**MINDING THE MISSIONS: MISSION SETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY RESERVE**

Manifold, Marilyn G.  
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force Reserve

**ABSTRACT**

Twenty-first century United States’ federal military reserve mission sets matter to national security because the nation needs the right missions in reserve to maintain readiness and meet wartime demands. Each US service reserve takes on different types of mission sets and decides on mission sets in a service-specific vacuum without looking across the Department of Defense to achieve synergistic effects. The United States federal military reserve forces lack a unified methodology to decide which mission sets each reserve will perform, and this unsynchronized effort leaves the United States with a less effective reserve force. In an era of fiscal austerity, the Department of Defense cannot afford to purchase less than the full amount of military readiness that can be bought with each taxpayer dollar, and implementing the DepSecDef Mission Set Working Group and the OSD Reserve Affairs Reserve Integration Cell will set the United States on a course for the proper reserve capability to meet the nation’s requirements and maximize taxpayer investments for their defense.

**SUBJECT TERMS**

Military Reserve, Mission Sets, Readiness, Cost Savings
MINDING THE MISSIONS:
MISSION SETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY RESERVE

By

Marilyn G. Manifold
Lt Col, USAFR
MINDING THE MISSIONS:

MISSION SETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY RESERVE

by

Marilyn G. Manifold

Lt Col, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: Marilyn G. Manifold

20 April 2018

Thesis Advisor:

Signature: Dr. Bryon Greenwald, Col (Ret.), USA Professor, JAWS

Approved by:

Signature: James Golden, Col, USAF Instructor, JAWS

Signature: Miguel L. Peko, Captain, US Navy Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
ABSTRACT

Twenty-first century United States’ federal military reserve mission sets matter to national security because the nation needs the right missions in reserve to maintain readiness and meet wartime demands. Each US service reserve takes on different types of mission sets and decides on mission sets in a service-specific vacuum without looking across the Department of Defense to achieve synergistic effects. The United States federal military reserve forces lack a unified methodology to decide which mission sets each reserve will perform, and this unsynchronized effort leaves the United States with a less effective reserve force. Examination of the methodologies used to determine and prioritize mission sets for the Reserves, in terms of national need and reserve capability, and exploration of the use of a standard methodology across the Department of Defense to improve effectiveness, reveals two findings. First, waste and inefficiency in the mission set process stems from misaligned requirements and capabilities. Second, the Defense Department lacks a reserve integrating mechanism to facilitate cross-service exchange of ideas. The US Department of Defense should provide overarching guidance on what mission sets its reserve forces should perform based on deployment timelines and reserve suitability and should establish an integration mechanism for service reserves to share the results of their reserve mission set suitability and force structure analysis, as well as other innovative ideas across the reserve force.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first and foremost acknowledgment is to God, who has given me life and sustained me with His strength and His wisdom. Without Him I am nothing and all glory for this completed thesis goes to Him.

My next acknowledgment is to my husband, who has sacrificed above and beyond the call of duty to help me succeed in this endeavor. To my kids, thank you for understanding all the time away from you that this work entailed, and I look forward to much more playtime in the coming months.

Finally, thank you to all the professionals who went out of their way to assist with this project: Dr. Bryon Greenwald, Col Doug Golden, Col Jody Owens, Mr. Jeff Turner, and many other reserve professionals who steered me towards ideas and sources.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... v

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... vi

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Understanding Mission Sets .......................................................................................... 9

Chapter 3: Services: Current Structure, Historical Foundations, and Missions ...................... 19

Chapter 4: Synthesis ......................................................................................................................... 38

Chapter 5: Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 47

About The Author ............................................................................................................................. 64
Chapter 1

Introduction

If the reserve components of our Armed Forces are to serve effectively in time of war, their basic organization and objectives must conform to the changing character and missions of the Active Forces. Under modern conditions the quality and combat readiness of the reserve forces are more important than numbers. The nature of warfare has changed so drastically during the last decade that the whole concept of the roles and missions of the reserve forces must be re-evaluated.

—President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Budget Message, January 1961

The planners saw no way around it—the forces would not get there on the timeline the generals envisioned. The Theater Opening/Port Opening (TOPO) troops, who would pave the way for the rest of the package, were reservists and had to be called up from civilian status to proceed to the operating area. “Who thought that through? Didn’t they know we would need those assets on short notice?” wondered the lead planner, fruitlessly searching for any TOPO units on the active duty rosters. The plans team would have had no trouble putting an active duty team on the next jet out of town, but as it was, the force flow to theater was on hold.

Down the hall, another team worked the plan to build bases for US troops in the barren country specified in the execution order. They had to build the entire military support structure from scratch, since the United States had no established presence in the region. The team had sent requests to all the active duty Air Force PRIME BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Force) and RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineering) units, but the active component had recently reduced the number of these assets in a budget decision. Of the remaining active units, some of them were already operating in another active theater. Others were in the middle
of major equipment overhaul and not available for another four months. Because the team still needed more assets, they looked to the various service Reserves—only to find that several service reserves had recently reduced their number of these units as well. “How could this have happened? Didn’t the programmers find out what the active component and the other service reserves were doing before they cut those units?” the team leader wondered incredulously. Now the team was going to have to look for Plan B to get the bases built.

As these two hypothetical yet very possible scenarios highlight, failure to assign and maintain proper reserve mission sets can lead to mission delay or failure. Twenty-first century United States’ federal military reserve mission sets matter to national security because the nation needs the right assets in reserve to meet wartime demands. As military assets and training become increasingly expensive and time-consuming, the nation’s need to have the proper human capital on hand is its most pressing readiness requirement.¹ Each US service reserve takes on different types of mission sets via various methodologies, and up to this point, each of the reserve forces or their active counterparts decides on mission sets in a service-specific vacuum without looking across the Department of Defense to achieve synergistic effects.

The civil engineering specialty is one example of discordant mission set assignment. While the Air Force retained most of its civil engineering capability in the active component, the Army put most of its civil engineering capability in the reserve component. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq put a huge demand on the civil engineering enterprise, and by 2007, the Army was out of mobilization authority for its

reserve civil engineers. Active component Air Force civil engineers and Navy Seabees picked up a large number of “in lieu of” taskings for the tapped-out Army Reserve forces and are still shouldering much of the load. These additional taskings have broken Air Force civil engineer readiness for the unique mission set those units provide—aircraft beddown capability. The civil engineering field is just one example of the consequences of poorly managed reserve mission sets.²

The United States federal military reserve forces do not have a unified methodology to decide which mission sets each reserve will perform, and this unsynchronized effort leaves the United States with a less effective reserve force. The problem is two-fold: first, the service reserves sometimes choose or are handed missions that are ill-suited for the citizen-service model where service members are generally not in full-time military service, and second, the service reserves do not coordinate with each other on which mission sets each performs. Because the majority of service reserves do not have a methodology for selecting mission sets, they are missing the opportunity for analysis that would lead to better use of limited resources. Such an analysis would illuminate which mission sets each service reserve could fulfill most successfully, eliminating the waste that comes from standing up a mission, spending time and money trying to make it viable, and then perhaps spending more time and money remissioning or standing down the unit. Standing up a reserve integration mechanism would allow the service reserves not only to share the results of their reserve mission set suitability analysis but also to look at force structure numbers across the entire reserve force. This

Military member interview, 26 Feb 2018.
would eliminate wasteful spending such as standing up a reserve unit in one service when another service reserve just stood up three of the same units, exceeding combatant commander requirements for that type of unit. The resources spent to exceed the requirement could be channeled to other mission sets where the requirements are not being met, giving the United States more of the force it needs without increasing the budget.

This thesis examines the methodologies used to determine and prioritize mission sets for the reserves in terms of national need and reserve capability, and explores the use of a standard methodology across the Department of Defense to improve effectiveness. It also illuminates the lack of integrating mechanism among the service reserves and proposes the proper organization of the necessary integrating mechanism. To avoid waste and inefficiency from misaligned requirements and capabilities, the US Department of Defense should provide guidance on mission sets its reserve forces should perform and should direct integration efforts among the service reserves.

**Methods**

The overall approach for this thesis is a process analysis to discover how each reserve force determines mission sets, identifies best practices, and recommends mission set actions to increase the readiness and combat effectiveness of the United States federal military reserve forces. Background information provides an understanding of reserve mission sets and includes topics such as current guidance and barriers to reserve mission integration and utilization. Chapter 3 examines the historical foundations, key performances, current organizational structure and mission sets, and methods of assessing the five US federal military reserve forces’ potential missions. Besides compiling and examining previously published work on reserve mission sets, the author interviewed key
reserve members to gather up-to-date mission set information from across the services and used the information to direct further research and assess trends. Chapter 4 contains the analysis of the preceding chapters’ exposition about reserve mission set determination across the services and illuminates best practices and pitfalls. The final chapter summarizes the discussion and restates recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

This thesis references only unclassified sources, which limits mission requirement discussions based on Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Combatant Command Integrated Prioritization Lists (CCMD IPLs). Classification also limits the discussion of missions required by operational plans (OPLANS) and other current plans. Readers with access to those documents should examine their classified mission requirements in light of reserve capabilities and strengths.

**Definitions**

As the terms used to describe reserve structure and statuses are often unfamiliar to those outside the reserve community, it is important to clarify several key terms. First, there are different components of military service. *Active duty* refers to “full-time duty in the active military service of the United States, including active duty or full-time training duty in the Reserve Component.”\(^3\) The *Reserve Components* consist of the Army and Air National Guards, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.\(^4\) For clarity, this paper refers to the active component (AC) as is commonly used, but to the two types of Reserve Components separately. As used here, the Guard Component (GC) consists of the Army

---

\(^3\) *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2017), 5.

