NATO’s Deterrence Strategy is Failing.
The Enhanced Forward Presence; Delusion or Renewal?

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This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes. (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy)

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Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acknowledges that the character of conflict is changing but has struggled to convincingly adjust. As a result, NATO’s application of deterrence theory lacks sophistication at a time when the Russian threat to NATO is growing in both nuance and complexity. The Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), established by the 2016 Warsaw Summit, is the latest manifestation of NATO adaptation. The NATO response is positive but overly simplified. An updated and better coordinated response is required if NATO is to avoid delusion and take tentative steps towards renewal. An examination of Russian cross-domain coercion and NATO’s associated response exposes strategic and operational weakness in NATO’s application of deterrence theory. The EFP should be seen as an opportunity to cohere consensus surrounding NATO deterrence and develop alliance capabilities that can credibly deter Russia.
Dedication

Writing a thesis is hard. I am indebted to many, not least the JAWS faculty whose collective wisdom, guidance, and patience have been invaluable. I am also indebted to those senior Officers who accepted my request for an interview. Their insight, candor and advice has significantly shaped the pages that follow, I am grateful for their time and investment. Nonetheless, what follows is my own, including the inevitable errors and leaps of argumentative faith. No doubt others will use or discard what I have thought and written, and make it better.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

What we see on the ground is a revanchist Russia that does not play by international rules or norms [and] their activities are destabilizing to neighboring states . . . and have a global impact – General Philip Breedlove

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) acknowledges that both the global security context and the character of conflict is changing. The contemporary operating environment is one of accelerated human progress, exploiting new technologies to challenge adversaries across multiple domains. Information is disaggregating to audiences, deregulating the international world order, and instantaneous. “Prevailing in this period will depend on an ability to synchronize multi-domain capabilities . . . [and] control information,” but in response, NATO has struggled to convincingly adjust to this changing character. NATO’s application of deterrence theory lacks sophistication at a time when the Russian threat to NATO is growing in both nuance and complexity. The Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), established by the 2016 Warsaw Summit, is the latest manifestation of pragmatic NATO adaptation, precipitated by Russian aggression. The NATO response is positive but exposes a struggle to overcome the implications of this emerging character with respect to deterrence theory, its operational employment, and the resilience of its forces. Unfortunately, the EFP’s contribution to NATO deterrence is symptomatic of an overly simplified approach. It is flawed, and an updated and better

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1 General Breedlove, Philip, NATO SACEUR, quoted from: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/article/604173/.
5 TRADOC, 6.
coordinated response is required if NATO is to avoid self-delusion and take tentative steps towards renewal.

Since mid-2013, the NATO Air Policing mission in the Baltics has scrambled Alliance fighter jets more than 100 times in response to Russian military activity - a 300% increase over the entire preceding period. Latvia alone has registered 150 “close incidents.” Finland totaled five violations of its airspace but had a yearly average of one or two over the previous decade.

Russia has also conducted a significant number of large-scale, regional exercises, including a snap exercise in March, 2015 that mobilized 38,000 troops. Exercise Zapad dominated September, 2017 and demonstrated a level of command and control sophistication hitherto absent in the Zapad series. Russian and Belarusian forces conducted an exercise against forces from Veshnoriya, a fictional country with geography startlingly similar to that of the Baltic States, which Russia described as a “defensive tactical anti-terrorist” exercise. Over the course of the exercise, however, the narrative changed and became increasingly about thwarting an advanced, conventional enemy that closely resembled a territory with NATO-interoperable armed forces. The exercise concluded with the launch of a nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missile with an experimental warhead, underlining the integration of Russia’s nuclear forces. Exercise Zapad 2017 should remind the West that Russian conventional capability is increasingly

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ready and sophisticated, while serving as a test-run for Russia’s strategic deterrence and coercive capabilities.9

A critical aspect of Russian policy is mobilizatsiya, described by Andrew Monaghan as grand strategic mobilization that is increasingly militant.10 Mobilization “describes a coordinated [state] attempt to address an array of evolving security threats”11 and is instructive because it is a transformative process that reveals Russian perceptions regarding NATO weakness, not least the inability to operate coherently across all-domains.12 The coherence of such a complex and ambiguous threat is consistent with the changing character of conflict by being primarily coercive in nature with cross-domain relationships to disrupt Alliance cohesion. Mobilizatiya provides the context for the application of “cross-domain coercion” (CDC), Dmitry Adamsky’s descriptor for Russia’s strategic approach.13 CDC is the latest incarnation of Russian strategic art that seeks to exploit the potential of the information age. Antulio Echevarria describes this incarnation as the coercion-deterrence dynamic, arguably sharpened by the information age.14 Unlike its western, doctrinal relations (the US’s Multi-Domain Battle or the UK’s Integrated Action) CDC has been thoroughly tested and developed in the crucibles of South Ossetia, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine.

The illegal annexation of Crimea and subsequent Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine from 2014 onwards triggered renewed NATO deterrence planning. The NATO

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9 Boulegue
10 Andrew Monaghan, Russian State Mobilization: Moving the Country on to a War Footing, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016.
11 Ibid., 2.
12 Air, Land, Maritime, Nuclear, Space, Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
14 Antulio Echevarria, Operating in the gray zone: an alternative paradigm for U.S. military strategy, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, April 2016, p xii
response was necessarily swift, a product of crisis planning given the proximate threat. The 2014 Wales summit offered an initial response, not least the creation of a brigade-sized reaction force capable of reinforcing NATO territorial defense at short notice. The 2016 Warsaw summit advanced further adaptation and announced the deployment of the EFP - four battalion sized units to be deployed to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland under UK, Canadian, German, and US leadership respectively. While NATO’s response appears to have been successful, as measured by the absence of Russian incursion into NATO territory, NATO cannot afford to be complacent. NATO must continue to evolve its application of deterrence theory in order to assure Alliance security.

The thesis concludes that NATO’s response to Russian revanchism is overly simplistic. NATO has failed to convincingly recognize the changing character of competition with Russia. Deterrence, in the face of a primarily coercive threat to Alliance cohesion must coherently balance a sense of solidarity with traditional but no less relevant strategies of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Solidarity is defined as both unified multinational resolve as well as coherent, seamless, integration of capabilities; it is both cosmetic and substantial. In this sense, solidarity extends beyond the well-understood requirement for credibility as a necessary component of deterrence.

Throughout NATO’s history, multi-nationality has been carefully moderated, through tactical task-organization, in order to mitigate the frictions of interoperability. CDC exploits technology to attack cohesion in an unprecedented manner. Christopher

Walker and Jessica Ludwig of the National Endowment for Democracy coin the term “sharp power” building on Joseph Nye’s seminal work.\textsuperscript{17} Sharp power “pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted countries.”\textsuperscript{18} Walker and Ludwig argue that democracies must “inoculate themselves against malign authoritarian influence” and also “take a far more assertive posture on behalf of their own principles.”\textsuperscript{19} Deterrence by solidarity is a response to this context and it demands much more of the Alliance in terms of integration and interoperability.

The Alliance must re-examine deterrence theory and nomenclature in the era of cross-domain coercion and reinvigorate understanding of Articles 4 and 5. Ironically, it is a clear and unambiguous understanding of Article 4, as opposed to Article 5 that might be most effective in deterring a cross-domain, coercive threat. The generation of the EFP and its \textit{deployment} are both encouraging markers of Alliance strategic resolve and unity. NATO must now ensure that operational \textit{employment} communicates credible solidarity. The routine description of the EFP as a tripwire and its “enhanced” nature appear to confer pre-eminence to traditional theories of deterrence based on the well-established domains of land, sea, and air, as opposed to what might be termed multi-domain deterrence by solidarity. If the EFP is primarily a tripwire connected to the NATO reaction force, what constitutes the response and how confident is NATO in its execution? The Alliance must develop EFP capabilities, in order to cope with the likely

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
exigencies of a cross-domain coercion battlefield. The EFP lacks resilience and feels distinctly one-dimensional in light of the apparent sophistication of the probable threat.

