LOST IN TRANSLATION: LESSONS FROM COUNTERTERRORISM FOR A MORE PROACTIVE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION STRATEGY

by

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June 2017

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In August 2016, President Obama directed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to take the lead in synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), thus orchestrating a shift in national strategy. Under this new role, USSOCOM signaled an intent to increase military efforts to identify and prevent proliferation threats from metastasizing into crises. This approach represents a turn from USSOCOM’s prevailing emphasis on WMD crisis response. But what are the conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, development, and proliferation prior to a crisis? USSOCOM offers a unique perspective in addressing this question, based on its experience synchronizing military counterterrorism plans since 2003. This study analyzes USSOCOM’s role in counterterrorism strategy and evaluates the application of this experience to counter-WMD strategy. The research generates two conclusions. First, friction caused by varied meanings and understandings of organizational language can be overcome by educating the force on language already in use and emphasizing WMD threat pathways as the shared calibration point between organizations. Second, USSOCOM can improve counter-WMD strategy by replacing rigid command hierarchies with a networked, interorganizational response unified around specific threats.
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ABSTRACT

In August 2016, President Obama directed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to take the lead in synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), thus orchestrating a shift in national strategy. Under this new role, USSOCOM signaled an intent to increase military efforts to identify and prevent proliferation threats from metastasizing into crises. This approach represents a turn from USSOCOM’s prevailing emphasis on WMD crisis response. But what are the conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, development, and proliferation prior to a crisis? USSOCOM offers a unique perspective in addressing this question, based on its experience synchronizing military counterterrorism plans since 2003. This study analyzes USSOCOM’s role in counterterrorism strategy and evaluates the application of this experience to counter-WMD strategy. The research generates two conclusions. First, friction caused by varied meanings and understandings of organizational language can be overcome by educating the force on language already in use and emphasizing WMD threat pathways as the shared calibration point between organizations. Second, USSOCOM can improve counter-WMD strategy by replacing rigid command hierarchies with a networked, interorganizational response unified around specific threats.
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>counterproliferation</td>
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<td>CT</td>
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<td>countering weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>GPC</td>
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<td>NP</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS

**Consequence management:** “Actions taken to plan, prepare, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] incidents.”¹ U.S. military doctrine substituted CM in January 2017 with the term “CBRN response.”²

**Countering weapons of mass destruction:** “Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. Also called CWMD.”³ CWMD is used almost exclusively by the U.S. military.

**Counterproliferation:** “Those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners. Also called CP.”⁴

**Nonproliferation:** “Actions to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. Also called NP.”⁵

**Proliferation pillars:** Nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. Most U.S. government agencies and international partners use these three concepts to describe efforts to respond to WMD threats.⁶ U.S. military doctrine discontinued the use of the three proliferation pillars in 2014.⁷

**Weapons of mass destruction:** “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or causing mass casualties. This does not include the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD.”⁸


² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response* (Joint Publication 3–41) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), iii.


⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.


⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*, iii.

⁸ Ibid., I-1.
References


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In August 2016, President Obama directed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to take the lead in synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans for countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), demonstrating a shift in national strategy.¹ Under this new role, USSOCOM signaled an intent to increase military efforts to identify and prevent threats from metastasizing to crises.² This approach represents a turn from USSOCOM’s prevailing emphasis on WMD crisis response. But what are the conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, development, and proliferation prior to crisis? More directly, how can USSOCOM help do pre-crisis CWMD better? USSOCOM offers a unique perspective in addressing this question based on its experience synchronizing military counterterrorism (CT) plans since 2003.

CWMD is not “CT 2.0.” Among other variations, the two cases differ in the maturity of current interagency contributions, tempo of operations, and appetite for risk acceptance by national leaders. However, prior to the emergence of a WMD crisis, CWMD and counterterrorism share strong commonalities—most notably, complexity of the threat and necessity for a networked interorganizational response—allowing for useful comparison. For this reason, the scope of this research includes only CWMD pre-crisis, or in what is called the “steady state.”

This study analyzes USSOCOM’s specific contributions to effective national counterterrorism strategy and evaluates the application of this experience to CWMD, with special emphasis on the steady state. The assessment of lessons learned from counterterrorism and subsequent application to CWMD is divided along two analytic categories: “how we communicate about the problem” and “how we organize to address


the problem.” This analysis is supplemented by interviews with interagency and military CWMD planners to provide current insight and context for applying counterterrorism lessons to CWMD. These interviews include first-hand commentary from representatives of the National Security Council, the Department of Energy national laboratories, the U.S. intelligence community, academia, and USSOCOM.

The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, the study draws lessons from USSOCOM’s counterterrorism experience to enable policy makers, interagency planners, and military leaders to develop a more effective, proactive CWMD strategy. Second, it amplifies USSOCOM’s CWMD narrative by providing a consolidated, unclassified account of current CWMD language and synchronization efforts.

A. LEARNING FROM USSOCOM'S COUNTERTERRORISM EXPERIENCE

1. Overcoming Disparate Organizational Dialects

Language carves up the world for us. Words provide the medium by which we understand and categorize the otherwise infinitely complex into manageable “chunks,” which can then be communicated between people and organizations. Within bureaucratic institutions, however, conflict arises when meanings are not shared.

In 2003, no clear consensus existed on the definition of “terrorism,” or by extension counterterrorism, between the myriad of interorganizational contributors. Instead, variation in organizational language (or counterterrorism dialects) accepted by interagency players created competing local realities and friction between organizations.

Wittingly or otherwise, USSOCOM played a central role in overcoming disagreement over counterterrorism language. Though tasked only as the military offensive coordinator in 2003, the command recognized the immense value of interagency contributors already occupying the mission space and sought to integrate the DOD into the broader U.S. government effort. Doing so, however, required overcoming the deep-seated language differences that separated counterterrorism entities. Two actions contributed to this end.
USSOCOM first educated itself on the counterterrorism language already in use by interagency partners. The command drew close to interagency counterterrorism partners through daily collaboration and liaison exchanges. In doing so, USSOCOM established a better appreciation for the various, unique organizational perspectives and the language used to communicate those understandings, similar to the way special forces embed into a region to develop cultural expertise and local language proficiency.

Second, rather than trying to adjudicate dissimilar definitions of the broad concepts of terrorism or counterterrorism, USSOCOM leaders initially described their efforts through a single, understandable concept: defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), not defeating terrorism writ large. USSOCOM essentially sidestepped the contentious debate over counterterrorism language by narrowing the discussion to a specific target, where defeating AQI represented the initial calibration point around which counterterrorism agencies could communicate and collaborate.

2. Organizing for Counterterrorism Operations

U.S. counterterrorism efforts in 2003 resembled a machine bureaucracy that promoted process standardization and functional grouping, with centralized leadership orchestrating how subordinate groups contributed to the final output. By 2004, this rigid hierarchical structure proved ineffective against the complex threat of AQI. Special operations task forces played a central role in restructuring counterterrorism into a more adaptable, resilient enterprise.

USSOCOM’s first step did not come in the form of a new action, but rather the acceptance of a new reality—comfort as a participant without clear command authority.

Second, USSOCOM replaced the rigid hierarchical structure with an interorganizational network unified around a specific goal: defeat AQI.

B. APPLYING COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS TO CWMD

USSOCOM’s handling of counterterrorism language and organizational design supports three recommendations:
• Learn the language(s). The majority of the international community and U.S. interagency describe their organizational roles along the three “proliferation pillars” (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management), while DOD uses the construct CWMD. These two dialects share many commonalities, but a lack of mutual understanding has led to confusion and friction in CWMD interagency working groups. Education—within USSOCOM and among partners—is the first step in diffusing misunderstandings. USSOCOM liaison officers are well situated to advance this effort.

• Target-focused collaboration. Use specific WMD threat pathways as the calibration points to focus interorganizational collaboration. Consensus on CWMD language must start with a shared understanding of a clear objective. WMD threat pathways represent concrete, limited-scope objects around which agencies can collaborate effectively. Analysis of WMD pathway choke points and network nodes provides a common point of discussion along these lines.

• Get the word out. USSOCOM is already applying lessons drawn from its role as the military counterterrorism synchronizer—comfort without command and unity of effort through collaboration—within its new CWMD role. USSOCOM leadership has taken steps to reassure interagency partners of the respect and value it places on their contributions, as well as USSOCOM’s limitations in the CWMD sphere. However, many interagency partners still conflate “USSOCOM counterterrorism lessons” with military kinetic targeting to defeat terrorist networks, rather than organizational changes to improve collaboration. The goal is to highlight USSOCOM’s CWMD efforts and amplify the “one team, one fight” message.

Reference

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This work is not my own. It is the product of efforts by a diverse group of wonderful people—spanning from career “counterproliferators” to two boys that still believe in dragons. Although many people contributed to this research, I would like to single out a select few for their thankless support.

First, I offer my utmost appreciation to my advisory team for their mentorship and expertise. Dr. Leo Blanken patiently guided me through theories of bureaucracy, organizational design, etymology, and ontology. His ability to translate the abstract to the practical underwrote a useful, understandable end product. Dr. Zachary Davis introduced me to an entire ecosphere within the government that I did not know existed. His depth of unique experience and dogged insistence on clear writing are reflected on every page of this text. I thank you both for your help and friendship.

I would also like to thank those who donated their time to the interviews and personal conversations contributing to this research—Dr. Robyn Klein, National Security Council; Mr. Erik Anderson, National Counterproliferation Center; Dr. Brendan Melley, National Defense University; and Mr. Robert Foster, USSOCOM. Your willingness to speak clearly and openly about this problem-set is a testament to the public servants focused on developing practical solutions to WMD threats, regardless of “rice-bowls” and “silos.”

This research would not have been possible without the funding and support of our sponsor, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical, CWMD Systems. Director Jim Stokes, Mr. Chuck Thornton, and Mr. Michael Scott have empowered the Defense Analysis Department to row hard on this problem.

Lastly, and most of all, thank you to my family. You are the reason we serve.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. WMD PROLIFERATION AS A GROWING THREAT

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a persistent threat to the United States as well as to its international partners and its interests. The threat of conflict between nuclear-armed states emerged with the introduction of nuclear weapons in the 1940s, and that risk still exists today. Defying international attempts to prevent proliferation, North Korea repeatedly challenges regional stability through nuclear tests and what Director of National Intelligence James Clapper described as a demonstrated “willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies” to other countries, including Iran, Pakistan and Syria. Both of those states possessed covert nuclear programs. On the so-called vertical proliferation axis, China is undergoing modernization of its military nuclear forces, including advancements in missile technology and increased production of its JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, has demonstrated interest in shorter range tactical nuclear weapons, and reportedly persists in chemical and biological weapons development. Despite Iran’s legal commitment to the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 2015 multilateral

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3 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 7.

agreement, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, analysts have raised concerns about Tehran’s latent nuclear potential, its ongoing missile programs, and the possibility that others in the region may react with nuclear programs of their own. In South Asia, India and Pakistan are ramping up their nuclear arms competition, and many countries are stockpiling nuclear materials associated with civil nuclear programs. Iran, North Korea, Syria, Pakistan, and others also raise questions about “the possible merging of networks dealing in WMD proliferation and terrorism.” As USSOCOM takes on new responsibilities for CWMD, the global threat is not receding.

