TWO CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

THOMAS P. GALVIN

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Thomas P. Galvin

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FOREWORD

Strategic communication has historically been cited as a weakness in U.S. military operations, both at the operational and strategic levels. Numerous studies have highlighted problems with U.S. abilities to promote a coherent message and influence the environment to be favorable to its strategic interests. Failures are easy to identify. The effects of poor communication can manifest themselves quickly; however, what about successes? Rarely are they discussed, perhaps because it is difficult to know when a campaign achieved enough of the desired effects such that leaders can claim success.

In this book, Dr. Thomas Galvin suggests two more reasons—that contemporary metaphors or measures of success are flawed, and campaigns can only be studied longitudinally. Using his personal experiences in Stabilization Force-Bosnia and the formation of U.S. Africa Command, Dr. Galvin presents both a framework for analyzing strategic communication campaigns and the stories behind the two campaigns, which have succeeded in achieving long-term effects on their environments. The lessons learned from these cases are important for strategic leaders who must undertake the difficult challenges of crafting new communication campaigns for their organizations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

THOMAS P. GALVIN is in his eighth year with the School of Strategic Landpower and currently serves as an assistant professor of leadership studies. Dr. Galvin retired as a colonel after 29 years of service in the U.S. Army, which included 10 years of service in various commander's action groups in joint, service, and combined commands overseas. He has research interests across the fields of individual and organizational learning, leadership, and management. Dr. Galvin holds master's degrees in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and artificial intelligence from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA; and a doctor of education degree in human and organizational learning from The George Washington University, Washington, DC.

SUMMARY

Everything an organization and its members say and do communicates. Organizations communicate to survive and thrive in their environments. They do so by promoting themselves and their competitive advantage, targeting opposing or competing organizations, and defending themselves from criticism by others. On the other hand, not all communication is what leaders desire. Say-do gaps and inconsistencies among messages abound. For organizations the size and scope of the U.S. military, these are recurring problems which confuse our partners and provide fodder for criticisms by adversaries. The challenge for leaders is orienting as much of the organization's communication as possible toward specific goals.

Strategic communication emerged in the defense community as an integrated process to develop and disseminate desired messages, ostensibly to convince opponents of friendly intentions. Strategic communication became the subject of many books and scholarly articles, especially on the qualities and capabilities of leaders and great orators who communicate effectively with external audiences. However, neither doctrine nor literature provided adequate clarity as to how strategic communication was related to other organizational functions that managed communication. The result has been studies and stories of communication failures of various forms, such as say-do gaps or wrong-headed actions that confused or angered audiences.

Identifying failure is easy. The negative effects often manifest themselves quickly. However, what does right look like? What constitutes a successful communication campaign? Unfortunately, the answer in the defense community has been to look at significant

seminal events such as the moon landing as exemplars, which ignores or bypasses the preceding histories. The space race as a whole contained many successful and failed actions both before the Apollo XI Mission and after. Single events are not good measures of the success of campaigns.

Rather, the best way to understand successful strategic communication is longitudinal. What was the full story of the organization, the campaign it undertook, and the changes in the environment that came from it? That is the approach of this book. Through two historic case studies of successful communication campaigns, one coalition and the other joint, the book presents an architecture that allows leaders in other contexts to build similar campaigns, implement them, and assess their effectiveness. The two cases differ significantly in context, environmental challenges, and the organizations' identities. Nevertheless, they shared one very important factor—the leader personally launched a campaign to change something undesirable in the environment and succeeded.

The book is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces this book and provides an overview of its chapters. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the treatment of strategic communication in joint doctrine and unresolved questions over the concept. One problem has been the disjointed formal structure of communication among military organizations, such as the mutually exclusive functions of public affairs and influence operations (e.g., propaganda). Although strategic communication clearly includes both functions, the (justified) barriers to communication between these entities make understanding and implementing strategic communication difficult. Another problem is the disagreement among scholars and practitioners over

whether strategic communication is an organizational process or a leadership skill. These perspectives differ in how they characterize what right looks like.

The approach of the book is to use a simple model from organizational development—Pettigrew's Triangle of process, content, and context—to understand both the communication environment and the campaign initiated within it. The Triangle is a useful lens to analyze and plan organizational change. Process refers to the processes of communication, or how organizations craft and spread messages. Content refers to the message itself: How well formulated is it? How aligned is it to the situation and the perspectives of audiences? How well does the message spread itself without extensive energy being expended by the organization?

The two cases follow. Chapter 3 is the case study of the Bosnia Multi-Year Roadmap (MYRM) developed by the Stabilization Force-Bosnia (SFOR) in 2000-2001. The MYRM emerged from an internal project assigned by the commander of SFOR to foster greater integration and cooperation between the civilian and military organizations in theater. Seeing the MYRM's potential as a broader collaboration and coordination tool, the SFOR commander used it to harmonize relationships among SFOR headquarters and the subordinate multinational divisions, while also championing it to the High Representative. The MYRM's adoption at the international level conferred legitimacy to the Roadmap, setting the stage for the development of strategic plans eventually handed over to the Government of Bosnia as SFOR's mission drew down.

Next, chapter 4 is the case study of the creation of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) from 2007 to 2010. USAFRICOM was formed under great controversy, with many opponents accusing the United States

of neocolonialism and militarizing foreign policy. The command exercised a campaign to convince a wide range of disbelieving audiences that this was not the case, and it succeeded because of the conciliatory strategy that defused the controversy until USAFRICOM's own programs could take shape. The harmonization of words and deeds over 2 years eventually changed the minds of many opponents and neutral parties, leading to enduring and productive relationships.

Chapter 5 analyzes the two case studies to draw common lessons learned in the areas of content, process, and context from Pettigrew's Triangle. Lastly, chapter 6 presents the implications of this report and offers an architecture for strategic communication campaigns built on six essential questions that leaders must answer to develop their own campaigns.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Everything an organization and its members **say** and **do** communicates. Organizations communicate to survive and thrive in their environments. They do so by promoting themselves and their competitive advantage, targeting opposing or competing organizations, and defending themselves from criticism by others. For example, private sector organizations promote their products and services in ways that keep them relevant in the marketplace. They target competitors to woo customers away, and, in turn, they protect the customers they already have. The meaning of survival is clear—if the business fails, it folds. Military organizations communicate similarly. They promote their capabilities to deter adversaries and reassure their people, targeting threats, and defending themselves against criticism in times of crisis or against cuts to their cherished programs. Their measure of success is preparedness to fight and win.

On the other hand, not all communication is what leaders desire. Sometimes members lack commitment toward the organization or speak and act independently of the organization's preferred messages. Say-do gaps and inconsistencies among messages abound. For organizations the size and scope of the U.S. military, these recurring problems confuse our partners and provide fodder for criticisms by adversaries. The challenge for leaders is orienting as much of the organization's communication as possible toward specific goals.

To that end, scholars and military practitioners alike have pursued models, frameworks, and means of communication as a tool. Since the 1990s, the focus was on the concept of **strategic communication**

described in a landmark study by the Defense Science Board as "an integrated process that includes the development, implementation, assessment, and evolution of public actions and messages in support of policies, interests and long-term goals."[1] Strategic communication became the subject of many books and scholarly articles, especially on the qualities and capabilities of leaders and great orators who communicate effectively with external audiences. Military commands and agencies establish offices or departments responsible for their strategic communication. However, neither doctrine nor the literature have provided adequate clarity as to how strategic communication was related to other organizational functions that managed communication. Unhelpful overlap surfaced, so much so that revisions to joint doctrine in 2017 dispensed with the term altogether.[2] Instead, it charges the military with providing **communication synchronization** in support of national strategic communication efforts.[3] Ostensibly, the goal is to ensure consistency of messages delivered to external and internal audiences through a coordinated process.

The controversy over the name is a symptom of a broader problem, that the U.S. military is dissatisfied with its communication and concerned about the speed of communications in the modern environment. It has taken criticism on the chin for supposed communication failures in the operational environment, with domestic audiences, and within its membership. From poorly conceived outreach programs in Iraq and Afghanistan to the challenges of recurring crises related to sexual harassment and assault, the bad news stories seem to outnumber the good. The military seeks what right looks like so that it can be replicated. Unfortunately, the common description of

what right looks like comes from the Defense Science Board study that cited various one-of-a-kind events that cannot be replicated, such as the moon landing. What leaders need are tangible, accessible examples of successful communication that provide actionable guidance to orchestrating a communication campaign which achieves its desired effects over a reasonable time.

This book serves such a purpose. Through two historic case studies of successful communication campaigns, one coalition and the other joint, this book presents an architecture that allows leaders in other contexts to build similar campaigns, implement them, and assess their effectiveness. The two cases differ significantly in context, environmental challenges, and the organizations' identities. However, they shared one very important factor—the leader personally launched a campaign to change something undesirable in the environment and succeeded.

The book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the treatment of strategic communication in joint doctrine and unresolved questions over the concept. Chapter 3 is the case study of the Bosnia Multi-Year Roadmap developed by the Stabilization Force-Bosnia in 2000-2001, which was eventually handed over to the Government of Bosnia as their strategic plan. Chapter 4 is the case study of the creation of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) from 2007 to 2010. USAFRICOM formed under great controversy, with many opponents accusing the United States of neocolonialism or militarizing foreign policy. The command exercised a campaign to convince a wide range of disbelieving audiences that this was not the case. Chapter 5 analyzes the two case studies and draws some lessons learned. It also restates the

problem which strategic communication is meant to solve. Chapter 6 presents the implications of this analysis and offers an architecture for strategic communication campaigns built on six essential questions that leaders must answer to develop their own campaigns.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board: Task Force on Strategic Communication*, ADA476331, Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January 2008, p. 1, available from *https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2000s/ADA476331.pdf*, accessed November 27, 2018.

2. Joint Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: the Joint Staff, July 2017, p. 222, archived copy available from *https://web.archive.org/web/20170807193907/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf*, accessed November 29, 2018.

3. The Joint Staff, *Joint Planning*, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 2017, p. II-10.

CHAPTER 2. THE PROBLEMS WITH "STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION"

> Americans have had many strategic communication successes. In some cases, it was a single document or speech (i.e., the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address) or an image (the moon landing). In other cases, success was a product of actions, complemented by images and words, in the context of strategic objectives (the Marshall Plan, Dayton Accords, HIV/AIDs initiatives). In still other cases, long-term relationships between people and institutions led to success (the Fulbright program, large-scale educational and scientific exchanges).[1]
>
> —Defense Science Board

How one measures success goes a long way toward understanding how one makes sense of the environment. There is little question that each event in the above list of "successes" claimed in the Defense Science Board study were events that had a tremendous impact on the national or global environment. The Declaration of Independence was a powerful document, a product of the will and courage of a group of men willing to put themselves at personal risk to declare themselves free from foreign tyranny. The Gettysburg Address summarized in just a few phrases the cost of the battle as well as the worthiness of the war and the need to preserve freedom. The moon landing, which pictured alongside the quote, captured the imagination of the nation.

However, these events were but single acts or episodes in what were longer campaigns by nations or organizations to influence the strategic environment in their favor. Those campaigns included individual acts of communication that succeeded or failed to produce their intended effects. It is common practice to look at discrete identifiable actions and brand them

as either successes or failures, and extend that assessment to the overall campaign.

However, is this accurate, such that those supposed successes could be replicated or guide today's planners to future communication successes? This book argues against this view. Isolating such well-recognized actions leads to over-determination of success and failure. Consider the examples from the Defense Science Board passage. First, the Declaration of Independence was but one action in a long campaign to secure American freedom from British rule, a campaign that not all colonists accepted or agreed with. The campaign included the Revolutionary War, which lasted for several years thereafter, cost many lives, and arguably continued through the War of 1812 several decades later. The Gettysburg Address was similarly part of a campaign to restore the unity of the country, but was followed by 2 more bloody years of war and a contentious Reconstruction. The moon landing symbolized the end of a particular effort, spurred by Cold War competition that included other fronts such as the continued Korean armistice and Vietnam. In looking at them as isolated events, their communication value was more tactical than strategic.

This problem in the strategic communication discourse persists. There has been plenty of literature discussing failures of strategic communication in military operations. Yes, particular programs or activities failed to achieve specified goals due to cultural differences and other communication barriers. What is too often overlooked is the broader campaign that these actions support. If the campaign is flawed, then any words or actions implemented by subordinate organizations are less likely to achieve sustainable effects.

A related problem is too much attention being paid to the qualities of particular "great" communicators who should be emulated, often highlighting very senior leaders who are instantly recognizable due to their elevated places in history. How often are Winston Churchill, Nelson Mandela, or George Marshall mentioned when it comes to great orations or great quotes? Yet, how many times are they misquoted or words misappropriated to them because the actual speakers have faded from memory?[2] These individuals were products of their times and a specific political and social context. Their greatness is measured in retrospect. The focus needed for today's strategic communicators is future oriented. How can they write the **next** messages to be delivered by the organization?

These problems have led to the development of tools aimed at quick solutions to near-term problems. Although cultural awareness, oral and written communication skills, emotional intelligence, and other tools are useful, strategic communication is more of an art, one that demands great patience and commitment to long-term goals.

This book culminates an effort to step back and look at the problem using two historical strategic communication campaigns that were arguably successful. The case studies pitted organizations in environments where controversy, misunderstandings, and misperceptions reigned. The pressure placed on the organizations' leaders was great. The resulting campaigns were not one-man shows of great orators. In fact, one campaign required that the leader stay in the background and let the organization do all the communicating, while the other required that all members of the leadership exercise alignment of many disparate messages. These campaigns were characterized by the

continuous, coordinated efforts of many within each organization to promote a central narrative and influence the environment more favorably. The qualities of these campaigns suggest a different set of tools and a different way of thinking about future campaigns.

BACKGROUND ON THE TERM "STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION"

A full recounting of the history of strategic communication is beyond the scope of this book, but the term was very much in use among academics in the 1990s. At the time, strategic communication was aligned with public relations, marketing, and other activities focused externally to the organization. For example, communication scholar Carl Botan wrote in 1997 that strategic communication campaigns encompassed a set of activities to achieve a specific purpose. One example was public diplomacy, to "persuade the people of another nation to influence their government's policies."[3] The term was also used in political science, representing the personal methods, plans, and rhetoric associated with communicating with internal and external audiences.[4] Toward the end of the decade, "strategic communication" began appearing in term papers[5] in the U.S. Army War College resident program.

There appear to be several avenues by which strategic communication entered the military lexicon more formally. Christopher Paul identified its origin with the 2001 *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination*.[6] James Farwell attributed the term's entry into the military to a branch of the Joint Staff in 2002.[7] A Google search shows several dozen documents from across the U.S. military

in 2001 and 2002 that presented or proposed strategic communication plans or suggested that strategic communication was something important for senior leaders. The subsequent 2004 Defense Science Board report and the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* set out to define strategic communication and determine the capabilities required to implement it.[8] These activities shared a common impetus that the various informational elements of national power (public affairs, public diplomacy, information operations, and such) were neither cooperating nor were they synchronizing their activities. Strategic communication would provide the answer. Better synchronization and cooperation of the message would assure the organization's ability to get its message heard and accepted.

However, the various elements of informational power did not cooperate easily. A personal experience of the author's is related to the introduction of strategic communication to operations in Stabilization Force-Bosnia in the winter of 2000-2001. Strategic guidance from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Headquarters called for cooperation and unification of public affairs and information operations under a single "strategic communication" plan to support efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Bosnian people and show solidarity with pro-Dayton elements within the government. However, the public affairs office rebelled against the idea, claiming that their credibility hinged on remaining distinct and detached from information operations and any communications that could be perceived as propaganda. Attempts to co-opt the public affairs office failed, and ultimately the effort stalled.[9]

Another problem with the term was the diffusion of its meaning among those who saw it as a process

versus those who viewed it as the ability to communicate "strategically."[10] The process orientation is evident in the way the Joint Staff defined **strategic communication** in 2010:

> Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.[11]

There are several key words in this definition. "**Focused**" expresses an increased concentration of attention, resources, and effort. It assumes that more communication, quantitatively greater and qualitatively better, is vital for pursuing the desired "conditions." "**Coordinated**" means the U.S. Government manages or governs its activities from a holistic perspective and eschews stove piping and uninformed activities. "**Synchronized**" expresses the importance of timing and interdependence of messaging. Some messages have the greatest impact when said exactly once or infrequently. Other messages require constant repetition and reinforcement. What is said or done in one location may affect how other activities are perceived elsewhere. Finally, "**programs, plans, themes, messages, and products**" encompass the "**what**" of communication. This incorporates both words and deeds, which should align as much as possible to present consistency and coherence. The board included among their recommendations that a new Department of Defense (DoD) office be established to review and coordinate communication activities among public affairs and information operations.[12] The process

would therefore overcome differences among the competing communities of practice.

The orientation on communicating strategically focuses on the senior leader's communication capabilities and capacity for aligning their words and actions with their desired strategy.[13] In the case of the U.S. Government, this orientation also extends to a number of agencies in the Departments of State and Defense who routinely engage with external audiences.[14] The perspective favors the public affairs and public diplomacy functions and reduces the focus on information operations and psychological operations. The downside was the emerging establishment of the Office of Strategic Communication, whose roles and functions overlapped with the public affairs function. In 2012, this led an assistant secretary of defense to publish a memo banning "strategic communication" from the defense lexicon in favor of the term "**communication synchronization**."[15] The role of joint force commanders was to "coordinate, integrate, and synchronize communications to support planning and execution of a coherent national effort."[16]

However, while this term is meaningful in joint planning and operations, it is less relevant for enterprise activities. For example, the four services launch their own independent campaigns, competing with each other for resources from Congress and for volunteers from the public to serve. Other times, they unite the DoD in competition for resources against other federal agencies. Communities of practice within the services also compete with each other for resources, attention, and relevance. So while strategic communication is no longer a joint term, there remains a persistent requirement of military organizations to communicate strategically as individual organizations.

THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN

The term "**campaign**" has been used to represent the strategy behind exercising strategic communication. The literature has been divided in describing the methods of deploying this strategic communication, with some viewing a "campaign" as simply a public relations tactic to disseminate a message widely, while others view it as a method to spread strategic communication with specific objectives in mind.[17] The Defense Science Board report identified three "timeframes" for strategic communication: (1) short-term news streams, (2) medium-range campaigns, and (3) long-term engagement.[18] The use of the word **campaign** in the medium-range category is consistent with the objectives and methods approach and aligns with Carl Botan's use of the term. However, it is unclear that the term "campaign" cannot apply to the other timeframes. For example, crisis management can have campaigns associated with them, and which may have the short-term goal of restoring the status quo ante or at least ameliorating the situation.[19] The difference between a medium-term campaign and long-term engagement, which the study refers to as a form of relationship-building and sustainment, is also unclear.[20] Should a campaign not achieve its purpose in the medium-term, one would expect it to continue until the purpose is served or the campaign is terminated. Engagement also serves a particular purpose—of garnering partners and shaping the strategic environment to serve one's own interests. Thus, one can view engagement as a form of campaign.

Therefore, this book defines **a strategic communication campaign** as a purposeful effort to coordinate

an organization's actions and words to achieve a specified purpose.[21] The purpose for the campaign is encapsulated in the organizational **narrative**, "a representation of a particular situation or process in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching set of aims or values."[22] The campaign is a useful metaphor, a symbol to represent the whole organization fighting to accomplish a strategic mission, but composed of hundreds or thousands of interdependent but often conflicting or chaotic activities. The metaphor allows leaders to think strategically about the desired effects on the environment, rather than overemphasizing measures of performance of individual acts of communication.

IMPETUS FOR THE CASE STUDIES

The author spent 10 years assigned to the staff groups of several combined, joint, and service component commands and held strategic communication responsibilities in each.[23] These included stints in the two commands discussed in this book during the times the campaigns were formed and underway. Both organizations can claim that their campaigns were "successful," meaning that they achieved their intended effects on the strategic environment, at least for a time. However, the two campaigns were vastly different in many ways. The leader's roles were different. The ways the messages were crafted, depth of planning, dissemination strategies, and how success was measured and claimed were all different. This made it difficult to articulate what brought about the successes in each such that other organizations could replicate them in other contexts. Thus began the author's effort to research the two campaigns retrospectively and in-depth to better understand what happened and to

capture the common and contrasting aspects, which could provide a generalized framework and methodology for planning and implementing strategic communication campaigns.

In reflecting on these cases, several questions came to the author's mind that provided the impetus for studying the campaigns and their implications in greater depth. The first question was whether strategic communication was only a process or communicating strategically, or was it something more? Both perspectives seemed to pay insufficient attention to the character and quality of the message delivered. In other words, both perspectives seemed more concerned with process, methods, and delivery, and not enough with how to construct a message to which others would listen. Indeed, one of the most difficult challenges for leaders is constructing a narrative, one that the organization would want to promote. As the former Chief of Strategic Communication for NATO Mark Laity states, this is a common weakness in communication campaigns:

> Right now we spend too much time on coordination and process. We have now created organizations whose sum is less than the parts. . . . The enemy is fast, flexible, and more attuned to the cultures where they operate. We talk Narrative, but Narrative is where they beat us. We do messages and themes, and our opponents do Narrative and tap into cultures and religion.[24]

A second question was related to the meaning of synchronization. The discourse and doctrine seemed to assume a purely top-down approach to planning and executing a campaign. Subordinate organizations and individual members were to be compliant to the higher authority's campaign. Moreover, it inadequately

considers individual preferences or disagreements, as the organization's narrative supersedes all.[25] This promotes the commonly held view that the organization must control the messaging, and must do it from the top-down. This deviated significantly from the author's experiences, where most campaigns were implemented as much bottom-up as top-down. This is supported by communication scholarship. For example, communication scholar Dennis Mumby developed a broad set of natural tensions between individual and organizational goals, values, and needs. He described organizational members as naturally struggling with their organization's attempts to control messages, suggesting that vertical communication planning should go both ways.[26]

The third question regarded the boundary of a communication effort or campaign. As shown above, the tendency has been to focus on a more narrow scope, whereas in a complex adaptive environment a broader scope may be more appropriate. Is a campaign something that the leader declares both at beginning and at end? Is a campaign something that goes on much longer, connecting all events and activities of an organization throughout its existence? Is it somewhere in between? The problems of the current view are easy to identify—the leader declares victory and walks away while the situation continues to evolve and eventually undermines the gains. The broader view presents a different challenge in that victory may be impossible to declare. While some scholars advocate the establishment of an **information end state**, in practice that end state may be unachievable, and even if achieved, may be subject to the continuous dynamics of the strategic environment.[27] Victory may be just a transitory state. Given that resources (including time) are finite,

leaders must choose the proper scope if they are to successfully articulate the need for campaigns to their followers.

A corollary to the third question was the relationship between campaigns of superior and subordinate units. Do the services not have their own communication campaigns separate and distinct from the DoD? What is the nature of nesting, such as how do commanders decide to follow a superior's campaign wholeheartedly or depart from it? The top-down view would suppress such subordinate campaigns, but that clearly does not occur in practice.

The fourth question regarded the focus on changing the hearts and minds of adversaries or audiences with a strongly opposing perspective. Steve Tatham's study of strategic communication efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an example, showing how, for various reasons, the United States failed to change minds or mollify angry populaces in operational environments.[28] What about changing the hearts and minds of friends? The author's experience suggests that organizations also often seek to change the hearts and minds of supposed friends and stakeholders, and this is every bit as difficult as influencing adversaries. Consider the case in the 2010s, with repeated attempts by the DoD to convince a skeptical Congress that the military needed a Base Realignment and Closure to reinvest savings from unneeded bases into modernization and readiness.[29] The discourse of such cases is careful to avoid impressions of "targeting" domestic audiences with propaganda, which was legally banned for many years.[30] Trust is a vital component in civil-military relations, and therefore military leaders must handle disagreements rationally without violating that trust.[31]

From a social and professional perspective, this difference between the treatments among friends, foes, and fence sitters (i.e., neutral parties) makes sense. Laws, agreements, and protocols constrain and enable communication between any two audiences, and these should be honored. In reality, the divided discourse appears purely artificial and erects barriers to the proper study of strategic communication campaigns, where communications aimed at one audience are shared over social media and potentially reaches **all** audiences. Answering the question requires a dispassionate look at the exercise of influence. From an organization's perspective, what is the qualitative difference between communicating with friends and foes? If there is no difference, then what contextual or processual cues help the organization differentiate messages aimed at friendly and adversarial audiences?

The fifth and final question regarded the roles of leaders. The literature on communicating strategically favors recognizable "name-brand" public figures whose perceived influence over the strategic environment were exceptional and noteworthy. However, this perspective appeared incomplete. What did the leaders do when not behind a microphone to further their campaigns? The author's experience suggests that the actions of leaders outside of public speaking and away from view were vital to ensuring that the coordination and synchronization of organizations' activities were sustained. Moreover, the rest of the management team—deputy commanders, Chiefs of Staff, directors, and so on—played critical roles, both good and bad.

PETTIGREW'S TRIANGLE AS A LENS

> The starting point for . . . analysis of strategic change is the notion that formulating the **content** of any new strategy inevitably entails managing its **context** and **process** [emphasis added].[32]
>
> —Andrew M. Pettigrew

The so-called "Pettigrew's Triangle"[33] of context, process, and content emerged from a landmark 1987 study in strategy research. Pettigrew's interest was in researching complex endeavors that were difficult to examine using traditional empirical methods and thus ignored by mainstream academics.[34] Rather than attempt to break such endeavors down to specific relationships between variables that can be measured and analyzed, Pettigrew was more interested in the broader context of the change. He wanted to describe that the change effort was influenced by the traditions, cultures, structures, and behaviors of an organization and its subdivisions, and he applied this to the study of a leading British manufacturing firm in the 1970s.[35] Therefore, **content** represents the content of the strategy, along with what it proposes to change. Content could be either formalized as a detailed plan or expressed more tacitly as intent. **Process** represents the "actions, reactions, and interactions from the various interested parties as they seek to move the firm from its present to its future state."[36] Meanwhile, **context** is divided into internal and external spheres. Internal referred to the structural, cultural, social, and political factors with the firm, while external context encompassed the "social, economic, political, and competitive environment."[37]

In a podcast reflecting on the impact his work has had on management studies, Pettigrew advocated

for more monographic works that tell stories of firms undergoing strategic change to better understand how strategy and strategic change happen.[38] During the podcast, strategic communication was discussed as an instance or subcategory of strategic change from which a similar monographic approach could be taken. Thus, Pettigrew's Triangle can be adapted to encompass the analysis of a strategic communication campaign as follows:

- **Content**—Content analysis for a strategic communication campaign includes its narrative, supporting themes and messages, activities to disseminate those messages internal to the organization, activities to promulgate the messages externally, and activities to collect and analyze data to measure achievement of the campaign's desired effects.
- **Process**—Processual analysis for a strategic communication campaign includes understanding the practices of communicating within the organization, how the campaign influenced the organization directly, and how the organization transformed due to implementing the campaign.
- **Context**—Contextual analysis for a strategic communication campaign includes understanding the external and internal environments before the campaign began, how they responded to the campaign, and how they evolved over time.

Thus, this book will use Pettigrew's Triangle as a lens to examine the two case studies. The cases are presented as stories that begin with the context in which an organization and its leader are immersed,

the impetus for change requiring extensive use of a coordinated strategic communication campaign, the development and implementation of the campaign, and the aftermath or termination conditions. Each case concludes with important lessons unique to the case. Afterward, chapter 5 will use Pettigrew's Triangle to compare and contrast the cases in terms of the content of the campaigns (e.g., narratives, messages, and actions), the internal processes of each command as they influenced the conduct of the campaign, and the internal and external contexts before, during, and after the campaign. This will facilitate general discussion about strategic communication campaigns in chapter 6.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY I: THE BOSNIA MULTI-YEAR ROADMAP (MYRM)

BACKGROUND OF THE MYRM[1]

> As personalities changed and IFOR [Implementation Force] drew down to transform into SFOR [Stabilization Force], the role of the OHR [Office of the High Representative] became increasingly important in the effort to stabilize Bosnia. Between 1997 and 2000, a document emerged within SFOR and later in the OHR called the Multi-Year Road Map (MYRM). Essentially a synchronization matrix, the MYRM lined up the pillars and established milestones for each ranging out to 10 years. . . . The end-state was labeled "Stability and Potential," the definition of which was an OHR prerogative but was established in conjunction with SFOR input. Views on the end-state differed: should Bosnia return to its pre-war state? Was that in fact feasible given the trauma? In any event, obstacles to the progress of the MYRM remained and they had to be dealt. The focus of SFOR activity well into 2001 was directed towards dealing with those obstacles.[2]
>
> —Sean Maloney, History Professor,
> Royal Military College of Canada

SFOR created the MYRM at a time when international commitments to its mission were growing tenuous. Bosnia and Herzegovina had experienced no open warfare since 1997 and the international community was tiring of sending money, troops, and resources there. The air campaign and subsequent peacekeeping operations in Kosovo fueled concerns that international efforts were making things worse, not better. Although SFOR was able to demonstrate progress toward its mandate, there was less certainty about progress in the diplomatic and developmental areas under the auspices of various international organizations. Moreover, unity of effort within SFOR

was hampered by the direct line between forward stationed forces and their governments.

The MYRM represented an effort to strengthen communication channels internal and external to SFOR, and evolved toward a higher purpose of providing strategic direction for the international effort. While it did not transform SFOR into a different organization, essentially the mission and responsibilities of the organization remained the same—it influenced how it engaged other actors in the environment. It clarified what was a complicated situation. This case study examines the origins and the construct of the MYRM as originally envisioned, and how it evolved before being absorbed into the Office of the High Representative's (Office of the High Representative) Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) in 2003.

