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AGAM-P (M) (26 Sep 67) FOR OT RD-67X047

3 October 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Malheur, conducted by
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation
Malheur. Operation Malheur was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Air-
borne Division during the period 11 May - 2 August 1967. Information
contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in
the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be
adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVBD-C

2 September 1967


THRU: Commanding General
Task Force ORDON
APO 96374

Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO 96602

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation MALHEUR.

   (Phase I: 11 May 1967 through 8 June 1967; Phase II: 8 June 1967 through 2 August 1967)

3. (U) Location: QUANG NGAI Province.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (U) Task Organization:
   a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation MALHEUR was as shown below:

   **Pde Troops**
   - 1-327 Inf
   - Engr LZ Clearing Tns
   - 3 Set Dog Tns
   - FAC Tm
   - Bde HHC
   - A/2-17 Cav
   - A/326 Engr (-)
   - LRRP Plt
   - MP Plt
   - L-101 Avn Sec
   - 20th Cal Det
   - 414th Pay ops Co
   - 406 BRD
   - 181 MI Det
   - TACP (-)
   - 42d Inf Plt, Set Dog (-)
   - D/Spt Bn
   - 2-502 Inf
   - Engr LZ Clearing Tns
   - 3 Set Dog Tns
   - FAC Tm
   - 2-320 Arty (DS)

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (MACV/RCS/33/32)

b. The task organization was changed during Phase I by the addition of one CIDG Platoon (direct support) from BA TO Special Forces Camp to both the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry. One platoon Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor also became OPCON to Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry.

c. During Phase II, two CIDG Companies (minus) from MINH LONG Special Forces Camp assisted the Brigade in operations in the SONG VE Valley with one company in direct support of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and one platoon each in direct support of the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

7. (C) Supporting forces:

a. 2-320 Artillery: Employed in a direct support role.

b. C/2-11 Artillery: Provided general support reinforcing fires.

c. 176th Helicopter Assault Company: Provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

d. 178th Aviation Company: Provided four flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.

e. 9th Air Commando Squadron: Provide air lift support for Psychological Operations.

f. 245th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support of operations in Phase I.

g. 244th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support of the operation.

h. 7th US Air Force: Flew 462 tactical fighter missions totaling 1055 sorties. One hundred and eighty-seven of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 30 minutes. In addition, 108 Combat Skyspot sorties, 10 flare-ship (AC-47) sorties, and 471 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. Twenty-seven B-52 sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flew 352 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

i. US 7th Fleet: Provided on call fires and assisted in firing 12 preparatory fires during Phase I of the operation.

j. BA TO CIDG Camp: Provided CIDG Companies in direct support of Brigade operations in NORMANDY, BASTOGNE, and ZON AO's.

k. MINH LONG CIDG Camp: Provided CIDG Companies in direct support of Brigade operations in BASTOGNE and ZON AO's.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, USAV directed that 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division become OPCON to Task Force OREGON and move from vicinity of KHANH DUONG to DUC PHO. The Brigade closed into CARENTAN Base (the Brigade forward base camp) on 3 May 1967. Task Force OREGON directed the Brigade to conduct search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/WA base camps in the areas west and northwest of DUC PHO commencing 11 May 1967. The mission was later expanded to include areas southwest of DUC PHO as well. Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation MALHEUR was conducted in two Phases. Phase I commenced on 11 May with airmobile assaults by two battalions acting on
intelligence placing the 2d VC Regiment in Base Area 124 in the high ground immediately west of DUC PHO. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry assaulted to the west of the base area followed a day later by the airmobile assault of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry to the east. (Inclosure 2 - Tab A). The majority of the month was spent in operations against the 2d VC Regiment in this area. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was more familiar with the area in which the 2d VC Regiment had moved northwest toward Base Area 123 in an attempt to evade the Brigade. As a result, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault, preceded by a B-52 strike on 3 June to the northwest of Base Area 124 and south of Base Area 123 (Inclosure 2 - Tab B). The other two battalions were extracted to CARENTAN Base on 3 and 4 June where they prepared for the second phase of the operation. Phase II commenced on 5 June with an airmobile assault by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry into Base Area 123 (Inclosure 2 - Tab C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault on 9 June into the area west of the SONG VE Valley. Operations revealed the presence of elements of both the 1st and 2d VC Regiments. The number of enemy contacts, initially high, declined over a period of days and intelligence indicated that the 2d VC Regiment had withdrawn to the west while the 1st VC Regiment was reported to have withdrawn to the northwest. At the request of Province officials, attention was focused to the evacuation of the inhabitants of the SONG TRA CAU and SONG VE Valleys which are highly fertile rice growing areas from which the VC had been extracting food and taxes for many years. The valley clearing operation commenced on 15 June with the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducting cordon and search operations and evacuating the population of the SONG TRA CAU and southern SONG VE Valleys to a refugee center at NHIA HANH. The following day the battalion conducted an airmobile assault to the northern end of the SONG VE Valley to act as a blocking force for a sweep of the valley from the south by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (Inclosure 2 - Tab D). During the course of the valley sweep, which terminated on 16 June, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted what was believed to be elements of the 1st VC Regiment in the high ground north of the valley mouth. At the conclusion of the clearing operation, attention was focused to the suspected location of the 2d VC Regiment vicinity of the SONG NE Valley to the southwest. On 17 June the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults, the 1st Battalion to the west after elements of the 1st VC Regiment and the 2d Battalion to the southwest after the 2d VC Regiment (Inclosure 2 - Tab E). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry commenced search and destroy operations toward the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry assisting in the hunt for the 2d VC Regiment. After a fruitless search for the 1st VC Regiment to the north the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the southwest on 29 June to assist the other battalions in their hunt for the 2d VC Regiment. On 3 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry returned to CARENTAN Base to conduct Operation LAKE (6 - 12 July). The remaining two battalions continued their search for the 2d VC Regiment and evacuated the population of the SONG NE Valley to NHIA HANH, once again at the request of Province officials. At the conclusion of the valley clearing operation, agent reports and other intelligence indicated that the 2d VC Regiment had returned to Base Area 124. Since the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was more familiar with the area in which the Regiment was reported it received the mission and conducted an airmobile assault into the area on 10 July. (Inclosure 2 - Tab F). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the northwest of Base Area 124 on 11 July and the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry to an adjacent area on 14 July in an effort to block enemy egress routes used previously by the 2d VC Regiment. Agent reports, information gained from captured VC and other intelligence indicated that the 1st and 2d VC Regiments were at less than 50% strength and that both were attempting to retreat in Base Areas 123 and 124. Responding to this information the Brigade scheduled a B-52 strike in Base Area 123 followed by an airmobile assault into the area by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry on 17 July (Inclosure 2 - Tab G). The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved to blocking positions north of the Base Area while the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry blocked to the west and south.
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11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation MALHEUR was characterized by small unit contacts. Initially
the enemy defended his position in platoon and larger size force. Contacts with
large forces, however, gradually declined as did the enemy's will to stand and
fight. Soon contacts with a squad size enemy force became rare and the Brigade
made most contact with groups of two or three men who attempted to withdraw on con-
tact. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling,
night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces.
The terrain over which operations were conducted included mountainous jungle,
rolling hills, sandy scrub forest and flat, cultivated lowlands.

b. Operation MALHEUR was initiated 12 days after the termination of
Operation SUMMERALL in KHANH HOA, PHU YEN and DAE LAC Provinces.
On 2 May 1967, the Brigade began movement to DUC PHO with one battalion combat team conducting convoy
movement from KHANH DUONG to NHA TRANG and then sea movement from NHA TRANG to DUC
PHO. On 5 and 6 May, the remainder of the Brigade conducted similar movements from
KHANH DUONG to DUC PHO. The Brigade completed closure at DUC PHO when the last
infantry battalion combat team arrived on 8 May. Operation MALHEUR commenced on
110700H May 1967.

c. Phase II The three maneuver battalions of the Brigade were located at
the Brigade base camp, CARENTAN Base, vicinity DUC PHO. On 110700H May 1967 the
1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN
Base into the northwest portion of NORMANDY AO and commenced search and destroy
operations to the east, followed by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry which
conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the southwestern portion of
NORMANDY AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the east. In conjunction
with the assaults, massive artillery fires and tactical air strikes prepared the
assault LZ's; fires were then placed on known or suspected enemy positions, routes
from enemy positions to LZ's, and enemy egress routes. The 2d Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry remained in reserve vicinity CARENTAN Base. Troop A, 2d Squadron
(Airborne), 17th Cavalry remained vicinity CARENTAN Base and secured the beach
logistical site, established OP's vicinity CARENTAN Base and assisted the Military
Police Platoon, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division escort logistical convoys on the
MOR between the beach and the airfield complex. The BA TO Special Forces/CIDG
Camp provided two CIDG Platoons, one each in direct support of the 1st Battalion
(Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, and one
CIDG Company which screened to the west of NORMANDY AO. The Long Range Reconnais-
sance Patrol Platoon, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted airmobile
insertions into the northwest portion of NORMANDY AO and commenced surveil-
ance of the area. On 11 May, 10 light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th
Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C), 1 NVA KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P), 1 NVC, 1 detainee
and 3 individual weapons captured. One platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne),
502d Infantry encountered 40 gravel mines and punji stakes in one area resulting in
7 US WHA. On 120850H May 1967, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry con-
ducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the east portion of NORMANDY AO
to establish blocking positions and to commence search and destroy operations to the
west. One platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry remained
vicinity CARENTAN Base under operational control of Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne),
17th Cavalry. Eight light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry
resulted in 1 US KIA, 2 US WHA; 6 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P), 6 detainees and 5
individual weapons and one refrigerator (GE) captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry detained 9 personnel including 2 male, military aged ralliers and
captured 10 pounds of military documents and 1 individual weapon. Three light contacts
by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.
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On 13 May one company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was engaged by an estimated VC company size force resulting in 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA, loss of 2 M-16 rifles, 13 VC KIA (C), and 2 individual weapons and 12 Chicom hand grenades captured. Eleven other light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 16 VC KIA (C), 16 detainees and 5 individual weapons, including 2 M-16 rifles, captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, 10 individual weapons, including 1 M-79, captured and the discovery of a weapon cache containing 34 individual weapons and 1 12.7mm Chicom machine gun. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 5 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, and 2 individual weapons captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an airlift cordon and search operation in a hamlet to the south of CARENTAN Base resulting in 2 detainees. On 14 May one company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size in well fortified, dug-in positions, resulting in 6 US WIA and 56 WHA. Seven other light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne). 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 2 individual weapons captured. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C). Eight light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 14 VC KIA (C) and 6 individual weapons captured. On 15 May one platoon of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an estimated VC battalion size force with automatic weapons and mortars in fortified positions. Continuous artillery and tactical air strikes were called in against the enemy positions and mortars. Upon the insertion of a reinforcing company, 1 UH-1D helicopter sustained a direct mortar round and was destroyed. Results of the contact were 3 US KIA, 34 US WIA, 1 UH-1D destroyed, 7 UH-1D damaged, 5 UH-1D damaged and 20 VC KIA (C). Five other light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 5 VC KIA (C) and 2 individual weapons captured. One platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an estimated VC battalion size force resulting in 4 US WIA, 6 VC KIA (C) and 5 VC KIA (P). Four other contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), and 1 VC KIA (P). Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 9 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, and 2 individual weapons, 1 82mm mortar tube and 23 82mm mortar rounds captured. On 16 May eight light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US KIA, 9 VC KIA (C), 6 detainees and 4 individual weapons, 1 rocket launcher, 2 rockets and 2 grenades captured. A light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Fourteen light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 6 US WIA, 16 VC KIA (C), 4 detainees, and 8 individual weapons captured. On 17 May a light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA and 12 detainees. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Eleven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 6 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and 5 individual weapons captured. On 18 May three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P), 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), and 2 individual weapons captured. On 18 May the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry contacted an estimated VC battalion size force armed with numerous automatic weapons and machine guns. The contact was characterized by many small engagements in a two-square kilometer area with friendly and enemy personnel intermingled. The enemy defended from numerous spider holes and fortified positions scattered throughout the area of contact. Artillery and Tactical Air supported. Contact lasted six hours and resulted in 12 US KIA, 44 US WIA, 31 VC KIA (C) and 12 individual weapons, 1 machine gun and 1 flamethrower captured. On 19 May a light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 US WIA and 1 VC KIA (P). Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Work performed by the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Brigade, 10th Airborne Division resulted in 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA. On 20 May two contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 9 VC KIA (P). A light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C).
and 1 individual weapon captured. On 21 May two light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C), and 1 individual weapon and 1 machine gun captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 4 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. One light contact by the 176th Assault Helicopter Company observed and took 8 VC, damaged, 1 US WHA, 1 M-791 rocket launcher, 1 81mm mortar round, and 1 individual weapon captured. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), 49 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. On 22 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 6 detainees. In three different locations the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered the bodies of 8 VC, killed by gunshots and fragments. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 23 May four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 VC KIA (C), 49 detainees and 1 individual weapon, 5 rounds 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition and 5 81mm mortar rounds captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). On 24 May eight light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 US WHA, 3 VC KIA (C), 14 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C), and 47 individual weapons and 3 radios captured. On 25 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry turned to Base to prepare for future employment in BASTOGNE. Two companies, A and C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airborne extractions to CARENTAN Base. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. A grenade in the position of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery resulted in 1 US WHA. On 25 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two significant contacts with enemy forces. One company contacted an estimated 50 man VC force in well fortified positions with automatic weapons and M-791s resulting in 1 US KIA, 11 US WHA, 1 CIDG KIA, 1 CIDG WHA and 11 VC KIA (C). Another company contacted an unknown size VC force in well fortified positions resulting in 8 US KIA and 10 US WHA. The results of four other light contacts were 4 VC KIA (P), 4 VC KIA (C), 3 individual weapons captured. Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted a non-illuminated, airborne assault at 0445H into LZ's in the southeastern portion of NORMANDY AO from CARENTAN Base. Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced operational control of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at 1200H. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 5 VC KIA (C) and 2 radios captured. On 26 May two light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 27 May three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). On 28 May three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), and 2 VC KIA (P). Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C), 1 individual weapon captured. The 176th Assault Helicopter Company observed and took 8 VC under fire resulting in 5 VC KIA (C) and 3 KIA (P). On 29 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions resulting in 8 US KIA, 14 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P) and 4 individual weapons and 1 machine gun captured. Ten other light contacts resulted in 3 US KIA, 5 US WHA, 2 VC KIA (C), 3 VC KIA (P), 31 detainees and 3 individual weapons, 1 rocket launcher, 1 telephone and 1500 M-16A1 ammunition captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 12 VC KIA (C), and 3 individual weapons captured. Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated operational control to the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and returned to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future employment in NORMANDY AO. On 30 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry suspended operations in the NORMANDY AO and returned to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future employment in BASTOGNE AO. One light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 2 individual weapons captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reoriented and conducted airborne assault into the north portion of the adjusted NORMANDY AO. One light contact resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. On 31 May the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted a non-illuminated, airborne assault into fortified positions with automatic weapons and M-791s. Two companies were maneuvered around the enemy force. Results were 15 US WHA, 1 UH-1D damaged, 13 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P) and 14 individual weapons.
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1 N-79 and 1 M-60 machine gun captured. On 1 June the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry employed an air strike against a suspected enemy position. A follow-up sweep of the area resulted in 1 US WHA, 5 VC KIA (C), and 6 individual weapons captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. A booby trapped grenade activated by 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA. On 3 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into LZs in the north portion of NORMANDY AO to exploit a B-52 strike. Two subsequent light contacts resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) terminated operations in the NORMANDY AO and conducted airmobile extractions to CARENTAN Base. Prior to the extraction, 24 detainees were apprehended. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). On 4 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered the graves of 6 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (minus) terminated operations in NORMANDY AO and conducted airmobile extractions to CARENTAN Base. A gravel mine detonated by a member of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery resulted in 1 US WHA. On 5 June one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 CIDG KIA. On 6 June five light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 CIDG KIA, 1 VC KIA (C), 2 VC and 1 individual weapon captured. A battery of artillery fire base consisting of one battery of 155’s and a battery of 105’s was inserted into the western portion of BASTOGNE AO in preparation for the second major phase of the operation. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon conducted an airmobile raid to apprehend detainees to provide current intelligence concerning BASTOGNE AO which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), apprehension of 15 detainees and capture of 2 hand grenades. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 4 detainees in two contacts.

