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THE EFFECT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN ON THE NORMALIZATION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

by

Christopher P. Lewis

March 2019

Thesis Advisor:	Robert J. Weiner
Second Reader:	Anshu N. Chatterjee

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When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the 2009 Japanese general election, Japanese security policy was poised to diverge from the status quo of normalization Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had held power for many decades. Curiously, Japanese security policy seemed to hold its previous trajectory, despite the less conservative DPJ holding power. This research examines three pivotal security policies of territorial defense of the Senkaku Islands, Futenma base relocation efforts, and the funding and uses of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to better understand the DPJ's security policy in comparison to the LDP's. For each policy, internal, external, and political party constraints that inhibited divergence from the established LDP status quo are identified and compared to the LDP for similarities. In doing so, this research finds that while there were many constraints on the DPJ's ability to follow through with a divergent security policy agenda, the most prominent and uniquely DPJ constraint was the party's inexperience and inability to lead effectively. Broadly, however, other political parties are likely to be constrained by external security threats and relationships, as these factors were consistent constraints for both the LDP and DPJ.

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THE EFFECT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN ON THE NORMALIZATION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

Christopher P. Lewis
Lieutenant, United States Navy
BA, University of California – Davis, 2011

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2019

Approved by: Robert J. Weiner
Advisor

Anshu N. Chatterjee
Second Reader

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the 2009 Japanese general election, Japanese security policy was poised to diverge from the status quo of normalization Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had held power for many decades. Curiously, Japanese security policy seemed to hold its previous trajectory, despite the less conservative DPJ holding power. This research examines three pivotal security policies of territorial defense of the Senkaku Islands, Futenma base relocation efforts, and the funding and uses of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to better understand the DPJ's security policy in comparison to the LDP's. For each policy, internal, external, and political party constraints that inhibited divergence from the established LDP status quo are identified and compared to the LDP for similarities. In doing so, this research finds that while there were many constraints on the DPJ's ability to follow through with a divergent security policy agenda, the most prominent and uniquely DPJ constraint was the party's inexperience and inability to lead effectively. Broadly, however, other political parties are likely to be constrained by external security threats and relationships, as these factors were consistent constraints for both the LDP and DPJ.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BMD	ballistic missile defense
CRF	Central Readiness Force
CSD	collective self-defense
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPP	military observer
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JGSDF	Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Force
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
KMT	Kuomintang
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
PFT	Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978
PKO	International Peace Cooperation Law
PM	Prime Minister
ROC	Republic of China
SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SBF	sea-based facility
SDF	Self-Defense Force
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SDPJ	Social Democratic Party of Japan
SMD	single-member district
SNTV	single nontransferable vote
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Japanese security policy has an unusual aspect of pacifism, as Japan is constitutionally barred from having a traditional military. This pacifism makes the examination of Japanese security policy particularly interesting given Japan's policy trajectory. Despite the limitations of the Japanese constitution, Japanese security policy has become increasingly more "normal" on a trend line that has mainly happened under the leadership of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). However, this trend was not interrupted with the ascent of the LDP's opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This lack of divergence in security policy and the constraints that surround it are notable and are therefore the subject of this thesis. The major research question of this thesis is "What impact did the DPJ have on the 'normalization' (expanded military roles and capabilities in particular) of Japanese security policy?" Given the LDP's almost uninterrupted control of Japan's government, my question examines the effect of the one major transfer of power away from the LDP, to the then-DPJ, from 2009 to 2012. Answering this overall question requires asking three smaller questions. First, "What were the security policies of the DPJ and the LDP?" Second, "How much and in what ways did the DPJ's security policies diverge from the LDP's, and what does this pattern say about the DPJ's effect on normalization?" Third, "Why did the DPJ pursue its particular pattern of divergence from the LDP concerning normalization?"

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Japanese security policy is highly relevant not only to East Asia, but also to the world at large, given its impact on alliances in the region and the economic activity that depends on stability there. By better understanding Japan's security policy as it applies to a "ruling opposition party" (an apparent oxymoron reflecting the common description of all anti-LDP parties as "opposition," even when they take power), this research offers a greater understanding of Japan's overall normalization trajectory. If, for example, Japan's security policy continues or is amplified under a non-LDP party like the DPJ, it may be

that Japan's likely future trajectory is a continuance of normalization no matter who rules; and this has implications for regional tensions and the presence and role of the United States military in the area. Alternatively, if there was stalling or rollback of the normalization of Japanese security policy when the DPJ was in control of the government, this would imply a possibly weaker or unstable trend of normalization of Japanese security policy in the future, in the event of another non-LDP party coming to power. A weaker trend of normalization would also have implications for regional disputes and the role and presence of the United Sates in the region. Greater normalization implies Japanese military self-reliance that might eventually reduce the need for United States military forces to be stationed in Japan. As Japan normalizes, further reinterpretations of Article 9 might also allow for further integration of Japanese and United States defense strategy. Ayoko Mie details a recent example of this trend in the Abe administration's reinterpretation of collective self-defense (CSD).[1] Conversely, stalled or lesser normalization might reinforce the historic role of the United States of stationing troops in Japan and remaining intimately involved in the defense of Japan.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

In establishing the literature examining the effect of non-LDP parties on the normalization of Japanese security policy, there are two distinct subjects that are useful to distinguish between. First, there is the straightforward question of what the DPJ's security policies were—the DPJ being the lone non-LDP party with extended experience controlled the Japanese government. The literature surrounding this is more a matter of record than of debate. There are, however, different interpretations as to the degree to and pattern in which the DPJ's policies diverged from the LDP's, and as to the circumstances and motivations surrounding the DPJ's policy decisions.

This first half of this literature review thus covers prominent DPJ security policy decisions, to establish what the DPJ did as a matter of record, and evaluates each policy's

[1] Ayako Mie, "Security Laws Usher in New Era for Pacifist Japan," *Japan Times,* March 29, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/29/national/politics-diplomacy/japans-contentious-new-security-laws-take-effect-paving-way-collective-self-defense/.

divergence from previous LDP policy. It ends with an assessment of these policies' normalization effect and pattern. The literature appears to find that the DPJ's security policy largely aligned with the status quo of its historic political opposition, the LDP. The second half of this literature review then moves to the body of literature that seeks to explain the influences and circumstances surrounding the formation and execution of said DPJ policies.

1. Security Policy of the DPJ

Scholars consistently discuss a few major policy actions when examining the security policy of the DPJ:

- the DPJ's commitment to territorial defense over the Senkaku Islands
- the DPJ's failed attempt to review and revise plans for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma
- the DPJ's use and development of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)

Collectively, the literature describes the DPJ's security policies as largely consistent with those of the LDP before and even after the DPJ's time in power.[2] The DPJ's overseas employment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) mirrors some of the LDP's use cases for SDF forces, even if the DPJ stopped the Indian Ocean refueling missions. Additionally, the military investment seen in the 2010 NDPG was consistent with that the LDP pursued both before and after the DPJ's time in power. MCAS Futenma and the Senkakus are more ambiguous cases. With Futenma, the ultimate lack of change was consistent with previous LDP policy outcomes, though the party did *attempt* a policy change at first, and its methods diverged from those of the LDP. On territorial defense, as

[2] See, for example, Paul Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," *Instituto Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internatzionale,* no. 81 (December 2011): 1; as well as Christopher Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy From 'Reluctant Realism' to 'Resentful Realism,'" in *Japan Under the DPJ The Politics of Transition and Governance*, ed. Kenji Kushida and Phillip Lipscy (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2013), 359.

seen in the Senkaku Islands examples, the DPJ was broadly consistent with LDP policy, even if its handling of particular crisis incidents diverged from what one might have expected from the LDP.

First are policies asserting control over the controversial Senkaku Islands (as they are known in Japanese and referred to here), claimed by both China and Japan. Overall, the DPJ promised policy that emphasized territorial defense for Japan, as discussed by Midford.[3] This stance was a direct counter to the threat of Chinese expansionism and included the stationing of GSDF troops on the western island of Yonaguni, which neighbors Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku Islands. Under the DPJ, Japan also expanded its Air Defense Identification Zone over the same area and shifted its readiness strategy to a 'Dynamic Defense' concept to prioritize reactive mobility for possible territorial crises. Such measures were indicative of a commitment to territorial defense and would be interpreted as setting a strong policy tone. Two key incidents with China involving an assertive territorial defense stance would highlight the DPJ's commitment to territorial defense, regardless of how successful their handling of the situations were.

Jimbo writes how in 2010, a Chinese trawler captain was arrested by Japanese authorities following a collision with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol and subsequently was made subject to criminal prosecution given the accusation of interference with Japanese public officials.[4] This diverged from the LDP's previous actions concerning the islands, which asserted ownership by arresting Chinese nationals who had landed on one of the islands in 2004 but subsequently releasing them via deportation without criminal prosecution. Jimbo describes how the ensuing diplomatic strain the DPJ encountered was formidable, as Sino-Japanese relations degraded quickly, with China retaliating by detaining Japanese citizens and stopping rare earth mineral exports.[5] This ultimately led to Japan releasing the Chinese trawler's captain, but at the cost of appearing out-pressured by

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[3] Paul Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 4.

[4] Ken Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," in *The Democratic Party of Japan in Power: Challenges and Failures*, ed. Yoichi Funabashi and Koichi Nakano (New York: Routledge, 2001), 85–87.

[5] Jimbo, 88-91

China in a diplomatic confrontation, particularly when China was perceived to be in the wrong. Such a departure from the LDP was in keeping with the assertiveness of the normalization of security policy; however, the DPJ's clumsy execution actually degraded the normalization goal of enhancing the ability to exercise sovereignty.

The boat collision incident was followed by more controversy concerning the Senkaku Islands in 2012, when Tokyo's governor, Ishihara Shintaro, pushed for the purchase of the islands by Tokyo Prefecture. Jimbo highlights how this was another consequence of the previous boat collision, as the owner decided to sell the islands in the wake of that controversy.[6] Jimbo goes on to describe how DPJ Prime Minister Noda subsequently endorsed a pre-emptive move for Japan to buy and thereby nationalize the islands, even though it was clear that such a move might provoke a response from China.[7] Jimbo then notes the consequences of this move and how the transfer sparked outrage in China, resulting in protests on the islands, arrests, and further condemnation from China.[8]

The nationalization of the islands can be strictly interpreted as a departure from the norm. It can also be interpreted as a pro-normalization move, given its assertion of territorial claims. Unfortunately for the DPJ, the timing and precedent from its response to the boat collision in 2010, in particular, cast a shadow over its overall policy and diplomatic relations toward the Senkakus. The DPJ's policies did not diverge from the LDP's: both highlighted a willingness to assert territorial defense. However, the DPJ's handling of the situation did diverge, as it created unnecessary political pressure and diplomatic strain.

MCAS Futenma relocation plans were another policy area in which the DPJ departed from the LDP in its approach and stated intentions but not in terms of ultimate policy impact. The issue of the base's location had garnered controversy and relocation plans were conferred upon by both the United States and Japan for years, especially after

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[6] Jimbo, 88–91.

[7] Jimbo, 88–91.

[8] Jimbo, 88–91.

1995—that is, during the LDP's long control of government.[9] While not an entirely new idea, the policy of base relocation pushed forward by Prime Minister Hatoyama's new DPJ cabinet unknowingly used the party's ambiguous policy platform in an aggressive manner instead of in the open-ended manner intended by its author, Goshi Hosono, the DPJ Policy Research Council's chief deputy director.[10] This initial relocation plan proposed a re-examination of U.S. forces in Japan, and it was deliberately vague, so as to satisfy the DPJ's farther–left-wing coalition partners without disturbing the relations with the United States. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama took license with this ambiguous language and proposed relocation of MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture. Ultimately, the DPJ's base relocation policy was not implemented, and its subsequent return to "square one" was not particularly divergent from former LDP policy, which had agreed on the likely need for the base to be relocated. However, it could be argued that the DPJ's uncoordinated nature on the issue and ensuing contradictory signals represented divergence in security policy *execution* in the eyes of Japanese citizens and the United States, as discussed by Zakowski.[11]

Last is the DPJ's stance on the uses and limitations of the SDF. Upon taking office in September 2009, the DPJ quickly ended the MSDF's overseas refueling missions in the Indian Ocean, which the DPJ was opposed to and which had become politically questionable to the Japanese public.[12] The DPJ saw such deployments as tacitly non-pacifist, given their link to United States military operations overseas, and made their cancellation one its first security policy actions. The DPJ had previously hamstrung the LDP's efforts to reauthorize the mission in 2007 and 2008.[13] The DPJ's opposition to the MSDF's overseas refueling mission was also politically popular and served as an exploitable political vulnerability of the LDP. When these overseas deployments were

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[9] Karol Zakowski, *Decision-Making Reform in Japan The DPJ's Failed Attempt at a Politician-Led Government* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 97.

[10] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 79–80.

[11] Zakowski, *Decision-Making Reform in Japan,* 99.

[12] Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 2–3.

[13] Midford, 2.

criticized by the DPJ, the LDP was forced to make concessions on overseas SDF deployments more generally. This DPJ policy decision represents an anti-normalization stance, as it limited the SDF's use and its deployments. However, this policy cannot be viewed in isolation as either representative of the DPJ's approach or as conclusively divergent from the LDP's. First, LDP prime ministers Koizumi and Aso had already made multiple curtailments to the use of the SDF, stopping GSDF and ASDF deployments to Iraq in 2007 and 2009, respectively, in an effort to relieve political pressure against these overseas uses of the SDF, as described by Midford.[14] This political pressure also limited Japan's support in Sudan in 2008, during the LDP's tenure.[15] Restriction of SDF deployments by the DPJ was therefore not particularly different from that of the LDP in practice, but it does serve as an example of the DPJ's ideological difference, given that the DPJ had previously attempted to stop the deployments before actually doing so once in control of the government. While in power, meanwhile, the DPJ also demonstrated its willingness to *expand* the use of the SDF, using the SDF to provide HADR support to Haiti in 2009 and UN peacekeeping support to Southern Sudan in 2010, to establish a permanent anti-piracy presence in Djibouti in 2010, and to provide domestic HADR support for the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake in 2011.[16]

Another facet of the DPJ's defense policy was a continuation of investment into Japan's security apparatus. These investments spanned multiple areas and aspects of defense, including the announcement of the 2010 revision of NDPG. The NDPG changed Japanese security policy in several ways. First was a realignment of the JSDF from a "Basic Defense Force" built for the Cold War era to a "Dynamic Defense Force" intended to make the JSDF more capable of reacting quickly to more-likely territorial threats and crises.[17]

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[14] Midford, 2.

[15] Midford, 2.

[16] See, for example, Midford, 2, and Robert Weiner and Yuki Tatsumi, *How Does the Democratic Party of Japan Affect Security Policy? High-Profile Stumbles and Quite Progress,* PASCC Report No. 2012 008 (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, 2012): 20–23. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/34345.

[17] Adam Liff, "Japan's 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines – Reading the Tea Leaves," *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, no. 89 (December 2010): 1. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125946/apb089_1.pdf.

The 2010 NDPG also expanded Japan's submarine fleet and F-15 inventory, and it added radar units on the Nansei Islands near Taiwan.

