A Smart Assignment Technique with Consideration of Multicriteria Reciprocal Judgments

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Abstract—To date the assignment problems are important tasks in recommender systems and one-to-one matching issues through social environments. The various approaches have been proposed to reach these purposes that are normally limited to the considerations of cost or profit incurred by each possible assignment. However most of the time, each of the alternatives at both assignment sides have particular criteria for judging about the other side alternatives, whereby they can evaluate their sufficiency. In this paper, in order to obtain the optimality of both dimensions of assignment, we try to consider the concept of efficiency rather than the cost or profit of each possible assignment. Therefore, the efficient assignment is the one that firstly, has the maximum optimality in terms of both dimensions of assignment, and secondly, takes into account the significance of judgment of each assignment from the viewpoint of decision maker. To do this, a compound index would be defined which includes the efficiency related to two-dimensional optimized assignment for the purpose of measuring the performance of each possible assignment. Next, a mathematical programming model for the extended assignment problem is proposed, which is then expressed as a classical integer linear programming model to determine the assignments with the maximum efficiency. A numerical example is used to demonstrate the approach.

Keywords—Assignment Problem; Multicriteria Reciprocal Judgments; Two-dimensional Utility; Total Efficiency in Reciprocal Optimality; Virtual Alternative.

1. INTRODUCTION

The assignment problem is a common term in the theory of linear and network flow. This problem has been proposed in different forms [1] but it is most often considered in form of optimal solution of assigning n jobs to n people in a way that minimum cost or maximum profit would be obtained. You can see some of its usage in [2-6]; in order to find effective and optimal solutions, different algorithm including standard linear programming [7-12], Hungarian algorithm [13], neural network [14], and genetic algorithm [15-19] have been devised. For standard assignment problem, only the cost or the profit of each possible assignment are considered in formulation of the problem; but in real usage, for each possible assignment several types of input resources are usually needed in an assignment problem. Moreover, decision-makers can have several different objectives to achieve for each possible assignment, and the ways to achieve these objectives may conflict with each other. Cambell and Diaby in an article [20] pointed out that demand levels in different departments as well as the number of present workers should be regarded as the input, and the assignment outcomes can affect quality of service and employee satisfaction. They also emphasized that effective utilizing of human resources is of utmost significance in sensitive professions such as nursing.

Bena and Suer also claim that multiple factors can affect the assigning of human resources in the manufacturing cell. Overall, different evaluation units could be used to assess performance measurements of the objectives. These measurements are considered as the output of the problem. The problem can have several incompatible and opposing input and output. In this regard, in an article [22] the author has formulated a problem by considering multiple input and output for each possible assignment, and utilizes data envelopment analysis (DEA) for measuring the efficiency in proposed approach.

Chi-Jen Lin (2011), proposes a labeling algorithm to identify two other sensitivity ranges — Type II and Type III. The algorithm uses the reduced cost matrix, provided in the final results of most solution algorithms for AP, to determine the Type II range which reflects the stability of the current optimal assignment [23]. Birger Raa et al. (2011) in [24] present a MILP model for the integrated BAP—CAP taking into account vessel priorities, preferred berthing locations and handling time considerations. Robert F. Bordley & Stephen M. Pollock (2012) in [25] used an approach that maximizes organizational utility which is assumed to be zero if any of the activities cannot meet its target (or resource allocation). In their approach, utility-based probability maximization (UPM) is a variant of stochastic optimization without recourse.

The standard assignment problem is a particular form of the transportation problem and could be formulated in a linear integer programming of 1-0 [26-27], as follows:
Min (or Max) \( \phi = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} c_{ij} s_{ij} \)

Subject to
\[
\sum_{j=1}^{n} s_{ij} = 1, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n
\]
\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij} = 1, \quad j = 1, \ldots, n
\]
\( s_{ij} = 0 \), or 1

In which the decision variable \( s_{ij} = 1 \) means that \( i \)’th individual is assigned to \( j \)’th job, while for \( s_{ij} = 0 \) no assignment is made. \( c_{ij} \) is the cost (or profit) imposed by the assignment. Particular computer software could easily be used to solve above formulated problems as well as to find the set of optimal answers for identifying the minimum cost and maximum profit. But it should be noted that in this formulation, the cost or profit is only regarded for measuring the function and as we mentioned earlier, other criteria rather than profit or cost could be used for measuring the function of assignments.

