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9. ABSTRACT

Total Force Integration (TFI) of the U.S. Air Force National Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty (AD) components is here to stay and will continue to provide the combat power required by Combatant Commanders for the future. The purpose of this paper is not to refute a need or disparage conclusions that TFI associated units will help meet budgetary constraints, but rather to highlight implementation strengths and weaknesses in order to improve the program for future success. Members from all components have and continue to exhibit reservations concerning the mixing and matching of component forces; however, it is undeniable that TFI is both cost efficient and effective in providing combat power. The question is how to correctly identify past, present, and future, problems that hinder its continued evolution. This project provides a brief history of TFI to give a foundation for program origination, and incorporates both objective and subjective studies to highlight strengths and weaknesses of the program. Knowing why and how Air Force structure needed to change and then analyzing the stumbling blocks it faced in the past as well as continues to confront in the present will enable Air Force leadership to better address current inefficiencies and to improve TFI today and ensure its success in the future.

15. SUBJECT TERMS: Total Force Integration (TFI), Active Duty (AD)
THE TOTAL FORCE:

CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION

By

Ryan E Haden

Lt Col, U.S. Air Force

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THE TOTAL FORCE:
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION

By
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

Total Force Integration (TFI) of the U.S. Air Force National Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty (AD) components is here to stay and will continue to provide the combat power required by Combatant Commanders for the future. The purpose of this paper is not to refute a need or disparage conclusions that TFI associated units will help meet budgetary constraints, but rather to highlight implementation strengths and weaknesses in order to improve the program for future success. Members from all components have and continue to exhibit reservations concerning the mixing and matching of component forces; however, it is undeniable that TFI is both cost efficient and effective in providing combat power. The question is how to correctly identify past, present, and future, problems that hinder its continued evolution. This project provides a brief history of TFI to give a foundation for program origination, and incorporates both objective and subjective studies to highlight strengths and weaknesses of the program. Knowing why and how Air Force structure needed to change and then analyzing the stumbling blocks it faced in the past as well as continues to confront in the present will enable Air Force leadership to better address current inefficiencies and to improve TFI today and ensure its success in the future.
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Acknowledgements

This thesis is borne from the trials, tribulations, and rewards of commanding a TFI classic associative unit. Struggling with an ill-defined problem and given no tools with which to deal with the issues, I found it to be a problem worth solving.

I would like to thank Dr. Keith Dickson, for his support in the production of the thesis. The library team at Joint Forces Staff College Ike Skelton Library have been patient, and professional, obliging my every whim with a smile and I could not have accomplished this without them.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Gwenn, and daughters Kendall and Loughren for their patience and understanding while spending countless hours grappling with this topic over the past several years.
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Introduction

Since its inception, TFI has passed through multiple milestones all of which point not only to a continuation of the program, but for expansion and total adoption across all components. As the TFI program has evolved, various research, studies, directives, and committees, have been undertaken to justify and provide for future program success. Some of these include: two research projects in 2007, a dissertation on *The Effects of Culture on Performance: Merging Airforce Active Duty and National Guard Personnel*; and a thesis examining the first significant Air Combat Command (ACC) implementation of TFI in fighter type units; a 2010 a project investigating TFI in an AMC Active Associate unit. These were followed in 2014 by a Congressionally directed National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, and then a RAND study, titled *Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components*, directed by the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. Subsequently a provision was included in the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015. This provision directed progress updates to Congress regarding the recommendations from the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force. Finally, the Senate Armed Services Committees directed the Government Accountability Office to further assess TFI progress. The same theme echoes throughout all of these studies and reports. Organizational culture and biases of the ARC and AD components, are the most significant barriers to the success of Total Force Integration. The interviews conducted for this project verify that no substantive plan to address the culture issues has been built, or put into action. Two separate cultures have been maintained, where a single new culture needs to emerge.
Depending on whether the associative unit is Classic or Active seems to dictate which culture becomes dominant leaving the other by the wayside. The goal of TFI to merge AD and ARC components must be accomplished by forming an entirely new culture that is clearly established, supported, and applied, across the entire force. In order to achieve a new TFI culture the Air Force must make a plan, and provide the education, tools, and road map; to cultivate a new set of shared assumptions, common paradigms, values, and norms.

Models exist which can aid the Air Force in the successful combination of ARC and AD cultures. The Air Force must first analyze the characteristics and attributes of both cultures. Once significant traits are identified and overlaid, an approach to change embedded mindsets can be adopted to then drive new behaviors. The way Airmen think about the Total Force must be guided by Air Force leadership; and taught holistically at all levels, ranks; and in every professional military education institution.
Part I: Origins and Current Environment of Total Force Integration (TFI)

Chapter 1: A Brief History of TFI.

The origin of a Total Force Integration, incorporating all three components of the U.S. Air Force into a homogeneous service, dates back to the 1960s and provides an important backdrop for the current issues facing Total Force Integration.

Chapter 2: A Current Assessment and Initiatives for TFI.

The current environment in which we find the ARC being used as an operational rather than strategic, reserve requires implementation and assessment of TFI to ensure it is the correct solution to a conflict between budget constraints and Combatant Commander (CCDR) needs.
Chapter 1: A Brief History of Total Force Integration

The Total Force Integration concept came to life in order to provide a capable U.S. Air Force, while managing significant budgetary constraints. Decreasing the size of Air Force Active Duty units and simultaneously increasing the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force National Guard and Air Force Reserve, known as the Air Reserve Component (ARC), has driven the Department of the Air Force to move to a Total Force concept. The first integration across the three components occurred in 1968 with Military Airlift Command (MAC), known today as Air Mobility Command (AMC), associating a Reserve and Active Duty unit to usher in the new C-141 aircraft.1 The concept employed by AMC associated ARC pilots with Active Duty owned aircraft. Although the active component owned the aircraft, both active and reserve pilots flew the planes forming what today we call a classic association. This integration occurred on a small scale, with the first inklings of a broad-spectrum Total Force concept originating during the Vietnam War, when political decisions prevented mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces.2 In the aftermath of Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird under President Nixon’s administration first entertained the Total Force idea to address predicted fiscal constraints saying: “economies will require reductions in over-all strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves.”3 Following Laird, James Schlesinger moved this concept forward

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in a memorandum stating, “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total 
Force Policy, which integrates the Active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous 
whole.”

In an effort to advance the Total Force policy, during the 1980s, the Air Force 
conducted equipment conversions for six Air Force Reserve wings and ten Air Force 
Reserve groups. Following these upgrades, in 1982, two studies, one from the National 
Defense University and another by the Air Force Reserve Management Assistance 
Group, measured program effectiveness. Both studies recommended structural changes 
to align Reserve components directly under active duty chain of command; however, Air 
Force leadership at the time denied the recommendation. Throughout the 1980’s and 
into the 90’s budget cuts drove a reduction in the size of the active duty component and 
provided a forcing function to Schlesinger’s vision. A budget driven smaller standing 
force, in conjunction with proven operational effectiveness of ARC forces, allowed 
realization of Total Force as a staple. Prior to DESERT SHILED/STORM the ARC had 
been considered a standby force, however, these operations provided a signpost for 
change, separating the previous rare usage of the ARC, from a new more regular 
activation model. “Before DESERT STORM, reserve component call-ups were rare – 
only eleven in 38 years. However, following DESERT STORM, with the military budget 
cuts of the 1990’s and efficacy of the Total Force Policy in the conflict, the number of 
Reserve component activations blossomed to more than 60 in the next decade alone.”

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6 Ibid., 340.
CHAPTER 1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF TFI

Total Force made its leap to Total Force Integration (TFI) in 1997 with Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s memorandum titled Integration of the Reserve and Active Components. This memorandum outlined four principles: “[1] Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders throughout the Total Force; [2] Clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit – Active, Guard, and Reserve – in service and joint/combined operations, in peace and war; [3] Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions; and [4] leadership by senior commanders – Active, Guard, and Reserve – to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.”9 Cohen’s memorandum moved forward in 1998 with the creation of the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF). AEF’s supported Secretary Cohen’s intent by mixing all three components into ten force packages, which allowed units from separate, but aligned, components to have both predictability of mobilization as well as opportunities to train together. Just as AEF cycles were in their infancy, the 2001 September 11 attacks began a new era of constant demand for Air Force overseas operations. In 2003 Representative John McHugh, Chairman of the House Armed Services Total Force Subcommittee, characterized this as a time of “open-ended commitment” with “added new dimensions, missions and manpower requirements for both the active and reserve components” making it clear that “increased heavy reliance on the reserve components in peacetime [would] continue indefinitely.”10

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9 Ibid.
CHAPTER 1: A BRIEF HISTORY OF TFI

Months after McHugh’s 2003 statement, General John Jumper, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, endorsed this position, highlighting the fact that, in the time since Desert Storm the Active Duty size had decreased by 40 percent while demands for military contingency operations had increased by 400 percent. This new environment of constant high demand for forces continues today still confounded by budgetary constraints that require the use of a Total Force both at home and deployed.

The four principles laid out in Secretary Cohen’s memorandum outlined broad changes that needed implementation. Responsibility, leadership, understanding, and commitment, not only provided a roadmap for a successful Total Force, but also framed the problems to be faced when implementing the Total Force Initiative beyond AMC. His guidelines hint at a need for something far more complex than transferring assets and improving individual units. Cohen’s principles spoke to a need for a cultural transformation. Today’s TFI concept has attempted to build upon successes of the past and expand them throughout the Air Force. Application of the classic association that worked in AMC provided much of the current template used by Air Education Training Command (AETC), and Air Combat Command (ACC). AMC continues to enjoy successes based upon their more than 40 years of experience and shared culture. In order to achieve the same success in other Major Commands (MAJCOM) Secretary Cohen provided insight into what would be necessary. Despite senior leadership endorsements; and appeals for comprehensive Total Force implementation, the action required to achieve a unified culture change among the other MAJCOMs has yet to be realized.