d. Phase II: At 0000 June 1967 the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reoriented and commenced search and destroy operations to the north in the southern portion of BASTOGNE AO. Three light contacts resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 7 detainees captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the northeastern portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the southwest. The assault LZs were protected by the coordinated fires of artillery, tactical air and gunships. Following the LZ preparations, fires were shifted to suspected enemy locations, routes of enemy ingress and routes from enemy positions to the LZs. One company contacted an unknown size enemy force in heavily fortified positions. Artillery, helicopter gunships and nine sorties of TAC Air supported. The contact resulted in 3 US KIA, 9 US WHA, 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 individual weapons. Eight other contacts resulted in 3 US KIA, 16 US WHA; 12 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee, 12 individual and 1 crew served weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry rendezvoused at CARENTAN Base and assumed the mission of Brigade Reserve. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry continued to provide security for the beach logistical site, to operate OPs from the high ground in vicinity of CARENTAN Base and to assist the Military Police Platoon, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in providing route security and convoy escort for logistical convoys moving between the beach and the airfield complex along the MSR. On 9 June the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was released as Brigade reserve, conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the western portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the south. Two light contacts resulted in 1 US KIA, 1 US WHA; 3 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees and 1 small arm captured. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon (minus) conducted an airmobile insertion into the southern portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced a surveillance mission. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an reconnaissance patrol into the vicinity of CARENTAN Base which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 VC, 1 detainee and capture of 2 individual weapons. On 11 June, one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and apprehension of 3 detainees. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 individual weapon and 1 grenade captured. One company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry discovered 1 VC KIA (C) and one individual weapon as a result of one of the enemy contacts on 9 June. In addition, 4 detainees were apprehended from a cave where they had been hiding. A second company contacted an estimated VC Company size force armed with at least one
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Heavy machine gun. The unit pulled back and called in heavy artillery fire and gunships. Results of the contact were 4 US KIA, 32 US WHA; 1 US WIA and loss of 1 4-60 machine gun and 1 M-79. Two other light contacts resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee apprehended. One LRRP Team conducted an airborne infiltration into the area north of BASTOGNE AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 12 June one company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an unknown size VC force. TAC Air and helicopter gunships supported. A second company was maneuvered to reinforcing/blocking positions. Results of the contact were 3 US KIA, 4 US WHA, 1 M-60 and 1 120-mm howitzer destroyed; 3 VC KIA (C) and 1 PR captured. Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 303d Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA; 2 VC KIA (C), capture of 1 individual weapon and apprehension of 152 detainees (refugees). The LRRP Team north of BASTOGNE AO accounted for 13 VC KIA (C) and 10 VC KIA (P) prior to conducting an airborne extraction to CARENTL1 Base late in the day. On 12 June three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 8 VC KIA (C) and capture of 6 individual weapons. One contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (P) and 1 individual weapon captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), capture of 3 detainees and 1 small arms. On 13 June three light contacts resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 VC WIA and 24 detainees for the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry accounted for 1 VC KIA (C) in one contact and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry for 4 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees and 2 individual weapons in four light contacts. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon (minus) conducted an airborne raid into the southern portion of the SONG VE Valley to apprehend detainees to provide current intelligence about the population and disposition of VC and NVA forces in the valley. Results of the raid were 3 VC KIA (C) and 11 detainees apprehended. On 14 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced cordon and search operations and evacuation of the civilian population of the SONG TRA CAU and southern portion of the SONG VE Valley. The results of the day's clearing operations were 2 VC KIA (C), 9 detainees and 2 individual weapons captured and relocation of 170 refugees to MOHIA HANH Refugee Center. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 8 VC KIA (P) and capture of 30 tons of rice. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and apprehension of 8 detainees. On 15 June, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry concluded the cordon and search operations and evacuation of the population from the SONG TRA CAU and southern SONG VE Valley. The day's operations resulted in 1 VC and 3 detainees captured and relocation of 436 refugees to the MOHIA HANH Refugee Center. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), 2 individual weapons captured and destruction of 20 tons of rice. On 16 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airborne assaults from the southern portion of BASTOGNE AO to the high ground north of the SONG VE Valley. The battalion's mission was to conduct search and destroy operations north of the valley, to block the egress routes north out of the valley and to conduct cordon and search operations and evacuate the civilian population of the northern portion of the SONG VE Valley. One Company contacted an estimated battalion size VC force armed with mortars, estimated 12-17mm machine guns and automatic weapons in fortified positions. A second company conducted an airborne assault to reinforce, Artillery, gunships and 19 sorties of TAC Air supported. Results were 3 US KIA, 37 US WHA, 1 UH-1D damaged and 8 VC KIA (C). Four other light contacts resulted in 2 US KIA, 1 US WHA, 1 UH-1D destroyed; 9 VC KIA (C). One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon (minus) conducted airborne insertions in the southern portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 17 June, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry commenced cordon and search operations and evacuation of the civilian population of the eastern and western portions of the SONG VE Valley respectively. Results of the day's operation were 532 refugees and 10 tons of rice relocated to the MOHIA HANH Refugee Center. Additionally, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry accounted for 2 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P) in three light contacts and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry for 3 VC KIA (C), apprehension of 14 detainees and destruction of .8 tons rice in five light contacts. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry had nine light contacts resulting in 3 US WHA, 1 UH-1D damaged, 3 VC KIA (C) and apprehension of 5 detainees. On 18 June four light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry resulted in 3 US WHA, 10 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon captured. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C), and 54 detainees. Six light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual and 1 crew served weapon. 1285 refugees and 6 tons of rice were relocated to the NHOCHI HANH Refugee Center. On 19 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had seven light contacts resulting in 1 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C), 35 detainees and 1 82mm mortar captured. Six light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 35 detainees and 2 individual weapons captured. Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 5 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees, 1 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured. Two light contacts by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee captured. One contact vicinity CARENTAN Base by Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 2 individual weapons and 1 VC KIA (P) and 1 individual weapon captured. A total of 1030 refugees were relocated from the SONG VE Valley to the Refugee Center at NHOCHI HANH. On 20 June five light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 VC KIA (C) and 24 detainees captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 30 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and 3 detainees captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had 1 light contact near CARENTAN Base resulting in 1 KIA (C), 65 refugees were relocated to NHOCHI HANH and 400 refugees were relocated to MO DUC District Headquarters from the SONG VE Valley. On 22 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 4 detainees in one light contact. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received 7 US WHA in a mortar attack on one company. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had seven light contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C) and 5 detainees captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had 1 light contact near CARENTAN Base resulting in 1 KIA (C), 65 refugees were relocated to NHOCHI HANH and 400 refugees were relocated to MO DUC District Headquarters from the SONG VE Valley. On 23 June, the three battalions resumed search and destroy operations in BASTOGNE 60. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a weapon cache of 5 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). The battalion also discovered a weapon cache containing 3 Chicom 82mm rockets and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry captured 2 detainees in two light contacts. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon captured 19 detainees, 5 motor scooters and 10 bicycles in three light contacts. On 24 June one light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon captured 4 detainees and 25 tons of salt in two light contacts. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon conducted an airborne extraction to CARENTAN Base.
On 25 June, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the west of their positions into the northeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the southeast in zone. The battalion suffered 1 US WHA in one light contact. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the southwestern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the northeast in zone. One light contact resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and capture of 1 individual weapon and 20 tons of salt.

Trop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an ambush vicinity CARENTAN Base which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 26 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry activated an enemy mine resulting in 2 US WHA. Eight light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 1 US WHA, 11 VC KIA (C), and capture of 1 crew served and 3 individual weapons. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 3 VC KIA (C), 4 individual weapons and 40 tons of salt captured. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon conducted airmobile insertions into the northeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 27 June, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 4 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 1 US WHA, 2 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees and capture of 1 individual weapon, 10 tons of salt and 2 tons of rice. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon made four observations of enemy movement and called in artillery fire resulting in 9 VC KIA (P). On 28 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 3 US WHA, 3 VC KIA (C).

