AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

SPECIAL SPIRITUAL CONNECTIONS: CHAPLAIN DEPLOYMENTS WITH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

by

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ABSTRACT

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) announced a plan to grow Special Operations Forces (SOF) end strength, suggesting that war planners will be relying more on SOF capabilities in future conflicts. Two core activities SOF conducts are Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). MISO uses information to influence foreign audiences’ attitudes and perceptions, and CAO identifies and mitigates societal causes of instability. With 84% of the world identifying as religiously affiliated, MISO and CAO teams will likely interact with religious leaders. United States (US) military chaplains conducting religious leader engagement (RLE) offer a clergy to clergy connection, which indigenous religious leaders may welcome. This paper explored the impact of chaplains supporting MISO or CAO through RLE. It provides a better understanding of RLE by Chaplains. This paper presented five case studies, and examined recurrent themes for lessons learned. Five traits of successful RLE emerged. They are: a willingness of religious leaders to engage, inter-religious dialogue, trust building, distribution of gifts and aid, and empowerment of local leaders. By utilizing chaplains to conduct RLE, SOF will be able to engage cultures in a manner not otherwise possible.
Introduction

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) announced a plan to grow Special Operations Forces (SOF) end strength.¹ This suggests that war planners will be relying more on SOF capabilities in future conflicts. SOF influences the operational environment through engaging relevant populations, enhancing stability, and preventing conflict.² Two core activities SOF conducts to achieve these ends are Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). In part, MISO uses information to influence foreign audiences’ attitudes and perceptions.³ CAO identifies and mitigates societal causes of instability.⁴

A 2012 study by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life found that 84% of the global population practices some form of religion.⁵ Religion often serves as a contributing factor to conflict, instability and war.⁶ Religion, however, can also serve to reduce conflict, add stability, and ameliorate human suffering during times of war. SOF forces will likely find themselves navigating religious issues when engaging indigenous populations. In some cases, MISO and CAO teams will interact with societal leaders who are also religious leaders or who have religious leaders as key advisors. United States (US) military chaplains have a long history of engaging local religious leaders. Religious leader engagement (RLE) offers a clergy to clergy connection, which many indigenous religious leaders may welcome.⁷ Some religious leaders, however, may be offended or uncomfortable with RLE.⁸

This paper will explore the impact of chaplains supporting MISO or CAO through religious leader engagement. Chaplains conducting religious leader engagement could enhance SOF MISO and CAO, prove detrimental to MISO and CAO operations, or not fit within the doctrinal framework of these operations.
This paper consists of three major sections. In the first section, five case studies will be presented, including one from the Canadian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one from the United States Army during the Battle for Ramadi and the Anbar Awakening, one from CJTF-HOA, one from an Australian Army chaplain in Afghanistan, and one examining a Civilian-led initiative within Nigeria. In the second section, these cases will be analyzed to determine methods used and to develop lessons learned. In the third section, the analysis will be utilized to develop recommendations for either operational application or abandoning the concept.

The Religious World

The 2014 QDR outlines a plan to focus on to the Asia-Pacific region while continuing to focus on stability and counter-terrorism in the Middle East and Africa. SOF in these areas will encounter a heavily religious populace. Religious demographics from Sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 indicate 96.8% of the population are affiliated with a religion, with numbers projected to rise to 97.1% by 2030. In the Middle East and North Africa 99.4% of the population claimed religious affiliation. Although analysts do not predict an increase in the religiously affiliated for 2030, the consensus is that shifts in popularity of specific traditions will occur. In 2010, 78.8% of Asians reported religious affiliation, and by 2030, predictions indicate 81% of the population will be religious. Perhaps most interestingly, analysts expect a shift in popularity with Islam overtaking Hinduism as the predominant Asian religion. To increase operational effectiveness, strategists must consider the impact of religious belief and practice in these geographic regions.

Case Studies

The cases examined in this section provide a cross-section of engagement across service branches, combat and humanitarian operations, and occurring in geographic areas. Cases from
the U.S. Military and coalition partners will be presented. In addition, a civilian-led initiative in Nigeria is examined for insights that may transfer into the military milieu.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1993**

Padre S.K. Moore of the Canadian Armed Forces deployed to Visoko, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993. Visoko was home to three major religious groups, including Orthodox Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Muslims. While there, he and his colleague Padre Eugenio developed relationships with the local Catholic priest. Upon hearing that two Canadian clergymen were in the city, Imam Asim Azdahic invited the Chaplains to a dialogue with five senior Imams from the region. The political climate did not lend itself to contacting the Serbian Orthodox priest, as many of the Orthodox Serb population had fled the area.

Padres Moore and Eugenio continued to develop their relationships with the Catholic Priest and Imam. They distributed humanitarian aid, when available, to both the Catholic and Muslim communities. The Canadians’ conversations with the local clergy focused on unity and building deeper levels of trust. The Padres began seeking ways to create reconciliatory dialogue between the factions.

In May, Padres Moore and Eugenio redeployed, leaving the work of reconciliation incomplete. Fortunately, the Padres’ replacements, Padres Guay and Pichette took up the mantle. The new Padres continued building relationships with the sectarian leaders and were able to extend their reach to the Serbian Orthodox priest. Now having relationships with all three of the factious faith groups, efforts to expand their circle of influence began.

Ultimately, area Catholic, Muslim and Serbian leaders agreed to work toward reconciliation as symbolized by an Ecumenical Service of Peace. During this service, the three primary clergy members, along with the Canadian chaplains, contributed a religious symbol to
be displayed within the Canadian Chapel. The clergy also led in songs and prayers of blessing, each in accordance with his respective tradition. This visible service of unity demonstrated resolve among the leaders to work toward peace within the war-torn community. No sources indicating the results of the leaders’ efforts were found.