Finally, NATO should experiment to see how nascent multi-domain battle thinking might function at the Alliance level. The UK’s contribution in Estonia offers a potentially useful laboratory for Alliance development that could conveniently contribute to the urgent requirement for a multi-domain battle framework.

The examination of the EFP’s efficacy demands a comprehensive explanation of the current environment with respect to the perceived Russian threat. One aspect of NATO weakness stems from the various and unhelpful terms used to describe Russian strategy: little green men, hybrid warfare, new generation warfare, or cross-domain coercion. Employing the term *cross-domain coercion* offers a more useful conceptual explanation and begins to address the threat to NATO.

The thesis assesses the efficacy of NATO’s response and identifies areas of Alliance and EFP weakness. Academic research is complemented by interviews with serving, senior leaders across the NATO Alliance. Research reveals a variety of shortcomings and associated recommendations to improve the EFP and equip the Alliance to deal with the Russian threat most appropriately. They are broadly characterized under the following headings:

- *NATO’s deterrence theory and language*, including the perceived weakness in the theoretical application of deterrence theory and an absence of clarity surrounding the thresholds required to trigger NATO articles 4 and 5.
• *Deterrence by punishment or denial.* It is unclear how the EFP, as a so-called enhanced tripwire, is effectively linked with a genuine strategy of deterrence by punishment or denial.

• *Resilience.* This category focuses on the resilience of the EFP to withstand likely Russian cross-domain coercion actors as well as its ability to credibly engage in the operating environment across all domains. Resilience is defined as the capacity to recover from and adapt to operational and tactical challenge. The thesis will also offer recommendations for future experimentation: a minimum, viable multi-domain battle\(^{20}\) capability to force the development of Alliance thinking and perhaps convince contributing nations of the urgency of the requirement.

\(^{20}\) Multi-Domain Battle is a US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) concept developed in parallel and in response to cross-domain coercion. It is discussed in detail in chapter 5.
Chapter 2: The Russian Bear

*I think that only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO.* – Vladimir Putin

Putin’s rhetoric belies a Russian strategic culture which is preoccupied by perceptions of threat and vulnerability. Russia’s geography and history combine to create a perpetual national discourse of insecurity. Recent NATO enlargement strayed beyond initial assurances to a nervous Russia, and Russia interpreted NATO interventions in the Balkans as further evidence of western aggression and a continued strategy of containment. Russia perceives an “arc of crisis” in her near abroad that threatens her security. The demise of the Soviet Union created persistent internal, institutional instability, compounded by the specter of popular revolution throughout the Arab world and most recently in Ukraine. Colored by this perennial sense of vulnerability, Russia is judged to have three major national interests germane to NATO and the Baltic States: security of the country and the regime, maintenance of influence in the Near Abroad, and a vision of Russia as a Great Power. The Russian threat to NATO is primarily coercive, but it oscillates between political threats to Alliance cohesion and the seemingly incoherent application of military power. This makes the threat to NATO challenging to understand and deter. The aggregation of Russia’s inferred national

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2 Ibid
interests reveal an uncertain security outlook. National and regime security are relatively self-evident but their manifestation is distorted by the strategic culture of vulnerability and a sense of siege mentality.

The re-establishment of Great Power status is premised upon the ability to influence in the Near Abroad, although the definition of the “Near Abroad” is geographically uncertain. The absence of the Baltic States from the 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept is conspicuous, inferring an acquiescence to Baltic independence that is inconsistent with past rhetoric. There is, however, an imperial nuance to Russia’s sense of Great Power status including what Igor Zegelev describes as a commitment to types of ethnic Russians, consistent with Huntington’s characterization of the Slavic-Orthodox civilization. There is no explicit policy evidence for a Russian desire to seize the Baltics, however, there is policy evidence for a commitment to the security of ethnic Russians who reside in the Baltics. It follows that Russia’s national interests combine to reveal a partial commitment to ethnic Russians that is consistent with its desire to be respected as a Great Power in an increasingly multi-polar world.

There is no explicit conflict of interest with NATO territory but there is certainly an implied, political tension with NATO member societies, as a result of the pseudo-

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imperial commitment to ethnic Russians. In this sense, the Russian threat is sharpened by the prospect of further NATO enlargement but is not explicitly territorial in nature. Russia is threatened by what NATO represents: the constructivist norms of sovereignty, democracy, and human rights. The center of gravity of that threat, from a Russian perspective, is arguably the Alliance itself and the idea of NATO collective defense. Nonetheless, the realization of Russian interests, in a strategic sense, has required what Monaghan refers to as “grand strategic mobilization.” It is a reaction to a Russian sense of persistently encroaching containment, described by Putin as “irresponsible and unprofessional.”

*Mobilizatsiya* is a strategic response to the perception of NATO as an offensive actor. It is the mobilization of all levers of national power to underwrite security as the pre-eminent, vital national interest. “Mobilization is thus primarily about readiness,” the alignment of society, the economy, and financial institutions on the singular objective of national security. In military parlance, Russia has moved to a war footing. The hyper-competitive, contemporary strategic environment encourages such an approach because of the ever-present risk of escalation to conflict and, potentially, war. The Russian seizure of Crimea demonstrates the advantages of rapid, proactive mobilization in terms of establishing victory before adversaries can react. The narrative of an unstable world, balanced on the edge of conflict is common to most strategic commentaries. It is

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12 Monaghan, 2.
13 Monaghan, 22.
particularly acute given Russia’s strategic culture of insecurity and its desire to re-establish a Great Power status, in order to deliver against its self-imposed pseudo-imperial responsibilities. The Russian move to a war-footing is rational and further evidenced by its procurement policy.

The May 2012 decrees, following Putin’s re-election as President, underscored a $640 billion investment in the military that sought to correct structural imbalance, modernize the military-industrial complex (with a focus on strategic nuclear forces), and professionalization of the armed forces, including ambitious procurement plans. Policy words have, thus far, been matched by military deed. Since January, 2015, Russia has conducted 124 brigade level exercises compared to NATO’s 38. During the same period, the Russians conducted 23 snap, combat readiness inspections for units over 1500 troops in strength; NATO did not conduct a single one. The Russian focus on readiness is ambitious, routinely focusing at the Brigade level. NATO’s ambition, however, is constrained by national reluctance to fund readiness exercises at this scale. Russian transformative programs are not limited to the military. The Ministry of Interior has conducted large-scale exercises such as exercise Zaslon in 2015 that sought to test law enforcement, counter-terrorism forces, and paramilitary territorial defense forces. Furthermore, in 2014, Putin opened the National Defense Control Center (NDCC) as a centralized, single point of coordination for information and control. Lt General Mikhail Mizintsev described the NDCC’s function as control “of the military machine and the

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14 Monaghan, 24.
economy of the nation in the interests of the war.”16 This transformation has endured in spite of a hostile economic climate. The global plunge in oil prices, coupled with the rising costs of international sanctions, forced Russia to reconsider its grand strategy. Putin, however, exempted defense spending from cuts. If the strategy is one of mobilization or national readiness, how does this translate at the strategic level?

