In October 2017 Prime Minister Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a super majority in national elections. The party majority gives Abe the potential to formally amend Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to authorize the Japanese Self Defense Forces and CSD. Amending Article 9 will further complicate Japan’s atonement efforts for atrocities committed by Japanese forces during World War II. This dynamic environment highlights the importance of the United States’ regional alliances and the relationships of regional powers in the Pacific.
IN DEFENSE OF JAPAN

by

Joshua S. Vogel

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense. This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract
In July of 2014 the Japanese cabinet led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinterpreted Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution to allow the use of force to aid an ally under attack. This revision overturned 60 years of precedents in revision that prohibited Japan’s involvement in collective self-defense (CSD). Factors leading up to this decision are a rapidly evolving strategic and political environment in Northeast Asia including a more aggressive China, continuous territorial disputes between major states in the Pacific area involving the South China Sea, the historical dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands, and increasing North Korea threats. The most recent developments in these relationships are China building and militarizing Islands in the South China Sea, and a nuclear capable North Korea launching missiles over Japan. In October 2017 Prime Minister Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a super majority in national elections. The party majority gives Abe the potential to formally amend Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to authorize the Japanese Self Defense Forces and CSD. The potential domestic and regional backlash to changing article 9 certainly needs to be considered. It is easy for the LDP to recognize that they can sustain defensive military improvements without fundamentally changing article 9. Amending Article 9 will further complicate Japan’s atonement efforts for atrocities committed by Japanese forces during World War II. This dynamic environment highlights the importance of the United States’ regional alliances and the relationships of regional powers in the Pacific.
Thank you to Dr. Antis and Professor Rodearmel for your assistance in developing this paper.
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INTRODUCTION

An October 2017 article in the Washington Post was titled “To deter North Korea, Japan and South Korea should go nuclear.”1 The opinion piece by Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore’s former permanent secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, compared the current constant saber rattling between a new nuclear North Korean state and the United States to the cold war adversarial relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. Kausikan explained in former cold war terms that just as DeGaulle declared the United States would never give up New York for Paris, it would also not give up San Francisco for Tokyo and therefore the best deterrent is for Japan to go nuclear followed shortly thereafter by South Korea. The article demonstrates the recent escalating security dilemma in Northeast Asia, which is a rapidly evolving strategic and political environment. It includes a more aggressive China, continuous territorial disputes between major states in the pacific involving the South China Sea, the historical dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands, and increasing North Korea threats. The most recent developments in these relationships are China building and militarizing Islands in the South China Sea and North Korea launching ballistic missiles over Japan. The issue brings into question what type of ally does the U.S. have in Japan and what type of ally does Japan have in the U.S.?

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On September 25, 2017, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Japanese Diet and called for snap elections to be held a month later. The New York Times reported the primary reason for new elections was Abe’s desire to consolidate power and revise Japan’s pacifist constitution in his third term as leader of the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) historic chief competitor, the Democratic Party, is in disarray and decline after its leader resigned, which led to multiple defections. Other contributing factors were the emergence of a new national party led by Tokyo’s popular governor Yuriko Koike. During summer metropolitan elections Ms. Koike’s party drubbed the LDP in Tokyo, leading many to think the LDP now has real competition. However, results from the election on 22 October 2017 gave Abe and the LDP a commanding lead. The LDP won enough seats to give them a two-thirds majority in the lower house. The results seem to validate Abe’s current hardline response against the North Korean threat and point to another attempt to amend the Japanese pacifist constitution to both validate the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) and potentially expand on Japan’s right to defend itself, to include Collective Self-Defense (CSD). While public opposition to revision caused Abe to drop his goal of a 2020 revision deadline, he insisted in his final campaign speech, “At a time when North Korea is threatening us and increasing tensions, we must never waiver.” This highlights

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
both Abe’s intent to continue to push revision and that the threat of a nuclear North Korea continues to add support for Shinzo Abe and the LDP.

The United States is a Pacific nation with a role in regional international affairs. The 2017 National Security Strategy signed by President Trump continues to affirm the nation’s competition and alliances in the region. What are the implications of Japan expanding its military authorizations and how might China, South Korea, and North Korea react? This thesis argues Japan should keep article 9 as written, and continue to maintain a technologically advanced defensive military that will not upset the balance of security in Eastern Asia. The U. S. should continue to assure the Japanese that it is a dependable ally that will defend Japan under any circumstances and seek improved cooperation with Japan’s competitors in disputed areas. Additionally, the United States must resist the urge to pressure Japan for support to U.S. interests outside of Northeast Asia. It is imperative that the U.S. recognize the importance of Japan’s role in providing strategic basing in Northeast Asia for U.S. military assets supporting U.S. enduring interests and work to maintain its current strategic relationship with Japan.

Methodology

How will this evolving environment affect the U.S. – Japan relationship and what impact will it have on the other major powers in North Eastern Asia? This paper will explore current relationships that further push Japan to potentially expand its self-defense capability and examine the extent to which changes to Japan’s constitution (revision or amendment) will affect its relationship with the U.S. and what actions this may drive its

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competitors to take. Recent books and articles relating to the history of Japan’s constitution and the interpretation of Article 9 pertaining to self-defense were examined to inform Japan’s current predicament. Additionally, domestic and regional implications were reviewed in order to identify the range of implications of such significant change in Japan’s approach to security and the potential consequences. There is no similar case study to apply the ramifications of a pacifist nation driven to rearmament by external threats. However, multiple cases of recently published studies on Japan were analyzed and additional examples of a country’s rearmament in other scenarios will also be evaluated.
Chapter 1: How did we get here? A Concise History of Japan’s Constitution, Article 9, and Pacifism.