Chapter 2: A Current Assessment and Initiatives for Total Force Integration

In 2007, because of the Total Force Initiative, the U.S. Air Force documented outcomes from Air Combat Command’s first classic association of fighter type units. The results of these findings were expected to inform “Air Force directives, instructions and guides [to] now codify many [of the] recommendations and lessons learned”\(^1\) to improve future associations. Findings from the association of 388\(^{th}\) Active Duty and 419\(^{th}\) Reserve Fighter Wings, Hill AFB Utah, revealed multiple challenges common across both organizations.\(^2\) These included issues relating to organizational culture (initial loss of unit identification), direction and policy (lack of detailed organizational models and structure), operations tempo, deployment expectations, requirements, and duration, and lack of acculturation between AD and ARC with relation to career progression and promotion as well as a deficient understanding in civilian versus military restrictions.\(^3\) The findings included an assessment from both AD and ARC wing leadership that “the culture differences would work themselves out over time and communication, early and often.”\(^4\)

In 2010, Major Travis Sjostedt examined benefits and drawbacks of active associate units. Sjostedt’s research was limited to AMC units; however, the drawbacks revealed in his research are worth attention. Potential problem areas for active associate units, organizations in which the ARC component owns the aircraft and both ARC and

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\(^2\) Ibid., 48.


\(^4\) Ibid., 50.
AD personnel ARC fly and maintain them, included “unresolved cultural differences”\textsuperscript{5} between host ARC and associate AD units. These differences would “limit the benefit of the host units more experienced workforce for active duty”\textsuperscript{6} personnel. Additionally, in Sjostedt’s view there was concern for both career progression and fairness of awards for Airmen of all ranks. Moreover, Sjostedt uncovered potential issues with rotating leadership that resulted in a lack of understanding within the chain of command and command authority responsibility in the association.\textsuperscript{7} Finally, the study noted that there would “be a loss of active duty culture and values among those in active associate units.”\textsuperscript{8} Both Active and Reserve implied that their personnel were losing respective values because they were so immersed within the associated unit, or distanced from their originating unit that they would lose identity from one or both. This highlights that both ARC and AD identify with a distinct culture and set of values, which are perceived to be in competition or at least threatened by the integration process.

In 2014, Congress directed research to evaluate current TFI programs. In order to both assess the current status, and move forward with better integration of the Total Force, Congress established the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force.\textsuperscript{9} The Commission was to “undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Air Force to determine whether, and if so, how the structure should be modified to best fulfill current and anticipated mission requirements for the Air Force in a manner consistent with

\textsuperscript{5} Travis Sjostedt, "Active Associate Units: Benefits and Drawbacks." Master’s Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2010, 36.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 36-37.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 37.
available resources.”¹⁰ When defining the current and future needs for Air Force assets, the Commission found that Pentagon force managers were constantly struggling to work in an environment that allowed for unconstrained Combatant Commander (CCDR) demands, which usually exceed available capabilities.¹¹ The demands frame the CCDR need for some type of steady state association. As a result, the commission made force structure recommendations that supported existing war plans, while also addressing the day-to-day operational requirements.¹² According to the commission, the Air Force must use the full capacity of the ARC. As a result, TFI appears to be needed more now than ever before. TFI is the workable solution while the Joint force adapts its approach to address national threats within a transregional, multi-domain, multi-functional strategic framework.¹³

In this report, the Commission indicated that the Air Force can field sufficient capability “to meet both daily needs and surge-level requirements.”¹⁴ In making this assessment however, the Commission made a number of significant assumptions. First, Air Force leadership had taken measures to ensure the ARC was able to maintain the same skills and operational readiness as the AD. Second, the capabilities provided by part time ARC members were more cost efficient than a full time AD counterpart. Third, although some required tasks had to be filled by AD, as many other tasks as possible should be entrusted to the ARC. Fourth, there was a clear limit to AD reductions that

¹¹ Ibid., 17.
¹² Ibid., 9.
cannot be crossed. Fifth, while the ARC was often a more cost efficient solution, this was not true in all cases. Based upon these five assumptions the Commission developed 42 recommendations constructed around its guiding principles of force structure and force management. These principles represented parameters for advancing the TFI concept. The AD could not be further reduced as a cost saving measure, therefore the ARC end strength needed to grow to establish a surge capability that would allow the AF to maintain both capacity and capability while reducing deployment stress on the AD. Some flexibility in supporting volunteers would be needed, as well as changes in laws, regulations, and codes (Titles 10 & 32) addressing hindrances and barriers to continuum of service, length of service; and activation statuses. Barriers to Airmen to transition back and forth from one component to another throughout their careers had to be eliminated, as well as changing restrictions on length of service for individuals in carrier fields that have associated high cost training.

Of the 42 recommendations informed by these principles from the Commission, Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark Welsh rejected only one. Welsh declared the recommendation to dissolve the Air Force Reserve Command a “nonstarter.” However, he maintained that the overarching Total Force concept of AD and ARC integration was more cost effective than maintaining completely separate components.

When Congress initiated its Commission, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff sponsored a RAND corporation study to examine the suitability of missions for Air Force
CHAPTER 2: A CURRENT ASSESSMENT AND INITIATIVES FOR TFI

Reserve components. The RAND report provided a comprehensive analysis of the missions best suited for the ARC and the proper organizational configuration to support those missions. Framing the problem around various units’ availability and cost considerations, RAND developed 10 measures over two mission categories: space and non-space, to assess Reserve mission suitability. The first six suitability criteria assessed operations tempo and aspects of training, readiness, as well as deployment related issues. Some of these same measures, (operations tempo, deployment expectations and requirements), had surfaced in the 2007 Hill AFB lessons learned as contentious. Because the RAND study was limited to an objective assessment of ARC capabilities, it informed only about the suitability of missions for the Reserve. The findings from the RAND study do not represent successful integration or bring to light potential obstacles to success; however, they do provide insight into the current mathematical approach the Air Force has taken towards Total Force Integration and are,

20 Albert A. Robbert, et. al., Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components. n.p.: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2014], xiii-xiv. Space missions include: Launch, Range, Test, Satellite Operations, Warning, Deployment Control, In-place Control, and Education/Training. Non-Space missions include: F-16, C-130, KC-135, C-17, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED HORSE), Cyber, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Remote Split Operations (RSO), and RPA Launch and Recovery Element (LRE). The 10 suitability criteria used by RAND include: 1) surge demand (“an anticipated wartime or other episodic surge in demand for forces”); 2) duration of activations (“missions with shorter activation periods are more suitable for assignment” to the ARC); 3) continuation training requirements (missions with more explicit continuation training requirements are more appropriate for the ARC); 4) steady-state deployment demand (missions stressed more by continuous deployment requirements are less suited to the ARC); 5) steady-state home station op-tempo (home station missions that stress individuals the same way that deployments do); 6) readiness (the ARC relies heavily on transition of AD members to the ARC to enable an experienced and highly trained cadre, therefore it goes that as the ratio of AD to ARC in a mission decreases the mission becomes less viable for the ARC); 7) absorption and sustainment (absorption must be carefully balanced so as not to drain either AD or ARC talent pools as this directly effects readiness); 8) overseas basing (permanent overseas basing is less suitable for the ARC); 9) civilian competencies (“some missions can be enhanced by engaging reservists in military duties that match or complement special competencies carried over from their civilian occupations”) and; 10) state missions (“missions that are directly relevant to the needs of the states,” which only applies to the Air National Guard Component of the ARC).
therefore, useful. Figure 1 provides a summary of the RAND findings regarding suitability of a mission assignment to the ARC related to non-space missions.

All of the flying missions and components incur surge and post-surge requirements. Each of the missions require continuous training (currency, and proficiency training). The fighter community details these training requirements in the Ready Aircrew Program (RAP); however, all of the airframes and components have similar requirements. When considering activations, all missions have experienced a high number of short duration activations, which leads to a conclusion that the ARC is well suited to these mission sets. As far as deployment demands and home-station operations tempo, RAND found the burden to be greater on AMC units (C-130, KC-135, C-17), and therefore AMC missions might benefit by more heavily weighting toward the AD component. Finally, the study also highlighted the issues of absorption and overseas
basing as significant to F-16 ARC mission assignment.\textsuperscript{21} Overseas basing, as an issue, is simple to understand in that the ARC cannot consistently support steady state operations for a mission that is not garrisoned in the continental U.S. However, absorption is more difficult to grasp and requires further explanation.