Strategic mobilization conveys a pre-eminence to the military instrument compared with other levers of national power. It represents a national decision to subordinate all national plans to the relatively narrow pursuit of advantage in war or conflict. This is an oversimplification and the Russian response is nuanced. The so-called Gerasimov doctrine establishes the foundations for Russian strategy, broadening the scope of traditional definition and seeing war as much more than military conflict.17 “War is now conducted by a roughly 4:1 ratio of non-military and military measures.”18 This reflects Gerasimov’s interpretation of the strategic environment and the threats facing Russia. Gerasimov “perceives threats to Russian sovereignty as stemming from U.S. funded social and political movements such as color revolutions, the Arab spring, and the Maidan movement.”19 Irrespective of whether such threats to Russia are imagined or real, the strategy to emerge from Gerasimov’s thinking is consistent with the emerging adjustments in the character of conflict. The Gerasimov doctrine has many names: hybrid warfare, little green men, new generation warfare, and cross-domain

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19 Ibid, 37.
coercion (CDC). This latter descriptor is used by this thesis, drawing on the work of Dmitry Adamsky.20

CDC is a blend of strategies of containment, deterrence, and coercion. It is a complex, sophisticated, 21st century synthesis of a patchwork of ideas developed independently over time. At its heart, it is the latest evolution of Sun Tzu’s indirect approach of winning without fighting. As Adamsky notes:

“Cross-domain coercion . . . aims to manipulate adversary’s perception, to maneuver its decision-making process, and influence its strategic behavior, while minimizing . . . the scale of kinetic force use.”21

NATO’s Article 5 envisages a context of overt military invasion. CDC is ambiguous, occasionally incoherent and provocative. It asks questions of an adversary that NATO is not necessarily structured to answer. In other words, CDC integrates ideas of nuclear deterrence, the comprehensive integration of hard, soft power, and sharp power across all domains, and the importance of information operations.

The nuclear component is an inseparable constituent of CDC and its evolution is instructive. The 1990s exposed the extent of U.S. airpower and precision strike capabilities; Russian military thinkers sought to establish theories to compensate for Russia’s apparent conventional inferiority.22 Thinking focused on the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons as a means of terminating small-scale, conventional hostilities, in the event of conventional overmatch. This theory is generally described as “nuclear de-escalation” and while nuclear deterrence has been formally codified in Russian

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21 Ibid, 9.
doctrine, disagreement persists within Russian circles regarding the application of non-strategic nuclear weapons in this way. Nonetheless, exercise Zapad in September 2017 coincided with the launch of a nuclear capable, intercontinental ballistic missile. The Russian missile had an experimental warhead, a so-called “multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), capable of targeting multiple missile defense sites. Despite an apparently narrowing conventional capability gap vis a vis NATO, the ambiguous notion of Russian nuclear de-escalation persists, inextricably linked to non-nuclear deterrence.

Gerasimov highlights the importance of integrating hard and soft power (necessarily inclusive of so-called sharp power), conventional and unconventional, military and civilian, and operating across all domains, as well as the electro-magnetic spectrum. Private Military Organizations and Special Forces are integrated alongside civilians to coerce. This is a change in the character of conflict, consistent with TRADOC’s era of contested equality. Historically, the alignment of all levers of national power and the conscious blurring of conventional and non-conventional military capabilities is only achievable during wars of national survival.

Gerasimov’s integration of all levers, answerable to a single NDCC exploits Russia’s autocratic politics and grand strategy of mobilization. Routine, democratic checks and balances are mortgaged in favor of strategic efficiency. Cross-domain coercion exploits the democratically illegitimate agility of autocracy. The alignment of

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power in a single, decision-making body offers a strategic edge relative to the Alliance, 
which remains beholden to both the checks and balances of consensus driven politics, and 
a necessarily federated approach to security.

The information environment is the first convincing manifestation of a changing 
character of conflict characterized by TRADOC’s era of accelerated human progress.\textsuperscript{27} 
Information operations are fundamental to cross-domain coercion. Conflict is seen as an 
informational-psychological struggle in which an adversary can be forced to act 
according to a false informational picture, known as reflexive control. Information 
operations have been propelled to extraordinary heights by virtue of an interconnected, 
strategic environment, and pervasive social media. Information operations contribute to 
disinformation, denial, and deception, in order to set agendas and create a narrative to the 
disadvantage of the adversary.\textsuperscript{28} Russian quasi-state control of media enables 
information operations of a breadth and precision that democratic societies, leveraging a 
predominantly free press, struggle to counter.

CDC synthesizes the principal components of nuclear deterrence, integration - in 
its broadest sense, and information operations to create a strategy, both complex and 
ambiguous. It is a blend of containment, deterrence, and coercion. Its coercive 
capabilities predominate and risk exacerbating any security dilemma rather than 
deterring. Its coherent execution, however, presents an enormous challenge to the 
command and control apparatus of the state. Snap readiness exercises are having a 
positive effect across the Ministries of Defense and Interior and it is clear that Russian

\textsuperscript{27} US Army Training and Doctrine Command, \textit{The Operational Environment and the Changing 
Character of Future Warfare}, TRADOC 2017, 6. 
\textsuperscript{28} Adamsky, 35.
and Western views of the strategic environment are at odds. While “the US military is cutting back on heavy, conventional capabilities, Russia is looking at a similar, future operational environment, and doubling down on hers [conventional capabilities].” The Donbass campaign has not been a resounding Russian success. The exercise of taut command and control to achieve sophisticated ends through decentralized affiliates/proxies is, at best, haphazard. Eastern Ukraine has, however, functioned as an operational laboratory to stress-test and develop the theories of cross-domain coercion. An examination of the likely Russian strategic ways that could be employed in the Baltics is necessary, if NATO is to understand the threat as precisely as possible.

Crimea and Eastern Ukraine should focus NATO minds on the nature of the Russian threat. Russia perceives that the western norms of sovereignty, democracy and human rights underpin the enduring containment of Russia and inhibit her ability to re-establish Great Power status both globally and in her near-abroad. “Breaking Europe’s political cohesion is the fundamental prerequisite for changing Europe’s security rules, principles and norms.” DSACEUR comments that “Russia is predatory and opportunistic . . . [and has] three objectives: Europe divided with governments increasingly sympathetic to Russia, Eastern Europe under direct Russian influence, and Europe divorced from the United States. This is a direct challenge to the world order.” The strategic end of NATO collapse can be pursued through two principal ways: the seizure of Alliance territory, or subversion of Alliance societies.

29 Bartles, 36-37.
31 General Sir James Everard KCB CBE, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, interview with the author, dated 26 Oct 17.
Firstly, the seizure of Alliance territory presents NATO with “the choice between open warfare for the re-conquest of that territory or acquiescence to the new status quo.”\(^3\) This very scenario was war-gamed by RAND in 2016 with the conclusion that the Baltic capitals would fall within 60 hours.\(^3\) Importantly, the conventional counter-offensive required to eject Russia would be extremely costly and might precipitate Alliance dissolution.\(^4\) A variation on this theme is a limited seizure of Alliance territory based on geographic coincidence with an ethnic Russian minority. Narva in Estonia or Daugavpils in Latvia represent viable opportunities.\(^5\) Both variants represent a frontal challenge to Alliance cohesion by likely triggering Article 5, albeit in calculated manner.

Secondly, Russian sponsored subversion of Baltic society also presents an opportunity to attack Alliance cohesion in two particular ways: Donbass-style subversion to incite civilian unrest and eventual insurgency, or limited and temporary incursions by Russian military personnel into Alliance territory. In both cases, Russia would seek to undermine Alliance cohesion by persistently operating below the threshold of Article 5 using the full spectrum of cross-domain coercion capability. The Donbass model is deniable, up to a point and offers a pretext for transition to overt intervention, in order to safeguard so-called “Great Russians” resident in the Baltics. Limited, overt violations of Alliance territory seek to gradually undermine confidence and faith in Article 5 and ultimately, Alliance cohesion.\(^6\) It is against these scenarios that the NATO response is


\(^5\) Ibid, 1.