The proliferation challenge has for some time extended beyond the confines of interstate conflict. Similar to the way economies have flattened under the pressure of globalization in recent decades, non-state proliferation threat networks have become increasingly interconnected through a combination of shared interests and opportunism. Commercial and private industries produce and trade in chemical, nuclear, and biological technologies, many with dual-use qualities affording both legitimate and nefarious application. Past research has demonstrated that illicit trafficking and counterfeiting networks, largely indifferent to the intent of their clients, support the hidden movement of persons, things, and money. The emergence of disruptive technologies—including chemical and biological microreactors and additive manufacturing—and poorly secured state nuclear, chemical, and biological programs have contributed to increased

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accessibility to WMD technologies. These factors, combined with a myriad of threat actors intent on proliferating, create the potential for WMD threats that span from improvised nuclear or radiological dispersal devices employed by terrorist groups to nuclear, chemical and biological warfare within the complexity of proxy conflict.

Acknowledging the growing threat, President Barack Obama and the 2015 National Security Strategy name WMD proliferation a top national security priority: “Vigilance is required to stop countries and non-state actors from developing or acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or the materials to build them.” Though mounting an effective response inherently requires the input and cooperation of many government agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD) shoulders some portion of that effort. Subsequently, the 2015 National Military Strategy, the 2014 DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), and military doctrine echo national policy guidance on the proliferation challenge.

Despite the growing complexity of the proliferation threat and its acknowledgement by national leaders, DOD’s contribution to preventing WMD proliferation remains largely unchanged, until recently. In August 2016, President Obama

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11 CWMD is a DOD construct referring to efforts to respond to the WMD threat. Most U.S. departments and agencies use the terms nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. Chapter II provides more detailed definitions and analysis of these terms. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5–0) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011).
appointed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the lead combatant command “for synchronizing planning for DOD CWMD efforts.” 12 “Changes to the combatant command authorities are not undertaken lightly,” stated Pentagon spokesman Gordon Trowbridge following announcement of the transfer of responsibility, “and in this case, the change reflects careful consideration of how best to address what is clearly a national security priority.” 13

B. LOOKING BEYOND “NINJAS AND NERDS”

The opening slide of a USSOCOM CWMD joint planning group in early 2017 read simply, “CWMD ≠ SOF.” 14 Initial comments at the forum sought to expose the misconception that military CWMD efforts are the principal responsibility of secretive teams of “ninjas and nerds,” whereby elite commandos and premier scientists insert in the dark of night, on a moment’s notice, anywhere in the world to resolve WMD crises. Though some version of this caricature may conceivably exist within the DOD toolkit—and would serve an inherently critical role in national defense—it does not represent the full contribution or potential of military CWMD activities. Unfortunately, within USSOCOM, crisis response often receives a significantly disproportionate amount of attention relative to its limited role in the larger proliferation response effort. Interagency CWMD planning groups suggest that, over time, special operations crisis response through direct action has emerged as the dominant characterization of military CWMD


operations, overshadowing the significant potential effect of efforts to identify and prevent threats from metastasizing to the level of crisis.\textsuperscript{15}

Now directly charged with coordinating DOD CWMD plans, USSOCOM holds the appropriate platform to consider the effectiveness of current military efforts on a broader scale and propose revisions where appropriate, to include a shift in focus away from crisis response to a more preventative posture. Beginning in 2015 and in preparation for the pending change in responsibility, USSOCOM began detailed evaluations of current military CWMD capabilities.\textsuperscript{16} These assessments, subsequent joint planning groups, and interagency CWMD exercises have consistently emphasized the need to expand CWMD shaping operations, specifically military efforts in the “steady state,” before the emergence of a WMD crisis.\textsuperscript{17}

The most recent defense strategy document partitions DOD activities addressing the proliferation threat along three lines of effort: “prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crisis.”\textsuperscript{18} These Defense Department constructs correspond roughly with nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management—the three “pillars of proliferation” commonly used throughout the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{19} Steady state refers to all efforts short of a WMD crisis, including preventing new acquisitions and containing and reducing current threats. Consequence management, inherently

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\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{18} DOD strategy includes a fourth line of effort, “prepare,” which is labeled a “strategic enabler,” and is considered integral to all CWMD efforts, regardless of phase. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9–12.
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triggered by the occurrence of a crisis, does not occur in the steady state and will not be addressed directly in this research. Carving CWMD into distinct portions—steady state and crisis response—allows for a more detailed analysis of what is required for each.

USSOCOM’s history and organizational essence may lead the command to recommend DOD simply \textit{do more, and do better}. However, if USSOCOM’s initial assessment of deficits in the steady state holds true, doubling-down resources and manpower along current lines of effort will do little more to curb pre-crisis WMD threats than current efforts by the U.S. government already accomplish. Furthermore, given the continually evolving operational environment and contemporary political tendency to favor special operations in lieu of conventional military force, USSOCOM will likely remain heavily tasked and globally engaged for the foreseeable future. Further constrained by looming military funding reductions, neither USSOCOM nor DOD can afford to undertake burdensome new operational requirements without proper introspection as to what can and should be done.

C. \textbf{RESEARCH QUESTION}

In order to contribute to a more complete understanding and ultimately a more effective CWMD strategy, this research poses the following question: What are the conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, development, and proliferation prior to crisis? Put more simply, \textit{how can USSOCOM help do steady state CWMD better?}

Additional nested research questions emerged during the course of this study:

1. What role does organizational language play in CWMD policy?
2. How can we overcome challenges in CWMD organizational language?
3. How does organizational design and structure contribute to (or detract from) CWMD efficacy?
4. What role should DOD—and USSOCOM—play in contributing to an effective CWMD strategy?
D. PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, the study draws lessons from USSOCOM’s counterterrorism experience to enable policy makers, interagency planners, and military leaders to develop a more effective, proactive CWMD strategy. The lessons drawn from counterterrorism in this research are neither original nor do they represent a comprehensive checklist for CWMD strategy success. Instead, this research applies a balance of theory and practice to illustrate how USSOCOM’s counterterrorism experience can help focus near term efforts to address lacunae in the DOD CWMD enterprise. Inherently, additional research is necessary to test the assertions presented here and to determine their utility for DOD CWMD strategy.

Second, this research amplifies USSOCOM’s CWMD narrative by providing a consolidated, unclassified account of current language used to describe the WMD threat and the efforts to counter that threat. During the course of this research, CWMD planners (military and interagency alike) consistently raised organizational language as a source of friction hindering collaboration. Yet, this study found no repository of WMD proliferation terms already in use, nor an analysis of similarities and differences between organizational definitions. A complete etymology of WMD language is beyond the scope of this research. However, this study consolidates the key terms in common usage at the national level, providing a foundation for further, more detailed analysis of WMD organizational language in future research.

E. SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

In addition to limiting analysis to the steady state, this research focuses only on USSOCOM’s charge to synchronize military CWMD planning. Three distinct roles characterize the relationship between the CWMD mission and special operations: force provider and maintainer; subunified combatant command; and DOD CWMD synchronizer.20

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USSOCOM units have long served an integral role in counterproliferation activities, often participating in crisis response operations due to specialized training requirements, readiness to accept operational risks, quick reaction capability, and the need to manage dynamic political sensitivities. Authority for these contributions originates from 10 USC §167 and the twelve core activities for special operations directed by the President and Secretary of Defense—one of those being CWMD. To provide and maintain a force capable of those activities, USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips special operations forces. Theater Special Operations Commands, or subunified combatant commands, then employ that force under the operational control of geographic combatant commanders. Much of the recent literature on special operations within CWMD focuses on these two Title 10 roles, and for good reason. There is clear value in optimizing the preparation for and employment of special operations forces to counter WMD through operational preparation of the environment, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and other unique contributions. But, this research excludes the two previous roles and focuses instead on USSOCOM’s new duty as a military synchronizer.

To unpack the argument that CWMD efforts in the steady state represent an underexplored opportunity and USSOCOM can assist in realizing those improvements, I conduct a heuristic case study. This theory-building analytical framework will allow a detailed analysis of a case study with similarities to the CWMD mission to “inductively

21 “Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces,” 10 United States Code § 167 (1986); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint Publication 3–05), x.

22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint Publication 3–05), I-3.

23 Ibid., III-4.


identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths.”26 With so many potentially relevant social science and international relations theories intermingled in the WMD proliferation field, this research establishes a tailored building block for understanding DOD’s approach to CWMD in the steady state. The case study I use for comparison is USSOCOM’s contemporary counterterrorism (CT) experience. First I identify where counterterrorism and CWMD are most similar—allowing for useful comparison—and where they differ. After establishing the comparative value of the two cases, I conduct a detailed analysis of counterterrorism “in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct,”27 which can then be applied within the context of CWMD.

I supplement this analysis with personal interviews of interagency and military CWMD planners to provide current insight and context for applying counterterrorism lessons to CWMD. These interviews include first-hand commentary from representatives of the National Security Council, the Department of Energy national laboratories, the U.S. intelligence community, academia, and USSOCOM.

F. WHY COUNTERTERRORISM?

The nature of this war does not lend [itself] to an easily identifiable battlefield. When we call it global, we do not just mean geographically. The enemy is operating in the seams of our information structure, our financial institutions, and our international political system.

—General Bryan D. Brown28

Then Commander USSOCOM, General Brown emphasized the challenges presented not only by the evolving threat of terrorism, but also the coordinated organizational response required to counter that threat. His 2004 commentary came on the heels of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 directive for USSOCOM to synchronize

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26 “Heuristic case study” is one of five types of case study methods offered by Harry Eckstein to evaluate social sciences. Ibid., 143–47; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75.

27 Eckstein, *Regarding Politics*, 144.

DOD planning for the global counterterrorism campaign and the 2003 announcement solidifying that responsibility as a supported and supporting combatant command.\textsuperscript{29} By 2003, USSOCOM held the central role in the U.S. defense strategy for countering terrorism. However, their new mission came with significant growing pains. From 2003 to 2006, USSOCOM underwent a significant transformation in the way it did business, ultimately emerging as the guiding force of a complex, adaptive network that spanned intergovernmental boundaries to counter an equally decentralized threat.\textsuperscript{30}

Given similarities between the challenge USSOCOM faced in tackling the global counterterrorism mission and the challenges associated with global proliferation networks, it is my thesis that lessons learned from USSOCOM’s counterterrorism evolution hold valuable insights to inform the development of a more effective CWMD strategy. Two important shared conditions form the connective tissue of the cases: the complexity of the threat and necessity for a networked interorganizational response.