FROM THE DAYTON ACCORDS TO THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

The General Framework Agreement for Peace (Also Known as "Dayton")

> On December 14, 1995, the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) was signed in Paris, after it had been negotiated in Dayton, Ohio. . . . Based on UN [United Nations] Security Council Resolution 1031, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] was given the mandate to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. . . . It accomplished its principal military tasks by causing and maintaining the cessation of hostilities. . . . Due to the [Implementation Force's] IFOR early success, a secure environment was established. This enabled the High Representative (nominated at the London Peace Implementation Conference of December 8-9, 1995) and other organisations to start their work with regard to the implementation of the civil aspects of the peace agreement, and to create conditions

> in which the return to normal life could begin in Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . .The [North Atlantic Council], in consultation with non-NATO contributing countries, SFOR and SHAPE, reviews SFOR force levels and tasks every six months. This periodic review is the basis upon which NATO assesses future force requirements and mission accomplishment. On October 25, 1999, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided, having taken into account the improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to implement, between November 1999 and April 2000, a revised structure for the Stabilisation Force (SFOR).[3]
>
> — Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The early 1990s conflict in Bosnia was horrific by any standard. Images of the war and its ethnic cleansing, widespread armed violence, and ineffectual UN peacekeeping operations shocked the world. The war ended in 1995 with the signing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialed by leaders of the combatants—the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The GFAP established the **Inter-Entity Boundary Line**, creating two distinct entities in order to separate the **former warring factions**, splitting Bosnia into the Republika Srpska (Serbs) in the north and east and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croats and Muslim Bosniaks), mainly in the south and west. See figure 3-1.

The Dayton Accords established a Bosnian governance structure designed for power sharing among the three ethnic groups, both in terms of civilian control and military capacity. Its Presidency was a three-member committee composed of one Bosnian Serb, one Bosnian Croat, and one Bosniak Muslim, each directly elected by their ethnic constituencies. Each member of the Presidency served a 4-year term, and one would serve as chair on a rotating basis.[4] However, all Presidential decisions had to be made via consensus. If consensus could not be reached, the dissenting member could declare the decision "destructive" to their constituents who, by a two-thirds majority, could effectively veto the decision.[5] Also, Annex 1B of the agreement called for arms reductions and caps on military personnel to achieve "balanced and stable defense force levels at the lower numbers" commensurate with the Entities security requirements.[6] These established fixed ratios of capabilities between the Entities (2:1 Federation to Republika Srpska) and among neighboring states (5:2:2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Republic of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina).[7]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*.

Figure 3-1. Post-Dayton Bosnia[8]

Implementing the framework by the international community had two distinct components—military and civilian. Under the military implementation of the agreement, NATO established an Implementation Force, known as IFOR, to keep the peace. The civilian implementation established a High Representative, a diplomatic official from Europe who would "coordinate and facilitate civilian aspects of the peace settlement, such as humanitarian aid, economic, reconstruction, protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections."[9] The High Representative would

answer to the UN, maintain an Office (known as OHR) in Sarajevo, and host meetings with the leaders or representatives (known as the "**Principals**") of the other key civilian organizations—the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the Office of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), the International Police Task Force, and IFOR. It is important to note, however, that while OHR had oversight authority over the other international organizations, it had none over IFOR, which was problematic for unity of effort.[10] OHR conducted routine meetings of the Principals,[11] and used the term "Principals" when conveying joint decisions and communications.[12] The following subsections summarize the key responsibilities of the Principals.

Office of the High Representative[13]

Article II of Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement directs the High Representative to monitor the implementation of the peace settlement, coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations, resolve disputes, and report progress to the UN, European Union, and key contributing nations such as the United States and Russia. Among the most important milestones in the peace implementation process was the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Conference in Bonn, Germany, in December 1997. Elaborating on Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the PIC requested that the High Representative remove from public office those officials who violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement, and to impose laws as necessary if Bosnia and Herzegovina's legislative bodies fail to do so.

Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch assumed the role of High Representative in 1999. A native of Austria, prior to this role he served as the Austrian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade from 1997 to 1999. He also served as the European Union's envoy to Kosovo in 1999, and was the European Union's Chief Negotiator for the Kosovo Peace Talks during 1998-1999. He would serve as High Representative from August 1999 through 2002.[14]

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina[15]

UNMIBH's mandate was to contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina by assisting in reforming and restructuring the local police, assessing the functioning of the existing judicial system and monitoring and auditing the performance of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and order.

UNMIBH was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Coordinator of UN Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who exercised authority over the International Police Task Force Police Commissioner and coordinated all other UN activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main components of the Mission were the International Police Task Force; the Criminal Justice Advisory Unit; the Civil Affairs Unit; the Human Rights Office; the Public Affairs Office; and the Administration, including the UN Trust Funds.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe[16]

The OSCE supported the establishment of governmental institutions, associations, and processes to strengthen Bosnia and Herzegovina's governance, encourage its consolidation as a multinational and multiethnic democratic society, and prevent future conflict. OSCE promoted the building of civil society; judicial, legal, political, and educational reform; development and professionalization of the security sector; election monitoring; and human rights. OSCE operated out of 14 field offices throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees[17]

UNHCR was designated as the lead organization for refugee return and all humanitarian operations. Annex 7 of the GFAP comprised two "chapters" regarding protection and returns of displaced persons, both external (who left the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and internal. UNHCR was responsible for refugee camps set up throughout Bosnia.

NATO Stabilization Force as of 1998[18]

IFOR only held a 1-year mandate, and was subsequently succeeded by the smaller SFOR. Along with sustaining IFOR's peacekeeping mandate to sustain a safe and secure environment, SFOR performed or supported demining operations, disarmament, arrests of alleged war criminals, and transformation of Bosnia's defense sector.[19] Through June 2000, SFOR headquarters operated out of the Hotel Ilidža, located in the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidža. It then moved to its new

"purpose-built"[20] home of Camp Butmir that straddled the Inter-Entity Boundary Line outside Sarajevo. One main gate opened to the Republika Srpska, while the other opened to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lieutenant General Michael L. Dodson assumed command of SFOR in September 2000, after the move was complete.

The Situation in Bosnia, 2000

Although there were few major incidences of violence in 2000, there were ominous signs that the peace was still fragile. The country was littered with landmines,[21] and civilians everywhere were still heavily armed and on guard in case hostilities resumed.[22] Repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was far behind what was desired, leading to concerns that the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, intended to be temporary, was in danger of becoming permanent.[23]

Several key war criminals had yet to be apprehended, and there was reluctance among the international community to pursue them vigorously for fear of a possible uprising.[24] Intelligence obtained and shared among the 21-nation SFOR staff were too often leaked to one of the three ethnic factions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, providing advanced warning about where and when SFOR was about to conduct raids. Moreover, it was open knowledge that several nations contributing troops to SFOR favored one of the three ethnic factions—either the Orthodox Serbs, the Catholic Croats, or the Bosniak Muslims. SFOR therefore began restricting intelligence access to only those involved in the raid, upsetting staff members who were left out of the loop.[25] This presented a dilemma for planners, forcing them to choose between keeping all relevant parties engaged and protecting the

mission from information leaks.[26] If left unchecked, these issues had the potential to fuel the resumption of open hostilities. These issues were largely under the purview of the civilian organizations implementing the Dayton Accords, but had obvious influence over the safe and secure environment that SFOR was charged with maintaining.

Remnants of Nationalism

When the Dayton Accords established the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, the Federation side was composed mainly of Bosnian Croats and Muslim Bosniaks. However, the latter greatly outnumbered the former, and thus the Bosniaks were becoming more powerful within the Federation, fomenting nationalist tensions among the minority. The HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union, or *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*) was the strongest political party representing Bosnian Croat interests, but it was a nationalist party at odds with the establishment of Bosnia as a multiethnic state. Between election rule changes from OSCE designed to reduce the influence of nationalist parties and waning support from the Bosnian Croat population, the HDZ entered the fall of 2000 facing the possibility of losing elections in its dominant districts.[27] HDZ's strategy was therefore aggressive. Under the campaign slogan of "Determination or Extermination," HDZ tried to unify the Bosnian Croats against the Bosniak majority, while also taking a direct confrontational stance against the international community who they claimed were biased against them.[28]

Despite having its own entity with established territory and independent political authority, the Bosnian Serbs were marginalized compared to the

Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation. This was due to a combination of their strong opposition to the international community during the conflict and external perceptions that the Bosnian Serbs were the primary (or sole) antagonist.[29] A possible contributor to this view was the open wound left by the Srebrenica massacre 5 years earlier. In July 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan officially apologized to the Bosniaks for the failure of UN peacekeepers to protect the roughly 8,000 Muslim men from the Bosnian Serb Army.[30]

The main political party representing the Serbs in 2000 was the nationalist SDS, a member of which was Radovan Karadzic, former President of the Republika Srpska and a person indicted for war crimes.[31] Between the SDS and HDZ, the Principals were expressing concerns about the possible regrowth of nationalist fervor and the impacts that may have on the near-term stability of Bosnia.

Slow Transformation of the Armed Forces

The Dayton agreement called for the separation of the Entity Armed Forces, while the subsequent "Florence agreement" established targets for phased demobilization that were met in 1997.[32] Concurrently with Dayton, the United States established a highly controversial **train and equip** program with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces to deter possible future Bosnian Serb aggression.[33]

By 2000, Elizabeth Cousens and Charles Carter explained there had been "no incidents of military-on-military violence," but that there had been no real integration of the three former combatant forces. The Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces remained

essentially separate, but trained together, while the bias described above prevented any real effort to integrate the Bosnian Serbs,[34] although the concept was discussed among the train and equip program's administrators. Incentives such as entry into the Partnership for Peace program had yet to spur speedier integration.[35]

Corruption and Donor Fatigue

Development of civil society also lagged behind expectations in 2000. A U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report from July that year showed that crime and corruption in Bosnia were very serious problems and that international assistance was especially prone to fraud and abuse.[36] The lifting of sanctions after the Dayton agreement did not weaken organized crime groups that had already grown deep roots in society on all sides.[37] Illegal logging, human trafficking, illegal reproduction of intellectual property, illegal businesses, the use of invalid rosters of government personnel (especially military) to siphon off funds, and other criminal activity was largely unchecked as these groups intimidated citizens[38] and blocked the return of refugees.[39] Thus, in late 2000, there were concerns about increasing **donor fatigue**, whereby donors of charitable resources lose willingness to contribute time, money, or resources because of the repetitive appeals for help, a perceived lack of progress of the cause, or loss of interest.[40] The World Bank, as the largest donor, was especially concerned, as it had been victimized by graft and corruption.[41]

Implications

The combination of the above factors, the lack of significant renewed hostilities, and the emergence of ongoing operations elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia fed a dual narrative. On the one hand, there was peace such that withdrawal could and should take place. On the other, there was concern that any reduction could and would reignite the conflict. For this reason, an SFOR staff member commented to the author upon his arrival in theater in late September 2000, "This winter will be a major turning point in Bosnia."

The Situation within SFOR Headquarters, 2000

Internally and externally in late 2000, SFOR faced challenges in unity of effort and unity of purpose. Despite the tremendous amount of activity that SFOR and the other international organizations undertook, there were barriers to closer cooperation and synchronization of efforts that frustrated the SFOR leadership.

National Pressures to Reduce Commitments

The first pressure came from the troop-contributing nations eager to reduce their commitments. One visible sign of this was the decision to reduce the SFOR commander from a four-star to a three-star U.S. general, along with the respective downgrading in rank of other senior headquarters' positions. This was justified by the slow but steady progress in implementation of the civil and military provisions of the Dayton Accords, along with perceptions that the likelihood of a return to hostilities was diminishing. Yet, troop-contributing nations still

wanted to maintain enough of a force in theater to hold leadership positions within SFOR headquarters. This resulted in the headquarters being top-heavy and somewhat fractious. The following passage from three Dutch officers summarized these challenges brilliantly:

> The organizational structure of the headquarters was not based on efficiency or span of control, but on power and access to information. Every participating country wanted to have a strong position in the headquarters. . . . This game involved lobbying, persuasion, as well as give-and-take, in order to collect as many high positions as possible. . . .Very interestingly, these national networks formed shadow organizations within the formal organization of SFOR headquarters. The different countries formed their own lines of communications between their officers on various levels. The highest ranking officer from each country . . . was responsible for representing, defending, and carrying out the national interests of his country. . . .Language was an advantage for the Anglo-Saxon countries and a big disadvantage for the other countries. Especially for the countries of Southern Europe,[42] it was difficult to comprehend what was said and meant during the formal and informal meetings. The use of English abbreviations, acronyms, and dialects contributed to the language barrier.[43]

Cultural Challenges Inside the Headquarters

In the SFOR headquarters, informal communication channels along national lines were strong and often influenced how things were done. In practice, the SFOR headquarters staff operated in a largely bifurcated fashion whereby Anglophone-dominated directorates or branches prioritized information flow toward the British deputy (deputy commander for operations, or "DCOMOPS"), and others (most

notably the French and German-dominated CJ5) answered more to the French deputy (deputy command or "DCOM").[44] The result was a weakening of the Chief of Staff position, held by an officer junior in rank to the deputies.

National lines also influenced communications between the SFOR headquarters and its Multinational Divisions (MNDs). There was a perception that the U.S. commander and British and French deputies had strong relationships with the MNDs of their countries, e.g., the U.S.-led Multinational Division-North (MND-N), the United Kingdom (UK)/Canadian-led MND-Southwest (MND-SW), and the French-led MND-Southeast (MND-SE). This created a perception among members of the SFOR headquarters staff that each command group member had its own subordinate division at his disposal.[45] On the other hand, these relationships were also important for continuity, as many of the national contingents within the MNDs and among the MND staff were on short rotations, which was disruptive to relationships with local Bosnians and international actors working within their sectors.[46] Moreover, the MND headquarters oversaw battle groups from very different nations,[47] each with both declared and undeclared missions and restrictions from their governments that meant that they responded differently to requests for action and information from SFOR headquarters.[48]

A New Commander and Staff Group

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Michael Dodson assumed command of SFOR on September 8, 2000. He had come from his assignment as deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command. He

had been the commanding general at Fort Riley, KS, and the commanding general of III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, OK. Dodson had a master's degree in operational research and systems analysis from Kansas State University.

Dodson's front office was organized similarly to that of many U.S. generals; however, the duty positions were named under NATO conventions. It included a military assistant (a U.S. Army colonel) serving as executive officer responsible for all office affairs, two aides-de-camp (one U.S. captain and one UK officer of equivalent rank), and a staff group of special assistants. In addition to accompanying Dodson on visits to international stakeholders, MNDs, and national contingents, the staff group was responsible for internal consultation within the headquarters, special projects for the Command Stabilization Force (COMSFOR), and recording and archiving the COMSFOR's professional activities.

Under the previous commander, the staff group included a U.S. officer to help with U.S. national affairs, a U.S. civilian serving as a Serbo-Croatian linguist (although the SFOR commander also had several native linguists on the staff), and a non-U.S. NATO officer. Both U.S. members swapped out in conjunction with Dodson's arrival. The staff group included Dr. George Chalustowki, who deployed from Germany on September 2. Chalustowski was a historian and political scientist who earned his Ph.D. in Poland and had a background in professional military education. U.S. Major Tom Galvin would arrive about 3 weeks later. Galvin had just joined U.S. Army Europe as a member of its commander's staff group after a year with V Corps in Germany. The NATO member was German Army Oberstleutnant (a lieutenant colonel

equivalent) Detleff Chalupa, who had already served multiple tours in Bosnia. He provided both continuity and historical knowledge for the group.

GENESIS OF THE MYRM

With so many agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina with various responsibilities for nation-building and post-conflict stabilization activities, it is hardly surprising that someone would come up with the idea to build a synchronization matrix. In interviews with the author, veteran SFOR staff members recalled the efforts of a previous SFOR commander to build one. Dubbed the Multi-Year Roadmap, the commander's staff group developed a wall-sized chart that detailed how SFOR would meet the military requirements and support accomplishment of the civilian ones. The staff group at the time was very large, and the project reflected alignment with the personality of the then-commander, who was very detail oriented. However, this Roadmap did not gain much traction outside of the staff group. The commander's successor operated differently. He was not interested in the details and preferred a much smaller front office. The Roadmap was abandoned and, perhaps in part due to the subsequent move to Camp Butmir, largely forgotten.[49]

Birth of the Idea

Soon after their arrivals, Dodson and Chalustowski discussed the situation facing the command. Dodson had developed a sense that members of the UN Mission had no sense of urgency, due to having no tolerance for bad news and it being in their best interest to preserve their good-paying jobs. He was concerned about the billions of dollars being poured into the

infrastructure of the war-torn country but a general lack of eagerness among members of the international organizations to leave Sarajevo.[50]

Dodson was also concerned about the troop-contributing nation's pushes to prematurely withdraw military and civilian commitments from the region. While the desire to conclude the mission after 5 years was understandable, he sensed that the vision of the future Bosnia was yet unclear among the Principals. He believed the progress since Dayton could be undermined if reductions in resources and effort preceded conditions under which Bosnia could self-sustain its security and development.

Dodson tasked Chalustowski to prepare the "Entrance Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina into the League of Civilized Nations," based on the words of the new High Representative, Petritsch. He had called upon the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to abandon their cultural animosities toward each other and unify. By using the High Representative's words, the task of convincing the troop-contributing nations to cooperate with a plan to turn over control of the government back to Bosnia and Herzegovina was reduced. By this time, Galvin had arrived and was in the process of becoming familiarized with the effort. At the same time, a concept was provided to NATO and Supreme Allied Commander Europe showing the troops required for the tasks at hand and defined the risks for the accomplishment of those tasks, to both the remaining troops and the mission.[51]

Following the Entrance Plan, Dodson asked Chalustowski to develop a "PERT Chart"[52] to identify all the different responsibilities of the Principals who represented not only the 23 nations that had troops on the ground with SFOR, but also the additional 31 nations

that contributed financially or materially to the mission. He wanted all the tasks identified, then combined into major axis/elements. Then he asked that one of the Principals be identified to be primarily responsible for each axis, as well as those Principals who would be supporting. Chalupa had known what was done previously and produced binders containing studies and plans that the staff group attempted to digest.

One early October morning, the staff group deliberated over the project at a cafe in Camp Butmir. The collection of tasks produced at that point were interesting, but did not provide a coherent story about the purpose of the international effort. The conversation soon shifted to wondering aloud: What progress was being made in Bosnia and how did anyone know? No one in the staff group had a satisfying answer, and they came up with a different approach than those expressed in the binders provided by Chalupa.

Galvin suggested using the requirements of the Dayton Accords as a basis, placing them on slips of cut paper, and then arranging them into an "end state." They then added the listing of SFOR's and Principals' activities collected thus far, similarly cut them into slips of paper, and sequenced them as best as possible into lines of effort leading to the end state. The result resembled a jigsaw puzzle with half the pieces removed. In essence, many of the Dayton annexes listed action items intended to change the conditions in Bosnia toward a better future state, but there were gaps in the logic exposed in the slips of paper on the table. They characterized the majority of the gaps as tasks that seemed insufficient to achieving the end state, and that subsequent actions needed to be identified. Other gaps were reflective of tasks issued to a Principal, in that the conditions in Bosnia and

Herzegovina that were necessary to execute the tasks were not yet set. Nonetheless, the Principal was executing the task.

The staff group saw an opportunity. Rather than build the chart based on assigned tasks alone, the group deliberated over both the end state and the gaps. Regarding the end state, the Accords themselves did not describe the future Bosnia and Herzegovina beyond the goal of "enduring peace and stability." Instead, they defined the goal solely in terms of the post-war settlement, as eliminating conditions that might lead to a renewal of hostilities.[53]

Thus, to make the end state more concrete, the group turned to expressions of vision coming second-hand from officials who participated in the talks. Representative examples follow:

> First, there should be a single Bosnian state, with a single international personality, and a commitment to its internationally-recognized borders; a federal government representing all the people of Bosnia with foreign policy powers and other national government powers; democratic elections to be held next year; strong guarantees of human rights.[54]
>
> —U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher

> Because implementation is now the key to true peace in Bosnia and the region -- to take Bosnia to free and fair elections during the next year; to let all of those who have been forced to flee to other countries or to inside the region, or inside Bosnia, have the possibility of returning to their homes, to disarm and demobilize; to start to rebuild a ruined economy; to secure human rights for each and everyone; to build that reconciliation that is the road to a future in harmony in Bosnia.[55]
>
> —Former Prime Minister Carl Bildt

> A secure environment adequate for the continued consolidation of the peace without further need for NATO-led military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . All parties demonstrate commitment to continue negotiations as a means to resolve

> political and military differences. Established civil structures are sufficiently mature to assume responsibilities to continue monitoring compliance with the GFAP. Conditions have been established for the safe continuation of ongoing nation-building activities.[56]
>
> —SFOR "Desired Endstate"

With a more fleshed out end state, the staff group then deliberated over the gaps. "**Someone does this, then what?**" was a common refrain. As new "tasks" were inserted into the gaps, synchronization challenges emerged among activities of different Principals. In addition, while there was clarity regarding the conditions in Bosnia at the time of the Accords, there was less clarity on how conditions in Bosnia were being measured in 2000. This led the staff group to sequence the tasks conditionally along major lines of effort, such that tasks were phased according to the advancement of peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The staff group also deliberated over measurements. How would the conditions be measured so to allow movement to advanced tasks? There were many quantitative measures of performance, such as how many weapons Operation HARVEST removed from the battlefield. However, the measures of effectiveness across activities was less clear, leading to discussions about lack of progress in one area undoing progress in another. For example, drawing from SFOR's ongoing concerns about the HDZ, the staff group determined that building effective law enforcement institutions would serve little purpose if corruption remained a problem. Therefore, they included measures of effectiveness for anticorruption efforts into the Roadmap. The expression of intermediate conditions allowed

for detection of both forward progress and backward regression.

Over subsequent days, the group fashioned a 5x6 foot wall chart that represented an event-driven progression of conditions from the GFAP state to a broad vision of Bosnia being the rough equivalent of other European Union nations because of transformation across the military and civilian sectors.

Structure of the Roadmap

The Roadmap in its initial form consisted of 10 lines of effort, each roughly corresponding to the military and civilian implementation annexes of the GFAP. See figure 3-2.



Figure 3-2. Ten Lines of Effort in the 2000 Multi-Year Roadmap[57]

The lines of effort roughly fell under three major themes. The first covered civilian objectives, which encompassed the first four lines of effort: (A) Economy, (B) Good Governance, (C) Rule of Law, and (D) Social Advancement. The second theme included the responsibilities of SFOR: (E) War Recovery, (F) General Security, and (G) Peace Support. Progress in these areas essentially amounted to SFOR working its way out of a job, with Bosnia and Herzegovina being able to assume responsibilities for its own security. The final three fell under the realm of the Entity Armed Forces responsibilities: (H) Post-War Reductions, (J) Civil-Military Establishment, and (K) Military Professionalism. These three lines of effort were closely related and represented the transformation of the security forces so Bosnians could accept full responsibilities from SFOR.

Each line of effort had subordinate lines of activity. For example, (C) Rule of Law was subdivided into four lines of activity: (C1) Border Security, (C2) Police, (C3) Social Acceptance of the Rule of Law, and (C4) Judiciary. Dividing the lines of effort proved useful, as the balance of responsibilities differed among the activities. For example, UNMIBH was the primary responsible agency for Border Security and Police, while OHR and OSCE had more dominant roles for the Judiciary.

The rainbow across the top represented stages of progress along each line. Black (later brown as in figure 3-2) represented the GFAP state of no progress, while red (later pink), orange, yellow, and green represented progress toward the end state, identified with blue.[58] In the early versions, the staff group assigned a descriptive phase for each stage within a line of effort. For example, the sequence of stages for

the development of the acceptance of the rule of law (C3) included the following:[59]

- Brown—"Separate entity legal and judicial systems; illegal immigration and smuggling are rampant."
- Pink—"European Criminal & Civil Law Convention's corruption monitoring mechanism implemented, and professionalized civil law enforcement agencies in place."
- Orange—"Laws relating to crime and corruption are harmonized at various levels of Government."
- Yellow—"NGOs and individuals become active partners in the fight against corruption."
- Green—"Improved acceptance and respect for law and order."
- Blue—"Bosnia and Herzegovina operates under the Rule of Law and its citizens have full confidence in the legal and judicial systems."

The group then placed task bubbles in between the stages to list who was responsible for doing what. The bubbles included SFOR, civilian agencies, and Bosnia and Herzegovina itself—activities that the Bosnians would have to accomplish on their own. In early versions, the bubbles included only a few broad tasks; they would become more detailed over time.

Commander's Response and the Roadmap's Socialization

Dodson came to the staff group seeking an update a few weeks into the effort. Upon seeing the completed wall chart for the first time and being asked if this was what he wanted, Dodson responded, "Well, not

exactly, but this certainly has given me a lot of good ideas."[60] Over the subsequent weeks, Dodson began to refine the Roadmap, regularly giving guidance on specific elements to ensure the end product stayed close to his original vision. Meanwhile, he concentrated his personal efforts on changing the internal staff procedures of the headquarters and strengthening his relationships with the heads of the Principal agencies, especially Petritsch.

Internally, Dodson determined that the disproportionate roles of the deputies over the Chief of Staff was unsatisfactory. With the arrival of a new Chief of Staff and rotation of the DCOMOPS in late October 2000, Dodson took steps to promote the Chief of Staff's central coordination role. For example, he modified the weekly battle rhythm such that the Chief ran general meetings more often without the deputies present. This had the effect of freeing the new DCOMOPS from the day-to-day routines of the headquarters and giving him a more strategic role. A symbol of this change in role was when Dodson brought the new DCOMOPS, UK Major General Richard Dannatt, over to the staff group area and used the Roadmap as an orientation tool. He would do the same with the new Chief of Staff, German Brigadier General Victor Krulak and the DCOM, French Major General Roger DuBurg.

This action gave the staff group the green light to begin more widely socializing the Roadmap with the staff directors. The most important, and by far the most contentious, engagement was with the French and German-dominated CJ5. By charter, the CJ5 was responsible for the headquarters' strategic plans and programs. Moreover, several of the CJ5 officers had long histories in Bosnia and were highly educated, with advanced civilian degrees. They had developed

particular antipathies toward U.S. officers and their supposed tendencies to take over the responsibilities of others and micromanage. Despite Chalupa's initial socializations with his German CJ5 counterparts, news that the COMSFOR's staff group had developed a Multi-Year Roadmap was initially not well received. They greeted it as yet another attempt by a U.S.-dominated staff group to step on their toes.

This situation was resolved once the staff group recognized the need not to promote itself as the owner or creator of the chart. Instead, the staff group subordinated the chart to Chief of Staff ownership, who in turn tasked the CJ5 to take primary responsibility for working with the staff group. Significant changes to the chart not otherwise directed by the deputies or the commander would require Chief of Staff approval. This quickly altered the relationship between the CJ5 members and the staff group, who began cooperating very closely. One example of this cooperation was when a British major in CJ5 good-naturedly identified a flaw in the products thus far, that they had been prepared in American English rather than the UN-standard British English. He quickly corrected the text and the products were ready for UN presentation. Subsequently, the Chief of Staff would be the one to present the chart to the staff, encouraging its use as an internal communication tool. The acronym "MYRM," pronounced "merm," was adopted during this time as shorthand for the Roadmap.[61]

Meanwhile, Dodson was sufficiently satisfied with the MYRM's progress that he felt it was time to socialize it with the Principals. In the late fall, he presented the MYRM to Petritsch, who cautiously welcomed the initiative and offered to allow its presentation at a later Principals' meeting. The basis for caution was,

in part, out of respect for the limited mandates of the other organizations and a recognition that the vision expressed in the MYRM exceeded the requirements laid out in the GFAP. In response, Dodson proposed that the MYRM should eventually belong to the Bosnian people. It would be a way of incentivizing progress. However, Petritsch remained cautious about the initiative.

In December 2000, the staff group was set to turn over completely. Chalupa's 1-year tour was completed, and he was replaced with German Army Oberstleutnant Lutz Rademacher. Chalustowski returned to Germany on emergency leave, while Galvin's tour was about to conclude. Consequently, primary responsibility for the MYRM moved to CJ5.

However, both Galvin and Chalustowski would return in January, as Dodson wanted the latter to expand the MYRM and write what the staff group would call "the Book," a much more expansive work to detail the tasks and conditions on the Roadmap. It was not sufficient for the MYRM to be a chart. If the goal really was to hand over the Roadmap to the Bosnians, it would have to be presented as an actionable manual. Meanwhile, Galvin returned to help socialize the Roadmap to a far wider audience beyond the Principals.

The arrangement with CJ5 at the beginning of 2001 was thus: CJ5, under authority of the Chief of Staff, remained the primary manager of the MYRM. Questions on technical and operational matters related to the Roadmap went to them. The staff group maintained its own copy in the commander's office but deferred to the Chief of Staff for any changes. Meanwhile, Galvin developed the strategic communication products that Dodson, Dannatt, and others at SFOR headquarters would use for socializing.

MATURITY—EARLY 2001 AND BEYOND

By mid-January 2001, Chalustowski had developed a 90-page draft of the Book that incorporated parts of the U.S. and German Constitutions plus various International laws and agreements into a MYRM implementation manual. It described each stage, line of activity, and task, with citations from authoritative sources. The wall chart further matured with detailed explanations of handover tasks, where responsibilities of Principal organizations would shift to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Book became the basis for each SFOR staff section to measure and verify progress, and provide additional explanations and measures determined to be missing.

Meanwhile, Dodson continued to engage with Petritsch and ultimately convinced him that the MYRM was ready for wider socialization. With the draft Book and strategic communication materials on hand, it was time to push the MYRM and see how far it would go with the international community.