Iraq - The Battle for Ramadi / The Anbar Awakening

Chaplain (Ch.) Nathan Kline, United States Army, deployed for 15 months to the Anbar province of Iraq in support of the 3-69 Armor Battalion in January 2007. In May, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Michael Silverman, Ch. Kline’s commander, invited the chaplain to accompany him on a visit to a local leader, Sheikh Heiss. Lt Col Silverman’s intent was for Ch. Kline to build a relationship with Sheikh Heiss as a springboard to engage other influential sheikhs who were speaking out against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Although some of the sheikhs had become AQI targets, their resolve to oppose AQI strengthened. Lt Col Silverman saw an opportunity to engage these Sheikhs and build community support in opposition to the insurgents. According to Kline, the meeting with Sheikh Heiss was well received, allowing for a larger meeting with Imams, including tribal Sheikh and Imam Jalal al Faraji Abdullah.

Ch. Kline’s partnership with Sheikh Abdullah resulted in over 20 meetings between the American and Iraqi religious leaders. These meetings did not focus on formal inter-religious dialogue. Instead, they largely focused on meeting the humanitarian needs of the people. One result of these meetings was Operation Ramadan, an initiative developed by Ch. Kline.

Operation Ramadan provided an opportunity to train United States soldiers and marines on the significance of Ramadan, and the impact Ramadan might have on operations. Commanders were given insight into the accommodation needs that Iraqi Army and police forces might face, deepening understanding and cooperation between the partner forces. In addition, in
accordance with the tradition of committing pious acts during Ramadan, *Operation Ramadan* provided a vehicle for distribution of humanitarian aid to schools in the surrounding communities.\(^{24}\)

Ch. Kline claimed that frequency of hostile attacks during his deployment decreased and ultimately ceased. While Kline admitted that other initiatives also affected the so-called Anbar Awakening, he concluded that religious leader engagement played a significant role.\(^{25}\) Although this may be the case, it is equally possible that Kline overestimates the effect of religious leader engagement toward achieving that end. Nevertheless, Lt Col Silverman credited the partnership between Ch. Kline and Sheikh Abdullah with strengthening the relationship between the United States military and the Anbari citizens. Lt Col Silverman believed that *Operation Ramadan* won the support of Anbaris who were previously uncommitted and resulted in the alienation of AQI insurgents.\(^{26}\) However, as previously noted, it is difficult to quantify with accuracy the effect of religious leader engagement on the hearts and minds of the Anbaris.

**Afghanistan - Australian Defence Force**

Ch. John Saunders deployed to Uruzgan, Afghanistan in 2011-2012 with Australian Defence Force Mentoring Task Force - 3. While in the UAE preparing to enter Afghanistan, Ch. Saunders formulated a plan to engage Muslim leaders.\(^{27}\) During his tenure at Multinational Base Tarin Kot, Ch. Saunders built relationships with religious officers of the Afghan National Army, Brigade Mullahs, and area Mosques. His goal was to counter the propaganda that the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) were crusaders against Islam.\(^{28}\)

Ch. Saunders arranged for gifts from an Australian Imam to the Afghan Muslims.\(^{29}\) He contacted the leader of the Queensland Council of Imams and arranged for an international gift of goodwill. The Australian Imam sent hermetically sealed copies of the Quran as gifts from the
Australian Islamic Community to the Afghani Islamic Community. Ch. Saunders presented the gifted Qurans to Mosque communities and used the presentations as an opening for dialogue.

Ch. Saunders also engaged by mentoring Afghan National Army religious officers and Brigade Mullahs.\(^{30}\) He developed mentoring relationships with the 4\(^{th}\) ANA Brigade Religious Officers and served as an advisor when issues arose for which the officers were unprepared. He noted that the position of religious officer is not a specifically religious one, and that his dialogue with these men often focused on Afghan requests for supplies.\(^{31}\) While visiting with the religious officers, he also engaged the Brigade Mullahs in inter-religious dialogue.

Ch. Saunders’ inter-religious dialogue with the Brigade Mullahs created a forum for dialogue between himself, Sunni and Shia Mullahs.\(^{32}\) Subsequent engagements occurred at the request of the ANA and continued after Ch. Saunders’ replacement arrived.\(^{33}\) While Ch. Saunders’ report of this case does not include a specific result, he noted that the ANA began asking when his replacement would visit.\(^{34}\) This suggests Ch. Saunders was successful in building relationships.

**AFRICOM: CJTF-HOA**

Ch., David Terrinoni, USAF, deployed as Deputy of Religious Affairs for Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) during 2010 - 2011. During this period, CJTF-HOA was focused on building partnerships through military-to-military engagements and seeking to prevent radical Islamists from gaining a foothold in Eastern Africa. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander wanted to build upon this mission by creating key religious engagements. Ch. Terrinoni led efforts to engage African leaders and build relationships on behalf of the CJTF Commander and the Director of Religious Affairs. Ch. Terrinoni’s target
audiences included grassroots local leaders, national military leaders, and international level organizations and diplomats.

In Moroto, Uganda, Ch. Terrinoni accompanied a United States Army Special Forces Civil Affairs Team (CAT) to visit an orphanage at San Paolo Church. The orphanage, founded by a Catholic Priest, Father (Fr.) Hilliard, included over 200 children in a boarding school setting. Fr. Hilliard’s goal was to change the mindset of children in order to effect change in the future. Moroto is located in the Karamoja district, bordering Kenya and Sudan, and was regularly patrolled by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). The mission of the UPDF was to disarm the tribes, who contributed to conflict by crossing national borders and stealing cows in order to build dowries.

