The Strategic Relevance of Modern Foreign Internal Defense and Security Force Assistance Initiatives

A Monograph

by

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**ABSTRACT**

This monograph argues for the necessity for the US Department of Defense to increase focus and commitment of resources toward foreign internal defense and security force assistance capabilities. The study analyzes reductions in defense resources among simultaneous emergent threats, which predicates the need for increasingly efficient and persistent force multiplication effects abroad. A study of current and evolving strategy documents highlights guidance which stresses increased dependence on partner capacity-building as a cornerstone to engaging contemporary global threats. Modern analysis of a successful security cooperation vignette is utilized to conceptualize the potential impacts of effective foreign internal defense efforts, which further enabled export of security cooperation strategy through third party partnerships. The monograph determined key lessons learned through historical venues among the armed services, which outline imperative considerations in developing future security cooperation programs. This monograph explores various modern approaches utilized by the service components to help illustrate challenges and opportunities, which are helping to shape future partner capacity-building platforms across the armed services.
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This monograph argues for the necessity for the US Department of Defense to increase focus and commitment of resources toward foreign internal defense and security force assistance capabilities. The study analyzes reductions in defense resources among simultaneous emergent threats, which predicates the need for increasingly efficient and persistent force multiplication effects abroad. A study of current and evolving strategy documents highlights guidance which stresses increased dependence on partner capacity-building as a cornerstone to engaging contemporary global threats. Modern analysis of a successful security cooperation vignette is utilized to conceptualize the potential impacts of effective foreign internal defense efforts, which further enabled export of security cooperation strategy through third party partnerships. The monograph determined key lessons learned through historical venues among the armed services, which outline imperative considerations in developing future security cooperation programs. This monograph explores various modern approaches utilized by the service components to help illustrate challenges and opportunities, which are helping to shape future partner capacity-building platforms across the armed services.
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<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Armored Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combined Action Program</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Conventional Forces</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Contemporary Operational Environment</td>
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<td>COLMIL</td>
<td>Colombian Military</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Army</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>DAMO</td>
<td>Department of the Army Military Operations</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DTO</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking Organization</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Republic of Colombia</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>FMOS</td>
<td>Free Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>Foreign Security forces</td>
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<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>IBCT</td>
<td>Infantry Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>Infantry Division</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>Internal Defense and Development</td>
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<td>Joint doctrine Note</td>
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<td>MATA</td>
<td>Military Advisor Training Academy</td>
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<td>MCSCG</td>
<td>Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group</td>
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<td>MET</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task</td>
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<td>MiTT</td>
<td>Military Transition Team</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>POTUS</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
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<td>Regionally Aligned Force</td>
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<td>Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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<td>SRM</td>
<td>Sustained Readiness Model</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>Train, Advise, Assist</td>
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<td>TSCP</td>
<td>Theatre Security Cooperation Plan</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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Introduction

As the United States prepares to deal with adversaries and to help defend partners, it is at the risk of becoming overextended. US national security resources are shrinking as its challenges are expanding. US engagement with friends and foes alike, therefore, must reconcile this potential mismatch between resources and requirements, and between means and ends.

—Hans Binnendijk, Strategic Rethink: Friends Foes and Future Directions

The current state of military affairs for the United States, when aligned against economic principles, shows an increasing demand with a decreasing supply. As the scope of threats across the world continues to increase and military resources continue to decrease, the United States faces growing challenges which require innovative strategic focus to help balance supply and demand disparities. A study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments highlights this trend in stating “the Navy and Marine Corps are facing a fundamental choice: maintain current levels of forward presence and risk breaking the force or reduce presence and restore readiness…this choice is driven by the supply of ready naval forces being too small to meet the demand from Combatant Commanders, as adjudicated by the Secretary of Defense.”

Growing challenges with terrorism, both domestic and abroad, cannot be solved strictly with military offensive capabilities. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have depleted both the American resolve for war and the bank accounts to fund large-scale operations. At the same time, current and potential threats must be engaged to help maintain world order and progress.

In an environment representative of resource and demand imbalance, variables that can help remedy the offset become highly influential. Considering scenarios in the national and global security domains, an updated security strategy of the United States becomes fundamentally paramount. Through the evolution of prominent global security situations in recent years such as those involving ISIS, the United States continues to assess and adjust national security strategies.

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and strategic defense guidance. Recently in December 2016, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter epitomized the notion of evolving US security strategy in the Middle East and “elsewhere,” highlighting the change in approach from one of direct US engagement of the enemy to engagement through capable partners.\(^2\) Using ISIS as an example, the contemporary defense strategy of the United States continues to show increased global focus on building partner capacity. With strategic guidance showing an increased focus on building partner capacity, a predominant question arises: how can the US Military contribute to the accomplishment of strategic security objectives through increased focus on security cooperation (SC) activities?

**Background and Significance**

Over the past fifty years, Department of Defense (DoD) SC activities, specifically foreign internal defense (FID) and security force assistance (SFA), have displayed positive impacts on national defense strategy throughout the world. Assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Security Strategy (NSS), and National Military Strategy (NMS) helps validate the need for effective FID and SFA in support of contemporary security strategy. Associated with relatively low resource costs in comparison to large-scale troop deployments, FID and SFA can prove vital among DoD efforts to accomplish national security objectives. In a contemporary operational environment (COE) characterized by increased resource constraints and heightened threats, the innovative and programmatic implementation of FID and SFA will become strategic catalysts to accomplishing future defense objectives.

\(^2\) During former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s Manama Dialogue in 2016, he states “The strategic approach of our military campaign in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere is to leverage all the tools at our disposal to enable capable, motivated, local forces to deal ISIL a lasting defeat. It was necessary to recommend this strategic approach because the only way to ensure that once ISIL is defeated, it stays defeated, is to enable local forces to seize and hold territory rather than substitute for them.” Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense, “The Logic of American Strategy in the Middle East” (dialogue, Manama, Bahrain, Dec 10, 2016), accessed Jan 05, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/1026639/remarks-on-the-logic-of-american-strategy-in-the-middle-east-2016-iiss-manama-d.
Across the armed services, there is a growing application of partner capacity-building efforts which include formalization of concepts and programs. Within the US Air Force (USAF), permanent educational infrastructure was recently established in the realm of advisory capabilities focusing on building partner capacity. Most significantly perhaps are efforts observed across the US Marine Corps (USMC) and US Army. USMC efforts include the creation of a security cooperation command as well as a Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) for advisors. On another front, the current Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), recently announced an initiative to create permanent SFA brigades over the next five years. Relatively new constructs across the services, these programs will continue to develop in support of evolving national defense strategy.

Methodology

This research supports the importance of more robust and updated FID and SFA practices in relation to the present and future global environments. It explores the current and evolving threats to national and global security while analyzing relevant constraints associated with the defense budget, elements of national power, national will and political implications of U.S. military activities abroad. Review of strategic guidance highlights the challenges and opportunities for the U.S. military in the areas of FID and SFA as they align against the QDR.

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NSS, NMS, and recent DoD guidance for SC. A modern vignette articulates the effectiveness of FID and SFA when properly implemented as part of defense strategy. Assessment of the COE associates defense strategy to show DoD successes and challenges associated with FID and SFA paradigms. Simultaneously, this research ties tactical and operational procedures and effects with strategic objectives.

The analysis here examines programs across the armed services aimed at building partner capacity, while demonstrating their efficacy in the realm of national defense strategy. Evidence of successful FID and SFA over time, when balanced against cost-benefit analysis, helps validate the argument of this monograph, and the implications for FID and SFA in support of defense strategy. Unclassified data in regard to ongoing FID and SFA missions along with an increased global demand for military activities also support the thesis. Recent articles, best practices, lessons learned, and vignettes also aided in the development of this monograph.