Broader External Socialization

The High Representative presented the MYRM at a Principals' meeting in late January 2001. Petritsch's presentation constituted an important gesture as it mitigated the potential for the initiative being seen as a military idea treading on others' responsibilities. However, Petritsch remained cautious, and at the meeting he was not prepared to offer full endorsement. Rather, he presented it as a point of further discussion. Consequently, the other Principals displayed acknowledgment with a couple offering support for the idea so long as the intent was to offer it to the

government of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a tool, and not to use it to undermine Bosnian sovereignty.

This acknowledgment was earned through a series of informal contacts between SFOR headquarters members, especially from the CJ5, and national counterparts or professional contacts among the Principals' organizations. Chalustowski, for example, had a long-standing professional relationship with the official overseeing the activities of the International Police Task Force, who supported the MYRM. Despite public misgivings from OSCE, these informal contacts showed strong support from among members eager to conclude the Bosnian mission and return home.

One important outcome was the willingness of the Principals to allow further socialization to nongovernmental organizations and other international organizations operating in Bosnia. DCOMOPS assumed the dominant role, but other senior SFOR officers were also involved. The focus of such engagements was the acceptance of the vision expressed in the MYRM, and to show that the Principals were actively working to strengthen cooperation of the overall effort.

Gaining support from some organizations was easier than others—during these engagements, several expressed concerns about what they perceived as a disjointed international effort.[62] These engagements bore fruit in the form of stories of misaligned efforts and poorly planned activities that helped further refine and expand the Roadmap. For example, an engagement with officials of the World Bank provided numerous stories about corruption and illegal economic activities that rerouted millions of dollars of aid toward the nationalist parties seeking to undermine Dayton.

It was the more tactical-level problems where the lack of coordination had its most visible effects on progress. Through contacts with the Danish Special Advisor to COMSFOR responsible for managing Denmark's foreign aid, Chalustowski learned how much of the money was wasted because of duplication or poor management. Below is his account of one situation:

> One organization allowed $10,000 for the purchase of bricks, another one provided a similar sum for windows, another one provided money for the roof; however, no one thought of money allocated to connect the house to the power grid or water and sewer systems. Often the former owners of the destroyed houses no longer lived in the area because of "Ethnic Cleansing" or because they voluntarily left a Bosnian majority area to go to a Serbian majority area. Yet, when the funding was available, they took the money to build a house where they had no intent of ever living in that area again. Meanwhile, the High Commissioner for Refugees was trying to resettle these ethnic groups back to the original place of birth and residence prior to the war.[63]

A second outcome was the desire to explore using the MYRM as an actual assessment tool. The Book represented a stable approach to post-conflict stabilization, something that the international effort lacked due to the constant rotations of SFOR commanders and High Representatives, each wanting to take their organizations in new directions, but never being around long enough to see their plans put in effect. The CJ5 and the staff group became very busy at this time as the Principals began promulgating the MYRM to their own staff members for analysis and planning, which generated many requests for information back to SFOR.

These contacts brought to light the staff-level resistance to the MYRM, especially emerging from within OHR. For example, a Danish major within CJ5 arranged a special off-site meeting between Chalustowski and three senior members of the High Representative staff to discuss the MYRM and why it was necessary for OHR to adopt it. In the discussion, the source of the resistance became apparent—the MYRM was being perceived as prescriptive and inflexible. When Chalustowski explained that the MYRM was intended to be very flexible and the High Representative staff had full freedom to alter it, resistance to it decreased.

By March 2001, Petritsch gave the MYRM his full endorsement. The Principals agreed to use the MYRM as a strategic planning and management tool on a quarterly basis, beginning with their June meeting.[64]

Inculcation at Multinational Division Level

There was also commensurate internal socialization with the MNDs that began in the late fall but increased in January and February 2001. The SFOR command group members pushed the MYRM to the MND commanders to use as a litmus test for their activities. The five stages were used to gauge relative progress in the 10 lines of effort within their sectors, and they were encouraged to prioritize activities to influence areas where progress was slow.

The influence of the MYRM was most notable with MND-SE, which was the least Anglophone of the three. Staff officers in MND-SE adopted the MYRM as a means of bridging the language gap. Of the three MNDs, MND-SE was the most likely to explain its situation and its activities in relation to the MYRM.

Moreover, MND-SE also provided the greatest quantity of feedback, which it provided through the CJ5 to the COMSFOR staff group, which continued to tweak the product until March.

Operationalizing the MYRM

There were three criticisms of the MYRM that SFOR faced. The first was the concern over the potential for fostering mission creep. Because the MYRM originated in SFOR, there were concerns that stakeholders might interpret the tool as SFOR asking for more missions or attempting to take over the responsibilities of other agencies. Beyond a power grab, critics felt that SFOR was using the MYRM to justify retention of resources or force structure. A similar complaint regarded how the civilian agencies might use the MYRM to justify a "cut-and-run" strategy, declaring premature victory in their lines of effort and leaving a mess behind for SFOR to clean up.

The second, more subtle criticism was that the MYRM depicted standards for Bosnia that many transatlantic nations could not themselves achieve. Coming from throughout SFOR headquarters and MND staffs, these criticisms averred that the blue "end state" was utopian and infeasible, and would frustrate the Bosnians more than it would help. The staff group's response was that it was better to pursue a clear and desirable vision that would spur the Bosnians to plan for a better future, making the ideal the new reality, rather than take the easy way out.

The third was the lack of objective measurement, something that had been a part of the COMSFOR staff group's initial deliberations. They left them off specifically because, while SFOR had objective measures for

the military implementation of GFAP, declaring measures for the civilian implementation was inappropriate. The staff group did not have the workforce to explore it, nor did it have access to such information from the civilian agencies. Thus, thematic statements of progress were sufficient for SFOR's purposes. In an environment where the international community was waning in its support for the effort in Bosnia, objective measures were necessary for making the best use of diminishing resources.

These criticisms shaped the March 2001 operationalization of the MYRM—how it would migrate from being an assessment tool to a planning tool. The first step was to adjust the meaning of the colored stages, recognizing the delta between achievement of the end state and achievement of the mandate for a given agency. The civilian implementation of the Accords involved a handover process from the international community to a sovereign Bosnia. Thus, the COMSFOR staff group adjusted the MYRM such that achieving the middle yellow stage should represent the handover point. Military implementation tasks required a later handover point, as SFOR was required to assure the safe and secure environment for civilian work.

From the earlier socialization by SFOR, Principal agencies became more willing to share information, and staff officers discussed measurement development with the COMSFOR staff group. Samples of such measures migrated into MYRM briefings. For example, one late March briefing used UNMIBH's State Border Service plan as an example to tie progress along the MYRM stages to funding requirements for investment and workforce for the then-planned 42 border crossing points.[65] Another area where the MYRM had influence

was in efforts to reform the Bosnian Armed Forces. Efforts to unify the two Entity Armed Forces exhibited limited progress by 2001, but SFOR used the MYRM to re-energize negotiations by providing concrete goals and incentives.[66]

Principal agencies used the MYRM to revisit assumptions about their activities. One experience in March 2001 exemplified this. While in Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska, Chalustowski encountered a military member who was headed to Sarajevo where he had previously attended university. The war had interrupted his studies, and he was ready to resume them, but he was uncomfortable going back to school in a Bosniak-dominated area and instead elected to continue at the University of Banja Luka among the Serb population. His travel to Sarajevo was to clear his apartment and move into a much smaller one up north. What the soldier's story exposed was the existence of an informal exchange program that was facilitating such university transfers without the knowledge of international agencies. Chalustowski brought this to the attention of the UNHCR with proposals to change their MYRM goals to reflect better the reality that assumptions about the desires of displaced persons to return to their prewar locations no longer held.[67]

Finally, the MYRM became a tool for presenting to NATO the current progress in Bosnia, from which future force structure requirements would be negotiated. Stronger emphasis was placed on the military implementation and efforts to transform the Entity Armed Forces. However, the ability to present an objective picture of progress on the civilian side and the increased communication between civilian and military agencies strengthened SFOR's message.

Decrescendo of the MYRM Campaign

The staff group rotated over the spring of 2001, with Galvin departing in April, then Chalustowski and Rademacher by June. Dodson served at COMSFOR until September 2001, by which point the MYRM had become well established.

In various forms, the MYRM remained in use until 2003, when it was effectively absorbed into the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan (MIP).[68] In the meantime, the number of lines of effort in the MYRM consolidated down to six to simplify the model. Much more attention was paid to required tasks and outcomes than the loftier end-state goals.[69] The MIP's "six core tasks" were the following, each overlapping with the original MYRM's lines of effort:[70]

- Entrenching the rule of law;
- Ensuring extreme nationalists, war criminals, and their organized criminal networks cannot reverse peace implementation;
- Reforming the economy;
- Strengthening the capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina's governing institutions, especially at the state level;
- Establishing state-level civilian command and control over armed forces, reforming the security sector, and paving the way for integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework; and,
- Promoting the sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons.

The MYRM construct also migrated to postwar Iraq, courtesy of then-Brigadier General David Petraeus, who became "immersed" in it while serving in SFOR.[71] As division commander in Iraq and finding

himself, as two biographers put it, "a virtual potentate in Mosul for much of 2003,"[72] he directed his planners to "Go download the multi-year roadmap from the Bosnia Stabilization Force website."[73] With it, the planners were quickly able to build a campaign plan for northern Iraq.[74]

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

This case study illustrates several important lessons about establishing, planning, and implementing communication campaigns. Most of the institutional practices of communication in the campaigning model are derived from the SFOR MYRM case. Steady-state communication campaigns, where the identity of the organization stays generally constant, is about adapting the organization's narrative rather than creating it. However, the campaign grew as the benefits of the MYRM became apparent to more and more stakeholders.

Meaning is More Important than Symbols

Despite the naming of this chapter, neither the MYRM wall chart, the Book, nor any of its other associated products were not the purpose of the campaign. Rather, the campaign's purpose was to restate the shared understanding of the mission to strengthen unity of effort. The products served as tools to capture that shared understanding, but the narrative expressed by Dodson and the SFOR leadership constituted the real substance. Their story was that the international effort had to be smarter and better aligned to overcome the growing challenges in theater and the wavering commitments of the contributing nations.

It tapped into the greater aspirations of both civilian and military organizations performing the mission and inculcated both a vision and an end state. At some point, the international effort would have to end or at least scale far back, and something had to be shown for those efforts. It had to go beyond counting collected weapons, cleared mines, displaced persons returned, or border-crossing points established.

With a shared understanding, it was easy to operationalize the MYRM products. As leaders and stakeholders co-opted the content of the original wall chart, the campaign emerged from their interpretations of it, and the opportunities they saw stemming from it. When they shared the MYRM with others, the messaging accompanying the MYRM was vitally important. It could not be paternalistic. Instead of "**here is a tool, you must use it,**" the message externally was, **"we need to do better as an international effort, here is 'a' way to view the challenges we face, so we ought to talk about it."** To internal audiences, it was, **"we need to make sure that we are doing things right and doing the right things, here is 'a' way to make sure we ourselves are in sync."**

In some settings, too much emphasis on the tools could have unhinged the campaign. The MYRM had the advantage of drawing heavily from the GFAP and the extant missions of all the Principals, so it was already steeped in language that stakeholders were using. In less familiar or less established settings, promoting a tool too strongly could expose the lack of shared understandings of the environment or disagreements over required activities, pushing the ideas aside. This leads to the next important implication.

Importance of Legitimacy

The Bosnia Multi-Year Roadmap of 2000 was a bottom-up initiative, borne out of SFOR with a stated goal of influencing the international effort. Legitimacy is what gave the MYRM its power as an internal synchronizing tool for the SFOR headquarters and subordinate commands, and as an external tool to provide a vision of a post-Dayton future Bosnia, from which the international community and Bosnian leaders could align activities. In conjunction with the above point on meaning over symbols, SFOR leaders sustained this legitimacy in the way they used the MYRM to foster constructive dialogue rather than foisting a tidy solution onto a messy complex problem. For the same reason, it was vitally important to the campaign that legitimacy be conferred by OHR. This did not happen right away, as OHR's initial responses to the MYRM were supportive but guarded. Legitimacy increased as OHR accepted the MYRM, directed its use in Principals meetings, and ultimately appropriated it into a different product, the MIP.

The COMSFOR's ownership and personal communications also played an important internal role. The legitimacy he conferred on the MYRM altered the way SFOR headquarters did business internally and externally. It provided a logic to justify changing the relationships among the deputies, Chief of Staff, and staff directors. He also empowered the staff group to serve as informal messengers and subject matter experts to help socialize the MYRM internally and assist in overcoming any resistance.

The communication posture was also important. COMSFOR's approach was to negotiate with the Principals and SFOR headquarters members, a posture

also adapted by the staff group and key leaders. The significant level of informal communications during the initial socialization period meant that everyone in SFOR headquarters had to deliver the same messages of shared understandings and flexibility in the tool. Otherwise, acceptance among OHR might have been far more difficult.

Importance of Managing Internal Communication

The above point leads to the third implication of this case. The one thing that the campaign did transform was how SFOR communicated with itself. The MYRM and associated leader messaging reduced the impact of multicultural communication barriers brought about by different languages and national military cultures. Socialization of the MYRM leveraged what disparate parties in the SFOR headquarters and MNDs agreed with—that their activities in Bosnia did more than represent a tick on a checklist, and instead constituted a longer-term way forward so their militaries would not have to return in the future to stop renewed hostilities.

The author's experience in SFOR was that self-awareness in a coalition environment is highly sensitive business. Political interests influence the level of commitments and types of contributions that nations are willing to give, and matters of language, bilateral relationships and histories, and the operational context make it easy to erect barriers (and the United States is far from immune to erecting such barriers).

LIMITATIONS OF THE CAMPAIGN AND CONCLUSION

While the campaign was successful, it is difficult to gauge its benefits in comparison to everyone in theater just continuing to muddle along. After all, Bosnia was moving toward a more stable peace despite some of the challenges it faced in 2000. The MYRM likely had marginal impact on political decisions to reduce forces or realign missions. So, if the campaign had not occurred—if the COMSFOR staff group had not gone through with the tabletop exercise or the COMSFOR decided not to co-opt it—what would have changed?

Causality in complex adaptive systems is almost impossible to gauge with accuracy.[75] However, given the counterfactuals, it is possible to imagine how various scenarios played out in 2001 could have gone differently in the absence of common shared understanding. Could Bosnian Croat and Bosnia Serb extremist activities that occurred in mid-spring of that year[76] have had a greater impact if it exposed seams among SFOR units or between SFOR and the other Principal agencies? If so, would those groups have been more emboldened, knowing that the international community was feeling increased pressure to reduce presence? Would SFOR's contributing nations come closer to decisions to give up and withdraw? While one cannot point to anything in the environment and necessarily say, **the MYRM did "that,"** one can conclude that it was far better to have had a MYRM than not have one.

The Bosnia Multi-Year Roadmap was a successful campaign to improve a difficult communication environment involving numerous independent actors with competing interests. It succeeded because it packaged

existing activities and requirements around a common story that members and stakeholders could latch onto. It was then enacted through a transparent and non-threatening socialization process, whereby leaders listened and welcomed feedback. As a result, communications in theater were more effective and robust, and contributed to an environment more favorable to accomplishing the respective missions of the Principals and SFOR.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. This case study represents the experiences and perspectives of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official views of NATO, the Stabilization Force-Bosnia, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), nor any of the named parties discussed, individual or collective. As is noted later in this chapter, the author was personally involved in this campaign, and therefore to the maximum extent possible, the author will refer to himself in the third person and present corroborating evidence to maximize the case's objectivity. The author greatly appreciates the contributions of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael L. Dodson and Dr. George Chalustowski, who provided detailed feedback and powerful insights into the case.

2. Sean M. Maloney, "Exit SFOR, Exit Canada: Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina?" Sean M Maloney.com, n.d., available from *http://www.seanmmaloney.com/old/articles/i0071.html*, accessed October 17, 2016.

3. Stabilization Force (SFOR), "History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SFOR, available from *http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm*, accessed December 5, 2016 (hereafter "History of SFOR").

4. David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*, London, United Kingdom (UK): Pluto Press, 1999, p. 67. Also, see *Article V of Annex 4 to the Dayton Accords*, New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Library, available from *http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/day14.asp*, accessed April 19, 2017.

5. Ibid., p. 68.

6. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of *Article IV of Annex 1B to the Dayton Accords,* Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Library.

7. Ibid., para. 3 to Article IV.

8. *The World Factbook,* s.v. "Bosnia and Herzegovina," Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, available from *https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html*, accessed December 19, 2016.

9. The logo of IFOR (and subsequently SFOR) included both Latin and Cyrillic texts, reflective of the use of these alphabets concurrently in Bosnia, both used for the same Serbo-Croatian language in the country. Texts using the Latin alphabet in Federation were merely transliterated into the Cyrillic alphabet in Republika Srpska.

10. Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 156-157.

11. Chandler, p. 58.

12. For example, see Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Principals in Bosnia and Herzegovina Condemn Violation of Property Laws," OSCE Newsroom, April 23, 2002, available from *http://www.osce.org/bih/54299*, accessed December 20, 2016.

13. Office of the High Representative, "Mandate," OHR: Office of the High Representative, n.d., available from *http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1161*, accessed November 28, 2018.

14. Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, "About Wolfgang Petritsch: Download CV," Wolfgang Petritsch Personal Pages, n.d., available from *https://www.wolfgangpetritsch.com/about/*.

15. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), "Bosnia and Herzegovina—UNMIBH—Background," UNMIBH Home Page, 2003, available from *https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmibh/background.html*, accessed November 28, 2018. UNMIBH completed its mandate by 2002

and disbanded. This website is maintained on the United Nations (UN) site for archival purposes.

16. Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *The OSCE*, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010.

17. International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery*, ICG Balkans Report No. 121, November 29, 2001, p. 3, available from *https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnia-reshaping-international-machinery*, accessed November 27, 2018.

18. "Summary of the General Framework Agreement: Fact Sheet Released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, November 30, 1995," NATO SFOR Website, available from *http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm*, accessed April 1, 2013.

19. Ivan D. Ivanov, *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities*, Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011, p. 85.

20. SFOR, "History of SFOR."

21. Currently, 2 percent of the country is still contaminated with landmines. Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Situation May 2018," BHMAC, n.d., available from *http://www.bhmac.org/?page_id=747&lang=en*, accessed November 28, 2018.

22. Operation HARVEST was an effort supported by SFOR but led by Bosnia's Entity Armed Forces to "remove illegally held weapons, explosives, and war-like materials from circulation." In 2000, Operation HARVEST led to the collection and destruction of thousands of weapons and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition. SFOR, "Operation Harvest 2000," SFOR Informer Online, April 2000, available from *http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/85/harvest/t000414n.htm*, accessed December 20, 2016.

23. Patrice McMahon, "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia," in Jeffrey S. Morton, R. Craig Nation, Paul C. Forage, and Stefano Bianchini, eds., *Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the*

Break-Up of Yugoslavia, New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2004, p. 197.

24. Jim Hooper, "Dayton's Mandate for Apprehending War Criminals," FrontLine, n.d., available from *http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/trial/hooper.html*, accessed December 20, 2016; Julie Moffett, "Former Yugoslavia: Task Force Calls for Apprehension of War Criminals," RadioFreeEurope, January 9, 1998, available from *http://www.rferl.org/a/1087797.html*, accessed December 20, 2016.

25. Email from George Chalustowski, March 13, 2017.

26. Ibid.

27. Hannes Grandits, "The Power of 'Armchair Politicians': Ethnic Loyalty and Political Factionalism among Herzegovinan Croats," in Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms, and Ger Duijzings, eds., *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories, and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 101-122.

28. Roberto Belloni, *State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 85.

29. Ioannis Armakolas, "Sarajevo No More? Identity and the Experience of Place among Bosnian Serb Sarajevans in Republika Srpska," in Bougarel, Helms, and Duijzings, eds., *The New Bosnian Mosaic*, pp. 79-100.

30. Jacki Lyden, "Memorial Service Held for Srebrenica Victims as UN Officials Issue Apology for not Protecting Bosnian Muslims," Weekend All Things Considered, July 15, 2000. Includes interview with Head of the UN Mission to Bosnia Jacques Klein. Despite the apology, an activist group called the Mothers of Srebrenica comprising some 6,000 survivors of the massacre would unsuccessfully bring suit against the Netherlands and the UN for their failure to sustain the safe haven. See "Mothers of Srebrenica et al v. State of The Netherlands and the United Nations," International Crimes Database, available from *http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/case/769/mothers-of-srebrenica-v-the-netherlands-and-the-un/*, accessed March 9, 2017.

31. Wikipedia, s.v., "Serbian Democratic Party."

32. Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Carter, *Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords*, Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2001, p. 55. Also email to author from Dodson, March 14, 2017.

33. Christopher J. Lamb with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder, "The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power," *Strategic Perspectives #15*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2014.

34. Cousens and Carter, *Implementing the Dayton Accords*, p. 64.

35. Lamb.

36. Harold J. Johnson, "Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threathen Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement," GAO Report #T-NSAID-00-219, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000, available from *http//www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00219t.pdf*, accessed December 21, 2016.

37. *International Crime Threat Assessment,* Chapter III, "The Balkans," William J. Clinton Presidential Archive, December 2000, available from *https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270chap3.html,* accessed November 28, 2018.

38. Johnson, *Bosnia: Crime and Corruption*.

39. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, "Bosnia: Donor Fatigue Threatens Repatriation," ReliefWeb, June 6, 2000, available from *http://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnia-donor-fatigue-threatens-repatriation*, accessed December 20, 2016.

40. Google, s.v. "Donor Fatigue," available from *https://www.google.com/#q=donor+fatigue*, accessed December 20, 2016.

41. Johnson, *Bosnia: Crime and Corruption*.

42. Email from Dodson, March 14, 2017, emphasized the fact that, in his terms, fluency in English was a requirement for assignment to SFOR. This was not mentioned in the quoted text.

43. Hans Born, Tessa Op Den Buijs, and Ad Vogelaar, "Dutch Experiences with International Military Operations," in Jean

Callaghan and Mathias Schönborn, eds., *Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters: A Comparative Study Based on Experiences in Bosnia*, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2004, pp. 159-160. Although largely reflecting 1998, the author's experience was that these conditions persisted through 2000.

44. Author's experience, late 2000.

45. Author experience and interviews with SFOR headquarters members.

46. Tjallie A. M. Scheltinga, Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, Sirp J. De Boer, and Celeste P.M. Wilderom, "Cultural Conflict within Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study in Bosnia," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2005, pp. 54-69, available from *https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662840500223606*, accessed September 11, 2018. It is also worth noting that the Command Stabilization Force (COMSFOR) was a 1-year assignment. The two deputies rotated approximately every 6 months.

47. Juan A. Pina, "SFOR Re-Structuring—Seamless and Smooth," *SFOR Informer*, Iss. 79, January 19, 2000, available from *http://www.nato.int/sfor/sfor-at-work/restruct/theaop/t000124b.htm*, accessed December 19, 2016.

48. Author experience and interviews with SFOR headquarters members, particular in the French and German-dominated CJ5.

49. The author can find no actual record of such a product having been created, and by the time of his assignment in SFOR, the SFOR headquarters had been moved to Camp Butmir, and very few files from previous staff groups were available.

50. Email to author from Dodson, March 14, 2017.

51. Ibid.

52. Email to author from Chalustowski, January 30, 2017.

53. "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," U.S. Department of State Archive, November 21,

1995, available from *http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52577.htm*, accessed July 11, 2016.

54. "The General Framework Agreement: Press Conference," Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, November 21, 1995, available from *http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-conf.htm*, accessed December 20, 2016.

55. "The General Framework Agreement: Initialing of the Balkan Proximity Peace Talks Agreement," Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, n.d., available from *http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-rem.htm*, accessed December 20, 2016.

56. SFOR, "SFOR Mission," NATO SFOR, last updated January 2003, available from *http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm*, accessed December 20, 2016. Apart from the inclusion of the MYRM with the "SFOR Commander's Intent" section, any differences in the mission from the fall of 2000 is not important for the purposes of the case.

57. Slide from SFOR, "Multi-Year Road Map," January 29, 2001, drawn by and available from the author of this volume.

58. Choice of colors was the subject of intense internal debate among staff group members concerned about symbology. Black was deemed too negative, while the dominance of red in national symbols for the entities (especially Republika Srpska) suggested that using red to represent a state of low progress would be off-putting. There were similar debates whether blue or violet should be used at the end state, but since the national flag of Bosnia was blue, it was decided to keep blue to represent the end state.

59. SFOR, "Multi-Year Road Map," January 29, 2001.

60. Email to author from Chalustowski, January 30, 2017.

61. It is worth noting the role of humor in fostering the cooperation between the CJ5 and the staff group. The DCOM Major General Roger DuBurg kept close tabs on MYRM development through the French colonel leading the CJ5 while the DCOMOPS and the American brigadier general serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (ACOS OPS) exercised close contact with Galvin. As the profile of the MYRM grew, the CJ5 and staff group

members began using "merm" as both term of endearment and pejorative to provide levity. The jokes and banter also became a part of the introduction of new members to CJ5.

62. Author experience from witnessing multiple such engagements.

63. Email to author from Chalustowski, February 21, 2017.

64. SFOR, "The Multi-Year Road Map," Overview and background presentation placed on the SFOR Home Page, March 29, 2001 (hereafter "MYRM Overview").

65. Ibid.

66. Still, the Entity Armed Forces did not actually unify until forced to do so through a scandal in 2002 that exposed deep corruption. See Paddy Ashdown, *Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century*, London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2007, pp. 248–250.

67. Email to author from Chalustowski, February 21, 2017.

68. Maloney. He does not mention specifically how this was done, and, unfortunately, the full text of the 2003 MIP is no longer available through the OHR website.

69. Ibid. Also, author communication with Galvin's replacement in the staff group.

70. UN Security Council, "Bosnia: 24th Report on the Implementation of the Peace Agreement to the UN Secretary-General (S/2003/918)," ReliefWeb, September 26, 2003, available from *http://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnia-24th-report-implementation-peace-agreement-un-secretary-general*, accessed December 14, 2016.

71. Paula Broadwell and Vernon Loeb, *All In: The Education of General David Petraeus*, New York: Penguin, 2012, p. 149.

72. Ibid.

73. Bill Kristol, "David Petraeus II Transcript," *Conversations with Bill Kristol*, transcript, July 5, 2016, available from

http://conversationswithbillkristol.org/transcript/david-petraeus-ii-transcript/, accessed December 21, 2016.

74. David H. Petraeus, "Beyond the Cloister," *The American Interest*, Vol. 2, No. 6, July 2007, available from *http://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/07/01/beyond-the-cloister/*, accessed December 14, 2016.

75. Andrew A. Hill and Stephen J. Gerras, "Stuff Happens: The Art and Science of Causation in Policy and Strategy," working paper, Carlisle, PA: School of Strategic Landpower, U.S. Army War College, 2016.

76. NATO, "NATO Statement on the Situation in the Balkans," ReliefWeb, June 7, 2001, available from *http://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/nato-statement-situation-balkans*, accessed December 14, 2016.

CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY II: CREATION OF U.S. AFRICA COMMAND (USAFRICOM)

Creating new organizations often requires an accompanying communication campaign to explain the mission, purpose, capabilities, and limitations to interested parties, stakeholders, and members. If it is a business, the campaign tries to convince potential customers that the company's goods and services are worth looking into, but the messages must compete with those already put out by extant competitors. Department of Defense (DoD) organizations face some similar and some unique challenges, as new organizations must compete against existing ones for budgets and workforce to provide promised new capabilities or capacity. Even with high-level sponsorship with the DoD or the armed services, new organizations often face great challenges getting anyone's attention, their mission acknowledged, and their message heard.