\(^6\) Kirchick, 16.
measured. Remembering Putin’s rhetoric, conventional conquest of Alliance territory remains unlikely. Notwithstanding the potency of CDC, the threat is, for the most part, coercive.\textsuperscript{37} It is credible, however, to argue that persistent Russian mobilization, allied to increased readiness reduces Russia’s conventional inferiority. While the Russian Army does not enjoy a raw, numerical advantage over NATO, “it is threatening a multi-domain equivalence in long-range missiles, rockets, drones, sophisticated cyber-attacks, jamming and an integrated information campaign.”\textsuperscript{38} The compound effect of peer conventional capability, chronic Russia/NATO tension, and indications of Alliance vacillation could dramatically stimulate Russian confidence and diminish her appreciation of risk, underscoring the requirement for credible NATO deterrence.

\textsuperscript{37} I think that only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO. See footnote 1 for citation.

\textsuperscript{38} Kevin M.Woods and Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood USMC (Ret), \textit{Multi-Domain Battle: Time for a Campaign of Joint Experimentation}, Joint Forces Quarterly (forthcoming, Jan 2018), 5.
Chapter 3: NATO responds

We have decided to establish an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to unambiguously demonstrate, as part of our overall posture, Allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression

– Warsaw Summit Communique

At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO articulated its response to Russian aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The creation of the Readiness Action Plan and the enhancement of the NATO Reaction Force with a 5000 strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) represent important steps in NATO adaptation. The VJTF is designed to provide both a quick reaction task force, capable of reinforcing member states, and a mobile “tripwire” to reinforce any Alliance response. The 2016 Warsaw summit signaled further and bolder NATO adaptation fueled, in part, by academic criticism of NATO’s posture.2 The VJTF was criticized for being unable to guarantee that it could be in the right place, at the right time. If Wales was about reassurance, then Warsaw was a very definite attempt to return to a deterrent posture. NATO agreed to deploy four multinational battalion sized Task Forces to the Baltic States and Poland. “The tripwire is finally in the right place: NATO’s Baltic battalions are unequivocally intended to deter Russia.”3 The forward positioning of various Alliance members, including NATO’s nuclear powers is intended to signal deterrence by solidarity and strengthen a deterrence by punishment strategy. The EFP tripwire, if activated by overt incursions or cross-domain coercion, should trigger a full NATO response (which could include nuclear

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weapons), in order to eject Russia from NATO territory. While the EFP battalions vary according to each framework nation, they should be combat-capable units and thereby enhance the broader capability of the host nation to contribute to an Alliance strategy of deterrence by denial. Command and control of the EFP battalions is exercised through the host nation and therefore EFP capabilities are integrated and interoperable with domestic formations but not convincingly with the wider alliance. NATO has necessarily subcontracted the responsibility for multi-domain integration to the respective, host nation.

In addition, Warsaw introduced reforms to the NATO command structure. Allies agreed to establish eight, tiny headquarters known as NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) throughout the Baltics and Eastern Europe. The NFIUs are specifically designed to facilitate the in-flow of reaction forces (the Enhanced NATO Reaction Force (the ENRF); the VJTF is its lead element) in accordance with pre-written, Graduated Response Plans (GRPs) for specific regions. NATO has already planned the logistic detail of movement, timings and assembly areas, in order to ensure that it has the right forces, in the right place, at the right time. Strategic communication command and control rests with NATO and so a coherent narrative should be achievable. The Wales and Warsaw summit communiques and their associated outputs are undoubtedly pragmatic but their shortcomings expose the scale of NATO’s inadequacy rather than its residual capability. Three principal deficiencies emerge: understanding of deterrence theory and language, the operationalization of deterrence theories, and a lack of resilience in the face of cross-domain coercion.
Academic commentary concerning the conceptual decline of deterrence predates the Wales summit. It cites a combination of hubris regarding western conventional superiority and the distraction of counter-insurgency campaigning as the principal reasons for such a decline. NATO is certainly vulnerable to both. The EFP reveals NATO confusion regarding the design of collective, territorial defense in the contemporary strategic environment. The EFP is typical of the Cold War paradigm and arguably fails to understand the contemporary threat. It is an old and comfortable template being used against an ambiguous and sophisticated threat. Deterrence theory does, of course, have a role, although NATO’s deterrence vocabulary reveals uncertainty in NATO’s adaptation to the modern environment. “We’re stuck in a 20th century paradigm . . . the language of deterrence doesn’t fit very well at the moment.”

The 21st century strategic environment is, in comparison with the Cold War era, increasingly complex. NATO’s own definition of deterrence is, however, sufficiently nuanced to cope with this evolution:

The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act.

Unfortunately the operational application of this concept lacks commensurate sophistication. NATO’s operational design is overly focused on armed conflict rather than coercion, in spite of the definition’s explicit reference to aggressive coercion. If

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CDC is the Russian response to an emerging character of conflict, NATO needs to address this adjusted threat in terms of its deterrence posture. Coercive capabilities in the Cyber and informational domains are readily accessible and relatively cheap, yet NATO’s posture appears to focus almost exclusively on the threat of armed conflict. “Cyber and Space domains are contributing a tremendous measure of complexity to the challenge of deterring future adversaries.” NATO needs to embrace contemporary thinking on CDC: “the use of threats in one domain, or some combination of different threats, to prevent actions in another domain that would change the status quo.” The Cold War paradigm and a linear escalation model are anachronisms. Deterrence exists across at least five domains concurrently; escalation and de-escalation occur simultaneously across multiple and inter-connected domains. Given this context, how has deterrence strategy evolved?

The deterrence of a primarily coercive threat by a consensus-driven Alliance must be based on unity and resolve: deterrence by solidarity. Until now, solidarity has been an implicit characteristic of Alliance operations; credible deterrence assumes adequate solidarity. CDC, however, seeks to attack the manifestation of that solidarity, from the strategic to the tactical. CDC capabilities can specifically target the seams of Alliance cohesion with an unprecedented frequency and intensity. NATO’s behavior and communiques implicitly recognize this adaptation but the vocabulary used to articulate the strategy is confusingly wedded to traditional theories of deterrence by punishment

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7 James Blackwell, *Deterrence at the Operational Level of War*, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2011, 36.
9 Air, Sea, Land, Nuclear, and Cyber domains.
and denial. Both traditional approaches remain relevant and should complement the central tenet of solidarity. “In the 21st century, [capacity alone] is not enough. Modern deterrence is focused on unity and resolve. The more united we are, the better the deterrence.”¹⁰ The sophistication of this intent has arguably been lost in execution. The persistent labelling of the EFP as a strategic tripwire risks constraining the EFP’s contribution to a strategy of deterrence by punishment alone. Moreover, its “enhanced” nature infers some sort of contribution to deterrence by denial. Both are true but the explicit labelling undermines the pre-eminence of deterrence by solidarity. The importance of solidarity requires explicit recognition in order to inform planning. This confusion risks undermining the coherence of the entire message. The notion of deterrence by solidarity requires further articulation, emphasizing how this goes beyond “credibility” and how the Alliance transforms multinational seams into strengths, rather than vulnerabilities. The global political response following the alleged Russian nerve agent attack in the British city of Salisbury demonstrates the power of political solidarity. The most compelling outcome from Salisbury was not the removal of hundreds of diplomatic staff but rather the breadth and depth of multinational solidarity.¹¹ Deterrence by solidarity demands the coherence of a similar response in the military domain and at the alliance level. The EFP could encapsulate solidarity both politically and militarily by emphasizing alliance unity, cohesion, and capability. The current EFP design, however, illuminates strategic seams and operational gaps.

