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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 Nov 66) FOR OT

SUBJECT: Combat After-Action Report, Operation KAHALA,
Headquarters, 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division

TO: L. M. Johnson

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Combat After-Action Report, Operation
KAHALA, Headquarters, 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division. Information con-
tained in this report is provided CDC as reference material for contin-
uous evaluation of organization and doctrine in accordance with the
provisions of AR 1-19.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the
Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the
future lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for
use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
Combat After-Action Report

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(Continued on page 2)
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Copies furnished:
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

1. (Operation KAHAL) OPORD 21-66.
2. 160700 April - 211910 April 66.
3. 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted search and destroy operations in the northeastern portion of Hau Nghia Province in area bounded by coordinates X1430, X15012, X15712, X16022. The operation was a three battalion sized operation reinforced with an armored company and Cavalry troop.

5. Reporting Officer: Colonel L. M. Johnson, Jr.
6. Task Organization and Commanders were as follows:

   Phase I and II: (16-19 April)
   TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col Mooney Cdr)
       1/27 Inf (-)
       B Trp (-) 3/1 Cav
       1 Sqd B/65
   TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cdr)
       2/27 Inf (-)
       A Co (-) 69th Armor
       1 Sqd B/65
   TF 1/5 (N) Inf (Lt Col Greer Cdr)
       1/5 (N) Inf (-)
       Plat A 1/69 Armor
       1 Sqd B/65

   Phase III: (20-21 April)
   TF 1/27 Inf (Lt Col Mooney Cdr)
       1/27 Inf (-)
       Plat A 1/69 Armor
       1 Sqd B/65
   Bde Control
       1/6 Arty (-)
       Plat (-) B/65
       MF Plat
       Plat B Trp 3/1 Cav
   TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cdr)
       2/27 Inf (-)
       A Co (-) 69th Armor
       1 Sqd B/65
   TF 1/5 (N) Inf (Lt Col Greer Cdr)
       1/5 (N) Inf (-)
       Plat A 1/69 Armor
       1 Sqd B/65
   Bde Control
       1/6 Arty (-)
       Plat (-) B/65
       MF Plat

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TF 2/27 Inf (Lt Col Bashore Cdr)

2/27 Inf (-)
Plat A 1/69 Armor
1 Sqd B/65

TF 1/5 (M) Inf (Lt Col Greer Cdr)

1/5 (M) (-)
1 Sqd B/65

7. Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery Support:

(1) Organization for Combat.

(a) 1/8 Arty:

1 1/8 Arty (-): GS 2d Bde
2 B 1/8 Arty: GS 25th Inf Div

(b) 3/13 Arty:

1 3/13 Arty (-): GS 25th Inf Div
2 B 3/13 Arty: GSR 1/8 Arty (-)
2 Flat (8" How) D 3/13: GSR 1/8 Arty (-)

(2) How and when artillery employed:

(a) Artillery supported from two locations during the
operation. 16-19 April Artillery base was located vic X555215. 20-21
April Artillery base was located vic X577181.

(b) Fires were utilized primarily to suppress sniper fire
and soften areas in front of advancing infantrymen.

(c) During Phase III of the operation preplanned artillery
fires (832 HE rds) were placed on the objective area.

(d) Artillery was used to maximum advantage in protection
of downed CH-47 on 20 April.

(e) On-call artillery fires were available throughout the
operation.

(f) A total 747 missions using 3797 105r's were fired in
support of the operation.

(3) Results, Effectiveness, and Timeliness:

(a) As a result of artillery fire there were 21 VC KIA
(BC), 11 POSS, 7 structures destroyed, 11 damaged.

(b) Reinforcing fire provided by elements of 3/13 Artillery
enabled the Brigade to employ fire power on targets at greater ranges,
and, in addition, increased the effectiveness of artillery fires on close
in targets.

(c) Both 155mm and 8" proved to be very effective during
preparation fires on heavily wooded areas.
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(d) Fires placed on the objective during Phase III of the operation were both accurate and timely.

