identifying ground positions from the air.
The control of air and artillery fires should not be usurped from the battalion's supervision. Relatively new FAC's must be oriented in employing air strikes in conjunction with artillery fires and at no time should a "Check Fire" be placed to allow an air strike to be carried out. The orchestration of air, artillery, and gunships is the responsibility of the battalion commander and accordingly the proper mix of these supporting fires should be left to his discretion.

When checking out suspect enemy positions and sightings, great caution merged with maximum use of artillery and mortar fires should be used.

Junior leaders must be fully aware that to attempt to maneuver against NVA forces often leads to disastrous results. The size of the NVA force is usually unknown, he is usually familiar with the area and by the positioning of his vantage points and prepared positions he in essence dictates the location of the engagement.

The current doctrine of establishing all around defensive positions at the company level and the liberal use of air and artillery on enemy forces peripheral thereto is of paramount importance.

Added emphasis is required at all echelons of command for reestablishing a command and control element should the command group be neutralized. Periodic drills to reestablish communications on additional nets and other radios along with a chain of command succession should be practiced at company and platoon level.

Inclosures:
1. Frag 0 2-67 LTC, Inf
2. Summation of Spot reports 8-11 July w/schematic of sightings and contact.
3. Schematic of Spar reports 8-11 July.
5. Schematic of fires w/schedule.
6. Schematic of air w/schedule.

/s/ Corey J Wright
COREY J WRIGHT
LTC, Inf
Commanding

TRUE COPY
FRANCIS B CUTLER
MAJ, Armor
Historian
1. SITUATION:
   a. Enemy Forces: Current INFORUM.
   b. Friendly Forces: Current SITREP
   c. Attach/Detach: No change.

2. MISSION: Bn conducts S&D 100700 through 140700 in the south PLLI DJRAO LUCK RIDGE, reestablishes screen in zone 140700 Jul.

3. EXECUTION:
   a. Concept: Three phase opn of two mutually spt'd Co's to S&D along designated routes and exploitation of aerial artillery strikes - reestablish screen in zone.
      (1) Maneuver:
         PHASE I: Co A rtn by rte, assumes R/S at FSB. Co C moves, occupies psn AXE NLT 091500 Jul concurrent with Co B move to occupy psn SPEAR NLT 091500 Jul.
         PHASE II: Com B & C conducts S&D 100700 through 140700 Jul occupying psn's Z-R and 1-4 respectively with Co B exploiting aerial artillery strike zone 110700 to 120700 Jul and Co C spt'n from psn 1 thru 3.
         PHASE III: Co B moves to psn Y, estb screen in zone 141500 to 170700 Jul, Co C prepared for extraction in PZ 140900, conducts supported CA in LZ MIKE, occupies psn B, estb screen in zone 141500 to 170700 Jul.
      (2) Fires: Priority to SPEAR in PHASE I and II to include defensive targets in psn's Z-R, to Co C in PHASE III to include prep of LZ MIKE. Priority to unit in contact.
      (3) Air: Tac air priority to SPEAR, to unit in contact. Aerial artillery strike area TGT NLT 100500, upon cancellation, Cmtt Proof requested astride SPEAR and AXE vic psn's Z,X,T, and 2.
   b. Co A
      (1) One 30 man plat, 30 min alert, aerial C/A.
      (2) Daily plat patrols, emphasis to south, day/night.
      (3) Continue improvement of FSB defense.
   c. Co B
      (1) Mutually spt'n plats S&D from Co.
      (2) Detail search of aerial arty strike area.
      (3) S2 debriefs strike result in psn T.

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d. Co C
   (1) Opt co C maneuver by fire, maneuver, from south flanks.
   (2) Coord all fires with Co B.
   (3) Plan for, rpts and prepared LZ while moving and - in Psn 1 to 3.
   (4) Prepares for aerial C/A - Details instr 131500 in Psn 4 Phase II.

e. Recon Platoon
   (1) Upon detachment rtn FSB OCA CO A.
   (2) Prepares for 30 min alert aerial C/A.
   (3) Prepares to screen Bn in Phase III.

f. Composite Mort Platoon: No Change.

g. H/4/42: No Change.

h. 3B/4 Engr: No Change

i. Coord Instructions.
   (1) SOP Reporting
   (2) EEI
      a. Fresh NVA/VC platoon or larger.
      b. Sightings - Headgear
      c. Tree Sniper Psn.
   (3) Three Km aerial safety line eff 100001 to 100600 July.
   (4) Defcon must be coord between Co B&C to facilitate Co B yet compliment Co C requirements.
   (5) Frequent navigational checks, smoke streamers and air.

   (6) Strike analysis:
      a. Photo of crater damage to bunkers.
      b. Tree blowdown.
      c. Dispersion.
      d. Indications of dead or wounded.
      e. Secondary explosions.
      f. Other significant destructions.

