IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY IN THE ENDURANCE OF COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

by

Gumersindo Santiago Rodríguez

March 2018

Thesis Advisor: Christopher Darnton
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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

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NSN 7540–01-280-5500

Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188

Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY IN THE ENDURANCE OF COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(WESTERN HEMISPHERE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2018

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ABSTRACT

What are the implications of ideology in the endurance of competitive authoritarian regimes? This thesis aims to study this connection through a comparison of two recent studies in Latin America, Perú, as governed by Alberto Fujimori, and Venezuela, under the rule of Hugo Chávez. I found that ideology, albeit significant, takes a backseat to economic and security triumphs by the authoritarian. Recently, there has been an increase in strong men rising to power in many countries. If we understand their sources of support, we can better anticipate, prepare, and perhaps even prevent their ascension.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

- **A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION** ........................................................................ 1  
- **B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION** ........................................ 2  
- **C. LITERATURE REVIEW** ................................................................................. 5  
- **D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES** ................................. 12  
- **E. RESEARCH DESIGN** ..................................................................................... 13  
- **F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE** ............................. 14  

## II. VENEZUELA UNDER HUGO CHÁVEZ

- **A. INTRODUCTION** ............................................................................................ 17  
- **B. DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA** ..................................................................... 17  
- **C. WHO WAS HUGO CHÁVEZ?** ........................................................................ 19  
- **D. CHÁVEZ POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS** ......................................................... 19  
- **E. LEFT AS AN IDEOLOGY** ................................................................................ 20  
- **F. THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA** .................................................................... 21  
- **G. THE LEFT IN VENEZUELA** ........................................................................... 23  
- **H. THE RIGHT IN VENEZUELA** ....................................................................... 23  
- **I. ALTERNATIVE STATEMENTS FOR CHÁVEZ’S REGIME ENDURANCE** .... 24  
- **J. THE CASE FOR IDEOLOGY** ........................................................................... 25  
- **K. IDEOLOGY-AUTHORITARIANISM LINK** .................................................... 26  
- **L. HUGO CHÁVEZ THE POPULIST NATIONALIST** ........................................... 27  
  1. Bolivarianismo ..................................................................................................... 28  
  2. Chavismo ............................................................................................................. 29  
- **M. HUGO CHÁVEZ THE EGALITARIAN REFORMIST** ..................................... 30  
- **N. SUPPORT FOR THE LEFT IN VENEZUELA** ............................................. 32  
- **O. SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIANISM IN VENEZUELA** ......................... 34  
- **P. CONCLUSION** ............................................................................................... 35  

## III. PERÚ UNDER FUJIMORI

- **A. INTRODUCTION** ............................................................................................. 37  
- **B. DEMOCRACY IN PERÚ** ................................................................................ 37  
- **C. WHO IS ALBERTO FUJIMORI?** .................................................................... 38  
- **D. FUJIMORI’S POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS** .................................................... 39  
  1. Cambio 90 (Change 90) .................................................................................... 39  
  2. Nueva Mayoría (New Majority) .......................................................................... 40  
  3. Other Parties ....................................................................................................... 40
### LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Acción Democrática (Democratic Action)</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Acción Popular (Popular Action)</td>
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<td>APRA</td>
<td>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance)</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>competitive authoritarianism</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>competitive authoritarian regime</td>
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<td>C-90</td>
<td>Cambio 90 (Change 90)</td>
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<td>COPEI</td>
<td>Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee)</td>
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<td>FALN</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation)</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>LCA</td>
<td>left-wing competitive authoritarian regime</td>
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<td>MBR-200</td>
<td>Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200)</td>
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<td>MIR</td>
<td>Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement)</td>
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<td>MVR</td>
<td>Movimiento Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement)</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Partido Aprista Peruano (Peruvian Aprista Party)</td>
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<td>PCP</td>
<td>Partido Comunista Peruano (Peruvian Communist Party)</td>
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<td>Partido Comunista Peruano-Sendero Luminoso (Peruvian Communist Party-Shining Path)</td>
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<td>PCV</td>
<td>Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Venezuelan Communist Party)</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Peruano (Peruvian Socialist Party)</td>
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<td>PSUV</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela)</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>right-wing competitive authoritarian regime</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To Gloria…
I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Competitive authoritarianism (CA), a form of hybrid regime is a phenomenon that has been taking root in many states since the end of the Cold War. Levitsky and Way define these as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.”

These regimes are considered hybrid because they combine characteristics of both democratic and authoritarian rule. In this case, the democratic portion of the regime maintains the institution of competitive elections while the authoritarian portion of this hybrid regime abuses power to ensure ruler longevity. Hence, elections are competitive but not at all in a level playing field as is the case in the United States. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many formerly Soviet Republics began their transition towards democracy expecting a swift and seamless transition. When their expectations were not met, many of these states kept some elements of democratic rule, such as elections, while at the same time becoming more authoritarian.

Increasingly, this type of regime has been spreading, first in Africa and now in Latin America. This is of great concern for the United States because it could be portrayed and understood by many as a reduction of influence and a weakening of the United States in the global arena. Based on historical examples from the Cold War era, regime type is one of the main influencers on whether the U.S. government cooperates or counters a foreign government. This collaboration focused on opposing leftist insurrections brewing in the region. U.S. involvement in Venezuela during the 1960s resulted in one of the strongest consolidated democracies in Latin America. The president of Venezuela at the time came

1 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.

from the left but implemented centrist policies that appeased the United States. Perú’s experience during the 1990s was not much different. The United States found an ally in Perú as it sought to fight the Shining Path and the spread of communism. Cooperation with Fujimori was seen as a necessary evil in order to establish a liberalized economy, which could be considered a centrist-right policy.

My study assesses the role of ideology as a perpetuator of competitive authoritarian regimes (CAR) in Latin America through a comparative study of Venezuela under the rule of Hugo Chávez and Perú as governed by Alberto Fujimori. Do left-wing competitive authoritarian (LCA) regimes outlast right-wing ones (RCA)? If so, what aspects perpetuate them? Current answers to these questions include previous types of government and how they regress to those after democratization failures. Other possible answers are found in the economic situation of a country and in the type of electoral system. I found that ideology has less of an impact in the sustainment of CARs than economic success or security accomplishments. When authoritarian leaders are able to stabilize a flailing economy, constituents are usually more willing to accept infringements in their liberties. Furthermore, when these authoritarians are fighting an enemy that terrorizes the population at large, he or she is given more freedom to curtail this problem, even if it comes as a tradeoff of individual rights, as was the case in Perú. Lastly, I found that LCAs are more enduring than RCAs as long as the government has a continuing source of revenue that can subsidize social projects. This was the case in Venezuela, as it enjoyed high oil revenues during the first decade of the 21st century.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Authoritarian politics in Latin America date back to colonial times. The entire region has had experiences with authoritarian rulers, and in some countries, these experiences have been as recent as in the late 20th century. Scholars have theorized on the

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origins of these types of regimes for many years. The main debate relevant to my topic is if these types of regimes arise from the extreme right only, or can they also come from the extreme left. Conventional wisdom indicates that authoritarian rulers only come from the extreme right. In the past, left-wing authoritarian regimes were considered a myth, something of fiction. In their article, Van Hiel et al. refer to these types of political tendency as “the Loch Ness Monster of political psychology.” However, they were able to conclude that left-wing authoritarianism does in fact exist, especially in Western Europe. It was not until 2006 that this debate got some clarification.

While most authoritarians arise from the extreme right-wing portion of the political spectrum, there is broad consensus that most populist leaders come from the left or extreme left. The cases of Perú and Venezuela were chosen in part because they challenge conventional wisdom. In Perú, despite not being an ideologue, Fujimori was elected as a populist with vast support from the right. In Venezuela, a leftist executive became increasingly authoritarian.

In the 1990s and 2000s, there was a resurgence of populist leaders in Latin America. This outcome has been attributed to the effect of policies contained in the Washington Consensus and its eventual collapse after the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. As many countries and sectors of a population within those countries became disenchanted with neoliberal economic policies and the effects of globalization, they sought out leaders that promised to enhance their circumstances as well as those of their countries. However, the type of regimes that emerged from this situation in Latin America were initially neither authoritarian nor fully populist. This is where a new term is required.

There has also been ample debate on how to classify regimes, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. CA is a relatively new term coined by Levitsky and Way in 2002 in the Journal of Democracy. They followed up this article with a book published in 2010

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titled *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Prior to Levitsky and Way, other terms were utilized to signify essentially the same thing. These include ‘“semidemocracy,” “virtual democracy,” electoral democracy,’ ‘pseudodemocracy,’ ‘illiberal democracy,’ ‘semi-authoritarianism,’ ‘soft authoritarianism,’ ‘electoral authoritarianism,’ and Freedom House’s ‘Partly Free.’”

All this being said, the issue of CA endurance in Latin America as a function of left- or right-wing ideology has not received much attention. Encarnación talks about the perseverance of democracy in Latin America and how elites in these countries seem resolute in avoiding “the ideological polarization of the past.” Furthermore, he attributes this singularity to a population that remembers how harsh authoritarian rulers were. When making this point he refers to rulers in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, which had some of the most punitive dictatorships in the region. However, prior to Fujimori and Chávez, both Perú and Venezuela were considered fairly strong democracies.

This thesis aims to explain the role of political ideology in the continuance of CARs. Most of the recent debate around this topic focuses on political parties and their structure. Handlin believes that “mass party organization” plays a crucial role in the durability of these regimes. Understanding the broader role of ideology can aid in the foreign policy decision-making process. It can help decide whether intervention is necessary in order to promote democracy or, whether a hands-off approach is more appropriate. In *The Third Wave*, Huntington argues that the process of democratization is usually swayed by foreign governments. Finally, a better understanding into the role of

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ideology could help predict the endurance and perhaps eventual collapse of a CAR, and in doing so, ensure preparedness.

C. **LITERATURE REVIEW**

A review of recent and historical literature on authoritarianism and CA reveals that these types of regimes are on the rise. Latin America is no exception to this hike in authoritarian regimes. This is despite what Huntington terms the “third wave of democracy.” In the *Journal of Democracy*, Huntington identifies and discusses three waves of worldwide democratization, describing them as waves since they ebb and flow. Some countries democratize only to recede back into some other types of regime, namely authoritarian. According to Huntington, the first wave took place from the 1820s until 1926. The second wave was from the end of World War II (WWII) until 1962. The third and most current wave is still ongoing.11 The case studies to be discussed—Perú and Venezuela—are third wave democracies.12

Many authors believe that the type of electoral system is one of the main reasons for how and why CARs hold on to power. Knutsen et al. ask why authoritarian rulers have elections and how elections influence regime endurance. They argue that CARs hold elections in order to consolidate power. In their analysis, they conclude that elections, albeit risky in the short term, can result in an enduring regime in the long run.13 This argument seems to be supported at least in part by Croke et al., who argue that more educated parts of a population are more likely to be disconnected from the political and electoral process in a CAR since they are more likely to engage in critical thinking and would rather not vote at all than vote for what is in essence a rigged system.14 With a less educated part of the

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12 Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” 41–42.


population engaging in the electoral process, it is easier to manipulate elections and ensure regime endurance.

