ILLUMINATING THE GRAY ZONE: USING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY TO DETECT EARLY SIGNS OF SUBVERSIVE THREATS

by

Fredrik Wegersjoe

June 2018

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- proxy warfare
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ILLUMINATING THE GRAY ZONE: USING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY TO DETECT EARLY SIGNS OF SUBVERSIVE THREATS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Although well-established indicators make it possible to predict hostile conventional military actions, few such indicators exist to help defense planners anticipate the onset of subversive activities by foreign adversaries. In the 21st century, however, Western societies have often been targeted by adversaries who exploit environmental aspects of the gray zone to subvert the democratic process and influence decision making. The use of non-state actors and social mobilization as well as non-military tactics, such as political, psychological, and information strategies, have frequently escalated to crises due to lack of situational awareness. This research provides a brief overview of the gray-zone literature, social movement theories (SMT), and social network analysis/social media exploitation to show how these theories and methods can enhance our understanding of current crises. Based on case studies of Ukraine and Estonia, this research uses SMT to conceptualize, examine, and identify early indicators of Russian subversive actions by carefully analyzing how gray-zone conflicts emerge.
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRK-CU</td>
<td>Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Common Operational Research Environment</td>
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<td>CUSUM</td>
<td>Cumulative Sum</td>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
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<td>Information operations</td>
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<td>Irregular warfare</td>
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<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>SNCD</td>
<td>Social Network Change Detection</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional warfare</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Unconventional warfare, which exploits the gray zone, is nothing new, though it has evolved to reflect the complexity of shifting global conditions.\(^1\) In the 21st century external actors have often targeted Western societies using nonmilitary tactics and political, psychological, and information strategies that take advantage of environmental aspects of the gray zone to subvert the democratic process and influence decision making in those societies. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict between Russia and Ukraine are only two of the current conflicts that have evolved from a gray-zone perspective where an external actor, through subversive actions, has tried to achieve its objectives. Given Russia’s continued struggle to regain its superpower status despite its lack of a modern military, it has been forced to leverage some kind of relative power over former Soviet Socialist Republics of strategic or economic interest. Russia’s use of nonstate actors and social mobilization to facilitate subversion in these recent conflicts highlights the significance of relationships, cooperation, and human interaction, rather than conventional military methods, at all levels ranging from the tactical to the strategic.\(^2\) As illustrated by Russia’s campaign in Crimea, dominating the human domain before conflicts arise is crucial. Within conflicts, the mobilization of existing social networks has become a decisive factor, and the human domain, therefore, demands increased attention from any nation seeking to develop or adapt its strategy to deter an adversary intent on subversion. Thus, learning about social movements and resistance networks and their growth can help militaries enhance their situational awareness and force readiness in the gray zone.

A. THE PROBLEM

By defining the conflict environment as the gray zone, the distance between peace and war has drastically decreased, and the threshold for declaring war has become


ambiguous across countries and alliances. There are well-established indicators for anticipating hostile conventional military actions, and for identifying which indicators play a crucial role in national security defense. Unfortunately, few indicators can help defense planners anticipate the onset of subversive activities influenced by foreign adversarial forces. Decision makers struggle to understand subversive warfare and lack good analytic indicators for recognizing subversive events in progress. Despite the increasing significance of gray-zone threats, analysts still fail to develop and systematically examine comparable warning indicators. Today, a mismatch exists between analyzing military movements and operations, and analyzing subversive operations in the gray zone.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to conceptualize, develop, and examine early indicators and warnings for Russian subversive actions by carefully analyzing how gray-zone conflicts emerge. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine serves as a model of Russia’s conduct in pre-conflict operations. Russia’s strategy in Ukraine highlights the importance of identifying indicators of hostile intent in the period before overt conflict occurs, not only to repress such conflicts, but also to thwart an adversary’s efforts to influence decision makers. The scope of this thesis is limited to the conflicts in Ukraine, since these conflicts are well documented and represent observable patterns in Russia’s current warfare. These findings from the Ukraine case study are then applied to Estonia to assess whether the indicators apply to other cases of Russian destabilization efforts.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question that I attempt to answer in this thesis is as follows. What types of information can indicate early symptoms of subversive threats in the gray zone?
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

To answer the research question, I utilize three schools of thought, the gray-zone literature, social movement theories (SMT), and social networks analysis (SNA)/social media exploitation (SME). These are all, in one way or another, theories and methods to examine historical conflicts, but more important, they contribute to greater understanding and knowledge of current crises and conflicts. In this chapter, I first review the literature about gray-zone threats and the challenges these present to society and the armed forces. Thereafter, I examine the theories of social movements and revolution and I review how these theories shed light on the conceptual early indicators of subversion in the gray zone. Finally, I discuss the SNA and SME literature as potential methods of establishing gray-zone indicators.

Nations are entering a period when they must be able to meet the adversary in an environment “characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition,” which some scholars define as the gray zone. The definition of the gray zone is widely discussed, and in this thesis, I will not try to develop another definition. Instead, I try to incorporate the gray zone’s environmental aspects that are critical for mitigating subversive actions. Phillip Lohaus argues that recent attempts to define the gray zone have lacked precision, which has hindered nations’ ability to develop appropriate responses. Of importance, then, is the context and environment that the gray zone implies. It is the people and its surroundings that are the focus, to influence them in the different areas where they participate, such as in diplomatic, societal, economic, and informational areas. In a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) white paper, Philip Kapusta describes the gray zone as “characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.” This highlights the interaction of people, not only

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military, but also the population within nations. This definition of gray zone implies that the gray zone demands a deeper understanding of the human domain than was required during the historical battles fought between two nations in an overt war. Some even go so far as to argue that “the human domain is one of the most critical and challenging aspects” of modern and future conflicts.⁶ The importance of mapping the human domain is explained by the assumption that if we have maps, we can more easily analyze where the areas for influence are great, but also where to analyze for further indicators. There are three broad categories of how to collect and analyze the human environment: “mapping key conditions of insurgency development, pathways of interaction, and nodes of influence.”⁷ These are crucial areas where we also should look for indicators, not only for our analysis on where to attack but also for how to recognize subversive actions.

Social movement theory seeks to explain the environment within crisis through a human dimension focus and how social networks evolve. SMT could answer questions such as the following: How does a society appear when it is susceptible to influence operations and when it is accessible for subversive actions? What does it take to influence a society? Which characteristics must be present in a society for a movement to emerge? Is it possible for external actors to influence a society? To analyze the environment for indicators, one must know how the society looks when it is politically stable, or one must understand characteristics in a society that are crucial for influence operations, to be able to analyze for indicators. One should look for indicators within the areas where successful resistance networks have grown.

Derek Raymond stresses the importance of analyzing a society’s human dynamics, and he examines the key principles of SMT and the conditions that are needed for a successful information operation.⁸ According to Doowan Lee in his article “A

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Social Movements Approach to UW,*9 one of the most important factors for success in unconventional warfare (UW) is the preexistence of a resistance movement. The definition of resistance movements is wide-ranging, depends on the context and can be either an opposition party or an underground network. This argument is reinforced by Christopher Fussell and Lee, who argue that smaller states and nonstate actors utilize networks to countervail the superiority of big nations.10 These are important arguments that provide the baseline in this thesis for analyzing the human domain. Nevertheless, to find indicators of subversion, we must understand what is normal and then analyze changes in the environment, or more specifically, changes that indicate that someone has tried to influence the environment. One way of doing that is to use SNA and SME.

Kevin A. Horrigan and Matthew J. Piosa stress the use of SNA and SMT to better understand the human domain to enhance decision making and to assess the potential of actors to influence areas where operations will be conducted.11 Also, Glenn Johnson, Maurice Duclos, and Dan LeRoy argue that military planners should use SNA to “map out, visualize, and understand the human terrain.”12 SNA should also be fundamental tools for planners to aid in crafting viable strategies.

SNA can be used as a tool to investigate the connections within movements, and to identify the actors or groups vital to the movements or networks. SME is used to explain how information and the discourse within certain areas develops, geographically but also within networks. Both SNA and SME interact with SMT, and an understanding of the specific environmental context that social networks operate in and how to use the

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10 Fussell and Lee, “Networks at War,” 369.


different methods to analyze them is crucial for understanding how dark networks operate.\textsuperscript{13}

Within a network, SNA can help identify brokers who could be crucial for influencing the network, and also find people who interact between different networks. Whether it is for disseminating information or for gathering supporters, finding individuals who act as brokers between social groups is a key factor in influencing operations.\textsuperscript{14} This is also important for decision makers in our society because it is these brokers who could be working for an adversary. By using SNA, it is possible to find people who could be engaged in Information Operations (IO), and also to observe changes within a network. SME supports military planners in viewing differences in the social media sphere such as the growth of certain topics or a certain aggressive style when people discuss these topics.\textsuperscript{15} SME can be skewed, however, because it is most applicable to youth and well-off areas where the information environment is well developed.

The main criticism of SNA is that it does not gather the necessary data easily. The specific data includes not only race, age, and gender, but relationships between people, like kinship.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton state in their article, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” SNA should not be the only approach when drafting one’s strategy but should work as a complement to other critical elements in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the SNA method and its result must be modeled for every different network since no single interpretation exists for each measure. Data depends on context and the way it is gathered, among other things. This is crucial and an

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{13}Dan Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murray, \textit{Understanding Dark Networks} (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 164.
\bibitem{14}Raymond, “Combating Daesh,” 38.
\bibitem{15}Daniel Cunningham, Sean F. Everton, and Robert Schroeder, \textit{Social Media and the ISIS Narrative} (Monterey, CA: NPS, March 2015), 11.
\end{thebibliography}
important part of the process. The data should be compared and contrasted to data from other networks and also within its own network to get insights.\textsuperscript{17}

It seems likely that adversaries use many of these methods as well. I argue that there are indicators, such as ties to foreign institutions and organizations, in the network environment that can reveal an adversary working subversively by conducting information operations trying to influence the main player within the gray zone—the people. These information operations can influence both the civilian population and also politicians and military leaders. SNA is a complement to traditional intelligence analysis that covers the characteristic environment specific to the gray zone. I argue that we must use this tool to exploit “friendly” organizations in a Phase Zero environment to find our adversary, to highlight a structure of previously unknown associations, and to enhance understanding of the human domain and its social structure as a tool in military decision making.

SNA is a valuable tool for decision makers to refine their analysis so they recognize the enemy within this concept and stop him. The schools of thought that I have just discussed all contribute to a higher understanding and explanation of crises. Many studies state the importance of mapping the human domain to evaluate already existent networks to plan for UW. What is missing in these discussions, however, is the use of these theories and tools to understand and find the adversaries’ subversive operations in Phase Zero. This thesis uses the tools and theories, not only to increase understanding and knowledge about the environment for enhancing planning and preparation, but also to identify indicators in the gray zone for recognizing an adversary making subversive efforts, in order to apply appropriate mitigation measures and to stop an adversary before a crisis occurs. By doing this, we can enhance our understanding, reinforce our decisions, and act proactively.

\textsuperscript{17} Cunningham, Everton, and Murray, \textit{Understanding Dark Networks}, 164.
III. METHODOLOGY

This thesis attempts to create a model that highlights indicators and eventually can anticipate the onset of gray-zone crises. The research is based on three methodological considerations: inductive, relational, and informational. The inductive process involves making many observations of phenomena in the real world and finding powerful statements about how things work in order to create a model.18 Moreover, the importance of relational data and the impact of information operations will apply. Russia’s hybrid warfare doctrine relies heavily on leveraging and exploiting nonmilitary means and the use of subversive information operations. These typically flow through personal or organizational relations, and the use of traditional and social media outlets is common.19 Relational data capture relations between actors such as people, organizations, and others, and play a greater role in this study compared to attribute data, which are nonrelational characteristics data.20

Using the inductive approach, I carefully reconstruct what has happened in Ukraine, reflecting on theories of social movements and resistance networks to lay out the baseline for environmental conditions and mechanisms that are essential for subversive operations. Then I use an in-depth case study of Ukraine and combine prior cases of Russian subversion with SMT and theories of Irregular Warfare (IW) to illuminate theoretical indicators that will be a foundation for analysis. Using SNA and SME as tools together with the conceptual indicators gleaned from the theories will help to create a model for analyzing society and derive established indicators.

Conceptually, this study draws from SMT and IW, together with methods like SNA and SME, to examine and compare relationships in a contested environment. The environments analyzed are Ukraine and Estonia. Ukraine functions as a role model for

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20 Cunningham, “Visual Analytics.”
Russian irregular warfare and serves to show how Russia interferes with countries that are in their area of interest. The current conflict not only reveals information about Russia but also how the environment reacts to Russian influence. The research process then centers on SNA and SME as methods to apply to the relevant phenomena that will ultimately reveal indicators for subversive actions. The technology at the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab supports mapping out the human networks that are identified as significant for the evolution of the crisis. The challenges faced in this environment are many; therefore, it is important that boundaries are placed on the research. Often social media accounts are deleted, and social networks are always changing. This forces us to pay attention to where, when, and what the data we find online tells us, and to cross-check significant information with different sources that have both high reliability but also high validity. Moreover, the data I use is collected from open sources, which sometimes needs translation due to the use of a language other than English. This is always going to be a concern when working with data in another language, but by using reliable translation software, this should be minimized.