The CAT Commander decided to take advantage of their proximity to meet and introduce himself to the new local UPDF Captain. Ch. Terrinoni recalls that initially, the atmosphere was tense, with the UPDF Captain displaying rigid body language and terse conversation. The Captain inquired as to the CAT purpose in the area. Ch. Terrinoni replied that they had come to visit Fr. Hilliard. The UPDF Captain responded by questioning why they would do that. Ch. Terrinoni reports that when he explained that he was a religious leader, the demeanor of the UPDF Captain changed, and he became affable and welcoming toward the CAT personnel. The purported success of this incident, without a corroborating source, might cast doubt on its veracity. However, the account is plausible if the UPDF Captain had a positive view of religion in general or the humanitarian work of Fr. Hilliard.

In another of Ch. Terrinoni’s experiences, shared faith opened a door for engagement quite accidentally. Ch. Terrinoni was sent to Ethiopia to work with the Office of Special Investigation in order to build relationships with religious leaders in preparation for an influx of
United States forces. While there, Ch. Terrinoni conducted a Christmas Eve service at the resort where American personnel were billeted. Noticing a local man in the congregation, Ch. Terrinoni decided to include prayers for the people of Ethiopia in the service. The next morning, his Chaplain Assistant woke him with the announcement that a meeting had been scheduled with the local religious council. The man who had attended the service, Eyassu, was the owner of the resort and was well connected with local and governmental leaders.35

Ch. Terrinoni met with the local council, which consisted of representatives from the Protestant, Catholic, Anglican and Islamic communities. Ch. Terrinoni sought to base dialogue in commonality. The council leaders expressed their concerns about the AIDS epidemic within their country and discussed their faith communities’ response. They asked for financial assistance amounting to roughly $1,000 USD to support their efforts. Ch. Terrinoni promised to elevate their request to the US government. In addition, he ensured that the council understood that, like them, he was a religious leader and the government may or may not grant his request.36

Likewise, when conveying the information regarding the influx of US forces, he approached the leaders from common ground. He asked whether any of the Ethiopian young people ever made mistakes or poor decisions. When the council members affirmed that such incidents occurred, Ch. Terrinoni related that while most of the American troops would be helpful and well behaved, some of our younger members might make bad decisions. He then asked the religious leaders to assist in restoring calm and order if such incidents occurred. Eyassu later shared with Ch. Terrinoni that the leaders were impressed to meet a representative of peace who listened to their concerns.37

Eyassu would prove to be well connected within Ethiopia. During a later visit to the resort, Eyassu hosted Ch. Terrinoni and the CJTF Surgeon for dinner where he made
introductions to the Senior Judge in the Gamo region, and the head of the Ethiopian Department of Trade and Industry. They discussed the living conditions for the farmers and people of the area. At the end of the evening, Eyassu asked Ch. Terrinoni if he would return and offer prayer with and for the 13 regional governmental leaders and other community leaders.38

Ch. Terrinoni inquired why Eyassu wanted someone to pray with the leaders, and why specifically him. Eyassu responded that many Africans view the United States as a godless nation. He believed that if they heard an American pray for them, they would realize that their perception was false and word of the “real values” of the United States would spread. He asked Ch. Terrinoni, because after hearing the chaplain pray for the Ethiopian people at the Christmas Eve service, he believed him to be genuinely concerned for Ethiopia and its people.39

For a variety of reasons, Ch. Terrinoni did not return to pray for the Ethiopian leaders. Ch. Terrinoni was concerned that if the honor of praying with the government had not been afforded to the local religious leaders, the relationship he had developed with the local clergy council might suffer. In addition, Ch. Terrinoni’s chain of command felt that their resources would be better applied elsewhere due to other strategic priorities.40

While serving the CJTF, Ch. Terrinoni also met with the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), again quite by accident. A sponsored missionary from Ch. Terrinoni’s home presbytery contacted him and asked if he would like to address the AACC. The AACC represents 173 church bodies and approximately 120 million Christians in 40 African nations.41 In addition, the AACC has diplomatic status and sends an Ecumenical Envoy to the African Union representing both the AACC and the World Council of Churches.42 Unlike the United States of America, most African nations have no separation between Church and State. The
AACC, therefore, is both a powerful lobby on behalf of the people and a powerful voice of influence within the region.

Ch. Terrinoni met with Mr. Bright Mawdor, deputy general secretary of the AACC. Mr. Mawdor expressed interest in the CJTF operation because of shared goals. Like the CJTF, the AACC was focused on capacity building and community building in Africa. In addition, the AACC also shared the goal of curbing religious terrorism. Mr. Mawdor invited the CJTF to assist in planning a previously scheduled interfaith conference as a means to create dialogue and building trust with national and local leaders.43

Ch. Terrinoni’s accounts capture only part of the CJTF efforts in the area of religious engagement. They, however, do illustrate attempts of religious engagement, at various levels, to contribute to the CJTF mission of strengthening partnerships, enhancing stability and strengthening security.