\(^4\) Ibid., 199.
and Air National Guards, and the Reserve Component (RC), on which this research is focused, consists of the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve, as shown on the right in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Service Reserves. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, 9/30/17. Credit: Joint Forces Staff College.

Within the RC, there are different statuses of service. Each reserve service has three categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve, both full-time and part-time, and the Individual Ready Reservists. Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) status refers to “National Guard and Reserve members who are on voluntary active duty providing full-time support to National Guard, Reserve, and Active Component organizations for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components.” Another full-time reservist status is military technician, which denotes a “Federal civilian

---

5 10 U.S. Code § 10141a.
6 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 194.
7 Ibid., 6.
employee providing full-time support to a National Guard, Reserve, or Active Component organization for administration, training, and maintenance of the Selected Reserve,“ while maintaining a part-time reserve status.⁸ Part-time reservists that are in a funded reserve billet are members of the Selected Reserve, and, along with the Individual Ready Reservists who are not currently in funded reserve billets but have had previous training and service, compose the Ready Reserve, liable for active duty as prescribed by Title 10.⁹ The Standby Reserve consists of “all members on the inactive status list of a reserve component, or who are assigned to the inactive Army National Guard or the inactive Air National Guard,” who are liable for active duty only in time of national emergency when the resources of the Ready Reserve are not enough to meet the emergency requirement.¹⁰ Finally, all reserve members who “receive retirement pay on the basis of their active duty and/or reserve service; those members who are otherwise eligible for retirement pay but have not reached age 60 and who have not elected discharge, and are not voluntary members of the Ready Reserve or Standby Reserve,” are part of the retired reserve.¹¹ Hereafter, references to the Reserve refer to the Selected Reserve.

Regardless of status, there are different ways that the nation can call on its reservists for full-time use. The National Guard, which normally operates under Title 32 of United States Code, can be called to federal service, which is “active duty to serve the United States Government under Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the

---

⁸ Ibid., 154.
⁹ Ibid., 194, 110.
¹⁰ 10 U.S. Code § 12301 and 12302.
¹¹ 10 U.S. Code § 12306.
¹¹ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 201.
Constitution and Title 10, United States Code.” An “order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service” is called activation. Once activated, Reserve Component units and individuals can be deployed or “recalled to replace deploying active units and/or individuals in the continental United States and outside the continental United States,” which is known as backfill. This process of activating reservists to expand Armed Forces capacity to meet the requirements for war or other national emergency is called mobilization. Finally, a unique provision of Title 10 called Presidential Reserve Call-up provides the President a means to “activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve), for not more than 365 days to meet the requirements of any operational mission, other than for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection.” Those reservists serving under Presidential Reserve Call-up or other partial or full mobilization are subject to stop-loss, which is a Presidential authority under Title 10 to “suspend laws relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the Armed Forces determined essential to the national security of the United States.” Thus, the President has vast power to utilize reservists for national security via the provisions in Title 10.

---

12 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 85. 10 U.S. Code § 12401 to 12408.
13 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 5.
14 Ibid., 23.
15 Ibid., 156.
16 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 186. 10 U.S. Code § 12304.
18 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 219. For more information regarding responsibilities and procedures for accessing the reserve component, see DoDI 1235.12.
Chapter 2

Understanding Mission Sets

The importance of adequate reserve forces to the security of the nation has been clearly demonstrated by recent world events.

—George C. Marshall
13 June 1951

The mission of United States Armed Force Reserve forces is spelled out in Title 10 United States Code (USC) §10102, “to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”¹ In light of this mission, the basic questions are what does the nation need the reserves to do most, and what can they do? In other words, what are the reserve requirements and capabilities?

Reserve Requirements

Determining reserve requirements is an ambiguous and difficult process, and what the nation needs of its reservists has changed over time. In light of the increased use of reserve forces after 9/11, as seen in Table 1, a debate rages as to whether US reserve forces should be strategic or operational, with concern over preserving the gains made by the service reserves during their time of increased operational tempo.² There is also tension between strategic needs, such as ensuring sufficient forces to execute national

---

¹ 10 U.S. Code § 10102.
operational plans (OPLANs), and operational needs, such as filling the global force management allocation plan (GFMAP).

Table 1. Reserve Mobilization Data 2001-2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Total Mobilized</th>
<th>Mobilized Once</th>
<th>Mobilized More Than Once</th>
<th>Not Mobilized</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>168,213</td>
<td>134,499</td>
<td>33,714</td>
<td>183,187</td>
<td>351,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>92,812</td>
<td>72,492</td>
<td>20,320</td>
<td>94,759</td>
<td>187,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>21,092</td>
<td>18,681</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>47,833</td>
<td>68,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>21,305</td>
<td>16,567</td>
<td>4,738</td>
<td>17,475</td>
<td>38,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>45,712</td>
<td>24,315</td>
<td>21,397</td>
<td>59,629</td>
<td>105,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>34,472</td>
<td>14,210</td>
<td>20,262</td>
<td>37,713</td>
<td>72,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Selected Reserve</td>
<td>383,606</td>
<td>279,214</td>
<td>104,392</td>
<td>440,596</td>
<td>824,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data indicate reserve component members mobilized for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, as of May 31, 2007.*

*Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.*

Another difficulty derives from how the need for reserve missions is communicated—discerning this need by reading through Combatant Command Integrated Priority Lists (CCMD IPLs) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is inefficient and ambiguous at best, so a more directive statement of reserve need is required. OPLAN and Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) analysis, while time consuming and limited by various classification restrictions, could generate a better statement of need, but it must be couched against the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) to determine need in sequence. It is also possible to look at utilization data to determine whether and how the United States uses the reserve force missions it has established thus far; but this data use gives a flawed perspective for two reasons. First, this data does not capture instances where a particular type of unit was needed but
not available, forcing planners to use another less-capable unit in its place or hire contractors at a much higher cost. Second, using utilization data to determine requirements is flawed because there is no utilization data for units that the nation may need but has not set up either due to low resource prioritization or organizational obstacles. Thus, there is no easy and accurate way to mine either documents or data for a list of reserve requirements.

Finally, it is difficult to locate actual guidance regarding reserve mission sets. Joint doctrine discusses both joint operations between the services and total force operations between the reserve and active components, but it does not give guidance on reserve missions. Additionally, the service reserves vary in their dedication to a static, unchanging set of missions versus a dynamic, evolving set of reserve missions. Various factors influence the demand for particular missions over time, to include service culture and Congressional pressure. Political pressure to preserve district resources makes it difficult to determine what the nation actually needs its reserve forces to do, and it is difficult to stand down current locations or missions if they are not replaced one-for-one by a new unit. Therefore, reserve requirements are unclear due to a variety of organizational and political culture issues.

**Reserve Strengths and Capabilities**

The reserve structure brings key capabilities to the US Armed Forces. The first capability is maximizing taxpayer return on investment in military training by retaining members leaving active duty for continued service in the reserve. For example, it costs
the nation approximately $11 million to train a fifth-generation fighter pilot, and when an active duty pilot joins the reserve, taxpayers continue to benefit from their investment.³

Another capability of the reserve is its ability to provide military power at a low life-cycle cost. A reservist is only paid when performing duty, and when the duty is complete, the reservist is returned to his or her civilian role and civilian pay provider. Reservists receive limited benefits when not on duty, and the reserve retirement pension process also lowers the reservist life-cycle cost, as it does not begin immediate payout at military retirement but instead delays payout until age 60.

Beyond cost-savings, the reserve model often provides the nation with warfighters of vast or unique military and civilian experience. For example, Air Force pilots must complete a ten-year commitment after completing pilot training, so by the time they are eligible to leave the service, they are undoubtedly at the peak of their operational expertise. By retaining a portion of that expertise in the reserve instead of losing it to the civilian sector through the member’s military separation, the Armed Forces benefit not only in operational efforts but in passing down that expertise to the next generation. Additionally, because the reservist often has previous or simultaneous civilian experiences analogous to their military careers, especially in fields such as firefighting, emergency medical services, or commercial airlines, the military benefits from the expertise reservists gain even when not on the Department of Defense payroll.

Finally, the Department of Defense benefits from the community connections that reservists typically entertain. Because reservists generally remain in one duty location

longer than their active duty peers, they become the “hometown team” when it comes to national defense. The local community normally rallies behind their reservists when they are called to duty, garnering positive media attention for schoolteachers, nurses, and policemen putting on the uniform and sacrificing for their nation. This positive attention is often the only military exposure for residents of communities located far from large military bases, helping ensure a supportive national populace for defense actions.

**Reserve Mission Criteria**

*You can pound a nail with a wrench but it damages the instrument and gets marginal results. Finding the best tool for the job at hand is important.*

—Mari Manifold

Despite all the strengths of the reserve, it cannot be successful at every mission. Because of its unique structure, the reserve has specific criteria that dictate where it can be successful. First, the reserve functions best when performing enduring missions. Due to its all-volunteer structure, which lacks the forcing function of the active duty orders process, reserve units are more sensitive to the disorder that results from mission standups, changes, or standdowns. Reserve members are often less mobile due to civilian job requirements and cannot easily relocate to a new base, mission, or unit; therefore, the reserves function better in missions that are anticipated to continue for the foreseeable future once established.

Second, the lack of an active duty orders process also affects what missions and locations the reserve can recruit. Potential reserve members must consider the location of both their military and civilian positions. Because no mechanism exists to force reservists to relocate, the reserve must stand up missions in places that afford sufficient quantities and the correct varieties of civilian jobs for its anticipated members. The
mission location must also provide enough quality of life to retain the reservist and any family members, as there is no method to force reservists to a suboptimal location.