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¹⁰ General Denis Mercier, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, interview with the author, dated 27 Oct 17.
The operational focus of the NFIUs risks being confused in the same way. Firstly, their positioning across the Baltic States appears to assume some sort of Newtonian equal and opposite response to a Russian seizure of NATO territory. The NFIU’s locations and functions infer that NATO’s deterrence by punishment strategy will seek to re-take lost ground west to east, in direct opposition to the axis of any Russian invasion. This is a Cold war paradigm built on dubious assumptions regarding the speed and availability of credible assembly options and the complexity of land, sea, and air domains, as a result of the Kaliningrad oblast. Moreover, this is in direct opposition to the original intent of Article 5 which sought to avoid any commitment to “meeting the attack.”12 Secondly, the operational functions of reception, staging, onward movement and integration are usually associated with operational movement in support of deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by solidarity might demand that NFIUs focus primarily on the integration of the force, vice those functions that contribute to assembly and movement. NFIUs are useful pieces of operational gearing but the current laydown highlights the shortcomings in NATO’s strategy.

Command and control of deterrence now demands a level of sophistication that current structures do not support. While NATO is committed to the recognition of the Cyber domain, Alliance members have sought to retain Cyber capabilities as national responsibilities in much the same way that NATO’s nuclear powers retained nuclear capability at the national level, vice the Alliance level. In the Cold War, the additional complexity of nuclear triggers being held in national capitals (Washington DC, London, and Paris) was seen as helpful in calibrating deterrent messaging to the Soviet Union, a

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view that persists today. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons was sufficiently high, that the absence of Alliance control was both acceptable and coherent. This is not necessarily the case with Cyber capability. Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008, Stuxnet, North Korea’s alleged attack on Sony Pictures, and an apparent US response, all demonstrate that Cyber-attacks by and against Alliance members are commonplace. “The idea that sovereign states, at this stage, will delegate offensive cyber command and control . . . to NATO is a long, long way to coming to pass . . . What worries me about that is that I think we could get caught out.” The adherence to a model of federated capability (for nuclear and cyber domains) is arguably necessary in an Alliance based on consensus, however, if NATO’s central message is one of unity, solidarity and resolve, then a federated approach is no longer appropriate. A strategy of deterrence by solidarity demands the integration of both defensive and some offensive cyber capabilities, particularly when the most likely threat to Alliance forces is from the Cyber domain. The apparently pragmatic federation of some capabilities undermines the credibility of NATO’s military capability and the Alliance requirement for solidarity. It is questionable whether 21st century deterrence is credible without a coherent, offensive cyber capability.

Each EFP battalion is nested within the national decision-making apparatus of the host nation. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), however, is the only forum where discrete national capabilities are shared. The result is an incomplete understanding of the theatre beneath the NAC because of huge variance in national capabilities. Given NATO’s acceptance of federated capabilities, a multi-domain determination of the

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14 Lieutenant General PNYM Sanders CBE DSO, Commander Field Army, the British Army, *interview with the author*, dated 7 Nov 17.
overall trends of escalation or otherwise is not possible below the strategic level. This is unwieldy and risky, particularly with respect to the cyber domain. The reality is that timely decisions will have to be made in national capitals, systemically ignorant of activity in other domains. This could contribute to Alliance disharmony.

NATO’s formal definition of deterrence is fit for purpose but its theoretical application is badly coordinated. Consequently, the Alliance command structures that underpin the EFP risk being equally off-balance. Cross-domain deterrence demands integration of hard and soft power sensors and capabilities as well as an agile, responsive, and superbly well-informed decision-making body. “Without further work, there is a danger NATO’s deterrence policy will turn into a Potemkin village: painted in bright colors and looking impressive at first glance but lacking substance behind the façade.”

NATO can afford to be much more deliberate regarding the balance between clarity and ambiguity in deterrence language; Articles 4 and 5 sit on the fault line. Deterrence messaging relies on a conscious and delicate balance between precision and opacity. Thresholds for response must be sufficiently clear to avoid exploitation but retain a sense of inexactitude that discourages attempts at circumvention. Hitherto, Article 5 has been a touchstone of NATO surety. It remains unambiguous with respect to conventional domains but is unhelpfully indefinite in the Cyber realm. The Cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 did not violate Article 5 but NATO has made it clear that a Cyber attack is capable of violating Article 5, if deemed sufficiently severe. “If Russia feels

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inclined to test NATO’s will or cohesion, it’s going to do it in the cyber space, either because it’s deniable or because it’s not going to risk punishment.” An uncertain threshold of severity acknowledges that cyber sovereignty is ambiguous and can be violated without response. Deterrence by solidarity demands Alliance consensus on the uncomfortable issue of cyber sovereignty and its violation with respect to Article 5, acknowledging the challenge of attribution without compromising cyber capability. NATO could be more assertive regarding Cyber attribution, perhaps accepting a lower burden of proof and at least creating a defensive, cohesive narrative about Cyber deterrence.

The November 2017 commitment to a NATO Cyber Operations Center and ongoing work on a Cyber Roadmap are late but welcome developments for the Alliance. Both fail to recognize that NATO’s deterrence strategy is critically undermined, in the cyber domain, if it is unable to describe the very cyber behavior it seeks to deter. “NATO has made considerable progress in its efforts to integrate cybersecurity into its planning processes, but while it may have gone as far as the political environment allows, it needs to do more.” It is, however, Article 4 that requires most thought.

Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” In an era of hyper-competition where Gerasimov blurs the boundary between conflict and peace, what constitutes an Article 4 threat? This is an

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17 Lieutenant General PNYM Sanders CBE DSO, Commander Field Army, the British Army, interview with the author, dated 7 Nov 17.
18 NATO Cyber Defence, accessed at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm
important question and NATO’s deference to national perception undermines its unity. The current position allows national capitals to subjectively perceive a threat and demand Alliance consultation, blurring the boundaries of *casus foedaris*. Article 4 could be improved with additional qualification of objective threats that must result in Alliance consultation. This would effectively create the potential for the automatic triggering of Article 4, instituting a threshold beneath Article 5 that would cohere alliance discussion and focus. Cross-domain coercion deliberately seeks to operate below the threshold of Article 5, inferring a clarity of adversary understanding regarding Article 5 that enables its deliberate circumvention. If Article 5 was the trigger for a Cold War response, then it is Article 4’s violation which is central to the escalation of conflict in the 21st century. The absence of NATO discussion on the limits of Article 5 and the usefulness of Article 4 betrays wider doubt about the Alliance’s longevity. An Article 4 discussion is overdue.

The EFP is premised on the coherent, operational application of deterrence theory. Deterrence by solidarity is evidenced by clear political statements and commitment, including the deployment of twenty-two nations as part of the EFP. Translating the compelling political intent into an operational employment model that exudes a sense of unity requires coherence with the treaty architecture and credible, complementary strategies of deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The contemporary interpretation of articles 4 and 5 is at odds with a credible strategy of deterrence and demands evaluation.

NATO’s application of deterrence by denial is embodied in Article 3 of The North Atlantic Treaty.²¹ Article 3 urges “continuous and effective self-help and mutual

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aid . . . [to] develop . . . capacity to resist armed attack.”

The enhanced nature of the EFP infers an improvement to host nation capacity that is not necessarily reflected in the force generation of the EFP units, which are arguably focused on political cohesion. Moreover, DSACEUR notes that “deterrence by denial is perhaps easier in the 21st century than it was in the 20th,” a function of anti-access, area denial capabilities. This is a credible assertion but arguably overstates Alliance capability. It is unclear how or if the EFP is designed to contribute to Article 3 and a strategy of deterrence by denial.