USAID: TOLERANCE

In Nigeria, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has entered into a five-year cooperative agreement with the Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC). The Training of Leaders on Religious and National Co-Existence (TOLERANCE) project, which began in 2012, seeks to enhance trust and strengthen conflict prevention and mediation.44 The IMC is a Faith Based Organization (FBO) created by a Christian Minister, James Wuye and Muslim Imam, Muhammed Ashafa, who were formerly enemies during religious conflict in the 1990s.45 After an introduction by a mutual friend, the two began a relationship that developed into respect and friendship. Wuye and Ashafa formed the IMC in 1995 as an effort to resolve conflict between the faith communities. Since 1995, the efforts of IMC have spread from Nigeria to Kenya, Chad and Sudan.46
In Nigeria, ethnic and religious conflict continues to threaten stability. Residents of the northern states have experienced religious conflict, violence and extremism. John Campbell noted that radical Islam has experienced a revival in Nigeria, particularly in the North. It is in this environment that Boko Haram among other groups have begun to attack both Christian and traditional Islamic groups. The TOLERANCE project is unique in that it involves a government agency, USAID, partnering with a non-government agency (NGO) led by religious leaders, that in turn engages local religious leaders.

One goal of TOLERANCE is to enhance IMC trust and relationship-building efforts within local communities. The IMC engages religious and traditional leaders and involves them in televised or radiobroadcast phone-in sessions. The leaders are chosen, in part, based on their appeal to local listeners, and they each spread a message of shunning hate speech. In addition, callers can ask questions and voice concerns to which the leaders respond during the program.

The content of the media sessions is selected to provoke thought and create dialogue. Topics included human rights, the role of religious leaders in promoting peace, the coexistence of Christianity and Islam, and methods for diffusing and counteracting dangerous hate-speech. Between 2013 and 2015, more than 80 media dialogue sessions were broadcast reaching over 3.1 million viewers or listeners. As a result, public hate speech among clerics has been decreasing within the Bauchi state. One wonders, however, whether private thoughts of hatred are still held, how lasting positive effects will be, and how many of the 3.1 million figure were distinct persons as opposed to serial listeners.

In addition to the media efforts, the IMC interfaces with local leaders and congregations, encouraging reflection on the themes of peace and tolerance within the respective faith traditions. During the TOLERANCE project, IMC trained 90 leaders from three states to use tenets of faith
as a basis for coexistence and resolving conflict. The participants learned strategies to create effective dialogue, identify shared experience, partner on conflict resolution within the community, cease negative stereotyping and coexist peacefully.®

TOLERANCE funded similar trainings in “flashpoint” communities. Facilitators guided participants to analyze their conflict and identify both triggers and sustaining factors. In addition, the workshops included “peace-model” communities who shared best practices with their volatile counterparts. The peaceful communities became a mentorship network for communities still experiencing conflict.®

Other IMC training events have targeted participants from key geopolitical zones. A 2003 event included persons with positions of influence among their peers, congregations or other associations. Participants were considered “commanders” within their religious movements.® In addition, many were respected by both politicians and community leaders.® There, however, were no stated criteria for determining the level of influence, making it difficult to assess.

The training event began with intra-religious dialogue, with Christians and Muslims having sessions at separate hotels. These separate sessions focused on “the concept of neighbor, the rights of nonbelievers in monolithic religious communities, respect of religious minorities, and their common beliefs and practices.”® As each group worked to identify fears about the other, the facilitators worked to allay the fears. The groups were exhorted to live by the tenets of their respective faiths. In addition, each group was encouraged not to find fault with the other group, but to accept responsibility for their own group’s contributions to the conflict and ask the other group for forgiveness.®

When the group moved to inter-religious sessions, participants were moved to the same hotel. This caused some participants to anticipate physical conflict. The facilitators, however,
opened the session by laying ground rules that respected both the religious needs and concerns of each group. Facilitators included Imam Ashafa, a second Imam, Pastor Wuye, and a second Christian pastor. They took turns presenting the positive and negative stereotypes from the intra-religious sessions, and used them as a springboard for discussion.

As discussion continued, the participants discussed and defined considerations for creating dialogue, focusing on respect and seeking to understand. As a result of the conference, a joint resolution was developed with analysis and recommendations for reducing interfaith conflict. In addition, Ashafa and Wuye invited senior government and religious leaders to participate in the discussion hoping these leaders would continue the dialogue within their local communities. Ashafa and Wuye claim that the second order effects from this particular conference impacted thousands and led to a reduction in conflict among the represented regions. There were no references to sources verifying their assessment.

The TOLERANCE project, however, does record a similar success that lends credibility to Ashafa and Wuye’s assessment. Muncy records an example from Bauchi as indicative of success. Prior to the disruptive influences of Boko Haram, the interfaith community was strong in Bauchi, even coming together for celebrations. Muncy reports that a 2013 IMC conference and the following community-building activities have led to a return to a sense of interfaith community, as indicated by a joint dinner celebrating both the Muslim Eid holiday and Christmas.

The TOLERANCE report also records testimonials from workshop participants and community members across Nigeria. Christians and Muslims have begun referring disputes to the faith community of the offender for resolution. Each faith group has stood watch to protect the other during Holy Day celebrations. Two Christian students enrolled in an Islamic school.
In the wake of terror attacks, Christian and Muslim youth have partnered to render aid rather than to seek reprisal. A Christian motorist reported that he feared violence when a group of Muslim youth approached his stranded car. Instead of attacking, the youth changed his flattened tire and shattered his stereotype.

These testimonials along with others indicate that the TOLERANCE project and the IMC are achieving success in their respective levels of engaging religious leaders. There, however, were negative assessments. One respondent distrusted the government to address the root causes of conflict, which he or she identified as a lack of jobs and striking workers. Another was displeased with not being included as a stakeholder in developing the TOLERANCE project. If such negative comments reflect a widely held opinion, seeds of discontent could grow fueling conflict and undermining success.