One often-overlooked criteria for a successful reserve mission area is one where the active component continues to supply a share of the mission. A reserve mission functions better when the active component has at least a moderate equity in the mission area, supplying a pool of prior-service members available to join the reserve when they separate from active duty. If the active component does not have any equity in the mission area, the reserve is forced to assume the costs of maintaining a schoolhouse and other administrative and support functions, which increases the life-cycle cost of those reserve members.

Finally, the best reserve missions are those that fit a particular operations tempo. The reserve requires missions that maintain a 1:4 mobilization to dwell rate or more, where for every month mobilized, the reservist spends at least four months at home before being mobilized again.\(^4\) This *mob to dwell* rate affects reservists’ relationships with their civilian employers and families, as does the average duration of mobilization. Due to the reservists’ need to coordinate their departure with civilian employers, the Reserve prefers missions with at least a 72-hour response time for contingency response. Finally, a RAND study captured several other suitability factors for reserve missions, including favoring missions that have a surge demand, and not favoring missions with lengthy deployments, high requirements for continuation training, high steady-state deployment demand or steady-state operational tempo, lengthy processes for absorption of new accessions, high requirements to sustain readiness, undesirable basing locations,

\(^4\) DoDI 1235.12, Change 1, 28 February 2017, 20.
and missions with low connection to any civilian competencies, such as nuclear missile operators.  

**Barriers to Using the Reserve**

Besides the strengths and criteria discussed above, there are several unique barriers to integrating reservists into particular mission sets. First, there are unique legal barriers, such as the complicated array of methods/statuses with which the reserve provides support. According to DoDI 1205.18, there are two full-time reserve statuses, and rules dictate which status is required for specific types of work. Full-time Active Guard Reserve (AGR) servicemembers are permitted to organize, assess, recruit, instruct, and train the Selected Reserve, and guidance in Title 10 dictates when a service reserve position may be AGR status. Full-time military technicians (miltechs) can be used for organizing, administrating, instructing, or training of the Selected Reserve and have the additional primary duty of maintenance and repair of supplies or equipment issued to the Selected Reserve or the armed forces. Miltechs can be assigned a plethora of additional duties as long as they do not interfere with their primary duties, but they operate under government civilian employment rules when not on duty in their military reserve position.

In addition to the legal issues, there are intricate fiscal barriers when contemplating reserve mission sets. According to the Anti-Deficiency Act, reserve component personnel may not perform a mission assigned to the active component for which the active component has received congressional appropriations, either money or

---

personnel. For example, the Reserve cannot establish positions to do an active duty mission for which the active component has already funded positions, even if the active component has trouble filling them due to shortage of personnel with appropriate skills. Also, reserve missions must be careful not to violate the Economy Act by performing services for another federal agency without being reimbursed according to a signed agreement or order, such as using Air Force Reserve resources to perform services for the Federal Aviation Administration without a signed reimbursement agreement in place, even if those services ultimately benefit military aviation assets.

Though all organizations suffer the barrier of administrative bottlenecks and bureaucratic waste to some degree, the reserve faces this barrier to a greater degree than its active counterpart. Because the reserve lacks the active duty orders function to force members to particular units, the reserve must produce vacancy ads and recruit and interview to fill vacant billets. Also, the necessity to produce orders to duty for each period of military work is a substantial administrative burden and can be a detractor to placing a mission in the reserve if it requires frequent processing of complicated reserve duty orders.

Finally, the reserve faces several unique social-cultural barriers to successful reserve mission execution. For example, setting boundaries is a unique reserve obstacle. Reserve forces do not want to say no to active duty requests, even if the mission does not fit, because they are typically already trying to overcome the perception that they are second-class citizens within the military due to their part-time status. In order to be perceived as equals, reservists often attempt to contribute like the active component in

---

7 31 U.S. Code § 1535
whatever needs to be done, in a “chameleon-like quest for relevance.”

This social-cultural dynamic can also play out in programming gamesmanship, where a service reserve desires to get into particular mission sets because that is where the funding is going at a particular time, such as the current pursuit of cyber and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission sets. Finally, the active force manpower shortfall tempts all involved to fill that shortfall with reserve manpower even if the mission is not a good fit, or alternately, the shortfall leads the active component to attempt to pass off low-priority/legacy/niche missions to the reserve component in order to repurpose the active manpower to higher priority missions. Neither results in the best mission sets for the reserve component.

**Summary**

The most important questions to ask in understanding reserve mission sets are “What does the nation need the reserves to do?” and “What can they do?” The first question is challenging because determining reserve requirements is an ambiguous and difficult process. What the nation needs of its reservists has changed over time, and clear reserve requirements are not delineated in key guidance documents. Reserve requirements are also ambiguous because they are influenced by organizational culture, fiscal environment, and political pressure. The second question is equally as challenging because the citizen-service model has both unique strengths and unique criteria that must be met for successful employment. The reserve can best bring its strengths, such as maximizing return on taxpayer investment, retaining top-quality expertise, and forging connections with the community, when it is leveraged within the proper criteria such as

---

8 Military member interview, November 2017.
enduring missions in recruitable locations with a proper operational tempo and active component mission share. If the above criteria are met and advocates successfully negotiate the legal, fiscal, bureaucratic, and cultural barriers, a mission set is likely to be successful in the reserve force.
Chapter 3

The Services: Current Structure, Historical Foundations, and Missions

To understand the distinct and enduring personalities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force is to understand much that has happened and much that will happen in the American military and national security arenas.

—Carl H. Builder

The origins and history of each service reserve influences its organizational perspective and the missions it performs today. Each service reserve organizes itself differently, either as a cause or an effect of the mission sets it performs, and the organization’s endstrength, listed in Table 2, reflects both its missions and its culture.

Table 2. US active and reserve endstrengths.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation/Service</th>
<th>Active Endstrength</th>
<th>Reserve Endstrength</th>
<th>Reserve percent of total service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>472,049</td>
<td>194,319</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Nat’l Guard</td>
<td>343,605</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force</td>
<td>318,580</td>
<td>68,798</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Nat’l Guard</td>
<td>105,670</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Navy</td>
<td>319,492</td>
<td>57,824</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Marine Corps</td>
<td>184,401</td>
<td>38,682</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
<td>40,600</td>
<td>6,221</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US data current as of 09/30/17, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp

The Army Reserve has the largest federal reserve endstrength, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves have mid-sized reserve forces, and the Coast Guard maintains the smallest reserve. While endstrength is foundational to service culture, understanding the current organizational structure, historical foundations, and resulting mission methodologies are key to further discussions of service reserve mission sets. In Examining the Army Reserve historical foundations in detail will illuminate many historical events that also impacted the other service reserve historical timelines.
Army Reserve

According to the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, “the Army Reserve comprises 20 percent of the total Army endstrength at a cost of only 6 percent of its budget.”\(^1\) The publication notes that “the core competencies of the USAR are combat support and combat service support,” accounting for “18 percent of the total combat support capability and 36 percent of the combat service support capability in the Total Army.”\(^2\) Diving further into the capabilities of the Army Reserve, “the Army Reserve is structured to manage specialized capabilities, including those not present anywhere else in the joint force: theater-level transportation and sustainment, theater engineer commands, civil affairs, and biological-agent defense. Additionally, the USAR maintains the majority of Total Army capability in many areas: civil affairs, quartermaster, military information support operations, postal and personnel management, and chemical agent defense.”\(^3\)

The Army Reserve traces its roots to 1756 during the French and Indian War as the first federated Citizen-Soldier force.\(^4\) After independence from England, America, a regional power bounded by vast oceans, generally required only a small standing Army and state militias.\(^5\) However, shortages during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, threats of Mexican cross-border raids, and World War I combined to bring about the National Defense Act of 1916, which, among other things, established the Army’s Officer and Enlisted Reserve Corps.\(^6\)

---

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 4.
As the United States assumed the role of a global power, this reserve establishment laid the groundwork to facilitate US overseas power projection. The Army Reserve sent 170,000 officers and enlisted personnel to Europe for World War I and began to call up reservists for World War II in June 1940. The nation sent over 200,000 Army Reservists across the globe during the Second World War, which ushered in an era of the United States as world guardian and shaped the future of the Reserve.

It became apparent that the United States needed a larger, more ready force to address the post-war world order, which was solidifying into the massive Communist resources of China, the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact versus the United States and its allies. The Army Reserve was the Army’s solution to the requirement, and the nation called 240,000 reserve soldiers to active duty for the Korean War. The Army Reserve made diligent efforts to maintain unit integrity and esprit de corps by not removing individual soldiers from their units to augment active forces. This action was influential in Army Reserve culture, as the official history recounts, because “the Army attempted to mobilize and deploy fully trained and manned Army Reserve units at the outbreak of the conflict. Thus, the lessons learned from the Korean War set the precedent for readiness of all Army Reserve organizations in future call-ups.”