(e) H & I fires again denied the VC freedom of movement during the hours of darkness.

b. US Air Force:

(1) Four airstrikes were flown in support of the operation. One was immediate; three were preplanned.

(a) Reaction time for the immediate strike was twenty-five minutes.

(b) All air strikes were requested by telephone (Hot Line) through 25th Infantry Division G3.

(c) A napalm strike was placed in vicinity of LZ's at 20120 April. The strike proved to be effective in suppressing VC sniper fire.

(2) Results of Air Strikes:

(a) An immediate strike effectively suppressed heavy mortar fires being placed on 2d Bn, 27th Infantry 201700 April and also destroyed 10 structures in the area.

(b) There were 6 KBA (BC), 18 (POSS), 4 structures destroyed, 2 damaged as a result of air strikes.

c. Army Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation flew a total of 520 sorties and moved 160 tons of supplies during the operation.

(2) 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Aviation Section provided CH23 supplies during the operation.

(3) On 160900 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (-) were airlifted by 40 UHID's and 4 CH7's from the Avn Bn to LZ's vic XT502228 and XT505265.

(4) On 201210 April, 1st Bn, 27th Infantry (-) and 2d Bn, 27th Infantry (-) were airlifted to LZ's vic XT598157 and XT503115 by 20 UHID's and 4 CH7's from the 11 Avn Bn.

(5) All lifts were conducted as planned with no significant problems except as follows:

(a) Initial loading zone in base camp was not large enough to adequately unload 40 UHID's and CH7's simultaneously.

(b) On 20 April one CH 17 was disabled by heavy ground fire and forced to land vic XT540216 during lift of 2d Bn, 27th Infantry.

d. Intelligence:

a. Analysis of Terrain In Which Operation was Conducted,

The terrain in the area of operations was generally flat to very gently rolling with very few relief features or high ground. Ground cover and vegetation varied from extensive rice paddies and small crop fields to various types of scrub. Also interspersed among the agricultural fields were small areas of woodland both natural and cultivated. Numerous dikes and ditches crisscrossed the cultivated portion of the area. Cross-country movement for tracked vehicles was fair to good in the dry paddies.
b. Intelligence Prior to Operation.

VC activity within the operational area had been light. The VC incidents were concentrated along LOC's. A Red Haze mission flown on 12 April disclosed 24 emissions from the area from XT530285 to XT550270. The VC units operating in the area included one Local Force Company and one guerrilla platoon. The Trang Bang Company, with a strength of 70, was unlocated but it usually operated within a radius of approximately 5 kilometers north of Trang Bang. The Quyot Chien Platoon #5 with an attached squad had been reported in the vic of coord XT575230 on 8 April 1966.

c. Enemy Situation During Operation.

As the Brigade Task Force moved into the operational area, the VC dispersed into hiding areas and exfiltrated from the area. Enemy activity consisted mainly of sniper and mortar fires, booby traps, AT and AP mines (comand detonated and pressure types). Although enemy contact was not intense, a successful search of the operational area disclosed caches of rice, documents, and a medical training area.

9. Mission: The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division was to conduct search and destroy operations commencing 16 April in Trang Bang District via XT5430, XT5322, XT5712, XT6028, to locate and destroy VC forces and base camps.

10. Concept of the Operation: The 2d Bde, 25th Infantry Division conducted airmobile and ground move to AO commencing 16000 April to conduct search and destroy operations. The operation was conducted in four phases.

Phase I: (16-18 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2d Bn, 27th Infantry moved to AO GREEN employing airmobile and ground elements to conduct search and destroy operations. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations along their axis of advance and established blocking pens along PL HUSH.

Phase II: (18-20 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2d Bn, 27th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in their respective AO's. TF 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry continued to block and conduct search and destroy ops along PL HUSH.