First, the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMDs share an uncommon level of complexity. This is not to say that other threats to the U.S. and its interests are not exceedingly complicated, but rather that the complexity observed in terrorism and WMD proliferation surpasses that of many other contemporary defense challenges due to their interconnectedness with individual, group, organizational, country, regional, and global factors. In 1972, design theorist and University of California Berkeley professor, Horst Rittel, published an initial theory on what he called “wicked problems,” characterized by socio-cultural complexity and a lack of clear structure.\textsuperscript{31} Avoiding the truism that some problems are just harder, military doctrine adapted Rittel’s theory

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through the lens of modern defense, distinguishing what it terms “ill-structured” problems through eleven defining characteristics:32

1. There is no definitive way to formulate an ill-structured problem.
2. We cannot understand an ill-structured problem without proposing a solution.
3. Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel.
4. Ill-structured problems have no fixed set of potential solutions.
5. Solutions to ill-structured problems are better-or-worse, not right-or-wrong.
6. Ill-structured problems are interactively complex.
7. Every solution to an ill-structured problem is a “one-shot operation.”
8. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to an ill-structured problem.
9. Ill-structured problems have no “stopping rule.”
10. Every ill-structured problem is a symptom of another problem.
11. The problem-solver has no right to be wrong.33

With even a cursory evaluation, counterterrorism and CWMD fit most—if not all—of the qualifiers for ill-structured problems provided in joint doctrine. Terrorists and WMD proliferators both include state, non-state, state-proxy, and commercial actors. Terrorism networks and WMD proliferation networks routinely pursue their objectives by exploiting ungoverned spaces and gaps in national defenses, circumventing international boundaries and intergovernmental jurisdictions. The global nature of both threats evinces significant overlap of functional and regional issues.

Given the complexity of the threat, it naturally follows that counterterrorism and CWMD share a second commonality: countering the threat necessitates a networked organizational response. Military leaders have long emphasized the importance of interorganizational collaboration, defined in joint doctrine as “the interaction that occurs

33 Ibid.
among elements of DOD; engaged U.S. government (USG) agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; IGOs; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”

The foundational document on military planning uses the term interorganizational seventeen times, and an entire publication has been dedicated to guide “the translation of national objectives into unified action” across organizations.

However, formulating an effective interorganizational response to terrorism and WMD proliferation requires more than planning and coordination between entities; it requires a truly networked response. The opening chapter of the 2013 SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual emphasizes this point in the context of terrorism:

The line of departure for any discussion of the interagency process is a shared awareness that no single department, agency, or organization of the United States Government (USG) can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups, and individuals. Similarly it has become increasingly evident that it is not possible for individual countries, coalitions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to “go it alone” against the threats posed by terrorists and their networks.

CWMD requires the same level of—or, as this research will argue, even more—interorganizational cooperation than that required for counterterrorism. Nearly every U.S. government department holds some equity in one or more of the proliferation pillars, and each of those to some degree rely on inputs or capabilities provided by nongovernmental organizations, commercial industry, and international partners. Though additional research has since challenged that it fails to capture the true complexity of players involved, a 2009 study (depicted in Figure 1) identified more than 143 U.S. government agencies.

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34 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5–0), xviii.

35 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5–0); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Cooperation (Joint Publication 3–08) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016).

entities responsible for counterproliferation alone, with no mention of essential civilian or international partners:  

Figure 1. 2009 U.S. Counterproliferation Organizational Chart

However, CWMD is more than “counterterrorism 2.0.” This statement may appear obvious, but it is a critical point if we are to avert blindly applying USSOCOM’s counterterrorism methods, which worked well under a specific set of conditions, to CWMD. International conflict historian, Zachary Shore, warns against the tendency to cling to idealized best examples of strategy. In the face of complex, ill-defined problems, military leaders must remain cognizant of what Shore terms the cognitive trap of cure-


allism, “an almost religious belief in a theory’s universal applicability.” It follows that USSOCOM faces inherent risk in trying to force an optimized solution for a specific problem (counterterrorism) onto a new and different challenge (CWMD in this case). The previously successful strategy for counterterrorism offers utility in addressing the new problem in many ways, but should be attempted only after properly acknowledging the shared or dissimilar conditions under which each occurs.

For example, USSOCOM is assuming the role of military synchronizer in a more mature mission-space than it did in 2003. Prior to USSOCOM’s entrance in either case, counterterrorism and CWMD held storied histories that included numerous interagency contributors along multiple lines of effort. But, within some areas of CWMD, interorganizational partners have been entrenched in clearly defined, specialized roles—some dating back as early as the 1940’s and the Manhattan Project. Preventing and countering the proliferation of nuclear technology has been a priority since the early days of the atomic age. Likewise, the proliferation dangers of chemical and biological weapons have been the focus of national and international efforts for many decades.

Further, the tempo of operations required to counter terrorism and WMD threats differ in many cases. U.S. counterterrorism strategy since 2003 has followed a pattern of frequent, rapid application of kinetic force. Counterterrorism task forces in Iraq, for example, dismantled terrorist networks through persistent targeting, often conducting numerous military raids in a single night. However, this relentless targeting pattern differs from that of CWMD operations. National Security Council Director of WMD Terrorism Threats, Dr. Robyn Klein, describes the duality of the CWMD operational tempo as mostly steady and deliberate in nature, but occasionally demanding rapid acceleration for short periods.

WMD threats are often complex, technical, long-evolving, and/or compartmented challenges that can require committed efforts over a long time horizon to develop the necessary understanding, opportunities, and approaches to address them. Among the key differences from other types

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40 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams.
of operations, CWMD operations often include a technical component that requires specialized expertise and approaches, which could result in a slowed tempo for any response. WMD also can pose a significant threat to life or property, which in some cases may accelerate efforts. Further, actors seeking to acquire or produce WMD may rely on dual-use equipment or other materials that can be difficult to track and thus will require entrenched efforts over time. All of this suggests that CWMD requires capabilities and commitment to address long-term and fast-emerging threats...41

Measured against the rapid pace of counterterrorism, CWMD operations follow a comparatively slower pattern overall, with infrequent and narrow opportunities to respond to threats. Among other constraints, CWMD operations are arrested by the commercial nature of WMD networks, acquisition of dual use goods, various authorities required to act, and the time required to develop and deploy complex technical systems.42 Some have suggested, for example, North Korean nuclear proliferation is “the Cuban missile crisis in slow motion”43

USSOCOM CWMD planner, Rob Foster, describes the contrast between counterterrorism and CWMD in this way: “Tempo lends itself to capacity and the ability to mass capability. The deliberate nature of most state and non-state WMD programs is many times slower, with a longer time horizon than that of other threats.”44 Foster goes on to describe how the measured pace of CWMD operations in the steady state can change suddenly after long periods of low activity. “This creates space for decision making, but also creates risk for missed opportunities and ‘losing the ball.’”45

Lastly, terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests account for thousands of deaths and millions in damage, while WMD’s have claimed comparatively few U.S.

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42 Zachary Davis (Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), in discussion with the author, May 20, 2017.


44 Robert D. Foster, Jr. (Pathway Defeat Strategic Planner, USSOCOM J53 Special Plans & Policy), in discussion with the author, April 17, 2017.

45 Ibid.
lives. The reason for the lack of WMD use is much debated, but its nonoccurrence is undeniable. Even including chemical weapon use in Syria, the WMD threat to the U.S. homeland appears less urgent than that of counterterrorism by comparison. In this way, policy makers and strategists understandably catalogue counterterrorism as an easily visible, extant danger while WMD use remains a high consequence but low probability event.

G. RELEVANT LITERATURE

Bodies of knowledge relevant to this study correspond to the two analytic categories that will be used to evaluate CWMD—the significance of organizational language and the maturation of collaborative networks.

1. Organizational Language

Although we inadvertently traffic in communication by means of the written word, we have been blissfully inattentive to the rhetorical manner in which language works to stabilize meanings that we then uncritically mobilize in our attempts to persuade others to our point of view.

—Robert Chia and Ian King

Language carves up the world for us. Words provide the medium by which we understand and categorize the otherwise infinitely complex into manageable “chunks,” which can then be communicated from person to person. Further, where language plays a critical role in the interaction between individuals, it plays an equal—or arguably greater—role in the interactions within and between groups of people, or organizations. Social psychologist Kenneth Gergen asserts that “our theories of organization are, first and foremost, forms of language. They are guided by existing rules of grammar, and constructed out of the pool of nouns and verbs, the metaphors, the narrative plots and the like found within the linguistic context.”


However, because “all observers are not necessarily led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe,” effective communication within an organization requires individuals to establish some level of unanimity on how to describe important concepts.48 Where consensus can be formed on the verbal expression of ideas, those specific words or phrases “come to form the instinctively shared calibration points for defining local reality.”49 But, that reality is truly local. The agreed meanings reached do not naturally extend beyond the boundaries of that organization. Instead, as cultural linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf explains, “We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language.”50

Unsurprisingly, language plays a central role in how various players understand and interact with one another to counter WMD threats. Is there an accepted definition of WMD? Who is responsible for implementing nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy? Should nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and military CWMD strategies be developed independently? Each of these questions depend upon shared (or dissimilar) meanings of the threats, players, and responses to the policy objectives. How we define these concepts influences the communication between and synchronization of disparate interorganizational bodies towards a unified national strategy. But, achieving a unity of effort may not require a universal language. After all, international partners successfully address complex problems daily, despite linguistic and dialectal barriers.

2. **Collaboration and Organizational Design**

Much literature has been written on the necessity and challenge of collaborating to meet national defense threats. At the broadest level, any attempt to modify existing national security programs will face the traditional bureaucratic challenges of conflicting organizational interests, Congressional budget restrictions, and a general aversion to

49 Ibid.
change in the system.\textsuperscript{51} Though interorganizational collaboration has improved within specific mission spaces such as counterterrorism, USSOCOM’s assignment to integrate military efforts into broader, ongoing nonproliferation and counterproliferation constructs must overcome reluctance by some—both within DOD and other agencies—to share information and embrace a true whole-of-government strategy.\textsuperscript{52} Beyond establishing an American unity of effort, the integration and leverage of international military partners to prevent WMD proliferation remains notably lacking.\textsuperscript{53} The evolution of U.S. counterterrorism strategy by 2007 demonstrated the combined strength and agility of a networked organization of interorganizational partners, providing a starting point for developing solutions to problems under similar conditions.\textsuperscript{54}


\textsuperscript{54} McChrystal et al., \textit{Team of Teams}; Joint Special Operations University, \textit{Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual}. 
II. USSOCOM LESSONS FROM COUNTERTERRORISM

We can’t control everything, but we can control how we organize, communicate, and operate.