Moreover, as the central focus of the study is a current event within an ever-changing environment, the research needs to establish a frame for the environment to be able to evaluate the changes that occur and infer what that might indicate. This frame evolves by implementing this in-depth case study to create a specific narrative for the different stages of the crisis. The intent of the research is to provide the decision maker with both a method and a list of the relevant indicators of subversion that occur in the society. This can provide better situational awareness, but most importantly, can increase readiness to disrupt subversive actions.
IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND SUBVERSION

In recent years, Russia appears to have shifted to the use of various solutions besides overt war with armed forces to achieve its objectives. In particular, it has used subversive operations as part of this strategy. Subversive actions are defined as “actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority.”21 This is not a new or uniquely Russian concept; it is also a part of the Western doctrinal modus operandi described as unconventional warfare. For instance, the United States defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”22 If subversion is the goal, the UW is the means to achieve this goal, to diminish the national power. Because SMT describes resistance emergent among people, it is well suited to frame domains in the society that should be in focus. By applying SMT, one may derive theoretical indicators for subversive operations.

A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze SMT through a UW lens to derive indicators for subversive operations. I first offer an introduction to SMT and describe how the context applies to the emergence of movements. Second, using SMT, I derive areas of interest regarding UW strategy and subversion. Third, from those areas, I conceptualize the conditions associated with the early actions of a subversive actor. Fourth, I analyze mechanisms and tools that exploit the conditions to achieve the desirable outcome (or effects). Finally, I offer a conclusion about the importance of understanding social movements or unarmed resistance as key early indications of crisis and subversion.


B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Social movement theory aims to explain “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities.” SMT is also relevant to explaining resistance dynamics and processes. In this light, I offer that SMT can potentially enhance decision makers’ and national leaders’ understanding of the environment where subversion is taking place.

This study uses SMT as a unifying framework for different scholars of emergent movements. I begin by briefly and critically discussing three major models within SMT, the classical model, the resource mobilization model, and the political process model.

The classical model of SMT tries to explain the emergence of social movements as mechanisms for “alleviating psychological discomfort derived from structural strains.” This model has an individual focus where personal psychology is the main cause of mobilization. Nonetheless, it does not explain how individual grievances evolve to collective movements. In other words, this approach might be useful when explaining why people join a movement but not how movements continue and grow over time.

Another perspective in SMT is the resource mobilization model that emphasizes the significance of the involvement of the elites to explain social movements. It posits that resources are crucial and contain variables that translate individual grievances into organized resistance. Instead of analyzing movements as irrational outbursts, it emphasizes the organized structured mechanisms of mobilization that provide strategic resources that are crucial for a movement’s sustained action. Proponents of this theory argue that many movements have not emerged from highly organized and structured masses and that outside support and resources have not been beneficial to the

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26 Wiktorowicz, 196.
movement’s life cycle. This approach might be useful when analyzing the organizational factors and the linkages within but lacks the explanation of a movement’s outer environment.

Another perspective used to explain and analyze the environment for conditions that pave the way for social movements is the political process model. The political process model argues that a social movement is a political rather than a psychological phenomenon. This means that a life cycle of political processes could be translated into social insurgency. It also highlights that a social movement should be understood as a longitudinal process from its emergence to its decline. The advantage of using this model compared to the others is that it covers the whole process of the movement rather than specific phases. Furthermore, the political process model highlights how ordinary people have the potential to mobilize to challenge the incumbent. The political process relies on the assumption that social movements develop in the interaction between different interest groups and the political changes they want to see. This study uses the political process model because it aligns with the strategy of subversion. As laid out in an article in a Russian military journal by General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Federation, Russia’s military doctrine reflects the kind of warfare that has developed throughout the world. Gerasimov argues that political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures, together with revolutionary protests, attempt to undermine the legitimacy of a target country’s political leadership. Furthermore, sociologist Doug McAdam’s research about the political process and the development of the civil rights movement in the United States from 1930 to 1970 illustrates how social movements challenge the incumbent and mobilize a large number of participants.

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29 McAdam, 36.

30 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’”
of groups by disrupting an existing political process.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, McAdam’s political process model highlights the type of disruptive factors that external actors may want to exploit in order to undermine the legitimacy of the local political process. This is reinforced by Lee in his article “Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory: Conditions, Mechanisms, and Effects,” where he describes the use of political groups, religious figures, and elections as conditions that can be exploited for disruptive actions.\textsuperscript{32} These authors all emphasize the use of an outside actor taking advantage of instability in the environment to influence the political legitimacy. Using the political process model explained by McAdam will let us highlight the indicators of subversion in a UW environment.

The political process model is described by McAdam in four key factors: broad socioeconomic processes, expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation, as shown in Figure 1.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{itemize}
  \item McAdam, \textit{Political Process}, 37.
  \item Lee, “Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory,” 130.
  \item McAdam, \textit{Political Process}, 51.
\end{itemize}
The broad socioeconomic processes are preconditions in society that let the other factors emerge, such as pressure through economic and diplomatic measures. Those social processes undermine the current political structure but also create the preconditions for a sense of inequality or other strains within society that people want to change.

From these preconditions in the socioeconomic environment, the political process model identifies three factors that are crucial for a movement to emerge.

**Political Opportunity** – This is explained as openings in the political environment. It could also be described as the access to the political domain and

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34 McAdam, 51.


36 McAdam, *Political Process*, 41.
possibilities to actually participate in decision making. This happens when there is a change of allies and opponents, and the stability of the current ruling actors is questioned, which indicates a change in capacity. In everyday life, there is relative power in society where the leading authorities have the majority of power, most often due to democratic rules and processes or as an authoritarian decision process. These rules make it hard for opponents to change society in a way they want. One can interpret every change in the structure of the political society as a push for political opportunity. This can be an event that changes and undermines the stability of the leading elite or the whole system itself, a change in status quo. Elections are a typical event when a political opportunity may arise and current leaders may be questioned. Political opportunities reduce the relative power between the leading elite and its opponents, and the change in relative power makes it harder to repress an opponent.

**Indigenous Organizational Strength** – To be able to mobilize, the political process model argues that one needs already existing organizations from which one can recruit and also develop opportunities in the political sphere. The political opposition within a country creates a network that in turn can create the seeds of opportunity. However, one still needs a network, community, or group in that structure to organize and link people together. Already existing organizations work as a recruitment base from which one can save time by recruiting blocs of people who are already an organized group. Organizations can cooperate for the same purpose or important question that they want to solve, even if they have other, different objectives. Moreover, the indigenous organizations create a network with an already existing communication network and experienced leaders. The indigenous organizations give the capacity to leverage grievance through their already existing communication network, leadership, members to recruit from, and incentives. It does not matter how much strain or grievance is within the society if no mechanism to organize people exists. McAdam argues that it is essential that the networks or groups are already in place and that these function as fertile ground for emphasizing incentives to resistance.

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**Cognitive Liberation** – The earlier mentioned factors only provide structural mechanisms, but the cognitive liberation factor emphasizes the importance of incentives and a feeling of a successful resistance among people. Movements need people who are motivated to move from words to actions. Thus, how participants interpret their situation is essential. This implies that so many people must perceive political opportunities that it seems manageable to change their situation and that the structure or tools to change it are there as already existing organizations. It does not matter if isolated people perceive that they are unjustly treated; they must have a *mass of people* to be able to change their situation and believe in it. This mass of people makes them believe that change is doable and that they are not alone and have strong personal links to others. An important mechanism to achieve this is framing. Leaders at a strategic level can achieve a greater efficacy determined by how they frame their narrative. Through framing, they have a measure to control and to influence activists, which encourages recruitment and gains media attention.38

By using SMT and the derived factors from the political process model combined with the objectives of unconventional warfare, one can derive four domains of interest where subversive operations may take place: *political, economic, social,* and *informational*. Analyzing these domains through the lens of the political process may help to achieve specific characteristics and mechanisms indicating subversive actions.

C. **DOMAINS: CHARACTERISTICS AND MECHANISMS FOR SUBVERSION**

Subversive operations try to disrupt the current environment within a country to achieve one’s strategic goals. Drawing from SMT and the characteristics of a movement’s emergence explained by the political process gives us four major areas where subversive operations most likely will appear: political, economic, social, and informational. By analyzing these domains, one can derive mechanisms that can indicate externally disruptive movements.

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Political – The political environment in democratic nations is conducive to making a change or influencing internal decisions, also known as political subversion.39 The goal for subversion is to create an unstable environment and conditions essential to influence decision making or to delegitimize the governing authorities.40 However, by influencing a democratic tool such as elections to the parliament, one can achieve a more legitimate outcome. These outcomes or results from the elections are harder to criticize or delegitimize due to the democratic process followed, even though they were influenced by an external actor. Other mechanisms that create political opportunities are major political realignments, changes in the current party structure, splinter groups, defectors, and existing parties that divide into several factions. This is most common in the time frame of elections but also sometimes when nations are in crisis.

Economic – SMT states that economic downturns enhance movement emergence by leveraging human feelings—individual grievances. Economic downturns can create pressure on current authorities to mobilize and motivate people for a change. This area can either generate a mobilization but also amplify the resistance. Income inequality, unemployment, and other similar factors are sources of systemic strain. The use of economic measures creates a permissive environment and puts pressure on existing political authority to influence its population.41

40 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v. “subversion.”
41 Lee, “A Social Movement Approach.”
Other than creating the base for grievances and economic strain, the economic domain can also finance resistance and develop platforms for influencing a society. In this domain, one can see how major investments in key industries could have an effect for several reasons: investment in media to enhance the information domain, ownership of industries that a society depends on, influencing import and export strategies, and offering attractive positions within the company. The energy sector also uses its power factor by overtly closing off the energy supply to coerce decision makers to choose energy suppliers as partners. It is also an area where resistance networks most often find their resources. Nonetheless, the movement needs population support to survive.

**Social** – The social domain is where the emergence of a movement can grow and people find like-minded supporters of the movement. It is in this domain that the movement has its foundation for mobilizing people. This structure is essential to coordinating information and actions across the society. The emergence of new social-political movements or minority movements to establish an organizational platform are ways to disturb the current political environment. Yet SMT emphasizes the use of already existing networks or groups where there is already an established structure with leadership and members. Indigenous organizations give the capacity for grievance but also a platform for recruiting. In the existing groups or organizations, there is already a common purpose or goal they share that can either reinforce or connect groups to each other.

**Informational** – In this domain, strategic communication can be used to build a counter-narrative to the current political one. One way to do this is to create a narrative that describes a specific minority group of people as victimized and exposed to unjust treatment by the current leadership. Creating a narrative about how some people are mistreated or how bad the West is, or disseminating information that is pro-Russian, among others, are tools to increase grievances and establish a sense of aggression. This area generates diagnostics, prognostications, and motivations to enhance the conditions.

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for subversion. Broadly, one finds the use of media to create a narrative and shape the information environment in the society to prepare for a decision in which Russia has an interest. The informational part can gain popular support, and by that, can legitimize Russian actions.

D. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

In this chapter, I have emphasized the importance of understanding social movements and unarmed resistance as key early indications of crisis and subversion. By merging SMTs and the objectives of subversive operations, one can derive domains of interest: political, economic, social, and ideological. Within those domains, one can identify general mechanisms and characteristics that externally disruptive movements might use to gain power within society. Events such as major political realignments, oppositional parties and splinter groups, or an existing party’s split into several factions are examples of how political opportunities arise. Economic factors, such as investments in key industries, but more specifically energy and media agencies, are other mechanisms used to influence decisions. Moreover, economic downturns put pressure on current authorities but also help create incentives for those who want to challenge the ruling government. In the social domain, new movements will emerge and evolve. Though it focuses on already existing organizations to recruit people, at the same time, the social domain may reveal creation of political opportunity. Finally, the ideological approach tries to gather individual grievances to collective actions through presenting incentives or creating psychological strain. The use of media like the internet and television to disseminate messages and to build a narrative is essential. In the next chapter, these factors are applied to the Ukraine crisis to analyze events in order to derive indicators of potential subversive operations.

44 Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare,” 3.
V. CASE STUDY OF UKRAINE

Russia’s use of subversion to reach its strategic objectives is well documented in the literature. Nevertheless, although Russia’s objectives are obvious and the analyses of the military operations that have disrupted Ukrainian sovereignty are many, few have studied early indicators of the crisis. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which surprised many nations, highlights the importance of identifying indicators of hostile intent in order to repress such operations, but also to restrain Russia’s intention to influence decision makers, also known as subversive actions. Leveraging subversive operations using the human domain has become a key factor. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, stated that the Arab Spring presents an example of war in the 21st century and that the use of political, economic, informational, social, and other nonmilitary means has increased the utility of the human domain and the potential of social movements. Gerasimov’s statements imply that resistance mobilization is a tool for subversion that Russia uses to achieve its objectives. This is reinforced by the Russian Federation military doctrine, which states that one of the main internal military risks for Russia is subversive information activities targeting the population. The doctrine also highlights the characteristics of current military conflicts as “integrated employment of military force and political, economic, informational or other nonmilitary measures implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of the population and of special operations forces.” The Russians have clearly identified methods and mechanisms


successfully leveraged in current crises and conflicts. They also have stated that one of their main tasks for deterring and preventing military conflicts is to respond in similar manner and to “neutralize potential military risks and military threats through political, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means.”\(^5\) Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is no exception.