Phase III: (20-21 April) TF 1st Bn, 27th Infantry and TF 2d Bn, 27th Infantry conducted airmobile move to LZ's vic XT595617 and XT535115 respectively. TF 1st Bn (H), 5th Infantry, Co A (-) 1st Bn, 69th Armor, Troop B 3/11 Cav moved overland to establish blocking pens around objective. Subsequently all units conducted search and destroy operations in their assigned areas.

Phase IV: (21 April) All units returned to base camp on order. TF 1st Bn (H), 5th Infantry and Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor conducted sweeps outside Highway 1 on return to base camp.


D-Day (16 April 1966)

1st Bn (H), 5th Infantry

At 0630 the Battalion minus Company D, and reinforced with a platoon of tanks began their move to AO BLUE. The BN TF swept north, then due west along three axes: Company C on the east, the reconnaissance platoon reinforced with tanks in the center, and Co A on the west. The units established blocking portions east of PL HUSH. Several booby-trapped rice caches were located during the day. A 2000 lb cache vic XT599253 and 20 100 kilo
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bag cache in the same area. The rice was extracted by helicopter. Two AP mines were detonated by APC's. The APC's were not damaged. However, 1 friendly KIA, and 2 WIA were sustained vic XT501266, when an APC hit a mine. No significant contact was made during the day. At dusk, the BN TF established blocking pans east of PL NASH vic XT568266. Four ambushes were established with no contact. MEDCAP was conducted during the day for approximately 20 women and children in the vicinity of the Battalion CP.

1st BN, 27th Infantry (Trp B (-), 3/4 Cav)

At 0752, Trp B (-), 3/4 Cav with the 1st BN, 27th Infantry left tail moved to vic XT505252 where the Battalion CP was established. Several dirt road blocks were bypassed during the move. By 0850 Companies A and B had begun their airmobile move to AO GREEN. The airmobile and ground forces linked up at 1015. Trp B (-), 3/4 Cav screened the western edge of the AO while Companies A and B moved abreast to the east conducting thorough search and destroy operations. Company B apprehended 11 VCS vic XT50265. At 1533 Company B engaged a VC squad vic XT521266 resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), two US carbines, and one Chicca 7.62 rifle captured. Airborne gunships were utilized against VC during the engagement. The TF, minus Co B, established a perimeter around the BN CP vic XT515259. Company B moved vic XT521265. At 2045, Company B was attacked from three sides by approximately 20 VC. At the same time, two of the Company's ambushes were sprung. As a result of the attack there were four VC KIA (BC) including a woman squad leader armed with a 7.92 Mauser rifle. The company continued to receive harassing sniper fire throughout the night. MEDCAP was conducted for 20 civilians at the village of X Rung Cay (XT5026) during the day.

2d BN, 27th Infantry

Companies B and C conducted airmobile assaults into LZ IRON (XT500226) and LZ GOLD (XT500213) at 0930 hours. The Battalion Command Group and land tail moved overland arriving in the AO by 1055. Companies B and C attacked east conducting search and destroy operations in zone. Light VC sniper fire was encountered during the morning hours but was suppressed by tanks and artillery. A large peanut and rice cache was located vic XT50246. In addition to an extensive tunnel system was located in the area and destroyed. The Bn continued to receive sniper fire. At 1315 Company C captured a VC squad vic XT502623. Company C continued to maneuver against the VC and upon overrunning the area found 3 VC KIA (BC) and captured two VC. At 1500, while continuing to search the area, another fire fight ensued resulting in an additional 3 VC KIA (BC). Later, at 1630, Co B apprehended six VCS vic XT512267. The BN Task Force established a perimeter vic XT500226 for the night. Three ambushes were established, none having contact.