The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon made four observations of enemy movement and called in artillery fire resulting in 16 VC KIA (P). At CARENTAN Base, Trop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an ambush resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 2 detainees. On 29 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the southwestern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the south. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon, 1 crew served weapon and 150 hand grenades. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 3 US WHA and 2 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon terminated its surveillance mission and conducted an airmobile extraction to CARENTAN Base. On 30 June, one company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile raid into an area in which considerable enemy activity had been taking place as reported by the LRRP Platoon. The unit made 6 contacts resulting in 1 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C), 6 detainees, 1 individual weapon captured and 1 ton of rice destroyed. The unit then conducted an airmobile extraction returning to their assigned portion of ZON AO. On 1 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had six light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, 2 individual weapons and 7 tons of rice captured, 1 ton of rice destroyed. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had five light contacts resulting in 7 VC KIA (C), at CARENTAN Base, Trop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). The LRRP Platoon conducted an airmobile insertion into the northeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 2 July three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C), capture of 2 individual weapons and destruction of 2 tons of rice. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. On 3 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 3 VC KIA (C). The battalion conducted an airmobile extraction to CARENTAN Base where training, maintenance and prepared for future combat operations were conducted. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 US WHA. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees. On 4 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received 2 US WHA from booby traps and captured 1 individual weapon in a company size base camp. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 5 July one
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company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry assumed the CARENTAN Base security missions from Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. The Cavalry Troop there joined under the operational control of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 individual weapons. In addition, the battalion discovered a total of 20 tons of salt in two locations. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had 6 US WIA as a result of three light contacts. On 6 July, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus)(reinforced) commenced Operation LAKE (See Combat After Action Report, Operation LAKE). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (F). Eight light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 CIDG WIA, 14 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual weapons. At CARENTAN Base, 13 US personnel were injured and a dump truck damaged as a result of a VC mine on the MSR. On 7 July three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 NVAC captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. On 8 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced cordon and search and evacuation operations in the SONG NE Valley. Two light contacts by the battalion resulted in 1 US KIA, 5 VC KIA (C), 7 detainees and 2 individual weapons captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 9 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry extracted 254 refugees from the SONG NE Valley to NHIA HAMN. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 US WIA; 2 VC KIA (C), 11 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. At CARENTAN Base, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon apprehended 4 detainees while on reconnaissance patrols outside the perimeter. On 10 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted cordon and search operations and evacuation operations in its assigned portion of ZON AO. Total refugees evacuated were 292. The battalion, less one company left under the operational control of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, conducted airborne assaults into the southeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations in Base Area 12A. 10 tons of rice were discovered and extracted. Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon. On 11 July the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) engaged an estimated VC company armed with mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles and small arms. Artillery, flareships and gunships supported the operation and one other company was maneuvered to reinforce. Results were 2 US KIA, 18 US WIA; 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (F) captured. Five other light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 8 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry terminated Operation LAKE and returned to CARENTAN Base. On 12 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) terminated Operation LAKE and returned to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future operations. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 2 individual weapons. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), 12 detainees and capture of 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry resumed the CARENTAN Base security mission. On 13 July four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. One company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airborne displacement and assumed the security mission of CHAMPS Fire Base under operational control of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced). On 14 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) conducted airborne assaults into the northern portion of extended ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations in Base Area 122. Two light contacts by the battalion resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry regained operational control of the company that had been working with the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced). One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. On 15 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts.
contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P), and capture of 6 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had three light contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had one light contact near CARETAN Base resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 16 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had three light contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had two light contacts resulting in 5 VC KIA (C). On 17 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P), and 11 detainees captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airborne assault into Base Area 123 following a B-52 strike. One contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had one contact resulting in the capture of 1 individual weapon. On 18 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had six light contacts resulting in 7 VC KIA (C) capture of 2 individual weapons, and apprehension of 11 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had five light contacts resulting in 17 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (C), capture of 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced), resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 11 detainees. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry counted 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (P) as the result of one contact near CARETAN Base. On 19 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and apprehension of 11 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had three light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 7 detainees in one contact near CARETAN Base. On 20 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 21 July one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 2 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had three light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 5 detainees and 1 individual weapon. On 22 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had five light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 8 detainees and 2 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two contacts resulting in capture of 9 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual weapons. On 23 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 4 detainees and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had five light contacts resulting in 2 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 2 detainees in two contacts vicinity CARETAN Base. On 24 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had five contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee. One contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had two contacts resulting in the capture of 2 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 3 detainees in one contact vicinity JUBERTH Base. On 25 July three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 6 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had five light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 3 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had eight contacts resulting in 9 VC KIA (C) and capture of 12 detainees and 2 individual weapons. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry detained 3 individual vicinity CARETAN Base. On 26 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had two contacts resulting in 9 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee, Seven contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (P) and capture of 13 detainees and 3 individual weapons.
individual weapons. One contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in capture of 1 detainee. On 27 July nine light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 1 US KIA, 6 US WIA, 5 CIDG WIA, 13 VC KIA (C) and capture of 15 detainees and 3 individual weapons. One element of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry observed 6 VC moving along a valley floor and engaged with artillery. When the area was swept the unit observed and engaged an unknown number of VC. Additional artillery was called in and the element maneuvered forcing the enemy to break contact. The results of the contact was 10 VC KIA (C). One other contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Six light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 1 US KIA, 8 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees, 2 crew served and 1 individual weapon. On 28 July 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, and capture of 7 detainees and 1 small arms. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry captured 7 detainees in two contacts before it and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted air mobile extraction to CARENTAN Base where the two battalions conducted preparation for future operations at CARENTAN Base. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 4 detainees in one contact. On 29 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 10 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. On 30 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 5 detainees in two contacts. One battery from the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted an overland displacement to QUANG NAI, C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery providing general support reinforcing fire at CHAMPS Fire Base, conducted an air mobile displacement to HA THANH CIDG Camp. On 1 August, one contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon killed 1 VC KIA (C) in an ambush vicinity CARENTAN Base. A second battery of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted an overland move to QUANG NAI. During the move a Military Police Platoon vehicle detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. No detainees were apprehended in the vicinity of the mining incident. On 20 August, Operation MAHAKAI terminated and Operation WOOD RIVER commenced. At the time of termination of Operation MAHAKAI, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were initiating air mobile assaults west of QUANG NAI while the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in its areas of operations in the northern portion of ZON AO.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 11th Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and neutralize VC/NVA base camps in NAM NAY, BASTOGNE and ZON AO's.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 869 VC/NVA KIA (C), 105 US VC/NVA KIA (P), 62 VCI, 18 NVAC, 771 detainees, 295 individual weapons, 19 crew served weapons, 133 tons salt and 260,65 tons rice.

c. Friendly losses resulting from combat operations were: 81 US KIA, 594 US WIA, 11 HA, 1 M-60 MG, 1 XM-177E, 2 M-16A; 1 M-79, 1 1/2 ton truck, 1 UH-1D destroyed, 9 UH-1D damaged, 3 UH-1B damaged and 2 M-151's damaged.

13. (C) Administration Matters:


14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. At the beginning of Phase II the Brigade established Fire Base CHAMPS containing one battery each of 105's and 155's in the AO. The Fire Base remained
in place for the remainder of the operation. It was used as a refueling and re-
arming point during one air mobile assault. Since CHAMPS was located generally
centered in the AO, the maneuver elements had continuous use of its fire support.
Sufficient ammunition was stockpiled to provide a reserve against large contacts.

b. During Phase II, the Brigade organized its own air cavalry platoon
from organic resources. Two armed LCH, two UH-1 gunships and six UH-1D troop
 carrier helicopters carrying one cavalry or infantry platoon comprised the force.
This "Eagle Eye" force provides an organic capability to conduct rapid reconna-
sance over large areas and to develop and exploit enemy situations encountered
utilizing minimum friendly forces.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Operations conducted against NVA forces in terrain lacking
landing zones require that units (Company and Platoon) remain close enough together
 to permit rapid overland reinforcement of a unit which makes contact with a large
size enemy force.

(2) A study of the location and organization of VC/NVA defensive
positions and base areas encountered will result in the identification of a defensive
pattern. When coupled with a detailed study, this pattern can be used to
identify those locations throughout the area of operations where enemy positions
 can be expected.

(3) Well trained VC/NVA units will generally establish well camou-
flaged defensive positions on ridge lines and hills. Searching forces should always
 attempt to conduct their operations from higher to lower ground in order to retain
as much tactical advantage as possible should one of these positions be encountered.

(4) Artillery should be fired forward of advancing elements particu-
larly when an enemy defensive position is thought to exist in the front.

(5) The VC and NVA attempted to delay engagement with Brigade ele-
ments until the distance between forces was too small for effective use of artillery,
 TAC Air, and gunships.

(6) A unit in contact with an enemy force occupying fortified defensive
positions should make maximum use of artillery, TAC Air and gunships to soften
the enemy before attempting to assault. The use of non-persistent CS will often
drive the enemy from his protected positions and maximize the effects of indirect
 fire support without impairing the assault of the enemy positions by the friendly
 force.

(7) Training in identification of VC mines and booby traps must be
continuously stressed despite the fact that enemy mines and booby traps may
appear to be absent in the current area of operations. These devices are almost
always present.

(8) Detainee screening should incorporate the services of district
agency representatives and officials. Being more familiar with the area and the
people, they will identify VC and NVA who might otherwise escape detection.

(9) Maximum use should be made of preplanned air strikes and Combat
Skyboats in landing zone preparation forward of advancing troops in areas lacking
natural landing zones to ensure that emergency pickup zones are available to the
units on the ground should they be needed.

(10) Tunnels could be effectively contaminated with bags of persistent
CS by placing the bags 7 meters apart within the tunnel complex and blasting all
entrances closed.

(11) The most effective method for destruction of bunkers with over-
head cover was to level the bunker from the ground with persistent CS and collapse
the overhead covering.
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S.I.O.:
Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALBURN (MACV/BCS/43/32)

(12) VC base camps and defensive positions containing numerous two and
three man fighting holes could be effectively contaminated from the air using
persistent CS. The CS concentration remained effective for 4 to 6 weeks.

(13) A lack of helicopter landing zones causes the consumption of
expendable 5 gallon water cans to increase by 300%. The cans are lowered to the
troops by rope or dropped through the jungle canopy and are not easily recovered
after use.

(14) Continued airlift of M102 Howitzers causes the life of the
Panoramic telescope sight to be greatly reduced. Extreme care must be taken in
handling howitzers as the sights and repair parts are not readily available.

(15) Where possible during valley clearing operations indigenous
forces or members of the population should be used to herd livestock as the pre-
sence of US troops and helicopters will often cause cattle and buffalo to stampede.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) During a lengthy operation of this nature, malaria, fever and
fatigue can be expected to increase. A general loss of troop resistance to these
infections can be expected when units operate in low valley floors which are or
have been inhabited by the local population and their animals.

(2) Contacts initially were with company and battalion sized enemy
forces who stood their ground and fought. Over the period of three months, the
size of the enemy holes could be become smaller until the majority of air contacts
involved two to five enemy. At the close of the operation the enemy appeared to
be avoiding contact completely.

(3) CIDG forces operating in support of the Brigade provided assistance
to companies and platoons through their knowledge of the terrain over which Brigade
forces were operating. The Brigade assisted the CIDG by providing the fire sup-
port and reaction force capability necessary for them to conduct operations in
areas not previously penetrated by them.

(4) Once again the enemy appeared to return to an area within 48
hours after US troops had passed through. At a minimum, reconnaissance elements
should be employed to maintain surveillance over old AO’s and to call fire on
enemy re-entering the area.

(5) One ship landing zones prepared by preplanned Tactical Air or
Combat Skyspot normally require additional clearing by a ground force before they
are suitable to accept a landing helicopter.

10 Incls
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operations Schematics
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Chemical
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Communications
8 - Psychological Operations
9 - Engineer
10 - Artillery

S. H. MATHESON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
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(Operations MAIHEUR 1 & 11) (U)

1. (C) TERRAIN: The area of operation is predominantly mountainous terrain with the SONG YE VALLEY bisecting the area. The heavy vegetation afforded good cover and concealment but poor observation and fields of fire. The major contacts were made in the SONG YE VALLEY and NUI HON (HILL 464, BS 6435) areas. The main avenues of approach are Route 516 (N-S) and the SONG YE (H-S) and the SONG BA YO (N-S). Route 515 and numerous small rivers constitute the avenues east and west to the coast.

2. (U) WEATHER: The weather during Operation MAIHEUR was generally favorable for military operations. Under the influence of the southwest monsoon, the weather was characterized by westerly winds of 10-15 knots, scattered thunderstorms over the mountains, clear skies over the coastal plain. In May and June there were often large patches of ground fog in mountain valleys during the morning hours. Temperature ranged from the upper 90's during the day to the 70's at night. Relative humidity was generally in the range of 60 - 90%. Except for an occasional airstrike cancellation due to thunderstorms, the weather had no ill effect on the mission during operation MAIHEUR.

3. (C) ANALYSIS:
   a. Intelligence Analysis
      (1) The operation was conducted against the 2d VC Regiment, 34 NVA Division and lst VC Regiment, 2d NVA Division. Local units were also contacted throughout the operation. Base area 122 was found not to contain significant facilities and should be deleted from active lists.
      (2) The first phase of the operation was conducted in Base Area 124, the SONG TRA CAU VALLEY and western BA TO District. All three battalions of the 2d VC Regiment were contacted. Interrogation of prisoners and translations of documents revealed that the battalion commanders of the 93rd, 95th and 97th Battalions were killed. The enemy was found to be well fed and amply supplied with ammunition. The enemy fought well from prepared positions to protect his base areas and when he felt he had the advantage. Western BA TO District appeared to be a rear area. Supplies of new clothing and equipment were captured. Prisoners taken here identified the 107th Anti-Aircraft battalion (a new identification) to be in the area. No direct contact was made with the 107th Anti-Aircraft battalion. The enemy units were fragmented during this phase.
      (3) In the second phase the Brigade continued to pursue to 1st VC Regiment and 2d VC Regiment. The enemy moved from base area to base area in an attempt to evade contact and regroup. The SONG YE VALLEY was cleared of civilians and cattle to deny their use to the enemy. Several large caches of rice and salt were discovered and either destroyed or evacuated. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon conducted raids in the SONG YE VALLEY to bring out people who could give information regarding conditions there. The raids revealed considerable intelligence information and resulted in the capture of a local Viet Cong political cadre leader. The enemy was believed to be concentrating in Base Area 123 and that area was again penetrated forcing the enemy to flee from the hills out onto the coastal plain. Prisoners revealed the 97th Battalion was low on food and ammunition and morale was poor. In the No DUC Valley, the local Viet Cong Lead Quarters was attacked resulting in the District Chief and his secretary being killed, his replacement, a courier, and the production chief captured. The files of the No DUC District were also captured.
A VC prison camp was found based on information received from a refugee and agent reports. Twenty two prisoners were freed, all of whom were Vietnamese nationals.

b. Communication Security

(1) During the operation a total of 108,261 radio transmissions and 6,364 conventional telephone transmissions were monitored.

(2) A total of twenty two (22) transmission security violations were noted over the Brigade FM radio nets and 19 over the Strike switchboard.


disclosure of Frequency Allocations 15
Disclosure of Plans & Operations 9
Linkage or Compromise of Callsign/Callword 8
Disclosure of TDY Personnel Activities 2
Disclosure of Unit Strength 1
Disclosure of Troop Movement 2
Disclosure of Locations 2
Disclosure of Classified Information 2
Use of Unauthorized Codes 2

c. Counterintelligence

(1) The Counterintelligence section screened detained persons at the NHAI HAHN detainee center. This screening resulted in locating 15 Viet Cong personnel, 6 weapons, 6 rice caches and 2 tunnels. Approximately 94,000 $VN was expended for information at NHAI HAHN.

(2) The section established a program to recover munitions dispersed by the ammunition dump fire on 20 June 1967, by offering monetary payment to local nationals for surrendering munitions. This program resulted in the recovery of 483 rounds of ammunition at an expense of approximately 39,000 $VN.

(3) A program has been started which will aid in the control of Vietnamese laborers within the Brigade Base Camp area. A list of all Vietnamese authorized to work within the Brigade area was obtained from the DUC PH District Chief. Photographs are being taken of these persons. Daily spot checks of the laborers will enable this section to detect any unauthorized Vietnames within the Brigade area.