A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER

In this chapter, I analyze events in Ukraine prior to the annexation of Crimea to highlight Russia’s actions aimed at influencing the society. First, I highlight earlier research done in that area and then briefly summarize the historical context to enhance understanding of the political and social environment in Ukraine. Second, I chronologically analyze SMT theoretical indicators in the political, economic, social, and ideological domains as described in Chapter II. Dividing the events according to those domains makes the different characteristics and mechanisms important for subversive indicators more apparent. Beginning with the political domain and a brief historical backdrop to the political environment contributes to a better understanding of how this framework can be utilized to influence decision making. More specifically, I study how the other domains—economic, social, and informational—seize the opportunity presented by political instability. Finally, I provide a conclusion about findings in the different domains of established subversive indicators, which might support analysts and decision makers in a contested environment.

B. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HISTORICAL BACKDROP

After gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has struggled through several crises such as the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan related to its huge neighbor in the east, Russia. Yet, modern research and analyses of the Ukraine crisis, more specifically the annexation of Crimea, have mostly focused on the “little green men” that occupied government buildings and Russia’s use of its military forces in

the eastern parts of Ukraine in 2014. Table 1 summarizes some of the research in well-cited journals and from recognized publishers about the Ukraine crisis. These articles mostly cover the period of late 2013 and onward. They highlight the military aspect of the Ukrainian crisis but lack the analyses of how its political, economic, and social aspects influenced the society and decision makers through subversion prior to the annexation. In this chapter, I analyze events prior the annexation in early 2014 to reveal indicators of Russian subversion.

Table 1. Previous Research.\textsuperscript{51}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication/Publisher</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>When</th>
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\textsuperscript{51} Jane’s, and other credible sources and databases where I surveyed the analysis.
C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Russia regards Ukraine as a country in which it has enduring interests. Ukraine’s biggest minority is Russian, and Ukraine’s geographical position makes it strategically important, especially as a buffer zone between Russia and the West. This is partly why Russians see the expansion of the West as a threat to their interests and consider every increasing linkage from Ukraine to the European Union as a decrease in Russian influence.52

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Ukraine is highly dependent on Russian energy, which is why Russia has used it as an influence tool. As an example, 83 percent of Ukraine’s aluminum industry is owned by Russian investors, and in 2013, Russia was the number one importer and exporter of Ukrainian energy; second was the European Union (EU). Due to Ukraine’s old-fashioned industry, which consumes considerable amounts of energy, and because Ukraine lacks its own resources, it is very dependent on Russia and its resources. This has been used both as a carrot and a stick to influence decision making in favor of Russia.

Furthermore, while the EU tries to promote democracy and deepen economic and political cooperation, Russia tries to counter the overtures using traditional and nontraditional tools of state power to pressure and influence Ukraine. The use of business affiliates and the energy sector, and its policy of supporting and protecting the rights of Russians living abroad, alias its compatriot policy, are only some of the ways it seeks to influence Ukraine through means other than the use of military force. Historically, Russia has had a low level of institutional ties with Ukraine and instead used its connections to pro-Russian elites, but this has changed. Moreover, Russia also tries to gain influence through its compatriot policy, which focuses on ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. This was reinforced in President Putin’s speech to the Duma at the same time as the annexation of Crimea:

Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that these people’s rights and interests are fully

protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{58}

Ukraine plays a significant role in Russia’s foreign policy. Its interests in Ukraine rest on many factors, some of which are shared by the EU and the West. Geographically, Ukraine is the largest country on the European continent with a population of about 44 million people. It has a strategic location in many aspects. Not only is the Russian Black Sea fleet stationed in Crimea, but also the gas pipeline from the Russian gas company Gazprom to Europe passes through Ukraine. Ukraine has a long history with Russia, and some people see Ukraine as the heart of Orthodox Church history. About 17 percent of Ukraine’s population is Russian-speaking, most of them in Eastern Ukraine, and the Russian media outlets are widespread, giving the Russian government a tool to leverage its own narrative.\textsuperscript{59}

What is just discussed and outlined in this section partly explains Russia’s interests but also concludes Russia’s prerequisites for influencing. What follows is a theoretical analysis of Ukrainian society through the different domains derived from SMT where Russian events are the focus.

\section*{D. THE POLITICAL DOMAIN}

Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, and the political system and the ruling government were relatively young. The political parties evolved from different subgroups with dissident interests via political parties with strong ties to business affiliates, to developed and stable parties after the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. Despite many changes through the years in alliances and party configurations, however, the established politicians have remained the same.\textsuperscript{60}

From 1994 to 2005, then-President Kuchma drove Ukraine closer to the EU while little protest from Russia was heard. However, corruption, constraint of media, and


\textsuperscript{59} Adomeit, “Russia and Its Near Neighbourhood,” 50.

limitations in the political sphere hindered the discussions between leaders in the EU and their Ukrainian counterparts.\textsuperscript{61}

The pro-democracy protest in 2004, the Orange Revolution, turned the EU and its leaders towards Ukraine and the interest in cooperation evolved. The Orange Revolution and other pro-Western influences, however, did not fulfill the pledges to the Ukrainian people. The people had not seen any major changes and were tired of the corrupt political system.\textsuperscript{62} In Russia, the Orange Revolution was seen as an operation conducted by the West to undermine Russia’s influence in Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution created an environment of instability and struggle between its backers and the opposition. After the revolution, the political landscape was divided into mainly two blocs: (1) the pro-Western bloc led by Viktor Yushchenko and his party, Our Ukraine, along with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, and (2) the pro-Russian bloc led by Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions.\textsuperscript{63} Due to the conflict between the coalition within the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, the pro-Western inspiration that got a push from the revolution began to decline. Despite the Western-friendly revolution, the EU did not show any greater interest in drawing Ukraine further into the EU, and at the same time it was careful not to push its agenda too hard, in order to avoid conflict with Russia.

Before 2005, the EU did not engage in any domestic change in the Ukraine political landscape.\textsuperscript{64} The Ukraine-European Union Action Plan was the first step to connecting these two parts. The Action Plan was a plan to integrate Ukraine more to the EU and fulfil the demands of a member state. However, there were no clear incentives for Ukraine to actually fulfill these obligations, and Ukrainian citizens did not see any greater changes in the society.


\textsuperscript{63} Proedrou, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,” 449.

This was reflected in the 2006 parliamentary election in which no one won a majority, creating a situation where decisions hardly could get through and a prime minister could not be chosen.\textsuperscript{65} This created a political vacuum where everyone tried to leverage their agenda to attract other parties to form a coalition. After a couple of months, a coalition emerged between Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Communist Party, which nominated Yanukovych as a prime minister.

Unfortunately, this setting was doomed to fail due to struggles between President Yushchenko and the coalition. Trying to find a solution to this struggle, a document signed by the leaders of the three biggest parties in the last election, Party of Regions, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the People’s Union Our Ukraine, contained guidelines for decision making where the president and the coalition had disagreements, such as the Russian language and membership in NATO.\textsuperscript{66} The document stated that Ukraine should enhance its ties to Europe, such as to NATO, the WTO (World Trade Organization), and the EU.\textsuperscript{67} This agreement gave hope and influenced most of Ukraine’s people whose lives had not improved after the election, despite overwhelming election promises.\textsuperscript{68} The NATO discussions were still ongoing, though some people, mostly in the eastern part of Ukraine, thought that membership would constrain them from meeting their relatives, many of whom still lived in Russia. This situation was later utilized by the Russian government through its compatriot policy. Nevertheless, Yanukovych did not follow the agreement and began to violate its terms. He became anti-EU and stated that Europe and NATO should not be an option.\textsuperscript{69} In early 2007, the instability and the corroded


\textsuperscript{69} International Republican Institute, \textit{Ukraine Parliamentary Elections}, 8.
relationship between the president and the parliament majority became too much. The president Viktor Yushenko, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, and the chairman of the parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, decided to dissolve the parliament. This forced them to conduct a new parliamentary election in September 2007.

Further events highlighted the competition for influence in Ukraine between the EU and Russia. In 2007, the EU began to negotiate with Ukraine about an association agreement (AA).\textsuperscript{70} The AA aimed to help Ukraine associate politically and integrate economically with the EU.\textsuperscript{71} Between 2008 and 2011, the EU discussed both the AA and a trade agreement, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine. These agreements were a clear increase in the battle for influence and were intended to persuade Ukraine to distance itself from Russia. Russia’s answer to this was to try to get Ukraine to join the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union (BRK-CU). DCFTA and BRK-CU were not compatible with each other, which laid out a clear competition between the EU and Russia for Ukraine.\textsuperscript{72} This situation was a clear incentive for both the EU and Russia to take advantage of the relatively unstable situation in Ukraine, an outcome to the emerged from the blurred leadership within Ukraine government.

The international financial crisis of 2007–2009 had a significant impact on the 2010 presidential election. Viktor Yanukovych’s focus on business-friendly policies, stability measures, and pro-Russian orientation aligned with what the Ukrainian population supported at that time. The common economic interests, family connections between countries, and a shared history were three main reasons important for the population’s decision in the election.\textsuperscript{73} These were things that Russia leveraged and emphasized when it operationalized its influence operations.

\textsuperscript{70} House of Lords European Union Committee, \textit{The EU and Russia}, 53.
The 2010 presidential election gave Viktor Yanukovych the power.\textsuperscript{74} The people thought that the Orange Revolution leaders had failed to deliver on their promises and therefore turned against them.\textsuperscript{75} Tymoshenko, however, did not recognize Yanukovych as president, alleging fraud, and stepped down as prime minister due to lack of support.\textsuperscript{76} Many from her coalition were persuaded to join a new coalition that consisted of the Party of Regions, Communists, and many defectors from Tymoshenko’s coalition.\textsuperscript{77}

Yanukovych then appointed Mykola Azarov as a new prime minister. Azarov had been Yanukovych’s right-hand man for several years and was a loyal member of the pro-Russian Party of Regions.\textsuperscript{78} The focus changed slowly towards Russia, and Ukraine’s progress towards integration with the EU halted. Yanukovych started to adapt pro-Russian policies and moved away from NATO interests.\textsuperscript{79} Yanukovych renewed Russia’s lease of the Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol for 25 years and created laws that determined Ukraine’s nonaligned status.\textsuperscript{80} This agreement was not unanimously embraced. The outcome, though, was the cheaper gas price for Ukraine.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, in October 2010, Yanukovych and the constitutional court erased the limits on presidential power, such as naming government ministers, which was a part of a deal that ended the Orange Revolution protests in 2004.\textsuperscript{82} This restored the regulations of 1996.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{76} “Ukraine Profile—Timeline.”
\textsuperscript{77} Whitmore, \textit{Political Party Development in Ukraine}, 7.
\textsuperscript{80} Costea, 259.
\textsuperscript{81} “Ukraine Profile—Timeline.”
Because of Yanukovych’s presidential position, he was now able to use legal sanctions on political opponents. He began to target people that have been active during the Orange Revolution and charged them for different criminal acts.\textsuperscript{84} Two of those were Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister, and Yuriy Lutsenko, a former minister of internal affairs with close ties to Tymoshenko, who were charged with abuse of state funds.\textsuperscript{85} Tymoshenko has been an active voice for Western focus and the work against corruption and was Yanukovych’s main opponent in the presidential election in 2010. Both Tymoshenko and Lutsenko were later sent to jail. This drew great criticism from both the opposition in Ukraine and international observers.

In 2011, Yanukovych took some small steps to counter his critics and hoped by those actions to strengthen relations with the EU and placate the oppositional factions. In March, ex-president Leonid Kuchma, former president of Ukraine, was charged with involvement in journalist Georgiy Gongadze’s death. Gongadze was a critical reporter of Kuchma’s presidency and was murdered in 2000. Kuchma was suspected pretty early, but he could never be charged at that time. In April, the main suspects in Gongadze’s killing, Olexiy Pukach and two other police officers, are said to have confessed and were sent to jail.\textsuperscript{86}

Further on, the parliamentary election was held in October 2012 and had a debatable outcome. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers, the United States, and the EU were skeptical. A report released in January 2013 by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), noted that the concerns were primarily due to “the abuse of administrative resources, lack of


transparency of campaign and party financing, and the lack of balanced media coverage."\textsuperscript{87}

Moreover, a proposal for a new language law fueled a debate among the political parties in the 2012 election. The Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and the Russian Bloc had a main objective of establishing the Russian language as the second state language in Ukraine. The party United Opposition-Batkivschyna, UDAR, Svoboda, and Our Ukraine did not agree to this.\textsuperscript{88}

In 2013, President Yanukovych steered Ukraine closer to the EU and established relationships to sign the AA. Just before signing in November 2013, the government abandoned further discussions with the EU and instead signed another agreement with Russia.\textsuperscript{89} The Russian agreement concerned the Custom Union with Russia, lower gas prices, and a decrease in a loan that Ukraine had. The abandonment of the AA in November 2013 shifted the focus toward Russia and ignited massive civil unrest (known as Euromaidan because the protests began in Maidan Square in Kiev), which resulted in the death of several protesters and excessive violence from the police to constrain the protest. In February 2014, President Yanukovych fled to Russia and abandoned the country. This was the beginning of the end of several-months-long unrest against corruption and people tired of abandoned promises.