Another question related to the electoral system is why some authoritarian regimes that hold elections democratize while others do not.\textsuperscript{15} This question is also related to the argument made by Knutsen et al. As previously explained, the CA incumbent runs the risk of losing when holding elections. In her article, Donno argues that despite popular believe, CARs are typically stable. Instability and the push for democratization come from domestic and international pressures. Without these pressures, CARs will likely endure in relative stability. However, as is the case in Venezuela, external pressures resulted in the doubling down of authoritarian policies by the regime, and in a propaganda tool for the government.

Magaloni, for her part, combines the questions previously discussed in her study of how autocracies maintain their grip on power and what is the process to democratization. Magaloni also proves parts of Levitsky and Way’s conclusions while not agreeing with others. The author does not write in an attempt to validate or discredit Levitsky and Way’s conclusions but her thesis indirectly does so. She believes that these CARs have been around for decades, and that they just hid behind a façade of democracy since elections were being held as is the case in Mexico under the \textit{Partido Revolucionario Institucional} (PRI).\textsuperscript{16} Even though this is a case study of a form government in a third country not related to the two case studies selected, it is useful in two ways. First, it brings CA to the Latin American region, which is more relatable to Perú and Venezuela as opposed to former Soviet republics. Second, it provides a historical background since the PRI ruled politics in Mexico for 71 years. All these questions posited in recent literature on CARs showcase a focus in the political and electoral systems of these regimes but fail to recognize the role of ideology in preserving authoritarian regimes.

A different school of thought cites economic factors, economic inequality to be more precise, for the endurance of CARs. Solt believes “that economic inequality within


countries shapes individuals’ feelings toward authority.”

Solt relies on the “relative power theory” to prove his point. This theory holds that the unequal distribution of resources results in the unequal distribution of power and this in turn provides support and respect for authority. This authority often comes in the form of an authoritarian leader. However, if that were the case, would not there be more authoritarian regimes worldwide? Out of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the United States continuously ranks among the highest in inequality. At times, it was only a few percentage points below Perú and Venezuela. However, the U.S. has not yet slipped into authoritarianism although it is beginning to show some signs of it. Therefore, economic inequality alone does not explain the endurance of authoritarian regimes.

Another arm of the economic thought believes that income growth perpetuates the reign of an autocratic leader, especially when this growth comes at an accelerated pace. Treisman uses the example of Spain under Franco to portray this phenomenon. He argues that while economic growth under an autocratic leader may help prolong the leader’s regime, it inevitably lays down the foundation for democratization. Treisman assertion fails to explain how Venezuela’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew exponentially during Chávez’s regime while at the same time becoming increasingly authoritarian. When Chávez took office, Venezuela had a GDP of $98 billion. By the time of his death in 2013, Venezuela enjoyed a GDP of $371 billion. This amounts to a 279% increase in GDP in a 14-year span and Venezuela was less democratic at the time of Chávez’s death, and even less so today. Furthermore, Fails and DuBuis believe that Treisman’s logic is incomplete.


They argue that economic growth can lead to the collapse of an autocratic regime when the source of growth is undiversified rents.  

Lastly, there are those that believe that democratic transition is inevitable. Scholars like Francis Fukuyama believed that once countries began to democratize there would be no turning back. Fukuyama was confident that Western liberalism had triumphed over socialism and other types of ideologies. In this situation, context matters. He wrote this in a time of political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union that might have created biases in his assertions. He has been criticized in part by his shortsightedness, and in part for being too idealistic in believing that Western ideals would be accepted and implemented by the entire international community. He did, however, leave a small window open to two possible challenges to his thesis—religion and nationalism. Both of these have proven true in recent years. The role of religion as a challenge to democratization is evident in the Middle East. For its part, nationalism has been on the rise worldwide, including in the U.S.

Levitsky and Way upstage Fukuyama’s thesis in *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. The authors attribute this upsurge in competitive authoritarian regimes to the end of the Cold War. They claim that after the fall of the Soviet Union, former Soviet republics and many military dictatorships throughout the world disintegrated and began a transition toward democracy. However, many of these newly formed or transitioning democracies either reverted to previous forms of government or simply became hybrid regimes. That is, they would hold elections but in no way were these elections free and fair. They look at 35 countries including Perú, in five parts of the world. The authors conclude that there are three factors that contribute to the successful democratization of these regimes: linkage to the West, the authoritarian’s “organizational power,” and leverage by the West. Where linkage to the West is high, it becomes harder for an authoritarian to establish and hold on to power. Furthermore, competitive

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24 Fukuyama, “The End of History?”


authoritarian regimes thrived in countries where the ruler’s government and party were well organized which enabled him/her to quash the opposition. In this sense, leverage by the West could be decisive whether a regime democratizes or not. If the ruler’s government is poorly organized, Western leverage proves advantageous in the process. This line of thinking could help explain why Venezuela became increasingly authoritarian. On the other hand, it ignores Fujimori’s linkage to the U.S. in the fight against the Shining Path.

Linz and Stepan believe that prior types of regime influence the transition to democracy or reversion to old types of governance. They argue that organizational power is highly influential in authoritarian politics. However, and as opposed to Levitsky and Way, they believe well established and highly organized authoritarian regimes are more likely to endure the transition to democracy since most of the necessary institutions are already in place. They explain that it is much harder for totalitarian regimes such as communist ones to transition to democracy because they have to build an entirely new political, economic, and societal system. It is because of this reason that many former communist countries revert to some sort of authoritarian or hybrid regime after a short stint with democracy.27 That being said, neither Perú nor Venezuela were communist countries prior to Fujimori and Chávez’s assumption of power. Furthermore, Venezuela was considered a beacon of democracy prior to the government of Hugo Chávez. This theory fails to explain the case of CA in these two countries.

Finally, Knudsen and Nygård ask why semi-democratic regimes are less enduring than autocracies and democracies, and they provide three alternative answers. First, they believe that semi-democratic regimes are born from social and/or political turmoil. Thus, no matter what, these regimes are bound to face stiff opposition threatening its stability. Second, other administration peculiarities like military support have a lot to do with the durability of semi-democratic regimes. Administrations that enjoy support from the military, as is the case in both Perú and Venezuela, are more enduring than those that do not. Third and last, they explain that biases in current indices of democracy might skewed

the durability of these regimes. Since they do not measure further liberalization in the case of democracy and further deliberalization in the case of autocracies during regime transition. However, the authors conclude that regardless of their possible explanations, semi-democratic regimes do not outlast democracies or autocracies. Furthermore, they mention that regardless of the type of non-democratic regime, they will eventually liberalize.²⁸ Again, neither Perú nor Venezuela was in turmoil when the leaders discussed were elected.

These explanations—political parties and elections, income inequality and growth, and former types of government—help us understand why CA endures in Latin America, but they fail to take into account the role of ideology in the continuation of CARs. Ideology plays a crucial part in Latin American politics albeit more so in some countries than others. Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister argue that in countries like Brazil and Ecuador, left-right voter identification has little to no significance in the vote. However, they do find a strong relation between left-right identification and the vote in both Perú and Venezuela.²⁹ This is of significance since ideology identification can help in election predictions and policy decisions.

The recent turns towards the left in Latin America are often referred to as the “pink tide,” a term attributed to New York Times reporter Rohter, who wrote an article on Uruguay’s 2005 presidential elections. In this piece, he describes how three-quarters of South American countries have elected and are being governed by left leaning leaders. Rohter believes that this tide has emerged in response to failed neoliberal reforms that took place in most of these countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s and, as a way to counter U.S. hegemonic power in the region. He writes that “as a result, in one country after another, the candidates who have been most successful in appealing to voters are those who, like Dr. Vázquez here, promise that the state will play a greater role and not leave the


market to its own devices.” These governments, however, are not moving to the extreme left side of the political spectrum, hence the expression “pink.” During the Cold War, many of these same Latin American countries experienced Marxist insurgencies, which were unsuccessful in seizing power. Having experienced both, the possibility of extreme left governments and neoliberal reforms under the Washington Consensus, many of these countries are opting for centrist-left types of administrations.

As far as the right is concerned, Barry Cannon mentions that the right has not received as much attention in current literature as it deserves. This is due mainly to the focus on the “pink tide.” Furthermore, Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser argue that this is because of the apparent downfall of the right in Latin America. They argue however, that the right is very much alive and affecting change through three mediums: (1) “the non-electoral right,” (2) “the non-partisan electoral right,” and (3) “the partisan right.” Back in 2014 they suggested “that a rightist electoral comeback” was not feasible. Fast-forward to mid-2016, and there are newspaper articles suggesting the contrary. Right-leaning countries, although not the majority in the region, seem to be making a comeback in what Chris Kraul of the Los Angeles Times describes as a “pendulum swing.” This swing is characterized by the pendulum moving from the previously discussed “pink tide,” to countries electing right leaning leaders. He talks about how many countries, seemingly in response to social and economic crisis, are beginning to take a turn towards the right. In this article, he utilizes the example of Perú’s new president who is, of all things an investment banker. Other countries that have been making this turn include Argentina, Guatemala, and Honduras. Taking a high-level view, the main cause for this turn seems

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to be strictly economic. However, I believe that as events in the region have unfolded in the past 10 to 20 years, politicians and populations alike have been able to experience what extreme left-wing policies can do to their countries. In response to these observations, right-wing politicians have been provided with ammunition to counter the narrative from the left and get a grip on power.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

There are many possible explanations for the endurance of competitive authoritarian regimes. One possible explanation is illustrated by Magaloni. She argues that these types of regimes can ensure their endurance through “massive electoral support.”\textsuperscript{34} Even in these types of regimes, the ruler mobilizes the population to vote in considerable numbers resulting in huge victories. This in turn would deter any popular challenger from running thus extending the reign of the authoritarian. This was the case in Mexico under the PRI, whose rule in Mexico lasted 72 uninterrupted years. Thus, one possible explanation lies in the type of electoral system.

Another possible justification for the rise of these types of regimes lies in the rise of income inequality and wage growth. Some like Solt believe that economic inequality leads to the rise of authoritarian leaders. When countries are going through tough economical situations, they are more likely to vote for a charismatic leader that may promise economic prosperity. Once elected and while enjoying great popularity, these leaders tend to move to consolidate and retain power by all means possible often resulting in a hybrid regime. This is usually made possible by a population that enjoys higher wages and the belief that the inequality gap has been diminished through policies.