4. Lessons Learned

a. RED HAZE: The effect of RED Haze was reduced considerably because the natives burn their fields during the dry seasons. It was also learned through captured documents that the VC have implemented counter measures against RED Haze in the form night fire discipline which resulted in minimal use of RED Haze during Operation KALIEH.

b. Aerial Photography: Excellent support was provided in the way of photographic coverage including trail, landing and drop zones overlays throughout the entire operation. There were a few instances where we had short notice to procure photo coverage of new areas; however, because of direct telephone request to TASK FORCE CHEROKEE, O-2, we were able to get the photography on time.

c. Visual Reconnaissance: The overall effect of Visual Reconnaissance was good throughout the operation. However, we only had one aircraft available. Some areas could not be covered because of the requirement to have two chips in the area.
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Indoctrination l (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report
(Operation MALHEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

d. Use of Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon.

1. On two occasions the Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized to conduct raids in the SONG VE Valley. Their mission was to secure individuals knowledgeable about conditions in the valley. The first raid was highly successful in that it caught the enemy by surprise and resulted in capturing a Viet Cong Political Officer and several cooperative civilians. The second raid netted additional civilians who confirmed information obtained previously.

2. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized to maintain surveillance on the SONG VE Valley, while the Brigade was operating to the west. Gunships and artillery were used to engage groups of the enemy seen in the valley.

3. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon established observation over routes south of Base Area 123. Artillery was utilized to engage enemy forces trying to flee south.

4. An intensive training program was initiated to qualify new members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon. Night ambushes and patrols were utilized outside the base camp perimeter for familiarization in night operations resulting in several small enemy contacts.

e. Base Area and Fortification Study:

1. A study was undertaken to determine if patterns existed for the establishment of enemy base camps and defensive fortifications. It was found during early operation that the enemy invariably established his bases in the upper reaches of draws where water was available and dense foliage precluded aerial observation. Fortifications were found on the "fingers" covering the base camps and were mutually supporting. A comparison with information obtained from other sources such as agent reports, trail studies, etc., indicated a pattern did exist and potential base areas and bunkered positions could be predicted.

2. Information obtained from CICV, photos, Red Haze, Visual Reconnaissance Special Agent Report was placed on overlays and the density of activity plotted. The activity generally fell into terrain favored by the enemy for his camps. The information was then placed on maps using red to represent probable base camp locations. A careful study of surrounding terrain was made to determine likely defensive positions and these entered in blue on the map. Thus commanders were presented with a clear indication of most likely areas of interest. Exploitation using this method of locating base camps has proved to be accurate and this method of prediction will continue to be utilized where enemy activity appears to fit this pattern.

5. (C) ECSY LOSSES: The following losses were sustained by the enemy during MALHEUR I & II.

a. Personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MALHEUR I</th>
<th>MALHEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (C)</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA Estimated</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW VC/VI</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>52/16</td>
<td>62/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detained</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC POW</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA POW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report
(Operation MAIMIR 1 & II) (U) cont'd

| MAIMIR I | MAIMIR II | TOTAL IN 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendant</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilian</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unprocessed</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body/Weapons Ratio</td>
<td>3:2:1</td>
<td>4:5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill Ratio</td>
<td>7:2:1</td>
<td>10:3:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Included in POW figures
** Unprocessed due to Medical Evacuation or the like reason

b. Weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>MAIMIR I</th>
<th>MAIMIR II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX-47</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-90</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren Model MKIID</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Carbine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Type 50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 58 Assault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson SMG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Cal Pistol</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Cal Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Cal SMG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrotech-charger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosin Nagant</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Rifles</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaufer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mos-36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp;hra</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Model</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP 40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German 7.92 MG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chzikllerault 7.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian 1MG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm Mortar (M-79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 in Rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore Mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare - 543 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt - 1333 tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Installations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>MAIMIR I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortified bunkers - Hut complexes</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 140 installations (bunker, Base Camps, Trench, Hospitals, Caves, and huts) were encountered during the operation.

d. Miscellaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>MAIMIR I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Phones</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric circuit tester</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walkie Talkie radio's</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch board</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report

A & B (O&A) I & II (U) cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tape recorders</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transistor radio's</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRC 10 radios</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Mask</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Scooters</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cylinder Engine</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsets</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commo Wire</td>
<td>2 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch Board Jacks</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speakers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteries 30</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jolly Cloth</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large amounts of medical supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TAB 1: A - Order of Battle**

**TAB 2: B - Organisation and Strength to OB**

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T.R.A. (Order of Battle) to Intelligence, Intelligence to Combat Action Report (Operations MUDIUM 1 & II) (U)

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle

a. NVA Units

(1) The 2nd NVA Division composed of the 1st VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Regiment, and the 21st NVA Regiment, and supporting units, was confirmed to be operating in QUANG NAI Province. The 3rd NVA and 21st NVA Regiments were believed to be operating north of the initial area of operations. The 1st VC Regiment composed of four VC battalions was located in the vicinity of BS 350570. The subordinate battalions were believed to be located at the following positions: 40th Battalion (BS 6655), 50th Battalion (BS 5055), 70th Battalion outside the area of operations, and 90th Battalion (BS 7043).

(2) The 3rd NVA Division composed of the 2d VC Regiment, 18th NVA Regiment, and the 22d NVA Regiment, and supporting units, was believed to be operating in the southern portion of the initial area of operation with the division headquarters in the vicinity of BS 750230. The 2d VC Regiment, with its headquarters in the vicinity of BS 860350, was believed to be operating with the 1st VC Battalion, 2d VC Battalion, and 3rd VC Battalion in the area of operations. The 22d NVA Regiment, in the vicinity of BS 790230, was believed to be deploying the 8th NVA Division was expected to influence the area of operations in a reinforcing role only.

b. VC Units:

(1) The 3eth Viet Cong Local Force Battalion was believed to be operating in the MO DUC District (BS 7836) within Base Area 123.

(2) The 4th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion was reported to be in the vicinity of BS 6150.

(3) The 409th Sapper Battalion was believed to be in the same area of operation but its location was not known.

(4) There are nine VC District Force (Guerrilla) companies within QUANG NAI Province. The locations for these companies were unconfirmed.

c. Base Areas: There were four base camp areas reported within the area of operations. Base Area 123, BS 6150, BS 7423, and BS 750230. A base area is considered a safe and secure area in which to train, rest, and regroup for combat.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in the Operational Area

a. Units not Contacted

(1) Elements of the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division were not contacted during Operation MUDIUM 1 & II, and are currently located in QUANG TIN and QUANG NAI Provinces respectively.

(2) Elements of the 18th and 22d NVA Regiment, 3rd NVA Division were not contacted during the operation. The 1st Cavalry Division had contact with the 18th and 22d NVA Regiments. The 3rd Brigade, 25th Division, had contact with the 3rd NVA Regiment south of the 1st Brigade area. The 22d NVA Regiment operated in the east in the NINH-QUANG NAI Province border area. The 18th NVA Regiment continues to operate south of the HUEKAIN area of operations.

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(3) Element of the 409th Sapper Battalion were not contacted during Operation MALHEUR I & II. Although numerous reports prior to the Brigade arrival place this unit in the operational area, no contact was made with the unit, and it was consequently dropped from Order of Battle holdings. Agent reports from III Field Sector Intelligence in QUJQG NAGI, and from Task Force Oregon placed this unit north of our area in the vicinity BS 5176. It is probably broken into small elements which are attached to other units.

b. Units with light contact

(1) Elements of the 38th & 48th VCLF Battalions were not contacted in force during MALHEUR I & II. Based on numerous agent reports from higher and adjacent units, these units were probably contacted in small units. As a result of the size of the contacts, intelligence results were insignificant. These units have as their primary interest the coastal plains area. During the operation they did not deviate from this, and are currently located north of our area, vicinity BS 67º4 and BS 73º2 respectively.

(2) Small resistance groups (normally 5 to 10 personnel) which are elements of the seven district and local force units, were contacted periodically throughout the Tactical Area of Responsibility with insignificant intelligence results.

c. Units Contacted

(1) Element of the 1st VC Regiment, 2nd NVA Division were contacted in force during these operations. On the 15th of May 1967, Reconnaissance element of lst Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry encountered a Battalion size force at BS 67º42º which was confirmed to be a portion of the 1st VC Regiment. The result of the engagement was 20 enemy KIA (C). On 12 June Company A lst Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry assumed 9 enemy with documents showing them to have been members of the 60th Battalion, lst NVA Regiment. On 15 June Company A, lst Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry recorded one KL with documents that revealed he was a member of the 60th Battalion, lst NVA Regiment. On 11 July, Reconnaissance Platoon 2nd Battalion (Abn) 502d Infantry engaged an estimated company size unit. The enemy returned fire with mortars, 57mm RR and small arms. The enemy broke contact when friendly reinforcements arrived. One enemy KIA (C) and one AK-47 were found. A search of the area at daylight revealed 26 newly dug positions and numerous bloody trails, bandages and bloody clothing. A Prisoner of War captured the following day revealed that the contact had been made with elements of the 90th Battalion, lst VC Regiment. On 26 June 1967, a Hoi Chanh revealed that the strength of the lst VC Regiment was approximately 700 men. The Regimental Headquarters and support elements had 200 men together, the 60th Battalion had approximately 110 men, the 60th Battalion had 150, and the 90th Battalion had approximately 170 men. The Hoi Chanh also stated that the Battalions were so understrength due to losses that they were referred to as reinforced companies. Other casualties have been assessed due to the lack of reliable prisoners and documents captured during contact. The lst VC Regimental is believed to be located northwest of our Tactical Area of Responsibility, vicinity BS 45º70.

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TAB 1 (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation
After Action Report (Operations MAHUR I & II) (5) cont'd

(2) Element of the 2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division, were
contacted in force during this operation. On 13 May,
Company B, 1st Battalion (Am) 502d Infantry engaged a
company size unit believed to be subordinate to the 2nd
VC Regiment. The results of the contact was 13 enemy
KIA (C). On 18 May, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Am)
502d Infantry contacted an estimated Battalion size force
vicinity BS 740310 with a results of 25 enemy KIA (C).
Based on the continued contacts with this Regiment,
Regimental strength is probably about 900-950 personnel,
with Battalions at a strength of approximately 300.
The 2nd VC Regiment is believed to be located southeast
of our Tactical area of Responsibility, vicinity BS 7728
and BS 804A.

(3) Final Disposition of the 1st & 2nd VC Regiments:
(a) 1st NVA Regiment Headquarters vicinity BS 5369
1 40th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 6547
2 60th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 4767
2 70th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity TIN PHUOC/TAN KI
4 90th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 4566
(b) 2nd NVA Regiment Headquarters - vicinity BS 629364
1 93rd Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 7728
2 95th Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 6254
(c) 97th Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 804A

(4) The friendly operations initiated during Operations
MAHUR I & II have reduced the enemy's combat
effectiveness. Interrogation of Prisoners of War and
returnees reports indicate that the enemy's combat
effectiveness has further been reduced due to illness,
desertions, friendly Air Strikes and ground operations.
The VC units have been forced to split into small groups
to avoid contact with friendly ground forces, while
attempting to regroup in safer areas to the northwest
and southeast. Morale has been another factor which
influenced the combat effectiveness of the enemy
units, as reported from Interrogation of Prisoners of
War and returnees, morale is poor among the low echelon
cadre for many of the above reasons. The enemy units
have the capability of regrouping and becoming a limited
threat when the terrain and defensive posture is to
their advantage, and they should be viewed accordingly.

(5) See TAB B Order of Battle Information pertaining to
Organization and strength of the 1st and 2nd NV.
Regiments.

d. New Units Contacted: 107 Anti Aircraft Battalion (also Known as 270th Battalion)

(1) History

Infiltration: In December 66, the 270th Battalion
(also Known as 107th) moved to Le Haut, NHO QUAN
District, NHA BINH Province, where the member of the
Battalion moved in with the local populace, in an

A-3

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effort to avoid being bombed. After one month, everyone was given a 10 day leave, to report back to H M Lat. Not later than 17 January 67, the battalion began its infiltration march, which took four months, and it was all by foot. The unit crossed the Demilitarized Zone, entered LOI0 and then worked down through THU, THIEN, QUANG TIN, and into QUANG NOI Province. The unit stopped for one day of rest every fifth day. The Battalion finally set up, for the first time on 26 May 67, after arriving in QUANG NOI Province. They set up in a valley approximately a two day walk south or southeast of BI 503433.

(2) Training and Tactics

(a) The battalion was formed and training began in late April 1966. The officers and Non Commissioned Officers for the Battalion were drawn from the 42nd and 50th Regiments, 350th Division. This division is responsible for the defense of HAI PHONG. The battalion first had to build its camp, which was located in the mountains of VI BAN (District), HOA BINH (Province). The first two days of training were devoted to basic infantry training, with the SKS rifle. Each man fired five rounds at a 50 meter target. They also received instructions in grenades and the use of the bayonet. For the following six months, all training was devoted to the 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun.

1. First Month: Disassembling, assembling, cleaning and care of the weapon.

2. Second Month: Carrying the weapon and preparations for battle. When the unit is moving, the weapon is broken down, for carrying, as follows: The Assistant Squad Leader carries an extra barrel, if available. The Battalion currently has an extra barrel for each of its nine (9) Heavy Machine Guns. The Squad Leader carries the sights. One man carries the tripod, one the wheels. All nine weapons in the 107th Battalion are complete, with wheels. Three men carry the firing mechanism and barrel. The rest of the personnel carry ammunition. The 107th Battalion currently has 200 rounds per weapon. During the infiltration march, an unknown amount was lost. Soon after their arrival in QUANG NOI (Province), they were re-supplied to bring the supply to its present level.