The operational execution of deterrence by punishment assumes that deterrence has failed and that an Article 5 threshold has been met. The strategy of deterrence by punishment seeks to dissuade the overt seizure of Alliance territory. RAND war-gaming concluded that Russia could seize the Baltic capitals within approximately 60 hours. It also concluded that a multinational force of approximately seven combat brigades would be required to stall this advance. The entire EFP enterprise amounts to less than a single Brigade and does not significantly adjust this calculus. The VJTF is unable to respond within this timeline and even if pre-positioned through indicators and warnings or serendipity, NATO is unable to generate sufficient land power to prevent the conquest of the Baltics in line with the RAND hypothesis. The follow-on forces themselves (the ENRF) are held against allies’ current operational commitments, and their mobilization could take months. The ENRF is, more or less, hollow. It lacks adequate training to compete against a technologically advanced enemy and would require significant

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23 General Sir James Everard KCB CBE, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, interview with the author, dated 26 Oct 17.
25 Scheffler Carvaja, A, Beyond Deterrence: NATO’s Agenda After Warsaw, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2016, 4.
investment in people, equipment, and logistics. NATO would also have to find a way past Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities including the integrated air defense and anti-ship systems in the Kaliningrad oblast. If the tripwire is not actually connected to a credible and timely response, deterrence by punishment does not exist. The Alliance does, however, enjoy an advantage over Russia in terms of military mass and it easy to overstate the well-understood frictions of interoperability, speed of decision-making and speed of assembly. Nonetheless, “modern deterrence is capacity, resolve and messaging . . . and the capacity must be credible.”26 There is academic doubt, evidenced by RAND, surrounding NATO’s capacity to effectively punish. NATO can afford to do more to reassure allies and commentators alike. “The capacity of NATO to respond to a limited incursion is so slow that it doesn’t present a credible deterrent. The deterrent value comes from the nuke and NATO’s capacity to out-mobilize Russia both economically and militarily . . . You’ve got to enhance NATO’s ability and capacity to respond sufficiently quickly.”27

A limited incursion (to seize Narva or Daugavpils for example) could make it difficult for the Alliance to come to consensus. Any such delay would be extremely damaging, deepening doubt and mistrust about the credibility of Article 5. Just as De Gaulle questioned American willingness to trade Paris for New York in the event of nuclear war in the 1960s, it is inconceivable to think that a limited incursion will be met with sufficient speed to mitigate the absence of credible follow-on forces.28 The loss of

26 General Denis Mercier, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, interview with the author, dated 27 Oct 17.
27 Lieutenant General PNYM Sanders CBE DSO, Commander Field Army, the British Army, interview with the author, dated 7 Nov 17.
Daugavpils to separatists is unlikely to resonate in the same way across all twenty-nine Alliance capitals and prompt an immediate and decisive military response. This calculation is complicated further by the presence of Russian minorities, providing the pretext for Russian involvement and demanding an agreed Alliance position on the treatment of those minorities.

The NATO response to Russian cross-domain coercion has been conventional adaptation, mirroring evolutionary steps in Alliance history.\(^{29}\) NATO has failed to account for a changing character of conflict and this failure is directly reflected in a lack of resilience in the EFP forces. EFP forces are, for the most part, structured and trained to face a conventional threat. Typically, they are conventional, armored units and lack the experience or wherewithal to counter threats across other domains or from unconventional forces. Faced with the blurring of lines between hitherto distinct spheres of statecraft, NATO has fallen back on conventional models from a more dangerous yet less ambiguous time.\(^{30}\) The irony is that such models can be exploited by a revanchist Russia for strategic opportunity; to attack the very Alliance cohesion the forces were sent to underwrite. The most likely Russian tactical courses of action focus on subversion of Alliance cohesion through either Donbass-style civilian unrest, or repeated, limited incursions into Alliance territory. The EFP forces will, by definition, operate among Russian minorities resident in the Baltics and fault lines will emerge that will challenge Alliance resolve. Already, German EFP forces in Lithuania have been the subject of a


\(^{30}\) Martin Zapfe, 150
likely Russian disinformation campaign that alleged the rape of a local minor by German soldiers.\textsuperscript{31}

In the event of growing civil unrest, the scope for Russian exploitation will grow and Alliance seams are likely to come to the fore. The current command and control construct of a framework nation working directly with a host nation risks creating a series of bilateral fiefdoms across what is, to Russia, a single operational theatre. The gaps and seams associated with national responsibilities and caveats in Afghanistan’s Regional Commands could well develop across the Baltics, including fundamental issues such as rules of engagement. Germany is likely to be much more sensitive to cultural and legal restrictions in comparison to the US or the UK, and Canada’s overarching commitment is questionable given apparent Canadian reluctance to commit as a framework nation.\textsuperscript{32}

“For the first time in NATO’s history, Russia will have the ability to target a select group of troop-contributing nations within the allied defense posture.”\textsuperscript{33} The Cold War presented similar multinational seams but the capabilities of the information age offer greater opportunity to attack seams with greater frequency, precision, and sophistication. The EFP construct is an Alliance patchwork vulnerable to exploitation in this way. This weakness is compounded by the task organization of the forces which is typically an armored or mechanized infantry battalion. Faced with Gerasimov’s ratio of four to one hostile civilian and military capabilities, operating simultaneously across all domains and


\textsuperscript{32} “The US had to considerably twist Canada’s arm to jump in as the fourth framework nation at the last minute”, quoted in Scheffler Carvaja, A, \textit{Beyond Deterrence: NATO’s Agenda After Warsaw}, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2016, 2.

\textsuperscript{33} Martin Zapfe, 155
under unified command, a single, conventional Battle Group feels a little one-dimensional.

Command and control is a particular concern. NATO has, in effect, subcontracted the command of nuclear and cyber domains to national capitals through its persistent, federated approach. A cyber-attack on the UK’s EFP force in Estonia would require a coherent response from four national capitals. The Alliance may be easier to divide during a crisis. Even where framework nations defer to their Baltic host, mitigating inherent vulnerabilities demands “complex command and control systems that can manage multinational, multi-agency operations, integrating general purpose forces, special operations forces and law enforcement personnel.” Such complex command and control demands a level of financial investment that is increasingly rare across NATO members. None of these perceived weaknesses are insurmountable and NATO’s senior commanders are confident in the EFP. “EFP launched quickly, has been a huge success and it will get better, not so much Battle Groups, but component parts of now much stronger brigades.”

Deterrence by solidarity must be credible and continually reinforced. Like all strategies, it must be able to compete with an adversary’s strategy and it is unclear how the Alliance can escalate deterrence by solidarity, in the face of subversive activity.

The use of non-strategic nuclear weapons is linked to Russian cross-domain coercion. It stands to reason that NATO must train its forces for operations on a nuclear

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34 The UK commitment includes sub-units from both France and Denmark.
battlefield. NATO is ill-prepared for this. There are Alliance procedures and capabilities for managing the consequences of weapons of mass destruction. The extent to which such capabilities are available and scaled to EFP formations or hosting Alliance members is doubtful. Furthermore, there is limited, modern NATO doctrine for conducting combat operations on a nuclear battlefield. While undoubtedly the most dangerous outcome and highly unlikely, it is a critical shortfall in NATO resilience, not least given our understanding of Russian nuclear de-escalation thinking.