The last explanation lies in the influence of previous forms of government on new regimes. The main argument posits that countries that were previously authoritarian are more likely to slip back into it after democratizing. The standing believe is that when a governing leader is threatened by endogenous actors, he/she utilizes this as an excuse to crack down on the opposition by curtailing liberties. Usually this results in temporary

\textsuperscript{34} Magaloni, \textit{Voting for Autocracy}, 257–259.
stabilization of the regime. Seeing the initial successes of deliberalization, leaders are often emboldened and move to further their concentration of power.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

I will explain why and how LCAs are more enduring than RCAs despite ideology taking a secondary role to economic and security factors in perpetuating CARs. In order to accomplish this, I compare two case studies: Perú under Alberto Fujimori and Venezuela as ruled by Hugo Chávez. These two case studies were selected from seven recent cases of CA in Latin America. The other five cases include Ortega’s regime in Nicaragua, Bolivia during Morales’ presidency, Honduras with Zelaya at the helm, Ecuador under Correa, and Argentina led by Fernández de Kirchner. All five of these cases could be considered left wing. However, these were not selected for various reasons. First, Presidents Daniel Ortega and Evo Morales are currently serving. The other three cases were ignored because despite the efforts of the leaders in Honduras, Ecuador, and Argentina to hold on to power, they were unsuccessful and were eventually voted out of office.

Perú and Venezuela were selected since both of these countries morphed into CA within a few years of each other and are fairly recent cases with enough documentation to draw from. Furthermore, one of the countries has already risen from an authoritarian regime, as is the case with Perú. The other one, Venezuela, is still struggling, and there are new developments coming to light every day. Also, both of these countries rode the “third wave” of democracy. Lastly, although both of these countries are quite different culturally, they are both in Latin America and both are contained in the South American continent.

Lastly, these cases were selected because based on Martin’s definition of ideology, both Chávez and Fujimori could be considered ideologues, albeit one more than the other. Ideology is defined by many scholars in many ways. Thus, who is considered an ideologue depends on the lens utilized for the analysis. Martin argues that many theorists define this
term too broadly. He concludes that “ideology is the most reasonable explanation for the resources that actors have to guide their political action.”

In order to test my hypotheses, I look at the levels of respect for human rights, free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and the rule of law in these countries. Then, I compare these indexes against policies enacted by the regimes of Fujimori and Chávez in order to analyze outcomes in terms of endurance and the eventual collapse of these two CARs. Finally, in order to measure the durability of these regimes I look at the number of electoral victories, length of terms, referendums won, and the total amount of years in power. All these are considered while looking at them through a lens of the policies being put forth in each election. I believe this is the best way to conduct my research on the endurance of CARs since these two countries cover both ends of the political spectrum, left and right. I draw from academic sources on ideology, populism, democratic consolidation, dictatorship, causes of regime change, while complementing these sources with reports from non-governmental organizations such as Latinobarómetro, Freedom House, The World Bank, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, and World Economic Forum to name a few.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis seeks to study the link between ideology and the endurance of CARs. I organize my thesis into four chapters. The first chapter explains CARs as well as provides a brief background into these types of regimes in Perú and Venezuela. Chapters II and III expands on these two CARs through the case studies of Venezuela with Hugo Chávez at the helm and Perú under the rule of Alberto Fujimori. These two chapters will briefly discuss the rise to power of these two rulers and their transition to CA, analyzing the policies adopted by these two leaders in order to test my hypotheses. This thesis concludes with Chapter IV and a comparison of the regimes of Chávez and Fujimori, followed by the implications of the study and some recommendations. The chapter closes with a summary

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of my findings; LCAs are more enduring than RCAs despite ideology not being as
important in the continuation of a regime as economic and security considerations.
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II. VENEZUELA UNDER HUGO CHÁVEZ

A. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez, democracy in Venezuela has been on a downward spiral. During his tenure as president, he was able to chip away at democratic institutions, effectively turning Venezuela into a competitive authoritarian state. However, this is not something that happens out of the blue or is done by an individual. Several explanations attempt to illustrate this phenomenon. I believe that political ideology—as reflected in the policies proposed and adopted by Chávez—and record oil rents helped him rise and hold on to power. Furthermore, even if ideology cannot be directly attributed with Chávez’s success, it was certainly a motivating factor throughout his entire presidency. Even though his regime ended after his death in 2013, it can be said that his tenure continues through his successor, Nicolás Maduro. This chapter will look at the role of ideology in perpetuating Chávez’s regime, even as he became increasingly authoritarian. In order to do so, I will begin with a brief history of democracy in Venezuela. I will then look at Chávez’s rise to the presidency. From there, I will talk about Chávez’s ideology and how he employed certain policies in order to gain popular support for his regime. Finally, I will conclude with a brief analysis on whether ideology aided or damaged his regime.

B. DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA

Prior to the election of Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan democracy was “near perfect.” 37 This near perfection Ellner alludes to took many years to grow and develop. It can be said that Venezuelan democracy began to take shape in the 1940s, ironically, after a coup d’état in 1945. 38 Following this coup, Venezuela held its first democratic elections and the elected government was in power during the time that came to be known as the trienio. This period,


as the name implies, lasted only three years but it could be said that the seeds of democracy had been planted. The trienio came to an end when military leaders associated with the governing Acción Democrática (AD) party became suspicious of AD’s growing power. Another coup followed which resulted in a 10-year dictatorship. This dictatorship ended early in 1958 following yet another coup supported by all facets of Venezuelan society. Late in 1958, once again Venezuela held democratic elections, which, to many, seemed like a continuation of the trienio and the actual beginning of Venezuelan democracy.39

From 1958 on, Venezuela enjoyed what Ellner refers to as a “model” democracy. Venezuelan politicians, their administrations as well as the political parties were praised by several U.S. administrations as well as political analysts for the policies being implemented.40 Political parties shared power and oil rents in what was known as the “Pact of Punto Fijo” of 1958.41 Furthermore, Coppedge mentions that Venezuelan democracy “survived the guerrilla insurgency of the sixties, the wave of authoritarian rule that swept the continent in the sixties and seventies [...] and the debt crisis of the eighties.”42 This all began to change in 1989 when there was a popular uprising known as the caracazo in response to the neoliberal policies implemented by the newly elected president. His response was swift, employing the military to quell dissent that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Venezuelans.43 Many believe this event gave rise to Hugo Chávez, the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200), and Chavismo. But who was Hugo Chávez, what was the Bolivarian Revolution, and what was Chavismo?

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C.  WHO WAS HUGO CHÁVEZ

Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, born to a working-class family, was a career military officer in the Venezuelan army. Cannon mentions that he came from a “revolutionary leftist tradition,” and in the early 1970s, he attended a civilian institution while pursuing a master’s degree in political science. It is here where his nationalistic ideals furthered developed. He founded the MBR-200 in the early 1980s, and in 1992, he led a failed coup attempt, which landed him in jail until 1994. He was pardoned by President Rafael Caldera in return for his military retirement as a condition. Following his release from prison, he founded the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and in 1998, he ran and won the presidential election. Throughout his presidency, he became increasingly authoritarian and was able to hold onto power until his death in 2013.

D.  CHÁVEZ POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

MBR-200 was a “secret lodge” founded in 1982 by Hugo Chávez and other military officers. Understanding this movement is important because it provides the basis for our discussion, Chávez’s political ideology. For starters, most of its members came from humble beginnings, had nationalist tendencies, and were “educated to revere Simón Bolívar and consider themselves heirs to the Liberator’s army.” Some of MBR-200’s goals included strengthening the armed forces, placing these forces in Venezuela’s center stage, and developing Venezuela into hegemonic power in the region. Its members were shaped through contact with left-wing political factions and their leaders, which led an armed resistance in the 1960s. On February 4, 1992 and led by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, MBR-200 attempted to remove President Carlos Andrés Pérez from power but failed when

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47 Sonntag, “Crisis and Regression,” 149–150.
they were not able to take him prisoner. Chávez took full responsibility for the attempt on national television and went to prison for two years. After Chávez’s release, MBR-200 morphed into the MVR and was his political party until 2007.\textsuperscript{48} Following the dissolution of the MVR, Chávez built a coalition of socialist parties supportive of the Bolivarian Revolution, which went by the name of the\textit{ Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela} (PSUV).\textsuperscript{49}

All these changes adopted by Chávez may suggest a thinness in his ideology. However, Burgess and Levitsky argue that in order for a populist party to survive in Latin America, it must adapt to the current circumstances in their countries. They also argue that AD, one of the parties previously mentioned, was slow to morph in Venezuela. According to them, AD had no incentive or the capacity to adapt since they were assured a seat at the table.\textsuperscript{50} This might help explain why Chávez’s alliances and political affiliations continued to change throughout his time in power. Perhaps he was responding to the Venezuelan political reality rather than a malleable ideology.

E. \hspace{1cm} LEFT AS AN IDEOLOGY

In his book, Castañeda divides the ideological left into four categories: “traditional Communist parties, the nationalist or populist left, the political-military organizations, and the Region’s reformists.”\textsuperscript{51} Typical communist organizations are those that sprang following the Russian Revolution and the birth of the Soviet Union. These parties adhere to Marxist social and economic concepts. Left-wing nationalism or populism advocates for social equality and a strong anti-imperialist ideal. As far as political-military organizations are concerned, they are exemplified by the guerrilla movements that adhere to violence in order to achieve their leftist goals. Finally, the reformists believe in the democratic rule of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} López Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Populist Left,” 214–216.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ellner, \textit{Rethinking Venezuelan Politics}, 127.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Katrina Burgess and Steven Levitsky, “Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in Latin America: Environmental and Organizational Determinants of Party Change in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela,” \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 36, no. 8 (October 2003): 881–883, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003256112.
\end{itemize}
law, separating themselves from the Soviet Union, affirming instead social reform through balloting.

F. THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA

Having looked at Chávez’s political alliances and the left as an ideology, let us now look at what is meant by the left in the Latin American context and the role it has played in Venezuelan politics. Ever since the independence movement of the 19th century and up to the 20th century, most if not all Latin American countries were ruled by caudillos. The left in Latin America began its slow rise in the 1920s and it is epitomized by the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA). APRA was founded in 1924 by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre while exiled in Mexico City. It was established as a Peruvian socio-political movement, which espoused Pan-Latin Americanism and worldwide support for all the people and helpless classes. Chang-Rodríguez mentions that *Aprismo* is an ideology rather than just a political movement with “philosophical, political, economic, and manifestations.” Central to this ideology is the belief that Latin America must come up with its economic and government systems. Other early ideas included anti-imperialism, especially at its beginnings at a time when the United States was meddling in places like Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico. APRA and its ideals spread to other countries in the region, namely Cuba, Argentina, México, and Costa Rica.