**Seeking Common Ground:**

This section examines common themes among the cases presented in the previous section. Five themes emerge. They are: willingness to engage, inter-religious dialogue, activities and/or conversations on trust building, gifts or humanitarian aid, and empowerment of host nation (HN) leaders.

**Willingness to Engage**

Though not explicitly addressed in the cases, willingness of inter-religious parties to engage undergirds each incident of RLE. In each case, the circumstances differed. In Bosnia, the Padres were invited to dialogue by the Imam. Likewise, in Anbar, Ch. Kline was invited by Sheik Heiss to meet Sheik Abdullah. In Afghanistan, Ch. Saunders does not record how his meetings were initiated, and in CJTF-HOA, each situation was different. IMC initiates by inviting participants to its trainings.
In each of these cases, invitations were accepted and engagement began. This would not occur in every case. Often, there are fears and barriers that must be overcome in order to leaders to desire engagement. In the case of the IMC, the Christians and Muslims were suspicious of one another, each afraid the other group would attack them at night.\textsuperscript{69} Saunders inferred that his leadership feared for his safety while conducting engagement.\textsuperscript{70} CJTF-HOA leadership was concerned that religious leaders would not accept someone from outside their faith.\textsuperscript{71}

To assume that an invitation will not be accepted is just as erroneous as assuming it will. Local intelligence may indicate whether specific religious leaders are likely to welcome engagement. Furthermore, reluctance to engage may come from the Chaplain as well as the intended audience. Regardless, engagement cannot occur if either party is unwilling.

**Inter-religious Dialogue**

Another theme is inter-religious dialogue. Inter-religious dialogue refers to discussion between leaders of different faiths regarding commonalities of their traditions and how beliefs are lived out. While some might take for granted that inter-religious dialogue would occur when religious leaders meet, this may be a faulty assumption. In my life and career, I have met with other religious leaders on many occasions where conversation remained at a superficial level.

In Bosnia, Padres Eugenio and Moore were invited to dialogue with Imam Azdahic and five other senior Imams.\textsuperscript{72} They discussed life in the West, the fervency of American Christian belief, and how belief impacted everyday life.\textsuperscript{73} During these conversations, Imam Azdahic shared his desire for reconciliation with the other sects.\textsuperscript{74} Later, Padres Guay and Pichette organized an opportunity for inter-religious dialogue with Azdahic, the Croat Catholic Priest and the Serbian Orthodox Priest. During this meeting, the Padres facilitated dialogue on how each ethnicity and faith had experienced the pain or war and “fractured fraternity.”\textsuperscript{75}
During an initial meeting with Sheik Heiss, Ch. Kline referenced a quote attributed to the Fourth Caliph, woven into a tapestry on display. The quote dealt with a leader’s power to oppress, and God’s judgment over the leader. Ch. Kline used the quote as a springboard to discuss a leader’s standing before, and responsibility to, God. As a result of this meeting, Ch. Kline had the opportunity to meet Sheik Abdullah and other Imams. Although he relates that dialogue focused more on the needs of Anbari citizens and getting to know one another, interreligious dialogue was part of their conversation during the subsequent 20 meetings.

Ch. Saunders reports that during visits to the ANA, he served as a consultant to the brigade religious officers, discussing approaches to handling issues within their ranks. During these visits, he engaged the brigade Mullahs in inter-religious dialogue. Ch. Saunders records spending time engaging Mullahs in inter-religious dialogue, meeting with as many as five Mullahs to drink tea and discuss religious texts, “faith, practice, and belief.” One meeting included an Afghani brigade religious officer, a Sunni Mullah, and a Hazara Shia Mullah and offered an opportunity for inter-religious dialogue among often-factional sects.

Ch. Terrinoni had the opportunity for inter-religious dialogue at multiple levels. His interaction with Eyassu precipitated discussion on faith and practice in the United States. Through Eyassu’s introductions, Ch. Terrinoni engaged local leaders in Ethiopia, and discussed the local religious response to the AIDS epidemic. Finally, his dialogue with the AACC focused on a religious response to terror.

Inter-religious dialogue is a foundational part of the TOLERANCE project and IMC. IMC was born from dialogue between its founders, Imam Ashafa and Pastor Wuye. IMC Media broadcasts include representatives from both Christianity and Islam, and entertain questions from practitioners of both faiths. At training conferences, mediated discussion brings Christians and
Muslims together to discuss perceptions, faith, practice, and faith-based conflict prevention and resolution.

In each of these cases, religious leaders created opportunities for dialogue. The specifics of inter-religious dialogue differed in each case, and conversations between religious leaders sometimes included non-religious topics. Nevertheless, inter-religious dialogue enabled sharing of different perspectives and provided opportunities for understanding the religious other. These sessions were beneficial to participants. One testimonial from TOLERANCE noted that the dialogue helped create a sense of family among the participants. Ch. Saunders reported that he learned much about Islam during his dialogue sessions with the Afghan Mullahs.

Christianity and Islam have enjoyed a long history of inter-religious dialogue. The World Council of Churches, the Vatican, the Muslim World League, the World Muslim Congress, and the Middle East Council of Churches have all led strategic efforts to facilitate dialogue and educate practitioners about the religious “other.” Unfortunately, the events of a post 9/11 culture have changed the way these two religions interact.

Rhetoric from extremist religious leaders and politicians on all sides has garnered media attention and led to mistrust. Chaplains conducting inter-religious dialogue must carefully craft their message to avoid further damage. Dialogue that could be perceived as judgmental, apologetic, or proselytizing in nature is not appropriate during RLE. Such missteps would almost certainly lead to mistrust and unwillingness to continue dialogue.