Challenges Facing the Department of Defense

In comparison to the past century, the exponential threats the United States and her partners face today are not as linear or defined. Among the hazards associated with the current environment are physical threats posed by both nation states and non-state actors. From Russia’s reemergence and recent operations in Ukraine and Crimea, to China’s increasing escalation of confrontational activities in the Pacific, to Iran’s nuclear programs to the continued unpredictability of North Korea, nation states continue to be at the forefront of global security concerns. To further complicate matters, non-state actors and organized criminal organizations continue to threaten sovereignty around the world. From the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and continued hostilities from Al Qaida, to drug trafficking organizations (DTO) and other organized crime groups, the demand for defense resources continues to increase.

A review of defense requirements and defense resources depicts the national defense budget and the size of the joint force remaining key subjects of debate and uncertainty. The 2014
QDR Executive Summary highlights this outlook in stating “the QDR demonstrates our intent to rebalance the Department itself as part of our effort to control internal cost growth that is threatening to erode our combat power in this period of fiscal austerity.” More powerful perhaps is a quote from former President Obama in describing his view of the global security environment, in his opening letter for the 2015 NMS which reads “[a]s powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite.” Understanding the problematic economic situations in the United States and around the globe, it is easy to comprehend genuine concerns and high scrutiny pertaining to federal defense expenditures. A general lack of agreement in defense budget among defense representatives, Congress and political leaders continues to dilute measures of predictability when it comes to defense resources.

Most recently, the 2016 budget process showed continued disagreements as the President’s request of five hundred thirty-four billion dollars was undercut by the Congress, and in the end five hundred twenty-two billion was authorized. With Congressional lack of punctual defense budgeting for the commencement of a fiscal year since 2008, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter continued to stress the correlation between a stabilized defense budget and defense readiness. Debates over the defense budget continued to escalate in 2016, when Carter threatened to recommend a veto of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act if it contained a “raid on war funding” which would increase risk to US national defense. The impacts of

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10 Furthermore, sequestration remains an annual contentious issue and threat to defense resources since its inception in 2011. In July of 2016, Vice CSA, General David B. Allen designated “sequestration”
continuing uncertainty in defense budgets, when combined with a scaled reduction in joint force strength present even more of a challenge to the supply of defense resources.

Military personnel costs continue to comprise a significant portion of the DoD budget, and showed a forty-six percent increase between 2000 and 2014. Following the force surges for Iraq and Afghanistan circa 2007-2010, US Military ground force numbers were at their highest level since the end of the Cold War. With the joint force continuing to shrink from peak numbers in 2010 of 1,430,985, the Army and USMC continue to endure the majority of the reductions. During the peak year, the Army consisted of 566,045 troops while the Marines counted 202,441 active duty personnel. Moving forward to 2015, the Army’s troop strength was down to 490,000 with ongoing reductions of another 40,000 between 2016 and 2018. As the USMC continued to reduce troop strength from 186,000 in 2015, the goal is to reach 182,000 by 2017. Although reducing the force structure can help reduce the DoD base budget, there are also extensive budgetary implications associated with funding large scale operations. Between 2015 and 2016 the Overseas Contingency Operations budget added approximately sixty billion dollars as the biggest threat to defense readiness, which again highlights the effects of unpredictability in the defense budget. US Department of Defense, Carter Highlights Budget Priorities, Warns of Defense Bill Veto Recommendation.


13 This figure is inclusive of all four components’ active duty forces. As the conditions changed in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq in 2011, and began a sharp reduction of forces in Afghanistan a year later. Since 2010, the size of the U.S. Military in terms of manpower reflects a steady decline, which is projected to continue through 2018, and perhaps beyond. Ibid.

14 Ibid.


Challenges and opportunities associated with the cyber environment warranted the creation of the DoD Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) in 2010, which continues to grow in scope and resource requirements. The budgetary dialogue continued for the 2017 defense budget with an increase from 2016 of roughly nine percent requested for the CYBERCOM authorization. Considering the cyber environment, this is yet another element which indicates the complexity associated with growing requirements to counter increasing threats around the world, and further highlights the need to streamline the US approach to defense strategy.

The United States continues to develop and enhance ways to negotiate the turbulent global security environment, with efficiency in the employment of limited resources becoming more critical. With increases in global threats and reductions in resources, current defense strategy may soon prove invalid to meet the desired endstates. To help offset the supply/demand inequalities, the United States must work to increase the supply of resources, or at least the effects of the defense resources available. An increased focus on force multiplication methodology
which can reduce resource requirements while providing effective outcomes will be key to meeting national security objectives. One key way the US Military can increase efficiencies and effects is through SC activities, specifically FID and SFA. Routinely ongoing throughout the world as part of Phase Zero (shape), both help to promote capable defense strategy and US interests with reduced resource costs.\textsuperscript{20} As the COE continues to change, an increased strategic focus on building partner capacity is simultaneously emergent.

National Strategy Guidance

Building partner capacity, forward presence and military engagement are terms increasingly referred to in many contemporary strategic defense documents which all encompass DoD activities in support of national strategy. These efforts, which are used for the implementation of national defense policy, encompass a broad range of activities the United States conducts to achieve national objectives. Examining FID and SFA, it is imperative to understand where and how these activities fall contextually within the paradigm of SC and military engagement. This criticality exists through the exploration of national strategy, and helps tie activities into the context of strategic guidance found in national strategy documents. The relationships, definitions and employment of FID and SFA among SC, forward presence, and military engagement activities can appear confusing in certain contexts. Exploration of various approaches to modern FID and SFA, to include both joint and Army doctrine, helps illustrate some similarities, disparities, and relationships between FID and SFA as they exist with broader SC efforts.

Within various joint and Army doctrinal publications, Figure 1 perhaps best simplifies the relationships with FID and SFA as they exist as SC activities. Observed in the chart, and echoed through Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance, Joint Publication (JP)

SFA and FID are both subsets of SC, but are not subsets of each other. JDN 1-13 explains the relationships among FID and SFA, in which the following exist:

1. FID strictly addresses threats within a nation’s borders as part of a nation’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), where SFA encompasses both internal and transnational threats.

2. FID programs, with established objectives in support of the host nation (HN) IDAD, provide the ways (i.e., planned sequence of actions to achieve objectives), while SFA activities provide means such as SFA-qualified personnel, material, and equipment for training and/or advisory assistance to foreign forces from the tactical unit up to the ministerial level; at the tactical level, FID can also provide similar means as SFA through small training teams supporting foreign security forces (FSF).

3. Whereas FID at the strategic level encompasses all of the instruments of national power, SFA focusses on the military instrument through DoD resources.

4. SFA may provide many, but not all, of the activities through which FID can be accomplished. Other SC activities dedicated to the non-security sector that may support FID, such as bilateral meetings, intelligence, psychological operations or civil affairs activities, fall outside the scope of SFA.

5. SFA activities are conducted with, through and by FSF, and the portion of SFA activities supporting an HN’s efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency support FID.

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6. FID at the tactical and operational level is primarily executed by Special Operations Forces (SOF); while FID is a legislatively mandated core activity of SOF, conventional forces (CF) also generate and employ organic capabilities to conduct these activities.\textsuperscript{22}

Similar, yet divergent as the relationships between FID and SFA may appear, the context of FID and SFA activities addressed as subsets of SC will focus on DoD initiatives which address assistance to FSF as represented in the portion of Figure 1.\textsuperscript{23} Though certain activities within the larger FID bubble may be planned and executed outside of DoD activities with the State Department or other agencies in the lead role, particular attention is given where FID and SFA overlap within the SC bubble.\textsuperscript{24} In the COE, the terms train, advise, assist (TAA) are most commonly used to outline this focus area.

\textsuperscript{22} The numbered list above includes ideas, quotes and paraphrasing of the section of JDS 1-13 which specifically addresses the relationships among FID and SFA. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, \textit{Security Force Assistance}, I-4-I-5.