Japan has a unique role as an economic power with a self-defense force bolstered by its alliance with the United States. The United States and Japan have been the closest of allies since its unconditional surrender to the United States in 1945 ending World War II. General Douglas MacArthur led the United States occupation of Japan and proved to be a highly effective soldier and diplomat. He was able to leverage his extensive experience in the Pacific and to help postwar Japan emerge from the ashes of defeat. The two most important enduring legacies from the occupation for Japan were the decision to maintain the Japanese monarchy and constitutional reform.¹ Through both of these decisions, Macarthur was able to maintain important institutions in Japan while reforming the country at the same time through the new constitution.

MacArthur laid out the principles for the draft constitution and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) staff produced the final draft of the Japanese constitution and submitted it to the Japanese cabinet for them to modify and ratify. The Japanese government ratified the new constitution on May 3, 1947.² Included in the constitution were sweeping changes to the previous Japanese government that included separation of church and state, the right to vote for women, and an established

legislature.\textsuperscript{3} Also included in the constitution was Article 9, called the “pacifist clause”.

Article 9 reads as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\textsuperscript{4}

The author of article 9 and the reasons why it was included remain shrouded in
mystery and there are multiple theories of its motivation and origin. Theodor McNelly
perhaps summarizes its origin best when he wrote:

Article 9 is something that MacArthur himself thought of. However, he presented
it to the Japanese government as the will of the American government and to the
American government as something from Prime Minister Shidehara. On other
occasions, he invoked the Emperor as its source, and elsewhere he claimed that
the Japanese people wanted this provision included, all of this to blur his own
responsibility for forcing Article 9 on Japan.\textsuperscript{5}

Why include a unique provision to the constitution renouncing war and outlawing
its ability to maintain a military? Some attribute it to the U.S. will to both create a
democratic state and to punish Japan for starting war in the Pacific. Others claim that
Article 9 was Japan’s apology to the world for its conduct during World War II. It has
stood for complete peace and no one has died at the hands of the SDF since the inception
of Article 9.\textsuperscript{6} While the impetus for Article 9 is also disputed, it immediately influenced

\textsuperscript{3} William M. Leavitt, "General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post-World War II
\textsuperscript{4} NIHONKOKU KENPO [Japanese Constitution], article 9, Tokyo, Japan 1947.
\textsuperscript{5} Fred Uleman trans., \textit{Rethinking the Constitution: An Anthology of Japanese Opinion} (Kawasaki: Japan
research Incorporated, 2006), 18.
\textsuperscript{6} Kenneth L. Port, Transcending Law, the Unintended Life of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 16.
Japan’s reconstruction after World War II and continues to be an important factor in Japan’s alliances and international relationships.

The Japanese constitution is an enduring document. It has not been amended since its adoption. Article 9 has seen multiple attempts at amending it fail as it simply has proven too difficult to change. Japanese administrations settled on reinterpretation on different occasions since 1947 to allow for an increase in military posture. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was the most adept at balancing pacification with revision. His initial interpretation in 1946 was that of full pacification which allowed no armaments and committed Japan to abandon war and the right of self-defense. Yoshida is quoted in discussing self-defense “I think that the very recognition of such a thing (for a state to wage war in legitimate self-defense) is harmful….It is a notable fact that most modern wars have been waged in the name of self-defense of States. It seems to me, therefore, that the recognition of the right of self-defense provides the cause for starting a war.”

The invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950 forced the United States to move what was left of its occupation army from Japan onto the peninsula to defend South Korea. This compelled MacArthur to order the Japanese to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve to enforce the laws of Japan. Up to that point, he had ignored calls from Washington D.C. for the creation of a 150,000 man paramilitary force to supplement the Japanese police and assist in the global fight against communism. This would be the first example of the United States historic trend to influence Japan to rebuild its military

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9 Port, 43.
10 Richter, 1234.
capability in order to assist in foreign wars. The United States has since pushed Japan towards reinterpretation in order to support Operation Desert Storm, the Global War on Terror, and most recently to deter North Korea’s threatening actions.

In 1950 at the start of the Korean conflict, the United States transferred military hardware to the Police Reserve. However, they changed the vernacular of the transferred equipment in order to prevent a violation of Article 9. For example, armored vehicles were called “special vehicles.”\textsuperscript{11} This set the precedent for simply modifying wording in an attempt to prevent violation of the provisions of Article 9. A man with no military background was appointed leader of the Police Reserve in an attempt to mitigate rearmament fears. In a four-year period, the National Police Reserve became the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF), a military in all but name comprised of three branches created to protect Japan from the perceived threat of communist invasion created by the Korean War. This transformative reinterpretation led by Prime Minister Yoshida set the original precedent for subsequent Article 9 reinterpretation. Japan as a true pacifist nation with no military only lasted for the three years from approval of the constitution in 1947 to the creation of the National Police Force in 1950, all while it was still under U.S. occupation.\textsuperscript{12}

Prime Minister Yoshida quickly realized the economic benefits of extremely low military defense spending in the national budget. He developed what came to be known as the “Yoshida Doctrine”. This doctrine, defined as the “notion of aggressive economic recovery coupled with passive international strategic disassociation” would fuel Japan’s

\textsuperscript{11} Port, 43.
\textsuperscript{12} Richter, 1234.
economic recovery.\textsuperscript{13} The Korean Conflict and the Cold War assured Prime Minister Yoshida that the United States would defend Japan under any circumstances. Article 9 was the reason that Prime Minister Yoshida could create and maintain such a radical doctrine. Thus, despite the ideals of peace and human rights associated with Article 9, its initial promulgation by the Yoshida government is not attributed solely to these ideals, but rather to an unprecedented and pragmatic approach to international relations.\textsuperscript{14} Subsequent Prime Ministers institutionalized the Yoshida doctrine. Kenneth Port elaborates that there are three main principles of the Yoshida Doctrine:

1) Economic rehabilitation was the prime goal and cooperation with the U.S. was essential to achieve that goal.
2) Japan should be lightly armed and avoid international conflict. This would contribute to economic development and avoid internal struggles.
3) In exchange for security, Japan would provide bases for the United States military.\textsuperscript{15}

The first 10 years of the post-war Japanese constitutional government set policy, precedents, and a baseline for its security alliance with the United States and international relations. Early lessons learned demonstrated that Article 9 did not prevent Japan from defending itself if attacked and that Japan had a sovereign right to maintain defensive forces for self-protection. Japanese politicians also learned that constitutional reinterpretation allowed them to implement constitutional policy change when they did not have political support for revising the constitution. The Japanese Supreme Court validated “revision” by exercising judicial restraint in matters pertaining to Article 9 and the United States-Japan Security Treaty, leaving the executive branch as the final

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 1235.
\textsuperscript{14} Richter, 1235.
\textsuperscript{15} Port, 58.
constitutional interpreter. While judicial theorists argued the Japanese Supreme Court has the authority to overturn revision, it does not appear that they will rule against the precedent of leaving defense matters to the executive branch anytime in the future.