The issue of absorption, defined as the processes by “which new pilots are initially absorbed into operational units,”\textsuperscript{22} presents a unique problem for F-16 and other fighter type units. “Fighter pilot absorption begins as the pilots report to their initial operational assignments and continues until they become experienced fighter pilots, which requires 500 flying hours in their primary mission aircraft.”\textsuperscript{23} Historically, it takes up to two years to classify a fighter pilot as experienced and the metric used to quantify a units’ absorption capacity is by how many new (inexperienced) fighter pilots it can turn into experienced within a single year.\textsuperscript{24} With an understanding of the concept of absorption capacity, one can then move to the idea that it is important not to achieve over-absorption. Over-absorption results in a disproportionate amount of experienced to inexperienced pilots in a squadron. A top-heavy squadron (i.e. one with a disproportionate number of experienced pilots) creates a problem because of the high number of RAP requirements the experienced pilot’s need, which then competes with the available sorties required for absorbing new pilots. The conclusion is that there is a ratio that must be maintained. “The Air force has determined that, for operational fighter squadrons, at least 55 percent of the line pilots must be experienced.”\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{21} Ibid., 51.
\bibitem{22} Ibid., 109.
\bibitem{23} Ibid., 110.
\bibitem{24} Ibid.
\bibitem{25} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
When units are 100 percent manned, this criterion ensures that adequate numbers of experienced pilots are available to provide required in-flight supervision as flight leads and instructor pilots, without requiring them to fly significantly more sorties than they individually require according to minimum RAP requirements. In the current constrained flying-hour environment, every extra sortie flown by an experienced pilot becomes a sortie not flown by inexperienced pilots, slowing their aging rate and limiting absorption capacity.²⁶

Fighter pilot absorption issues directly relate to sustainability, which is the ability to maintain inventories that sufficiently meet requirements. In the fighter community, this means that the number of pilots in pre-operational training should not exceed the number of pilots operational units have a capacity to absorb.²⁷ Absorption and sustainability differ between AMC and fighter missions in that the absorption capacity calculus is slightly different. Often times absorption capacity in communities with multi-seat aircraft, are greater than their sustainment requirements.²⁸ In the mission types that include both pilot and copilot positions, they allow absorption to be governed primarily by the rate “at which copilots can acquire enough experience to upgrade to aircraft commander.”²⁹ In addition to considering the suitability of mission types to either ARC or AD components, RAND also analyzed the organizational configurations available to accomplish these missions.

In making assessments, the RAND study determined that missions with shorter activation times and explicit continuous training requirements were more suited to the

²⁶ Ibid.
²⁷ Ibid.
²⁸ Ibid., 111.
²⁹ Ibid.
CHAPTER 2: A CURRENT ASSESSMENT AND INITIATIVES FOR TFI

Reserve component. Missions determined to have more continuous deployment requirements were assessed to be less suitable to ARC. Applying these newly created criteria resulted in multiple AMC assets, such as C-130’s, KC-135’s, and C-17’s, receiving marginal to very unsuitable assessments while Air Combat Command’s F-16 mission was deemed suitable for ARC with the only real exceptions being basing and absorption capability. This begs the question why did an F-16 mission, deemed highly suitable under the RAND study, receive such harsh critiques when integrated at Hill AFB in 2007 and AMC seems to be enjoying successful integration?

The initial 1968 integration configuration of the total force was fashioned in what is known as a Classic Association. Classic Associations are those in which an Active Duty unit retains primary responsibility for weapon systems, which it shares with one or more ARC units. The Active Duty and ARC component units retain separate organizational and chain of command structures, interlaced with a multitude of memorandums of understanding (MOU) and memorandums of agreement (MOA).30 The initial 1974 success of this model prompted Mobility Airlift Command (MAC) to propagate the same association across five different airlift wings.31 Today’s TFI concept has taken the Classic Association model and applied it to both AETC as well as ACC. In an effort to expand integration, TFI has also built Active Associate units. Active Associations are identical to Classic in structure; however, the host unit, (often the ARC) retains primary responsibility for weapon systems.32 While the layman typically only

views associations as Classic or Active, RAND also considered Reserve associate
(associating one reserve unit with another), Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA),
and ARC or AD equipped units. Figure 2 presents the RAND findings for organizational
constructs based on a cost or effectiveness perspective.33

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NOTE: Checkmarks indicate that an indicated organizational construct is recommended for an indicated mission. Figure 2. Preferred Organizational Constructs.
(Robbert, Albert A. et. al., Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components. n.p.: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2014], 49.)

RAND concludes that all four of the flying missions were reasonably suited for
ARC assignment. Moreover, although there were issues with absorption and overseas
basing for the fighter missions, “active associations, coupled with classic associations as
necessary, can certainly improve absorption and sustainability circumstances.”34 A
mixture of these types of classic and active unit associations will allow AD and ARC to
leverage each other providing a more capable Total Force. For example, ARC units are
primarily comprised of highly experienced operators who build this experience either
through upgrades in the squadron locally, or by gaining previously AD members through
the continuum of service. AD units are constantly working against 2-3 year permanent
change of station (PCS) cycle, all the while trying to maintain an optimum ratio of

33 Robbert, et. al., Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components, 50.
34 Ibid., 115.
experienced to inexperienced operators. By associating inexperienced pilots with ARC units, the AD can gain ground on their capacity issues. Additionally, by the ARC helping to season AD operators they can in turn help aide in sustainability issues.

RAND assumes that our current strategic environment, with constant call-ups and deployments, will not change and therefore continue to drive a need for TFI. The report emphasizes that the ARC, once viewed as a strategic reserve, is now also utilized as an operational reserve.35 This same observation was highlighted in the Congressional Commission’s recommendations, which said that Combatant Commanders should no longer be allowed, “to take an unconstrained view as they plan for the employment of air power for contingencies or steady-state operations in their theaters.”36 This recommendation implies that Combatant Commanders have made the mental shift from the previously intended use of the ARC to how they are utilized today; “routinely employed to help meet steady-state, ongoing contingency operations … which has produced a corresponding shift in expectations.”37 During the 2015 Air and Space Conference, Total Force, Lt Gen James Holmes supported this notion saying that, “in general the Air Force is about 12 percent short of being able to provide the numbers of deployments and the number of deployable things that Combatant Commands have asked us for.”38 The RAND study supports conclusions found in the Congressional Commission stating that considerations for ARC activation, use, and availability, must be “tempered by statutory and funding restrictions on the use of reservists for active

35 Ibid., 3.
37 Robbert, et. al., Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components, 3.
missions.” Consideration for when the ARC force should or could be activated is also confounded by the multiple statuses, laws, and jurisdictions, which govern the use of ARC forces (See figure 3).

In response to the commission’s findings, the Air Force created a Total Force Task Force led by general officers from each component who, in turn, made their recommendations to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Mark Welsh. Based on their recommendations, General Welsh created a new office called the Total Force Continuum (TFC) led by three general officers, each representing his respective component. The purpose of the TFC is to analyze the 42 recommendations put forward by the National Commission in conjunction with 80 integration initiatives that are already underway. As an additional control measure, the Defense Authorization Act for FY ’15 required the Air Force to provide Congress with annual updates regarding progress on accomplishing the 42 recommendations. The first report was delivered in February of

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39 Robbert, et. al., Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve Components, xi.
2015, and additional reports are to continue through 2019.\footnote{United States Government Accountability Office, Force Structure: \textit{Performance Measures Needed to Better Implement the Recommendations of the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force}, Report to Congressional Committees, May 2016, S. GAO-16-405, accessed 1 September 2016. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676960.pdf, 1.} This first report was to provide specific milestones based on the Air Force’s review of recommendations, as well as to provide corresponding implementation plans. The Senate Armed Services Committee was dissatisfied with this report and tasked the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the Air Force’s methods and measures of effectiveness.\footnote{Ibid., 2.} The GAO report found that as of February 2016, the Air Force had only closed six of the 42 recommendations. Furthermore, the Air Force had not included appropriate measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) that would allow Air Force leaders to accurately assess progress.\footnote{Ibid., 26.} Other significant recommendations that were not addressed, and still required implementation, included initiatives such as the Integrated Wing (i-Wing) and legislative actions to “permit reserve personnel and dual status military technicians to train active duty pilots as a primary duty.”\footnote{Ibid., 11.} The iWing concept is significant because it proposes an integrated chain of command. The commission believed that structuring associated Air Force Wings with a
mixture of ARC and AD leadership throughout the chain would be beneficial and should be implemented (See figure 4).

Studies and reports up until this point simply address TFI as an organizational process or structure problem in which people, qualifications, and equipment, are objects that can be manipulated in a vacuum and will function wherever and however put together. This type of analysis, while useful in identifying an end-state for TFI, does not take into account the human factor, and specifically, the cultural issues that occur when merging AD and ARC components. The Air Force is not ignorant to the problems that manifest when two cultures are blended; on the contrary, as early as 1997 Secretary Cohen implied that cultural mergers would have to be nurtured. In 2007 ACC documented organizational culture as problematic while capturing lessons learned from their first Classic Association. Moreover, in 2010, Sjostedt published his findings highlighting unresolved cultural differences in Active Associations that he believed would limit the overall benefits of the merger. The Air Force acknowledges culture as
problematic. Lt Gen Holmes stated, “we [the Air Force] have unique cultures, we have unique things in being part time and citizen Airmen and being full time Airmen that make us a little different."\textsuperscript{45} The problem lies in a lack of action taken to address the issue. While much time and effort have been devoted to justify the Total Force concept; too little effort has been given to properly design the implementation of the Total Force policy and to address the issues inherent in merging two distinct organizational cultures. The difficulty of merging people and organizations with different values and expectations should not be discounted or ignored, and the complex social environment in which these organizations exist and operate must be considered.

\textsuperscript{45} Holmes, “Total Force,” 8.
Part II: Organizational Culture: The Missing Link

Chapter 3: Organizational Culture

Unique cultures of organizations, such as those found in the ARC and AD, can prove to be a help or hindrance during a merger, and therefore understanding the concept of culture and its impact on organizational mergers is important to ensuring future success.