The *Partido Aprista Peruano* (PAP) was the main political vehicle for the APRA. However, no sooner than the PAP was founded, it was banned from electoral participation. Apristas were persecuted for over 20 years. It was not until 1962 that Apristas were allowed to run in the elections and their founder and presidential candidate fell victim to a fraudulent vote count. In order to gain access, the PAP leadership struck a deal with their previous foe, the National Odriísta Movement, and together they controlled both chambers of congress. This move infuriated the ideological wing of the PAP and most of them broke

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53 Earle K. James, “APRA’s Appeal to Latin America,” *Current History* 41, no. 1 (October 1934): 42.
off and formed more radical offshoots. This is an important development with significant implications for Perú and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Furthermore, it could be said that the left in Latin America peaked in 1959 after the Cuban Revolution. Ever since this event and with a few exceptions, the left has often been closely associated with armed revolution. One such exception is the APRA in Perú. At the beginning, the APRA attempted to gain prominence and power through both political activism and violence, especially during its first two decades of existence. Their last attempt at insurrection was in 1956. After failure, APRA leaders realized that insurgency was ineffective in achieving its goals and they abandoned it. Other exceptions include the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico which despite its autocratic rule, was able to remain in power for 71 years without having to resort to violence and to a lesser extent Salvador Allende in Chile and Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala.

From the Shining Path in Perú to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the left in Latin America often espouses a Marxist ideology. However, Castañeda argues that even though the left is often linked to Marxism, communism, and even the former Soviet Union, the left has existed way before these doctrines and could trace its origins back to the French Revolution. These days, Latin America has experienced a turn to the left in what many refer to as a “pink tide” without firing a single shot in many cases. This has resulted in the legitimization of the left while renouncing violence and armed struggle. Furthermore, the left in 21st century Latin America is markedly different from that of the past. For starters, “it lacks the ideological common

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57 Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed, 18.
denominators that characterized the Marxism underpinning twentieth-century Communist rule.” So, what is the left in Venezuela and how did it take hold?

G. THE LEFT IN VENEZUELA

It could be said that the left in Venezuela began to take hold after the revolution of 1958 and puntofijismo. Of the three parties included in this pact, two were from the center left and one was center right. The only party that was excluded was the far left Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV). In response to this exclusion, another political party was born, the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). As these leftist parties were increasingly excluded from Venezuelan political life, frustration grew. In addition, in 1962, following the example of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) were formed in Venezuela. However, by taking up arms and attempting to implement their will through violence, the PCV and MIR were further alienated from politics in Venezuela. From the 1960s and up until Chávez’s election in 1998, it could be said that the left in Venezuela was fairly immaterial. Sure, there were center left as well as center right parties that shared power, but the extreme left grew from a sense of frustration in the country with puntofijismo. Having looked at a background of Venezuelan politics, let us now examine its sources of LCA endurance.

H. THE RIGHT IN VENEZUELA

From independence and up to Chávez’s election, Venezuela’s political ideology has seen several waves. From right-wing to left and center-left politicians, and from military rulers to more centrist governments. Following independence, Venezuela was no stranger to the struggles dominating the entire continent between liberal and conservatives. The right ruled mostly from independence until mid-19th century and then again at the beginning of the 20th century, mostly in the form of military rule. These governments


59 Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 125–133.
sought to expand the armed forces and were able to maintain a solid grip on power through repression, which often resulted in death for those who opposed them.60

After the Punto Fijo Pact, the right in Venezuela became more centrist in nature and is exemplified by the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI) also known as the Social Christian Party. However, by the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez, COPEI and the right in general had become all but inconsequential. This is one of the reasons given for Chávez’s ascension. The right did have some near successes, namely the 2002 coup that almost toppled Chávez. Furthermore, Domínguez argues that the main goal of right in Venezuela during Chávez’s regime was to “destroy the Bolivarian Revolution” by any means possible.61 So far, the right in Venezuela has proven unsuccessful in taking back power amid an increasingly unbalanced playing field.

I. ALTERNATIVE STATEMENTS FOR CHÁVEZ’S REGIME ENDURANCE

Some arguments explaining Chávez’s endurance revolve around the economy. Murillo et al. concluded that presidential ideology in Latin America as a whole is directly related to each country’s account balance. The more debt the more likely a president will tend to govern on the right. Conversely, the higher the surplus and even the higher the debt servicing, the more likely the executive will govern on the left. They also found that the less dependent a country is on IMF financing the higher the likelihood of leftist presidents.62 These conclusions are partially supported by the case in Venezuela under Chávez as evidenced in the next section. However, this fails to explain Chávez’s doubling

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60 Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change, 30–108.
down on his leftist agenda during the 2009 financial crisis when the price of crude and his main source of income took a significant hit.63

J. THE CASE FOR IDEOLOGY

As previously mentioned, ideology was not at the core of Chávez’s political movement when he was first elected. This is not to say that Venezuelans did not believe in his ideas, but that they mainly elected him as an alternative. McCoy argues that “this was not a vote for a leftist ideology, but a vote of frustration and anger.” Anselmi seems to agree when he posited that at the macro level ideology has all but disappeared. However, at the local level new ideologies emerged, as is the case in Venezuela and Chavismo.65 Hersh mentions that as early as his first inauguration as president, Chávez “vowed to realize the dreams of Simón Bolívar through his ideology,” and as Chávez’s government began to take shape, his ideology began to play a more central role. He went from a man that idolized Simón Bolívar to one that revered Fidel Castro of Cuba. This shift could be said that began to take place after a 2000 visit by Castro to Venezuela. While in country, he asked to be taken to the house where Chávez was born. There, he stated that “we’ll make this house a shrine of the revolution.” This marked a shift, one of many to come, in influence from Chávez’s mentor, Luis Miquilena to Castro and his socialist agenda.


K. IDEOLOGY-AUTHORITARIANISM LINK

Nisnevich and Ryabov talk about how despite “the decline of political ideologies on a global scale, authoritarian and neo-authoritarian regimes...need political ideologies to legitimize their power.”68 They describe neo-authoritarian regimes as presidential republics that ascend to power through free and fair elections. Once at the helm of their countries, elections are carried out on an uneven plane. Moreover, these regimes are sustained by “dominant ruling parties with left-oriented ideologies” and excessively elevated levels of corruption.69 Based on this description, it could be said that Venezuela is a neo-authoritarian regime.

But what aspects of Chávez’s ideology allow him to undermine democratic institutions? The answer to this question is a simple one. As Nisnevich and Ryabov explain, “the system of views and ideas justifying it [corruption] has become the personal ideology of the reigning social groups and their leaders.”70 In other words, the only thing maintaining neo-authoritarian regimes in power is political corruption. The first example of this is the rewriting of the constitution in 1999 and the continued efforts to amend it in 2007 and 2009. The 1999 rewrite of the constitution was to be expected as this was one of his campaign promises.71 However, the other two were an attempt at a power grab. The more extreme one in 2007 was unsuccessful but the one in 2009 abolished presidential term limits, clearing the way for him to continue running while essentially controlling the whole of government.


L. HUGO CHÁVEZ THE POPULIST NATIONALIST

Some argue for populism as an ideology. Others, like Aslanidis argue that populism is merely a discourse. The same can be said about nationalism. There are those that believe it is an ideology, and others like Freeden contend that “nationalisms may appear as distinct thin-centered ideologies, but are more readily understood as embellishments of, and sustainers of, the features of their host ideologies.” Whether populism or nationalism are considered an ideology, is debate for a different study. In this case, both of them are employed to frame the Hugo Chávez case and to better understand decisions and policies.

When Chávez was elected in 1998, the Venezuelan economy was suffering from almost 20 years of stagnation. Almost 50% of the population lived in poverty and wages had not kept up with inflation. This is quite ironic given the vast amounts of oil reserves contained within Venezuelan borders. Karl argues that Venezuela fell victim to an addiction to petrodollars in order to pay for a ballooning budget during two oil boom cycles between 1973 and 1981. Even during times of plenty, Venezuela’s public spending was way more than its oil rents. This trend continued even when the price for a barrel of oil had dropped to half of what they were during the 1970s booms. In order to make up for this spending-revenue gap, Venezuela issued massive amounts of debt in order to finance its government instead of diversifying during times of plenty. This practice was not sustainable and in 1989, Venezuela was forced to adopt International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures in order to be able to continue borrowing money. These measures resulted in less spending on social programs and as a result, an increase in poverty rates.

By the time Chávez was elected, Venezuelans were fed up with the status quo. The Pact of Punto Fijo, which could be regarded as the bedrock of Venezuelan democracy, had

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morphed into a power-sharing scheme. Politicians from the two governing parties did not feel the need to put any effort into governing as their time in power was assured. Chávez took advantage of what Roberts calls the “repoliticization of social inequality in Venezuela,” and was able to rally popular support by challenging the status quo, and by assuming an anti-neoliberal and anti-U.S. platform. He promised a participatory democracy as well as investment in the poor and rooting out corruption. In mid-19th century, Ezequiel Zamora—a military leader during the Federal War—coined the term “Horror a la [sic] oligarquía” (horror to the oligarchy) as a rallying cry. In order to gain popular support, “Chávez resurrected the slogan to appeal to the poorest Venezuelans.”

1. **Bolivarianismo**

The roots of Venezuelan nationalism could be traced back to Simón Bolívar and his struggle for independence. Venezuelan nationalism under Hugo Chávez is said to be adherent to Bolívar’s thinking. Chávez as did Bolívar, believed in strong handedness in governing. Furthermore, it should come as no surprise that Chávez relied heavily on the military in order to carry out his agenda. Bolivarianismo was the main tool used by Chávez in his rise to power. From his days as an officer in training, through MBR-200 and MVR, and throughout his presidency, Chávez’s ideology was based on Bolívar’s. Some of these ideals included political inclusion, the rooting out of corruption in Venezuelan politics, “territorial and economic sovereignty,” and the idea of el pueblo to name a few. The latter concept was crucial in Chavez’s rise to power, and in his longevity.

By identifying himself as from el pueblo and a rule by el pueblo, Chávez was able to position himself as the leader of the people. In this new position he focused on social

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matters above all else, including the economy. He proposed leftist policies that were popular with the people and was able to mobilize the masses under this new ideological banner of Bolivarianismo. Bolivarianismo evolved into Chavismo and it is under Chavismo that ideology began to take root as a perpetuator of Chávez’s regime.

2. **Chavismo**

Chavismo evolved from Bolivarianismo centered on a charismatic leader, Hugo Chávez. It is an amalgamate of ideologies and economic principles that often contradict each other. For example, it mixes socialist ideologies with “Catholic social teaching.” Also, it preaches liberal democracy while eroding human rights and freedoms. Chavismo is the ideology of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) founded by Chávez in 2007. Other socialist factions in Venezuela adhere to this ideology but the PSUV is the chief proponent of Chavismo. But how did Chavismo emerged as an ideology in Venezuela?

Ellner and Robinson argue that in Venezuela as in other Latin American countries like Bolivia and Ecuador, there was an amalgamate of circumstances that gave rise to what they call the “twenty-first century radical left.” In Venezuela, Chávez was able to rise and remain in power for an uncharacteristically long period, especially for a leftist executive, due to various reasons. They speak of the weakness of the right and their failure to propose and implement suitable alternatives to neoliberal reforms that seemed to favor a small minority. Also, they do give credit to the left’s anti-U.S. policies and their dedication to social programs. However, as Chavismo continued to morph, so did support for it.