   (7) LRRP insertions in North 14-15 July.
   (8) Co B plan to Assume mission on 17 July, Co A to screen.
   (9) POW evacuation immediately after friendly serious wounded.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTIC
   a. General - For minimum resupply 10-13 July.
   b. Material Svcs.
      (1) CO B requests LRRP Rations, 4 meals
      (2) ASR - No Change, No limit when in contact.
      (3) Emergency Class V resupply Available at FSB.
      (4) Priority resupply
         a. Class V
         b. Water
         c. Others
      (5) 81mm mort 10 rds illum, minimum 30 rds HE.
   c. Medical - SOP

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a. Signal
   2. Emergency signal, Red Yellow smoke.
   3. Night mark Pan, Illum, max elevation, chl.
      1.25 sec time.

b. Command
   1. FSB
   2. Aerial C&C in Contact or aerial C/A.
   3. With reserve when committed or link-up in obj area.

Acknowledge:

ANNEX: Wright
A — Opn Overlay LTC

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Inclosure 1

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Summation of Spot Reports 8-11 July 1967. Incl 2

8 July 1967

1. 080917, 81/61, YA886126 - Found 1 man trail 2 days old running South.
2. 080915, 81/60, YA880176 - 2 NVA typs shovel, 2 ponchos, 1 pup tent 2 months lod.
3. 080925, 82/60, YA854176 - Found trail 1' wide used last night running on 180°.
4. 081010, 81/61, YA851124 - Found trail used early morning running N-S by approx 3 men.
5. 081217, 81/61, YA838117 - Sighted 2 men on AZ of 45° at 500 meters wearing gray uniforms - no weapons observed.
6. 081317, 82/61, YA848163 - Found 2 trails (1) 290° AZ 1' wide (2) 320° AZ 1' wide. 3-4 men used first trail; fresh prints in mud running west.
7. 081315, 82/61, YA848163 - Taken under fire on 350° AZ at 150 meters friendly returned fire. 2 NVA KIA. Organic weapons firing blocking fire to N & NW.
8. 081316, 82/61, YA848163 - Suspected tunnel network being checked.
9. 081416, 82/61, YA848163 - NVA wearing khaki shirts and short trousers.
10. 081416, 82/61, YA848163 - Found 2 man dugout used by 2 or 3 men for 2 or 3 days.
11. 081416, 82/61, YA848163 - Found trail 1'wide 2-3 days old running noth.
12. 081416, 82/61, YA848163 - Was within 8' of NVA, type weapon not determined, khaki's no headgear, semi automatic weapons fire.
13. 081517, 82/59, YA838164 - Saw movement on 240° AZ at 100 - 150 meters.
14. 081603, 82/61, YA848163 - Reports 1 NVA KIA, 1 moving out of area.
15. 081605, 82/61, YA848163 - Saw 5 NVA, opened fire, saw 4 drop.
16. 081612, 82/61, YA848163 - 4 NVA killed confirmed.
17. 081621, 82/61, YA848163 - Confirmed 1 more KIA. Total 5 NVA KIA.
18. 081629, 82/61, YA848163 - Recovered 2 NVA bodies. 3 More NVA bodies to their front. Possibly 1 NVA WIA to their front; seized 2 AK L7's.
19. 081715, 81/61, YA838164 - Reported 4 NVA bodies including 1 officer.
20. 081715, 82/61, YA848163 - Sweeping around tunnel complex. Recovered 3 bodies.
21. 081722, 82/61, YA838164 - Reports the 3 NVA bodies have been blown up in the tunnel complex. One of the KIA above was the WIA previously reported.

9 July 1967

1. 091222, 74, YA 833164 - Found 3 more NVA KIA's in area of previous day's action. Appeared to have taken direct hit from artillery.

10 July 1967

1. 100834, 82, YA985014 - Found trail running 150°, 1½' wide used recently by 5-6 individuals.
2. 100932, 82, YA984154 - Heard movement to north, found area that looked like 3-4 individuals had been there in last 30 minutes.
3. 101005, 83, YA854118 - Found 8-10 bunkers, no overhead, 2-3 weeks old. C-Ration cans in area.
4. 101250, 74, YA938018 - Spotted 1 NVA, found 3 sacks of rice, one pair of shorts.
5. 101655, 82, YA921146 - L.P. taken under fire by 1 NVA sniper, one friendly WIA.