Chapter 4: A Culture of Change

Merging cultures of organizations can provide varying results including the establishment of a dominant and subservient culture or even the emergence of a distinctly new hybrid culture. However, during the process, the choice must be clear as to what the desired endstate is, and a culture of change must guide the combined organization through the transformation to enable success.
Dr. Christopher Johnson compiles a number of well-informed organizational culture definitions, which include such common components as shared assumptions, common paradigms, values, and norms, and the behavior of leaders and subordinates. Harris Stephenson observes that “symbols, rituals, and practices which give meaning to the activity of the organization” can define a culture. He offers that the goal of cultural change is institutionalization of desired attributes, which give meaning to the organization. More than other organizations, military units function more because of their shared culture than from their formal doctrine. In military organizations, “origins of change are a product of primarily top-down influences, although bottom-up change can occur.” Because any change is usually a top-down process, leadership is key, as Secretary Cohen’s memorandum made clear. Mergers that require a new organizational culture will surely fail if leadership does not direct and support change, “the culture of an organization relies on not only the contribution of the members but also on the vision, guidance, and support of their superiors.” Tamara Carleton addresses the issue of how “leaders find the right balance between reinforcing a strong existing culture and

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CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

stretching people’s ability to accept change.”7 Carleton proposes that “organizations seeking to drive change”8 should be asking two questions in order to determine if there is a valid need for change: first, is our thinking visionary enough? Second, how can our vision change our culture? Carleton developed a simple test during her assessment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as a tool to help define aspects of their culture. Additionally her test addressed the validity of a need for change in the first place, ultimately rating the idea across four dimensions. The first of the dimensions asks how far reaching is the new concept, a low rating will require no change in how people think, while a high score will validate a need for a paradigm shift. The second asks if the idea is technically challenging. If it is not, then change will not be needed, conversely, if it is technically challenging and does require major advancement in technical knowledge, then change will be required. The third dimension addresses if the idea is multidisciplinary. A low score in this category would mean that it requires only one class of knowledge, and a high score would require multiple distinct bodies of knowledge and therefore drive change. The fourth and final dimension is whether the concept is actionable, the amount of clarification required to define, and scope the change, determines how much effort and time it will take to begin moving toward a new culture (See figure 5).9 Scoring high on the DARPA Hard Test would allow an organization to appreciate the need and feasibility of a cultural change and the organization could then begin the transformation using the five elements she asserts are

8 Ibid., 13.
9 Ibid.
required for a culture change: 1) involve everyone; 2) foster a long-term mindset; 3) create ownership; 4) take a holistic view, and; 5) communicate change.10

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<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Score 1</th>
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<td>Far-Reaching</td>
<td>Requires no change in how people think about solution</td>
<td>Requires a paradigm shift in how solution is viewed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technically Challenging</td>
<td>Requires no new technical knowledge</td>
<td>Requires major advancements in technical knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidisciplinary</td>
<td>Requires only one class of knowledge</td>
<td>Requires multiple, distinct bodies of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actionable</td>
<td>Requires so much clarification that the next step is another meeting</td>
<td>Requires little effort to begin moving toward a solution</td>
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Greg Lane proposes that there are two main tasks necessary to change an organization’s culture. First is to deploy strategic objectives, and second, develop a cultural transformation plan.11 Interestingly, Lane is very clear in presenting what deploying strategic objectives does not involve. Lane states that “strategy deployment is not a budget, it is not throwing together 30 or more initiatives you think are important, it is not a form of cutting costs, it is not creating a series of single events to tackle the many issues, [and] it has nothing to do with pushing non-negotiable targets onto the organization.”12 Lane indicates that a cultural transformation plan requires leaders to define the “general traits, behaviors and values of the culture(s) required to reach the breakthroughs.”13 Lane clearly indicates that leadership is paramount.

10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 51.
CHAPTER 3: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Using traits found common across multiple models and theories for change, (to include John Kotter’s eight steps for organizational change) Denison Consulting developed their Organizational Culture Model. Johnson uses the Denison model that identifies four traits related to organizational culture, 1) involvement, 2) consistency, 3) adaptability, and 4) mission. These traits are measured using 12 indices, with three indices related to each trait. The traits and their indices radiate out from a core of beliefs and assumptions, presenting a model in which “the more two cultures differ in

Figure 6. Denison’s Organizational Culture Model.

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14 Leslie Christensen, “Creating Cultural Change in a 115-Year-Old R&D Organization,” Research-Technology Management (May-June 2015): 32. John Kotter, a leader and innovator in the field of organizational change, developed the following eight steps to successfully accomplish change: 1) Establish a sense of urgency; 2) Create a guiding coalition; 3) Develop a vision and strategy; 4) communicate the change vision; 5) Empower broad-based action; 6) Generate short-term wins; 7) consolidate gains and produce more change, and; 8) Anchor new approaches in the culture.

15 Denison Consulting Group, founded in 1998, is an organization whose mission is to optimize the performance of organizations by improving their culture and leadership.


17 Ibid., 120-121. Denison traits and indices include: (involvement) empowerment, team orientation, capability; (consistency) core values, agreement, coordination and integration; (adaptability) creating change, customer focus, organizational learning; (mission) strategic direction and intent, goals and objectives, vision.
their values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions, the more organizational performance will diminish as a result.”  

Johnson concludes that the Denison Model captures most, if not all, aspects of organizational cultures. In contrast, a solely mathematical comparison, as seen in recent Air Force studies and analysis, only identifies mission commonality between the ARC and AD. Using the Air Force monetary cost/benefit method results in determination that Total Force Integration is the most cost effective solution. However, as seen in Secretary Cohen’s memorandum, studies in the implementation of both AMC and ACC, as well as Lt General Holmes’ assessment … the Air Force is missing something.

The different components have significant and distinctly diverse paradigms, values, norms, and behaviors, characteristic to their respective component. One example is ARC concern for Guard and Reserve members assimilating to closely to an AD culture. This fear is based on the perception that if ARC personnel align too closely with the AD, they will eventually lose the control (assignment location, deployment timing, promotion opportunities) that they originally joined, or transitioned to the ARC, to achieve. Another example is the subtle but real difference between Guard and Reserve members and responsibilities. The National Guard is directly associated with individual states. This allows them to respond to humanitarian disasters within their state. AD or Reserve members cannot legally work in the same way during circumstances such as a post hurricane clean up and police actions. Specifically, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, within a Guard unit can be used during these types of statewide disasters. However, the same type of equipment or expertise, residing in an

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18 Ibid., 120-121.
19 Subject interview question three, Appendix B, 58.
AD or Reserve unit, may not be used. Further, guardsmen are typically homegrown and reside in their guard state. They have a general expectation that they will be able to reside and progress through their entire career without relocating. Conversely, reservists are more likely to be required to move in order to continue career progression, and more commonly commute greater distances from home residence to the associative unit location. These subtle but distinctive differences are vague and reside only in generalities and opinions, collected from experience and interviews, but they need to be codified better than this in order to appreciate the context for generating a new combined Total Air Force culture.

Implementation of the Total Force concept lacks the attention that must be given recognizing these significant differences. Using frameworks like Carelton’s DARPA design and the Denison model will surely reveal many of the dissimilarities that exist such as; regularity and length of tasking’s, governing laws determining long term and short-term duty availability, deployment expectations, and average unit experience levels.
Chapter 4: A Culture of Change

The object of defining attributes, which comprise an organizational culture, is to use these traits to merge cultures and provide a desired level of performance for the organization. Identifying cornerstones for cultural change exemplifies who, and what, anchors the culture. ARC and AD components now exist in tact as separate and distinct cultural units that co-exist all too often in a state of competition or conflict. If TFI is to succeed, the ARC and AD cultures must merge into a unified culture sharing common core elements.

Acknowledging that there are at least two distinct Air Force cultures to merge, it is then useful to consider some likely outcomes of a merger. The first is to build a new integrated culture; the second is to have the two cultures continue to co-exist, with one culture dominant and the other culture subordinate. The only other realistic outcome is the unacceptable total failure of the cultural merger. Johnson’s research in conjunction with others cited in his work such as Atkinson, Dyer, Kale, and Singh, document that almost 60 percent of all mergers and acquisitions in the business world fail. However, this does not have to be the case. Research also indicates that successfully merged cultures are “based on common philosophical ground shared by the committed staff [leadership] of the two merging agencies.” Leadership, from all sides, must be involved and committed to defining and promoting the new cultural direction, as we have seen in

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2 Ibid., Abstract.
both Carelton and Denison’s research, that then results in establishment of an entirely new culture.4

In 2010 John Shook published his findings describing what made the joint venture of General Motors and Toyota such a success. The lessons learned from this venture contradict the typical Western approach to organizational change.5 Although Shook’s model (see figure 7) appears to depict the process of moving from an ‘old’ single culture into a new one, it is not limited to this situation. In fact, his approach is useful in the merger of two cultures because the desired outcome in both situations remains constant, a single new culture.

Figure 7. Shook’s Model.

CHAPTER 4: A CULTURE OF CHANGE

The conventional concept for changing a culture is to “first change how people think.”6 The idea is to change the culture by working through a group’s values and attitudes, hoping for a resultant change in what they do (reference the arrow on the left side of figure 6, Old Model Change thinking to change behavior). Shook adapted Edgar Schein’s original model of corporate culture into a version that he summarizes with the phrase “it’s easier to act your way to a new way of thinking than to think your way to a new way of acting”7 (the arrow on the right side of figure 6: ‘New Model Change behavior to change thinking’). Shook concluded that an organization wishing to change from two cultures to a single new one should begin by adjusting the actions of the people, provide avenues in which subordinates/employees can do their jobs successfully, and recognize that the manner in which difficulties are handled affects the developing culture. Lane provides support to Shook’s idea that changing how a person or group act leads to a new way of thinking commenting, “true leaders realize that people don’t resist change as much as they resist being changed.”8

Because, as Denison depicts in his model, beliefs and assumptions or values are at the core of any culture, it is important to pay close attention to the “espoused values of the leadership and what the followership truly do according to their real values.”9 In his study, Johnson points out that mergers too often rely on the espoused values of the leaders rather than paying the close attention due real values as expressed through the actions of the followers.10 Stephenson also highlights the same concept commenting,

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 5.
“change may be ‘espoused’ within an organization but is not ‘in use.’ Espoused theories are ‘those that an individual claims to follow,’ while in use theories are ‘those that can be inferred from action.’ “11 “The organization’s culture is inculcated into new members through formal education and training processes as well as ‘micro-transactions,’ which Terrif describes as ‘highly institutionalized cultural attributes [that] are transmitted from one individual to another.”12 These observations also help make it clear that identifying the actual aspects of each culture to be merged is of utmost importance.