3. Third thru Sixth Month: Setting up positions, use of field of fire, support of infantry in both defense and attack, deployment against armored Personnel Carrier and convoys. Each man fired 20 rounds, during training, on a 300 meter range, at an opening in a wooden board, the opening being 25cm x 75cm. They fired once during daylight and once at night, each time firing one burst of five rounds and one of nine rounds.

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(b) Employment:

1. The 107th Battalion constructs its positions as follows: There is no mound in the middle to set the gun on. The walls of the bunker are 1.60 meters high and 0.80 meters thick. The inside diameter is 3.00 meters. In bivouac, the three companies set up in triangular pattern, with the Battalion Command Post in the center. Each unit is about three minutes walk apart.

2. Within each company, the three weapons are also set up in a triangular pattern, with three positions prepared for each weapon. Distance between each of these positions is approximately 500 meters. The primary and alternate positions are well camouflaged. None of the positions are occupied. The gun team waits a safe distance from the primary position. If the positions are bombed, they feel sure a heliborne attack will follow. After the bombing, they then occupy the primary position and commence fire when the helicopters come within range. Before the helicopters land, however, the gun teams withdraw to the alternate positions.

(c) Communications:

In the North Viet Nam, the Battalion used field phones for communication between the company, and the battalion; however they did not bring any to South Viet Nam and must rely on messengers.

3. (C) COMPOSITION:

a. In North Viet Nam, the 320B Division is part of the III Corps. Unknown number of Division make up the Corps.

b. The 320B Division has three Regiments, however the 3rd Regiment is the only one about which information is known.

c. The 3rd Regiment consists of 10 battalions.

(1) The 301st, 302d Infantry Battalions.

(2) The 269th, 270th, 271st and 272d Anti Aircraft Battalions.

(3) The 270th (Also Known as 107th) Anti Aircraft Battalion has three companies numbered 1, 2 and 3.

(4) Each company has two platoons, numbered 1 and 2.

(5) Each platoon has three squads. The squad in the 1st platoon are numbered 1, 2 and 3. Those in the 2d platoon are numbered 4, 5 and 6.

(6) Each squad has three cells.

4. (C) STRENGTH (Weapons):

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<th>In South Viet Nam</th>
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<td>500</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>Anti Aircraft Company</td>
<td>144</td>
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<td>Platoon</td>
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T.O.1 (Order of Battle) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation
After Action Report (Operations MALEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

3. (2) STRENGTH (Cont'd):
   a. Every two squads in the Battalion 1 x 12.7 Heavy Machine Gun, total of 9.
   b. Company level officers and above have X-45 pistols.
   c. Platoon leaders, assistant platoon leaders and squad leaders have M-50s.
   d. Other personal do not have small arms because they must carry parts of the Heavy Machine Guns when unit is moving.
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1st VC Regiment, 2nd NVA Division

WORKSITE 1
Gong Truong 1
Steel Works
Night Dragon
Cuu Long
Southwind

CONFIRMED LOCATION vicinity BS 5368, 1 August 1967 Task Force Oregon
Accepted Location vicinity Base Area 121

HQ STRENGTH
200 men, 1st Brigade, 101 Airborne Division, 15 August 1967.

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

PERSONALITIES

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Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to after-action Report (Operation MALABAR I and II) (U) Con't'd

40th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS:

80th Bn
Thach Ho
Man Hai
3rd Bn
Phi Doi 2007
Song Ma

1st Co/40th
361
2nd Co/40th
362
3rd Co/40th
363
4th Co/40th
364

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Tan

Mieng

Vu

Xuang

POLITICAL OFFICER

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Tan

Mieng

Vu

Xuang

WEAPONS

8 B,40 RL & 81 mortars
3 81mm mortars
5 60mm mortars
3 BK, 75mm RCL
7 30 cal. MG
4 50 cal. MG
14 CKCS (SKS)
12 RIFTS

LOCATION

Confirmed: Vicinity BS 6547, TFO 1 August 1967
Accepted: Vicinity BS 6547, B. 123

STRENGTH

150 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to
Action Report (Operation NAKIMUR I and II) (U) Cont'd

ALSO KNOW AS:

60th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

1st Bn  1st Co/60th  Thanh Ha 601
T.112  Ap Bac 120
Thanh Ha 470 2nd Co/60th  Thanh Ha 602
Thanh Ha 470

1st Bn  3rd Co/60th  Thanh Ha 603
Ap Bac 2006  Phong Hai

1st Bn  4th Co/60th  Thanh Ha 604
Phong Hai

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Thong
Do Cong Mai

POLITICAL OFFICER

Tu Duc

Linh

WEAPONS

2 81mm mortars
3 81mm weapons (cal unk)
2 B.40 Rockets launchers
6 60mm mortars
4 30 cal MGs
1 57mm FR

LOCATION

Confirmed location: vicinity BS 4764, 1 August Task Force Oregon
Accepted location: vicinity Base Area 121

STRENGTH

140 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners
of war reports and captured documents.
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 7 (Organization and Strength) to 'Mission 1 (Intelligence) to
After Action Report (Operations MOUSER I and II) (U)

70th VC BN, 1st VC Regiment

USK KNOWN AS:

P 07
Tiger BN
Truong Sen 70
Chu Song
Phi Doi 2009
Chu Long
35th BN

PERSONALITIES

CONSUMERS

Trinh Thiet Hong
Nguyen Doc Cong
Nguyen An

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Vu Thanh Nam
Tran Doi Thang

POLITICAL OFFICER

Thua
Hieu
Duan Cong Thanh

WEAPONS

6 60mm mortars
10 Hatts Mk's (French)
12 840 Rockets Launcher
3 81mm mortars
4 57mm AA
12 Flamethrowers

LOCATION

Confirmed: vicinity Tien Phuoc/Tan Ky, 1 August 67
Accepted: vicinity Tien Tho/Tan Ky, 1 August 67

STRENGTH

300 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, Interrogation prisoners
of war reports and captured documents.

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Tab D (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to
After Action Report (Operation LIEUR I and II) (U) Cont'd
90th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS:
51st Bn
Son Hong
Thuang Son 210
Thuang True
Xuyen Son 210
33rd Bn
Pho Doc 2008
X.90

* 1st Co/90th
* Son Hong 1
* Truong Son 211

* 2nd Co/90th
* Son Hong 2
* Truong Son 212

* 3rd Co/90th
* Son Hong 3
* Truong Son 213

* 4th Co/90th
* Son Hong 4
* Truong Son 214

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

NGUYEN
Lo Ngoc Cau
Ho Thanh Thi
Le Truc Do
Hai

POLITICAL OFFICER

Vo Ngoc Cam
Phong

WEAPONS

2 81mm mortars
1 57mm RP
3 30 cal MG's
3 LMG's

LOCATION

Confirmed: vicinity BS 4556 TFO 1 August 1967
accepted: vicinity Base Area 321 1 August 1967

STRENGTH

170 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 1 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners
of war reports and captured documents.

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Tab 3 (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to
After-Action Report (Operation MALEUR I and II) (U)

2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division.

FACTS OF WAR

2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division

ALSO KNOWN AS:

Worksite II
Than Phuoc 600
Quiet Chien
Le Loi
Province 2
Khanh Mai
Group 120
Black Tiger

Song Ba
Tanh 2
8th Regiment
Lien Gia 2
11th Regiment
Song Hung
Inter-Family 1
Hong Ha

PERSONALITIES

COMMANDERS

Nguyen Thanh Hao
Khanh
Ngat
Trong
Ly Dv

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Tri
Hiang
Xien
Nam
Di
Ngat
Ha

POLITICAL OFFICER

Ly Trong Hung

HEADQUARTERS LOCATION

Confirmed Location
Vic BS 680310 - 18 June, Task Force Oregon

Accepted Location
Vic BS 629354 - 25 June, III Marine Amphibious Force

STRENGTH

250 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of
war reports and captured documents.

\[ \text{Diagrams showing organization and strength} \]

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Tab: (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Alteration Report (Operation MALHEUR I and II) (U) Cont'd

Letter Box Number—2nd VC Regiment

| 6200 | Unknown Unit 2nd VC Regiment |
| 6201 | 93rd Battalion |
| 6202 | Possible 1st Company 93rd Battalion |
| 21.100GM | 2nd Company 93rd Battalion |
| 21.101GM | 2nd Regiment Headquarters |
| 21.102GM | Military Staff |
| 21.103GM | Political Staff |
| 21.104GM | Rear Services |
| 21.105GM | Unknown |
| 21.106GM | Unknown |
| 21.107GM | 75mm RR Company |
| 21.108GM | Unknown |
| 21.109GM | Unknown |
| 21.110GM | Unknown |
| 21.111GM | Unknown |
| 21.112GM | Unknown |
| 21.113GM | Unknown |
| 21.114GM | Unknown |
| 21.115GM | Unknown |
| 21.116GM | Unknown |
| 21.117GM | Unknown |
| 21.118GM | 2nd Battalion Headquarters |
| 21.119GM | 4th Battalion Headquarters |
| 21.120GM | 1st Infantry Company, 93rd Battalion |
| 21.121GM | 2nd Infantry Company, 93rd Battalion |
| 21.122GM | 3rd Infantry Company, 93rd Battalion |
| 21.123GM | 79th Battalion Headquarters |
| 21.124GM | 1st Infantry Company, 95th Battalion |
| 21.125GM | 2nd Infantry Company, 95th Battalion |
| 21.126GM | 3rd Infantry Company, 95th Battalion |
| 21.127GM | 4th Heavy Weapons Company, 95th Battalion |
| 21.128GM | 97th Battalion Headquarters |
| 21.129GM | 1st Infantry Company, 97th Battalion |
| 21.130GM | 2nd Infantry Company, 97th Battalion |
| 21.131GM | 3rd Infantry Company, 97th Battalion |
| 21.132GM | 4th Heavy Weapons Company, 97th Battalion |

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Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Inclusion 1 (Intelligence) to Inter-Action Report (Operations WILDEBERRY I and II) (U) Confd

93rd VC Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment

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PERSONNEL

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<tr>
<td>DANG DUY N.</td>
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<td>T.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PH.</td>
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<td>NGUYEN N.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

WEAPONS

- 3 82mm Mortars
- 6 7.62mm MBR
- 4 82mm Mortars
- 12 3.00 Rocket Launcher
- 4 12.7mm Machine Guns
- 4 12.7mm Mortars
- 2 7.62mm Machine Guns
- 2 C3U 9MM Aircraft Guns
- 2 RPD Light Machine Gun
- 7 Carbines and Rifles
- 4 57mm Recoiless Rifles
- 4 30 Caliber Machine gun

LOCATION

Confirmed: vicinity BS 7630 1 August

Accepted: vicinity BS 7630 1 August Task Force Oregon

STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.
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Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operations MILLIEM I and II) (U) Cont'd

95th VC Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS

BL NOH
CHI KIM
H22
DONG VI 515
LEYEN DOI 2
THON RANG 260
KIAO 99
THON SANG 260
HUN
District 22

Inter-Unit 2
THON RANG 63
5th Battalion
CHI KIM 64
KMN 2
K22
H58
BL MINH
X95
Unit 511

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

CHI MINH
MINH
MINH
VINH
VINH

POLITICAL OFFICER

SAU
VINH
SAO

WEAPONS

1st Company

Total

2 Light Machine Guns
2 X-47
3 K-90
6 SKS
16 Grenades

9 60mm Mortars
6 30 Caliber Machine Guns
9 .50's
72 Sub Machine Guns
6 81mm Mortars
4 57mm RR

8 50 Caliber Machine Guns
27 B.R's
6 Bazooka's
16 X-47
8 SKS

LOCATION

Confirmed vicinity BS 6354 1 August 1967
Accepted vicinity BS 6354 1 August 1967

STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

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Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operation "MEUR I and II") (U)

97th VC Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS

703 Battalion
Chi Bay
Nguen 2
Bay
District 23rd Battalion
Chi Bn
Hoang Ha 1
6th
District

703 Battalion
Chi Bay
Nguen 2
Bay
District 23rd Battalion
Chi Bn
Hoang Ha 1
6th
District

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

N.: Tran Dai
J.: Tracce
V.: Tran Vich
T.: Tran Binh

POLITICAL OFFICERS

Ly
Nam
Di
Ngat
No

WEAPONS

4 81mm mortars
4 75mm Rk
2 50 calvary machine gun
2 60mm mortars
6 Sub-machine gun, K50, K44 & Carbines
4 57mm Rk
1 Chicom Heavy machine gun
4 Pistols

LOCATION

Confirmed vicinity BS 8043 1 August
Accepted vicinity BS 8043 3 July Task Force Oregon

STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.
### CONFIDENTIAL

**Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operation MAELSTROM I and II) (U)**

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<tr>
<td>Headquarters Support</td>
<td>BS 5268</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
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<td>40th Battalion</td>
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Tab A (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (NAVAIR)(U)
Tab B (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (MALHEUR)(U)
Confidential

Tab C (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 (Operations Schematic) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation VALHEUR
Tab D (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 (Operation Schematic) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR
Tab E (Schematic) to Inclusion 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (HALEBUR) (U)
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Tab V (Schematic) to Enclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (Mission)(U)
1. (c) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTCE)</th>
<th>4510</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - DUC PhO</td>
<td>3642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - PHAN RANG</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 99% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 37 were hospitalized, 48 intransit, 157 were on TDY/SD status, 124 on leave, 18 in confinement, and 12 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTCE)</th>
<th>4510</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - DUC PhO</td>
<td>3496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - PHAN RANG</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 104% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 96% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 28 were hospitalized, 34 intransit, 130 were on TDY/SD status, 117 on leave, 15 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

c. Beginning of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (MTCE)</th>
<th>4510</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>4626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - DUC PhO</td>
<td>3488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - PHAN RANG</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 102% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 95% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 24 were hospitalized, 44 intransit, 118 were on TDY/SD status, 110 on leave, 18 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

d. Conclusion of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

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(g) Replacements received during Phase II of the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-320</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Inf (SD)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for Phase I of the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-200</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326 Engr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Casualties for Phase II of the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326 Engr</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-17 Cav</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MIAHERU (U)

6. Total casualties for Operation MIAHERU were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Total casualties to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>473</td>
<td>2562</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Units from PHAN RANG and CHU LAI continued their visits to forward units during the operation.

b. A Red Cross representative was located in the Brigade Forward Echelon during Operation MIAHERU.

c. Records checks were conducted by AG in the forward area during the operation.

d. During this period one USO show visited the forward area to entertain the troops. There were two performances by the show.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: Planning during the period involved the following areas:

a. During the months of May, June and July, the Brigade rotated approximately 1583 personnel to CONUS receiving 2777 replacements. At this time the Brigade rotational hump is over and the personnel posture of the Brigade is excellent.

b. Assistant Brigade S-1 initiated a system of monthly visits to USARV Headquarters to deliver requisition and discuss and plan officer replacements.
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Incl 4 (Logistical) to After Action Report, Operation MAUHER I and II

1. (C) Organisation for Support:

a. Supporting Forces

(1) Task Force Gallagher, US Army Command, Qui Nhon coordinated and controlled all supply and services provided in the Carentan Base area by the following activities:

(a) Forward Support Area which provided issue points for all classes of supply except JP-4.

