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THESIS

**THE IMPACT OF PRO-GOVERNMENT MILITIAS ON
STATE AND HUMAN SECURITY: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE AND
THE JANJAWOOD**

by

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March 2018

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POLICE AND THE JANJAWEEED**

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ABSTRACT

How do pro-government militias impact state and human security? Throughout the world, governments are more frequently interacting with and employing armed groups and militias in order to increase their security and position through unofficial means. Additionally, throughout the current academic literature, there are significant disagreements on the impacts of pro-government militias on state and human security. This thesis examines the relationship and impact of pro-government militias on state and human security by conducting a comparative analysis on two recent pro-government militias, the Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan and the Janjaweed in Sudan. The resulting analysis of this research generates two major theses: First, that the use of pro-government militias can provide limited increases in security to the principal who employed them; second, that we should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government militia employment and human security. This study also identifies several areas where the international community should focus, in order to understand how current or future pro-government militias may impact state and human security.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
AP3	Afghan Public Protection Program
CBSS	community-based security solutions
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Police
GIRoA	Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GoS	Government of Sudan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISCI	Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure
JEM	Justice Equity Movement
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SLA	Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SOF	special operations forces
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VSO	Village Stability Operation

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. In order to evaluate the relationship between the state and pro-government militias, the thesis focuses on six sub-questions. First, why do states align themselves with pro-government militias? Second, how do pro-government militias affect a state's monopoly on force and its overall stability? Third, how does the presence of pro-government militias impact human security? Fourth, how does the level of recognition by the state to the pro-government militia influence both state and human security? Fifth, how do the connections between pro-government militias and the general civilian population influence both state and human security? And, sixth, how do preexisting group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict, influence the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security? By delineating the relationships between the state, the civilian population, and pro-government militias, this thesis provides clarity on the implications and consequences of state partnerships with pro-government militias.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

Throughout the world, governments often interact with armed groups that are not official members of the governmental security apparatus. Specifically, groups such as irregular militias, vigilantes, and paramilitary organizations often operate as agents of the state but outside of official control. Various types of militias have been a significant part of history and a governmental resource since ancient times. Historically, a militia is an armed civilian group that can be called on by the state in the case of war; in *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz called for the use of militias, characterizing them as “a very extensive more or less voluntary co-operation of the whole mass of the people in support of the war...ready [to] sacrifice of all they possess.”¹ Similarly, the United States' constitution directly

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 372.

addresses armed militias in the second amendment, which recognizes “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” in respect to “a well-regulated Militia” which it declares “necessary to the security of a free State.”² There are many types of militias, this thesis focuses specifically on pro-government militias, defined by Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell as “an armed group that has a link to government but exists outside of or parallel to the regular security apparatus, and has some level of organization.”³

Despite their historic presence, recently, the prevalence of pro-government militias has been on the rise. Recent research indicates that between 1982 and 2007, more than 60 states had ties to informal armed groups that operated within their territories.⁴ Furthermore, pro-government militias have aided and supported state counterinsurgency operations in approximately two-thirds of civil wars since 1989.⁵ Currently, the totality of operations being conducted by pro-government militias in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria demonstrates the importance of further interrogating the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security.⁶

Overall, there is a consensus in the literature that both the scope of operations and the frequency with which states employ pro-government militias have increased in contemporary conflict.⁷ Various types of pro-government militias are or have been prevalent throughout history, but, currently, there is only a limited understanding of the

² Corinna Jentzsch, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger, “Militias in Civil Wars,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 757, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576753.

³ Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 20, no. 9 (January 2017): 9.2, doi: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-051915-045433.

⁴ Neil J. Mitchell, Sabine C. Carey, and Christopher K. Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations, International Interactions,” *International Interactions* 40, no. 5 (October 2014): 812, doi: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932783.

⁵ Jessica A. Stanton, “Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 899, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576751.

⁶ For example, the Misratan militia’s battle against the Islamic State in Sirte, Libya, the Shia Popular Mobilization Forces’ operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the use of the Afghan Local Police against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the operations of the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan.

⁷ See, for example, Sabine C. Carey, Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence: A new database on pro-government militias,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 2 (March 2013): 249, doi: 10.1177/0022343312464881; Ariel I. Ahram, *Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State Sponsored Militias* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 1.

consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. Therefore, by applying the questions outlined above to two cases studies, a greater understanding of and framework for the consequences of pro-government militias will be established.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the last five years, there has been an increasing output of scholarly works on the topic of pro-government militias. The following literature review covers the major themes of the recent literature and explains how the literature relates to the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. The first section defines pro-government militias and outlines how they will be categorized throughout this thesis. The second section covers both the principle-agent dilemma and the inherent deniability of pro-government militias, explaining how both impact regime and human security. Third, the literature review examines how states' employment of pro-government militias impacts their monopoly on force and their security. And, finally, it examines how pro-government militias impact human security. Ultimately, this review surveys recent literature on pro-government militias in order to derive a set of hypotheses that potentially explain the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security.

1. Pro-government Militias: Definitions and Typologies

Throughout the world, governments are increasingly utilizing pro-government militias as a force multiplier and as a cheaper alternative to conventional military forces.⁸ Pro-government militias are “complex organizations with a variety of purposes that differ across a range of characteristics.”⁹ In order for a militia to be classified as a pro-government militia, it must meet four criteria.¹⁰ First, the militia itself must be identified as pro-government, and possible links between the state and the militia that may identify this relationship include, “information sharing, financing, equipping, training, and [or] an

⁸ Sabine C. Carey, Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell, “Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 851, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576747.

⁹ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

¹⁰ Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 250.

operational link.”¹¹ Second, the militia must operate outside of the official security structure of the state.¹² Third, the militia must be armed and able to commit violent acts; however, it does not have to have committed violence to qualify as a pro-government militia.¹³ And, fourth, the militia must have some sort of organizational structure.¹⁴ Using this framework for pro-government militias allows for a refinement in the understanding of the specific consequences of governments outsourcing security.

Recent literature outlines two major typologies for pro-government militias: semiofficial pro-government militias and informal pro-government militias.¹⁵ A semiofficial pro-government militia “has a formalized and official link to the government, though it is separate from the regular military and police force. The government might have established the group by official decree or law, and members may receive some regular compensation.”¹⁶ An informal pro-government militia, by contrast, has an informal relationship with a government, which may or may not be widely known and acknowledged.¹⁷

The second key characterization of pro-government militias discussed in the literature is the pro-government militia’s link to society.¹⁸ The two categories of this characterization are simply based on “whether or not the group is locally recruited and locally active.”¹⁹ Ultimately, the literature and this thesis utilize both the militia’s link to the government and its link to society to monitor goal variance and the consequences of pro-government militias to the state and human security.²⁰

¹¹ Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.

¹² Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.

¹³ Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.

¹⁴ Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, “States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence,” 251.

¹⁵ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

¹⁶ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

¹⁷ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

¹⁸ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

¹⁹ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

²⁰ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

Finally, fundamental to this research are the definitions of regime security and human security. For this thesis, the phrase “regime security” refers to the ability of the government to remain in power and enforce the rule of law within its borders via a monopoly of force; “human security” refers to civilian well-being, focusing mainly on physical security rather than life-attainment prospects.

2. The Principal-Agent Dilemma and the Deniability of Militias

One of the major themes in the literature on pro-government militias is the principal-agent dilemma between the state and the militias.²¹ Fundamentally, the principal-agent dilemma examines how a state is able to control a self-interested agent.²² When applied to state and human security, the principal-agent dilemma manifests when the state is no longer able to control the pro-government militia due to a divergence of interests. Ariel Ahram explains that, unlike official security forces, which are directly aligned with and tied to the state apparatus, local militias operate in a way more akin to free agents.²³ They may fight on behalf of the state or rebels but are not in direct lines of command and control and have some degree of autonomy. Therefore, one major theme in the literature suggests that the strength of the relationship between the state and the pro-government militia determines how well the state can manage the effects of the principal-agent problem and has corresponding consequences to state stability and human security.²⁴

A second key theme in the literature on pro-government militias is the inherently deniable nature of militias, which allows states to commit atrocities without being held

²¹ See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6; Ore Koren, “Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (2015): 2, doi: 10.1177/0738894215600385; Ariel I. Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 3 (October 2015): 210, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1104025.

²² Neil J. Mitchell, Sabine C. Carey, and Christopher K. Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations, International Interactions,” *International Interactions* 40, no. 5 (October 2014): 814, doi: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932783.

²³ Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 9.

²⁴ See, for example, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 813; Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6.

accountable for their actions by the civilian population or the international community.²⁵ Ahram argues that “by colluding with nonstate actors, states gain plausible deniability for flagrant violence committed against civilians in the course of often brutal counterinsurgency campaigns.”²⁶ If governments understand the domestic and international cost and consequences of using excessive force or oppression, the rational choice may be to sub-contract out these actions to pro-government militias.²⁷

Consequently, the deniability of pro-government militias may allow states to engage in certain types of military actions without the fear of international repercussions. Carey and Mitchell argue that some types pro-government militias, such as informal militias like the Interahamwe in Rwanda, provide a higher level of deniability and are therefore more likely to be used to commit acts of violence.²⁸ Correspondingly, they argue “the degree of control [a state wields over a militia] influences the ease with which governments can deny responsibility for the violence these groups perpetrate.”²⁹ Therefore, because semiofficial pro-government militias are less deniable, one would expect them to be less frequently employed to commit acts from which the state is intending to distance itself. Furthermore, as Huseyn Aliyev explains, “the ability of the state to mask its association with paramilitaries has become critical for any assessment regarding how much control the state has over militias.”³⁰ Ultimately, based on the principal-agent dilemma and the deniability of militias, this thesis tests the hypothesis that the more official the ties are between the pro-government militia and the government, the less perilous the pro-government militia is to both state and human security.

²⁵ See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.8; Koren, “Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” 6; Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” 210; Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 14.

²⁶ Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 14.

²⁷ Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell, “Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability,” 852.

²⁸ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.8.

²⁹ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.8.

³⁰ Huseyn Aliyev, “Strong militias, weak states and armed violence: Towards a theory of ‘state-parallel’ paramilitaries,” *Security Dialog* 47, no. 6 (2016): 501, doi: 10.1177/0967010616669900.

3. Pro-government Militias: Monopoly of Force and Regime Security

In “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber famously defined a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”³¹ However, in reality, developing states often sub-contract security tasks, specifically during development or a time of crisis, and this thesis examines how that sub-contracting impacts regime security.³² Some of the current literature suggests that pro-government militias are both a contributor to and consequence of both weak states and state failure.³³ Specifically, pro-government militias may contribute to state failure due to the problems they create via the principal-agent dilemma; similarly, a weak state’s reliance on pro-government militias may also be a consequence of needing to employ a more cost effective security force than the traditional military apparatus. Accordingly, it is not surprising that there is little pro-government militia activity in modern developed states.³⁴

Some scholars argue that pro-government militias provide a comparatively cheaper resource to solve state problems when compared to conventional security forces.³⁵ Ahram contends that “while nonstate actors have been implicated in atrocities, in many circumstances they have also provided levels of stability and security superior to a failing state.”³⁶ A recent cross-national study found that pro-government militias may not only raise the probability of a state achieving victory throughout an internal conflict, but they also serve as an adequate counterbalancing tool towards “coup-prone” military branches.³⁷

³¹ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, edited by Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 40.

³² Bruce B. Campbell, “Death Squads: Definition, Problems and Historical Context,” in *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*, edited by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 17.

³³ See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6; Aliyev, “Strong militias, weak states and armed violence,” 502; Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 8.

³⁴ Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” 208.

³⁵ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.6

³⁶ Ahram, “Proxy Warriors,” 5.

³⁷ Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” 209.

Nevertheless, Aliyev concludes that “as long as there is armed conflict and the government is weak, state-parallel groups tend to thrive and increase their power vis-à-vis the state.”³⁸

Overall, the impact of pro-government militias on the state is one area where there is significant disagreement throughout the literature. One side of the argument is that pro-government militias help the state achieve a monopoly of force and regime security through providing a cheaper alternative to conventional forces. The other side emphasizes that the limited controllability of pro-government militias leads to a lack of accountability and ultimately degrades regime security. Correspondingly, the literature reviewed on the implications of pro-government militia on regime security is indeterminate, and this thesis intends to clarify this relationship and determine whether both the level of recognition between the state and the militia, and the connections between pro-government militias and the general civilian population influence the different conclusions drawn in the literature.