This was not the case with U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM).[1] The announcement of its creation in February 2007 was resoundingly jeered, and the fledgling organization faced intense scrutiny and criticism throughout its early days. Yet within 2 years, USAFRICOM succeeded in changing the minds of many U.S. and African stakeholders and overcame much of the negative, reactionary opinions the announcement generated through a concerted communication campaign. How the command accomplished this task is the subject of this case, and, like the Multi-Year Roadmap campaign in the previous chapter, many of the lessons learned contribute to the models and concepts offered later in this book. It will also show the limits of such campaigns. As USAFRICOM's first named operation approached in 2011 (Operation ODYSSEY

DAWN in Libya), old criticisms against the command resurfaced quickly.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION IN A CAUSTIC ENVIRONMENT

> President Bush Creates a New Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa [February 6, 2007]
>
> Today, I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to stand up U.S. Africa Command by the end of fiscal year 2008.
>
> This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.
>
> We will be consulting with African leaders to seek their thoughts on how Africa Command can respond to security challenges and opportunities in Africa. We will also work closely with our African partners to determine an appropriate location for the new command in Africa.[2]

In 1995, the DoD opened its *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa* with "America's security interests in Africa are very limited," a statement reflected throughout the history of *Unified Command Plans* in the 20th century.[3] Before 1980, only portions of Africa were included in the *Unified Command Plan*, primarily the Maghreb countries due to their geographical proximity to and relationships with their European neighbors. Many nations in sub-Saharan Africa went

unassigned.[4] Then, during the Cold War, African nations were included, but subdivided among multiple geographic commands and not considered priority among any of them, although President Ronald Reagan did point out the need for securing natural resources in Africa.[5]

The 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania caused the United States to alter its stance. Interest in Africa as a source of emerging threats and growing security interests increased, and calls came for a separate geographic command for Africa. Navy Commander Richard G. Catoire (2000-2001) wrote, "The existing Unified Command Plan['s] . . . lack of focus on Africa makes it difficult for the United States to prioritize its security interests and pursue them consistently in this region."[6] After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and several years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration was concerned that Africa could become another front on the War on Terror.[7] Consequently, the DoD directed the planning effort to create a separate Africa-focused geographic command, which culminated in Bush's announcement.[8] The DoD then established a transition team as an initial cadre, and set October 1, 2007, for activation at **initial operating capacity**, described as the command having its inaugural leadership and cadre in place, capable of accepting responsibility for missions from the other three combatant commands; in addition, the command was scheduled to achieve **full operating capability** as an independent command by October 1, 2008.[9]

However, the political environment of February 2007 was not favorable. Questioned were the timing of the announcement, the motivations of the administration, and the missions and purposes of this new

organization. J. Peter Pham quoted New Jersey Representative Donald Payne, "because there has been so little attention given to Africa. . . . All of a sudden to have a special military command, I think the typical person would wonder why now and really what is the end game?"[10] Abroad, numerous critics of the Bush administration decried the move as a ruse toward securing (or stealing) African resources or imposing neocolonial rule over the continent.[11] The Government Accountability Office (GAO) questioned whether the command's establishment could be completed in such a short time (only 18 months) and result in an effective organization.[12] Other U.S. Government agencies openly worried about whether this move was a continuation of trends toward military-first approaches to international engagement, embodied in the phrase "militarization of foreign policy."[13]

USAFRICOM was not necessarily the target of this criticism, rather the commentary reflected broader policy disagreements with (and within) the Bush administration. The announcement came on the heels of a degenerating situation in Iraq, questions about the long-term stability in Afghanistan, and angst over U.S. detention operations and alleged human rights abuses at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba and in the lingering aftermath of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Hence, while the administration did work to explain the mission and purpose of the command, it did not fully resonate. Prominent websites decried the command's establishment, such as a group known as Resist AFRICOM, who said on their homepage:

> Enabled by oil companies and private military contractors, AFRICOM serves as the latest frontier in military expansionism, violating the human rights and

> civil liberties of Africans who have voiced a strong 'no' to U.S. military presence.[14]

Resist AFRICOM has remained active as of late 2016, reporting on U.S. military engagements in Africa, arguably in biased fashion to prove their points. Human rights groups (such as African women's groups representing victims of sexual- and gender-based violence) feared the command would use the Global War on Terrororism as its justification to train African militaries to be more effective as using repressive techniques against its own people. Other critics were convinced that USAFRICOM's purpose was to counter militarily China's increased influence in the region, extending a global rivalry onto the continent of Africa.[15]

U.S. communications efforts did not include all the right participants and did not reach all the right players.[16] The two initial Deputies to the Commander, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Robert Moeller and Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates of the State Department, lamented that, "Unfortunately, the consultations held prior to [October 2007] were insufficient to ensure our partners understood the intent and purpose of the command."[17] Among the shortcomings were the omission of engagements with some key African partners because the imposed schedule of the command's stand-up did not allow for sufficiently broad consultation, and that the makeup of the consultation team included only DoD representatives and no one from the Department of State.[18] Worse, consultations "with U.S. Embassies were also insufficient to permit the Country Teams to help address these questions and concerns."[19]

The DoD's intended design for USAFRICOM also included a much larger number of personnel from other government agencies, beyond just State and the

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This was touted as a way to enhance USAFRICOM's primary focus of building security capacity and preventing conflict. However, the DoD never specified a number nor conducted an analysis of the interagency staffing requirement. Thus, unvetted estimates began to appear; the initial estimate was 25 percent of the command's staff, however, due to the agencies' limited capacity, this number was reduced to approximately 50 total interagency personnel.[20] The DoD planned to place non-DoD personnel in some of the command's leadership positions, something unheard of at the time.[21] This facet confused both Africans and diplomats alike—the former fearing AFRICOM's takeover of State and USAID functions, and the latter worried about the blurring of lines between the agencies.[22]

The most inflammatory debate concerned the final statement of Bush's announcement, which critics wrongly understood to mean the installation of large U.S. military bases and significant presence on the continent. While the question of where to station the headquarters was a natural one, the angst over any consideration of placing the headquarters on the continent was significant, both for Africans and for the United States. Not unexpectedly, Africans expressed opposition to the idea, calling it neocolonial,[23] a potential magnet for terrorists,[24] and proof of real U.S. desires to steal African oil.[25]

However, there were other factors related to internal African politics. Under the African Union, the continent is divided into five regions, each represented by at least one economic community.[26] Regional rivalries contributed to concerns about any particular nation or region receiving disproportionate benefit from the command's location.[27] Liberian President Ellen

Sirleaf-Johnson was the only African national leader to announce publicly a desire to host the command; meanwhile, there were other "expressions of interest" initially presented by other nations.[28] However, the other nations would withdraw their offers because of either internal national politics or because of policy decisions by regional members.[29]

U.S. officials had more pragmatic concerns about how such a headquarters would function. With extremely limited commercial transportation in Africa (much East-West air traffic must go through Europe, for example), members of a continentally based headquarters would have significant difficulty visiting African partners. Since geographic combatant command organizations can comprise more than 1,500 people—including military, civilians, and contractors, as well as their families—such an organization would require significant life support, and even the largest African states lacked the capacity to absorb such a footprint. By comparison, a number of established U.S. Embassies in Africa have a U.S. staff of 50 or fewer, and life support for them continues to be a complex issue. Finally, the establishment of the command on African soil would entail DoD resources simply not available, especially military construction dollars. Congressmen and civic agencies were already posturing to bring USAFRICOM to the continental United States for the economic benefit, so the idea that Congress would appropriate significant money to build a headquarters in Africa was simply unrealistic. Ultimately, this was because of several factors: the large number of personnel from U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) who were rapidly transferred to the new command; the transition team's established operations at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany,

only 5 kilometers away from USEUCOM headquarters at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany; and old but adequate facilities available at Kelley Barracks (albeit desperately needing renovation). Stuttgart became USAFRICOM's "temporary" home through the initial stand-up period. Based on recommendations from the command and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Robert Gates elected to defer the decision on a permanent home until the command matured.[30]

THE USAFRICOM LEADERSHIP TEAM

The organizational development challenges on October 1, 2007, were daunting. On that day, USAFRICOM grew from the 60-member transition team to roughly 200, including the new leadership team headed by General William E. "Kip" Ward, U.S. Army, formerly deputy commander of USEUCOM and a member of the Executive Oversight Committee that observed the transition team's activities prior to activation. His deputy to the commander for military operations (DCMO) was newly promoted Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, who previously served in U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and acted as the transition team's executive director. The first-ever deputy to the commander for civil-military activities (DCMA) was Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, who served two ambassadorial tours in Africa and was most recently the political advisor in USEUCOM. The Chief of Staff was Brigadier General Michael Snodgrass of the U.S. Air Force, who would pin on his second star in the summer of 2008.

Ward commanded at battalion, brigade, and division levels as a career infantry officer.[31] Of note, he deployed his brigade to Somalia for Operation

RESTORE HOPE in 1993. Prior to division command, he served as the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Egypt in Cairo, an office within the U.S. Embassy to Cairo responsible for all U.S. security cooperation activities within Egypt. He subsequently commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2002-2003, and later was assigned the inaugural position of U.S. security coordinator to the newly fashioned Israel-Palestinian Authority in Tel Aviv. In 2007, he published a commentary on his service in Somalia, Bosnia, and Palestine that he titled "Toward a Horizon of Hope."[32] In this commentary, he discussed "common elements of [post-conflict situations] leading to the development of a framework that permits better international and interagency coordination for influencing outcomes of future conflicts."[33] He wrote this while serving as deputy commander of USEUCOM, and would parlay some of the ideas expressed in the article toward the initial narrative development of the command.

Moeller's service included several duty assignments in the Pentagon, including in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of the Secretary of the Navy as a surface warfare analyst, and as a maritime warfare analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation. He commanded the Surface Warfare Officer's School and, as rear admiral, the USS *Ronald Reagan* Strike Group. His association with USAFRICOM followed duties as the USCENTCOM J-5 and special assistant to the commander, USCENTCOM.[34]

Yates' first diplomatic posting in Africa was to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1991.[35] During this posting, she gained "first-hand exposure to the genocide taking place in nearby

Rwanda" in 1994.[36] Five years later, during her first ambassadorship (to Burundi), she brokered peace talks between the former warring Hutus and Tutsis. She was subsequently named U.S. Ambassador to Ghana (2002-2005), where she again became involved in peace talks, this time involving the civil war in Liberia. Afterward, she joined USEUCOM as the foreign policy advisor, which was the senior Department of State official supporting a combatant command. When the DoD established USAFRICOM, she moved into the newly created civilian deputy position.

Snodgrass was a fighter pilot and instructor who would serve as commander of a fighter squadron in Georgia, an air expeditionary group in Kuwait, and a wing in Alaska in 2005. In the midst of these tours, he served 4 years in the Pentagon within the Joint Staff J-8 and the Department of the Air Force. Immediately prior to joining USAFRICOM, he served as the Director of Plans, Programs, and Analyses (A5/8/9) in U.S. Air Forces in Europe, exercising the command lead for Air Force service component command responsibilities for most of Africa.[37]

There were others instrumental to the establishment of the command at the director level, along with the senior enlisted advisor, foreign policy advisor, and other personal staff members. As the case focuses on the actions of the above four individuals, these other contributors will be named only by exception.

THE FIRST MONTH—ANALYSIS PHASE

For USAFRICOM, the campaigning process officially began with the October 1, 2007 activation, as Ward assumed command and the transition team became the core of USAFRICOM's headquarters staff.

Naturally, USAFRICOM inherited the existing narratives and counternarratives from the DoD. Now was the time for the new headquarters to decide upon its own narrative and promote it, while helping the DoD craft better messages at their level.

There were many stakeholders and audiences for the fledgling command. The primary stakeholder was the DoD. Meanwhile, secondary stakeholders included: the other participating U.S. Government agencies, especially the Department of State, USAID, and their country teams; African regional and national governments and their militaries, particularly those participating in peacekeeping missions; the U.S. Congress; the combatant commands who were transferring missions to USAFRICOM; and the armed services who were staffing, equipping, and funding the command. Key third parties included nongovernmental organizations and others conducting civil activities on the continent; the media, including print and social; and various U.S. and African think tanks, academics, and other parties who actively opposed USAFRICOM's establishment.

Key Concerns about the Command

As discussed above, the inflammatory rhetoric facing the command's establishment prior to October 2007 was far reaching. Given the very small size of the headquarters at launch—growing from 60 to 200 people over the course of the first week—it was impossible for the command to respond directly to each message. Instead, the approach was to consolidate the opposing messages into a smaller manageable set of opposing narratives. Some critics directed their messaging at the DoD, with USAFRICOM as a

target of opportunity, but most messaging was aimed squarely at USAFRICOM.

The United States is Neocolonizing Africa

Although the State Department's long-standing desire was to "elevate the U.S. model of civilian government [under] which the military serves," the environment in 2007 was not conducive to viewing the United States as a benevolent partner.[38] Still fresh in many African minds was its recent colonial past with Europe, which left the continent distrustful of Western powers.[39] Thus following the announcement of the command were numerous rumors that USAFRICOM would essentially invade Africa through the slow construction of a "burgeoning U.S. military presence in the region."[40]

The intensity of the counternarrative grew during 2007 for several reasons. First, DoD officials allowed the deliberations about the headquarters' final location to continue in public.[41] This was in part because the DoD leaders initially felt it important to establish some sort of "command presence" on the continent, even though it was infeasible to accomplish in the short timeline for establishing the headquarters.[42]

Second, the United States was perceived by Africans as a belligerent power, as evidenced by the invasion of Iraq only a few years earlier, U.S. airstrikes in Somalia, and support for Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia.[43] The U.S. Global War on Terror meant that violent extremist groups across Africa, but especially in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region, were potential targets.

The third factor was the U.S. Government's and the DoD's lack of consultation with African leaders before making the decision. The DoD leaders did not

view such consultations as crucial—the Secretary of Defense had told then-Rear Admiral Moeller not to worry about the Africans, and that they would simply come around to accepting USAFRICOM, a view that Moeller accepted.[44] When consultation did occur, they did "enormous harm" because of the "glib and uninformed messages" delivered by the delegation.[45] Meanwhile, drawing from his own travels around the African continent, then-Brigadier General Snodgrass, as well as several other senior leaders from the other services, recommended greater consultations to the transition team, but their efforts were rebuffed.[46] Thus, the opportunity to socialize the new command more thoroughly was missed, allowing misperceptions of the command's purpose to spread rapidly.

Fourth was that the DoD saw the move as a simple internal reorganization, and there was little reason to expect U.S. military programs on the continent to change drastically. They also assumed that EUCOM's and CENTCOM's existing engagements on the continent would have been sufficient.[47] These misperceptions gelled into a story that the United States was secretly planning to invade Africa to act as a neocolonial strongman.

Associated with this counternarrative was a belief that the real U.S. intentions were to protect its oil interests, steal other African resources, or prevent other powers access to either resource.[48] U.S. interests had always been in ensuring access to Africa's natural resources through the free market. These interests contributed to the increased strategic profile of the continent.[49] However, suspicion of U.S. intentions, especially post-Iraq, created a climate of distrust toward the United States.[50]

Africans Distrusted Militaries in General

Africans had several reasons to be distrustful of militaries in general, and this contributed to the hostile reception to USAFRICOM. From the 1960s through the 2000s, there were 144 coups in Africa, of which 67 were successful. These coups occurred across the continent, especially in the north, central, and western regions.[51] In many cases, the coups resulted in a military leader taking over control of the country and instilling authoritarian rule. Also common were "presidential guards," who were beholden to the state's ruler and separate from the military chain of command, adding to instability when political dynamics shifted within a nation.[52]

Human rights violations by soldiers were also a major problem. "With little civilian oversight or public accountability, soldiers and police routinely were able to get away with the worst abuses."[53] Particularly in central Africa where armies were nonprofessional, poorly paid, and ill equipped, soldiers committed extortion, mass rape, robbery, and other violent acts.[54]

These concerns produced a counternarrative that the United States was using USAFRICOM as a tool for propping up repressive regimes friendly to U.S. interests,[55] even though African states were trying to distance themselves from a "culture of military rule."[56] Themes were region-specific, such as the potential for the United States to destabilize Nigeria over oil,[57] to impose itself on the ungoverned spaces and terrorist havens in the Sahel,[58] or to take over control of Africa's developing regional security apparatus.[59] While doing so, the United States (and therefore USAFRICOM) would turn a blind eye toward atrocities

being committed by the militaries of friendly states, as it has allegedly done elsewhere.[60]

The United States is Militarizing its Foreign Policy

Another inherited counternarrative that emerged from the growing imbalance of power between the DoD and the rest of the U.S. Government was the militarization of foreign policy, which is loosely defined as the "reliance on [the] military to pursue objectives better achieved by other means."[61] Although this imbalance has ebbed and flowed over the past century, it became acute during the early stages of post-conflict Iraq where the Department of State became significantly marginalized, and worsened as former U.S. generals began serving in diplomatic posts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[62] Efforts to correct the imbalance, such as the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, were unsuccessful because of underfunding and understaffing.[63]

This counternarrative drew strength out of the fact that USAFRICOM was a DoD initiative not complemented by a commensurate interagency initiative. Put another way, "How can we adopt a whole-of-government approach by putting it in uniform?"[64] Instead, USAFRICOM would contribute to greater interagency coordination through the embedding of non-DoD civilians within the combatant command's staff, including senior leadership positions.[65] Given the comparatively meager staffing resources available to the other agencies, this added to the perception that the DoD was assuming control over the activities of other agencies.

Moreover, the poor consultations performed by the DoD equally affected the ambassadors on the

continent. There were no cables sent to the Embassies explaining the command, and therefore, the ambassadors lacked talking points for engaging African leaders. Thus, rather than elevating the U.S. model of civil-military relations in the minds of partners, the tensions between the DoD and State was seen by Africans as proof positive that the true U.S. intentions were nefarious.[66]

USAFRICOM's Formation is not a Priority

This counternarrative viewed that establishing USAFRICOM was not a compelling priority compared to other DoD requirements and was being done too quickly.[67] Creating USAFRICOM placed two staffing bills on each of the services (one for the joint command headquarters and one for each of the service component commands), start-up costs for renovating facilities, and establishing standard combatant command capabilities (such as intelligence, support aircraft, and a theater special operations command), and required the services to budget for military training and exercises.[68] It also incurred diplomatic costs between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, as the existing Status of Forces Agreement was formulated to address NATO forces, and there were questions about USAFRICOM's standing, especially when it came to welcoming its assigned interagency members.[69]

There were also arguments against creating USAFRICOM as a separate combatant command. The plan was for USAFRICOM to form as a sub-unified command under USEUCOM until achieving full operating capability by October 1, 2008, when it would become an independent organization. Even after achieving

initial operating capability by October 2007, some within the DoD and USEUCOM still argued in favor of keeping USAFRICOM as a sub-unified command under USEUCOM. Remaining as a sub-unified command, the argument went, would make the command smaller and less expensive by consolidating common functions such as administration and training, and eliminating the Status of Forces Agreement concerns with the German Government.

This Was the DoD's Mess That USAFRICOM Had to Clean Up

Antipathy toward the OSD's policy was high during the transition team days and continued during the early days of the command. This dislike was a byproduct of the highly aggressive timelines for the command's establishment, very poor and unproductive communication among the Department of State, OSD, and the transition team, and OSD's communications touting USAFRICOM as a "different" or "innovative" organization—referring to its potential interagency makeup.

Team members characterized the relationship with OSD as toxic. A member explained that it was "a mix of direction with very little clarity, describing the planning guidance received from OSD as 'Go get me a rock. No, not that rock. A different rock. I'll tell you when you have the right rock'."[70] Transition team members were particularly frustrated with the priority given about planning for the command's location on the continent when other matters were more pressing.[71]

The initial influx of personnel to the headquarters in October included both officers and civilians familiar

with the poorly managed rollout of the command over the summer. They quietly committed themselves to constructing and maintaining a certain amount of distance from OSD. Meanwhile, the headquarters also felt the brunt of the poor relationship between the DoD and the Department of State, and USAFRICOM's newest members from the interagency (e.g., the foreign policy advisor and other subject matter experts) arrived with a guarded view of the DoD and an intent to correct the interdepartmental feud from the bottom up.

Commander's First Engagements

A well-coordinated narrative was needed to overcome the above issues. Because of his tightly packed schedule, Ward devoted most of his first month with the command in Washington, DC, engaging with internal U.S. Government stakeholders. He would not have the opportunity to engage his own staff until the latter part of the month.[72] Thus, his early press engagements, such as at a foreign press conference in Washington on October 3, effectively doubled as his initial guidance to the command. The purpose of the campaign was given indirectly in the following passage:

> This is the right time for bringing AFRICOM on board. The African continent's economic, social, political, and military importance in global affairs has grown tremendously. The African continent is linked to the United States by history, culture, economics, and geostrategic significance. In my previous capacity as Deputy Commander of the United States European Command, I traveled extensively on the continent to meet military and civilian leaders and enable our ongoing military assistance activities to help enhance security and stability.

> From my observations, I believe our assistance to existing and emerging African security institutions is most effective when it fosters African solutions to African challenges. Many African leaders and their collective organizations, such as the African Union, have made a commitment to work towards a safe and secure environment on the continent to promote effective development. The US European, Central and Pacific Commands have made great strides working with African militaries to enhance security on the continent through exercises, humanitarian programs, training events and support to peacekeeping operations. Much of their success stems from listening to the Africans and getting their perspective, and applying solutions in accordance with their stated needs and within our means.[73]

This passage stood in direct contravention to the anti-USAFRICOM discourse that existed at the time. It countered the charges that the command was a deliberate attempt by the United States to take over or assume greater power over Africa. It placed the command, and its commander, in a more open and engaging light, recognizing the rights and perspectives of Africans. It also promoted collaboration and trust, that Ward was personally familiar with the African theater and was therefore not a faceless individual from the U.S. military treating Africa like another Middle East.

These same sentiments would be repeated during several other speaking engagements, but one other engagement stood out as noteworthy. On October 15, 2007, Ward spoke at the Chiefs of Mission conference for the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs. The Defense-State relationship was rocky, and many U.S. Ambassadors to African nations openly questioned or opposed the creation of the command and felt steamrolled by the decision. Ward took a reflexive stance early in his presentation: "What we think is

important to us and what we want to do isn't the best answer for those we want to help. The reason? Sometimes **we** [pointing at self] don't listen well enough [emphasis added]."[74] He then related several key points about why the command was created: (1) recognition of the importance of Africa, (2) inefficiency of having multiple combatant commands serving the continent, and (3) the need for the United States to play a more consistent role in providing military programs to support the security development needs of Africans.[75]

Two talking points (to differentiate from **themes** as defined in this book) would constitute the foundational guidance that the command would incorporate in the analysis phase of the campaign. The first was the idea of a "**command under construction**," which reflected the idea that there was considerable flexibility available to shape the command to serve the needs of the DoD and African partners. Ward's concern was the command being perceived as fixed in its structure and mission and therefore unable to adapt to the environment. The second was that of four principles for the formation of the command:

- **Build a team**. Inviting other parties to "participate in the building process."
- **Do no harm**. USAFRICOM would not disrupt or confuse the execution of ongoing programs and activities.
- **Adding value**. USAFRICOM would "harmonize" efforts across the U.S. Government, and most importantly, would respect the Department of State's lead.
- **African solutions to African problems**. Rather than U.S. imposed solutions, USAFRICOM

would foster Africa's self-sustainment through cooperation.

When Ward returned to the headquarters later that month, one of his first acts was an "all-hands" meeting on October 25, where these principles were the centerpiece of his presentation. He also described his goals for the first year, after which the command would be declared as **fully mission capable**. These goals were the capabilities and capacities to:

- Build partner security capacity, which he described as training, equipping, coaching, and mentoring partners.
- Prevent conflict and deter aggression, which included the demonstration of a commitment to peace and preparedness to act.
- Respond to crises, such as providing rapid and sustained support and ultimately restoring peace.
- Provide effective "forces for good," which meant giving a helping hand when possible and contributing to the building of African humanitarian capacity.[76]

Deliberating the Organization's Mission and Vision Statements

The first opportunity to engage the command's leaders, many of whom were still reporting to the new unit, was on October 31, 2007, at a 1-day off-site conference south of Stuttgart. Prior to this conference, in a July memorandum, DoD leaders had established a rather lengthy and unwieldly mission statement:

> US Africa Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to **help strengthen stability and security in the AOR**. US Africa Command **leads the in-theater DOD response to support other USG [U.S. Government] agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies**. In concert with other U.S. government and international partners, US Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and **improve accountable governance**. As directed, US Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises [emphasis added].[77]

In a memorandum, the J-5 expressed concerns about some of the wording beyond the statement's sheer length—it was 2½ times longer than any other Gulf Cooperation Council mission statement.[78] The three highlighted phrases in the above quote are germane to this case. The first, "help strengthen stability and security in the AOR," was deemed too indirect and unclear. The second, "leads the in-theater DoD response . . . policies and strategies," was redundant to the general responsibilities of combatant commands in the Unified Command Plan; J-5 believed that the phrase following "in concert with" would be sufficient. Finally, "improve accountable governance" was very poorly received by DoD audiences, as it suggested USAFRICOM would "stray into other USG agencies' lanes."[79]

Thirty senior members of the command participated, including two from USAID.[80] After a large roundtable to discuss the mission, the participants broke into groups to discuss three important mission areas for the command's inaugural year—building the team, military operations, and civil-military activities. Some interesting questions raised from the group

work included the need to refine the mission and vision over the subsequent months:

- Was it best for the vision statement to represent a vision for USAFRICOM or for Africa? If the former, it might not have been very inspiring, since it would entail just the creation of the command. If the latter, it would serve external audiences better and provide strategic direction for the command, so long as it did not imply the command would overstep its boundaries with other U.S. Government agencies.
- What is the best approach toward presence on the continent? At that point, the permanent location of the headquarters was not completely settled, nor was the question of whether or not regional headquarters were needed.
- What would constitute the "suitable representation" or joint, interagency, or multinational partners in the headquarters? What would be the terms of reference for these arrangements?
- What would be USAFRICOM's scope of assigned capabilities and capacities versus reach back to the DoD or other combatant commands? This question was raised, given the knowledge that Africa faced problems of failed and weakened states, emerging violent extremist groups, and challenges in controlling both land and maritime territories.

At the end of the off-site conference, participants had proposed and deliberated over six different mission statements that were considerably shorter than the DoD version. They reflected differing views of: (1)

the justification for the command, (2) the proper balance between traditional military capabilities and civil-military activities, (3) the emphasis on interagency and multinational engagement, and (4) the focus of the mission being internally focused toward the DoD or externally focused toward Africa.

WINTER 2007-2008: CONTINUING ANALYSIS AND MOVEMENT TO PLANNING

Fresh from the off-site conference, the USAFRICOM leadership began internal deliberations on the mission and vision statements. Meanwhile, the headquarters staff was still getting itself organized on Kelley Barracks, occupying a couple of hastily renovated buildings formerly used by the transition team. Negotiations between USEUCOM, the command, and the garrison management were in full swing: surveying, building a plan, and executing a rotating renovation approach of other buildings on Kelley—left largely underutilized since the end of the Cold War—to support the expected rapid growth of the workforce. Additionally, renovations at Robinson Barracks were being planned to upgrade old family housing units to modern standards because an influx of families was anticipated.

The potential rapid growth concerned the former transition team. By September 2007, they had developed a very strong rapport with each other. Many were Africanists who strongly believed in the idea of the command and wanted to see the DoD put more priority on African issues. Because they worked independently from the rest of USEUCOM in an isolated location with little garrison support and performed difficult and constantly evolving tasks, transition team

members forged a strong unifying culture of "We are all in this together." There were fears that the command's creation would disrupt this bond. In a briefing that the author attended, one of the members delivered a lament in the form of a question, "When we grow to over a thousand people, how can we keep everybody working together like we are now?"[81]

What follows is a summary of key communication activities from November 2007 through approximately February 2008.

Initial Senior Leader Messaging

Bolstered by the initial positive receptions during October, Ward's primary themes became the core of the command's initial external campaign—a command under construction and the three "principles" of building the team: adding value, doing no harm, and enabling African solutions to African problems. From November through February, Ward engaged personally with various African stakeholders, U.S. Congress, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA, or simply "HoA").

He would deliver these themes on his first major engagement in Africa, in an address to the African Union Ambassadors to the United States in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on November 8, 2007.[82] The address also brought forth another theme that was embedded in Ward's previous addresses but emerged as a key component of USAFRICOM's corporate identity as a listening and learning organization. This was both to support the themes and to defend the command against the criticisms about African leaders not being properly consulted. In effect, the message was that

this was in the past, and USAFRICOM would take an entirely different approach:

> I have two goals in coming to the AU headquarters—explain what USAFRICOM is; and to listen. I want to spend more time listening, so I will make my remarks brief. There have been many things written about USAFRICOM. I feel that you need to hear directly from me as the Commander—to hear my vision on what USAFRICOM is all about. It is my intention to listen closely and receive feedback on what you think about our new organization. As an infantryman, gaining an 'on the ground' perspective is important. . . . I intend to lead a learning organization that will evolve through sustained interactions with you—our African partners. Teamwork is the key to USAFRICOM. Success in my eyes is having earned our teammates' and partners' trust and confidence in who we are and what we are going to do.[83]

The address also included another message that would become polished in several subsequent engagements through the next 2 months. Subordinate to the "add value and do no harm" theme, the message was that the command was merely inheriting existing activities that other combatant commands were already performing. USAFRICOM, however, would add value to those programs by making them the command's sole focus and priority. Delivering the message thus involved recounting those existing programs and activities.[84]

Another emerging message was **now is the right time for AFRICOM**, which was how Ward opened his formal comments about the command:

> Now is the right time for USAFRICOM. The African continent's economic, social, political, and military importance in global affairs has grown tremendously. From my observations, the leaders of Africa and its island nations are increasingly demonstrating the will to provide

> a safe and secure environment for their citizens. My goal as Commander of USAFRICOM is to build an enduring organization with regular and sustained engagement that benefits both the citizens of the United States and the citizens of the nations in Africa. The establishment of USAFRICOM presents a tremendous opportunity to work closely with U.S. interagency partners. Working together as a team, the net result over time will be a stable and prosperous Africa with expanded horizons for growth and development.[85]

The above elements contributed to the formation of USAFRICOM's initial command briefing in late November 2007, for a presentation to visitors to the headquarters. A key component was the addition of what Ward chose for a "proposed" mission statement:

> United States Africa Command conducts sustained security engagement through military to military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.[86]

Ironically, this mission statement was closest to the proposed statement from the October off-site conference crafted by participants from USAID. This subtle fact would be occasionally used as evidence of the command being serious about listening to its interagency partners.[87]

Another agency that Ward immediately wanted a close partnership with was the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), an institute located on the campus of National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington, DC. In Ward's view, USEUCOM had not adequately leveraged ACSS for its tremendous African expertise. Since its founding in 1999, ACSS conducted senior leader development programs

on the continent and was establishing its research capacity at USAFRICOM's founding.[88] A strong relationship between USAFRICOM and ACSS followed, and together they would cohost many symposiums involving U.S. and African civilian and military officials on a wide range of security topics. A key benefit was how ACSS provided low-threat opportunities for USAFRICOM leaders to engage with African partners and deliver the command's messages.