The basic idea of performing this research has been derived from the assignment problem which encounters in real positions and is not solvable with current methods. The problem is that we want to optimally assign some of employees to some jobs in a way that each of occupations needs some kind of capability and eligibility as evaluation criterion. Meanwhile, manager as decision maker in order to enhance sense of job satisfaction wants to take into account tastes and utility of employees in case of each job. Meanwhile, imposing each person’s taste and also qualifications and capabilities needed for every job have different level of importance. Therefore, we deal with assignment problem of two goals: first, to maximize degree of utility in view of each person’s taste and second, to maximize degree of utility from the dimension of qualification and competency needed for each occupation according to the priority of each items. As another example we can consider a coach as a decision maker who intends to divide his/her students into different teams in different sports with limited space; in this decision making process he should take into account the qualifications and capabilities required for each sport area as well as the taste of the individuals so that the teams could have the required conditions for success.

Therefore, in this study, the maximum of the total efficiency in obtaining the optimality of both dimensions of assignments would be considered as the criterion of optimal assignment according which this study is organized and you could see what will come next in this paper. Part two would discuss about the overall structure of the model and would provide a definition of the problem. Part three put forward an approach for solving the problem and finding the optimal answer. Part four presents an example to better explain the approach, and finally part five deals with the conclusion of the study.

II. THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF PROBLEM

Among the basic concepts required for elaborating the model of the problem, are the three concepts of ‘alternative role’, ‘arbiter role’ and ‘decision maker role’. When an element has the role of an arbiter, it means that it has some criteria for measurement and can assess and order the opposite alternatives. The element that is being judged has the role of an alternative. The element which directly utilizes the assessments and judgments to the final solution has the role of a decision maker. Therefore, the element that has the role of a decision maker has definitely the role of an arbiter, but the element with the role of an arbiter does not necessarily have the role of a decision maker.

Here, we consider the decision making system as consisting of three distinct types of elements (a component of the decision making system called “element” that could accept one or more role of the tree role of “alternative”, “arbiter” or “decision maker”). Both the elements of \( X \) and \( Y \) have the roles of ‘alternative’ and ‘arbiter’ reciprocally, and the third element, that is Decision Maker (DM), has the role of a decision maker which is the one responsible for doing the assignment task (See Fig 1). We assume to have \( k \) elements of the \( X \) type, each of them are shown as \( X_i, i = 1, 2, \ldots, k \) ; on the other side we have \( l \) elements of the \( Y \) type that each of them are shown as \( Y_j, j = 1, 2, \ldots, l \). \( C^X = \{ c_{11}^X, c_{12}^X, \ldots, c_{kl}^X \} \) is the set of the references of the attributes related to the assessment of \( X \)s and \( C^Y = \{ c_{11}^Y, c_{12}^Y, \ldots, c_{lk}^Y \} \) is the set of the references of attributes related to the assessment of \( Y \)s. In this problem each element \( X_i, i = 1, 2, \ldots, k \) takes into account some attributes of \( C^X \) as the criterion of assessment and judgment about all \( X \)s, and also each of \( Y_j, j = 1, 2, \ldots, l \) has considered a subset of \( C^Y \) attributes for the sake of measurement and judgment about all \( Y \)s. Now DM is the one that makes decision about the assignment of elements of the \( Y \) type to the elements of the \( X \) type and intends to perform the assignment in a way that the maximum optimality is obtained observing the criteria of the elements of the both sides. It should be noted that each element \( Y \) could only be assigned to one element \( X \) and the assignment capacity for each \( X_i, i = 1, 2, \ldots, k \) equals the number of \( P_i \) (\( P_i \) is Natural number and \( \Sigma_{i=1}^{k} P_i \leq l \)).