The 1950s through the 1980s saw a status quo develop in the United States-Japanese relationship. United States policymakers continued to call on Japan to become a more capable and active security partner. LDP-led governments continued to adhere to Article 9 as the grounds for not increasing military offensive posture. However, they continued to eat away at the edges with rearmament while expanding their role in regional relationships by embracing deterrence. In 1952, the head of the precursor to the Japan Defense Agency judged fighter jets unconstitutional, as they were a defensive and offensive weapon. Within 30 years the JSDF was flying the world’s most advanced fighter jet: the U.S. designed F-15 Eagle. The Soviet Union’s Far East military buildup and the rapidly improving capabilities of regional militaries shifted Japan’s minimal necessary limit of defense with no formal reinterpretation of Article 9 required. In 1978, Japan and the U.S. signed the guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, which created a framework for the two militaries working together in the context of deterring aggression, resisting attacks against Japan, and confronting situations in the Far East.

The Cold War period of 1950-1990 is extremely important to evaluate in light of the precedents that were set. Analyzing the effect of those actions, helps determine international and regional actors influence on Japan’s defensive capabilities and postures. Japan maintained the Yoshida Doctrine throughout this period. Japanese policy makers

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16 Chen and Wada, 352.
17 Liff, 148.
18 Richter, 1240.
further upheld Yoshida Doctrine enacting a policy that limited Japan’s defense spending to no more 1% of its Gross Domestic Product. That policy stayed in place until 2017. The rearmament and military buildup of other regional actors were seen as increased threats that allowed Japan to increase its defense posture without amending or reinterpreting Article 9. U.S. pressure also caused Japan to accept its military role in the deterrence of its neighbors. Despite this pressure, Japan was able to maintain Article 9 as originally written without any substantial reinterpretations since the beginning of the Korean War. Japan did not consider any other role for the JSDF than self-defense and national humanitarian assistance. Lastly, Japan maintained its only military alliance with the United States and continued to provide access to the U.S. for key military basing in the Far East.
Chapter 2: The 1990s to the present. Reasons for Japan to remilitarize and revise Article 9.

On July 1, 2014, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe “reinterpreted Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to allow the use of force to aid an ally under attack, otherwise known as collective self-defense (CSD).” This overturned 60 years of constitutional interpretations prohibiting Japan’s involvement in CSD. The move was the culmination of attempts by Abe and the LDP to amend article 9 of the constitution. Even though PM Abe had a two-thirds majority in the lower house, it was not politically feasible to amend the constitution, so he worked with his cabinet and settled for a reinterpretation. Now with the October 2017 election results it appears the Abe government will move for amending the constitution to establish Japan’s right to maintain a modern military and expand on the military’s role. While it is still a question if the LDP will find pushing for a formal amendment politically sustainable, it is important for the U.S. to understand the ramifications of Japan expanding its military authorizations and the balance of security in Northeast Asia. It also is important to understand how in a 15-year period Japan went to constitutional reinterpretation and is now possibly on the brink of constitutional amendment.

In 1990 Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait resulting in a U.S.-led international military response approved by the United Nations. The U.S. built a coalition of 39 countries that provided military assistance, resulting in a resounding defeat of the Iraqi military during ground operations in February of 1991. The Persian Gulf War would

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1 Adam P. Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics of Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” Asia Policy, No. 24 (July 2017), 141.
be one of two crises acting as a catalyst to awaken the Japanese government to seek a role in international security. The LDP secretary-general, Ozawa Ichiro, wanted to dispatch Japanese Self-Defense Forces to the Middle East as part of the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force. However, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki cautiously opposed the deployment because it was constitutionally impossible and would require reinterpretation. The Japanese government would refuse the use of SDF ground troops because they might be required to use force even the use of cargo planes was disapproved on the grounds that the SDF was only allowed to fly overseas in support of training. Ultimately, Japan’s support to the Persian Gulf War was the donation of $13 billion and the deployment of minesweepers after hostilities ceased. Internationally this proved to be an unsatisfying result. The monetary contribution was not acknowledged by the Kuwaiti government and Tokyo’s checkbook diplomacy received international criticism. The United States also recognized that Japan’s crisis management proved suspect in that they could not be counted on to provide military support in a crisis. In March 1991, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost cabled Washington:

A large gap was revealed between Japan’s desire for recognition as a great power and its willingness and ability to assume these risks and responsibilities….For all its economic prowess, Japan is not in the great power league….Opportunities for dramatic initiatives…were lost to caution…[and] Japan’s crisis management system proved totally inadequate.

Once again, the United States pressured Japan to increase its role in international security. Japan could not provide a timely response based on the constitutional

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requirements of Article 9. However, The Persian Gulf War demonstrated a new found desire by Japan’s policy makers to be involved in international security for the first time since World War II.