4. Pro-government Militias and Human Security

Many scholars suggest that pro-government militias decrease overall human security because of the pro-government militia’s deniability and the lack of state control over pro-government militias’ actions.³⁹ Ore Koren argues that the use of pro-government militias by states will often “tip the balance for perpetrating strategic mass killing by lowering anticipated government costs.”⁴⁰ Specifically, this aligns with the deniable nature of pro-government militias allowing states to deflect estimated costs. Furthermore, another argument is based on the principal-agent dilemma. This argument claims that the inability of states to curtail atrocities conducted by pro-government militias due to a lack of control or divergent objectives may also lead to a significant risk to human security. Overall, these arguments support the hypothesis that, while pro-government militias may initially increase regime security through violence conducted by the militias, they may also lead to a decrease in human security.

³⁸ Aliyev, “Strong militias, weak states and armed violence,” 502.

³⁹ See, for example, Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.16; Koren, “Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” 1.

⁴⁰ Koren, “Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing,” 3.

Specifically, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler argue that “informal agents increase accountability problems for the governments, which is likely to worsen human rights.”⁴¹ This is likely due to the difficulty in both training and controlling informal militias, and also due to the increased chance of informal militias becoming self-interested when compared to semiofficial militias.⁴² Therefore, semiofficial militias, when compared to informal militias, should be less prone to the problems created by the principal-agent dilemma due to their increased ties to the government. Overall, this leads to the hypothesis that the more official the ties are between the pro-government militia and the government, the less perilous the pro-government militia is to the state and the civilian population.

Another key claim of the literature is that the proximity of pro-government militias to their local area directly influences the level of violence they conduct towards civilians. Carey and Mitchell explain that militias that operate in their local area are less likely to conduct “indiscriminate or predatory violence.”⁴³ This lack of violence in the local area may be due to family ties and other established relationships with the civilian population. Additionally, another argument is that militia groups that recruit members by focusing on “in-group” and “out-group” discrimination present a significantly higher probability of conducting human rights violations against the innocent population.⁴⁴ Therefore, tracking a militia’s recruitment exclusivity and whether or not the group is locally active should directly impact how pro-government militias impact human security. Ultimately, these arguments support the hypothesis that pro-government militias that operate and recruit within their local area may be less dangerous to human security, and that employing a pro-government militia in an area with negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resources-based conflict, likely leads to a higher probability of violence.

⁴¹ Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 812.

⁴² Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, “The Impact of Pro-Government Militias,” 812.

⁴³ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.9.

⁴⁴ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.14.

Conversely, some scholars argue that pro-government militias do not degrade human security.⁴⁵ Recent studies have indicated that states do not delegate “shameful acts” to militias and that, when states decide to perpetuate “shameful acts” on civilians, these acts are conducted in conjunction with the regular security forces.⁴⁶ Many arguments suggest that the state is expected to delegate activities like sexual violence away from conventional forces; however, Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordas analyzed militia activity in conflicts from 1989–2009 and concluded that states did not delegate sexual violence as expected.⁴⁷ Correspondingly, Jessica Stanton suggests that “militia forces rarely use higher levels of civilian targeting than their government counterparts.”⁴⁸ Overall, these authors demonstrate that pro-government militias may not increase the overall risk to human security and that pro-government militias and regular security forces operate at equal levels of intensity toward civilians.

Thus, like the impact of regime security, the impact of pro-government militias on human security is also actively debated. Many scholars suggest that pro-government militias decrease overall human security because of the pro-government militia’s deniability and the lack of state control over the pro-government militia’s actions. Another key claim is that the proximity of pro-government militias to their local area directly influences the level of violence they conduct towards civilians. Other studies suggest that pro-government militias are in fact unlikely to use more violence than their regular security counterparts. Therefore, the literature reviewed on the implications of pro-government militia on human security is also indeterminate, and this thesis intends to clarify this relationship and determine whether both the level of recognition between the state and the militia and the connections between pro-government militias, and the general civilian population influence the different conclusions drawn in the literature.

⁴⁵ Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordas, “Do States Delegate Shameful Violence to Militias? Patterns of Sexual Violence in Recent Armed Conflicts,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 877, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576748.

⁴⁶ Cohen and Nordas, “Do States Delegate,” 877.

⁴⁷ Cohen and Nordas, “Do States Delegate,” 877.

⁴⁸ Jessica A. Stanton, “Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 917, doi: 10.1177/0022002715576751.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The literature review outlines multiple potential explanations and hypotheses for the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security. Outlined below are the specific hypotheses presented earlier in the literature review. Additionally, Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell's typology of pro-government militias was extremely influential in developing these hypotheses; their framework is mainly based on multiple cross-national, qualitative studies.⁴⁹

Q1. Why do states align themselves with pro-government militias?

H1. States align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a cheaper cost than traditional force employment.

Q2. How do pro-government militias affect a state's monopoly of force and overall stability?

H2a. A state's employment of a pro-government militia provides the state with the ability to achieve a monopoly of force via other means, aiding regime stability.

H2b. The inability of the state to control the pro-government militia, due to the principal-agent dilemma, leads to a decrease in overall stability.

Q3. How does the presence of pro-government militias impact human security?

H3a. Pro-government militias decrease overall human security because of the pro-government militia's deniability and the lack of state control over pro-government militias' actions.

H3b. The utilization of pro-government militias does not increase the overall risk to human security because pro-government militias and regular security forces operate at equal levels of intensity toward civilians.

Q4. How does the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government militia influence state security and human security?

⁴⁹ Carey and Mitchell, "Progovernment Militias," 9.11.

H4. The more official and transparent the ties are between the pro-government militia and the government, the less hazardous the pro-government militia is to the state and human security.

Q5. How do the connections between pro-government militias and the general civilian population influence both state and human security?

H5. Pro-government militias that operate and recruit within their local area are less dangerous to both state and human security than those that do not recruit and operate within their local area.

Q6. How do preexisting group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resources-based conflict influence the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security?

H6. Employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a high probability of a negative impacts on state and human security.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to examine the consequences of pro-government militias on regime security and human security, this thesis tests the cross-national qualitative framework outlined by Carey and Mitchell against two case studies. The first case study focuses on the Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan, a semiofficial pro-government militia, and the second case study examines the Janjaweed in Sudan, an informal pro-government militia. By selecting both a semi-official and informal pro-government militia, this thesis is able to test hypothesis four, which investigates how the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government militia influence state security and human security. Furthermore, both pro-government militias examined in the case studies operated both within their local community and external to it and had areas with preexisting negative group dynamics. Overall, the cases selected for this thesis allow for specifically testing the framework outlined by Carey and Mitchell.

Correspondingly, the three major independent variables selected for the two case studies are the level of recognition between the state and the pro-government militia, the proximity of the militia's operations to its local area, and the level of preexisting negative group dynamics. Although there are likely many more independent variables, these variables allow this thesis to create a testable framework for current and future analysis. In order to determine the level of recognition and the proximity of operations, this thesis reviewed both primary and secondary sources of information on the historical context of each case study and tested them against the multiple hypotheses outlined above. The subsequent conclusions will provide a better understanding of the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime security and human security.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

In order to examine the consequences of pro-government militias on both regime and human security, the remainder of this thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapters two and three will focus on the two analytical case studies evaluating and determining the consequences of its respective pro-government militia on regime and human security, and chapters two and three test hypotheses one, two, three, five, and six. The final chapter will conclude with a discussion on the implications of pro-government militias by conducting a comparative analysis of the two case studies in order to test hypothesis four. Additionally, the final chapter provides the major findings on and implications of governments employing pro-government militias.

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II. THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to examine the impact a semi-official pro-government militia has on state and human security, this chapter describes and analyzes how the Afghan Local Police impacted the government and citizens of Afghanistan. In fall of 2001, the United States government began robust counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, intending to defeat the al Qaeda elements responsible for September 11, 2001. Utilizing northern Afghan militias made up of primarily Tajik and Uzbek forces, the United States and its allied partners momentarily destroyed most of the al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan while simultaneously toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; however, shortly following the fall of the Taliban, the newly established government of Afghanistan and its U.S. advisors quickly realized that they were facing a growing insurgency.⁵⁰

Historically, in order to establish and protect national security in Afghanistan, governments have relied on locally based militias or security groups.⁵¹ This chapter examines the Afghan Local Police (ALP), a U.S. and Afghanistan jointly sponsored locally based semi-official pro-government militia. While classifying a local police force as a pro-government militia may initially result in confusion, throughout this chapter, it is important to remember how a semi-official pro-government militia is defined. First, a semi-official pro-government militia “has a formalized and official link to the government, though it is separate from the regular military and police force.”⁵² Second, a semi-official pro-government militia is often established formally by governmental decree, and third, the government may pay the salaries of a semi-official pro-government militia group.⁵³ The ALP meets all three of these requirements. In order to test the hypotheses outlined in

⁵⁰ Seth G. Jones and Arturo Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 1, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1002.pdf.

⁵¹ Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War*, 1.

⁵² Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

⁵³ Carey and Mitchell, “Progovernment Militias,” 9.4.

chapter one, this thesis is outlined in five sections. First, the chapter looks at the history of militias in Afghanistan to set a brief history and precedence of militia use. Second, the chapter details the creation of the ALP and explains why the government of Afghanistan chose to utilize a pro-government militia. Third, the chapter examines the impact of the ALP on state security and human security. Fourth, the chapter provides an in-depth provincial level ALP case study on Kunduz Province. And, finally, the chapter provides some final analysis, discussion, and conclusion.

Overall, the impact of the ALP has been very uneven across the country, and the findings from this chapter show that, hypotheses one, five, and six were supported by the ALP case, and the relationships tested in questions two and three were further defined.⁵⁴ Specifically, to address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the Afghan government, at the request of the United States, decided to create the ALP as a cost-effective method to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of insurgent groups.”⁵⁵ This action by the GIRoA supports hypothesis one which suggest that states align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a cheaper cost than traditional force employment. Similarly, both hypotheses five and six which focus on the importance of pro-government militias operating and recruiting within its locality, and the impact of the predisposition of the local area on the effectiveness of the pro-government militia, were also supported. For example, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on both state and human security depends upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group dynamics, such as competing ethnicities, and upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their own locality. Finally, the ALP case further defined questions two and three of this thesis which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security. First, the ALP’s impact on state security and stability varies greatly across the country’s regions which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the

⁵⁴ Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias? Not so fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police experience,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 2 (March 2016): 268, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169>.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.

literature review, and second, the government's decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will compare these findings against the findings in the next chapter on the Janjaweed to determine the differences between a state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-government militia.

B. HISTORY OF MILITIAS IN AFGHANISTAN

Throughout Afghanistan's history, powerful warlords, external actors, and the Afghan government itself have employed, respected, and utilized militias in Afghanistan, and since the 1980s, militias have played a fundamental role in many of the country's major political and security developments.⁵⁶ Specifically, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Abdur Rahaman Khan utilized tribal militias for regime security while attempting to centralize the Afghan state.⁵⁷ Likewise, "starting in 1929, the dynasties of Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan built a relatively small modern army, while respecting the parallel authority of rural leaders and their tribal forces."⁵⁸ More recently, the United States relied upon the mujahedeen in the 1980s to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and in 2001, the United States worked in parallel with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban.⁵⁹

But, while militias have been a key participant in many important political and security developments, they have also preyed upon the civilian population and weakened the ability of the central government to project power to the rural areas. A recent Human Rights Watch report explained that "for decades, Afghans have suffered serious human rights abuses at the hands of local militias, which include a diverse array of irregular forces ranging from armed groups working for tribal leaders to private security companies,

⁵⁶ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 259.

⁵⁷ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police* (Brussels, Belgium: The International Crisis Group, 2015), 4, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/268-the-future-of-the-afghan-local-police.pdf>.

⁵⁸ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 4.

⁵⁹ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 259.

criminal gangs, and insurgent groups.”⁶⁰ Furthermore, many militias in Afghanistan are led by “local strongmen or warlords” whose power is often backed by individual members of the national government, creating a situation where these militias’ leaders often have more power and influence in their areas of operation than the national government itself.⁶¹

While militias have been present throughout the history of Afghanistan, historically, militias have manifested differently in northern Afghanistan where the population is more ethnically diverse consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns, than in southern and eastern Afghanistan which are predominantly Pashtun.⁶² Northern Afghan militias historically have been employed along political or ethnic divides, and groups such as “Jamiat-i-Islami, Junbish-i-Mili, Ittihad-i-Islami, and Hezb-i-Islami have all been implicated in egregious laws-of-war violations, particularly during the civil war in the 1990s.”⁶³ Southern Afghan militias, by contrast, especially in rural Pashtun areas, have mainly manifested as a locally empowered police, or “arbakai,” and these forces have traditionally tended to be a “small, defensive, confined to village-level protection, and controlled by the jirga or shura that called them.”⁶⁴

C. THE DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

1. Factors leading up to the Establishment of the ALP

In order to determine why Afghanistan decided to utilize a pro-government militia and test hypothesis one, it is first important to understand the major variables leading up to the decision to establish the ALP. Since the fall of the Taliban, the majority of efforts by both Afghanistan and the international community have been focused on the development of a strong central Afghan government capable of projecting power from Kabul to the

⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia” Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police” (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2011) 1, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf>.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.