![Fig. 1. The structure of assignment model based on multicriteria reciprocal judgments](image)

In addition, DM may attach different significance to judgment of the elements \( X \) and \( Y \), therefore, \( W_X \) is the significance weight of the elements of the \( X \) type and \( W_Y \) is the significance weight of elements of the \( Y \) type and accordingly \( W_X + W_Y = 1 \). Also among the elements of \( X \) type, the DM may attach different importance to \( X_i \) in which case \( w_{X_i}, i = 1, 2, \ldots, k \) is the significance weight of element
$X_i$ in terms of DM in a way that $\sum_{i=1}^{k} w_{x_i} = 1$. In the same vein, about elements of Y type $w_{y_j}$, $j = 1, 2, ..., l$ is the significance weight of element $Y_j$ in terms of DM so that $\sum_{j=1}^{l} w_{y_j} = 1$.

Because of the reciprocity of alternative role in this decision making model, the set of alternatives to be considered in this problem is a two dimensional set which can be viewed as a set of virtual alternatives that are ordered pairs and each of their component is related to each side of the assignment. Therefore the set of $A \times Y$ would be the set of the alternatives to be considered and is represented as follows:

$$A \equiv X \times Y = \{(X_i, Y_j) | X_i \in X, Y_j \in Y\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Each alternative of $(X_i, Y_j)$ from the set of $A$ ($i = 1, 2, ..., k$ $j = 1, 2, ..., l$) is interpreted as the assignment of element $Y_j$ to the element $X_i$. With such a definition, we are dealing with a problem of multi-criteria decision analysis which has $k \times l$ alternatives and one decision maker (DM). It should be noted that each of the $X_i$, $i = 1, 2, ..., k$ and each of the $Y_j$, $j = 1, 2, ..., l$ could be either alternative or criteria in which one of their components is included. In order to simplify the issue, we define some restrictions of set $A$ as follows:

$$\forall i = 1, 2, ..., k \quad A_{X_i} := \{(X_i, Y_j) | Y_j \in Y\}$$
$$\forall j = 1, 2, ..., l \quad A_{Y_j} := \{(X_i, Y_j) | X_i \in X\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

So with this definition we can say that each element $X_i$, $i = 1, 2, ..., k$ has the role of arbitrator only toward the virtual alternatives of set $A_{X_i}$, as well as each of the element $Y_j$, $j = 1, 2, ..., l$ only toward the virtual alternatives of set $A_{Y_j}$; but DM is the element that has the role of arbitrator and decision maker toward all elements of set $A$. Now, we try to find an algorithm to solve the problem whereby we could obtain the best assignment with maximum optimality in terms of elements of $X$ and $Y$ type.

III. PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH

Here we are dealing with an assignment problem in which decision maker intends to process the assignment in a way that the maximum optimality could be obtained in terms of both sides of the assignment. Regarding this, first the procedure of ranking which is frequently used in this algorithm would be defined and noted.

A. The ranking procedure:

The purpose of utilizing the ranking procedure is to recognize the criteria, value functions and the mental ideal point of the decision maker on the criteria and to rank the alternatives by measuring the preferable distance of each alternative from the ideal point, so that in terms of the preference amount, the closest alternative to the ideal point would gain the first rank, and in the same vein, the remaining alternatives would obtain the next ranks. The symbol of this procedure is written as rank$_{C}(\ast, \ast)$. As an example we could assume that the element b is the arbitrator and the set $A = \{a_1, a_2, ..., a_k\}$ is the set of to-be-considered alternatives. The set $U = \{u_1, u_2, ..., u_k\}$ is also the reference set of the criteria. Therefore, rank$_b(A, U)$ is the ranking of the set of alternatives $A$ by the arbitrator $b$ which is based on the arbitrary criterion of the arbitrator among the criteria of the reference set $U$ which is done through these procedures:

Step1. Choosing the criteria: the arbitrator would be asked to choose a subset of arbitrarily chosen criteria based on which he wishes to do the ranking from the reference set $U$; the set of chosen criteria is called $C$.

$$C = \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_n\} \subseteq U; \quad |C| = n \hspace{1cm} (4)$$

Step2. Giving weight to the chosen criteria: in this step we can directly ask the arbitrator to provide us with the weight of the criteria and if not possible we can calculate the weights of the criteria through one of the common ways of weight-giving to match in the following conditions.