D+1 (17 April 1966)

3d BN (M), 5th Infantry

During the day the Battalion Task Force conducted detailed search and destroy operations along PL NASH. Co A moved south, XT575235 - XT580228. Co C with one tank platoon attached moved north XT575283 - XT575283. What appeared to be a VC rest area was located vic XT514235. The hut contained many pictures, signs, and directional arrows pointing at the various trails in the area. At 1330 Co C (+) made initial contact vic XT50287 with a reinforced VC squad utilizing MG's, 57MR, and automatic weapons vic XT50287. One tank and one APC were damaged in the area by AT mines. The vehicles were repaired on site. However, and returned to action. Artillery and mortar fires were called on suspected VC locations. There were 7 VC KIA (POSS) during the action. At 2233 the ambush vic XT568828 was sprung killing five VC (BC) and estimating 3 KIA.

1st BN, 27th Infantry

At 0130 the Company C ambush vic XT512265 engaged several VC result-

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The Battalion continued to move east conducting detailed search and destroy operations with Company C on the north and Co B on the south. The Battalion Command Group received sniper fire during the morning. One Command and Control ship received several hits, but remained operational. At 1848, an oxcart hit a mine vicinity of XT50228. At 1135 the Battalion Command Group began its displacement. At 1136 the third vehicle in the convoy, a tank, was severely damaged by a command detonated mine. Two friendly WIA were sustained and the tank was declared a total loss. A 2/4 ton truck dispatched to assist the injured personnel in the disabled vehicle struck a land mine. At the same time small arms fire was placed on the convoy from the woodline on the west of the road. This fire was returned by small arms, machineguns, tanks firing cannister and mortar fires. A VC mortar harassing Company C was silenced by gunships in the area. As the convoy displacing the Battalion CP continued, it was engaged with small arms via XT52720. A brief fire fight resulted in one VC KIA (BC), two KIA (POSS), the new CP became operational at 1816 in vicinity of XT53221. Several mortar hits were fired into the Battalion perimeter during the night. One WIA was sustained. Counter mortar fires were immediately called, silencing the VC mortars.

D+2 (18 April 1966)

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

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D+2 (18 April 1966)

1st Bn, 5th Infantry

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

During the day the Battalion Task Force conducted detailed and thorough searches of their AO via XT5027, XT5223, XT5323, XT5527. Numerous rice caches were discovered. Large caches were found at XT5226, XT5228, XT5225. At 1300 Company B received a group of fortifications with 30 cm evacements and an underground room 6'x6'x6' by 1/2' at XT5225. Defensive positions for the night were centered around XT5225. The Battalion defensive lines were probed by small VC units throughout the night. Company B killed one VC probing the perimeter via XT5225.

D+2 (18 April 1966)

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

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search and destroy operations with emphasis on a methodical search of their 
40. Co B apprehended one VC in the vicinity of the Battalion perimeter 
X532220. Co L (-) 1st Bn, 69th Lancers disposed several VC snipers via 
X539220 with canister. Also several trenches and tunnels in the vicinity 
of X530395 were destroyed. Throughout the morning Company G engaged VC 
who used harassing and evasive tactics. Four VC were flushed and fired upon 
vic X530196, with unknown results. One tank hit a mine at X533199 causing 
minor damage. All units continued their operations returning to the battalion 
perimeter by 1600. During the afternoon twenty civilians in the area were 
treated during MEDCAP. During the evening mortar fire was placed on suspec-
ted VC positions throughout the area.

D+3 (19 April 1966)

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion began its move to new area of operations to search the 
village in vicinity of X7570176. The heavy mortar platoon, Recon Platoon, 
and company weapons platoon established blocks around the village. A total 
of 9 VC's and 3 CM VC's were apprehended during the search. Also a cache con-
taining three 155 duds, one 75 lb bomb and seven steel helmets was located 
vicinity X756173. The duds were blown in place, the helmets recovered. The 
thorough search was terminated at 1733 and a battalion perimeter was estab-
lished vic X753187. Nine ambushes were established in the area to prevent 
VC mining the road and establishing ambushes along it.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