⁶² See for example, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 27; and Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War*, 27.

⁶³ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 27.

⁶⁴ Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War*, 27, 32.

border regions, that ultimately led to the creation of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA), whom would be the primary forces tasked with national security.⁶⁵ This, the top-down strategy for security in Afghanistan, has proven to be highly ineffective for a number of reasons. Primary among these are that the current Afghan government is highly unlikely to be able to maintain the number of forces required to project security to the border, there is not a historical precedent for a strong centralized government, while there is strong historical precedent of both localized rule and central government skepticism.⁶⁶ Ultimately, this led to an environment where both the Afghan government and the international community agreed to start utilizing pro-government militias as a cost-effective temporary solutions to the gaps in Afghanistan's security left by both the ANP and ANA.⁶⁷ Furthermore, this plan to utilize localized defense forces mirrored the highly successful use of local defensive forces in Iraq, which possibly influenced the decision.⁶⁸

As a result, over the last 17 years, multiple community policing initiatives have been approved and implemented by Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ Programs such as, the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), the Critical Infrastructure Police (CIP), the Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS), and the Interim Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) were all intended to increase localized security, and most of these previous programs would ultimately be rolled into the ALP.⁷⁰ Support for these militias has

⁶⁵ Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan's Local War*, 6.

⁶⁶ Jones and Munoz, *Afghanistan's Local War*, 13.

⁶⁷ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 5.

⁶⁸ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, *From Arbaki to Local Police: Today's Challenges and Tomorrow's Concern* (Kabul, Afghanistan: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2012), 11, [http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/Reports/Research/English/Report%20on%20Afghan%20Local%20Police%20\(Final%20Draft,%20English\).pdf](http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/Reports/Research/English/Report%20on%20Afghan%20Local%20Police%20(Final%20Draft,%20English).pdf).

⁶⁹ Department of Defense, *Special Plans and Operations; Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Afghan Local Police*, (Washington, DC: Inspector General United States Department of Defense, 2012), 65, <https://media.defense.gov/2012/Aug/02/2001712883/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2012-115.pdf>.

⁷⁰ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 5.

varied greatly since 2001, and most of the early pro-government militia programs had significant flaws. In particular, many skeptics of the early use of militias in Afghanistan point to the “corruption, abuse of authority, weak command and control, and tenuous ties to GIRoA (Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).”⁷¹ Overall, these factors led to a complete retooling for how both Afghanistan and ISAF supported and utilized militias, and as a result, the government created the ALP, the most significant and largest pro-government militia ever employed by Afghanistan.⁷²

2. Mission and Formal Establishment

To address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the Afghan government, at the request of the United States, decided to create the ALP as a cost-effective method to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of insurgent groups.”⁷³ Formally, the mission of the ALP, as stated in the MoI’s ten-year vision for the Afghan National Police, is as follows:

Afghan Local Police Under the direct supervision of the DM for Security, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) will concentrate on ensuring security in insecure regions, to prevent infiltration of armed insurgents, and to provide the grounds for rehabilitation and economic development, so that the National Police can concentrate on providing community and civilian policing services. The ALP will undertake their responsibilities in accordance with Afghan laws and ALP regulations and procedures. Within ten years, as security conditions improve, the ALP will be transformed and, after receiving the required education and training, will be integrated into the ANP.⁷⁴

Correspondingly, when General David Petraeus, the Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan at that time, was asked about the ALP and VSO (Village Stability Operations) while testifying before the U.S. Congress, he explained that:

⁷¹ Department of Defense, *Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts*, 65.

⁷² Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 261.

⁷³ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.

⁷⁴ Ministry of Interior Affairs, *Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1392–1402* (Kabul, Afghanistan: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2013), 12, <https://ipcb.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/13-04-02-ten-year-vision-english-final-version.pdf>.

VSO and ALP districts also support the larger campaign plan by disrupting insurgent infiltration routes and by denying insurgents staging areas from which they can attack populations in key districts. By working through local shuras and community leaders, VSO and ALP help to mobilize communities to defend themselves. After all, no one is more vested in the security of a village than those who live there and those who have offered their own sons to defend the village. This “defense in depth” adds security in areas where Coalition forces are minimal or absent. In this respect, VSO and ALP act as important “thickening” agents to increase security force presence, especially in rural areas.⁷⁵

Overall, both the MoI and the United States’ mission for the ALP focuses on increasing security in the rural areas not fully reached by either the ANA or ANP; that said, the MoI’s mission for the ALP seems to be more focused around community policing, while the United States’ mission for the ALP seems to be more focused on counterinsurgency.

Initially, President Karzai was against the ALP, fearing it could be utilized to undermine his power base in Kabul; nonetheless, Karzai approved the creation and utilization of the ALP, viewing it as a chance to control and standardize the multiple pro-government militia experiments in Afghanistan at that time, as it placed them under the umbrella of the ALP within the MoI.⁷⁶ President Karzai formally created the Afghan Local Police under the purview of the MoI in August of 2010, approving an initial force of 10,000 men for a period of two to five years.⁷⁷

3. Recruitment, Training, and Expansion

a. Recruitment

Initially, one of the main pillars of the ALP’s recruitment structure was that new members were required to be nominated by either three village elders or a local shura.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Developments in Afghanistan: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (March 16, 2011) (statement of General David Petraeus, Commander International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan).

⁷⁶ United States Institute of Peace, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Peaceworks, 2014), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias-and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf>.

⁷⁷ The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, i.

⁷⁸ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 267.

This locally based nomination process was a key difference from previous local defense initiatives and was intended to both prevent the Taliban or other anti-government militias from joining the ALP and to keep community based abuse from the ALP low.⁷⁹ However, as Vanda Felbab-Brown from the Brookings Institute explains, “frequently...a powerbroker would control the village elders, dictating his preferences through the elders in a way that escaped the outsiders’ scrutiny. At other times, the village elders would have no problem vouching for militia members as long as they only extorted a rival village.”⁸⁰ Furthermore, local shuras were tasked by the MoI with determining the eligibility of individuals who had been previously members of past insurgencies.⁸¹ Ultimately, while the nomination and recruitment process benefited the ALP as a whole, it was not without significant difficulties.

b. Training

Originally, United States special operations forces (SOF) exclusively conducted the training for the ALP; however, as U.S. troop reductions began in Afghanistan, United States conventional forces also conducted ALP training.⁸² Training focused on small arms training, how to properly use radios and vehicles, how to communicate with SOF forces, and basic first aid.⁸³ Furthermore, in order for an ALP member to receive his pay, he had to be successfully in-processed during training, which included, verifying that local vetting took place, verifying that the member was between 18–45 years of age, collecting the new member’s biometric data, administering a urinalysis, and completing payment paperwork

⁷⁹ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 267.

⁸⁰ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 267.

⁸¹ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 268.

⁸² Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 266.

⁸³ See for example, Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 266; and “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 55–56.

for the MoI.⁸⁴ The training is scheduled to last 21 days; upon completion, the new ALP member is issued uniforms, an AK-47, and communication equipment.⁸⁵

c. Expansion

President Karzai's 2010 plan for a 10,000-member ALP for a period of two to five years has vastly changed, and as of 2015, the ALP was at least 26,000 members strong.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the ending of most NATO missions in Afghanistan has increased levels of insurgency in the country, further increasing the demand for pro-government forces.⁸⁷ Correspondingly the ALP in Kabul is therefore requesting permission to increase its size to 60,000-members and for an extension of the program to at least 2024.⁸⁸

D. THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE ON STATE SECURITY AND STABILITY

Overall, the Afghan Local Police's impact on state security and stability varies greatly across the country's regions which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review. Correspondingly, the following section provides examples of where the ALP had both positive and negative impacts, and like the literature review cannot specifically determine an overall positive or negative impact. The ALP had the greatest positive impact on state security and stability when it operated in close accordance with the ALP's guidelines of only operating locally, and when the ALP was established in a locality that was predominantly free of any negative local dynamics, such as ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict; similarly, there are many cases where ALP units negatively impacted security and stability due to deviation from the ALP's guidelines,

⁸⁴ Jefferson P. Marquis et al., *Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs to Support the Afghan Local Police* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 4, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1399/RAND_RR1399.pdf.

⁸⁵ Lisa Suam-Manning, "VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense" (working paper, RAND, 2012), 9, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR936.pdf.

⁸⁶ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 262.

⁸⁷ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 262.

⁸⁸ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 262.

or the ALP being established in an area that had preexisting negative local dynamics. These findings support both hypotheses five and six.

1. A Case for a Positive Impact

Most comprehensive unbiased studies on the ALP focuses mainly on the program's shortcomings; however, there is limited reporting claiming the ALP succeeded in increasing regime security. Felbab-Brown a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute explains that under the best conditions, the ALP can have a significant positive influence on security and stability by both defeating and deterring insurgent groups like the Taliban and opening up roads and areas that were previously too dangerous to use.⁸⁹ Similarly, a United States Department of Defense Inspector General report explained that "ISAF, some district leaders, and village elders believed that the ALP initiative has been effective in expelling insurgents from the district/village levels and preventing them from returning."⁹⁰ Furthermore, the same report explained that many Afghan officials support the ALP because they believe that the ALP connects the central government to the villages, is extremely cost effective compared to the ANA / ANP, and ultimately, defeats and deters insurgents.⁹¹

Moreover, major advocates for the ALP program explain that the ALP is safeguarded from most abuses associated with militias due to the program's requirement for MoI oversight, local appointments, and the enduring relationship with United States SOF.⁹² Correspondingly, both the 2013 and 2014 United Nations' Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) annual reports on civilian casualties in Afghanistan claim that many communities welcome the presence of ALP units in their communities, citing

⁸⁹ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 263.

⁹⁰ Department of Defense, Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, ii.

⁹¹ Department of Defense, Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 12.

⁹² Human Rights Watch, "Just Don't Call it a Militia," 4.

improved security conditions that the Afghan civilians attribute to the presence of the ALP and the ALP's locally based recruitment.⁹³

Additionally, General Petraeus in his testimony before Congress explained that overall, the majority of ALP units have been successful at decreasing violence, reestablishing communities, and returning commerce to ALP areas.⁹⁴ Furthermore, he concluded that “all of these are important signs of localized progress, and, taken together, are increasingly contributing to our overall COIN campaign.”⁹⁵ Ultimately, these reports argue that the ALP had a positive impact on some localities where the ALP both followed procedures of staying in their assigned locality which supports hypothesis five, and the ALP also had a positive impact when the government employed them in an area that did not contain many preexisting negative local dynamics which supports hypothesis six; however, the evidence supporting this case is thin because of a lack of available research focused on the successes of the ALP.

2. A Case for a Negative Impact

Contrary to Petraeus' positive evaluation, independent research agencies found trends arguing that ALP regions had more instability than those without the ALP. A 2015 International Crisis Group report claimed that “in general, ALP deployment did not correlate with greater peace and stability: violent incidents rose 14 per cent in the entire country from 2010 to 2014, while the five provinces without ALP saw a 27 per cent decrease.”⁹⁶ The following section continues to evaluate question two on how do pro-government militias affect a state's monopoly of force and overall stability arguing that the ALP negatively impacted the security and stability of Afghanistan due to a lack of control

⁹³ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2014), 50, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG_0.pdf; and, United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2015), 80, <https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2014-annual-report-on-protection-of-civilians-final.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Petraeus, testimony on Developments in Afghanistan, 109.

⁹⁵ Petraeus, testimony on Developments in Afghanistan, 109.