Common espoused values of both ARC and AD are service to the country; and to support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemy’s foreign and domestic. This commonality between the components is not only championed, but also demonstrated by the actions of all subordinates regardless of their originating component. Interviews and operational results show the Total Force concept is best demonstrated during combat operations. “Down range [deployed combat operations] have no problems, if you want to see TFI in action, as a well-oiled machine, go look at a deployed TFI unit.”13 Friction points in a merger between AD and ARC components (referred to as subordinate actions, or real values by Shook, Stephenson, and Johnson), are how the mission gets accomplished on a day-to-day, and deployment-to-deployment basis. The weight of effort must therefore go beyond highlighting the espoused mission values. Leadership must commit to education, at every level, that will enable appreciation, acceptance, and then adaptation, of the differing components resulting in a new culture.

12 Ibid., 114.
13 Subject interview question two, Appendix B, 56.
that has aligned both the overt mission commonalities, and underlying points of contention.

Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein’s January 2017 Wing Commander’s Call in Washington D.C. addressed several important points regarding both leadership and culture. He opened the conference by stating that “Commanders weren’t hired to tread water, [but rather to] move the organization forward, leave it better than you found it.”14 “Squadrons are where we succeed or fail as an Air Force. Airmen join a squadron after technical school, [the] squadron is where they learn our culture, squadron is where the mission happens, squadron is where innovation happens, squadron is where we impact the lives of our Airmen – what happens to [and] with them.”15 “The squadron command team is the most important command team in our AF.”16 Goldfein also identified four characteristics of a successful command team to include knowing the mission, and setting the culture.17 General Michael Ryan stated that the success of any project requires three things: first, a single point of contact because committees solve nothing; second, there must be a written plan which is clear and concise, but more than power point deep; and third, that there must be milestones with metrics and objectives.18 In setting the culture, Goldfein expanded upon General Ryan’s thoughts saying that “after 6 weeks the organization will take on the culture of the commander, [and therefore the commander must] make doing the right things easy and wrong [or] stupid things hard.”19

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Part III: Interviews and Analysis

Chapter 5: Subject Interview Summary

Interviews were conducted sampling both AD and ARC leadership, from both Classic and Active Associative units. Interviews were targeted to assess if leadership from the Wing through Group and Squadron levels were receiving education prior to taking command and thus able to achieve the desired TFI results.

Chapter 6: Analysis

TFI will provide the Air Force of the future; however, crucial pieces of the puzzle are continuously glossed over and ignored. Cultural concerns for the merger of AD and ARC forces must be seriously addressed in a systematic manner to ensure the cultivation of a new Air Force Culture.
Chapter 5: Subject Interview Summary

The purpose of these interviews was to verify whether leadership in action level Air Force command positions were receiving awareness, education, and desired results from their various associate units. Because of regulatory restrictions to the scope of this project, interviews were limited to Air Force Fighter and Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals units. Fighter type units were targeted for this study because of their distinctive strength and depth of culture. Seven Classic and three Active Associations were sampled from all levels of leadership. The Fighter Mission Design Series (MDS) represented in this study include A-10C, F-15C, F-22, F-35, F-16, and T-38C. In addition to these units, Air Combat Command (ACC) staff personnel responsible for future TFI programing were also interviewed. Commanders and Directors of Operations, past and present were queried based on their experiences leading Wing, Operations Group, and Squadron levels. The results represent sampling of three Directors of Operations, seven Squadron Commanders, three Group Commanders, four Wing Commanders, and one ACC Staff personnel. In order to ensure objectivity, leadership from all three Air Force components representing the ARC and AD were included. In order to ensure interviews met the intent, questions were prepared, reviewed, and edited with the assistance of Dr. Elizabeth Carhart, CIV US JFSC/IRAAD. Subjects were provided the questions prior to their interview allowing for careful reflection rather than spontaneous reactions, additionally interviewees were allowed anonymity to help encourage candid responses. Subjects were given the following project introduction with their interview read ahead: The Total force Integration (TFI) concept of associating/integrating, the Air Reserve Component, both Reserve and Guard (ARC).
CHAPTER 5: SUBJECT INTERVIEW SUMMARY

directly with Active Duty (AD) units of like specialties has experienced varied results.
Successful TFI moving forward will require accounting for cultural differences between
AD and ARC across education, job assignment, and evaluation of associated units.

The questions listed below are those used during interviews, however, subject responses were not limited to these topics and personal experience as well as subject expertise was encouraged in answers.

1. Tell me about any education prior to taking command relating to demands of leading associated units in a TFI mission.
2. Describe a success story you have seen in your unit as related to its association.
3. Describe barriers you have encountered in your unit as related to its association.
4. Job type:
   a. What types of jobs do associate pilots in your unit fill?
   b. Is that ideal or how might you change job assignments based on their AD or ARC status?
5. How might specific types of units or missions be better suited to any associate or specific type of association?
6. To what extent does the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) provide appropriate feedback to assist you in better leading your association unit?

Interviews included only subjects who were currently in or just recently completed leadership roles. Choosing this demographic for the project provides the assumption that leaders are key to the future success of TFI. The interview results provide several themes common across all participants, as well as some also seen in the results of Sjostedt’s 2010 study. With regard to education; without exception, none of the subjects in this project received any formal education or training prior to assuming their leadership position. This is best surmised in an interview response from one individual that all he had to go on was, “on-the-job training … figuring it out as you go.”1

1 Subject interview question one, Appendix B, 54, 55.
additional subject offered that they were provided access to an optional 30-40 minute TFI orientation, however, the brief was lacking to such a degree that students knew more than the apparent instructors, which resulted in an extremely disappointing experience.

Finally, another interview offered insight that, Air Force level ARC leadership had “recently recognized education as a major issue and complaint, but significant movement has yet to be realized because formal education today is virtually non-existent.”

Acknowledging the importance of education prior to taking command, all subjects agreed that formal education needed to be implemented in the various commander courses at every level. Subjects also converged on the idea that education provided should be interactive including two-way conversations between the new and old commanders.

Question three and four pressed the subjects to describe some barriers encountered during their tenure, as well as describe job types filled or that should be filled by associate pilots in their experience. The results of these questions all circled around perceptions and relationships much the same as they did in Sjostedt’s study where his interviews provide that “relationships are EVERYTHING! Bad relationships will prevent everything. Perceptions are reality when working together as AD and ARC.”

The barriers commanders faced dealt with regulatory limitations to duty days, which then lead to perception biases. Additionally convoluted chain of command distinctions caused doubt as to whether or not job and carrier progression, awards recognition, and promotion opportunities were fair between associate and host unit members. In a perfect association it would be as one commander stated “Squadron, Group, and Wing jobs should [not] be

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2 Ibid., 54.
exclusively AD or ARC – [rather they should] depend on rank, experience, and duty status.”⁴ Expanding upon the duty status issue many of the interviews highlighted that ARC members could not perform shop chief and other significant unit duties based upon the time demands associated with them. The idea of duty and pay statuses is exacerbated by the complex array in ways that ARC members are tasked and paid. “In a classic association, when an ARC member is working inside an AD unit, the number of restrictions and types of duty statuses (36 different types of pay and duty statuses to be exact) limit how long they can work… and exactly what tasks they are allowed to be assigned (really equating to a work to time versus work to task concept).”⁵ Another perspective offered in the 2010 study described “reduced visibility [for an associate member] leaves the perception that those at active associate units are less likely to receive a number one stratification if any.”⁶

Success stories in question two consistently circled around relationships and deployed combat operations. “The best place I have seen TFI work, as it is intended, is during combat operations. When the Reserve pilots deploy with the active duty squadron, they are flying side by side with the active duty pilots on a daily basis. Furthermore, there is only one chain of command, so they are truly integrated into the squadron during those times.”⁷ It is important to note that although the interviewees all approached the issue of barriers from their own component or association neither the ARC nor AD should be singularly targeted as the problem. This is evident by combat mission successes, which allude recognition across the components of a common goal.

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⁴ Subject interview question four, Appendix B, 59.
⁵ Subject interview question five, Appendix B, 61.
⁶ Sjostedt, "Active Associate Units: Benefits and Drawbacks," 50.
⁷ Subject interview question two, Appendix B, 55.
CHAPTER 5: SUBJECT INTERVIEW SUMMARY

This idea is well stated in one subjects perspective that “both AD and ARC have innumerable ‘he said – she said’ relationships and problems, however they also have just as many pilots who are altruistic with their time and efforts, thus it goes that problems cannot be singularly targeted against one component or the other.”8

8 Ibid., 56.
Chapter 6: Analysis

The problem with TFI today is that there is no propensity for cultural change. The momentum behind TFI is for an organizational change to align the separate components without addressing the intricate problems that arise when two different cultures collide. Evidence of this failing is found in interviews taken at all levels of Air Force leadership to include, wing, group, and squadron, where no education, instruction, or plan of action is provided. The concept as it currently exists provides new commanders with the model of; ‘here is your associative mixed squadron, now figure out how to make it work.’ Graduates of the 2017 Air Combat Command Commanders course stated that Total Force Integration was not referenced, discussed, or mapped out in how innovative success could, or should, be achieved.

Culture was addressed as early as 1997 in Secretary Cohen’s memorandum, then in 2015 at the Air and Space conference by General Holmes, and now most recently in 2017 by Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Goldfein. We can therefore infer that due diligence has been accomplished, at the service level, towards the DARPA Hard concept of determining the worth of evolving a new culture from the existing ARC and AD cultures. In order to achieve a cultural merger between ARC and AD cultures, while still meeting current operational requirements, the Air Force must conduct analysis and implementation with models that build on experience, such as Denison or Shook’s. Using models such as these will help to identify the specific characteristics of each culture and in-turn provide a framework for a new culture.