Ellner posits that Chavismo and its evolution can be divided into five phases each with its own characteristics: 1999–2000, the moderate phase; 2001–2004, the anti-neoliberalism phase; 2005–2006, the socialist phase; 2007–2008, the nationalization phase;

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and 2009–2013, the expropriation phase. The first phase is characterized by what brought Chávez to power, anti-establishmentism, popular with the middle class. The initial phase is followed by economic legislation largely unpopular with the middle class and provoked the failed coup. The third phase is the beginning of true ideological radicalization, favored by the poor and working class. The final two phases, characterized by the seizure of private enterprises, were popular with the working class as they demanded better benefits. Ellner further mentions that “if government decisions were made on the basis of ideological considerations, taking into account only the correlation of forces among political currents within Chavismo and those for and against socialism in general, the challenges facing the Chavistas would be relatively simple.”

This brief breakdown of Chavismo illustrates two important and telling attributes of this ideology: its malleability and its incremental radical nature. Chavismo’s pliability in particular caused some of Chávez’s closest allies and supporters to become disillusioned with the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution and Chavismo. Retired Venezuelan General, ambassador to Chile, and vice-president of the PSUV, Alberto Müller Rojas retired from politics citing the “dreadful state” of the “Venezuelan ‘revolutionary process.’” He went a step further saying that “we should be talking about Socialism, not about names or brands.” It is worth mentioning that Müller Rojas was one of the principal ideologists of Chávez Bolivarian revolution.

M. HUGO CHÁVEZ THE EGALITARIAN REFORMIST

According to Cannon, the military in Venezuela is traditionally more egalitarian than other militaries in the region. This is the military in which Hugo Chávez the military officer was developed. Furthermore, while attending the Simón Bolívar University in

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Caracas, he gained a better understanding of the social ailments of his fellow military personnel as well as the population at large. This furthered shaped his belief for social justice and emboldened his resolve to attain it by any means possible, including an attempted coup.\textsuperscript{86}

Once in power, he began a series of reforms to implement his agenda. Starting with elections for a Constituent Assembly in order to draft a new Constitution which promoted equality, but it was mainly seen as a concentration of power in the president’s hands. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, he is quoted as saying that “we must confront the privileged elite who have destroyed a large part of the world.”\textsuperscript{87} At the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Chávez stated “that it is necessary to transcend capitalism [...] through socialism [...] with equality and justice.”\textsuperscript{88} With greater power and treasure, he was able to fund many social programs prioritizing “the human needs of the marginalized before the wants of the privileged.” Some of his anti-poverty reforms included “income transfers for seniors, women and disabled people,” investments in education, food security, and public health. In doing this, he was able to garner great support from the masses.\textsuperscript{89} Moreover, through his often-changing ideology he was able to polarize the Venezuelan population, with elites on one end and the proletariat on the other,\textsuperscript{90} of which the latter as it is to be expected, comprised the vast majority.

Finally, through the increasingly radicalization of “21st century socialism” ideology and \textit{Chavismo}, he was able to nationalize some of the most prosperous industries in Venezuela of which oil was the most profitable. However, these expropriations of medium-to-large size businesses did not follow and ideological scheme according to

\textsuperscript{86} Cannon, \textit{Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution}, 55–56.


\textsuperscript{90} Hersh, “Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Message,” 40.
Ellner. He claims that they came about as a mere answer to “the political and economic challenges posed by the private sector, which was closely tied to the Venezuelan opposition.”

N. SUPPORT FOR THE LEFT IN VENEZUELA

According to data gathered by the World Values Survey (WVS) from 1994–1998, the right enjoyed broad support in Venezuela. Respondents were asked to self-identify in a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is left and 10 is right, and 5 and 6 could be considered center-left and center-right respectively. Out of the 1,200 individuals surveyed, 278 or 23.2% ranked themselves as a 10. The only answer that ranked higher than 10 was “do not know,” which garnered 312, or 26%. Respondents that answered 1 totaled 87, or 7.2%. Center-left came in at 11% and center-right at 9%. Fast-forward to the 1999–2004-time period and the left remained virtually unchanged. However, the right and “do not know” lost their advantage to the center-left and -right. Center-left was tied to ‘do not know’ for most responses at 18%, and the center-right and right were tied for second place at 17% of the responses. Based on this one survey alone, support for the left seems to gain momentum as Hugo Chávez comes to power and begins to enact his socialist agenda. In order to get a better picture, it is necessary to look at other sources.

Data from the 2008 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) shows the same trend. In gathering its data, LAPOP employed the same 1 through 10 scale as WVS. LAPOP reported that approximately one third (31.8%) of all respondents identified themselves as a 5, or center-left. Furthermore, those that believed they were a 6, or center-right came in second place with 10.6%, and those that chose 1 or left came in third place at 10.4%. Furthermore, in 2008, 53.5% of Venezuelans approved of the political system.

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in Venezuela, which could be said was quite leftist at the time. That percentage has been in steady decline except a bump to 57.2% in 2012. By 2014, a year after Chávez’s death, it was down to 43.5%.94

Finally, Latinobarómetro utilized a similar scale as WVS and LAPOP with one exception. They identified the left as 00 instead of 1 as the other two. In this case, 5 would be in the center as opposed to center left as is the case with the previous two analysis. Latinobarómetro reported that the left in Venezuela went from having no support in 1998 to a high of 15% of respondents, which identified themselves with the left or 00 in 2013, the year of Chávez’s death. Respondents that self-identified as right or 10 saw an almost inverse relationship to those in the left for the same period. In 1998, they stood at 15%, and by 2013, support for the right had decreased by 1%. However, the right peaked at 26% in 2002. The center or 5 came in as the top choice 10 out of 14 years of collected data (no data found for 1999) or 71.4% of the time.95

Based on this data, it could be deducted that throughout Chávez’s time as president, ideology might have played a role in his first election with a dwindling effect in subsequent ones. This comports with findings by Zechmeister. She found that left-right identifications in Latin America do not play a crucial role in predicting voter’s choice. She however, came up with a few exceptions to this rule, one of them being Venezuela.96 Lupu’s findings further reinforce the notion that Chávez was brought to power by the left or the typically poor. Furthermore, he believes that as time went on he had to expand his base of support and was able to garner the backing of the middle classes.97


O. SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIANISM IN VENEZUELA

When it comes to support for a strong or authoritarian leader in Venezuela, we can look at the same studies in order to see what the local populace believed during the same time frame. Beginning with Latinobarómetro, support for democracy over any other type of government increased almost steadily from 1998 until 2013. In 1998, it was at 60% and by 2013, it hit an all-time high of 87%. That being said, the rise was not constant. There were dips that are worth studying in 6 out of the 14 or 43% of the years examined, namely 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010, and 2011. As far as the WVS is concerned, 46.8% of respondents believed that democracy was preferable to any other type of government from 1995 to 1999. Respondents in the 2000–2004 timeframe overwhelmingly believed that democracy is better than any other type of government by a 68.4% majority. Lastly and utilizing similar metrics, let us look at LAPOP’s data.

The Americas Barometer of 2006–07 concluded that overall, in the Americas, those individuals that tended to lean left were less supportive of democracy than their counterparts. This was the case in Venezuela. Out of 15 Latin American countries studied and the left’s support for authoritarianism in those countries, Venezuela came in tied for sixth place with Colombia. Furthermore, during the 2007–08 timeframe, Venezuelans overwhelmingly preferred a democratic than an authoritarian government. That being said, those that had previously voted for Chávez were more willing to accept a less democratic country. This last relationship, although more political than ideological gives us a small glimpse into Chávez’s increasing support among his constituency and his disregard for democratic institutions.


By 2014, this trend was reversed. Satisfaction with democracy had decreased to its lowest levels since 2007—37.9%—which is below the median for Latin America. However, this reversal seems to be more due to factors including the economy, Venezuelans personal economic situation, an increase in insecurity and crime, a rise in corruption victimization, an erosion of the freedom of expression, and a decrease in trust in institutions than ideology.\textsuperscript{102}

P. CONCLUSION

Petras and Veltmeyer believe that “never had conditions been so favorable for the left as in the early years of the new millennium.”\textsuperscript{103} This was the case in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez despite the fact that he came to power a couple of years prior to the 21st century. His rise to power was swift albeit unexpected since the left in Venezuela had been out of contention since the days of puntofijismo. Furthermore, his ascendance was through completely legal and democratic means. However, once in power he began to chip away at democratic institutions in order to consolidate his rule while enjoying enormous popular support. His leftist policies helped him garner and maintain this support throughout most of his presidency until his death in 2013. However, his leftist agenda was financed by record high oil revenues that throughout most of his presidency. To this day, Chávez remains very popular in Venezuela.

Furthermore, it seems like Chávez’s leftist ideology was always bubbling under the surface. He came to power promising change. Once in power he moderated his tone in order to maintain support. As he progressively consolidated his power, he was able to unleash his more leftist and radical side. In the face of opposition, he became increasingly authoritarian, continually shifting his basis of support. Ideology might not have been what kept him in power, but it was his guiding force while pushing his agenda forward. All this being said, was his popularity strictly and ideological one or, was it all due to the

\textsuperscript{102} Rodríguez, Seligson, and Zechmeister, “Briefing on LAPOP’s National Survey in Venezuela.”

\textsuperscript{103} James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, What’s Left in Latin America? Regime Change in New Times (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 228.
redistribution of wealth? In order to answer this question, I will study the role of ideology in Perú next, and then compare and contrast my findings.
III. PERÚ UNDER FUJIMORI

A. INTRODUCTION

When Alberto Fujimori was elected president of Perú in June of 1990, the country was battered by terrorism and hyperinflation. Not long after assuming power, he was able to stage an autogolpe or self-inflicted coup. In this, he had the support of the military and was able to declare a state of emergency. He dissolved congress, rewrote the constitution, and began his power grab in what eventually became a competitive authoritarian regime. Fujimori employed the Peruvian military and secret service to quell the opposition and remain in power. He served as Peru’s president for 10 years and was ousted amid allegations of corruption. It is my belief that he was able to remain in power this long due in part to fujimorismo, but mostly thanks to the rightist ideology of those supporting him. In this chapter, I will analyze this hypothesis. I will begin by looking at Perú’s history with democracy. Then, I will discuss Fujimori’s rise to the presidency followed by his right-wing ideology and the ideology of the sectors of Peruvian society that supported him, and how this ideology was reflected in his policies. Finally, I will close with an analysis of how ideology aided or hampered his regime.