⁹⁶ The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 8.

of and accountability placed on the ALP from the central government, the ALP operating outside of their locality, and establishing an ALP over an area that contained negative local dynamics, such as preexisting ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict.

a. Lack of Central Control over local ALP Units

An assumption critical to the success of the ALP program is that the central government, through the MoI and district ANP chiefs, will be able to control and maintain the ALP;⁹⁷ however, throughout Afghanistan, Afghan officials and local communities alike occasionally lack the capacity necessary to confront or control ALP forces.⁹⁸ In these areas, the ALP often operates as armed gangs outside of the control of the state, often under the control of “warlords and criminals, some of whom are also significant politicians.”⁹⁹ Furthermore, these rogue ALP elements often leverage their ties to powerful governmental figures or warlords to act with impunity, free from any accountability.¹⁰⁰ Ultimately, this leads to a situation that hurts local security, undermines governmental authority, and significantly complicates the ability of the central government to govern effectively.¹⁰¹

The increasing departure of coalition forces from Afghanistan further decreased Afghanistan’s ability to both control the ALP and hold ALP accountable.¹⁰² Felbab-Brown explains that “the absence of supervision by, and support from, U.S. forces, meant that the militias quickly turned to predation and abuse, and neither local community structures nor official government structures, such as district provincial police chiefs, were able (or willing) to restrain them.”¹⁰³

Additionally, one of the major accountability issues with the ALP, as was common with many militia programs in Afghanistan, was the fact that there was not a predetermined

⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 5.

⁹⁸ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 11.

⁹⁹ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 25.

¹⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 5.

¹⁰¹ Department of Defense, *Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts*, 66.

¹⁰² Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 264.

¹⁰³ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 264.

method for punishing or disbanding ALP units that either did not support the GIRoA or were conducting activities that were not conducive to the GIRoA.¹⁰⁴ A review of the ALP in June of 2015 requested by President Ghani determined that at least 2,200 members of the ALP were under direct “control of local powerbrokers”; nevertheless, the UNAMA reported that no changes or measures were observed being implemented to deal with the members of the ALP not under GIRoA control.¹⁰⁵

b. The Negative Impact of Militias Operating Outside of Their Locality

In the interest of testing hypothesis five which focuses on how a pro-government militia’s ties to locality impact state and human security it is first important to examine how locality impacted the ALP in Afghanistan.

Throughout Afghanistan, the ALP is restricted to operating in the district that they are recruited from in order to prevent the likely hostilities associated with sending an ALP from one village to another. In some instances, however, ALP members have been operating far from home causing significant difficulties for GIRoA supporting hypothesis five.¹⁰⁶ Specifically, a 2012 Department of Defense Inspector General report found that “some senior Afghan leaders...are employing ALP assets for other reasons that do not focus on support to the villages...ALP members were routinely being used as back up or reinforcements...outside of their village area - in some cases in other areas of their district and even province.”¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, this same report explained how most of these “out of area” deployments of the ALP were being conducted for personal reasons that did not support the overall mission and stability of the GIRoA.¹⁰⁸ Correspondingly, in Helmand

¹⁰⁴ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 268.

¹⁰⁵ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2015), 68, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc_annual_report_2015_final_14_feb_2016.pdf

¹⁰⁶ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, From Arbaki to Local Police, 31.

¹⁰⁷ Department of Defense, Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts, 28.

¹⁰⁸ Department of Defense, Assessment of the U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts.

province, there have been reports of ALP units from Daikundi province coming to Helmand and partaking in both attacks and robbery of local shops.¹⁰⁹

Ultimately, both of these reported instances of the ALP operating outside of their locality showcase the relationship in hypothesis five which states that pro-government militias that operate and recruit within their local area are less dangerous to both state and human security than those that do not recruit and operate within their local area. As mentioned in the previous section, the ALP had the greatest positive impact on regime security when they operated in close accordance to the ALP's guidelines of staying within their assigned locality. Correspondingly, as detailed above, there are many cases where ALP units negatively impacted regime and human security due to deviation from the ALP's locality guidelines. Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on state security depends upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their own locality, supporting hypothesis five.

c. Preexisting Group Dynamics Impact on the ALP

This next section examines the impact of preexisting negative group dynamics on the ALP's ability to increase state security in order to test hypothesis six. In many cases, the impact of the ALP greatly intensifies a region's preexisting group dynamics, because the ALP utilizes the authority provided through the ALP to target previous competitors, and while the GIRoA and the U.S intended for the ALP to be ethnically representative, it often did not manifest that way in formation. For instance, when the GIRoA employed the ALP over an area that had preexisting negative group dynamics, such as an area with competing ethnicities, the ALP magnified and aggravated the previous rifts. Felbab-Brown explains that, "in very heterogeneous, polarized, and fractured communities, the establishment of ALP units often exacerbates security dilemmas among the communities and triggers an armament spiral."¹¹⁰ Furthermore, without significant monitoring and accountability from Kabul, ALP members often use their new-found authority to settle both

¹⁰⁹ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, *From Arbaki to Local Police*, 31–32.

¹¹⁰ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 270.

interethnic and personal disputes that often predate the formation of the ALP.¹¹¹ Additionally, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported multiple links between the ALP and both “economic mafia and drugs traders” in the south and east of the country, and multiple connections between pre-existing warlords in the north.¹¹² This has led to senior officials in Baghis province to emphasize the predation of the ALP is ultimately deteriorating the security situation and the overall trust in GIRoA.¹¹³

Moreover, the actions of ALP that have caused either forced migration or a migration due to fear, are predominantly in areas where local politics focused on competing ethnicities prior to the formation of the ALP.¹¹⁴ For example, a 2014 UNAMA report detailed that somewhere between 150–200 families from Farah province were forced to move from Khak-e-Safed district based on ALP accusations that the village was supporting the Taliban.¹¹⁵ Similarly, UNAMA also reported that at least 100 families had fled from Baghlan, Afghanistan due to fears associated with the impunity and brutality of ALP.¹¹⁶ Overall, both of these actions have had significantly adverse impacts on both Afghanistan’s overall stability and security.

Ultimately, both of these reported instances of the ALP intensifying the area’s local dynamics confirm the relationship in hypothesis six which states that employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a high probability of a negative impacts on state and human security. Correspondingly, there are many cases where ALP units negatively impacted regime and human security, because they intensified the areas preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, clan or political rivalries.

¹¹¹ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, *From Arbaki to Local Police*, 40.

¹¹² Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, *From Arbaki to Local Police*, 39.

¹¹³ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, *From Arbaki to Local Police*, 40.

¹¹⁴ United Nations, *Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014*, 80.

¹¹⁵ United Nations, *Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014*, 80

¹¹⁶ Luke Mogelson, “Bad Guys vs. Worse Guys in Afghanistan,” *The New York Times Magazine*, October 19, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/magazine/bad-guys-vs-worse-guys-in-afghanistan.html>.

Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on state security depends upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group dynamics, supporting hypothesis six.

3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the ALP on State Security

Overall, the Afghan Local Police's impact on state security and stability varies greatly across the country's regions which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review. The ALP had the greatest positive impact on state security and stability when they operated in close accordance to their guidelines in a locality that was predominantly ethnically homogenous and absent of preexisting negative group dynamics supporting hypotheses five and six; conversely, there are many cases where the ALP negatively impacted security and stability, because they deviated from the ALP's guidelines, or the GIRoA established the ALP in an area that contained preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic or resource-based conflict. Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the impacts of a pro-government militia on state security are indeterminate.

E. THE IMPACT OF THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE ON HUMAN SECURITY

In order to determine the impact of a pro-government militia on human security and investigate question three of this thesis, the following section investigates the impacts of the ALP on human security. Overall, since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan civilians have had to deal with multiple actors conducting human rights violations, negatively impacting Afghan human security, and the ALP has been a major participant in many of these violations.¹¹⁷ Correspondingly, the UNAMA reports that some of the most common ALP violations "include severe beatings, property destruction, theft, threats, intimidation and harassment."¹¹⁸ Additionally, UNAMA has also reported that the ALP has conducted

¹¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Today We Shall All Die" Afghanistan's Strongmen and the Legacy of Impunity (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2015) 1, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0315_4up.pdf.

¹¹⁸ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015, 67.

targeted killings, unlawful imprisonment, child employment, and sexual crimes.¹¹⁹ UNAMA attributed 441 civilian casualties, including 144 civilian deaths, to the ALP between 2013–2016.¹²⁰ The following sections details the impact of the ALP on human security by first by providing a few example cases of specific human rights violations by the ALP, and second, explaining the role of locality and localized group dynamics on predation. Overall, this section does not intend to include all of the human rights violations conducted by the ALP; however, it does provide support for a key finding of this thesis which argues that we should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government militia employment and human security. Reporting from UNAMA, Human Rights Watch, and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission provides the majority of human rights violations in this section.

1. Example Cases of Human Rights Violations by the ALP

Throughout Afghanistan, the ALP has been responsible for many different human rights violations, mainly executed outside of the ALP mandate. Categorically, most incidents fall under “punishment/revenge killings, illegal searches, and ‘accidental’ shootings in questionable circumstances.” Below are some examples of the above violations.¹²¹

- The 2013 UNAMA report on civilian casualties documented 11 separate cases of summary executions by the ALP. In one case, on July 10, 2013, “insurgents attacked an ALP checkpoint Shindand district, Herat province.”¹²² In response, the ALP went to the village of the suspected attackers and abducted relatives of the attackers in retribution. Ultimately,

¹¹⁹ For example, see United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015, 67; United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014, 81; and United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013, 60.

¹²⁰ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013, 50; United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014, 79; United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015, 67 and; United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2016, 102.

¹²¹ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013, 51–52.

¹²² United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013, 51.

the abductees were executed, and their bodies were found in a nearby field.¹²³

- The 2015 annual UNAMA report documented multiple cases of sexual violence against children to include four cases conducted by the ALP. In one case, on March 17, 2014 an ALP member was convicted of “sexual assault and the rape of a seven-year-old boy.”¹²⁴
- A 2011 Human Rights Watch report indicated that in June of 2011 that the ALP arrested two boys 17 and 18 years of age under the suspicion that the boys planted an IED. Ultimately, the local villager elders were reported to have rescued the boys after they were found detained, physical abused, and one of the boys was reported to have “nails hammered into his feet” requiring hospital care in Pakistan.¹²⁵
- A 2015 International Crisis Group report detailed the summary executions of 45 prisoners by an ALP commander in Logar province. Including one execution that involved “a suspected Taliban militant who was blindfolded and used as target practice for rocket-propelled grenades.”¹²⁶

Ultimately, violations like these by the ALP, while rare, greatly decrease the overall human security in Afghanistan.

2. The Importance of the Locality and Localized Group Dynamics

Throughout Afghanistan, the localized group dynamics, such as ethnic composition of an area, and the ability of ALP to remain local greatly impacts the level of predation of the ALP on the population, and both of these findings support hypotheses five and six. For example, less predation by the ALP is observed in locations where the ALP naturally arose from the local population to defend the community from an external pressure.¹²⁷

¹²³ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2013, 51.

¹²⁴ United Nations, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2014, 18.

¹²⁵ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 79.

¹²⁶ The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 9.

¹²⁷ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 259.

Correspondingly, the chance of the ALP preying on and abusing the population greatly increases if they operate outside of their local area, or are formed in an area that suffers from interethnic, political or resource contention.¹²⁸ This dynamic has manifested in many ways. In one example, a Tajik ALP commander in a northern province closed roads to Pashtun travelers; eventually, his actions led to increased local strife and the local Pashtun community killed him.¹²⁹ In another case, local leaders employed the ALP outside of its assigned local region in Daikundi province resulting in the robbery of local villages and shops.¹³⁰

Overall, the ALP is assessed to be more prone to prey on the local population when the ALP does not stay within its assigned locality and the local dynamics, such ethnic and political rivalries, don't support the presence of a local militia. Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on human security depends upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group dynamics and upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their own locality, supporting hypotheses five and six.

3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the ALP on Human Security

Overall, in the case of the ALP, the government's decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. While there were some areas where the ALP was reported to have raised the level of human security for Afghan citizens, many ALP units were reported to have preyed on the population due to a lack of governmental accountability towards the ALP. Additionally, abuses against the civilian population increased due to previous rivalries that were magnified by the government's enhancement of the ALP's power and the abuses were worse in areas where the ALP operated outside of their assigned area. This supports hypotheses five and six. Overall, in

¹²⁸ Felbab-Brown, "Hurray for militias," 259.

¹²⁹ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 9.

¹³⁰ Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, *From Arbaki to Local Police*, 37–38.

the case of the ALP, the impacts of a pro-government militia on human security are negative.

F. THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE IN KUNDUZ PROVINCE

The implementation of the ALP in Kunduz clearly demonstrates some of the major challenges of establishing an ALP in areas that contained preexisting negative group dynamics, specifically a long history of ethnic rivalries, to ALP success. For example, one issue facing the ALP in Kunduz was significant ethnic diversity. Kunduz province contains a mixture of “Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, Arab, Baluch, Hazara and Turkmen communities”; however, Tajiks and Uzbeks are the two predominant ethnicities in the province.¹³¹ Furthermore, Kunduz borders Tajikistan to the north, and this has led to an increase in inter-ethnicity mixing resulting from multiple waves of immigration.¹³² Overall, the implementation of the ALP would be overlaid over an increasingly diverse community, challenging the ALP from the beginning, because the ALP would use the power enhancement from the government to confront historical rivalries.