During the night, the Battalion perimeter was probed periodically by 
small numbers of VC. VC were engaged with small arms, M-79's and mortars 
with unknown results. Numerous trench and bunker complexes were located 
and destroyed during the day's searches. A tunnel vicinity X539221 was 
approximately 30 meters long with a room large enough to accommodate four 
to six people. An active civil affairs program was continued in the 
Battalion AO. "Helping Hands" items of soap, toothbrushes, and toothpaste 
were distributed to the villagers of X Rung Cay (X5026). Preparations were 
made for the following day's airmobile operations. At 2215 a claymore 
killod one VC vic X532251. Also at 2300 Co B's ambush vicinity X5172b was 
sprung killing 2 VC.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

During the morning Companies B (+) and C (+) conducted search and 
destroy operations south of the Battalion CP to the vicinity of Highway 1. 
Canisters were effectively employed to neutralize VC snipers in the area. 
Company C evacuated 1500 lbs of rice from the area and apprehended 11 VC's 
during the sweep. In the afternoon hours the Battalion Reconnaissance and 
Security platoons conducted search and destroy operation southeast of the 
Battalion CP. No contact was made. At 1915 automatic weapons fire was 
received in the Battalion perimeter from X532215. Fire was immediately re-
turned and tanks aggressively searched the area with no results.

D+4 (20 April 1966)

Phase III of the operation was initiated and in accordance with 
FRG ORD 1 to OPORD 21-66 an airmobile and ground assault consisting of 
mechanized, armored, and cavalry units was launched into AO PHM. At 
1220 a napalm strike was placed vic X505158 to suppress VC fire on the 
LZ's. At 1220 1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry and Trp B, 3/4 Cav crossed High-
way 1 to establish blocking positions and prevent VC exfiltration from the 
area. Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Lancers followed those units, moving to Objective 
D to conduct search and destroy operations.

1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

The Battalion moved quickly to establish blocking pans along PL YELLOW.
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The block had been established by 1300. At 1400 Company A initiated search and destroy operation in Objective C moving from north to south. Company C moved abreast of Company A searching the western portion of the objective. Three civilians who had been wounded by a VC AT mine were evacuated from the area. At 1520 the company killed a VC sniper vic XT5224L3 and captured his carbine. The search of Objective C was completed by 1540 and the search of Objective E was subsequently initiated. A thorough search of Objective E was terminated at 1815 without contact. Company A was ordered to return to base camp upon completion of the search in Objective E. The Company closed base camp at 1915. Company C remained in Objective C and established numerous night ambushes. The ambush located at XT5231L7 was sprung at 1945 killing 5 VC. A team of tracks dispatched to reinforce the ambush engaged and killed another VC and captured his carbine.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

At 0200 approximately 13 rounds of 81 and 82mm mortar rounds were received in the Battalion perimeter resulting in 2 US KIA and 2 WIA. Immediate countermortar fire were placed on the VC position and the mortars were silenced. At 1240 the Battalion (-) conducted an airmobile assault into LZ vic XT5001L06. Co B established a blocking position along the western edge of Objective A. Trp B, 3/4 Cav maintained their blocking positions north of Objective A. At the same time Co A conducted a slow methodical search of the objective. 22 VCS were apprehended during the search. 3k structures and three tunnels were destroyed in the area. No VC contacts were made during the night.