The command brief also delved more directly into the headquarters' actions to stand up USAFRICOM. This included a critical activity known as the Mission Transfer Process that addressed USAFRICOM's acceptance of missions, activities, programs, and exercises from USEUCOM, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and USCENTCOM. The transition team had developed a prototype chart to depict the process, but it was far too complicated and overwhelming to be useful as a communication tool. Thus, the command brief included a simplified, but technically inaccurate chart that divided the process into four "lines of effort"—(1) strategies, theater plans, and policies; (2) theater security cooperation responsibilities; (3) contingency planning responsibilities; and (4) ongoing operations, training, and exercises. All were to transfer in from the other combatant commands, while (1) also included the DoD and Department of State. The brief reinforced the "do no harm" theme, as the stated intention was to conduct these transfers without disruption to the missions.

Forming and Growing the Headquarters

By November 2007, the headquarters had developed its initial battle rhythm—sets of routine meetings and briefings for sharing information and setting

priorities. However, there were several matters to tend to that contributed to external messaging.

Grappling with the F-Staff Organization

As one of the innovations for the command, the DoD required USAFRICOM to adopt something other than a traditional J-staff organization used by other combatant commands and the Joint Staff. The "F-staff," as it was known, was supposed to be a matrixed organization where division of labor was according to functions, not specialized areas of expertise. The intention was greater interdepartmental communication, making it simpler for the interagency partners soon to join the command, and the elimination of silos. The directorates would therefore be named functionally. For example, the Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Programs would be responsible for theater strategies, contingency planning, and conducting civil-military activities, which would ordinarily have been fulfilled by a combination of J-5 and J-9. The Directorate of Operations and Logistics would encompass traditional military operations, training, and sustainment; equating to a combination of J-3 and J-4. Other directorates were similarly formed. These were the Directorate of Resources (equivalent to a J-1 and J-8), Directorate of C4 Systems (J-6), Directorate of Intelligence and Knowledge Development (J-2, supplemented with intelligence assets typically afforded to combatant commands), and Directorate of Outreach (J-9). The matrixed character of the organization was to encourage the formation of working groups comprised of members from appropriate directorates to plan and conduct the command's activities.[89] The renaming of the directorates to something other than

the traditional structure was intended to convey the command's emphasis on preventing conflict rather than conducting it.[90]

The Directorate of Outreach bears special mention, as it was unique in several ways. First, it was a dedicated directorate-level organization handling functions of public diplomacy and strategic communication that other combatant commands subsumed within other directorates or special staff. Second, the director of outreach was coded for a State Department official, one of the other key leadership positions reserved for non-DoD.[91] Third, the organization was very civilian-heavy in structure, with the deputy director coded as a DoD officer in the Senior Executive Service. The directorate was organized into two divisions: partnership and strategic communications. According to a USAFRICOM Public Affairs Office publication about the organization's first three years, the Directorate of Outreach:

> establishes and nurtures lines of communication and partnership with organizations, entities and audiences who share an interest in African security and can contribute to the effectiveness of AFRICOM in achieving its security objectives.[92]

It became quickly apparent that the new organizational structure was disadvantageous in establishing horizontal relationships with the joint staff and other combatant commands. Other J-3s, J-4s, and J-5s were unclear where to locate certain functions within the USAFRICOM staff. The staff had to feel out this process over the first few months because USAFRICOM was still very small, with several of its divisions and branches only one-person deep. It encouraged an environment of everyone being a jack-of-all-trades to get the job done. However, looming ahead was the big

growth over the summer rotation when the organization would balloon to 1,500 people.

Terms of Reference for the Two Deputies

The general benefits of having a military and a civilian deputy to the commander was never in question. Having a senior State Department civilian responsible for overseeing civil-military activities made perfect sense, given USAFRICOM's conflict prevention mission. How that would actually work in the command was not well understood, and it took time to sort out.

The original vision of the civilian deputy role was to be "in the command structure and have line responsibilities."[93] This led initially to the DCMA having line responsibilities over the directorates of Outreach and Strategy, Plans, and Programs; plus the open source division of Intelligence and Knowledge Management.[94] The DCMO had line responsibility over the rest. However, because Title 10 made it illegal for a non-DoD official to exercise command authority, USAFRICOM recharacterized this as coordination and oversight relationships.[95] In practice, the Title 10 restrictions gave DCMO greater ability than the DCMA to be hands-on with the staff. Civil-military operations still involved traditional military planning that was beyond the DCMA's expertise. On the other hand, the DCMA became much more externally focused to sustain the momentum of interagency partnerships and outreach that the commander was performing. Soon the line responsibilities were shifted directly to the commander, with the Chief of Staff as primary integrator.[96]

Maintaining coequality of the deputies was very important for promoting the command's interagency

flavor. There were concerns that the staff members would treat the DCMO as superior out of force of habit, as the DoD civilian deputies at the time were not typically afforded the same courtesies as three-star flag officers. Thus, the Deputies and Chief of Staff instituted several protocol rules in which the DCMA was treated as a three-star flag officer, and that the relative positioning of the deputies at the table for meetings would depend on the subject matter. If the meeting regarded a military operation or plan, the military deputy would sit to the commander's right. If the meeting regarded a civil-military or interagency matter, the civilian deputy would sit to the commander's right. Moreover, when Ward was not present at regular staff meetings, the Chief of Staff arranged for the DCMA or DCMO to alternate as the host.[97] Although seemingly small gestures, this contributed to the establishment of a culture in USAFRICOM that respected its interagency partners.

General Ward and the two deputies would deliberate over terms of reference for the next several months. Who would assume direct responsibility for overseeing what? Staff officers were very interested, as this would appear to simplify the lines of communication. However, the leaders decided not to formally declare the terms right away. The deliberations themselves were sufficient to contribute to a mutual understanding between the deputies, and they instead allowed the division of responsibilities to develop normatively over time.

During this time, Yates and Moeller (later Yates and Snodgrass) would routinely conduct outreach activities together as a civil-military team.[98] An example was a video-teleconference that they conducted together with leaders from the Algerian armed forces

in February 2008.[99] The joint presence of the civilian and military deputies signified USAFRICOM's message of being partners with officials from the Department of State, and Yates stressed how Chief of Mission authority would be preserved and sustained. Moeller reiterated these messages, and the video-teleconference would be used as a seminal event in subsequent USAFRICOM communications outside the command.

Addressing Lack of Knowledge about Africa

Apart from the core of Africanists among interagency personnel and the Strategy and Operations directorates, incoming personnel were largely unfamiliar with Africa. The exigencies of the assignment processes used by the armed services meant that the majority of incoming personnel would have had limited joint experience and likely no African experience. Because of the dominance of operations and activities in the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific, resident expertise on Africa was limited to a small number of foreign area officers and attachés, many of whom were already on the USAFRICOM staff. Consequently, there was little depth of knowledge about the continent and U.S. military operations going on within it.[100]

The wintertime saw the initial influx of such personnel coming from the services. Seeing this, Snodgrass instituted as part of the headquarters' weekly update a requirement for a staff directorate to brief a short overview of one of Africa's five regions or highlight one of the important countries to help educate the staff. Because the headquarters was still very small and the participation in staff meetings was very high, this approach, along with other training and education efforts within the directorates, was successful.

Addressing "Tone" of Communication

One of the interesting cultural perspectives that emerged during this time regarded the use of symbols and words between the military and other government agencies. Two examples bear mention, both of which became rules of thumb for the development of leader communications.

First, words and symbols that carried aggressive or imposing connotations were eliminated from the command's vocabulary. For example, Ward prohibited the use of the word "shaping" when referring to desired effects of USAFRICOM's activities in theater. Even though "shaping" was an official term in joint doctrine and its meaning well understood, African partners perceived it as imposing U.S. will on the continent. Ward joked that Africans did not agree that their theater needed U.S. "shaping."[101] Regarding symbols, when developing briefing charts or other graphic displays, military officers were apt to use boxes and arrows reflecting motion, causation, or change. Interagency members found such symbology to be aggressive and likened to conquest. Hence, these symbols were used minimally in presentations for external audiences.[102]

The other regarded the use of negations in speech and writing. Some interagency members were steeped in public diplomacy experience, and among their advice on external engagement was to find ways to avoid using the following: **no**, **not**, **never**, **not only** . . . **but also**, and others.[103] These were judged to be defensive words in nature that denied that something was true but risked the opposite effect. For example, saying that USAFRICOM would not militarize foreign policy risked reminding others that militarization was

an issue. Such a statement put USAFRICOM in a state of denial, which in turn emboldened critics who could charge USAFRICOM was lying. Instead, communications should emphasize what the command **was** about, and avoid talking about what it was not.

The Directorate of Outreach, and in particular its early directors, assumed a particular role in demilitarizing the command's vocabulary. One director expressed a common view among directorate members that the job was to take the military strategy products from the J-5 and rewrite them into forms that would be understandable to the interagency.[104]

Leveraging Ongoing Activities

Overcoming the external and internal challenges meant that USAFRICOM needed some quick wins to demonstrate the validity of its messages. Not only did it require something tangible to counter external criticism, it also needed something that headquarters members could latch onto to further these messages themselves. It was very important that the organization's emerging culture matched its messaging. Several activities on the continent were quickly highlighted as visible proof of the claimed nature and character of USAFRICOM as a listening and learning organization.

Messages were two-fold. The first was that these activities showed USAFRICOM would not act unilaterally against the wishes of Africans or its own interagency partners to conduct activities. As Ward told an African audience in February 2008, "As long as it is something that you have requested, and that is consistent with U.S. foreign policy, we will try to find or develop a program that will help."[105] The second was

that USAFRICOM would not unilaterally disrupt existing activities, again emphasizing its theme of doing no harm.

Africa Partnership Station

Africa Partnership Station (APS) exemplified the activities that USAFRICOM inherited from other combatant commands. APS originated from USEUCOM and U.S. Naval Forces Europe as a program to help nations in the Gulf of Guinea region build maritime security capacity. Illegal fishing, trafficking, and piracy flourished where African navies lacked the ability to control their territorial waters. Nongovernmental organizations were not sufficiently robust to build the civil infrastructure necessary to combat the problem.[106] Consequently, in a 2006 conference in Benin, the Gulf of Guinea nations formally requested assistance from the United States. APS became the U.S. program in response.

Following the successful piloting of the Global Fleet Station in the U.S. Southern Command's areas of responsibility during the summer of 2007, APS was launched in October 2007 on a deployment that would involve stopping in eight Gulf of Guinea nations. APS activities were oriented on "maritime security training and awareness building, humanitarian work, and crisis response," and included participants from several European navies and nongovernmental organizations.[107]

Although APS predated USAFRICOM, the latter was eager to claim the former as its own creation. As APS began its activities in the Gulf, Ward told a gathering of the South Africa Development Community:

> New U.S. initiatives such as the upcoming African Partnership Station will demonstrate the types of activities AFRICOM will seek to promote as "forces for good." This maritime initiative is not a one-time ship visit. Instead, it will work on and off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea over a period of months to build capacity and long-lasting human relationships.[108]

Activities and success stories of APS permeated USAFRICOM's messaging. It trained African sailors in "boarding procedures, maritime security awareness, operational medicine, damage control, firefighting, and hand-to-hand combat training;" supported delivery of humanitarian and medical aid; and was able to participate in crisis response under an international relief effort to provide emergency aid to Chad.[109] APS was touted as the exemplar of what USAFRICOM provides: "programs that add value to African efforts to increase their security capacity and contribute to stability on the continent."[110] The fact that APS originated from the request of African nations was also co-opted into the message as demonstration that USAFRICOM would operate as a listening and learning organization.

Department of State Partnerships

USAFRICOM also co-opted several ongoing civil-military activities run out of the Department of State as means of showing the command's potential for adding value, while also demonstrating its deference to the Department of State. Some examples follow.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership was a "multifaceted, multi-year strategy . . . to assist partners in West and North Africa increase their immediate and long-term capabilities to address

terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism."[111] As an important activity of the partnership, exercise Flintlock occurred in Mali during the late summer of 2007, to build regional counterterrorism capacity, train in humanitarian and disaster relief activities, and prepare for peacekeeping operations. The participation of 10 African nations in the exercise highlighted the regional nature of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

Another key State Department-led program was the African Contingency Operations and Training Program, which originated "in 1997 with the mission of enhancing the capacity of African partner nations to participate in worldwide multinational peace operations."[112] In fiscal year 2007, 19 African nations from all around the continent participated in the program.[113] USAFRICOM's creation brought with it calls to expand the African Contingency Operations and Training Program to build greater peacekeeping capacity on behalf of the African Union, but the command affirmed its commitment on multiple occasions that it supports having the State Department as its lead.[114]

State Partnership Program

The State Partnership Program is a bilateral security cooperation program that establishes enduring relationships between a partner military and a state National Guard. Born out of the post-Cold War era to help transform former Soviet militaries, the State Partnership Program grew to a worldwide program. Compared with other combatant commands, however, USAFRICOM inherited a very small number of partnerships, mainly concentrated on Africa's larger

nations such as South Africa (with New York since 2003), Morocco (with Utah since 2003), Ghana (with North Dakota since 2004), and Nigeria (with California since 2006).[115] Although other partnerships were pending at the time of USAFRICOM's formation, these were also small in number, and there was strong belief among headquarters staff that the State Partnership Program should consider realigning its partnerships away from nations who have shown transformational progress to increase its presence in Africa.

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa

As the only enduring U.S. military presence on the continent, CJTF-HoA was very important. Located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, CJTF-HoA was founded under USCENTCOM in 2002 to help build partner capacity in the Eastern Africa region, while also promoting regional stability. Historically, many of its activities included humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations, but under USCENTCOM, it was not given the same level of attention as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time of USAFRICOM's formation, CJTF-HoA was emblematic of the arguments over militarization of foreign policy. For example, a scathing critique of CJTF-HoA's activities in 2007 described several military-led humanitarian projects that failed and a concern over mixed messages between those projects and American antiterrorist operations.[116] Moreover, complaints from Chiefs of Mission were that CJTF-HoA conducted some of its activities without the full or requisite knowledge of the country teams, that the projects were extremely costly (as compared to how USAID was able to execute similar projects at much lower costs), and that the projects

were not synchronized with the country teams so that one team could assume responsibility and ongoing support for the project once complete. These were all valid complaints.

Without directly acknowledging or finding fault, USAFRICOM's approach was to resolve the issue through indirect messaging. The positive work that CJTF-HoA did was emphasized, while USAFRICOM leaders continuously stressed the preeminence of Chief of Mission authority to CJTF-HoA leadership and instituted processes for more oversight of CJTF-HoA activities.

Results—The Initial Vision, Mission, and Focus Areas

The internal and external experiences of the command's formative period cumulated with the publication of the initial vision statement, **focus areas** that Ward described as the priority activities of the headquarters, and **guiding principles** for how the headquarters would engage with others. The vision statement constituted the evolution of the commander's initial messages:

> USAFRICOM will be an effective unified combatant command that:
>
> - Develops and implements military programs that add value to the important endeavor of enhancing stability and security on the continent of Africa and its island nations.
> - Directs, integrates, and employs credible and relevant military capability in peace and in response to crisis.
> - Is a trusted and reliable partner for the national and security institutions of Africa, our U.S. Government

teammates, our allies, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working in Africa.
- Is a listening and learning organization [emphasis in original].[117]

The vision statement symbolized the competitive advantage USAFRICOM would claim in contrast to the prior arrangement of three combatant commands responsible for programs in different geographic areas. For example, regarding programs, Ward wrote, "The headquarters must be able to anticipate the need for and develop programs that meet the unique needs of the nations and security organizations in Africa."[118] Thus, rather than deny that the prior arrangement caused programs for Africa to receive less attention and priority, the statement focused on the future. Similar constructive wording accompanied all the vision statement points.

The guiding principles constituted both guidance and measures of performance for the headquarters' institutional practices of communication during its rapid growth through the rest of 2008. These were:

- Consider perspectives of African, interagency, and other partners in everything we do.
- Encourage innovative thinking, challenge assumptions, and create new paradigms.
- Strive for a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of African issues and challenges.
- Do not harm . . . the Command will seek to support, but not disrupt or confuse ongoing U.S. Government, international, and non-governmental efforts in Africa.
- Be results oriented.
- Foster collaborative planning at every echelon.[119]

These principles were normative, but had a regulative effect. Each action or communication that the

headquarters engaged in was judged against these principles, particularly the impacts on the partners and the potential for harm. A common concern voiced by USAFRICOM staff members was that on October 2, 2008, the command would face a tremendous crisis on the continent of Africa, and, despite a proper transition, the command would be ill-prepared and fail. Worse, there were also concerns that such a crisis would be purposefully timed to occur precisely to embarrass the command and the United States.

The focus areas will be discussed in the next section, covering the remainder of the formative first year.

PLANNING PHASE AND RAPID GROWTH—MARCH-OCTOBER 2008

The release of the mission, vision, and focus areas document was immediately followed by the command's initial theater strategy document. Although named a "strategy," the document served an important communication function—it laid out the priorities of the command in relation to national security objectives in Africa. In effect, within the confines of USAFRICOM's mission, the strategy provided a partial vision statement for Africa. The near-term tasks of the strategy included actions carefully chosen to match the commander's vision for the command. Each constituted "means" available to the command, offering opportunities for quick wins.

An additional major theme emerged, or more properly re-emerged, during late winter. This was Ward's philosophy of **active security** that he drew from his previous tenure with USEUCOM. This philosophy would play an important role in the command's

communications during the second half of its formative year as it described the nature of programs and activities that USAFRICOM would create for itself, as opposed to those it would inherit. Thus, this section begins with a brief overview of active security; then reviews the major events that occurred through the summer; followed by the transition to full operational capability on October 1, 2008.

Philosophy of "Active Security"

The term "active security" emerged during a routine periodic update of USEUCOM's theater strategy in 2006-2007. USEUCOM planners looked at overhauling USEUCOM's strategy because of the growing post-conflict challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, significant changes in the security environment in Europe and Eurasia, ongoing drawdowns of the U.S. force posture, and the likelihood that future conflicts would occur outside of Western Europe—where the majority of U.S. forces were stationed. All these environmental factors pointed to a USEUCOM theater where so-called Phase Zero operations, activities designed for "shaping the environment," were highly important.[120]

Active security was analogous to **active defense** in combat operations. Active defense was an Army term, referring to a defensive doctrine that emerged in the 1970s when U.S. forces in Europe were insufficient to defend the European territory employing existing doctrinal precepts. In effect, it was about "how to win outnumbered."[121] In practice, the doctrine was about continuously employing available resources across the theater to attrit the enemy, rather than being hunkered down behind the wire and employed in mass only when necessary. The analogy at USEUCOM was

that U.S. forces in Europe needed to spread its security cooperation resources thinly across the theater to build partner capacity in order to prevent further conflict.

As Deputy Commander of USEUCOM, Ward oversaw the theater strategy development process, and therefore brought it over to USAFRICOM. He began using the term "active security" in his speeches and remarks in February. Active security then became the first focus area in USAFRICOM's initial theater strategy:

> Our strategy will be founded on the premise of "**Active Security**." That is to say, our day-to-day activities will be focused on preventing or reducing the likelihood of conflict, deterring aggression, and preventing attacks against our homeland, our interests, or our partners. Active Security means creating and capitalizing on opportunities to define the environment during peacetime in order to avoid the catastrophic effect and costs associated with conflict while allowing our African partners and our U.S. Government (USG) teammates to focus more effectively on diplomacy and development. Should prevention fail, however, Active Security will also ensure our African partners, United States Africa Command and its components, and potential coalition partners are postured correctly to respond in a manner that mitigates the effects of conflict and allows a rapid cessation of hostilities [emphasis in original].[122]

The theater strategy subsequently operationalized active security through establishment of end states, objectives, and near-term tasks. The end states and objectives emphasized USAFRICOM's support role as part of the U.S. Government effort and not as an independent actor. The three theater strategic end states, projected for "15+" years, were: (1) African capacity to provide for their own security, (2) capability and capacity of African regional security apparatus, and (3) professionalism of African armed forces. "Interim

objectives" of the strategy, which were meant to guide USAFRICOM actions over the next "2-15 years," largely involved how the command would plug into the interagency structure.[123]

The six near-term tasks showed where and how the command intended to focus its activities during its first 2 years. These are summarized below (but intentionally not in order) with comments.

The first task:

> Explore options to alter programs currently employing contractors (i.e., African Contingency Operations and Training Program) by replacing or augmenting them with active or reserve component, uniformed Service members;

along with the second task:

> Develop options for expanding enlisted professional development as part of our building partner capacity activities, programs, and exercises.

These reflected questions among the Africanists on the staff as to how effectively a contracted program could instill professional values. There was little doubt to their efficacy at training and educating, but there was a strong belief within the command that the presence of U.S. noncommissioned officers had a powerful effect on how well African militaries internalized professional values. Moreover, the command saw that transforming African militaries into forces suitable for confronting the threats on the continent required professionalizing the enlisted soldiers, as was done in the United States.

The third task:

> In conjunction with the Department of State, explore potential policy recommendations to augment, advise, or

> assist ongoing U.N. and A.U. [African Union] missions in Africa.

African participation in internal peacekeeping and other post-conflict operations on the continent were seen as an important metric of Africans taking care of their own problems. Clearly, this was beyond USAFRICOM's responsibility to affect, but its leaders would clearly need to be involved in interagency policy discussions.

The fourth task was "Draft and implement a plan to augment the Command's Offices of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Africa." An OSC was a cell of a few officers and civilians located within a U.S. Embassy, and their roles were to manage bilateral military-to-military cooperation with the host country, including purchase and fielding of U.S. defense equipment and associated training and logistics. There were several OSCs at the predominantly larger U.S. Embassies, and the desire to expand them furthered a message that USAFRICOM began communicating by March 2008—the notion of **inherited presence**, which sought to redirect the discussions about USAFRICOM's headquarters location. Rather than USAFRICOM headquarters moving to the continent, the message was "we were already there" in the form of OSCs it inherited from USEUCOM and USCENTCOM. Expanding OSCs would involve extremely small numbers, ones and twos, and would serve a more efficient means of achieving the positive effects of being on the continent than moving the headquarters.

Paraphrased, the fifth task was to construct larger OSCs tied specifically to African regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States. OSCs were bilateral by definition, and it was understood that the levels of military-to-military

cooperation with many African nations did not justify establishing an OSC, and instead it would be better to help the African Union more directly by supporting the establishment of regional Africa Standby Forces. CJTF-HoA would serve this role for East Africa.

The final task was to complete the upgrade of Kelley Barracks to house the headquarters. Similar to the inherited presence message, the Strategy offered another defense against the headquarters stationing conflict:

> USAFRICOM's mission and requirements must drive our presence on the continent; the desires of our African partners should 'pull' more presence to the continent rather than the United States 'pushing' the same.[124]

Major Events Through September 2008

Several significant events occurred from March through September 2008 that afforded USAFRICOM leaders the opportunity to present its strategy and communicate its messages to U.S. and African audiences. The lessons from these engagements were fed back into the command's communication campaign. The below subsections summarize the key points communicated and the feedback to the headquarters.

"Airlie House II" in Chantilly, VA, March 2008

Airlie House II was so named as a follow-on conference from one involving the transition team in 2007. Like its predecessor, Airlie House II was an opportunity for the DoD to engage with a wide range of African stakeholders. This time, however, USAFRICOM was established and all eyes were on the command.

Yates was the USAFRICOM representative and delivered the keynote presentation. She placed great emphasis on the programs and activities already underway and upcoming U.S.-African exercises that included maritime security, disaster preparedness, and command and control training. She also expanded the inherited presence message to include the defense attachés (explicitly, because of their roles in security cooperation where OSCs were not present), the bilateral assistance officers associated with the State Partnership Program and the liaison officers of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. This created a map of Africa that showed a widely distributed presence (see figure 4-1), but Yates stressed that most dots represented only one or a "small number" of individuals.



Source: USAFRICOM.

Figure 4-1. Inherited Presence Slide from Presentation at Airlie House II[125]

Given how quickly the inherited presence slide evolved, the headquarters staff began an active discourse over whether the addition of more dots would have the opposite effect as intended. Would such a crowded slide, absent from the explanation of a USAFRICOM leader, be misconstrued as alleged proof that USAFRICOM is taking over the continent? Initial reads from audiences suggested that this was not a problem. The map showed what was already going on. The inherited presence slide would continue to grow numbers of dots over the summer as other categories of liaisons and officials increased in number.

Manning Challenges, April 2008

Unfortunately for the fledgling command, the provision of staff lagged over the spring, due in part to heavy U.S. commitments to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[126] The armed services were to have provided a steady incoming stream of staff throughout the initial operating capability year to foster the acceptance of missions from the other combatant commands. However, this did not come to fruition, as the services succumbed to rumors that the command would be disbanded.[127]

By April 2008, the situation became critical, and USAFRICOM leaders warned USEUCOM that the command was at high risk of not fulfilling all the requirements for full operational capability by September. Subsequently, Ward briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, upon which the Chairman directed the services to provide the staff immediately.[128] By July 2008, the influx of personnel brought USAFRICOM up to 524 out of 639 military positions filled, but had only 222 of 665 civilian positions filled with a projection of

only having half its authorized civilians by October.[129] Moreover, the sudden injection of large numbers of personnel "just in time" presented significant challenges for incorporating the new arrivals into the team at a time when USAFRICOM was trying to construct policy, programs, and procedures and work toward meeting full operating capability.

The same would be true for acquiring interagency personnel. Yates and Moeller called Deputy Secretaries all over Washington, DC, explaining USAFRICOM and trying to recruit senior interagency members to come to the command. A significant hurdle was the different career management norms between the DoD and other departments. In essence, interagency members taking jobs at the DoD were committing career suicide, unlike the DoD officers who were encouraged to take broadening assignments.[130]

These new members also required education on African matters since, like many of the initial cadre, African expertise was lacking. Yates and the State Partnership Program and outreach directors began hosting film series and book discussions to help familiarize them with the continent.[131] It is a testimony to the leadership of the directors (general officers and civilians) that the command accomplished the necessary tasks and declared full operating capability on time.[132]

USAFRICOM Off-Site Conference, Mainz, May 2008

At the time of the first off-site conference, most of the command's senior leaders below director level had not yet arrived. Thus, the colonels and lieutenant colonels comprised a majority of the participants and conducted the conference like a working group session.

Over the winter, however, most of these senior members (especially interagency) of the command had arrived. Thus, a second off-site conference oriented toward forming the command's leadership and allowing them to bond was set in Mainz in May 2008. The off-site conference also served an important outreach mission, as the guest speakers were mostly external experts on African matters, and included academics, senior officials from the continent, and officers from United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and The Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ward met with the guest speakers in a special session on the evening of the first day to encourage continued communication.

The final day was devoted to internal matters of implementing the strategy. Two key themes emerged. The first regarded the tension between meeting the long-term goals versus pressures to show "added value" immediately. Participants recognized how the constant pursuit of "quick wins" could inhibit the needed patience and restraint that the long-term goals required. Patience was also a point of emphasis in relationships with the interagency, and the newer interagency leaders cautioned against the temptation to act faster than other agencies could handle. Flexibility and adaptability were going to be key for working at the regional levels. The resulting guidance was that USAFRICOM should pursue its short-term wins where the authorities and activities were clearest. If USAFRICOM could improve those activities, that would support the theme of "adding value."

The second theme was bracing for the rapid growth of what would be primarily military officers and the DoD civilians rounding out the staff. Participants showed concern about the newer members

overwhelming the interagency members, not understanding the command's unique ways of doing business, and settling into familiar habits. They committed to vigilance in eliminating jargon and acronyms, maintaining an Africa perspective in all actions, and defining (or clarifying) what "whole-of-government" means to a military-heavy organization. Participants also committed to an "enduring sense of optimism," as they worried that the lack of measurable progress would frustrate members and breed cynicism.

Final Approval of USAFRICOM's Mission, May 2008

After the off-site conference, word came that Gates had approved the following as USAFRICOM's mission statement. Note the middle phrases that expanded upon **what** the command was responsible for, and how many times the word "military" appears.

> United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.[133]

The phrase "sustained security engagement" bears special mention, as it represented the philosophy of active security using different words. While active security was still promoted as a way to orient activity, sustained security engagement was found to be a better plain-language substitute that sounded less like a term and more like an activity.

Also of note was the phrase "in concert . . . and international partners," which was inserted at the department level and considered by some within

USAFRICOM to be redundant. The inclusion of the phrase reinforced the original collaborative flavor of the command sought during the transition team era.

Testimony to the House Oversight and Governmental Reform Committee, July 2008

Congress had taken a special interest in the command's formation since the Presidential announcement. During the command's formative period, the GAO launched a study into the progress of forming the command, using the DoD's original correspondence as the baseline. Thus, the report recounted a number of the misconceptions dating from the transition team period, and some of these influenced GAO's findings. For example, based on the DoD's original conception of greater interagency participation, the report noted that actual assigned interagency personnel fell far short of the mark, even though USAFRICOM had already welcomed temporary loans of personnel and other measures designed to reduce the burden on other government agencies. GAO investigators reported concerns and criticisms that the command's purpose and mission were still unresolved, and that stakeholders were yet unclear or unconvinced of USAFRICOM's messages. Moreover, regarding presence on the continent, GAO saw the command's and the DoD's positions as unclear and contradictory, despite the fact that the DoD had long deferred the matter to USAFRICOM. In turn, USAFRICOM had successfully pushed to have the headquarters location discussion taken off the table until the command was stabilized.

USAFRICOM was invited to testify in a hearing before the House Oversight and Governance Reform Committee's Subcommittee on National Security and

Foreign Affairs. Yates and Snodgrass served as witnesses in a panel with Ms. Lauren Ploch from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), who had been reporting on the command since its formation.