Additionally, a foundation for the new Total Force Integration culture must be established from the very beginning of every Airmen’s carrier, and then reinforced at
every organizational level, and in every interaction with professional military education along the way. This means education in basic training, all commissioning sources, and inclusion in the squadron, group, and wing levels. One Wing Commander observed that training “cannot be Computer Based Training modules, or a couple hour block of generic instruction. The education must be substantial and it needs to include a wide array of vignettes primarily delivered during question and answer sessions led by experienced associate leaders of all varieties.”\(^1\) Incorporation of a new Total Force culture must be accomplished with a holistic approach. Secretary Cohen accurately prescribed leadership as forging the way, however, at the same time the Airmen should be infused with a paradigm for the Total Force culture at first contact in technician schools. Finally, in order to ensure efforts from the top and bottom are not made in vein, effort must also be applied to existing units at the squadron and wing levels.

Focus should be applied to the wing and squadron levels analyzing Denison’s four traits: involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission.\(^2\) Wings and squadrons have different mission focuses across the Air Force, therefore, Denison’s traits, and accompanying indices, should be uniquely applied to each wing and their subordinate squadrons. Beyond identifying both the unifying and confrontational issues that exist between the AD and ARC, Air Force leaders must work with Shook’s concept to change behavior first, in order to subsequently change thinking. An adaptation of Shook’s model provides a visual representation of how overlapping, and taking into consideration the two separate cultures, will in turn result in a new culture as a product of the original two.

\(^1\) Subject interview question one, Appendix B, 54.
Figure 8 shows how Shook’s model can be adapted to merge both AD and ARC cultures resulting in a new culture (see Figure 8).

Both General Ryan and General Goldfein make clear that in order for any project to succeed there must be a clear and concise plan that is more than conceptual. The plan must be documented in such a way that it is simple enough to be understood, but also more than power point deep. The plan must be goal oriented with clearly defined benchmarks. The RAND study of the Suitability of Missions for the Air Force Reserve components helps identify where and what type of associative units will most benefit the Air Force. The National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, i-Wing concept, provides a suitable structure for current and future Total Force in some instances. However, these results do not provide the entire picture, and serious consideration must be given to the thoughts, comments, and struggles, that current commanders have already, and continue to face on a daily basis.
While the i-Wing construct may be suitable in certain situations, this will not be the case in others. One example of complications involved with i-Wing implementation is an AD flying wing, ‘Wing-X,’ that is comprised of 2000 personnel, of which only 500 hundred are ARC. The adjacent ARC wing, ‘Wing-Y’ likely has a comparable number of ARC members, roughly 1500-2000. Complications to this scenario lie in the fact that only 500 of Wing-Y are associated with Wing-X, and the other 1000+ members are geographically separated and associated with other AD wings, say Wings-A, B, and C. Therefore we must ask is it then appropriate for Wing-X to have disproportionate, but evenly distributed, ARC leadership built in throughout its chain of command? And if so, what wing should the remaining 1000+ ARC members, who were previously associated with AD Wings-A, B, and C be given for a chain of command? The Air Force must deliver a plan that goes deeper than the allocation, apportionment, and directing the types of associations.

Johnson notes, “Senior Air Force military leaders should recognize the implication that ignoring cultural divides could risk reduced performance.”3 Leadership must be at the forefront of this effort, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated; leaders have to move their organization forward.4 Constant in every study and model is the need for informed leadership driven change. The Air Force is failing with the informed portion of this need. Units have succeeded or failed based on the resident talent of the commander who faces the challenge ill-informed and ill-equipped to tackle the challenges.

3 Ibid., 123.
Conclusion

The cultural rift between ARC and AD components is preventing successful implementation of TFI. Assessing the characteristics of each of these cultures and merging them to inform a single Total Force culture, across all components, is the answer. The Air Force continues to recognize cultural identity as the problem but fails to address it with conviction. The only tool provided to commanders of TFI units is the vague concept that ‘relationships matter.’ Good relationships are, more often than not, a force multiplier. However, the Air Force has allowed the idea of ‘good relationships’ to evolve into an organizational model where relationships not only matter … but are everything, and in many cases, the only thing holding units together. This cannot be the enduring Air Force solution for successful TFI.

Merging AD and ARC cultures will require Air Force leadership at all levels, across all components to commit to both the value and viability of the venture. With total commitment, the Air Force can then move towards developing strategic objectives and evolving a transformation plan. The strategic objectives cannot be founded in budgetary requirements and initiatives. The transformation plan will require leadership to clearly define distinctive aspects of each unit’s beliefs and assumptions. Defining organizational and cultural traits will inform and therefore allow convergence on a newly merged culture. Successful implementation of the new culture will rely heavily on both leadership and education.

The plan to develop, implement, and nurture, a new Total Force culture throughout the Air Force will first and foremost require the Air Force to commit to an endstate of a new culture. The culture must be more than just implementing the TFI
program for budgetary reasons. Second, the Air Force will need to simultaneously teach and develop a holistic academic plan throughout, ensuring education occurs at all key leadership levels and in all learning institutions. In conjunction with education, organizations must take an in-depth look at each of the cultures resident within their unit. This will entail the rigors of defining cultural traits. The true value gained by defining cultural traits, by each individual unit, is in the exploratory process rather than the answers it provides. Third, the Air Force must codify the new culture based upon a combination of all available inputs, which were derived during the discovery process. The resulting new culture will be the foundation for subordinate unit’s to then cultivate their own subsidiary cultures. Fourth and finally, the Air Force must provide tangible tools and instruction that commanders will require to implement the new Air Force culture. Vital throughout the process is the requirement for each step to continue to inform step two, teaching and development (see figure 9).
The greatest roadblock to a successful TFI is and has always been the cultural differences between ARC and AD organizations. As Johnson recognizes, “with full knowledge of cultural differences, military leaders could establish the correct vision, strategies, goals, and objectives related to bringing two disparate cultures closer together for the purpose of optimizing combat capability.” Every study and interview, at all levels of Air Force leadership, acknowledges differences in culture between the ARC and AD. However, prior work on the subject left the nature of the differences and perspectives between the two cultures unclear and poorly defined. Commanders continue to document the cultural clash as problematic but the Air Force has yet to provide a unifying vision and strategy to equip commanders to address it. Lacking the guidance or tools needed, individual commanders must do the best they can in an ad hoc manner, relying on personal experience and uneven personal networks of relationships to bridge gaps between the two differing cultures. Finding a solution to help combined units address and integrate these two cultures must be a priority for the Air Force if TFI is to achieve its intended purpose. Using the methods provided above, the Air Force could highlight differences between cultures in sufficient detail to equip leaders to do more than simply acknowledge the problem but rather provide a real solution to guide them to a new integrated total force culture.

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Bibliography


Kellogg, James W. Leveraging the Reserve Component: Associating Active and Reserve Aviation Units: [Norfolk, VA : National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2013].


Appendices

Appendix A: Request for Informed Consent
Appendix B: Compilation of Interview Results
APPENDIX A: REQUEST FOR INFORMED CONSENT

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED RESEARCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title:</th>
<th>Cultural Considerations to the Future of TFI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Question/ Thesis Statement:</td>
<td>The Total Force Integration (TFI) concept of associating/integrating the Air Reserve Component, both Reserve and Guard (ARC), directly with Active Duty (AD) units of like specialties has experienced varied results. Successful TFI moving forward will require accounting for cultural differences between AD and ARC across education, job assignment, and evaluation of associated units.</td>
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Interview Questions

1) Tell me about any education prior to taking command relating to demands of leading associated units in a TFI mission.

2) Describe a success story you have seen in your unit as related to its association.

3) Describe barriers you have encountered in your unit as related to its association.

4) Job type:
   a. What types of jobs do associate pilots in your unit fill?
   b. Is that ideal or how might you change job assignments based on their AD or ARC status?

5) How might specific types of units or missions be better suited to any associate or specific type of association?

6) To what extent does the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) provide appropriate feedback to assist you in better leading your association unit?

INFORMED CONSENT

Please check the box next to the statement you will be using to gain informed consent from your subjects.

☒ For interviews in which you anticipate attributing statements directly to participants by name/identity:
By signing below, I consent to participate in this study. I understand my participation is strictly voluntary.

I consent to the disclosure of my identity as it relates to my responses.

Signature: 

☐

I do not consent to the disclosure of my identity as it relates to my responses.

Signature: 

☐
APPENDIX B: COMPILATION OF INTERVIEW RESULTS

The purpose of these interviews was to verify whether leadership in action level Air Force command positions were receiving awareness, education, and desired results from their various associate units. Because of regulatory restrictions to the scope of this project, interviews were limited to Air Force Fighter and Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals units. Fighter type units were targeted for this study because of their distinctive strength and depth of culture. Seven Classic and three Active Associations were sampled from all levels of leadership. The Fighter Mission Design Series (MDS) represented in this study include A-10C, F-15C, F-22, F-35, F-16, and T-38C. In addition to these units, Air Combat Command (ACC) staff personnel responsible for future TFI programing was also interviewed. Commanders and Directors of Operations, past and present were queried based on their experiences leading Wing, Operations Group, and Squadron levels. The results represent sampling of three Directors of Operations, seven Squadron Commanders, three Group Commanders, four Wing Commanders, and one ACC Staff personnel. In order to ensure objectivity, leadership from all three Air Force components representing the ARC and AD were included. In order to ensure interviews met the intent, questions were prepared, reviewed, and edited with the assistance of Dr. Elizabeth Carhart, CIV US JFSC/IRAAD. Subjects were provided their questions prior to interview allowing for careful reflection rather than spurious reactions, additionally interviewees were allowed anonymity to help encourage candid responses. Subjects were given the following project introduction with their interview read ahead: The Total force Integration (TFI) concept of associating/integrating, the Air Reserve Component, both Reserve and Guard (ARC), directly with Active Duty (AD) units of like specialties has experienced varied results. Successful TFI moving forward will require accounting for cultural differences between AD and ARC across education, job assignment, and evaluation of associated units.