The 2010 NDPG did not address Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports from 1967, which stated that "Under the Three Principles, 'arms' exports to the following countries or regions shall not be permitted: (1) communist bloc countries, (2) countries subject to 'arms' exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, and (3) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts."[18] However, Prime Minister Noda's administration did issue a "Statement on the Guidelines for Overseas Transfers of Defence Equipment," which opened up arms transfers under certain circumstances and with approval from the Japanese government.[19] This loosening of arms export restrictions allowed for multiple bilateral arms agreements, including ballistic missile defense development collaboration and integration with the United States and other allies.[20]

The DPJ also expanded Japan's spy satellite program by upgrading from commercial to military quality hardware.[21] These policies were in keeping with the LDP's vision of a normalized Japan, one in which the military provides independent security and is internationally involved. Indeed, if anything, these policies were an acceleration of, not a divergence from, previous LDP normalization goals.[22] While they might have diverged

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[18] "Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy. (Note: This quote is from the website of the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan which provides an English translation of the law's text and can be found at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/.)

[19] Christopher Hughes, "Japan's Emerging Arms Transfer Strategy: Diversifying to Re-Centre on the US-Japan Alliance," *The Pacific Review* (September 2017): 433-434. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1371212.

[20] See, for example, Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 93, as well as Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 3, and Weiner and Tatsumi, "How Does the Democratic Party of Japan Affect Security Policy?" 5.

[21] Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 3.

[22] Brendan Howe and Joel Campbell, "Continuity and Change: Evolution, Not Revolution, in Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," *Asian Perspective*, no. 37 (2013): 110.

from the status quo in 2010, they were reiterated and built upon in 2013 with Prime Minister Abe's 2013 NDPG.[23]

In terms of normalization, the DPJ's security policies are a mixed bag. The policies examined in the literature can be grouped into pro-normalization, anti-normalization, and no effect. Three policies can be coded as having a pro-normalizing effect. First, the DPJ's policies concerning the SDF can be seen as anti-normalization when they involved restricting the use of the SDF; however, the DPJ ultimately expanded the SDF's use domestically and abroad, resulting in a push toward normalization overall. Second, the DPJ's policies around military investment had a pro-normalization trend, but only in that its NDPG expanded military investment and reinforced normalization. Third, the DPJ's policy actions with the Senkaku Islands were assertive in the realm of territorial defense and were pro-normalization. One policy can be coded as no effect: the DPJ's policy on the Futenma basing issue ultimately accomplished no change to normalization while souring diplomatic relations.

The literature suggests that the DPJ ultimately did promote normalization, even if in a less acute way than outright constitutional revision. In fact, the DPJ promoted normalization to a greater degree in some areas than the LDP had. For example, the DPJ's vision of normalization appears to bend towards that of a more independent Japan, which includes putting Japan in a better balance with regional neighbors and allies, to include the United States. This is as opposed to the LDP vision of normalization (or, at least, that of some members of the LDP), which can be perceived as pushing for a more explicit form of normalization through constitutional revision while still keeping Japan in an unbalanced alliance with the United States. Some authors, however, characterize the DPJ's security policy as "reluctant realism," indicating that perhaps some of the similarity with the LDP's normalization stances represented more of a fallback position in the face of constraints than an intended DPJ policy plan.[24]

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[23] Andrew Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance New Polities and Politics for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 100.

[24] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy," 359.

2. DPJ Policy Constraints

What influenced the DPJ to make its particular decisions? Moreover, what explains why the LDP's falling out of power would ultimately result in security policy outcome largely similar to those of its time in power? The literature points to three major explanations for this counterintuitive outcome: domestic structures, international structure, and party competence.

Some scholars argue that domestic structural constraints restricted the DPJ's options. In particular, the DPJ and bureaucracy shared a mutual distrust of each other: the DPJ avoided and alienated the bureaucracy, which is heavily involved in the formation and execution of security policy in Japan, and the bureaucracy was not fully willing and able to work with a new party and new security policy ideas.[25] The result was a weakening of the DPJ's ability to form and execute policy, as it lacked the expertise traditionally provided by the bureaucracy.[26] Some authors stress that because these structural forces were very difficult to overcome, arguments that emphasize the DPJ's clumsy policy implementation overstate the incompetence of the DPJ.[27]

Other domestic structural arguments point to the legislature's structure via its elections. These scholars point to first-past-the-post election system which incentivized a narrowing of party platforms to attract voters.[28] In 1993, the House of Representatives changed from a single nontransferable vote system (SNTV) system in multi-member districts. This system gave multiple top vote-getters in a given race seats in the Lower House, which encouraged a fracturing of parties, as any given individual could strive to be one of the top vote-getters, and multiple candidates within a party could compete against

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[25] Yuki Tatsumi, "Japan Under DPJ Rule The Costs of Overemphasizing Political Leadership," *Harvard International Review* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2013): 57.

[26] Tatsumi, 60.

[27] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy," 334.

[28] See, for example, Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 10, as well as Ethan Scheiner "The Electoral System and Japan's Partial Transformation: Party System Consolidation Without Policy Realignment," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 12, no. 3 (Sep-Dec 2012): 352–352, and Daniel Smith, Robert Pekkanen, and Ellis Krauss, "Building a Party: Candidate Recruitment in the Democratic Party of Japan, 1996–2012," in *Japan Under the DPJ The Politics of Transition and Governance*, ed. Kenji Kushida and Phillip Lipscy (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2013), 165.

each other. Starting in the 1996 elections, however, Japan's system changed to a single-member district (SMD) system (with an overlapping regional proportional representation component). The effect, as described by Scheiner, is that there is a structural pressure on candidates to coalesce into unified parties, since only one candidate can win in each district (and to take advantage of the PR voting system that requires a party presence to win seats).[29] This electoral system can also encourage a convergence of party platforms as parties broaden their platforms to attract larger pools of voters on the national scale. In doing so, party platforms converge on a broadly agreeable middle ground—in the case of security, a slow normalization of Japanese security policy. More concretely, this translates into an assertive territorial defense, allowing the United States to have a military presence, and rejecting the historically divergent move of revision for the Constitution's Article 9.

The nature of Japanese public opinion is also cited as a domestic structural influence behind the DPJ's lack of a large policy shift away from normalization. Such arguments revolve around the concept that voters did not incentivize the DPJ to take a divergent policy stance and that the DPJ was punished when it lost voter confidence. In part, the DPJ was elected to lead the government primarily because of their prioritization of domestic policies.[30] Some argue that DPJ did not gain its electoral victory on the basis of a new DPJ security policy vision, but rather on the basis of policies which emphasized domestic reform.[31] The DPJ campaigned heavily on what it called the "Five Pledges," a robust domestic reform plan that sought to ease domestic economic troubles.[32] This platform was put forward by the DPJ as critique and response to the Abe cabinet's inattention to domestic economic issues and not necessarily as a refutation of the LDP's security policy. The idea that Japanese public support hinges on economic issues is further

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[29] Scheiner, "The Electoral System and Japan's Partial Transformation," 352.

[30] See, for example, Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 96 and Koichi Nakano, "Introduction," in *The Democratic Party of Japan in Power: Challenges and Failures*, ed. Yoichi Funabashi and Koichi Nakano (New York: Routledge, 2017), 3.

[31] See, for example, Koji Nakakita, "The Manifesto Why was the DPJ Unable to Keep Its Campaign Promises," in *The Democratic Party of Japan in Power: Challenges and Failures*, ed. Yoichi Funabashi and Koichi Nakano (New York: Routledge, 2017), 8–9 and Oros, 96.

[32] Nakakita, 8.

supported by the return to power of Abe himself and the LDP in 2012, when Abe campaigned on Japan's economic revitalization and a continuance of the security policy normalization trajectory that had continued through the DPJ's time in power.[33]

Additionally, after initial failures, the DPJ was particularly quick to lose support from the electorate, who viewed the "young" DPJ as ineffective and incapable of governing, and this limited the DPJ's ability to pursue divergent policies for fear of further electoral losses.[34] Such a characterization would further undercut any radical policy movements, especially if said policies were executed poorly. The effect of this lack of confidence from voters was visible in the divided government, known as the Twisted Diet, which left the DPJ unable to govern effectively (and could itself be seen as a structural constraint).[35]

External structures also may have constrained the DPJ's security policy options. Some authors argue that regional tensions with China and North Korea narrowed the policy options available to the DPJ, since they essentially demanded an assertive response from the Japanese government.[36] China's aggressive territorial expansion required a stalwart response, lest further infringements be made. Similarly, North Korea's nuclear and missile programs required an assertive response.

Outside of Japan's regional neighbors, other international structures may have constrained the DPJ's policy options. The United States had built a multi-faceted relationship with the LDP over the decades after World War II, with Japan as essentially a junior partner. In this time, both countries had become accustomed to interacting within established diplomatic channels and within the bounds of the LDP's normalizing security policy trends. It is possible that the DPJ's policy options were somewhat restricted by this

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[33] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance,* 129.

[34] See, for example, Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 77, and Tatsumi, "Japan Under DPJ Rule," 56.

[35] Jimbo, 79.

[36] Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, "Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Vision Within the Democratic Party of Japan," *Asia Policy*, no. 9 (January 2010), 56.

history. Oros describes how the DPJ was hindered by the fact that the diplomatic relationship between Japan and the United States had been built through bureaucrats whose roles were weakened by the DPJ's reform efforts—and, to add to the domestic-structure component discussed previously, these bureaucrats were essentially backed by the United States as well.[37] The existing diplomatic structure restricted the DPJ's diplomatic capability, which in turn restricted Japan's ability to execute policy. This can be seen in Prime Minister Hatoyama's meeting stiff opposition in his attempts to restructure the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan and diplomatic frustrations over the Futenma basing negotiations.

Another set of explanations centers around the DPJ's inability, as a party, to create and execute divergent security policy. Some scholars argue that the DPJ was a party divided into factions, which diluted the DPJ's policy cohesion and rendered it unable to enact policy efficiently. This factional explanation refers to the fact that DPJ was only really unified in its anti-LDP stance and opposition party identity, while members' individual policy preferences ranged widely between leftist anti-militarist former JSP members to conservative LDP defectors.[38] Other scholars explain the DPJ's troubles by pointing to the inexperience of the party.[39] Without experienced and competent personnel to run the government and legislature, the party could not competently work the levers of policy development and execution. Finally, other authors point to the disorganization of the DPJ as the cause for its inability. The party leadership was flat instead of hierarchical, which meant there was no incentive to own policy issues.[40] In addition, the party never transitioned from an election posture to a governance posture.[41]

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[37] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance,* 113.

[38] See, for example, Steven Reed and Ethan Scheiner, "Electoral Incentives and Policy Preferences: Mixed Motives Behind Party Defections in Japan," *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no 3. (2003): 470; Oros, 111, and Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 77.

[39] See for example, Oros, 110, Akihisa Shiozaki "The Failure of the DPJ's 'Five Measures,'" in *The Democratic Party of Japan in Power: Challenges and Failures*, ed. Yoichi Funabashi and Koichi Nakano (New York: Routledge, 2017), 48, and Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss, "Building a Party," 160.

[40] Tatsumi, "Japan Under DPJ Rule," 58.

[41] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 77.

D. ROADMAP

This thesis is divided into chapters that review the key security policy areas as comparative case studies. Each chapter begins by establishing the policies of the LDP's to serve as a baseline of security policy. Next, the DPJ's policies on each issue area are established to outline what the DPJ could or could not do in terms of security policy. These party policies are then compared to establish the (lack of) divergence in the normalization trend of Japanese security policy. After an assessment of DPJ divergence is established, each chapter outlines the relevant constraints in three areas: external constraints, internal constraints, and party structure and leadership constraints. External constraints address factors that constrained DPJ policy options that are international in nature, such as relationships with other countries, international agreements, and diplomatic efforts. Internal constraints address factors that constrained DPJ policy options that are domestic in nature, such as voters, local factors, and the Japanese government. Party structure and leadership constraints address factors that constrained DPJ policy options that are specific to the DPJ as a party and its ability to maintain a governing coalition. These constraints also include specific party leaders and other individuals. Finally, each chapter concludes with a review of similar constraints that also limited the LDP in its own security policy agenda, to establish which constraints act as a constant in Japanese security policy.

Each chapter addresses a specific security policy, as addressed in the literature review section of this chapter. Chapter II addresses territorial defense of the Senkaku Islands, Chapter III addresses the issue of U.S. basing in Okinawa, and Chapter IV addresses the expansion and uses of the SDF. Finally, Chapter V is the conclusion of this thesis and summarizes trends that are consistent across multiple security policies. This conclusion establishes the overall constraints on DPJ security policy that kept Japan on a normalization trajectory and establishes their relevance for other non-LDP parties that may come into power in Japan.

II. TERRITORIAL DEFENSE OF THE SENKAKU ISLANDS

The issue of territorial defense and the Senkaku Islands has evolved over the decades and is an aspect of Japanese security policy that shows a growing trend in normalization through both parties. The DPJ did not shy away from confrontation regarding the islands, rather, the DPJ's handling of incidents related to the islands could be interpreted as even more assertive than status quo established by the LDP. While the DPJ made errors in handling crises related to the Senkaku Islands, their policies stand as examples of how the DPJ diverged in the normalization of security policy by going further than the status quo in the trajectory of normalization.

A. POLICY OF THE LDP

The LDP's policy history dates back to the Cold War years and makes up the vast majority of Japanese policy actions on the disputed islands. In 1970, the dispute started to gain momentum, as oil was found off of the coasts, resulting in a dispute between Taiwan and Japan, who claimed the islands as a part of Okinawa.[42] Later, in 1978, during Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978 (PFT) negotiations, the islands were used as leverage between Japan and China. It was perceived by some LDP members that China desperately wanted a treaty with Japan that contained "anti-hegemony" language to act as a balance to the agreements made between the Soviet Union and Vietnam.[43] Given this dynamic, some in the LDP wished to use China's desperation for a treaty as a way to force the settling of the Senkaku Islands issue. Finally, in 1990, Taiwanese athletes were organized by a conservative Kuomintang (KMT) politician to make a claim on the islands by bringing an Olympic torch and claiming ownership of the islands. Of note, the Taiwanese KMT, of the Republic of China (ROC), is one of the two faces of China that Japan interacted with over the islands, as it is the defeated nationalist party that fled to Taiwan at the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War. Each of these incidents are shaded with

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[42] Chien-peng Chung, *Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 31–32.

[43] Chung, 36.

economic and political maneuvering and reveal that the significance of the islands during the Cold War years might be their role as a political bargaining tool as much as an economic one.