The three issues of concern from the GAO report were the subject of discussion from the members; however, Yates and Snodgrass responded by setting a clear boundary between the discourse prior to USAFRICOM's formation and the present, suggesting that all three areas of concern were outdated. The final approved mission statement, still only 2 months old, specifically addressed the confusion over the mission as it clarified both what and how the command would do business. They reassured the members about the justification for keeping the command in Germany, despite some congressional members (not necessarily within the subcommittee) becoming open in their desire to have USAFRICOM moved to the United States. Yates and Snodgrass also disputed the GAO concerns about lack of interagency representation; instead, they promoted the message that the requirements and factual analysis should dictate manning levels, not arbitrary statements made in 2006.

> In building the command, we determined that it was very important to have, within the headquarters, relevant subject matter expertise from the broader security and development domains. These experts would be integrated into the development and planning stages of our activities. Identifying these staff positions and placing them appropriately throughout the command has been a deliberate process that is progressing well through the full support of many . . . [U.S. Government] agencies. By employing permanent and temporary interagency personnel and through increased partnerships with key agencies across the . . . [U.S. Government], our capabilities as an interagency command are growing.[134]

Although members expressed some skepticism about the interagency staffing and perceptions of militarizing foreign policy, there was genuine acceptance of the message.

Activation Ceremony for the 1st Battalion of the Armed Forces of Liberia, August 2008

This was one of many activities on the continent of Africa during the formative year, but the activation ceremony in Liberia is notable for the country's history and relationship to the United States. A mere 5 years earlier, in the immediate aftermath of combat operations in Iraq, the U.S. military deployed a joint task force to Liberia to protect the U.S. Embassy and conduct humanitarian missions as Liberia devolved into civil war.[135] With the installation of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia quickly recovered.

The transformation of the Liberian armed forces from a militia to a professional military was seen as an important step to lasting stability and security. Liberia was one of the first nations to professionalize its armed forces in the era of USAFRICOM, something that USAFRICOM would subsequently initiate in other African nations. Thus, the command's messages of adding value and African solutions for African problems were preeminent, as roughly 2,100 Liberian soldiers stood ready as the 1st Battalion of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

Ward's address at the ceremony initially addressed the dignitaries—emphasis on security as the necessary first step to enabling economic development and the role of a professional armed force in civil society. He addressed the majority of his remarks, however, to the soldiers themselves. He listed six professional

values that made a well-rounded soldier: selfless service, respect, duty, courage, integrity, and loyalty. He charged them to internalize these values, saying:

> You are the spirit and pride of your nation. Liberians in every corner of this land count on you to protect them and to provide a safe environment in which they can work, go to school, and raise their families. Soldiers, here is your chance to make a difference.[136]

Although this address did not signal a major shift in communication, it laid the groundwork for numerous follow-on communications from USAFRICOM leaders and staff regarding opportunities for the professionalization and capacity building of other African militaries.

Development of the Headquarters

The second off-site conference signaled a key phase in USAFRICOM's formation—its rapid influx of military personnel during the traditional summer rotation. It was at this point that the command had to grapple with scaling its internal communications while continuing to accept missions from other commands and contending with an increasing operations tempo. Synchronization of communication activities was critical. This section presents some vignettes and anecdotes displaying some of the challenges faced within the headquarters and some ways that the command addressed them.

Leveraging External Contacts

The new command needed independent contacts external to the organization to help verify independently USAFRICOM's messages to other stakeholders and audiences. It was critically important

that these contacts sustained their professional autonomy and independence so their endorsements of USAFRICOM's positions were legitimate, while at the same time offering useful constructive criticism to the command and its leaders. These helped the command keep the messaging on track.

It is beyond the scope of this case study to deliver an exhaustive list of such contacts, but a few notable ones follow.[137] Dr. J. Peter Pham, then-associate professor of political science and African studies at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, had written extensively about U.S. strategic interests and engagement in Africa; authored books on the failed state of Liberia and child soldiers in Sierra Leone; and, in 2007, authored articles on U.S.-Africa relations and the Global War on Terror. Pham would be the plenary speaker at the Mainz off-site and would continue to write articles on U.S.-African issues and their impacts on USAFRICOM throughout the following decade.

Lauren Ploch was a specialist in African Affairs at the CRS during USAFRICOM's first several years. She joined Yates and Snodgrass at the hearing before the House Oversight and Government Reform committee, providing independent verification of USAFRICOM's messages regarding its formation.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies also published favorable and supportive commentaries on USAFRICOM during its formation. Notable contributors were J. Stephen Morrison, then-Director of the Center's Africa Program, and Dr. Kathleen Hicks, then a senior fellow who had previously served 13 years in the DoD. They conducted a study of the USAFRICOM concept and, throughout 2007 and 2008, would release joint commentaries and deliver testimonies to Congress favoring the command's creation.

Keeping Stakeholders Informed

The leadership team recognized the need for follow-up communications with stakeholders. Since October, they had been continuously engaged in the United States and Africa with officials from the host, Germany, and other European allies. The breadth of audiences to be engaged by so few individuals meant that many would only get one personal visit from a USAFRICOM leader. This would not be enough to keep stakeholders informed, particularly U.S. country teams on the continent facing barrages of questions and protests about the command. Despite the Directorate of Outreach and USAFRICOM Public Affairs not yet having received all their incoming personnel, they were already under pressure to keep information flowing through fact sheets, media circulars, and other standing documents available through the command's new website or directly from the staff.

One activity that was very important was the creation of the USAFRICOM Blog, a feature of its new website. The blog was made public very early on, and all audiences, whether friendly or critical, were encouraged to post. All members of the headquarters staff were asked to review posts from outside the headquarters and provide a response. Despite the requirement to screen blog posts before being made public, the Public Affairs office generally only screened for objectionable language. This mitigated the potential for critics to claim that the blog was only for show and used for propaganda purposes. Numerous very strong criticisms of the command were included, with the command's responses alongside. Staff members strove to use constructive language and not take any of the criticism personally. Whenever possible,

staff members also referred to the command's ongoing activities as evidence to avoid "he said, she said" type contradictions that would not sway detractors. The numbers of critical posts dwindled during the command's first year, with many critics electing not to continue communications over the blog.

A more targeted communication activity was the command newsletter, published sporadically during the formative year beginning in March 2008. The newsletter's primary audiences were the U.S. Ambassadors, to keep them informed both of the command's activities, particularly those of the commander and deputies, and progress in standing up the command and accepting missions.[138]

Also in March 2008, USAFRICOM assumed responsibility for a USEUCOM program known as the Africa Web Initiative. The feature website—Magharebia: The News & Views of the Maghreb—served as an "Internal information source targeting audiences in North Africa."[139] The website was designed to foster constructive dialogue about regional issues and "fight misinformation and inaccurate information provided by extremist websites."[140]

Interagency and Multinational Participation

USAFRICOM headquarters was also very busy in the spring and summer receiving visitors from U.S. Government agencies and foreign partners to learn about the command and possible augmentation of subject matter experts and liaison officers. By April 2008, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and France had provided rotating liaison officers to the headquarters.[141] Over the spring, the command welcomed delegations from the Departments of Homeland Security,

Commerce, Agriculture, and others concerning interagency participation and collaboration.[142] The command also hosted a delegation from the International Committee for the Red Cross in May 2008, to discuss the command's objectives in Africa.[143]

Interagency leadership emerged as a major theme as USAFRICOM welcomed a senior federal service civilian from the Department of Commerce as the deputy director for resources, a senior civilian from USAID as the senior development advisor to the commander, and a retired USAID official to join as the deputy director for programs. A special "organizational chart" slide showing the integration of these senior interagency members as leaders in the command presented a strong message. Unlike before, where the emphasis on interagency participation was about the number of participants, the emphasis was on their impact on the organization.

One emerging challenge was the external and internal pressures on these interagency leaders to conform to DoD norms for individuals in leadership roles. U.S. military mid-level leaders also needed to learn to treat these interagency professionals with the same respect and deference they did other military members. In general, interagency leaders have far greater autonomy and fewer administrative requirements than DoD leaders, and their parent organizations were generally flat. U.S. country teams in Africa, for example, exercised very flat structures, with team members often having direct links to the ambassador. Such was not the case in USAFRICOM despite its relatively small size, and certainly not after the command ballooned to about 1,500 by full operating capacity.

In response to these issues, Snodgrass instituted several protocols for communication and review of

interagency inputs to USAFRICOM message creation and mission execution. These included a direct line to him as Chief of Staff, monthly meetings with small groups of interagency partners, and the requirement to forward any dissenting opinion about a proposal from any interagency partner. These dissents would be attached as the proposal went through the approval process in the directorate, and, if not resolved there, would be sent to the Chief of Staff for resolution. After installing these protocols, not one dissent from an interagency partner was ever forwarded to the Chief of Staff because they were resolved and incorporated by the directorates to the satisfaction of the interagency member involved.[144]

Mission Acceptance and New Mission Initiation

During the final 6 months before full operating capacity on October 1, the rate of USAFRICOM's mission acceptance drew considerable focus. Some missions were transferred easily, such as the aforementioned Magharebia website, while others, such as command and control of the CJTF-HoA and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-TRANS-SAHARA, would be far more complex. USAFRICOM communicated aggressively to ensure stakeholders understood how much responsibility the command had assumed.

Like APS, USAFRICOM rapidly took ownership of additional major initiatives and turned them into quick wins. Africa Endeavor 2008, a command and control interoperability exercise, was a notable example of another significant early USAFRICOM achievement. The exercise was in direct support of the African Union to "help achieve its goal of attaining interoperable standards and procedures to provide effective

command and control of peacekeeping, peace support, and humanitarian operations on the continent."[145] From the April final planning conference in Accra, Ghana, to the July exercise itself, 26 African and 7 European nations participated.

Meanwhile, USAFRICOM would also realize its first successful internally generated program. The Africa Deployment Assistance Phase Training (ADAPT) Phase I training was borne of an idea by a major on the USAFRICOM staff who recognized that partner nations were untrained in configuring loads for air transport, thereby presenting major safety and security risks. For example, loadmasters had detected the dangerous interspersing of flammables with other military equipment on the same pallet. Beginning with a proof of principle in Uganda in July 2008, ADAPT became an example of how "It doesn't take much to make a huge difference."[146]

FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY—OCTOBER 2008 AND BEYOND

USAFRICOM achieved full operational capability on October 1, 2008. All designated missions had been transferred, many of the facility renovations in Germany were complete, and the subordinate service components commands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Special Operations were established. Thus, the communication campaign moved to a new phase, from implementation to sustainment. This section covers only a few significant events and activities that influenced the communication campaign during the command's first year and beyond.

Establishment Ceremonies, October 2008

The next day, Gates, Mullen, Ward, and USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore unfurled USAFRICOM's colors in a small ceremony inside the Pentagon. The ceremony highlighted the interagency support for the command and its mission. Fore said:

> We look forward to this evolving relationship, the central point of which must be clear, that security, stability and peace are essential for the quality of human life and essential for development. We know well that the conditions for economic growth and poverty reduction are secure, stable and appropriately governed environments. . . . Conflict is an impediment to development and families and nations building their futures. During my travels as direct [sic] of United States Foreign Assistance and as USAID administrator, I've seen firsthand the terrible toll that conflict takes on people's lives. . . . But with peace, it is a time of hope. To our African friends and partners in the audience, I want to reiterate the United States government's commitment to supporting your plans for your countries. We have long and fruitful ties with your nations. And I am here today in part to reiterate that commitment to you as well as to give the support of the American people to your continued progress.[147]

The larger ceremony would come 2 weeks later. On October 17, USAFRICOM hosted its Establishment Ceremony on the grounds of Kelley Barracks. Guests included numerous U.S. ambassadors to Africa, federal and local officials from Germany, and officials from the State Department and USAID. Following remarks from the Deputy Administrator of USAID and the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Brigadier Jean de Martha Jaotody spoke as the representative of the African Union:

> I wish to state on the outset, on the many cross-proposals and broad outlines of AFRICOM's stated mission in Africa that we share: The prevention of conflict and the promotion of stability in our region; addressing the root cause of underdevelopment and poverty, which are making Africa a fertile ground for breeding terrorism. We need to (give?) [sic] our strength to undertake this support operation through training and capacity-building are all issues that we believe are essential to address the peace and security challenges for the African continent. Africa will continue to seek Africa's solutions to its problems, and from . . . [African Union's] recent experiences . . . it was evident that we have to continue to develop our institutions and sufficient capabilities for planning, training, intelligence, logistics, and mobility, and all this requires sustained resources. . . . It is our hope that the establishment of our own African Standby Force would be crucial in helping us to manage, and eventually to resolve conflicts from our continent for good. . . . Contrary to conventional wisdom, we believe that the United States has compelling strategic interest in Africa, covering a spectrum of cross-cutting issues. Indeed, the fact that AFRICOM has evolved into a single structure attests to the recognition of Africa's emerging strategic importance and the determination to address the peace and security challenges in the continent in a holistic manner. We are in full cognizance of the fact that peace and stability on the continent will impact not only on Africans, but to the interests of the United States, and to the international community as a whole.[148]

Although the context was conducive to favorable comments toward USAFRICOM, the harmonization of the speakers' messages with USAFRICOM's own was striking. Words very similar to USAFRICOM's own messages were uttered by leading interagency and African partners, not just during the ceremony but also in other venues during the latter part of 2008. The command's leaders interpreted this as a strong sign that stakeholders recognized the alignment of

interests and were willing to give the command a chance. With the command established, stakeholder attention turned from curiosity to expectation. USAFRICOM had to deliver the goods.

USAFRICOM Executive Board

USAFRICOM's four service component commands and Special Operations Command Africa had only achieved their "initial operating capability" on October 1, 2008, and were not due to reach full operating capability until the end of the fiscal year. Thus, USAFRICOM's subordinate layer was undergoing some of the same turmoil that the combatant command headquarters had undergone the previous year. Each of them faced different challenges. For example, the Southern European Task Force, the U.S. Army's division-level headquarters stationed in Italy, would be redesignated the U.S. Army Africa. While the size of the headquarters would change little, the shift from tactical airborne unit to service component command would be significant—necessitating a complete overhaul of the duties and required expertise resident in the headquarters. The other subordinate commands would be formed by splitting their European counterparts—some creating completely separate and distinct organizations (Marines and Special Ops), others creating two distinct subdivisions or staffs underneath a single commander (Air Force and Navy).

USAFRICOM would follow the example of U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR), who had established a "Board of Directors" that would meet monthly and discuss strategic matters of the command. The USAREUR Board consisted of the headquarters' senior leaders and all the subordinate

commands. The USAFRICOM Executive Board would be similarly organized, comprising what was known as the "G-17"—the five members of the USAFRICOM command group (including the senior enlisted leader) and the commanders and senior enlisted leaders of the four service component commands, Special Operations Command Africa, and CJTF-HoA.

The inaugural Board meeting was held in mid-December 2008 and focused on three major areas—reinforcing success, prioritizing activities, and determining such prioritization—thereby encouraging partners to engage with and trust the command.[149] One of the key takeaways was the decision to use a top-down prioritization strategy rather than other models in use. For example, other combatant commands had employed what was known as a "lead-follow" strategy that assigned responsibilities for bilateral military-to-military engagement to a single service component command that would have primacy over activities of other service components. Although efficient for distributing direct engagement responsibilities and helpful for horizontal integration of activity, it too often led to service activities deviating from combatant command requirements. The top-down prioritization model would avoid such problems. Moreover, the top-down approach would be better for fostering relationships between African partners.

The second key takeaway regarded seam issues among the combatant commands. Established by the Unified Command Plan, the boundaries were culturally very fixed—the jurisdictions of geographic commands were inviolable. To date, USAFRICOM had already faced two very direct complications with boundaries and resolved them. One was Egypt, an African nation seen by the United States as Middle

Eastern, and therefore retained in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. During the formative year, Ward, a former Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Egypt in Cairo, worked hard to assure the Egyptian military that they could engage as required with both USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM, depending on the nature of the issue. The second regarded the intersection of DoD boundaries with the Department of State regional bureaus. The State's Bureau of African Affairs covered sub-Saharan Africa, while the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs covered the Maghreb. Although these boundaries previously existed and clashed with the boundaries of USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, the lesser degree of interagency cooperation rendered them less important. For USAFRICOM, on the other hand, these boundaries were far more important, such that Yates and other senior interagency leaders on the staff made a special effort to engage the affected regional bureaus. However, these discussions largely focused on land.

The growing problem of piracy off the coast of East Africa brought the maritime side of the issues to the fore. For the United States, who saw freedom of navigation as an important interest, the increasing scope and quantity of piracy incidents was a great concern. However, when it came to addressing the problem, board members were unclear as to which command would be the supporting command and which would be the supported. Moreover, the board saw piracy as a mere symptom of the greater problem of the breakdown of rule of law and the infiltration of organized crime and terrorist groups. African partners saw these as far more important than stopping piracy alone.

A third key takeaway regarded how the six headquarters would handle a joint task force requirement.

By design, the organizations were kept small, which reduced the labor cost. There was potential for USAFRICOM to need to form joint interagency task forces that were "interagency-heavy" in the event of a large-scale crisis. Planning was not so much the concern, as the combatant command had this capability; it was implementation of plans that required attention.

Visit of President Obama to Ghana—Attention to African Issues

The first half of 2009 was a busy time for the headquarters. In February, it hosted an annual Theater Security Cooperation Working Group conference that had 500 participants from the combatant command, subordinate commands, defense attachés and security assistance officers from the continent, and representatives of various U.S. and international agencies. They discussed security cooperation priorities, issues, and opportunities. The second deployment of APS took place during the late winter and spring, making follow-up stops in several of the same ports as the first APS. Security sector reform activities in Liberia were underway. From Cape Verde and Ghana to Mauritius, USAFRICOM engaged in dialogue with maritime partners to discuss challenges of trafficking, drugs, illegal fishing, and other problems. In May 2009, USAFRICOM and USPACOM jointly hosted a planning workshop in Rome with 18 African and Asian nations to address the growing threat of pandemic influenza. U.S. and Moroccan military personnel conducted humanitarian assistance and medical training in conjunction with exercise AFRICOM Lion, while CJTF-HoA completed several engineering projects such as a

water system for a Kenyan high school and a modern bridge in Aroma, Uganda.

In January 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th President of the United States, and the first African-American to hold that office. Among his initial actions as President was to "reset" international relations and engage in more outreach, distancing the United States from the more militaristic policies of his predecessor. He sought an end to the war in Iraq and closure of the detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay. His initial visit to Africa was Cairo, Egypt, in June 2009 when he called for a "New Beginning" between the Islamic world and the United States. However, it would be his first visit within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility the following month that was of seminal importance to the command.

On July 11, Obama visited Ghana, which included meetings with President John Mills and an address to the Ghanaian Parliament. Included in his remarks were:

> This is the simple truth of a time when the boundaries between people are overwhelmed by our connections. Your prosperity can expand America's prosperity. . . . see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world—(applause)—as partners with America on behalf of the future we want for all of our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual responsibility and mutual respect. And that is what I want to speak with you about today.
>
> We must start from the simple premise that Africa's future is up to Africans.
>
> I say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this part of the world. After all, I have the blood of Africa within me, and my family's. . . . I'll focus on four areas that are critical to the future of Africa

> and the entire developing world: democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. . . . [T]hese things can only be done if all of you take responsibility for your future. And it won't be easy. It will take time and effort. There will be suffering and setbacks. But I can promise you this: America will be with you every step of the way—as a partner, as a friend.[150]

The address was a boon for USAFRICOM as both tone and rhetoric aligned with the command's existing messages and activities. Elements of the address were included in internal and external communications associated with USAFRICOM's growing list of activities and those of its developing subordinate commands. However, the manner of its use was as confirmation of USAFRICOM's own engagements. As Ward would later write:

> [The President's] priorities were consistent with the expressed desires of many African political and military leaders with whom we have engaged since our 2007 inception. They told us they also desire African solutions to African problems, especially in providing for their own security and stability in ways that serve to prevent future conflicts and promote the full resolution of existing ones.[151]

The "Security-Focused Vision for Africa" and USAFRICOM's Role

In February 2009, Ward began including a "Vision for Africa . . . As expressed by our African Partners" in command communications that reflected four "pillars:"

1. employment of capable and accountable military forces;
2. strengthened security institutions;

3. the ability to support international peace efforts; and,
4. the ability and will to dissuade, deter, and defeat threats.

Nothing in the vision was surprising or controversial, as it reflected messages delivered by external parties during the command's establishment. However, it constituted an important course reversal from previous internal discussions over the vision, where an Africa-focused vision was deemed too inflammatory. The phrase "as expressed by" was the justification. Rather than the vision being generated at USAFRICOM, leaders would emphasize that the vision came from Africans. It would be presented as evidence that USAFRICOM was listening to the Africans.

This was not used as a central message until after the Presidential visit, when it became the **security-focused vision for Africa** with the same four pillars but with the attending message of "How USAFRICOM Can Help."[152] Leveraging the President's Ghanaian Parliament address, USAFRICOM adopted a theme that "African Problems are Global Security Challenges," but that African nations have "insufficient means" to confront their challenges and therefore depend on foreign assistance.[153] Thus, USAFRICOM's help would come largely in three forms: building operational capacity, building institutional capacity, and building human capital.

A late 2009 program would become the centerpiece of this messaging. A joint effort of USAFRICOM and the Department of Homeland Security became the African Maritime Law Enforcement Program, a combined law enforcement program conducted off the coasts of Cape Verde, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

This program built partner maritime law enforcement capacity and helped detect illicit activities within the exclusive economic zones of the participating nations. A U.S. Coast Guard cutter and crew helped train, coach, and monitor African teams conducting patrols and boarding vessels that were conducting illegal activities. If requested by partners, parallel efforts by other U.S. Government agencies would advise on the handling of impounded vessels and cargo and the prosecution of crewmembers. The first African Maritime Law Enforcement Program mission had an immediate impact, as a Sierra Leone law enforcement detachment seized four fishing vessels for violations with potential fines exceeding one million dollars.[154]

Similar stories were constructed around other USAFRICOM activities throughout 2009, such as the second Africa Endeavor interoperability exercise that involved 29 nations; the multinational growth of the APS, including the Netherlands' provision of the Rotterdam-class ship *Johann de Witt* to serve as the lead ship; and the exercise Natural Fire in Uganda, which focused on increasing capacity for disaster response and humanitarian assistance among Central and Eastern African nations.[155] Each of these were presented as examples of how USAFRICOM plays a role in addressing African partner requirements that the U.S. Government approves as consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Recognition of the Campaign's Success

The combination of USAFRICOM's words and deeds throughout 2009 had an impact on the tone of communications between the command and its stakeholders as 2010 approached. First, many of

USAFRICOM's programs grew steadily in scope year after year, with more African partner nations participating, European and other international partners participating, or with growing numbers of soldiers or sailors. Moreover, African nations were willing to conduct the activity again the next year. The success of APS in West Africa, for example, would spur inquiries into the potential for a second APS in Eastern Africa, where piracy was continuing to be a problem for international commerce.

USAFRICOM leaders found that in question and answer sessions, routine media engagements, and other external communications, questions about the command's mission and purpose were no longer being asked. Critics of the command from the transition team days were growing silent, and several websites devoted to attacking the command and the United States were growing silent or had shut themselves down.

However, there were still critics who believed the original 2007-era stories about the command. Moeller had this to say in a *Foreign Policy* article near the end of his tenure:

> I have seen anecdotal stories of military personnel showing up in an African nation unaware that they ultimately report to the U.S. ambassador of the host nation in question. If you run across one of those stories, take a look at the date. There's a strong chance that incident took place before or not long after October 2008, when Africom formally became responsible for everything the U.S. military does in Africa. One of the reasons Africom was created was to help put an end to that kind of confusion.[156]

The combatant command's establishment also heralded the initial operating capacity of many of its service

component commands, which brought about new communication challenges. As with any combatant command, relationships with component commands are ordinarily challenging because of their dual responsibilities to the combatant command and their parent service. USAFRICOM faced particular challenges because its Air Force and Navy components were not fully split from their USEUCOM counterparts. This made harmonizing messages between USAFRICOM and their components difficult, and there were numerous instances where USAFRICOM had to address miscommunications coming from the components.[157]

The Long Term—ODYSSEY DAWN and Criticism Anew

The winter of 2010-2011 signaled a major shift in the African security environment. Civil unrest in northern Africa would erupt after the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor who protested alleged mistreatment by police. Large-scale protests against governments followed all across northern Africa and the Middle East, leading to several national leaders being toppled or volunteering to step down.

Of significance for USAFRICOM was the onset of the Libyan Civil War of 2011, in which Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi turned his security forces on his own people to quell a rapidly growing rebellion. On February 26, 2011, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1970 condemned Gaddafi's use of lethal force and imposed sanctions. However, Gaddafi continued his actions against the rebels, leading to UNSCR 1973 on March 17, 2011, that established a no-fly zone and demanded an immediate ceasefire. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, USAFRICOM's first military operation,

began 2 days later. It would provide grist for critics who took the old counternarratives and updated them for present purposes.

> [The] March 2011 aerial bombardment of Libya under the command and control of AFRICOM Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn shows how close to the surface the devastating use of American military force with total impunity against Africa remains, even for this flexible, "listening," organization. . . . [E]ven if AFRICOM today is generally the ineffective organization some make it out to be, the delineation of possible future scenarios remains important.[158]

> AFRICOM is fundamentally a front for U.S. military contractors like Dyncorp, MPRI, and KBR operating in Africa. U.S. military planners who benefit from the revolving door of privatization of warfare are delighted by the opportunity to give AFRICOM credibility under the facade of the Libyan intervention.[159]

> The velvet glove of humanitarian trainer has at last been taken off to reveal the fist of the military and its dominant role in U.S. Africa engagement. . . . AFRICOM's lead role in the assault on Libya will breed greater anti-Americanism while draining much needed monies and threatening civilian lives, with each bomb dropped.[160]

> Like NATO, AFRICOM's function is that of every predatory military power: The threat and use of armed violence to gain economic and geopolitical advantages. Nothing more, nothing less.[161]

Google searches on USAFRICOM continue to produce many of the original critical articles along with new ones, with the results not sorted by date so it takes extra effort to find recent ones.[162] Thus, as Dave Brown from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies wrote:

> While AFRICOM's vocal opponents are becoming fewer and perhaps more fringe than mainstream, the Command cannot become complacent because there remains strong opposition to AFRICOM among certain African audiences. . . . Perhaps there is an inevitable pendulum swing in the life of any combatant command between steady-state engagement and military operations and that, in 2011-2012, there was a pronounced swing at AFRICOM toward military operations. . . . [H]owever, the Command recognizes that African security challenges cannot be met long term by military means alone, but rather through a fully coordinated, comprehensive U.S. Government interagency strategy for Africa that addresses underlying, nonmilitary causes of instability.[163]

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

This case illustrates several important lessons about establishing, planning, and implementing communication campaigns.

"Victory" as a Transitory State

If the world ended in the winter of 2009-2010, it might have been easy to say that USAFRICOM "won." Its primary goals of altering the discourse about the command were achieved. Its critics had gone quiet, and the counternarratives lost their traction. USAFRICOM was acting according to its words, and speaking according to its actions.

Rather than earning victory, however, USAFRICOM's campaign simply entered a new phase as the environment changed. The measures of success stayed rather constant—to defend itself in such a way so that audiences would trust USAFRICOM more than the critics, and trust USAFRICOM's messages more than

the criticizing messages. In this new environment, USAFRICOM's campaign had to reset its messaging for the new realities and move forward as before. Clearly, the character of the command had to change as a result. No longer purely a security cooperation command, it had to change its narrative to adapt to being a combat-capable entity. The old messages were still relevant, just less salient.

This suggests that "victory" should be viewed as a transitory state. The campaign either moves to a new phase or is replaced with a new campaign, depending on the stimulus that the organization experiences. Although it may feel like the new situation takes the organization two or three steps "backward," this should be viewed as a natural phenomenon of complex adaptive environments. Successful promotion of one's adapted message becomes an important measure of success.

Opposing Narratives Never Go Away

This is a corollary to the above. The USAFRICOM case study is instructive in how the original opposing narratives grew silent over time due to the campaign's successes, only to become reanimated when the security environment changed. That the old criticisms resurfaced so quickly is not evidence that the campaign failed; rather, it is a misunderstanding about what campaigns can reasonably accomplish. Once an opposing narrative is made public through the statements of an adversary, it is burned in the permanent global memory. Even if purged from written or electronic media, its authors and sympathizers will remember it and relaunch it asymmetrically, given the opportunity.

For the same reasons why "victory" is never complete, just merely transitory, so too is the enemy's "defeat." It is an unfortunate aspect of the information environment that adversaries can attack an organization readily and asymmetrically based on changes in the environment that the organization cannot control, such as the Libyan crisis and the international response to it. Thus, the success of the campaign is measured by how quickly the organization is able to adapt to restore the status quo ante, isolating the new messages and re-isolating the messengers.

On the other hand, if the status quo ante is not achievable, then the campaign must change. Using a counterhistorical argument, what if USAFRICOM had contributed to the Arab Spring or Libya's crisis and was therefore culpable for the strife? The likely condition is that opposition to the command would grow and begin influencing key audiences and stakeholders, and USAFRICOM would have difficulties promoting its earlier messages since they would be discredited. Therefore, the command would have had to alter its themes and messages to pursue a new status quo, such as one that acknowledges error, or one that projects an entirely different image of the command.

Words and Actions Must Support the Narrative

USAFRICOM's own internal narrative was well-crafted from the beginning and essentially did not change through its first years; the diverse team listened to and learned from others and focused on building the security capacity of African partners. Themes and messages from it evolved over the years but did not deviate from it.