11 July 1967

1. 74/2, 110900, YA870130 - Log across stream W/trail E & W.
2. 82, 110920, YA842125 - Found plat or Co size base camp. 1 body W/equip; 5 skeletons, 1 booby trapped W/equip, skeletons believed to be 4-5 months old. Fresh trail believed to have been used this morning on 100° AZ 1° wide.
3. 83, 110950, YA835143 - Trail E & W 2' wide used recently.
4. 82, 110950, YA827137 - Found tunnel complex and old positions - some W/overhead, Used last 2 or 3 days. Also punji stakes 2 months old. Whole area has charlie positions.
5. 83, 111015, YA827137 - Spotted 1 NVA 150 meters away running in high grass. Couldn't see weapon or uniform.
6. 83, 111200, YA831137 - Found est. Bu size base camp, many one man holes full of water. Many upright bamboo shelters, estimated 2-3 months old. 22 -2 man bunkers, 10 prone pos, beer cans, NVA tent post, rice remains 5-6 months old.
7. 83, 111315, YA831131 - 2 trails 1' wide 1 day old running E & W.
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INCL 6

THRU: Commanding Officer
1st Bde 4th Inf Div
ATTN: AVDDA-BRC
APO San Francisco 96265

TO: Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDDA-CG
APO San Francisco 96262

1.(U) Name or identify and/or type of operation: FRANCIS MARION
(DUC CO III): Search and Destroy Operation


3.(U) Location: PIET YA BO (YA 854200)

4.(U) Command Headquarters: Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry

5.(U) Reporting Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Lynch, CO, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry

6.(C) Task Organization (during the actual contact):
   A 3/8 Inf
   B 3/8 Inf
   C 6/29 Arty (105) (DS)
   A 5/16 Arty (155 SF) (Reinforcing)

7.(C) Supporting Forces:
   a. C/6/29 Arty (DS) provided close-in fire, firing a total of 1894 rounds in support of the operation.
   b. A/5/16 Arty (Reinforcing 6/29 Arty) provided close-in and blocking fire, firing a total of 1488 rounds in support of the operation.
   c. C/5/16 Arty (General Support Reinforcing) provided close-in, blocking and denial fires, firing a total of 1244 rounds in support of the operation.
   d. D/5/16 Arty (General Support Reinforcing) provided close-in, blocking and denial fires, firing a total of 1047 rounds in support of the operation.
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a. 6/6/14 Arty (General Support Reinforcing) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 27 rounds in support of the operation.

b. 6/6/14 Arty (General Support) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 966 rounds in support of the operation.

c. 6/6/14 Arty (General Support) provided close-in and blocking fires, firing a total of 31 rounds in support of the operation.

d. 6/4/14 Arty (Support) provided close-in, blocking and denali fires, firing a total of 361 rounds in support of the operation.

i. Artillery fires were effective as blocking, harassing and denial fires. During the contact and the night immediately following the contact, a total of 6688 rounds of artillery were fired.

j. Air: Requests for immediate and continuous air support were forwarded through the FAC to the Air Force. There were a total of 12 F-100 sorties flown during the actual period of engagement. Three of these were directed at troops in the open at coordinate YA 855185. Ten F-100s were found in that vicinity during the subsequent sweep; however, it is undetermined as to whether they had been killed by artillery or air strikes. Five sorties were directed at troops in the open at coordinate YA 855190; twenty F-100s were found in that area. The sorties were directed at an enemy escape route at coordinate YA 843184; results of these sorties are undetermined. An enemy base camp at coordinate YA 866185 was struck by 2 sorties; 21 F-100s were found in that vicinity. During the evening, the 2nd combat skyboats were flown as part of the denial effort. One sortie was flown by an F-100 and was directed at coordinate YA 879201; the other sortie was flown by a B-57 and was directed at coordinate YA 887177. Results of the skyboats are unknown.

k. US Army Aviation:

(1) Gunship support was provided by D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and the Assault Platoon of the 119th Aviation Company, 52d Aviation Battalion. Throughout the contact a minimum of one pair of gunships remained on station immediately responsive to the requirements of the battalion commander.

(2) Lift support for the displacement of the reconnaissance platoon and 4/3/3 Infantry was provided by the 199th Aviation Co and the 119th Aviation Company of the 52d Aviation Battalion and by elements of the 4th Aviation Battalion.

8.(C) Intelligence:

a. The terrain in the contact area is primarily single canopy with thick underbrush and secondary growth. The trees are about 30 feet tall and from 12-27 inches in diameter. Fields of fire are limited to about 30-50 meters around the area of the C Co CP, vicinity coordinate 12354199. In this area fields of fire run up to 75 meters in the south, 300 meters in the north and east, and are unlimited in the west.

b. Weather at the time of the contact was hot and clear. Visibility was unlimited. During the night it was partly cloudy with light scattered showers.

c. The enemy units involved included the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of the 32d WA Regiment. Elements from all three battalions participated in the attack. Enemy strength of the combined force is estimated at between 1000 and 1200 personnel.

d. The enemy was heavily armed with M-7, M-10 light machine guns and 8/8 rockets. RPD-7M were also used. 82mm and 80mm mortar fire was employed against C Company CP with negligible results due to rapid suppression by friendly artillery fire and air strikes. One 82mm mortar was seen destroyed.
by artillery fire, another was later captured by ground forces where it had been abandoned by the withdrawing enemy.

c. The morale and discipline of the NVA was detected high. They were well armed. Their uniforms were of khaki and included both short and long trousers. No distinction could be made or conclusions drawn as to who were long or short trousers. There were some black PJ's worn under the khakis and a few of the enemy were a mixture of black PJ's and khakis. Headgear included cloth bush hats, pith helmets, and woven bamboo with plastic coverings.

d. Enemy losses in addition to 184 NVA KIA (BC) are estimated at 150-200 KIA, 200-250 WIA for a total of 534-634 NVA casualties in the 32d IWA in the 32d IWA zone, thereby decreasing its combat strength by more than 50%.