2nd Bn, 27th Infantry

At 1232 the Battalion Task Force commenced their air mobile assault into LZ vic XT5051L6. While making an approach into the loading zone vic XT5021L6, one OH-43 was disabled by ground fire. The Battalion Reconnaissance platoon remained with the disabled aircraft as security. In addition an OH-23 carrying the Battalion sergeant major on a reconnaissance was fired on by VC snipers. The pilot was hit but managed to land the helicopter safely. He was immediately evacuated. Throughout the day, Companies B and C conducted detailed search and destroy operations in Objective E, moving from west to east. 20 VCS were detained in the operational area. In addition approximately 120 women and children were detained for further disposition. Concurrently, the platoon securing the Chinook was brought under small arms and mortar fire. Gunships and artillery were used in an attempt to disrupt VC fire. The Battalion Commander's command and control ship was utilized to evacuate wounded from the area and in addition moved elements of the command group to the new operational area. At 1750 an air-strike was flown to suppress VC fire being placed on the downed Chinook and its security force. Finally at 1920 the OH-43 was repaired and departed the area. The Reconnaissance platoon was immediately evacuated from the area. The Battalion (-) cycled in Objective B for the night. At 2040 a Co B ambush killed 2 VC and captured a Chinese carbine in the vicinity of XT5051L6. Also a VCS was apprehended in the area at 2215.

D+5 (21 April 1966)

1st Bn (N), 5th Infantry

During the morning the Battalion (-) swept through Objective C again. 86 women and children were evacuated from the area and relocated in the Thai My New Life hamlet (XT511L). One VCS apprehended was turned over to the National Police. Based on an intelligence report of VC tax collecting activities in a village vic XT5051L65, the Battalion (-) sealed off the village and conducted a thorough search of the area. No evidence of VC activities could be found. Company C and the Battalion CP returned to base camp by 1345. The Battalion reconnaissance platoon remained in the AO to secure the civilians until evacuation had been completed. By 1212, evacuation was complete and the reconnaissance platoon commenced move to base.
The platoon had two contacts during their return, killing 2 VC vicinity XX-5316. One platoon from Company A provided security for a VTR returning a disabled 1st Bn, 27th Infantry vehicle. All elements of the Battalion closed base camp by 1800.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

The Battalion continued their aggressive search of Objective A. Emphasis was placed on maximum destruction of tunnels and trenches in the area. At 1200 Companies A and B commenced their airlift to base camp utilizing three UH-1D's. The land tail departed the operational area at 1336. At 1400 Battalion CP was engaged with sniper fire. Troops immediately dismounted, and deployed against suspected VC positions. VC mortars fired into the area resulting in 6 friendly WIA's and damage to one 2½ ton truck. The truck was towed back to base camp. By 1710 all Task Force elements had closed base camp.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

Search and destroy operations continued in Objective B with emphasis on destruction of VC tunnels and fortifications in the area. Upon completion of operations, Companies B and C marched to vic XX-53166, where trucks returned the units to base camp by 1800. The Battalion CP was airlifted to base camp.

12. Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Friendly Losses</th>
<th>Enemy Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA: 3</td>
<td>VC KIA (SC) 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA: 45</td>
<td>VC KIA (POSS) 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VC 2BA (SC) 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VC KIA (POSS) 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VCC 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VDS 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rice: 1.1 ton destroyed 15.1 ton evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peanuts 700 lbs evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/A 16 evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hvy Wpns 1 mortar destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Documents 15 lbs evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bldgs 125 destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunnels 4 destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bunkers 51 destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Booby Traps 40 destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mines 5 destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steel Helmets 7 evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical Supplies 1 box evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tape Recorder 1 evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio 1 evacuated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bombs and Duds 75 lb - destroyed 250 lb - destroyed 500 lb - destroyed 175 lb - destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a recapitulation of combat damage to vehicles and aircraft.

1st Bn, 27th Infantry

1 2½ ton truck damaged and evacuated.

2d Bn, 27th Infantry

2 3/4 ton trucks damaged; one evacuated, one repaired in the field.
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1st Bn (M), 5th Infantry

4 APC's damaged and repaired in the field.

Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry

5 tanks damaged, three evacuated, 2 repaired in the field.

Company A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor

4 tanks damaged; 2 repaired in the field, 2 evacuated (one beyond repair).

HHC, 2d Brigade

1 helicopter damaged and evacuated.

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply:

(1) All resupply of Class I, V and water was effected by air except for two overland convoys in support of the artillery at Trung Lap.