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
Within an established collection of contemporary national strategy documents, SC initiatives can be found as integral elements for the implementation of future strategy. Documents which span the recent past, present and near-term future such as the QDR of 2014, the 2015 NSS and the 2015 NMS, all contain evidence of the increasing utility of FID and SFA in national strategic policy. Exploring more detailed guidance for SC into 2017, additional specificity protrudes which showcases deep roots with FID and SFA in strategic guidance in the coming era of national security strategy. Summarizing the relationships shared by FID and SFA under the SC umbrella, the 2014 QDR effectively articulates some of the challenges of the COE, and how FID and SFA are programmed into the strategy as means to help meet national objectives.
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review

A document published every four years, the QDR assesses national security strategy and priorities. Beginning with the Secretary of Defense’s cover letter for the 2014 QDR and throughout the document, the strategic objectives of national security policy effectively relate the importance of innovative FID and SFA as means to help achieve the strategic ends. Serving as a basis to defense strategy in accordance with QDR endstates, dependence on alliances is paramount and depends heavily on US DoD efforts to help grow partner capacity. Reviewing the importance of shared international understanding of the COE, the QDR outlines the context of helping to shape the strategic environment in projecting the ideals of the United States to develop partner capacities to eventually “play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions.”

With defense of the United States homeland at the forefront of national objectives, the QDR Executive Summary relates the development of partner capacity to other interrelated objectives such as the promotion of deterrence, counter-terrorism, and regional stability. Here, the QDR stresses the importance of effective SC which will promote forward presence and engagement with allies across multiple regions to help strengthen alliances. Later as the QDR progresses to more detail on strategy, a quote from Chapter II (The Defense Strategy) of the QDR helps depict this association in stating “[b]uilding security globally not only assures allies and partners and builds partner capacity, but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and

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25 Here, the Secretary’s cover letter identifies the “three strategic pillars” 1- defending the national homeland; 2- building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; 3- remaining prepared to win against any adversary should deterrence fail), with the body of the document listing similar objectives as the “four core national interests” 1- the security of the United States; 2- a strong innovative and growing U.S. economy in an open international system of economics; 3- respect for universal values at home and abroad; 4- an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.) US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, March 4, 2014. (Washington, DC): cover letter-ii.

26 Ibid., iii.

increasing the stability in regions across the Middle East and North Africa.” Referring to more specified regional approaches, the QDR focuses on specific geographical areas of concern to further articulate the need for restructure and innovation in SC as part of contemporary defense strategy.

Considering the global environment that continues to present increased demand for US DoD efforts to promote security, the QDR specifies geographic focus areas to include the Asia-Pacific region, Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. In presenting the strategic aim for each of these areas, the QDR explains efforts to bolster SC efforts across all of the armed services. Specifically for ground forces that execute the majority of FID and SFA, the QDR outlines the use of persistent presence to include permanent basing and rotational forces, as well as episodic deployments to further “pursue increased training opportunities to improved capabilities and capacity of partner nations.” Relating the forecasted increase of regional engagement with the supply and demand challenge associated with increasing threats and decreasing resources, the QDR highlights the reduction of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq from a 2014 perspective. Considering the QDR is a four-year programmed document with DoD currently negotiating the operational environment nearly three years after the 2014 QDR was published, it is imperative to review more modern strategic assessments found in documents such as the latest National Security Strategy of the United States.

2015 National Security Strategy of the United States

Whereas the QDR places a higher emphasis on the military element of national power and DoD endeavors, the NSS is an all-encompassing document in the sense that it more equally balances the reliance on the four elements of national power. Through detailed exploration of the

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29 Specific material in quotations is derived from page 34 of the QDR in discussion of the Asia-Pacific region. Ibid., 34-36.
contents of this document, the aspects of the military element protrude as key factors in the implementation of national security strategy. The President of the United States’ (POTUS) cover letter immediately sets the stage for the assessment of future defense initiatives and the means to achieve national security objectives, which is further articulated in the introductory chapter of the strategy. Here President Obama states “[a]s powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite,” which projects the common theme of increased challenges and limited defense resources. As the 2015 NSS progresses, the validity of innovative SC practices become more visible.

The introduction of the NSS places a strong emphasis on US leadership in the global environment as a critical component to execute national security objectives. Within the realm of American leadership, the NSS ties the importance of alliances and collective action while discussing the way ahead in terms of expansion and reform of SC efforts. The second chapter among six of the NSS, focuses on security and is where the most correlation between SFA, FID and future security strategy exist. Within the introductory paragraph of this chapter, the NSS presents the importance of SC initiatives in stating, “we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict.” In the following sections of the security chapter, an increased focus on the strategic importance of FID and SFA is observable.

The wide variety of topics presented in the NSS’s chapter on security span eight separate subsections of security policy. Amid these subsections, topics range from climate change to weapons of mass destruction to physical defense of the homeland. The two which emerge with distinct influence focus on counterterrorism (CT) and capacity building as primary venues for FID and SFA in their relevance as strategic catalysts. On the CT front, without discounting global

30 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, cover letter, 2.
31 Ibid., 3.
32 Ibid., 7.
33 Ibid.
terrorist organizations, the NSS presents the Middle East as the primary geographical area of concern. Here, the NSS highlights the efficiencies associated with SFA and its associated strategic importance through discussion of ending combat operations in Afghanistan and using a TAA approach to promote governance and stability in conjunction with CT operations.34

In addition to CT, the NSS stresses SC activities with a focus on building partner capacity. A second glaring subsection of the NSS’s chapter on security “Build Capacity to Prevent Conflict” alone in name helps depict the strategic implications of SC activities in support of deterrence objectives.35 Here, in describing the integration of SC initiatives with the diplomatic element of national power, the NSS again stresses the importance of enhancing partners’ capabilities.36 With the 2015 NSS portraying SC initiatives such as FID and SFA as key ingredients among other elements of national power to achieve national security objectives, the 2015 NMS derives concepts from the NSS which are more focused from a military standpoint. Exploration of this document further validates the high demand for SC activities alongside other DoD capability sets.

2015 National Military Strategy of the United States

The 2015 NMS contextually parallels the QDR and NSS as a derivative strategic document while presenting more micro-level focus on DoD’s roles in the execution of defense strategy. In doing so, the NMS utilizes the same enduring national interests and national security objectives as a framework for this strategy document. Going a step further, the NMS establishes three main national military objectives: first, deter, deny and defeat state adversaries; second, disrupt, degrade and defeat violent extremist organizations; and third, strengthen our global

34 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 10.
36 Ibid.
network of allies and partners.\textsuperscript{37} Within these three objectives, the increasing relevance of SC initiatives, to include FID and SFA, is most prevalent in the third objective involving strengthening relations and capabilities among partners.

With an in-depth focus on regional stability through alliances and networking with partners, this objective within the NMS discusses collective abilities promoted through cooperative activities. At the forefront of this objective’s written section, detailed ways and means are described to include those associated with the following: preservation of alliances, expansion of partnerships, training exercises, SC activities, and military-to-military engagement.\textsuperscript{38} Specificity in geographically aligned regions are later articulated while discussing details of mil-to-mil engagement. For example, in the Asian region, nations such as Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam are within those aligned against SC topics such as cyber and maritime security, while explanation of European priorities centers on the NATO alliance and defines specific SC-related and multi-national SFA-based training events.\textsuperscript{39} The closing paragraph of this section describes SC activities as “the heart” of military efforts to provide regional stability.\textsuperscript{40}

In addition to the NMS highlighting the importance of security force assistance-related activities in conjunction with one of its three main objectives, the NMS further relates the importance of such activities in describing the twelve Joint Force Prioritized Missions. In this section of the NMS, FID and SFA are realized under SC activities in the explanation of the joint priority: “[c]onduct Military Engagement and Security Cooperation - the US Military strengthens regional stability by conducting security cooperation activities with foreign defense establishments. Such activities support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-defense and prepare for multinational operations. Strengthening partners is fundamental to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Dempsey, 5.
\item Ibid., 9.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid., 10.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
our security, building strategic depth for our national defense.”41 Through conceptual explanation of this joint priority in the NMS, the strategic reliance on FID and SFA is evident.