The second event in the 1990s that propelled Japan towards reinterpretation was the first North Korean Nuclear crisis. In 1993 the United States discovered a secret North Korea nuclear weapons program. This was the beginning of the North Korea nuclear crisis which remains relevant today. The United States, Japan, and South Korea reached the framework for a treaty that would provide energy resources to North Korea in exchange for the dismantling of their nuclear weapons program. Subsequent North Korea nuclear weapons programs crises reappeared throughout the decades leading up to recognition in 2017 that North Korea has nuclear weapons. While the U.S. ultimately failed in its efforts to curb North Korean nuclear proliferation, the crises would fuel the push by Japanese policymakers to increase their military preparedness. In that aspect, this is the impetus to proponents of increasing defense capability. Even without reinterpretation, the North Korea problem fuels Japan’s push towards rearmament. Samuels asserts that the original crisis caused many Japanese to recognize that the world and their own neighborhood were dangerous places.

The third event of the 1990s that contributed to Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation is the rise of China. Beginning in the late 1990s, Japan and China saw their economic dependence on each other grow rapidly. By 2003, China had become responsible for more than 90 percent of the growth of Japan’s exports, and Japanese

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4 Samuels, 67.
5 Ibid., 68.
companies employed more than ten million Chinese. While most international relations theorists would point to strong economic ties as a sign of goodwill, it appears that China and Japan are competitors in all areas. In the 1990s, China also reasserted itself militarily in the region. The decade saw squabbling between the United States, China, and Japan over Taiwan. Arguments included U.S. and Japan support of separatists in Taiwan, Japan’s new defense guidelines expanding to include areas around Japan, and increased U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense that could range Taiwan in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile program. China would further escalate matters by continuously sending vessels into Japanese territorial waters contrary to international law. All of this happened despite the increased economic cooperation of each country. Richard Bush concludes that the Japan-China interaction regarding Taiwan left each country more suspicious of the other and that the issue ultimately increased insecurity in their relationship.7

The decade of 1990-2000 would see a dramatic shift in Japan’s policies dealing with international security, rearmament, and regional relationships. Japan demonstrated for the first time a will to be a security actor on the international stage. Increased competition from China, and North Korea’s nuclear program served as the impetus changing domestic perception in Japan about its role in the nation’s defense and what its capabilities should be. These actions drove Japan’s further involvement in international operations, and attempts at reinterpretation in the decade to follow. Perhaps Japan’s

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6 Samuels, 69.  
leaders finally had realized Yoshida’s evolving views on Japan’s future. In his memoirs, he remarked:

As Japan’s capacity expands, so also must its responsibilities. During the negotiations that preceded the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, I opposed rearmament by Japan and instead stressed the need for my nation to concentrate upon economic development….Since then, however, the situation in Japan finds itself has changed completely…. In the matter of defense, we seem to be advancing beyond the stage of depending upon the strength of other countries.⁸

The 1990s reflected a major transformation for Japanese security policy. The unfolding 2000s would again resemble how the previous decade started. On September 11, 2001 the terror attack on the United States brought about the Global War on Terror. The Bush administration sought coalition partners to participate in military operations in Afghanistan in 2002 followed by Iraq in 2003. Once again, the U.S. applied pressure on Japan for greater involvement in international security. Even before September 11th, Japan was already moving forward to expanding its authority for involvement in regions close to its border. In April 2001 Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro ordered a study of the government interpretation of Collective Self Defense (CSD). Within hours of the 9/11 attacks he issued six initiatives including solidarity with the U.S. and military support.⁹ Japan would provide naval vessels to refuel U.S. operations supporting Afghanistan in international waters. Many consider this Japan’s first major step toward CSD and again asserting itself in international security. However, this instance was much less clumsy than Japan’s support for the Persian Gulf War. Prime Minister Koizumi next expressed support for sending Japanese troops to Iraq. Japan deployed Soldiers in the Ground Self Defense Force to Samawah, Iraq to provide humanitarian support including engineering

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⁹ Samuels, 95.
and construction. Japan would also provide cargo aircraft to assist in moving supplies in and out of Baghdad.

Domestically the decision to deploy Japanese troops on an international mission was very unpopular. Despite this, Koizumi and the LDP party were reelected by reorienting the conversation to the North Korean threat and their tough stance on Pyongyang.\(^\text{10}\) In response to the Korean threat, Japan and the U.S. agreed to cooperate on ballistic missile defense of Japan. Koizumi was able to implement the missile defense cooperation plan with the U.S. while keeping Japan’s GDP military spending at 1% by cutting spending on tanks, ships, and aircraft. He also insured that part of the missile systems were built in Japan and integrated with the Japanese defense industry.\(^\text{11}\)

The military escalation of China during this decade also continued to be an important issue for Japan. While North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and ballistic missiles firing towards Japan are clearly the main motivation causing Japan to expand its military authorizations, the Japan-China relationship still played a role as well. This relationship continued to decline in the early part of the decade. The key parts of friction in the Japan-China relationship are a territorial issue concerning the Senkaku Islands, maritime frictions in the East China Sea, the Taiwain Strait, and Chinese belief that Japan must still atone for its actions during World War II. The heart of the previous mentioned issues are the definitions of economic exclusion zones (EEZ), definitions of what constitutes an island which can expand EEZs, and according to those definitions what country has the rights to develop resources within those zones. Both countries cite the United Nations

\(^{10}\) Samuels, 98.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., 104-107.
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but they also interpret it differently. Proximity and their competition for control in the area led to repeated violations of UNCLOS by China in sending multiple unsanctioned research vessels into Japanese waters. In 2008 the situation escalated when Japan passed legislation to strengthen its authority for the passage of ships through territorial waters including the Senkaku islands. In December of 2008, the Japanese Coast Guard confronted two Chinese vessels operating in the EEZ of the Senkaku islands. While violence was averted between the vessels, the incident demonstrated the potential for a future clash in the area.12

The past decade is both a further explanation of the rising tensions in Eastern Asia and an example of the present security dilemma in which Japan finds itself. The past 25 years demonstrate that the main cause fueling Japan’s rearmament and potential constitutional revision is the North Korean threat. That threat now looms larger than ever with a nuclear capable North Korea trading daily insults and war threats with Japan’s only military ally the United States. Every ballistic missile that North Korea fires towards Japan pushes it further into rearmament. At the same time, Japan’s growing military authorizations and capabilities are perceived by China as a threat as both powers wrestle over territory and resources in the East China Sea. Therefore China continues an aggressive plan to assert more military control over the East China Sea that includes building and militarizing islands out of coral reef. Wars have started for less.