(2) A forward trains element was located at Trung Lap within the 1st Bn, 8th Artillery area. The following comprised this element:

(a) Maintenance and POL personnel

(b) Selected vehicles - VTR's, wreckers and a service unit for flame APC's.

(c) 5,000 gallon water tanker, 5,000 gallon Mogas tanker, and 5,000 gallon diesel tanker.

(d) A contact maintenance team from Support Command.

(3) Support Command spotted a 5,000 gallon water tanker, and a drum stockage of 30 diesel, 30 Mogas, and 20 Avgas drums at the resupply pad in base camp.

(4) POL consumption by units is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Fuel Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, (M), 5th Infantry</td>
<td>3610 gallons Mogas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>610 gallons Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop B, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cavalry</td>
<td>1150 gallons Mogas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2600 g.; H.-ns Diesel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) A total of 359 resupply missions were flown airlifting 160 tons. The following is a breakdown by class of supply:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Combat loads: Upon departing base camp personnel carried two canteens of water and two C-Rations meals. Ammunition loads were as follows:

- M-14 - 200 rds; M-16 - 300 rds; M14E2 - 300 rds; M60 - 1500 rds; M79 - 36 rds; 5 AM's per platoon; 4 claymores per platoon; 2 hand grenades per man; 2 CS/CH grenades per fire team.
c. Maintenance:

(1) A Maintenance Contact Team was established as indicated previously.

(2) 1st Bn (N), 5th Infantry had twenty-one vehicles inoperable because of mechanical failure. Only four APC's had to be returned to base camp for these deficiencies; all of these on the last day of the operation.

(3) Maintenance was stressed throughout the operation. Maintenance inspections were conducted by unit commanders upon return to base camp.

d. Treatment of casualties and evacuation.

(1) Battalion aid stations accompanied the Battalion Forward Command Posts.

(2) The Brigade Surgeon remained at the Brigade Forward CP.

(3) Resupply and Command and Control ships were used whenever possible, depending on the seriousness of the casualty, for medical evacuation.

e. Communications.

(1) Types utilised.

(a) FM radio
(b) AM radio

1. Point to point (Hot Line) telephone.

2. Switchboard to switchboard (common user telephone).

3. Teletype (on line crypto)

(c) Courier (liaison officers)

(d) Wire.

(2) Because of initial overlap on the Brigade Command Net 1st Bn (N), 5th Infantry had to switch to the alternate frequency.

(3) Courier remains the fastest, simplest method of transmitting classified, time deadline reports over short distances. These reports include the INTRAC and the STREP.

(f) Incorporation and use of the new family of radios in the Brigade Command Net was accomplished satisfactorily.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

Starlight devices were carried by all units and utilised during night operations.

15. Commander's Analysis:

a. TACR boundaries must not be planned too close to the actual area of operation. When such is the case and targets are outside the TACR, the delay necessitated by fire coordination results in the loss of the quick reaction of supporting fires.
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b. Too many vehicles were taken by the 2d Bn, 27th Infantry, thus causing movement problems.

c. When tanks cannot be utilized by units due to terrain, they should be returned to Brigade Control as soon as possible.

d. Units must thoroughly and quickly clear their base defensive perimeter. This will prevent VC from emplacing claymores and launching surprise attacks. In the daytime, smaller ambushes or outposts must be used to prevent sniping at choppers coming in to land. Once fire is received, aggressive action must initiated to suppress fires.

e. Different routes must be used when leaving areas. Suspected routes of movement are always mined and booby trapped.

f. Units should anticipate VC mortar fire at any time. Dispersion must always be maintained to prevent unnecessary losses. Night defensive positions should include overhead cover whenever possible. Spill or sand bags shot be placed so as to provide the individual with maximum cover from the flanks as well as the front and rear.

g. In VC infested areas double or mutually supporting ambushes should be employed. This technique may prove to be better than a large platoon sized ambush. When ambushes mutually support one another, they must be a minimum of 200 yards apart in order to effectively employ claymore mines in all directions. When small ambushes are employed consideration should be given to employing claymore mines in depth i.e., 40 meters, 20 meters.