—Dr. John Arquilla

Most agree that USSOCOM played an important role in forming American counterterrorism strategy. But, what are the true “lessons” of the counterterrorism evolution? What, specifically, did USSOCOM contribute to effect positive change? USSOCOM adopted several practices that significantly improved its effectiveness in counterterrorism at the tactical and operational levels, to include an aggressive targeting process and the delegation of responsibility lower in the command structure. But, despite their value, these lessons do not inform the proper conduct of USSOCOM in its role as military synchronizer at the combatant command level.

In order to draw the correct lessons that hold utility for USSOCOM’s CWMD role, this chapter remains firmly focused on USSOCOM’s actions from the capacity of global synchronizer for counterterrorism military plans. These contributions can be broadly sorted by how USSOCOM communicated about and organized for counterterrorism operations.

A. THE LANGUAGE OF COUNTERTERRORISM

1. Counterterrorism: What’s in a Name?

By September, just a year after the turn of the century, terror struck the United States. Before the fatal attack that drew the attention of the world, Americans citizens and leaders largely understood terrorism as a foreign problem; threatening interests abroad, but representing no real danger to the homeland. However, the murder of innocent civilians by terrorists yielding knives, guns, and explosives introduced America to a new reality. At the height of this violence, the assassination of President William McKinley in September

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1 Quoted in Lothringer et al., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2.
1901 “shattered American complacency” and ushered in the “war against anarchist terrorism.”\(^3\) Addressing Congress for the first time in December of that year, President Theodore Roosevelt called the nation and the international community to join together to meet the threat of terrorism: “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all mankind should band against the anarchist.”\(^4\)

One-hundred years later, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and other incidents—resulting in far greater deaths and strategic impact than the 1901 attacks—spurred similar sentiment to leverage all available tools of national power against terrorism. A broad array of interagency players contributed to counterterrorism, applying the instruments of U.S. national power, commonly categorized by “diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement components.”\(^5\) Over time, their collective lexicon and actions began to codify the definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism. A language for countering terrorism was forming—or rather, evolving.

Terrorism and its policy cousin, counterterrorism, are not 21st century concepts. Unsurprisingly, the language used to describe the threat and response are equally storied and varied. Though the act of terrorism and its definitions extend throughout the length of recorded history, we will limit the scope of our focus to the emergence of “modern terror,” attributed to Russian anarchists in the 1880s.\(^6\)

Even within this narrower history, however, some contend that the language still lacks clarity, and “the search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on.”\(^7\) Historian Alex Schmid’s 1984 study identified 109 distinct definitions of terrorism, formed through

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the varied combination of twenty-two qualifiers, ranging from the use of violence to the victimization of innocent civilians. Caleb Carr emphasizes the centrality of civilian targeting more specifically through an extensive historical survey of terrorism, what he terms “deliberate warfare against civilians.” Hoffman later challenged the assertion of the “victim” or “target audience” as the defining feature of terrorism, positing that the definition must expand to account for the actor—state terrorists and revolutionaries, for example—and their motivations—political change and religious ideology, for example. More contemporary academic commentary focuses on describing the nature of terrorism and its ideologies, to include Rapoport’s expanding and contracting wave construct and later challenged by Parker and Sitter’s theory of terrorism as contagious strains of an infectious disease.

If the search net is cast wide enough to include academia, mainstream media, and general public dialogue, then characterizing a widely-accepted definition of terrorism seems unmanageable. However, though these communication mediums influence political discourse to some degree, they do not inherently represent the dialect within the government. Instead, the government’s construction of terrorism derives principally from two sources: “linguistic representations expressed by political leaders and counterterrorism officials” and the actions and practices carried out in the name of those expressions. Hoffman compiled the definitions used in 2002 by several key government entities, demonstrating how the language of terrorism employed by U.S. officials remained largely divided.

The U.S. State Department, for example, uses the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d):

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8 Ibid., 5.
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience… We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.”

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives,”

while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that terrorism is “an activity that involves an act that: is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and… must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”

And the U.S. Department of Defense defines it as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.”

Variations in these definitions corresponded mostly with the organizational interests, perspectives, and authorities of the government entities they represented. The State Department characteristically underscored politics and subnationalism as key tenets of terrorism. The FBI approached the topic from a lens of legality and adjudication. Protecting critical infrastructure and resources reflected the DHS’ mission focus as the domestic protectorate. The Defense Department’s definition represented the broadest interpretation, providing qualifiers for the threat, the effect, and the motivation of terrorism. In effect, each agency demonstrated their commitment to the national policy of counterterrorism—or at least the broader strategic narrative that terrorism must be countered—through official language and resulting practices, but no consensus existed on exactly what was to be countered or how to organize efforts into a unified strategy.

14 Ibid.
2. Overcoming Disparate Organizational Language

Within the bureaucratic construct, language and organizations become so intertwined that “the problems of organization theory are essentially problems in the use of words.”\(^\text{15}\) As shared meanings become more accepted within an organization, language assumes a more dominant role, even blurring the lines between structure and agency. Both the organizational design (or its “structure”) and the actions of individuals belonging to that organization (their “agency”) begin to reflect the shared meanings subscribed to by that organization.\(^\text{16}\) As a result, the language accepted by an organization even influences that organization’s essence:

Indeed, oftentimes we are very much at the mercy of that particular form of language which has become the common medium of expression for our own collectivity, so much so that the language habits of our community unconsciously predispose us to certain preferred choices of interpretation.\(^\text{17}\)

In the case of counterterrorism, variation in organizational language accepted by interagency players created competing local realities and friction between organizations. French philosopher Michel Foucault explains that such conflict originates from “power-knowledge” positions, and from those positions organizations can leverage discourse as a tool to exercise power over one another.\(^\text{18}\) As consensus on language within each organization grows and meanings solidify further, ontological variations between organizations become more acute, strengthening the power that disparities in the language impart: “To the extent that meanings become fixed or reified in certain forms, which then articulate practices, agents and relations, this fixity is power. Power is the apparent order of


\(^{17}\) Chia and King, “The Language of Organization Theory,” 312.

taken-for-granted categories of existence, as they are fixed and represented in a myriad discursive forms and practices.”

Moreover, the ambiguity of the language around which these organizations disagreed—counterterrorism in particular—further hindered any attempt at reaching consensus of meaning between organizations. Useful verbal constructs “need not refer to something observed,” explains organizational theorists Lloyd Sandelands and Robert Drazin, but “they must at least refer to something. Behind them must stand a definite object or event of some kind. Where this minimum criterion is not met, words denote non-existent (unreal) objects or events.” Terrorism certainly passes this litmus test, ultimately manifested as acts of terrorism that can be observed. However, counterterrorism is less concrete. Individual acts of counterterrorism could be observed, such as arresting a terrorist or defusing an explosive device. But, the broader concept of counterterrorism, if meant to denote a combined, organized USG effort, arguably did not exist in 2003. Agencies and bureaus conducted activities under the auspice of counterterrorism, but principally only through their organizational perspective and agnostic to the efforts of other agencies. Rather than providing clarity and points of collaboration, the term “counterterrorism” served to “instead mystify the process in a welter of misbegotten abstractions and unauthentic processes” and “portray an unreal world where organizing appears to be explained, but is not.”

In *The Lessons of Terror*, military historian Caleb Carr summarizes the American state of affairs and challenge of describing terrorism and counterterrorism by 2002: “Confusion and arguments over terms and concepts, goals and strategies, have hampered the prosecution of America’s response from the start. The costs of this confusion are apparent, the reasons behind it less so.”

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21 Ibid., 458, 472–73.
Given the disparate definitions and resulting bureaucratic conflict, how then, did these various organizations come together to form what most consider today to be a highly effective national counterterrorism strategy?

Enter USSOCOM in 2003, appointed as DOD’s new counterterrorism offensive coordinator. Wittingly or otherwise, USSOCOM played a central role in overcoming the challenges of language in counterterrorism. Though tasked only with coordinating military efforts to counter terrorism, the command recognized the immense value of interagency contributors already occupying the counterterrorism mission space and sought to integrate DOD into the broader USG effort.23 Doing so, however, required overcoming the deep-seated language differences that separated counterterrorism entities. Two specific actions contributed to this end.

First, USSOCOM educated itself on the counterterrorism language already in use by interagency partners—a sort of assessment phase. In 2003, special operations task forces significantly increased their practices of incorporating interagency partners in military command centers, embedding liaison officers within other agencies, and promoting unprecedented information sharing.24 Though principally aimed at improving interorganizational collaboration, these initiatives also allowed USSOCOM to develop a familiarity with the common practices and language within the other organizations through close, daily interaction. Similar to the way Special Forces embed into a region to develop cultural understanding and local language proficiency, USSOCOM drew close to interagency counterterrorism partners and in doing so established a better appreciation for the various, unique organizational perspectives and the language employed to communicate those understandings.

Of note here is what USSOCOM did not do to resolve the language conflict. Faced with the conflicting objectives of promoting a unified interagency response and overcoming disparate organizational language, special operations could have directly confronted the friction by establishing its own “knowledge-power” position in

23 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, chap. 6.
24 Ibid., 161–71.
conjunction with its new counterterrorism role. Yet this study finds no evidence that USSOCOM took deliberate steps—such as imposing homogeneity or assuming the role of translator between organizations—to participate in the ongoing bureaucratic struggle over language.

Instead, USSOCOM narrowed the scope of its focus through a second contribution: special operations task forces in Iraq described their efforts through a single, understandable concept—"defeating AQI." To be clear, USSOCOM did not create the verbal construct or idea of dismantling AQI. Rather, the Secretary of Defense directed the command to target terrorist networks, and AQI represented the most relevant threat at the time. However, rather than attempting to rectify disparate language between partnered agencies over the broader concepts of terrorism or counterterrorism, special operations sought to form consensus on the specific target and requisite response to countering it. This consensus was not formed through force, though. Instead, the special operations task forces simply adopted the narrow target-focus themselves and then invited interagency partners to come alongside in that effort through collaboration. In doing so, "defeating AQI" came to represent the primary shared calibration point between contributing organizations. USSOCOM essentially sidestepped the contentious debate over counterterrorism language by narrowing the discussion to a specific target.

B. ORGANIZING FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

Despite the friction generated by disparate organizational language, the USG—including military forces synchronized by USSOCOM—eventually formed and executed an effective counterterrorism response capable of meeting the rising threat.

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25 Ibid., 118, 214.

26 Ibid.

Understanding that success requires a more detailed analysis of how USSOCOM and the larger USG construct organized to counter terrorism. Until the last few years, few unclassified sources documented USSOCOM’s role in the successful evolution of counterterrorism, but a growing body of literature has emerged, spurred largely by the memoirs of General Stanley McChrystal. Expanding on those accounts, this chapter identifies two specific conditions that contributed to counterterrorism effectiveness in Iraq (causal mechanisms) and the subsequent results of those actions (causal effects).