The 1970 dispute served as a launching point for the dispute over the islands and mainly concerns the ROC and Japan. Japan declared ownership in September 1970 after oil surveyors reported the high likelihood of oil in the sea-bed.[44] Chung writes that Taiwan took similar actions: "Taiwan announced she would exercise all sovereign rights over the natural resources in the sea-bed and subsoil adjacent to her territorial sea."[45]

These dual claims posed a problem, as Japan could not credibly make claim to the economic development of the entire continental shelf and it therefore extended a plan in conjunction with the ROC (representing China) and Korea to create a United Oceanic Development company in order to further development through cooperation.[46] This proposal dwindled in the face of criticism from the PRC which saw a Taiwanese claim as illegitimate and a Japanese claim as military expansionism.[47] Adding to this, the tentative cooperative agreement was already shaky. Chung writes that in 1970, "reports surfaced in Hong Kong about Japanese Maritime Safety Agency patrol crafts obstructing Taiwanese fishing boats from coming too close to the vicinity of the disputed Tiaoyuti Islands."[48] Chung also notes that earlier that year, Japanese authorities had removed a ROC flag planted by a journalist with the intention of asserting ROC ownership of the islands.[49] These actions show that little agreement could be found over ownership of the islands from the beginning and are indicative of the nature of the three-way dispute over the islands. Complicating this further is the twist of Chinese ownership itself being disputed by the PRC and the ROC, who each claimed to represent the Chinese side of the dispute. Such

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[44] Chung, 32.

[45] Chung, 32.

[46] Chung, 32.

[47] Chung, 32–33.

[48] Chung, 33.

[49] Chung, 33–34.

diplomatic complications may have been a source of the LDP's willingness negotiations by Japan, given the potential danger of conflict with one or both of these entities and the pro-Taiwanese elements of the LDP.

In recounting the influences of these actions, Japan and Taiwan had economic incentives to further their claims due to oil discoveries, as at that time, Japan and Taiwan relied heavily on imported oil, making a joint cooperative venture desirable.[50] The ROC and PRC, however, were also influenced by non-economic factors like nationalism and sovereignty, given their posturing.

A second Cold War era incident marks a set of new actions by the three claimants, revolving around the PFT. Pro-Taiwan Japanese and LDP hardliners (Seirankai or Blue Storm Group) wanted to use PFT negotiations as an opportunity to settle disputed ownership and cement Japan's claim.[51] Chung notes that while diplomatic leaders in the PRC and Japan had decided to put the island dispute aside in an attempt to ensure the PFT, neither side could afford to appear weak on territorial sovereignty, as domestic nationalists could undercut them politically.[52] Even so, on April 12, 1978, 100 armed fishing trawlers under the PRC flag came within the 12nm territorial limit of the islands with banners declaring the islands as Chinese territory. Chung writes that the PRC's vice-premier Geng Biao claimed the incident was not coordinated and was instead accidental.[53] The incident served as the first move by the PRC and established that it would not let the islands be used as leverage in diplomacy and that it was prepared to act in response to claims that the PRC viewed as infringing on its territorial sovereignty.[54] In an effort to reconcile for the sake of the PFT, diplomatic elements of the PRC and Japan appealed for calm, despite foreign minister Sonoda declaring the incident as coordinated and not accidental.[55]

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[50] Chung, 32.

[51] Chung, 36–37.

[52] Chung, 36–37.

[53] Chung, 36.

[54] Chung, 37.

[55] Chung, 36–37.

The 1978 trawler group incident serves as an indicator of the power of domestic politics in territorial disputes between the claimants. Nationalists and hardliners in Japan and China put pressure on the Japanese Diet and foreign minister Sunao Sonoda and China's Deng Xiaoping, forcing each side's leadership to decide between the satisfaction of domestic audiences and a milestone diplomatic achievement. In the end, a middle ground was taken, whereby each claimant balked and did not escalate tensions any further, allowing for the PFT to be successfully signed. In doing so, Chung notes that Deng's ultimate goal was likely to "avoid a delay in concluding the PFT, which would achieve the higher policy objectives of facilitating close Sino-Japanese relations and creating a united front against Soviet 'hegemony.'"[56] This incident shows the strength that domestic pressures can have on territorial disputes and how both the PRC's and Japan's claims are rooted in nationalistic and diplomatic influences and not just economic ones. However, effectively threading the needle on such controversial issues with multiple stakeholders requires political finesse and experience. Given the LDP's long-standing role as the leader of Japanese government, it is no surprise that the party was able to do so successfully.

A final Cold War era event serves as a transition from relatively benign interactions and posturing surrounding the disputed ownership of the islands. As the Cold War neared its end, Sino-Japanese relations were still relatively calm, but a burst of activity rekindled the dispute that had been relatively dormant through the 1980s following the PFT.

In 1990, Taiwanese fishermen became increasingly concerned with the future of their fishing rights near the islands, as Japanese maps and a small lighthouse erected by the right-wing Japanese Seinensha group signaled a Japanese willingness to establish a stronger claim on the islands.[57] These fisherman were backed by the KMT Mayor of Kaohsiung, Wu Dun-yi, who in an effort to undercut the nationalist draw of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, said that any acting on a Japanese claim would be an invasion of Chinese territory.[58] He then organized a trip of Olympic athletes and media in

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[56] Chung, 41.

[57] Chung, 40.

[58] Chung, 42.

an attempt to visit the islands with an Olympic torch as a way to assert ownership in the form of a media event.[59] Furthermore, this issue was taken up by students and Suganuma describes how "[the] lighthouse controversy had … spread to students in Taiwan, and students planted the flag of the ROC on the Diaoyu Islands."[60]

Facing these kinds of conspicuous challenges to Japanese ownership of the islands, Japan reacted in an effort to reassert itself on the islands issue. Suganuma describes Japan's swift response to the flag planting and writes, "within days, Japanese Defense Agency officials landed on the island and removed the flag."[61] Additionally, Japanese Maritime Self-defense Force (JMSDF) patrol craft stopped the Taiwanese Olympic torch group from landing and Japanese pro-Taiwan LDP members were forced to back off of recognition of the lighthouse.[62] The incidents surrounding the lighthouse, while nominally insignificant, expose the competing influences for territorial disputes within Japan, as nationalists who are normally under the umbrella of the LDP were pitted against their own pro-Taiwan party members, who wanted to de-escalate tensions and confrontation before it spiraled.[63] Furthermore, it shows the rising influence of nationalism in Taiwan's actions but also reaffirmed the ability of the LDP government to keep relative control over said influences. In this case, Japan under the LDP was able to successfully shutdown multiple media-centric stunts from Taiwan while also suppressing the vocal domestic support for the provocative Japanese lighthouse.

On July 14, 1996, another lighthouse was erected by Japanese nationalist Seinensha group on Kita-Kojima Island and was followed-up with a 200-mile EEZ claim by the Japanese government the following week. Chung writes that, "On 30 September Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, leader of the LDP … announced his party would support Japan's claims to the islands, probably with a view to capturing the nationalist vote in the

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[59] Chung, 42.

[60] Unryu Suganuma, *Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 139.

[61] Suganuma, 139.

[62] Chung, *Domestic Politics,* 42.

[63] Chung, 43.

Diet elections set for 20 October."[64] The connections between these events cannot be overlooked. As Chung writes, "the long-time ruling LDP has always been a factionalized coalition of conservative forces that portrayed itself as the alternative to the opposition socialists … [and] has harbored many nationalist groups of caucuses."[65]

On March 24, 2004, another incident occurred in which protestors from the PRC attempted to land on the islands in order to erect a flag. These protestors were detained by the JCG and Prime Minister Koizumi asserted that these protestors would be handled through Japanese law.[66] Manicom details how this drew outcry from the PRC, which reiterated its claim to the islands, but both sides' responses resulted in little fallout.[67] Manicom highlights the backlash of public opinion and describes how the lack of bigger reactions sparked protests in both Japan and China, to include Japanese nationalists planning to travel to the islands as a response to the Chinese protestor landing.[68] Manicom then describes how the deteriorating situation escaped further tension, writing, "Despite the tensions, elites on both sides intervened to manage the dispute."[69] In the end, the Chinese protestors were deported instead of prosecuted and Japan banned the Seinensha group from following through on their plan in an effort to avoid further problems. Mincom notes that this incident serves as an example of one of the last times that Japanese and Chinese elites were able to soothe tensions among their nationalist actors and influences.

In 2008, another crisis began when the Taiwanese fishing boat *Lien Ho* was sunk after colliding with a JCG vessel.[70] Weiss notes that Japanese leadership under the LDP had handled the incident by rescuing the fishermen from the water and deporting them.[71]

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[64] Chung. 44.

[65] Chung, 44.

[66] James Manicom, B*ridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 53.

[67] Manicom, 53.

[68] Manicom, 53.

[69] Manicom, 53.

[70] Jessica Weiss, *Powerful Patriots Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press: 2014), 168.

[71] Weiss, 168.

This incident marked a second high-profile incident in which Japan simply deported those involved in an incursion into the waters and in this case, the Japanese government even offered an apology and compensation. However, this policy stance was something that was arrived at by trial-and-error, as evident in Koizumi's initial preference of using Japanese law to prosecute the perpetrators. Over time, the LDP learned the political and diplomatic limits of how assertive its territorial defense policy could be. As Koizumi and the LDP learned, hard-nosed territorial defense policy in the vein of a normalizing security policy had its limits and was better tempered by an understanding of the applicable constraints to achieve a goal of preserving territorial integrity.

B. POLICY OF THE DPJ

As the DPJ came into power in 2009, Japan's actions on the issue of territorial defense would reflect noteworthy changes from the LDP's previous policy actions on the matter. Specifically, the dispute over the Senkaku Islands gives several indications of how the DPJ differed from the LDP and is an example of Japan leaning towards a stronger normalization footing with regards to territorial disputes, even if not intentionally. While the trajectory of the dispute may have had its own momentum beginning in 2004, regardless of Japan's leading party, it is noteworthy that this change happened during the DPJ's tenure. The noteworthiness comes from the way the DPJ handled the crisis and the proceeding controversy regarding the nationalization of the islands that had a negative effect on the very Sino-Japanese relations that the DPJ nominally wished to strengthen. These actions highlight the constraints the DPJ faced, as opposed to how objectively divergent the DPJ's policy was in the context of the LDP leadership that bookended the DPJ's tenure in power. On September 7, 2010, the policy status quo over the Senkaku Islands showed its first sign of change when there was a collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessels, the *Mizuki* and the *Yonakuni,* near the Senkaku Islands.[72] Zakowski describes how it is possible that the vessel veered towards the islands while attempting to fish, but recordings of the collisions highlight the

[72] Zakowski, *Decision-Making Reform in Japan,* 134.

belligerence of the Chinese vessel.[73] Even so, this situation was complicated by the fact that Japanese authorities thought that the trawler might have been a ploy for activists to conduct political activities on or around the islands, a pre-judgement that was reinforced by the repeated and aggressive actions of the Chinese vessel and its refusal to cooperate with Japanese authorities.[74]

The trawler captain, Zhan Qixiong, was subsequently arrested (as opposed to deported) and was therefore subject to criminal prosecution, given the accusation of interference with Japanese public officials.[75] This policy by the DPJ government was a divergence from the LDP's previous actions concerning the islands, which had historically asserted ownership by deporting both the offending Chinese nationals in 2004 and a Taiwanese fisherman involved in an at-sea collision with the JCG in 2008. The LDP's previous policy action of release through deportation had the benefit of avoiding the diplomatic complications of criminal prosecution in Japanese courts.[76] Such prosecution would run the risk of diplomatic tensions with China, as prosecution under Japanese law would imply sovereign authority over the islands by Japan.[77]

Hagström describes the events that followed and writes, "[On the evening of the arrest] Saiki Akitaka, director general of the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called Chinese Ambassador Cheng Yonghua to lodge a protest."[78] Japan further asserted itself when the Maritime Safety Agency pressed charges, resulting in swift condemnation from the Chinese government, to include repeated demands to meet with the Japanese ambassador in an effort to lobby the Japanese government for the release of the arrested captain and crew and to reassert the Chinese

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[73] Zakowski, 134.

[74] Zakowski, 134.

[75] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 85–87.

[76] Jimbo, 85-87.

[77] Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 168.

[78] Linus Hagström, "'Power Shift' in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5, no. 3 (September 2012): 272, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos011.

claim to the islands.[79] In this back and forth, Japan relented and released the crew, but then continued to assert the legitimacy of its actions by keeping the captain under arrest during the Japanese investigation of the incident.[80] By September 24, Japan finally relented and released the captain under the guise of prioritizing diplomatic relations.[81]

While Japan ultimately landed on a conciliatory stance and released the Chinese trawler captain, it was at the cost of appearing out-pressured by China in a diplomatic confrontation, particularly when China was perceived to be in the wrong. Furthermore, additional damage was done to diplomatic relations after the captain's release. As Hagström writes, "Beijing suspended intergovernmental talks on matters such as coal, joint gas development in the East China Sea and aviation rights, curtailed Chinese tourism to Japan, and cancelled several Sino-Japanese official and non-official exchanges."[82] Beijing also responded by arresting Japanese nationals on flimsy charges and suspending rare earth mineral exports.[83]

After this incident, the Senkaku Islands garnered more policy attention from the DPJ when the DPJ released the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2010. The DPJ's 2010 NDPG realigned the JSDF from a "Basic Defense Force" built for the Cold War era to a "Dynamic Defense Force" intended to make the JSDF more capable of reacting quickly to more-likely territorial threats and crises.[84] Part of this restructuring added radar and GSDF assets on the Nansei Islands, which sit close to Taiwan. This policy highlighted the shift in policy to prioritize territorial defense, particularly in the south, as opposed to the older construct that was developed in the Cold War for threats from the USSR and DPRK.

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[79] Hagström, 272.

[80] Hagström, 272.

[81] Hagström, 272.

[82] Hagström, 273.

[83] Hagström, 273.

[84] Liff, "Policy by Other Means," 1.

After the 2010 Senkaku Islands collision incident, more controversy followed in 2012. In a rather sudden move, Tokyo's governor, Ishihara Shintaro, pushed for the purchase of the islands by Tokyo Prefecture. This new controversy was in itself a consequence of the 2010 Senkaku Islands incident, as the owner decided to sell the islands given the controversy that surrounded them.[85] Governor Ishihara's move to purchase the islands was an effort to develop the islands, which would create a stronger case for Japanese ownership and control over them, but such a move would also come at the cost of disrupting the status quo between China and Japan as to their status. Jimbo describes how DPJ Prime Minister Noda subsequently endorsed a pre-emptive move for the central government to buy and thereby nationalize the islands.[86] The consequences of this quickly manifested, as Jimbo notes that the prospective change in status of these islands to was seen as a nationalization of the disputed islands and sparked outrage in China, resulting in protests, arrests, and further diplomatic condemnation from China.[87]

C. EXAMINING DIVERGENCE IN POLICY

The DPJ's divergence of security policy from the LDP's status quo boils down to how it did things as opposed to what it did. In the post–Cold War years, a shift started to occur in how each claimant handled the dispute and how these actions were influenced. Manicom describes the 2004 incident as a transition point in the dispute, whereby nationalist sentiments in the dispute changed from being concerned with island ownership and sovereignty into a dispute that symbolically encompassed the East China Sea as a contested maritime space between claimants.[88] This change parallels Japanese military normalization and a China increasingly interested in asserting itself in the region. In terms of effects on Japanese security policy, while specific Japanese actions across this time period may have been different between the LDP and DPJ, a trend of normalization runs through both parties that indicates a consistently more assertive Japan. To this point, while

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[85] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 88–91.