The final stages of the Vietnam War brought about significant changes for the Army Reserve. The Army Reserve had only been activated twice since Korea, providing 68,500 Army Reservists for the Berlin Crisis in 1961-62 and nearly 6,000 for the early

7 Ibid., 4, 6.  
8 Ibid., 6.  
9 Ibid., 8.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid., 10.
stages of the Vietnam War. Even after the 1967 creation of the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, the active Army handled most crises without using the Reserve.\(^{12}\) In the later stages of Vietnam, however, Congress reduced active Army endstrength from 1.5 million to 785,000 soldiers and transitioned to an all-volunteer force.\(^{13}\) The Department of Defense announced a “total force policy” that encouraged a shift towards “increased reliance on reserve component units for rapid deployment to military operations.”\(^{14}\) This policy became known as the \textit{Abrams Doctrine}, named after Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., and shifted important combat support and combat service support roles, responsibilities, and resources to the Army Reserve, though scholars debate its intent.\(^{15}\)

The classic interpretation of the Abrams Doctrine is that he wanted to ensure the country never again went to war as in Vietnam without the support of the populace, so he designed a structure that would make it impossible to go to war without the capabilities lodged in the reserve.\(^{16}\) The theory suggests, for those who take this side of the debate, that the reserve forces are more connected to their communities, and that if the communities did not support their “hometown team” being activated for the cause in question, the population would stand up to limit government actions towards war.\(^{17}\) Recent scholars, however, find no primary sources that attribute that belief to General Abrams.\(^{18}\) Conrad Crane, chief of historical services for the Army Heritage and

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 11.  
\(^{13}\) Ibid., 10.  
\(^{14}\) Ibid.  
\(^{15}\) Ibid.  
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 11.  
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
Education Center at Carlisle Barracks and a former director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and RAND senior historian Gian Gentile believe that General Abrams was simply using the reserve to mitigate large manpower cuts taking place in the active component and to help deal with the duplicative effects of expanding active forces through the draft rather than activating the reserve forces.\(^\text{19}\) While it may be impossible to resolve the debate over the true intent of and need for it, the Abrams Doctrine has deeply influenced Army Reserve force structure by entrenching the perceived requirement to place mission critical assets in the Reserve to make sure political leaders cannot go to war without calling up the Reserve.

Similar to the shift in the early 1970s, the Army Reserve experienced several influential events in the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War allowed the lower-level conflicts simmering beneath the surface of the great power conflict to boil up, and the new US role as sole remaining superpower coincided with a significant increase in US interventions abroad. In 1990, the Army activated 80,000 reservists for Operation DESERT STORM, including 21,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve.\(^\text{20}\) The desire for a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War, combined with the drawdown after DESERT STORM, caused the Army to reduce endstrength.\(^\text{21}\) The dawn of the information age and the rise of digital technology simultaneously caused the combat support and combat service support fields to multiply and become more complex, requiring a more skilled workforce.\(^\text{22}\) According to a history of the U.S. Army Reserve, “Faced with implementing a global peacekeeping mission with a greatly curtailed

\(^{19}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Army Reserve: A Concise History, 14.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
military budget and active military force, Congress intended to leverage the reserve components and the new technologies to make up the difference.”23 This leveraging caused Congress to create the Army Reserve Command in October 1990 and initiate the modern concept of an operational reserve force.24

As the Army manpower and budget levels dropped, Army leadership signed the 1993 Offsite Agreement to compromise on Army component force structure.25 The active Army continued to focus on combat arms, while the Army Reserve took on the combat support and combat service support roles at corps level and above.26 The compromise left the remaining combat arms capability and the divisional-level combat support and combat service support responsibilities to the final Army component, the Army National Guard.27

**Army National Guard**

The Army National Guard (ARNG) declares its birthdate to be 13 December 1636, when, based upon an order from the Massachusetts Bay Colony's General Court, the Colony's militia was organized into three permanent regiments to better defend the colony from the Pequot Native American tribe.28 The ARNG, which is broken down into seven geographical commands and 21 functional commands, employs part-time forces similar to the reserve that allow the ARNG to provide 34 percent of the Army’s total personnel for only 10 percent of the Army’s base budget.29 Unlike the federally-

---

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 12, 14.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 National Guard, *How We Began*, accessed 7 Jan 18 at http://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/How-We-Began/
29 *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*, 1-29.
controlled reserve forces, however, ARNG forces are under the control of their respective state or territorial governor unless federalized for a national emergency. As such, the ARNG is ideally suited for and most often used under the Homeland Defense mission.

In accordance with the 1993 Offsite Agreement, the ARNG maintains a mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities, including several unique and emerging mission sets. Missions unique to the National Guard, which often draw upon citizen-soldiers’ civilian skills, include Civil Support Teams, Safety and Security Battalions, Agricultural Development Teams, counter-drug programs, and the State Partnership Program, which links a state’s National Guard forces to another country’s military forces in order to build long term assistance relationships.\(^\text{30}\) The ARNG has other missions that are not exclusive to the ARNG but reside there predominantly, such as the Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise, which is 66 percent ARNG forces.\(^\text{31}\) The ARNG is also well-qualified for emerging missions such as Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs). By 2018, the ARNG will have CPTs in 24 states, reinforcing the Department of Defense’s highest priority cyber mission, defense of the network, by providing 32 percent of the cyber force.\(^\text{32}\) According to joint publications, “the National Guard is uniquely positioned for vital aspects of this mission, and is able to leverage existing communication channels with state and local governments, the authority to act at the state level, and understanding of local utility company operations to make it a force multiplier for cyber protection of critical infrastructure.”\(^\text{33}\) Thus, although the framers of the 1993

\(^{31}\) The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1-29.
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
\(^{33}\) Ibid.
Offsite Agreement likely did not have agricultural farming and computer network defense in mind, the ARNG continues to fulfill its broad range of mission sets for both state and federal purposes.

**Air Force Reserve**

The Air Force Reserve, like its active component, has more recent origins than the Army. In December 1945, in response to the Army Air Forces’ growing role, an Army Air Force officer joined what was then the Office of the Executive for Reserve and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) Affairs. The Army Air Force officer “advised and assisted the executive in Army Air Force Reserve and ROTC Affairs,” liaising with all agencies in the Army Air Force Headquarters related to the Organized Reserve Corps and ROTC. Two years later, the Air Force Reserve was officially created by the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Air Force and its reserve components.

The Joint Mid-Range War Plan and the Twining Memorandum, released soon after the establishment of the Air Force Reserve, created enduring expectations for employment. Released in late 1954, the Joint Mid-Range War Plan identified a D-Day requirement for 51 tactical Air Force Reserve wings. In order to meet the D-Day requirement, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining’s January 1955 memorandum advocated that Air Staff thoroughly reexamine all “plans, policies, and

35 Ibid.
programs pertaining to tactical and support units of the Air Reserve Forces.”

The Twining Memorandum urged Air Staff to reorient its budgetary efforts to achieve the requirement by “fully equipping Reserve units with aircraft capable of carrying out the D-Day mission; provision[ing] adequate facilities and full unit equipment; and supervis[ing] and inspect[ing] training programs with an end toward reaching an acceptable degree of combat capability at the earliest practicable date.”

The cultural expectation of a rapidly available Air Force Reserve, initiated through the Twining memorandum, endures and manifests itself today in many Air Force Reserve operational capability documents with short notification-to-deployment windows.

According to the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, “the USAFR comprises 14 percent of the Air Force total endstrength, and executes 28 percent of the combat search and rescue, 22 percent of the theater airlift, and 22 percent of the Air Force’s strategic airlift capability.” In addition to sharing missions with the other components, the Air Force Reserve (AFR) has unique missions that only it executes, such as aerial weather reconnaissance, or hurricane hunting, in support of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Hurricane Center. The aerial spray mission, intended to control the spread of pests and other unwanted items through aerial distribution of pesticides, herbicides, or oil-dispersant chemicals, is also an AFR-unique mission.

38 Ibid., 142.
39 Ibid.
40 Military member interview, 11 Feb 2018.
42 Ibid.
Beyond stand-alone, unit-equipped reserve units and individual augmentees, the Air Force Reserve has two different types of associations. In a classic association, active and reserve component members perform duties on equipment owned by the active component. In an active association, active and reserve component members perform duties on equipment owned by the reserve component. A RAND study published in 2014 entitled, *Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components*, gives general guidance on which arrangement is best for which mission sets, based on factors such as cost, employment, and absorption rates. The Air Force Reserve uses a variety of methods to determine what missions to undertake and with what structure. These methods include evaluating potential missions with a Roles and Missions Assessment Team, providing input to the tri-component Total Force Continuum process, assessing active component appetite for each mission set into a product known as the High Confidence Model, and using statistical analysis methods to determine desired end state in each mission area. All of these methodologies lead into the programming prioritization model, which attempts to resource the highest priority missions based on annually-set criteria. Thus, the Air Force Reserve goes to great lengths to ensure it participates in the most relevant mission sets.

**Air National Guard**

The Air National Guard, which also has its roots in the National Security Act of 1947, comprises roughly 21 percent of the Air Force total endstrength, and executes

---

44 Active and reserve US Army Aviation units are in the beginning stages of using the associate unit concept as well.
almost 50 percent of the Air Force’s tactical airlift support, combat communications
functions, aeromedical evacuations, and aerial refueling capability.\textsuperscript{47} The Joint Staff
Officer’s Guide highlights several ANG-predominant missions, such as operating 17 of
18 Aerospace Control Alert Sites across the United States, and several ANG-unique
missions such as Antarctic Air Logistics, Airborne Military Information Support
Operations, and the State Partnership Program to build air-minded security force
assistance relationships.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Navy Reserve}

The Naval Reserve traces its beginnings to 3 March 1915, when it was established
as the Federal Naval Reserve.\textsuperscript{49} As with the Army, the looming threat of World War I
brought increased emphasis on reserve forces, and on 29 August 1916, the Federal Naval
Reserve was reorganized and renamed as the U.S. Naval Reserve Force.\textsuperscript{50} Also similar to
the Army, the Naval Reserve supported World War I and was essential to US success in
World War II and Korea, but saw generally lower levels of mobilization during the Cold
War.