Through detailed exploration of the complexities of current and emerging environments, it is evident the US defense strategy considers the disparity between security challenges and available resources. In-depth analysis of four contemporary national strategic security documents further points to the increasing importance of building partner capacity and strengthening relationships among partners of the United States. Understanding FID and SFA activities executed by DoD entities in cooperation with other governmental agencies remains a fundamental concept toward implementation of security strategy, it is important to conceptualize the achievement of strategic success. Review of a historical vignette involving complex problem sets and complex environments helps illustrate challenges and successes of past partnership ventures.

**Colombia - A Case Study**

In 2013, describing turmoil around the world, former Central Intelligence Agency Director David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution explained, “Colombia has come a long way in its half-century fight against drug trafficking, insurgency, kidnapping, and murder. At a time of acute doubt over the future of the Middle East in particular, Colombia provides a model for progress as well as a reminder of requirements necessary to enable success.”42 Through observation of a whole of government approach which included a heavy focus on building partner capacity within Colombian security institutions, the Colombian experience depicts a positive example of US security strategy implementation. Peaking in the 1990’s with instability, Colombia was well known for acts of internal terrorism, drug cartels,

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41 Dempsey, 12.

murders and kidnappings.43 Through a combination of Colombian efforts and US assistance, though challenges still remain, Colombia has witnessed an overall impressive reestablishment of stability in areas associated with governance and security. Perhaps most impressive in Colombia’s success story is the nation’s recent actions not only to gain control of its internal security situation, but its ability to export security assistance to neighboring and partnering nations.

From the heavy influence of major drug cartel leaders such as Pablo Escobar in the 1980s, to the rise of left wing insurgencies in the 1990s, Colombia continued to experience a series of threats which undermined domestic stability “tearing at the national fabric of social cohesion, and challenging the government’s monopoly of power.”44 Late in the 1990s, a combination of growing power and influence among insurgent groups and challenges within the Colombian Military (COLMIL) showed a drastic deterioration of internal security. Boldly transitioning from traditional insurgent tactics, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was able to mobilize successful, large-scale conventional combat tactics against the Colombian Army, and in 1997 was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.45 By 1998, FARC offensives against Colombia military units produced considerable results, but were not the only security concerns for the Colombian Government.46


44 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 60.


46 In 1998, a Colombian Infantry Battalion operating in the central part of the country was overwhelmed by a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) unit resulting in 62 Colombian Army (COLAR) Soldiers killed and 43 captured. Later that same year, a 1500-man FARC formation seized
Outside of increased battles with insurgents and Colombia’s security forces, violent crime plagued many cities and towns. In 2000, Colombia led the world as the nation with the highest murder rate.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, kidnappings, attacks against security institutions, along with other violent crimes conducted by cartels and leftist extremist organizations, continued to contribute to the unrest around the country. Assessed as too unstable for many, several hundred thousand affluent Colombians secured visas and departed their homeland for other, more secure places to live.\textsuperscript{48} At such a pace, without outside assistance, Colombia’s government may have reached a point of failure to maintain power and influence across the country. As US foreign policy experts recognized the impact of the fragile Colombian state as a major threat to regional security and US interests, in 1999 Colombia’s President Andres Pastrana requested assistance from the United States, in an effort which would later be called “Plan Colombia”.\textsuperscript{49}

Fast forwarding ten years, data collected from 2000-2011 revealed a ninety-two percent reduction in kidnappings, forty-five percent reduction in homicides, and seventy-one percent reduction in terrorist attacks, with an estimated reduction in cocaine production by sixty-one percent.\textsuperscript{50} Once a nation where its inhabitants fled the borders for their own safety, Colombia now sees flourishing tourism and boasts perhaps the most capable security institutions across the Capital City of the Vaupes Department in the Southeast Colombia, after decimating the city’s police force. Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Griego, \textit{Persistent Engagement in Colombia: Report 14-3} (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2014), 14.


\textsuperscript{48} Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, 14.


Americas. This drastic turn of the tables did not come without cost or dedication on behalf of multiple leaders, agencies, and foreign support. Colombia’s resurgence is primarily due to Colombia’s own efforts, yet the influence of American military and other governmental support are not to be discounted.\textsuperscript{51} The overarching strategy which helped bring about Colombia’s success story, Plan Colombia, encompassed a whole of governmental approach, though it was often scrutinized as being overly focused on Colombia’s military and police.\textsuperscript{52}

Through the incorporation of diplomatic, information, military and economic efforts, Plan Colombia displayed overlapping objectives among the two major players. For the United States, countering the exportation of narcotics from Colombia and economic development were at the forefront of policy objectives, where the Colombian government also prioritized promotion of internal peace and security as well as economic development.\textsuperscript{53} At the heart of the strategic objectives of both nations, enhancing the capabilities of Colombian security institutions served as the basis for policy implementation. The strategy led by Colombian President Alvaro Uribe beginning in 2002 reflected a change to where security was viewed as the top priority for Colombia, and would provide the conditions for improvements in governance and economic development.\textsuperscript{54} In efforts to set these conditions, Uribe began to increase resources to the Colombia Military which included doubling the Colombian defense budget to four percent of the gross domestic product, an increase in the size of the Army by 60,000 personnel, and the creation

\textsuperscript{51} In his book, Petit focuses on US Special Operations support to partner capacity building within the Colombian Military institutions. Petit, 120.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 123.


\textsuperscript{54} Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, 25.
of five joint commands responsible for the regional operational areas of Colombia’s major threat groups. As Plan Colombia continued to evolve with security force capabilities at the forefront of Colombian policy, US Military support to Colombia paralleled Uribe’s strategy.

An enduring regional ally of Colombia, prior to Plan Colombia the United States traditionally maintained a force cap of 400 military and 400 military contractors for support to Colombia Security institutions. Through a combination of factors to include the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, authorization through executive order granting increased authorities for funding and operations in Colombia, and increased requests from Colombia for more US aid to the COLMIL, the US force cap doubled in military personnel to 800 and increased to 600 contractors. US funding to Plan Colombia significantly increased from 276 million dollars in 2001 to 808 million dollars by 2003, followed by a relatively stable level from 2004-2010 with figures between 600-700 million dollars. Included in these aid packages were costly military expenditures on key equipment such as helicopters in which the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade tripled its number of aircraft to more than 100 helicopters. Within the expansion of aid, US military personnel support remained a key component of Plan Colombia.

As influential as monetary support and equipment were to the Colombian security institutions, a significant contribution from the US came as SC activities focused on advisory efforts. A similar notion remains within the current US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) posture statement which includes the lines of efforts conducted in the GCC’s Area of

55 Long et al., 62.
57 Ibid.
58 Restrepo.
59 Ibid.
Responsibility (AOR). Here the document states “building partner capacity is the cornerstone of everything we do.”\footnote{Kurt W. Tidd, Admiral, US Navy, 2016 Posture Statement for US Southern Command, 2016 (Miami, Florida): 14.} Looking at Plan Colombia from its inception to the current SOUTHCOM activities in Colombia, persistent FID/SFA activities remain a main effort. With a range of partner capacity-building advisory efforts, varying in authorities, techniques, locations, focus areas, target audience and US military forces involved, both US SOF and conventional forces have continued to remain critically involved in Colombia’s resurgence for more than fifteen consecutive years.