12 Bush, 63-78.

Japan has a military that is on par with that of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. According to Global Firepower Japan is ranked 7th out of 133 countries in its 2017 power index which comparatively ranks waging a prolonged campaign against another country.\(^1\) This places it within the same comparative military means of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with India being the only country ranked higher than Japan that is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council.\(^2\) This is not an assumption one would make about a pacifist country.

Japan’s 1% GDP policy on defense spending would appear to limit Japan to a small modern self-defense force. Yet Japan’s robust economy keeps its defense spending on par with other global military powers. In 2014 Japan ranked 8th in the world in total military defense spending in U.S. dollars. The top seven were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Saudi Arabia, and Germany.\(^3\) Giving Japan even more spending power, they generally exclude how much is spent per year on military pensions.\(^4\) The 1% cap is successful in that it keeps Japan’s defense budget at roughly the same amount spent from year to year without any major fluctuation. For the years 2012 through 2017, Japan’s annual military defense budget has steadily held in between $44

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\(^2\) Ibid.


\(^4\) Kenneth L. Port, Transcending Law, the Unintended Life of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 115.
and $48 B per year, all close to the 1% GDP cap.\(^5\) It also must be taken into account that Japan is not a nuclear-armed country and therefore it does not spend defense money to maintain a nuclear arsenal. Japan’s cost sharing agreement supporting the United States military and bases within its borders are also not included in these figures. However, falling under the nuclear umbrella of the United States and providing bases from which the U.S. operates certainly adds to the Japanese defense posture.

While this proves that Japan maintains a modern and powerful military, it is troubling when comparing it to the relative defense spending of its competitors. China is the second largest spender on defense following behind only the United States. Most troubling for the Japanese-China relationship is that China is incrementally increasing its defense spending while Japan’s remains within its 1% GDP. Chinese government figures indicate that from 1998 to 2007, average annual GDP growth was 12.5%, military expenditures increased by an average of 15.9%, and total state expenditures increased by 18.4%. Jane’s estimates China’s current GDP spending for 2017 to be around 1.8% of GDP.\(^6\) Japan’s military expenditures are clearly not keeping up with China. However, Chinese defense figures are widely disputed and they are likely even higher than the government’s official statistics.\(^7\)

In March of 2017 Prime Minister Abe announced to the Japanese Diet an official break with the previous policy of restricting Japan’s defense spending to 1% of Gross

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Domestic Product. The immediate implication of this move is the expectation that Japan will increase its defense budget beyond 1% of GDP in order to continue strengthening of the JSDF. While it remains to be seen how much of an increase Abe will push for and what will be politically sustainable for the LDP, this again demonstrates the security dilemma that the escalating military tensions from both North Korea and China are forcing Japan to react by increasing its defense posture.

Most recently Japan’s news media reported that senior Japanese defense officials are considering a plan to procure the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to operate from its Izumo-class amphibious assault ships. Japan has two Izumo-class ships that were officially built as “helicopter destroyers” and commissioned in 2015. It is important to note here that even in 2017 Japanese officials are quick to correct anyone calling the vessels carriers. That would potentially deem them an offensive weapon and in contravention to Article 9. The plan quickly raised criticism from China. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said on 26 December, in response to questions on the report “Due to historical reasons, Japan’s moves in the field of military security have been closely followed by its neighboring countries in Asia and the international community at large. We urge Japan to adhere to the policy of ‘exclusive defense’, stay committed to the path of peaceful development, act cautiously in the area of military

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security and do more to enhance mutual trust between regional countries and promote peace and stability in the region, instead of the opposite,” she added.9

Evaluating defense budgets can be a confusing exercise. Especially when the official numbers of the country are left out, or do not comparatively include the same budget items. The important aspects to draw out of this analysis as it pertains to the region are:

1) Japan is already militarily relevant to its regional competitors based on its defense spending and arms purchases from the United States.

2) Many of Japan’s military capabilities deemed only defensive in nature could be used in an offensive manner and Japan is continuing to increase the capabilities of the JSDF. The use of STOVL aircraft on its helicopter destroyers is one example; another is the addition of amphibious operations to the capabilities of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF).10

3) Increased military spending by China extrapolated with its more aggressive tendencies in China’s seas are pushing Japan to continue to change its associated norms with Article 9.

4) Abe’s canceling of Japan’s 1% GDP policy in place since the 1970s will fuel higher defense spending budgets in Japan’s future if they are politically sustainable, creating another factor to increase regional tensions.

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Chapter 4: Pacifists or Defensive Realists?

Paul Midford asserts “Nascent attitudinal defensive realism was evident and widespread in Japan even before the end of the occupation.”¹ Historically the Japanese never doubted their right to self-defense. Midford further summarizes that Japanese public opinion is an extremely important part of the democracy. While it certainly is not a country with a majority of pacifists, distrust of offensive military capability, overseas deployments, and fear of entrapment continue to be the main reasons the public opposes the LDP amending the constitution. This paper previously mentioned the unpopularity of Prime Minister Koizumi’s deployment of SDF forces to Iraq. While PM Koizumi weathered this unpopularity, Japan was certainly not ready for an increased international security posture. Within a year of the JGSDF withdrawal from Iraq, a backlash in public opinion that caused Tokyo to reverse course saw Koizumi’s policy of expanding SDF deployments abandoned and ongoing commitments in the Indian Ocean and Sudan were scaled back.²

During Abe’s first term at Prime Minister in 2007 the LDP government pushed both amending Article 9 and expanding it to allow for Collective Self Defense and continuing to expand the operational scope of JSDF overseas operations. Additionally PM Abe proposed establishing a National Security Council based on the United States that would help Japan play a more active role in international security. Unfortunately for Abe these reforms were poorly timed. While he did succeed in upgrading the Japanese