Russian revanchism in the form cross-domain coercion prompted NATO to instinctively reach back for a Cold War template that is out of date. While political and senior military leadership recognized the requirement for an updated deterrence approach, the articulation and execution of the EFP belie a deeper uncertainty regarding the strategic context for the EFP. Deterrence must weave the threads of solidarity, denial, and punishment coherently. The current design is theoretically off-balance and undermined by confusing language. Deterrence relies on the certain ability to match word and deed. The tactical manifestation of “solidarity” in terms of task organization, command and control, and escalation measures requires more thought, particularly if it is more than straightforward credibility. Similarly, the Alliance should develop its understanding of how the EFP might contribute to Article 3 “denial” as well as the credibility of any “punishment” response triggered by the EFP tripwire. Furthermore, the Alliance must address the overall resilience, in its most general sense, of its EFP forces.
Chapter 4: The Way Ahead

_The measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion the boldest are the safest –_
Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson

NATO faces a choice. It can continue its largely conventional adaptation, seeking to develop depth and capability across the force. Alternatively, “NATO can go down the road of soft- and hardware integration, clarifying new principles of order and backing them with adequate force.”¹ The latter arguably offers more promise, but common to both recommendations is a requirement for better, unified, political leadership, and the commitment of national treasure. Collective security is not bought on the cheap, particularly when facing an adversary committed to a transformative agenda of state mobilization. The Warsaw summit welcomed the first, collective increase in defense expenditure since 2009 but cautioned that only 5 Alliance members meet the 2% GDP minimum.² “It is essential that allies display the political will to provide the required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed.”³

NATO’s overarching strategy of deterrence demands clear-eyed re-examination. The initially pragmatic response to Gerasimov’s message requires urgent renewal to incorporate better thinking and modest increases in resource, following the reduction of commitment in Afghanistan. Senior leaders are aligned on the requirement for an updated deterrence strategy and what might be termed a theory of deterrence by solidarity. This intent is yet to translate into meaningful operational and structural change. Solidarity as a

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³ NATO, _Warsaw Summit Communique_, Section 33.
theoretical output demands further research and thought, not least with respect to task-organization, multi-domain command and control, and escalatory measures. Politicians have demonstrated the art of the possible following Salisbury and this should provide sufficient momentum to prompt an alliance discussion surrounding military solidarity. NATO sponsored rejuvenation of deterrence thinking throughout Alliance war colleges might foster debate and conversation among military elites and political leadership.

Perhaps ironically, NATO’s definition of deterrence is entirely fit for purpose and elegantly captures the importance of deterring coercion. The application of deterrence theory in the 21st century demands a renewed focus on aggressive coercion and the capabilities required to underpin a credible deterrence posture. Deterrence by solidarity posits a subtly different paradigm whereby the Alliance seeks to develop such convincing evidence of solidarity that coercion, in any domain, is counter-productive because it strengthens solidarity. The current NATO deterrence strategy builds a solid material structure with seams (national and capability-based) that could fracture under extreme pressure. Deterrence by solidarity should be equated with the mechanics of liquid. Interoperability and breadth of capability remove seams and the force can absorb pressure, albeit with some compression, like a liquid. It cannot be fractured or perforated and, in fact, pressure only increases its latent strength. This analogy is easy to describe but admittedly challenging to operationalize.

Pending the establishment of a command structure able to interpret, understand, and respond to Russian coercion, the NATO Russian Council should be cautiously de-frosted. The re-establishment of dialogue, in spite of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its aggression in Eastern Ukraine, offers scope for risk reduction to mitigate
inadvertent provocation through strategic incongruence. The necessity for dialogue is linked to the ambiguity regarding NATO’s key principles.

Article 5 requires detailed reaffirmation in the strongest terms. While “an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against them all,”4 the resulting actions are merely “such . . . as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”5 Moreover, “any such attack . . . shall immediately be reported to the [UN] Security Council.”6 Article 5 must permit strategic decision space but equally, it must unequivocally underscore a collective commitment to respond, particularly if premised on a strategy of deterrence by punishment. A retrospective declaration that the 2007 Cyber-attack on Estonia represented a breach of Article 5 might be useful in developing a meaningful conversation about the scope of territorial defense in the cyber realm.

NATO’s own definition of deterrence relies on convincing an aggressor that the consequences of coercion outweigh the gains. In the cyber domain, a refusal to meaningfully articulate what might constitute coercion undermines deterrence. The retrospective admission of a failure to act could be a powerful, restorative declaration of solidarity, future intent, and could force useful discussions regarding the challenges of timely cyber attribution. Similarly, in a hyper-competitive strategic environment, perpetually bordering on conflict, Article 4 is worthy of renewed interest. Article 4 is not part of the current deterrence debate and it should be. Clarity of understanding regarding an Article 4 threat, where it can be agreed, might attenuate the prevailing Russian approach and mitigate against the threat of societal subversion across the Baltics.

5 Ibid., Article 5.
6 Ibid., Article 5.
The operationalization of NATO’s deterrence strategies is another area that demands clear-eyed reappraisal. The EFP encapsulates Alliance uncertainty regarding the purpose of forward presence. Is it simply a tripwire to trigger a substantial reinforcement or should it be genuinely capable of defensive (deterrence by denial) operations alongside its Baltic hosts and in direct support of Article 3? The current proposition is arguably an unbalanced and awkward hedge; this thesis advocates a broader but not necessarily larger force, mirroring a cross-domain threat. Each EFP battalion must be crafted in light of existing host nation capability, eschewing any duplication of effort. The sum must be able to operate an array of integrated sensors across all-domains, such that the tripwire can perceive and trip the full spectrum of likely threats. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is furthest ahead in understanding the operational ramifications of Russian cross-domain coercion. TRADOC’s nascent and admittedly immature response, ably supported by the US Marine Corps, is “Multi-Domain Battle” (MDB).7 Multi-Domain Battle seeks to “deter and defeat increasingly capable adversaries in competition short of armed conflict, during armed conflict, and in post-armed conflict by calibrating force posture; by employing resilient, cross-domain capable formations that can maneuver on the expanded battlefield; and by converging capabilities across multiple domains to create windows of advantage that enable maneuver.”8

As the EFP gradually evolves and adapts, TRADOC’s MDB should be its doctrinal foundation. “[MDB] is the best counter to what the Russians might try. It’s

conceived primarily as a response to anti access area denial but that’s a very narrow way of looking at MDB.” MDB also begins to expose what deterrence by solidarity might look like. A multi-domain capable force would enhance deterrence by denial and improve the efficacy of the tripwire. It would, of course, require deeper investment, although this would likely prove cost effective in the longer term. Furthermore, the credibility of the current punishment strategy demands reconsideration. A Russian invasion into the Baltics is likely to be prohibitive of a swift reversal West to East along the same axis. The compound effect of clumsy, internal Alliance lines of communication, injurious bureaucracy, and Kaliningrad’s integrated anti-access area denial capabilities prompt the uncomfortable conclusion that NATO might be forced to temporarily cede the Baltics, pending their subsequent liberation from another flank. This should be self-evident but the positioning of the NFIUs and, to a lesser extent, the task-organization of the EFP battalions belie a naïve, almost Newtonian belief in a direct reversal of any Russian incursion. The current posture seems premised on indicators and warnings, coupled with a speed of response and assembly that enables NATO overmatch within the first few weeks. Absent NATO’s ability to assemble this quickly, the positioning and value of the NFIUs is questionable and they risk being exposed as cosmetic, political gestures.

This thesis does not offer a solution beyond querying the wisdom of the current operational assembly plans (GRPs) and the bureaucratic efforts to support NATO’s operational speed of assembly. NATO’s ability to mobilize the ENRF needs to be tested, in the same way that Russia tests its forces at readiness, in order to formally quantify accusations of its hollowness. Only a genuine exercise of the capability will silence the

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9 Lieutenant General PNYM Sanders CBE DSO, Commander Field Army, the British Army, interview with the author, dated 7 Nov 17.
doubters who cite its potential over-commitment. Alternatively, such an exercise might expose a moribund capability that demands urgent re-evaluation.