(b) Graves Registration Team, 19th STS Company.

(c) Laundry and bath service.

(2) 176th Avn Co & 178th Avn Co (-), 11th Avn Bn provided UH-1, UH-1D, CH-47 aircraft in support of tactical logistical operations.

(3) 3/463 Light Truck Co provided wheeled vehicle support (2½ ton trucks).

(d) 563rd Medical Clearing Company provided general medical support.

b. Support Bns: Provided a Forward Support Element (FSE) at Carentan Base that included the following elements:

(1) Detachment HQ which controlled and commanded the FSE. The HQ was organized into command operations, communications, movement control and food service elements.

(2) Supply Detachment which received, stored and issued all classes of supply. A limited rigger capability was also provided.

(3) 801st Maintenance Co (-) which repaired small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal, quartermaster and a limited amount of fire control instruments.

(4) Administrative Detachment which provided AG, Personnel APO and Finance service.

(5) Company D, 326 Mod Bn (ABN) which provided clearing station, surgical, dental, emergency treatment and holding facilities.

(6) Forward Supply Point Team which controlled the issue of limited types of all classes of supply to maneuver elements from a forward point when the lines of communication from Carentan Base became too long. The team was provided from existing manpower within the FSE.

2. (C) Material and Services

a. Supply: Accomplished by point distribution and (during MAUHER II) a Forward Supply Point.

(1) Class I: Meal Combat Individual, formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. #1* rations and condiment supplements, to include ice cream, were served whenever possible. Fresh vegetables, potable ice and limited amounts of ice cream were available throughout the operation. Excellent support from Task Force Gallagher was received during "stand down" periods when it was possible to serve 100% #1* rations. Double issues of ice and ice cream were made available by FPU at "stand down" time. Condiments were available in limited amounts and limited types. A total of 878.2 short tons of class I were issued during the operation.

(2) Class II and IV: The majority of Class II and IV items were drawn through the Phu Rang Sub Area Command of US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. An exception to this was made at the stand down in preparation
for operation Hood River. Poncho liners, camouflage helmet covers and also small regular fatigue fatigues were not available through Cas Bank Bay or Task Force Gallagher, Task Force Oregon Spc. Command located sufficient quantities of these items to direct exchange or issue all that were required. No other non-storable Class II and IV shortages were experienced. Periodic Logistic Report (PLR) continued to be an effective tool in bringing shortages of Combat Essential items to the attention of Logistics Command, Commanders and Staff. Corrective actions were invariably forthcoming following the addition of needed items on a "PLR".

(3) Class III: JP-4 accounted for the majority of fuel consumption as no convoy moves were made during the operation. All MDA3 consumption was as a result of normal base operations in and around the Cantho and Montagnas (3/25 Inf) areas. A total of 691.6 short tons of class III were issued.

(4) Class IV: All types of munitions continued to be available. Temporary shortages were experienced with cratering charges, C-4 explosive compound and on one occasion 105mm HE ammunition. The artillery ammunition was made available within 12 hours. At no time were the artillery batteries below a basic load as the shortage was identified at the ASP level. Substitute items were available for issue in lieu of C-4 and cratering charges. The standard items were available within 16 hours after being requested. Again the shortage was confined initially to the ASP. The 48 Class IV yard was able to maintain a basic load of C-4 at all times. Cratering charges are not an item of stockage in the basic load. A total of 1209.3 short tons of Class IV items were issued during the operation.

(5) Water: Palatable water was supplied initially by the 39th Engineer BN (US) and the Co A, 316 Eng BN (ASW). On May 11, A/326 Stg gained the total water supply mission for the Brigade operating a 1500 and a 600 gal per hour evaporator. The 1500 gal per hour evaporator was moved to the FSP at Minh Long during MAIHUR II to provide water for the maneuver elements of 3 Infantry Battalions and one artillery Battalion. Palatable, potable water was available throughout the operation except during the 4–8 July 67 period when the water sources became saline. Shifting the water points to potable water sources was not satisfactory. On 12 July the water point was re-moved. Palatable water was available from that point on.

b. (6) Maintenance: I. Support Battalion’s Support Maintenance Company received and repaired the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Forward: Automotive 107 ENGINE 110 Armament 188 186 Signal 1,065 953 Engineer 89 79 Aircraft 35 33

In addition, contact teams were provided from Spt BN to all units to aid in field maintenance.

c. Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: The 3rd platoon of the 163rd Light Truck Co Chu Lai was in direct support during the operation.

(2) Air: UH-1H C02, C123, C130, US Army CH5 and Marine CH5 aircraft provided airlift support for the airlift cargo from Phu Bang to Doc Pho to include passengers, mail and limited amounts of all classes.
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of supplies. C130s were also used to move the FSP team, quartering parties and the Medical Clearing Station from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai at the close of MAINEUR II in preparation for Hood River. C123 aircraft supplemented the C130 airlift. C123, CSH7 and CSH5 aircraft were used exclusively to resupply the FSP at Minh Long for the period 26 June to 31 July 1967. On 15 July C123s assumed the primary Phan Rang to Duc Pho daily airlift mission with two round trip sorties per day.

(3) Sea: One LST was used to move Brigade vehicles over "B" configuration from Duc Pho to Phan Rang via Cam Ranh Bay.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration service was available at Carontan Base during the entire operation.

(2) One Quartermaster Laundry and Shower unit provided services at Carontan Base during the entire operation.

3. (c) Medical:

e. Organization: During MAINEUR I and II, Company D, 326th Medical Bn, was operational with all assigned personnel at Duc Pho RVN in support of the Ist Brigade.

b. Medical Service Support:

(1) General: The medical company admitted, treated and evacuated the highest number of casualties since arriving in Viet Nam during the operation. The company experienced no major difficulties in handling these casualties with its present organization. Most significant in accomplishing the unit's medical mission was the short time it took the newly assigned Medical Corps Officers to adapt to work under the conditions that exist in Viet Nam.

(2) Patient Treatment and Care: After arriving in the Duc Pho area of operation the company was confronted with a large number of patients with eye problems. During the initial phase of the operation it was necessary to evacuate the more serious patients to Qui Nhon and Phan Rang to receive eye refractions because neither the company nor the 563rd Medical Clearing Company, which was in general support of the Brigade, had organic capabilities to perform eye refractions. This problem continued until 18 July, at which time the company was able to obtain the services of an optometrist. This service is now available in the brigade forward area on a bi-monthly basis and also for unit stand-downs. With this increased capability, the company has been able to reduce the time the individual soldier is lost from his unit from 5 to 10 days to two to four hours. Also during the months of May and June the company had access to the service of a Social Work Officer attached to Task Force Oregon. This service helped eliminate two potential psychological problems in the brigade.

(3) Patient Evacuation: During the operation the company's ambulance platoon maintained responsibility for evacuation coordination of the brigade casualties in the forward area. Approximately 1900 patients were evacuated through the company's evacuation facilities. This figure includes patient evacuation from the brigade area of operations, forward base camp area and patients subsequently evacuated to supporting medical facilities in Cam Lai and Qui Nhon. The division of labor within the platoon to successfully evacuate the number of personnel was affected as follows: the RTOS received and transmitted Med-Evac request to the Air Ambulance (Dust-Off) crews from the 2nd Platoon 158th Air Ambulance Company supporting the brigade. In addition, when air ambulance capabilities were strained or limited because of tactical situations the MOs affected Med-Evac coordination through the brigade aviation section. Routine evacuation to the rear area hospitals was coordinated with the Air Force Casualty Staging unit personnel located at the Duc Pho airfield.

c. Medical Statistics

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>KTA</th>
<th>MUL</th>
<th>MALARIA</th>
<th>FEVER</th>
<th>BONES</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR I</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR II</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>1808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3097</td>
<td>3921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant Items**

1. **Brigade Medical Supply**: Upon moving into the Rac Pho area, the Brigade Medical Supply Section experienced difficulty in the timely receipt of medical resupplies through normal resupply channels from the 32nd Medical Depot at Cam Ranh Bay. This problem was created by the long and indirect route of travel. In order to resolve this problem, the Brigade Medical Supply Officer established an account with the Forward Motions of the 32nd Medical Depot located in Qui Nhon. To ensure that an adequate level of supplies are constantly available in the brigade forward area, the Brigade Medical Officer has established a revised requisition system requiring all units to request in writing. This practice provides the Brigade Medical Supply Officer a usage for maintaining an adequate level of medical supplies.

2. **MEDCAP Operations**: During the quarter the company continued to provide personnel in support of the brigade MEDCAP Operations. The most significant results from these operations were the Dental Services provided by the company's Dental Officer, who treated 229 Vietnamese and Montagnards.

**Conclusions:**

a. Problem areas encountered were minor and were resolved within existing capabilities.

b. The Support Battalion has the ability to establish a Limited Forward Supply Point from existing assets.

c. The logistical support concept adequately provided for the Brigade needs.

**Recommendations:**

a. That the present system of support be continued.

b. That no more than one Forward Supply Point be established at a time.

4.
1. (C) MISSION: To conduct Chemical ground and air assault operation against VC/NVA forces operating within ZON AO and to employ riot control agents to harass and demoralize civilians under VC/NVA influence in conjunction with psychological warfare operations.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:
   a. General: Chemical operations during Operation MALHEUR consisted of area denial, tunnel flushing/denial, CS gas grenade drops, and rice and salt contamination. All operations were conducted by the 20th Chemical Detachment under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.
   b. Area denial operations: During Operation MALHEUR a total of 10 area denial operations were conducted, utilizing 1320 lbs of bulk CS-I. A brief resume of each operation is as follows:

   (1) On the morning of 7 June A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a VC base camp concealed in dense jungle vicinity BS677392. This target was hit by the 20th Chemical Detachment 071430H June 1967. 480 lbs of bulk CS-I was spread over a circular area with a 200 meter radius from target center. All CS bugs detonated properly placing a heavy concentration within the target area.

   (2) 071530H June 1967 vicinity BS682345 a VC base camp was attacked with bulk CS-I. A total of 480 lbs of CS-I was delivered on the target covering a circular area with a 200 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

   (3) 091400H June 1967 vicinity BS683378 an enemy defensive network consisting of numerous 2 and 3-man fighting holes and several bunkers was attacked. 800 lbs of CS-I was delivered on the target. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

   (4) 161530H June 1967 vicinity BS681050 a VC base camp was attacked with 240 lbs of bulk CS-I contaminating a circular area 150 meters from target center. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

   (5) 191400H June 1967 vicinity BS684343 a VC base camp surrounded by trenches and numerous 2 and 3-man fighting holes was attacked. 800 lbs of CS-I was dropped, placing a heavy concentration of CS in the target area. Supported unit: C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

   (6) 201300H June 1967 vicinity BS682043 a VC base camp was attacked with 240 lbs of bulk CS-I contaminating a circular area on the ground in a 150 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

   (7) 260930H June 1967 a VC base camp and bunker complex extending from BS596777 to BS582568 was discovered. 800 lbs of CS-I was delivered on this target. A new type of plastic container for the 8 lb package of CS-I was dropped to ascertain effect of det cord and ground impact on containers. A minimum of 1 turn of det cord will disrupt the container. Containers will rupture upon impact with the ground when dropped from 1500 feet.

   (8) The CG, 1-101, directed that a frequently used route north from SON VC Valley be attacked with bulk CS-I on 5 July. On the morning of 5 July the route was reconnoitered and a section of 250 meters through the MC DUC Pass was selected. Rest of this section of the route was a 50-100 foot drop into a deep gallery, while to the west the ground sharply rose to a height of approximately 1200 feet. 800 lbs of CS-I were dropped on this section of the road. The area was placed under observation for two (2) days. A total of 17 people were observed approaching the contaminated area. 3 individuals riding bicycles, all others turned back. It could not be determined if personnel riding bicycles were using type of protective mask. Supported unit: 1-101.
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Include 5 Chemical Operations to Combat Operation After Action Report,
Operation MAIMUR (1)

9) 291101G July 1967 vicinity BS613495 - BS614380, a valley containing a VC base camp and trails along a river bank was attacked. 240 lbs of CS-I was dropped on the trail along the river bank and VC base camp. Supported unit: 1-101.