Prior to the formalization of Plan Colombia from 1999-2000, USSOF was at the forefront of engagement with Colombian security intuitions.\footnote{Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, 17.} Starting with a mere sixty-five advisors from the US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Airborne), between 1999 and 2001, small groups of advisors focused on three Colombian counter-narcotics battalions and a newly-created brigade headquarters.\footnote{Ibid.} The efforts which were relatively limited in scope trained more than 2,300 Colombian troops on light infantry and airmobile tactics, human rights training, and staff planning processes.\footnote{Ibid.} As US commitment to Plan Colombia progressed regarding US military advisory efforts, additional US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) SOF advisors from across the services participated in various capacities and specialized focus areas. With the 7th SFG maintaining the largest role as far as command structure and persistent engagement, during the peak of the 7th SFG’s engagement in the 2003-2004 timeframe, battalion-sized formations of special operators spearheaded FID efforts involving building partner capacity across the Colombian National Police and Colombian Army.\footnote{The author of this paper was deployed to Colombia as part of the 7th SFG in 2003 as a battalion assistant operations officer, and later in 2009 as a Special Forces company commander.} As the demand for special operators needed...
for combat operations across Afghanistan and Iraq increased circa 2007-2010, SOUTCOM-focused USSOCOM forces became more involved in Middle Eastern combat roles, which resulted in a decrease in USSOF advisory resources for Colombia.\textsuperscript{65}

Maintaining a steady demand for American support with a continued force cap of 800 US military personnel, SC activities involving advisory efforts increasingly involved conventional US forces. Whereas in the past, the focus of advisory efforts had been predominantly SOF-led efforts, US conventional advisory efforts slightly changed the scope of mil-to-mil engagement. The US Military Group (MILGRP) stationed in Bogota, Colombia assumed the lead as the major US entity providing advisory support, and executed with more focus on logistics and operational planning at the strategic to brigade levels.\textsuperscript{66} In 2007, eighty percent of all advisory efforts in Colombia were being executed under the MILGRP by conventional US forces.\textsuperscript{67} Whether the preponderance of advisory efforts was delivered by SOF or conventional forces, a key takeaway involves the persistent and influential engagement of advisors in support of Colombia’s successful recovery as a nation.

Reviewing the resultant data as part of what may be considered a role model for a theatre SC plan, Colombia’s data is impressive. The following key results apply:

1. COLMIL forces continue to successfully target and kill Senior FARC leaders. Since 2008 they have killed the overall commander of the FARC, two “second in

\textsuperscript{65} Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, 26-35.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 34.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 35.
commands” and numerous other senior tactical and operational leaders associated with the secretariat leadership of the FARC.68

2. All of the 1,099 municipalities in Colombia are under Colombian governmental control, and by 2014 the country’s homicide rate reached a three-decade low.69

3. Between 2002-2015 the FARC was reduced from approximately 21,000 to 6,000.70

4. Kidnappings continue to decrease: In 2000 kidnappings were at a high of 3,572 per year and by 2015 kidnappings had dropped to 277 per year. Wherein 2000 the vast majority of kidnappings were the acts of insurgent groups, by 2015, seventy-five percent of kidnappings were not associated with these groups and were attributed to common criminals.71

5. Comparing security expenditures of the United States to showcase the return on investment for Colombia: by 2015, the United States had spent $10 billion on Colombia as compared to 1.6 trillion dollars spent for Afghanistan and Iraq combat and reconstruction efforts, which equates to approximately 10 billion dollars spent every twenty-nine days.72

Results from a deliberate and concentrated effort in internal security display a completely different environment from Colombia in 2000. Along with Colombia’s continued security progress on a larger scale, the FARC and Colombian Government finally reached a peace accord

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69 Restrepo.


72 Restrepo.
in the late summer of 2016, after more than fifty years of fighting. Though the Colombian populace voted and later rejected the details of the agreement by a thin margin in votes, the Government continues to work to progress with the successful gains made by the agreement between both the FARC and the government to end the fighting.

Colombia’s national security success within its own borders continues to expand in the realm of regional SC initiatives. What can be considered “US SC by proxy” or “leading from behind”, Colombia continues to receive and fulfill increasing numbers of requests for SC support from regional partners. Between 2009 and 2013, Colombia’s International Affairs Office of the Colombian National Police reported the training of more than 20,000 security personnel from forty-seven different countries in security-related tasks and operations. Colombia’s increasing capability to support US and regional security strategy through the execution of FID and SFA reflects a unique and relevant correlation between low-cost, low resource and effective execution of national security policy. A summary of Colombia’s resurgence highlights the implications of US SC activities, and is visible through comments from Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander of USSOUTHCOM where he states, “[a]fter fifty-one years of armed conflict, Colombia — a strategic ally, friend and preeminent partner — is on the verge of ending the hemisphere’s longest-running guerilla war. Thanks to its own efforts and our sustained assistance, Colombia

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76 Ibid.
has been transformed from a near failed state into a major regional player with significant political influence, world-class security forces, and a growing economy.”

Programs and Lessons from SFA and FID in the Contemporary Operating Environment

Looking across the US military services, advising FSF continues to become more common. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) provided the most notable platform for conventional military forces in advising FSF, as stressed from a strategic perspective through former Secretary of Defense Gates’ comments in 2007 when he stated “...arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.” For SOF, specifically US Army Special Forces, though the theatres and authorities have changed for certain missions, SFA and FID have remained a constant and highly sought application. Looking back to US military efforts in the early days of combat operations in Afghanistan from a doctrinal perspective, SOF operations did not fall under SC activities. Arguably however in practice, as USSOF partnered with Northern Alliance Forces to topple the Taliban regime in late 2001-2002, American advisory efforts were ongoing and unknown to the world at the time, the long-term future of partner capacity-building in Afghanistan was born. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed early success in dismantling the Iraqi regime, and as the environment unfolded and

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77 Admiral Tidd’s posture statement for USSOUTHCOM was read on 10 March 2016 before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee. This posture statement relates USSOUTHCOM’s SC activities to US National Security Strategy and further details specific SC data and events executed across the services under USSOUTHCOM’s Theatre Security Cooperation Plan. Tidd, 14.

strategies changed, the US military again found itself with a need to employ advisory operations on a large scale.

Summarizing the recent history of the US Army’s path to increased focus on building partner capacity which parallels the other services, an article written in the November-December 2014 Military Review perhaps best summarizes the process in stating “[t]hus, after the Vietnam War, Special Forces honed their advising capabilities and deployed military advisors to numerous regions around the globe—albeit typically in much smaller advisor teams—while the conventional Army generally lost its advising capability until the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts after 9/11.”79 Prior to the GWOT, Army Special Forces maintained their traditional role of advising regionally aligned FSF, as depicted in the Colombia scenario. As US military SC and combat efforts continued to increase post 9/11, SOF from across the services assumed growing roles in partner capacity-building, with their highest concentration of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2013, with USSOF operating in seventy-eight countries, the USSOCOM Commander Admiral William McRaven considered partner capacity-building to be “the best approach to dealing with some of the world’s most complex security problems”.80 Though SOF have advised a combination of Afghan and Iraq militias, SOF, conventional military forces and police units, the preponderance of SOF efforts in these two areas has been with elite military forces.81 Outside of USSOF, the growing demand for SFA and FID capabilities has led to increased conventional force involvement around the world.


81 Field Studies conducted as part of a RAND Corporation publication focused on SOF partnerships and highlight persistent engagement by USSOF among Afghan Commando Kandaks and elite Iraq units. Long et al, 1,43-44.
Across the armed services, SFA and FID have become more common practice with increased resources committed to advising foreign militaries. For example, within the USAF, in formalizing the process to meet increasing global demands for general purpose force air advisors, the USAF Air Advisor Academy was created in 2007 as a permanent training organization under the USAF’s Air Education and Training Command (AETC). By 2013 the Air Advisor Academy trained 3,400 airmen. Since reaching full operational capability the same year, the academy now trains up to 1,500 airmen annually who “will advise counterparts in a multitude of nations across every region, supporting a wide array of contingency and peacetime missions around the world.” Observing the US Air Force’s increased focus on SC activities, it is also important to consider modern joint CF efforts, which contribute significant amounts of forces to global SC endeavors.