The Ukrainian political environment in its historical context is almost a road map for what SMT explains as political opportunities. The election system has changed throughout time, and different rules and regulations regarding political parties and coalitions have been introduced. The institutional environment has changed depending on who the president is, and the power has shifted between the president and the parliament. The political environment has had increasing problems with financial industrial groups, personalization of political parties, defectors between parties, lack of coherence, and


\textsuperscript{88} OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 22.

differences in geographical support due mainly to language attributes. Due to weak ideology, and sometimes to corruption, the loyalty of leading politicians is quite often questioned. As an example, Petro Poroshenko and five others founded the Party of Regions then moved to a series of other parties, including Our Ukraine, Front for Change, and finally UDAR. Poroshenko has floated between being allied to both pro-Russian and pro-Western parties. The Party of Regions has its roots in the Donbass region most known for its many Russian-speaking oligarchs and having an attraction to old Soviet nostalgia.

E. THE ECONOMIC DOMAIN

Despite gaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine’s economic ties to Russia are significant. Due to income inequalities, unemployment, and other considerations, Russia’s use of economic mechanisms as tools for influence has been obvious. Gazprom is Russia’s largest gas company and provides many parts of Europe with gas; its main gas pipeline to Europe goes through Ukraine. In 2006, Russia demonstrated its use of Gazprom as a power tool to influence decision makers in Ukraine. Russia argued that Ukraine kept some gas for its own consumption and that the price Ukraine paid was too low. By turning off the natural gas that it provided to Ukraine and other parts of Europe, Russia highlighted the necessity of good relationships with Russia. In 2005, the gas price went from $50 to $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. This seems to be an outcome of the Orange Revolution and enforced a new agreement that was set in January 2005 for another five-year period.

In April 2008, Gazprom sbyt Ukraine, a subsidiary to Gazprom, was registered in Ukraine. They signed a contract with Ukraine’s biggest energy company, Naftogaz Ukraine, to supply them with gas directly instead of going through a privately owned

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company, RosUkrEnergo. This increased Russian influence in Ukraine’s general economic sphere but also demonstrated a more direct influence over the Ukrainian government. In January 2009, however, another dispute between Ukraine and Gazprom occurred over unpaid bills, which allowed the Russians to cut off the gas for many areas, mostly in Ukraine. Russia had kept raising the gas prices over several years when it peaked in 2009 at $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. The increase of the gas price and the level it reached was not what was disturbing because the price Ukraine had paid was still lower than the world price. More disturbing was how Russia introduced the price increase and the disruption of gas production in the middle of the winter that signaled some kind of will to influence Ukraine decision making. In one week, however, the gas was turned on again since a new 10-year agreement was signed between Russia and Ukraine.

Furthermore, in the summer of 2013, the AA with the EU was published, and Russia now had the opportunity to read it. The agreement clearly stated that Ukraine would no longer be able to maintain the same relationships with Russia as it had earlier. Therefore, Russia became more engaged in the discussions about the AA and undertook a coercive stance to deter the Ukrainian government from continuing to pursue these pro-Western actions. The Russian policy targeted President Yanukovych and his political decisions by exercising influence in the economic sector, more specifically in import and export between the two countries. Dr. Lilia Shetsova, the senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow, said that this was the beginning of a trade war that Russia had started to influence, or more precisely to force, Yanukovych to end the dialog with the EU. The Ukrainian ambassador in the United Kingdom, Andrii Kuzmenko, also highlights that there were lots of influence actions from Russia due to the AA. These political and economic actions from Russia, which Kuzmenko termed as a customs war, milk war, gas war, and other similar phrases, had the sole purpose of

95 Copsey, “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of 2006.”
97 House of Lords European Union Committee, The EU and Russia, 54.
98 House of Lords European Union Committee.
preventing Ukraine’s integration with the EU. Russia’s restrictive trade measures were a big loss for the companies and industry and were aimed at forcing Ukraine to cancel its dialogue with the EU and instead join the Moscow-led Customs Union.

All these measures taken by Russia in the economic domain created an unstable environment where grievances and polarization among the citizens increased. This, in turn, was leveraged against the ruling government in order to influence decisions in Russia’s favor. Most often, the economic domain boosts the social conditions through organizations and corporations linked to Russia, which were developed to disseminate the Russian narrative. In summary, the economic domain reinforces Russia’s influence potential among the population partly through its media outlets but also through its compatriot policy.

F. THE SOCIAL DOMAIN

Utilizing the Russian population as a “power tool” is nothing new and is very tangible in areas where Russia has interests; this is also known as the compatriot policy. It is a tool used by Russia to legitimize its involvement in other countries’ businesses and to build incentives for becoming involved in those countries’ political process. The concept of the compatriot policy is to influence both Russians abroad but also people within Russia to gain support for Russia’s activities. The policy also works as a threat to foreign governments that Russia will interfere if they do not take care of the Russian people.

A cornerstone of the compatriot policy is the Russkiy Mir (Russian World). In 2007, the creation of the Russkiy Mir Foundation was decreed by the Russian president. Russkiy Mir is linked to the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation—

99 House of Lords European Union Committee.


101 Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare,” 3.

Rossotrudnichestvo—and is supposed to emphasize Russian culture and the Russian language abroad, which is the Russian compatriot policy. In October 2013, Russkiy Mir announced that they would open three new Russian centers in Ukraine. These centers create a platform for disseminating pro-Russian information and give the Russian government a legal, geographical base to engage domestically. Today, Ukraine has 11 Russian centers, compared to the United States, which has two, where Russkiy Mir disseminates its messages. Since 2009, the Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir have coordinated their activities and aggregated their objectives. This has both strengthened Russkiy Mir and also given the Russian government the opportunity to work through its network and physical locations. These organizations build the narrative primarily about Russian culture but more specifically the Russian language.

In July 2012, a law was passed that strengthened the Russian language in Ukraine. The law stated that Russian should get a regional language status, and many feared that this would divide the country even more. Protests arose against the language law but without any success. Yanukovych and his allies argued that this was a way to get closer to the EU and to follow the rules of human rights in Ukraine. Due to the relatively large protests, this law has been used many times to depict Ukrainians as Nazis because they do not accept Russian as a second language. Therefore, Russian media outlets will be able to smear the current leadership.

In May 2012, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev signed an executive order to establish a foundation for the support of the Russian compatriots and to defend the rights

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of Russians in courts abroad.\textsuperscript{108} Between 2012 and 2013, it received about $8 million from the Russian government. The foundation is responsible for Human Rights centers, and in 2013, there were about 10,000 beneficiaries, three times more than the previous year.\textsuperscript{109} These beneficiaries are not official and can be anyone promoting or supporting Russian interests, such as politicians or other influential persons.

Victor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician with considerable influence in current Ukrainian political decision making. His work in the Kuchma administration from 2002 to 2005 and his many interests in the business sector make him a person with many engagements but also many opportunities to influence people in his areas of interest. Moreover, Medvedchuk has strong connections to the Russian government in general, but more specifically to Putin himself. In 2012, Medvedchuk established the Ukrainian Choice, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), as a reaction to Ukraine’s pro-Western approach. Its goal was to prevent then president Yanukovych from signing agreements with the EU.\textsuperscript{110} In 2013, Medvedchuk invited President Putin to a conference where Putin emphasized the importance of good relationships between the two countries.\textsuperscript{111} Medvedchuk also launched a forum that discussed the dangers of becoming a member of the EU.\textsuperscript{112} Ukrainian Choice aims to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty from foreign interference and to develop democratic values within decision making. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of self-determination in decisions like what language to use, the government’s not interfering in personal decisions, self-government, and free choice of territory.\textsuperscript{113} The partners to the Ukrainian Choice are most often organizations working to increase cooperation between Russia-Ukraine and are often


\textsuperscript{109} Lutsevych, \textit{Agents of the Russian World}.


\textsuperscript{111} Herszenhorn.

\textsuperscript{112} Lutsevych, \textit{Agents of the Russian World}.

related to war veterans, education, businesses, and religious affiliates.\textsuperscript{114} Ukrainian Choice strongly opposed the EU agreement DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area) and broadcasted what the damage would be if Ukraine signed it. In 2013, Medvedchuk also established the Eurasian Forum in Kiev, partnering with the Russian Youth Public Council, which emphasized the same message.\textsuperscript{115}

Another NGO is the Russian Orthodox Church, which is working to reunite the Russian world. The church has a Russian-centric approach, working through affiliated NGOs, various publications, and charity groups, to spread its political issues—mainly criticisms of the EU and NATO membership. The church cooperates with other religious groups abroad that are affiliated in certain ways to the Moscow Patriarchate. In 2013, the Russian Orthodox Church’s own international organization, Day of Baptism of Rus (\textit{Den Kreshchenia Rus}), which was created in 2007, launched open-air concerts in ten cities across Ukraine. These events aimed to strengthen the church’s objective to unite Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, by using slogans like “We are one” and “Unity for Slavic People.”\textsuperscript{116}

Another tool of the Russian government in the effort to create its narrative is the use of paramilitary groups such as the Night Wolves and the Russian Cossack network. They both have significant funding and have been very active since 2013. The Night Wolves have close cooperation with Putin, who is a member of the gang, and in 2011 and 2012, they held their annual meetings in Crimea. In 2013, Putin was present at their annual meeting. Another organization, the Russian Cossack Network, had a summer camp in Crimea in 2013 that taught young people typical military skills, such as shooting and fighting. Both these organizations had huge funding and close ties to the Russian government.\textsuperscript{117}


\textsuperscript{115} Lutsevych, \textit{Agents of the Russian World}.

\textsuperscript{116} Lutsevych, 24.

\textsuperscript{117} Lutsevych, 31.
G. THE INFORMATIONAL DOMAIN

Strategic communication used to build a counter-narrative can be used, in turn, to victimize minority groups or to describe them as exposed to an unfair situation in the country where they live. A narrative describing how a Russian minority is mistreated, dissemination of information that is pro-Russia, and emphasizing how bad the West is, among other things, is meant to increase grievances and incite people to protest against the ruling elite.

The ideological factors are mainly disseminated and reinforced by the Russian World concept—Russkiy Mir, cultural centers, media projects, and other pro-Russian organizations. These are organizations, most often funded by the Russian government, which makes it difficult for Ukrainian media companies to get the same impact with less support. As an example, in July 2010, a Kiev court decided to cancel the allocation of frequencies for two privately owned TV channels, which, according to Ukrainian media experts, were two channels that provided independent news. This also happened in the same period as Ukrainian Security Service head Valery Khoroshkovsky applied for new frequencies to his rival media company, Inter Media Group. Valery Khoroshkovsky is well known for his close ties and his co-ownership of media companies with pro-Russian people.

Furthermore, in February 2013, the Russian government released a policy document emphasizing the importance of building a positive narrative of Russia abroad. The document strengthened Russia’s compatriot policy but also highlighted the use of media and other information channels as a tool to disseminate its pro-Russian narrative. Russia uses members of political parties or other people who are in positions of

118 “Ukraine Profile—Timeline,” BBC.
power as “experts” who strengthen Russia’s narrative while messaging in media and other information outlets.\textsuperscript{122}

Once again, in February 2014, just after the collapse of the Yanukovych government, the Russian media broadcasts targeted the Maidan movement as a fascist movement, which discredited the new government; and emphasized the hostile environment to Russian people and the upside to Crimea’s return to Russia,\textsuperscript{123} which was a familiar narrative.

H. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

Influencing people means influencing those who make decisions. This chapter analyzed how this is applied by Russia when trying to achieve its interests abroad. The use of SMT complements the currently available analysis of Russia’s actions by having a population-centric approach. The four areas derived from the political process model through UW explain crucial areas where one also should look for indicators of subversive actions. SMT can be used to analyze episodes of contentious collective actions and therefore is a usable tool to study changes in society and actions taken for influencing people.\textsuperscript{124} The analysis of Ukraine has revealed the following main indicators for Russia’s subversive actions in the different domains:

- Development of Culture Centers, NGOs, and other gathering points where they can spread their propaganda.
- Indirect support of political realignments, parties, and splinter groups.
- Use of lies to smear the Ukrainian government—media propaganda.
- Use of surrogates to finance political dissidents.
- Shutting down airwaves and marginalizing media.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{122} Estonian Information Board, \textit{International Security and Estonia} (Tallinn: TEABAMET, 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{123} Michael Kofman et al., \textit{Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 13.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
• Cutting off the gas.