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i = 1, \quad w_i > 0 \quad ; \quad W = (w_1, w_2, ..., w_n) \hspace{1cm} (5)$$

Step3. Identifying the value function related to each criterion by the arbitrator: in this phase the arbitrator would be asked to identify the mental value function in respect to each criterion. In these functions, the horizontal axis represents the value of outcomes in intended criterion, and the vertical axis is related to the value that those outcomes have for the arbitrator. Here, we define 3 aspiration levels for the value size and we ask the arbitrator to identify the value size related to outcomes of each criterion based on these levels. These levels are as follows: 1. "quite dissatisfaction" which has the zero value. 2. "quite satisfaction" which has the value of one. 3. "quite surprised" which has the value of two.

If the outcome of a criterion is quite satisfactory for the arbitrator, we give value 1 to that outcome in the vertical axe, and in the same vein, for each outcome based on the relative satisfaction it creates for the arbitrator, we assign values equal, smaller or larger than 1. The smaller the value is than 1, the more arbitrator would be dissatisfied; and the more it is than 1, the arbitrator would be more surprised. In fact the range of the value function would be between zero and two in which 1 indicates the quite satisfaction and 1 to 2 represents that arbitrator is surprised. As an example, the value function could be as follows:

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

Fig. 2. Three instances of identified value function by the arbitrator.

The value function $v_i$ is a converter that transforms the outcome value obtained from the alternatives $a_j$, $j = 1, 2, ..., g$ on the $c_i$ criterion to the value defined by the arbitrator.

$$v_i = F_i(c_i(a_j)) = v_i(a_j) \quad ; \quad j = 1, 2, ..., g \hspace{1cm} (6)$$
We define the vector \( V' \) that has \( b' \) components as the vector of value functions and in each of its component we put the value function related to one of these criteria.

\[
V' = (v'_1, v'_2, \ldots, v'_n) = (v'_1(a_j), v'_2(a_j), \ldots, v'_n(a_j)) ; \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, b'
\]  

(7)

Note: in the aggregation model, in order to obtain the whole preferences of the arbiter or decision maker on the alternatives, the assessment criterion for each alternative is considered as a function of value functions and the vector of criteria weight and based on the values obtained from this aggregation function would be ranked in descending order that is the alternative that gain the highest value in the aggregation function would get the rank 1 and the others would be ranked based on the same vein. But get the aggregation function is very difficult because autonomy and dependency status should be among the criteria considered. Sometimes, considering all these relations will not be practical. But this model is proposed a method that to obtain ranking and of aggregation function is not used.

Step4. Formation of \( n \)-dimension space with value functions and identification of each alternative \( a_j \) (\( j = 1, 2, \ldots, b' \)) as a point with the coordinates of \( V' \): we assume to show each of the alternatives of \( A = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_g\} \) with \( n \)-component vector so that the \( i \)-th component related to \( a_j \) (\( i = 1, 2, \ldots, n ; j = 1, 2, \ldots, b' \)) is the outcome of alternative \( a_j \) in the \( i \)-th criterion. In this way we could consider the alternatives as points in \( n \)-dimension space of criteria. Therefore, each alternative could be displayed with his value functions vector that is alternatives could be considered as points in the \( n \)-dimension space of value functions. As an exemplary assumption take \( n = 3 \) that mean we have 3 criteria so the 3 dimension of criteria and the 3-dimension space of value functions is as follows:

![Diagram](image)

Fig. 3. Definition of the alternatives as the points in the space of criteria and its consequence to the value functions space.

Therefore, we would consequently have \( n \)-dimension space that each of its dimensions is the identifier of value function related to one of the \( n \)-criterion of the arbiter; and each alternative \( a_j \) (\( j = 1, 2, \ldots, b' \)) in this space has the \( n \)-component coordinates that could be considered as a point (point) of this space in a way that the \( i \)-th component of each coordinate of alternative equals the value, the outcome of which is obtained in terms of the \( i \)-th criterion of arbiter \( b' \).

The point to be noted is that the value functions space and the coordinates of an alternative in this space is strictly dependent on the idealizations of the arbiter \( b' \), since the criteria are selected by the arbiter as well as identification of value functions. Therefore, a particular alternative may have quite different coordinates in the space of arbiters' value functions either in terms of the number of the components or in terms of the value of each of the coordinate's components. Consequently we can explain the \( n \)-dimension value functions space of arbiter \( b' \) as the "\( n \)-dimensional space of \( b' \) idealization".