The EFP’s resilience in the face of cross-domain coercion is questionable. Multi-Domain Battle offers a potential solution. The implementation of a MDB concept of operation would likely require adjustment of the current operational command and control structures, in order to harness all domains under a unified, Alliance commander. A regional two-star command able to bring coherence across the EFP endeavor and host nations might start to break down hitherto stubborn obstacles to multi-domain capability. Similarly, it would require appropriate delegation of authorities across all domains from both the North Atlantic Council and some national capitals with respect to Cyber capability. The experimental application of MDB in an Alliance context may reveal opportunities closed to a unilateral, national design. The collaborative pursuit of a MDB operational framework could be a useful stalking horse to unite Alliance political opinion, sustain military cohesion, and generate a resilient force capable of answering the questions posed by cross-domain coercion. The ability of the Alliance to access releasable intelligence across all domains and leverage multi-domain capability in response to Russian stimuli is fundamental. Indeed, it is questionable “whether NATO can field a credible military force without some public linkage to an offensive cyber capability.” MDB does, however, require limited dissolution of national stovepipes that house nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities. In the absence of an open, federated approach, it is challenging to imagine how the Alliance can achieve decision superiority over an autocratic Russian structure. Alliance members may not be ready to delegate

cyber domain capabilities to NATO. Nonetheless, NATO should encourage bilateral agreements to experiment and share, on the basis that NATO would benefit in general terms.

The EFP’s task organization needs to comprehensively reflect the challenges it faces. Form must follow function; a resilient force capable of deterring and responding to the subversive, opaque threats of cross-domain coercion must be suitably broad. “We need to integrate a whole of government approach. If we demonstrate readiness with just the military forces, we are not credible.”11 A joint, host, and framework nation back-brief to NATO’s Military Council that elucidates how the most likely Russian courses of action are addressed, might enable the sharing of best practice and highlight the gaps in the Alliance inventory. Multi-Domain Battle offers doctrinal promise.

There is also a requirement for modern Alliance doctrine regarding the nuclear battlefield. The Alliance needs to contemplate and plan for operations following the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Is it conceivable that NATO might choose not to respond to a nuclear detonation with an equal or greater nuclear weapon? The malevolent notion of nuclear de-escalation is only challenged by forces fully trained and equipped to continue with their mission in spite of a nuclear operating environment.

There are obvious, challenging capability gaps across the Alliance, not least an uncertain sense of deterrence theory, a weak deterrence by punishment/denial strategy and a forward presence that lacks resilience. NATO’s senior leadership recognizes these challenges and appears confident in an emerging sense of renewal. These tentative and

11 General Denis Mercier, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, interview with the author, dated 27 Oct 17.
encouraging steps must be clearly and confidently communicated in order to embolden those fighting to drive change.
Chapter 5: EFP revitalized

*It is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong*¹ – Michael Howard MC

Russia’s strategic culture is dominated by a desire to reestablish Great Power status, a sense of vulnerability by virtue of its geography, history, and the perception of NATO behavior during and since the Cold War. The resultant threat posed by Russia is credible. Cross-domain coercion is the latest strategic incarnation of Russian thought in her quest to realize her national interests. Cross-domain coercion heralds a changing character of conflict that NATO has been slow to recognize as a result of its focus on counter-insurgency operations. Cold War deterrence theory is no longer equipped to deal with this evolving character of conflict. Unfortunately, stubborn vestiges of the Cold War template have corrupted the design of the current response. Further adaptation is needed. The cautious de-frosting of the NATO Russia Council is needed, not least given the complexity of messaging in the contemporary environment. Nonetheless, deterrence remains essential and the EFP has a critical role therein.

A blend of strategies of deterrence by solidarity, punishment, and denial demands vigorous scrutiny, particularly in light of the changing character of conflict and with respect to the operational form of the EFP. What does NATO seek to deter? Articles 4 and 5 no longer provide a satisfactory encapsulation of the threats and attacks NATO is designed to defend against. Furthermore, how should NATO operationalize solidarity? How will NATO actually punish or deny Russia? The identification and design of forces and their role in a coherent plan requires further attention. Having crafted a response, a

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trigger or tripwire can be built and herein lies a genuine role for the EFP. In the event of an Article 5 incursion, the tripwire may well be sacrificial, in which case its size and organic capabilities need to be carefully calibrated. More importantly, the EFP must be capable of actually “tripping” an incursion, cognizant that the incursion takes many forms and operates across all domains. The four battalions of mostly infantrymen in Poland and the Baltics are not yet fully equipped to deal with the sophistication of the threat they face. The current design subcontracts any gaps to the host nations and therefore creates both strategic and operational seams. Traditional boundaries between distinct components of the civilian/military security architecture must be broken down.

In its current form, the EFP risks being the embodiment of NATO delusion. It is premised on strategic thinking from a past environment and its operational manifestation exposes NATO’s shortcomings. Theory can, however, be re-written. The North Atlantic Treaty is broadly fit for purpose but there is a requirement for updated policy consensus surrounding the application of articles 3, 4, and 5, not least given the advent of CDC, sharp power, and a militarized cyber domain. The EFP should be seen as an opportunity to highlight areas of alliance vulnerability and cohere political will for further adaptation. Furthermore, an MDP-capable EFP formation across the entire Baltic theater is not unrealistic in the medium term. In fact, it is fundamental to credible deterrence. Labels are important and the title of “Enhanced Forward Presence” is worthy of reconsideration to underscore the importance of deterrence by solidarity. “Enhanced Alliance Presence” might better encapsulate the requirement for a blend of deterrence strategies.

Operational commanders need to have situational awareness of all domains, including nuclear, cyber and space. Tactical escalation in the land domain may appear
incontrovertibly coherent to a commander facing a proximate, kinetic threat. Escalation in another, parallel domain, however, might be the most sophisticated and appropriate response. How do we enable such sophistication at the lowest possible level? The UK’s tenure as the framework nation for Estonia might provide a useful laboratory to develop some of these themes. The maturation of a concept is a critical first step in the birth of any capability. “MDB conceptualizes bringing jointness further down to the tactical level [by] allowing smaller echelons to communicate and coordinate directly while fighting in a decentralized manner.”2 Alliance endorsed innovation with assured NATO common funding could contribute to TRADOC’s world-leading thinking and start to develop a minimum viable task force capable of operating in a multi-domain battle. Estonia is the Alliance lead for Cyber capability and the country most experienced in alleged Russian interference, following the attack in 2007. The UK is, of course, a nuclear power with limited space assets, and significant cyber capabilities. A trilateral US/UK/Estonia commitment to a tightly-bound, multi-domain experiment might generate serious momentum behind wider NATO renewal. US interest could be driven by a thirst for Multi-domain data and could help to craft the parameters for such an experiment. “We need a visualization [of the] . . . delivery of joint deterrent effect . . . I think now is the right time.”3 A bold NATO attempt at renewal with attendant benefits for all might solidify commitment to the Alliance in an increasingly transactional strategic environment. The EFP presents an opportunity to silence NATO’s critics but it requires

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3 General Sir James Everard KCB CBE, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, interview with the author, dated 26 Oct 17.
strategic and operational adjustment. Strategy overcomes weakness by establishing
options that are politically and legally acceptable. An increasingly clear and present
Russian threat should prompt a shift away from delusion and towards renewal.
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Vita

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hadfield MBE was educated at both the University of Bristol and the National University of Singapore, studying Law and International Law, and graduating in 2002. LTC Hadfield attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2003 and commissioned into the 1st Battalion The Light Infantry.

In command, he has served multiple tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland. He was awarded the Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service following an Afghanistan tour. He has exercised in Poland, Germany, Canada, Kenya, France, and across the Baltic States.

He attended the UK’s Intermediate Command and Staff Course at the UK’s Joint Services Command and Staff College in 2011/2012 before working on the MOD staff as a planner for Afghanistan and Libya. This role demanded multiple deployments to Afghanistan, including 9 months as a Task Force Chief of Staff. He was awarded the MBE (Member of the Order of the British Empire) for this tour.

His most recent assignment, prior to attending JAWS was as the Chief of Staff of the UK’s 20th Armoured Infantry Brigade (the UK’s only combat brigade based in Germany). This tour included Brigade exercises in Canada and deployments to Estonia, Ukraine, and Iraq.

Upon graduation from JAWS, LTC Hadfield returns to the UK’s Ministry of Defence.