Because the Navy does not have a National Guard component, it relies entirely on
its reserve component for augmentation. The Navy Reserve comprises roughly 15
percent of the Navy total endstrength, and, while it does not own surface ships or
submarines, it can support nearly every mission area in the Navy with staff
augmentation.\textsuperscript{51} Contrary to the Army model of sending reserve units forward, the Navy

\textsuperscript{47} The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1-30 – 1-31.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} US Navy, \textit{Navy Reserve Celebrates 100 Years}, accessed 3 Jan 18 at
http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/deptStory.asp?dep=8&id=85885
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} DMDC statistics, accessed at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
surge model surmises that in the event a surge is needed, active sailors on shore duty would augment the sea duty units, and generally reservists would backfill the shore duty positions. Exceptions to that model include USNR-unique mission sets such as air logistics and tactical adversary strike-fighter support, and USNR-predominant missions such as mobile construction, coastal riverine, cargo handling, and Navy expeditionary logistics missions.\textsuperscript{52} With less emphasis on maintaining reserve unit integrity and equipment, the Naval Reserve is highly operationally integrated into active units across the fleet.

**Marine Corps Reserve**

President Wilson created the Marine Corps Reserve on 29 August 1916 by signing the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 in anticipation of World War I.\textsuperscript{53} Marine Corps reservists served alongside their active compatriots in World War I, World War II, and Korea, with Marines in the trenches giving little care whether the Marine beside them was active or reserve.\textsuperscript{54} Marine Corps members are well known to be fiercely loyal, with the reservists particularly so, asserted Director of the Marine Corps Reserve, Colonel Julius Turrill, in August 1929: “Let us give the credit that is due the members of the Reserve … they are Marines, who from motives of patriotism and love of Corps alone are devoting their vacation days to the service without reward and at considerable personal sacrifice.”\textsuperscript{55} Equally impressive to their loyalty was their valor, as 44 of the 82 Marine Medals of Honor in World War II went to reservists.\textsuperscript{56} During the Cold War, the nation

\textsuperscript{52} The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1-30.
\textsuperscript{53} US Marine Corps Reserve, United States Marine Corps Reserve—100 Years, accessed 3 Jan 18 at http://www.marforres.mil/USMCR100/History/
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
did not call up Marine Corps reservists in great numbers, but the Persian Gulf War in 1990 saw a return of the MCR to major battle alongside their active counterparts.\textsuperscript{57}

Today, the Marine Corps Reserve makes up roughly 17 percent of the Marine Corps total endstrength.\textsuperscript{58} The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, which lists the MCR motto as “Augment, Reinforce, Support,” details that “Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) is the largest command in the Corps. . . consisting of a Marine Division, a Marine Air Wing, a Marine Logistics Group, and a Force Headquarters Group.”\textsuperscript{59} In addition to these reserve units in command architectures that mirror active Marine Expeditionary Force units, the Marine Corps Reserve includes USMCR-unique units such as mortuary affairs, the only USMC tactical aggressor squadron, and four USMCR Civil Affairs Groups, the Corps’ entire civil affairs capability.\textsuperscript{60} Despite providing unique capabilities such as civil affairs, the Marine Corps Reserve prides itself on being just like active component peers, bonded in Corps loyalty and ready to answer the call.

\textbf{Coast Guard Reserve}

Congress established the Coast Guard Reserve on 19 February 1941 by signing the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act into law.\textsuperscript{61} Since that time, the Coast Guard Reserve has been mobilized for both major contingencies such as World War II, where 92 percent of serving Coast Guard members were reservists, and domestic operations such as crash search and recovery, hurricanes, floods, oil spills, space shuttle security zone enforcement, and evacuations.\textsuperscript{62} Today, the Coast Guard Reserve accounts for 13

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{58} DMDC statistics, accessed at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
\item\textsuperscript{59} The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1-30.
\item\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{61} US Coast Guard Reserve, \textit{USCGR History}, accessed 3 Jan 18 at http://www.reserve.uscg.mil/about/history/
\item\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
percent of the Coast Guard total endstrength and has both units and individual augmentees. 63 According to the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, “the USCGR’s primary mission focus and Coast Guard-unique capability is Port Security.”64 The USCGR operates eight Port Security Units “staffed with 96 percent reserve Coast Guardsmen, which provide security for military and critical logistics material and handling facilities.”65 Port Security Units are both expeditionary and domestic, and “can deploy within 24 hours and establish operations within 96 hours, conducting OCONUS port security for CDRs through waterside protection to key assets. . . PSUs are [also] capable of operating in US territorial waters.”66 Not only is Port Security the top statutory Coast Guard mission by percentage of total Coast Guard operating expenses, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 clarifies Port Security as one of the five Homeland Security Missions, along with Drug and Migrant Interdiction, Defense Readiness; and Other Law Enforcement.67 In contrast to the single-mission unit program, over 5,000 individual augmentees serve in various roles such as Defense Operations, Port Waterways/Coastal Security, Response Operations, and Incident Management.68 These mission areas are an excellent use of reserve forces because they are the most likely to require surge or contingency operations. Clearly, the Coast Guard Reserve units serve in a vital mission set for national defense, and the augmentees serve in logically-selected mission sets that require episodic surges of personnel.

67 US Coast Guard Historian, Missions, accessed 3 Jan 18 at http://www.history.uscg.mil/Missions/
68 Military member interview, 22 Dec 2017.
A Shared Experience

While each service reserve has a unique blend of its active service culture and a reserve-specific culture, they have touchpoints of similar experience based on common national history. The Reserve has seen periods of dramatically increased and decreased demand over the course if its existence. The two World Wars saw extremely high use of the reserve components due to attrition on the front lines. The Cold War period typically saw decreased demand for the Reserve, with little reserve participation in Vietnam or Operations EAGLE CLAW, URGENT FURY, or JUST CAUSE. Post-Cold War events saw an increase in reserve participation with high numbers of reservists participating in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and follow-on operations in those areas, as depicted in Figure 2.

![Sustained Use of RC Forces](image)

*Figure 2: Reserve Duty Days (Historical). Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserve, (Falls Church, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1 Nov 2016), 26.*

After DESERT STORM, the Reserve Component served to relieve stress on the
Active Component but was also called on to provide unique capabilities for the conflicts of the 1990s:

At the time, the combination of force downsizing, reduced budgets, and rising operational tempo increased the stress on the active forces and made use of the Reserve Component essential. As a result, use of the Guard and Reserve increased both as a way to relieve that stress and because the Reserve Component was the repository for capabilities needed in the later phases of major theater war, particularly in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts abroad, and in conducting HD missions at home. These capabilities—such as civil affairs, military police, and air traffic control—were unexpectedly crucial to U.S. commitments in operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as to [US] post-September 11, 2001 operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the homeland.69

Thus, the decreasing manpower numbers and increasing requirements led to increased use of the reserve component in the 1990s and also to an increased comfort with using their capabilities in a more operational role.

The 2006 QDR addressed the concept of the operational reserve in the context of being fully engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq: “The Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today. During the Cold War, the Reserve Component was used, appropriately, as a ‘strategic reserve,’ to provide support to Active Component forces during major combat operations. In today’s global context, this concept is less relevant.”70 This line of thinking reflects a short-sighted belief that the events of 2001-2015 represent a permanent change to the type of adversary the United States will fight. As the 2017 National Security Strategy confirms, the United States is engaged in planning against near-peer competitors such as China and Russia, and the potential for

69 Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component, (Department of Defense, 5 April 2011), 16.
major combat operations against North Korea is high, revealing that strategic support to Active Component forces during a major combat operation is not an irrelevant concept of the past.\textsuperscript{71}

As resources become tighter, expecting a 100 percent operational reserve to be ready when called upon to fill the strategic reserve role is unrealistic. The active components have become reliant on the reserve components to meet their operational requirements, making a wholesale return to a strategic reserve nearly impossible. To meet a growing number of active component requirements that the active component cannot fill, for example, the Air Force is offering Reserve members VLPAD, or \textit{Voluntary Limited Period of Active Duty}, tours. During a VLPAD tour, a reserve member enters the active duty billet for a set amount of time not to exceed three years and then returns to the reserve. The VLPAD program has both positive and negative consequences for the reserve and its members. While VLPAD allows qualified reserve members to fill vital vacancies on the active roster, gaining career opportunities and bringing their unique experience to the fight, the program requires that the reserve members continue to count against reserve endstrength numbers while in the active billet. This requirement causes the reserve to lose that manpower for the duration of the VLPAD commitment, and the Air Force Reserve is just beginning to analyze the impact of that loss.

The VLPAD program is limited to three years due to another barrier to operational use of the Reserve, the “1095 Rule.” This rule applies to all services and mandates that no reservist perform more than 1,095 duty days in a 1,460 day window,

excluding active duty for training days or mobilization tours, unless a waiver is obtained from the Service Secretary. This rule limits reserve volunteerism, as do other policies that disincentivize volunteerism by not giving benefits, such as pay or health coverage, or operational tempo credit, such as protection from involuntary mobilization immediately following return from a voluntary mobilization. The increase in involuntary mobilizations can impact readiness as individuals faced with involuntary mobilization often opt for separation or retirement. Thus, there are clear risks in continuing to use reserve forces in this way.

**Summary**

Carl Builder, in his book *The Masks of War*, asserts that arguing each service has a distinct and enduring personality is relatively easy; however, “making them credible and vivid, so they result in empathetic understanding and a reliable basis for action, is a much more extensive undertaking.”

The Army Reserve, the largest federal service reserve, has its missions constrained by the 1993 Offsite Agreement. The Air Force Reserve, the youngest service reserve, has a culture geared towards proving AFR relevance both with the active Air Force and with other services, particularly the land services. The Naval Reserve has very little equipment of its own, so it is easier for the active Navy to dictate what the Naval Reserve looks like. The Marine Corps Reserve has a culture of self-sufficiency and prides itself on being interchangeable with active counterparts, ready whenever the Marine active component calls. Finally, the Coast Guard Reserve units support the top mission of the Coast Guard, and its individual augmentees support mission areas requiring episodic surge. Despite operating under

---

common current conditions, the unique challenges and historical influences of each service reserve have shaped divergent perspectives on mission sets and overall reserve integration.
Chapter 4
Synthesis

"Everyone takes the limits of his own vision for the limits of the world."