9.(C) Mission: 3/8 Infantry to establish a fire support base vicinity coordinates YA 891252 and conduct S & D operations and maintain surveillance in assigned AO.

10.(C) Concept of Operations: 3/8 Infantry established its fire support base at YA 891252 on 14 July 1967. B and C Companies then moved by foot from the fire support base to the western sector of the battalion's AO. The fire support base was initially secured by the reconnaissance platoon, mortar platoon and artillery personnel. A Company, OPCON to 1/12 Infantry on 14 July, returned to OPCON 3/8 Infantry on 160600 July 1967 and closed into the fire support base to assume the security mission and serve as battalion reserve.

11.(C) Execution:

a. Events prior to the contact:

(1) The mission of B & C Companies for 23 July 1967 was to patrol from established company bases vicinity coordinate YA 853199 (3 Co) and YA 856197 (C Co). A Co, located at the battalion's fire base was in reserve. Further guidance concerning the mission was disseminated by the following pertinent messages.

220715 July: Advised B and C Companies of possible NVA activity to the south and west of their location (based upon intelligence of a "Snoopy" aircraft).

220923 July: B and C Companies were notified to hold their patrols on the 23d until notified by the battalion CO.

230700 July: B and C Companies were directed to initiate reconnaissance patrolling when ready.

(2) At 230905 July, three reconnaissance patrols departed B Co CP and proceeded north, northeast and southeast. At the same time, three patrols of C Co departed the company CP and patrolled to the southeast and south. The disposition of B and C Company at the time of the initial contact (231155 July) is as indicated in inclosure 1.

b. Events during the contact: The following is a chronological sequence of events which occurred during the period of the contact.

231150 July: 3d Platoon, returning to the C Company CP from the south observed 2 NVA to the platoon's north vicinity coordinate YA 855190. The platoon immediately pursued while the company commander directed the 1st Platoon to maneuver to a blocking position. At the same time the 2d Platoon was returning to the company CP.

231155 July: The platoon leader of 3d Platoon, Company C reported that the platoon was cut off and surrounded. The company commander
ordered the 1st Platoon to the relief of the 3d Platoon; however, the 1st Platoon was under intensive small arms and mortar fire and was pinned down, precluding the directed relief. At this time the C Company Commander ordered the 2d Platoon, now some 800 meters southwest of the company perimeter to hold in place.

231205 July: B Company was directed to regroup and be prepared to assist C Company.

231206 July: The first immediate air arrived on station armed with 20mm cannon only, having delivered its bomb load prior to the contact in another area. The aircraft stayed on station at the contact area to cover with the 20mm cannon.

231207 July: C Company's 3d Platoon Leader reported his platoon sergeant and 270 had been killed. Immediately thereafter all communication with the platoon was lost.

231216 July: C Company CP received 7-8 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Simultaneously, one NVA was captured at the C Company CP location.

231220 July: B Company was directed to link up with C Company.

231225 July: B Company received automatic weapons fire from the southeast.

231230 July: B Company started moving toward C Company CP.

231235 July: The first ground attack was initiated against C Company's CP. At this time the gunships were ordered in to fire south of C Company's CP. The ground attack was repelled by a combination of close combat, artillery and gunship fire and the enemy withdrew south/southwest.

231237 July: B Company started receiving mortar and small arms weapons fire, then craterly pinning the unit down; however, it was ordered to continue moving and effect its link-up with C Company CP. The company started moving again.

231240 July: A second ground attack was initiated against the C Company CP. Again the NVA were repelled by close combat, artillery and gunship fires. Reinforcements arriving from B Company contributed to repelling the enemy during this attack.

231245 July: B Company effected its link-up with C Company.

231254 July: B Company counterattacked southeast and south from the C Company perimeter. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was placed on standby alert for commitment to the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in event A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was committed to the battle.

231306 July: B Company, sweeping south and southeast continued to receive sporadic small arms fire.

231320 July: An airstrike was executed against enemy in the open at coordinates YA 855185.

231340 July: An airstrike was executed against enemy troops in open at coordinates YA 855190.

231350 July: B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was placed OPCON to 3/8 Infantry and directed to move to the contact area.

231417 July: B Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry(Mech) was placed OPCON to 3/8 Infantry and directed to move to the contact area.

231445 July: A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was airlifted into the battle area. Lift terminated at 231510.

231445 July: An airstrike was executed against enemy troops in the open at coordinates YA 855190.

231500 July: CC, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry ordered B and C Companies to sweep the area, then dig in and remain in the battle area overnight.

231527 July: A tank from B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
hit a mine at coordinates YA 857230, temporarily halting the progress of the troop closing on the contact area.