Trust Building

Each instance of RLE sought to build trust with the religious “other.” As their relationship progressed, Padre Moore extended an invitation to host the Roman Catholic and Islamic religious leaders on the Canadian base and provided them an opportunity to meet the
Commander, tour the chapel and share a meal. In turn, Imam Azdahic invited the Padres to his home for a meal. It was during this event that the Imam shared his desire for reconciliation.

Ch. Kline sought to build trust beginning with common ground, as he respectfully discussed perspectives on leadership and faith. As a result, Sheikh Heiss arranged a meeting with Sheikh Abdullah. As Ch. Kline continued to meet with Sheik Abdullah, the majority of their conversation focused on getting to know one another. As the trust between them grew, Ch. Kline sought to build upon this foundation and build trust between then US Soldiers and Marines and the Iraqi Army and Police.

Sheikh Abdullah, his fellow Imams, and Ch. Kline collaborated on a program called Operation Ramadan. The primary goal was to educate US Soldiers and Marines about Ramadan and the accommodations that the Iraqi Army and Police might require due to fasting during the heat of the day. Much of the planning took place over shared meals with the Sheikh and Imams. One of these meals took place at the US Dining Facility in conjunction of a tour of the base.

Sheikh Abdullah and other Imams joined Ch. Kline in presenting the training at Camp Diamond. Ch. Kline facilitated discussion between the Sheikh, Imams and Commanders regarding accommodation without compromising the mission. The involvement of the Sheikh and Imams in developing and leading Operation Ramadan, along with resulting accommodations made by US forces, sent a message of respect and partnership to the Iraqi Army, Police and Anbari citizens.

Ch. Saunders spent time with Mullahs, drinking tea or coffee. He hosted a Sunni Mullah and a Shia Mullah for a visit to the base Chapel where they participated in inter-religious dialogue and explored the history of relations between their nations. Though not corroborated by an outside source, Ch. Saunders stated that the Afghans developed a greater understanding of
both Christianity and the relationship between Australia and Afghanistan. This claim is difficult to verify, as I have been unable to find a source presenting the Mullahs’ point of view. For his part, however, Ch. Saunders reported that he felt respect for and a deep connection with his Afghan contacts.

Ch. Terrinoni built trust with Eyassu quite accidentally. Eyassu shared that Ch. Terrinoni’s inclusion of Ethiopia in his prayer revealed a sincere love for Ethiopia. Ch. Terrinoni’s efforts to build and preserve trust with the local religious council, however, were intentional. Ch. Terrinoni’s mission was to preserve trust by preparing the leaders for potential negative events that might take place when US forces arrived. He conveyed trust in the local leaders influence by asking them to assist if issues arose. In addition, he sought to protect trust by eliminating unrealistic expectations. Ch. Terrinoni made it clear that, though he represented the US government, he had no authority to promise financial assistance to the local group.

IMC sessions within the TOLERANCE project sought to build trust through a structured program. The facilitators began with intra-religious dialogue, bringing issues out into the open. When moving to inter-religious dialogue, ground rules were outlined that protected the interests of both parties. Trained facilitators led the discussion and modeled respectful communication while ensuring both perspectives were heard. In addition, the physical move to the same hotel, despite the fears of some participants, proved to the Christians and Muslims that the groups could trust one another not to attack.

The method of building trust varied in each case. Distillation of the cases reveals a pattern of respectful communication and spending time with the other party. Many of the trust-building examples involve a meal or sharing of food. While not all trust building requires a meal, hospitality is important in many cultures and may assist in developing relationships.
Gifts and Aid

In each of the military cases examined, gifts and humanitarian aid were used to open doors for dialogue. In the Balkans, Padre Moore distributed humanitarian aid such as clothing and food, from Canada to both the Christian and Muslim communities. Padre Moore did not identify all of the agencies with whom he worked, though he did specifically mention the Red Crescent. Neither did he disclose whether the humanitarian aid was sourced from civilian or government agencies. Padre Moore did note that he attempted to ensure equal distribution between the faith groups to avoid any implied partiality.

In Ch. Kline’s case, the humanitarian aid was distributed during Operation Ramadan. Many Muslims view Ramadan as a time of focus on piety and caring for the poor. This may be due in part to the tradition of Muhammed being even more generous during Ramadan. Kline gathered charitable donations from a school in Georgia and combined them with items purchased with Operational Funds by his Command. Ch. Kline’s unit distributed the educational supplies to 13 local schools.

Ch. Saunders arranged for gifts of the Quran to be sent from the Queensland Council of Imams. The Qurans served as a connection between the Australian and Afghan Islamic communities. Several Mullahs expressed their appreciation for the gifts. Ch. Saunders believed that these gifts created opportunities for dialogue and assisted in building trust with the Muslim community.

Although Ch. Terrinoni did not provide humanitarian aid to the Ethiopian council of religious leaders, the subject arose during their dialogue. The Ethiopian leaders requested assistance with funding for education, treatment and prevention of AIDS. The amount of money
requested was approximately $1,000. While Ch. Terrinoni had no authority to grant their request, he promised to elevate their request to the CJTF-HOA for evaluation.

Both humanitarian assistance and gifts seem to hold the potential to provide a tangible demonstration of good will, thereby opening doors for dialogue. It is possible, however, that some religious leaders might meet with Chaplains for the sole purpose of seeking aid, with no desire or intent to build a deeper relationship.

In Ch. Terrinoni’s case, the clerics’ motive for asking is uncertain. AFRICOM, through CJTF-HOA, funded many humanitarian projects. It is possible that the clerics were aware of CJTF-HOA’s efforts. Alternatively, the clerics’ request could have been fueled by a perception that the United States is rich and could afford to assist them. It is also possible that they viewed Ch. Terrinoni as a representative of US churches, which give lots of money to African missions. Finally, it is possible that there were ulterior motives and the clerics viewed Ch. Terrinoni simply as a mark for a con.