—Arthur Schopenhauer

The service reserves each have their own way of determining their mission sets. The ways vary in regards to degree of decision-making autonomy as a result of their relationship with the active component and, in the case of the Army and Air Force, with their guard components. The methodologies also differ due to legal arrangements, size, mission equipment, and service culture.

The Army Reserve, despite being the largest federal reserve force and having the largest percentage of total service force of any federal service reserve, has very little autonomy due to the restrictions set in the 1993 Offsite Agreement, which dictates that the Army Reserve will only have combat support and combat service support. Historically, the Army has the hardest time with cross-component relations, with the active component having little regard for the guard component and even less for the reserve component.¹ With prevailing beliefs that part-time soldiers do not perform comparably to active component soldiers reaching even the highest general officer ranks, the Army Reserve has little strength with which to advocate for different mission sets, especially combat mission sets.² In the competition for combat roles, which are perceived as desirable missions from both prestige and resourcing perspectives, the

¹ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, National Guard Commanders Rise In Revolt Against Active Army; MG Rossi Questions Guard Combat Role, accessed 7 Jan 18 at https://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-rise-in-revolt-against-active-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role/
² Army Times, National Guard chafes at comments of Army top officer, accessed 7 Jan 18 at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/14/army-national-guard-readiness/4472077/
Active Army and the Army National Guard compete while the support-only Army Reserve sits quietly in the shadows due to the 1993 Offsite Agreement.

Even if the Abrams Doctrine influences Army Reserve mission sets to be something the nation cannot go to war without, there is neither a requirement that the mission sets be support-only nor a requirement that they be needed in the opening days of the conflict. Therefore, it would not be the Abrams Doctrine that drives the Army to place 100 percent of its Theater-Opening-Port-Opening (TOPO) capability in the Reserve. Placing a reserve capability early in the deployment order mandates that reserve forces are mobilized prior to the commencement of hostilities, telegraphing US intent to its adversaries. In addition to being operationally risky, setting up reserve forces such as the Army Reserve’s “Fight Tonight” structure where 181 Unit Identification Codes are tasked before C + 30 could be administratively wasteful. In addition to the cost of wastefully mobilizing and demobilizing troops to meet potential taskings, the concept violates Department of Defense policy, based on section 515 of Public Law 110-181, which mandates a 30-day notification to reservists being mobilized, thereby requiring a SECDEF waiver. The only reason the Army Reserve could benefit from the TOPO arrangement would be from an application of the Weinberger Principle, which proposes the “First to Fight” resourcing allocation where “units that fight first shall be equipped first, regardless of component.” The 1982 Weinberger Principle, however, appears to

---

4 DoDI 1235.12, Change 1, 28 February 2017, 18.
5 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, “Report to Congress: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves,” 31 January 2008, 15-16. The Weinberger Principle is also reflected in DoDI 1225.06, 30 Nov 2017, which states in para 4b that “The priority for the distribution of new and combat-serviceable equipment, with associated support and test equipment, shall be given to units scheduled for mission deployment or employment first, regardless of component. Equipment distribution and
have little influence in today’s programming process as evidenced by the growing importance of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA).

NGREA is a separate equipment appropriation for the guard and reserve components established by Congress in 1981 as a response to past active component budget priorities. The active component has historically passed older equipment down to the reserve and taken the new equipment for itself. In times of budget constraints, the active component has also taken resources from the reserves, similar to a slush fund to draw from when money is tight. Congress intended NGREA to supplement the services’ procurement money for their guard and reserve components, and for FY1982, it appropriated $50 million to the Army National Guard. By 2016, Congress doled out $1 billion to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserves and the Army and Air National Guards, reinforcing the idea that the active component will not adequately take care of the reserve component to the point that Congress must appropriate money to reservists who will take care of the reserve component.

Certain service leaders have even publicly acknowledged the idea that ‘reservists need reserve advocacy’ goes beyond taking care of equipment and includes taking care of reserve members as well. In the 2014 report from the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF), the commission recommended the disestablishment of modernization priorities for RC units shall be established by applying the same methodology as used for Active Component (AC) units having the same mission requirements.”

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Defense Acquisition University, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA), accessed 2 Feb 18 at https://www.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=687a524a-3b83-48f2-a217-a130653e32bd
10 Ibid.
of Air Force Reserve Command, and all reserve numbered air forces, wings, and squadrons. The report recommended that the duties of all those reserve entities be assumed by the active duty major commands and that reservists should be sprinkled throughout those major commands. Of the 42 recommendations in the NCSAF report, the recommendation to dissolve the separate reserve organizational structure is the only recommendation the Air Force leaders rejected.\(^{11}\) Both the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force spoke against the dissolution before the Senate Armed Services Committee, with Secretary Deborah James stating, “I absolutely do not agree with the disestablishment of the Reserve Command until and unless such time, perhaps in the future, that we had really totally cracked the integration nut so well that we would no longer need a team of people who currently are at the command who are specialized in taking care of 70,000 reservists.”\(^{12}\) Thus reserve advocacy for reservists is important for both reserve equipment and personnel, and the level of reserve advocacy a reserve service has impacts its mission set decisions.

Even as active and civilian service leaders maintain that reserve advocacy is critical, the rank and number of reserve general officers who are able to advocate to active general officers on behalf of the reserve is being slashed. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act gave the service chiefs the ability to reduce the rank of their reserve chiefs below three stars, abolished 18 one and two-star general Chairman’s reserve positions, and eliminated 2 two-star reserve component positions that advised the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^ {13}\) In contrast to the National Guard Bureau that has


\(^{12}\) Ibid., 33.

\(^{13}\) Military member interview, 25 Oct 17.
a four-star general position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the lack of key reserve input at the highest levels leads to decisions that lack reserve expertise and advocacy.

In spite of these challenges, the Air Force Reserve, the nation’s youngest reserve force, appears to maintain the most autonomy from its active component regarding mission set decisions. The Roles and Missions Assessment Teams perform their analysis and provide a recommendation to a two-star AFR general for approval or disapproval. Typical of the AFR sense of managing itself, the AFR Desired End State product “articulates how the AFR will manage AFR force structure, guide integration efforts, and ensure a flexible and accessible combat-ready force into the future.”

Regardless of whether it results from being a younger service or simply a quest for programmatic survival, mission set decisions in the AFR are entirely relevance-driven. As it seeks to add the most value, the AFR quantifies strategic “appetite” for given mission sets in its High Confidence Model, which it uses throughout the programmatic process. The AFR also uses products like the High Confidence Model when influencing bodies like the Total Force Continuum, which recently quantitatively evaluated most Air Force mission sets for a mixture of active, reserve and guard participation.

Especially important is that the Air Force Reserve makes it a point to focus on growing mission sets rated “High” on the High Confidence Model, paying particular attention to mission sets that grow reserve endstrength. The AFR also emphasizes preserving unit-equipped force structure, as well as the programmatic to support it, such

---

16 The Total Force Continuum performs High Velocity Analyses to determine optimal AC/RC force mix, but these analyses are unconstrained by existing resources and implementation is driven by a separate programmatic and budgetary process.
as flying hour dollars. In many regards, though seemingly self-serving, the emphasis demonstrates political savvy, as it guarantees a measure of programmatic independence and gives the AFR a greater voice. Occasionally relying on classic and active associations with its active component to increase the utilization rate of expensive aircraft, the AFR has managed to maintain better tri-component relations than the Army and better position for reserve advocacy.  

In contrast to the Air Force Reserve and its ability to maintain an independent voice, the Naval Reserve has been nearly ‘integrated to death.’ After the 2002 Naval Reserve Redesign, the Navy undertook a process of Active Reserve Integration (ARI) that entailed placing reserve forces under the active component and dismantling the reserve infrastructure. From 2004 when ARI began until 2017, the Naval Reserve decreased in size from 87,000 to 57,000 as the active component took control of reserve assets and shifted those resources to active component interests. As a result of active component control, the Naval Reserve lost its ability to externally advocate from a reserve perspective, resulting in lack of expert oversight to protect a level of surge capacity for naval operations in time of crisis. Without outside intervention, the Naval Reserve will be unable to recover external advocacy as the active component shrinks reserve monetary and personnel resources.

In contrast to the Air Force Reserve who has it and the Naval Reserve who does not, the Marine Corps Reserve does not appear to want the ability to advocate as a

---

17 For more on the potential to expand associations to the Army, see 2013 JAWS thesis by James W. Kellogg, Jr., Leveraging the Reserve Component: Associating Active and Reserve Aviation Units.
18 Rear Admiral David O. Anderson and Rear Admiral J. A. Winnefeld, Navy's Reserve Will Be Integrated with Active Forces, accessed 7 Jan 18 at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1104_ Reserve,00.html
19 Kimberly Rodgers, Chief of Naval Reserve Gives Perspective on Active Reserve Integration, accessed on 7 Jan 18 at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=13497
Reserve. The fierce loyalty of Marines to the Marine Corps seems to be a stronger unifying force than the separating force of having different components. One senior Marine reservist exemplified this mindset by explaining that “there is no Marine Corps Reserve Chief. My Commandant is the Chief of our Reserve.”\(^{20}\) Although there is very clearly an accomplished three-star Marine general with the duty title “Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve,” this senior Marine felt allegiance to his Corps above all other organizations.\(^{21}\) The shared identity of “every Marine a rifleman,” is just one example of the strong Marine Corps culture that appears to unify active and reserve forces in loyalty to the Corps.