231527 July: 2d Platoon, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry linked up with the remainder of the 3d Platoon of C Company. At this time it was verified that both the platoon leader and platoon sergeant of the 3d Platoon had been killed.

231530 July: Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry closed with C Company's 2d and 3d Platoons. Company A was directed to move to vicinity coordinates YA 854295 at this time.

231539 July: B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10 Cavalry continued to move to the area of contact. Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry prepared to move to secure the mined tank of B/1/10 Cavalry which was left in place with a platoon of the cavalry troop.

231605 July: Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry became OPCON to 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry and was directed to establish a blocking position vicinity coordinates YA 839188.

231630 July: An airstrike was placed against a suspected enemy base camp vicinity YA 865185. (Area was later confirmed as a base camp and 22 NVA KIA were found at that location).

231645 July: Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was airlifted to the location of the mined tank. Simultaneously, the last lift of Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry arrived at the battalion fire support base to provide necessary security. These lifts were both completed at 231650.

c. Events which occurred after the contact:

231740 July: B/1/10 Cavalry linked up with Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at coordinate YA 850198. Then both units moved to YA 853198 and established a night location. C Company remained at its established company CP throughout the night.

231830 July: One platoon was detached from B/1/10 Cavalry and attached to Company C.

231900 July: B Company closed into night location vicinity YA 857224.

231930 July: B/2/8 Infantry(Mech) closed into night location vicinity YA 839188.

Throughout the night immediately following the contact, H & I artillery fires and blocking fires continued to be fired into the contact area at a high rate. These fires were controlled by the artillery LNO, on location, in the contact area. Company C was returned to the battalion fire base on 24 July. For several days following the contact, S & D operations were continued by C Co, B Co, B/1/10 Cavalry and B/2/8 Infantry(Mech) in an effort to regain contact with the enemy and further to accomplish a thorough police of the battlefield, including the burying of enemy field and recovery of enemy weapons.

12.(C) Results:

a. Enemy losses: 134 NVA KIA (RC), 8 NVA WIA (FOM), 2 NVA POW uninjured, 31 AK-47, 3 RPG, 11 SKS, 7 B40, 2 RPG-7, 2 82m Mortar, 1 7-38 Pistol, 1 Soviet Carbine (53), 79 hand grenades, 10 anti-tank grenades, 28 B-40 rockets, 10 RPG-7 rockets, 9 82m mortar rounds, 1 Bangalore Torpedo, 2 satchel charges, 15 82m mortar fuzes, 1 FM Radio complete with hand and head set, 13,720 rounds small arms ammunition, 60 canteens with covers, 40 ponchos, 30 ammunition packs, 35 packs, 42 hankocks, 17 holsters, 15 mile wire, 15 blocks 121, 23 aid packets, 67 entrenching tools, 78 magazines and assorted individual clothing.

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b. Friendly losses: 19 KIA (1 B Co, 16 C Co, 1 6/29 Arty, 1 Hq Co); 37 evacuated WIA (14 B Co, 22 C Co, 1 6/29 Arty); 16 WIA not evacuated (C Co); 0 MIA; 21 M-16; 3 CAR-15; 3 M79; 3 pair binoculars; 1 shotgun; 4 M2 Compasses; 17 Ionsatic compasses; 5 wristwatches.

13.(C) Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Resuply was initiated on 23 July and was limited to ammunition and water. The 24th of July was a full resupply day for A and B Companies in the field.

b. Basic Load Data: All combat troops in the field carried the following basic load of ammunition: M-16 - 600 rounds, M-60 - 2000 rounds, M-79 - 50 rounds(HE), Shotgun 100-200 rounds.

c. Initial treatment of injured was conducted by organic medics. All WIA were evacuated to Jackson Hole, except for minor injuries on 23 July 1800 hours...

d. Transportation: N/A

e. Communications: Communication was maintained with the companies by direct radio. No communication difficulties were encountered throughout the contact. Communication was continuous.

f. Medical Evaluation: Of the US WIA, ten were considered serious. Nine were returned to duty and the remainder were evacuated to higher facilities.

14.(C) Special Equipment: None

15.(C) Commander's analysis: There were no civil affairs activities conducted.


17. Lessons Learned: See attached lesson learned formats.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

THOMAS P. LYNCH
LTC, Armor
Commanding

11. Incl
1. Terrain Sketch - Contact Area
2. Combat Lesson Learned - Conduct Training in Foreign Weapons
3. Combat Lesson Learned - When patrolling from a company base, leave claymore mines employed around the base.
4. Combat Lesson Learned - Units should carry a "heavy" basic load of small arms ammunition for individual and crew served weapons while conducting S & D operations.
5. Combat Lesson Learned - Small units which are separated from their parent unit should change to the battalion frequency to facilitate the most effective command and control.
6. Combat Lesson Learned - Insure that a separate supply of small arms ammunition, claymores and grenades is on hand on the fire support base perimeter.
7. Combat Lesson Learned - A requirement exists for a concealable radio antenna.
8. Combat Lesson Learned - Overhead cover in open areas should be either of a very low silhouette or not utilized.
9. Combat Lesson Learned - Considerable evidence exists that NVA reserve elements normally follow from 1500-2000 meters behind their main attacking force.
10. Combat Lesson Learned - It is essential that a sweep be made in depth, immediately after a contact, to determine with validity the number of enemy dead and to capture those enemy wounded still in the battle area.
11. Combat Lesson Learned - Adjustment of close-in artillery fires from 200-430 meters from the perimeter edge is to be accomplished by the artillery FDC on the ground. All other fires including blocking, TAC Air, and gunships should be controlled by the battalion commander.