The questions listed below are those used during interviews, however, subject responses were not limited to these topics and personal experience as well as subject expertise was encouraged in answers.

1. Tell me about any education prior to taking command relating to demands of leading associated units in a TFI mission.

2. Describe a success story you have seen in your unit as related to its association.

3. Describe barriers you have encountered in your unit as related to its association.

4. Job type:
   
   c. What types of jobs do associate pilots in your unit fill?
   
   d. Is that ideal or how might you change job assignments based on their AD or ARC status?
5. How might specific types of units or missions be better suited to any associate or specific type of association?

6. To what extent does the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) provide appropriate feedback to assist you in better leading your association unit?

The findings of these interviews are discussed with relation to the questions listed 1-6 above.

**Question 1: Tell me about any education prior to taking command relating to demands of leading associated units in a TFI mission.**

- No only on the job training from previous experiences as a participant.
- Any “education” I have had with regards to leading associated units in a TFI mission has been on-the-job training/figuring it out as you go.
- I had some understanding prior to taking Sq/CC based on TFI setups I had seen at previous bases, and peers who had transitioned to AFRC and ANG units.
- I had no formal education specifically in regards to being a commander of a TFI unit.
- Although I gained some experience working as a flight commander and assistant operations officer in a TFI unit, I did, and have not, received any formal education related to the demands of leading associated units.
- I received no training prior to leading a TFI unit. AF level ARC leadership has recently recognized education as a major issue and complaint, but significant movement has yet to be realized because formal education today is virtually non-existent. In order to capitalize on successes we must institute education for both AD and ARC components. This education institution cannot be Computer Based Training modules, or a couple hour block of generic instruction. The education must be substantial and it needs to include a wide array of vignettes primarily delivered during question and answer sessions led by experienced associate leaders of all varieties.
- During the AD commanders course I was offered a 30-40 minute optional introductory discussion on TFI. The session was more disheartening than useful, as incoming commanders we had more awareness of the pitfalls of the program than the presenters, who had never commanded or substantively participated in the associations we were about to command. The session turned into the presenters becoming the students and very defensive at that stating that they were just there to give us an overview. Very disappointing and that’s being kind!
• During my January 2017 ACC squadron commanders course we were not offered any insight or instruction with regard to TFI. Furthermore there was no discussion about the different types of associative units that I myself, or others in my class, were currently leading or enroute to take command of. We were expected to get on-the-job training…figuring it out as you go.

• I did not get any education about TFI in either the squadron commander or wing commander courses. I believe that education is paramount for commanders to succeed in these types of units. I also think that, a lessons learned roundtable venue, with previous commanders guiding the discussion for new commanders would be invaluable.

Question 2: Describe a success story you have seen in your unit as related to its association.

• Observe members going out of their way to help the ‘other’ side when it clearly isn’t something they are required to do. The tie that binds is the mission, relationships make this happen but there is significant concern about what will happen if those relationships dissolve or are strained. ARC bodies are filling a few key Wing Staff positions, which is helping with the manning shortage created by inadequate force ratios.

• The best place I have seen TFI work as it is intended is during combat operations. When the Reserve pilots deploy with the active duty squadron, they are flying side by side with the active duty pilots on a daily basis. Furthermore, there is only one chain of command, so they are truly integrated into the squadron during those times.

• We were able to put TR pilots on orders during weeks when we were short on AD pilots to fill the schedule… ART pilots in the squadron helped fill additional duties – scheduling, training, stan/eval when many AD pilots were required to fill attached (OG/FW) positions.

• The only success stories I have in regards to TFI are specific people who happen to be in TFI that I work with. TFI has not contributed any to the success of my unit in its construct or intended use.

• The AD at our IFF training unit is seeing very low AD experience rates within its units because of the voluntary separation program, and AD pilots choosing to ‘seven day opt’ [separate from the military] in pursuit of commercial aviation opportunities. Our ARC personnel have recently taken several high-level positions within the AD wing to help the AD transition during this tumultuous time. I have had three ARC individuals fill AD squadron DO positions as well as OGV Chief, FCF Chief, and Chief of Flying Safety. ARC members are able to step up due to experience and maturity with minimal training and make significant contributions.
At the very beginning of Active associations with the ARC the program was commonly referred to as the ‘hide a pilot’ program. In this early implementation, AD units with absorption capacity problems were able to send young inexperienced pilots to the well-seasoned ARC units at which they gained invaluable experience – training – and qualifications. … Almost all of the successes of the past as well as those we see today are relationship based. In order to keep the positive effects of associations at the forefront and maintain forward progress it is important to KEEP THE RHETORIC DOWN, leadership between the components must ARGUE BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. Both AD and ARC have innumerable ‘he said – she said’ relationships and problems, however they also have just as many pilots who are altruistic with their time and efforts, thus it goes that problems cannot be singularly targeted against one component or the other. Down range [deployed combat operations] have no problems, if you want to see TFI in action, as a well oiled machine, go look at a deployed TFI unit.

ARC members in my classic associative unit needed to take a day every week to disappear and deal with ARC only related administrative and pay issues. This day was always scheduled on Fridays when there was a reduced flying schedule allowing for squadron wide academics and social events. The ARC chose Fridays because it was perceived to be the least costly to the AD unit. The problem was that the AD pilots sitting in academics and follow on events missed out on experienced ARC contributions and built a perception that the ARC members were disconnected and not a part of the team. This cultural divide created significant problems in the unit. The success story was found through a creative solution in which the ARC administrative day was negotiated and moved to Mondays when their absence would not be noticed. This adaptation and success was achieved through personal relationships and took almost a year to identify and action which was a shame.

**Question 3: Describe barriers you have encountered in your unit as related to its association.**

- Deployments and CPS taskings require the ARC to volunteer, and when they do they have different dwell ratios than the AD. Those taskings then tend to be filled by AD primarily even though the ‘manning’ is designed to support a more equal distribution. The same can be said for daily duties in the unit. The 3 AFRC for 1 AD body math does not add up to the same and the remaining fewer AD bodies are being asked to do the same or nearly the same amount of work as they were doing previously.

- The cultural differences between the active duty and the Reserves especially when dealing with pilots who have not spent any time on active duty and flew for a period of time in a Reserve unit that was not associated with an active duty unit before joining a Reserve unit that is associated with an active duty unit. Reserve
pilots are not accustomed to the work schedule of an active duty unit, primarily because they are limited by law as to how much they can work (traditional Reservists). This is often difficult for the active duty pilots to understand as they typically work more than 8 hours a day. Moreover, there are just differences with how the active duty and Reserves go about executing the mission. There are no “part-timers” in the active duty. When the Reservists who are not full-time show up, they are there to primarily get their required sorties for the month and then go back to their civilian jobs. They do not have time for additional duties. This is often difficult for active duty pilots to understand as they are juggling flying requirements with additional duties (usually multiple additional duties). Another potential barrier to an association is personality differences between the leadership. If the active duty and Reserve leaders have not fully bought into the TFI concept, it is doomed to fail from the start because that attitude inevitably trickles down to every pilot in each respective unit. You wind up with the active duty and Reserves doing their own thing on a daily basis and there is zero integration. A third barrier to integration lies within the bureaucracy of the active duty and the Reserves... The Reserves have their own flying hour program, their own funding stream, and their own rules on filling deployment requirements (even though they are aligned to a specific active duty unit). If the active duty is unable to fill a deployment billet, but the Reserves have a member available who can fill that billet, it is not as simple as putting the Reserve member into that billet. The active duty must reclama the billet, with the appropriate justification up to the MAJCOM. Then the requirement has to go over to AFRC and they have to certify the requirement before they can task a specific unit. Furthermore, the active duty MAJCOM may look to fill the billet with another active duty member from a different base even though that was never the intent and there was a volunteer from the associated Reserve unit from the very beginning.

• One barrier was the AFRC hiring process. We were “forced” to bring a pilot on board because he was a preferential/mandatory hire because he was losing his position in another ARC unit. The position we were attempting to fill was an O-4 Squadron shop chief, however the ARC pilot hired was a very senior O-5 and ARC leadership did not feel he should be in the squadron. Therefore, we were forced to find him a position outside the Squadron that was “commensurate” with his rank/experience.

• Barriers are numerous in TFI. Mostly it is in reference to the fact that they have to please two masters. The full timers are expected to run a full time group here (when in fact they have numbers of a squadron) while being expected to fill the .25 manning gap that I am taxed for having a TFI unit. In addition, whenever the part timers are in town, they generally are needy. I have one part-timer that is great about scheduling, but most of the time they come into town hat in hand, need everything, and give nothing i.e. Top 3 tours etc. In addition, specific to our manning, it is manned with inexperienced vs experience and while TFI is
supposed to give me experience, of the four TFI spots I deployed with 2 were wingman and although one was qualified as a Flight Lead due to lack of experience I was unable to use him in that capacity during combat operations.

- There is not much room for growth; we do not own positions within the AD wing. The positions we fill are usually due to short notice needs and are unpredictable. When I have someone I would like to develop, I do not have the capability to do so on the ARC timeline I need.