[86] Jimbo, 88-91.

[87] Jimbo, 88-91.

[88] Manicom, *Bridging Troubled Waters*, 54–55.

the DPJ may have pursued a divergent policy with the nationalization of the islands, it was not in an effort to provoke conflict, but rather to defuse it. Overall, the DPJ happened to take power a few years after the nature of the dispute had fundamentally changed, and the party's actions lie on the through line of normalization that is bookended by the LDP, which has since continued to assert the importance of the islands.

In terms of process, the DPJ's lack of internal political control was on display with the nationalization of the islands and indicated a departure from the norm of nuance and that the LDP had showed in previous decades. The nationalization of the islands continued Japan's pro-normalization trajectory, given the blunt assertion of a territorial claim. While the LDP certainly could have endorsed this kind of policy, it is unlikely that it would wade into a diplomatic spat with China in such a fumbling way.

Overall perceptions aside, reactions to incidents also serve as a point of similarity. The DPJ's arrest of the Chinese nationals mirrors Prime Minister (PM) Koizumi's initial reaction to use law enforcement in the 2004 incident, a stance that he was forced to back away from. Both the LDP and DPJ poorly handled their respective Senkaku Islands incidents, but there were key differences to their flaws. Krauss writes that while the LDP relented on the use of law enforcement, it stuck to a position of blaming the Taiwanese vessel.[89] In contrast, the DPJ did not back away from the use of law enforcement quickly, angering the Chinese government, but kept video evidence hidden until its eventual leak on YouTube.

Unfortunately for the DPJ the timing of the nationalization of the islands and precedent from its response to the boat collision in 2010 cast a shadow over policy and diplomatic relations concerning the islands. The DPJ's policies did not show any particularly large divergence from the LDP's, as both highlighted a willingness to assert Japanese control over the islands to the point of diplomatic confrontation. These similarities aside, the DPJ's handling of the situation was particularly different than the LDP's, as the DPJ created unnecessary political pressure and diplomatic strain. This is

[89] Ellis Krauss, "Crisis Management, LDP, and DPJ Style," *Japanese Journal of Political Science,* 14, no. 2 (May 2013): 188, https://doi.10.1017/S1468109913000029.

particularly true because the DPJ was in a position to learn from the LDP's previous policy stumble in attempting to use Japanese law enforcement and courts in an international incident. In addition, the DPJ engendered controversy with the nationalization of the islands that the LDP likely never would have had to deal with. Ishihara's move to develop the islands by way of purchasing them from a private citizen was a nationalist move that was likely provoked by the DPJ's poor handling of the 2010 collision with the Chinese trawler. To this end, it is unlikely that the staunchly conservative Tokyo governor would have acted as he did under the more conservative and diplomatically savvy LDP.

Taking these issues together, the nationalization of the islands was a departure from the status quo that the LDP had established, but the end result showed little divergence. The DPJ oddly ended up being closer to LDP security policy because of its mishandling of the incidents, as these incidents undercut the Sino-Japanese relationship that the DPJ wished to grow. Krauss describes the overall effect of these incidents and writes, "The DPJ had been forced back into a foreign policy posture and strategy much more similar to the previous LDP's reliance on the U.S. that it had wanted previously."[90] Instead of fostering relations with China, the DPJ-led government had damaged relations and was forced to continue to rely on the United States as a major security partner, just as the LDP had for decades.

D. CONSTRAINTS FOR DIVERGENT POLICY

1. Internal Constraints

The DPJ lost some of its ability to control foreign policy and diplomacy as the leader of government. In this way, internal actors created pressure on the DPJ government by making a political move that had outsized effects on international relations and diplomacy. Governor Ishihara's attempt to purchase the Senkaku Islands for private development was an indicator of nationalist sentiment that had developed around the islands and the growing importance of the issue for the domestic audience. In a way, Governor Ishihara forced the hand of the DPJ by challenging the status quo on the islands

[90] Krauss, 188.

that had been established with China. To Japanese nationalists this behavior was a good bet to force the issue even if the national government preferred to adhere to the status quo. This is because the Japanese government's likely stances are to either accept it and become more assertive on the issue, or refute it and attempt to revert to the status quo. While it is possible that this could backfire, given the importance of the issue, it is unlikely that the central government would ever walk back its claim to the island.

Krauss's examination of the incident reveals that another internal constraint emerged when a JCG officer leaked video of the 2010 vessel collision on YouTube, exposing the Chinese vessel's purposefully belligerent actions.[91] Krauss describes the consequences of the leak and writes, "[The leak] was a huge embarrassment to the DPJ government that had been trying its best to downplay and resolve the crisis."[92] The leak caused further problems for the DPJ. Krauss describes the constraint it presented: "the fact that the DPJ government had concealed this aspect of the confrontation from its own people in order to calm relations with China did not go over well with the public and undermined DPJ popularity."[93] As Hughes notes, this action, in addition to the mishandling of the incident itself, served as an indicator of how doubtful the Japanese electorate was of the DPJ's abilities more broadly.[94] It had the added complication of happening just as the DPJ was attempting to put out the diplomatic fire that PM Kan's mishandling of the situation had started. Altogether, the leak undermined the Japanese public's confidence in the party as a whole, including on issues beyond the handling of the Senkaku Islands.

In looking at the effect of these constraints, Oros describes one of the key security policy goals of the DPJ in the 2009 election as "closer ties to China and other states."[95] These two incidents put the DPJ policy on an opposite trajectory. More broadly, the DPJ's inability to handle such diplomatic issues and control its foreign policy created an internal

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[91] Krauss, 187.

[92] Krauss, 187.

[93] Krauss, 188.

[94] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy," 353.

[95] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance,* 112.

constraint in the form of critical Japanese public opinion about the party's competence and undercut the ability of the DPJ to deliver on a substantively different security policy platform. Similar to the Futenma basing issue, there was a dynamic in which the DPJ had less freedom to make mistakes, as it was a party with no history of leadership, meaning any mistake it made would be highlighted and draw more criticism than a similar mistake by the time-tested LDP.

2. External Constraints

Given that territorial defense is inherently an international affair, there was significant pressure from China with regard to the DPJ's policy on the Senkaku Islands. For example, when the Chinese nationals were arrested instead of deported in the 2010 incident, the Chinese government was put in a position to push back diplomatically. Krauss describes the Chinese reaction and writes, "Despite early signs that the crisis might be contained, the Chinese belief that the Japanese were violating their prior secret agreement, and the prosecutor's decision to hold the Captain of the Chinese fishing vessel for an additional ten days, further inflamed the Chinese government."[96] Furthermore, from the Chinese perspective, letting the Japanese government act in this way could be perceived as tacit approval of Japanese jurisdiction on the islands. The ensuing diplomatic strain the DPJ encountered was formidable and Sino-Japanese relations degraded quickly, as China retaliated by detaining Japanese citizens and stopping rare earth mineral exports.[97] The issue had sparked more than a tit-for-tat response, however, and China even sought an explicit apology from the Japanese government over the matter.[98] What had started as a stable status quo on how to handle incident in the islands devolved and was thrust onto the international stage with external constraints pulling at the Japanese government.

External pressures were further amplified by governor Ishihara's desire to purchase and develop the Senkaku Islands, which drew additional criticism from China as a change

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[96] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 187.

[97] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 85–87.

[98] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 187.

in the status quo of the islands.[99] More to the point, PM Noda's attempt to defuse this issue by having the central government purchase the islands created an even larger problem for Sino-Japanese diplomacy given the perceptions of a more robust claim via the nationalization of the islands.[100] To the PRC, Japanese nationalization of the dispute islands was definitely a change to their desired status quo, yet there was initially hope for reconciliation in the initial talks between the Chinese embassy and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jimbo writes that an August Jiji Press report noted Chinese officials' desire "to maintain the status quo even if the islands are nationalized."[101] This report also noted that the Chinese officials relayed that such agreement was dependent on there being no landing of people on the islands, no construction, and no resource or environmental studies or developments.[102]

The initial lack of a strong reaction from Beijing had stoked nationalist sentiment in China, particularly among youth. Rou-lan Chen describes how nationalism had grown by 2012: "In 2012, before the eighty-first anniversary of the Manchurian incident, tensions between China and Japan escalated sharply amid fiercely anti-Japan protests against Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands."[103] Chen explains the source of this youth-driven protesting, writing, "Without elections to vent their anger, Chinese youth went out in the streets to express themselves and to mitigate their anxieties associated with emotions in conflict."[104] Chen continues, "Many Chinese youth regarded the CCP's rhetorical protests as merely for show and believed that the CCP was actually putting economic interests ahead of national dignity."[105] Nationalistic sentiment in the youth of China had grown wildly and was putting pressure on the Chinese government.

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[99] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance,* 119.

[100] Oros, 119.

[101] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 89.

[102] Jimbo, 89.

[103] Rou-lan Chen, "Chinese Youth Nationalism in a Pressure Cooker," in *Taiwan and China Fitful Embrace*, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 110.

[104] Chen, 110.

[105] Chen, 111.

These complications meant that the PRC could not simply choose the cheaper and easier option of seeking the status quo. Whatever hope for agreement on the issue there was quickly disappeared, as the September 9, 2012, meeting between Prime Minister Noda and President Hu Jintao resulted in Hu describing the move for nationalization as illegal and invalid.[106] Nationalist influences on both sides were putting pressure on their respective governments and escalated the island dispute from an issue that postponed confrontation for the sake of cooperation to one that put Japan and the PRC in direct opposition. Ultimately, as Hughes writes, "China's rise is exerting near-relentless strategic pressure on Japan with the result that the DPJ administration has slipped very much back into the default policy positions of the LDP."[107]

Additionally, the security dynamic of the Senkaku Islands can be seen as a factor in the 2010 NDPG changes. The 2010 NDPG's dynamic defense realignment emphasized a "southwestern shift," to include the incident-prone Senkaku Islands.[108] As Hughes writes, "The 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) clearly identify the need to shift JSDF assets southward to garrison outlying islands in Okinawa Prefecture against Chinese incursions."[109] Given this, the external constraint of a crisis-driven atmosphere in the region can be seen to have pushed the DPJ on to normalize security policy by militarizing the Senkaku Islands issue.

3. DPJ Party Structure Constraints

Party discipline and inexperience also played a role. The DPJ's decision was ultimately influenced by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, who leaned on the Coast Guard, who finally got the ear of Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku. Sengoku's influence within the cabinet was considerable and his influence on this issue was pivotal. This was in conjunction with the fact that the DPJ had difficulty in relying on the permanent bureaucracy, who would have undoubtedly advised against this

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[106] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 90.

[107] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy," 353.

[108] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 100.

[109] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy," 352.

course of action, given the standing agreement between China and Japan to not arrest one another's citizens over the islands. In the wake of the revelation that his policy decision betrayed said agreement, Sengoku made a revealing comment, "I should have familiarized myself a little more with the fact that differences in understanding judicial processes (in both countries) are so different."[110] This lack of government control and disciple trickled down further, as even the courts were out of the loop, as they continued to detain Zhan.[111] As the crisis continued to unfold, the DPJ further showed its inexperience by neglecting to leverage the bureaucracy to develop policy options and contingencies for a diplomatic confrontation with China.[112] Zakowski summarizes the constraint of the DPJ's self-constraining ignorance and writes, "A lack of awareness regarding the gravity of the situation in the initial days after the incident made a seemingly minor international problem evolve into a full-scale diplomatic clash."[113]

Another intra-party constraint was the tension between PM Kan and political veteran Ichiro Ozawa. In dealing with the crisis in September 2010, PM Kan was worried about the party leadership vote and between himself and his opponent Ozawa. Zakowski notes that this distraction may have affected Kan's handling of the crisis in the Senkaku Islands and writes, "When on 14 September 2010 Kan finally defeated Ozawa in the race for DPJ leadership and formed a new cabinet on 17 September 2010, he could once again pay more attention to foreign policy."[114] Zakowski speculates on the effects of PM Kan's preoccupation and its influence on PM Kan's actions and says, "Prime Minister Kan probably did not want to show a soft posture towards China because he feared that it could be used by Ozawa to criticize the government."[115] She continues, "Moreover, he remembered the disastrous experience of Hatoyama, who was accused of bending to

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[110] Zakowski, *Decision-Making Reform in Japan,* 135.

[111] Zakowski, 135.

[112] Zakowski, 136.

[113] Zakowski, 136.

[114] Zakowski, 136.

[115] Zakowski, 134.

foreign pressure in dealing with the Futenma Issue."[116] PM Kan would not be wrong in thinking this way, given Ozawa's criticism of the LDP and PM Koizumi after the release of Chinese nationals in the 2004 incident.[117] Unfortunately, this came at the cost of enabling faulty policy that created unnecessary diplomatic tensions with China.

The DPJ party and its own leadership are also constraints that limited any divergence in policy concerning the Senkaku Islands. Broadly, the DPJ suffered from inexperience that wrought poor diplomatic management and what Hughes describes as a "lack of basic policy competence"[118] These shortfalls (and the subsequent constraint on a divergence of security policy) are observable in the clumsy handling of the Senkaku Islands incidents. PM Kan may have had personal blame in the crisis getting so out of hand, as he delegated the matter down to his Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshito Sengoku.[119] In doing this, PM Kan was ridiculed as not being able to handle the things that a leader is responsible for, undercutting the perception of his capabilities. This might have not been far off of the mark, as PM Kan's DPJ soon showed its lack of experience as the crisis unfolded.

Another party leader who may have contributed to policy constraints is PM Noda. PM Noda's failed attempt to alleviate the controversy of governor Ishihara's move to develop the islands had the opposite effect and created even more controversy. While this move may have been an honest mistake, it shows a political and diplomatic naiveté that is consistent with the inexperienced DPJ government. As mentioned previously, the conservative governor Ishihara may have never created this problem in the first place under the nominally conservative LDP. However, if the LDP did encounter this, they might have acted differently than the DPJ. For example, the LDP, having more experience and bureaucratic knowledge, may have preempted Ishihara or negotiated some agreement to keep from causing discord over the islands. If Governor Ishihara had pushed the issue to

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[116] Zakowski, 134.

[117] Zakowski, 134.

[118] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (But Failing) Grand Strategy," 353

[119] Zakowski, *Decision-Making Reform in Japan,* 134.

develop, he might have found himself losing LDP support, as was the case with the Seinensha group lighthouse years earlier.

The DPJ's inexperience and missteps are particularly apparent because of the recently observed taboo of subjecting Chinese nationals to Japanese law enforcement over the Senkaku Islands. As discussed previously, this external constraint limited the possibilities for divergence and created a situation where the DPJ was forced to adhere to the LDP security policy status quo. Even though this constraint is external, it was ultimately self-imposed, given that DPJ leadership allowed these crises to form in the first place.