1. **Comfort without Command**

USSOCOM’s initial organizational structure and operational approach entering Iraq in 2003 reflected the traditional military concept of a command, a choice that degraded the efficacy of the U.S. counterterrorism response. Eventually recognizing the rigidity of the hierarchical command structure and its ineffectiveness against an evolving threat, USSOCOM adopted a counterterrorism leadership role less reliant on centralized authority. A more effective counterterrorism response followed.

The concept of command plays an integral role in the conduct of traditional military operations. Military workplaces depict the chain of command in an array of photos from the President down to the lowest unit level. Assumption of command ceremonies honor the transfer of authority from outgoing to incoming unit commanders. Briefings routinely include block-and-line organizational charts explicitly depicting command relationships and the level of authority—such as operational, administrative, or tactical control—one commander holds over another.

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29 Distinguished Research Fellow, Christopher Lamb interprets General McChrystal’s memoirs as demonstrating four principles for successful interagency operations, but this research excludes one of those posited by Lamb: “delegating responsibility for local best practices.” This research posits that, while important, this principle applies more so at the operational and tactical levels than to USSOCOM’s counterterrorism synchronization role. Lamb’s remaining three principles are synthesized in this research into two more comprehensive concepts, *comfort without command* and *target-focused collaboration*. Lamb, “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” 9.

30 McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, chaps. 5–6.
Military vernacular and joint doctrine use the term in three distinct forms: the lawful exercise of authority over subordinates, an issued order to create specific action, and an organizational structure under the leadership of a single individual. Military operations fold these three concepts into the practice of *unity of command*, elevated as one of the nine principals of war and stressing “all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.” This vertical centralization of control for decision making and the rigid hierarchical structure it produces are characteristics of what business management theorist, Henry Mintzberg labels “the machine bureaucracy.” Mintzberg asserts that machine bureaucracies seek to regulate decision making and information flow more so than any other organizational structure: “All of this suggests that the Machine Bureaucracy is a structure with an obsession, namely control. A control mentality pervades it from top to bottom.”

General McChrystal acknowledged the military’s reliance on highly formalized command structures in early counterterrorism operations, comparing the initial organizational design of special operations counterterrorism units to the top-down, reductionist management approach of Frederick Winslow Taylor:

> a combination of specialized vertical columns (departments or divisions) and horizontal tiers that denote levels of authority, with the most powerful literally on top—the only tier that can access all columns. At the top, we envision the strategic decision making. At the bottom, we imagine action by those taking direction. The efficiency, strength, and logic that we are

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31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1–02)* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), 43.


34 Mintzberg, *The Structuring of Organizations*, 319.
inclined to see in such a chart is a natural extension of the separation of planning from execution.\textsuperscript{35}

By 2004, however, a lack of genuine progress in countering AQI spurred leaders to question the effectiveness of the hierarchical structure.\textsuperscript{36}

This ineffectiveness did not stem from an incomplete application of unity of command. It is true that counterterrorism in Iraq involved numerous intergovernmental players from dozens of countries and that no single entity led the entirety of that effort. Various organizations coordinated interagency and multinational contributions within specific functional areas, but no leader held the unitary command authority over all diplomatic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement entities.\textsuperscript{37} However, rather than a mistake, this division of authority was by design, ensuring the integrity of civilian leadership “while unity of command and the exercise of command and control (C2) apply strictly to military forces and operations.”\textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, the civilian-military command relationship remained unchanged from 2004 to 2008—when an effective counterterrorism response had been generated—demonstrating that unity of command across interorganizational entities is an unnecessary condition for success.

Instead, the early breakdown in countering terrorism in Iraq resulted in part from the inability of the rigid hierarchical structure to promote a unity of effort. Military doctrine even acknowledges the importance of unified effort in operations where the commander may not control all civilian interagency or multinational partners,\textsuperscript{39} but the structural design of early counterterrorism efforts in Iraq worked directly against that end.

The machine bureaucracy promotes process standardization and functional grouping, with the centralized leadership structure orchestrating how subordinate groups contribute to the final output. To promote efficiency, work groups develop a high degree

\textsuperscript{35} McChrystal et al., \textit{Team of Teams}, 47.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., chap. 5.
\textsuperscript{38} Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Interorganizational Cooperation} (Joint Publication 3–08), ix.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., I-5.
of specialization, which in turn produces a sense of purpose limited in scope to that team’s responsibilities. For example, a factory worker assigned to the wheel casting department—and connected to other departments in the production process only through a direct supervisor—comes to associate her purpose with casting wheels, as opposed to contributing to the larger purpose of producing a car. Mintzberg warns, however, that this design thrives only “in environments that are simple and stable,” where the inputs and expected outputs of the organization remain relatively unchanged:

So a fundamental dilemma faces the top managers of the Machine Bureaucracy as a result of the centralization of the structure and the emphasis on reporting through the chain of authority. In times of change, when they most need to spend time getting the “tangible detail,” they are overburdened with decisions coming up the hierarchy for resolution. They are, therefore, reduced to acting superficially, with inadequate, abstract information.

Simple and stable do not accurately characterize counterterrorism in 2003 Iraq. Viewing counterterrorism as a process, changes in the input—methods of attack, popular support, mediums of communication—necessitated changes in the output or organizational response—counterterrorism. However, the rigid hierarchical structure prevented a unity of effort across counterterrorism contributors, in turn preventing the adaptability necessary to meet the threat. Both military and civilian contributing organizations demonstrated a high level of proficiency, but lacked a shared sense of collective purpose. Even within special operations elements, this lack of unity showed:

On its own, each team exhibited horizontal bonds of trust and a common sense of purpose, but the only external ties that mattered to each team ran vertically, connecting it to the command superstructure, just like workers on an assembly line. Meaningful relationships between teams were nonexistent. And our teams had very provincial definitions of purpose: completing a mission or finishing intel analysis, rather than defeating AQI [Al Qaeda in Iraq]. To each unit, the piece of the war that really mattered was the piece inside their box on the org chart; they were fighting their own fights in their own silos. The specialization that allowed for

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40 Mintzberg, *The Structuring of Organizations*, chap. 18.
41 Ibid., 344.
breathtaking efficiency became a liability in the face of the unpredictability of the real world.\footnote{McChrystal et al., \textit{Team of Teams}, 118.}

The first critical step in correcting the limiting effect of the rigid hierarchical structure in countering terrorism did not come in the form of a new action, but rather the acceptance of a new reality—comfort as a participant without command authority. This acknowledgement did not \textit{cause} better interagency and multinational integration, but it was necessary to enable that process. By letting go of the deep-seated cultural tendency to maintain centralized control within a clearly defined organizational structure, special operations made room for adopting a unified counterterrorism response, a task requiring a second, more deliberate approach to integration.

\subsection*{2. Target-Focused Collaboration}

Counterterrorism leaders replaced the inflexible command-centric structure of 2003 with an approach based on interorganizational collaboration, what General McChrystal termed a “team of teams”\footnote{Ibid., chap. 6.} design for waging “collaborative warfare.”\footnote{Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,” \textit{The Washington Post}, September 8, 2008.} Rather than emphasizing collaboration as a \textit{part} of the counterterrorism process, collaboration became the primary vehicle enabling the process. Special operations leaders replaced previous linkages between organizations based on formal command and communication lines with more productive, trust-based relationships to achieve a common purpose.\footnote{McChrystal et al., \textit{Team of Teams}, chap. 6.}

An abundance of literature on the topic over the last two decades suggests it has become axiomatic that counterterrorism necessitates collaboration between
Rather than providing another detailed recount of interorganizational collaboration within counterterrorism, this section will focus on two, more specific observations.

The first highlights the importance of a properly scoped, unifying objective around which to collaborate.

USSOCOM pioneered neither the idea nor the practice of fostering a unity of effort through increased interorganizational cooperation. It is more likely that the counterterrorism evolution in Iraq succeeded by building on previous wisdom and experience. In 1996, DOD dedicated an entire doctrinal publication to interorganizational coordination during military operations, emphasizing the very concepts operationalized in Iraq and even warning against approaching such efforts with a traditional military command and control mindset. Some have offered Joint Interagency Task Force-South as the “gold standard” of cross-organizational collaboration, drawing its roots from counterdrug operations in Latin America beginning in the 1980s. USSOCOM also relied on the integration with interorganizational partners including multilateral forces, law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community in Somalia (1993), Haiti...

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47 In 2016, DOD revised the title of Joint Publication 3–08, replacing the term “interagency” with “interorganizational,” more explicitly acknowledging the role of international and nongovernmental organizations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3–08), vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1996), chap. 1; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Cooperation (Joint Publication 3–08), iii.


Rather than representing an original concept or practice, the counterterrorism response in Iraq set itself apart from previous operations by the scale at which interorganizational collaboration occurred. The number and variety of actors participating in counterterrorism in Iraq represents the largest collaboration effort led by USSOCOM since its activation in 1987. The military component alone included deployed forces from thirty-seven countries, supported indirectly by more than twenty others. Many of these countries also contributed in nonmilitary capacities, providing diplomatic officers, intelligence analysts and collectors, law enforcement experts, and civil development advisors.

However, the unprecedented size of the task often overshadows the reality that interorganizational collaboration in Iraq occurred within a relatively narrow scope, aimed at achieving a single task—defeating the AQI network, not defeating terrorism writ large. Establishing an effective unity of effort required identifying a manageable objective around which all contributors could unify.

Attempting to form a collaborative counterterrorism network beginning at the top would have met significant resistance owing to the sheer size of the participant pool. A 2010 study by The Washington Post found 1,271 government entities and 1,931 private contractors contributing to counterterrorism from the U.S. alone. Similarly, USSOCOM’s reference manual for interagency counterterrorism operations identifies 636 significant players by name, but includes a disclaimer emphasizing that continuous

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49 U.S. Special Operations Command History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History, 59–73, 139–44; Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon, 8–14; Yodsampa, Coordinating for Results: Lessons from a Case Study of Interagency Coordination in Afghanistan.


51 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 118, 214.