² Ibid., 147.
Defense Agency to full ministry status, the revisions to Article 9 and Collective Self Defense proved extremely unpopular with the Japanese people. During elections that year Abe’s majority party the LDP suffered unprecedented defeats to its rival the DPJ giving them a majority in the upper house for the first time in 52 years. While the results were not exactly a referendum on constitutional revision and CSD, they did force the LDP to refocus their agenda on domestic insecurity issues first. PM Abe would resign just 2 months after the election results due to health issues. His efforts to create a Japanese style NSA were scrapped and the party saw a decline in popularity from 2007-2010 even losing its majority in 2009. Abe and the LDP regained power and the majority in 2012 after 3 years in the minority. Now in 2017 with the most recent election results the party is stronger than ever.

Ken Port writes that the endurance of the LDP is one of the biggest contradictions in modern Japanese politics. On the one hand the majority of Japanese consider Japan a pacifist state incapable of possessing a military. However, these same people continue to reelect the LDP into power and this trend continued with the recent October 2017 elections. The contradiction here is that the LDP is a hawkish, politically conservative party.

Paul Midford disagrees with Port on the assertion that the majority of Japanese are pacifists. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Midford emphasizes that the majority of Japanese were defensive realists over pacifists. During the Cold War, antimilitarist distrust of the state was strong, but public opinion never embraced unarmed

3 Midford, 148.
4 Kenneth L. Port, Transcending Law, the Unintended Life of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 93.
neutrality as promoted by Japanese Socialist Party elites. While initially the SDF was viewed with distrust, over time mass opinion has come to trust the SDF. The declining antimilitarist distrust has revealed a Japanese public that embraces defensive realist attitudes, recognizing military power as useful for homeland defense but not much else. He further asserts that there is little indication that the Japanese public is moving to an offensive realist view of the utility of military force and instead maintains a defense-dominant view of the utility of military power.5

The arguments by both Port and Midford help explain how the hawkish LDP has stayed in power for so long in Japan and why the seemingly simple issue of Collective Self Defense is so controversial. PM Koizumi was the first Japanese PM to push the SDF into overseas missions in support of the United States’ Global War on terror. From 2001 to 2008, the SDF took part in over 20 international peacekeeping missions with the majority of its effort supporting the United States’-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.6 The LDP suffered severe elections setbacks due to the unpopularity of the SDFs overseas involvement. In October 2017, when the LDP supported remilitarizing the SDF including expanding its missions set and spending on defense related systems the Japanese public supported Abe’s most recent referendum. This comes at a time when the U.S. is less involved in major deployments in the Middle East and regionally focused with president Obama’s Pivot to the Pacific to contain a rising China. With collective self-defense the Japanese are comfortable with regional conflicts where they can depend on the United States military might, however they do not want to be involved supporting U.S.

5 Midford, 172-173.
6 Port, 77.
Operations outside of their region because of an entangling collective self-defense agreement with their only ally.

During President Trump’s visit to Japan in 2017 Prime Minister Abe reiterated that Japan’s policy is that it would shoot down any North Korean missile aimed at Japan or if it were judged to pose an “existential threat” to Japan because it was aimed at the U.S. The shooting down of a missile aimed at the United States certainly would be an act of collective self-defense. This is another example of a changing norm as CSD that creates defensive actions is moving into the realm of acceptance in Japan and thus becoming another accepted reinterpretation of Article 9 with no formal amendment to the constitution. This is relevant for the United States because it shows that even if CSD is a revision that stands, the U.S. will only have a reliable ally that will quickly deploy military assets overseas if future Japanese administrations agree with the revision. Past examples display that any potential deployment will be debated and changed which will take time and it is most likely that the only CSD actions the U.S. can depend on in the Japanese alliance will be defensive, regional, and hotly debated with potential restrictions before they are approved.

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Chapter 5: International Relations and the “Normal” Country Argument.

It is important to analyze the regional relationships between Japan, China and North and South Korea as well. Even though World War II ended over 70 years ago, Japan’s military aggression, and war atrocities are still ripe in the minds of each nations’ citizens. The post war relationship of South Korea and Japan has historically been stunted and remains so due in part to the Japanese military sexual enslavement of Korean women during the war. During the first North Korean Nuclear crisis in 1991 Secretary of State James Baker cabled D.C. that ‘Japan's "bitter history" with the Koreas would "inhibit policy coordination," even though "Japan has important economic leverage on the North which the South will want to see used effectively.” Baker went on to write that “the Koreans made it clear that they did not want Japan involved in politics on the peninsula” and that “we will have an important role to play in mediating between the republic of Korea and Japan as we seek to keep both on the same policy track regarding North Korea.”

The historical relations between Japan and China are similar. Richard Bush writes:

More than any other country, Imperial Japan exposed and exploited China’s weakness, fostering a deep sense of victimization among the Chinese and leaving scars on the Chinese psyche. Those scars cause pain even today, as China returns to national health and its former status as a great power. In spite of joint efforts to reduce and manage tensions, China doubts that Japan will accommodate its expansion. For the Chinese, the shadow of the past darkens the future.

In any event regarding Japanese remilitarization the Chinese are very quick to invoke past atrocities that were the result of a militarized Japan. China’s response to the potential addition of F-35B STOVL aircraft to their Izumo class helicopter destroyers is a good example.