The increased involvement of CF in SC activities associated with training and advising FSF through efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the world since 9/11 is noteworthy. Among many programs, terminologies and mission sets, the Army and Marines have utilized several prominent programs to execute these duties. Between various efforts, some of the most symbolic include military transition teams (MiTT), Brigade Combat Team SFA deployments, the Army’s Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) paradigm and the USMC Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) and Marine Free Military Occupational Specialty (FMOS) initiative. All with distinct formations, backgrounds, merits and challenges, these initiatives executed in support of national security strategy, have remained flexible to meet the demands linked to complex security environments.

82 Zadalis, 4.
83 Ibid., 5.
84 Ibid.
Joint Military Transition Teams

Similarities with situations in Afghanistan and Iraq displayed an increased need for building FSF. Programs which involved the most diversity for the services’ contributions to building partner capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq centered on MiTTs. In the period circa 2003-2006 MiTTs in Afghanistan and Iraq were often ad-hoc organizations composed of a combination of Active duty, Reserve and National Guard forces.86 These hastily created teams varied in size from eleven to sixteen personnel, lacked standardization in military occupational specialty composition and received training varying in content and quality.87 With a high demand for qualified SFA resources, the US Military increasingly institutionalized the MiTT construct.

By 2006, formalization of the MiTT concept was more solidified, with the Army taking the lead through the establishment of a permanent cadre as the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (ID) was missioned to form the cadre and lead centralized MiTT training at Camp Funston, Fort Riley Kansas.88 Through this process, 10 to 15-man teams composed of servicemen from the Army, Navy and Air Force were brought together as a team, and spent two months organizing as a MiTT.89 After organizing and receiving formal training, a MiTT would later deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq to advise FSF.90 The formalized MiTT training concept was executed at Fort Riley through 2009, at which time it transitioned to the re-activated, 162nd

87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, with a throughput of up to five thousand advisors per year. 91 Further prioritization and institutionalization among the MiTT architecture developed at the Department of the Army level. Here, senior leaders were designated to serve dual-hatted as senior advisors to foreign leaders, as well as commanders for MiTTs. These key leaders were selected through scrupulous annual command selection boards and participated in the formalized MiTT training process. The rapid expansion of the MiTT concept was shortly followed by a rapid decrease, which paralleled the force reductions and withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq between 2010 and 2014. The MiTT formations eventually dissolved and gave way to Brigade SFA deployments.

Army Brigade Combat Team Security Force Assistance Deployments

Through various techniques, missions, and formations, Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) have been executing SFA missions since the inception of the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. As early as 2010, Regional Command East in Afghanistan began to employ Army BCTs as modern SFA missions, which would later show the end of the traditional MiTT era and would pave the path for future SFA BCT missions.92 With more employment in Afghanistan which has continued through the ongoing force reduction, similar BCT SFA deployments began in Iraq in 2014 in conjunction with the rise of ISIS. Under this construct, Army BCTs train and deploy with organic resources and personnel assigned to the deploying unit.

The exact composition of advisory teams within a BCT varies by mission. Factors leading to a general lack of uniformity include variances in targeted partner audiences, locations, force caps, and other environmental considerations. An example of a recent BCT SFA


deployment to Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2016 involving advisory efforts from 2nd BCT, 4th Infantry Division (ID) help illustrate the current paradigm. In this case, the BCT manned approximately thirty advisor billets ranging in officer ranks from the BCT Commander (Colonel) down to a First Lieutenant, and also included Non-commissioned Officers, DA Civilians and contractors.93 This advisory team’s targeted audience included Commanders and staffs across four Afghan National Defense Forces to include an Afghan Army Corps, the Kandahar Provincial Police of the Afghan National Police and Afghanistan Border Police.94 In other locations, task organizations, advisor team composition and detailed roles of a BCT’s advisory efforts can vary.

Pre-deployment SFA training a BCT receives is also variable depending on the assigned SFA mission set and other factors involving training levels and readiness guidance. As the MiTT paradigm faded and troop withdrawals from the Middle East continued, so did the scope of employment of the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk. With the deactivation of the 162nd BDE in 2014, only the 3rd BN of the 353rd Regiment still remains as the source for training BCTs tasked to execute BCT SFA missions.95 Reduced in scale, the 353rd currently runs a one-week SFA Advisor’s course at Fort Polk and can also tailor mobile training teams to conduct home-station training for BCTs.96 One key tenet associated with building partner capacity which was more prevalent through the formalized MiTT concept but lacking through the SFA BCT model involves selection and training of advisors. Where SOF benefits through rigorous selection

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93 The author of this paper was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan with 1/10 Mountain Division as a Senior Advisor and Deputy Officer in Charge of the Train, Advise, Assist Command- South Advisory Detachment. In this capacity, he oversaw the transition of advisory duties among the 1/10 MTN and the 2/4 IN advisory teams.

94 Ibid.


96 The author of this paper was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan with 1/10 Mountain Division as a Senior Advisor and Deputy Officer in Charge of the Train, Advise, Assist Command- South Advisory Detachment. In this capacity, he oversaw the transition of advisory duties among the 1/10 MTN and the 2/4 IN advisory teams.
processes and incorporates partner-building/advisor skill set training into pipeline training, the void in these formal processes can be detrimental to conventional SFA efforts.

In addition to training challenges, BCTs face other complexities. For example, a SFA-designated BCT is often tasked with multiple deployment requirements within the assigned SFA mission, to include unilateral, or combined security-related activities. In some cases, as with the 2/4 Infantry BCT (IBCT) that also deployed a battalion simultaneously to Kosovo, a unit identified for a SFA deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan may be further tasked to execute various mission sets across different theatres. Though the main effort for the 2/4 IBCT deployment was SFA-related, the BCT conducted a decisive action mission readiness training exercise to maintain its core combat mission essential task (MET) proficiency levels, and later executed a one-week mobile training team event provided by the 3/353rd Battalion from Ft. Polk. Adding to the challenges of the SFA BCT concept, while considering unit readiness under the Army’s Sustained Readiness Model (SRM), this type of situation poses significant challenges in the realm of training, mission command and offset deployment timelines, which directly impact security capabilities at the national level.

Under the Army’s 2016-2017 Strategic Readiness Guidance, the Army aims to regain tactical prowess in combined arms operations while improving key aspects of strategic readiness in support of the NMS, through the SRM. Under the SRM, a BCT is expected to maintain a relatively consistent level of proficiency in its core wartime METs, regardless of other deployments or emergent mission requirements. In the case of a BCT designated to execute a SFA mission, the challenge of maintaining decisive action/combined arms proficiency with SFA

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97 The author of this paper was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan with 1/10 Mountain Division as a Senior Advisor and Deputy Officer in Charge of the Train, Advise, Assist Command- South Advisory Detachment. In this capacity, he oversaw the transition of advisory duties among the 1/10 MTN and the 2/4 IN advisory teams.

98 Ibid.

task training requires a delicate balance of multiple requirements. With the BCT often spread across two or more continents, having forward and rear command structures, it is also common to have subordinate units on different deployment/redeployment timelines, all of which can negatively impact collective BCT combined arms proficiency. Experiencing many of the same challenges of the SFA BCT deployment mission, the RAF concept is another common contemporary approach to meet the objectives of national security strategy.

Regionally Aligned Forces

The global footprint of US forces changed drastically beginning in 2011, through a combination of large scale troop withdrawals from Iraq as well as overseas base closures. Simultaneously, the idea of RAFs highlighted the strategic future landscape for governmental and military leaders. In January 2012 the Secretary of Defense of the United States outlined this future concept through strategic guidance stating, “[a]cross the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” 100 This guidance to the components was further developed by the Army and eventually led to the employment of the RAF concept involving Army Brigades. In March of 2012, the CSA, General Ray Odierno, explained the 2013 initiation of the RAF concept in describing the involvement of the Total Army, also referred to as the “Total Force” (Active, Guard, and Reserves), with a purpose of “improving partner capacity, sustaining strong relationships and to assist our Joint, Interagency, International and

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Multinational partners in building a stronger global security environment”\textsuperscript{101}. Later that year, the first RAF mission commenced with the 2nd Armored BCT, 1\textsuperscript{st} ID (2/1 ABCT) out of Fort Riley, Kansas providing support to US Africa Command. Since 2013, Army Brigades from the Total Force have been aligned against the six GCCs to execute RAF missions and deployments.