- Because the ARC benefits by receiving a great deal of its talent from transitioned previous AD members, the ARC understand AD problems better than the other way around. This lack of understanding manifests itself when the ARC individual deals with civilian personnel management and Force Support Squadron functions. By this I am not saying there aren’t problems on both sides. Lack of understanding occurs on both sides, AD gets a bad rap, but the ARC ‘messes’ it up too. … Culture is a major problem between the AD and ARC, this is evident by the idea that during the transition process (in a continuum of service type fashion), from the AD to the ARC its common to see pilots experience ‘one day I was a golden boy who had unlimited potential and could do no wrong… to the next day I was a pariah.’

- ARC members not available for less ‘sexy’ duties; ARC members having limited duty day capabilities; embedded ARC members maintaining separate uniform patches and distinctions which exacerbate cultural divides; having to completely trash or rearrange a flying schedule and upgrade plans based on part time ARC members showing up and having to get all of their requirements complete in a very specific and short amount of time.

- Large scale exercises are a significant challenge in my unit. This is because in a TFI unit I never truly exercise the whole team. We only ever look at the AD + fulltime ANG + some part-time ANG. Therefore, in any exercise during which I want to exercise the entire capability of my unit, I must commit a certain amount of human capital towards simulating the part-time ARC that is missing.

- The process I have to go through when my unit receives a tasking is significantly painful and convoluted. When a tasking drops, I am required to reclama positions that I cannot fill. The reclama processes all the way up through ARC HAF level leadership eventually resulting in a tasking to my ARC component… for the purpose of filling a separate unit tasking which is aligned with the AD tasking I originally received.

- There are undoubtedly cultural aspects to the ARC that contrast with AD. Many of these contrasts can be characterized by an overarching concern that if ARC members assimilate too closely with the AD, they risk losing the control their carrier and lives… and the whole reason they transitioned to the ARC in the first place.
Question 4: Job type:

a) What types of jobs do associate pilots in your unit fill?

b) Is that ideal or how might you change job assignments based on their AD or ARC status?

- OGV, OSS ADO, OSK, and APO positions. Normally they also task share Top 3 and SOF duties as well; it is not ideal but it is workable and with the recent addition of 5 x civilian hires to the fighter squadrons, it is more so.

- Jobs like Stan/Eval liaison officer, training officer, scheduling officer, etc. It really depends on their rank and experience level. We are somewhat limited to the jobs we can put the Reserve pilots in based on the amount of hours they can work in a given week compared to the amount of hours the job demands. If the Reserves are on AGR orders for an extended period of time (several months minimum), that changes the equation and we can look to put them into jobs such as a flight commander. If not, I can’t have a flight commander who is limited to working 40 hours a week in an active duty squadron.

- I don’t think Sq/Grp/Wg jobs should be exclusively AD or ARC – depends on rank, experience, and duty status (TR, ART, AGR).

- The TFI program has not provided me the confidence I need in order to trust it to fill the 25 manning gap it costs. The example would be that I lost senior captain positions and the inexperience level of ARC pilots here means they cannot replace those shop chief positions for the following reasons: a) the ARC pilots are too young  b) not available enough  c) the ARC pilots are trapped trying to serve two masters for a quarter of the month, and d) because the ARC personnel are the only person in town representing their component they end up trying to coordinate a whole ARC Operations Group’s training alone in preparation for a drill weekend. I specifically manage the job TFI personnel fill based upon severely limited availability, as such we end up constantly managing their status and it ends up being an extra drain on an already less than ideally manned squadron.

- In our training unit, it is great to be able to provide broadening to members. We do not own equipment or student pilot production so our jobs internal to the squadron are administrative in nature. Working TFI positions within the AD is the only opportunity to grow operational leadership and management experience.

- The ARC members do not provide the availability to put into key squadron positions, therefore they are marginalized and end up contributing very little other than flying sorties. Sorties are important but contrary to uneducated understandings of a fighter squadron… there is a mountain of work and positions that need to be accomplished and filled in addition to flying. I placed highly experienced ARC members as assistants to assistants in the squadron.
Question 5: How might specific types of units or missions be better suited to any associate or specific type of association?

- Ops units are difficult to work the TFI around based on the need for bodies to support both AEF rotations and the CPS tasking’s that occur before the rotation. An FTU unit (as witnessed) tends to lend itself better to the AF view/structure of TFI.

- Associations would work best between units that do not deploy and work similar schedules (in terms of daily hours).

- I believe the Fighter Training Unit’s are an ideal classic and active associate location; I do not support classic associate with combat-coded units unless AFRC/ANG personnel can serve in the same capacity and duration as their active duty counterparts.

- The ONLY way TFI construct should be executed is in training units. Trying to “augment” an AD full time CAF unit is ludicrous and a drain on personnel of that unit. If that continues, then the AD unit should be augmented with a different ratio because the “experience” provided is not the same like it is in training units.

- The IFF training mission is ideal for a Classic associate unit. My ARC members provide a vast amount of experience for a fraction of the cost of an AD member. Their sortie production rate per dollar spent is a tremendous value for the total force.

- Active association works, it works very well in fact. To this point I would not by choice go backwards thus disassociating our ARC units from the Active members we have associated with them.

- I sent pilots from my AD unit to be associate members of ARC units in an Active Associate role and got outstanding feedback and results.

- Without question I believe, at least in flying fighter type units, Active Association is the way to go. One of the consequences of this type of association is what we saw back in the ‘90’s with the TFAP program. When we send AD members, for an extended period of time, to an ARC unit they inevitably end up separating from the AD as soon as possible in order to join the ARC. Which then poses a question that I don’t think is easily answered: What is the advantage of staying in the AD vice transitioning to the ARC? I actually support the TFI concept but have seen a retention problem with some of my best officers who are continually being siphoned off to the ARC.

- I feel that Active associations work better than Classic because of a manpower capability differential. The delta is transparent when deployed regardless of the type of association. However, in garrison and when preparing to deploy, it’s a whole different ballgame. The difference in capability is reflected by the
restrictions that apply to ARC versus AD members. An AD member working in an ARC unit (active association) has no real duty limitations. If for example they are told to stay and work until the job is done (work to task vice work to time) they are able…and obligated to do so. On the other hand in a classic association, when an ARC member is working inside an AD unit, the number of restrictions and types of duty statuses (36 different types of pay and duty statuses to be exact) limit how long they can work…and exactly what tasks they are allowed to be assigned (really equating to some sort of work to time versus task concept).

**Question 6: to what extent does the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) provide appropriate feedback to assist you in better leading your association unit?**

- I do not think that it does. The requirements are the requirements and unless a constant dialogue occurs b/w the IG and the unit, the inspection team will be unaware of the TFI limfacs. Even if they are aware, the unit is still expected to maintain a certain level of readiness and while the AFIS in conjunction with a solid CCIP may let the CC and IG know that there are things not being accomplished, that may not be enough to ‘get them off the hook” from an inspection perspective.

- AFIS really does not provide me any feedback when it comes to the association unit in my opinion. AFIS is focused on what I do on the active duty side of the house and there are no metrics to measure how successful, or unsuccessful, we are integrating with the Reserves other than measuring the number of sorties the Reserves pilots get each month flying active duty jets. I do not think we need any metrics in this area because it’s shouldn’t matter. An example would be an AD unit that took an offset of 6 pilot positions when TFI was stood up. Those positions are supposed to be filled by full-time Reserve pilots. 4 out of the 6 at said unit are currently empty because the Reserves are experiencing the same fighter pilot manning shortfall as the active duty. If all of the positions were filled, then it should be a seamless operation. Those pilots should wear the same patches as the active duty pilots for their respective squadron and they should be fully integrated into daily operations. Ideally, an outsider should not be able to tell the difference between an active duty pilot and a Reserve pilot in that squadron. That is how it should work, but it is not reality.

- I have never had any feedback or assistance regarding TFI from AFIS. This may be in part because the TFI unit conducts and receives their own separate inspections. This is confounding in that the AD maintains many of the ARC programs for them and therefore when inspected is culpable for ARC data but the perception is that it is not the case when ARC inspections occur.

- Almost none! We gather our measures of performance and effectiveness via other means, ARCNET primarily since we do not own a mission or production. Every
day a member is on status they log their events performed and I get a terrific metric and can thus derive a dollar value per sortie.

- ARC and AD inspections are still spate due to funding issues. The AD has ARC members on their teams as they inspect AD units, however this is not true in the reverse situation. AD members are not a part of ARC inspection teams because the AD does not have the manning to provide those personnel.

- AFIS treats the AD and ARC separately so I got nothing useful in the way of TFI from them… other than the records and data that my unit maintained for the ARC being my responsibility (I feel this a valid comment as I participated in two of the new inspections as well as built the CCIP program at its inception as well)

- Because the AFIS is a commanders program I believe I have used it so as to provide information I need while protecting aspects which I feel should have anonymity. I set up the program such that a problem identified by my CCIP will expose the applicable issues, however, whether it was an ARC member or an AD member is not presented. This is good because it protects my organization from sophomoric blame association. However, a related issue is that in the event that a cultural issue is identified on the ARC side, whether or not this was a result of AFIS or my CCIP, I am limited in what I can accomplish to fix the problem. I am only able to truly effect change in this type of situation by working through the parallel ARC chain of command.
Vita

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan E Haden, (USAF) received his commission from the United States Air Force Academy in 1997. He attended Undergraduate Pilot Training at Columbus AFB, MS. He has had five A-10 assignments with the 74th, 25th, and the 75th Fighter Squadrons, as well as the 66th Weapons Squadron. He was selected to attend and then instruct at the United States Air Force Weapons School, and has deployed six times in support of Operations SOUTHERN WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Lieutenant Colonel Haden most recently commanded the 74th Fighter Squadron after which he served as the Deputy Group Commander 23d Fighter Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA. He attended Intermediate Developmental Education at Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS where he also earned a Master of Business Administration degree. He is a Command Pilot flying as an A-10 evaluator, instructor, weapon’s officer and operational test pilot.