Japan’s conduct during World War II remain locked in the past but relevant in the present. Japan continues to make missteps in trying to atone for atrocities committed against its neighbors. Though it remains in negotiations on the issues, they do not seem to be close to being resolved anytime soon. In 2015 Japan and South Korea reached an agreement on the issue of the Japanese military forcing Korean women into sexual slavery during World War II. In exchange for an $8.8 million cash settlement from Japan to the dwindling survivors, South Korea would address the Japanese grievance of a “comfort woman” statue placed in front of its embassy in South Korea. In December 2017, the current South Korean President Moon called the settlement flawed and vowed that it did not solve the issue between the two countries.\(^3\) In November, activists placed statues of comfort women on South Korean public buses with the intent to ensure that younger generations of South Koreans are aware of the issue.\(^4\) China and Japan have a similar dispute over the Rape of Nanking, an incident in which the Japanese military committed unimaginable atrocities against Chinese civilians during World War II. In 2014 China established a national day of remembrance so that the event would not be

forgotten. In an article in the Washington Post titled “A (very) short history of Japan’s War apologies” Anna Fifield concludes that the big part of the problem is that Japan’s official apologies are partially undone by statements and actions of Japan’s public officials. Examples include Prime Minster visits to a Japanese War Shrine that contain convicted war criminals, the Japanese Justice Minister claiming the Nanking massacre was fabricated, and Tokyo’s attempts to have statues memorializing Korean comfort women removed. In her book “Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics” Jennifer Lind asserts;

Tokyo’s apologies have been perceived as too little, too late. Even worse, its politicians repeatedly shock survivors and the global community by denying past atrocities; its history textbooks whitewash its wartime crimes. Japan sees itself as pacifist, cooperative, and generous global citizens, with a strong antiwar and antinuclear identity. But after sixty years, Japan’s neighbors still see bayoneted babies. Relations between Japan and its former victims remain fraught with distrust.

While Japan has normalized relations with both China and South Korea that include strong economic ties, both China and South Korea continue to be extremely distrustful of any military efforts made by Japan. South Korea and Japan are the two largest and most influential allies of the United States in Northeast Asia. Yet the alliances are bi-lateral between the U.S. and each individual country, and must be managed carefully to meet like goals for all three countries as demonstrated by Secretary Baker. In the confines of a defensive alliance, having South Korea and Japan in military discussions is a difficult proposition because Japan’s conduct during World War II is still

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felt today across most of Asia. The Japanese are mindful of this regional anxiety and dedicate a large portion of their foreign aid budget to countries occupied by Japanese forces during World War II. In 2014, Japan provided foreign aid distributions to China, The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Japan provided foreign aid to the South Korea through the year 2010. Japan must learn to cease undoing its actions of goodwill by trying to stop the discourse of its actions during World War II. Until then regional relationships will continue to be negatively affected by this issue.

Discussion continues about the necessity for Japan to become a “normal” country. Normal country is defined as a country that can use all instruments of National Power, in Japan’s case including the military as a means to an end. Therefore, by this definition and the existence of Article 9, Japan is not a normal country in the mold of the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Amending or repealing Article 9 will allow Japan to be a larger player on the international stage, perhaps even leading to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security council. The “normal country” move would also lead to a new strategic relationship between the United States and Japan that completely changes today’s agreement. The United States and Japan would renegotiate current bi-lateral agreements resulting in less U.S. influence over Japanese military and international relations, potentially culminating with the removal of U.S. troops from Japan.
United States foreign policy is certainly a major contributing factor to Japanese remilitarization. The U.S. demonstrated in 1950 that its response to any major contingency would be to push for Japanese support ultimately with troops and not just economics. The “Yoshida Doctrine” shielded Japan from U.S. pressure up until the Persian Gulf War. However, the U.S. reaffirms every decade its wish for Japan to be more normal in the confines of military support to U.S. interests by its actions. The Persian Gulf War in the 90s, the Global War on Terror in the 2000s, and currently the deterrence of North Korea and China all included different U.S. administrations seeking the same goal. In 2014 President Obama praised PM Abe for his efforts to strengthen Japan’s SDF, to deepen the coordination between their militaries, and stressing the importance of CSD for deterring North Korea.\(^1\) During President Trump’s most recent visit to Japan in November 2017, he reiterated that Japan would be buying massive amounts of U.S. military equipment.\(^2\) Presently with the LDP owning a recently elected majority in both houses, established reinterpretation of CSD, and the 1% GDP military spending policy rescinded, it appears Japan might slowly be onto the normal country path.

This U.S strategy has the potential to be extremely short sighted as it pertains to U.S. interests. President Trump has backed off President Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific,” and continues to stress the importance of U.S. competition and alliances in the region. The U.S. is a big part of the strategy for defending Japan, and reciprocally receives major


strategic benefits from its current bi-lateral alliance with Japan. The strategic basing location and infrastructure that Japan provides to the largest overseas U.S. bases are irreplaceable real-estate if the U.S. were to be involved in a conflict in East Asia. Even if Japanese politics prevented offensive actions launching from these bases they still would provide intermediate basing and logistics support to any U.S. effort in Asia. In light of the current agreement with Japan it also is a bargain compared to agreements with other countries that the U.S. has major military bases. According to Pentagon estimates, Japanese host nation support provides more than 75 percent of the cost of stationing troops in Japan.13 Comparatively Germany only pays about 18% cost sharing for the United States bases located on German soil.14 Thus any declarations that pulling U.S. troops out of Japan would both save money and provide more strategic assets elsewhere prove to be disingenuous.