DISTRIBUTION:
"SPECIAL"
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Conduct training in foreign weapons.

   
   Item: Employment of fallen enemy weapons against the enemy.

   Discussion: During the contact, some personnel of B and C Companies were forced to use available NVA weapons due to damage to their own weapons.

   Observation: NVA weapons were used effectively by friendly forces against the NVA.

2. Supporting Facts:

   a. Source of information: Company Commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

   b. Unit: B and C Companies, 3d Bn 8th Inf.

   c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.

   d. Date: 23 July 1967.

   e. Location: YA654197

   f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

   g. Enemy: Type: NVA.

   Estimated strength: Regiment.

   Disposition: Above ground, moving.

   h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Inf initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.

   i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours.

   j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

   k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

   l. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn:

   Because of the intense contact and close combat of the action, some individuals were forced to utilize enemy weapons after their individual weapons were damaged. Due to prior familiarization with enemy weapons the infantrymen were able to effectively use the NVA weapons. Weapons employed included the AK-47, the SKS and the RPD light machine gun. Knowledge of these weapons undoubtedly reduced friendly casualties and increased enemy casualties.

Inclosure 2
1. Combat Lessons Learned: When patrolling from a company base, leave claymores employed around the base.

Item: Employment of claymore mines around a company patrol base.

Discussion: During the contact, Company C and Company B of the 3d Bn, 8th Inf formed a defensive perimeter around their patrol base. Claymore mines contributed to repelling the enemy.

Observation: Correctly employed claymore mines were very effective against enemy ground attacks in relatively open areas.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of Information: Company Commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

b. Unit: B and C Companies, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission. Specifically, defense of a company patrol base was being conducted.

d. Date: 23 July 1967

e. Location: YAC5/197.

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA.

Estimated Strength: Regiment:
Disposition: Attacking across open terrain.

h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Inf initiated contact while patrolling. The enemy force continued the contact by attacking the company patrol base.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours.

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

l. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry had left their claymores emplaced prior to the contact. Consequently, the platoon securing the company base was able to sustain its defense and repel ground attacks from a numerically superior enemy force until reinforced by Company B. The devastating effect of the emplaced claymores and their instant availability contributed significantly to repelling these attacks. It is highly desirable therefore, when operating from a company base, to leave claymores in place daily and change their positions just prior to darkness.
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Units should carry a "heavy" basic load of small arms ammunition for individual and crew served weapons while conducting S & D operations.

Item: Basic load of ammunition for individual and crew served weapons.

Discussion: Prior to and during the contact, Company C and Company B had more than the normal basic load of ammunition for individual and crew served weapons on hand.

Observation: Company B and Company C carried considerably more than a normal basic load of small arms ammunition. It is doubtful that they could have sustained themselves through the contact, which lasted more than four hours, had they had a normal basic load of ammunition.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of Information: Battalion and Company Commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

b. Unit: 3d Bn, 8th Inf.

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.

d. Date: 23 July 1967.

e. Location: YA554197

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA.

Estimated Strength: Regiment.

Disposition: Above ground, moving.

h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Inf initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours.

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes.

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn:

Prior to the contact the Battalion Commander had established a SOP that the companies would carry a minimum of 600 rounds per M16, 2000 rounds per M60, 50 rounds per M79 grenade launcher and as many grenades as possible. It was later determined that the NVA carried approximately 100 rounds per SKS, 150 rounds...
Por AK-47 and four rockets per launcher (B-40 and RPG-7). Because B and C Companies were carrying this "heavy" basic load, they were able to sustain themselves during the period of contact and gain small arms fire superiority.
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Small units which are separated from their parent unit should change to the battalion frequency to facilitate the most effective command and control.

Item: Command and control of small units separated from their parent unit.

Discussion: During the contact, some elements of the companies were separated and could not close with their parent unit.

Observation: Effective command and control was maintained because these elements changed to the battalion frequency. Artillery and air support could therefore be effectively employed because the location and disposition of these elements was at all times known.