B. DEMOCRACY IN PERÚ

Perú’s experience with liberal democracy could be traced back to 1980. Prior to this Perú struggled with democracy and with its neighbors, which hindered the development of a truly democratic society. Going as far back as 1821 when Perú declared independence from Spain, it was involved in a series of skirmishes with Chile, Colombia, and most recently, Ecuador. These disputes were mainly over territory. From independence and up to 1980, Perú was ruled by a series of caudillos, oligarchs, military generals, and juntas. Granted, there were democratically elected presidents prior to 1980 in Perú, but their terms were often short lived and replaced by military regimes. One of the

longest democratic periods in Peruvian history was between 1956 and 1968. However, even this period was briefly interrupted by a coup d’état in 1962 and it was ended by another one in 1968. It was not until 1980 that democracy in Perú began to flourish when the country elected its first president in almost 40 years.

Ever since the elections of 1980, Perú’s experience with democracy has been fairly positive. Since the aforementioned election and up to present day, the will of the electorate has been respected by Peruvian politicians and the military and Perú has enjoyed a peaceful transition of power. There is however, on exception to this rule: Alberto Fujimori and his autogolpe which will be further discussed below.

C. WHO IS ALBERTO FUJIMORI?

Alberto Kenya Fujimori Fujimori, a Peruvian engineer and educator turned politician and president of Perú from 1990 to 2000. He was born in Perú to Japanese migrants who instilled the value of hard work and self-improvement. Most of his life was dedicated to academia, that is until 1988 when—backed by colleagues and business people—he began to develop as a politician. This was due in part to the reach and support he was able to garner through a Peruvian talk show he hosted called Concertando (Getting Together). Fujimori founded the political party Cambio 90 (C-90) in 1989, and on October 15 of that same year, he registered as a presidential candidate and ran under the slogan: Honestidad, Tecnología, y Trabajo (Honesty, Technology, and Work). On June 10, 1990, he was elected as the 62nd president of Perú, after two rounds of balloting. Throughout his presidency and up to the point of his exodus from Perú on November 17, 2000, he became increasingly clientelistic and authoritarian. He lived in Japan under self-imposed exile until November 2005 when he was arrested by Interpol agents in Chile. Fujimori was extradited to Perú in September 2007 where he was convicted of abuses of power, human

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rights violations, and corruption and bribery.¹⁰⁷ He was eventually pardoned by the current president of Perú, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in December 2017 in what many regard as a quid pro quo move.¹⁰⁸

D. FUJIMORI’S POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Political parties in Perú all but disintegrated in the lead up to and during the 1990s. Most of these political parties were hinged on their charismatic leaders. As the party founders died so did the parties themselves.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Peruvian populace had lost faith on established political parties due to their inertia in responding to economic crises and the perception of corruption. Fujimori was able to harness this disenchantment by attacking his opponents on the left and right, and established himself as an independent centrist candidate.¹¹⁰ As such, he founded four political parties during his tenure as a politician.

1. Cambio 90 (Change 90)

*Cambio 90* (C-90) was political party put together by Fujimori months prior to the election of 1990. Initially, this party had no real ideological stance or agenda. This organization came about as a repudiation of established political parties that had promised reforms but had not been able or willing to deliver on those promises. The party was primarily backed by technocrats, evangelicals, and business people looking for neoliberal reforms. Fujimori established himself as the center of the party and once elected he all but dismantled C-90. After assuming the Peruvian presidency, he continued this trend in government by attempting to establish himself as the nucleus of government. Furthermore,

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he was able to cement his grip on power by allying himself with right-wing factions in Congress. This is when Fujimori’s identification with the right began to emerge and when _Fujimorismo_ was born.

2. **Nueva Mayoría (New Majority)**

In the elections of 1990, Fujimori learned that he did not have to attach himself to any established political party in order to win an election. Based on these experiences and following the _autogolpe_ and subsequent Democratic Constituent Congress, Fujimori founded a second party, _Nueva Mayoría_. This new party jointly ran candidates from C-90 and together they won 55% of the total legislative seats. Under this new umbrella, Fujimori began to remove candidates that were not loyal to not so much the party but himself. This new alliance continued to break with established norms and political parties, creating instead a party based on the man himself. In 1995 while enjoying a wave of popular support, Fujimori won the presidency by a wide margin as well as a majority in congress. After securing such a big victory, he asserted that democracies do not require political parties, furthering his slide into authoritarianism. Peruvian voters, however, did not agree with Fujimori’s assertion.

3. **Other Parties**

Having had success running under the previous parties, Fujimori also founded _Movimiento Independiente Vamos Vecino_ (Independent Movement Let’s Go, Neighbor) and later Perú 2000, in order to recruit and field pro-Fujimori candidates in the municipal elections of 1998 and the general elections of 2000 respectively.

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E. RIGHT AS AN IDEOLOGY

Having discussed Fujimori’s political affiliations, let us now explore the right as an ideology. Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser define the right by placing it in three groups: ideological, based on policies, and in sociological terms.\textsuperscript{116} The ideological right is characterized by the values it espouses, namely conservative and/or Christian. Political parties are also included in the ideological definition. In the past, many of these parties were authoritarian in nature, oligarchical, and fascist. More recently, right-wing parties tend to lean towards the center. That is, seeking support from the masses by appealing to common interests such as conservative morals and the need for security. When it comes to policies in the right, it could be said that they are more economically driven. Right-wing policies espouse a liberal market approach to the economy with minimal government intervention. In the sociological realm, those involved are typically upper class or part of the ruling elites making it difficult to appeal to the majority of a population. Furthermore, it could be said that the right is more factious in nature as everyone involved seeks out his or her own self-interests as opposed to the common good.\textsuperscript{117} For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the ideological portion of the definition.

F. THE RIGHT IN LATIN AMERICA

The right in Latin America dates back to the independence movement of the 19th century under the guise of conservatism. Despite gaining independence, most of the countries in the region were still ruled by strong men who sought to hold on to power and the prestige that their families had enjoyed for generations. Most of these men were of Spanish descent and enjoyed privileges inherited through the previous colonial rule.\textsuperscript{118} In general, the right ruled uninterrupted in Latin America for over 100 years. This began to


change with the Mexican nationalist movement and the Bolshevik Revolution when communist and socialist parties began to emerge in Latin America. This change however, was slow and did not come about without conflict.

Fast-forward to the 1960s in post-Cuban revolution, Latin America and the right, according to Burton, saw a resurgence. Many governments fearing the fate of the Cuban people, and many of them aided by the U.S., began a turn to the right. He also mentions that between the 1960s and 1980s, most governments in South America were either military dictatorships or democratically weak. For their part, Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser believe that in general, the Latin American right has been in decline in the 20th century. They argue that this could be due to several factors such as the dwindling influence of the U.S. and as a reaction to rightist policies implemented in previous years. Despite the slight disagreement between these authors, the right is not obsolete in Latin America. Several countries in the region like Mexico and Colombia continue to be governed by rightist governments; others have taken turns to the right in recent years. They also mention that even though the right has lost its grip on power in the area, it still able to influence politics and policy. Furthermore, Durand believes that Perú is part of a group of countries in the region in which “right-wing parties and conservative policies have prevailed over the long term.”

G. THE RIGHT IN PERÚ

Perú is no exception to the rightist rule in the region. For the most part, the right dominated in Perú in a mostly undemocratic fashion from independence and throughout the 19th century. In the 20th century, the left made some strides; however, these governments were often short lived usually being interrupted by military coups. The one

121 Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, “The Right in Contemporary Latin America,” 1–2.
exception to this rule is the coup d’etat of 1968, which brought General Juan Velasco Alvarado to the presidency. The exceptionalism of this dictatorship is contained in the policies that it sought and its duration. In the eight years in power, Gen. Velasco’s military government pursued social and economic reforms uncharacteristic of military dictatorships. Dobyns and Doughty argue that Velasco’s government was able to achieve more in terms of political and socioeconomic problems than any government since Peru’s independence.\textsuperscript{123} Velasco was eventually ousted by a coup and it was back to business as usual.

Burton argues that it was not until the elections of 1980 that the right had a chance to rebound and reinvent itself into a democratic force. The Acción Popular (AP) won the election, embarked in ill-fated neoliberal reforms, and in 1985 lost its grip on power to the APRA, a center-left party. Upon assuming power, the APRA candidate attempted to nationalize the banking system which left many Peruvians disillusioned with both left and right parties and their failed policies, leaving them searching for an outside candidate.\textsuperscript{124}

\textbf{H. THE LEFT IN PERÚ}

In order to understand Fujimori’s rise to power and eventual downfall, it is necessary to discuss the left in Perú, more specifically, the radical left. Rochabrún Silva claims that “almost the entire left has replaced the themes of class struggle, revolution, and socialism with that of democracy.” Furthermore, they argue that this resulted from reforms implemented by military governments, which caused the exhaustion of leftist ideology in Perú.\textsuperscript{125} However, this is a new development in Perú as in the rest of Latin America.

One portion of the left in Perú, APRA and its PAP, was discussed in the previous chapter. The other one worth mentioning is the Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP), which emerged from the Partido Socialista Peruano (PSP). The PSP was the original socialist party in Perú. However, in 1930, most of the people that had founded the PSP broke off to


\textsuperscript{124} Burton, “The South American Right,” 17–18.

form the PCP. Those that did not agree with this switch either joined the PAP or created their own parties. *Sendero Luminoso* (PCP-SL), founded in February 1970 and led by Abimael Guzmán, was one of those offshoots.¹²⁶ The PCP-SL, or rather the fight against it, was one of Fujimori’s main sources of support.

PCP-SL is “a communist guerrilla group” that mainly operates from the rural areas of the Andes where there is little to no government presence. This organization employs terrorist tactics in order to further its cause and at its height, the PCP-SL came close to bringing down the Peruvian government.¹²⁷ In 1980, the PCP-SL began to wage war against the government of Perú, and in that year alone, it carried out 219 terrorist attacks. Their tactics went from burning electoral ballot boxes to bombings in the streets of Lima. By 1992, their attacks had become so incessant especially in Lima, that “Fujimori closed the congress, suspended the constitution, and gave the military sweeping powers to arrest and detain citizens, effectively putting the country under martial law.”¹²⁸

I. ALTERNATIVE STATEMENTS FOR FUJIMORI’S REGIME ENDURANCE

Fujimori’s fight against *Sendero Luminoso* is one of the most widely accepted reasons given for his endurance as a president. The fight to counter the PCP-SL proved to be a source of support for Fujimori’s regime albeit temporarily. Between 1980 and 1994, 27,888 deaths could be directly attributed to political violence. Furthermore, close to 35% of those deaths occurred between 1990 (Fujimori’s ascension to the presidency) and 1992 (the capture of Abimael Guzmán).¹²⁹ In order to prosecute his war against Shining Path, Fujimori relied heavily on his head of intelligence, Vladimiro Montesinos and the military. Montesinos, a dubious character that ended up bringing down Fujimori’s regime, employed

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brutal tactics that entailed egregious human rights violations\textsuperscript{130} but many in Perú were willing to put up with it. However, after the capture of Guzmán and the rapid disintegration of the Shining Path, most in Perú clamored for a return to normalcy, including in government. Moreover, Weyland found that a successful anti-terrorism campaign, despite increasing Fujimori’s popularity in the short term, did not pay long-term dividends.\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, while the fight against PCP-SL may have garnered temporary support for Fujimori, it does not explain the continued sustainment of the regime.