A new strategic relationship between the U.S. and Japan also could provide an ironic role-reversal. During the Cold War and the War on Terror, Japan feared that the alliance could drag Japan into a U.S. led war that had no interests for Japan. With Japan as a more active player in international security there is certainly potential that Japan’s actions and relationships with its neighbors might instead drag the U.S. into a war that is the product of Japanese foreign policy and not in the U.S. interests.15

There is a large counter argument to the “normal country” theory that asserts that it does not take into effect the underlying regional feelings about Japanese conduct during World War II as previously discussed. Even after 70 years, relationships in Northeast Asia have shown that while attitudes have changed since the end of World War II, they have not changed that much. Any weakening of Japan’s pacifist credo is expected to anger China and South Korea, where many still harbor bitter memories of Japan’s war atrocities committed during World War II.\textsuperscript{16} Japan’s wish for acceptance as a normal, even military, power conflicts with China’s preference that it remain just an economic power. For Japan to advance to the status of a military power or even a political power is contrary to the Chinese belief that it has not atoned.\textsuperscript{17} According to the Pew Research Center, attitudes between South Korea and Japan taken in recent polling after the October elections represent that South Korea still has a negative view of Japan. However, it has slowly increased positively over time.\textsuperscript{18} The Balkans demonstrated it could take multiple generations for cultures to forget past war atrocities inflicted on them by a neighbor. Richard Samuels contends:

\begin{quote}
that Japan has been completely “normal” since the end of World War II. It successfully managed its dependence on the United States throughout the Cold War, and continues to do so with considerable skill today. Japan has been doing what all states do to reduce risk and maximize gain in an uncertain world-it has
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Justin McCurry, “Shinzo Abe secures strong mandate in Japan’s general election,” The Guardian, October 22, 2017.
hedged…. while at the same time wielding an economic sword and a defensive shield.\textsuperscript{19}

Japan acting as a “normal” country without article 9 in place will definitively aggravate tensions with China, South Korea, and North Korea that were born out of World War II, potentially escalating current regional security dilemmas.

In his book on the post-modern state and the world order Robert Cooper defines Japan as the lone post-modern country surrounded by states firmly locked into an earlier age and that if China develops in an unpromising fashion, Japan could be forced to revert to defensive modernism.\textsuperscript{20} China’s emergence as a competitor and the actions of a nuclear North Korea have done exactly that. Article 9 is the only barrier to Japan taking a step back.

\textsuperscript{20} Robert Cooper, The post-modern state, and the world order (Demos medical publishing, 1996), 30.
Conclusion

At this point, there are no convincing arguments for Japan to fully amend its constitution. The only positive reason supporting that course of action is that it may serve as a deterrent to North Korea aggression. However, this is no sure thing and the actions of the United Nations and the United States current bi-lateral relationships may be enough to keep North Korea in its box. If there is another conflict on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. will rely heavily on its bases in Japan to support that conflict just as it did during the Korean conflict in the 1950s. On the other hand, several points support the counterargument to amendment of article 9.

The uncertain legality of Abe’s reinterpretation could ultimately lead to the revocation of the newly declared right of collective self-defense, leaving the United States exposed and unable to call upon the Japanese military support it relied upon in forming its foreign policy strategy in the region.\(^1\) While it is likely that the U.S. will pressure Japan to support another unexpected contingency not in its interests, the irony is that these continued actions by the U.S. may cause the Japanese to reinterpret collective self-defense and the LDP to lose power just as it did after deploying troops to Iraq in the 2000s. Both the U.S. and Japan must also understand that any change to Article 9, whether reinterpreted or amended, has a negative impact on its relationships with its neighbors due to lingering feelings from World War II.

In the examination of this issue, two things standout about Japan that are against the conventional wisdom. The first is that even though Japan has Article 9 and is

\(^1\) Jeffrey P. Richter, “Japan’s “Reinterpretation” of Article 9: A Pyrrhic Victory for American Foreign Policy,” Iowa Law Review Vol. 101, (February 21, 2016): 1236
routinely referred to as a pacifist nation; in reality, its population supports a country that is defensive realist. Public opinion in Japan is positive about the SDF and supports both a strong defensive regional posture and its regional role providing humanitarian support. Japanese voters strongly favor the LDP at the ballot box when it maintains defensive actions even reinterpreting to allow for collective self-defense. The actions of North Korea and Japan will continue to allow Japan to expand its defensive capabilities and it is likely that the acceptance of CSD will be the norm. The second revelation is that Japan is already a “normal country” in that it fully exercises all elements of national power. The creation and execution of the Yoshida doctrine and for over 40 years is perhaps the cleverest national policy maintained by a country and it certainly led to Japan’s resurgence on the world stage. Japan presently provides foreign aid to over 150 countries and is active in multiple international organizations including the United Nations. The only countries extremely distrustful of Japanese offensive military capability are those that it invaded during World War II.

The United States must recognize its role in providing security for Japan. The bilateral agreement between the two countries provides the United States basing that fully support its interests in the pacific at a fraction of the cost if the U.S. was unilaterally paying for those bases. The agreement also provides partnership on the important missile defense programs of both countries now that North Korea is a nuclear power. In exchange, the U.S. provides a security guarantee. Moving ahead, it is extremely important that U.S. administrations reaffirm their defense commitment to Japan. Future

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U.S. administrations should also reconsider any actions to pressure Japan for international military support outside of East Asia. The deterrent provided by a strong economic and defense partner is certainly worth the exchange of a token contribution to an international adventure elsewhere.

Japan needs to consider its future role and interests as a regional power as it debates the future of article 9. It is easy for the LDP to recognize that they can sustain defensive military improvements without fundamentally changing article 9. The potential domestic and regional backlash to changing article 9 certainly needs to be considered. On the diplomatic front Japan must work harder to atone for its actions of World War II. Recognition of those actions is only the first step. Japan’s failings in atonement stem from its official actions of being diplomatically angered when South Korea or China memorialize their victims. Japan is better served to take part in those memorials and accept that “comfort women” statues in front of their embassy are acceptable while clamping down on any atrocity deniers within its own country.

Both Japan and the United States must further develop dialogue with China so they are aware of the other’s military developments. Transparency on any defense build-up by Japan is key to ensure it does not create a Far East arms race. All three countries must also find a resolution to the escalating maritime issues in the South China Sea and around the Taiwan straits.

Japan as a country is truly unique among the world’s actors and that uniqueness has served Asian stability for over 70 years with article 9 in place. In the words of Robert
Cooper, “Advice for the postmodern state: never forget that security can be achieved more by cooperation than by competition.”\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{3} Cooper, 35.
Bibliography


*Nihonkoku Kenpo (Japanese Constitution) Article 9.* Tokyo, 1947.