Since the range of the value functions of \( v_j, j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \) is between zero and 2, the ideal point could be considered as a point of the value functions space in which all the components of coordinate is 2, that is the alternative that has obtained the highest value in view of the arbiter and would be represented as \( a^* = (0, 2, \ldots, 2) \). In the similar vein the negative ideal point is the one that has obtained the lowest value in view of the arbiter, so all the components of the coordinate equals zero and is displayed as \( a^- = (0, 0, \ldots, 0) \). It should be noted that, here we assume \( a^- \) has never been a member of the alternatives to be considered, for the simple reason that the occurrence of such a phenomenon i.e., existence of such an alternative that in view of all criteria has the absolute zero value is quite rare and almost impossible. If by chance such an alternative exists, it could be removed from the set of to-be-considered alternatives from the very outset.

Step5. Calculating the closeness of relational preference of alternatives to the ideal point and their ranking based on this index: in this step, we obtain the Euclid distance, between the identifier point of each alternative in value functions space, from the two ideal point and negative ideal point as follows:

\[
S_j^* = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \times (2 - v_i^* - v_j^*)^2} ; \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, b'
\]

(8)

\[
S_j^- = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \times (v_i^* - v_j)^2} ; \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, b'
\]

(9)

In which for \( S_j^* \), \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, g \) consists of the Euclid distance of alternative \( a_j \) from the ideal point and \( S_j^- \), the Euclid distance of alternative \( a_j \) from the ideal negative point in the value functions space. Now, in order to rank the set of alternatives \( A \), we define an index termed as "closeness of relational preference to the ideal point" as what you could see below:

\[
RPC_j^b = \frac{S_j^-}{S_j^* + S_j^-} ; \quad j = 1, 2, \ldots, g
\]

(10)

The \( RPC_j^b \) is the indicator of the closeness of relational preference of alternative \( a_j \) to the ideal point of \( a^* \) in idealization space of the arbiter \( b \); if \( a_j = a^* \), \( RPC_j^b \) equals 1 and when \( a_j = a^- \) it equals zero, but since we assume that \( a^- \) is not a member of to-be-considered alternatives of \( A \), always we have \( 0 < RPC_j^b \leq 1 \) (\( j = 1, 2, \ldots, g \)). The higher is the index for one alternative, the closer the alternative is to the ideal in terms of the preferences of arbiter element \( b \), and at the same time it is farther from the negative deal. Finally we order and rank the alternatives of set \( A \) in descending order, from the highest proximity of relational preference to the ideal point, to its lowest proximity.
Now for solving this problem and obtaining the most appropriate assignment, we suggest the following phases:

Phase 1: We utilize the ranking procedure for every single element of X and Y type in arbitrary position:

\[
\forall X_{i=1,...,k} \text{ rank}_{X_i}(Y, C^X) \text{,} \quad \forall Y_{j=1,...,l} \text{ rank}_{Y_j}(X, C^Y) \quad (11)
\]

Phase 2: In this phase we form the decision matrix of problem by applying the result obtained from the first phase as follows. As we know, we are dealing with a reciprocal judgment and each assignment of a Y type element to a X type element form a to-be-considered alternative which are shown as \((X_i, Y_j), i = 1, 2, ..., k \text{ and } j = 1, 2, ..., l.\) In addition, we want to assess each of these alternatives as two attributes the first attribute (U^X) is the amount of relative utility of this assignment in terms of X type element, and the second attribute (U^Y) is the amount of relative utility of this assignment in terms of Y type element. We show the set of these two attributes as U^X = (U^X, U^Y). Therefore, the decision matrix structure would be defined as follows:

![Decision Matrix Structure](image)

Fig. 4. The structure of decision matrix in assignment model based on the multi-criteria reciprocal judgments.

In which the U^X (i = 1, 2, ..., k and j = 1, 2, ..., l) is the result or the outcome of the judgment of X type element about the assignment \((X_i, Y_j)\), and equals the amount of relative utility of element \(Y_j\) in terms of element \(X_i\), also U^Y, (i = 1, 2, ..., k and j = 1, 2, ..., l) is the result or outcome of the judgment of Y type element about the assignment \((X_i, Y_j)\) and equals the amount of relative utility of element \(X_i\) in view of element \(Y_j\). Now the question is how are these outcomes obtained? For each i = 1, 2, ..., k and j = 1, 2, ..., l we define the outcomes of decision matrix in following way:

\[
U^X_{ij} := w_{X_i} \cdot RPC_{X_i}^Y ; \quad U^Y_{ij} := w_{Y_j} \cdot RPC_{Y_j}^X \quad (12)
\]

So for each i = 1, 2, ..., k and j = 1, 2, ..., l We have \(0 < U^X_{ij}, U^Y_{ij} \leq 1\).