Unfortunately, there is little ability to assess motive without continuing to engage. If a leader or group no longer engages in contact after receiving a gift, or asks for aid each time dialogue occurs, that might indicate an ulterior motive exists. As time passes, motives are likely to become clear. Well-developed record keeping and a thorough after-action report (AAR) may help create a database of those individuals and groups who seek to become rich at the expense of others’ generosity.

Empowerment

As engagement occurs, empowerment of local leaders is essential to create ownership of the process and to allow local leadership to save face and gain the confidence of their followers. In the Balkans, Padres Guay and Pichette facilitated the interfaith service held at the Canadian
chapel, but the Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic leaders themselves took the prominent public role of leading the service. Each leader presented a symbol from his faith along with prayers. The leaders’ participation sent a clear message that they were committed to peace.

Ch. Kline’s *Operation Ramadan* empowered local leaders by making them the face of the humanitarian efforts. Educators, Sheikhs, Imams, Police and Iraqi military personnel distributed the donated supplies to the Anbari schoolchildren. This arrangement made the leaders appear both benevolent and able to provide for the needs of their community.

Ch. Saunders gave copies of the Quran to both ANA and civilian Mullahs. In turn, the Mullahs were able to share the Qurans with their communities of faith. On occasion, Ch. Saunders was able to provide some spiritual material to the ANA religious officers. In addition, Ch. Saunders mentored the officers, providing ethical and spiritual counsel to them on challenging matters. Both the mentorship and material enabled the religious officers to overcome their lack of training and rise to greater levels of professionalism and competence.

IMC engagement empowers community leaders to train the population and cooperate across religious lines. IMC efforts have led to the establishment of early warning systems, consisting of community members trained to identify and proactively defuse conflict. Leaders among Muslim and Christian Youth developed a new group, the Interfaith Youth for Peace in Bauchi. This group has organized interfaith community sporting events, as well as interfaith community dinners for both the Eid and Christmas holidays.

Empowering local leadership and organizations may increase local confidence and trust in leaders, decreasing influences of groups seeking to create instability. Moreover, programs that empower and build capacity by training locals may create a sense of pride and ownership and instill a greater commitment to programs and initiatives.
Conclusion

Based on the results within the examined case studies, it appears that MISO and CAO could be enhanced by incorporating RLE. The chaplains studied each reported success in engaging leaders and creating dialogue. In cases where local leaders are also religious leaders, a similar benefit may occur within the context of MISO and CAO.

Chaplains deploying with MISO teams can enhance efforts to convey information and influence foreign audiences’ attitudes and perceptions. Chaplains could connect with local religious leaders in order to convey messages about US or Allied objectives. Ch. Saunders sought to counter the impression that the war in Afghanistan was part of a crusade against Islam. Although RLE can present a difficult challenge, its components of inter-religious dialogue and trust building may help counter negative interpretations of Americans portrayed by mainstream media.

Likewise, RLE may benefit CAO through dialogue identifying and mitigating societal causes of instability. Chaplains can serve as channels for distribution of humanitarian aid and empower local leaders through mentorship and training. Ch. Terrinoni’s dialogue with Ethiopian government and religious leaders identified the AIDS epidemic and local economic and living conditions as societal concerns with the potential to disrupt stability. The work of the TOLERANCE project and the IMC in Nigeria illustrates the potential of RLE partnerships to train local leaders to identify and defuse nascent conflict before instability results.

Limitations on Research

Although the results of this research indicate that RLE may positively affect MISO and CAO, the findings may not be universally applicable. Most source data came from first-person accounts of the chaplains who conducted the engagements examined. The chaplains may hold
unintentional bias toward their perceptions of events. No views from other religious leaders were available for comparison. The sole bystander source was Lt Col Silverman, and he is still susceptible to the bias of an inherently American point of view. In addition, individual circumstances and religious climate vary from one situation to another, which may lead to different levels of receptiveness among local leaders, as well as perceived success of efforts. This, however, does not negate the potential for RLE to enhance operations.

**Other Considerations:**

The primary doctrinal role of chaplains is to protect the first amendment right of freedom of religious expression for all military service personnel. Chaplains may conduct RLE activities within the context of military engagement but must not do so in order to create military advantage. Although *military advantage* is not defined by the joint publication, specific prohibitions are included against chaplains engaging in deception, conducting intelligence activities, or participating in the targeting cycle. In addition to creating mistrust, these activities have the potential to jeopardize chaplains’ noncombatant status.

Doctrine and service specific guidance for RLE varies widely. The US Army has a well-developed techniques publication developing a service-specific methodology for RLE. US Navy guidance consists of three paragraphs outlining circumstances under which a chaplain may engage local leaders. No practical methodology is given, and content largely focuses on restrictions to protect the chaplains’ non-combatant status. Air Force policies consist of two direct references to JP 1-05, noting that chaplains may be tasked to conduct liaison. No further description or guidance is given. JP 1-05 itself lacks practical guidance, focusing on prohibitions rather than recommendations and best practices. For RLE to succeed in the joint operating
environment, leaders of the respective Chaplain Corps must collaborate to codify best practices into Joint Doctrine, and issue service-specific doctrine to match.