h. Just prior to an airmobile extraction, a sweep around the loading zone should be conducted. This will not eliminate the need for basic security throughout the extraction, but will assist in elimination of some of the snipers in nearby areas.

i. Whenever an area is to be destroyed, arrangements must be made to accommodate civilians and refugees, even though none may be expected. Women and children can create a big problem. ARVN assistance with the civilians is a must. Arrangements should be made to have a standby team from the Province in which operations are conducted so that the team can be airlifted into the area very quickly when needed.

j. The tailend of a march column, whether foot mobile or motorized, must be especially watchful since the VC will habitually fire at the last troops leaving an area. Instant reaction is a must.

k. When selecting assembly areas, consideration should be given to including roads if they are in the area, and if the area is in an open field remaining in the center of it.

l. Numerous strong ambushes must be located surrounding defensive positions, particularly on the first night of occupation since results obtained have been excellent.

m. Continuous reconnaissance must be made to locate routes which heavy vehicles may use to avoid wet areas and linkup with infantry.

n. Units must emphasize shell reps when VC's mortar our positions.

o. Before moving on a highway, units must insure that both sides of the highway have been cleared.

p. Although fire must be returned immediately, indiscriminate firing into villages must cease.

q. Unless it is an operational necessity, no cross attachments should be made at night.

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r. During the third phase of the operation, Trang Bang officials should have been brought up to date soon enough for them to effectively halt civilians leaving the operational area.

s. A vigorous Civil Affairs Program was conducted throughout operation KAHAIA.

(1) Approximately 200 civilians were treated during MEDCAP.

(2) Helping Hand supplies were distributed throughout the operational area. Demonstrations were given on the proper use of the health items distributed.

(3) 12 tons of rice were evacuated from the operational area. The rice was turned over to the Trang Bang sub-sector advisor to be given to needy families.

(4) 69 civilians were evacuated from VC controlled areas during the third phase of the operation to the Boc Ha #2 New Life Hamlet (X76473).

(5) A Psyops loudspeaker mission was flown over the village of X Rung Cay to exploit the VC mortar attack on that village the previous day.

(6) VC will mine the sides of roads adjacent to road blocks. Before bypassing road blocks, units must thoroughly check the area for mines.

u. According to reliable reports, Trung Lap is used as a refuge for the VC during operations in that area.

v. Landing zones should be planned closer to objectives.

w. Plans for operations must be rigidly adhered to.

x. Only necessary traffic should be transmitted over radios. All radio operators should know exactly what they are going to say prior to transmitting.

y. In general, all units participating in Operation KAHAIA performed in an outstanding manner throughout the exercise. The final phase of the operation was particularly complex due to the numerous elements and agencies involved. Nevertheless, each element executed its movements and mission exactly as planned. Consequently, 119 valid VCS were apprehended, 14 of which were confirmed VC and the remainder primarily draft dodgers.

16. Recommendations:

a. Division should place a "Recovery Reaction Force" on a 30 minute standby at Base Camp to respond to evacuation and recovery missions on a mission basis only.

(1) Composition - Equipment

- 2 VTN's
- 1 Lowboy
- 1 Wrecker
- 1 Escort Platoon

(2) Composition - Personnel

- Maintenance Warrant Officer
- Necessary drivers
- Recovery personnel.

(3) Procedures,

(a) Brigade S-4 contacts G-4 outlining mission and requirements.
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(b) G-4 contacts Support Command which tailors the basic standby element to accomplish the mission.

(c) Vehicles and Escort report to Division formation area and meet with the Brigade Representative who issues frequency and call sign.

b. Prior planning should provide for evacuation of civilians at the earliest possible time in order to release those combat troops used to control the civilians.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LOOM J. BRIGGS
Captain, Infantry
Acting Adjutant