The fact that the Marine Corps Reserve is organized as a mirror-image to active Marine Expeditionary Force units increases reserve component legitimacy in the eyes of active component Marines, who can identify with fellow Marines who “look like us.” The mirror-image arrangement also makes it easier for the two components to understand each other as the unit organizational titles are similar, reducing the language barrier sometimes felt between components. The only downfall of the mirror-image setup, as stated in the Pentagon’s Total Force Policy Report to Congress, is that reserves were meant to complement the active component, not merely mirror them.\(^{22}\) Some missions need to be performed by active component forces, such as those with short response times or too many recurring training requirements, and others are better performed by reservists bringing civilian expertise, such as specialized medical professions. The

---

\(^{20}\) Military member interview, 22 Dec 17.  
Marines do not rely solely on force structure, however, to increase cross-component flow of ideas. The Marines also assign active component personnel to reserve units as Inspectors and Instructors (I&I), which one Marine states makes the active component more understanding of reserve issues and the reserve component less of a foreign culture to active members.  

The Coast Guard Reserve believes it has integrated its small force both operationally and administratively into Team Coast Guard. At slightly over 6,000 personnel in size, it is easier for the Coast Guard Reserve to implement administrative integration such as an integrated pay and personnel system, and the fact that many Coast Guard missions have 24/7 requirements makes it easier to seamlessly plug reservists into a duty schedule on active-owned equipment. The Coast Guard Reserve makes up only 15 percent of the total Coast Guard endstrength, and five out of every six Coast Guard Reservists are individual augments serving in active units. Though the high level of integration means that active leadership and support personnel are familiar with reserve affairs, the high level of integration also causes the Coast Guard Reserve to lose its independent voice in the appropriations process.

Looking at reserve mission sets requires addressing historical and tradition-based culture impacts and how those historical roots affect today’s active-reserve relationships. The unspoken assumption in several services is that active component control of the reserves improves the reserve component, which in most cases turns out to be false as

---

24 Ibid., xv.
25 Military member interview, 22 Dec 17.
exemplified by the need for NGREA appropriations. Several reserve components have lost their ability to externally advocate for themselves in the appropriations process due to an over-emphasis on active-reserve integration, while others have been lulled into silence by a culture of long-term subjugation. This silence leaves no reserve component expertise available to identify and advocate for the reserves when the assigned missions are not the best use of reserve resources or are not in line with the planned use of forces and reserve force capabilities. In an era of fiscal austerity, the Department of Defense cannot afford to purchase less than the full amount of military readiness that can be bought with each taxpayer dollar.
Chapter 5

Recommendations

Theories have four stages of acceptance:

1. This is worthless nonsense;
2. This is interesting, but perverse;
3. This is true, but quite unimportant;
4. I always said so.

—J. B. S Haldane

If at first an idea does not sound absurd, then there is no hope for it.

—Albert Einstein

One should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success than to introduce a new system of things. For he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old system as his enemies, and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new system.

—Machiavelli, The Prince

The United States needs to have its reserve forces structured to perform missions that both meet the nation’s needs and that the reserve construct can successfully organize, train, and equip within the citizen-soldier model. An improved reserve force structure with proper mission sets will increase the long-term readiness and cost-efficiency of both the active and reserve force and ensure taxpayer dollars are purchasing the best force it can afford. Additionally, providing a mechanism for the reserve forces to integrate, communicate, and improve as they tackle similar reserve-specific issues would increase the readiness and efficiency of the reserve force.

Mission Sets: Active and Reserve

Integrating the reserve mission sets is part of a bigger task of coordinating the service active and reserve mission sets with each other, and currently there is no person,
office, or policy compelling the services to perform that coordination. In order to compel such coordination and answer the question of “What does the nation need the reserves to do?,” the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) should chair a working group on active and reserve mission sets, which would give the working group tasking authority over the Service Secretaries and their responsibility to organize, train, and equip, as depicted in Figure 3.¹ Using a timeline/TPFDD-driven perspective to align the force structure, thereby assigning forces required before day 60 to the active component and forces needed after day 60 to the reserve, as well as re-examining active and reserve end strengths, could help alleviate some of the stress over reserve utilization. This alignment would even assist employ-in-place reserve units as they mobilize part-time reservists into full-time duty to meet wartime demands. The Day-60 dividing line could be shifted left or right over the years as needed to accommodate the changing context and conduct of war, accounting for factors such as the technologically-enabled increase in number of assets that employ in-place.²

Regardless of the exact dividing line, having vital capabilities needed at the beginning of an operational plan reside in the part-time reserve, especially in today’s ultra-connected world, is a grave security risk. Reserve activations cannot be done quietly due to reservist connections with the community, and as a 1993 RAND study expresses, “If [the DOD] put even more support units into the reserve components, the president will have no choice but to call-up the reserves even before he makes a final

¹ Military member interview, 28 Dec 17. This action could be codified in DoDD 5100.01.
² The 1990 Pentagon Total Force Policy Report to Congress recommended that active-duty forces “be able to deploy rapidly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first thirty days with virtually no support from the reserve components.”
In addition to creating a stressful “yo-yo” environment where troops are wastefully activated and deactivated as tensions rise and fall, telegraphing US plans or even potential US plans by pre-emptive reserve mobilizations will put US forces at risk of launching against an enemy anticipating their arrival.

Figure 3. Structure of the National Command Authority. Source: http://www.wikiwand.com/en/United_States_Armed_Force

After looking at potential shifts in reserve mission sets in regards to timeline and TPFDD, the next step is to examine the mission sets that fall to the reserves for mission suitability. One product that could be used to answer the question of “What can the Reserves do?” is the Air Force Reserve Roles and Missions Assessment guidance. The guidance provides a comprehensive list of suitability questions to guide analysis, thoroughly covering the reserve model criteria. The goal of the analysis is to identify areas that could potentially impact a service’s ability to organize, train, equip, and sustain

---

4 See also Joint Publication 1, Change 1, 12 July 2017, specifically II-10, Figure II-3.
5 See Chapter 2 of this publication. Strengths are retaining taxpayer investment, low life-cycle cost, unique experience, and community connections. Criteria are enduring missions, suitable locations, active component mission share, and appropriate operations tempo. Other considerations include surge demand, length of deployments, requirements for continuation training, length of absorption process, and civilian competencies.
the mission and its personnel, assessing topics such as requirements, manpower, and resources. If a mission is inexecutable by a reserve component, the DSD working group must adjudicate between the TPFDD criteria and the suitability criteria and mitigate the risk. For instance, if the TPFDD criteria indicates the need for a reserve unit to maintain expensive equipment, the risk of low utilization rate could be mitigated by setting up an association with the active component, sharing the equipment and increasing the utilization rate.

It is possible that, as roles and missions are potentially swapped, the results of this two-pronged mission analysis will meet initial resistance from both active and reserve elements. In many cases, service culture and politics would need to be overcome, which is challenging because, as Carl Builder notes, “there is considerable evidence that the qualities of the US military forces are determined more by cultural and institutional preferences for certain kinds of military forces than by the ‘threat.’” But rising personnel costs erode US ability to procure game-changing technology needed to maintain strategic advantage against current competitors, and “wasting readiness by putting too many missions on active duty that are not needed right away” is money the United States cannot spare. Maintaining more than roughly the first 60 days of TPFDD on active duty may also be wasted readiness as the ports and other receiving infrastructure can only handle a certain capacity, akin to pushing a bathtub’s worth of water through a soda straw.

---

6 AFRC/A8XP, HOI 90-1101, 6 April 2015, para 1.
7 Builder, 6.
8 Military member interview, 28 Dec 2017.
9 Ibid.
One potential key to overcoming political lobbyist resistance to change, as may arise from organizations such as the National Guard Association of the United States or the Reserve Officer’s Association, is to engage industry lobbyists to make their case to Congressional members that any personnel cost efficiencies gained by appropriately-assigned roles and missions could be pumped back into the US industrial complex as procurement money, thereby growing both US economic and military power. In the end, the exercise in shifting missions may be beneficial for the nation as a whole, as the ability of the defense architecture to flex over time to meet demands is the essence of strategic agility and the mark of a strong state.

Service Reserve Integration—“None of Us Is Smart As All of Us”

When you integrate things, you bring them together where they had previously been separate. To this point, the service reserves have been separate, with no mechanism to come together, and this research has illustrated numerous ideas worth sharing or problems worth addressing among the service reserves. Figure 4 illustrates this problem: the horizontal purple arrows indicate current efforts at jointness, the vertical purple arrows indicate current efforts at total force integration, and the red hashed arrows indicate the missing piece of integration—integrating the expertise of each service reserve at the reserve component level.

If the service reserves had a way to integrate with other service reserves, first at staff levels and growing downward as the culture progresses, they could establish networks of like-minded workers across the services to share current events and possible

\[10\] Ibid.
solutions that already exist in other service reserves. Nations holding prisoners of war keep prisoners separated because integration would increase the overall power of the

![Diagram showing the military branches and their reserves]

*Figure 4. The Missing Integration Link Among Service Reserves.*

prison population; likewise, once staffs can communicate with each other they can do more powerful things than they could alone. The vision is to shape the culture so that the Air Force Reserve staffer charged with solving a problem immediately thinks to ask, "How does the Navy Reserve address this problem?" or "Can I glean something from the Marine Reserve model to help us in this situation?" and the organizational structure provides a way to reach out to his counterparts in the other reserves for answers.

Similarly, solutions should be shared among service reserves. When staffers develop an improved way to calculate or track something important to the reserve or to reserve-active relations, they could share these best practices and improve the reserve as a whole instead of improving only one service reserve.