52 Priest and Arkin’s investigation was not limited to counterterrorism in Iraq, but the study does illustrate the immensity of the U.S. counterterrorism apparatus. Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing beyond Control,” The Washington Post, July 19, 2010.
changes and additions make any list or organizational chart capturing the entire structure out of date at the time of print: “A comprehensive list would be more confusing than helpful; it would also never be completely accurate.”53 Improving interagency collaboration to defend against terrorism more broadly certainly represented a leading national policy goal at the time.54 But, previous failed attempts—even under presidential direction—suggest attempting to revamp the entire national system at once would not lead to effective collaboration.55 (Taking Stock, 39–40)

Instead, USSOCOM bit off a more manageable portion of the elephant, collaborating with interorganizational partners to target AQI specifically. The fruits of focusing collaborative efforts narrowly around defeating AQI began to emerge by 2006.56 A Washington Post report recalled government agencies beginning to leave their organizational silos to participate in a more concerted effort, unified by the solitary goal of dismantling the AQI network:

the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] provides intelligence analysts and spycraft with sensors and cameras that can track targets, vehicles or equipment for up to 14 hours. FBI forensic experts dissect data, from cellphone information to the “pocket litter” found on extremists. Treasury officials track funds flowing among extremists and from governments. National Security Agency staffers intercept conversations or computer data, and members of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use high-tech equipment to pinpoint where suspected extremists are using phones or computers.57

Secondly, USSOCOM played a unique role in this collaboration effort. General McChrystal acknowledged the dichotomy of the command’s position: “We needed to bind everybody into a single enterprise, but we had no explicit authority to do so.”58

56 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 217–18.
58 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 165.
Pursuant its 2003 charge from the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM held primacy for synchronizing military counterterrorism planning, but it did not command the entirety of the interorganizational response. Instead, special operations—both at the command and tactical unit level—served as active participants in the larger USG construct. In addition to the military, numerous other government organizations had been applying their unique, and often exquisite, organizational capabilities to counterterrorism for years. Rather than attempting to assert hegemony throughout the mission space, USSOCOM “accelerated action.” Special operations forces use the colloquial expression, accelerating action, to describe a common practice of adding value to an ongoing effort or operation by integrating special operations into the existing construct formed by prior contributors, their actions, and their relationships to one another.

Moreover, by building trust-based relationships with other contributing members and providing venues to foster those relationships, special operations came to represent a counterterrorism network hub, or a connector. Journalist Malcolm Gladwell asserts connectors routinely cross social, cultural, and organizational boundaries to associate with an uncommon number and variety of people: “They are the kinds of people who know everyone.” USSOCOM certainly did not stumble into this role, however. Senior special operations commanders directed its ranks to form the network’s mortar, viewing collaboration and connectivity as inseparable:

We didn’t need every member of the Task Force to know everyone else; we just needed everyone to know someone on every team, so that when they thought about, or had to work with, the unit that bunked next door or their intelligence counterparts in D.C., they envisioned a friendly face rather than a competitive rival… We needed to enable a team operating in an interdependent environment to understand the butterfly-effect ramifications of their work and make them aware of the other teams with

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59 U.S. Special Operations Command History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History, 15–16; Inside the Pentagon, “SOCOM To Function as Both Supported and Supporting Command.”

60 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, chap. 8.

whom they would have to cooperate in order to achieve strategic—not just tactical—success. 62

Realizing this goal required considerable effort, which USSOCOM consumed. Operations centers provided physical space for interagency partners to interact with one another daily. “Institutionalized ambassadors,” or liaison officers, “deployed” throughout theater and Washington, DC to solidify relationships with the intelligence community, law enforcement, the diplomatic corps, and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 63 To build trust, special operations commands shared information with interagency counterparts at an unprecedented level—“our standing guidance was ‘share information until you’re afraid it’s illegal’.” 64

Ultimately, special operations’ role as a connector directly contributed to a more integrated, collaborative counterterrorism construct. An organizational chart from a 2010 study (Figure 2) illustrates how the counterterrorism response evolved into an interconnected network of teams, largely agnostic to organizational boundaries and formal hierarchical structure.

62 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 129–30.
63 Ibid., chap. 9.
64 Ibid., 164.
3. Causal Effects

These two contributions—comfort without command and interorganizational collaboration around a unified objective—had at least three important effects on terrorism response.

First, the counterterrorism apparatus in Iraq became more adaptable. The ability to respond appropriately to change in an adversary and the operating environment holds obvious utility in any conflict, however, the speed of change in terrorism necessitates an uncommon level of adaptability. Modern terrorist networks typically maintain an advantage in this respect, unburdened by bureaucratic and legal constraints, rigid


authority structures, and time-consuming decision cycles. Much of the effort of counterterrorism, therefore, focuses on minimizing that comparative advantage by improving the adaptability of the response. Flattening the structure of the counterterrorism network in Iraq led to faster communications, sense-making of the threat, and decision-making—collectively contributing to a more agile response.

By extension of the first effect, USSOCOM’s organizational changes contributed to a more resilient counterterrorism network in Iraq. Where adaptability ensures a competitive organizational response to change more broadly, an organization’s resilience measures its ability to respond appropriately to damage.

The resilience developed by the counterterrorism network in Iraq differs, however, from the organizational resilience encouraged by disaster and crisis management literature which emphasizes “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back.” For example, high reliability organizations such as air traffic control systems for commercial aviation and nuclear power generation plants focus on the maintenance of their system’s minimal, essential functions in the face of damage, followed by rapid recovery and the institutionalization of new lessons into future practices. Similarly, many government institutions and civilian companies have restructured their organizations to be more resilient to a terrorist attack, emphasizing above all returning “to previous levels of functioning relatively quickly.”

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The counterterrorism network went beyond simply surviving and learning from mistakes. Counterterrorism leaders came to “accept the reality that they will inevitably confront unpredicted threats” and then formed the network “to roll with the punches, or even benefit from them.” Emerging threats became opportunities to gain comparative advantage, similar to the way the human body adapts to attacks.

Professor Dennis Coyle explains how detoxification by enzymes and immune cell activity represent a more progressive form of resiliency than mere survival, one resulting in incremental improvement through each iteration of threat and response. When a harmful substrate enters the body, for example, enzymes render the substance harmless and often turn the threat into useful material that the body then employs: “through a complex network of anticipatory and resilient mechanisms—more the latter than the former—they make possible, however briefly, vigorous life amidst inevitable danger.”

Within the counterterrorism network, there also seems to be a correlation between the organization’s adaptability, resilience, and risk tolerance. Seeking innovative ways to influence the terrorist network, commanders often entertained unproven ideas and methods, inherently leading to an increase in the risk or even realization of mistakes. Resilience allowed the counterterrorism network to minimize the effect of those failures. But, in addition to occasional mistakes, those risks often revealed new opportunities, some of which translated into better practices. The result is a virtuous cycle leading towards increased efficacy—organizational resiliency allows the network to assume more risk; entrepreneurial action creates mistakes and innovation; successes from innovation contribute to a more adaptive and resilient network.

Lastly, the organizational and operational changes made by the counterterrorism network led to a marked increase in inefficiency. This should come as no surprise since

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71 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 78.
73 Ibid., 168.
efficiency represents a central goal of bureaucracies, and deconstructing the hierarchical bureaucratic structure was the first major move in forming a more effective response to AQI. General McChrystal recognized the natural tension between inefficiency and the reductionist bureaucratic model: “Anyone who wanted to beat us at a game of bureaucratic politics would have all the ammunition they needed, but that wasn’t the fight we were focused on.” Countering terrorism more effectively necessitated adaptability. Inefficiency was an unavoidable byproduct of that transformation:

Where org charts are tidy…teams are messy. Connections crisscross all over the place, and there is lots of overlap: team members track and travel through not only their own specialized territory but often the entire playing field. Trust and purpose are inefficient: getting to know your colleagues intimately and acquiring a whole-system overview are big time sinks; the sharing of responsibilities generates redundancy. But this overlap and redundancy—these inefficiencies—are precisely what imbues teams with high-level adaptability and efficacy. Great teams are less like “awesome machines” than awesome organisms.

The duplication of efforts and overlapping responsibilities stood in direct defiance to the neatly partitioned, highly specialized silos of the 2003 counterterrorism command structure. Recent statements before Congress by senior military leaders illustrate how, even today, USSOCOM maintains the networked organizational design it honed in its early counterterrorism role.

In combatting terrorists, special operations forces have built flat networks that bridge interagency divides down to the tactical level. Inherently joint, our special operations warfighters have continued to support global U.S. Government objectives by leveraging critical interagency and international partnerships. These boundary-spanning networks minimize our tactical response time while radically accelerating innovation.

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74 Weber, *Economy and Society*.
75 McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, 165.
76 Ibid., 120.
III. CWMD THROUGH THE COUNTERTERRORISM LENS

A. DEMYSTIFYING PROLIFERATION LANGUAGE

But, for all that, I cannot but be of opinion, that, translating out of one language into another… is like setting to view the wrong side of a piece of tapestry, where, though the figures are seen, they are full of ends and threads, which obscure them, and are not seen with the smoothness and evenness of the right side.¹

—Don Quixote de la Mancha

Participating in an interagency WMD working group can often resemble a United Nations symposium, where much is said, but subtle nuances are lost in translation. Like terrorism, the proliferation challenge has summoned a language all its own, with unique dialects forming within contributing government agencies. USSOCOM also finds itself in a familiar position, redefining its role in an already mature mission-space, but charged with planning and coordinating a more effective military contribution to an evolving threat. Using counterterrorism as a point of comparison, any attempt at overcoming organizational language barriers first requires establishing a clear picture of the words and phrases already in use to describe WMD proliferation.

While admittedly a more modern construct than terrorism, WMD proliferation does not represent a new idea. Credited with one of the earliest uses of the phrase, Archbishop of Canterbury, William Cosmo Gordon Lang referred to weapons of mass destruction during a Christmas address in 1937.²

Take, for example, the question of peace. Who can think without dismay of the fears, jealousies, and suspicions which have compelled nations, our own among them, to pile up their armaments? Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the suffering, the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China?


Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction?³

The Archbishop offered no clear definition of the term during his speech; however, its use in this context did not refer to WMD as understood today, and W. Seth Carus posits “there is no reason to believe that subsequent uses resulted from the Archbishop’s address.”⁴

The modern understanding of WMD originated instead during a joint declaration by the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Canada on November 15, 1945.⁵ The United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments further codified the term in a resolution released on August 12, 1948:

The Commission for Conventional Armaments resolves to advise the Security Council: 1. that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction, and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.⁶

After nearly eight decades of use in various forms, some critics argue that WMD remains poorly defined and widely misunderstood, even within the U.S. government. However, despite common misusage and conflation of related terms among media outlets and occasionally academic circles, Carus argues that an authoritative, internationally accepted definition of WMD does currently exist. “The term is integral to the international community’s long-standing disarmament dialogue,” posits Carus, who provides a detailed history of WMD’s diplomatic origins, associated treaties, and

⁴ Ibid., 7.
alternative uses. This study accepts Carus’ position and uses the definition common to international policy circles and codified in military doctrine: “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or causing mass casualties.”

Despite relative consensus in meaning, WMD as a typological construct still presents several problems within the USG. For example, merging four unique threat streams—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—produces an enormous and complex mission space. Chemical barrel bombs in Syria necessitate an entirely different response than a Russian biological weapons program. The threat of radiological attacks by violent extremists differs significantly from North Korean nuclear development. Generating policies and strategies to respond to such an immense, complex idea naturally leads to friction within the bureaucracy to include stove-piping and authority overlap. Some participants even choose to deviate from the accepted definition by design, interpreting the problem through their respective organizational lens.