If chaplains are going to deploy as part of a SOF team, steps must be taken to ensure the chaplain’s presence does not endanger the team. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, chaplains must be careful not to jeopardize their noncombatant status. Chaplains should receive SOF indoctrination and complete appropriate SOF qualification training prior to deployment. This would allow for chaplain integration into the SOF team, as well as provide an opportunity for exploring the peculiarities of a noncombatant chaplain’s role within a small elite combat unit. The demanding physical criteria for such a requirement would certainly limit the number of chaplains who would qualify for these roles. It is worth noting, however, that four chaplains recently completed the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course, earning their Green Beret.113

**Recommendations:**

The themes of successful RLE are a willingness to engage, inter-religious dialogue, trust building, gifts and aid, and empowerment of local leaders. Successful RLE operations must include these elements.

Not every chaplain is well suited for conducting RLE. Some chaplains may harbor attitudes that would be detrimental to interfaith relationships. An attitude of superiority or desire to proselytize is not compatible with RLE. Chaplain Corps leadership must consider the personality of chaplains assigned to billets for conducting RLE, or else they risk creating or exacerbating inter-faith and political discord.

Chaplains conducting RLE must have a well-developed understanding of World Religions. At minimum, the chaplain should be familiar with major tenets and traditions of
religions represented within the AOR. Such knowledge is necessary as a basis for respectful dialogue and understanding.

Chaplains conducting RLE must have the blessing of the Commander and be integrated into the Command Plan. Within each of the examined cases, RLE took place within the larger Command Plan. Ch. Kline was integrated into his commander’s planning process. In Bosnia, the commander gave his blessing for the Padres to host the local religious leaders and inter-faith service on the Canadian base. Ch. Saunders’ commanders gave their support to his vision. The CJTF-HOA commanders had traditionally supported RLE, but prior to Ch. Terrinoni’s rotation, had not codified RLE into the command plan.

Chaplains conducting RLE should be provided resources to provide gifts and/or humanitarian aid to indigenous populations. As illustrated previously, successful RLEs benefited from providing gifts and humanitarian aid. In the cases of Padre Moore and Ch. Kline, there was assistance from non-governmental organizations back home. Unfortunately, the availability and appropriateness of donations could prove unreliable. For example, Ch. Saunders was able to procure the gifted Qurans, but was generally not successful in meeting the religious officers’ requests. Ch. Kline also received assistance from command-sponsored funds. Likewise, Ch. Terrinoni noted that CJTF-HOA served as a conduit of AFRICOM aid. Unfortunately, resourcing aid will be difficult as the US military forecasts a continued fiscal restraint. In some cases, however, the chaplain could potentially be a conduit of previously budgeted aid without incurring an additional cost.

Chaplains conducting RLE must look for opportunities to empower the indigenous leaders whenever possible. The ability of local government and leaders to appear competent and able to care for their citizens may bolster internal stability. Empowerment efforts, however, must
be weighed against any need for the US to receive “credit” for humanitarian assistance in an effort to win the hearts and minds of local nationals. Command-level guidance should specify intent for humanitarian efforts.

If possible, chaplains conducting RLE should seek to conduct intra-religious dialogue before inter-religious dialogue. The case of TOLERANCE and the IMC provides a great example of this model. Unfortunately, in many cases, chaplains likely will not have chaplains of other faiths deployed with them. In these cases, chaplains could potentially rely on trusted local leaders to facilitate intra-religious dialogue sessions.

A more comprehensive study of RLE is warranted to ensure optimum implementation and effectiveness. First, researchers should examine perspectives from all participants involved in engagements. Second, research efforts should examine RLE between adherents of monotheistic and polytheistic religions. Third, research efforts should examine the application of RLE when engaging adherents of religious fundamentalism. Finally, researchers should study the long-term effects of engagement efforts within communities.

The global population is religious and projected to become increasingly so. The US must not overlook the benefits of engaging religious leaders. By utilizing chaplains to conduct RLE, SOF will be able to engage cultures in a manner not otherwise possible.
Notes

1 Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” XII.
2 JP 3-05: Special Operations, II-1.
3 Ibid., II-14.
4 Ibid., II-16.
7 Terminology varies among sources. Some use the term Religious Leader Liaison, and still others Chaplain Leader Liaison or simply Chaplain Liaison. For the purposes of this paper, Religious Leader Engagement will be used throughout.
9 Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” V.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 23-34.
21 Ibid., 25.
22 Ch. Maj, J. Nathan Kline, (United States Army Chaplain Center & School, Fort Jackson, SC), interview by the author, 10 March 2016.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Silverman, Awakening Victory, 259.
28 Ibid.
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31 Ibid., 29.
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33 Ibid., 30.
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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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40 Ibid.
43 Terrinoni, Interview.
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49 Muncy, "TOLERANCE," 24
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 27.
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56 Ibid., 22.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 22-23.
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61 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 103.
64 Ibid., 102-103.
65 Ibid., 103.
66 Ibid., 104.
67 Ibid., 105.
68 Ibid., 105.
69 Ibid., 22-23.
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76 Kline, Interview.
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81 Terrinoni, 2016.
82 Muncy, “TOLERANCE,” 94.
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91 Moore, “Military chaplains as Agents of Peace,” 21
92 Ibid.
93 Al-Bukhari, “Sahih Bukhari.”
94 Kline, Interview.
97 Kline, Interview.
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99 Ibid., 29
100 Ibid.
102 Ibid., 12.
103 Ibid., 29.
104 Ibid.
106 JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, I-1
107 Ibid., III-5
108 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 AFPD 52-1, “Chaplain Corps,” 1, 2.
113 Fisch, “Special Forces Tab, Green Beret”
114 Kline, Interview.
117 Cutler, “Role of The Chaplain,” 44.
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