4. Common Constraints

In comparing the constraints that the DPJ and LDP faced in Senkaku Island policy, there are many similarities. These similarities span all three constraint types and outline the possible limits for Japanese politicians to achieve divergent policy, pending substantial changes to the issue. First, the external constraint of diplomatic pressure from China and its effects on Sino-Japanese relations was visible during the LDP and DPJ tenure. This pressure was particularly acute when Chinese nationals were subjected to detention by Japanese law enforcement. Additionally, both the LDP and DPJ suffered an internal constraint in being unable to control perceptions as video evidence from incidents leaked. This lack of control would undercut messaging by the central government and limited policy options. Finally, the personal and party constraint that encompasses intra-party mechanisms and individuals applies to both parties. This constraint, however, is largely avoidable, given the lessons that have been learned over time. Personal errors in policy by PM Koizumi, PM Kan, and PM Noda all stand as warnings to tread carefully around the Senkaku Islands issue. Errors such as inattentiveness, reactionary decisions, and uncritical policy choices have the potential to provoke outsized diplomatic consequences and are behaviors to be avoided.

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III. FUTENMA BASE RELOCATION

The DPJ's policy on U.S. basing at Futenma Air Station serves as an example of a security policy that was ultimately not particularly different from what the LDP did during its own tenure. The party's policy was influenced by all three of the constraints being examined. The internal constraints of Japanese politics pushed both the LDP and DPJ; however, these internal factors were not influential enough to secure an acceptable relocation or closure policy for the American base. External constraints in the form of American policy maker preferences to keep a strong regional presence via Japanese bases constrained plausible policy alternatives such as relocation plans. Finally, party structures in the form of individual actions and coalition appeasement created a dynamic that did not allow for divergence on U.S. basing policy and ultimately resulted in maintenance of the status quo for the Futenma Air Station.

A. POLICY OF THE LDP

The LDP had a much longer policy history on the matter of U.S. basing policy, given their long tenure in power. The modern incarnation of this policy dispute goes back to September 1995. Krauss explains the roots of the controversy: "In September 1995, a U.S. sailor and two Marines kidnapped and gang-raped a 12-year Japanese schoolgirl on her way home from school."[120] Krauss continues, "Although protests against the bases by Okinawan citizens (including landowners whose land had been confiscated to build the U.S. bases years before) had been endemic for years, they had always been smaller scale and manageable by the authorities."[121] This issue had become something that was not going to be swept under the rug for the national Diet and became more salient in the minds of voters at the national and local levels. Krauss notes the effect of the crimes of these U.S. service members: "[T]he 1995 rape crystallized the anti-base movement that then organized huge protests involving as many as 80,000 persons on Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, and created an unprecedented wave of resistance against national Japanese

[120] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 180.

[121] Krauss, 180.

government policy of the large U.S. base presence on Okinawa"[122] This phenomenon had transformed the basing issue into a broader national issue and not just the complaint of Okinawans.

As the protests continued, the LDP engaged in negotiations with the United States over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This policy was of particular importance to those who criticized the U.S. presence, as the agreement kept a legal barrier between U.S. service members and the Japanese legal system and law enforcement.[123] Krauss notes the tension that surrounds this policy: "The Japanese are dissatisfied with this provision, but the U.S. maintains the different criminal justice systems and the human rights of its soldiers require such a provision."[124] However, there was some movement on the issues, as the United States agreed to be more amicable to Japanese requests in violent crimes, such as the gang-rape that sparked the latest wave of discontent over U.S. basing policy.[125]

Following SOFA negotiations, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established under LDP leadership in 1996 with the purpose of providing alternatives to the controversial U.S. basing arrangement.[126] The SACO's final report provided for three options of relocating the base, but ultimately gave an endorsement to what it called a "sea-based facility (SBF)" that would be based off-shore and could be closed if it was unnecessary in the future.[127] However, Okinawa Governor Ota Masahide did not see this as a sufficient response and he instead preferred a draw-down of the U.S. presence, not just a relocation.[128] Ota's displeasure with the situation would become more relevant when he refused to cooperate with leasing agreements for the land of the base, forcing LDP Prime

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[122] Krauss, 180.

[123] Krauss, 181.

[124] Krauss, 181.

[125] Krauss, 181.

[126] Krauss, 181.

[127] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The SACO Final Report*, 1996. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html. See also: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)*, 1996. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco2.html.

[128] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 181.

Minister Hashimoto to sue to move forward with the legal steps of the land's use.[129] This ultimately resulted in a restructuring of procedures that cut the Governor of Okinawa out of the leasing approval process. Even more, Ota was ousted from office and succeeded by the conservative Keiichi Inamine who won the 1999 gubernatorial election. Keiichi Inamine pledged to move forward with relocation with the help of the national LDP government.[130] Things did not actually move forward though, as Inamine added runway requirements and demanded adherence to a 15-year time frame, each being complicating factors that ultimately led to the cancelling of the new facility by the Japanese government.[131]

Relocation negotiations began to move forward slowly when the issue resurfaced again in 2004. A U.S. helicopter crashed into an Okinawa International University building in August 2004, which reinvigorated local protests about U.S. basing on Okinawa.[132] This local outrage was followed by a resolution by Ginowan City and pressured LDP Prime Minister Koizumi to readdress Okinawa basing policy in the LDP's 2006 realignment negotiations.[133] However, the proposed plan to move MCAS Futenma and reconsolidate U.S. forces would again stall due to disagreements that could not be reconciled. At this point, any LDP-led policy would be put aside as the DPJ won the general election in 2009.

The LDP took up the baton on U.S. basing policy again in December 2012 after winning back control of the government. The latest controversy with the policy was the U.S. deployment of MV-22 Ospreys to Futenma and a helicopter crash in August 2013.[134] These actions reawakened outrage and Prime Minister Abe promised national government

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[129] Krauss, 181.

[130] William L. Brooks, *The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-1997, 2005-2006*, Asia-Pacific Policy Paper Series Report No. 9 (Washington, DC: Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, 2010), 29–34.

[131] Brooks, 34–35.

[132] H. D. P. Envall and Kerri Ng, "The Okinawa 'Effect' in US-Japan Alliance Politics," *Asian Security* 11, no. 3 (December 2015): 231. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2015.1111339.

[133] Envall and Ng, 231.

[134] Envall and Ng, 233.

support to assist Okinawa with the burden of U.S. basing.[135] It is important to note, though, that the outrage surrounding safety issues like aviation crashes is a more localized controversy, hence PM Abe's pledge for national support to Okinawa. The LDP's latest efforts promised to provide development funds to Okinawa through 2021 and a new framework for U.S. basing. However, Envall and Ng describe how negotiations deteriorated between Okinawa and the national government when former LDP member Onaga Takeshi won the gubernatorial election in 2014 on an anti-basing platform that criticized relocation policies that kept forces in Okinawa.[136] The national LDP government narrowed their policy window and stalled meetings while protests ramped up in 2015. Altogether, a relocation policy was left at an impasse and MCAS Futenma has not relocated as of 2019.

B. POLICY OF THE DPJ

The DPJ's stance on the issue of U.S. basing on Okinawa started out as what looked like a policy of relocation and genuine sensitivity to the controversy surrounding the issue. Leading up to electoral victory and control of the national government, the DPJ released what was called the "Okinawa Vision," which reiterated its bona fides on the issue.[137] Brooks writes that "On June 21, 2005, the Democratic Party of Japan reissued its August 2002 'Okinawa Vision' that included a call for the relocation of Futenma Air Station outside of Okinawa or eventually outside of Japan—a campaign promise that reappeared in the party's successful strategy to win the Lower House election in August 2009."[138]

However, in reality, the DPJ's position seemed considerably more malleable than the "Okinawa Vision" might imply. In fact, by the time the 2009 election came around, the DPJ's policy on the matter had become a promise to "Move in the direction of re-examining

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[135] Envall and Ng, 233. (Note: Cited by Envall and Ng as "Abe Firm on Futenma But Vows Respite," *Japan Times,* March 20, 2013. Available at www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/20/national/abe-firm-on-futenma-but-vows-respite/.)

[136] Envall and Ng, 233.

[137] "DPJ Okinawa Vision," Democratic Party of Japan, July 8, 2009, https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/080714/01.html.

[138] Brooks, "The Politics of the Futenma," 57.

the realignment of the U.S. military forces in Japan and the role of U.S. military bases in Japan."[139] This shift was indicative of the watering down of policy alternatives that the DPJ purported to champion on behalf of the electorate and offered no substantive promise of policy divergence. Krauss notes the flimsiness of such language and writes that the "'Moving in the direction of re-examining' is about as vague a promise as one could get, and without any specific mention of Futenma."[140] This loosening of language would become a pattern for the DPJ over time and foreshadowed the party's difficulty on the matter.

Once the DPJ took office, however, it appeared that the DPJ was recommitting to its prior promises of challenging the U.S. on the basing policy. Jimbo describes the tangible changes of the DPJ: "The newly inaugurated Hatoyama Cabinet announced it would thoroughly investigate the agreement concluded under the LDP administration for the relocation of the Futenma base."[141] Jimbo continues, "Given Hatoyama's desired to see the base moved outside the prefecture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense were instructed to reconsider the potential alternatives to the planned relocation of the base to the Henoko coastal areas of Nago City."[142] This, however, did not happen in a vacuum, as this policy shift was a prerequisite for the DPJ's coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the People's New Party who sought relocation outside of Okinawa.[143] Envall and Ng note another the possible source of this shift back to an anti-basing policy and write, "Discussions between DPJ officials and the U.S. prior to the election suggested that the U.S. was more focused on Afghanistan and Japan's Indian Ocean refueling missions, a lack of interest which Hatoyama took as an opportunity to seek a new compromise on MCAS Futenma."[144] However, this was not a universally held

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[139] "The Democratic Party of Japan's Platform for Government," Democratic Party of Japan, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf.

[140] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 182.

[141] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 80.

[142] Jimbo, 80.

[143] Jimbo, 80.

[144] Envall and Ng, "The Okinawa 'Effect,'" 170.

preference within PM Hatoyama's cabinet. Jimbo describes this intra-cabinet discord and writes, "In response to Hatoyama's growing desire to relocate the base outside of Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs Okada and Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa took up the issue within their ministries, and asked Hatoyama to keep some distance from the issue."[145] Kitazawa fell on the side of not relocating outside of Okinawa, while Okawa preferred consolidation at Kadena Air Base and then later found the Henoko relocation plan to be the only feasible choice.

Unfortunately for PM Hatoyama and the DPJ, the Obama administration still had strong preferences regarding U.S. basing at Futenma and was not welcoming to the idea of rehashing the basing issue. The tension did not stop there though, as U.S. representatives further cautioned, the damage that could be done to the relationship between Japan and the United States if the issue was picked apart.[146] In the most blunt move from United States, Envall and Ng write, "When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Tokyo later that month, he delivered an even franker message—that the U.S. would not renegotiate the 2006 Roadmap."[147] They continue, "Moreover, Futenma was the 'lynchpin' of the realignment, and so without Futenma, there would be no consolidation of U.S. forces in Okinawa."[148] The culmination of U.S. representatives impressing the importance of this issue was President Obama's visit to Tokyo in November 2009, where he asked PM Hatoyama to take care of the basing issue quickly.[149] Shindoda quotes their discussion on solving the basing issue quickly and within the bounds of the agreement that the U.S. and Japan had already come to: "Hatoyama said, 'Please trust me,' to which Obama replied, 'Absolutely,

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[145] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 80.

[146] Envall and Ng, "The Okinawa 'Effect,'" 231–232.

[147] Envall and Ng, 232.

[148] Envall and Ng, 232. (Note: The authors' citation for these specific interactions are attributed as follows: Japan Ministry of Defense, "Japan-US Defense Ministers Joint Press Conference," October 21, 2009. Available at www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2009/091021.html. See also Shinoda, 173; H.D. P. Envall, "Underplaying the 'Okinawa Card': How Japan Negotiates its Alliance with the United States," Australian *Journal of International Affairs* 64, no. 4 (2013): 391–394. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10357718.2013.803033.)

[149] Tomohito Shinoda, *Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 174.

I trust you.'"[150] However, trust of the United States would be broken the very next day when PM Hatoyama surprisingly seemed to backtrack from this conversation and told journalists that he did not expect a solution to be found within the year and questioned the plausibility of the plan's framework.[151] As the issue went on, Krauss writes "Near the end of May 2010, the issue was finally settled by an agreement between the [United States and Japan] that gave some face-saving gestures to Hatoyama but substantially returned to the original LDP agreement to move Futenma to northern Okinawa and not off the island."[152] Even so, the upcoming 2010 election for the Upper House posed a problem for the DPJ, as PM Hatoyama saw a loss of support from the Japanese electorate on the basing issue which could threaten the DPJ in the election, as described by Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss.[153] Krauss notes the consequences of the DPJ's eventual acquiescence to U.S. policy preferences: enraging Okinawans, undercutting the DPJ's coalition, and contributing to PM Hatoyama's resignation in June 2010.[154]

C. EXAMINING DIVERGENCE IN POLICY

The overall policy that the DPJ enacted on U.S. basing does not hold much divergence from the LDP in its substance. If anything, the notable difference was the means to arrive at the same ends of a status quo of U.S. basing policy. The DPJ policy appears, at most, to have been a feint towards renegotiation that elicited hope, but with no evidence that this could actually be done. The DPJ's rhetoric could be interpreted as mostly posturing that this was an issue that could be changed by DPJ leadership without any plausible solution being offered as policy. However, the LDP also seemed to walk a tightrope on this issue, given their exploration of relocation policies and their efforts in the SACO. Given this, it is likely that the DPJ, or any party for that matter, had little chance of making substantive change. Unfortunately for the DPJ, their approach in attempting to achieve this

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[150] Shinoda, 174.

[151] Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 80.

[152] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 183.

[153] Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss, "Building a Party," 165.

[154] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 183.

was a divergence from the politically skillful LDP's. DPJ PM Hatoyama's awkward handling of the issue caused unnecessary disturbances in the DPJ's relationships with government coalition partners, Okinawan voters, and its U.S. security partner. Ultimately, this could be viewed as superficially divergent, given PM Hatoyama's shifting positions on the matter; however, the end result was practically no different than what the LDP has ever done: promise negotiations and relocation proposals that have no feasible means of implementation given the opposing constraining pressures of issue-specific Okinawan politics and U.S. security policy preferences. Furthermore, the DPJ was new to political leadership and unproven in the eyes of the international community and Japanese voters. This status likely created less tolerance for error from these entities and created a climate in which any policy decisions were more harshly scrutinized, regardless of the fact that their policy often mirrored that of the more trusted LDP.

D. CONSTRAINTS FOR DIVERGENT POLICY

1. Internal Constraints

The main internal constraint that shrunk the policy options for any DPJ divergence was that of its own electorate, particularly Okinawa. The repeated hardline anti-base stances of Okinawa governors created a gap in feasible policy that left no room for the national government to renegotiate in a compromise. Similarly, ignoring Okinawans could leave the DPJ open to criticism and a fall in voter trust if it was perceived that it had merely paid lip service to its commitment to the basing issue. If this were to happen, the DPJ could be perceived as having a policy that was strangely similar to the LDP and therefore of no consequence in deciding to vote for the DPJ. The power of this constraint can be observed in the resignation of PM Hatoyama in the run-up to the 2010 election for the Upper House, where his dwindling public support over the basing issue was a non-trivial factor in his resignation. Ultimately, this constraint created internal pressure created an anti-basing policy polarity that the DPJ could not feasibly deliver.