2. Supporting Facts:
   a. Source of information: Battalion and company commanders, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry.
   b. Unit: B and C Companies, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry.
   c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
   d. Date: 23 July 1967
   e. Location: YA854197
   f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
   g. Enemy: Type: NVA
      Estimated Strength: Regiment
      Disposition: Above ground, moving.
   h. How contact was made: The Third platoon of Company C, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging and NVA security element.
   i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
   j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours 55 minutes
   k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.
   l. Summary of events from which the combat lesson is drawn: Prior to the contact, a battalion SOP had been established that required elements separated from their parent unit during a contact to switch to the battalion frequency when so directed. This procedure enabled the battalion commander and artillery liaison officer to most effectively control and support by fire the separated units. In one case, a squad of B Co was separated from the company by some distance. Since the main element of the company was in contact, the company commander directed the squad leader to change to the battalion frequency. In another situation, a platoon was separated from C Co because the platoon and the company were both in heavy contact in separate
areas. In both cases the exact location of the separated elements was known and direct coordination of fires was affected between the separated units and the battalion commander on the battalion frequency.
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Insure that a separate supply of small arms ammunition, claymores and grenades is on hand on the fire support base perimeter.

   Item: Ammunition available on the fire support base perimeter.

   Discussion: During the contact, Co A, the company assigned the mission of security of the fire support base, was rapidly committed to the contact area, requiring other forces to secure the perimeter.

   Observation: Because an independent supply of small arms ammunition, claymores and grenades was on hand at the defensive positions on the fire support base perimeter, there was no decrease in the effectiveness of the defenses of the perimeter because of ammunition shortages.

2. Supporting Facts:

   a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Bn, 8th Infantry
   b. Unit: 3d Bn, 8th Infantry
   c. Activity being conducted: Relief of a company securing a fire support base perimeter by other personnel within the fire support base and later by another company.
   d. Date: 23 July 1967
   e. Location: YA892251
   f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
   g. Enemy: Type: NVA
      Estimated Strength: Regiment
      Disposition: Above ground, moving
   h. How contact was made: N/A
   i. Time of initial contact: N/A
   j. Length of time in contact: N/A
   k. How contact was broken: N/A

   1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: During the contact, the decision was made to reinforce the units in contact by commitment of the security company for the battalion fire support base. Because necessary small arms, grenades and claymores were stockpiled on the fire support base perimeter, the original company was able to rapidly deploy with its basic load while leaving the defensive positions of the fire support base intact and instantly effective for the relieved force.

Inclosure 6

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Item: Portable radio antenna signature.

Discussion: The antenna of the portable is readily identifiable by enemy forces.

Observation: Enemy forces concentrate their fires on radio operators and leaders, knowing that friendly forces will be less effective without these personnel. The radio antenna helps identify the radio operator.

2. Supporting Facts:
   a. Source of information: Company Commanders, 3d Bn 8th Infantry
   b. Unit: 3d Bn 8th Infantry
   c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
   d. Date: 23 July 1967
   e. Location: YA854197
   f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.
   g. Enemy: Type: NVA
   Estimated Strength: Regiment
   Disposition: Above ground, moving.
   h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
   i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
   j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours 55 minutes
   k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn:
During the contact the radio operator of the third platoon of Company C was killed immediately after the contact began. The platoon loader, who was later also killed, operated the radio but stated that the NVA had him and the radio zeroed in.
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Overhead cover in open areas should be either of a very low silhouette or not utilized.

Item: Overhead cover in open areas,

Discussion: Construction of an overhead cover provides an increased target size for B-40 rocket launchers. These launchers are a greater threat to the security of a friendly perimeter than mortars, due to the pinpoint accuracy of the launcher. Therefore, all overhead cover should provide the lowest possible silhouette or overhead should not be utilized.

Observation: NVA B-40 Rocket firings were relatively ineffective during the contact because there were no suitable targets. C Company had no overhead and its open positions were difficult to detect in the grass.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of information: Company Commander, 3d Bn 8th Infantry
b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.
d. Date: 23 July 1967
e. Location: YA854197
f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility,
g. Enemy: Type: NVA
   Estimated Strength: Regiment
   Disposition: Above ground, moving,
h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes
k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn:
   Many B-40 rocket rounds landed within the Company C perimeter causing some casualties; however, it is felt that casualties were minimal because there were no hard targets for the B-40's.
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Considerable evidence exists that NVA reserve elements normally follow from 1500-2000 meters behind their main attacking force.

   Item: Location of NVA reserve elements.

   Discussion: A knowledge of the location of enemy reserves can facilitate total destruction of an enemy force.

   Observation: Artillery and airstrikes at a distance of from 1500-2000 meters from the main contact area caused many casualties among NVA personnel. It is considered that these personnel were the reserves for the attacking forces.

2. Supporting Facts:

   a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry

   b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry

   c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.

   d. Date: 23 July 1967

   e. Location: YA854197

   f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

   g. Enemy: Type: NVA

      Estimated Strength: Regiment

      Disposition: Above ground, moving

   h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.

   i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours

   k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

   l. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: Visual reconnaissance substantiated considerable movement of enemy personnel at distances of up to 2000 meters from the main contact area. Artillery and airstrikes were placed on these targets. Later, large numbers of enemy casualties were found at these locations.