In the National Capitol Region (NCR), advocacy bodies that could facilitate reserve integration are few. One entity working for the reserves as a whole is the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB). The RFPB works on personnel policies and labors for

---

favorable policies that affect all the services, such as duty statuses, pay, and benefits. However, the board has a very small staff of currently-serving reservists, and they are assigned to various projects related to personnel policy rather than to actively sharing and integrating their service reserves.\textsuperscript{13} The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Reserve Integration office, the remnant of a much-larger Reserve Affairs office that has been reduced to a very small staff, focuses on integrating reserve concerns into active doctrine and policies rather than integrating the service reserves with each other.\textsuperscript{14} The Office of the Assistant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard and Reserve Matters, which also focused on integrating reserve concerns into active doctrine and policies, was disbanded in 2017 and its small staff reassigned elsewhere.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, there is currently no existing NCR staff structure that serves to integrate the reserve services.

The most likely place to spearhead a Reserve Integration Cell (RIC) is to resurrect OSD Reserve Affairs and place the RIC within the resurrected hierarchy. For similar reasons to placing the mission set working group under the Deputy Secretary of Defense, having the RIC under OSD gives it tasking authority over the services, as seen in Figure 3. Placing the RIC under any type of advisory body, such as the RFPB or the CJCS, would doom it to failure as the services would be able to ignore innovations, especially anything inconvenient.

One way to begin to build a culture of integration is through Reserve Exchanges. In a Reserve Exchange, a member of one service reserve would assume a position

\textsuperscript{13} Military member interview, 21 Sep 17.
\textsuperscript{14} Military member interview, 28 Dec 17.
\textsuperscript{15} Military member interview, 19-20 Oct 17.
embedded within another service reserve, beginning at headquarters level and expanding down as the program grows. These exchanges would serve not only as real-time ways to reach out, such as a Navy Reserve exchange officer at Air Force Reserve Command connecting an Air Force Reserve staffer with a Navy Reservist working a similar issue, but the exchange officer would carry the connections he made in the Air Force Reserve network back to his next Navy Reserve assignment and then be able to connect Navy Reservists to contacts back at AFRC as needed. Unlike the Reserve Component National Security Course or Joint Combined Warfighting School—Hybrid experiences where the face-to-face periods are only 2-3 weeks total, reserve exchanges would be longer duration opportunities to build extended professional networks. In time, these reserve exchanges may even become senior officer promotion criteria, which would validate and implant the concept in reserve culture.

Another way to increase cross-reserve exchange is to facilitate active component hiring of cross-service reserve members using Active Duty for Operational Support for the Active Component (ADOS-AC) man-days. Currently, if an active component has a need for a reservist and the ADOS-AC man-days to hire one, that active unit searches for reservists from its own service even if the skills reside in available reservists from other services.16 This change would not only increase the effectiveness of the force by filling requirements with qualified service members, but it would have the secondary effect of increasing cross-service reserve expertise and networks, potentially leading to increased efficiency and innovative solutions across the force.

16 Military member interview, 20 Oct 17.
Therefore, after the DepSecDef establishes the Reserve Integration Cell, key reserve personnel from the RIC must take a “road show” to as many audiences as possible explaining the purpose and utility of the RIC. Besides the in-person or Video Teleconference road shows, all available media methods, such as email, Facebook, and websites, must explain the concepts and availability of resources now at member disposal. This step is critical to the success of the endeavors as mass buy-in and participation will produce the initial successes and resulting media coverage, which in turn will spread the word farther and encourage further participation. As the momentum grows, new expectations for reserve integration and exchange of ideas will become part of the culture, which will ultimately serve to secure a flow of resources to ensure long-term success.

In his book *Team of Teams*, retired General Stanley McChrystal describes his experiences building a network of embedded liaisons among all the teams contributing to the fight against terrorism in Iraq. He details instances where embedded liaisons were initially marginalized and misused, but as their host organizations came to understand what the liaisons could do for them, the relationships vastly improved. McChrystal concluded that “the embedding program met stiff initial resistance but paid off by building trust, understanding, and connection to the other groups.”¹⁷ Reserve cross-service exchange will likely face similar initial resistance but will eventually have the same success, with the end result being more national security for the same resources, and increased trust, understanding, and connection among the service reserves.

¹⁷ McChrystal, 175-177.
Obstacles to Innovation

JP-1 states, “Jointness implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability
of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the
capability of individual components). . . . The synergy that results from the operations of
joint forces maximizes the capability of the force.”18 But the Reserve faces many of the
same obstacles to jointness that the active component faced after the institution of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Despite the push for joint thinking, the individual
services still control the budgets and the promotion process, and parochialism and service
culture remain strong forces.19 The “service-first” culture even drives a joint “tragedy of
the commons,” where services want to keep their budget and their best service members
for their own staffs rather than sending them away to serve in a joint capacity where the
service loses that individual’s expertise for 2-3 years.20 Even at a Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), where important defense requirements are brought together
and prioritized, each member wears the uniform of one particular service and each
service chief is invited, making it hard to eliminate service allegiances.21 Thus, service
biases have a negative impact on increasing cross-service exchange of ideas.

These service biases can be mitigated by providing OSD civilian oversight of the
innovations. In the instance of mission sets, left to themselves, the services’ inter-service
or inter-component rivalry may lead to mission set arrangements that suit service interests
but not national security interests.22 OSD civilian oversight, however, could manipulate

18 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 July 2017), I-2.
19 Military member interview 1, 12 Dec 17.
20 Military member interview 2, 12 Dec 17.
21 Ibid.
inter-service rivalry to foster healthy competition to further innovation. Civilian oversight can also guard against dysfunctional cooperation schemes that stifle innovation for the sake of a united front to Congress or to prevent a budget battle. Thus, while reserve military innovation ideas are likely to come from within the military itself, civilian oversight of the reserve integration effort is key to its success, as it facilitates healthy cooperation and competition.

While OSD civilian oversight is key, Congressional intervention is not. Both the Mission Set Working Group and the Reserve Integration Cell address readiness issues and can be handled within the Department of Defense. Including specific language about reserve joint requirements in any type of Goldwater-Nichols reform is likely to draw critiques as a reserve-specific statute already exists. Section 666 of the original Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 states, "§666. Reserve officers not on the active-duty list. The Secretary of Defense shall establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers not on the active-duty list. Such policies shall, to the extent practicable for the reserve components, be similar to the policies provided by this chapter."23 Because Section 666 already directs the reserves to emphasize joint experience, a Congressional rewrite would be unnecessary. Reserve leaders would caution against committing the reserve to abide by active duty standards for joint requirements, noting that the unique citizen-service construct requires flexibility. The current wording of Goldwater-Nichols leaves the reserves vast discretion on the stringency of reserve joint requirements, and

until a public problem such as a military failure occurs, tightening reserve joint
requirements is unlikely to make the public political agenda.24

The most important outcome is for all those who deal with the reserves in their
current state to shed the weight of the current narrative, to compose a different storyline,
and to question the unquestionable dogma of service and reserve cultures in order to
innovate a better culture. Before an organization can successfully accomplish innovation,
from realigned mission set constructs to cross-reserve exchanges, it must change its
thinking. Organizational theory notes that change occurs as a result of natural reaction to
threat, failure, or desire to expand, and these reserve mission set and integration cell
changes may result from both foreign threat and fear of fiscal failure.25 Robert Jervis’
concept of cognitive consistency, which states people “see what they expect to see and
assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images,” molds people’s thoughts unless
they are motivated and taught to think differently.26 By altering preconceived notions,
the Department of Defense can affect what people expect, such as having other service
reservists working with them—or, more interestingly, what they do not expect, such as
being included in a wide range of mission sets. If the strategic narrative can mold people
to expect that the future will not have to look the same as today, their very belief will
help to make it so.27

25 Ibid., 59.
26 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 117.
27 See also Marilyn Manifold, What Are You Worth? The Value Of A Human Life And Its Impact On
Conclusion

*I am interested in the future because that is where I plan to spend the rest of my life.*

—Maj Gen Perry Smith, USAF, Retired

Military organizations do not like to change, and often they do not even recognize that they need to change. But in the case of reserve mission sets and reserve integration, change is due. The current system of culture-driven disparate mission methodologies yields reserve missions that often do not provide what the nation needs for the best price or are not suitable for reserve strengths and capabilities. In order to ensure national resources are being utilized to their full potential, the Deputy Secretary of Defense should stand up a working group to systematically examine mission sets in order of TPFDD/timeline requirement, with the intent to designate assets required before Day 60 as active component missions. The DSD should then follow up that analysis by assessing the missions that are required after the 60-day mark for reserve mission suitability using guidance similar to Air Force Reserve Roles and Missions Assessments. Additionally, the DSD should resurrect OSD Reserve Affairs and stand up a Reserve Integration Cell within that organization to increase the cross-service reserve exchange of ideas and personnel. These actions will set the United States on a course for the proper reserve capability to meet the nation’s requirements.

---

28 Posen, 226.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


_____. *DOD FMR 7000.14-R*. September 2015.

_____. *DODI 1235.12*, Change 1, 28 February 2017.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Col (s) Mari Manifold received her commission from the United States Air Force Academy in 1998, and she is an AC-130H pilot who has deployed multiple times in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Mari has also served in staff positions at the group, wing, numbered air force, and major command levels, recently serving as the Twenty-Third Air Force director of staff at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and as the deputy chiefs of strategic planning and programming at Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Georgia. A summa cum laude graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a distinguished graduate of both the C-130 Qualification Course and Air Command and Staff College, Col (s) Manifold also graduated from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.