Phase 3: Now we define an index that could be used as the decision criteria in solving problem. This index is called "total efficiency in reciprocal optimality" and for each alternative \((X_i, Y_j), i = 1, 2, ..., k \text{ and } j = 1, 2, ..., l,\) we show it with \(E_{ij}.\) We could consider this index as a linear combination of \(U^X_{ij}, U^Y_{ij},\) that is if the decision maker (DM) give the weight \(W_X\) to the X type element judgment and give \(W_Y\) to the judgment of Y type element so that \(W_X + W_Y = 1, 0 < W_X, W_Y < 1,\) then the linear combination of \(E_{ij} = W_X \cdot U^X_{ij} + W_Y \cdot U^Y_{ij}\) could be considered as an index for measuring the "total efficiency in reciprocal optimality". However, the point to be noted is that in this definition, the \(E_{ij}\) derivative in relation to \(U^X_{ij}\) or \(U^Y_{ij}\) is a constant value, which is the ratio of the total efficiency changes to the relative utility changes of the alternative is a constant value. While, commonly the closer the amount of relative utility is to 1, and the alternative has higher level of satisfaction, the less the sensitivity would be toward the optimality changes. For this reason, we should define index \(E_{ij}\) in a way that it owns this characteristic. Here we define the index \(E_{ij}\) for the alternative \((X_i, Y_j), i = 1, 2, ..., k \text{ and } j = 1, 2, ..., l,\) in following way:

\[
E_{ij} = \frac{1}{1 + \log_{W_X} U^X_{ij}} + \frac{1}{1 + \log_{W_Y} U^Y_{ij}} \quad (13)
\]

In which the first sentence shows the efficiency of \((X_i, Y_j)\) in X dimension and the second sentence shows the efficiency in Y dimension. Also it is clear that \(0 < E_{ij} \leq 2\).

The reasons that confirm the appropriateness of the above definition for \(E_{ij}\):

1. Function \(\frac{1}{1 + \log_{W_X} x} (0 < b < 1)\) is shown in picture5. Simply we could see that the derivative of this function is positive (ascendant) and its second derivative is negative. In fact the more we get closer from x=1 to x=0 the slope of the graph slowly become lower which is compatible with what is in the mind of the decision maker. Because the more the relative utility is and closer to 1, the less the sensitivity of the decision maker is toward the optimality changes, in other words when the relative utility of an alternative gets higher the speed of the efficiency changes becomes lower.

2. This definition maintains the order and density of the preferences properly, and calculates the efficiency size with regard to the significance weight related to the judgment of each dimension based on the relational preferences.

   - Without disturbing the totality of the problem, we consider the statement related to the efficiency from the dimension of X \((\frac{1}{1 + \log_{W_X} U^X_{ij}})\) if we consider the sentence related to the efficiency from the Y dimension the change procedure would be the same. Therefore, the consideration of one of these two is sufficient.

   - We assume \(U^Y_{ij}\) to be constant and increase the \(W_Y;\) consequently, as shown in Fig.5, the value of \(\frac{1}{1 + \log_{W_X} U^X_{ij}}\) would decrease; in fact the efficiency would decrease from the X dimension. In other word, if we assume the amount of relative utility of assumed alternative (assignment of Y to X) in view of X judgment as constant and increase the amount of \(W_Y;\) in fact we have decreased the significance of judgment in X dimension, because \(W_X = 1 - W_Y\) and it is normal that the efficiency get decreased in X dimension. Also if we decrease \(W_Y;\) consequently, the \(W_X\) get increased and the value of \(\frac{1}{1 + \log_{W_X} U^X_{ij}}\) would increase and in fact the efficiency would increase from X dimension.
Now, we keep $W_i$ a constant and distinct value and increase the amount of $U_{ij}^y$. As in Fig. 5, we will see that $\frac{1}{1+\log_{b_1} U_{ij}^y}$ increases in parallel with increase in $U_{ij}^y$. That is if we assume $W_i$ as constant value (in fact, the significance weight related to both dimension is assumed to be constant and specified), based on the graph in Fig. 5, the more the value of relative utility of alternative is in view of $X_i$ judgment, the more the efficiency value would get from the $X$ dimension. The reverse also turns out to be true, that is the decrease of $U_{ij}^y$ for one alternative leads to decrease its efficiency in view of $X$ dimension. However it should be noted that the slope of efficiency changes would decrease with an increase in relative utility value and it is exactly what happens in the decision maker mind, because with increasing in the relative utility level, the sensitivity of the decision maker about these changes would decrease and this feature is well considered in the definition of efficiency.