Another reason given for Fujimori’s endurance by many scholars is the state of the Peruvian economy and its hyperinflation. As it will be discussed in detail further in this study, Fujimori implemented the same austerity measures proposed by his opponent in the 1990 presidential elections, measures that he vehemently opposed and opposition that arguably got him elected. These measures were highly unpopular but aided in stabilizing the economy and to some extent could be considered successful. However, as his regime progressed, so did the demands from Peruvians, demands that his government was not able to fulfil.\textsuperscript{132} This undermines the economic argument as his popularity began to dwindle.

Finally, there is something to be said about the role of corruption. Ironically, Fujimori was able to amass power by accusing his opponents of being corrupt.\textsuperscript{133} However, Conaghan argues that corruption, rather than simply being a consequence of “an incompetent or inefficient regime,” was the glue “that held it together and ensured its

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\textsuperscript{130} Rovira Kaltwasser, “From Right Populism in the 1990s,” 155–156; Kenney, Fujimori’s Coup, 166–169.


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reproduction.” Furthering the irony, corruption was what brought down the regime when Fujimori attempted to govern for an unprecedented third term.

J. THE CASE FOR IDEOLOGY

Initially, Fujimori had no real ideological template. However, most of his support emerged from right leaning institutions. Durand argues that businesses and the military all supported Fujimori from candidacy, through the coup, and up to his unraveling. He also mentions that “the Catholic Church [...] became an important pillar of support for the Fujimori government.” Despite not identifying himself with any sort of ideology, Fujimori’s political alliances and coalitions, his basis of support, and his policies ranged from the right to the extreme right. Moreover, according to Kay, Fujimori’s policies are “tied to the retreat of the state from the economy, the expansion of control of private (mainly foreign) capital, and the elimination of many government redistributive and allocative functions that favor the working classes,” all arguably rightist policies. So, whether directly or indirectly, rightist ideology was part of Fujimori’s support system.

K. IDEOLOGY-AUTHORITARIANISM LINK

The link between ideology and authoritarianism in Perú is rather weak. Fujimori’s turn towards authoritarianism emerged from the inability to implement his policies due to the fact that he did not have a legislative majority. With the support of the military in 1992, he decided to dissolve congress and suspend the constitution. After succumbing to international pressure, he held Constituent Assembly elections in 1993 which effectively reduced the powers of the legislative and judicial branches” and concentrated “decision-making power in the executive branch.” Moving forward he was able to carry out his


137 Kenney, Fujimori’s Coup, 117–118.

agenda with impunity justifying “Fujipopulism” and its increasingly authoritarian turn by pointing at the successes in the economic and anti-terrorism realms.139

L. FUJIMORI THE NEOPOPULIST

Weyland describes Fujimori as the quintessential neopopulist.140 Neopopulism or populismo de derecha141 as the term implies, is a new or resurgence of populism. Stein defines populism as a reorganization of wealth powered by resentment from the proletariat, as a challenge by the “rural classes” which is peasant in nature, while attempting to preserve and idolize the rural lifestyle. He does, however, believe that this definition is not all encompassing when applied to Latin America and more specifically, Perú. He argues that populism in this region is characterized by a political amalgamation of all sectors of society led by an elevated leader that can engage the majority of a population while developing a “patron-client” relationship where the leader decides what is best for his country and therefore his people.142 According to McClintock, Fujimori was able to paint himself as a savior of the people, and with this belief in mind he began his clamp on power in 1992.143

1. Autogolpe

In the 1990 elections, C-90, Fujimori’s political party garnered only 29% of the vote. In the Senate, only 14 out of 60 senators belonged to Fujimori’s party. In the Chamber of Deputies, his support was even bleaker, with 32 out 180 deputies belonging to C-90. Needless to say, he did not enjoy a legislative majority. Furthermore, as he began a turn to the right after being elected president, he alienated some members of his own coalition that tended to lean left. This gained him supporters on the right and he was able to govern

141 Durand, “A Right for All Seasons?” 98.
swiftly and effectively for a year and a half. However, as powers granted to Fujimori by the legislature were set to expire, he issued a multitude of decrees that were eventually blocked by his opponents in the legislature. Fujimori, fearing the “political weakening” suffered by his predecessors, decided to issue a self-coup. He suspended the constitution, effectively dissolving congress and reorganizing the judiciary.

2. **Fujimorismo**

Quesada Rada describes fujimorismo as a mixture of mostly right-wing ideologies, namely caudillismo, populism, and clientelism. Quijano for his part defines fujimorismo as an authoritarian political regime [...] which embodies a coalition of power between [...] capitalists, prominent members of the armed forces, and a select group of technobureaucrats. [...] It has fascist traits, but it lacks the nationalist discourse [...] and it is not a mass movement. [...] Congress, the judiciary, and the electoral authorities, etc., are completely subordinated to the Executive.

In a nutshell, fujimorismo was a hybrid regime characterized by loyalty to the president above all else while at the same time, subjugating all relevant institutions of the Peruvian bureaucracy to Fujimori. But what gave rise to this type of ideology? Crabtree mentions that there are two components that helped Fujimori propagate his doctrine: one is administrative in nature and the other one is mainly economical. The lack of a democratic institutions and the economic turmoil witnessed by the country and induced by previous administration resulted in the rise of this ideology. Some may argue that fujimorismo is not a full-blown ideology. However, for the purpose of this study, fujimorismo was the guiding force which buttressed Fujimori's regime, and to this day, it is still a political ideology being evoked by politicians in Perú.

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M. FUJIMORI THE NEOLIBERAL

By the time Fujimori assumed the Peruvian presidency, the country was suffering severe hyperinflation. According to The World Bank, inflation in Perú in 1990 was 7,481.66%.\textsuperscript{148} One of Fujimori’s first moves after assuming the presidency was to disregard the campaigned promises that got him elected in the first place. Fujimori ran as a populist constantly driving home the point that he was a president like you. He pledged to extend government credit to campesinos and vowed to protect street merchants.\textsuperscript{149} However, once elected he changed his tune and adopted the policies promoted by his political rival, the strategy he once opposed.\textsuperscript{150}

1. Fujishock

The fujishock was an economic policy instituted by Fujimori weeks after taking office in order to rein in hyperinflation. It was based on removing subsidies that had kept consumer goods prices artificially low, and letting the markets dictate prices. Overnight, consumer good prices went up by 1,000%, almost doubling the indigent population to over 50% of all Peruvians.\textsuperscript{151} The changes were so swift and sudden that many resorted to looting stores and the entire country descended into a state of emergency.\textsuperscript{152} At the time, most Peruvians complained that they were able to afford only half of what they used to. However, after the initial shock, prices began to stabilize. Prices were still relatively high and hundreds of thousands of workers were fired.\textsuperscript{153} One of the biggest and most positive outcomes of this policy was the curbing of inflation. By 1991, one year after the fujishock, inflation had gone down to just over 400%, and by the time Fujimori left office in 2001,
inflation was down to 3.4%. 154 This was of course, not without consequences. As a result of these policies, Crabtree argues that it created “more losers than winners.” 155

N. SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT IN PERÚ

As previously mentioned, up to 1985 Perú had been governed mostly by rightist administrations, many of them military in nature. So, it could be said that the country was predisposed to support the right. Yes, the left had its chances throughout the 20th century but it was always ousted by a coup of sorts. The only time the pendulum swung left and was democratically voted out of office was in the 1985 presidential elections when the candidate for the APRA won with 53% of the vote. Furthermore, this is partly supported by the results in the 1990 presidential elections in which Frente Democrático (FREDEMO)—a coalition of rightist parties—garnered 33% of the vote, the highest for that cycle. Fujimori’s C-90 came in second place with 29%. However, since no single candidate obtained at least 50% of the vote, there was a second round of elections in which Fujimori and C-90 emerged victorious. Further evidence of support for the right in Perú emerges from the distribution of political parties in the 1990 legislature. FREDEMO and C-90 held the highest and third highest majorities respectively in both the senate and the chamber of deputies. 156

A World Values Survey (WVS) conducted between 1995 and 1999 found that the majority of Peruvians identified with the center-left with 30.4%. The third most popular response was center-right with 15.7%, following a “do not know” that garnered 20.5% of responses. However, the split between support for the left and the right is closer that it may first appear. When aggregated, support for center-left all the way to the extreme left, that

154 The World Bank, “Inflation, Consumer Prices (Annual %): Perú.”


percentage is 41.5%. On the opposite side of the spectrum, center-right to the extreme right came in at 38.1% of interviewees.\textsuperscript{157}

O. SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIANISM IN PERÚ

In a 1995 survey, Latinobarómetro found that 52.4% of the Peruvian population preferred democracy above any other option. The second most popular answer was an authoritarian government with 22.9%. From 1995–2000, support for democracy increased peaking in 1998 with 62.9% of respondents agreeing on democracy as the best form of governance. Conversely, the percentage of respondents that would rather have an authoritarian government in certain situations decreased hitting its lowest mark in 1998 with 12%. Many others maintained that they did not care either way. Furthermore, when asked how satisfied they are with democracy, the majority of Peruvians answered that they were not very satisfied with it. Again, during the same time frame, the number of people that were not very satisfied with democracy rose from 40.5% in 1995 to more than half of the population in 2000 hitting its peak of 52.7% in 1996. Lastly regarding democracy, most Peruvians believed that democracy could solve their problems in 1995. By 2002, even though most respondents still believe that democracy could solve most problems in Perú, that percentage dropped close to 10 percentage points down to 52.3% The same survey asked respondents about their attitudes towards authoritarianism. In 1995, most people believed that \textit{mano dura} was not a bad idea. By 2004, the percentage of people that held this belief dropped from 80.3\% to 69.6\%. In any other situation, this could be regarded as a marked drop. However, the number of supporters of authoritarianism still seemed quite remarkable.\textsuperscript{158}

For its part, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) found that support for authoritarianism in Perú is a fact of life that should be accepted. For the most part, it blames this endorsement on centuries of authoritarian rule. Furthermore, it asserted that Perú was one of four Latin American countries that attempted to rid itself from democracy


in the 1990s. The other three countries included Guatemala, Venezuela, and Paraguay. Furthermore, Perú was the only country out of the four in which this attempt was successful. Looking at the numbers, LAPOP found that in 1992, support for an executive coup like the one that took place was at 52%. By 1996, this number had dropped to 30%. Despite these findings, the Peruvian population was one of the most unwilling to support public demonstrations and civil disobedience.159 This might explain why despite the country not agreeing with authoritarian ways, was still willing to put up with it for some time. Lastly, by 1998, attitudes toward democracy had not change much with 66% of interviewed Peruvians believing that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” Only 15.3% believed that “in some cases, an authoritarian government may be preferable.” What is most alarming about these findings is that 18.7% answered that “it makes no difference whether the system is democratic or not.”160 Once again, over a third of the population either directly or indirectly supported authoritarianism.

P. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Fujimori was able to rally support and become Perú’s 62nd president by playing a complicated political game. In his largely influential book, Francis Fukuyama argues that if Perú regresses into authoritarianism it would be because of some sort of military coup or because of the ascension of a politician that claims to convey the will of the people.161 As we now know, it was the latter that came to fruition. The will of the people was what got him to power but he quickly ignored it assuming and implementing the rightist policies of his political adversary. Initially, he was unpopular due to the austerity measures adopted. However, as the economy stabilized and his government forces captured the leader of Sendero Luminoso, his approval ratings grew and he was able to implement his ideology, namely Fujimorismo. This gave him room and confidence to execute an

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autogolpe in 1992 and begin his turn to the right and into authoritarianism. Over time, he was able to erode Peruvian institutions becoming the center of their bureaucracy. Ideology played a role in supporting his regime, but in this case, it was the rightist ideology of those that sustained him and his government, namely the Catholic Church, the business sector, and the military, rather than fujimorismo itself, that allowed him to remain in power. Even after scandals in his administration came to light, he ran and won an unprecedented third term in office. Whether this election was free and fair is topic for a different analysis. The fact of the matter is that he was able to rule unopposed for ten years and might still be in power today were it not for several missteps along the way.
IV. CONCLUSION

A. COMPARISON

Both Alberto Fujimori in Perú and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela were considered unlikely candidates to win the presidency in their respective countries. At the time of their elections, both Perú and Venezuela were riddled with economic woes. Perú was suffering from rampant hyperinflation and Venezuela’s economy had been stagnant for close to 20 years despite Venezuela having vast amounts of oil. Furthermore, Perú had been brought to its knees and was close to collapsing to a leftist terrorist insurgency. Both of these candidates were able to capitalize on popular discontent with the status quo, they offered a third option to the traditional conservative/liberal divide and managed to emerge victors through democratic means against all odds and expectations. They were both elected as outsiders and alternatives to the long-standing state of affairs in their respective countries.

Immediately after being sworn in as president in the case of Venezuela, and shortly into his term in the case of Perú, both men took steps to consolidate their power. Chávez did it through democratic means while fulfilling a campaign promise. Conversely, Fujimori, fed up with an impasse in the legislative branch and with the backing of the Peruvian military, dissolved the Congress and suspended the constitution. These moves resulted in the rewriting of each country’s respective constitutions and in the amassment of power in the executive. Moreover, these steps were highly popular and supported by the majority of Peruvians and Venezuelans, despite them being considered by many outside and some inside observers as a move towards authoritarianism.

Their popularity was further bolstered by their initial successes in stabilizing the economy in Perú, and the lowering of poverty levels in Venezuela. In the case of Perú, the effects of Fujimori’s neoliberal policies are still being felt today. Economically, the country is in much solid footing than when he took office. Nevertheless, the ramifications of a booming economy were not felt equally across society. In Venezuela, while enjoying high oil prices, Chávez was able to fund social programs that made him extremely well liked, especially among the indigent. However, by becoming so reliant on crude revenues, the
Venezuelan economy ended up being dangerously susceptible to fluctuations in oil prices. The consequences of Chávez’s economic policies are still being felt to this day in Venezuela.

One president was much more ideologically driven than the other, Hugo Chávez. Also, it could be said that Chávez was a leftist ruler based on the historical and contemporary definitions by Levitsky and Roberts. They argue that classically, the left is inspired by socialist movements as an alternative to capitalist economic models, emphasizing government control over production and services. In more recent days, they identify the left as an ideology that seeks to “reduce social and economic inequalities.”

From his days in the military to the time of his death, Chávez became increasingly leftist eventually calling for a socialist Venezuela in 2007. His policies ranged from wealth redistribution to land reforms.

The other, Fujimori, was less ideologically driven. However, the policies adopted during his tenure were textbook rightist. As opposed to the left and according to Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, the right believes that inequalities are naturally occurring and the government has no business in leveling the playing field. Furthermore, they group the definition of the right into three categories: ideological, in terms of policies adopted and implemented, and sociological. In terms of ideology, the right is conservative in nature, having its roots in the post-colonial struggle to maintain the status quo. When it comes to policies, the right tends to remain divorced from markets. Lastly, the sociological dimension of the definition is rooted in its sources of support. The right is largely sustained by the upper classes, which often form coalitions with different sectors of society in order to climb to or remain in power. Fujimori implemented austerity measures, liberalized the economy, was relentless in pursuing and dismantling the leftist insurgents, and when convenient, he would enact social and development programs in rural areas, usually leading up to elections.

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Fujimori and Chávez were both considered populists, coming to power by claiming they represented the interest of the population at large.¹⁶⁴ This statement is supported by Conniff’s definition, which describes populists in Latin America as “leaders who had charismatic relationships with mass followings and who won elections regularly.” Furthermore, he explains that populists evoke nationalist and cultural sentiments in their constituencies, which often come from the working and middle-classes of society. In order to garner support, populists employ their charisma, often promising social and economic reforms. In the case of Fujimori, Conniff considers him as a “textbook case” of neopopulism.¹⁶⁵ Chávez, for his part, is described as a radical populist by Ellner. He considers Chávez and his government as radical since he first attempted to take power by force in 1992. He further characterizes Chávez as a radical populist due to the fact that he implemented agrarian reforms, nationalized the most profitable industries in Venezuela, and took a hard turn towards socialism.¹⁶⁶ Whether neo- or radical populists, both Fujimori and Chávez could be considered within the populism spectrum.

They also became increasingly authoritarian as their governments moved forward. By authoritarian, I adhere to Levitsky and Way’s definition of competitive authoritarian. They define it as a ruler that, despite governing under democratic institutions, is able to abuse said institutions in order to tilt elections in his or her favor.¹⁶⁷ Both of these men exemplified this definition. As previously mentioned, they both convocated constituent assemblies. Chávez did so within days of being sworn in. In Perú, this move took several years. However, once Fujimori had his new Constitution, his powers were expanded much faster than in the Venezuela case. Chávez, for his part, remained a leftist populist while becoming increasingly authoritarian throughout his entire tenure drawing on support from


¹⁶⁷ Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 7.
the poor for his socialist agenda. Fujimori took a slightly different route. He went from populist to Latin American neoliberal as defined by Hall, a monetary experimentalist, and from neoliberal to competitive authoritarian accused of massive human rights violations. The Peruvian president drew his support from rightist institutions that included the military, the business community, and the Catholic Church.

Ironically, both Fujimori and Chávez ran and were elected in part on an anti-corruption platform. They vowed to tackle rampant corruption in their countries but ended up being accused of being highly corrupt themselves. In both Venezuela and Perú, Chávez and Fujimori were able to root out the opposition and install loyalists in all sectors of government, including the legislative and judicial branch. They were able to rule with impunity until the time of his death in the case of Chávez, and his self-imposed exile in the case and eventual extradition, trial, and conviction in the case of Fujimori.

B. IMPLICATIONS

Judging from how these two men were able to remain in power in an increasingly polarized political situation can give us a glimpse into what could happen elsewhere in the globe, including the United States, in a not so distant feature. In recent years, a small wave of former consolidated democracies has slipped into either competitive or full-fledged authoritarian regimes. All this despite optimism of democracy as the supreme form of government following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

This study challenges conventional wisdom, the notion that authoritarians only come from the right and populist from the left. Chávez was a leftist populist that became ever more authoritarian. Fujimori for his part, drew most of his support from the right despite not embracing much of an ideology, but was elected and ruled as a populist.

Furthermore, aids in the early identification of possible competitive authoritarian regime (CAR). Authoritarian regimes, as popular thinking has it, mostly emerge from the right. The right in this case exemplified by Fujimori and his sources of support. Venezuela

and others in Latin America that emerged from the “pink tide” largely contradict this assumption. Venezuela however, is the longest continuous left-wing competitive authoritarian regime (LCA) regime in the region and perhaps in the world, going on 18 years. Perú was able to re-democratize after Fujimori. The immediate future does not look bright for Venezuela. Early identification of conditions conducive of these types of regimes can prevent the situation experienced by the Peruvian people in the 1990s and what Venezuelans continue to endure.

C. MOVING FORWARD

Political ideological identification in Latin America has been in steady decline since the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Fukuyama contends that the West has reached the “end point of mankind's ideological evolution.”169 However, just because ideology has been in decline in Latin America, it does not mean that it is insignificant, especially, when some may exploit it in order to maintain or extend their hold on power. Colburn argues that historically, the left in Latin America as a political force compelled many of the governments in the region to be more compassionate with its constituents.170 Colburn’s assertions could be both refuted and validated in the study of both Venezuela and Perú. Instead of reaching an ideological end point, Chávez pushed Venezuela increasingly to the left until the time of his death. His successor however, has become less ideologically driven and more authoritarian. In Perú, Fujimori’s move to the right was less ideologically driven. However, he implemented rightist policies in order to appease those who supported him who in turn, were more rooted in ideology. As previously stated, political ideology is still an important factor in evaluating prospects of future allies or foes.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States, as country committed to the ideals of democracy, freedom, and equality, should pay close attention to political developments worldwide, especially those in its closest sphere of influence as well as other more fragile areas of the globe. Rising

popular discontent in these countries can promote unsavory characters to leadership positions. Once in power, these individuals, through their policies, can threaten the stability of their neighbors and by extension, an entire region. Early identification and a comprehensive plan to deal with these emerging threats are crucial to prevent another Venezuela from occurring in Latin America.

A more in-depth study should be conducted in order to have a more representative sample and more conclusive information as to the implications of ideology on competitive authoritarian regimes. Perhaps such as study should include countries governed by more centrist authoritarians as well as some Central American nations.

E. SUMMARY

Competitive authoritarian regimes are less influenced by ideology and more motivated by a desire to remain in power by those governing, especially in countries with term limits. The ruler’s longevity is more likely to be supported by economic successes, especially when the leader implements leftist policies of wealth redistribution. Rightist authoritarians also tend to enjoy popular support, albeit initially, when they stabilize the economy through austerity measures and neoliberal policies. However, they can quickly lose support from the populace, as these reforms tend to disproportionately benefit the higher sectors of society. Furthermore, unless rightist leaders are faced with other difficulties to overcome, as was the case in Perú with Sendero Luminoso, it is hard for him or her to maintain popular support. Furthermore, I believe that LCAs are more enduring than right-wing competitive authoritarian regimes (RCA), not just because that is the case in this comparison, but because it is easier for the majority of a population to support a government that is seen as taking away freedoms while at the same time improving their way of life, as opposed to a privilege few as is the case in RCAs.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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