A caution is in order, however, because in the end USAFRICOM's initial narrative was largely uncontroversial and non-threatening. There was little to dispute—who would be opposed to joint, interagency, or multinational cooperation? Or listening and learning? Or helping partners? Of course, not all military organizations had the luxury of relying solely on such narratives, and any inclusion of traditional kinetic activities would have brought out vociferous, and probably more persistent, critics.

Thus, the real value in the case is how the words and actions supported the narrative and fed each other. Leader words spurred associated actions, which in turn fed back into the words, so everything was self-reinforced. The continuous presentation of tangible evidence of progress, even small-scale as most of USAFRICOM's were, made it more difficult for critics to question the leaders' messages as misleading or empty or to find contradictions. This choked the fire out of adversarial voices, who were left with repeating the earlier complaints that African audiences were no longer taking seriously.

The Institutional Practice of Communicating Must be Well-Coordinated

Aligning words and deeds require a whole-of-organization approach to communication, which was a great strength of USAFRICOM during its early years. The Africanists among its ranks believed in the mission and purpose of the command as they saw it (as opposed to that which came from the DoD), and carried the narrative throughout the formative days of the organization. As leaders espoused the virtues of the command, the staff quickly internalized it and

put it into practice. The shared understanding of the narrative was critical to the campaign's success, as it prevented say-do gaps coming from within the headquarters staff and from across the components as the command grew.

This is naturally an easier task to accomplish in the formative days of a new organization, when the true believers may have greater freedom to develop the fledgling culture from the start.[164] However, the speed in which military organizations often must form (and USAFRICOM was no exception) can inhibit the members from forming the culture they desire. Instead, compressed timelines may allow the culture to develop based on social interaction with stakeholders, which may or may not conform to the members' desires.

Best Offense is a Good Defense

The USAFRICOM case showed an excellent example of how successful defensive communication is not necessarily defensive in tone. A direct comparison of the DoD messages about USAFRICOM and those of the command itself is instructive. The DoD's approach was confrontational against the critics, directly refuting their stance. In contrast, USAFRICOM was more mitigative, shifting the attention back to its preferred narrative without directly denying the criticisms and not always acknowledging them.

The important lesson is that USAFRICOM was using a defense narrative that was detached from its primary narrative. The defensive narrative is a story that underlies its messaging in response to an adversary's narrative. The defensive story can be summarized as follows:

- Much of the controversy came about during the DoD's watch, and nothing the command says will change what came before.
- African attitudes toward the United States are shaped by history and the strategic environment that the DoD itself does not presently control. In fact, the military symbolizes the very criticisms that are out there.
- Interagency and other partner attitudes toward USAFRICOM are similarly shaped by history and a disparity of resources, neither of which USAFRICOM can influence.
- Refuting criticism directly does not serve the command well. USAFRICOM would end up subsuming its identity under the United States and the DoD and would fail to garner its own credibility.
- Therefore, USAFRICOM defends its narrative by establishing itself as a separate and distinct organization with its own central character.

Chemistry of the Leadership Team is Important

Unity of the leadership team of military organizations is too often assumed, when it should not be. Commanders of joint organizations in the United States do not always get the opportunity to choose their team, and even when they do, the different context can mean that the assembled team works differently (and possibly less successfully) than before. USAFRICOM benefited from having the leadership team operate under a shared understanding of the mission and purpose of the command, even if they did not exactly agree on the vision or the best approaches.

However, they worked sufficiently well together to ensure the accomplishment of the command's formation and deliver consistent and aligned messages throughout the campaign. Importantly, the leadership team avoided major public say-do gaps, which could easily have detracted from the campaign.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. The author served in USAFRICOM headquarters from October 2007 through June 2011, and this case includes his personal experiences and observations during that time period. The author is grateful to Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates and Major General (retired) Michael A. Snodgrass for their tremendous feedback and insights on earlier drafts.

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18. Comment from anonymous reviewer who served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the time of these events.

19. Moeller and Yates, p. 69.

20. Pendleton, p. 12.

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22. Pendleton, p. 15.

23. Resist AFRICOM Home Page.

24. Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM's Dilemma: The "Global War On Terrorism," "Capacity Building," Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2007, p. 8, available from *http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?-pubID=827,* accessed November 19, 2015.

25. Davis, pp. 123-124.

26. These regions were north, west, central, south, and east—respectively represented by the following economic blocs: the Arab Maghreb Union in the north; the Economic Community of West African States; the Economic Community of Central African States; the Southern African Development Community; and a combination of the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, covering the east and including the Horn of Africa (HoA).

27. Email to author from Ambassador Yates dated April 4, 2017.

28. "Liberia 'Offers' Territory," *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series*, Vol. 44, No. 7, August 2007, p. 17170;

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "AFRICOM Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves," allAfrica.com, June 25, 2007, available from *http://allafrica.com/stories/200706251196.html*. See also Choolwe Beyani, "Race in the Age of Obama, Part 2," *Research in Race and Ethnic Relations*, Vol. 19, 2015, pp. 203-229, see note 3.

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2014, available from *http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/oh150/yates/biography.html*, accessed July 10, 2016.

36. Ibid.

37. U.S. Air Force, "Major General Michael A. Snodgrass," U.S. Air Force, November 2011, available from *http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104765/major-general-michael-a-snodgrass.aspx*, accessed July 10, 2016.

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46. Email from Snodgrass to author, March 6, 2017.

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63. Marcella, "Understanding the Interagency Process," p. 27.

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68. Ploch, AFRICOM CRS Report, pp. 10-11.

69. Jeffrey S. Palmer, "Legal Impediments to USAFRICOM Operationalization," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 51, 4th Quarter, 2008, pp. 79-85.

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71. Ibid.

72. Rules regarding avoiding presumption of confirmation prohibited Ward from engaging with anyone as the USAFRICOM command nominee until he was confirmed in very late September. Thus, he was not allowed to conduct any transition-type meetings with stakeholders until after October 1, 2007.

73. William E. Ward, Remarks to Foreign Policy Conference about US Africa Command, as delivered, October 3, 2007.

74. William E. Ward, Address to Department of State Africa Bureau's Chief of Mission Conference, October 15, 2007.

75. Ibid.

76. William E. Ward, *USAFRICOM All-Hands*, October 25, 2007.

77. Paul R. Daniels, "Proposed USAFRICOM Mission Statement," memorandum for U.S. Africa Command Headquarters, October 29, 2007.

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79. Ibid.

80. At the time, participation of other agencies was conducted on a temporary duty basis while more permanent or enduring arrangements were being negotiated.

81. Recollection of the author. On a related note, it is worth mentioning that the initial "Joint Operations Center" (JOC) was established inside the former Kelley Barracks chapel, which provided a very open environment for the fledgling command to get together. When the new JOC was built as a standard secured facility later on, some of the inaugural members felt like they lost something. Email from Yates, April 4, 2017, corroborated with other former USAFRICOM members.

82. William E. Ward, "Address to AU Ambassadors Conference," as delivered, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, November 8, 2007.

83. Ibid.

84. William E. Ward, "Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee—Statement for the Record," November 11, 2007 (hereafter "HASC 2007 Statement"); "Interview on the Charlie Rose Show," November 14, 2007.

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86. USAFRICOM, "Command Brief," November 27, 2007.

87. This was a point included in USAFRICOM's command brief notes during its first year, typically offered during briefings to interagency visitors.

88. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017. Also see "History," AfricaCenter.org, Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, available from *http://africacenter.org/about/history/*, accessed April 12, 2017.

89. Charles Coon, "AFRICOM to Depart from J-Code Structure," *Stars and Stripes,* August 12, 2007, available from *http://www.stripes.com/news/africom-to-depart-from-j-code-structure-1.67597*, accessed July 10, 2016.

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91. The first three directors in the position were Mr. Paul Saxton (2008-2011), Ambassador Helen La Lime (2011-2014), and Ambassador Don Koran (2014-2017). The directorate is now the J-9 Office of Interagency Cooperation and is part of the J-5.

92. The USAFRICOM Coordination Center was included on the USAFRICOM organization chart through 2008, but was removed by 2009. It was intended as a one-stop center for inquiries and engagement with the command. For more on the original Outreach Directorate, see *U.S. Africa Command: The First Three Years*, Stuttgart, Germany: U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs Office, 2011, pp. 65-67.

93. Ryan Henry, "Update on U.S. Africa Command," USAFRICOM, Washington, DC: Foreign Press Center, June 22, 2007, available from *http://www.africom.mil/media-room/transcript/6063/update-on-us-africa-command*, accessed December 21, 2016.

94. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017. She mentioned that the first director of Strategy, Plans, and Programs was not comfortable with the supervisory relationship, but this was mitigated by strong working relationships with the two deputy directors, one military and one from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

95. David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, note 77, available from *http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1164,* accessed July 10, 2016.

96. USAFRICOM Command Brief, March 2008, depicted direct lines from the commander to all six directors. The Chief of Staff had the primary coordination line, while the deputies were advisors.

97. Ibid.

98. From Yates: "There were many at State strongly opposed to the command. . . . This is when [Ward] designed the Bob and Mary Road Show, and off we went into the lion's den. We had a set talk and would literally go anywhere." Email to author, April 4, 2017.

99. *USAFRICOM Command Brief*, April 2008, highlighted this event. Also see Denise Shorey, "Africa Theater Security Working Group Begins Weeklong Conference in Germany," USAFRICOM, March 17, 2008, available from *http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/6141/africa-theater-security-working-group-begins-weekl*, accessed April 12, 2017, for an example of Yates and Moeller communicating as a duo at an event involving USAFRICOM staff and defense attachés and security assistance officers from the continent.

100. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017. Even among the Africanists in the command, depth of knowledge about the political dimensions of the continent were limited. The following vignette from Yates is instructive:

> We failed initially at the command to understand the leadership role South Africa played and still plays on the continent. This is not popular with all African nations but because [South Africa] is such an economic giant on the continent, the others have to listen.

101. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017, said the following about Ward's approach to explaining this problem to USAFRICOM staff members: "He used to joke about how that was received by African leaders and how would you like it if someone told you, you were going to be shaped by the US military? He always got a laugh but [shaping] is still widely used in military circles."

102. Arrows were reserved in the Command Brief for specific slides showing causality between a USAFRICOM activity and a significant benefit to African partners. For example, a popular block and arrow diagram in *USAFRICOM Command Brief*, April 2008, told the story of how a 2006 Gulf of Guinea Ministerials Meeting produced a request to the U.S. military for maritime training support because of the first deployment of the Africa Partnership Station (APS).

103. Yates offered this as personal guidance to the author, and this was reinforced directly or indirectly by several other State and USAID participants in the command during the first year.

104. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017.

105. William E. Ward, "Address to the ECOWAS Strategic Leader Seminar," Bamako, Mali, February 2008.

106. Kathi A. Sohn, "The Global Fleet Station," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 45-58.

107. Ibid., p. 51.

108. William E. Ward, "Opening Statement to Southern African Development Community," as prepared, Gaborone, Botswana, December 4, 2007.

109. Ward, "ECOWAS Strategic Leader Seminar."

110. William E. Ward, "All-Hands Call, USS Fort McHenry," at port in Cameroon, Africa, February 21, 2008.

111. Department of State, "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership," available from *http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP*, accessed December 21, 2016.

112. U.S. Mission to the African Union, "African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program Factsheet," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, November 26, 2013, available from *https://www.securityassistance.org/content/african-contingency-operations-training-and-assistance-acota-program-factsheet*, accessed November 28, 2018.

113. Daniel Volman, "Africom: The New US Military Command for Africa," *Pambazuka News*, November 7, 2007, available from *http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/africom-new-us-military-command-africa*, accessed December 21, 2016.

114. Berschinski, *AFRICOM's Dilemma*. For example of the command supporting the State Department as lead, see Ward, "HASC 2007 Statement." At the time, an internal debate was brewing over the quality of the program because of its use of contractors for classroom training, and a strong belief that it would

be far better to have uniformed personnel, such as junior non-commissioned officers, do it instead. This discourse is beyond the scope of this chapter.

115. U.S. National Guard Bureau, "State Partnership Program," June 2018, available from *https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs/StatePartnershipProgram/SPP%20101%20(June%202018).pdf*, accessed November 28, 2018. While serving as Ambassador to Ghana, Yates was personally involved in the establishment of the North Dakota-Ghana partnership. During its first year, the partnership conducted 16 cooperative events. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017.

116. Scott C. Johnson, "Taking the War on Terror to Africa," *Newsweek*, September 15, 2007, available from *http://www.newsweek.com/taking-war-terror-africa-99949*, accessed December 21, 2016.

117. William E. Ward, memorandum to the uniformed and civilian members of the U.S. Africa Command, March 14, 2008.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. Thomas P. Galvin, "Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset: Ensuring Unity of Effort," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 45, 2nd Quarter, 2007, pp. 46-51.

121. Paul H. Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," *Leavenworth Papers*, No. 16, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988, available from *http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531279.pdf*, accessed November 28, 2018.

122. William E. Ward, "Commander's Update #1, United States Africa Command Theater Strategy," memorandum for members of the United States Africa Command and its Components, March 14, 2008, p. 1.

123. Ibid., p. 5. The interim objectives included the elimination of specific violent extremist organizations in Africa that, at

the time, were active. The strategy, however, emphasized the desire for African forces to confront them, not American.

124. Ibid.

125. USAFRICOM Command Brief, March 2008, available from author.

126. Ploch, AFRICOM CRS Report, p. 11.

127. Email from Snodgrass, March 6, 2017.

128. Ibid.

129. Pendleton, p. 9.

130. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017.

131. Ibid. One example highlighted the showing of the film *Blood Diamond*, fostering a discussion about Idi Amin and the history of Uganda.

132. Email from Snodgrass, March 6, 2017.

133. William E. Ward, Memorandum to the members of U.S. Africa Command, Subject: U.S. Africa Command Themes, August 23, 2008.

134. Mary C. Yates and Michael A. Snodgrass, Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, July 15, 2008.

135. "History (Southern European Task Force/U.S. Army Africa)," United States Army Africa, n.d., available from *http://www.usaraf.army.mil/about/history*, accessed November 28, 2018.

136. William E. Ward, "Address to the Activation Ceremony for the 1st Battalion of the Armed Forces of Liberia," as prepared, August 28, 2008.

137. The four mentioned in this section were nominated by members of the command either through interview or email exchange with the author, or through the author's own personal

experiences. These four were commended for their independence and accuracy in their publications regarding the command and its purpose.

138. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, *U.S. Africa Command Newsletter,* No. 1, March 2008.

139. Ibid.; For an archived version of the now defunct website *www.magharebia.com,* see Magharebia: The News & Views of the Maghreb, available from *https://web.archive.org/web/20080316050920/http://www.magharebia.com:80/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/homepage/.*

140. Adam Mazmanian, "DOD Shutters Two 'Influence' Websites Covering Africa," FCW.com, February 13, 2015, available from *https://fcw.com/articles/2015/02/13/african-web-sites.aspx*, accessed December 21, 2016.

141. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, *U.S. Africa Command Newsletter*, No. 2, April 2008.

142. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, *U.S. Africa Command Newsletter*, No. 1, March 2008, and No. 4, September 2008.

143. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, *U.S. Africa Command Newsletter*, No. 3, May 2008.

144. Email to author from Snodgrass, March 6, 2017.

145. U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, *U.S. Africa Command Newsletter*, No. 3, May 2008.

146. USAFRICOM Command Brief, October 2008.

147. USAFRICOM, "TRANSCRIPT: U.S. Africa Command Activation Ceremony," Arlington, VA: U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, October 1, 2008, available from *http://www.africom.mil/media-room/transcript/6324/transcript-us-africa-command-activation-ceremony*, accessed December 21, 2016.

148. USAFRICOM, "TRANSCRIPT: African Union, USAID, State Department Officials Speak at U.S. Africa Command Establishment Ceremony," Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of

State African Union, October 17, 2008, available from *http://www.africom.mil/media-room/transcript/6340/transcript-african-union-usaid-state-department-of*, accessed December 21, 2016.

149. Thomas P. Galvin, "Summary of Points: Inaugural U.S. AFRICOM Executive Board Meeting," December 15, 2008.

150. The White House, "Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament," Washington, DC: The White House Briefing Room, July 11, 2009, available from *https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-ghanaian-parliament*, accessed November 28, 2018.

151. William E. Ward and Thomas P. Galvin, "'Africa's Future Up to the Africans': Putting the President's Words Into Action," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 58, 3rd Quarter, 2010, p. 8.

152. USAFRICOM Command Brief, as of late 2009.

153. Ibid.

154. "U.S. Coast Guard, Sierra Leone Law Enforcement Complete Joint-Maritime Exercise," *Coast Guard News*, August 11, 2010, available from *http://coastguardnews.com/u-s-coast-guard-sierra-leone-law-enforcement-complete-joint-maritime-exercise/2010/08/11/*, accessed December 21, 2016.

155. Regarding exercise Africa Endeavor, see William E. Ward, "Address to the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University," as delivered, November 4, 2009. Regarding multinational growth of the APS, see William E. Ward, "Address to the Senior Executive Seminar, George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany," as delivered, January 20, 2010.

156. Robert Moeller, "The Truth about Africom," *Foreign Policy*, July 21, 2010, available from *http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/21/the-truth-about-africom/*, accessed December 21, 2016.

157. Email to author from Yates, April 4, 2017.

158. Adam Branch, *Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 218.

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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES

CONTENT

This chapter draws lessons learned from comparing or contrasting the cases, categorizing them according to the three components of Pettigrew's Triangle from chapter 2.

Connection of Identity and Narrative

As the two campaigns emerged, both organizations faced the task of creating a narrative, and both relied on identity as the basis. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) staff initially looked to the Dayton Accords but found it insufficient to describe the greater purpose of the organization, which was to leave Bosnia as a fully stable state with no possibility of hostilities resuming. Meanwhile, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) essentially rejected the identity it had inherited from the Department of Defense (DoD) and from its inception sought to forge a different one. The identity provided a common basis from which both commands could extract messages to promote their identity to the environment. This connection also made it easier, but not necessarily easy, to disseminate the message internally. The Multi-Year Roadmap (MYRM) case included internal resistance to the MYRM's existence, which was overcome as members understood the connection between the Roadmap and SFOR's identity.

Multiple Levels of Campaign

The corollary to the ties of identity and narrative are that both commands initiated campaigns to

achieve specific objectives against a backdrop of pre-existent, ongoing campaigns related to the organizations' missions and goals. This is easily apparent in the Bosnia MYRM case, in which SFOR had already been in existence for several years and had long been campaigning to ensure the satisfaction of the military goals of Dayton. The MYRM campaign corrected or improved SFOR's internal and external communication in support of the mission. However, the stakeholders, audiences, and many of the messages predated and post-dated the MYRM campaign. USAFRICOM's campaign effectively began with the Presidential announcement establishing the command's identity, continuing as a DoD campaign for 7 months through the transition team. Then, with the installment of its first commander, the fledgling command immediately put together a shorter-term campaign to correct the misperceptions and missteps which had occurred up to that point. Indeed, the mission, audience, and stakeholders had already been established before the command inherited them.

This suggests that both commands exercise one campaign that persists throughout the life of the organization, from inception to disbandment, where "inception" could be the mere idea of creating the organization. This can be called the **standing campaign**, in which the organization ordinarily works to survive and thrive in the environment. Campaigns such as the MYRM constitute interventions into the standing campaign, ostensibly to either change the organization or change the environment. Those campaigns have an identified purpose, specific messages, and shorter-term goals and objectives that the organization wishes to achieve. These would be considered **named campaigns**, because they likely have a moniker

to identify them such as the MYRM—or not, as USAFRICOM's named campaign was seen more as one with its establishment.

Leader's Role in Content Management

Both Lieutenant General Michael Dodson and General William E. "Kip" Ward clearly owned their narratives, and they shaped the personal communications of both leaders. Both clearly connected their standing and named campaigns together. They invigorated the desirable qualities found in their organization's identities, while highlighting the flaws or shortcomings and communicating how the named campaigns would help. Effectively, both leaders expressed campaign-specific visions of what the future state would be like after the campaign succeeded. These visions were expressed as improved versions of the standing campaign. Moreover, both leaders seized opportunities to launch their interventions under favorable (or less unfavorable) conditions—SFOR when the staff group came up with an unexpected answer to a question, USAFRICOM when the commander was confirmed and able to draw maximum attention to his preferred vision.

PROCESS

Unity of the Top Management Team

Both cases succeeded in part through the cooperation of the top management team, which played a significant role in supporting the commander's campaign. This was done very publicly in the USAFRICOM case, in which the two deputies and Chief of

Staff were also major communicators on behalf of the command. Despite any disagreements or differences in perspective the top managers may have had, the narrative and campaign vision provided the necessary strategic direction to align their words and actions. The top management climate at SFOR, in contrast, was a problem and thus targeted as part of the MYRM campaign. Dodson's actions to broker greater cooperation among his deputies and Chief of Staff laid the groundwork for the unified presentation of the MYRM later.

Self-Promoting Messages and the Importance of Shared Understanding

Members of both commands had plenty of reason to reject or show disinterest in their headquarters' campaigns. The SFOR headquarters staff and subordinate elements could have rejected the MYRM as a U.S.-centered idea or a pet project of the SFOR commander. During USAFRICOM's rapid growth, new members could have viewed the command as just like any other combatant command. The campaign to forge USAFRICOM's unique identity might have lost salience. In both cases, leaders were cognizant about how information spread within the organization and made use of informal as well as formal channels. Leaders showed trust in each other to support the campaign, and trusted that subordinates would at least listen to the message and not outwardly repudiate it. Thus, it was not necessary for the leaders to sell the message continuously nor exercise excessive top-down control. This was possible because of the alignment of message with the organizational identity—followers listened and enacted the message because it was an acceptable message that made sense.

Measuring Success in Terms of Plausibility, Not Causality

Both cases presented indicators of success based on changes in the communication environment that emerged during the course of the campaigns. However, it is not possible to **prove** that the campaign caused the full desired effects. Could SFOR have found another way to improve its internal communications and engagement with the Principals? Probably. There was interest in pursuing such improvements among all those involved; the creation of the MYRM provided a ready opportunity. Could USAFRICOM have communicated the same words and deeds at another time and failed to change the environment? Probably. Much of USAFRICOM's environment was outside of its influence. Indeed, what would have happened if Operation ODYSSEY DAWN or something like it had been required to launch on October 2, 2008, instead of in March 2011? USAFRICOM's campaign might have taken longer to realize the desired effects.

Military leaders desire certainty when measuring the effects of their actions. However, certainty is an impossible standard for communication campaigns. Too many variables are present to show that a campaign caused the desired effect. However, to dismiss signs of success as luck or good fortune is unhelpful.

Therefore, the measurement of the success of a campaign cannot rely on measured certainty, but instead on its plausibility. In effect, is it **plausible** that the campaign contributed to the presence of desired changes in the communication environment? Is it **plausible** that a lack of undesired negative changes in the environment were brought about in part by the campaign? Of course, one could easily claim plausibility

based on the coincidence of the campaign and effects, so it is important that objective standards of plausibility be developed.

Leader's Role in Process Management

Both commands were geographically dispersed and diffused, but much of the campaign's work was initially done within the respective headquarters, whether it was Dodson engaging his top management team or Ward hosting an off-site to begin restating the command's mission. Both were proactive in reaching out to internal and external audiences to establish stronger command climates, disseminate the campaign's vision, and provide direction for the preferred way of doing business. These actions were related to, but independent from, the processual aspects of conducting the named campaigns. For example, Dodson was already taking steps to change the command's climate prior to the MYRM's inception. Meanwhile, many of Ward's internal messages to the command mirrored the same messages he used in previous duties, and would likely have used regardless of the command he led.

CONTEXT

Competing Campaigns at Different Hierarchical Levels

Both cases put organizations in the context of existing campaigns among their parent organizations and stakeholders with which they had to align. SFOR's standing campaign was naturally nested under that of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), as both

had responsibilities to ensure implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. SFOR and the OHR, however, exercised different standing campaigns related to implementation of the military and civilian aspects, respectively, of the agreement. The Bosnia MYRM began as a named campaign under SFOR, and was then proffered to the High Representative as an intervention for the overall international efforts. As the case study showed, the High Representative could have rejected the MYRM and the campaign would have remained in SFOR. Instead, he appropriated it, and it became OHR campaign.

The same was also demonstrated as the MYRM was disseminated to the subordinate multinational divisions. Each multinational division had its own identity, rooted in the troop-contributing nations traditionally involved, the geographic sector under their care, and the social and political contexts therein. It is also shown in the further divide into national sectors monitored by homogeneous brigade-sized units and independent single-nation support elements. The dissemination of the MYRM caused each subordinate entity to assess the alignment between their own standing campaigns and that of the higher-level named campaign being presented to them.

In a similar way, the USAFRICOM case study showed two organizations with interrelated but distinct campaigns—USAFRICOM and its parent, the DoD. After the DoD established USAFRICOM, the DoD continued to exercise its own standing campaign of which the new command was now a part, but as one of seven geographic combatant commands under its purview. Otherwise, it assumed a new role of stakeholder for USAFRICOM, who then developed its own campaign.

Although not included in the case study, USAFRICOM's service component commands were similarly establishing themselves, albeit a year behind the combatant command's schedule. Each service component command had its own standing campaign which was influenced by the relationship they had with their USEUCOM counterparts, as some were formed by their services as dual-hatted USEUCOM-USAFRICOM components, while others were wholly separated (e.g., U.S. Army Africa). As is ordinarily the case, service component commands draw their responsibilities and identities from both the combatant command and service, and often must balance the demands of both stakeholders.[1]

Is the Organization Transforming or Not?

This follows the discussion regarding the connection between narrative and identity. Organizational change provided a contextual undercurrent in both cases, although the degrees of internal change differed. SFOR faced the possibility of premature downsizing, but the mission would only scale downward. The nature of the mission to provide a safe and secure environment would remain. USAFRICOM, on the other hand, grew rapidly from a small cadre dominated by Africanists to a full-fledged headquarters. Everything about USAFRICOM changed, from how it communicated internally to which missions it performed, all while having to engage with a hostile external environment.

Thus, an important contrasting factor was the presence of transformational change, based on the change of the identity of the organization. Without transformation, the organization is merely trying to improve

its situation and sustain a better status quo. Communications of the MYRM presented this message at several levels, addressing cultural differences within SFOR and lowering barriers to communication among the Principals. Yet, even if downsizing had occurred at that point, SFOR's identity remained founded within the Dayton Accords. SFOR would have continued to see itself as the provider of a safe and secure environment, just with lessened capability and capacity, and quite probably declaring the downsizing as proof of SFOR's success.

USAFRICOM showed, however, that changes in a stated mission are less important than changes in identity. Effectively, USAFRICOM repudiated the mission statement it was given upon its formation, and at the first opportunity began a deliberate process of redefining it. The deeper conflict was in the organization's self-concept—it rejected the externally given mission because it did not fit the USAFRICOM cadre's collective sense that self-reflected what they felt the organization should be. This identity emerged early and guided the organization from the beginning; the formulation of the mission statement months later merely codified it. The transformation took place over the course of the command's first 2 years, including the evolution of the self-concept as an interagency organization; a nonstandard, joint command (e.g., not using the traditional J-code structure); and a command focused on partner capacity building. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN would ultimately test this identity, one that would shape the organization thereafter.

From a communication standpoint, the USAFRICOM case showed how transformational change involves a rejection of either the organization's sense of self or of the views held by external stakeholders.

Such rejection was not central to the SFOR case whose campaign was simpler, but by no means easier. This suggests that campaigns involving changes in the organization's identity are qualitatively more complex.

Leader's Role in Contextual Management

The major lesson of the cases was how well both leaders aligned the campaign to the context. Alignment proved to be far more important than the manners of communication employed alone. The cases illustrate just how varied the leaders' approaches to campaigns can be, as Dodson's and Ward's approaches were polar opposites. As USAFRICOM commander, Ward approached his campaign in line with the traditional leader-centric view of strategic communication. Ward was out front, engaging with as many audiences as possible, personally delivering the message. The climate he fostered within the top management team was similarly outward-focused. This fit Ward's assessment of the external context that required the command to assert itself and its own identity to break with the past that had generated many of the opposing messages.

In contrast, Dodson campaigned in a much less public manner, keeping the organization and its mission out front such that the MYRM was presented as a theater-wide tool rather than an SFOR creation. Doing otherwise would have been disastrous, as the Principals would have shut down the MYRM quickly if it appeared to be an SFOR product. Thus, Dodson pursued the campaign through one-on-one contacts and not through the media. The result was the relatively quick acceptance and adoption of the MYRM.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Burwell B. Bell and Thomas P. Galvin, "In Defense of Service Component Commands," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 37, 2nd Quarter, 2005, pp. 97-104, available from *http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA523722*, accessed August 3, 2017.

CHAPTER 6. IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS

The case studies and analysis helped address the five questions given in chapter 2. Answering the first question is straightforward: strategic communication is far more than a process. Using Pettigrew's Triangle as a lens, there is clear evidence from both the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) that aligning the campaign with the internal and external contexts are critical in achieving or progressing toward the desired effects. The content was also important—there was considerable effort made within both organizations to create the right messages.

Both cases also suggest that the answer to the second question, regarding the meaning of synchronization, is more complex than simply imposing the message top-down. Communication and synchronization occurred both top-down and bottom-up, such that the meaning of the campaign was socially constructed throughout. Although both commanders led the campaigns, they delegated, listened to feedback, and adapted the campaigns as the situations changed. Both campaigns showed versatility and flexibility as a result. Thus, the process of synchronization should not be imposed upon the organization; rather, the preexisting practices of communication constitute important parts of the internal context.