- If $U_{ij}^x$ and $U_{ij}^y$ have the same value and $W_x > W_y$, then based on the assumed definition, the efficiency of the alternative from the $X$ dimension would get higher than the efficiency of the alternative from the $Y$ dimension.

- If $W_x = W_y$, meaning that the significance of judgment of $X$ and $Y$ dimension is the same in decision making and $U_{ij}^x > U_{ij}^y$, then the based on the definition, the efficiency from $X$ dimension would be higher than the efficiency from the $Y$ dimension.

$$y = \frac{1}{1+\log_{b_1} x}$$

$$y = \frac{1}{1+\log_{b_2} x}$$

Fig. 5. The graph of $y = \frac{1}{1+\log_{b_1} x}$ when $0 < b_1 < b_2 < 1$

It should be noted that, here, we aren't looking for the numerical value of efficiency index, but what is important is that this index could properly identify the total preference order based on the two dimension optimality of the to-be-considered alternatives, and since the behavior of defined formulation for $E_{ij}$ is all the time in consistent with reality of decision maker mentality, it seems that this definition is more appropriate and efficient than he basic definition (linear compound). So in this phase for each assignment $(X_i, Y_i)$, $i = 1, 2, ..., k$ and $j = 1, 2, ..., l$, the numerical value of $E_{ij}$ would be calculated based on the defined formulation.

Phase 4: In target function of assignment problem, in order to identify the maximum of 2-dimension optimality measurement, the values of $E_{ij}$ would be utilized and the problem would be formulated in following way:

$$\max \phi = \prod_{i=1}^{k} \prod_{j=1}^{l} E_{ij}^{s_{ij}}$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{k} s_{ij} = p_i, \quad i = 1, 2, ..., k$$

(14)

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} s_{ij} \leq 1, \quad j = 1, 2, ..., l$$

$$s_{ij} = 0 \text{ or } 1$$

In which the $s_{ij} = 1$, that is the assignment of element $Y_j$ to the element $X_i$ is done through DM while for $s_{ij} = 0$ no assignment has taken place. Since $0 < E_{ij} \leq 2$ and $s_{ij} = 0 \text{ or } 1$, we could conclude that $0 < \phi$. Therefore, by calculating the logarithms of the target function of $\phi$, we could convert the above non-linear problem to the following linear programming problem:

$$\max \psi = \log \phi = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \sum_{j=1}^{l} s_{ij} \cdot \log E_{ij}$$

Subject to:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{k} s_{ij} = p_i, \quad i = 1, 2, ..., k$$

(15)

$$\sum_{j=1}^{k} s_{ij} \leq 1, \quad j = 1, 2, ..., l$$

$$s_{ij} = 0 \text{ or } 1$$

The above linear programming would certainly have one optimal answer, and that answer would indicate the optimal assignment of the set of $Y$ type element to the set of $X$ type elements by DM and with considering the utility of both decision dimensions.

IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

Here we provide a real experiment about the assignment of job positions to individuals in order to demonstrate the applicability of the suggested approach in which a corporation manager, as a decision maker, requires the decision analysis techniques for assigning three employees ($Y_1, Y_2, Y_3$) to two jobs of store management ($X_1$) and finance manager ($X_2$) so that by considering the utility and employees' interest and also the required competencies of each job, decide on the best assignment in a way that the utility of both sides is being satisfied as far as possible. Here each job is being occupied by one person and the weight factor which the manager allocates for assignment system element is as follows:

$$W_{Y_1} = 0.7, \quad W_{Y_2} = 0.3$$

$$W_{Y_1} = 0.4, \quad W_{Y_2} = 0.4, \quad W_{Y_3} = 0.2$$

$$W_{X_1} = 0.6, \quad W_{X_2} = 0.4$$

In order to extract the required data, we have designed some simple question forms, which were customized to estimate alternative's score on each criterion. In these forms, the person had selected a number in range 1 to 5 for each question to demonstrate his/her preference, and total average number was final score, which is converted in range $0$ to $1$. 
TABLE I. INTRODUCTION OF THE SET OF CRITERIA $C^1$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>$C_1^1$</th>
<th>$C_2^1$</th>
<th>$C_3^1$</th>
<th>$C_4^1$</th>
<th>$C_5^1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary and benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularity in that department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II. INTRODUCTION OF THE SET OF CRITERIA $C^2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>$C_1^2$</th>
<th>$C_2^2$</th>
<th>$C_3^2$</th>
<th>$C_4^2$</th>
<th>$C_5^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job-related education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job-related experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III. WEIGHT-GIVING TO CRITERIA FOR JUDGMENT ABOUT $Y$s IN VIEW OF $X$s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x_1$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_2$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IV. WEIGHT-GIVING TO CRITERIA FOR JUDGMENT ABOUT $X$s IN VIEW OF $Y$s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Y$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_3$</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE V. THE VALUES OF $Y$s ON CRITERIA IN VIEW OF $X$s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$X$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x_1$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_2$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_3$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VI. THE VALUES OF $X$s ON CRITERIA IN VIEW OF $Y$s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Y$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_3$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VII. THE VALUES OF $X$s ON CRITERIA IN VIEW OF $Y$s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Y$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VIII. THE VALUES OF $X$ ON CRITERIA IN VIEW OF $Y$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Y$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IX. THE VALUES OF $X$ ON CRITERIA IN VIEW OF $Y$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Y$</th>
<th>$C_1$</th>
<th>$C_2$</th>
<th>$C_3$</th>
<th>$C_4$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$y_1$</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2$</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE X. DECISION MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$A_1$</th>
<th>$A_2$</th>
<th>$A_3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2$</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_3$</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_4$</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_5$</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_6$</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE XI. THE TOTAL EFFICIENCY IN RECIPROCAL OPTIMALITY FOR EACH POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>$E_{ij}$</th>
<th>$\log R_{ij}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(X_1,Y_1)$</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(X_1,Y_2)$</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>-0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(X_1,Y_3)$</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(X_2,Y_1)$</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(X_2,Y_2)$</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(X_2,Y_3)$</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this stage, we solve the following linear programming to achieve the assignment with maximum efficiency.

\[ \text{MAX } \psi = \log \phi = -0.225 S_{11} - 0.362 S_{12} - 0.34 S_{13} - 0.282 S_{21} - 0.268 S_{22} - 0.354 S_{23} \]

Subject to:

\[
\begin{align*}
S_{11} + S_{22} + S_{33} & = 1 \\
S_{21} + S_{22} + S_{33} & = 1 \\
S_{11} + S_{22} & \leq 1 \\
S_{12} + S_{22} & \leq 1 \\
S_{13} + S_{23} & \leq 1 \\
S_{ij} & = 0 \text{ or } 1
\end{align*}
\]

The optimal answer of this linear programming is: $S^* = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)$. That is only amount of $S_{12}$ and $S_{22}$ are 1 and 0. This means that (According to the proposed method in this study) assigning individual $Y_1$ to position of store manager and individual $Y_2$ to position of finance manager were appropriate decision with regard to judgments of two fronts of assignment. In practice, after assigning new managers based on obtain results. The satisfaction survey (by question forms) demonstrates satisfaction in these two departments over %75 increased than before on both upper managers and employees’ levels.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study with proposing a novel viewpoint on the basis of existing reciprocal system of judgment between the alternatives of the both side of assignment, the objective would be to maximize the assignment efficiency in obtaining the two dimension optimality with which cost and profit gets substituted which was considered in standard assignment problem, and for this purpose, a compound index was defined for measuring the function of each possible assignment in problem formulation. Then a mathematical programming model was proposed for problem solution and for determining the assignment with maximum efficiency it was transformed to a classic linear programming model.
REFERENCES