Initially, the first ALP was established in Kunduz province in the fall of 2011, and consisted of approximately 225 ALP members in Kunduz district.¹³³ By the summer of 2014, the ALP in Kunduz had continued to grow with 250 members in Kunduz District, 195 in Aliabad, 300 in Imam Sahib, and 300 in Chardara.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, the ALP in Kunduz had difficulties in conducting balanced recruiting, specifically, lacking Pashtuns.¹³⁵ Additionally, United States SOF mentorship was also limited in Kunduz when compared to other regions. For example, Felbab-Brown reports that while in some areas it was common for the ALP to have SOF provide six weeks of mentorship on site, the ALP units in Kunduz were only visited once a week.¹³⁶ Ultimately, this started the ALP on poor

¹³¹ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 29.

¹³² United States Institute of Peace, Counterinsurgency, 32.

¹³³ United States Institute of Peace, Counterinsurgency, 35.

¹³⁴ The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 14.

¹³⁵ The International Crisis Group, The Future of the Afghan Local Police, 15.

¹³⁶ Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” 267.

footing, and the International Crisis Group assessed that “in the four districts where it was first introduced, violence increased 25 to 30 per cent from 2010 to 2014. By comparison, the two districts of the province entirely without ALP had no increase during the same period.”¹³⁷

Most of the major incidents surrounding the ALP were results of either a lack of effective command and control from GIROA or attacks from the predominantly Tajik ALP towards Pashtuns. For example, the International Crisis Group reported a case of an MoI member frustrated with the lack of control of rogue ALP members, and he is quoted saying, “we can’t really manage them. We just deliver their salaries.”¹³⁸ Additionally, Human Rights Watch has reported multiple cases of militias in Kunduz conducting “killings, rape, beatings, and extortion.”¹³⁹

Ultimately, the culmination of the ALPs failures came in the spring offensive of 2015. Specifically, leading up to 2015, the ALP had been pushed out of significant checkpoints surrounding Kunduz by local villagers tired of ALP abuse.¹⁴⁰ For example, the International Crisis Group reported that “in Chardara district, villagers forced the ALP from an outpost where the members were accused of killing, maiming and disrespecting the locals.”¹⁴¹ Consequentially, in the spring of 2015, the Taliban utilized the absence of the checkpoints leading into Kunduz in conjunction with the neutrality created by ALP predation to set siege to Kunduz.¹⁴² Ultimately, the ALP in Kunduz had such a strong negative impact on both state security and human security that two battalions of ANA were deployed to Kunduz to save the city from falling into the Taliban’s hands, and the

¹³⁷ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 15.

¹³⁸ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 16.

¹³⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.

¹⁴⁰ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 15.

¹⁴¹ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 15.

¹⁴² The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 15.

conventional forces would be tasked with correcting the negative impacts that the ALP had left on both the state and the population.¹⁴³

G. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, President Karzai established the ALP with the intention of securing the gaps left by both the ANA and ANP; however, the impacts of the ALP program on state and human security has been mixed at best. The ALP had the greatest positive impact on state security and stability when they operated within the local area that they were recruited from and in a locality that was devoid of any major destabilizing group dynamics, such as competing ethnicities; conversely, there are many cases where they negatively impacted security and stability due to deviation from the ALP's guidelines of remaining local, or the ALP being established in an area that was not suitable for their deployment. Similarly, there were some areas where the ALP is reported to have raised the level of human security for Afghan citizens; nonetheless, many militias were reported to have preyed on the population due to a lack of accountability. Additionally, abuses on the civilian population increased due to previous rivalries that were magnified by the ALP's power enhancement, eventually causing, in some cases, the locals to push them out, leaving room for the Taliban to overtake the community.

Ultimately, hypotheses one, five, and six were supported by the ALP case, and the relationships tested in questions two and three were further defined. Specifically, to address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the Afghan government, at the request of the United States, decided to create the ALP as a cost-effective method to "secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of insurgent groups."¹⁴⁴ This action by the GIRoA supports hypothesis one which suggests that states align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a cheaper cost than traditional force employment. Similarly, both hypotheses five and six which focus on the importance of pro-government militias operating and recruiting within

¹⁴³ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 17.

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch, "Just Don't Call it a Militia," 2.

its locality, and the impact of the predisposition of the local area on the effectiveness of the pro-government militia were also supported. For example, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on both state and human security depended upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group dynamics and upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their own locality. Finally, the ALP case further defined questions two and three of this thesis which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security. First, the ALP's impact on state security and stability varies greatly across the country's regions which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review, and second, the government's decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will compare these findings against the findings in the next chapter on the Janjaweed to determine the differences between a state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-government militia.

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III. THE JANJAWEED

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to examine the impact an informal pro-government militia can have on state and human security; this chapter describes and analyzes how the Janjaweed militia impacted the government and citizens of Sudan from 2003–2005. In the summer of 2003, the Government of Sudan (GoS) began robust counterinsurgency operations in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. Utilizing the government’s ground and air forces, in conjunction with Janjaweed Arab militiamen, the GoS attempted to quell a growing militant insurgency in Darfur that was fueled by decades of political and financial marginalization.¹⁴⁵ As a result of the conflict, and via what Secretary of State Colin Powell described as a joint GoS and Janjaweed “scorched-earth policy towards the rebels and the African civilian population,”¹⁴⁶ more than 70,000 civilians were killed, over 400 villages were completely destroyed, and more than 1.8 million citizens were displaced.¹⁴⁷

Historically, in order to establish and protect national security in Sudan, governments have relied on locally based militias or security groups to defeat rebel insurgencies.¹⁴⁸ This chapter examines the Janjaweed, an informal pro-government militia that was utilized heavily by the GoS from 2003—2005 with the goal of defeating and removing all rebel elements from Darfur.¹⁴⁹ A goal which the GoS did not accomplish. In comparison to the semi-official pro-government militia outlined in the previous chapter, it

¹⁴⁵ Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (February 2005): 124, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034212>.

¹⁴⁶ The Current Situation in Sudan and the Prospect for Peace: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. (September 9, 2004) (Statement of Colin Powell, Secretary of State).

¹⁴⁷ Straus, “Darfur,” 123; “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur,” Department of State, September 2004, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/36028.htm>.

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2005), 59, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/darfur1205webwcover.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis* (Brussels, Belgium: The International Crisis Groups, 2004), i, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/76-darfur-rising-sudan-s-new-crisis.pdf>.

is important to remember throughout this chapter that an informal pro-government militia is defined as a pro-government militia that has an informal relationship with a government, which may or may not be widely known and acknowledged.¹⁵⁰ The Janjaweed meets these requirements. In order to test the hypotheses outlined in chapter one, this thesis is outlined in four sections. First, the chapter looks at the history of both Darfur and the use of pro-government militias in Sudan to establish a precedent for how the GoS used militias in the past. Second, the chapter details the events leading up to the Sudanese decision to utilize the Janjaweed in Darfur in the early 2000s. Third, the chapter examines the impact of the Janjaweed on state security and human security. And, finally, the chapter provides some final analysis, discussion, and conclusion.

Ultimately, the decision by the GoS to employ the Janjaweed was extremely detrimental to human security, and the impacts of the Janjaweed on state security were mixed. Hypotheses one and six were supported by the Janjaweed case, and the relationships tested in questions two and three were further defined. Specifically, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS's conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn't the only motivator for their employment.

The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the deniability and the "out of control" nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone. Similarly, the Janjaweed case supports hypothesis six which focuses on the impact of localized group-dynamics on the effectiveness of the pro-government militia. For example, there are many cases where Janjaweed units negatively impacted state and human security because the governments' employment of the Janjaweed intensified the area's preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, political or resource-based rivalries. Finally, the Janjaweed case further defines questions two and three of this thesis which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and

¹⁵⁰ Carey and Mitchell, "Progovernment Militias," 9.4.

human security. First, the Janjaweed's impact on state security and stability varied throughout the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review, and second, the government's decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will compare these findings against the findings in the previous chapter on the ALP to determine the differences between a state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-government militia.

B. BACKGROUND

1. A Brief History of Darfur

In order to understand how the employment of the Janjaweed impacted state and human security, it will be useful to first layout a brief history of Darfur, Khartoum's militia use, and the conflict which contextually framed the GoS's decision-making throughout the conflict presented in this case study. In 1916, Darfur, Sudan's western-most region, became part of the British Empire after three hundred years of independence.¹⁵¹ At that time, Dar Fur, as described by Flint and De Waal, was "one of the most powerful kingdoms in a string of such states positioned on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, trading with the Mediterranean and raiding its southern neighbours."¹⁵² Over the next 70 years, the original inhabitants of Darfur peacefully and willingly integrated into the Sudanese culture and population.¹⁵³

During the 1980s, conflicts in Darfur became more violent.¹⁵⁴ The chief complaint of the people of Darfur in the 1980s was not the loss of independence and culture that was associated with becoming Sudanese; rather, it was that they felt marginalized by the central government due to a lack of being treated as full citizens of the state.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, in a

¹⁵¹ Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War* (New York, NY: Zed Books, 2008), loc. 251–253 of 5872, Kindle.

¹⁵² Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*, loc. 251–253.

¹⁵³ Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*, loc. 361–363.

¹⁵⁴ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 5.

¹⁵⁵ Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*, loc. 386–388.

resource-based conflict between the Fur and the Arabs from 1987–1989, militants first began to self-identify as “Arabs” vs “non-Arabs.”¹⁵⁶ The International Crisis group explains:

The conflict began at a very limited level among some camel herding Arab tribes in Northern Darfur and some sectors of the Fur in the northern part of Jebel Mara but it quickly degenerated as a result of the meddling of the politicized elements [of both groups] in Darfur’s towns and “Darfur intellectuals” in Khartoum. Propaganda, particularly in the Khartoum media, intensified and stoked the fighting until it drew all the sectors of the Fur on one side and all the Arab tribes on the other.¹⁵⁷

Throughout the conflict, an alliance of 27 Arab tribes worked together for the first time to counter the non-Arabs, particularly the Fur.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, the Fur created their own militias in order to defend their population from the perceived aggression of the Arab militias at that time.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, this was the first time the Fur labeled the Arab nomad militias as Janjaweed, which roughly translates to “evil men on horseback.”¹⁶⁰ In the end, the conflict between the Fur and the Arab militias resulted in at least 2,500 Fur fatalities and 500 Arab fatalities with hundreds of villages or camps destroyed on each side.¹⁶¹

Darfur contained over 6 million people at the onset of the conflict and consisted of almost one fifth of Sudan’s territory prior to South Sudan’s referendum for independence in 2011.¹⁶² Darfur’s population is overwhelmingly Muslim and comprises a combination of both Arab and non-Arab ethnicities.¹⁶³ Throughout Darfur, the predominant non-Arab

¹⁵⁶ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 5.

¹⁵⁷ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 6.

¹⁵⁸ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 6.

¹⁵⁹ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 6.

¹⁶⁰ Straus, “Darfur,” 126; The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 6.

¹⁶¹ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 6.

¹⁶² Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

¹⁶³ Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

ethnic group is the Fur, but other non-Arab ethnic groups also operate throughout Darfur, such as the Zaghawa, Massalit, and Daju.¹⁶⁴

2. A History of Militia Use and Khartoum's Militia Strategy

Khartoum's extensive use of pro-government militias began in 1985, in response to offensive operations being conducted by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan.¹⁶⁵ The GoS realized that by manipulating preexisting tribal or societal fractures with monetary, political, or military aid, it could successfully turn numerous neutral groups residing in southern Sudan against the SPLA.¹⁶⁶ Initially, the GoS viewed the pro-government militias as a force multiplier that would allow the GoS to conserve their own troops, but as the GoS continued to utilize pro-government militias, its leaders realized that militias provided the GoS with plausible deniability.¹⁶⁷ Militias allowed Khartoum to broadcast to the international community that there was no real war going on and that the conflict was chiefly local/ tribal conflict, while at the same time the GoS utilized the militias to conduct offensive operations outside of the purview of the international community.¹⁶⁸ Overall, the GoS viewed pro-government militias in the south as a key offensive element in their strategy of achieving regime security, because the pro-government militias effectively defeated the enemy and served as deniable force, allowing the GoS to utilize significant levels of violence without fear of consequences from the international community.