The third question addressed the boundary of the campaign, which can now be answered in multiple ways. The first is the differentiation identified in chapter 5 between standing and named campaigns. Studies of campaigns will naturally gravitate toward named campaigns, as empirical analysis is more tangible when studying interventions. However, the standing

campaign cannot be ignored as it provides critical internal context. Both cases also showed how campaigns exist at echelon. USAFRICOM had its standing and named campaigns distinct from those of the Department of Defense (DoD) and distinct from those of its fledgling subordinates. The campaigns in Bosnia were similarly stratified. Therefore, the campaigns from higher headquarters levels should not be treated as automatically subsumed, but simply as part of the external context of the organization.

Do we target our friends and stakeholders? Perhaps not in those terms, but unquestionably, differences of opinion between organizations and their superiors with any other actor in the environment play significant roles in campaigns. In effect, both organizations had a disagreement with their superior organizations and found ways to communicate resolutions to those disagreements such that both superiors were co-opted. The implication is that discussions about campaigns cannot be limited to adversaries alone and that relationships with all audiences are vital parts of the external context. The content of campaigns, therefore, must be free to include whatever messages and means of delivery are necessary to change the minds of any audience whose views or actions detract from the organization's desired outcomes. Meanwhile, content and process must account for the existing channels between the organization and its stakeholders—including how they enable and constrain communication—and determine whether they need to change.

The final question concerned the roles of the leaders. The sharp contrast between the cases show that it is incorrect to attribute a specific set of qualities or traits as necessary for leaders to conduct a campaign,

and that alignment is more important. Later, this chapter will present four roles of leaders that better represent the expectations of leaders from stakeholders and members alike.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to deriving a conceptual approach to strategic communication campaigns, from which one can develop tools and methods for analyzing the internal and external contexts and developing communication plans and strategies. It begins with a restatement of the problem that strategic communication campaigns are meant to solve, followed by a definition and description of a campaign. Finally, an architecture is proposed based on six questions that any campaign's tools and methods must address.

REASONS TO CREATE NAMED CAMPAIGNS

The first reason is to restate the problem to be solved—Why is it necessary for the organization to intervene in the environment and launch a communication campaign? It is no longer only about supplanting the narrative of an adversary—it could be anything that the organization needs to sustain its competitive advantage, which the cases showed to include requirements such as resources, attention, or the mitigation of controversy.

Restatements of the problem are offered in simple terms through liberal use of the pronouns "**we**" and "**they**." "We" constitutes the organization in question, although that may be uncertain at the onset. For example, "we" at a local level may face a communication challenge that necessitates a campaign at the federal level. Determination of whom "we" represents is made after the need is identified.

Meanwhile, "they" constitute an organization or mass collection of individuals either: 1) internal to the organization; 2) external to it; or 3) both. Examples of option 3 include labor unions, the formal organizational structure of which may reside outside a firm's boundary, but which might have members inside it, or demographic groups such as African-Americans, who are members of a firm but also a mass of individuals with a collective identity. The composition of "they" is dynamic, as any organization or collective is an open system with porous and dynamic boundaries; for example, men and women who enter and leave military service every day. In addition, "they" may be a specific actor in the environment or may be unidentified, such as anonymous participants in the social media community. Like the use of "we," "they" would be further identified as leaders analyze the environment.

"They" Are Not Listening

This simple statement has many facets, but accurately represents the continuous challenge facing leaders—that the intended audiences are not receiving or responding to the messages sent by the organization. They continue life as though the message was not sent, or they explicitly deny or defy the message. If a campaign were to address this effectively, why "they" are not listening is an important contextual clue. Some explanations follow.

"They" Cannot Listen

This appears to be the simplest and most easily addressed as a means-driven problem. Some audiences that the United States and its military wish

to influence are remote and have limited physical access to outside media (e.g., Internet and open news sources). Regardless of their economic or political reasons, our message is not being heard. The solution sounds similarly means-driven: add radio stations and programs, websites, and news articles. Then, increase the volume by presenting our message through texts, posts, videos, and broadcasts. In the end, more will hear us, and more will abide by our message.

Steve Tatham's case study of the U.S.-fostered television advertisements from 2012 in Pakistan, which denounced the offensive movie, *The Innocence of Muslims*, illustrates the limits of this view. The advertisements sought to assuage the Muslim communities that the film, which was made in the United States, did not represent U.S. policies and instead presented the United States as a friend and ally to Muslims, both partnering together against violent extremists. Tatham showed that the large numbers of Pakistanis who never saw the advertisements nor had heard of the movie they referenced had conducted the subsequent rioting that occurred in that country.[1] Simmering anti-American sentiments and word-of-mouth ruled the day, leading Tatham to conclude that increasing the amount of communication activity is insufficient. It is far more important to understand the motivations behind the undesired behaviors of others; those motivations are likely to cause individuals to tune out contravening messages.[2]

There is a strong parallel with domestic audiences, whose increased polarization of views means that an individual's political orientation greatly influences where they turn for news.[3] It also affects their social media behavior, as like-minded individuals will tend to blog or retweet to each other.[4] Even though the

U.S. Government, including its military, tries to keep the American public informed of its policies, activities, intentions, et cetera, the public is not necessarily tuning in to these direct sources. In effect, it is the identical problem as described earlier regarding international publics.

"They" Will Not Listen

Compounding the above problem is the strength of opposing narratives, such that even those who receive U.S. communications are likely to reject them, or react to them in ways opposite of what was intended, thus creating a "see-hear" gap. Tatham's Pakistani television commercial example showed this as well. The "U.S. hates Muslims" view was stoked by the presence of U.S. President Barack Obama in the advertisements delivering the message. To us, message delivery by the President indicated the seriousness of our position, the importance of the communication, and the personal investment in setting the record straight. To them, the image of the U.S. President—and who the President was probably did not matter—blaring on the screen was simply a symbol of American arrogance and injustice.

Although we acknowledge the "**say-hear**" gap can be deliberate, the strategic communication process assumes clear and more consistent communication can close this gap. Tactically, this may be true, and we may succeed in ensuring a better understanding of our perspective among some individuals who are swayed by the opposite narrative. Strategically, however, this nets very little when the opposing narrative has large segments of the population at sway, causing the mere existence of friendly communication to carry greater symbolic meaning than the communication itself.

"They" Are Listening More to Others

This is evident from the above two situations. Our strategic communication process assumes that the fundamental problem is one of **misinformation** or correcting the "**say-hear**" gap by reaching out more; harmonizing the communication efforts; tailoring for audiences; and adjusting as needed to overcome mis-steps, changes in the situation, or changes in our own policies and strategies. Strategically, however, the more important problem is one of **disinformation**, or the presence of a competing narrative fueled by an embedded dislike or distrust of "our" intentions or even "our" existence.

This is a more complex form of disinformation than traditionally held. The traditional view assumes that parties are poisoning our message by deliberately planting wrong or misleading messages, and that exposure to the truth allows individuals to make a better-informed choice. Obviously, we hope this causes receivers to reject that which is false, and accept our message as the truth. However, when the disinformation comes through a disembodied and persistently opposing narrative, which is sown in an individual's personal experiences and widely shared and reinforced through one's social circle, tactical words and actions cannot easily overcome it. This is true when considering both international audiences (the Pakistani television advertisements), and domestic audiences (polarization of the political parties). In the former, the competing narrative was that the "U.S. hates Muslims," whereas in the latter the competing narrative can be summarized as "the other Party is wrong."

"They" Are Changing Their Actions, but Not Their Minds

Assuming we reach our intended audience with our message, and they are at least willing to listen to that message, we do not always realize our desired effects. Polling numbers or other empirical indicators, when available, may show evidence that the message is indeed out there, received, and used as a guide. They have heard us, seen us, or watched our actions, or they learned of it second- and third-hand from others by word-of-mouth or other media. Therefore, they may be changing what they do, but the evidence suggests that they are only doing it to placate us or deflect attention away, but not to internalize the message. Examples follow.

"They" Do Not Wish to Appear to Have Been Influenced by Us

Whether the receivers are international or domestic, friendly or adversarial, or external or internal, maintaining self-determination can be an overriding concern, even when our audience agrees with our message. Each receiver must weigh the consequences of appearing to lose independence or become too closely associated with us. Appearing to be under another's influence can damage individual reputations, as it can invite criticism for being weak, dependent, waffling, or other pejoratives. In the worst case, it can cause others to target them, both literally and figuratively. This cuts both ways. At times when someone has chosen to follow the message of another party, especially an adversary, we levy many of the same criticisms to show our displeasure or as a tactic to try to change their minds.

Agreeing With "Us" is Too Risky

There are many circumstances in which a receiver who agrees with us faces great risk, from ostracism to physical harm, if they do not publicly appear to be absolutely against us. Such situations are easy to illustrate internationally, whereby foreign parties encounter persecution for adopting beliefs and behaviors favorable to us but inimical to adversaries operating in their area. This persecution can grow worse for parties expecting or relying on "us" to provide for their safety or well-being in return for their support. Domestically, the calculus is the same. A domestic organization (e.g., a political party or a politically-oriented organization) may have to remain publicly opposed to U.S. Government policies or actions, even if they partly agree with them; as an agreement might be viewed negatively.

"They" Agree, But Decline To Be "Our" Messenger

This is related to the abovementioned point, but more oriented on friendly audiences. They may be publicly on our side, but prefer to remain neutral or passive. The costs outweigh the benefits of pushing the message, or it is simply not a priority for them. In addition, they may feel it is not their place to help push the message, seeing it as strictly our responsibility to reach others. This goes against one of the desired goals of the strategic communication effort, to leverage reliable and trustworthy third parties to help carry the message forward, which is seen as both efficient and effective at reaching skeptical audiences. Such reticence causes us frustration, especially under constrained resources, as reliance on third parties seems both attractive and essential. If we deem their active participation as essential, then we will have to negotiate.

"We" Cannot Replicate Success or Avoid Failure

One might view this as an overstatement, as certainly there are instances that derive their success from a well-conceived communications effort. The Defense Science Board identifies several—including the Gettysburg Address, the moon landing, the Marshall Plan, the Dayton Accords, and the Fulbright Program, among others.[5] While these instances represent highly successful activities and carry significant value as symbols of national pride, the Defense Science Board does not make sufficiently evident the importance of having the organization's communication efforts occur before the action took place. Consequently, the cited actions are used **precisely** because of their historical symbolic value, which has built up over many years after the fact.

This leaves some important "so what?" questions unanswered. Would the Dayton Accords have counted as a strategic communications success if the former warring factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina resumed fighting, as was threatened to happen for several years after the parties signed the Accords? The moon landing was a powerful event, made more so as it fulfilled the national priority President John F. Kennedy proclaimed in his speech to a joint session of Congress in May 1961. But the impetus behind this priority was "pressure to have the United States catch up and overtake the Soviet Union in the space race," serving as one facet of the greater Cold War.[6] How does one replicate that success without such direct and heated competition that could justify landing someone on Mars or accomplishing some other great feat?

The symbolic value of these events clouds some of the turmoil, difficulties, and tragedies leading to them. The impetus to negotiate the Dayton Accords was partly a result of the horrifying ethnic cleansing that occurred around Srebrenica, Republika Srpska, 4 months earlier, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaigns that followed. So, was Dayton a true success or did it mask failure? If the latter, is masking failure a viable communication outcome? The Apollo XI moon landing also came at a human cost in the command module fire of Apollo I, a tragedy early in the program—but 2½ years after Kennedy's death—that perhaps could have led to wholesale cancelation of the entire Apollo program. What made the program survive, and the nation resilient (beyond the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's commitment to the program as a measure of survival), such that we can replicate it?

"We" Do Not Trust Our Processes

The relationships of symbols and meanings cross over organizational, hierarchical, and societal boundaries. A high military command may attach a strategic story to the organization's mission statement, but others who co-opt the mission statement may attach new meanings reflecting an individual's experience. For example, the organizational story may be one of excellence and histories of success in combat, but individual disgruntled former members may replace the story with tales of dysfunction and share it over social media. Rather than a conventional fight of words among high commands, the fight is asymmetric in multiple ways—the organization against an individual; a coordinated, common message against a single,

countering experience; or a leader serving as a figurehead and promoting the story, yet facing an informed critic.

The common response in the military is one of increased control over the message.[7] The organization, the leader, and the message must operate in unison and overwhelm the adversary with the organization's truth.[8] Conflicting messages, in this view, provide fodder for others to attack and exploit. However, the modern communication environment is highly asymmetric, and critics currently hold a tremendous advantage because they are not bound to the same truth.[9] Increasing control over the message does not necessarily lead to more consistency in delivery. Greater control is interpreted by members as a lack of trust and is inconsistent with the U.S. military's espoused philosophy in *Mission Command* that includes the creation of shared understanding, exercise of disciplined initiative, and acceptance of prudent risk.[10]

However, more loosening is not necessarily the answer. In some circumstances, especially crisis response, a campaign may require significant centralization of the message and process. This was the case with the DoD's campaign against sexual harassment and assault that was a problem for both the military's identity and its reputation with stakeholders, for example, with Congress and the public. Thus, the question for leaders to ponder is whether the internal processes of communication are aligned with the environment and leader expectations. Are levels of control over the organization's messages appropriate, or are they too strong or too loose, therefore inhibiting the desired flow of communication or strain relationships between leaders and members?

"We" Do Not Believe Our Own Message

Resistance to the message is far from futile, to borrow a phrase from *Star Trek*.[11] If the members do not accept the leader's message, the communication campaign is unlikely to succeed. There are several ways that members might reject or show little interest in the message.

The Message is Pabulum

Leaders are often advised to keep messages simple so they can be grasped easily.[12] Both case studies involved the development of simple and understandable messages that fostered dissemination and retainability. If the members cannot draw meaning from the messages, then they will probably reject them as **pabulum**, "insipid, simplistic, or bland."[13] Another way to express this is "PowerPoint deep," where the message is not backed up by plans or strategies.[14]

A potential source of the problem is that the message is crafted by leaders at the strategic level of the organization, and is being disseminated to organizational or tactical levels of leadership where it does not apply. Pettigrew's internal context is not being sufficiently addressed. Instead of the leader's intended meaning, the meaning embraced by members is: "their leader is disconnected" and "does not really know the organization." Both cases involved deliberate consideration for how the message can be crafted to make sense and be adapted to the contexts of subordinate units. This greatly helped unify the campaigns.

The Message is Old or Obsolete

This is a problem of reaching back too far into history. Perhaps the message has meaning in some past glory days. Perhaps it reflected a past period of excellence that propelled the organization to greatness at one time, or it was the bravery or heroism of organizational members with whom leaders wish current members to know about.

Messages do not reinvigorate themselves; leaders must invigorate them. The SFOR case was an example of taking what was the shared understanding of the organization's history and breathing fresh life into it to overcome the current problems. USAFRICOM found itself having to put substantial energy into its campaign as it grew 20-fold in its first year—lest the incoming personnel fail to internalize the identity of the command as established by the core of Africanists from the first day.

The Message is Not Reality

When leaders subject ground truth to interpretation, there is a possibility that members will reject the message. This is like the sports fan who chants, "We're number one," while the team is mired in last place. As with simplicity, inspirational is another quality espoused for leader messaging. That may translate into messages conveying what could or should be true rather than what is true. Military leaders will often use superlative language to convey both the pride the leader has in the unit, and therefore the pride that members should feel among themselves. In other cases, leaders may be trying to convey one view of a situation that has unfolded, but which is in conflict

with the predominant perceptions of members. If such differences in perspective become a pattern or routine, then members are less likely to accept future leader messages.

SIX ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS FOR PLANNING A COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN

Once a leader has determined that there is a need for an intervention, how do they proceed? Drawing from the lessons learned in the two cases, there are six essential questions that must be answered. Both SFOR and USAFRICOM answered these well, contributing to their campaigns' successes.

Question 1. What is Our Narrative?

The organization's narrative is the underlying story that binds an organization's words and actions together.[15] It is an outgrowth of the organization's identity—Who are we?—that describes how the organization sees itself and its place in the environment. From the narrative, organizations create self-replicating, self-coordinating messages.

Thus, an approach to answering the question is to begin with the seminal concepts from organizational identity theories. The original construct came from Stuart Albert and David Whetten, who uncovered three different claims that organizations use to describe themselves: 1) central character, or the organization's avowed essence; 2) distinctiveness, what separates the organization from others; and 3) the organization's connection with its history.[16] Respectively, examples for the U.S. Army include: "we are a profession of arms," "we contribute uniquely to

America's landpower," and the symbolism associated with combat medals.[17]

The next step concerns the image that the organization projects onto the environment through its words and actions. How does the organization demonstrate its competitive advantage or disadvantage? The competitive advantage of a military organization can be expressed as superiority or inferiority of capability, greater or lesser capacity, alignment or misalignment of capabilities to deter and defeat threats, ability or inability to mobilize, levels of interoperability with partners, or the will to fight.[18] Capturing the bad with the good ensures the narrative's accuracy, as leader messages that disregard the organization's context can be easily dismissed or used by opponents to attack the organization.[19] Finally, leaders construct the narrative by combining elements of identity and image into a story that captures the essence of the organization and ensures the goals of the campaign—what the organization is trying to communicate and why—are aligned.

Question 2. What Are the Opposing Narratives?

Identifying adversarial messages is easy, because they are seemingly everywhere. This is because everything that an organization says or does can and will be used against the organization. If they are not careful, leaders can find themselves constantly reacting, and therefore not devoting enough energy promoting the organization's narrative. The campaign methodology takes a more proactive approach of tracing the adversarial messages back to a root story, or **counternarrative**.

Counternarratives are narratives that exist primarily to "refute other narratives."[20] They often emerge as "stories . . . which offer resistance, either implicitly or explicitly, to dominant cultural narratives."[21] They can emerge from something the organization said or did, or can be completely fabricated, but generally focus on conflicts or tensions with or within the organization. Sometimes counternarratives attack the organization, while other times they represent polite disagreements, concerns, or alternative explanations.

The challenge for leaders is analyzing the many opposing messages and finding root counternarratives that allow opponents to generate new criticisms targeting the organization. Through questionnaires and exercises, the methodology helps leaders identify the characters of opposing messages to find common underlying stories. There are four types of counternarratives that organizations face, and each could be found in the case studies.

The first type is **discrepant claims against the narrative**, which takes some element of the narrative and analyzes it. The counternarrative offers an alternative story that contradicts or challenges the organization's view. Opponents then take actual or perceived "say-do" gaps, inconsistencies, or errors by the organization and use the counternarrative to deliver opposing messages that challenge the narrative. For example, a counternarrative against the Army's professionalism campaign is its being overcome in bureaucracy, indicated by tolerance of unprofessional behaviors.[22] SFOR also faced this type of counternarrative as its claim of being a central character within a coalition force was undermined by cultural divisions within the headquarters.

The second is **repudiation of the organization's existence**. These stories emerge from beliefs that the organization exists for nefarious or hidden purposes, essentially disregarding the narrative utterly. For example, charges of neocolonialism associated with USAFRICOM were not based on the command's words or actions but on perceptions that USAFRICOM's creation was a bad idea.[23] What USAFRICOM did or said was irrelevant; its mere existence was to be challenged. SFOR also faced this counternarrative, but in a different way. Its stakeholders were interested in reducing or eliminating the force quickly, feeling it was no longer needed and desiring to use their funding or resources elsewhere. SFOR was not the target of criticism so much as a victim of dynamics in the political landscape.

The third type is **claims that are made by association**. Organizations sometimes inherit counternarratives aimed at the parent organization or industry. For example, some criticisms directed at the U.S. military actually target the United States as a whole, with the military as proxy. Some of the criticisms against USAFRICOM were of this variety, including those directed at the interagency regarding the perceived militarization of foreign policy.[24] USAFRICOM was therefore criticized as a symptom of a broader U.S. Government problem.

The final type are **post-crisis counternarratives** that often follow scandal or crisis from which opponents (for example, victims, witnesses, and their followers) emerge who fear or expect the scandal or crisis to repeat. Such stories present the crisis as an indicator of systemic flaws or uncorrected attitudes hidden from public view. Examples include the counternarratives against the U.S. military related to recurrent

sexual harassment and assault problems, as victims and their advocates criticized the poor handling of cases, perceived lax enforcement, and retribution against victims.[25] USAFRICOM ran into this counternarrative after Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was criticized by opponents who claimed the operation was representative of the real U.S. intention to meddle in African affairs, as opposed to the command's previous messages of building African security capacity. SFOR, in an ironic twist, was using this type of counternarrative against others as a warning against the premature disbandment of the mission. **If SFOR went away too soon, the potential existed for renewed hostilities**.

Deriving counternarratives against the organization helps leaders become more proactive about attacks and criticisms that might surface from the campaign. They can develop and disseminate messages that confront or deflect the criticism and make room for future promotion of the organization's narrative.

Question 3. Whom Are We Communicating With?

An **audience** is a collection of "people who watch, read, or listen to something."[26] Audiences can be any organization or a collection of organizations; examples include an industry, a mass of individuals, the general public, and specific demographic or geographic groups. The traditional approaches to strategic communication emphasize tailoring messages to audiences, ostensibly to improve the messages' chances of being favorably received.[27] However, there is a limit. Tailored messages to one audience may be retransmitted worldwide over social media or other means, potentially confusing another audience who received a different tailored message. Successful campaigns

synthesize the relationships the organization has with its audiences—good, bad, or indifferent—to foster sustained delivery of messages and achieve the campaign's desired long-term effects. Does a relationship have to change for the campaign to achieve the desired effects? Alternatively, must a relationship remain status quo such that the campaign must **prevent** a change in the environment? In addition, should any changes to the environment be permanent or just temporary until the campaign ends? Leaders must also be aware that the answers to these questions may change during the course of the campaign due to the natural complexity of the strategic environment.

Large, complex organizations such as militaries will have many communication campaigns ongoing simultaneously (e.g., pursuing new capabilities, addressing systemic problems, recruiting volunteers, and so on) potentially engaging many of the same audiences. This means leaders should not implement multiple communication campaigns in isolation from each other. Thus, leaders must frame the environment and model relationships with all actors within it—whether friend, foe, or fence sitter—to prioritize message delivery.

Question 4. How Do We Communicate?

Strategic communication texts mostly address the process of synchronizing communication activities across an organization in a top-down fashion.[28] Large, complex organizations such as militaries have diverse subcultures and identities; robust, globally distributed, formal and informal networks; and hosts of laws, regulations, and norms that influence what is said or done, and by whom, when, and where. Messages that

make sense at the strategic level may not translate well to the front lines of the organization—whether that is the individual service member performing military tasks or individual staff members negotiating and collaborating with peers in other staffs.

Effective communication requires self-aware, learning organizations that understand and leverage how information flows and how messages are interpreted across subcultures.[29] If the aim is to have the organization, leaders and members alike, present a unified campaign, it is important to understand how the organization ordinarily communicates internally and externally. Building an effective and efficient dissemination plan depends on understanding the existing communication processes and methods—its culture—so the organization will be able to either leverage or modify them in the campaign.

One approach is to analyze the communication culture as an institutional practice, defined by W. Richard Scott as "multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources."[30] Institutional practices represent ways of understanding activities and behaviors of collective bodies, including organizations, and thinking about how they do and should function.[31] Institutional practices include three interdependent components: 1) formal structures and official channels; 2) informal norms and habits; and 3) shared understandings among organizational members. All three are equally important, and initiating and terminating communication channels within each component are done very differently.[32] What channels must be leveraged or changed become important questions when implementing campaigns.

Question 5. What Are the Leader's Roles?

Senior leaders play prominent roles in the development and sustainment of all communications in the organization, but some circumstances require the leader to be more public. For example, when the organization is transforming or facing a significant crisis, the leader's words and actions carry great weight, as do the **lack** of words or actions from the leader. At other times, it may be better for the leader to take a back seat and let the members do the talking. The leader's personal preferences and communication styles matter, as the leader must be comfortable in the role of leading the campaign, or others will see the leader's words and actions as inauthentic. The case studies showed that leaders in both organizations performed the following four roles that can be generalized to other contexts.

Embodiment of the Organization. Senior leaders adopt a working identity that is congruent with the organizational identity.[33] In essence, whatever the organization sees as salient, the leader personally adopts. The campaign is therefore an important extension of the leader, and the leader is the figurehead of the organization.

Steward of the Narrative. By virtue of being a leader in an organization, one is entrusted with coauthorship of the organizational narrative with all other leaders in the organization. The term "**steward**" is used to describe the caretaker role that leaders perform in running the military profession, and the same caretaker responsibilities apply to narrative.[34] It is in the role of steward that leaders determine whether an intervention is necessary to alter the organization's narrative or shape the external environment.

Governor of the Process. Leaders own the internal processes of communication, regardless of how much control they actually exercise over it. They must account for how organizations ordinarily engage with their environments—formally and informally. If the communication process is not working, the leader must fix it or assume the risks of communication failure.

Communication Campaign Champion. Senior leaders are personally responsible for implementing all communication campaigns in their organizations. Even when leaders choose not to publicly endorse particular campaigns and delegate message delivery, audiences presume leader approval and endorsement. As shown in the SFOR case, leaders must champion any campaign they appropriate from below. They cannot raise a subordinate element's campaign to the higher level and put the organization's insignia on the campaign, and then delegate it back to the subordinate element for implementation. As for campaigns from higher levels, the leader must ensure any differences in perspective between the organization and the parent headquarters are reconciled to sustain alignment.

Question 6. How Do We Implement a Campaign?

The methodology recognizes three important phases of a communication campaign—**prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch**—but planning for all three should occur at prelaunch. In effect, once the leader has determined a campaign is needed, the campaign has begun. All actions associated with developing and designing the campaign affects the members. They may want to know how the budding campaign may

affect them, what the leader is trying to accomplish, or who is involved and why. Pockets of resistance may appear.

Prelaunch design of the campaign establishes the campaign's purpose and vision, or mental picture of what the campaign will accomplish. It also includes the initial sets of messages, broad guidance on dissemination, and the leader's anticipated roles in the campaign. Prelaunch also includes launch planning, such as the desired or necessary conditions for making the campaign public; launch activities, such as rollout events and media engagements; and measures of performance to gauge how well and how widely the launch messages were received.

Postlaunch planning focuses on measuring effectiveness and routinizing the campaign into the communication culture of the organization. What evidence can the organization gather to gauge how well its narrative is being received and if it is having the desired effects on the environment? What evidence might show the campaign having the desired effects on opponents and their messages—such as causing them to communicate less effectively, or to be disregarded by stakeholders or other audiences? How would leaders know that the campaign is strengthening or altering the organization's communication culture? Clearly, the answers will evolve as the campaign is implemented; however, preliminary planning will help leaders envision how the campaign will proceed, and better anticipate when it is falling off track or failing to achieve its goals.

CAMPAIGN ARCHITECTURE

In broad terms, answers to the six essential questions comprise an architecture for strategic communication campaigns. See figure 6-1. The first four essential questions establish what was defined in chapter 5 as the **standing campaign**—the ordinary context of the organization and its relationship with the environment. The fifth question on the leader's role regards the leader's assessment of the standing campaign and determination that named campaigns are required.

That determination can take on two different characters; hence, there are two different forms of named campaigns. The decision point to the right in figure 6-1 follows Lewis' paradoxical tension between continuity and change, rendering the decision very important.[35] When the goal is one of continuity, the nature of the campaign is to promote and defend the existing narrative while adapting according to the dynamics of the environment. This represents the **steady-state campaign**. Steady-state campaigns are simple for the leader as it involves stewarding the existing narrative forward. On the other hand, when the goal is one of transformational change, the nature of the campaign is more complex. The organization is changing its identity, therefore replacing its narrative with a new one. This is called the **transformational campaign**.

The transformational campaign is far more difficult and complex because, as illustrated in figure 6-1, the leader is attacking the organization's own identity to set conditions to change it. Planning for such a campaign therefore includes launching counternarratives against oneself for the purpose of establishing both the impetus for change and the associated sense

of urgency—important first steps for leading a change effort.



Figure 6-1. The Standing Campaign and Two Types of Named Campaigns[36]

CONCLUSION

The primary resource is a workbook that provides questions and exercises for leaders to address each of the six essential questions and organize the responses into a feasible, suitable, and acceptable campaign. However, as communication campaigns are complex and context-dependent, the focus for the workbook is asking the right questions while avoiding a deterministic formula. The goal is to ensure leaders have considered all possible factors in the environment that could influence a campaign. However, just as the USAFRICOM campaign required months of development and evolution before achieving success,

communication campaigns require investments of time and reflection. The modern communication environment is highly asymmetric, and critics currently hold a tremendous advantage.[37] Successful campaigns help leaders determine which engagements are the right ones, if it is the right time and place for them, and the effects that they will produce.

Leader communication is much bigger than the leader's personal communications. The tactical engagement between a leader and an audience is just that—an engagement. Organizational communication is everything that the organization says and does within itself and to others. Well-designed communication campaigns attach a purpose to all these engagements. However, campaigns do not exist merely because the leaders say so nor do they begin because of a slogan. Successful campaigns empower leaders and members alike with the rationale for communicating the narrative, which necessitates sustaining the organizational memory of how the narrative came to be and how the campaign's vision formed. A vision statement must have the power of vision behind it, otherwise members will develop neither understanding nor commitment to it—it will be just an empty slogan. The same is also true of the vision statement crafted by an isolated working group whose work is held in secret. Internal restrictions on sharing and explaining the vision statement can be detrimental to the campaign. Understanding and commitment are built through the socialization of the campaign prior to launch and throughout implementation.[38]

The leader's roles as steward of the narrative and governor of the process are critical to a well-coordinated campaign. The manner in which a campaign is developed affects the campaign's acceptance by the

membership. There may be reticence among members to perform introspection and air the dirty laundry, and leaders may not always react well to the result. Campaign development involves its own communication campaign, and it may be a transformational one if the organization is not accustomed to talking about its internal communication methods.

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