The categories of how to collect and analyze the human environment were mentioned earlier. By “mapping key conditions of insurgency development, pathways of interaction, and nodes of influence,” one can build a good roadmap when crafting strategies to counter subversion. Furthermore, working through NGOs and in the fog of compatriots and using economic influence, mainly through the energy sector (Gazprom), are Russia’s way of subverting Ukraine’s political environment and Ukrainian society as a whole.

This case study focused on the four domains and the indicators derived through SMT. In the political environment, where many people may have access, one can see that Ukraine has had a lot of political instability and struggle in the society, which emphasizes political opportunities. It is a relatively unstable political environment where existing parties have divided into several factions or splinter groups. The emergence of culture centers and other NGOs is Russia’s way of maintaining influence without picking up arms.

The complexity of this crisis, but also crises in general, highlights the importance of cooperation between agencies and NGOs to better resist attempts at subversion but also to detect it earlier.

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125 Fussell and Lee, “Networks at War.”
VI. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF UKRAINE

This chapter’s purpose is to analyze Ukraine prior to the annexation of Crimea and examine how different networks evolved. Specifically, how has the network of interactions between Russia and Ukraine changed, and how has the relation between sub-state actors evolved? Moreover, using SNA to highlight changes in the Ukraine crisis may be useful for anticipating and highlighting subversive actions and may contribute to the understanding of specific indicators in the different domains. Finally, this case study will analyze how Russia might use its state power tools working beside and through NGOs.

A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER

The chapter’s outline is as follows. First, it details and describes the network data—its sources, its boundaries, and the relationships and attributes coded—and presents sociograms (i.e., network maps) of the networks. Next, an exploratory analysis of the network looks at the interactions between Russia and Ukraine and their sub-state actors, beginning in January 2012 and ending January 2016. Finally, it investigates whether there were any significant changes in the network during the Ukraine crisis and how the network evolved, if at all.

B. DATA DESCRIPTION AND NETWORK BOUNDARIES

After careful consideration of the pros and cons of each method to boundary identification, I settled upon a nominalist (objective) strategy coupled with a positive and negative communications event definitional focus. Nevertheless, knowing that the goal was to specify the boundaries of the network accurately, I decided I would most likely succeed using a hybrid approach. The data is derived monthly from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset. The data contains events coded as

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127 Everton, 79.
either cooperative or hostile interactions between sociopolitical actors such as individuals, groups, or nation states. The events are extracted and identified from different news articles by the BBN ACCENT coder, which identifies approximately 300 types of sociopolitical events in plain text such as news articles, Twitter feeds, or similar sources. These events are essentially quadruples, consisting of a source actor, event type (according to the CAMEO taxonomy of events), target actor, and date.

- The **nodes** in this study are sub-state actors (sectors of society) in Ukraine and Russia: government, business, civilian, education, judiciary, media, opposition, private organizations, and rebel groups. In the tables and figures the nodes have six-letter acronyms where the first three letters point to which country they represent, Russia (RUS) and Ukraine (UKR), and the last three letters point to what kind of actor they represent, educational (EDU), media (MED), judiciary (JUD), private (PTY), civilian (CVL), political opposition (OPP), business (BUS), rebel group (REB), governmental (GOV).

- The **ties** represent the mean positive (or negative) Goldstein score of all interactions between two actors in a given month; two layers of data representing positive ties and negative ties in the network. The Goldstein score is a value measuring the level of conflict or cooperation in an event, with -10 being the most conflictual and 10 being the most cooperative. An automated process extracts event data from news reports around the world and then through a language analysis engine categorizes the content as positive or negative.

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130 Boschee et al., “ICEWS Coded Event Data.”


132 Boschee et al., “ICEWS Coded Event Data.”
• The **time period** for this analysis is January 2012 to January 2016, while the data range is monthly. This time period and range were selected to allow for two years of data on either side of the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

• The networks are either networks of positive ties or networks of negative ties.

C. **METHODODOLOGY**

To conduct network-level and node-level SNA and temporal analysis of the network, this study uses the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA),\(^{133}\) which allows us to identify visual changes in the network over time and identify important metrics, thus providing a more complete picture of the network at any given period. ORA’s Measure Over Time feature helps identify trends that otherwise may go unnoticed, and its Social Network Change Detection (SNCD) function can identify “statistically significant” periods of network change, as well as compare and contrast Russia and Ukraine. SNCD support analysts identify periods in which a single measure of centralization has a significant increase or decrease that is not explainable by random fluctuations in the data.\(^{134}\)

C. **KEY TERMS**

**Network centralization**: This can be used to analyze a network and determine whether there are any nodes that are more central than others, that is, having higher centrality scores (degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and others). The more variation there is in centrality scores among the nodes, the higher the centralization score.\(^{135}\)


\(^{135}\) Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 398.
**Total Degree Centrality:** Total degree centrality is a measure of the number of ties a node has to its neighbors. The degree centrality value can be directional; that is, in-degree for ties going into the node, and out-degree for ties going out from the node, and the total degree centrality value is a summary of both. Actors or organizations who are linked to many others assumes having access to their ideas, beliefs, and opinions and therefore are assumed to have a high influence potential. Those people are identified by the degree centrality in the specific social network. The higher values in this metric are equal to more connections to other actors in that specific network.

**Closeness Centrality:** The closeness centrality value describes the path distance between nodes in a specific network. It measures the path distance (i.e., number of ties) between each node and may indicate that the node with a high closeness value (i.e., is close to many other nodes) can disseminate information quickly but also is reached by information fast, too.

**Eigenvector Centrality:** This measurement counts the numbers of ties each node has but weights them by its neighbor’s centrality score. That is, a node’s eigenvector centrality is calculated by its ties to other nodes and their centrality scores. The eigenvector centrality assesses connections to other nodes with high centrality scores higher than nodes that are more on the periphery. It assumes that if a node has a neighbor with high centrality scores it may have high potential influencing that neighbor.

**Betweenness Centrality:** This measures “the extent to which each actor lies on the shortest path between all other actors in a network.” The more often an actor lies on the shortest path between pairs of actors, the higher their betweenness score; if an actor does not lie on the shortest path between pair of actors, then its betweenness score

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136 Everton, 399.


138 Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 398.

139 Everton, 400.

140 Everton, 397.
equals zero. Information is more likely to pass through actors with high betweenness scores, which may indicate a brokerage position (see definition below).

**Network density**: This value indicates how connected a network is. It equals the ratio of actual ties over the total possible number of ties in a network.

**Fragmentation**: Equals the proportion of unconnected pairs of actors in a network. A pair of actors is considered to be unconnected if they cannot reach one another (via a network path) either directly or indirectly.\(^{141}\)

**Brokerage**: A brokerage position within a network indicates that this node may have high influence potential but also that it could be a source of gathering information since the information between two networks most often needs to go through this brokerage. This study uses betweenness centrality to measure brokerage potential.

**Newman Groups (Community Detection)**: Newman group algorithms are a series of clustering algorithms that detect subgroups such that there are more ties within the subgroups than across them than one would expect “in a random graph of the same size with the same number of ties.” The optimal number of subgroups generally uses modularity as a measure of fit.\(^{142}\)

E. **INITIAL ANALYSIS**

I first analyzed the network from January 2012 through January 2016. This allowed me to identify trends and shifts in the overall structure of the network. Next, I identified specific points in time that seemed interesting, points in time where metrics, such as the density of the network, had shifted dramatically. This allowed me to narrow the range of January 2012–January 2016 to August 2013–April 2014. By narrowing the range, I identified a specific period with the most interesting network-level and node-level events shifts, the highest change in total density of the network.

Sociograms (network maps) of Russia’s influence operations in Eastern Europe network relationships were coded and then visualized. The period from August 2013 to

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\(^{141}\) Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 401.

\(^{142}\) Everton, 401.
April 2014 was chosen as the range because there appeared to be a dramatic shift in network centralization. Network centralization measures the difference between the most-central nodes and the rest of the network. High values indicate that few nodes are very highly connected, and most have very few ties. In contrast, low values indicate that many nodes are highly connected, and most have many ties. There was a total degree centralization of 0.247 in August 2013 and 0.120 in April 2014, indicating that the nodes became much more highly connected with many more ties in April 2014. These dates coincide with the change in relationships between Russia and Ukraine during the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea.

Based on the initial analysis, this study identified the standard centralization measures (degree, closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness) and network density, as the most interesting network-level measures warranting further investigation. This study also investigates standard centrality measures (degree, closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness) and brokerage positions at the node level.

F. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This section will chronologically describe and visualize the different analyses and their results.


A total of 18 actors, not including isolates, were identified for the entire time period (January 2012–January 2016). Throughout that period, a total of 49 different networks among these actors where identified. Sixteen networks were in the beginning time period, 17 in the middle, and 16 in the end. Analysis was conducted for both positive and negative network interactions between Ukrainian-to-Ukrainian, Ukrainian-to-Russian, and Russian-to-Russian actors. The results are shown in Tables 2–4.
Table 2. Network Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Interactions Network</th>
<th>Avg. Path Distance</th>
<th>Avg. Diameter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2012–January 2016</td>
<td>11.605</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Interactions Network</th>
<th>Avg. Path Distance</th>
<th>Avg. Diameter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2012–January 2016</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>3.492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Negative Interactions (Centrality)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Positive Interactions (Centrality)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. January 2012–January 2016 Interactions (Measures Over Time)

Figures 3–6 (specifically 4 and 6) use social network change detection (SNCD) to highlight changes within a network by monitoring its topography (e.g., density, fragmentation, and centralization). Briefly put, SNCD allows for real-time analysis and can potentially alert analysts as to whether and when a sudden change has occurred in a network, and when compared with other sources of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), may explain possible causes for specific events. Significant changes are determined to occur
when a particular measure varies from a baseline at a rate greater than a predetermined threshold.143

As identified by the measure charts, network density, network centralization, and their corresponding social network change detection (SNCD), each provides evidence that August 2013 and April 2014 are two of the most important periods—periods with the greatest shifts (positive and negative interactions) in value. ORA’s output can be confusing because it graphs both significant increases and decreases of a particular metric with lines that rise from the baseline. For example, in Figure 4 the red line indicates increases in network density while the blue line charts decreases. Similarly, the green line indicates increases in network fragmentation, while the yellow line tracks decreases. Looking at the figure, the red, blue, and green lines all cross the threshold (indicated by the red horizontal line), suggesting that significant changes did occur. The next step is to determine the time at which each change began to occur in order to identify what factors may have led to the significant changes. With SNCD, the time at which a significant change is deemed to have begun to occur is the point where the line leaves the baseline and begins to rise.

143 Everton and Cunningham, “Detecting Significant Changes in Dark Networks.”
The time points identified in Figure 4 (and Figure 6, which applies SNCD to network centralization) correlate with certain events that occurred between Ukraine and Russia. Specifically, in August 2012, Russia stopped all imports from Ukraine to Russia. It was an obvious move from Russia trying to coerce Ukraine not to sign the AA with the EU. In November, the Euromaidan civil unrest began, followed by lots of violence, especially from the governmental security forces and the protesters. This resulted in President Yanukovych’s resignation in February 2014, when a temporary government was established. On March 18, Russian President Putin signed a law that implied annexation of Crimea.

Figure 3. Network Density and Fragmentation (January 2012–January 2016)

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145 EU Association Agreement set out the core for cooperation and partnership between EU and other countries.

Figure 4. Social Network Change Detection (Density and Fragmentation) (January 2012–January 2016)
Figure 5. Network Centralization (January 2012–January 2016)
Figure 6. Social Network Change Detection (Centralization) (January 2012–January 2016)
a. August 2013 Interactions (ORA Visualization #1)

The sociogram shown in Figure 7 illustrates the August 2013 network (15 nodes and 81 ties) with isolates hidden and nodes colored by Newman group, links colored by positive (blue line) and negative (red line) ties, and links weighted by the number of interactions (thick lines indicate more interactions). As noted earlier, Newman Groups is an algorithm that detects subgroups within networks by comparing the pattern of ties between actors to a random network of the same size and density. If the level of interconnectedness between some actors is greater than one would expect strictly from random interactions, then it is seen as evidence that it a subgroup within the network.

Figure 7. August 2013 Network; MDS Layout.

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Everton, *Disrupting Dark Networks*, 401.
• **Newman groups** shows two distinct subgroups; blue represents the largest with nine nodes (Russian); red represents the second largest with six nodes (Ukrainian).

• **Newman Modularity** of 0.3454 indicates the grouping has a low degree of community structure; lower values indicate a weaker clustering (i.e., less community structure). The groups that Newman’s algorithm identifies make visual sense in the manner that the Newman group exhibits less community structure.

• RUSGOV (Russian Government) and UKRGOV (Ukrainian Government) appear to occupy **brokerage positions** within the network.