The FBI, for example, holds a more inclusive definition of WMD based on U.S. law. The Bureau accepts chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear in its definition of WMD. But, it expands beyond those to include bombs, grenades, and rockets “having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than four ounces” and missiles “having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce.” Adopting a broader definition enables the FBI to prosecute threats that other agencies would not classify as WMD related, including the use of rocket-propelled grenades and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. The FBI does not expect other agencies to accept its

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7 Ibid., 5.
8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 3–40), I-1.
interpretation of WMD, but instead draws on language to generate a more effective federal law enforcement response.

However, though the object of discussion may be widely accepted (WMD), how the U.S. government describes efforts to affect change on that object can blur in a misunderstanding of three common expressions: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and CWMD.

Understanding nonproliferation and counterproliferation requires clearly defining their root. Accepted definitions of proliferation originate primarily from historical diplomatic usage, the United Nations (UN) 1947 Commission on Conventional Armaments, and various international treaties relating to WMD. However, an interagency study directed by Congressional mandate in the 1994 Defense Authorization Act synthesized previous terminology more succinctly: “Proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.”

The report expounded that nonproliferation encompasses “the full range of political, economic and military tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction.” Common nonproliferation efforts include diplomatic engagement, international treaties, import and export controls, and disarmament assistance. The more widely accepted contemporary usage of nonproliferation can be found in current DOD doctrine, which emphasizes preclusion and omits efforts to “reverse” proliferation where it has already manifested: “actions to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and

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12 The 1994 DOD report’s definition of proliferation includes the phrase “and the missiles used to deliver them.” The phrase is omitted here, because delivery mechanisms—including missiles—are explicitly excluded from the current definition of proliferation. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 1994), 1.
13 Ibid.
expertise.” However, as stressed in the 1994 DOD report—and consistent with diplomatic, UN, and treaty handling of the term—nonproliferation emphasizes prevention as its central tenant.

In contrast, counterproliferation holds a strong connotation of active intervention. DOD joint doctrine defines counterproliferation as “those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners.” As with nonproliferation, counterproliferation extends across “the full range of U.S. efforts,” but shifts focus from potential and emerging proliferation cases to “extent” threats, or problem-sets that have already materialized. The differentiation between nonproliferation and counterproliferation can be clarified through international relations theorist, Thomas Schelling’s delineation of deterrence and compellence. The prevention of an act (deterring proliferation) characterizes nonproliferation; the discontinuation of an act (compelling the reversal of proliferation) best characterizes counterproliferation.

In 2002, national strategy documents added the phrase “combatting weapons of mass destruction” to the proliferation discourse. In its original form, “the U.S. approach to combat WMD” simply referred to the aggregation of the “pillars of our national strategy”—nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. The 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction expanded on the military’s role within those pillars, but it also referred to CWMD as a more unified,

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15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 3–40), GL-5.
16 Ibid.
18 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 3–40), GL-5.
21 Emphasis added, Ibid., 1–2.
singular activity. For example, the 2006 document outlines that the purpose of the strategy “is to provide DOD Components guidance and a strategic framework for combating WMD,” as opposed to guidance along the three existing lines of effort. It is unclear if DOD intended CWMD to take on a more singular meaning in the 2006 strategy, or if the term was only offered as a way to succinctly refer to the entire mission space. However, the document does represent the first authoritative use of the acronym CWMD and set a precedence for degrading the clarity of the pillar construct.

Military strategy documents later replaced the terms combat and combatting (championed by the 2001 presidential administration) with the term countering weapons of mass destruction, which remains in use today. In its current form, military doctrine provides the following definition for CWMD: “Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.”

Of importance, the 2014 DOD Strategy for CWMD deviated from the pattern up to that point by excluding references to the proliferation pillars and their relationship to the concept of CWMD.

Rather than dividing WMD proliferation response along the traditional pillars, CWMD is articulated through the U.S. military construct of ends, ways, and means: “DOD will seek to achieve the End States, targeting the Priority Objectives via the Strategic Approach (Ways), all of which are supported by Countering WMD Activities and Tasks (Means).” The 2014 military strategy document depicts the relationship

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23 Emphasis added. Ibid., 4.

24 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

25 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 3–40), GL-5.

26 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, iii.

27 Ibid., 12.
between these three concepts as a continuous cycle (Figure 3) “carried out simultaneously against a diverse group of actors of concern at all stages of proliferation.”

Figure 3. CWMD Ends, Ways, and Means as Depicted in Military Doctrine.

The strategic approach for conducting CWMD can then be described as the combination of three lines of effort, or ways: “prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crisis.” The three end states from military doctrine— “no new possession, no WMD use, and minimize effects”—clearly correspond to the goals of the three proliferation pillars, but do not necessarily correspond with how to achieve them (the ways).

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28 Ibid.
29 Adapted from DOD Joint Publication 3–40, Ibid., 12–13.
30 The 2014 DOD Strategy for Countering WMD uses the phrase “contain and reduce threats.” DOD joint doctrine uses the phrase “contain and roll back threats.” Neither document offers an explanation for the variation. Ibid., 12; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 3–40), I-4.
31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 12; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 3–40), I-4.
However, though the military abandoned the pillar construct, the remainder of the USG did not. A survey of seven principal government departments that contribute to the proliferation threat reveals that six departments use the term counterproliferation in their mission statements and organizational charts; only DOD consistently uses the term CWMD. As a result—and not originally intended as such—the term CWMD has become synonymous with U.S. military efforts to affect the WMD proliferation threat. This organizational mismatch in labeling has led to some confusion and tension within interagency working groups focused on addressing WMD proliferation.

Yet, detailed analysis of CWMD and the proliferation pillars suggest the differences in the constructs are relatively minor and can be reduced to two deviations.

First, CWMD refers to a mission space that includes nonproliferation, counterproliferation, consequence management, and nothing else. This should come as no surprise, since the concept of CWMD originally referred to the combination of the three pillars. But, this relationship has led to confusion even in recent proliferation working groups. In fact, both CWMD and the proliferation pillars draw their direction and authority from the same three national policies: no new WMD acquisition or

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33 Based on author’s observation and three counterproliferation interagency working groups conducted in 2016 which included senior representatives from OASD NCB, USSOCOM, ODNI, CIA, FBI, and three other departments.
development, no WMD use, and minimize the effects of WMD use. This relationship is best understood by viewing CWMD and the pillars as responses to a WMD threat pathway, or portions of that response. WMD threat pathways are often sophisticated networks “encompassing ideas, materials, technologies, facilities, processes, products, and events that enable actors to conceptualize, develop, possess, and proliferate WMD and related capabilities.” Reduced to its fundamental parts, however, a successful proliferation pathway begins with the intent to acquire or develop a WMD, followed by proliferation, and concludes with use. Therefore, from the perspective of requisite response to that pathway, both CWMD and the proliferation pillars (when combined) occupy the same mission space, beginning with intent and ending with the consequences of the WMD use managed.

However, though the two constructs share the same start and finish, it would be misleading to view CWMD as a summation of the proliferation pillars:

\[ CWMD \neq \text{Nonproliferation} + \text{Counterproliferation} + \text{Consequence Management} \]

This formula inaccurately depicts the relationship between CWMD and the pillars due to typological differences in how the two constructs bin lines of effort within the mission space—specifically in the demarcation between counterproliferation and consequence management.

Within the U.S. interagency, the categorization of efforts—how activities to influence WMD proliferation are grouped—corresponds with the pillars themselves. For example, if an agency describes an action as a nonproliferation activity, it would signal that activity supports the policy of no new WMD acquisition and occurs on the threat pathway bounded by two specific limits: intent and proliferation. In this case, CWMD

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35 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Joint Publication 3–40), 18.
offers an identical line of effort, binned with the same limits as nonproliferation, only by a different label, “prevent acquisition.” Therefore, so long as the players involved understand that “nonproliferation” and “prevent acquisition” hold the same meaning to describe a specific category of activities, the terms could be used interchangeably without risk of miscommunication.

But, this equivalency of terms breaks down in describing efforts after WMD acquisition. Both CWMD and the column construct divide the remainder of the response into two lines of effort. These typologies vary in where to draw the dividing line between the two categories (Figure 4). Counterproliferation begins with acquisition and ends with WMD use; consequence management begins where counterproliferation leaves off and ends once the effects of WMD use have been managed. In contrast, the emergence of a WMD crisis separates lines of effort in the CWMD construct, marking the end of “contain and reduce threats” and the start of “respond to crisis.”

Figure 4. Overlay of WMD Pathway, Proliferation Pillars, and CWMD.36

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36 Adapted from DOD Joint Publication 3–40, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 12–13.
Unlike nonproliferation, counterproliferation cannot be used interchangeably to describe the military’s line of effort to contain and reduce threats. Likewise, consequence management and respond to crisis do not describe the same category of efforts.

If organizations fail to understand these typological differences, there may be a tendency to conflate the proliferation pillars with CWMD lines of effort. CWMD uses three lines of effort; the proliferation pillars use three lines of effort. But, viewing CWMD simply as a summation of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management ignores the variation in language between the two constructs, potentially contributing to organizational friction in the form of miscommunication or competing realities.

For example, military doctrine provides a chart listing notional tasks and typical operations that might be performed within each CWMD line of effort (Figure 5).\(^37\) Now, imagine for a moment a U.S. government agency conflates counterproliferation with the CWMD line of effort “contain and reduce threats.” Based on their understanding of the typology, that agency would expect to find only tasks appropriate to counterproliferation within that line of effort. Indeed, the military chart includes typical counterproliferation tasks within “contain and reduce threats”—such as targeting, interdiction, and unified action.\(^38\) That agency would also expect that counterproliferation tasks not appear in any other line of effort. Yet, the same three counterproliferation tasks also appear within the third CWMD line of effort, “respond to crisis.”\(^39\)

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\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
Clearly defined terms and delineation of relationships between the terms discussed above provide a framework for concise discussion of the problem set. *Proliferation* is the international reality that weapons of mass destruction continue to spread if unimpeded. *Nonproliferation* and *counterproliferation* represent national policies, though both are often used to describe strategies or efforts in support of those policies. *Countering weapons of mass destruction* refers to strategies and efforts across the entire spectrum of a WMD threat pathway, but is a term used almost exclusively by the U.S. military and varies slightly from the proliferation column typology.

Given the significant friction over WMD language, some suggest DOD should abandon CWMD terminology and adopt—or revert back to—the more widely accepted proliferation pillars. Doing so would theoretically lead to consensus throughout the USG, aligned with the language used by the national command authority.