The RAF concept is designed to provide culturally and regionally-focused forces to GCCs for employment in support of their respective TSCPs with a heavy focus on SCA such as SFA. A RAF can be expected to conduct a wide variety of missions and tasks to include operational missions, bilateral and multinational exercises with foreign partnered-nations along with other SCA as directed by the GCC. While an Army BCT may assume a RAF mission and related deployments, not all of the BCT will deploy and/or various units and key personnel may deploy to various locations at different times. The RAF construct involves leaving behind elements that can be reorganized as needed to continue training for future requirements or deployment in support of the RAF, as well as emergent tasks outside of the RAF requirements.\textsuperscript{102} With the decentralization of forces necessary to meet the demands associated with the RAF concept, key challenges affect functions such as mission command as well as collective training requirements. This broad array of requirements poses additional challenges to the BCT’s training competencies.

A review of the 2014 CSA Strategic Guidance and Priorities showcases the flexibility required from a RAF BCT. Here, the BCT is expected to be trained to decisive action and globally responsive while simultaneously regionally engaged.\textsuperscript{103} Similar to the SFA BCT mission

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\end{itemize}

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challenge in regard to readiness, the RAF concept can have negative impacts on a units MET proficiency. Combining the training requirements and skills required to meet the demands of RAF specific missions, along with skill sets required for a BCT to remain globally responsive and competent in decisive action skills often prove challenging to maintain. Along with challenges associated with the RAF concept, the RAF concept provides several key opportunities at the strategic and lower levels.

The RAF concept directly supports national strategic priorities in several keys ways. When considering the processes involved to execute RAF deployments at the BCT to theatre levels, there is a direct correlation with strategic priorities such as global responsiveness through improving deployment processes.\footnote{Headquarters, Department of the Army, G3/5/7, \textit{Regional Alignment of Forces Brief}, Army G 3/5/7 (Washington, DC: June 10, 2014): 3, accessed November 26, 2016, http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/g2Docs/DAMI-FL/RegionallyAlignedForces.pdf., 2.} In the realm of increasing deployments of forces across many regions, the RAF paradigm further enhances capabilities and relationships among partners, through multinational exercises and training events. A generally new concept with only three years since its inception, the RAF model will continue to take shape and serve as a solid foundation as a “way” to promote national security strategy.

United States Marine Corps Advisors

With a rich history in advising foreign militaries dating back to the early twentieth century in South and Central America, again in Vietnam and most recently through actions in the Middle East through the GWOT, the USMC continues to exert influential leverage in the realm of building partner capacity around the world. As early as 1915, the USMC was influential in building partner capacity in support of US national strategy through advisory efforts associated with the “Banana Wars” in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.\footnote{William Rosenau et al, \textit{United States Marine Corps Advisors, Past, Present and Future}, CNA Analysis and Solutions, August 2013: 9, accessed Dec 18, 2016,} The foundations
established through advisory initiatives in Latin America continue to prove influential within today’s USMC advisory infrastructure. During this historical era, Marine advisors were challenged with increasing responsibilities outside of military-focused advisory roles. Leading constabulary organizations, Marines were involved with early whole-of-government approaches to promoting US policy, often involving aspects of diplomacy, economics, law and order as well as traditional military advising activities. As enlisted Marines often served as officers within such constabulary organizations, the increased responsibility, power and influence associated with these billets often led to highly sought after Latin American posts for Marines. One Marine NCO’s self-description of his duties and responsibilities while serving as an officer in the Haitian Constabulary (Gendarmerie d’ Haiti) in the 1920’s reads:

“[h]is duties in this connection are manifold; he is responsible for the training of the native soldiers, their proper feeding and clothing, [and] instruction in their duties as police. He also is financial advisor of one or more towns. He is in charge of paying the civil officials of his subdistrict. These sub-districts are often spread over a large territory and he must make frequent inspections. He must also maintain friendly relations with the native officials in the different towns. For it is only by the cooperation of these officials that he can observe the workings of the courts, [and] the progress of the towns of which [he is the] financial advisor.”

Similar in nature to some of the more contemporary advisory responsibilities of Marines in the GWOT, some of the experiences and key lessons learned include the importance of adequate pre-deployment training as well as the challenges associated with language and cultural barriers.


106 Ibid. 10-16.
108 Ibid.
109 Rosenau et al, 9.
As the USMC played an important role in advising South Vietnamese Forces in the 1950s-1970s, a variety of programs and experiences provided valuable lessons which continue to be integrated into the modernization of the USMC’s advisory methodology. With two main advisory programs including the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) and Combined Action Program (CAP), advisor selection and pre-mission training contributed to varying degrees of success between the two. Considering the two programs, an overall assessment reveals considerable investment in predeployment training and more detailed selection for advisors were generally more prevalent as part of the VNMC structure in comparison to the CAP, which resulted in considerable more challenges for the CAP advisors and mission. Similar lessons learned were later carried forward and revalidated as the Marines provided advisory efforts during military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Marine support to SC from 2003-2012 in Iraq and Afghanistan provided major partner capacity building support to the GWOT across a range of programs and formations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Marine efforts varied in scope from small ad hoc Marine teams assisting US Army Special Forces working with Afghan Commando Battalions, to part-time advisors with Iraqi Army units, to more deliberate efforts involving the 3rd Marine Division formally aligned against the advising mission for the Afghan National Army’s 201st Corps. Amid a long list of advisory and partnering efforts and organizations which Marines supported or led, some of the more formal endeavors included Marine MiTTs, Police Transition Teams, Coalition Military Assistance Training Teams, Advisor Support Teams, and Border Transition Teams. To date, the role of the Marine Advisor in Afghanistan continues to be at the forefront of US and Coalition

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110 Rosenau et al, 31.
111 Ibid., 32-34.
112 Ibid., 55.
113 Ibid., 35-74.
efforts in places such as Helmand Province where the Marines have a long history of combat and advisory operations.

In addition to the ongoing partner capacity-building efforts across the Middle East, USMC advisors continue to be paramount in the promotion of national security policy around the globe. The establishment of the MCSCG helped formalize the structure and focus of these efforts. Created in 2011 at Fort Story, VA, the MCSCG was established “as a unique command that consolidates all facets of SC to include advisor skills, training and assessment expertise, and security assistance program management.”

Further institutional efforts within the USMC and the MCSCG in the realm of building partner capacity, includes a recent focus on tracking advisory experience, education and skills across the ranks for talent-management purposes. With the creation a Marine Free Military Occupational Specialty (FMOS) labeled Foreign Security Force Advisor (0570/0571 for enlisted/officers respectively) in December 2014, and continued annual screening of personnel files, the USMC is aggressively maintaining visibility on these key skill sets within the ranks. Beyond a starting point in regard to the establishment of an advisory command and identification of advisory skill sets, with continued efforts in this arena, the USMC is postured to further enhance their ability to build partner capacity globally.

The Army’s Latest Initiative: Future SFA Brigades

In light of some of the key challenges with current practices and future demands associated with national security strategy, the Army aims to develop a new command architecture to help promote objectives centered on building partner capacity. The SFA Brigade concept

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addresses several of the Army’s prevalent challenges to include impacts on BCT readiness associated with the RAF and SFA BCT concepts, increased persistent engagement capabilities, and the ability of DoD’s largest ground force to better support subsequent defense strategy. This structure, which is currently in development, potentially will encompass an entire Army Advisory Corps, composed of six brigades and two division-level headquarters.\textsuperscript{116} Serving as the Army’s 39th CSA, in June of 2016 General Mark Milley publicly highlighted the versatility of capabilities of the Army in supporting GCCs with an operational SFA brigade as early as 2018.\textsuperscript{117} With this first SFA brigade aligned against the US Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility, plans call for two more SFA brigades to activate by early Fiscal Year 2019.\textsuperscript{118} Following these activations, three additional brigades, two divisions and the corps headquarters’ activations will follow.\textsuperscript{119} Still in the developmental phases, this initiative displays the ability to best address current and future strategic requirements of the Army.