2. External Constraints

Externally, the United States would continue to object to certain forms of change regarding the basing issue, as was the case with the LDP. Obama administration balked at

PM Hatoyama's attempt to reopen negotiations once the DPJ took power in fall of 2009, especially given that the administration thought the issue was settled. U.S. policy preferences continued to highlight the regional need for a strong U.S. presence and lobbied hard for the status quo under the banner of regional security, as it had for years. If the DPJ was to diverge from the LDP on the basing policy and force the issue, the party risked its legitimacy in the U.S. security relationship as the new face of Japan's national government. Given that the LDP had successfully managed to draw out basing negotiations out for so long, it is possible that U.S. pressure was such a strong external influence that it also won out in the DPJ's agreement to fulfil the same LDP-negotiated plan of keeping relocation to Okinawa. However, it could also be the case that U.S. preferences were more closely aligned with LDP preferences than that of the DPJ and U.S. diplomatic pressure was able to overcome the DPJ, given its inexperience and desire to keep the relationship intact.

3. DPJ Party Structure Constraints

PM Hatoyama's DPJ showed its inexperience from the outset, as in the lead up to the 2008 election, DPJ members made promises in line with Okinawa residents' desires in an effort to get votes, while not indicating any particularly compelling knowledge of how complicated and difficult the issue was.[155] As the election drew closer, however, these policy promises became flimsier and less specific. These weaknesses would be a continuing trend for the DPJ, as the party was further constrained by its coalition partner and an ever-wavering policy stance.

With regard to the party structure of the DPJ, it could be said the coalition itself had an influence on the policy sought by the DPJ, as mentioned previously. However, PM Hatoyama himself did not help matters, as his inclinations on the issue seemingly flipped depending on his audience. Envall and Ng write, "At a meeting with U.S. President Obama in November 2009 in Tokyo, Hatoyama sought to reassure Obama on the Roadmap, giving the U.S. president the impression that Japan was committed to the agreement."[156] They

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[155] Brooks, "The Politics of the Futenma," 57.

[156] Envall and Ng, "The Okinawa 'Effect,'" 232.

continue, noting that, "While in Singapore to attend the APEC leaders' summit shortly after, however, Hatoyama questioned the U.S. expectation that the solution would follow the Roadmap."[157] This contradiction undermined what the United States assumed to be a closed issue. Even more, Envall and Ng write that "Then, back in Tokyo, he expressed support for a joint US-Japan Working Group that had been established to make recommendations on the issue and that was, at the time, moving to agree on an early solution."[158] This vacillation between policy positions created divergent expectations from the multiple stakeholders of Okinawans, the Japanese electorate, and U.S. partners. In the end, there was no way to satisfy each side and this policy ambiguity further complicated negotiations, with the relevant parties each believing that PM Hatoyama was on their side. However, this was a self-made constraint, as PM Hatoyama was in a position of deciding to fulfill promises to each stakeholder despite the gap in policy preferences making this impossible. In PM Hatoyama's case, by having such extreme differences in his positions, there is really no compromise to be had. Instead of attempting to cajole his partners to a middle point, PM Hatoyama tried to appease both sides, despite each partners' mutually exclusive policy preferences. To decide one way or another would mean betraying the other side and was therefore an impediment to any policy that required a decision. In this case, it becomes easier to see how the status quo rises above other options to become the policy, as allowing the status quo to continue undisturbed requires no action or decision.

Additionally, Engvall and Ng write about the influences of the DPJ's necessary coalition and describe how "The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was an important coalition partner due to its role in helping the government get its legislation through the upper house, and the DPJ was also under pressure to do well at the upper house election set for July 2010."[159] They continue, "The SDP, however, viewed the Futenma relocation as an issue upon which to take a more clearly left-wing stance and accordingly sought for any decision to be delayed."[160] This created a policy limit for the DPJ on negotiations with the United

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[157] Envall and Ng, 232.

[158] Envall and Ng, 232. (The authors' original citation is for Shinoda, 170)

[159] Envall and Ng, 232.

[160] Envall and Ng, 232.

States, as the DPJ's necessary ally for the upper house had essentially pegged the issue on the relocation side of the spectrum. This constraint manifested in stalling any policy change as Envall and Ng write, "In late December 2009, under pressure from the SDP as well as the DPJ kingmaker, Ozawa Ichiro (who was seeking to maintain coalition unity), Hatoyama delayed any decision to consider alternatives even as he signaled to the U.S. that the government would follow the [2006] Roadmap."[161] They continue, "At the same time, the DPJ was telling the U.S. that once it had won the upper house election it would be able to move quickly to resolve the Futenma issue."[162] The overall party structure pressure is well summarized by Krauss who writes that "Hatoyama was under extreme pressure from all sides to live up to his campaign promise."[163] Krauss continues, "[Hatoyama's] coalition partner, the SDPJ, the former Socialist Party, was totally on the side of the anti-base movement and urging him on."[164] The theme in these party structure constraints is that the DPJ was never able to act from an independent policy position, given the various political debts it owed to get power in the first place. To disregard the SDPJ's preferences would leave the DPJ open to a loss of the power that it had finally achieved. However, the ultimate result of these hardline coalition policy preferences was to bring the entire argument so far to a relocation policy as to make it impossible to compromise with other entities, like Japan's U.S. security partner. In doing so, the DPJ defaulted to not decide, which had the benefit of not betraying any given partner, but also meant that it could not truly satisfy any of them either.

The party and personal factors of the coalition government and the inexperience of Hatoyama made for a messy and undeliverable policy of divergence. In total, the DPJ showed a naiveté over how complicated the issue of U.S. basing was and was beholden to many policy positions that were mutually exclusive. This tension made its policy moves messy and disruptive to the many relationships that would be necessary to keep control of the government, much less to enact substantive policy. This created an atmosphere

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[161] Envall and Ng, 232.

[162] Envall and Ng, 232.

[163] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 183.

[164] Krauss, 183.

whereby a DPJ attempt to move towards a compromise risked a loss of government and political opinion. Making things worse, the DPJ's lack of political finesse exacerbated the issue by creating expectations for its political allies that it consistently undermined and could not deliver on.

4. Common Constraints

The long-time ruling LDP faced similar pressures as the DPJ on this issue and it is important to note them to recognize what was unique to the DPJ's tenure in office. The LDP was also caught between two similar pressures. First, the internal pressure of its SDP coalition government ally of the 1990s that championed relocation. Second, the LDP also faced external pressure from the United States that pushed against the proposal to reduce the footprint of U.S. Marines there, which was a step beyond the negotiations of revising the land agreement.[165] The LDP's relocation negotiations also encountered local pressures, as Nago voters voted against a non-binding referendum for a replacement offshore heliport for Futenma Air Station in 1997.[166] This would be mirrored in the DPJ's troubles in negotiating with Okinawa, as outlined previously. Externally, the United States was steadfast in its argument that U.S. forces there served as a deterrent to North Korea and China.[167] This was a consistent policy theme from the United States that was reinforced by regional tensions. Brooks writes that "Indeed, just when Japan was pushing for a reduction of the U.S. military presence, including Okinawa, during realignment talks, North Korea was again rattling its sabers, testing a nuclear device in May 2005 -- hardly the time to talk about moving troops out of Japan."[168] This policy basis could be viewed by anti-base advocates as alarmist; however, Brooks notes that "Adding to the Pentagon's case, the Overseas Basing Commission in a report to the U.S. Congress stated that keeping current force levels in the East Asia region was important due to growing tensions with

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[165] Brooks, "The Politics of the Futenma," 29.

[166] Brooks, 33.

[167] Brooks, 30.

[168] Brooks, 50.

North Korea over nuclear and missile programs and with China over the Taiwan Strait."[169] These influences mirror some of the issues the DPJ encountered when attempting to create a divergent policy, as the DPJ encountered coalition issues, local voter issues, and consistent pro-security pressure from its U.S. partner that leaned towards the status quo. Given these similarities, it could be said that the biggest difference is the theme of the DPJ's lack of political experience and difficulty in managing competing political relationships and constraints. From the beginning, the DPJ found itself unable to stand on a strong base relocation platform that it had championed previously. However, when the DPJ took power, the party's dissonance in what it communicated to different actors amplified political friction and left both internal and external partners dissatisfied.

[169] Brooks, 50.

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IV. USES OF THE SDF

Japan's status as a pacifist country is constitutionally mandated by Article 9, which renounces the right of war, threats of force, and prohibits the maintaining of land, sea, and air forces.[170] However, in the less than a decade after the adoption of the Constitution of Japan, the JSDF were established in a contentious political climate. Since then, the more conservative LDP pushed the envelope on the limits of constitutionality of the SDF and its various uses but has had to balance pacifist norms and reined in the SDF when politically necessary. In particular, the post-Cold War era and beyond present multiple instances of policies that deal with the SDF's use, funding, and constitutional questions that serve as points of comparison between the DPJ and the status quo of the LDP. DPJ policy on these matters presents multiple key trend points that exhibit a continuation of the status quo of the LDP and provide little evidence of divergence with regard to the normalization of security policy. Though the DPJ did restrict SDF missions abroad, its divergence from the trend of normalization fell short of what might be expected. Instead, the DPJ's 2010 NDPG policy continued the trend of expanding military assets and relaxed the exportation of military technology. While this landmark policy could be interpreted as a modest divergence in the normalization trend, it would only be so in that it promoted militarization *more* than the LDP status quo. This lack of divergence from the overall trend of normalization was due to multiple factors that include the external constraints of regional threats and security relationships, internal factors of domestic public opinion, and the personal goals of political leaders like the conservative PM Noda.

A. POLICY OF THE LDP

In the broadest terms, the LDP has overseen a steady trend of expansion of the SDF and the legal interpretations surrounding what is considered constitutional. These policy stances include interpretations of the constitutionality of the SDF in its very inception and the use of the executive branch to influence constitutionality questions like CSD.

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[170] *Constitution of Japan*, November 3, 1946, Accessed December 13, 2018. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

Additionally, the LDP presided over establishing the status quo of the use of the SDF both domestically and in overseas deployments for the Gulf War, humanitarian aid, and post-9/11 missions. Finally, the LDP was influential in the post-Cold War era shift in the SDF through multiple NDPGs, which set the new status quo of the SDF for modern Japanese security policy.

1. The Constitutionality of the SDF

In the years leading up to the establishment of the SDF, Japanese leadership encountered the competing pressures of domestic pacifists and the United States, which lobbied for rearmament to fight communism, as described by Hunter-Chester.[171] The LDP was formed just after the SDF was first created in 1954 and served as its major patron from then on. This lineage becomes clear when looking into the roots of the LDP, which was formed by a group, dubbed "antimainstream" conservatives by Samuels, that sought a policy of Japan's developing an independent ability to defend itself.[172] The issue of the SDF even being constitutional was a question that the LDP encountered in the first few decades of its establishment. The Supreme Court ruled that the issue of the SDF's constitutionality was a matter to be solved politically and not judicially.[173] This ruling foreshadowed the political dimension of the SDF's uses and set a precedent of political supremacy in deciding this continual question.

Finally, the second tenure of PM Abe saw an expansion of the SDF's use in terms of international security alliances. In 2013, Abe cabinet successfully pushed for a constitutional interpretation of Article IX that allowed for CSD, further expanding the use cases for the SDF. This interpretation is notable because the parties of a CSD arrangement will engage in hostilities to protect another CSD member that is attacked, as opposed to the pure self-defense status quo of Japanese policy of only engaging in hostilities if one's own assets or territory are threatened.

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[171] David Hunter-Chester, *Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force*, *1945-2015* (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 126

[172] Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 42.

[173] Samuels, 46.

One of the major influences that allowed for such a reinterpretation is the fact that Japan lacks an assertive judiciary to intervene or provide explicit interpretation on constitutional matters. This void allows the Prime Minister's cabinet to fill-in as a constitutional arbiter.[174] The avoidance of ruling directly on Article IX by the Supreme Court of Japan has facilitated the emergence of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) in the controversial role of "a quasi-constitutional court with a de facto monopoly on interpreting the constitution."[175] Additionally, the CLB falls under the executive branch, meaning its work is directly influenced by the Prime Minister who heads said branch. Given Abe's preference for a CSD policy, it is likely that this internal structural factor played (and will continue to play) an important role in determining the constitutionality of uses of the SDF.

2. Humanitarian Aid

Domestic use of the SDF was an issue that needed to be addressed and the status quo was set in the years preceding the DPJ taking power. Use of the SDF during disaster relief was not always set in stone, as the use of defense forces on a country's domestic soil can bring up questions about authorities and powers that are not known unless previously established. To this point, Japan was no different in the wake of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, particularly given its pacifist nature. At the time of the earthquake in 1995, PM Tomiichi Murayama of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) presided over a ruling coalition in which the LDP had a majority of representation, but the position of Prime Minister was given to the JSP. Given this, the Hanshin Earthquake does not strictly stand as an LDP-DPJ policy comparison, but it does serve as an example of an established status quo where the LDP's power was still strongly represented.

The use of the SDF in the disaster relief efforts got off to a slow start. Krauss describes the some of the turmoil: "Personally, Prime Minister Murayama was criticized for his lack of experience in government, but also politically because some thought his and

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[174] Adam P. Liff, "Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics of Japan's Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations," *Asia Policy*, no. 24 (2017): 153.

[175] Liff, 154.

the government's slow response to using the SDF extensively was because of his and his party's long ideological opposition to the SDF's constitutional legitimacy."[176] However, such criticisms cannot be solely laid at the feet of an individual leader, as internal constraints in the form of domestic political structures also curtailed the SDF's use and efficacy. Samuels notes some of these issues and describes how requests for SDF support were only to be made by letter and local governments requesting support were responsible for the costs incurred to mobilize SDF support.[177]

Some leaders' political aversion to the SDF, coupled with these more structural complications, manifested on the ground and created friction in the disaster relief efforts. Hunter-Chester notes how these complications played out on the ground and describes the difficulties that GSDF commander General Matsushima Yusuke encountered as GSDF forces were dispatched to provide recovery assistance but found themselves challenged by local leadership who impeded SDF operations such as landing aircraft.[178] Conversely, Hyogo Governor Kaihara argued that confusion was not the problem, but rather, he placed blame at the feet of General Matsushima, who he said commanded an inadequate response plan.[179] Regardless of the blame, clearer legal standards, known by all parties, may have alleviated the problems encountered in the crisis. In the end, however, hesitance from parts of the national leadership and local officials seemed to have been for naught. In retrospect, the Japanese public and elected leaders largely viewed the SDF's role as positive, allowing for a more relaxed political climate around the matter of using the SDF for domestic disaster relief.[180] This can be seen in the policy changes that came afterwards that sought to more clearly define legal authorities between the national government, local

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[176] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 190.

[177] Richard J. Samuels, *3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 60.

[178] Hunter-Chester, *Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force*, 186.

[179] Samuels, *3.11*, 60.