Wouldn’t it be good if DOD would organize itself the way the President organized his cabinet? If you went up to the White House and looked for an office labeled CWMD, you wouldn’t find it. Instead, you would find offices

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40 Adapted from DOD Joint Publication 3–40, Ibid.
that are issue-specific, such as NP [nonproliferation] or CP [counterproliferation]… There is no CWMD policy coordination committee [PCC] for example... I would push to get the language more consistent with whatever the White house directs are the topics of the PCCs.\textsuperscript{41}

However, senior research fellow Brendan Melley goes on to highlight that a sudden, whole-sale substitution of language “would break a lot of china in the Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{42}

In contrast, USSOCOM’s handling of counterterrorism language offers a more measured approach to overcoming organizational friction. As outlined in Chapter II, USSOCOM first educated itself on the language already in use by other government entities and then highlighted AQI as the shared calibration point around which to collaborate. Applying this model to CWMD provides a practical solution to overcoming disparate organizational language.

Dr. Robyn Klein, for example, emphasizes the importance of participants building awareness of CWMD language and the organizations that reflect those understandings: “While a common lexicon certainly would be helpful, the most important requirement is a common understanding regarding the extent of the mission space and the different roles, responsibilities, authorities, and tools that are, can, and should be applied to the different problem sets within it.”\textsuperscript{43}

Some evidence suggests USSOCOM has already begun applying lessons from the counterterrorism model to the CWMD language challenge. USSOCOM leaders have advocated that planners and intelligence officers “understand the differences in terminology” in order to properly integrate military contributions into other USG efforts to counter WMD threats.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Brendan Melley (Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University), in discussion with the author, May 9, 2017.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Emphasis added. Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National Security Council), in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{44} Robert D. Foster, Jr. (Pathway Defeat Strategic Planner, USSOCOM J53 Special Plans & Policy), in discussion with the author.
B. CWMD ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

Assuming coordinating authority for CWMD allows USSOCOM to draw lessons learned from one fight (CT) and apply them to another (CWMD). While every fight is different, the global perspective and network approach USSOCOM brings to problem solving have the ability to support Geographic Combatant Commands and the Interagency in their responsibilities to counter WMD threats.\textsuperscript{45}

—Robert D. Foster, Jr., USSOCOM Special Plans and Policy

Chapter II illustrates how USSOCOM drew two significant organizational design lessons from its role as the counterterrorism military synchronizer: comfort without command and target-focused collaboration. Based on the similarities between counterterrorism and CWMD, these lessons can—and should—be applied to CWMD and their value can be explored in more detail. Dr. Robyn Klein offers some context for the utility of seeking collaboration to achieve a unified objective within CWMD.

Each department or agency at the federal level has unique roles, responsibilities, authorities, and processes that shapes its perspective, equities, and operations. Unity of command resides with the President and typically not with a single department or agency lead, which means our system requires that departments and agencies support a “unity of effort” model, both in steady state and during crisis. This is not unique to CWMD, but means that CWMD efforts across departments and agencies will always benefit from shared understanding of problems and close collaboration on the integrated sets of options to address them.\textsuperscript{46}

As with organizational language, USSOCOM CWMD planners have already acknowledged the pitfalls of approaching CWMD synchronization with the rigid hierarchical structure of a machine bureaucracy. In some ways, the organizational design lessons drawn from counterterrorism are already being applied to USSOCOM’s new CWMD role.

For example, USSOCOM has made clear its role as military CWMD synchronizer does not equate to command authority in the mission space, but instead necessitates a

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National Security Council), in discussion with the author.
unity of effort—both within DOD and between interorganizational partners. “We are a surrogate, writing a plan for the department,” explains USSOCOM CWMD planners, highlighting the importance of clarity in the command’s assignment as the coordinating authority rather than command component or sole practitioner of military CWMD activities and plans.47

Beyond integrating activities within the U.S. military, USSOCOM has also initiated deliberate efforts to better integrate DOD CWMD into broader USG efforts to counter WMD threats. Where military CWMD does not inherently denote special operations, it is equally true that CWMD is not the exclusive or even dominant responsibility of DOD. The military plays a role in the broader USG effort to counter WMD threats, but often serves as supporting cast to the myriad of other interorganizational entities routinely contributing to the non- and counterproliferation policy effort. Testifying before Congress in May 2017, USSOCOM Commander, General Raymond Thomas highlighted the command’s current focus to fold military contributions into ongoing interorganizational CWMD efforts:

We are publishing a new Global Campaign Plan to provide a comprehensive, trans-regional approach which integrates ongoing regional and interagency efforts. We have also established a CWMD Coordination Center to design, execute and assess this new trans-regional approach and connect to other USG Departments and Agencies, as well as international partners. The Center leverages the resources and skills of multiple agencies that will result in a multi-layered comprehensive approach to address the CWMD problem set.48

Comments by USSOCOM senior leaders at the 2017 DOD CWMD Global Synchronization Conference explained in more detail the intent of the Global Campaign Plan (GCP) referenced in General Thomas’ testimony. A single, concise statement

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48 United States Special Operations Command: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 4.
summarized the plan’s guiding principal: “The GCP is about unity of effort, not unity of command.”\textsuperscript{49}

USSOCOM is also emphasizing target-focused collaboration around WMD threat pathways, similar to counterterrorism collaboration efforts in 2003 based on defeating AQI. USSOCOM commanders and planners consistently offer specific WMD threat pathways as the starting point for collaboration in CWMD interagency working groups.\textsuperscript{50} During a senior leader seminar at the 2017 DOD CWMD Global Synchronization Conference, USSOCOM presented “the pathway as a useful model to understand USG efforts to prevent the spread or use of WMD.”\textsuperscript{51} Rather than attempting to collaborate across the full breadth of the CWMD challenge at once, the forum underlined how the narrow scope and specificity of a WMD threat pathway helps interorganizational participants to “understand the activities, policies, authorities, or operations that can contribute” to a unified response.\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{51} U.S. Special Operations Command, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Campaign Approach, Senior Leader Seminar.”

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

It would be hard to find a CWMD challenge that is not inherently an interagency problem requiring an interagency—and an international—solution. Cooperation and collaboration across the interagency is integral to achieve these solutions… While the NSC [National Security Council] process often facilitates the development, coordination, and implementation of the President’s national security policy at the strategic level, it relies on departments and agencies working together independently on a day-to-day basis. In its new role, USSOCOM can help to increase this collaboration and focus interagency efforts on shared problems.

—Director Robyn Klein, National Security Council

The spread and use of weapons of mass destruction threaten the U.S. and will likely persist as a substantial threat for the foreseeable future. The complex nature of that threat necessitates a collaborative, interorganizational response. USSOCOM holds an appropriate platform to influence the formation of a more effective, unified national approach to opposing WMD threats, based on the command’s new charge to synchronize U.S. military CWMD plans.

Similarities between USSOCOM’s counterterrorism synchronization mission and its newly assigned CWMD role provide an opportunity to draw lessons from one problem to apply to another.

However, misconceptions about what lessons might be carried over from counterterrorism persist throughout the USG. In large part, this is the result of misunderstanding the true causal mechanisms of USSOCOM’s counterterrorism successes. Some conflate the successful formation of an effective counterterrorism strategy with accelerated military kinetic operations to kill and capture terrorists. A closer look at SOCOM’s counterterrorism legacy tells a different story.

This study illustrates that the maturation of a successful response to terrorism required USSOCOM and its interorganizational partners to change the way they

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1 Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National Security Council), in discussion with the author.
communicated and organized. First, USSOCOM played a central role in overcoming disparate counterterrorism language by assessing how other organizations described the problem and then focusing collaborative efforts on a narrowly-scoped objective—initially defeating AQI, and then focused on other well defined targets. Second, USSOCOM contributed to two significant organizational design changes in the counterterrorism enterprise: 1) it embraced its role as a participant in the overall effort without clear command authority, and 2) it facilitated a collaborative interorganizational response unified around specific, identifiable, and achievable goals.

A. WAY FORWARD

USSOCOM’s handling of counterterrorism language and organizational design supports three recommendations for the command’s new role in synchronizing CWMD military plans.

1. Learn the CWMD Language(s) Already in Use

The majority of the international community and U.S. interagency describe their organizational roles along the three “proliferation pillars” (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management), while DOD uses the construct CWMD. These two dialects share many commonalities, but a lack of mutual understanding has led to confusion and friction in CWMD interagency working groups. Education—within USSOCOM and among partners—is the first step in diffusing misunderstandings. USSOCOM liaison officers are well situated to advance this effort.

2. Target-Focused Collaboration around WMD Threat Pathways

Use specific WMD threat pathways as the calibration points to focus interorganizational collaboration. Consensus on CWMD language must start with a shared understanding of a clear objective. WMD threat pathways represent concrete, limited-scope objects around which agencies can collaborate effectively. Analysis of WMD pathway choke points and network nodes provides a common point of discussion along these lines.
3. **Get the Word Out: Carrying over the “Right” Counterterrorism Lessons**

USSOCOM is already applying lessons drawn from its role as the military counterterrorism synchronizer—comfort without command and unity of effort through collaboration—within its new CWMD role. USSOCOM leadership has taken steps to reassure interagency partners of the respect and value it places on their contributions, as well as USSOCOM’s limitations in the CWMD sphere. However, many interagency partners still conflate “USSOCOM counterterrorism lessons” with military kinetic targeting to defeat terrorist networks, rather than organizational changes to improve collaboration. The goal is to highlight USSOCOM’s CWMD efforts and amplify the “one team, one fight” message.

**B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

With less than a year in its new role, some questions remain regarding USSOCOM’s charge to synchronize military CWMD plans. This study provides a starting point for carrying over lessons from counterterrorism such as clear language and organizational changes, but further research is necessary to address underexplored portions of the problem in more depth. During the course of this study, three specific questions emerged necessitating more analysis.

*What role should networks play in describing and understanding WMD threat pathways?* During a senior leader seminar at the 2017 DOD CWMD Global Synchronization Conference, planners characterized networks as “the physical and virtual manifestation of pathways and supply technology, materials, and expertise to meet the demand of actors pursuing WMD programs and capabilities.”

Chapter IV highlights USSOCOM’s current efforts to promote collaboration around WMD threat pathways, but, some interagency and international partners seem to have followed a similar pattern of target-focused collaboration oriented on *networks* rather than pathways. Focusing on

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networks for collaboration may provide even greater focus and clarity than pathway targeting.

What impact does organizational language have on collaboration with international organizations to prevent acquisition, development, and proliferation of WMDs? Theory and observations presented in this study emphasize the difficulty of communicating clearly and effectively within the U.S. government. These same hurdles likely exist in our relationships with international partners and competitors.

How can USSOCOM contribute more effectively to the national strategy for consequence management of a WMD event (what DOD terms “CBRN response”)? Consequence management of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack occurs under considerably different conditions than nonproliferation and counterproliferation. Properly synchronizing military plans for consequence management requires a genuine understanding of what DOD could and should contribute to the mission space.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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