**b. August 2013 Interactions (ORA Visualization #2)**

Figure 8 describes the network in August 2013, separated by types of interactions. Blue ties (15 nodes, 36 links) indicate positive interactions, and red ties indicate negative interactions. The Russian government holds a broker position within both networks. One can also derive a negative tie between Ukraine business and Russian government, which can be explained by the import embargo. The two major clusters consist of separate states, one of Ukraine (red nodes) and one of Russian groups (blue nodes). These visualizations highlight that there is a similar pattern between positive and negative interactions. The majority of ties are reciprocal except for a few, and there are both negative and positive ties between the same actors. However, the overall weight of the negative ties is much higher than the positive ties, revealing a conflicted environment.
Figure 8. Network Visualization of the August 2013 Network.
c. **August 2013 Interactions (SNA Reports)**

There were 15 total nodes, fewer isolates, identified for the period of August 2013. Analysis was conducted for network Agent × Agent Negative ties, for network Agent × Agent Positive ties, and for individual nodes.

Analysis identified the following the rank of the top five actors in terms of degree, closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness centrality, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. Russia’s 0.49 and Ukraine’s 0.47 betweenness scores in Table 5 are four times higher than the other actors, which confirm their strong brokerage positions. Ukraine’s relatively high score in eigenvector centrality (0.8) is explained to its tie to Russia, which is a highly centralized actor with many ties to other actors. The closeness centrality scores, which are quite even between the top five actors in both table five and six, reveal that it is a highly connected network where every actor has a relatively high potential to disseminate information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.160)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.0145)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.80)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.125)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.0140)</td>
<td>UKROPP (0.51)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.110)</td>
<td>RUSPTY (0.0135)</td>
<td>UKRBUS (0.43)</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.080)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.0134)</td>
<td>UKTPTY (0.43)</td>
<td>RUSPTY (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RUSPTY (0.075)</td>
<td>RUSMED (0.0133)</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.35)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Negative Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.33)</td>
<td>UKRPTY (0.092)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.68)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.26)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.060)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.61)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.15)</td>
<td>RUSJUD (0.059)</td>
<td>RUSREB (0.49)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RUSOPP (0.14)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.058)</td>
<td>RUSBUS (0.49)</td>
<td>RUSJUD (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>RUSBUS (0.13)</td>
<td>RUSMED (0.056)</td>
<td>RUSOPP (0.45)</td>
<td>RUSPTY (0.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the negative and positive networks do not differ significantly in scores, these tables look similar, and the analysis confirms only the first more broad analysis of 2012-2016. Russia’s dominance in eigenvector centrality indicate a more negative dissemination of information than Ukraine’s relatively positive.

ORA identified the following recurring top-ranked agents from ORA’s standard SNA report for the August 2013 network (Positive and Negative Interactions), as shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Recurring Top-Ranked Agents in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Pos. &amp; Neg. Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>UKRGOV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RUSGOV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UKRCVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RUSCVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5-way tie for fifth place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These tables describe what one might expect regarding the Russian and the Ukrainian governments as central actors, especially due to degree centrality. Remarkably, though, these are the top-ranked actors in eigenvector centrality. These are, except for the Ukrainian government, only Ukrainian sub-state actors such as the opposition, business affiliates, private sector, and civilian organizations. As mentioned earlier in this study, the eigenvector measures eventual influence capability, and in this case may be actors vulnerable to Russian influence operations.

These visualizations describe both the Ukraine and Russian governments as central actors throughout several measurements. Analyzing the top actors according to eigenvector and brokerage potential, however, one can derive, especially by looking at the positive ties, that sub-state actors play a significant role. The top-ranked actors in the brokerage measurement (betweenness centrality) are civilian actors and private organizations that might have an indirect influence potential.

de. April 2014 Interactions (ORA Visualization #1)

Figure 9 illustrates the network in April 2014, with isolate nodes hidden. Notice that there are 18 nodes and 140 ties; positive ties are represented by the blue lines and negative ties are represented by the red lines. During this time, there was a network centralization—total degree of 0.700. This represented a major shift in the total number of interactions, both positive and negative; the network appears to be much denser, and apparent brokerage roles have disappeared.
Figure 9. ORA Visualization of the April 2014 Network.

Figure 9 illustrates the April 2014 network (18 nodes and 140 ties) with isolate nodes hidden, nodes colored by Newman Grouping, links colored by positive (blue line) and negative (red line) ties, and links weighted by the number of interactions (thick lines indicate more interactions).

- Newman groups shows two distinct subgroups; blue represents the largest with 11 nodes (nine Russian, two Ukrainian), red represents the second grouping with seven nodes (seven Ukrainian).
• **Newman Modularity** of 0.1766 indicates the grouping has a low degree of community structure; lower values indicate a weaker clustering (i.e., less community structure). The groups that Newman’s algorithm identifies make visual sense in the manner that the Newman group exhibits less community structure.

• Easily identifiable brokerage positions no longer are readily apparent within the network.

This analysis highlights the balance between positive and negative interactions, showing why this network can be described as conflictual. The Ukrainian government is assigned to the same network/cluster as the majority of the Russian nodes, which may be explained by the negative interactions with the Russian actors. Moreover, this analysis also reveals a path of exclusively positive ties between Ukrainian business, Ukrainian opposition, Russian rebels, and Russian business affiliates.

**e. April 2014 Interactions (ORA Visualization #2)**

Figure 10 depicts the network in April 2014, divided into separate negative and positive visualizations. The networks are much denser, and there are no well-defined subgroups as in August 2013. In the positive interaction network, there are 18 nodes and 69 links. In the negative interaction network, there are 18 nodes and 71 links. The Russian and Ukraine governments do still hold a central position, but now the other actors have many more interactions than before. There is an increase of both positive and negative ties, but it is difficult to derive any specific conclusions from that. Remarkable, however, is the increase of interactions, both positive and negative, and the increase of actors, or more specifically, a lack of isolates. This time frame highlights an event where Russia violates Ukraine’s sovereignty. In that situation, one may expect the opposite, that is, a decrease of interactions due to hostility.
Figure 10. Network Visualizations of the April 2014 Network
April 2014 Interactions (SNA Reports)

Eighteen total nodes, less isolates, were identified for the April 2014 period. Analysis was conducted for network Agent × Agent Negative ties, network Agent × Agent Positive ties, and individual nodes.

ORA’s standard SNA report for the April 2014 network identified the rank of the top five actors in terms of degree, closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness centrality, as shown in Tables 8 and 9. Compared to the August 2013, the closeness centrality score is about sixteen times higher and emphasize a network where actors are more close to each other. This implies that each actor has more potential to disseminate information. Also, the betweenness centrality scores reveal that Russian civilian actors may have a better brokerage potential in 2014 due to higher scores, similar to the Russian and Ukrainian governmental organizations.

Table 8. Positive Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.170)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.23)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.68)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.170)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.22)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.61)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.085)</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.13)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.49)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UKROPP (0.075)</td>
<td>UKROPP (0.12)</td>
<td>RUSBUS (0.38)</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.060)</td>
<td>RUSOPP (0.09)</td>
<td>RUSREB (0.30)</td>
<td>UKRPTY (0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9. Negative Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Eigenvector</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.37)</td>
<td>UKRJUD (0.017)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.53)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.33)</td>
<td>RUSGOV (0.0115)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.51)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>UKRCVL (0.31)</td>
<td>RUSPTY 0.01</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.45)</td>
<td>RUSMED (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.23)</td>
<td>UKRGOV (0.012)</td>
<td>RUSCVL (0.45)</td>
<td>UKRREB (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UKRREB (0.20)</td>
<td>RUSMED (0.011)</td>
<td>UKRREB (0.43)</td>
<td>RUSPTY (0.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ORA identified the following recurring top-ranked agents from ORA’s standard SNA report for the April 2014 network (Positive and Negative Interactions) as shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Recurring Top-Ranked Agents 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Pos. &amp; Neg. Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>RUSGOV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UKRGOV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>RUSCVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UKRCVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4-way tie for fifth place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these tables, one can observe that the Ukrainian and Russian governments still hold the top positions. The differences in these tables are the changes in actors, especially within the eigenvector centrality. The eigenvector centrality’s top-ranked actors are now
Russian actors, meaning that Russia now might have more capacity for indirect influence. One can also derive the shift in the presence of different rebel groups that might have more interests within the society at this time. Moreover, from these tables, one can observe an increase in Ukrainian education affiliates within the brokerage position. The measurements overall have increased in value, but the positive interactions have decreased. The distribution of the tables is, other than for minor changes, the same as it was in August except for the rise in nongovernmental organizations’ measurement values, indicating more indirect influence.

G. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF UKRAINE

SNA can contribute to the understanding of covert groups, but researchers need to be aware of the limitations of drawing conclusions from SNA alone. Here are the key findings regarding the use of SNA.

1. Ties matter for analysis.

2. Incorrect, insufficient, or inadequate data may lead to false results.

3. Hybrid networks, such as this network, often include relations that create trust, competition, and dependencies among members that traditional metrics, such as centrality measures, cannot capture.

4. In covert network analysis, analysis of complex networks often requires disaggregation into smaller components that allow each relationship type to better understand the meaning and the structure of network ties.

This chapter has tried to analyze how the environment evolves through a crisis but also how Russia might use its state power tools to influence other countries. The purpose was to highlight changes in the Ukraine crisis that might be useful to adapt for other countries to anticipate Russia’s subversion. Validating general conclusions from this study may be difficult when this is only a single case study from a single dataset. Further studies where Russia is involved must be undertaken. Nonetheless, this study reveals a significant change between August 2013 and April 2014, which most likely is explained
by the rise of the civil unrest and the evolution of the crisis. The ties have changed from being clustered into two significant groups of Russian and Ukrainian actors to a network with low centrality but higher density.

One should expect stability and cooperation throughout a crisis within a country when influenced by a foreign adversary. This study highlights the increase of interactions within the network, which might indicate cooperation. However, one may expect a decrease in cooperation between actors in Ukraine and Russia’s counterpart due to hostilities, but this seems not to be the case. Rather the opposite appears to have occurred. This is why this might indicate some kind of will to influence different actors within the exposed country, in this case, Russia influencing Ukraine. This relative instability can create opportunities that favor either part that aims to subvert the legal authorities.

The interactions between NGOs are clear and their ranks in the measurements related to indirect influence, such as brokerage potential and eigenvector centrality, are high. Nevertheless, influencing people means influencing those who make decisions. This study collected and analyzed data from the human environment according to the categories by Lee and Fussell, by “mapping key conditions of insurgency development, pathways of interaction, and nodes of influence,” and revealed that one can build a good roadmap for crafting strategies to counter subversion.148 Furthermore, this study revealed Russia’s preferred methods to subvert the Ukrainian political environment and Ukrainian society as a whole were by working through NGOs and in the fog of compatriots and by using economic influence.

The role of indirect influence is even more important today when the use of social media and other information channels rapidly disseminate information, for example, the use of unauthorized military violence, such as the Eastern Ukraine 2014. The network of April 2014 highlights the importance of cooperation between different agencies within one’s country to be able to alert decision makers when changes in network structure occurs but also to be able to prevent destabilization of the country. Unity and joint operations are the future for defense.

VII. CASE STUDY OF ESTONIA

One of Russia’s main objectives is to weaken the unity of the international system of Western-friendly countries, more specifically the EU and NATO, which are its greatest threat. Estonia, which shares a border with Russia and is a member of both the EU and NATO, is no exception. With its geographical location between the Baltic Sea and Russia, it has definitely a place in Russia’s sphere of interests, also known as its “buffer” zone. Since Estonia lacks any significant natural resources or other assets essential for Russia, however, Russia can be more aggressive in its subversive operations aimed to disrupt the society and dissolve the political process. Subversive actions are a key to success for Russia due to Estonia’s membership in NATO, and the membership initially excluded Russia’s use of conventional armed forces. NATO membership protects Estonia through the deterrence factor, which may be the biggest difference compared to Ukraine. Even though the differences between Estonia and Ukraine are many, the two countries share striking similarities of Russian involvement within their respective societies, especially within the four SMT-derived domains—political, social, informational, and economical.

A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER

In this chapter, I focus on Estonia and analyze events confirming indicators gleaned from the political process model. By using derived indicators from the Ukraine case study, one may see similar patterns within Estonia. First, I briefly summarize the historical perspective to enhance the environmental understanding but also to enhance understanding of the different sectors of the society. Secondly, I analyze chronologically the domains derived from the political process model to highlight similarities and differences between the events that occurred in Ukraine. Finally, I present conclusions drawn from the findings and a comparison of the indicators achieved from the Ukraine case study to either dismiss or confirm indicators of Russia’s subversive operations.


B. HISTORICAL BACKDROP

Along with many other Eastern European countries after World War II, Estonia was forced to adopt the Russian way of life. Traditions, culture, and rules, but also the Russian language, were imposed. Russian architecture was also imposed on structures such as official government buildings and military installations. The Russian heritage is represented in part of the society even today.