Since then, the GoS has leveraged the practicality, effectiveness, and deniability of pro-government militias in a majority of recent conflicts, and the level of violence ratcheted up when the government employed militias in Darfur.¹⁶⁹ For example, in 2003, the leadership from Khartoum implemented a strategy in Darfur that would utilize

¹⁶⁴ Department of State, "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur."

¹⁶⁵ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 505–508.

¹⁶⁶ The International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising, 5.

¹⁶⁷ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 1031–1034.

¹⁶⁸ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 1031–1034.

¹⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, Entrenching Impunity, 58.

governmental forces in conjunction with the Janjaweed to annihilate the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SLA) and the Justice Equity Movement (JEM) forces and their supporters in Darfur.¹⁷⁰ Ultimately, the GoS decision to utilize the Janjaweed from 2003–2005 resulted in one of the worst conflicts in Sudan’s history, outlined in the following sections.

3. Factors Leading to 2003 Conflict

Throughout Darfur’s history with Sudan, there have been many cases of popular opposition rebel movements against the government in Khartoum, and the 2003 uprisings by the SLA and the JEM are just the most recent.¹⁷¹ Similar to previous conflicts in Darfur, this crisis was rooted in resource scarcity, overlaid with Arab vs non-Arab ideology; however, unlike previous conflicts, the importance of twenty years of unequal policies from Khartoum toward the region also influenced the 2003 crisis.¹⁷² Following the conflict between the Fur and the Arabs in 1989, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir had approved the recommendations from a peace conference organized by the belligerents of the conflict; however, the central government continued implementing policies that marginalized the area, specifically the non-Arab ethnicities.¹⁷³ As a result, conflicts continued in the region, leading to another reconciliation conference between the Arab and non-Arabs in 2002, chaired by the GoS, which the residents of Darfur “criticized as flawed and did not lead to a sustainable settlement.”¹⁷⁴ Correspondingly, employment of the Janjaweed over the above negative localized group dynamics is important to testing hypothesis six of this thesis in the following sections.

¹⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*, 58.

¹⁷¹ Ulrich Mans, “Briefing: Sudan: The New War in Darfur,” *African Affairs* 103, no. 411 (April 2004):292, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3518614>.

¹⁷² The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 4.

¹⁷³ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 4.

¹⁷⁴ Amnesty International, *Sudan: Darfur: “Too many people killed for no reason”* (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2004), 4, <http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/idatcs/00010201:803f567cd39c627d78b9f4ff11377985.pdf>.

One of the factors leading to the conflict in 2003 was the marginalization of the population of Darfur. Like many areas outside of Khartoum and the fertile Nile river valleys, the central government has marginalized the area by providing a lack of infrastructure, development, and economic resources.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, major administrative restructuring in 1994 led to policies that further divided the area. First, in 1994, the central government placed many Arabs into positions of power throughout Darfur, a move viewed as an attempt by the non-Arabs of Darfur to further marginalize their population and challenge their traditional power.¹⁷⁶ Also in 1994, the central government divided the region of Darfur into three states: Northern, Southern, and Western Darfur; this division ultimately split the Fur into multiple administrative authorities, weakening their position in the government.¹⁷⁷

Yet, another factor leading into the conflict was the arming of the Arab militias by the central government in conjunction with the mindset of Arab supremacism. Prior to the conflict in 2003, the Darfur region had experienced many years of significant weapons proliferation.¹⁷⁸ Specifically, since 1986, the GoS had viewed arming the Arab militias in Darfur as a viable strategy to countering SPLA actions the region, and the proliferation of weapons also served as a significant destabilizing factor in the region.¹⁷⁹ The weapons the government intended to be used against possible SPLA advancements were also used against the Fur and other non-Arab ethnicities in Darfur, resulting in many deadly conflicts from the late 1980s through the 1990s.¹⁸⁰

Thus, over the past several decades, the combination of negative local dynamics, such as drought, scarce recourses, poor governance, ethnic marginalization, and the

¹⁷⁵ Amnesty International, Sudan, 5.

¹⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government Militia Forces in Western Sudan* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 6, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0504full.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 7.

¹⁷⁸ Amnesty International, Sudan, 4.

¹⁷⁹ Amnesty International, Sudan, 4.

¹⁸⁰ Straus, "Darfur," 126.

proliferation of weapons to the area, primed the Darfur region for conflict.¹⁸¹ In the early 2000s, lawlessness increased in Darfur, and in response, the governors of Darfur “issued a decree establishing a state of emergency in the region, instituting Special Courts to try people convicted of illegal possession or smuggling of weapons, murder and armed robbery.”¹⁸² However, the level of violence did not decrease in response to these new policies; indeed in 2003, the violence escalated to an unprecedented level.¹⁸³ In February of that year, the Fur argued that the GoS’s policies were not working to stop violence in the region and called for the GoS “to establish an independent and impartial Commission of Inquiry into the complex causes for the violence and human rights abuses in Darfur”; however, the GoS did not answer their call, and so the SLA and JEM “took up arms.”¹⁸⁴

C. THE DECISION TO EMPLOY THE JANJAWEED

The increasing tensions outlined above turned to armed conflict in the beginning of 2003, and by April of that year, the GoS had implemented a multi-faceted strategy to include utilizing the Janjaweed militia to deter and defeat the SLA and JEM rebels in Darfur.¹⁸⁵ In September of 2003, the government and the rebels would sign a ceasefire; nevertheless, multiple reports indicated that fighting continued.¹⁸⁶ The following section includes an overview of the onset of the conflict, the decision for why the GoS decided to utilize the Janjaweed, and the overall tactics and strategy employed by the GoS and the Janjaweed. Overall, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn’t the only motivator for their employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in

¹⁸¹ Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Destroyed*, 6.

¹⁸² Amnesty International, *Sudan*, 5.

¹⁸³ Amnesty International, *Sudan*, 6.

¹⁸⁴ Amnesty International, *Sudan*, 6.

¹⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*, 6.

¹⁸⁶ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 2.

Darfur, because both the deniability and the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone. Therefore, the Janjaweed case supports hypothesis one, with the caveat that there were other major factors, such as the deniability, “out of control” nature, and the demonstrated success of militias in the south, that led the GoS to employ the Janjaweed.

Consequentially, the conflict in Darfur is still ongoing today and has resulted in more than 70,000 civilian fatalities, over 400 destroyed villages, and more than 1.8 million displaced citizens.¹⁸⁷

1. Onset of the Conflict and the Impact of Early Governmental Losses

In order to understand why the GoS decided to utilize the Janjaweed, it is first important to understand that at the onset of the conflict the rebels were causing significant losses to Khartoum’s conventional forces, and these losses initially framed the GoS decision to utilize the Janjaweed. Fighting in Darfur first began in February of 2003, when the SLA and JEM attacked governmental quarters in response to decades of marginalization and poor governance from Khartoum.¹⁸⁸ Initially, on 18 March 2003, the governor of the Northern Darfur state, General Ibrahim Sulieman, initiated a temporary peace between the rebel movements and the GoS; however, things changed after Arab militiamen ambushed a prominent Masalit sheikh, Saleh Dakoro.¹⁸⁹ Saleh Dakoro left Darfur for medical treatment in Khartoum after the ambush, but he would later die in Khartoum after calling relatives and telling them that he would return to Darfur in days.¹⁹⁰ Upon Dakoro’s death, Flint and De Waal explain, “the word spread like wildfire: the grand old man of the Masalit, wounded by the militias in Darfur, had been murdered by the government in Khartoum”;

¹⁸⁷ Straus, “Darfur,” 123; Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

¹⁸⁸ Mans, “Briefing: Sudan: The New War in Darfur Support,” 292.

¹⁸⁹ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2064–2072.

¹⁹⁰ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2064–2072.

his death confirmed to the rebels in Darfur that the government was removing the opposition, and they determined to continue to take up arms and escalate the conflict.¹⁹¹

On April 25, 2003, the JEM and the SLA conducted the most successful attack of the conflict against the GoS, an attack that would change the level of engagement from the GoS.¹⁹² For the first three months of the conflict, the SLA and JEM defeated Khartoum's forces on the battlefield, as the GoS's soldiers were not used to fighting in a desert environment; however, the rebel forces were taking significant casualties from Sudan's air force.¹⁹³ Otherwise powerless against the aircraft, a force of 317 SLA and JEM militants attacked al Fasher airbase when the aircraft were on the ground, killing more than 70 GoS soldiers and pilots; destroying seven GoS military aircraft; capturing the head of the Sudanese Air Force, Major General Ibrahim Bushra Ismail; and acquiring multiple mortars, 120mm anti-aircraft guns, and military vehicles.¹⁹⁴ Flint and De Wall explain that "in more than twenty years' war in the south, the SPLA had never inflicted such a loss on the air force. The rebels were jubilant. 'The attack changed everything.'"¹⁹⁵

Until the attacks against al Fasher airbase, the GoS had publically described the conflict in Darfur as a local/tribal conflict; however, the strength of the attack on the airbase demonstrated to the government in Khartoum that the rebels were a legitimate military threat and that the GoS risked losing Darfur if its military strategy did not change.¹⁹⁶ Consequentially, the GoS denied any political settlements to the rebels, fully mobilized the military in Darfur, fired General Suleiman, and greatly expanded the recruitment of the Janjaweed.¹⁹⁷ These actions resulted in the bloodiest years of the whole conflict in Darfur, from 2003–2005.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹¹ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2064–2072.

¹⁹² Amnesty International, Sudan, 2.

¹⁹³ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2081–2084.

¹⁹⁴ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2114–2119.

¹⁹⁵ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2120–2121.

¹⁹⁶ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2122–2124, 2132.

¹⁹⁷ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2127–2128, 2140–2142.

¹⁹⁸ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2142.

2. The Benefit of the Janjaweed's Deniability and "Out of Control" Nature to the GoS

In conjunction with the heavy losses inflicted on the GoS's conventional forces at the onset of the conflict, the GoS also viewed the deniability and the "out of control" nature of the Janjaweed as a key asset to achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone and expounding upon the relationship tested in question one of this thesis. The following sections explain the origins of the Janjaweed which shows why the GoS viewed the Janjaweed as a plausible partner for both violence and increasing stability. Overall, the GoS viewed the Janjaweed as a key offensive element in their strategy of achieving regime security, because the pro-government militias could defeat elements of the rebel forces and served as deniable force, allowing the GoS to utilize significant levels of violence without the fear of consequences from the international community.

The Janjaweed militias include multiple nomad Arab militia groups. A Human Rights Watch report explains that most Janjaweed are recruited from "camel-herding nomads who migrated to Darfur from Chad and West Africa in the 1970s, and from Arab camel-herding tribes from North Darfur."¹⁹⁹ The International Crisis Group explains that the Janjaweed militias draw on the history of the "Hambati," who were Arab social bandits.²⁰⁰ The GoS, fully aware of the "raider culture" of the Janjaweed and the ethnic dynamics and tensions in Darfur, decided to employ the Janjaweed to augment their traditional military forces in the area.²⁰¹ Although many of Khartoum's official calls for militia recruitment solicited any and all help to defeat the insurgency, the GoS specifically targeted the Janjaweed based on the militias' history of conflict with the ethnic groups that made up the SLA and JEM.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 2, <http://pantheon.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2004/07/19/darfur9096.htm>.

²⁰⁰ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 16.

²⁰¹ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 16.

²⁰² Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*, 10.

In order to recruit the Janjaweed, the GoS offered multiple incentives and significant military support to the militias: specifically, the government offered “payment and access to loot, as well as promises of access to land and administrative power”²⁰³ Militarily, the GoS is reported by multiple organizations to have provided the Janjaweed with small arms, military uniforms, transportation, fire support, communication equipment, money, and food.²⁰⁴

Throughout the conflict, the government’s official recognition of its support of the Janjaweed was inconsistent. Most official media statements from Khartoum strongly deny any formal relationship with or support for the Janjaweed.²⁰⁵ In December of 2003, however, President al-Bashir reframed the objectives of the campaign in Darfur and the utilization of pro-government militias, contradicting the official denial: “our priority from now on is to eliminate the rebellion, and any outlaw element is our target ... We will use the army, the police, the mujahedeen, the horsemen to get rid of the rebellion.”²⁰⁶ While al-Bashir did not specifically refer to the Janjaweed by name, both “the mujahedeen” and “the horsemen” are colloquial or possibly code terms that refer to the Janjaweed. Regardless of Sudan’s official denial that it supports the Janjaweed, multiple studies and reports by the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State Department establish irrefutable coordination and support between the Janjaweed and the GoS.²⁰⁷

Correspondingly, throughout this latest conflict, the GoS have implemented their strategies and tactics for achieving regime security through two parallel lines of effort, the Janjaweed and the military; the majority of the tactics used by the GoS were initially developed and refined against the SPLA in the south.²⁰⁸ Specifically, the GoS has used

²⁰³ Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*, 10.