[180] Katsumi Ishizuka, "The Crisis Management Capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces for UN Peacekeeping, Counter-Terrorism, and Disaster Relief," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 14, no. 2 (June 2013): 216, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109913000030.

governments, and the SDF.[181] Samuels notes the quick legislative response: "Once a Hanshin/Awaji narrative critical of the government's lack of crisis preparedness became dominant, sixteen new national laws were passed."[182] Krauss describes a further policy shift under LDP leadership: "Administrative reforms later passed by the Diet and implemented…were partly aimed at rectifying the problems that were clearly shown in the government's response to the Hanshin quake, including strengthening the prime minister and the cabinet's control and coordination over the bureaucracy and consolidating several agencies."[183] This legislation would alter the status quo and created a new norm of deploying the SDF domestically in future emergencies.

3. The SDF Overseas

The LDP governed over a landmark change in policy when the SDF was deployed overseas for the Gulf War. This decision was not arrived at quickly, as PM Kaifu was more or less dragged into the decision. At first, PM Kaifu was conflicted, as Hunter-Chester highlights the external pressure from the United States which pushed for a "direct contribution to the effort."[184] Hunter-Chester relates PM Kaifu's two-fold reservation due to internal constraints and writes, "When [Kaifu] tried to push through a UN Peace Cooperation Bill, Kaifu was impeded … [by a] 1980 government position that SDF units could not participate in UN actions that will result in military action, and by the—at that point—even longer-held government position that Japan cannot participate in collective security action."[185] Even with Japan's $13b contribution to the effort, it had still not sent material support and suffered criticism in the international community.[186] Ultimately, PM Kaifu was able to muster a material contribution by sending minesweepers in April of 1991 (two months after the war had ended) by citing the minesweeping mission of the SDF that

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[181] Hunter-Chester, *Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force*, 187.

[182] Samuels, *3.11*, 62.

[183] Krauss, "Crisis Management," 190.

[184] Hunter-Chester, *Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force*, 181.

[185] Hunter-Chester, 181.

[186] Hunter-Chester, 181.

did not stipulate a restriction on the location of minesweeping operations.[187] This landmark change to the status quo has since brought about multiple other overseas deployments in the name of humanitarian aid and UN peacekeeping missions. Ishizuka notes the subsequent change in the legal status quo, describing how in September 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO) was passed, which has been the legal *terra firma* for SDF participation in UN peacekeeping missions ever since.[188] Of note, many of these missions have been dispatched during times of LDP leadership, such as the 2008 mission to Sudan, but they have also occurred under the DPJ, as was the case with the 2011 mission to Haiti. However, these missions were not without limitations, as the LDP encountered some push-back to overseas deployments: Midford writes that the "Fukuda cabinet was in the end only able to authorize the dispatch of 2 SDF members to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Sudan in 2008."[189]

LDP policy continued to expand the role of the SDF in the post-9/11 years, as the party presided over an expansion of overseas deployments. Oros notes that after September 11, 2001, the LDP-led Koizumi government passed multiple laws in an effort to combat terrorism, one of which broadened the allowable missions of the SDF.[190] Oros writes, "The Anti-Terrorism Measures Law, passed in October 2001, enabled the dispatch of the JMSDF to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to the U.S. and multinational coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan—operations that took place from November 2001 to January 2010."[191] While these forces functioned in a support capacity, it is still notable that the breadth of the SDF's missions grew in this way, given their "self-defense" namesake. Hein notes the creeping use of the SDF in this new capacity and writes, "[The JMSDF's] mission was to prevent the marine transportation of illegal weapons and

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[187] Hunter-Chester, 181.

[188] Katsumi, "The Crisis Management Capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces," 216.

[189] Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 2.

[190] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 44.

[191] Oros, 44.

ammunition, and the drugs which fund terrorist activity."[192] Hein recounts the context of this change to the status quo for using the SDF and writes, "This was the third time Japanese military vessels had been dispatched overseas since World War II, following the deployments of mine-sweeping units during the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War."[193] Over the years, this policy of overseas deployments had gained traction, particularly with the regard to the demands from the United States. This trend would only continue with the LDP as the United States expanded its expectations of active participation from Japan on the international security front.

The role of the SDF continued to grow in the years following the Indian Ocean refueling and logistics mission. Kliman describes another step in the broadening of the SDF's uses, as the 2003 War in Iraq set new precedents in deploying the SDF overseas, largely in an effort to build a security relationship with the United States.[194] Kliman pinpoints North Korea's renewed efforts at a nuclear program as specific factor in this desired to ensure a strong relationship with the United States and writes, "Thus, during the run-up to the Iraq War, enhancing the bilateral security relationship offered tangible rewards—mitigating the North Korean threat."[195] Additionally, the United States pushed for Japan to lead on the international stage and commit support to the effort.[196] However, securing legal SDF support to Iraq was not a given. These external considerations aside, PM Koizumi still had to overcome objections to the policy from other parties, as the DPJ saw overseas deployments as a wedge issue to pick up votes in the 2003 fall election and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the SDP saw the move as a violation of Article IX.[197] Regardless, Kliman describes how momentous PM Koizumi's accomplishment was

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[192] Patrick Hein, "In the Shadow of Pacifism: Foreign Policy Choices of Germany and Japan in Afghanistan," *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (June 2011): 140, https://www.doi.org/10.1007/s12140-011-9140-5.

[193] Hein, 140.

[194] Daniel M. Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World Embracing a New Realpolitik* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 127.

[195] Kliman, 127.

[196] Kliman, 129.

[197] Kliman, 134.

and writes, "Koizumi's bill on Iraq reconstruction set a new legal precedent—SDF deployment based solely on UN resolutions."[198] Shinoda notes the power of the LDP and its ability to articulate legislation as another facet to this shift from the status quo and writes, "[Koizumi's] top-down policy process was completely different from Japan's traditional bottom-up system, which Aurelia George Mulgan calls an 'Un-Westminster System' in which the bureaucrats in the ministries play a central role with the LDP being the only political power to negotiate with them."[199]

Success of implementing the policy aside, the LDP's Iraq deployment was internally constrained by the Japanese Diet. Midford describes the consequences of expanding the SDF's mission and writes, "Nonetheless, their deployment to the war zone that was Iraq, albeit it to a relatively safe area, and the fact that they did occasionally come under fire, even while avoiding any casualties, went well beyond what public opinion tolerated, thereby creating an opening for the DPJ to use this against the LDP."[200] Midford notes how this constraint manifested in policy: "Already, before stepping down, Koizumi had ended the GSDF deployment before it became a burden on his successor Abe."[201] However, the mounting domestic political exposure created by an overseas deployment policy was not enough to dissuade PM Abe in 2006–2007. However, this danger was recognized by Abe's successor, PM Aso, who curtailed the LDP's normalization agenda and ended the Iraq mission for the sake of the 2009 election.[202]

Aside from specific missions overseas, Japan also saw changes to its defense policy under the LDP with the 2004 NDPG. The 2004 NDPG was the basis for a shift in the status quo of a Cold War defense posture that revolved around stationing more heavily armored units northward, in Hokkaido, in defense of a Soviet threat.[203] Hunter-Chest describes how

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[198] Kliman, 134.

[199] Tomohito Shinoda, "Japan's Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 7, no. 1 (April 2006): 71, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109905002070.

[200] Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 2.

[201] Midford, 2.

[202] Midford, 2.

[203] Hunter-Chester, *Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force*, 214.

the 2004 NDPG required forces to become more lightly armored and a more direct command structure to enable a quick responses to developing threat situations.[204] Hunter-Chester notes the establishment of the Central Readiness Force (CRF) in 2007 that included a streamlined command structure to facilitate these needs.[205] This policy was influenced by external constraints in the form of a post-Cold War threat picture that included territorial disputes with China and the developing missile threat from North Korea and set the groundwork for further NDPG changes in the following years. In addition to these structural changes, the 2004 NDPG made multiple cuts from the 1995 NDPG, to include modest reductions in SDF personnel and combat aircraft in both the JMSDF and JASDF.[206]

B. POLICY OF THE DPJ

In Japanese domestic politics, the DPJ historically been antagonistic to the LDP's expansion of the role of the SDF, particularly PM Koizumi's overseas deployment policy. However, in surveying DPJ policy concerning the SDF, there are few instances in which the DPJ committed to shrinking the role and size of the SDF. Notably, the DPJ stopped the Indian Ocean resupplying mission; however, their broader body of policy included domestic deployments of the SDF, overseas deployments for humanitarian aid, and further expansion of the SDF with the DPJ's 2010 NDPG.

One of the DPJ's first policy moves concerning the SDF was a reduction in the scope of its activities, particularly to stop the Indian Ocean refueling mission that had been established under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law. Katsumi describes how this new policy was not a specific law that was passed, but rather a refusal to take up legislation to sustain it, writing, "[the Indian Ocean refueling mission] was eventually terminated in January

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[204] Hunter-Chester, 214.

[205] Hunter-Chester, 213-214.

[206] Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014* (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2014), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_2-4-3_web_1031.pdf. (Note: The *Defense of Japan 2014* government publication is broken up into sections. A comprehensive collection of the individual chapters of the publication can be browsed and retrieved from http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html.)

2010 when the DPJ-led government allowed the Anti-Terrorism Law to expire."[207] In doing this, the DPJ was able to keep its policy consistent with its political rhetoric, which criticized the expanding use of the SDF. However, expansion of the SDF's uses was still an option, as Hughes writes: "The DPJ government, despite withdrawing the MSDF from the Indian Ocean, has maintained MSDF dispatch on antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and has assented to the building of Japan's first overseas base in Djibouti."[208] Given this, it may be that the DPJ was not fundamentally against such deployments as they were against the specific Indian Ocean deployment.

1. Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief

Another DPJ policy was the use of the SDF during domestic humanitarian crisis. The 3.11 earthquake in 2011 echoed the 1995 Hanshin earthquake, whereby the SDF was deployed to assist in the crisis. The aftermath of the 1995 disaster had laid the political and legal groundwork for SDF forces to be deployed domestically in emergency situations. The DPJ would follow the same path and use the SDF in domestic disaster relief, which was received positively by the broader Japanese public.[209] Given the political and legal groundwork laid by the 1995 disaster, the DPJ was actually more ready to engage in the domestic use of the SDF, with Krauss writing, "Unlike in the Hanshin quake, a large…contingent of SDF was quickly mobilized and responded, and foreign aid was accepted without huge delay."[210] The scale of this operation cannot be understated, as Samuels describes how, "Within three days, more than 100,000 Japanese troops—nearly half of all the nation's total military—had been mobilized for search and rescue in the largest ever mobilization of the SDF."[211] The DPJ's policy of domestic deployment of the SDF was not only a marker for the status quo of domestic SDF employment in Japan, it was the largest SDF search and rescue operation ever enacted, domestic or otherwise.

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[207] Katsumi, "The Crisis Management Capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces," 213.

[208] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (but Failing) Grand Strategy," 342.

[209] Samuels, *3.11*, 81.

[210] Krauss, "Crisis Management", 191.

[211] Samuels, *3.11*, 10.

In addition to the domestic deployment of the SDF, the DPJ also expanded overseas deployments of the SDF for humanitarian aid and peacekeeping which spanned across multiple countries. These deployments are symptomatic of a more normalized security policy that allowed the SDF to be used for other purposes than strictly self-defense functions. The DPJ presided over the Japanese government while the SDF conducted humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions in Haiti and South Sudan.[212]

2. The 2010 NDPG

The final DPJ policy that concerns the SDF was the 2010 NDPG, which was another policy that largely fell in line with the normalization trajectory of Japanese security policy by expanding certain military assets, codified the dynamic defense structure, and loosened the restrictions on arms exports. Oros describes the foundations of the policy as being largely an extension of previous LDP policy that had been in development in the prior years.[213] It did, however, emphasize a security policy that saw Japan as engaging regional partners and more independently capable with domestic military hardware.[214] The 2010 NDPG saw reductions in combat assets such as a reduction of 10 combat aircraft (-2.8%) in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and a reduction of 1,000 authorized personnel (-0.6%) in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF); however, there were other key areas of the SDF that saw development.[215] For example, the JMSDF submarine force grew from 16 to 22 (+37%) and its Aegis-equipped destroyers grew from 4 to 6 (+50%).[216] Additionally, the Air Warning & Control Units that were capable of ballistic missile defense (BMD) missions in the ASDF grew from 7 warning groups to 11 (+57%).[217] These assets were reflective of the evolving security dynamic in the region and

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[212] Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, 300.

[213] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 117.

[214] Oros, 117.

[215] Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2014*, 152.

[216] Ministry of Defense.

[217] Ministry of Defense.

undoubtedly delivered on the DPJ's desire to have a more robust domestic security capacity.

This desire was also reflected in the DPJ's dynamic defense force paradigm, which formally brought Japan's SDF into a post-Cold War era security posture. This policy rested on three pillars articulated by Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa alongside the publishing of the 2010 NDPG. Sugio Takahashi notes the Defense Minister's three key aspects of the 2010 NDPG dynamic defense force policy: "The first is 'continuous steady-state intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in areas surrounding Japan.'"[218] Takahashi continues, "The second guideline is 'immediate and seamless response to contingencies' … [and] [t]he third guideline is 'layered cooperation with the international community.'"[219] Each of these three pillars reflect the changing use cases for the SDF and its pivot from an in-place bulwark against possible communist aggression in the north to a more flexible and modern force that can meet the needs of modern conflict. These policy stances on the SDF were also consistent with the DPJ's desire to have a more autonomous defense capability, the third "cooperation" pillar.

Arms exports is another are of the 2010 NDPG that is noteworthy. While the document did not address Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports from 1967, some restrictions were lifted. PM Noda's administration published the "Statement on the Guidelines for Overseas Transfers of Defence Equipment," which allowed for arms transfers when approved by the government.[220] This policy would allow for multiple bilateral arms agreements, which include ballistic missile defense development collaboration and integration with the United States and other allies.[221] Finally, the DPJ

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[218] Sugio Takahashi, "A Dynamic Defense Force for Japan," SITC-NWC 2012 Policy Briefs, P*olicy Brief* 4 (2012): 2. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/44v4t14z.

[219] Takahashi, 2.

[220] Hughes, "Japan's Emerging Arms Transfer Strategy." 433-434.

[221] See, for example, Jimbo, "Foreign and Security Policy Under the DPJ," 93, as well as Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 3, and Weiner and Tatsumi, "How Does the Democratic Party of Japan Affect Security Policy?," 5.

also upgraded the Japanese spy satellite program and transitioned its assets from commercial to military quality hardware.[222]

C. EXAMINING DIVERGENCE IN POLICY

The pattern of the DPJ's policy surrounding the SDF is, like many of the policy areas examined in this thesis, not divergent in the ends as it is in the means. While the DPJ did cancel the Indian Ocean refueling mission that was started by the DPJ, the LDP had already began to scale this activity back as a way to protect itself from political backlash. Additionally, the DPJ's 2010 NDPG was largely a facsimile of the LDP's policy that was drafted before the DPJ's electoral victory in the 2009 election.[223] Given the policy's lineage, any attributed DPJ divergence must be viewed in the context that the 2010 NDPG is broadly the policy of the 2009 LDP and not a wholly DPJ policy stance. Even the dynamic defense force construct that created strictly divergent policy by ending the Cold War era basic defense force paradigm cannot be solely attributed to the DPJ. While this policy did create a more agile SDF, more fitted for modern threats, it could be viewed as merely the logical culmination of the LDP's similar policy trajectory that dated back to the post-Cold War years in its 1995 and 2004 NDPG policies which called for a more flexible SDF.