   Inclosure 9
1. Combat Lesson Learned: It is essential that a sweep be made in depth, immediately after a contact, to determine with validity the number of enemy dead and to capture those enemy wounded still in the battle area.

Item: Sweep of battle area after a contact.

Discussion: Immediately after a heavy contact, there may be many enemy wounded still within the contact area. Furthermore, many of the enemy dead may not have been evacuated. An immediate sweep will facilitate capturing these wounded and getting an accurate count of the dead. Because of the NVA's obsession with a meticulous police of their dead, a sweep of a few days later will determine that the NVA have already policed up their dead and no wounded enemy survivors remain.

Observation: The day following the contact, the battalion was committed to another mission which precluded a thorough sweep of the battle area. It was not until three days after the contact that a thorough sweep could be made. By this time there was considerable evidence that the NVA had dragged away many bodies and policed the battle area of enemy survivors.

2. Supporting Facts:
   a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
   b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry
   c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on D & D mission.
   d. Date: 23 July 1967
   e. Location: YA854197
   f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility
   g. Enemy: Type: NVA
      Estimated Strength: Regiment
      Disposition: Above ground, moving
   h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.
   i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours
   j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes
   k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

Inclosure 10
1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: The day following the contact, the battalion was committed to another mission which precluded a thorough sweep of the battle area. It was not until three days after the contact that a thorough sweep could be made. By this time there was considerable evidence that the NVA had dragged away many bodies and policed the battle area of enemy survivors.
1. Combat Lesson Learned: Adjustment of close-in artillery fires from 200-400 meters from the perimeter edge is to be accomplished by the artillery FO on the ground. All other fires including blocking, TAC Air, and gunships should be controlled by the battalion commander.

Item: Control and adjustment of supporting fires.

Discussion: The company commander on the ground does not have the time during a contact, nor the knowledge of the overall situation, to control blocking fires of artillery or the fires of TAC Air and gunships. For the preservation of his perimeter, the company commander must guide the FO in adjustment of artillery fires around the immediate perimeter.

Observation: During the contact, the company FO's adjusted artillery fires around their immediate perimeter. The battalion commander employed blocking fires on avenues of approach and withdrawal, as well as TAC Air and gunships on known and suspected enemy locations. In this manner the most effective utilization was made of supporting fires.

2. Supporting Facts:

a. Source of information: Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

b. Unit: 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry

c. Activity being conducted: Contact with estimated NVA Regiment while on S & D mission.

d. Date: 23 July 1967

e. Location: YA854197

f. Weather: Hot and clear with unlimited visibility.

g. Enemy: Type: NVA
   Estimated Strength: Regiment
   Disposition: Above ground, moving

h. How contact was made: The third platoon of Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry initiated contact by engaging an NVA security element.

i. Time of initial contact: 1155 hours

j. Length of time in contact: 4 hours, 55 minutes

k. How contact was broken: NVA broke contact by withdrawing to the south.

Inclosure 11
1. Summary of events from which the combat lesson learned is drawn: During the contact, the company FO's adjusted artillery fires around their immediate perimeter. The battalion commander employed blocking fires on avenues of approach and withdrawal, as well as Tac Air and gunships on known and suspected enemy locations. In this manner the most effective utilization was made of supporting fires.
1. (C) Chemical operations conducted during Operation FRANCIS MARION are tabulated below. Graphic illustrations are on overlays 7-1 thru 7-5.

   a. Riot Control Agent (RC) Missions.

   (1). Bulk CS-1

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   (2) CS Grenades.

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   (3) L-58R2 C3 Cannister Cluster.

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Inclosure 8
b. Defoliation and Crop Destruction Missions.

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2. (U) Two new devices, a defoliation apparatus for use in the UH-1 helicopter, and a UH-1 grenade dispenser, were developed and tested. The devices are fully explained in paragraph 14 of the basic report. Sketches are at TAB's A and B attached.
Tab B to Inclosure 8
The OPORD, FRAGOs and changes, corrections and additions thereto, as listed below, were pertinent to Operation FRANCIS MARION.

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<td>Brigade CP Area at ZA110275</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>Operation Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLWAR</td>
<td>Political Warfare (ARVN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW, PW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Preplanned</td>
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<tr>
<td>PZ</td>
<td>Pick-up Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Riot Control Agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>Revolutionary Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RL</td>
<td>Rocket Launcher</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of VIETNAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;D</td>
<td>Search and Destroy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slick</td>
<td>UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Left</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Self Propelled</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spooky</td>
<td>Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flareship</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
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<td>TAOR</td>
<td>Tactical Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, VIETNAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSF</td>
<td>United States Special Forces</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>VC</td>
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<td>VCC</td>
<td>Viet Cong Captive</td>
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<td>VETCAP</td>
<td>Veterinary Civic Action Program</td>
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<td>VR</td>
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<td>Variable Time</td>
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<td>WIA</td>
<td>Wounded in Action</td>
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