As the Army’s force structure and end strength numbers continue to evolve in relation to DoD budgetary guidance, crafting the SFA brigade concept remains a work in progress. With the eventual goal of the SFA initiative centering around five active duty and one Army National Guard brigade, fully-manned organizations are not templated.\textsuperscript{120} Describing a “cohort” type of architecture, General Milley envisions a skeletal framework of brigades that replicate modern combat brigades without manning these formations with lower enlisted personnel.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{116} As the SFA Brigade concept remains under development, a pre-decisional draft briefing for the Army G-3/5/7 dated December 22, 2016 was utilized as a source of up-to-date information pertaining to the development of this new formation within the Army. Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, \textit{SFA Force Generation Council of Colonels Brief #1: Pre-Decisional Draft version 4} (Washington, DC: December 22, 2016): 19.

\textsuperscript{117} Milley.

\textsuperscript{118} Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, \textit{SFA Force Generation Council of Colonels Brief #1: Pre-Decisional Draft version 4}, 7-8.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 8.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 4, 8.

\textsuperscript{121} Milley.
Encompassing the six templated SFA brigades, two will be established as armored and four as infantry brigade variants.\textsuperscript{122} Within these brigades, battalions will most likely provide command and oversight of companies, with the execution platforms being advisory teams made up of various specialties as observed under the MiTT construct. Manning will consist primarily of NCOs and officers, with commanders and advisory team leaders being more senior in nature and proven former commanders with key and developmental billets successfully executed prior to assignment in the brigades.\textsuperscript{123} As part of the assignment process to the SFA organizations, personnel will undergo a formal training process.

As the CSA states, the formations will have a “little flavor of Special Forces in there and a flavor of the Foreign Area Officer program”. Within these “flavors”, majors will fill the roles of company commanders, and training for personnel assigned to the SFA brigades will include cultural and language skill set development.\textsuperscript{124} In the realm of training for future SFA brigade soldiers, the Army plans to create a permanent military advisor training academy (MATA).\textsuperscript{125} With the MATA expected to begin training future advisors sometime in Fiscal Year 2018, the CSA’s prioritization of SFA focus within the Army is clear.\textsuperscript{126} Creating this new advisory corps is a complex endeavor striving to better support strategic requirements while simultaneously addressing specific Army capability gaps.

Reviewing some of the key challenges associated with the current RAF or SFA BCT paradigms involving unit readiness and global engagement between partnered nations, the SFA Brigade concept appears to address both. With the intent to produce regionally-focused units with SFA expertise, these brigades will be allocated to the GCCs for SFA employment, with the

\textsuperscript{122} Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, \textit{SFA Force Generation Council of Colonels Brief #1: Pre-Decisional Draft version 4}, 7-8.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
additional capability to perform as combat units in cases of national emergency. Based on the cohort type of organization, the SFA brigades’ ranks could rapidly be filled with soldiers to round out the formations as combat units. In cases such as Operation Inherent Resolve or Resolute Support, where SC activities involving train, advise and assist are key aspects of the mission, senior leaders and staff members would be better equipped to serve dual-hatted functions within the advisory division or corps as well as key advisors to foreign senior leaders. A concept still in development, the Army staff continues to address some of its associated challenges.

Within a series of topics which continue to be analyzed for implementation, four key areas stand out as challenges to the Army’s SFA concept: manning, funding, basing and infrastructure, and decentralization of entities associated with the program. Manning the proposed formations presents challenges in the realm of drawing the best talent and fitting career timelines. Funding the creation of new organizations involves a myriad of complexities involving training apparatuses, infrastructure and equipment, as just a few examples. In the realm of basing and infrastructure, nine brigade and above headquarters require attention which will inherently encounter unique challenges. Finally, under the current proposal, multiple organizations are involved in the development and future operational processes which can potentially create additional challenges based on the decentralized nature of the inputs to the organization. Included in the list of those involved include the following major entities: Department of the Army Military Operations (DAMO) - Training, DAMO - Force Management, DAMO Strategic Plans and Policy, US Army Forces Command, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the US Army Human Resources Command. Whereas the USMC model with the MCSCG unifies the

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127 Milley.
129 Ibid.
majority of the functions associated with SC under one headquarters, the Army process is templated to remain much more decentralized which can add additional challenges. Still in an infant state, the Army’s senior leaders continue to streamline the future construct to maximize the efficacy of this complex endeavor.

Conclusion

The world continues to experience growing threats and complexities related to regional and global security. As a global leader, the United States continues to face challenges in the realm of strategic security implications as growing concerns continue to mount in the arena of national security and projection of defense strategy. In an era of both domestic and international economic stress, national resources aligned against defense allocations are increasingly restricted and managed with extreme caution. With recent force drawdowns across the services, the challenges presented for security institutions continue to progress along expansive paths. Updated outlooks in the realm of strategic assessments and security strategies leads to changes in the ways and means the US Department of Defense will achieve future strategic endstates.

Change in national security strategy increasingly relies on SC activities such as FID and SFA. The notion of increasing focus towards building partner capacity continues to underwrite strategic defense methodology across a wide spectrum of programs, concepts, and strategic documents. Assessments from key defense documents, to include the US QDR, NSS and NMS all reveal this growing approach. Expressed concisely during perhaps President Obama’s final speech to a large military formation in December, 2016 at Macdill Airforce Base, President Obama highlighted a new strategic outlook while discussing the fight against terrorists in the Middle East in stating “we should ask allies to do their share in the fight, and we should strengthen local partners who can provide lasting security.”

130 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism,” MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, December 6, 2016, accessed Jan 7, 2017,
The United States has a long history involving building partner capacity through FID and SFA. From the earliest days of US military history, advising foreign militaries and building partner capacity has been an imperative aspect of the Defense Department’s lineage. With successful endeavors such as those in Colombia, the joint force has demonstrated the powerful resolve of well-executed SC programs across troubled regions. Further assessment of Colombia’s ability to export FID and SFA, or US “SC by proxy” scenarios now taking place in Central and South America exemplify the progressive potentialities existing in the defense arena. Across the services modern initiatives, concepts, and programs show the continued expansion of focus and capabilities related to strategic guidance and national defense strategy. Comparing a multitude of factors across the COE, the armed services’ obligations and commitments increasingly support partner capacity-building.

With robust capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains, US partner capacity-building platforms continue to expand across the services. Future SC programs which incorporate FID and SFA activities must be executed while considering key lessons learned from historical application as well as through the assessment of contemporary challenges. First, service command architectures must maximize centralization of the entities involved in the execution of FID and SFA, as is observed with the MCSCG model. Second, personnel serving in capacities focused on building partner capacity must be carefully selected and properly trained. Third, billets and/or career tracks established through service programs must be career enhancing and professionally appealing. Fourth, engagement strategies must be persistent in nature to foster rapport, trust and access. Finally, expansion of SC within SFA and FID capability sets must increase capacity building efforts in areas such as cyber and other influential contemporary domains.

In summary, the United States continues to represent global leadership with the ability to project military power and influence worldwide. Among turbulent conditions, the strategic reliance on DoD’s ability to build partner capacity continues to evolve with increasing importance. As the future asymmetric environment encompasses growing uncertainty and complexity, the US Military must remain poised to meet the associated demands. Variations in contemporary defense strategy, further supported through increased dedication of resources by the services highlights the future relevance of FID and SFA in accomplishing national security objectives.
Bibliography