In terms of the upgrades to Japan's military and security systems, such policy preferences are in-line with the LDP's vision of a normalized Japan, one whose military provides independent security and is internationally involved. To this point, the DPJ's policies can be seen as acceleration of the LDP's well-established trend of normalization.[224] Even so, the DPJ always had a policy core of Japan being self-sufficient in defense, so this lack of divergence is not surprising. Even though the DPJ and its policies could be said to be divergent from the status quo at its time in power, these policy baselines

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[222] Midford, "Japan's Security Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," 3.

[223] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 117.

[224] Howe and Campbell, "Continuity and Change," 110.

were reiterated and built upon by LDP Prime Minister Abe and the new NDPG published in 2013.[225]

D. CONSTRAINTS FOR DIVERGENT POLICY

1. Internal Constraints

In terms of internal constraints, the DPJ did not face strong opposition to its use of the SDF. Instead, DPJ had the political upper hand with the Indian Ocean refueling and connections to combat operations. Given the ever-declining domestic support for the mission, Japan's domestic constituents and the norm of pacifism had an effect on the DPJ's policy to allow the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Measures Law to lapse, effectively cancelling the Indian Ocean refueling mission deployments.[226] The DPJ also did not have any particular domestic opposition to the domestic deployment of the SDF during the 3.11 crisis. While there are many criticisms of the overall handling of the DPJ's handling of the 3.11 crisis, these criticisms were largely pointed at the nuclear disaster and the inefficiencies of the DPJ and the bureaucracy, as opposed to the employment of the SDF for disaster relief, which was seen as broadly positive.[227] In fact, the Cabinet Office's Public Opinion Survey of on the SDF and Defense issues revealed that domestic poll respondents favored the use of the SDF for disaster relief dispatch at a rate of 78.4% in January 2009 which grew throughout the DPJ's tenure to 82.9% in January 2012.[228] The support for disaster relief was even higher than that for using the SDF to maintain national security, the nominal purpose of the force, which sat at 70.0% and 78.6% in January 2009 and 2012, respectively.[229] Given these attitudes, it appears that the DPJ's policy was not subject to

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[225] Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 100.

[226] Katsumi, "The Crisis Management Capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces," 213.

[227] Public Relations Office of the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, "Outline of "Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues," March 2012. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/public_opinion.pdf. (Note: This polling data is an English translation from the Office of Public Relations of the Cabinet Office of Japan. The original text was published in Japanese.)

[228] Cabinet Office Public Relations Office, "Outline of "Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues."

[229] Cabinet Office Public Relations Office.

much internal constraint, save for the Indian Ocean refueling mission, which the DPJ already wanted to cancel.

2. External Constraints

International reaction to the cancellation of the Indian Ocean refueling program was an external constraint on DPJ security policy, in that it created a difficult climate for Japan with regards to its security relationships. For example, the cancellation of the mission created difficulties for Japan's security partnership with the United Sates, as Katsumi notes that U.S. policy preferences were pressuring for more anti-terrorism support from Japan, particularly for Afghanistan.[230] In addition, Hughes describes how the Indian Ocean refueling mission was seen by the United States as symbolic of Japanese commitment and a harmonious security relationship between the United States and Japan.[231] Even though the United States accepted the withdrawal without much protest, disrupting this harmony could only create doubts about Japanese commitment in other security policy issues, such as the Futenma base relocation, creating constraints in other security policy areas for the DPJ.

Another key external factor in the DPJ's policy was the effect of the regional security climate that complimented the DPJ's desire for a more indigenous defense capability. Liff describes the direct relationship between regional dangers and the 2010 NDPG and writes, "In addition to modest reductions in the number of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) personnel, tanks, and artillery, the NDPG also emphasizes the importance of improving the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) ability to defend Japan amid the 'immediate and grave destabilizing factor' of North Korea and mitigating 'concern' about China's rapid military modernization and naval activities in the East China Sea."[232] The regional security threats that had started to manifest after the Cold War years appear to have complemented the DPJ's desire to have more indigenous

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[230] Katsumi, "The Crisis Management Capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces," 213.

[231] Hughes, "The Democratic Party of Japan's New (but Failing) Grand Strategy," 342.

[232] Liff, "Japan's 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines," 1.

defense capabilities. To this end, they may have had a compounding effect, as the DPJ's policy preferences would be more justifiable in the face of a dangerous regional security dynamic.

Takahashi brings even greater clarity to the effects of external regional security pressures that underpinned Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa's three pillars of the dynamic defense force. On the subject of ISR, Takahashi writes, "Since everyday activities by Chinese armed forces, including the PLA, have become more prevalent, Japan must conduct constant and more frequent ISR activities."[233] In terms of seamless responses to contingencies, Takahashi describes the ever-increasing importance of the coordination of forces and agency efforts and capabilities to address crises.[234] Last, Takahashi describes the importance of international cooperation to strengthen relationships and present a united security front to threats.[235] All of these policy influences are indicative of the heightened regional threats that Japan began to face (and continues to face) in the post-Cold War security environment. Given this reality, it is very likely that these external pressures had an influential effect on the 2010 NDPG, which was translated into policy.

3. DPJ Party Structure Constraints

In terms of the constraints of the DPJ party and its leadership, several factors shaped security policy surrounding the SDF. As an individual and intra-party influence, PM Noda was a more conservative voice in the party, and it is not surprising that his policy trended towards normalization. This dynamic brought with it intra-party friction, whereby other DPJ members were disgruntled by PM Noda's more conservative security policies. Sneider notes that these DPJ detractors viewed these as a facsimile of the LDP's policies.[236] Such

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[233] Takahashi, "A Dynamic Defense Force for Japan," 2.

[234] Takahashi, 2.

[235] Takahashi, 3.

[236] Daniel Sneider, "New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan," in *Japan Under the DPJ The Politics of Transition and Governance*, ed. Kenji Kushida and Phillip Lipscy (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2013), 370-371.

a dynamic likely created boundaries of acceptable policy in the DPJ, though it is unknown how far in the normalization spectrum PM Noda could have tilted, given the DPJ's loss after he dissolved the Diet during his tenure as prime minister.

Ichiro Ozawa was another influential constraint on the DPJ's security policy and brought with him many opinions indicative of his party-hopping tendencies. For example, Sneider recounts Ozawa's support of the SDF Gulf War peacekeeping missions when he was in the LDP in the early 1990s, a stance that is unsurprising, given his conservative and nationalist leanings.[237] Sneider describes how the DPJ under his leadership also established a security policy platform in the years leading up to the DPJ's 2009 electoral victory that rejected the Indian Ocean refueling program and SDF missions to Iraq and pledged participation in UN peacekeeping operations.[238] In looking at these policies, Ozawa showed an acceptance of overseas deployments, but not without limits. Even though Ozawa was only one person, his preferences had an outsized influence on the DPJ's policy. Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss note that, "Of the DPJ's new representatives…over a hundred were known as 'Ozawa's Children,' because they were personally groomed and trained (and often financed) for the election by Secretary General Ozawa."[239] In effect, Ozawa had a stable of political acolytes that would help shape the DPJ's policy and were necessary for the DPJ to keep its newly found leadership. This would be proven in the downfall of the DPJ, as an unrelated domestic policy dispute within the DPJ resulted in the Ozawa faction splitting the party, contributing to the party's massive loss in the 2012 election.[240]

4. Common Constraints

The largest common constraint in policy surrounding the SDF for the LDP and the DPJ was the changing regional security dynamic after the Cold War. The status quo, as developed by the LDP, was continually creeping towards normalization, starting the

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[237] Sneider, "New Asianism," 377.

[238] Sneider, 378.

[239] Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss, "Building a Party," 166.

[240] Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss, 167.

establishment of the SDF, as a means to protect Japan. However, with the end of the Cold War, the paradigm shifted to more international cooperation, and a more reactive force that could handle the more modern problems of global terrorism, humanitarian disasters, a rising China, and the emerging threat of North Korea. The DPJ was similarly influenced by these changes, as evident in their use of the SDF for disaster relief both domestically and abroad. Additionally, the DPJ saw regional security dynamics as justification to enhance the security apparatus of Japan, setting a new bar for normalization that was continued by the LDP after the DPJ lost its leadership role.

In terms of overseas deployments of the SDF, the DPJ and the LDP both were bound by internal constraints. For example, the DPJ was aligned with public opinion that did not favor the SDF overseas mission of the Indian Ocean refueling program. The LDP was also constrained by internal constraints, as disapproval for the 2008 humanitarian aid mission in Sudan greatly limited the acceptable level of aid provided. Additionally, the LDP was constrained by domestic political parties, which influenced PM Koizumi's withdrawal of overseas deployments in order to alleviate political pressure in elections. Internal constraints, therefore, have been a consistently constraining factor across both parties in shaping Japanese security policy over the SDF and its uses.

V. CONCLUSION

A. THE DPJ AND NORMALIZATION

Despite some expectations of the DPJ diverging greatly from the LDP's trajectory of a normalization of security policy, the actual security policies of the DPJ largely fell in line with the trends set by the LDP and in some cases even pushed past normalization further than the LDP. One such example of greater normalization was the territorial defense of the Senkaku Islands, through which the DPJ not only adhered to the normalization trend, but actually pushed further than the status quo established by the LDP. By being so assertive, PM Kan departed from the previous LDP blueprint that had stressed it was easier to defuse controversy than to aggravate it. In addition, the DPJ's handling of the nationalization of the islands was beyond any LDP policy on the matter, which, again, has had a record of diplomatic engagement over the islands. Additionally, the DPJ's handling of the MCAS Futenma basing policy could be said to be more normalizing than that of the LDP, as normalization has a sense of autonomy that aligns with expelling a foreign military power from your territory. Finally, the 2010 NDPG cemented the transition of a post-Cold War SDF in its "dynamic defense force" construct, which has since been built upon.

Even though the DPJ showed some divergence in its normalization stance, the lion's share of policies examined in this research show that the DPJ largely followed the path of the LDP. The DPJ's final policy on U.S. basing, the use of the SDF domestically and abroad, and the defense build-up articulated in the 2010 NDPG all fall into the overall trend of normalization and fit with the policy record of the LDP before and after the DPJ's tenure.

Even though the review of DPJ policy showed a broad adherence to normalization, there were some policies that attempted to reverse this trend. The most clear-cut example is the DPJ allowing the lapse of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Law, which in turn ended the Indian Ocean refueling mission that the party outspokenly opposed. Another policy was the party's attempt to force the MCAS Futenma base relocation issue. While the DPJ was not successful in this endeavor, it was an example in which the party attempted to force

their preferences. Even so, the DPJ definitely diverged in terms of the method of implementing its policy on the U.S. basing issue and other policies. One such example was the handling of the 2010 Senkaku Islands incident. Taken together, one of the largest hallmarks of the DPJ's divergence in the normalization of security policy was the way in which it arrived at a policy, in that the party's lack of knowledge and discipline were far from the status quo of the politically seasoned LDP.

Ultimately, the DPJ showed little effective divergence from the status quo of the LDP in the normalization of Japanese security policy. When the DPJ did diverge, it often did so by pursuing policy that sought to assert Japan's sovereignty and autonomy in a way that was more normalizing than the politically agile LDP. In addition, the DPJ's divergence often boiled down to the means by which it arrived at a final policy, often to the detriment of the party and Japanese foreign policy as a whole. That said, there were a few key instances of divergence in the normalization of Japanese security policy. However, the scope of these policies was limited, and they were of little consequence to the overall trend of the normalization of Japanese security policy.

B. TRENDS IN CONSTRAINTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PARTIES

Given this research, future non-LDP parties that take power in Japan may be constrained in similar ways. Internally, non-LDP parties will likely be constrained by domestic public opinion that tends to favor a strong defense of the Senkaku Islands in the face of Chinese incursion. Similarly, domestic opinion, particularly in Okinawa, includes strong opinions about U.S. basing, particularly in the wake of criminal activity by United States service members or military equipment accidents, both of which are difficult to prevent. However, domestic opinion appears to favor the trend of growing SDF overseas deployments, particularly for humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions. These missions are likely to continue, if not expand, regardless of the party in charge, as the LDP has a history of expanding the constitutional boundaries of the SDF, and the DPJ continued the trend of overseas SDF deployments, save for the Iraq and Indian Ocean refueling missions.

Externally, the security relationship with the United States and rising threats from North Korea and China have shown to be consistent constraints that have shaped and are likely to continue to shape Japanese security policy. In terms of the security relationship with the United States, base relocation has been a slowly evolving policy through both the LDP and DPJ. Despite domestic objections, Japan receives a two-fold benefit from United States basing that will hold in the coming years. First, Japan gets the benefit of a security guarantee from the United States, whose military is not bound by the same restrictions as the JSDF, while still having an influence on its operations. Second, the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Japan is now closely bound by a CSD policy that is mutually beneficial and is amplified by a U.S. presence in Japan. Additionally, the United States has shown a preference for Japan to take a leadership role on the international stage and has specifically highlighted overseas deployments of the JSDF as a way for Japan to pick up the torch of leadership.

With regard to the external constraint of the growing regional threats from China and North Korea, the situation has only grown in recent years, as China continues to develop its military and expand its presence, both globally and regionally, with artificial islands. Similarly, the North Korean missile threat has continued to grow, as that country develops delivery systems and nuclear payload capabilities. These factors, combined with U.S. preferences, pushed the DPJ towards the status quo in U.S. basing policy and the development of the JSDF in the 2010 NDPG. The rise of China also informed the DPJ's assertive stance on the Senkaku Islands, regardless of the DPJ's desire to foster Sino-Japanese relations. These regional threats have also informed recent LDP's security policy, such as PM Abe's CSD constitutional interpretation. Given this, so long as these regional security threats remain, Japanese security policy has been seen to follow a normalization trajectory, regardless of the party in control.

In terms of party structure, if a party requires a coalition to govern, then management of said coalition could be influenced by hard pacifist leanings that negate the ability to find an acceptable compromise in policy, as was the case with the DPJ coalition on the issue of United States basing policy. However, individual leaders have shown the potential to be incredibly effective in swaying normalization policy. For example, the

Prime Minister has shown a pattern of having outsized control on constitutional questions with the CLB, as was the case with the LDP. Similarly, PM Noda brought his conservative preferences into his party, edging the DPJ towards more conservative policy. Even so, the DPJ's political follies are a testament to how individuals can also hurt the policy goals of a party, as the multiple political missteps of DPJ leaders led to instability in the U.S. security partnership and Sino-Japanese relations. Future non-LDP leadership that makes mistakes similar to the DPJ may also find that domestic and international audiences have low tolerance for political miscalculations with unproven political leadership in Japan. Furthermore, this low tolerance may adversely affect other policy options, as was the case with the DPJ's errors in handling the 2010 Senkaku Islands incident with China as well as the DPJ's two-faced stance on U.S. basing relocation, both of which affected broader diplomatic relationships with the countries concerned.

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