10) 301201H July 1967 valley vicinity BS616464, frequently used by VC was attacked. 480 lbs of CS-I was used on the target area. The mouth of the valley was contaminated with a high concentration of CS; the valley was seeded for a distance of 660 meters north from coordinates BS616464.

c. CS Gas Grenades Drops:

(1) The initial CS grenades drop during Operation MAIMUR occurred 061001H June 1967 vicinity BS610417. The target was an unknown number of snipers in a treeline, and the mission was flown at the request of D Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Three passes were made upwind of the target area, producing a line source upwind of 400 meters each pass. A dense CS cloud drifted over the target area, remaining in the area for 20-30 minutes. The CS strike was immediately followed by TAC Air. A total of 330 M7A3 CS grenades were dropped during this strike.

(2) On 110901H June 1967, C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry encountered an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions along a steep ridge line vicinity coordinates BS609460. At 111001H June 1967 the enemy was attacked with CS gas grenades. The initial drop at 1100 hours showed lapse conditions which caused the CS cloud to rise. Subsequent passes were made further down the sides of the ridge to allow the CS cloud to drift up the ridge. The target was covered and the enemy abandoned their positions. Total amount of M7A3 CS grenades used were 400.

(3) 161555H June 1967 C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received intense automatic weapons fire from vicinity BS581572. An immediate airstrike was requested, however the airstrike would be preceded by a CS gas grenade drop to cause the enemy to flee his fortified positions, thereby making him more vulnerable to the airstrike. To insure also dropped CS concentration would remain in the target area, 30 8 lb CS bags were also dropped on the target. The first drop was the CS grenades, which commenced 161701H June 1967. They were dropped in three passes from BS581572 to BS581572, producing a dense concentration upwind of the target. The agent drifted upslope over the target area, 305 M7A3 CS grenades were dropped on the target. The CS bags were dispersed in a stream bed from BS581572 to BS581572 in three passes. The CS bag drop was immediately followed by an airstrike.

(4) Early in the morning of 30 June 1967, C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry received sniper fire from a well concealed enemy vicinity BS591465. C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry received sniper fire from a well concealed enemy vicinity BS591465. A CS gas grenade drop was requested. The CS gas grenade drop commenced 301201H June 1967, with a total of 630 M7A3 CS grenades being dropped on the target. The grenades were dropped in two sorties and 15 low level (100-200 feet) passes. Strike was directed by unit on the ground and Command and Control helicopter, 252 grenades were dropped on likely routes of withdrawal, while the remaining 378 were dropped on the sniper position. A very heavy concentration was produced in the vicinity of each drop but calm wind conditions allowed agent cloud to rise instead of producing desired downwind coverage. C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry assaulted the enemy positions following the strike.

(5) The Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Plato n observed several VC in a village vicinity BS613412 and called for an artillery strike. The Artillery strike was preceded by a CS gas grenade drop at 031101H July 1967. 230 M7A3 CS grenades were dropped on the village in three passes. A heavy concentration covered the target area. 1 VC ran from the village and was engaged with gunships providing cover for the gas ship. Immediately following the strike the Long Range Reconnaissance Plato n called in Artillery on the village.
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Inclusion 5 (Chemical Operations) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (6)

A Company lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received small arms fire from a village vicinity B6666,798 at 311323 July 1967. To get to the village required the unit to cross an open area approximately 100 meters wide surrounding the village. Artillery was called in, but the small arms fire continued. At 311400H July 1967 a CS gas drop was requested. The target was attacked at 311455H July 1967 utilizing 378 M743 CS grenades. Gunships fired on the village continuously to suppress the enemy fire during the strike. After the first pass over the target with CS, all firing on the gas ship ceased. Two additional passes were made. A Company lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (masked) assaulted across the open area and engaged the enemy.

d. Tunnel flushing/denial operations: During Operation MALHEUR 8 tunnel flushing/denial operations were conducted. Data on each operation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Amount of CS Disposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun 67</td>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>16 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jun 67</td>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>64 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 67</td>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>40 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/1-327th Inf</td>
<td>80 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/2-17th Cav</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Jul 67</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/2-327th Inf</td>
<td>80 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on each operation is as follows:

a. Destruction of Salt Cache: An 80 ton rock salt cache was discovered on 28 June 1967 by A Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry vicinity B6666,798. It was not tactically feasible to extract the salt and it was decided upon to destroy the salt in place. 20 8 lb bags of CS were dispersed throughout the cache and blown simultaneously with a cratering charge spreading the salt and CS throughout the area. On 291430H June 1967 an additional 680 lbs of CS was dropped on the cache from the air. A low level flight was made over the area on 6 August 1967. The CS concentration was still heavy and there were no signs of activity in the area or that any of the salt had been removed.

3. (C) Results: Tunnel flushing/denial, CS gas grenade drops, and Salt/Rice Cache Contamination/Destruction operations were considered satisfactory. An evaluation of the effectiveness of area denial operations continues to be a major problem. This is due to the fact we do not place the area under observation after the strikes nor do we enter the area to determine the intensity of the CS concentration. Tactical units have come upon areas three to four weeks after their contamination with CS-I and found the concentration too strong to operate without protective masks which is indirect proof that the desired results are probably being attained.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Rice/Salt Caches can be effectively destroyed with bulk CS-l powder.

b. Sniper fire from villages and concealed positions in woodlines can be suppressed with non-persistent CS gas.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MAUREUR (U)

1. (U) Phase I
   a. General: Two significant Civil Affairs operations were conducted during Phase I of Operation MAUREUR.

   (1) The first operation involved the resettlement of Vietnamese civilians within the CARENTAN Base perimeter to a hamlet at the Southern portion of the Brigade Area. The villagers were allowed to take their personal belongings with them. This movement required 109 24 ton truck loads. Roofing tin was supplied by CORDS. Food was supplied to the people during the movement period. An access road to the new hamlet was constructed by Brigade Engineers who also laid out roads in the hamlet. KEDCAPs were conducted for the people and veterinary services provided for their animals. The project took three weeks to complete. Upon its completion security within the perimeter was enhanced.

   (2) The second operation involved the return of 24 cattle and 25 water buffalo to DUC PHO District. These animals had been sighted in the area of operations by the ground combat elements. Since the area was located in Viet Cong territory, a decision was made to return the livestock to the refugees that had previously departed. One platoon of DUC PHO Popular Forces was airlifted into the Area of Operations and subsequently herded the cattle to District Headquarters.

   b. Resume of Phase I Operations:
      (1) 420 Refugees relocated within CARENTAN Base.
      (2) 114 Innocent Civilians, apprehended in combat operations, were returned to their homes.
      (3) 305 persons Medically Treated.
      (4) 30 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
      (5) 21 Cattle returned to government control.
      (6) 25 Water Buffalo returned to government control.

2. (U) Phase II:
   a. General: During Phase II Civil Affairs operations centered on Refugee Movement and Control, Food Extraction, Livestock Evacuation, and KEDCAP Operations.

   b. Refugee Movement and Control: During Phase II a total of 8465 refugees were evacuated from the Area of Operations. The majority of refugees went to a Refugee Center at NGHIA HANH while the remainder were divided among Refugee Centers at MINH LONG, BA TO, and NO DUC. At the request of the Province Chief the Brigade evacuated the populations of the SONG VE, SONG NE, and NO DUC Valleys. The people were evacuated by helicopter and were allowed to take only the personal possessions they could carry with them. Province officials and CORDS insured that adequate space and building material was on hand in each refugee center to satisfy the needs of the people. Following the evacuation of the refugees all structures were burned to deny their use to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces in the area. This also discouraged refugees from returning to their homes after having been evacuated.

   c. Food Extraction: During Phase II, 79.5 tons of unpolished rice and 27.5 tons of salt were extracted from the Area of Operations and returned to government control. In most extraction operations a labor force was provided by District officials while the Brigade supplied security and airlift.

   d. Livestock Evacuation: Concurrent with the evacuation of the population from the SONG VE VALLEY the tactical units herded a total of 1149 cattle and 192 water buffalo out of the valley. These livestock were turned over to the NGHIA HANH and MINH LONG District Chiefs for redistribution to the evacuated refugees.
UNCLASSIFIED

a. MEDCAP During Phase II, 1974 persons were treated in MEDCAP operations. While directly benefiting the people these operations also helped build the GVN image and provided our forces with a limited intelligence source.

f. Resume of Phase II Operations:
   1. 8468 Refugees evacuated.
   2. 399 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
   3. 1974 persons Medically Treated.
   4. 79.5 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
   5. 27.5 tons of Salt returned to government control.
   6. 1149 Cattle returned to government control.
   7. 192 Water Buffalo returned to government control.
   8. 183 Chickens returned to government control.
   9. 88 Ducks returned to government control.
  10. 66 Pigs returned to government control.
  11. 156 Animals treated.

3. (U) Conclusions:
   a. No problems were encountered which required major outside support to solve.
   b. Prior coordination with Sub-Sector, Sector and CORDS representatives is essential to a smooth running Civil Affairs/Civic Action Program.

4. (U) Total Operation MALHEUR Statistics:
   a. 8885 Refugees evacuated.
   b. 313 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
   c. 2279 persons Medically Treated.
   d. 109.5 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
   e. 27.5 tons of Salt returned to government control.
   f. 1173 Cattle returned to government control.
   g. 217 Water Buffalo returned to government control.
   h. 183 Chickens returned to government control.
   i. 88 Ducks returned to government control.
   j. 66 Pigs returned to government control.
   k. 156 Animals treated.

UNCLASSIFIED
3. (c) Mission: The First Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had the joint mission of providing signal support for the brigade.

2. (c) Operations:

a. General: The 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided signal support during Operation MALHEUR I and II by establishing the Brigade Command Post and Communications Systems at DUC PHO.

b. The brigade VHF Section was not used during Operation MALHEUR I and II.

c. Communications Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at DUC PHO

d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade Command Post at DUC PHO terminating 120 circuits and installed approximately 55 miles of wire.

e. FM Radio Section provided FM Radio, Secure and Radio Wire Integration Stations at DUC PHO. An automatic retransmission and relay station was employed at BS564448. The NLRS Station was established to provide phone patch service to the United States.

f. AM Radio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between DUC PHO and PHAN RANG. A secure teletype circuit between the Forward Support Element at DUC PHO and the Forward Support Platoon at MINH LONG was established to assist the Support Battalion.

g. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

h. Task Force Oregon Signal Support: Company A, 36th Signal Battalion provided circuits into the in-country system, secure radio teletype between Task Force Oregon and Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear.
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Inclosure 6 (Psychological Operations) to Combat After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (C)

1. (C) Mission: To assist the ground commander in the accomplishment of his tactical mission by the employment of Psychological Operations targeted against the VC/NVA combat forces, VC political cadre and the Vietnamese and Montagnard population within and adjacent to the area of operations.

2. (C) Operations:

   a. General: During Operation MALHEUR (27,912,000 leaflets were distributed and 230.25 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts logged.

   b. Payoff Programs:

      (1) Phase I: During Phase I of Operation MALHEUR two simultaneous programs were conducted.

      (a) The first centered around CHANHAI Base in conjunction with the establishment of the Brigade base camp. The central purpose of this program was population control complimented by CHIEU NOI appeals targeted against VC infrastructure and small units of local VC known to be conducting both political and suppressive operations in the area. Themes used in this program were:

         1. Americans are your friends.
         2. Americans are here at the request of the GVN.
         3. Ourfew instructions.
         4. Do not run from US troops.
         5. Do not run from helicopters.
         6. Off limit areas.
         7. CHIEU NOI appeals.

         In addition, loudspeaker broadcasts were made in conjunction with the resettlement of all local civilians to the southern portion of the Brigade Base Camp.

      (b) The second program centered on the tactical operations being conducted in NHUANHUY area. Themes employed in the AO were:

         1. Exploitation of B-52 strikes.
         2. Refugee instructions.
         3. CHIEU NOI appeals.
         5. VC/NVA decriminalization.
         6. Ourfew instructions.

      (2) Phase II: During Phase II of Operation MALHEUR two programs were also conducted.

      (a) The first program supported the tactical combat operations.

         Themes used during this phase consisted of:

         1. VC/NVA decriminalization.
         2. CHIEU NOI.

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Inclosure 8 (Psychological Operations) to Combat After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

2. National Propaganda:
   a. Induce Passes.
   b. Weapons rewards.
   c. Exploitation of B-52 strikes.
   d. Control power.

3. Air power.

(b) The second program supported the valley clearing operations in the SONG VE and SONG NE Valleys. Themes utilized were:

1. Population control.
2. Refugee instructions.
3. Curfew instructions.
4. Allies are your friends.
5. VC/NVA do not have the best interests of the people at heart.

(c) Special Operations:

(1) Immediately following the destruction of the FSA ASP an intensive weapon reward campaign was launched vicinity of CAHANTAN Base. The funds for the campaign were supplied by the 161st Military Intelligence Detachment. The campaign was launched in an effort to recover ammunition which was known to have been hurled out of the FSP by explosions but had not detonated. The result of the campaign was the return of 655 assorted artillery and small arms rounds by the population living in the resettlement area south of the base camp.

(2) Following the discovery of the VC POW camp and liberation of twenty-two Vietnamese a special leaflet exploiting VC atrocities was developed and distributed throughout the central lowlands of QUANG NGAI Province.

(3) A special leaflet was also developed exploiting the payment of 121,000 $VN to an NVA HOI CHANH who had turned himself over to the Brigade and subsequently led friendly elements to a weapon cachet containing a .30 cal IMD and 60mm mortar in addition to other miscellaneous equipment and ammunition. This leaflet also was given wide distribution in the province lowlands.

3. (C) Results: Four HOI CHANH, two VC and two NVA, turned themselves over to elements of the Brigade during Operation MALHEUR. Additionally, 357 HOI CHANH returned to the GVN by way of GVN agencies in QUANG NGAI Province, a marked increase over past province achievements.

4. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. During Phase I of Operation MALHEUR, the Brigade received direct support from a loudspeaker team from the 245th Psyops Company in NHA TRANG. Leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts during this period were provided by the 214th Psyops Company in DA NANG.

b. During that latter portion of Phase I and all of Phase II, the 244th Psyops Company provided the ground loudspeaker team support.

5. (C) Equipment: The ground loudspeaker teams are equipped with a 4 bank man portable speaker set, tape recorder and microphone. Equipment organic to the Brigade included a 16 bank, 1000 watt loudspeaker set and 7 bullhorns. The bullhorns were distributed to the battalions giving each a limited organic capability to conduct face-to-face PSYOPS's in conjunction with ground operations.
6. (C) Problem Areas:

   a. The lack of availability of complete, detailed and accurate psyops intelligence covering an area of operations continues to be the single biggest problem area. The results achieved by the Brigade Psyops program in this and past operations (indicated by increased defections primarily to GVN agencies) is impressive. However, results could be greatly increased if greater amounts of detailed intelligence were available.

   b. Coordination of Psyops programs requires more emphasis. During Operation MALHEIR six different agencies were concerned with Psychological Operations in the Brigade AP: Special Forces, Province, District, CORDS, J USPAO and Brigade. Quite frequently leaflet drops or loudspeaker broadcasts would be scheduled by one of the civilian agencies responsible for Psyops in the area. The Brigade would receive notice of the mission when leaflets began falling or the loudspeaker O-2 began broadcasting. While it is doubtful that any adverse effect to the psyops resulted, the broadcast and leaflet drops did interfere with tactical operations. Considerably more coordination is necessary than has been conducted in the past to insure that no confusion results from similar incidents in the future.

   c. The USAF minimum altitude for loudspeaker ships must be lowered. High winds and thick vegetation make broadcast conducted over 1500 feet ineffective.

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

   a. The ammunition reward program conducted vicinity of CARENTAN Base proves that an intensive campaign properly conducted over a limited area will achieve the results desired. Care must be taken to insure that all parties participating in the program are aware of what the people are being told and that promises are made good immediately upon the audiences accomplishment of the desired result.

   b. Conducting search and destroy operations while promising good treatment to defection (HOI CHANH) is not credible to the VC or NVA soldier. CHIEU HOI appeals should constantly stress the GVN. The prospective HOI CHANH should be encouraged to rally to the government as an alternative to hardship and death which the search and destroy force is serving.
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Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (U) General:
   a. Combat engineer support for maneuver battalions and the brigade (-) was provided by Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne).
   b. Operation MALHEUR consisted of Phase I from 11 May - 7 June and Phase II from 8 June - 3 August 1967.
   c. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion was commanded by Captain B.P. Schlapak during the period of Operation MALHEUR.

2. (C) Mission:
   a. To provide teams to each maneuver battalion which would accomplish landing zone clearing, demolition of bunkers and tunnels, and mine clearing.
   b. To provide general engineer support in the Brigade (-) area.
   c. To fight as infantry as required.

3. (C) Concept of Operations:
   a. One Platoon (-) was attached to each maneuver battalion. These units provided an LZ clearing/demolition/mine clearing team to each infantry line company and provided a stand-by team which remained at each battalion tactical command post until needed.
   b. General engineer support in the Brigade (-) area included:
      (1) Operation of 1500 GPH water point.
      (2) Daily mine sweep on road from beach to a point halfway to MONTECUMA.
      (3) Heliport maintenance to include dust control.
      (4) Heliport and road construction.
      (5) EOD operations.
      (6) Tunnel destruction/denial.
      (7) Perimeter security and ambush patrols.

4. (C) Notable accomplishments and actions:
   a. Landing Zone/demolition/mine clearing teams with each infantry line company cut an average of two landing zones per week. A small amount of CHICON mines and booby traps were encountered and destroyed. Occasionally, bunkers and tunnels were destroyed/denied by the combined use of CS gas and explosives. The teams at the Battalion TAC CP's destroyed captured enemy mines, booby traps and mortar rounds, blasted holes for bunkers and positions, and were occasionally called upon to cut helicopter landing zones. In one instance, a platoon leader rappelled from a UH-1D with a team to clear a landing zone. The majority of the time of the engineers continues to be spent as riflemen.
   b. Organic engineer bulldozers were used to clear approximately 1.5 square kilometers of area of all vegetation to insure good fields of fire and secure roads in the vicinity of CARENTAN Base.
   c. The unit operated a water point near CARENTAN Base which averaged 15,000 gallons purified per day. Lack of rain and tide changes necessitated the construction of dams to prevent salt water intrusion into the fresh water. The location of the water point was changed once to a better source of raw water.

9-1
Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

d. Dust control on the helipad of the 176th Aviation Company and all brigade utility and hokpads was accomplished using penoprimo and diesel fuel. Approximately 100,000 gallons of penoprimo and/or diesel fuel was disposed.

e. Fire base CHAMPS was built using a D6B Bulldozer which had been lifted into the area. The D6B had to be broken down into 2 groups for transport. One CH-47 lifted the blade and tracks while one CH-54 lifted in the dozer body. The dozer dug firing positions for 105 and 155 artillery pieces, bunkers for the FDC and CP locations and constructed a road.

f. The ammunition storage area on the Task Force GALLJLHER beach exploded throwing rounds as far away as one kilometer. Some 1420 rounds, beyond the perimeter fence, were recovered by the Engineer Company (-) and were destroyed. These rounds were of all sizes from 40mm to 175mm.

g. Three tunnel complexes were destroyed while testing the new acetylene tunnel destruction kit. The tunnels had been dug into hillsides and a combination of explosive devices was needed to close the entrances.

h. On the second Phase of Operation MALHEUR, it was necessary to operate a 600 GPH water purification unit at MINH LONG. The unit produced an average of 1000 gallons per day for use of the maneuver battalions. An additional supply of chain saws, mine detectors and explosives was also located there.

i. The nine clearing teams which swept half of the road from CAVENTAN Base to KOTOERUMA daily detected two bamboo pressure type mines and three command rigged artillery shells. One bamboo mine was disarmed and extracted while all others were destroyed in place.

j. A 500' x 200' hook helipad was constructed which provided room for 4 to 6 CH-47 helicopters. Four revetments were also constructed.

k. 1.5 kilometers of road was cut to an outpost on the hill to the west of CAVENTAN Base. A laterite borrow pit was opened at the base of that hill.

5. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. The acetylene generator tunnel destruction kit, XM69 works well on shallow tunnels which have 1 - 2 meters of overburden but is ineffective when hillsides tunnels are encountered. Hillside tunnel must still be denied using a combination of CS gas and conventional explosives.

b. The 600 GPH water purification unit can handle the daily water needs of 3 committed maneuver battalions.

c. The D6B Bulldozer can be broken down and lifted to otherwise inaccessible areas to perform engineer work. The unit can be reassembled and working 30 minutes after the CH-54 has placed the body of the tractor on the tracks which are brought in first along with the blade by a CH-47.

d. In EOD operations, considerable care must be taken in destroying 40mm, 66mm, and 106mm rounds which are duds or have been separated from the round base. These rounds must be destroyed in place. Their internal spin setback system makes them extremely sensitive.
Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Coosat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (J)

1. (U) The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during Operations MALHEUR I and II. General support was provided by elements of 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery.

2. (C) Summary of Operations:

   a. In the conduct of Operations MALHEUR I and II, the same techniques of artillery support that have proven successful in the past were employed. Terrain did permit the use of radar outside the base camp and the radar was successfully helilifted on two occasions, once during Operation LAKE and once during MALHEUR II.

   b. In view of the great distances between firing batteries and base camp, the battalion Fire Direction Center functioned as a control/coordination agency only and conducted no technical fire direction. A Liaison Section was provided by the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery to coordinate all general support fires of that unit and Battery C (8/175), 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery. The Battalion FDC was positioned at CARENTAN Base Camp and continuous communications were maintained with all elements without the use of a relay.

   c. A fire base, (Fire Base CHAMPS), was established during MALHEUR II to provide light and medium fire support throughout the major portion of the area of operations. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery occupied the base by helilift on 7 June 1967 and remained until 27 July 1967. During the period Battery B supported 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry and Battery C reinforced fires of the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. Security of the base was provided by one company of 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry, and later replaced by a company of 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry. A collocated Fire Direction Center was successfully used and facilitated fire coordination.

   d. Additional forward observer requirements were imposed with the attachment of CIDG companies to maneuver battalions. These parties were provided from organic sections and the battalion headquarters. Two additional liaison personnel were required from Task Force OREGON at the BATO and MINH LONG Special Forces Camps. Personnel were taken from battalion FDC to fill this commitment, however, radios could not be provided in all cases.

3. (U) Execution:

   a. A/2-320th displacements:

      (1) On 110830 May, A Btry displaced by air to BS62093700. Unit closed at 1225 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

      (2) On 100800 May, B Btry displaced by air to BS63363799. Unit closed at 1128 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry, and 2/327th Infantry.

      (3) On 160935 Jun, A Btry displaced by air to BS613583. Unit closed at 1515 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

      (4) On 290930 Jun, A Btry displaced by air to BS68367. Unit closed at 1420 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

      (5) On 031000 Jul, B Btry displaced by air to BS62063715. Unit closed at 1520 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

      (6) On 140900 Jul, B Btry displaced by air to BS58265805. Unit closed at 1420 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

   b. B/2-320th displacements:

      (1) On 170730 May, B Btry displaced by air to BS730328. Unit closed at 1200 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.
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Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

(2) On 250730 May, B Btry displaced by air to BS791355. Unit closed at 1140 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(3) On 300730 May, B Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp vic BS84073700. Unit closed at 1230 hrs. Mission to support security of base defense.

(4) On 060745 Jun, B Btry displaced by air to BS664450. (Fire Base CHAMPS). Unit closed 1420. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(5) On 280800 July, B Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp vic of grid BS84073700. Unit closed 1212 hrs. Mission to support security of base defense.

c. C/2-320th displacements:

(1) On 110700 May, C Btry displaced by air to BS61783120. Unit closed 1157 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(2) On 200700 May, C Btry displaced by air to BS62043005. Unit closed 1426 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(3) On 310740 May, C Btry displaced by air to BS731328, Unit closed 1820 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(4) On 041300 June, C Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp vic BS6835005. Unit closed 1828 hrs. Mission to support security of base defense.

(5) On 080910 June, C Btry displaced by air to BS645539. Unit closed 1315 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(6) On 250900 June, C Btry displaced by air to BS61576. Unit closed 1415 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(7) On 280920 June, C Btry displaced by air to BS477476. Unit closed 1340 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(8) On 100900 July, C Btry displaced by air to BS588327. Unit closed 1330 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(9) On 171000 July, C Btry displaced by air to grid BS647540. Unit closed 1445 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(10) On 280730 July, C Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp. Unit closed 1140 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

4. (C) Results:

a. 27 VC (KBI) (C)

b. 34 VC (KDA) (P)

c. 2 VC (KDA)

5. (U) Administrative Matters: N/A

6. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The AN/WQ-4 radar was successfully hilllifted in positions south of CARENTAN Base. One lifting jack was damaged on the initial move, however, changes in placement of the slings rectified this fault on the second move. The radar was operational within one hour after completion of the second move.

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10-2
b. Artillery was used extensively to flush the enemy from cover and to block his movement from an area. Two guns firing one round every 20 to 30 seconds can effectively restrict enemy movement. Flushing fires were moved along tree lines and ahead of friendly forces. This caused the enemy to show himself.

c. Landing zone preparations were conducted using simultaneous tactical air and artillery support. Careful planning of flight patterns and artillery trajectories made it possible to provide a heavier volume of fire for a shorter period before the maneuver elements reached the landing zone.

7. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. Close and continuing coordination between the liaison officers and forward observers and their supported units facilitated the rapid development of thoroughly coordinated fire plans. An outstanding example of this is the use of concurrent air and artillery preparations of landing zones, which was used extensively during MALHEUR I and II.

b. Co-location of the AN/MPQ-4 radar with one of the batteries allowed the frequent conduct of radar registrations. This technique reduces ammunition expenditure and also provides valuable training for the radar crew, thereby enhancing crew efficiency and confidence.

c. The use of flushing fire proved to be extremely effective in forcing the enemy to either expose himself, or to drive him into an established ambush site. The use of this technique will be incorporated in future operations.

d. The majority of the fires delivered were observed. The use of H and I fires was limited except where solid intelligence indicated a reasonable assurance of attainable results.

e. The use of centrally located fire base permitted economy in the use of security forces. The utilization of the battery FDC's facilitated coordination and rapid delivery of fires.

f. The restrictive terrain coupled with the need to conserve security resources (co-location with rifle bn CP), forced occupation by batteries of the highest features. Positions were often so limited in space, that individual gun sections were less than 20 feet apart, whether in "star" or "line" formation. Occupation of high needle-head positions probably surprised the enemy since he failed, with one exception, to fire, booby-trap, and punji these areas, as he normally does in WTBF I area positions. The training value was immense in that the artillery personnel realized, at great impact, that so-called "impossible" position sites are available in great numbers.

g. The battalion's proficiency was further increased by the daily utilization of light observation helicopters provided by TF OREGON during a period when Brigade's LOH were down continually for maintenance and/or replacement. LOH enabled each firing unit to register daily, and reconnaissance/command and control were performed without interruption.

h. A high-water mark had been attained with the rifle battalions and with the Support Battalion forward elements in support, coordination and cognizance of SOP. The results has been increased successes, to include a higher degree of proficiency, professional standard, esprit and morale.
Appendix 1 (Recapitulation of Missions Fired) to Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

MALHEUR I

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MALHEUR II

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