Similar to Ukraine, Estonia gained its independence in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It became a member of both the EU and NATO in 2004, along with the other Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia is a rather small country, bordering Russia to the east and Baltic Sea to the west. Its population is about 1.2 million, about 70 percent of whom are Estonians, 25 percent Russians, and 5 percent other ethnic groups. The Russian population in Estonia is proportionally larger than in Ukraine where the Russians are only about 17 percent of the population. Only 50 percent of the Russians in Estonia have Estonian citizenship, a critical condition used by Russia when creating a narrative that Estonia does not take care of its Russians and therefore they should demand Russia’s support and involvement. Estonia’s development since its independence has been far greater than its southern allies, Latvia and Lithuania. It ranks high in categories such as education and press freedom and has had a steep development curve within the technology sector.

C. THE POLITICAL DOMAIN

Despite Estonia’s well-developed technological industry and its membership in NATO, its political system lacks stability and experienced leaders. A weak governmental framework and an unbalanced institutional bureaucracy, a leftover from the Soviet era,

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153 “Estonia.”

make Estonia susceptible to Russian influence.\textsuperscript{155} Sometimes there are ties between political organizations and business affiliates where the funding of different parties is blurred, opening the door for political opportunities.\textsuperscript{156}

Unfortunately, the relatively large Russian minority has not been given the chance to receive Estonian citizenship. The Center Party, representing about 80 percent of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia,\textsuperscript{157} is a strong supporter of the Russian compatriot policy and leverages the citizenship issue to gain popularity among Russians. Furthermore, the Center Party is strongly connected to the pro-Putin party, United Russia, and has a specific agreement for close cooperation.\textsuperscript{158} This makes the connection to Russia obvious, and it is also where the Center Party gets its agenda.

In 2010, the Estonian Internal Security Service released its annual report that revealed information about the Center Party’s connection to Russia. More specifically, the leader of the party, through his connections to Russian sponsors, had been able to build a Russian Orthodox church in an area of Tallin where most of the Russian people are situated.\textsuperscript{159} The same thing happened in 2013 in Paldiski. Another church was built funded by an Estonian-Russian businessman in an area heavily populated by Russians and in a town where governmental control was low.\textsuperscript{160} These events clearly point out the Russian government’s use of the Russian population in general, but through the church more specifically, to gain control and influence. Leveraging a very large number of Russian people against local politics is an effective tool in the subversion toolbox.\textsuperscript{161}

In 2011, Russian involvement within the political environment continued. Prior to the parliamentary election in Estonia, a propaganda film elevating the leader of the


\textsuperscript{156} Grigas, 3.


\textsuperscript{158} Winnerstig, \textit{Tools of Destabilization}, 51.

\textsuperscript{159} Winnerstig, 51.

\textsuperscript{160} Winnerstig, 59.

\textsuperscript{161} Winnerstig, 59.
Center Party was broadcast by a Russian media agency. That media agency has its office in Moscow and does not have any local offices or other connections within Estonia, but announced this information just days before the election. The actions of this media agency, with no direct connections to Estonia, and its interest in an Estonian party leader are hard to explain other than to indirectly influence the political environment to create conditions favorable to Russian interests.\(^\text{162}\)

**D. THE ECONOMIC DOMAIN**

Compared to Ukraine and the other Baltic states, Estonia is less dependent on the Russian energy sector. Yet, historical remnants and old infrastructure still keep Estonia in the grip of Russian organizations. That said, they are not fully independent, especially not regarding the natural gas sector. The huge Russian energy company Gazprom plays a significant role in Estonia, as it did in Ukraine.\(^\text{163}\) Gazprom uses economic factors to gain control over certain areas in the society trying to influence decision makers and makes a statement if governments and their decision makers do not align with Russian interests. In May 2007, Russian oil dealers stopped using the port of Tallinn and instead used their port in St. Petersburg to export oil products. The impact of this embargo on the Estonian economy was significant. The economic impact on those business affiliates that used to work with the Russian exports was devastating, which influenced decision makers not only at the local level but also at the regional level. The largest oil company that used to export oil through Tallinn was owned by Gazprom.\(^\text{164}\) This embargo happened at the same time as a protest against Estonia’s decision to move a Russian statue located in Tallinn.

Overall, Russia’s and Estonia’s trading market has had a positive development since Estonia’s independence. Russia is one of Estonia’s largest export markets, and


exports have increased ever since independence, apart from the economic crisis in 2009.\textsuperscript{165} Still, it is a cooperation most often ruled by Russia and settled with several obstacles. First, no trade agreement with equal rights and obligations exists between the two countries. The rules are most often set to Russia’s advantage. Also, Russia refuses to recognize the Estonian health and safety certificates from Estonian producers and approves certificates only from their own organizations.\textsuperscript{166}

E. \textbf{THE SOCIAL DOMAIN}

The history of the Soviet Union’s occupation of Estonia and the outcome of World War II divides the majority of Estonians’ and Russians’ perspectives on Russia either as liberators from the Nazis or as an occupying force.\textsuperscript{167} This was obvious in 2007 when a Soviet monument was moved from the city center of Tallinn to a cemetery outside the city. It was a bronze statue supposed to remind the Estonian people about the Soviet occupation. Many Estonians saw the statue as a reminder of the Russian influence in the society and did not subscribe to the story it told, but many Russians felt that they had been insulted and that the Estonian society had minimized the importance of the historical Russian involvement. Moving the statue to a cemetery could be questioned from an outside perspective and was also used by Russia as an ignitor to develop a civil unrest, named the “Bronze Night.” A frigid diplomatic relationship between Estonia and Russia emerged from this event.\textsuperscript{168} What followed, except for the diplomatic complications, were economic constraints, a cyberattack apparently originating from Russia, and an information operation trying to discredit Estonia and its decision makers.

Within the social domain, SMT emphasizes the importance of already existing organizations. In Estonia, however, new Russian media agencies and websites have emerged. The use of the Russian population in Estonia as a complement to the lack of existing organizations to leverage influence and as a power tool to destabilize the

\textsuperscript{165} Winnerstig, \textit{Tools of Destabilization}, 61.
\textsuperscript{166} Winnerstig, 63.
\textsuperscript{168} Conley et al., 2.
political discourse is obvious. These organizations are coordinated through coordination councils manned from the Russian embassy in order to collect NGOs and affiliates that support Russian objectives or otherwise promote the Russian way of living.\footnote{Winnerstig, \textit{Tools of Destabilization}, 43.}

In 2008, Russkiy Mir established a language center located in the middle of Tallinn. It became a hub for the dissemination of Russian information. In 2009, Russkiy Mir merged their organizational objectives with those of the Russian Federal Agency responsible for the compatriot policy, Rossotrudnichestvo. This defined its ties to Russia and created a platform for Russia to influence the narrative.\footnote{Grigas, \textit{Legacies, Coercion, and Soft Power}, 10.}

The effort against Russian influences in Estonian society has been an ongoing process. One major issue among decision makers is about what the official language spoken in Estonia should be and difficulties with integrating the Russian population into the society. These issues are similar to those identified in the Ukraine study. To justify Russia’s interference within the decision-making processes of other countries, neutral NGOs, funded by the Kremlin, are used to create a narrative and report human rights crimes. Two of those are the Legal Information Centers for Human Rights (LICHR) and the Russian School in Estonia. Through these organizations, Russia can decide what kind of narrative should be broadcast and can use these sources later on to argue that the information came from an independent third party.\footnote{Estonian Internal Security Service, \textit{Annual Review 2015} (Tallinn: Internal Security Service, 2015), 7, \url{https://www.kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/Annual%20Review%202015.pdf}.} The organization Russian Schooling, founded in 2010, was exactly such an organization. It was seen as a response to the strict policy against the Russian language and promoted the Russian way of life and culture.\footnote{Winnerstig, \textit{Tools of Destabilization}, 44.}

In June 2010, the organization Mir bez Natsizma (World Without Nazism [WWN]) was founded in Kiev. Their agenda is said to be a human rights movement working against neo-Nazism, but more specifically, against mistreatment of Russian
minorities abroad. Their leadership consists of people who used to be members of *Nochnoi Dozor* (Night Watch) and has strong ties to the Russian government. Night Watch was the leading organization in the unrest following the movement of the bronze statue. World without Nazism is described as one of the most influential NGOs defending Russia’s interests abroad. In March 2011, a new NGO emerged named Nazi-Free Estonia. It had its founding meeting in Tallinn and seems to belong to the same network as World Without Nazism. The Nazi topic is often used when trying to discredit leaders or decision makers by accusing them of being Nazis or having connections to Nazi organizations. Quite often, these organizations compare how Russians abroad are treated by the societies they live in to Nazi-like treatment.

In 2008, Galina Sapozhnikova, a journalist for the Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and Igor Teterin, an Estonian entrepreneur, founded a media club called Impressum, which has been accused of promoting anti-Estonian propaganda and at the same time glorifying Russia. In December 2011, it held a meeting where the guests could sign a petition against a political reform conducted by the Estonian government at that time. In 2009, the club Format-A3 was created in Crimea, which is pretty similar to Impressum, with the same guest speakers and speaking points. In September 2010, the media club expanded into Ukraine but under another name, Skovoroda Club, in Kiev. Its founder was Dmitry Kiselyov, who became the director of Rossiya Segodnya, the new media agency created by Putin in 2013 by merging RIA Novosti and the radio station Golos Rossi.

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175 Winnerstig.
Questioning historical events and disseminating a pro-Russian perspective is another tool used by Russia to influence people’s opinions and perspectives. The Historical Memory Foundation, founded in 2008, claims it conducts research on and analyzes historical events in Russia and its eastern neighbors.\textsuperscript{179} The group’s actions, however, suggest something different. The foundation seems to pay more attention to the resistance movements in the Baltic states and Ukraine, and tries to create a narrative in which the participants in resistance movements were selfish and cruel at that time. In 2010, the foundation created a database containing the names of victims of the armed resistance in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belarus.\textsuperscript{180} Another historically focused organization is the Baltic Research Center. Founded in 2012, the Baltic Research Center questions the historical view of the Baltic states and argues that they emerged from the former Russian Empire and thus are meant for “internal consumption.”\textsuperscript{181}

In 2010, the fund Amber Bridge was established by Russian sponsors, whose main objective has been to increase information sharing between Russia and the Baltic states and to enhance economic cooperation between the countries. They argue that different assessments of historical events are the greatest obstacle for deeper relationships. Their interests are also in the transit, environmental, and energy sectors, and they want to facilitate the exchange of students between universities. These are all programs that already exist in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) where Russia is already a member; thus, this can only be described as Russia’s use of soft power to feed its own narrative.\textsuperscript{182}

For Russia to be able to spread its information and influence societies, it requires a credible spokesperson. In 2012, the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad was established to train, fund, and

\textsuperscript{179} О Фонде—Фонд «Историческая Память»” [About the Foundation-the Historical Memory Foundation], Фонд «Историческая Память» [Historical Memory Foundation], n.d., http://historyfoundation.ru/about/.


\textsuperscript{182} Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual Review 2010, 14.
support such spokespersons and related organizations. One of the organizations was the Tallinn-based Legal Information Center for Human Rights (LICHR), which in 2014 organized a conference in Tallinn. The conference focused on a narrative that painted Estonia just as the Russian strategy desired, as a divided society that violates the human rights of the Russian-speaking people.\textsuperscript{183} The Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad and its members are supporters of the annexation of Crimea, and the organization very often supports court cases related to people linked to Russian special services. Moreover, many of its members have ties to special services in Russia.\textsuperscript{184}

Russia uses media projects as another tool of influence. In October 2014, a media website called the Baltnews emerged as a Russian language news portal. It was a project that disseminated information through all the Baltic countries. The project was funded by Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today), also active in Ukraine, which was established in 2013 as the Russian state information agency. The Baltnews project targeted the Russian-speaking population abroad and was coordinated by employees of Rossiya Segodnya, which also managed and coordinated what was broadcast and when programs were broadcast. They also coordinated another media project named Sputnik.\textsuperscript{185} Sputnik was developed and funded by the same organization as the Baltnews, Russia Today, which broadcast in about 34 different languages. In 2014, Sputnik advertised to recruit journalists in Estonia in order to broaden its coverage of Russian news in Estonia. The network of both Sputnik and Russia Today are closely linked to organizations and people active in Russian compatriot policy and also has ties to other Russian governmental organizations in the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{186} It was not until 2015 that Rossiya Segodnya tried to


establish an office in Estonia along with an Estonian and Russian language portal, and in February 2016, Sputnik launched its Estonian website.\textsuperscript{187}

In 2016, the Russian influence operations continued. The Russian Association for Baltic Studies (RAPI), which aims to bring together researchers of the Baltic states, and another discussion club named Yamburg, whose purpose was to unite researchers and experts and to strengthen ties with the Baltic states, were established and presented at the Rossiya Segodnya press center in Moscow. The messages coming from those foundations follow the typical pattern of Russia’s influence operations: identifying the Baltic states as a problem area, declaring that Russian people are being discriminated against there, and a falsifying of the history.\textsuperscript{188}