²⁰⁴ See, for example, Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Documents*, 1; Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*, 65; Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

²⁰⁵ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 16.

²⁰⁶ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 16.

²⁰⁷ See, for example, Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”; Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Documents*; The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*.

²⁰⁸ Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*, loc. 2142–2143.

tactics such as “aerial bombardment, the recruitment of ethnic militias as proxy ground forces, forced displacement—on an ethnic basis—of rural civilians on a massive scale, and persecution of real or perceived political opposition,” in both campaigns.²⁰⁹ In the majority of the clashes between the government and the rebel forces a similar pattern of events occurs. First, the GoS would bomb the rebel villages from the air. Second, the GoS forces would arrive in vehicles, trailed by the Janjaweed on horses or camels. Third, the forces would surround and enter the villages. Fourth, fleeing villagers would be targeted by both the ground and air forces. And finally, the GoS forces and the Janjaweed loot and destroy the village.²¹⁰ Therefore, throughout many steps of operations, the GoS utilized the Janjaweed as a key asset to achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone.

3. Analysis of Why the GoS Decided to Utilize the Janjaweed

Overall, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn’t the only motivator for their employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the deniability and the “out of control” nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone. Therefore, the Janjaweed case supports hypothesis one, with the caveat that there were other major factors, such as the deniability, “out of control” nature, and the demonstrated success of militias in the south, that led the GoS to employ the Janjaweed.

D. THE IMPACT OF THE JANJAWEED ON STATE SECURITY

Overall, the Janjaweed’s impact on state security and stability varied throughout the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in

²⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*, 6.

²¹⁰ Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

the literature review. Correspondingly, the following section provides examples of where the Janjaweed had both positive and negative impacts, and like the literature review cannot specifically determine an overall positive or negative impact. In some instances, the employment of the Janjaweed by the GoS ultimately helped the GoS achieve some military objectives temporarily increasing regime and state security. Nevertheless, the GoS employment of the Janjaweed had some negative consequences towards state security: the increased involvement of the international community, a lack of accountability, and further instability, both within and outside of Darfur. The following section provides both the positive and negative impacts of the GoS utilizing the Janjaweed in Sudan.

1. A Case for a Positive Impact

At the beginning of the conflict, the Janjaweed provided the GoS with a deniable force multiplier that aided the GoS in achieving military objectives in Darfur, and therefore, increased state security by defeating rebel movements. In most of the engagements in Darfur, the Janjaweed were an integral part in operations, and the catastrophes the Janjaweed caused were deliberate.²¹¹ A Human Rights Watch reported that on 24 April 2004, Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail conceded that in some cases the GoS worked in conjunction with the Janjaweed, because the Janjaweed's basis for conducting attacks "was a just one."²¹² He explained, "the government may have turned a blind eye toward the militias...This is true. Because those militias are targeting the rebellion."²¹³ Similarly, the GoS often argued that the militias in Darfur were "out of control"; however, the "out of control" mentality provided the government with what they believed to be a deniable agent to conduct mass killings and displacements in Darfur.²¹⁴

Moreover, during the conflict, the government often denied any formal ties to the Janjaweed and overwhelmingly tried to limit the information available to the international community about their support. Specifically, the government, throughout 2003, banned the

²¹¹ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2539–2540.

²¹² Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed, 43.

²¹³ Human Rights Watch, Darfur Destroyed, 43.

²¹⁴ Human Rights Watch, Entrenching Impunity, 28.

Khartoum Monitor, Al-Jazeera and Al-Ayam to control the flow of information leaving from the capital, further protecting the deniability of the government's support for the Janjaweed.²¹⁵ Overall, both the deniability and the "out of control" nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives in Darfur, and these objectives helped defeat the threat from the SLA and JEM that emanated from Darfur.

2. A Case for a Negative Impact

Although the use of Janjaweed aided the GoS in fighting the rebel movement in Darfur and resulted in temporary increases in security, the utilization of the Janjaweed, in some cases, negatively impacted regime security for the GoS. The following section continues to evaluate question two on how pro-government militias affect a state's monopoly of force and overall stability arguing that the Janjaweed negatively impacted the security and stability of Sudan due to an significant increase in the amount of attention brought onto the domestic crisis from the international community, threatening Sudan's monopoly of force, and inability of the GoS to control some Janjaweed members due to utilizing the Janjaweed over an area that contained negative local dynamics, such as preexisting ethnic and resource-based conflict, supporting hypothesis six.

a. A Loss of the GoS Monopoly of Force

As the International community perceived the Janjaweed's violence to be increasing, many actors in the community called for Sudan to act against the militias.²¹⁶ Specifically, in 2004, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1556 mandated that, "the Government of Sudan fulfil its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities."²¹⁷ The UNSC resolution also endorsed and fully supported the deployment

²¹⁵ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 16.

²¹⁶ Department of State, "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur."

²¹⁷ "Documentation," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (February 2005): 274, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500066560>.

of African Union troops to Darfur to monitor the situation.²¹⁸ Eventually, these actions would by the international community would make it more difficult for the GoS to continue to implement their strategy of “annihilation,” and the presence of foreign troops in the country undermines the GoS sovereignty in the region. Overall, due to the action of the Janjaweed in Darfur, the international community began to dictate some of Sudan’s domestic actions, threatening the GoS monopoly of force.

b. Preexisting Group Dynamics Impact on the Janjaweed

This next section examines the impact of preexisting negative group dynamics on the ALP’s ability to increase state security in order to test hypothesis six. In many cases, the negative impacts of the Janjaweed were greatly intensified by the region’s preexisting negative group dynamics, because the Janjaweed utilized the authority provided from the government to target previous competitors, sometimes beyond the intentions of the GoS. For example, while the government benefited from the employment of the Janjaweed, in some instances the intentions of the Janjaweed did not match the goals of the GoS. The GoS intention in Darfur was to defeat the rebellion while not disturbing the negotiations going on with the South; however, the Janjaweed desired more, Flint and De Waal explain that “many Arab militiamen wanted more: to take possession of Fur and Masalit lands, if not by emptying them of their inhabitants then by killing their chiefs and installing their own.”²¹⁹ Ultimately, this divergence in interest led to a principal—agent dilemma where Khartoum did not have complete control of the Janjaweed in Darfur. Therefore, in some cases in Darfur, the impacts of a pro-government militia on state security depended upon the ability of the state to control the militia, and in some cases the presence of preexisting negative group dynamics limited that control, supporting hypothesis six.

²¹⁸ Alex de Waal, “Darfur!,” *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (September 2006): 783, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007138>.

²¹⁹ Flint and De Waal, *Darfur*, loc. 2258–2260.

3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the Janjaweed on State Security

Overall, the Janjaweed's impact on state security and stability varied throughout the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review. In some instances, the employment of the Janjaweed by the GoS ultimately helped the GoS achieve some military objectives temporarily increasing regime and state security. Nevertheless, the GoS employment of the Janjaweed had some negative consequences towards state security: the increased involvement of the international community, a lack of accountability, and further instability, both within and outside of Darfur. Therefore, in the case of the Janjaweed, the impacts of a pro-government militia on state security are indeterminate.

E. THE IMPACT OF THE JANJAWEED ON HUMAN SECURITY

In order to determine the impact of a pro-government militia on human security and investigate question three of this thesis, the following section investigate the impacts of the Janjaweed on human security. Ultimately, the decision by the GoS to support and coordinate with the Janjaweed in Darfur has had exceptionally grave consequences on human security. Furthermore, throughout the conflict in Darfur, the non-Arab civilian population took the most casualties and paid the biggest price for the conflict due to a government sponsored intensification of previous rivalries between the Janjaweed and the non-Arab civilian population.²²⁰ This supports hypothesis six which suggest that employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a high probability of a negative impacts on state and human security. Throughout the worst years of the conflict from 2003–2004, the actions and tactics by the GoS and the Janjaweed caused over 200,000 non-combatant casualties and displaced millions of residents from Darfur.²²¹ Overall, the unrestricted nature of the Janjaweed's mass oppression and victimization towards the non-Arab tribes resulted in massive atrocities throughout Darfur; consequently, it is difficult to

²²⁰ Mans, "Briefing: Sudan: The New War in Darfur Support," 2.

²²¹ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 4663–4664.

find any reported instances of where the impact of the Janjaweed resulted in a net positive impact on human security.²²²

1. Example Cases and Characterizations of Human Rights Violations

Throughout Sudan, the Janjaweed has been responsible for many different human rights violations. In 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell in an address to U.S. Senate outlined that throughout Darfur, there was a “consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes, burning of villages) committed by jinjaweid [sic] and government forces against non-Arab villagers.”²²³ Similarly, Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General explained that he was “alarmed at the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, and by reports of widespread abuses against civilians, including killings, rape and the burning and looting of entire villages.”²²⁴ Detailed below are some examples of Janjaweed’s impact on human security:

- A 2004 International Crisis Group report detailed that on February 27 2004, a joint GoS and Janjaweed attack on North Darfur resulted in the murder of 67 civilians, kidnapping of 16 schoolgirls, and the rape of 93 others.²²⁵ Furthermore, in the same report, it was reported that “the Janjaweed branded those they raped on their hands to mark them permanently and ostracize them from society.”²²⁶ Overall, the attack resulted in a complete destruction of the town.
- A 2004 Amnesty International report detailed that on July 28, in Meramta, more than 300 people were killed by the GoS and Janjaweed. In the same report, it was reported that after the initial attack, women trying to flee were beaten by the Janjaweed and homes were destroyed. Meramta, a village of

²²² John Hagan, Richard Brooks, and Todd Haugh, “Reasonable Grounds Evidence Involving Sexual Violence in Darfur,” *Law & Social Inquiry* 35, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 912, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40926288>.

²²³ Powell, testimony on The Current Situation in Sudan.

²²⁴ Amnesty International, Sudan, 2.

²²⁵ The International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising, 17.

²²⁶ The International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising, 17.

over 450 households, was reported to Amnesty International to be completely empty.²²⁷

- Julie Flint and Alex de Waal report that extreme sexual violence and rape also occurred at the hands of the Janjaweed throughout Darfur. In one instance, “a young Zaghawa woman called Mariam Ahmad was stopped at a roadblock and forced to watch while Janjawiid [sic] cut the penis off her three-week-old son, Ahmad. The child died soon after in her arms.”²²⁸ In another attack, the Janjaweed raped Hobu Izhaq Azrak over seven days; after the rape, she was tied to her dead brother, who was killed by the Janjaweed, and both were set on fire.²²⁹ In another attack in Bargai, the Janjaweed reportedly sexually abused a new mother of twins following childbirth; after the attack, the Janjaweed killed the infants by putting them in boiling water.²³⁰

Ultimately, violations like these by the Janjaweed, greatly decrease the overall human security in Sudan.

2. The Importance of the Locality and Localized Group Dynamics

Throughout Sudan, the preexisting localized group dynamics, such as ethnic and resource competition, greatly impacted the level of predation of the Janjaweed on the population, supporting hypothesis six. For example, Darfur’s topography is challenging, consisting of vast deserts and steep mountains. Furthermore, Darfur has a very arid climate and a dearth of arable land, which has increased resource scarcity, increasing competition and resource-based conflict in the region.²³¹ In 2004, the United States State Department argued that “the competition for scarce resources over the years has contributed to recurring conflict between nomadic Arab herders and non-Arab farmers, particularly over land and

²²⁷ Amnesty International, Sudan, 14.

²²⁸ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2355–2357.

²²⁹ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2333–2337.

²³⁰ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 2355–2357.

²³¹ Flint and De Waal, Darfur, loc. 163; Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

grazing rights. Various ethnic groups have fought over access to water, grazing rights, and prized agricultural land as desertification has driven herders farther south.”²³² For multiple generations, conflicts between and within the Arab and non-Arab ethnicities have been based on the access to and usage of resources such as land, water, and livestock; however, until the 1980s, these conflicts were generally infrequent and maintained a low level of violence.²³³ Correspondingly, there are many cases where Janjaweed units negatively impacted human security, because the government’s employment of the Janjaweed intensified the area’s preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, political or resource based rivalries. Therefore, in the case of the Janjaweed, the level of impact of a pro-government militia on human security depends upon the ability of the state to deploy the militia in an area absent of preexisting negative group dynamics, supporting hypothesis six.