F. THE INFORMATIONAL DOMAIN

The 2007 unrest over the bronze statue was followed by a wave of cyberattacks on websites connected to Estonian media and governmental organizations. No clear evidence pointed to a specific country, but much evidence indicated involvement of Russian individuals through their IP addresses.\textsuperscript{189} Then, in 2010, the bronze statue lost its value as a tool to leverage propaganda and conflicts for Russia. Russia had to find another event to engage when disseminating its narrative of Russia as a deliverer of salvation. Russia tried to build a message that all opposition to Soviet occupation was an act of Nazism. Therefore, Russia turned its focus to an annual event involving soldiers who had fought in World War II. These events were covered by an unusually high number of Russian journalists describing the event as an attempt to change the historical case and as Nazi rallies sponsored by the Estonian government. Boris Sphigel, a member of the Federation Council of Russia, Dmitri Kondrashov, a Russian activist for Russia’s compatriot policy, and Andrei Zarenkov, also an activist emphasizing the compatriot policy, financed and organized the Nochnoi Dozor’s demonstration aiming to provoke


\textsuperscript{188} Estonian Internal Security Service, \textit{Annual Review 2016}, 10.

confrontations during the main events that year.\textsuperscript{190} Russia continued to build its narrative that the Soviet Union was the liberator and that the resistance from the current Estonian government is an example of pro-Nazism.\textsuperscript{191}

In 2011, Russia’s accusations of Estonia as a promoter of neo-Nazism and crimes against human rights continued. The media-club Impressum organized a public meeting covering the tense relationship between Russia and Estonia, and media continued to cover people who questioned the history as it is told today and instead wanted to derive a more Russian-friendly approach.\textsuperscript{192} This was reinforced by a high-ranking Russian officer’s speech in Riga “attacking the Baltic states for promoting fascism and human rights violations against their Russian-speaking minorities.”\textsuperscript{193} In 2014, Boris Spiegel, an activist and member of World Without Nazism, received a financial grant from the Russian president, and with those contributions, the WWN organized a youth conference titled “Youth for a Nazism-Free World.”

The use of youth organizations is leveraged both domestically in Russia as an influence tool but also abroad where it wants to disseminate its agenda. In May 2013, a youth organization, Young Word, organized a conference in Estonia that emphasized military characteristics such as courage and bravery. It was supported by the Russian embassy in Estonia and the Estonian Orthodox church.\textsuperscript{194} Moreover, every year a Russian youth camp named Soyuz, dedicated to the memory of the Russian Empire and its victory in World War II is held in Russia by the Rossotrudnichestvo and an association called The Courage of the Fatherland. It has a military and athletic theme, and participants are invited from Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Baltic states. In September 2013, the location changed to Odessa, Ukraine. The Soyuz event

\textsuperscript{190} Estonian Internal Security Service, \textit{Annual Review 2010}, 11.
\textsuperscript{191} Estonian Internal Security Service, 11.
\textsuperscript{193} Winnerstig, \textit{Tools of Destabilization}, 49.
\textsuperscript{194} Winnerstig.
was highly covered by the larger news agencies in Russia, as well as other Russian governmental organizations.\footnote{Estonian Internal Security Service, \textit{Annual Review 2013}, 11.}

In order for the compatriot policy to be successful, Russia needs either to segregate people or make them feel segregated and undermine the integration process by trying to make them dependent on Russia. Russia justifies its interference in other countries’ politics and internal affairs by leaning on its compatriot policy. They speak about human rights and argue that Russia has a responsibility to protect its people abroad when they engage in different events in other countries. For example, the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad, founded in 2012, was established in Estonia to support and finance pro-Russian organizations in order for them to work toward Russia’s foreign policy objectives. The fund supported the participation of World Without Nazism’s activists in OSCE conferences and also for WWN to be able to organize its General Assembly in Strasbourg. The WWN has an annual seminar to remember that the Red Army conquered Tallinn.\footnote{Estonian Internal Security Service, \textit{Annual Review 2012} (Tallinn: Internal Security Service, 2012), 7, \url{https://www.kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/Annual%20Review%202012.pdf}.}

By building this network, Russia can implement its information operations through legal organizations in other countries under the flag of compatriot policy. An example is the Legal Information Center for Human Rights in Estonia, developed in 2012 by Alexey Semyonov, who is a member of Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots. The council is led by the local embassy of the Russian Federation.\footnote{Estonian Internal Security Service, \textit{Annual Review 2013}, 7.}

Moreover, the media is a significant tool when framing different narratives. In early spring 2010, a film crew from the Russian TV channel 5 came to Estonia to document the life of Russians living there. It was told to create a story of a creative society with engaged people, but when broadcast, it turned out to be the opposite. It was perfectly tailored to Russia’s propaganda narrative that Estonia was far better when belonging to the Soviet Union and that the Russian people living in Estonia are
oppressed.\textsuperscript{198} In August 2015, a Russian TV crew from the Russian TV channel Rossiya visited Estonia and later broadcast a news program that smeared the Estonian TV channel ETV+. ETV+ is a Russian-language TV channel broadcasting Russian news from an Estonian perspective.\textsuperscript{199}

All these information operations clearly aim at creating an environment that is unfavorable to the Russian people in Estonia or at least designed to create a feeling of being mistreated. This both creates incentives for people to rise up and protest but also frames the narrative to gather masses of people. Russia’s compatriot policy tries to connect the Russian-speaking population living abroad, more specifically in Russia’s areas of interest, with foreign policy objectives—as it is in Estonia. By uniting the Russian-speaking people under Russian authorities and leadership, such as the Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad, the Russian Foreign Ministry, and Russian embassies, Russia can more easily distribute information and use Russian-speaking people as a tool when meddling in other states’ political decision making. Using this kind of soft power makes it more difficult for governments to target a specific area that is an obvious threat to them.\textsuperscript{200} The Russian national agency, Rossotrudnichestvo, which was founded in 2008 by the Russian government, was in 2013 defined as a department in the Russian Federation, whose main tasks are developing and running Russia’s foreign policy. Rossotrudnichestvo is responsible for the compatriot policy but more specifically for assisting the development of humanitarian cooperation and other support based on the compatriot strategy. Konstantin Kosachev, director of the Rossotrudnichestvo, emphasized the importance of independent organizations of Russians abroad to show why a closer cooperation with Russian businessmen should be established. This forced the local Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots to change in 2013 by dividing into several sectors, where one had an economic focus with the goal of finding both Russian and local businessmen ready to support the compatriot policy.\textsuperscript{201}

\ \textsuperscript{198} Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual Review 2010, 11.
\textsuperscript{199} Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual Review 2015, 8.
\textsuperscript{201} Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual Review 2013, 5.
Another common tool for Russia is the use of people promoting anti-Estonian narratives at events of an international character. Funding and supporting those actors has been used historically. In September 2016, representatives from the Legal Information Center for Human Rights and the Russian School in Estonia participated in an event organized by the OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) covering subjects like human rights and integration. The Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad paid for these organizations’ participation. The message these organizations spread was about the violation of language rights and that Russians without Estonian citizenship created a heavy burden for the Estonian society. The message was designed to thwart a sense of belonging among Russians in Estonian society. In September 2011, a campaign symbolized by a white ribbon was launched to support Russian schools that did not want to be taught the Estonian language. The campaign was supported by Night Watch, which also organized a couple of demonstrations. By analyzing the participants and the organizers, however, one could observe that there were almost no students or parents protesting and that the connection to the Russian government was clear.

Another way of gaining influence is to give money to political parties in foreign countries or to offer lucrative positions in companies to former politicians. These companies are often owned by or closely related to the Russian government. Other Russian government foundations and media companies support different nonprofit organizations, including Estonian nonprofits.

Finally, in 2016 NATO decided to pre-position battlegroups in the Baltic states. This created an aggressive propaganda reaction from Russia, both in the media and in political messaging. In Estonia, a handful of extremist activities spreading anti-NATO messages emerged but to no great effect in Estonian society. Nonetheless, the Russian media picked up the news and spread it widely to demonstrate the anti-NATO wave in

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Estonia. A similar event occurred in 2016 when Russia delegated a skinhead from St. Petersburg to participate in a memorial event in Estonia. When arriving at the event, he had clothes that revealed neo-Nazi symbols. This was captured by the Kremlin-controlled media, which broadcast this as the social problem in Estonian society. Fortunately, the Estonian Internal Secret Service had control over this and highlighted the event to discredit the attempt. Other attempts to gain influence in the society emerged in 2016. Konstantin Zatulin, blacklisted in Ukraine from 2006 to 2008, tried to become a politician, representing the Russian-speaking people. His campaign was covered by the Russian TV channel Tsargrad, owned by Konstantin Malofeyev. Malofeyev, who is on the EU’s sanctions list, is a wealthy Russian businessman with strong connections to Putin. He also runs Russia’s largest foundation, St. Basil the Great Foundation.

G. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN ESTONIA

The similarities to Ukraine are obvious and Russian interference is sometimes even more apparent in Estonia. It could be because of stronger control at the governmental level but also because Russia may have a stronger posture in Estonia than in Ukraine.

Russia’s operations in Estonia aim to influence society in such a way that society becomes diverse and lack unity. Russia utilizes the depth of the divided ethnic society, and the success of the compatriot policy is striking. The events in the different domains are highly influenced by dissemination of pro-Russian narratives, and the use of both existing but also newly created organizations on a sub-state level is common. Different organizations and institutes, registered as research institutions, are platforms used to build credibility in the dissemination of information within the Russian strategy. Defending the rights of Russian-speaking people has been used as a pretext for Russia before to intervene in internal affairs, such as in Ukraine.

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206 Estonian Internal Security Service, 8.
Russia’s strategic objectives are to weaken the unity of the international system, but more specifically, the EU and NATO, which they see as a threat. Information operations enable the Russian government to divide and rule different states in order to influence public opinion and discredit the democratic process. Furthermore, information operations are designed to make the Russian way of life more attractive. By using its compatriot policy, which aims to segregate ethnic Russians from the society in Estonia and to defame Estonia’s social and political leadership, Russia creates an unfavorable situation by generating mistrust. The events described in this chapter hinder other countries, but especially Estonia, from establishing closer ties to the West. The cultural centers are their foundations and serve as a tool to disperse Russian influence in a legal way and to depict Russia as the only alternative.209

Finally, support of political dissidents and funding of their activities, often through surrogates, is a tool for causing tensions within a state. The resulting tensions create political opportunities for Russia to utilize, not necessarily today but maybe tomorrow, when international pressure has become too great for the Russian government to handle.

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In general, Western countries promote democratic society as a role model for other countries to follow. From diplomatic channels to military engagements, Western ambassadors, politicians, and military personnel try to convince their partners that democracy is “the way to go.” The democratic process works as a mechanism for the average citizen to engage in decision making and thereby influence their situation in life, most often by elections or other processes where the will of the people plays a significant role. This makes the decisions made by the democratic instrument difficult to question and even harder to overrule. It is the will of the people in a democratic structure that is promoted as the key ingredient in a functioning, equal, and fair society.

Unfortunately, the democratic process has lately been Western societies’ most vulnerable domain. Its attempted comeback as a superpower has proved to be more difficult than expected for Russia. Strong alliances and other agreements between Russia’s antagonists and Russia’s lack of a modern military compounds this challenge. This has forced Russia to find other ways to compete in the world arena. Its lack of deterrence power forces Russia to leverage some kind of relative power to influence foreign countries and their decision making, most often to prevent countries from strengthening their relationships with Western alliances (NATO) and the United States. A very efficient strategy that has been used recently is subversion, which is defined as “a systematic attempt to overthrow or undermine a government or political system by persons working secretly from within.”\(^{210}\) The military equivalent to this is unconventional warfare, which is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”\(^{211}\) Based on this research project, I conclude that Russia’s strategy exploits democratic rights through democratic institutions by leveraging the will of the people, an

\(^{210}\) *Merriam-Webster*, “subversion.”

approach Russia calls its “compatriot policy.” Working through legal institutions like cultural centers and volunteer organizations, Russia creates a platform for further operations to undermine governments and political systems. From these platforms, Russia builds networks within the society and uses the human domain and the potential of social movements.

Unfortunately, most Western countries are unprepared for this and lack methods and knowledge about how to confront these operations. Understanding and anticipating the changing tactics are crucial to preventing Russia from influencing the democratic process in general and the political decision-making process more specifically.

This thesis research concludes that one can use SMTs to frame areas of interest in societies where subversive actions may take place and to identify indicators of such actions. Patterns and indicators are obvious in both Estonia and Ukraine. One can see Russian engagements especially within organizations on a sub-state actor level. It identifies Russian governmental organizations working through proxy organizations, such as nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, the research emphasizes the importance of cooperation between agencies and NGOs not only to better resist attempts of subversion but also to detect them earlier. The solution seems to be close cooperation between NGOs and their governmental counterparts and strong alliances. It seems to be even more important for small state actors because they lack the deterrence aura that follows a larger country with bigger armed forces.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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