3. Analysis of the Overall Impact of the Janjaweed on Human Security

Overall, in the case of the Janjaweed, the government’s decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. Additionally, abuses against the civilian population increased due to previous rivalries that were magnified by the government’s enhancement of the Janjaweed’s power, supporting hypothesis six. Overall, in the case of the Janjaweed, the impacts of a pro-government militia on human security are negative.

F. CONCLUSION

The GoS recruited the Janjaweed to defeat and deter the rebel movements of the SLA and JEM in Darfur; however, the impacts of the Janjaweed on state security were mixed, and the impacts of the Janjaweed on and human security were exceptionally grave. The Janjaweed’s greatest impact towards state security and stability was their ability to augment the conventional Sudanese forces; nevertheless, the Janjaweed’s level of violence resulted in Sudan garnering more international inquiry into Sudanese domestic operations

²³² Department of State, “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.”

²³³ The International Crisis Group, *Darfur Rising*, 5.

than they wanted. Similarly, the decision of Khartoum to employ the Janjaweed resulted in terrible consequences to Human Security in the region.

Ultimately, hypotheses one and six were supported by the Janjaweed case, and the relationships tested in questions two and three were further defined. Specifically, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS's conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn't the only motivator for their employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the deniability and the "out of control" nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone. Similarly, hypothesis six which focuses the impact of the predisposition of the local area on the effectiveness of the pro-government militia was also supported. For example, there are many cases where Janjaweed units negatively impacted state and human security, because the government's employment of the Janjaweed intensified the area's preexisting negative group dynamics, such as ethnic, political or resource-based rivalries. Finally, the Janjaweed case further defines questions two and three of this thesis which focus on the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security. First, the Janjaweed's impact on state security and stability varied throughout the timeline of the conflict which supports the indeterminate findings on hypothesis two in the literature review, and second, the government's decision to employ a pro-government militia resulted in a decrease in overall human security. The final chapter of this thesis will compare these findings against the findings in the previous chapter on the ALP to determine the differences between a state employing a semi-official and an informal pro-government militia.

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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND OVERALL IMPLICATIONS

Overall, the intention of this thesis was to investigate the impacts of pro-government militias on state and human security by researching and comparing two recent case studies. The concluding chapter is broken into two major sections. First, the chapter intends to outline the conclusions identified in chapter two and three, and then draw the comparisons across the two cases. Furthermore, section *d.* of the following section intends to test hypothesis four which suggest that the more official and transparent the ties are between the pro-government militia and the government, the less hazardous the pro-government militia is to the state and human security. And, second, the thesis concludes with a discussion on the overall implications of the analysis.

A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

1. Research Questions and Hypothesis Evaluated

a. Why do states align themselves with pro-government militias?

Based on the literature reviewed, this thesis initially hypothesized that states align themselves with pro-government militias to achieve regime security at a cheaper cost than traditional force employment, and in both case studies it is apparent that cost did play a factor. However, there were many other contributing factors in both cases as well. Specifically, to address the security void left by the ANA and ANP in Afghanistan, the Afghan government decided to create the ALP as a cost-effective method to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of insurgent groups.”²³⁴ However, other factors such as pressure from the United States to utilize militias as a counterinsurgency strategy, and a strong history of militia use contributed to the decision to employ the ALP as well. Similarly, the GoS decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because at the onset of the war, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the GoS’s conventional forces and utilizing the Janjaweed would provide the GoS with a more cost-effective

²³⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia,” 2.

solution, supporting hypothesis one; however, the cost-effectiveness of the Janjaweed wasn't the only motivator for its employment. The GoS also decided to unleash the Janjaweed in Darfur, because both the deniability and the "out of control" nature of the Janjaweed aided the GoS in achieving military objectives that would have been significantly more difficult to achieve through conventional forces alone. Overall, states likely do align themselves with pro-government militias because it is more cost effective, but as demonstrated in the two case studies, there are likely many other reasons as well that drive states to employ militias.

b. How do pro-government militias affect a state's monopoly of force and overall stability?

The literature reviewed actively debates the impact of pro-government militia on a state's monopoly of force and overall stability. Initially this thesis intended to clarify this relationship by investigating the impacts of the ALP and Janjaweed on a state's monopoly of force and overall stability. After conducting the research, however, the impact of a pro-government militia on state security is still indeterminate. In the case of the ALP, the ALP had the greatest positive impact on state security and stability when they operated in close accordance to their guidelines in a locality that was predominantly ethnically homogenous and absent of preexisting negative group dynamics supports follow on hypotheses five and six; conversely, there are many cases where the ALP negatively impacted security and stability, because they deviated from the ALP's guidelines, or the GIRoA established the ALP in an area that contained preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic or resource-based conflict. Similarly, the impact of the Janjaweed had mixed results on state stability. In some instances, the employment of the Janjaweed by the GoS ultimately helped the GoS achieve some military objectives temporarily increasing regime and state security. Nevertheless, the GoS employment of the Janjaweed had some negative consequences towards state security: the increased involvement of the international community, a lack of accountability, and further instability, both within and outside of Darfur. Overall, states can improve their security and stability through the use of pro-government militias, yet as demonstrated in the two cases compared, there are likely to be some negative impacts when a government delegates security to militias.

c. *How does the presence of pro-government militias impact overall human security?*

The literature reviewed actively debates the impact of pro-government militia on a state's monopoly of force and overall stability. Therefore, this thesis intended to clarify this relationship by investigating the impacts of the ALP and Janjaweed on human security, and overall, in both cases, the utilization of a pro-government militia negatively impacted human security. In Afghanistan, there were some areas where the ALP was reported to have raised the level of human security for Afghan citizens; nonetheless, many ALP units were reported to have preyed on the population due to a lack of governmental accountability towards the ALP. In Sudan, the literature review did not provide any cases in which the Janjaweed benefited human security; conversely, the employment of the Janjaweed in Sudan had unimaginable consequences on human security in and around Darfur. Overall, in the two cases studied, it was overwhelmingly apparent that the presence of pro-government militias greatly decreases human security, underlining a key finding that we should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government militia employment and human security.

d. *How does the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government militia influence state security and human security?*

This thesis initially hypothesized that the more official and transparent the ties are between the pro-government militia and the government, the less hazardous the pro-government militia is to the state and human security. More specifically, that semi-official pro-government militias carry less risk to the state and human security than informal pro-government militias. Considering the aspect of human security, the results from the two case studies support the initial hypothesis. While it was previously assessed that the two case studies resulted in negative impacts on human security, the manner in which the threats towards the population manifested in each case study support that a semi-official militia is less likely to negatively impact human security. Specifically, the ALP had the most negative impacts on human security when individual members or units did not follow procedures that the government had established to guide their behavior. When ALP individuals and units followed government guidelines more closely, they had a more

benign impact on human security. Conversely, the Janjaweed, an informal militia often used tactics that greatly decreased human security, and the GoS often implicitly supported the Janjaweed's harmful actions. Therefore, while both had negative impacts on human security, it appears that in the two cases evaluated, the inherent deniability associated with being an informal militia increased the negative impact.

Determining, how the level of recognition from the state to the pro-government militia influence state security is more difficult. In the two cases examined, the results of a state operating in conjunction with pro-government militias were indeterminate. Consequently, there is not enough evidence in these two case studies to accurately identify a causal relationship or trend.

e. How do the connections between pro-government militias and the general civilian population influence state security and human security?

The initial hypothesized relationship about the connections between the populace and the militias held that pro-government militias that operate and recruit within their local area are less dangerous to both state and human security than those that do not recruit from the local area. The ALP case study supported this argument; however, there was not enough reported evidence to support the argument in the case of the Janjaweed. In the case of the ALP, the ALP had the greatest reported positive impact on regime and human security when they operated in close accordance to the ALP's guidelines of staying within their assigned locality. Correspondingly, there are many cases where ALP units negatively impacted regime and human security due to deviation from the ALP's locality guidelines. Therefore, in the case of the ALP, the positive impact of a pro-government militia on state and human security depends upon ability of the state to recruit and operate the militia within their own locality, supporting the above hypothesis.

f. How do preexisting group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resources-based conflict influence the impact of pro-government militias on state and human security?

This thesis initially argued that employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict likely leads to a high probability of negative impacts on state and human

security, and both cases supported the argument presented in the literature. Specifically, in the case of the ALP, the ALP is assessed to be more prone to prey on the local population when the local dynamics, such ethnic and political rivalries, don't support the presence of a local militia. Similarly, in many cases, the negative impacts of the Janjaweed were greatly intensified by the region's preexisting negative group dynamics, because the Janjaweed utilized the authority provided from the government to target previous competitors, sometimes beyond the intentions of the GoS. Overall, both cases clearly demonstrated that employing a pro-government militia in an area with preexisting negative group dynamics, such as a history of ethnic, religious, or resource-based conflict leads to a high probability of a negative impacts on state and human security.

2. Limits of the Analysis and Future Research

The analysis above was limited by many factors. First, due to time constraints, only two cases were selected for comparison in this thesis limiting the strength of the analysis. Second, the two cases selected were heavily engaged in significant counterinsurgencies during the main years researched for this thesis, likely increasing levels of violence. And finally, this thesis focused mainly on reviewing primary and secondary sources of information on each case study; however, in person interviews with members of both sides of the conflict would greatly strengthen the analysis. Therefore, to continue the research, further studies should be conducted on pro-government militias that are operating outside of current counterinsurgencies, and future research should focus on increasing the amount of primary source collection; specifically, on the topic of pro-government militia employment and efficacy.

B. OVERALL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS

Throughout the world, governments interact with armed groups and militias intending to increase their security and position through unofficial means, and since 1982, the prevalence of pro-government militias throughout the world is increasing.²³⁵ Correspondingly, it is important for both academia and the international community to

²³⁵ Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, "The Impact of Pro-Government Militias," 812.

understand some of the possible and likely impacts of their employment. By examining the implementation, usage, and past and current results of the ALP in Afghanistan and the Janjaweed in Sudan, this thesis identifies two major implications of pro-government militia use. First, that the use of pro-government militias can provide limited increases in security to the principal who employed them, and second, that we should expect to see an inverse relationship between pro-government militia employment and human security.

States can provide limited improvements to their security and stability through pro-government militias, yet as demonstrated in the two cases compared, there are significant negative impacts when states delegate security to militias. In both Afghanistan and Sudan, the ALP and Janjaweed served as a force multiplier when they operated in accordance to their particular mandates, and in some instances provided an increase to state security and stability. However, in both cases analyzed, elements of the pro-government militias deviated from their original objectives, with negative consequences. Because these were unofficial forces, there was little the governments could do to reign in the excesses – manifesting the principal agent problem that characterizes these relationship, for example, the ALP operating outside of their local assigned area, and the Janjaweed engaging targets beyond the control of GoS.²³⁶ Ultimately, in these situations, the impact of utilizing pro-government militias often results in negative security repercussions to the state. Consequently, in future cases where either a state or foreign principle employ pro-government militias, the international community should identify where militias are operating outside of their intended roles and monitor for security and stability decreases.

In the two cases studied, it was overwhelmingly apparent that the presence of pro-government militias greatly decreases human security. While there was limited reporting indicating that the ALP increased security in some sectors,²³⁷ the overwhelming majority of information collected on these two cases portrayed a situation that emphasized the negative impacts on human security by the ALP and Janjaweed. Specifically, the greatest

²³⁶ See, for example, Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for militias,” and Human Rights Watch, *Entrenching Impunity*.

²³⁷ The International Crisis Group, *The Future of the Afghan Local Police*, 8.

deteriorations in human security occurred in locations where ethnic, economic, or religious conflicts predated the employment of the pro-government militia by the state. Furthermore, the two cases examined demonstrated that informal pro-government militias are likely more predatory on the civilian population than semi-official militias. For example, the majority of reporting for this thesis emphasized that the GoS implicitly supported the Janjaweed's actions against the local population; conversely, the majority of reported incidents against the human population by the ALP were conducted in situations where individuals operated outside of their authorities, formal or implied. Consequently, in future cases where either a state or foreign principal employ pro-government militias, the international community should expect a decrease in human security; furthermore, the international community should be especially wary of situations in which states employ pro-government militias informally or in areas of preexisting tensions.

Pro-government militias will continue to play an important role in the domestic affairs of many countries for many years to come, and further studies will be required to adequately understand their current and future impact. This thesis intended to answers some of the outstanding questions on the topic; however, many impacts are still unknown. Overall, the implications of this thesis detailed some of the major relationships and impacts of pro-government militias on state and human security. Nevertheless, this thesis is only one small step in sufficiently understanding the impacts of pro-government militias.

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